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Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 16 : Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
Author: Various
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 16 : Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946" ***
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 16 ***
[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
_NUREMBERG_
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
_PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_
_1948_
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME XVI
_OFFICIAL TEXT_
_IN THE_
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
_PROCEEDINGS_
11 June 1946-24 June 1946
CONTENTS
One Hundred and Fifty-second Day, Tuesday, 11 June 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 32
One Hundred and Fifty-third Day, Wednesday, 12 June 1946,
Morning Session 61
Afternoon Session 106
One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Day, Thursday, 13 June 1946,
Morning Session 141
Afternoon Session 160
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Day, Friday, 14 June 1946,
Morning Session 204
Afternoon Session 239
One Hundred and Fifty-sixth Day, Monday, 17 June 1946,
Morning Session 263
Afternoon Session 288
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh Day, Tuesday, 18 June 1946,
Morning Session 312
Afternoon Session 338
One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Day, Wednesday, 19 June 1946,
Morning Session 378
Afternoon Session 417
One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Day, Thursday, 20 June 1946,
Morning Session 447
Afternoon Session 477
One Hundred and Sixtieth Day, Friday, 21 June 1946,
Morning Session 513
Afternoon Session 551
One Hundred and Sixty-first Day, Saturday, 22 June 1946,
Morning Session 592
One Hundred and Sixty-second Day, Monday, 24 June 1946,
Morning Session 621
Afternoon Session 646
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND DAY
Tuesday, 11 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand._]
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr.
President, I should like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday
with respect to the notes of the conference between this defendant and
Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts.
Apparently, Colonel Williams of our staff, who interrogated this
defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the defendant; and
somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced.
So the defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but
I think in error in saying that he turned them over to me.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Yesterday
we had reached one of the most important points in the Indictment, the
question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what
did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the
Netherlands? Did you write any letters?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Yesterday I stated that I had people
sent from the Netherlands to the Auschwitz Camp in order to ascertain
whether there were accommodations and, if so, what kind. I have given
you the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police, that is,
Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to
keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made.
For about three-quarters of a year or a year correspondence was
maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I
do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were
identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters
dropped off later—it never stopped completely—the Security Police told
me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the
Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in
Auschwitz.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, did you turn to Bormann, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich’s
order, I requested Bormann to inquire of the Führer whether Heydrich
actually had such unlimited power. Bormann confirmed this. I admit
frankly that I had misgivings about the evacuation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you do anything to alleviate these misgivings?
SEYSS-INQUART: My misgivings—which increased in the course of the
war—were that the hardships of the war would be a heavy burden, above
all for the Jews. If there were too little food in the Reich, the Jewish
camps in particular would receive little, while probably the Jews would
be treated severely and for comparatively slight reasons heavy
punishment would be imposed upon them. Of course, I also thought of the
unavoidable tearing apart of families, to a certain extent, at least, in
the case of labor commitment. That also was the reason why we brought
forward difficulties for 3 or 4 months.
The decisive argument, however, was the declaration of the competent
authority, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the
Jews were not to be in the immediate theater of operations.
I ask the Court to consider that the most important and most decisive
motive for me was always the fact that the German people were engaged in
a life-and-death struggle. Today looking at it from another perspective
the picture looks different. At that time, if we told ourselves that the
Jews would be kept together in some camp, even if under severe
conditions, and that after the end of the war they would find a
settlement somewhere, the misgivings caused by this had to be cast aside
in view of the consideration that their presence in the battle area
might weaken the German power of resistance.
In the course of 1943 I spoke with Hitler and called his attention to
this problem in the Netherlands. In his own convincing way he reassured
me and at the same time admitted that he was thinking of a permanent
evacuation of the Jews, if possible, from all of Europe with which
Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to have the
Jews settled on the eastern border of the German sphere of interest
insofar as they were not able to emigrate to other parts of the earth.
At the beginning of 1944 I spoke with Himmler, whom I happened to meet
in southern Bavaria. I asked him in a determined manner about the Jews
in the Netherlands. The fact that our Eastern Front was being withdrawn
meant that the camps would be in the battle area in the course of time,
or at least in the rear area. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews
would become even more serious then. Himmler said something to the
following effect: “Do not worry; they are my best workers.” I could not
imagine that the Jews capable of labor were working while their
relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could
expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and
strangle him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you did learn of these evacuations? In your
capacity as Reich Commissioner did you help carry out these evacuations
through your administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the evacuation was a fact, I considered it proper
to concern myself with it to the extent that was possible for me as
Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, power to
carry out the evacuation, to exercise control, and to take steps if
excesses occurred other than unavoidable difficulties, or to report such
to me. Dr. Boehmke was in constant opposition to the so-called Central
Office for Jewish Emigration. We had to intervene again and again, but I
am convinced that we did not put an end to all hardships.
The Jews were collected in the Westerborg Camp. When the first
transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I
vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and
asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly
manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the
transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions
generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains
occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is
true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the
execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of some Dutch
secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an
exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions;
the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of
exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least
according to my reports.
These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerborg Camp. When the
invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this
was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he
said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also release property on this occasion?
SEYSS-INQUART: These Jews who were made exceptions retained control of
their property.
DR. STEINBAUER: In closing this chapter I should like once more to call
the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the
document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish
problem in the Netherlands, and on Page 6 it gives all the agencies
which dealt with the Jewish problem. Under Number 3 you will find the
General Commissioner for Security, the Higher SS and Police Leader H.
Rauter, General of Police. Under Number 4 is the Central Office for
Jewish Emigration, Leader Aus der Funte—under the “General
Commissioner,” as under 3. The report says about this:
“Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality,
an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate
them, or to deport them.”
This was the most important office, which was directly under Himmler’s
Higher Police Leader, and not under the defendant.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as
Higher SS and Police Leader in this case, and not as “General
Commissioner for Security,” for the measures were carried out by the
German Police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech also spoke about his views on
the Jewish problem at one time. The Prosecution has submitted a part of
this speech.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Steinbauer, you
are putting this Document 1726-PS to the witness, which contains a
historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the
historical statement is accurate?
Do you, Defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
SEYSS-INQUART: May I see the document?
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and
it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the
document or whether he challenges it.
SEYSS-INQUART: The presentation of facts is accurate, except for the
addition of the correction which I made with reference to the “General
Commissioner for Security.”
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your
attention ought to be drawn to: February 1941, for instance. You have
the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading
February 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You have to put that to the witness. He said that the
facts are accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you will find under “February 1941” a
statement—I have only the English here—saying that Jews were arrested
and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
SEYSS-INQUART: I discussed this case yesterday. That was a measure at
the direct order of Himmler, which only came to my knowledge after it
had been carried out and against which I protested. To my knowledge,
mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur again after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that
document is accurate except where you referred to under the Numbers 3
and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my testimony yesterday I confirmed the orders
contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual
events.
DR. STEINBAUER: The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is
correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: The actual presentation, too, is basically correct.
Yesterday I spoke also of the burning of synagogues and of the
prevention of the destruction of synagogues in The Hague and Amsterdam.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to refer to Document 79, Page 203,
from Exhibit Number USA-708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made
on the Jewish question. The Prosecution submitted this document. Since
it needs a little explaining I shall begin by reading the last sentence:
“The only thing we can discuss is the creation of a tolerable
transitional state while maintaining our point of view that the
Jews are enemies, and thus applying every precaution customarily
observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will
not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public
life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves
whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the
German people for the sake of the Jews.”
Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking
of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never thought of that at all, and in this speech I was
not even thinking of evacuation. At that time I held the point of view
that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, as is done with
enemy aliens, for the reasons which are given in the preceding part of
this speech, which the American Prosecution has submitted. The idea
still prevailed of treating them as enemy aliens, even though
Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich. I have
already pointed out that that viewpoint later changed to conform to the
measures against Jews, which were customary in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: We now come to...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?
SEYSS-INQUART: This speech is of March 1941. Only once again did I
express my point of view, and that was on 20 April 1943, when I made the
somewhat, I admit, fantastic suggestion that all belligerent powers
should pool 1 percent of their war costs in order to solve the Jewish
problem from the economic standpoint. I was thus of the opinion that the
Jews still existed; incidentally, I never called the Jews inferior.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this topic and go on to another
charge which is made against you—violations of international law, the
subject of spoliation.
Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for this, and the extent to which it was
to be done, originated with the Reich offices. The operations were
carried out either by my offices, by the Wehrmacht, by the armament
inspection offices, or even by the Police and the Waffen-SS; but from
the middle of 1944 on they were carried out in the main by the office of
the Armament Minister, which was also my office, and by the field
economic commands of the High Command of the Army. At that time control
was extremely difficult.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your own attitude toward this problem?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the provisions of the Hague
Convention for Land Warfare applying to this were obsolete and could not
be applied to a modern war because the labor potential of the civilian
population is at least as important as the war potential of the soldiers
at the front. How much could be demanded seemed to me to depend on the
conditions prevailing in one’s own country. These doubtlessly varied in
each country. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reich
Marshal Göring to the effect that the Dutch were to live under the same
conditions as the German people. This promise, to be sure, was not kept
completely in the ensuing period.
DR. STEINBAUER: How was the confiscation carried out? By what
authorities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Until 1943, the Dutch offices carried out our
assignments. The technical experts had to provide me with factual
justification for confiscations, since I was not familiar with such
matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I
prevented the removal of margarine works in Dordrecht and of a brand new
electrical works in Leeuwarden.
Reich Minister Speer issued an important order that only the machines
from factories which delivered more than one-half of their total
production to the Reich, for example, Phillips in Eindhoven, could be
transferred to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: The French Prosecution charges that you favored the
black market. What do you have to say about this?
SEYSS-INQUART: We combated the black market from the beginning. It was
therefore always a so-called “grey market” with us. I had prohibited the
purchase of food from the current production and likewise of other
important consumer articles on the black market. Every case was
investigated by the competent offices in conjunction with the Dutch
offices. If it was a business which had been forbidden by me, the goods
were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch offices. These measures
were 100 percent for the benefit of the Dutch, for what the German Reich
wanted officially it got anyhow. I see from the document that the
turnover in the Netherlands was the lowest anywhere. The figures are
deceptive, though, since prices on the black market were several times
higher than those on the normal market, so that the actual amount of
goods was much lower.
DR. STEINBAUER: In Document 1321-PS the charge is made that you turned
medical instruments over to the SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Please judge that in connection with my
general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals at the
front, for all its hospitals which had been destroyed by bombings. In
the laboratories of the University of Utrecht there were microscopes
which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my office and
what seemed dispensable confiscated. In this connection I refer to a
case which was much more important for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to
tear down the Kammerlingh Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most
famous low-temperature research institutes in the world. I believe only
the Soviets and the Americans have one as well, especially suitable for
atomic research. I prevented the tearing down of this institute which
would have meant an irreparable loss for the Netherlands. Experiments
which seemed necessary were carried out by Professor Heisenberg himself
in Leyden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Document 1988-PS, RF-130, charges that you had the
rolling mill in Ymuiden removed.
SEYSS-INQUART: This rolling mill in Ymuiden was built up after May 1941
by a German firm, which in exchange was given a partnership in the blast
furnace joint stock company. The electrical installations of these works
were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the
intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion the
Reich Marshal was right in ordering that they be moved to the Reich.
This was done. Why no indemnity was paid I do not understand, for I had
issued an order that all such demands had to receive full
indemnification, but perhaps the German concern relinquished its
partnership.
DR. STEINBAUER: The charge is further made that you turned over the
essential transportation means of the Netherlands to the Reich.
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not in substance dispose of the means of
transportation; that was the concern of the transport command of the
Armed Forces. Once I merely took part in demanding 50,000
bicycles—there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands—for the
mobilization of troops in the Netherlands themselves.
DR. STEINBAUER: Another charge is that you had art objects removed from
public museums and collections.
SEYSS-INQUART: I most painstakingly took care that famous art objects,
especially pictures, in the Dutch public museums of Amsterdam,
Mauritshuis, and so forth were especially protected. But it is possible
that loans to these museums which belonged to Jewish persons were
claimed in connection with the liquidation of Jewish property. There was
just one case. A Kruller Foundation existed in the Netherlands which was
willed to the Netherlands State. Without my permission three pictures
from this foundation were taken to the Reich, for which I later
concluded a contract for sale with the museum authorities. I endeavored
to replace these pieces for the museum. They procured some beautiful Van
Goghs and a Corré from the German treasure list, and the head of the
museum once told me that the new pictures fitted better into the museum
than the old ones. The famous paintings were in a bombproof shelter on
the Dutch coast. When the coast was declared a fortified area, I induced
the Dutch authorities to have a new shelter built near Maastricht. The
pictures were taken there, always under Dutch care. No German had
anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944 Dr. Goebbels demanded that
the pictures be taken to the Reich. I definitely refused this and had
reliable guards placed at the shelter, and also sent an official from
the Dutch Ministry who was authorized to hand over the pictures to the
approaching enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in
England would see to it that these pictures remained in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself acquire any pictures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not buy any pictures for myself in the Netherlands,
except for two or three small etchings by a contemporary artist. As
Reich Commissioner I bought pictures by contemporary artists at
exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and
were offered for sale. I also bought old pictures and gave them to
public institutions in the Reich, especially to the Museum of Art
History in Vienna and the Reich Governor’s office in Vienna. They were
all purchases on the open market, as far as I am informed. Among them
was a picture attributed to Vermeer, although it was contested. On the
other hand I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by
preventing its sale to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this
defendant of having bought pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the trial brief. May I continue? Let
us conclude this question.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he
told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about
the pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. I submit to you
Document RF-136. It describes the confiscation of the property of Her
Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: To tell the full truth, I must add something to the
previous question. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from
enemy fortunes, when there was a reason for it, were liquidated and sold
in the Reich. In this connection a very lively free trade developed with
the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless favored by the
free transfer of foreign currency.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to go on to the question of the royal
property, RF-136. What do you know about the order for the liquidation
of this property?
SEYSS-INQUART: I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands we,
of course, had an order to confiscate enemy property, as in all occupied
territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was
merely placed under trusteeship, without any steps being taken to seize
it. Right after the outbreak of the campaign in the East, the Queen of
the Netherlands spoke personally on the radio in a very antagonistic
manner, severely accusing the Führer and making an express appeal for
active resistance. In view of this state of affairs the property of any
Dutch citizen might have been confiscated. I therefore decided to
proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent an excessive
extension of this measure as had been demanded of me, while having the
conviction that I could not make any exceptions. I myself, as I said,
signed the order for confiscation, in order not to implicate anybody
else.
DR. STEINBAUER: What instructions did you give in the course of the
liquidation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I immediately issued liquidation orders which in practice
prevented the liquidation being carried out. I ordered estates or
castles to be turned over to the Netherlands State—with the exception
of one apartment house, I believe—and likewise bonds and securities and
archives, and that all historic or artistic or otherwise valuable
furniture be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands
State could take it over. The commission included almost everything at
all possible in its list. I realized that and did not strike out one
piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Soestdyk and
Huis ten Bosch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted the Huis ten
Bosch installation as a memorial to the people of Brandenburg. Finally,
even the personal things...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so
detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things
were turned over to the Netherlands State.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I should like very briefly to ask in this
connection: Do you know to what extent the property was actually
liquidated?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that 3,
or at the most, 5 percent of the property was actually liquidated.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is enough.
SEYSS-INQUART: The proceeds were turned over to a fund for the repairing
of war damages.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall proceed to the question of the confiscation
of factories and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I may refer to my previous statements. From the late
summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the economic field
commands. There are individual documents available with notations
referring to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came
from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together
with the Armed Forces commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader I
ordered that the strictest measures be taken against these methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two
documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save
time. These are Documents Number 80 and 81, Pages 205 and 208. It can be
seen from these that this was a task of the Armed Forces; that these
confiscations were all carried out by the occupation forces.
In Document RF-137, Witness, the charge is made that the removal of
furniture and clothing from Arnhem was sanctioned by you.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The
front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance
lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It
was being shelled and installations and goods in Arnhem were gradually
being ruined in the course of the winter. The Führer ordered at that
time through Bormann that textiles, particularly, be brought from the
Netherlands for German families who had suffered bomb damage. Without
any doubt the furniture and the textiles in Arnhem would probably either
have been looted or would have been ruined by the weather or would have
been burned in a battle at Arnhem. Although it was not in my territory
but at the front and the executive power thus lay with the Armed Forces,
I gave my approval that under the circumstances furniture and textiles
be brought to the Ruhr area. I ordered at the same time that the items
be listed for indemnification claims. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can
confirm this as a witness.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is also raised against me that I blew up
safes. I opposed this most strongly. When such a case was reported to
me, I had my prosecuting authority issue the indictment and the order
for arrest.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall go on to the next question. How about the
blowing up and destruction of ports, docks, locks, and mines in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the
Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock
installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of
Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe
that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the
offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the
Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary
measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I
refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened
with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of
the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports.
I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this
intervention.
When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the
mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about
this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them
out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this
effect. I hope that they were not violated.
DR. STEINBAUER: We have heard in this Trial of “scorched earth” policy.
Did that apply to the Netherlands also?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a “scorched earth” order from Bormann. Without
there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations
were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland,
that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or
16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3
or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I
established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting
with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had
been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had
full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should
not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have
anything to do with them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know about this, and in a certain connection I did have
something to do with it.
There were previously prepared floodings by the Armed Forces for defense
purposes and there were so-called “battle” floodings, which suddenly
became necessary in the course of battle. The prepared ones were carried
out in closest contact with my office and the Dutch offices. Through
their intervention, about half of the area demanded was spared and
saved. The flooding was done mostly with fresh water so that less damage
would occur, and the outer dikes were spared. There were two battle
floodings in Holland, at the order of the commander of Holland. The
Wieringer Polder was mentioned in particular. At that time there was
great danger of a troop landing from the air which would outflank the
Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the execution of the
battle floodings. The commander had decided on it overnight.
When, on 30 April, I talked to Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, General
Eisenhower’s Chief of the General Staff, he told us: “What has been
flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you
flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable.”
After 30 April there were no more floodings.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
86, Page 221, without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of
a purely military character.
Another charge which was made against you, Witness, is the question of
the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you
take to maintain the food supply of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: The food question in the Netherlands was doubtless the
most difficult question of the whole administration; and I believe,
because of the special aspects of the case, it was one of the most
difficult in all the occupied territories.
In the Netherlands there is a density of population of 270 people per
square kilometer, in Holland specifically there are more than 600 per
square kilometer to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated as a
processing economy dependent upon the importation of hundreds of
thousands of tons of food. With the occupation and the blockade all that
had disappeared. The whole food economy had to be put on a new basis, as
well as the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was
certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture and its leadership
that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very
effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich.
Food distribution in the Netherlands was also very carefully regulated,
more so almost than in any other occupied territory. The most important
thing for me was to maintain this food system, although its leader,
Generaldirektor Louwes, and his entire staff of helpers were definitely
hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office, I
nevertheless retained him, because otherwise I would not have been able
to bear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also deliver food to the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the troops, above all, claimed the right to live off
the land, I believe, but grain was supplied from the Reich to an extent
of 36,000 tons, vegetables being demanded in exchange. The Reich
demanded in addition more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle,
canned meat, seeds, and some other products. Vegetables and meat would
not have made so much difference, but the seeds caused trouble. I am
convinced that the Dutch food system did its utmost to prevent
deliveries.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that that is enough on this theme, and I
should like to ask how the general food situation was in the fall of
1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: During most of the occupation period we had a caloric
value at first of 3,000, and then of about 2,500 calories, and in 1944
about 1,800 calories. Experience today will show what that meant.
In September of 1944 the Netherlands became a theater of war again. At
about the time that the first British airborne divisions landed at
Arnhem, a general strike of the Dutch railroads began on order of the
Dutch Government in England; and it was carried out almost completely.
At the same time ships vanished from the internal waterways. It was not
a formal strike, but it amounted to the same thing.
Through this situation the defense possibilities for the German Armed
Forces were most severely endangered. The German Armed Forces then began
to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I got in
touch with the Armed Forces and was told that if the railroad strike
stopped they would not have to proceed so rigorously. I reported this to
Secretary General Hirschfeld and Generaldirektor Louwes. No result was
achieved, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I
discussed it with the Armed Forces, and I suggested that I would give
them 3 or 4 weeks’ time in which they could secure their necessary
shipping space. Out of about 2 million tons available, they needed
450,000 tons. During this time I forbade all ship traffic, because the
Armed Forces was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of
small ships in Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the
defendant?
DR. STEINBAUER: The Report of the Netherlands Government, which the
Prosecution also mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant,
as Reich Commissioner, is responsible for the famine which began in
September of 1944 and lasted until the spring of 1945 and for the great
mortality, especially of children—whole tables of statistics have been
submitted—because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike,
he prohibited the importing of food. That is one of the most important
and serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this
subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may
speak about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to be allowed to comment on this matter.
This is the charge which seems the most serious to me, too.
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now, if Your Honor
agrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Government Report it is asserted that at the time
50,000 Dutch people died of starvation; and, therefore, I should like to
ask you what reason you had for establishing this traffic embargo at
that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have already explained that in the main. The
traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to make sure of its
shipping space. As long as it did that there was no ship traffic as such
possible. I wanted to limit this to as short a period of time as
possible so that afterwards ship traffic could again be assured and
Holland regularly supplied with food. Ship traffic was not interrupted
primarily by my embargo, but rather—the witnesses will confirm this—by
the fact that all ships that could be found were confiscated. Naturally,
I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered; and I
said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for
this state of emergency, and that the military interests of the Reich
were, anyhow, equally important. I thought that if in the second half of
October I could establish an orderly ship traffic, then, according to my
experience, I would have 2 months’ time in which to take care of the
food supply for the Dutch people. Then I could bring in between 200,000
and 250,000 tons of food. And that would be sufficient to maintain
rations of 1400 to 1800 calories. I believe I can recollect that between
15 and 20 October I gave the order to establish ship traffic again.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ship traffic was not established because the Dutch
traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because
they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general
railroad strike. For weeks on end our efforts were fruitless; and
finally I talked with Secretary General Hirschfeld and gave him complete
authority, particularly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this
matter can be gone into extreme detail like this.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and
tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am practically finished. I gave Secretary General
Hirschfeld full authority in the field of transportation. He then,
although very hesitantly, re-established traffic. He will confirm that I
supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into
Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Within my sector, I then
provided additional aid, about which witness Van der Vense and, I
believe, witness Schwebel can give you information in their
interrogatories.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to submit as the next document an
affidavit deposed by the witness Van der Vense. It has just arrived, but
the translations are already finished and will probably be given to the
Tribunal this afternoon or tomorrow morning. I shall now submit the
original. I do not believe it necessary to read this document which has
been translated into four languages. It describes exclusively the food
situation in this critical period of time.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch
Government...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number 105.
SEYSS-INQUART: ...that the Dutch Government changed the figure of 50,000
deaths to the correct one of 25,000.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as
Reich Commissioner. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that
military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?
SEYSS-INQUART: That we had to reckon with the possibility that Germany
might not win the war will be seen in my letter to the Führer in 1939.
Actual fear that this might happen arose at the time of Stalingrad.
Therefore one had to consider that possibility, and in due time I feared
that things would take this turn; I definitely and reliably knew it
through a statement which Reich Minister Speer made to me on 1 April
1945...
DR. STEINBAUER: 1945?
SEYSS-INQUART: April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe
it; but faced with the prospect of an unconditional surrender and
complete occupation, I naturally believed that in every respect I should
have to prepare for the worst because the consequences were
unpredictable. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany,
would end in a relatively short period of time because armament
production simply could not be kept up. He said 2 to 3 months.
DR. STEINBAUER: When you realized this fact, what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: I decided to end the defensive occupation of Holland
without violating my duties to the Reich and to the Führer. I went to
The Hague and discussed the methods with Secretary General Hirschfeld.
We agreed to get in touch at once with the confidential agents of the
Government in The Hague—which was illegal for me—and to ask them to
start negotiations on the basis that the Allied troops should not
advance against Holland, in which case no further destruction would
occur and the Allies could take over the feeding of the Dutch population
through direct contact with the Dutch authorities for food supply. Then
we would wait for the end of the war.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this not an arbitrary act on your part as far as the
German Government was concerned?
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the date of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: This conversation with Secretary General Hirschfeld took
place on 2 April 1945. Then the negotiations dragged on, and on 30 April
I had the conversation with Lieutenant General Bedell Smith. I purposely
did not ask for authorization from Berlin in order to avoid a refusal or
be prohibited from carrying out my intention. I did this on my own.
General Blaskowitz, the commander of the Netherlands, was very
apprehensive. He called me during the night, because his superiors had
asked him just what was going on. Nevertheless, I was determined to
carry through this matter, for it seemed the only reasonable step I
could take in this situation. I stated that I would assume all
responsibility. On 30 April the conference took place and the result
that I had desired in effect materialized—the giving up of the military
defense of Holland.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what did you personally do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Admiral Dönitz, as head of State, called me to Flensburg.
I went by speedboat across the North Sea and reported to him, and the
Admiral will confirm this as my witness; I succeeded in having the
demolition decree rescinded and tried my very best to return to the
Netherlands. Finally I plunged ahead and was arrested in Hamburg.
DR. STEINBAUER: Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in
the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should answer for
my administration there; and finally, I was of the opinion that since we
had been out in front in the hour of triumph we could lay claim to being
out in front in the hour of disaster as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination of the
witness.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Did you belong to the SS?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I
was not a regular member of the General SS, but I was very much
interested in the SS as an ideological and a political formation.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you exercise any functions in the SS, or did you just
have a title?
SEYSS-INQUART: _De jure_ I had only a title. Politically I tried to
exert a certain influence on the SS in the Netherlands, insofar as it
was not the Waffen-SS, the Security Police, and so on; and in April of
1945 I believe I can say that _de facto_ I was the foremost SS Führer in
the Netherlands.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you have the impression that the SS was a closed,
unified organization, or were there great divergences within the
organization itself?
SEYSS-INQUART: To outward appearances it was an extremely closed system.
Internally there were two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a
political training unit. Obergruppenführer Heissmeyer belonged to this
school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of
the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated,
but later he went over completely to Heydrich’s camp. The SS ideal
disappeared, because Himmler misused it for executive powers.
DR. HAENSEL: Can you limit that as to time? When approximately, in what
year, did this ideal die out?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the first signs were evident in 1938. The
process continued with giant strides at the time of the Eastern
campaign.
DR. HAENSEL: Did not the General SS come a little to the fore ever since
1939, whereas only the executive office groups or the Waffen-SS were
active?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event from this time on Himmler transferred people
from the General SS and put them into his various executive
organizations. The General SS, for me anyway, did not come to the fore
after that time.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you think that the SS man could know about the struggle
for power in the leadership, that he had insight into this at all; or
was he unconscious of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that the ordinary SS man knew this, but
there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable and who remained with
their organization only because they felt it was their duty.
DR. HAENSEL: You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich’s
caused you to have Jews transported from Holland. Did you see Hitler’s
decree to Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think so—a decree from Hitler to Heydrich alone would
not have been for Heydrich.
DR. HAENSEL: You picture the situation as if Heydrich had told you that
he had this decree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, he told me that, and a few weeks later he sent me
this decree.
DR. HAENSEL: Was it in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it was in writing.
DR. HAENSEL: And what did the decree say?
SEYSS-INQUART: That he had complete charge of the final solution of the
Jewish question as well as other matters dealing therewith.
DR. HAENSEL: And when was this? 1941? 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was at about the time when the evacuations started.
That was in 1942.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be wrong. It was 1941; not later.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the
date of the decree.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be the case. But this decree, you said, was
conceived in general terms?
SEYSS-INQUART: General terms.
DR. HAENSEL: It could be interpreted one way or another? I mean, you
know...
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I had the impression that in the occupied
territories Heydrich was to carry through the evacuation, and at that
time I was not quite sure whether that was to be a final
evacuation—which, however, was possible. The most extreme possibility
was that the Jews would be collected in camps and after the end of the
war settled somewhere.
DR. HAENSEL: I beg your pardon, Witness, the most extreme possibility
would certainly be that the Jews would be destroyed, is that not so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am speaking of the most extreme possibility which I
thought of at the time.
DR. HAENSEL: And which you could imagine according to the words of the
decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Now, the question is: Is there a possibility that Heydrich
went beyond Hitler’s decree, that Himmler himself did not want these
acts which Heydrich committed?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot testify to that.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the witness can tell what the possibility
was as to what Heydrich would do any better than we can. He cannot give
evidence about that sort of thing.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Before 1943 did you discuss these problems
with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was merely present when Hitler talked about these
problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the
German population and to send them somewhere abroad.
DR. HAENSEL: But there was no talk at all about destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Never.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did
Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands, and did he have churches and
motion picture houses surrounded?
SEYSS-INQUART: He could not have done that. I would not have allowed
that; and he did not ask to have that done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the operations of
the Army in 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, he did not know anything about that. When he heard
about it, one of his men arrived so that he could in any case recruit
skilled workers on this occasion; but this actually did not take place,
for the Armed Forces sent these men into the Reich right away.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the regular worker transports to Germany, in
connection with the recruitment of workers by Sauckel, take place under
normal transport conditions or under very bad conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether the recruitment was voluntary or compulsory,
transport conditions were always normal. The same as for everybody else
in the Netherlands. They were not accompanied by Police, but by
officials of the Labor Employment Office, with the exception of the
2,600 whom the Police had arrested and who were sent to a camp of
Sauckel’s in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the transporting of
internees or Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the working conditions were for the
workers who came from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I knew about them in the main. They were the same
conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose.
First of all, the employers in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people
had in part given false information at the time of their recruitment and
did not meet with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts were for
a certain duration and the employers wanted to have the Dutch people
remain in the Reich for a longer period.
I saw to it that nothing was written into these labor contracts which
would not actually be observed in the Reich, no matter what one might
find out in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Witness, I wanted to put one question to you
regarding the floodings. What did you, your offices, or the Commander,
West undertake in order to prevent the pump stations from being flooded
and so avoid a great flooding of Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not quite understand the question. The pump stations
could not be flooded, only the polder area.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: There were two dangers. One was that of blowing up, and
in that case the pump stations would not have been of any use; anyway it
was not done, as is known, but was prevented. The second danger was lack
of coal and oil. We tried, as long as possible, to supply the pump
stations with coal. This coal was listed as a top priority need. It was
thus placed in the same category as every other Armed Forces
requirement. When we received less and less coal, we allowed certain
very low-lying reclaimed areas to run full, so that others would not be
flooded. There was completely frictionless co-operation with the Dutch
offices; and a deputy of the Dutch Government in England, with whom I
spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the technical
point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your
counsel, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the
harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene?
SEYSS-INQUART: With General Christiansen, who was then
commander-in-chief and Wehrmacht commander, who took my side
immediately.
DR. LATERNSER: Then you found him in agreement at once with regard to
your intervention with this military office?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, you mentioned
yesterday the protected industries (Sperrbetriebe). Can you tell me when
these industries were established in Holland and how they aimed to
affect the labor employment program, that is, the transportation of
workers from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the protected industries were established
during 1943, if I remember correctly in the second half of 1943. The
workers in these industries were protected. Thus, the recruiting and
transporting of Netherlands workers to the Reich was partly slowed down
and partly prevented altogether.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When the protected industries began to function and work
was taken up, were raw materials brought from Germany to Holland, coal
in particular, so that the orders could be fulfilled?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal.
Coal was brought in from Limburg.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you
know to what extent this Organization Todt in Holland used Dutch
construction firms for construction work there on the Atlantic Wall and
to what extent this construction was carried out by Dutch construction
firms?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the bulk of construction work in Holland,
Northern France, and Belgium was done by indigenous construction firms.
This is definitely true of Holland; and Dutch construction firms also
carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These firms brought
their workers along with them. In this manner some 35,000 to 40,000
Dutch workers who were not drafted by compulsion were working in Belgium
and Northern France in the middle of 1942.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us what results this procedure had generally
on the recruitment of native labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: The indigenous workers naturally preferred to go into the
protected industries or the firms of the Organization Todt, for there
they were at least more certain of not being transported to the Reich.
And in addition, while they were with the Organization Todt they
received special food rations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of
enemy bombings on the distribution system, production in Holland was
hampered or even paralyzed, what measures were taken in order to protect
the unemployed workers of the protected industries?
SEYSS-INQUART: Three courses were open to us: First of all, to bring the
workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss these workers and give them
unemployment relief; and, thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay
them their wages even though they did little or no work.
I believe it was because of a decree issued by Reich Minister Speer that
the third course was chosen. The workers in those industries received
their pay, and I took care that the factory owners received a certain
compensation for wages which they paid those workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you mentioned before a discussion which you had
on 1 April 1945 with Codefendant Speer. Can you tell us what the purpose
of this discussion was?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned already that I, for my part, wanted to talk
with Minister Speer about the “scorched earth” decree. But Minister
Speer also had a purpose in mind. He wanted us to transport potatoes
from north Holland into the Ruhr region and in exchange to bring coal
from the Ruhr area into the Netherlands: In view of the potato supply in
north Holland this could readily have been done, but we did not have
enough transportation means at our command to carry out this plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the
securing of food supplies during the period after the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had
stored trainloads of food and that he had appropriated the means of
transportation from the armament program, so that if the Ruhr area were
invaded there would be trains with food for this area available.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? I
am sorry, Dr. Kubuschok, did you have something to say?
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner has asked me, as the defense counsel sitting nearest him,
to state that he had discussed with his attorney a number of questions
which he would like to put to Seyss-Inquart. I just tried to reach Dr.
Kauffmann, Kaltenbrunner’s defense counsel; at present and probably all
this afternoon it will not be possible for us to reach him. The
Defendant Kaltenbrunner asks for permission to have these questions
asked of Seyss-Inquart tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will expect some explanation from Dr.
Kauffmann as to why he is not here to cross-examine. He must have known
that the time was about to arrive for him to cross-examine. But the
Tribunal will assent to the suggestion that those questions may be put
at a later date, tomorrow, if possible.
Now, do Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. DELPHIN DEBENEST (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic):
Defendant, you have studied law, and you have told us that you had even
obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at the University of Vienna in
1917?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You were a lawyer from 1929 to 12 February 1938, at which
date you became Minister for the Interior?
SEYSS-INQUART: From 1921.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Now, was not your clientele mainly composed of
Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not mainly, but there were some among them.
M. DEBENEST: And yet you told us yesterday that you had been an
anti-Semite ever since the first World War.
SEYSS-INQUART: My clients knew that. It was widely known.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. But it did not, at the same time, cause you to despise
Jewish money.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither did it prevent the Jews from coming to me.
M. DEBENEST: Were you a Catholic?
SEYSS-INQUART: What do you mean by that?
M. DEBENEST: I am asking you whether you were a Catholic.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am a member; that is, I belong to the Catholic Church.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not also a member of a Catholic fraternity when
you were a student?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never belonged to any student organization, Catholic or
national.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. You were appointed Reich Commissioner for
Holland by a decree of Hitler’s dated 18 May 1940; is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Your orders, on reaching the Netherlands—as you told us
yesterday—were: To maintain the independence of the Netherlands and to
establish economic relations between that country and Germany. You added
that these orders were never afterwards modified by the Führer; is that
true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand one word, the reference to
economic relations.
M. DEBENEST: I said that you had arrived in the Netherlands with the
following orders: 1) to maintain the independence of the Netherlands and
2) to establish economic relations between that country and Germany. Is
that so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not put it that way exactly; rather, I was to try
and bring about as close an economic relationship between Holland and
Germany as possible. The economic stipulations, too, were, in the long
run and apart from war necessities, not intended to be dictatorial.
M. DEBENEST: But you did say that you had not come with the intention of
giving a definite political outlook to the people of the Netherlands. Is
that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I would not put it that way. It was my intention to
further National Socialist policy wherever possible in Holland; not to
decree it, but to promote it as much as possible.
M. DEBENEST: Was it also your intention not to introduce but to impose
it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for one cannot force a political ideology on anyone.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. I am going to have a Document, Number 997-PS,
handed to you. This document has already been submitted both by the
Prosecution under Number RF-122, and yesterday by the Defense.
Will you kindly turn to Pages 7 and 8 of the German text? It is Page 7
of the French text, at the paragraph “Measures.” This document, as you
will note, is a report which you yourself made.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You write:
“In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first of all
to eliminate Winkelmann’s influence, which was done in the
following manner: The secretaries general were expressly
informed that from now on they would take orders only from the
Reich Commissioner, which they expressly agreed to. The offices
of secretaries general were retained and the same persons kept
in office, since in the event of their resignation it would
probably be impossible to find Dutch people who would be willing
to take over the administration. In the rightist parties there
were hardly any people qualified to do this; but it seemed
necessary, from a political point of view, that a certain number
of measures, above all economic measures, and indirectly, police
measures as well, signed by the Dutch secretaries general, be
made known to the Dutch nation.”
In short, according to this document, it appears that if you decided to
retain the secretaries general, it was because you needed them for
imposing certain measures on the Dutch people? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but what has that to do with politics? This is a
matter of administration.
M. DEBENEST: As far as I know, this refers to political as well as to
economic questions.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in the German text it says “police question.”
Economic and police questions, not political; there is a difference.
M. DEBENEST: In that case, I will re-read the sentence, bearing your
answer in mind.
“But it seemed necessary, from a political point of view...”
Now is that “political” or “police” which we see?
SEYSS-INQUART: Just a moment, please. Yes, that is correct. But that
does not mean politics in the sense of party politics, but political in
respect to the treatment of the Dutch people as such. Whether they
thereby became National Socialists or not was quite immaterial to me.
M. DEBENEST: Was it in the interests of Dutch or of German policy?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I admit without any hesitation at all that I
followed a German policy. That was part of my task.
M. DEBENEST: But the German policy of that day was surely the policy of
the National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The German policy was, at that time, the policy of a
fight for existence on the part of the German people, and this struggle
was led by the National Socialist Party. But the basic concern was not
the carrying out of the 25 points of the Party program, but rather the
carrying through of our fight for existence, and that is what I think
this means.
M. DEBENEST: In your administration, in the Netherlands, you were helped
by four Commissioners General: Wimmer in Administration and Justice,
Fischböck in Finance and Economy, Rauter for Public Security, and
Schmidt for Special Questions.
The Commissioner General for Public Security, Rauter, was directly
subordinate to you, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The four Commissioners General were immediately
subordinate to me; Rauter, insofar as he, as Commissioner General for
Security, headed the Dutch police, and not insofar as he was chief of
the German Police.
M. DEBENEST: You had decided to rule and administer the Netherlands
alone; to accomplish this you dissolved the two Assemblies which then
existed; and by the same decree, you restricted the powers of the State
Council to the juridical field.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember this decree, but it may very well have
been that way.
M. DEBENEST: You also seized control over the finances, and over the
Treasury of the Netherlands. For this purpose you issued a decree on 24
August 1940 authorizing you to appoint the president of the Bank of
Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the date exactly, but I did issue such a
decree.
M. DEBENEST: When you arrived in the Netherlands, Mynheer Trip was
president of the Netherlands Bank and Secretary General for the
Treasury?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: For what reason did you have him replaced?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was replaced because he objected to the lifting
of the existing foreign currency and clearing limitations. I put it to
him that he could resign if he did not want to carry out my measures.
M. DEBENEST: And by whom did you replace him?
SEYSS-INQUART: By Mynheer Rost van Tonningen.
M. DEBENEST: You had known Mynheer Rost van Tonningen for a very long
time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe I knew him—only by name at the most. He
obviously had been judged capable of holding the same office for
Austria—in connection with the League of Nations—in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: Since when did you know his name?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most probably since the time when he assumed his office
in Vienna. I do not know the date.
M. DEBENEST: You were not associated with him when he was in Vienna?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I never saw him.
M. DEBENEST: Was Mynheer Rost van Tonningen not a member of the Dutch
National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Was that the reason why you appointed him?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was one of the reasons. Not so much the fact that he
was a member but rather that he represented our views.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly look again at the document which I have
just shown to you, 997-PS, Page 5 of the German text, and Page 5 of the
French text. This is what you say about Mynheer Rost van Tonningen:
“Rost van Tonningen: Meets perfectly all the ideological
requirements, is in line with the Germanic idea and National
Socialism, speaks effectively and animatedly, has a strong
desire to be active, does not find his strength in himself but
seeks the support and backing of other people.”
As far as I can see, we do not find in what you write here about Rost
van Tonningen that he was particularly competent in financial matters.
SEYSS-INQUART: In reference to the other gentlemen as well, I never
described their technical qualifications but merely their political
attitude. I did not say that Mr. Mussert was really a recognized
engineer in the Netherlands and so forth. I described merely their
political attitude.
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. Therefore, you set up in the Netherlands a civil
government, a German civil government.
SEYSS-INQUART: My four Commissioners General could not be considered as
having the same offices as ministers normally have. Certain functions,
however, had been delegated to the secretaries general. But these
secretaries general did not represent a government or a ministry. I
mentioned yesterday that I took over the Government.
M. DEBENEST: But the secretaries general did represent the Government of
the Netherlands, did they not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; the secretaries general were the supreme heads,
officials of certain ministries; but they were not what we call the
bearers of sovereignty in the State. Those gentlemen were in England.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew, nevertheless, that they had been left in the
Netherlands by the Government in order to carry on the duties of the
Government in its place?
SEYSS-INQUART: What intentions the Government which had gone to England
had in making this appointment, I do not know. I assumed that they
remained there in order to direct the administration technically. It is
within the jurisdiction of an occupying power, in the case of complete
occupation of a country, to determine just how the government is to be
carried on.
M. DEBENEST: But did you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country was in conformity with international
conventions?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I object to this question. In my opinion,
it is a question which should be solved by the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question may be asked. The
defendant has already given his views of international law in his
examination-in-chief. We allow the question.
M. DEBENEST: Then answer me, please.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please have the question repeated?
M. DEBENEST: Do you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country is in conformity with international
convention?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the way in which it took place in Holland, certainly.
M. DEBENEST: And why?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because, as a result of the complete occupation, Germany
had assumed responsibility for the administration of this country and,
therefore, had to establish a responsible leadership in this country.
M. DEBENEST: You yourself created the secretariats general, particularly
the Secretariat for Information and Fine Arts?
SEYSS-INQUART: We call it the Propaganda Ministry.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: And whom did you put at the head of this Secretariat?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe Professor Goedewaagen first. He, too, was a
member of the Dutch National Socialist Party.
M. DEBENEST: That is true. Was not the staff of the General Secretariat
mainly composed of members of the Dutch National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced of that, but I did not know them
individually.
M. DEBENEST: Do you also know that in one of the offices a member of the
SS even acted in an advisory capacity?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch SS?
M. DEBENEST: No, the German SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then he was a consultant?
M. DEBENEST: He was a consultant for national education and national
development.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite follow you—he was a consultant for...
M. DEBENEST: For national education.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I did not know him. I consider it possible; but I do
not believe that he was there as an SS man in particular, but rather for
other reasons.
M. DEBENEST: You ordered the dissolution of the municipal and provincial
assemblies; why?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say the dissolution of the administration. I
eliminated merely the elected representatives of the communities and the
provinces. I not only kept the administration itself, but also
strengthened it in its functions.
M. DEBENEST: You even turned out the mayors of the more important
municipalities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly; and I am convinced, with the full right of an
occupying power. The burgomaster of Amsterdam did not prevent the
general strike but rather promoted it.
M. DEBENEST: But was that the same reason that made you turn out all the
mayors, or at least a certain number of them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not remove any mayors from office until they became
unbearable for me because of their actively hostile attitude. Otherwise
their political attitude was of no significance to me. Up to 1945 I kept
Herr Boraine’s brother as mayor in a Dutch city, even though he was a
very bitter enemy of National Socialism and of us Germans.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. And by whom did you replace all these mayors?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that until the year 1943, at least, the posts
were filled in agreement with Mr. Frederiks, the Secretary General of
the Interior, who was left behind for me by the Dutch Government to
administer interior affairs. There were National Socialists; there were
those who were not National Socialists. For instance, the son of the
province commissioner of Holland was a firm enemy of National Socialism
and of Germany, and yet I appointed him mayor of one of the largest
Dutch cities, Zwolle.
M. DEBENEST: You are not exactly answering my question. I am asking you
to tell me by whom you replaced all the mayors whom you had turned out?
Were they members of the NSB?
SEYSS-INQUART: In part they were members of the Dutch National Socialist
Party. In part they were nonpolitical men; and in part they were members
of political trends which were absolutely against National Socialism and
against Germany. In time there were more and more people of the Dutch
National Socialist Party, for other people did not put themselves at our
disposal any longer. That was the greatest success of the Dutch
resistance movement that politically it resisted us so completely. That
was Holland’s significance in this war.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore assert that it was the Dutch resistance
movement which led you to put a great number of NSB people in all the
important positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that would be going a bit too far. The Dutch
resistance movement merely induced the population not to co-operate with
the occupying power at all, so that outside of the members of the Dutch
National Socialist Party there was no one who wanted to work with us.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the
Low Countries, you installed agents who were directly subordinate to you
and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the
NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by “agents”? I had
German representatives in the provinces and in the big cities. Do you
mean the German or the Dutch ones?
M. DEBENEST: No; I meant to speak of the Beauftragten (delegates).
SEYSS-INQUART: They were Germans, and I assume that all were members of
the NSDAP. I do not know for certain, but it is quite possible and I
believe that was the case.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, in order to refresh your memory, will you
please take Document 997-PS, which I had handed to you this morning. I
refer to Page 9, in the French and German texts.
I would like to inform the Tribunal that I gave an incorrect reference
this morning. The document was submitted under the Number USA-708, but
it is RF-122.
[_Turning to the defendant._] At the top of Page 9 you write:
“Delegates have been provided for the provinces which have a
far-reaching independent administration. The creation of these
posts was delayed due to the necessity of making a preliminary
examination of the situation. It has now been shown that it must
be less a question of administrative officers than of men who
have had political experience. Therefore, through
Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt, Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess’ staff) was
asked for men who, coming mostly from the Party, are now on
their way and can be installed in their functions in the
provinces in a few days.”
That was true, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I find my assertion confirmed that they were not
all from the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, but I also notice that these men were specially
selected.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, they were politically experienced men for I did not
want any administrative bureaucrats but men who were experienced and
skillful in public political life, not Party political life.
M. DEBENEST: On what basis did you organize the municipal councils and
the regional councils?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, it seems to the Tribunal—I don’t know
whether we are right—that it would be better if you would pause after
the sentence rather than after each word.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by municipal and
provincial councils? According to our concept, the word “council” means
a corporate body, but I did not establish any such bodies, I appointed
individual men to direct the administration.
M. DEBENEST: In the communes, in the Netherlands, there were municipal
councils and in the provinces provincial councils, however differently
you may have termed them.
SEYSS-INQUART: Thank you. I understand. In 1941 I dissolved the
provincial and community assemblies which had previously existed. I
provided for such councils in the community regulations which I issued
then, but never actually appointed such councils because the Netherlands
population did not co-operate and as a result these community councils
would have been only artificial bodies. This provision of my community
regulations did not go into effect.
M. DEBENEST: But on what basis did this regulation establish this
organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall any certain basis. I assume that it was
established by law, if it was provided for at all.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will put the question in a different manner and
perhaps you will be able to answer it. Did you introduce, by means of
your regulations, the Führer Principle?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I called it the “one-man responsibility,” and I am
of the opinion that in times of crisis a “one-man responsibility” is the
correct thing.
M. DEBENEST: That was, in fact, the system which was also applied in
Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Perhaps it was not exactly the same, but
under the circumstances I considered it correct.
I repeat what I said yesterday: We committed an error here. We committed
the error of considering the order imposed by the occupational forces
better than that already existing in the occupied territory.
M. DEBENEST: Well, the introduction of this principle had a particular
importance, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly thought it did; especially in these
territorial districts I had to have a man who was responsible to me for
the administration and not an anonymous majority of a representative
body.
M. DEBENEST: I am having Document F-861 handed to you, which I submit
under Number RF-1524. From the last paragraph you will see the
importance which was attached to that in the Reich. It is a letter of
the Minister of the Interior dated 6 September 1941. It reads as
follows:
“Particular importance must be accorded to the decree because it
contains detailed regulations concerning the introduction of the
Führer Principle in the municipal government of the
Netherlands.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The Minister of the Interior was interested in this.
I should only like to point out, to get things straight, that the Reich
Minister of the Interior exerted no influence, and in the second place
that these larger powers were given in 1941 to at least 80 percent of
the mayors, who belonged to the democratic party and were therefore my
political opponents.
MR. PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you established, by the questions
that you have put to this defendant, that he did alter, to a
considerable extent, the form of government in the Netherlands, and that
he introduced a different form of government? Isn’t that all that you
really require for the argument which, no doubt, you intend to present?
The details of it don’t very much matter, do they?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I simply wish to demonstrate that, contrary
to what the defendant said, he had sought to impose the National
Socialist system upon the people of the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, to a large extent, I think he had admitted that. He
said just now that he introduced what he called “one-man
responsibility,” which is another phrase for the Führer Principle, and
that he had dissolved various organizations of the Netherlands
Government. All I am suggesting to you is that, having got those general
admissions, it isn’t necessary to go into details about the exact amount
that the Government of the Netherlands was interfered with or the exact
way in which it was replaced. Isn’t it really all stated in a document
drawn up by the defendant, namely, the document you have been putting,
997-PS?
M. DEBENEST: More or less, Mr. President, but not entirely.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only question is whether the details are really
very important for the Tribunal.
M. DEBENEST: I thought that those details might have a certain
importance, since the governors of the Reich itself attached a great
deal of importance to it and, in fact, the whole was part of a plan
which had been definitely laid down.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is inclined to think that you have got
all that is necessary for the argument which you are indicating that you
would present. If there are any particular details that you think
important to us, no doubt you can bring them out.
M. DEBENEST: Quite so, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] For what purpose had you centralized the
police into a police directorate?
SEYSS-INQUART: I will repeat my testimony of yesterday. The Netherlands
police was under three or four different agencies, the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, I believe the Army Ministry, and so
forth. For the sake of a clear police administration, I thought it
necessary to combine these various police organizations in one and to
place it under the Ministry of Justice.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not appoint as chief of this police a National
Socialist?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: In short, the end that you had in view—was it not to place
the Netherlands in the hands of the NSDAP and thus adapt the internal
organization of the Netherlands to that of the Reich? In other words, to
do something similar to what you had done in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that one can say that. In particular,
the policy of the NSB was not that of the NSDAP. The NSB was different
in many respects. In the second place, if I had wanted to do that, I
would have been able to make Herr Mussert Prime Minister; that would
have been less complicated. The simple explanation is that I used,
possibly in a somewhat schematic way, the example of the Reich as a
model in setting up an administration in the Netherlands, which, at
least in part, made it possible for me to carry out my task of watching
over safety and order. Yesterday I only asserted that I forced no Dutch
citizen to become a National Socialist. I did not deny that a certain
co-ordination was undertaken due to the mistakes which I have repeatedly
admitted.
M. DEBENEST: But you placed members of the NSB in all the administrative
bodies, the higher offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not exclusively, but I did it because in the last
analysis I could rely only on them; all others sabotaged my orders.
M. DEBENEST: You told the Tribunal yesterday of the dismissal of the
magistrates of the court of Leeuwarden. Would you tell us again the
exact causes of this dismissal?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were not the magistrates but the administrators of
the court. This court of Leeuwarden had said in a public judgment that
those Dutch citizens who were condemned by Dutch courts and sent to a
Dutch prison would be transferred to German concentration camps,
maltreated, and executed. As a result, the court no longer felt in a
position to sentence a Dutch citizen.
This statement of the court was wrong in my opinion. In my opinion Dutch
citizens have not been sent from Netherlands prisons to German
concentration camps to be executed there.
In the meantime I cleared up the situation at the suggestion of the
Amsterdam judges, and through the Secretary General for Justice I had
the court in Leeuwarden requested to continue passing sentence. The
court in Leeuwarden did not do so. Thereupon, I dismissed this court.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I have here the document “Verdict of the Court of
Appeal of Leeuwarden” and there is no question of Dutch prisoners being
sent to concentration camps or being tortured or otherwise put to death.
All that is mentioned is that the magistrates of that court do not wish
that the detainees be sent to concentration camps after they have served
their sentence.
I shall hand you the original of this document so that you can check it.
The document has already been submitted under Number RF-931.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not receive a German translation or the original
German.
M. DEBENEST: Then I shall read you the translation of the judgment; you
may check it:
“Considering that the court wishes to take into account the fact
that for some time past various terms of imprisonment have been
imposed by the Dutch judges upon the people contrary to the
intentions of the legislation, and the penalties of the judges
have been executed in a manner which aggravates those penalties
to such an extent that it is impossible for the judge to foresee
or even to suppose the penalty to be inflicted....”
THE PRESIDENT: Why not summarize the document to the witness, do it in
that way? You can give the effect of the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
This judgment sets out in detail that the judges no longer wish to
pronounce a penalty which might result in preventive detention.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear the question?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Mr. President, but why did they not want to pass
sentence? I had the German translation here in my hands, and I took this
translation as my basis in this matter because I did not recall this
judgment. I read it here, and I remember that it stated there that these
Dutch prisoners were to go to German concentration camps to be tortured
and executed.
THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t appear to say anything about that in the
judgment before us. There is nothing about that in the judgment, is
there?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, the defendant claims that the judges did not
wish to pronounce any such judgment any more so that people would not be
sent to concentration camps to be tortured or executed. There is no
question of that in the judgment. The only thing that is mentioned is
that the court did not want to inflict any penalty which would result in
the people being sent away to concentration camps. I do not see that
there is anything in this judgment which the defendant might consider as
a personal insult or injury.
SEYSS-INQUART: Now I have the German text. It reads:
“The court wishes to take into consideration the fact that for
some time judges have imposed penalties and that Dutch criminals
of male sex, contrary to legal prescription and contrary to the
intention of the legislator and the judge, have been executed
and are being executed in the camp in a manner which”—and so
forth.
Those are the concentration camps which the court meant. It concerns the
fact that prisoners were sent from Dutch prisons to German camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: As regards education, did you not bring about very
extensive changes?
SEYSS-INQUART: I introduced the supervision of the curriculum of the
schools, and I made my influence felt in the appointment of teachers,
particularly in the very numerous private schools in the Netherlands.
Two-thirds of the Netherlands schools were private. I felt it necessary
because in these schools there was definitely an anti-German tendency
which was taught to the students. The Netherlands Education Ministry had
the supervision of these matters.
M. DEBENEST: You thereby prevented a large number of clergymen from
taking part in public education.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe so. I ordered, or agreed to the order,
that clergymen should not be heads of schools. As for clergymen who were
teachers, I agreed to have their pay reduced by one-third. They were
able to continue to teach with two-thirds of their income, and with the
money which was saved I gave positions to 4,000 young teachers out of
work.
M. DEBENEST: Talking of teachers, did you not cause the creation of a
special school for teachers?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I believe you mean courses which were given in
Amersfoort or for those who volunteered for them.
M. DEBENEST: No. What I mean is those teachers who were compelled to
take a course for a few months in Germany before their appointment.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the case. It might be those who were to
teach German in the Netherlands schools. In that case, it is possible
that I demanded that they first spend a certain time in Germany in order
to be employed.
M. DEBENEST: You did, as a matter of fact, make the study of the German
language in certain classes obligatory?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the 7th grade, and also in the 8th grade which I newly
introduced. But at the same time, I also had instruction in the Dutch
language increased in order to prove that I did not want to germanize
the Dutch, but only wanted to give them an opportunity to study the
German language.
M. DEBENEST: But they already had that opportunity. German was taught
simultaneously along with English and French. You imposed the teaching
of the German language at the expense of the other two foreign
languages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I spoke of the elementary schools in which the study of
German had not yet been introduced. It is conceivable that in the
secondary schools instruction in German was increased at the expense of
instruction in English and French.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not order the closing down of several universities?
And why did you do so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I recall only the closing of the University of Leyden.
When, according to my instructions, Jewish professors of the faculty
were dismissed, the students of the University of Leyden went on strike
for an extended period of time, and I thereupon closed its doors. I do
not recall having closed any other universities. The Catholic University
in Nijmegen and the Calvinistic University in Amsterdam, as far as I can
recall, closed of their own accord.
M. DEBENEST: And the Polytechnic Institute at Delft? You did not order
it to be closed either?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. That was a temporary measure. It was reopened, as
far as I recall.
M. DEBENEST: How about the Catholic Commercial College at Tilburg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember that.
M. DEBENEST: It was in 1943.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. It is quite possible that for some
reason or other it was closed, probably because it seemed to me to
endanger the interests of the occupation forces.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to investigate this in detail, is it?
If the defendant said that he closed one school without giving an
adequate reason why, isn’t that sufficient for you to develop your
argument?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Later on you attempted to turn the
University of Leyden into a National Socialist university?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you consider the appointment of 2 or 3 professors out
of some 100 or 50 professors as such, I should have to say yes. I cannot
recall any other measures. Once it was suggested to me to establish a
university in Leyden at which German and Dutch students could study, and
that studies there should find suitable recognition in Germany. This did
not come about.
M. DEBENEST: Anyway, you admit that you had the intention of creating
this school?
SEYSS-INQUART: “Intention” is a little too strong. These ideas were
discussed. There was another idea. In the Netherlands, in the German
Wehrmacht, we had a number of university students who had not been able
to continue their studies for understandable reasons. It was considered
at that time to hold courses at Leyden for these university students in
the Wehrmacht, which would be a sort of continuation of their studies.
M. DEBENEST: I shall have Document F-803 presented to you, which I
submit under the Number RF-1525. This is a report from the Ministry of
National Education of the Netherlands. It is on Page 23 of the French
version and Page 16 of the German version.
I shall read the passage:
“Attempts were made to make the University of Leyden a National
Socialist university by appointing National Socialist
professors. However, these attempts failed as a result of the
firm attitude taken by the professors and by the students.
Certain professors even....”
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on Page 15?
M. DEBENEST: That is on Page 23 of the French text, in the last
paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: What is it?
M. DEBENEST: It is F-803.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask what document it was. I asked what is the
nature of the document.
M. DEBENEST: I pointed out to the Tribunal that it was a report of the
Minister for Education in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Was he appointed by the defendant, or appointed before
the war?
M. DEBENEST: It is the present Minister for Education. I would point out
to the Tribunal that I am obliged to go into a certain amount of detail,
because when the French Prosecution presented its case, we did not have
all the documents at our disposal, and the Dutch Government is anxious
to have these facts presented in as detailed a manner as possible.
I might add that today I am producing documents which emanate from the
Dutch Government.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Page 23?
M. DEBENEST: Page 23 of the French text, six lines before the end of the
last paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: “Attempts were made to make the University of
Leyden a National Socialist university by appointing National
Socialist professors. However, these attempts failed as a result
of the firm attitude taken by the professors and by the
students. The professors even presented their collective
resignation in May 1942, and as there was no reaction to it,
they presented it a second time in September of the same year.”
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the defendant has already said this, has he not?
This is Leyden University that you are speaking about, is it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. If I understood correctly, I believe
the defendant said that there had been question of creating a National
Socialist school in Leyden but that he had not put this project into
effect. On the other hand, it appears from this document that it did not
depend upon him but that it was a result of the attitude of the
teachers. That is what I wanted to bring out.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I comment on that?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: The fact that there was an attempt to make Leyden a
National Socialist university is stated only in this document. I repeat
my assertion that I appointed two, or at the most three, professors who
were National Socialists, and this document shows clearly what my
attitude was. I did nothing at all against the demonstrative gesture of
resignation of the professors. The second attempt was also unanswered.
The fact that arrests occurred then is connected with the fact that part
of the professors were otherwise suspected, and these professors were
sent to St. Michelsgestel. That is this concentration camp where the
inmates played golf.
M. DEBENEST: Then that was a coincidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not say that. Certainly after the second attempt
we checked up on the gentlemen a little.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not take measures to oblige the students to do
forced labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think that this was done as long as they were
studying, for I had issued express orders for the exemption of all
students. Advanced technical students were given exemption and
university students who were actually studying or had fulfilled the
requirements for study were not forced to work, either, as far as I
remember.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I shall give you briefly an account of Paragraph 2 of
your regulation. It is the Ordinance of 11 March 1943, Number 27.
“Any student who, after the present regulation has been put into
effect, has successfully passed the final examination or a
similar test in one of the studies mentioned in Paragraph 1 and
specified as such by orders of the Secretary General in the
Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture, is compelled to
work for a determined period within the scope of the allocation
of labor.”
Is that your ordinance?
SEYSS-INQUART: Does it say labor service?
M. DEBENEST: I have not got the German version in front of me. It is
Ordinance Number 27.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ordinance Number 27. May I ask what paragraph it is?
M. DEBENEST: Second paragraph.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. It says, “Students who have taken the
final examination,” that is, who are no longer studying but have
finished their studies. Members of the same age groups were meanwhile
drafted for labor commitment, and those exempted by me now had to make
this up. But their study was not disturbed or interrupted.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore, the students were able, freely, to continue
their studies?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall any obstacles.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you please look at the next decree, that is,
Number 28, which is a decree of Secretary General Van Damm. This decree
forces the students to make a declaration of loyalty.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct.
M. DEBENEST: What were the consequences?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not understand the consequences. The universities
were, at that time, the seat of anti-German activities. I demanded from
the university students a declaration promising they would uphold the
laws in effect in the occupied Netherlands territories, that they would
abstain from any action against the German Reich, the Wehrmacht, and the
Netherlands authorities, and that they would not interfere with public
order in the university.
I cannot understand why a university student could not make such a
statement. Those who did make it were able to continue their studies
without any hindrance. But the Dutch professors, by way of sabotage,
refused to give them any instruction.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, those who did not subscribe to this
declaration, what happened to them?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were no longer university students, and if they
belonged to the age groups which I had called up for labor commitment,
they were drafted.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not apply the Führer Principle to the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe quite as strictly as in the community
administrations. But I gave the president of the university greater
power because I demanded greater responsibility from him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Was not a certain National Socialist propaganda
made in the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that could not be entirely prevented.
M. DEBENEST: In particular, did not the students have to visit certain
exhibitions and be present at lectures organized by the Party or even by
the Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know, but it is possible.
M. DEBENEST: In short, you interfered in the administrative domain, in
the realm of teaching, and you also interfered in a similar manner in
the cultural life of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, to the extent which I stated yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You did, in fact, create various professional syndicates,
is not that what you told us?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged that the acceptance into these syndicates was
not obligatory and that you never imposed payment of dues?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is not correct. Membership in these syndicates was
obligatory. I am also convinced that the head of the syndicates required
the members to pay their dues. I refused to conclude from the failure to
pay dues that a person was no longer a member of the syndicate, and
consequently could no longer practice his trade, or that his dues could
be collected by way of court action.
M. DEBENEST: However, do you not recall the difficulties which arose in
this manner with the medical profession?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was just thinking of the Medical Syndicate. Certain
circles therein desired that the members who did not pay their dues
should be prohibited from carrying out their profession, or that at
least the dues should be collected through court pressure. I told these
gentlemen that if it was not possible to persuade the members to pay
their dues, I, for my part, would not assert any force.
M. DEBENEST: What were these circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps you can tell me, then we shall save more time.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not the NSB for instance?
SEYSS-INQUART: In what connection?
M. DEBENEST: Did you not yourself say that certain circles had demanded
the payment of dues? I am asking, what circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean what friends or co-workers of mine urged me
to insist on payment? The question is not very clear to me.
M. DEBENEST: I am just asking you to say exactly what you mean by
“circles.” You yourself used the word—unless it is a mistranslation.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal thinks really that you are
spending too much time on these various small subjects. We have spent
the whole afternoon on these various measures which the defendant
introduced in the Netherlands. It is perfectly clear according to his
own admission that he was altering the whole force of administration in
the Netherlands.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not also take part in the persecution of the
churches?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the measures could be called
“persecution of the churches,” but I took measures concerning the
churches.
M. DEBENEST: What measures in particular? What measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the most serious, in your eyes, would be
the confiscation of various Netherlands monasteries. One of them was
turned into a German school and the church building was torn down.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged yesterday that priests or at least one priest
could visit concentration camps? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I did not say that. I said only that in the Jewish
camp at Westerborg there were Catholic and Protestant Jews, who were
visited on Sundays by a clergyman from outside. I do not believe that
clergymen were allowed to pay visits to the concentration camps under
the control of German Police or were able to enter them.
M. DEBENEST: Just one question as regards the press. Did the press
retain a certain—I repeat, a “certain”—liberty during the time of the
occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: From my point of view, much too little. The press was
under fairly strict control by the Propaganda Ministry. The editors were
employed after being judged suitable by the Netherlands Propaganda
Ministry. I believe that it is a matter of course for an occupying power
that for such an important instrument one takes only people who have a
certain positive attitude. I would have wished that these men could have
been given much more freedom of speech, and I believe that I can say
that so far as I exerted any influence, this was the case; but even the
Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands was not almighty.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not reprisal measures taken against certain
newspapers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: We might get on a little bit more quickly. There is a
very long pause between the question and the answer.
SEYSS-INQUART: I must first recall the circumstances. If unexpectedly I
am questioned about something which happened 5 years ago I must think
over carefully what actually happened in individual cases. For example,
I can say “no” immediately, but I am sure that the answer is wrong.
Now, for instance, reprisals—I know that once in The Hague the editor’s
office of a newspaper was blown up. That was a measure taken by the
Security Police. It was the seat of an illegal propaganda group.
M. DEBENEST: You spoke yesterday of the sterilization of the Jews in
Holland. Who introduced this measure?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you say “introduced,” I believe that I can answer the
question correctly. The Security Police informed me that a number of
Jews had themselves sterilized by Jewish doctors and that thereupon
these Jews were freed of all restrictions and could dispense with the
wearing of the Jewish star. These were not Jews who otherwise would have
been evacuated, but who would have remained in Holland subject to
certain restrictions.
I asked the head of my health department to investigate the matter. He
informed me that this was a very serious operation in the case of women,
and thereupon I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to forbid this
action, at least in the case of women. Then the Christian churches
protested to me. I answered the Christian churches—I assume you have
the letter in your files—describing the state of affairs and pointing
out expressly that no compulsion must be exerted here. Shortly
thereafter this action was finished. As I heard, the Christian churches
informed the Jews, and when they were sure that no compulsion would be
exerted on them they no longer submitted themselves to this operation.
I myself returned their property to the Jews in question, and the matter
was ended; although I must say today that the further away one is from
this period of time, the less understandable it is.
M. DEBENEST: But was it you who had the idea of this sterilization?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the matter was reported to me by the Security Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, I shall have Document 3594-PS handed to you,
which I shall submit under Number RF-1526. It is an affidavit by
Hildegard Kunze, an agent of the RSHA. Third paragraph:
“I remember that either in this report or in another report
he”—that is, Seyss-Inquart—“suggested that all Jews who were
privileged to remain in Holland should be sterilized.”
There is no question of police agencies there.
SEYSS-INQUART: This involves the correctness of the memory of a
stenographer. In the third point, moreover, she does not even assert
that the report in the third paragraph is the one she mentions in
Paragraph (2), and which she ascribes to me. It is out of the question
that she saw any report from me wherein I made such a suggestion. The
case was reported to me as a fact by the Security Police, as an already
existing fact or one in process of realization.
M. DEBENEST: So you contend that it was not you but the Police. In any
case, you tolerated it?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the male Jews were concerned I tolerated it for
a time; that is true. It was made clear to me that no direct compulsion
was exerted on these Jews, no threat to their disadvantage.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, do you claim that you forced no one to go and
work in Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the contrary, I believe I enrolled 250,000 Dutch
people to work in Germany, and I testified to that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Good. I shall not dwell on that point.
Did you not also introduce certain legislative clauses as far as
nationality was concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: You mean the nationality of Dutch citizens?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: Did you take part in the arrest, interning, and deportation
to concentration camps in Germany of Dutch citizens, and in what way?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to explain briefly the matter of
citizenship.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: Quite a few Dutch enlisted in the Waffen-SS. It was the
intention of the Führer to give them German citizenship. However, with
that they would have lost their Dutch citizenship, and that was
something they certainly did not want to happen. Therefore, I issued a
decree that upon the acquisition of German citizenship, the Dutch
citizenship would not be lost for a year, during which time the person
involved could make his decision.
This should serve to clarify the purpose and the object of this decree
of mine.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to put to you again the question which I put to
you a few minutes ago. Did you take part in arresting, interning, and
deporting to concentration camps Dutch citizens, and under what
conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bringing anybody into and keeping him in a concentration
camp was exclusively a matter for the Police. I do not recall a single
instance in which I requested the Police to put any Dutchman into a
German concentration camp. It may have happened that I ordered the
German Police to take Dutchmen to Hertogenbosch or Amersfoort.
Especially at the time when the Netherlands courts were very lenient
with black-market operators and slaughterers who supplied the black
market, I did demand their internment in a concentration camp for 2 or 3
months.
However, if you have specific cases in mind, please mention them and you
may be assured that I will tell you everything exactly as I remember it.
M. DEBENEST: No, your answer is sufficient.
Did you participate in the seizure of hostages and in their execution?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated yesterday that I recall only one actual hostage
case, which took place in 1942, and I told you what I had to do with it.
The so-called shooting of hostages, beginning with July 1944, was not
actually shooting of hostages, but rather executions carried out by the
Police on the basis of a Führer decree.
I myself never ordered a single shooting. But I would like to repeat:
If, for instance, I called the attention of the Police to the fact that
in any certain locality of the Netherlands an illegal resistance
movement was causing much trouble, and gave the Police instructions to
investigate the case, it was perfectly obvious to me that the leaders of
the resistance movement could be arrested by the Police who, on the
basis of the Führer decree, would shoot them.
But I must repeat: I had to meet my responsibility, even in the face of
a difficult situation whereby those who were guilty—that is, legally
guilty and not morally, because morally I probably would have acted the
same way as they did—those who were guilty were not put before a court.
M. DEBENEST: As far as the facts which you mentioned yesterday are
concerned, this deals with hostages who were shot following an attempt
upon the railroad at Rotterdam?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who selected those hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hostages were selected by the Security Police, and the
Higher SS and Police Leader submitted this list to me. As I testified
yesterday, I asked why he selected the people that he did and he
explained that to me. Then, in checking the matter over, I crossed off
the names of fathers who had several children. I returned the list to
the Higher SS and Police Leader and asked him to take my attitude into
consideration in the execution of this decree.
Therefore, through my direct intervention, I saved fathers of several
children from being shot.
M. DEBENEST: How many hostages were selected in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall that today, perhaps 12 or 15. Out of that
number, 5 remained. That was the number finally arrived at after cutting
down on the original figure of 50 or 25.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to have you shown a document concerning the
seizure of these hostages. It is Document F-886, which becomes RF-1527.
This is a statement made by General Christiansen, or rather, it is a
copy of a statement made by General Christiansen, which was taken from
an affidavit by the head of the Dutch Delegation. Will you please look
at the fourth paragraph before the end of the first statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I just said that this was only the copy of a
statement which comes from an affidavit of the head of the Dutch
Delegation. If the Tribunal desires, we can certainly have the original
submitted as soon as we have received it.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, there is no certificate at all identifying
the copy, is there?
M. DEBENEST: I thought, Mr. President, that an affidavit of the
representative of the Dutch Delegation existed in Nuremberg. On the
original—I beg your pardon; it was not reproduced, but the original
does contain the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to prove by this affidavit? About the
hostages?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. It says that the defendant himself
selected these hostages.
THE PRESIDENT: In what proceedings was the affidavit made?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, it was during the proceedings which were
taken against General Christiansen in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you say it is admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that we have already submitted
documents of this nature—that is, copies—to the Tribunal, copies which
have been certified as being copies of an original which is being kept
in the country where it originated.
THE PRESIDENT: If the original from which the copy was taken were a
document which is admissible under the Charter, that would probably be
so, if there were an authentic certificate saying it was a true copy of
a document which is admissible under the Charter. But is this document
admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that it is admissible because it
is purely and simply an affidavit. It is an affidavit which has been
legally received in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: And you haven’t got a German edition of it?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, this document has been translated into
German. I have had it translated into German.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, this appears to be a document which is in
Dutch, and General Christiansen, who gave the evidence, was a German,
was he not?
M. DEBENEST: No, Mr. President, the original affidavit is in Dutch.
THE PRESIDENT: The original is in Dutch, is it?
M. DEBENEST: The original is in Dutch, yes. That is according to the
information that I have. Yes, the original is in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: And what was the affidavit given in, what proceeding?
M. DEBENEST: In Dutch, with interpreters.
THE PRESIDENT: I mean what proceeding, before what court?
M. DEBENEST: I suppose before a Dutch Military Tribunal. Yes, before a
Dutch Military Tribunal.
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May
it please the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: This document is an excerpt from criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands taken against General Christiansen upon the request of the
Dutch Government. The Minister of Justice of the Netherlands has let us
have an extract of the minutes which were taken in the Netherlands in
legal form during the proceedings which were carried on against General
Christiansen. The text was, therefore, made in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: This deposition, this affidavit is in Dutch. Now, General
Christiansen, is he a Dutchman?
M. DUBOST: General Christiansen is a German.
THE PRESIDENT: If he is a German why does he give his evidence in Dutch?
If he did not give it in Dutch, why isn’t the German copy here? You see,
we have a certificate here from a colonel, who is said to represent the
Government of the Netherlands, that this document is a true copy of
General Christiansen’s evidence. Well, the document which we have here
is in Dutch, and if General Christiansen gave his evidence in German,
then it can’t be a true copy and it is subject to the translation in
Dutch. What do you say to that?
M. DUBOST: The deposition made by General Christiansen was received
through an interpreter in conformity with Dutch procedure and was
transcribed in Dutch. It is not possible for a Dutch Tribunal to receive
minutes in a foreign language. The minutes are taken in the Dutch
language.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I just say a few words in this
connection, please? I know, for I am in contact with the defense counsel
for General Christiansen, that there was a court-martial proceeding on
the part of the English instituted against him. I have misgivings about
this document, since it is not confirmed, and we cannot judge whether
the interpreter who interpreted from German into Dutch was a suitable
and adequate interpreter; and also, since in this manner I do not have
the opportunity, as defense counsel, to cross-examine General
Christiansen. It seems to me that through the mere submission of this
document the rights of the Defense have been greatly infringed upon.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I have just been informed that General
Christiansen is right now imprisoned at Arnhem by the Dutch authorities.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Debenest, the Tribunal will admit the document
if you get a certificate from the court who tried General Christiansen.
But the only certificate you have at present that this is a true copy is
from a Colonel Van—some name that I can’t pronounce. There is nothing
to show, except his statement, that he is an official on behalf of the
Dutch Government. We don’t know who he is.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President, but we will get the original for
the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will submit an original later on.
M. DEBENEST: Van—is the accredited representative of the Dutch
Government with the French Delegation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have only a French translation in front
of me which reads as follows:
“Christiansen is not here as a witness, but rather as a
defendant, and he was interrogated as such, and he is not bound
by oath to tell the truth. He can say whatever he pleases
without being held responsible for what he says.”
For that reason alone, I believe the document is to be refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the reason why the Tribunal is prepared
to admit the document, when it is certain that it has got the document,
is that Article 21 provides that reports, including the acts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for
the investigation of war crimes and the reports and findings of military
or other tribunals of any of the United Nations, shall be taken judicial
notice of. It is for that reason that the document is, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, admissible when the authentic document is before it.
[_Turning to M. Debenest._] Now, you undertake then to produce a
properly certified copy of the document.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please comment on this document?
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly wait until I read to you the passage which
I wish to submit to you.
It is on Page 4 of the French text, the fourth paragraph before the end
of the first statement, the second paragraph of the page:
“I think that I can recall that already upon that occasion
Seyss-Inquart said that five hostages would be shot. I didn’t
know any one among these hostages. I did not select these five
men, and I had nothing whatsoever to do with their execution. It
was a case of a purely political nature in which I became
involved in my capacity as commander.”
Now you may give us your attitude if you choose to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: The picture which is given here by General Christiansen
as a defendant, not as a witness, completely coincides with the picture
that I gave. In the beginning of this record General Christiansen says
that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and the OKW gave him the order through
his chief of staff to take the hostages, and he says further that
through his legal department he had issued a proclamation that the
hostages would answer with their lives if further sabotage acts should
take place. He then says that they did take place, and he contacted the
Commander, West or the OKW and received the answer that the hostages
were to be used. Then he goes on to relate that he advised me of this
order, indicating that the original ruling with regard to the hostages
still applied, and so I said that 5 of them were to be executed. That is
what I have always maintained, and I also said that 25 were to have been
killed and that I negotiated for the lives of the remaining 20.
The report, therefore, is fundamentally correct and agrees with what I
have said.
M. DEBENEST: But in this document no mention is made of 25 hostages. We
are only dealing with the fact here it was you who chose these 5
hostages.
Take the following page of the statement of 5 March 1946. General
Christiansen declares:
“I remember now that Lieutenant Colonel Kluter also took part in
this conference. There were thus seven participants in all. I
therefore transmitted the order to use hostages and
Seyss-Inquart said immediately that five men were to be
apprehended. You are asking why it was as simple as all that.
Obviously Seyss-Inquart had authority to do this.”
It was therefore you, in fact, who designated and chose these hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: The repetition of these words in no wise changes the fact
that 25 hostages were demanded, as the witnesses will confirm to you
tomorrow, and that I intervened so that only 5 were demanded, and that
altogether the entire matter was in the hands of the Army and the Higher
SS and Police Leader; the proclamations were issued in the names of both
of them. As Reich Commissioner I assumed the right to reduce the number
of hostages as much as possible. The final figure was determined by the
Commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, did you read the last paragraph in the
affidavit, Page 4 at the bottom?
M. DEBENEST: That is right, Mr. President, I did not read it. I am going
to read it.
“I will ask you to note that at this conference with
Seyss-Inquart he expressly reserved the right to appoint
hostages.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I can say nothing more than what I have already said. The
selection of hostages was probably made by the Higher SS and Police
Leader according to directives which he had received from the Armed
Forces commander, or, rather, from his superiors. I myself asked to be
shown this list, for I, as Reich Commissioner, was interested in knowing
who was to be selected, and I tried to exert influence to the effect, as
I have already said, that the fathers of many children were crossed off
this list.
Furthermore, I do not wish to be polemic in face of the subjective
descriptions of General Christiansen. We got along very well together in
our work. The Court will decide whether I am not telling the truth or
whether he is mistaken in this case.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly what I was thinking. You therefore do
contend that this is the only case in which you intervened as far as the
seizure and execution of hostages is concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe so, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did you know about the execution of hostages following the
assassination attempt made on Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated the extent of my information yesterday. I did
not know the exact figure. It was known to me, however, that shootings
were taking place, the shooting of those men who, on the basis of their
demeanor and actions, were to be shot under the decree of the Führer by
the Security Police. The actual figure was made known to me later.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you did not intervene in this question of the
shooting of hostages at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I cannot say that, for I discussed at length with the
deputy of the Higher SS and Police Leader what should be done in such a
case—for after all it was a very grave matter—and whether he should
carry out these executions; I said yesterday that I agreed. I declared
yesterday that I could not contradict him in his decision actually to
carry out the executions at this point.
M. DEBENEST: Who was this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: What do you think of Dr. Schöngarth?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Dr. Schöngarth was not a man who was
especially harsh and very eager to deal with this matter. He must
certainly have found the matter unpleasant.
M. DEBENEST: But was he a man whom one could trust?
SEYSS-INQUART: I always had confidence in him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case, I am going to have a document
shown to you, Document F-879, which I submit under Number RF-1528.
I wish to inform the Tribunal that once again this is a copy of
proceedings which was received at Amsterdam by the War Crimes agency. It
is signed by people who were questioned, and it also comes with an
affidavit as in the preceding case. Here again, if the Tribunal wishes
it, I shall obtain the original for the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will submit the original as before.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Or else get it from somebody in the Government.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
Defendant, will you kindly look at Dr. Schöngärth’s statement on Page 5
of the French document; it is the third statement, the fifth paragraph.
Have you found it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I have.
M. DEBENEST: This is what Dr. Schöngarth says:
“After the investigation, I personally went to see Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner in Holland, with whom I
discussed the matter. Seyss-Inquart then gave me the order to
take increased measures of reprisal by executing 200 prisoners,
who were condemned to death, at the place where the
assassination attempt had been made.
“This execution was aimed at intimidating the population. It was
announced by a public notice that a large number of persons
would be executed because of this assassination attempt.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Well?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event, it is confirmed that we are concerned here
with the shooting of Dutchmen who, as this man says, had been condemned
to death for having participated in some sort of sabotage or other
matter; they were, in line with the Führer decree, to be shot anyhow.
That is the first and most important point. The question is whether the
figure of 200 was mentioned; and the question further is whether I
demanded that number. I still maintain what I have already said in reply
to the testimony of former collaborators; but I also maintain my own
declaration to the effect that I never even would have had the power to
give an order like that to Dr. Schöngarth. He was not at all my
subordinate in such things. I certainly did state that we must act with
severity in this case. That is quite right. The figure of 200—I even
believe it was 230—only came to my knowledge later. The public notice
which he mentions here is signed by Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: You did not say “severe measures”; you said “stricter
measures of reprisal.” It’s not quite the same thing.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand the question.
M. DEBENEST: I repeat: You did not say “severe measures,” but “stricter
measures of reprisal.”
SEYSS-INQUART: The severe measures which were to be taken would, of
course, serve to intimidate. But we were not concerned with reprisals;
that is, the shooting of people whom otherwise one would have had no
reason to shoot.
M. DEBENEST: But it seems to me that this document is extremely clear.
It deals with “measures of reprisal” following the assassination attempt
against Rauter.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which were to be carried through in such a way that
Dutchmen were executed who would have been executed in any event; for he
confirms here that the people had been condemned to death.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly repeat the explanation. I did not get the
translation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Here we were concerned with the shooting of men who would
have been shot in any event, for it says specifically here that they had
already been sentenced to death, as it says in the next paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I already wrote it down 5 minutes ago. You have said it
already. He has said it already. The document speaks for itself, M.
Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
You stated yesterday as well that no hostage had been shot at the
hostage camp of Michelsgestel.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is unknown to me.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you stated that yesterday. Or are you still
claiming that none had been shot at that time?
THE PRESIDENT: Will the defendant answer, please? Don’t just nod your
head. It does not come through the sound system.
SEYSS-INQUART: I wanted to say only that I know of no case. Perhaps on
some occasion such a case did occur, but I do not remember.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you are not denying that some may have been
shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: There might have been reasons which necessitated such a
shooting. But I do not recall a single case.
M. DEBENEST: The hostages who were executed in this manner, were they
all people who had been sentenced to death?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know because I do not know whether anyone was
shot at all.
M. DEBENEST: In the case of the execution of hostages at Rotterdam, was
not one of the hostages arrested the day before the execution, and shot
the very next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am not informed on that point. I can see from this
document that we are talking about hostages from Michelsgestel. I do not
recall that hostages were taken from this camp. But in the circumstances
it may have been possible, for this was an actual hostage case.
M. DEBENEST: No. I am not asking you whether hostages were taken from
the camp of Michelsgestel. I am asking you, in the case of the execution
of the hostages of Rotterdam, whether one was not arrested on the eve of
the execution and shot the next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know.
M. DEBENEST: I will give you the name. Maybe that will help you remember
the case: Baron Schimmelpennink.
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I recall Baron Schimmelpennink came from
Zeeland. But I do not know any more than that.
M. DEBENEST: You do not know under what conditions he was arrested, and
why?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I know only that a Baron Schimmelpennink was among
those five hostages who were shot.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore do admit that numerous executions followed
the setting up of the summary justice courts in the Netherlands by you?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. That is certainly not the case. For these shootings,
from the middle of 1944 onward, cannot be traced to my directives and my
summary justice courts, but rather to a direct decree of the Führer.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that there was not a single case of
execution as a result of your order of 1 May 1943?
SEYSS-INQUART: The executions did not come about on the basis of summary
courts which I had provided for in this decree against violations of
this decree. It is possible that the Higher SS and Police Leader used
this decree as the basis for his decisions.
M. DEBENEST: But you are still contending that you had no power over
this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not have the power to command him, but we certainly
worked together in a close understanding.
M. DEBENEST: He therefore consulted you about all reprisal measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. How do you mean?
M. DEBENEST: Were not the reprisal measures which were taken or which
were announced by him applied with your agreement?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reprisal measures and his announcements were made in
his domain. In many cases I myself did not learn of these announcements
at all, or not until afterward. There was no directive which I gave for
these measures. I again and again refer to the fact that this resulted
from the Führer decree given by Himmler to the Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Were you in favor of these measures of reprisal?
SEYSS-INQUART: I fully approved of action being taken against members of
the resistance movement who committed sabotage and other acts. There
were no other means for taking steps except arrest by the Police,
passing of judgment on the part of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and
shooting on the part of the Police. I could not oppose these measures.
You may interpret that as agreement, if you want to. I would have
preferred it if courts had given the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, certainly.
I am going to have you shown Document F-860, which is a letter which I
am submitting under Number RF-1529. This is a letter written by you,
dated 30 November 1942 and addressed to Dr. Lammers. I will pass over
the first part.
I am sorry. I forgot to tell the Tribunal that the originals are not
here; they are just photostat copies. But I have in my possession an
affidavit which I shall submit to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: It is all right, M. Debenest. You need not bother to give
us an affidavit. We have the photostat copy.
M. DEBENEST: I will pass over the first two pages of the French copy,
and will pass on to the second paragraph.
“The drafting of the special police law (Polizeistandrecht) was
effected in accordance with the views expressed in a letter of
the Reichsführer SS. I believe that I have conformed with all
the wishes which are contained in it, only I would not like to
appoint the Higher SS and Police Leader as court administrator,
for, from the point of view of the Dutch, this would mean a
curtailment of the authority of the Reich Commissioner,
particularly in view of the fact that the Reich Commissioner is
designated in the Führer decree as the guardian of the interests
of the Reich. However, in the decree I have assigned to the
Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers which a court
administrator needs. I believe that this special police law may
be a useful instrument and to a certain extent an example for
all further regulations.”
You did, therefore, have authority over the Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had the authority over the special police court, but
not over the Higher SS and Police Leader. I remained the top court
administrator, even for the police court in an emergency state. All the
same I could not give executive orders to the Police. Anyway, this
police law existed in the Netherlands for two weeks at the most.
M. DEBENEST: It is nevertheless certain that we here find special
tribunals and that you entrusted them to the Police Leader.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct, but only within the scope of police
courts in an emergency state, and what the police courts did at that
time I assume responsibility for. This was on occasion of the general
strike in May 1943.
M. DEBENEST: Well, we quite agree then. You did entrust these emergency
courts to the Police.
Very well, I will now have you shown Document 3430-PS. This document is
a collection of all the speeches which you made during the occupation of
the Netherlands. Will you please take...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, is that the only reference you are making to
this Document Number 860?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, I am only concerned with the second
part. The first part concerns the Police.
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think it is imposing a very heavy burden on the
Translation Department? There are 18 pages of it.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I quite agree with you. I intended to use
this document for the police organization, which is in the first part.
But I did not think it was necessary to do so right now because I wished
to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: I only mean this: If you are only going to use a small
part of the document it does not seem necessary to make the Translation
Department, who have a very great deal of work to do, translate 18 pages
of it.
Here’s another one—F-803, which has got many more than 18 pages in it,
and of which very little use has been made. But go on.
M. DEBENEST: I know, Mr. President. I did not use more of it because the
Tribunal considered that it dealt with details which it did not consider
important. That is the only reason.
THE PRESIDENT: You have passages on each of these 18 pages? I am very
much surprised.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, anyway.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, we will now pass to another subject.
When you arrived in Holland, didn’t that country possess very
considerable stocks of foodstuffs and of raw materials?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, a great many supplies were on hand. An extraordinary
amount.
M. DEBENEST: Were not important requisitions made during the first years
of the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, in accordance with a decree within the scope of the
Four Year Plan all supplies were requisitioned and a 6 months’ reserve
supply was set up in the Netherlands with the obligation on the part of
the Reich to supply all further needs as required.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that these stocks were to be reserved
for the Dutch population?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly? Very well. Will you take the document which I
have shown to you this morning, 997-PS, Pages 9 and 10.
SEYSS-INQUART: Do I have the document before me?
M. DEBENEST: Page 12 of the French text and Page 11 of the German. You
write:
“The stocks of raw materials have been collected and with the
agreement of the Field Marshal have been distributed in such a
manner that a quota sufficient to keep Dutch economy running for
6 months will be left behind. Raw material quotas and food
rationing, _et cetera_, will be assigned the same way as in the
Reich. Considerable stocks of raw materials have been guaranteed
for the Reich, such as, for example, 70,000 tons of industrial
fats which represents about one-half of the amount which the
Reich still needs.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that coincides with the description I have just
given you.
M. DEBENEST: But I thought you said that the stocks were at the disposal
of the Dutch people and not for the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is an error in transmission. I said that the
supplies were confiscated and enough left there for only 6 months and
that future needs would be supplied by the Reich in the same proportion
as the Reich was supplied. But primarily these stocks were confiscated
for the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the translation did not come through. You
received numerous complaints about these requests, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: And what measures did you take?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attention of the gentlemen who were with me, that is,
Secretary General Hirschfeld and the other secretaries, was called to
the fact this was a strict directive in the framework of the Four Year
Plan. In some cases I may have transmitted the complaints to the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan, if the stocks were taken away in what
seemed to me excessive quantities.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to these requests, were there not mass
purchases made by the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes...
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now? Will you be much longer, M.
Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, everything will depend upon the length of
the answers which the defendant will make, but I think that in half an
hour or three-quarters of an hour at the most I shall have finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD DAY
Wednesday, 12 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand._]
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Tribunal, the
report is made Defendants Hess and Jodl are absent.
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, you agree that very important stocks were sent
to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is quite true.
M. DEBENEST: Concerning another system, for pillage, used in the
Netherlands, I would like to submit to you a document which indicates
moreover that you were not the only one to participate in this pillage;
but Göring and the OKW are involved too. This is Document F-868, which
becomes Exhibit RF-1530. It concerns a teletype message which is
addressed to you by the OKW and which is signed Reinecke. This teletype
message is dated 5 December 1940 and begins as follows:
“Meeting at the office of the Reich Marshal on 7 October 1940.
Regulation concerning the dispatch and the taking of merchandise
from Holland by members of the Armed Forces or of the units
attached to it.
“In agreement with the Reich Marshal and the Reich Commissioner
for the occupied Netherlands territories, the regulations in
force up to now concerning the dispatch and the taking of
merchandise out of Holland are rescinded. Members of the Armed
Forces and of the units, organizations and affiliations attached
to it”—then follow the designations of these organizations—“as
well as the officials of the services employed in Holland, can,
within the means at their disposal, send home by military post
packages of a maximum weight of 1,000 grams, without any limit
on their number. If the parcels weigh more than 250 grams....”
I won’t read what follows; it deals with a question of postal rates.
“The taking along of merchandise on the occasion of furlough or
other crossing of the frontier is not subject to any
restriction.”
This regulation was drawn up with your agreement, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: “Agreement” is putting it a little strongly in this case.
An authority for confiscation is not involved here, but rather only
instructions for transport. These things had to be bought in some
manner. They could not be confiscated. The Reich Marshal decreed this
and I put it into force. That was the so-called “Schlepp-Erlass,”
meaning that any soldier who returned from the Netherlands could bring
with him as much as he could carry of any of the things he had bought.
And I then gave this order for civilians in accordance with the military
decree. I believe this decree was rescinded after 2 years, for the fact
was constantly brought up that it, in particular, promoted the black
market.
M. DEBENEST: I did not say that it concerned requisitions. Yesterday I
said to you that there had been mass requisitions and you answered that
this was correct. Today I tell you, and I submit this document in order
to demonstrate to you, that there was also another way of pillaging the
produce of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: But previously you did mention confiscation. I only
wanted to correct that point.
M. DEBENEST: I merely spoke yesterday of it. Let us go on. Will you tell
me what the task was of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the wording of this decree. I believe it
has been read here. At all events it dealt with the organizing of the
entire economic wealth within the German sphere of interests in favor of
the policy carried on by Germany and during the war, in favor of the war
economy, of course.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the liquidation of the property of the
Freemasons?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must admit that I really do not know that. My attention
was called to the case after the property had been confiscated. I assume
that this emanated from Himmler by way of Heydrich.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will refresh your memory, I will have handed to you
Document F-865, which becomes Exhibit RF-1531. It concerns a letter
which comes from you, doesn’t it? It is dated 11 March 1944. It is
signed by you, isn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely correct.
M. DEBENEST: Good. You express yourself as follows in this letter:
“Dear Dr. Lammers:
“I have had the property of the Freemasons in the Netherlands
liquidated. As the liquidation took place through me, that is to
say, through a government office, unlike the liquidation in
other areas, it is for the Reich Finance Minister to decide on
the further utilization thereof.
“I have written a letter today to the Reich Finance Minister,
and I enclose a copy of it for you. I beg you to support my
suggestion.”
You, therefore, did not hear of this liquidation until after it had been
undertaken, since you yourself had undertaken it, isn’t that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I still entirely uphold my first assertion. The question
was who decreed this; I understood you to ask me who was the person in
the Reich who demanded this. It is a fact that I did not hear about this
whole matter until a few months had passed. Then I took over this
liquidation and had it carried through to the end through my offices,
and then I wrote this letter. Thus the execution rested with me.
M. DEBENEST: You said just now—and I understood the translation very
clearly—that you heard of it only after it had been done. You
contradicted your own declaration, as I was able to note yesterday on
several occasions, when the documents were submitted to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand that. Is that a question to me?
M. DEBENEST: I am simply making a remark.
Was this liquidation of the property of the Freemasons a big
undertaking?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, certainly. I should like to say that it was started
by another office. The property was confiscated, then I took over this
task and had it carried through by my competent offices.
M. DEBENEST: Did you make arrangements for the utilization of the funds
which this liquidation produced?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made the proposal that this money be given to the
Party.
M. DEBENEST: You discussed this beforehand?
SEYSS-INQUART: I wrote a letter as well. I believe the enclosure to my
letter to the Finance Minister, which was mentioned just now, contains
the proposal that this property be given to the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not threaten to let the people of the Netherlands
starve as a result of the railroad strike in September 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: You can look upon it as a threat, but in any event I
described it as very probable.
M. DEBENEST: You asked the secretary general to stop this strike?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal would like to have further
investigation as to who ordered the confiscation of the Freemasons’
property.
Defendant, do you know who ordered the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I do. The confiscation was ordered by Heydrich and
was set in motion by the Police. Then a trustee of the Party started the
actual liquidation and at that stage I took it over and transmitted it
to my offices.
M. DEBENEST: At what date was this liquidation ordered?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the first few months. The whole thing went very
rapidly. It was only a matter of weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Was any reason given for it?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Freemasons were declared to be enemies of the Reich
according to the decree about the taking over of the property of those
who were inimical to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the order of Heydrich in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I can’t say. It went to the Security Police, and the
commander of the Security Police insured its execution. I assume that it
was a teletype message, although this entire action might have been
planned in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean that you carried it out without having
any order in writing about it at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a report from the Security Police—it may have
been in writing, or it may have been oral—that this confiscation was
being carried through by the RSHA, and I took over this matter at this
stage.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the amount involved by the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the final amount of the liquidation was more
than 8 or 9 million guilders.
THE PRESIDENT: And then I think you said that you proposed that it
should be handed over to the Party.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I proposed that these 9 million guilders be turned
over to the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: And were they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I received no decision. This property must have
remained in the Netherlands in some form of securities, probably in
treasury bonds.
THE PRESIDENT: You were the Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands,
weren’t you? What happened to the money?
SEYSS-INQUART: The money was deposited in a bank account, and perhaps
Dutch treasury bonds were bought. It was treated as a separate fund, and
it was not used.
THE PRESIDENT: But this was all in 1940, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I estimate that the liquidation continued until the year
1942, and from that period on the money remained in a bank account.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the bank?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I cannot tell you, Mr. President. But there is no
doubt that the Dutch have ascertained this.
THE PRESIDENT: And when you said it was confiscated in the first few
months, you meant in 1940, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, immediately after the invasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Were the funds from this liquidation utilized in the same
way as the money from the liquidation of Jewish property?
SEYSS-INQUART: For the most part the proceeds from the liquidation of
Jewish property were transferred to the Administrative Office for
Property and Pensions. The funds were not absorbed, but certain
expenditures were met from them. For instance, the erection of Vught
Camp was paid for from these proceeds. The funds derived from the
liquidation of Jewish property amounted to perhaps 400 million guilders
or slightly more. However, they were not taken over.
M. DEBENEST: How were the funds actually used? Were they used for the
purpose of the German Government or for other purposes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Jewish property, first of all, was confiscated. Then,
as far as possible, it was liquidated, and we called that
“Aryanization.” The proceeds of the Aryanization were pooled in the
Administrative Office for Property and Pensions, but as a whole were
not...
M. DEBENEST: Pardon me, but will you answer more directly without
recounting to us how this liquidation was effected. I asked you about
the utilization of the funds.
SEYSS-INQUART: The funds were not used at all. The 400 million guilders
must have been placed on deposit in the Administrative Office for
Property and Pensions of the Netherlands, partly in Dutch treasury bonds
and partly in the original securities. Only relatively small amounts
were used for certain purposes. I believe the largest amount was 14
million guilders which was used for the erection of Vught Camp.
I called the attention of the Reich Finance Minister...
M. DEBENEST: Excuse me. I asked you a question. Were the funds from this
liquidation used for the benefit of the Reich? Yes or no?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, unless you call the erection of the Vught Camp using
the proceeds for the Reich; but the funds were used because Vught Camp
was to be a Jewish assembly camp.
M. DEBENEST: So you consider that the building of the Vught Camp was in
the interest of the Dutch?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most certainly it was. The cost of Vught Camp, as far as
I was informed, was covered out of this property—I believe 14 million
guilders were spent—because this camp was to be a Jewish assembly camp.
It was only later that Himmler transformed this into a concentration
camp.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion, and the Tribunal will decide about it.
But regarding the property of the Freemasons, what was done with the
sums produced by this liquidation, exactly how were they utilized—for
the Reich, or also for the construction of concentration camps in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither the one nor the other.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, he has said already, hasn’t he—I thought he
said quite clearly on deposit in some unknown bank, and that there were
about 400 million which came from the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, I know the bank. The property of the Jews
is deposited in the “Vermögens-Verwaltungs und Rentenanstalt.”
M. DEBENEST: Well, I am now going to submit to you a document, which is
a letter, Number F-864, which becomes RF-1532. This document states
exactly the destination of the property which was thus liquidated.
First, you indicate at the beginning of the letter that the total
resulting from the liquidation amounted, as you say, to 6,134,662
guilders up to that date, and you indicate that this sum is located in
the Reich Foundation (Reichsstiftung) of the Netherlands. This is a
German organization, and not a Dutch organization, as far as I
understand. You indicate further on how the various sums were to be
allocated.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you don’t need trouble about the details of where
it is. He says it is there in the bank.
M. DEBENEST: Exactly, Mr. President, I would merely like to read the few
lines at the end where he states exactly the purpose of the allocation
of the various sums.
“I believe I am complying with your intentions if I assume, with
reference to this liquidated Freemasons’ property, that it too,
as we discussed with reference to Jewish property, should be
used for specific purposes within the Netherlands, according to
an agreement to be reached between us.”
Consequently, your intention was to use the sums in the same manner as
the Jewish fortunes, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: It doesn’t say that at all.
M. DEBENEST: We have it in writing. That’s still better.
SEYSS-INQUART: The purpose of utilization is perfectly plain. The Reich
Minister of Finance wanted to exercise control over Jewish capital; and
I called his attention to the fact that it had not been called in,
suggesting to him not to call this money into the Reich but to wait and
see what the course of events would be.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not proposing to him here that it should be
utilized for the same purpose?
SEYSS-INQUART: I suggested to him to use it for certain purposes in the
Netherlands, that is, not to send this money into the Reich, but to
leave it in the Netherlands; but the use to which it was to be put was
left entirely open. He wanted to bring it to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, I think you can pass on.
M. DEBENEST: I was just thinking that we could leave that to the
judgment of the Tribunal.
Let us come back to the matter of these railroad strikes. Did you not
ask the secretaries general to stop these strikes?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not put an embargo on the means of transport and on
the food in transit?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: That was you, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I said that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you knew very well at that time what the food
situation was in Holland and the grave consequences which would
inevitably result from the decision which you made—a very serious
decision.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not really. The fact was that traffic had already
been disrupted because of requisitioning by the Armed Forces, and it was
only a question of finding a _modus vivendi_ and after insuring the
needs of the Armed Forces, which appeared urgent to me, of resuming the
transport of foodstuffs into Holland. If the railroad strike had not
taken place, I would have succeeded in persuading the Armed Forces to
refrain from requisitioning, and navigation would have been left
undisturbed.
M. DEBENEST: But we are not discussing the Armed Forces. You knew very
well that the moment you placed this embargo on ships, on the fleet,
that it was the time when they were transporting foodstuffs for the
winter to Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, at the moment when I declared the embargo, there was
actually no more traffic; and the few ships carrying food were
requisitioned by the Armed Forces together with the foodstuffs.
M. DEBENEST: Then your decision was useless?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, because in making this decision I prevailed upon the
Armed Forces to make the requisitioning as short as possible and they
promised me that the ships which I earmarked would not be interfered
with by them.
M. DEBENEST: How long did this embargo last?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that between 15 and 20 October I instructed the
chief of my traffic department to lift the embargo. Actually, it lasted
some weeks longer because the Dutch traffic organization didn’t
function.
M. DEBENEST: Until what date, approximately?
SEYSS-INQUART: It may have lasted until the middle of November.
M. DEBENEST: Was not that the period when the traffic was heaviest?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite correct. In November and December we could
only bring enough foodstuffs to Holland to tide us over these 6 weeks of
frost, at the most; and in September I was of the firm conviction that
in November and December the shipping facilities would be at my
disposal.
M. DEBENEST: And actually, did you obtain them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Unfortunately, no. For due to the failure of the Dutch
traffic authorities, coupled with the other war conditions, these
facilities were not at my disposal.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew very well that the decision which you were
making was fraught with grave consequences?
SEYSS-INQUART: In September this decision was not as serious as the fact
that the Armed Forces, in view of the railroad strike, was in sore need
of this transport and these facilities; and as it was up to me to
safeguard the Reich’s interests, there could be no graver accusation
against me than for the German people to say that I did not do
everything humanly possible to help to win the struggle.
M. DEBENEST: The Tribunal will take note of your answer.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, you dealt with the subject yesterday, didn’t
you?
M. DEBENEST: I do not think I did, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the embargo on shipping surely was gone into
yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I think I spoke yesterday only of the
requisitions which were carried out and I only asked one or two
questions of an economic nature. I do not think I touched upon this
subject. If I did, I apologize to the Tribunal. In any case, I am
finished with it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the position of the Netherlands
Bank on your arrival in 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Netherlands Bank as an issuing bank was, I believe,
set up primarily on the basis of a private bank. The president was Mr.
Trip. The State probably had a certain influence, since it served as the
issuing bank.
M. DEBENEST: Give us a briefer explanation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then it would not be stating the whole truth.
M. DEBENEST: Did the gold reserves cover the amount of notes issued?
SEYSS-INQUART: I assume so on the basis of the gold cover or the
reserves of gold currency. In fact the gold cover was higher than the
amount of notes issued. The Netherlands Bank had more gold and more gold
currency, than it had notes issued.
M. DEBENEST: And what was the position at the time of the German
capitulation?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were several thousand million guilders in paper
money in circulation, and perhaps another 23 million in gold guilders.
M. DEBENEST: But, above all, Reichsmarks?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I said 23 million guilders in gold. The rest of the
coverage might have been bills from the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not you who ordered the abolition of the “Currency
Frontier”? Will you answer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were you absolutely in agreement with the necessity for
abolishing these frontiers?
SEYSS-INQUART: The proposal originated in my office. I took it over. Mr.
Trip protested. I sent it to Berlin. In Berlin the Reich Marshal decided
in its favor. The Reich Minister Funk was against it; I carried out the
proposal which I had made and which had been approved by the Reich
Marshal.
M. DEBENEST: But personally you agreed with it?
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean exactly by the Currency Frontier that
you are dealing with now? We merely want to understand what you are
talking about.
M. DEBENEST: I mean the free circulation of German currency in Holland.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did not Holland also have to pay large
sums in the form of so-called voluntary contributions, among other
things, for the war against Bolshevism?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have explained this matter quite clearly. The
Reich demanded during a certain period of time, as direct occupation
costs, 50 million marks for the defenses of Holland. In Holland we
called this a “voluntary contribution” for obvious political reasons. In
reality it was a demand of the Reich which would have had to be paid one
way or another, and I would not lay it to the charge of any Dutchman
that he paid this contribution voluntarily.
M. DEBENEST: You agreed to these measures, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: What were the economic and financial consequences of all
these measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: The financial consequences were a greatly increased
circulation of bank notes, and extremely large banking accounts which
remained the same in the Reich as in all occupied countries. We applied
one system in Holland, another in France, and in view of the collapse of
the Reich, the financial consequences were the same. If Germany had not
lost the war, Holland would have had a claim of more than 4,500 million
guilders against a sovereign Germany.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you then look at Document 997-PS, which you had
in your hands yesterday. I will read to you what you thought of these
measures. It is Page 14 of the French text and Page 12 of the German
text. It is the big Seyss-Inquart report, RF-122, 997-PS.
You write there—and I am reading from the sixth line:
“This regulation goes far beyond all similar regulations which
have been introduced so far with the national economics of
neighboring countries, including the Protectorate.”
Page 12 of the German text, 14 of the French:
“It actually represents the first step toward a currency union.
In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which
almost affects the independence of the Dutch State....”
And then you add:
“....it is of decisive importance that the president of the
bank, Trip, who is very well known in western banking and
financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in
the above sense.”
That was your impression of these measures, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, but I must admit today that the opinion I
held at that time was wrong. Otherwise I would incriminate the bank
president, Herr Trip, too deeply. What is written down here is not yet
the situation as it existed later when the Currency Frontier was
abolished. This was only the agreement between the two issuing banks
concerning the unlimited acceptance of bank notes. I should also like to
refer to the statements which I made about the qualities of Herr Trip.
The fact that he gave his approval does, in my eyes, establish the
admissibility under international law.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not state that it affected the independence of the
occupied country?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was an exaggerated optimism in my presentation of
the facts.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the Tribunal will judge as to that. On the other
hand, you contemplated the suppression of customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand your question.
M. DEBENEST: You do not wait until you have had the translation. How can
you expect to understand? I said: Did you not contemplate the
suppression of the customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not in the Netherlands certain agencies which
were charged with the looting of art objects?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot call it looting, but at any rate the
administration and care of them, and so forth.
M. DEBENEST: That is your opinion. At any rate there were several
agencies?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You are particularly well acquainted with the agency of Dr.
Mühlmann?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who called him to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I sent Mühlmann to the Netherlands ahead of me so that he
could arrange for premises for my offices.
M. DEBENEST: But it was only to set up your offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time, only to set up the offices.
M. DEBENEST: But later?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mühlmann then left and some time after he returned as an
agent of the Four Year Plan, for the safeguarding of works of art. It
was similar to what took place in Poland.
M. DEBENEST: What do you understand by “safeguarding”?
SEYSS-INQUART: In point of fact—I do not want to talk a lot about
it—but actually he had to determine whether there were any works of art
in the confiscated fortunes and then he had the task of reporting these
works of art to the various Reich offices.
M. DEBENEST: Only to report them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, because the purchasing was taken care of by these
various offices themselves. I assume—that is, I know—that he also
dealt privately in works of art, as an intermediary.
M. DEBENEST: Did you also, obtain some pictures for yourself through his
mediation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Not for myself, but for the purposes that I
described yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. You also stated yesterday that you had placed in
safekeeping a large number of works of art, particularly pictures. What
was your purpose in doing this?
SEYSS-INQUART: Many works of art I secured only in the sense that when
the decree about confiscation of enemy and Jewish property came out,
they were secured and liquidated. I bought perhaps three or four
pictures which, as I mentioned, were to be presented as gifts to the
Museum of Art History in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: No, no, I asked you for what purpose you placed these works
of art in safety.
SEYSS-INQUART: The confiscation of Jewish and enemy property had, as its
primary purpose, sequestration; but in time it became clear that these
art treasures were being bought by the Reich. These three or four
pictures I purchased with the immediate purpose of giving them to
certain Reich institutions, the Museum of Art History in Vienna, for
instance.
M. DEBENEST: But there was not only Jewish property there.
SEYSS-INQUART: I said enemy property as well, but that was not enemy
property in general, but only in cases where a specially hostile
attitude towards the Reich was proved. Such property was confiscated
also.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. That is what you wrote in a document which has
already been submitted to the Tribunal, and which you certainly know. It
is Document F-824, submitted under Number RF-1344. You know that
document. It is a letter which came from you and is addressed to Dr.
Lammers. This letter concerns the acquisition of pictures, which was
done for the Führer. In Paragraph 3 of this document, in the French
text, you write as follows:
“From the list which had been submitted to me I deduce that in
this manner a comparatively large number of valuable pictures
has been secured which the Führer was able to acquire at prices
which, according to investigations which I have made in the
country, must be described as extraordinarily low.”
Then you add that Rembrandt’s self-portrait had been found again, thanks
to Mühlmann.
Consequently, the placing in security of works of art was clearly a
means of allowing the Reich authorities to take them into Germany; isn’t
that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no doubt about that. Regarding the Rembrandt
picture, I should only like to say that it had come into Holland
illegally; and therefore it was confiscated.
M. DEBENEST: And it was taken to Germany by legal means?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that in the case of the Rembrandt picture there
was no question at all, because in this case a German regulation had
been violated.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to paintings, you also procured for yourself a
large number of works of art and diamonds, precious stones, and so on?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: You know nothing about that, but do you know that you have
a house in Vienna at Untergasse, Number 3?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is Iglauer Strasse 15. However, that may be
true, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not deposited a certain number of works of art
which had come from the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will pass on to something else.
Who ordered the confiscation of the property of the Royal House?
SEYSS-INQUART: I personally.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore you took the initiative in this matter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, not only was I the instigator, but I decided to do
that and I carried the decision through.
M. DEBENEST: So you only carried it through?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I also carried it through.
M. DEBENEST: I did not ask if you also carried it through. I asked quite
clearly if you only executed this order?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I stated very clearly yesterday the reasons why I
decided to confiscate the royal property. I also carried out the
confiscation.
M. DEBENEST: You maintained that it was the result of a speech made by
the Queen. Isn’t that what you stated yesterday?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: I will show you Document F-828, which I submit under Number
RF-1533. This document is a letter from Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of 3 July 1941. At the beginning of the
letter Bormann discusses the speech of the Queen of Holland; and in the
last paragraph, which is the one which is important to me, he writes:
“The Führer has therefore given permission to confiscate the property of
the Netherlands Royal House, for which the Reich Commissioner had
already applied at an earlier date.”
Do you still maintain that it was because of the speech made by the
Queen?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon. There was a hitch in the sound
apparatus.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, there was, but in any case you have the document in
your hands.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I know what the question is here.
M. DEBENEST: Of course you know it.
SEYSS-INQUART: It had escaped my memory entirely, that I might have
asked for that permission at an earlier date. I really cannot remember.
Perhaps I discussed the question as to whether this property was to be
confiscated or not, but the only thing I do remember is my suggestion at
the time this speech was made. After all, that was not the first speech
made by the Queen of the Netherlands. She had spoken in the same manner
previously.
M. DEBENEST: That is an explanation, and the Tribunal will take note of
it.
Now, in regard to the looting of the Netherlands and the attempt to
nazify and germanize that country—were these not the actions of the
civil government of which you were the head?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes and no. It is quite obvious to me that from the
economic point of view the Dutch people considered our conduct as
looting. Seen from the legal point of view I do not think it was. I did
not germanize the Netherlands in any way.
M. DEBENEST: Will you take Document 997-PS, Page 26 of the French text
and Page 22 of the German text? I refer to the section of your report
entitled “Remarks.” Have you got it? I will read the remarks which you
made concerning your own activities. That was on 18 July 1940:
“2) The administration is at present sufficiently under the
direction and control of the German authorities and will be
increasingly so in the future.
“3) The national economy and communications have been set in
motion again and adapted to a state of war. Plans are on foot
for large-scale reconversion geared to the continental economy,
and practically everything is ripe for this change-over. Stocks
in the country have been placed at the disposal of the Reich war
economy. Nearly all the financial resources”—that is in
1940—“have been made available and placed under the control of
the Reich, all this on the basis of extensive co-operation by
the Netherlanders.”
Isn’t that exactly what you wrote? Isn’t that exactly what you thought?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I believe that any occupation power would fully
understand Point 2, and Point 3 was a constructive conception of a new
Europe.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion which the Tribunal will judge.
I would like to return briefly to the Jewish question. You stated
yesterday that you protested against the deportation of 1,000 Jews to
Mauthausen or Buchenwald and that there had been no more deportations to
these camps. But why did you not protest against the transports to
Auschwitz? Did you think that this camp was very different from the
other two?
SEYSS-INQUART: Naturally, because Mauthausen and Buchenwald were
concentration camps, whereas I was informed that Auschwitz was an
assembly camp in which the Jews were to remain until such time as the
war would be decided or some other decision would be made.
M. DEBENEST: Before coming to the Netherlands you had been adjutant to
the Governor General of Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not adjutant, but the deputy.
M. DEBENEST: All the better. Consequently you had heard about this camp,
had you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time Auschwitz did not even exist.
M. DEBENEST: But did you not know that the ashes of those 1,000 Jews who
had been sent to Buchenwald or Mauthausen were sent back to their
families against payment of 75 guilders? This happened in 1941. That did
not prevent you later on from taking other measures against the Jews,
measures which necessarily led to their being deported?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because to my thinking this measure, which was first of
all called an evacuation, is something completely different from a
deportation or removal to a concentration camp.
M. DEBENEST: But after all you knew the fate of these Jews who were
transported to a camp in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most people, the great majority, did not know of this
fate as it is known to us today; and I testified yesterday as to my
misgivings.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion. You spoke yesterday of reprisals taken
against the newspaper in The Hague...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Is this something you cross-examined
about yesterday?
M. DEBENEST: These are questions which were handed to me this morning as
a result of statements made yesterday by the defendant. Otherwise I have
finished.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you should not go over this matter
again.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, since all of the questions concern
either hostages or—
There is still one question which I would like to ask, if the Tribunal
permit; it is a question about the flooding. All the other questions I
had in mind concern hostages; and if the Tribunal so wishes, I will not
ask them. However, may I be permitted to ask a question concerning the
flooding?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you went over the flooding
yesterday. I don’t know.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:45 in order
to sit in closed session.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have noticed that counsel for the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner is here this morning. I understood there was to be some
cross-examination of this defendant by counsel for Kaltenbrunner, and I
thought we might save time if he preceded us and finished his
cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I beg to apologize for having incurred the Tribunal’s displeasure
yesterday by not being here. But I had a very special reason, for
circumstances are sometimes stronger than the will. If I may say this, I
have been through a serious illness in the last few years and I did not
feel well, although I firmly intended to be present at the session
yesterday and had prepared everything. I respectfully beg to be excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Kauffmann, the Tribunal accepts your
explanation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much.
Witness, since when have you known the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was either 1935 or at the beginning of 1936 that I met
Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in connection with the “Langot” relief work for
National Socialist families who were in need. This was a form of support
tolerated by the police.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What part did Kaltenbrunner play in Austria before the
Anschluss in March of 1938? Did he belong to the radical elements or was
he a moderate?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the time I was told that Kaltenbrunner was closely
connected with the SS, but he was not the leader of the illegal SS. That
was an engineer from Styria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it the engineer named Leopold?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I spoke several times to Zernatto about
Kaltenbrunner. We called him the “policeman of the 11th of July” in the
Party; that is to say, it was due to his influence that radical elements
were dissuaded from excesses, such as those of July 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then Kaltenbrunner became an under state secretary in
Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the suggestion for his appointment as an under state
secretary made by Austrian circles, or did it come from Himmler and
Hitler or the Defendant Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I know, it was only made by Austrians. I myself
did not receive or accept any suggestions from the Reich regarding my
own Ministry. The Party in Austria drew my attention to Kaltenbrunner
because we wanted also to have a man in the police organization.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were his actual tasks as an under state secretary?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that as an under state secretary he did nothing
at all. After Skubl retired, the President nominated him state
secretary. In that capacity he had administrative and economic
functions. He could not intervene in the actual executive. For instance,
if I wished a man to be released from custody, then Kaltenbrunner would
have had to get in touch with the commander of the Security Police; and
if he said “no,” then we would have had to go to Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, it has been established that in 1943 Kaltenbrunner
was appointed head of the Reich Security Main Office. He has testified
here that he repeatedly tried not to accept that post. Can you say
anything about that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I only know that I was at headquarters at the end of
November or the beginning of December, 1942. On that occasion I also
visited the field headquarters of Himmler; and one of the adjutants, I
think it was Wolff, told me that the Reichsführer wanted to have
Kaltenbrunner for the Reich Security Main Office and that Kaltenbrunner
was reluctant to accept. He was now to be ordered to appear at field
headquarters and remain there for 4 weeks, where he would be handled in
such a way that he would take over the post.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that the actual reason for the
appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office
was that he was to organize and direct a political and military
intelligence service?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know certain things which go to prove that he did not
have control of Security Police matters to the same extent as Heydrich,
and I had definite facts regarding his intelligence work. In Heydrich’s
time the commander of my Security Police, when he wished to get a
decision from Berlin, only talked about Heydrich. When Kaltenbrunner
came into office, I do not remember his mentioning Kaltenbrunner; but he
talked about the Reich Security Main Office, and sometimes mentioned
Müller. I myself, as far as I can remember, only discussed Security
Police matters with Kaltenbrunner on two occasions. One was about Dr.
Schuschnigg’s further fate, and Dr. Kaltenbrunner has already told you
about that. The second time was when a relative of mine was to be taken
to a concentration camp. I went to Kaltenbrunner because he was the only
man I knew in the RSHA and I assumed he had some say there. I knew
nothing about the line drawn between the various functions. On that
occasion Kaltenbrunner telephoned to Müller in a manner such as a
superior would never adopt when talking to a subordinate official. I
have positive proof of his activities, because since 1944 I worked
closely with Kaltenbrunner in that respect. I placed at his disposal
foreign currency for his foreign intelligence service, that is, I
obtained it for him from the departments concerned; everything was done
in conjunction with the appropriate department in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just now you mentioned Müller. Do you mean Gestapo Chief
Müller?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have the impression that this man really held the
reins as far as Security Police matters were concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can only say that I know that in the course of that
telephone conversation Kaltenbrunner said to Müller: “What will you
decide in this case?”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you received military and political reports directly
from Kaltenbrunner? Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, quite often. Those were the very secret reports of
which only four copies were made, I believe.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was this the case before Kaltenbrunner’s nomination?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Kaltenbrunner only introduced these reports at the
end of 1943 or 1944, if I remember rightly.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the difference between those reports and the
reports formerly prepared by Canaris?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about the Canaris reports, or very little.
I know them from the former Reich Security Main Office.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that the reports made by Kaltenbrunner were
noted for their particularly sharp and open criticism of all public
measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that too. Kaltenbrunner’s reports were, above all,
really objective; and not prepared reports serving certain ends.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How big were these reports?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think these reports generally ran into 40 to 60 pages,
sometimes more; and they probably were issued every three or four weeks,
as far as I know; but there must have been special reports as well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether these special reports were addressed
to military offices or did they—the ones you have just mentioned—sum
up the situation from the military point of view?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reports of which I am speaking were predominantly
political and they were addressed directly to the Führer. In connection
with these reports I remember they contained particularly severe
criticism of the attitude of the Reich toward the Poles and toward the
Catholic Church and that they were written on stationery with the Reich
Security Main Office heading, which appeared to me then to be an
impossible state of affairs.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned two criticisms. Can you perhaps
tell me what was the gist of that criticism of the two phases of public
life which you have just mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: With regard to the Poles, it demanded quite tersely that
the Poles should once again be given an autonomous and independent
existence as a state, or at least they should be promised it; and
speaking of the Catholic Church, it demanded that all administrative and
other measures should be rescinded and that the Catholic and Protestant
Churches should in no way be molested.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that you became a Party member
in 1938 and that your Party membership number was somewhere in the
millions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Seven million. The membership came into effect from 13
March 1938. That is when I formally became a member of the Party.
MR. DODD: Well, when you say “formally,” you are trying to distinguish
then, as I understand it, and point out that you were in fact, although
maybe not formally, a Party member for some time. You paid dues and you
supported the Party, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: The first two points are incorrect. I only paid
subscriptions from the autumn of 1937—I beg your pardon, from the
autumn of 1932 until 1933; inwardly I felt myself to be a National
Socialist and a Party member, without however having made any formal
declaration of loyalty.
MR. DODD: Were you a member of the Styrian Home Protective Organization
(Steierischer Heimatschutz)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Styrian Home Protective Organization, yes, from the
autumn of 1932.
MR. DODD: And that organization was taken over, practically in its
entirety, by the National Socialists at a time when you were a member,
wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That had been the intention, but it was not carried out.
There had been an agreement that the Styrian Home Protective
Organization was to be taken into the Party, but Munich did not carry
this out. Individual members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization
had to join the Party individually.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man with the name of Dr. Andreas Morsey,
M-o-r-s-e-y?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean Andreas M-o-s-e-r? I think he was a
solicitor, but I did not know him personally.
MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he was also a member of the Styrian
Home Protective Organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: Do you remember having a conversation with him on 7 March
1938, just a few days before the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have no recollection of it.
MR. DODD: Well, let me see if I can help you. Do you remember telling
him that you entered the Styrian Home Protective Organization in 1932
and that that was shortly before that organization was forbidden?
[_The Interpreter translated: “....telling him that you were Chief of
the Styrian Home Protective Organization....”_]
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite out of the question. The Chief of the
Styrian Home Protective Organization was Konstantin Kammerhofer. The
whole of Austria knew that.
MR. DODD: You don’t remember, then, having any conversation in which you
said such as I have just stated to you? Is your statement that you never
said it or that you don’t remember the conversation? That is what I am
trying to get at.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do remember that conversation; but I am stating that it
is out of the question that I could have said that I was the Chief of
the Styrian Home Protective Organization, because the whole of Austria
knew that it was Konstantin Kammerhofer. At most I may have told him
that I was very friendly with Kammerhofer, as indeed I was.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to show you then his statement, or his testimony
rather, in the Case of the People _versus_ Dr. Guido Schmidt. It is
Document Number 3992. This testimony was given before the Supreme Penal
Court in Vienna on 19 March 1946 before Judge Sucher.
We offer this as USA-882.
I ask you to look at the second page and you will find a sentence which
begins:
“On 7 March 1938 Seyss-Inquart personally informed me that he
had entered this organization in 1932, that is, before it was
made impossible; shortly before the Styrian Home Protective
Organization was forbidden.”
Then he goes on and makes reference to the man Kammerhofer, whom you
just made reference to, and further down, in the next sentence, he says:
“He (Seyss-Inquart) had entered this organization and had been
admitted by the leader, Engineer Pichler (Franz), in Waitz and
he had never left the organization.”
Therefore your statement that you had not been a member of the NSDAP can
be considered formally correct; but the statement that you had not
worked illegally, he says, is not true.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Moser could not possibly know whether I worked
illegally. He is basing his statement on the assumption that the Home
Protective Organization was actually amalgamated with the NSDAP, and
that is incorrect. The witness Uiberreither can confirm this. I still
hold entirely to my testimony.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man named Rainer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Very well, indeed. Dr. Friedrich Rainer.
MR. DODD: Yes. You have asked for him and he is coming here as a witness
on your behalf, isn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: But what do you say if he says that you became a member of the
NSDAP when that Styrian Home Protective Organization went over?
SEYSS-INQUART: To that I wish to say for all...
MR. DODD: By the way, before you answer let me tell you something that
will help you. This document is already in evidence, so I assume you may
have seen it. It is Number 812-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It is a letter, a report from Dr. Rainer.
MR. DODD: So you know what he has said, I assume. You have seen the
document, have you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: You agree that he does say in this document that you were a
member through your membership in the Styrian Home Protective
Organization and that you joined the Party, so to speak, when that
organization was taken over?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I should like to say that until 1938 that was also
my opinion, and I never doubted whether I was or was not. But in 1938
the Party stated clearly that it did not recognize that fusion and that
the members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization were not members
of the Party but that every one of them had to join the Party
individually to be a Party member. Rainer will surely confirm that.
MR. DODD: Well, tell me this, whether or not you were formally a member,
didn’t you during all this time acknowledge the leadership of Klausner,
who was the leader of the National Socialist Party in Austria; and
didn’t you follow his wishes and obey his directions?
SEYSS-INQUART: The leadership in Austria or in Germany?
MR. DODD: In Austria. I am talking about Klausner, who was in Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It was clear to me and I recognized the fact that
Klausner was the leader of the Austrian National Socialists. I did not
recognize Klausner as my political leader, a fact which is made clear by
the same report which you, Mr. Prosecutor, have just mentioned. There
Rainer says, “Seyss-Inquart recognized Klausner in political matters
which were actually not binding.”
MR. DODD: Well, he says precisely the opposite, if you will take a look
at it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh, no.
MR. DODD: Well, now, wait a minute and look on Page 9, I think, of the
German text, Line 7 from the bottom; in the English text it is Page 7:
“Relations between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner were as follows:
Seyss acknowledged unconditionally the Party leadership with
respect to the whole program and thereby also Klausner’s
leadership. As a Party member, he therefore subordinated himself
specifically and literally to Klausner’s leadership.”
Do you find that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have only a draft before me, but it goes on to say:
“Over and above that, he declared himself, on the basis of the
agreement at Berchtesgaden and particularly on the basis of the
declarations made to him by the Führer on the occasion of his
staff visit to Berlin, as being a trustee of the illegal NSDAP
in Austria directly responsible to the Führer within his
political and state functions.”
Then there must be another passage where I say that in regard to
political matters I would not subordinate myself to Klausner.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway, to move along, it is a fact, isn’t it, that very
early in this period you acknowledged your unqualified allegiance to
Hitler, and long before the Anschluss, too? You acknowledged your
political allegiance, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: One can almost say that. As far as “unqualified
allegiance” was concerned, that was not clear to me at the time, because
it was my opinion that Hitler, too, wanted a revolutionary course.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Didn’t you have something to do with the
Dollfuss matter other than what you have told the Tribunal? You know, of
course, that Rainer says that you did, in this same Document 812-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: And I think it is important that you make some answer to it.
You haven’t done it on your direct testimony, and the document is in
evidence, and in it he says that you supported...
SEYSS-INQUART: The reason, Mr. Prosecutor, why I did not do it was
because Rainer is coming here as a witness. Rainer will have to tell us
here under oath on which facts he bases his statements. I can only say
“no.”
MR. DODD: Well, I know. I understand that, and that is another reason
for asking you now. You see, you will be off the witness stand when he
is on it; and I would like to know what you say now to what Rainer has
said in this document, which is in evidence, to the effect that you were
involved in the Dollfuss plot on 25 July 1934.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite wrong.
MR. DODD: All right. In connection with this there is one other matter I
think we should clear up now if we can. You didn’t mean to convey to the
Tribunal, did you, that the ceremonies—if I may use that
expression—commemorating the assassination of Dollfuss had nothing to
do with Dollfuss at the time that they were held?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly do wish to create that impression, because
that ceremony was for the seven National Socialists who had been hanged
at that time. On that occasion, as far as I remember, there was no
thought of Dollfuss’ death; but only of the fact that several men of the
Standarte, I think Number 107 or 108, had made an attempt to do away
with a system which in National Socialist opinion was hostile to the
Reich, and as a result seven were hanged. The fact that Dollfuss was
shot on that same occasion was not mentioned during the ceremony.
MR. DODD: Well, I don’t say that it was, but the ceremony certainly
commemorated the attack on Dollfuss; and I think it is quibbling, is it
not, to say that it had no reference to it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, if Dollfuss had not been shot, then the ceremony
would have been carried out just the same.
MR. DODD: Are you sure of that; you think that all would have been
hanged if he hadn’t been shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I know they were hanged.
MR. DODD: Well, you were appointed a State Councillor in 1937—and of
course again we are going to talk a good deal about this in this short
time, about Rainer and this document. You know Rainer also says that you
were appointed through the influence of Keppler and other Nazis in
Austria and Reich officials. Is that so? Did they influence your
appointment in 1937? Rainer is wrong about that as well, is he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all—Keppler had no influence at all on the
nomination as State Councillor.
MR. DODD: And Rainer, in your judgment, is in error when he says that
they did have? You disagree with his statement, as I understand it. I
want to make that clear.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely incorrect.
MR. DODD: All right.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was appointed State Councillor because Zernatto had
discussed the matter with a friend of mine and then suggested it to
Schuschnigg. A proposal from Keppler would probably have been a reason
for Schuschnigg’s not nominating me.
MR. DODD: It was just a casual thing, and Schuschnigg appointed you
because somebody spoke to him; and the Nazis with whom you were familiar
in those days had nothing to do with it, had they?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I would not say. I discussed with Rainer the
possibility of an appointment as State Councillor, because our mutual
acquaintance had previously discussed the question with Zernatto. I then
discussed it with Rainer, but he exercised no influence with regard to
the appointment.
MR. DODD: You have seen the document known as the Hossbach Minutes,
USA-25, 386-PS, introduced before this Tribunal many months ago. Do you
recall then that Hitler, in the course of this discourse, as is reported
by Hossbach, stated some of the plans that he had for Austria as well as
for Czechoslovakia? Do you remember that? It is in the document, I can
assure you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: That was the 11th of November 1937—no, I’m sorry—it was on
the 5th of November 1937. When did you first hear about that meeting?
For the first time in your life, when did you hear about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Here, in this room.
MR. DODD: Now, do you remember the letter you wrote on 11 November to
Dr. Jury?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Do you remember it very well, or would you like to see a copy
of it? I will show it to you. We have a copy here. You haven’t seen
this; this is a new document.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have also got a copy.
MR. DODD: It is 3396-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is right.
MR. DODD: What did you mean when you wrote to Jury on 11 November 1937,
when you wrote:
“....I personally believe that there will be no visible results
until early next year. In the meantime, I have received an
authentic report from Linz....”
and you go on to talk about a newspaper article.
What I wanted to know was, what did you mean by the events in the early
part of 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the situation prevailing in Austria at that time, it
was clear that the internal political position would not remain static.
The optimistic National Socialists thought that during the coming weeks
either Schuschnigg would retire or something else would happen. I viewed
the situation more correctly, and it was my opinion that the new
internal political development in Austria would not take place until the
spring, that is to say, developments in the direction of further
permissible activities on the part of the National Socialists. The
newspaper article is something quite different.
MR. DODD: I am really not concerned about that unless you feel that it
is important to your answer. I wanted to go back a little bit. You see,
you open your letter by referring to a conversation with Mr. Keppler.
Now, he is the man who was Hitler’s emissary on 11 and 12 March when
Austria was handed over to the Nazis, isn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: And you say:
“The conversations with Mr. Keppler today were carried on in an
atmosphere of complete calm, and they were also extremely
revealing. I do not believe that things are so ripe for
discussion as they appear to be from the national side and in
the Reich.”
Then you go on:
“I should be pleasantly surprised if an initial solution were to
be found before the end of this year.”
What you were really talking about was the handing over of Austria to
the Nazis. Isn’t that what you had in mind when you wrote this letter?
Isn’t that the “initial solution”?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. First of all, it does not say that my conversations
with Keppler were secret, but only that they were informative.
MR. DODD: It says “in complete calm.” I don’t know whether that is
secret. I don’t know what that means.
SEYSS-INQUART: It means that we talked very realistically. The Reich was
very insistent. We might have discussed the possibility of applying some
diplomatic pressure, but the aim was to promote the activities of the
National Socialists in Austria, with the intention, however, of
achieving the ultimate goal of the Anschluss.
The contents of the Hossbach Document were not mentioned at all, and I
am convinced that Keppler had no knowledge of it. Keppler did not have a
very strong position with the Führer at all.
MR. DODD: Yes. You recall you wrote Keppler a letter a little later, in
January of 1938. Do you remember that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: That you wanted to give up your mandate or your trust or your
responsibility or whatever the proper expression is.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: What kind of mandate did you have from Keppler or from Göring,
to which Keppler refers in his letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the mandate was the Austrian State Councillorship. I
wanted to give it up, as well as the task of investigating the
understanding necessary for obtaining the co-operation of the National
Opposition. I did not receive any mandate at all from Keppler, and I
could hardly have accepted one.
MR. DODD: You know the document that is in evidence, 3397-PS. It is
USA-702. And Keppler says that he informed Göring of the situation and
that Göring told him to keep you at your task, or that is the sense of
it.
Now, my question is, why should Göring be interested in this mandate if
it only had to do with your position as State Councillor in Austria? He
wasn’t an official of the Austrian Government, and you were.
SEYSS-INQUART: In that case may I have the document?
MR. DODD: Yes, indeed. You will also find reference in here to Dr. Jury,
the very man concerning whom we talked a few minutes back and to whom
you wrote that letter on 11 November.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which passage do you mean, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, my question about it is this, I am wondering why Keppler
would go to Göring with your desire to withdraw from whatever position
it was that you occupied with respect to the Nazis or, as you put it,
with respect to your place as State Councillor; and it is even more of a
problem to us with respect to your explanation. What did Göring have to
do with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that Dr. Schuschnigg had given me the
task of investigating conditions for co-operating with the National
Opposition. I always told Schuschnigg that the Austrian National
Socialists would not accept any offers without Hitler’s agreement. With
the knowledge of Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg I visited Göring and Hess.
Both these gentlemen knew that I not only had contact with the Austrian
National Socialists, but also with the gentlemen in the Reich, through
Keppler. This was also known to these gentlemen in the Reich, and they
were interested. If now I were suddenly to say, “I’m through, I’m not
going on with it,” then I considered it my duty to inform these
gentlemen in the Reich that they could no longer count on my
co-operation. That, I believe, is a matter of course. One could not do
otherwise.
MR. DODD: Yes, and the letter that you wrote to Jury on 11 November was
after your meeting with Hess and Göring; too, wasn’t it? Of course it
was; you saw Hess and Göring in July 1937.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the Reich Marshal testified to that already.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now I will ask you a little bit about this
meeting with Von Papen in Garmisch. That just happened casually and was
not planned, as I understood you. You talked about the possibility of
the place of the Minister of Security being filled by a member of the
Nazi Party. What I want to know is, did you also talk about the possible
trip of Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, which didn’t come so long after
this meeting, did it? Was it mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, we did not talk about the technical means, whether a
meeting between Dr. Schuschnigg and Hitler would take place and so forth
or whether this should be accomplished through diplomatic channels—that
was not discussed by us.
MR. DODD: Wasn’t it discussed at all, that’s all I want to know? Wasn’t
there any discussion about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: A meeting between these two state leaders was not
discussed, but only the material content of our plan.
MR. DODD: When, for the first time, did you learn about the proposed
meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and from whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think 2 days—it must have been on 10 February that I
received information from Rainer or Globocznik telling me that this
meeting was expected to take place. At about the same time Zernatto
asked me to come to Vienna, but he still did not tell me what it was
about.
MR. DODD: Actually, isn’t it a fact that you prepared notes or, if you
prefer to call it, a memorandum for Hitler which he used as the basis of
his discussions with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made a written proposal for clearing up the matter; and
I gave it to Zernatto, on the one hand, and to Dr. Rainer on the other.
It is perfectly possible that Rainer passed it on to the Reich. I would
also have seen nothing wrong with that.
MR. DODD: You know very well, don’t you, that Mühlmann was sent up there
that night by you and your associates; and he got to Berchtesgaden ahead
of Schuschnigg and Von Papen with that memorandum, isn’t that a fact?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann is...
MR. DODD: Yes, the same gentlemen you referred to as having been in
Holland with you, and in Berchtesgaden.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann went to Berchtesgaden at that time and was
informed about my last conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg. He will
probably have noted that down.
MR. DODD: Don’t you know that he did, and Schuschnigg didn’t know—and
that’s the important thing—what Mühlmann was doing up there ahead of
him with the notes or the conditions that you had presented to
Schuschnigg the night before. Schuschnigg didn’t know that, did he, when
he went there like a lamb to Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced Schuschnigg did not know that Mühlmann was
in Berchtesgaden and had quite probably informed Keppler who in turn
informed the Führer. Schuschnigg certainly did not know that. When I
talked to Dr. Schuschnigg, I did not know Mühlmann would go along.
MR. DODD: When did you find out that Mühlmann would go?
SEYSS-INQUART: After the discussion with Dr. Schuschnigg I returned to
my office, and there I found Dr. Rainer and perhaps someone else; and I
told Dr. Rainer about our conversation. Possibly Mühlmann was present,
and then we—I say we, because I do not want to except myself from
this—we decided to inform Keppler of the nature of our conversation. In
the meantime, Dr. Schuschnigg had probably gone to the station. I really
did not see any reason for informing him directly at this time.
MR. DODD: And so you did want to inform Hitler then—did I hear you
correctly—of the nature of your conversation with your Chancellor
Schuschnigg that night?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time I had no opportunity or cause to inform Dr.
Schuschnigg of the fact that Mühlmann was going there.
MR. DODD: I know you may not have seen any cause, but what I am trying
to make clear is that you did want to let Hitler know that you had had
this conversation with Schuschnigg and what you had said to Schuschnigg.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Why in the world were you notifying the head of another State
about your conversation with the head of your own State, to which you
owed allegiance?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not see that this is a breach of faith. It was
giving information to heads of two parties to an agreement, for whom I
was negotiating.
MR. DODD: Would you say that you could negotiate between your country
and Germany at that time without notifying your own Chancellor?
Schuschnigg didn’t know that you’d sent that note on to Hitler, did he?
Now be frank about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is certain that Dr. Schuschnigg did not know
this. But Dr. Schuschnigg did know very well that I was in constant
contact with the Reich through Keppler and that the outcome of our
conversations was always passed on to the Reich, for the Reich also had
to express an opinion. I always said there can be no internal political
understanding unless Hitler agrees with it. That is a fact, and nothing
can be done about it; whether it is morally right or not, that was the
position. Otherwise there should have been no attempt at carrying
through a policy of understanding.
MR. DODD: That was not the only time that you did not play completely
fairly with Schuschnigg, was it? Do you remember when you gave him your
word of honor that you would not make known his plans to announce the
plebiscite? Remember when he first told you and asked you on your word
to keep quiet and you told him that you would?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: You went right from that meeting to the Regina Hotel, and do
you remember what your associates asked you and what answers you made?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot help you; I think you are
confusing two events. At that time I did not go to the Regina Hotel. It
was on the evening of 10 March, and it was an entirely different matter.
First of all, it was wrong for Dr. Schuschnigg to ask me for my word of
honor, for he himself employed me as liaison man in connection with the
agreement of 12 February. Had I known in advance what he wanted of me, I
would have turned it down, for on the basis of the agreement of 12
February it was my duty immediately to inform the Reich of this. But I
kept my word. On the same evening Jury came to me. He had heard about
this from other sources, and I did not mention a single word to Jury
that I knew about it. During the forenoon of the following day, Rainer
came. I did not take part in these negotiations until it was nearly
midday. Rainer says that it was in the forenoon, but it was really
towards noon.
MR. DODD: Well, I will accept the correction as to the time, but I don’t
think it is very important. The point is...
SEYSS-INQUART: It is very important in my opinion.
MR. DODD: Very well, if you think it is, we will settle for that. I want
you to read what Rainer says about your keeping of your word.
“Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
few hours but that he could not talk about it because he had
given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
conversation he made us understand that the illegal information
we received was based on truth and that in view of the new
situation, he had been co-operating with the regional leaders
(Landesleiter) from the very first moment.”
Now, certainly, that is not keeping silent or keeping your word as both
you and Schuschnigg understood it, is it?
SEYSS-INQUART: In this case, it was absolutely impossible to do
otherwise. It was getting on towards noon on the day on which my pledge
of silence expired. The gentlemen sat in front of me and told me all the
details. I could not now suddenly say that this was all a bunch of lies,
for I did not promise Schuschnigg to lie either. Instead, I kept silent
about it, and from that the others deduced that that was probably so.
MR. DODD: You knew when to keep silent and you knew when to make
observations in order to give information to your associates what
Schuschnigg had asked you to keep confidential.
Now, when did you learn the true nature of what happened at
Berchtesgaden, about the threats and about the terrible way that
Schuschnigg was treated up there?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I heard from Zernatto. I think that was already on
13 February. Then I heard it from Foreign Minister Schmidt, and Dr.
Schuschnigg told me more or less the same thing. It was therefore
probably on 13 or 14 February.
MR. DODD: Well then, you had a rather complete picture of the way that
Schuschnigg was threatened; and I suppose you knew about Keitel being
called in to frighten him, and all the threats of marching in by
sundown. You had a rather full knowledge of what happened up there,
didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember the story of Keitel, but Schuschnigg
told me that the generals were up there, and obviously military pressure
was to be exercised.
MR. DODD: And you knew, too, that Hitler had demanded your inclusion in
the Government as Minister of Security. Schuschnigg told you that,
didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I believe that Hitler had demanded that the National
Socialists should be given the Ministry of the Interior and Security.
Schuschnigg agreed and to Hitler’s question as to whom he proposed
Schuschnigg was supposed to have mentioned my name. But that is nothing
but rumors and stories and I do not know any details. At any rate, that
happened in the course of these very dramatic conversations.
MR. DODD: I think this is rather important, because you have a witness
coming here who was there at that meeting, Dr. Schmidt. Are you now
telling this Tribunal that it was Schuschnigg who suggested your name,
and not Hitler who demanded that you be appointed?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do hot want to tell the Tribunal any stories; I merely
want to make my contribution to clear up the background of events as far
as the Charter allows. I say explicitly, I have heard that it was so. If
Schmidt was there and says that it was otherwise, then of course I will
believe him.
MR. DODD: Can you tell us who told you that, because we have the sworn
testimony of President Miklas, who says Hitler demanded it. We know that
Schuschnigg says Hitler demanded it and Dr. Guido Schmidt is going to
tell you that Hitler demanded it. Now, who told you that it was
Schuschnigg?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann told me that. But I wish to say that the
facts are as you state them, Mr. Prosecutor, for this is just a tactical
detail. If the Führer forced Schuschnigg to cede the Ministry of the
Interior, and then there was an exchange of words and he stated my name
first, then I do not want to draw the slightest conclusion from that for
my defense.
MR. DODD: Well, I think that is very brave. The fact of the matter is
that it was all arranged; you knew it, and so did Hitler, that you were
to be included in their government and that anything that went on there
was unimportant as to who actually mentioned your name first.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. But I did not know for sure that on that
day Hitler would demand the Ministry of the Interior and would nominate
me, because Herr Von Papen did not inform me about the outcome of his
conversation with Hitler. I only supposed that things would take that
course. I was by no means such a persona grata in Berlin that Berlin
would certainly decide on me.
MR. DODD: Now, not many days after that so-called agreement, which was
reached in Berchtesgaden, Hitler broke it, did he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: On 17 February, yes.
MR. DODD: He broke it before the 17th, didn’t he? Do you remember when
he appointed Klausner as the head of the Party, despite the fact that he
had agreed with Schuschnigg that no such thing would be done and that
there would be no such political organization? You knew about that,
didn’t you, when it was done?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon, but I think perhaps I misunderstood
your first question...
MR. DODD: Maybe it is a little involved. The point is that a few days
after this meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler appointed Klausner as the
head of the illegal Nazi Party in Austria; isn’t that so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that only happened after 17 February, because I
myself suggested to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner’s being
the leader of the Nazis in Austria. It was perfectly clear to me that no
National Socialist in Austria would follow anybody unless Hitler was
agreeable.
MR. DODD: Would you accept the recorded history of Guido Zernatto, whose
book you have offered to the Tribunal? Would you accept his record of
when it happened?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I would.
MR. DODD: He says it was a few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting. I
suppose that could be the 17th, but it is not likely. Wasn’t it before
you went to Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Who said that—I?
MR. DODD: Zernatto.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the first time in my life that I saw Hitler was on 17
February; and at that time I think Klausner had not yet been nominated,
because I myself mentioned to Hitler that he ought to agree to
Klausner’s becoming the leader of the Austrian National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Now I see that you recognize that. That is a very crucial
matter in your whole dealing between Austria and Germany, because if, as
Zernatto indicates, this agreement was broken a few days after the
meeting, then when you went to Berlin and talked about a Trojan Horse
you knew that Hitler had already started his illegal activity in
Austria, didn’t you, if, indeed, it was before you went there.
SEYSS-INQUART: I would like to say that the illegal activities—not
necessarily Hitler’s but several people’s—never ceased, and it was my
intention to shape this illegal activity in such a way that we could
control it from the Austrian side. I also told Schuschnigg repeatedly
that the Austrian Nazis would do nothing without Hitler.
MR. DODD: Well, that is not the point. I am not going to labor it
further. I am going to ask you one other question about your meeting
with Hitler. You surely knew by the 17th how badly Schuschnigg and Guido
Schmidt had been treated at Berchtesgaden. Did you say anything to
Hitler about that in the course of your 2½ hours’ conversation with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for I am not responsible for the policy of the
Fatherland Front against the National Socialists in 1934. It was only
the reaction to the suppression of the National Socialists in Austria.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now we come down to 8 March. That is the day
that Schuschnigg told you about the plebiscite that he intended to hold
in a few days.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: It was on 9 March that you wrote the letter to Schuschnigg and
sent the copy of it to Hitler, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Did you tell Schuschnigg that you were sending a copy by
courier to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know; but I would have had no qualms about it,
because after 12 February 1938, I had to inform the Reich.
MR. DODD: You certainly also had to inform Schuschnigg, didn’t you, as
his State Councillor, that you were sending a copy of this very
important letter to Hitler? You did not tell Schuschnigg anything about
that, isn’t that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is possible, but I believe that I may have told
Zernatto. I certainly told Zernatto that I was informing the Reich. Of
that there is no doubt.
MR. DODD: We will see about that. The next night you had a meeting with
Schuschnigg and with Schmidt and with Skubl, I guess in the Chancellery
office. You never mentioned the fact to any one of them there, did you,
that you had already communicated with Hitler by special courier; do you
remember that meeting?
SEYSS-INQUART: Actually I have no clear idea of it. I only remember the
meeting on the evening of 10 March, but I think it is quite possible
that it...
MR. DODD: That is the night that you did go to the Regina Hotel and saw
Klausner; immediately after that meeting you went right down to the
street and saw your associates. Did you tell them what Schuschnigg had
said to you and what you had said to Schuschnigg in the conversation a
little earlier?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I found a most amazing lack of interest.
MR. DODD: But your courier was back from Berlin, wasn’t he; Globocznik
had returned from Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Globocznik came back and informed us that Berlin
refused to agree to this plebiscite, and that the following day I would
receive a letter indicating Hitler’s attitude.
MR. DODD: Now, during that same meeting at the Regina Hotel you heard
Rainer give instructions for the mobilization of the Party in Austria to
be ready to put on demonstrations or to seize power the next day. You
were there when he laid out his plans. Do you remember that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that is a considerable exaggeration on Rainer’s
part. I only remember that Klausner said, “Well, then everybody is to
keep in touch with him tomorrow.” That demonstrations might of course
take place was so obvious that everybody was aware of it. If the matters
were not cleared up now, there would be serious demonstrations. But the
Government also knew that.
MR. DODD: I think we can get over it pretty quickly if you will agree
with me that these demonstrations were not spontaneous at all, as I
thought you were trying to convey to the Tribunal, but they were well
planned out by your associates.
SEYSS-INQUART: That the actions were not spontaneous? Certainly they
were not spontaneous.
MR. DODD: They were not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The entire situation after 8 March became more and more
heated.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, when Glaise-Horstenau came back from Berlin on
the next morning, 11 March, he told you about the planned military
events or the talk of military events in Berlin, didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and we told Dr. Schuschnigg the same thing.
MR. DODD: You went to see Schuschnigg and you wrote him another letter
that same morning.
SEYSS-INQUART: Before that, during a conversation which lasted for
nearly 2 hours, I reported all details. The letter was merely a
confirmation.
MR. DODD: Well, the letter was an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, wasn’t it;
and it was written by you at the direction of your political superior,
Klausner?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Rainer has asserted that—that again is one of his
assertions. If you can call it an ultimatum, then I had already given
that orally, because when I left Dr. Schuschnigg I asked him to reply to
me by 2 o’clock in the afternoon; and I said that in the event of his
refusal Glaise-Horstenau and I would have to resign, but at that time I
had not even spoken to Klausner yet.
MR. DODD: Well, as I take it, everything that Rainer has said in this
report, in this Document 812-PS, you say is untrue. He also says
there...
SEYSS-INQUART: Not untrue, but slightly exaggerated.
MR. DODD: All right. I just want to get your views, I repeat, because
you will not be available after he comes on the stand. You know he also
says that he talked with you about the seizure of power in the event
that Schuschnigg refused your ultimatum. Do you say that is so or not
so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. I do not think so.
MR. DODD: What do you say about his statement that you discussed three
definite possible steps for the taking over of Austria and handing it
over to Germany? Is that true or not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that that is a construction placed on it
afterwards by Rainer.
MR. DODD: Now, I have to ask you about these things because we must get
your view, I think.
SEYSS-INQUART: Please do.
MR. DODD: Rainer also says that the telegram, the now well-known
telegram to Hitler saying that there was a bad situation in
Austria—that that telegram was actually brought back from Berlin by
Glaise-Horstenau. He says that in the same document. What do you say to
that?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is not quite correct. Hitler’s letter...
MR. DODD: Well, how is it correct, if it isn’t quite correct? You
indicate that there is some truth in it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I received Hitler’s letter through a courier, not through
Glaise-Horstenau. And in that letter there was a draft for a telegram.
MR. DODD: And that is the same telegram that Göring referred to when he
talked to you on the telephone, and the same one that Keppler referred
to when he talked to Dietrich on the telephone, isn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that telegram was at least twice as long and I very
decidedly rejected this telegram.
MR. DODD: Well, finally, let me ask you this about that particular day.
This radio speech that you made was really made at the direction of
Göring, was it not? He told you...
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: ...to make a statement, didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no question of it. That would have been of no
interest to me.
MR. DODD: You had better look at the transcript of his telephone
conversation with you. It was 1957 hours that night, when he told you to
make a statement to the people, and about 3 minutes later you went on
the radio and made it. What do you mean that Göring did not tell you to
do it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but Göring asked me to do something quite different.
He asked me to declare myself head of a provisional government and to
take over power. At least that is what I believe. I introduced myself as
Minister of Interior and Security and I demanded that the people should
keep calm and should not put up any resistance to the German troops who
were marching in, which was exactly what Schuschnigg had said half an
hour before me.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway it only took you 2 or 3 minutes to get to the
microphone after you talked to Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: I talked to Field Marshal Göring such a lot—I do not
want to involve him or myself in all that we did on the basis of the
telephone calls. I believe that I did hardly any of these things.
MR. DODD: You are not indicating, are you, that Göring was not
interested in your selling out Austria to Germany? He certainly had a
great interest in what happened there that day, had he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I do not think the expression “selling out” is
very suitable. Obviously Göring was extremely interested in bringing
this thing to a final conclusion, perhaps in some drastic way.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that there were about 40 SS
men in the building and that you thought they were there because Miklas
and Schuschnigg did nothing to remove them, that they could very easily
have removed them. Now, the truth of the matter is that you were the
Minister for Security; and it was your responsibility to remove them,
was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not the master of the Federal Chancellery.
Apart from that, there was Dr. Skubl; and one word from Dr. Miklas or
Dr. Schuschnigg would have sufficed to bring in 300 men from the Guard
Battalion to restore order. One could not expect me, at that moment, to
proceed against National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Well, if one word from them would have sufficed, just the wave
of your finger would have sufficed, would it not, to get them out of
there? They were your National Socialist SS men; beside the fact that
you were the head of the police.
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether they would have obeyed me or not I do not know. I
did not have command over the Guard Battalion because it was part of the
Armed Forces. Undoubtedly I could have exercised my influence and it
might have been successful, but the fact that these 40 men were there
seemed to me to be quite insignificant.
MR. DODD: The place was surrounded with them, was it not? They were not
only in the building, but they were outside of it and on the roofs of
neighboring buildings. You remember all that?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were a few thousand National Socialists in front of
the Federal Chancellery at the time.
MR. DODD: Well, we had better refer to your friend Rainer, who is coming
here on your behalf, and see what he says about it.
Have you seen the article—yes, I guess it is fair to call it an
article—that he wrote about that historical night? Are you familiar
with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh yes; one can really call it more than an article.
MR. DODD: Yes. He called it “The Hours of Historical Decision.”
This is 4004-PS, Mr. President, USA-883.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You will agree, then, that it is quite a
different picture that Rainer gives from what you have given this
Tribunal, is it not? If you know the article, and you say you do. He
says, you know, that Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men there that night
and that Lukesch had 6,000 SA men within half an hour, and they received
the order to advance and occupy the Federal Chancellery and to hold the
Ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was
proclaimed; and that 40 SS men under Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant, Rinner,
received the order to force their way into and occupy the Federal
Chancellery, and so on. And you ordered—he says that you are the man
who ordered—that Rinner be let in. That is very important, and I would
like to know what you say about that. Rinner was in command of the 40 SS
men that you say somebody else should have removed. You will find that
he says:
“It was getting on towards 10 o’clock when the commanding
officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr.
Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by
40 others was demanding to be let in through the gate on the
strength of higher orders. I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that
these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed to occupy
the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be
brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by
a lanky guardsman, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian champion
runner....” and so on.
He was the first National Socialist Sturmführer who entered the
headquarters that night; and you are the man, actually, who let him in.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is a victory article, written in the flush of
victory. All I can say is that I saw these National Socialists, in black
trousers and white shirts, in the corridors; and I asked, “What is going
on?” But this dramatic account about my opening the gate—well, let’s
wait and see whether Rainer confirms that.
MR. DODD: Well, I understand that; we look forward to it as well as you
do.
You will notice that a little further on he says that you, on your own
responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and let these men in.
But you say that isn’t so. That is all I want to know.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite new to me.
MR. DODD: Well, I think we can pass on. There isn’t any truth at all, I
expect, is there, in this whole article by Rainer? Or is there something
in it that you might admit is true? You know he is going to be your
witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am also extremely interested in hearing what he has to
say here. This is a somewhat poetical account of these events. The basis
is certainly correct, but there is a lot of victorious exultation
attached to it.
MR. DODD: I think I should also tell you, by way of a preliminary to a
question, that Guido Schmidt, in testimony which we have here and which
I will be glad to present to you, says that the place was surrounded by
these SS men and that they were in there with your knowledge. What do
you say to that? He is also going to be your witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have said that a few thousand National Socialists had
collected around the Federal Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA
men, that I do not know. There were quite a lot of women among them.
This so-called mobilization order of the Party was unknown to me; but I
told Dr. Schuschnigg that very morning that if we could not agree, then
he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations by the Party.
MR. DODD: Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal—did I
understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned
without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then
the Bundespräsident of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned
without any request from you?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was my request that he should sign the Anschluss Law,
and he said he would not do that. According to the Constitution his
powers would then pass to me. He did not want to stand in the way of
developments. I do not think I told him to resign; I merely demanded
that he sign the law.
MR. DODD: Well, he has testified before a court in Vienna, in which
testimony he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember or have you
forgotten or do you say that is untrue?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I consider that is out of the question because I
clearly remember that he said:
“I cannot sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of
developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the
Anschluss should be carried out, then I shall resign and you
will have my powers.”
If he understood that as a demand to resign, then I do not want to
contradict him. I do not want to make his position any more difficult,
because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to offer this in evidence, and you may look at it
if you like. In any event, it is his testimony before a court in Vienna
on 30 January 1946. It is Document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If
you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you,
that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for
you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from
Germany and therefore he had to resign. That is on Page 17 of the
English text of the testimony of President Miklas.
Did you once write a letter to Himmler, or did you twice write letters
to Himmler, about Bürckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask
you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you
wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were
interfering with the deportation of the Jews; that you had only insisted
that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner’s men, the SD?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know it. It was submitted here. I know I have seen it
in this Court.
MR. DODD: I think you have seen it, but it has not been submitted in
evidence; however, I wish to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the letter is certainly correct.
MR. DODD: It is Number 3398-PS, which is USA-885.
In the letter you said that you gave instructions that the deportation
of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and
through the SD and that you could not permit wild actions.
SEYSS-INQUART: Right. Do you want me to state my views with regard to
it, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and
I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination.
You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part
to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to
make with you, and I assume that you agree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course I knew that a few trains had been loaded
with Jews in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded. No
preparations whatsoever had been made, and the Jews were in serious
difficulties. I opposed this state of affairs; and when Bürckel
complained, I told Himmler, “If such actions take place, then they ought
to be carried out by the SD,” because I was under the impression that
then better preparations would be made. When I say that today it sounds
very tragic and bitter, but I thought that at least emergency quarters
and so on would be provided somewhere. Apart from that I knew from 9
November 1938 how these things were carried out. The Party forged ahead,
and then the State had to take over these matters and carry them out.
MR. DODD: Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time
was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of
Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in this connection. I think
that was done by the Party alone. I believe Kaltenbrunner had no part in
it.
MR. DODD: Didn’t you say the SD, and wasn’t that under Kaltenbrunner in
Austria, at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I said that it ought to do it, but these transports were
not run by Kaltenbrunner, Globocznik ran them.
MR. DODD: Well, they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the
head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, he was rather the commander of the Security Police;
and how much influence he had there I could not say, but I think it was
very little.
MR. DODD: You found out since you have been sitting here that he had
quite a lot, didn’t you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: You mean to say you haven’t heard here that Kaltenbrunner had
something to do with the removal of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. From my own
observations I do not know it.
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn’t what I asked
you. I asked you if you haven’t heard in this courtroom that
Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don’t you? And
don’t you now know that he had something to do with the removal of Jews
at the time you wrote the letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my opinion, Kaltenbrunner had nothing at all to do
with the evacuation of Jews as mentioned here, because that was a wild
action carried out by the Party or Gauleiter Globocznik.
MR. DODD: Do you remember when you got the authority, through Lammers,
for the confiscation of property that you asked for in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Have you seen these documents? They are new; your letter to
Lammers, his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your
request. Those are three documents.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Your letter to Lammers is dated 23 October 1938, and it is
3448-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-886. And Lammers’ reply to you is
dated 24 October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-887.
The order itself is 3450-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-888.
That was a confiscation of the property of the Jews in Austria, was it
not, which you requested?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I
co-operated in this matter by issuing decrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in 5 minutes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
MR. DODD: I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it.
Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were
dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: About the many Austrians who died in concentration camps?
I really learned about that in this courtroom, but about the numerous
Austrians who were in concentration camps, perhaps in the course of
1943-44. In 1938-39 I knew that some political opponents were in
concentration camps, but they were gradually being released again, or at
least some of them.
MR. DODD: Didn’t you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as
early as 1939? Didn’t you know some of the people, and know about their
deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn’t you know about
the death in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
MR. DODD: You never heard a word about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not mean to say that at all. If you give me a name,
then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
MR. DODD: I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I
suppose. However, I am asking you first if you didn’t in fact know that
some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know. It
was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I shall most certainly admit that it is possible that I
was told that one or another died in the camp even as early as 1938 or
1939.
MR. DODD: Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis, although at
least you knew that vast numbers of your fellow countrymen were being
thrown into concentration camps. Didn’t that make any difference to you?
Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they
were doing after it.
SEYSS-INQUART: That I knew that large numbers were dying is out of the
question. That there were a few, one or another, who died would not have
affected me particularly because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as
many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr.
Dollfuss and the Fatherland Front, that is to say, of the Austrian
State.
MR. DODD: Well now, wouldn’t you agree with me that conditions were very
bad in Austria after the Nazis took over and they went from bad to worse
and you knew it and everybody else in Austria knew it? Or do you want to
take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what
your opinion is.
SEYSS-INQUART: I will tell you quite frankly. Of course, if you listen
today to the leaders of the political opposition, then it was terrible.
However, if you saw the people up to 1939, then you could see that they
had a new lease on life, because unemployment disappeared and there was
quite a different spirit. But then the war altered all that.
MR. DODD: One last question, if you can answer it for me briefly.
Do I understand you to accept responsibility for whatever went on in
Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is,
joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, that can only apply to the time when I was
there and acted as deputy.
MR. DODD: Of course. I certainly don’t mean after you left there. I am
only talking about the time that you were there.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, then, as deputy, only where I acted as deputy, or
where crimes came to my knowledge without my taking measures against
them.
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a
document that has already been offered in evidence, Mr. President. It is
Document 2233-PS; and from that document, Page 1, Paragraph 4, I would
like to read this, because part of it was read by the Defense, but this
part was left out. It is under the small Arabic Figure 3:
“The necessary police and other measures arising therefrom will
be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Security
Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly avoided.”
This had to do, by the way, with the “AB Action,” concerning which this
witness has testified.
The records show that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the
time that the Defendant Frank discussed this AB Action and made this
statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don’t
deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you?
Because you did know about that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither in connection with the AB case nor in any other
case did I deny anything. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, Document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now
available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted
by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was
offered. It has now been completely translated into the French, and I
offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
I have concluded my examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of 11 November 1937,
3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, Mr. President. I will check that. I meant to
offer it, and I fear that I did omit to do so. That would become
USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at 10
minutes past 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you
were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that reason knew
Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the Government
General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with
the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name of Kunze, in
3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly repeatedly sent
reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with this
matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in
contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under
Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection with
me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler by way
of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews. That is
utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich Commissioners
were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the Jewish question was
concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters concerning individual
cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but never by way
of the Security Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient. You were, in addition, confronted
with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schöngarth in connection with the
question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schöngarth was the successor, or more accurately,
the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had
inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler
demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was
aghast; and Schöngarth said immediately that that was completely out of
the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schöngarth: “But we
must do something, we must react in some way to this.” He then told me
that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be
carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He suggested
that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to the effect
that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in the
Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue warnings
to the population, as is customary under international law?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which contains a
warning by me against sabotage, _et cetera_, in which I threatened, in
the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and to draft
the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Further, I have to confront you with a
document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General
Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the
order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He admits
that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was
urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but perhaps
the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since he was
present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this question,
since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that
this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation of an
accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion, Paragraph 21
of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a partial
matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically
possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the
grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay
this Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement
of Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in
Document Number 77, Page 199.
Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor
asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the
Dutch Government to serve as a government, and that you were not
justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What
have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it is of no
consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for the entire
region except Zeeland.
The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From the
civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on
the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the
government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should
like to submit a document which takes issue with this question. This is
a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January 1942. In
my final speech I shall refer to this from the legal standpoint. It will
be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages through
the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is 96.
Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out mass
shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the
displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the
Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show
that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a war
losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given more
attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented
something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures
are decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase
in the population.
Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of the
statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to
10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12
per thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50
percent even though the Dutch people were under their own Government,
were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the
statistics which I received from the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, from
1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-half. In the year of my
administration, up until 1944, the population increased from 20 per
thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-fourth increase. Of
course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch people. But it is
surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I
should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics
Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a German and
English version, but it is not certified. The original should be in the
office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the proceedings here,
it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the
Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he is also held
responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the decrease
in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made in the
Dutch Government report and in part also produced here. Yesterday, with
the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to the Dutch
Government and I received this answer. In fact it answered more than I
requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But we will pay
homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in
evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the General
Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate
in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report which I
received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding Austria. The
first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged that you
gave Mühlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes
contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion which I had
just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the agreement
to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischböck, and the
institution of national political sections within the Fatherland
Front—in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf
Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the
Austrian National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew
that Austrians died in concentration camps after the Anschluss. You
answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did die in Austrian
concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of months, you
have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you mean to say that
they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might have
been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps. The
Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what we have
heard here about German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief of
the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to
call my first witness on the Austrian question, General
Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):
Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land
warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual stipulations
for the protection of the civilian population were outdated by technical
developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike measures like
total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, _et cetera_, are directed
primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and consequently
are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a war
potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then
the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in
such a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say “considered in such a way,”
you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population
to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is that not the
conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks,
approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the bombing
attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two short questions.
You said that you told the Führer that you would not act as a Trojan
Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that you should
act as a Trojan Horse?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my difficult
position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for such
purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation could
be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after you had
been talking to the Führer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself
had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the discussion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for some time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this Austrian
matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a difference of
opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity
could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented both sides
at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter of
declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those
declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree of the
Führer’s giving you authority to do that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in the Reich,
and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask you about
the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That practice was
under a decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all occupied
countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree in the
Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about on the
basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to get you
confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Führer, was it
not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Führer; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it been
put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in it. What
was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of persons
who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated. I had
already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was
issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the Netherlands
who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an
enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the
decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police and the
courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go to the
courts to get that determination surely, did they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision of this
kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court
sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on the
basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the Freemasons was
confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other
groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that direction of the
Führer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others, although
there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect—see if I state the practice
correctly—the Police would decide that an individual or group of
individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies of
the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was that of
Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through his
decisions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through Heydrich’s decisions;
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich’s decisions when it came to
property rights. The association of Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to
those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to the group
too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah’s Witnesses was
confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but what they had
was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to serve in the
war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused—let me get this straight. This
is interesting. Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to fight or to serve in the
German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany refused to
serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited there and
then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I
am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Netherlands were not
prohibited because they refused to serve in the German Army, but rather
because we were against this group on principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As
pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property;
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper Austria. I came
of an officer’s family of French descent. In 1918 I was a major in the
General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on politics and
the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the Austrian
Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the civil service
as director of archives at the university, a historian and author. Among
other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old
Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only
your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July 1936 on, I
was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of the July
Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet
of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in the
obscure job of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I had
to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb without
troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb
because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was against the official
policy and was one of the basic opponents of the Ustashi terror. Another
reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the State, who
was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a “criminal subject,”
among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and
it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a characterizing
phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss
itself, but everything as to how it came about. Therefore I ask you very
briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you in any way connected
with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may be
characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6
million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, counting
their families, that more than a million were in the misery of
unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of
the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and immediately
that all the possibilities always received “no” as an answer. If Austria
wanted the Anschluss, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to call the
Hapsburgs back, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to enter a German
customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was “no.”
And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of a Danube federation,
we received only cold shoulders from our autarchically minded neighbors.
That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the Anschluss as
the main point of its program. What were the combat methods of this
party?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of this Anschluss
was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer who the
year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only possibility for
the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to
the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end of the
twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf
Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler,
however, sent a land inspector by the name of—what was his name; a
Prussian—I cannot think of the name at the moment—who was evicted from
the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht—Dr. Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain
Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of
the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with
respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by absolute obedience
and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached.
After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about
his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with Seyss-Inquart shortly
before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me then
about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with what he
later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but only as a
support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the
Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front—at the same time
its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria,
and had Adolf Hitler’s blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, or
did you talk with him?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three
opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government after 12 February
1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on
17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with Hitler to
Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite which was
to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the plebiscite, I
left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks’ leave. Therefore, I cannot
give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had been decided
upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart or
not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not handled by any
Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from my leave,
certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a
plebiscite. Where were you and what did you experience at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I went on leave,
and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned for a long
time. And the subject of my speech was “Central Europe in the Year 1000
A. D.”
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the facts.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau in the
Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Bürckel, whom I had told
nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard over
the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it
was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in view of
Hitler’s nature, certainly bring about some form of grave
countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Bürckel was to
have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery and
Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the
reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and
subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin.
I heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did
not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all
solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached
Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 2½ hours, a
conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no concrete
decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at 11
o’clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did not
call me until 8 o’clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts
for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b)
of a radio speech.
I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I
asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on I received a third draft from Göring, who was Field Marshal at
the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second request to
Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should like to say
from the beginning, all these drafts—as far as I know also the third
draft—had no actual significance. These were my experiences on the 11th
in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met Seyss-Inquart. What did
you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him
briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made entirely clear to
him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-Inquart and I, at
11 o’clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went to see
Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before Schuschnigg certain inner
political problems which I did not know about because I had been absent,
I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of tears, that there
was great danger of new world complications, even of a new world war,
and, implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite which was
scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far orally. This
discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about 1 o’clock,
we offered to resign.
For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National
Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I
had made my decision in the home of Bürckel that, in connection with the
plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of
ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this proposal to
postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about
2 o’clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido Zernatto—I do not
have to tell you who these gentlemen were—made efforts to establish a
_modus vivendi_ with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in the background
since my mission had already been fully accomplished on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to no result,
Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in accordance
with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday plebiscite. I
believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter
Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly
agitated, saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could
not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to
demand succession to the post of Chancellor.
Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned this
down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and returned
after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me to be of
importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the
Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret: “Now
we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with the
Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political
combine with which I shall govern.” However, he was going to demand of
Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5
years’ tranquillity.
DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that. Instead he
marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law. You were named
Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered into the
Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned this law,
for three reasons:
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the
world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and
I must say something here which has been said in the southern German
press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street
demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass
psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and
it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the
Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands—I
did not participate in the origination of this law—the German tanks
were rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf
Hitler was accomplished. With him this meant “bend or break.” If Austria
had tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible.
Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that it
should have committed suicide from fear of death...
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr. President, I
have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result of pressure
from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual desire and
mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete confidence in
Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my relationship to
Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of Herr Von
Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called “Langot aid fund”?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which was established
quietly by the Government in typical Austrian fashion—this is not
intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian
fashion—for the help of National Socialist family members of National
Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have knowledge of this
fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they both knew
definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and particularly of
Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were completely opposed to Von
Papen. They were inimical toward him to begin with because he was a
Catholic, and they distrusted him additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that went on
in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No.
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to
Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about some topic but
that I should let myself be used as an informer was contrary to my
tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for
by Bürckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your trip when
you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March 1938, when
Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but rather from
the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered
this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know what was
going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip
when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is all. What
did you understand was the purpose?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler’s invitation
and to see just what was taking place in Berlin.
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you were
interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you
got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for
Seyss-Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a
peaceful and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned; did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained the absolute
impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday plebiscite,
then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with that
telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of
disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that
this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent to
carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a sharp
difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Göring. I did not
take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in which you
said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was contrary to the
truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these three things
along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I should
like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the agreement
of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich and Party
agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a
falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was
not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with
this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart whether
this telegram had ever been sent off and he said “no,” it had never been
sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown
away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they
were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of Seyss-Inquart who,
according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and
Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of
answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to
think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any
further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I
do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any
point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew
about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I
think you said either by Hitler or by Göring. You were then a Minister
without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was
a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and
deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged,
and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the
fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg
explicitly—leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say
anything more specific—that Hitler would march in if we did not call
off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not
going on with it.
Do you remember telling us that at the time that Göring was talking to
Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von
Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Göring in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse
in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann, whom I just
happened to be with.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, you know Defendant Von Papen once wrote a
letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with
him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany,
and that was way back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence
in this case, USA-67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator
with Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a willing collaborator for the normalization of
the relations between the two countries; but I am not familiar with this
document.
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
[_The witness Rainer took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH RAINER (Witness): Friedrich Rainer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: What functions, and for how long, did you have in the
NSDAP?
RAINER: I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until
1934 I had no functions. Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Carinthia
called me to the Gauleiter’s office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the
Landesleitung. Landesleiter Leopold, in the autumn of 1936, relieved me
of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In
February of 1938 Klausner again appointed me his political adviser and
co-worker in the Landesleitung. In May 1938 the Führer appointed me
Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to
Carinthia. Those were my political functions.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were therefore Gauleiter of Carinthia at the end?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And through years of work in the NSDAP you had a chance
to get to know it well?
RAINER: Yes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you get to know Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The first time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1935. We
had a conversation which lasted a few minutes. A few days later I was
arrested, and for 6½ months I was in the custody of the Austrian police.
After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart
again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was he a member of the Party?
RAINER: During the time that the Party was prohibited Seyss-Inquart was
not a member of the NSDAP, but he was a member of the Styrian Home
Guard. That organization was, I think in 1933 by agreement between its
leaders and Habicht, taken over entirely as part of the Austrian NSDAP.
After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich
Treasurer, Schwarz, and the members of the Styrian Home Guard, among
them, I believe, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply again for membership.
DR. STEINBAUER: So your statement in the famous “Rainer letter”—I shall
call it the Rainer letter henceforth for short—is incorrect?
RAINER: At that time I did not know that the transfer in its original
form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had
talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his
ideas regarding the Anschluss?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What were these ideas? Please be very brief.
RAINER: The Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our
discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all
Austrian parties; it remained the ideal goal for all of us. In this
case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State
should once again steer a course toward Germany and that internal
conditions should be peaceful. The difficulty in this connection was
that the State founded by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, by disregarding the
democratic constitution, was going to permit only a one-party system. It
was particularly difficult, therefore, to draw into participation and to
legalize the great mass of the opposition of the National wing. That
task, according to Seyss-Inquart’s conception and my own, was to be
carried out without further bloodshed by peaceful means. With good will
on both sides and a postponement of radical means such a way seemed
possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then came the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to
clarify his attitude toward the party. What did Adolf Hitler say to you
at the time?
RAINER: A few days after 11 July 1936 I was called to Berchtesgaden, and
on 16 or 17 July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little quicker than you are going,
Witness.
RAINER: The Führer made very serious and thorough observations, and he
demanded in very severe words that the Austrian National Socialists
should respect the Agreement of 11 July under all circumstances. He
criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they
had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of
such methods would lead to continuous difficulties in foreign politics.
He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the
existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question whether this
included the Fatherland Front, he said “yes.” He assured us that in the
near future the general tension would be relieved by an improvement in
the relationship between these two German states.
DR. STEINBAUER: In its essentials, therefore, he approved of
Seyss-Inquart’s policy?
RAINER: The Führer’s statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the
correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Seyss-Inquart also the leader of the Party?
RAINER: No, Seyss-Inquart was never the Party leader.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he subordinate himself to the leadership of the
Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was a member of the National Opposition group, and
in that capacity he recognized the existing leadership.
I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner in
that letter because Klausner, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement,
had replaced Leopold by request of the Führer, since he promised to
steer a quiet, clear, and open course. Co-operation with him appeared to
assure adherence to the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as
trustee for the Berchtesgaden agreement and Minister in Schuschnigg’s
Government he was independent of Klausner.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, Witness, after the understanding of 12 February
1938 did you, during a railway journey, meet Seyss-Inquart who was
coming back from his visit to the Führer?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did he tell you about his conference with the
Führer?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his
compartment. He had a piece of paper—I think it was an envelope—and on
that there were notes. I remember that he described the formalities
which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his
capacity as an Austrian Minister, bound by oath to the Constitution, and
responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that
he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans. Afterwards
he told me in detail about points of that conference, not all of which I
can remember now. My whole impression was that the discussion had passed
satisfactorily, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted
in a spirit of full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can
remember, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you remember his telling you that he had stated to
Hitler that he would be Schuschnigg’s living guarantor, and not a Trojan
Horse?
RAINER: I do not wish to confirm those exact words. The expression which
Dr. Seyss-Inquart repeatedly used was that he was not a Trojan Horse
leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression
frequently that he was the living guarantor for mutual adherence to the
agreement of Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural
fight?
RAINER: I do not believe that I can remember that. At any rate, that was
his point of view, and I certainly assume that he spoke to the Führer
about that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Führer agree to these proposals?
RAINER: I had the impression that Adolf Hitler was in full agreement
with the suggestions of Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
RAINER: That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his
intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he tell the Austrian National Socialists the same
thing?
RAINER: Yes, because that was particularly necessary. Seyss-Inquart made
a speech at a conference of leaders at the beginning of March and
pointed out that an evolutionary course and measures which were to a
certain extent disappointing to the radical followers—namely, the
dissolution of the illegal organization—were specifically desired by
Adolf Hitler.
I think I can also remember that during the large demonstration at Linz,
and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that
specifically; for the visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the
necessary legitimate foundation in the eyes of the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter of yours you wrote that
Seyss-Inquart had been informed of preparation for revolutionary steps.
RAINER: May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you
mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: Those of 10 March.
RAINER: May I have permission to go into some detail in this connection?
The expression “revolutionary steps” is too far-reaching. The measures
which were introduced were mainly these: After Chancellor Schuschnigg’s
speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that thereby every
basis for an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that
this speech would be like a spark in a powder barrel.
Whereas previously we had had consultations under what circumstances the
vote might be “yes,” it had now, in view of the attitude of the broad
masses, become impossible.
A clear-cut indication of attitude by the National Socialist leaders had
to be brought about. During the night, the new Gauleiter were still
being given their first piece of information about the Party not being
agreeable to the proposed plebiscite, and that therefore the slogan
would be, for the time being, to refrain from voting. The strictest
discipline was demanded, because we feared that feeling would soon run
very high. On 10 March the long-prepared propaganda of Zernatto began,
and clashes occurred. We also had reports to the effect that large
groups of the Protective Legion, forbidden in February 1934, were being
armed. Strictest alert was ordered for the formations, therefore, and
the formations received orders to provide protection for the Nationals.
Essentially, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; I think I
informed Dr. Seyss generally, in the afternoon, regarding the atmosphere
in the provinces. I probably did not inform him about individual
organizational measures.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he promote that atmosphere?
RAINER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he demand demonstrations, or did he prevent them?
RAINER: He neither promoted them, nor did he urge them. Prevention at
that stage was no longer possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
RAINER: On 11 March in the forenoon I was working at the office of State
Councillor Jury at 1 Seitzergasse. I no longer know at exactly what
task. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, and several others about noon
in the office of Dr. Fischböck, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the
outcome of the conferences with Dr. Schuschnigg.
The result of our consultation was the letter which the Ministers and
State Councillors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which set a time limit for 2
o’clock in the afternoon, demanded the cancellation of this
unconstitutional plebiscite and the fixing of a new plebiscite a few
weeks later in accordance with the regulation of the Constitution, or we
would resign.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened? Schuschnigg postponed the
plebiscite. How did you hear about that?
RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to
give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the
Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported
to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it
produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a
half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that
started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through
the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a
letter from Adolf Hitler to Vienna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at
midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had
been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that
morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my
opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the Reich
on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean “conspiracy” by “collaboration,” then I must say
definitely, “no.” But the collaboration which was agreed upon at
Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to
act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound
not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been
retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the
plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner
did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize
power?
RAINER: That order was given by Klausner on the evening of 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart approve?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until some time later.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I must put to you the fact that Gauleiter Eigruber,
of Upper Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram
in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about
that?
RAINER: I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know
that Klausner’s order was telephoned from 1 Seitzergasse. That evening
Globocznik was also putting through calls from the Chancellery. I assume
that Eigruber is referring to one of these telephone calls.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that Globocznik, who was Gauleiter of
Vienna before this illegal period, told you that he misused the name of
Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
RAINER: Globocznik told me that several inquiries had been directed to
the Chancellor’s office which were passed on to him over the telephone,
and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One
special case relative to Salzburg is known to me very well.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter you also made a statement which
mentions some assistance rendered on 25 July 1934. The Prosecution
considers that this has some connection with the murder of Chancellor
Dollfuss.
RAINER: That remark goes back to a conversation during which
Seyss-Inquart told me that after 25 July he had been afraid for a few
days that his name might be connected with those events. But after a few
days it turned out that there was no such connection. Subsequently he
tried to exert his personal influence toward reconciliation and he took
over some defense cases. That is what I meant.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that is your explanation for the expression
“rendering assistance”?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that pressure was exercised on President Dr.
Miklas by the Austrian National Socialists, so that he would appoint
Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The negotiations, which occupied the entire late afternoon and
evening, were under a certain amount of pressure; for practically in the
whole of Austria the change had already been carried out. The overthrow
of Schuschnigg’s Cabinet loosed a tremendous avalanche. During the
negotiations that fact made itself felt.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you mean that clearly there was
pressure, but not physical, directly upon the person of the President?
RAINER: There can be no question of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But then, how do you explain that at that time 40 SS men
marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it?
RAINER: An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When,
toward 8 o’clock in the evening, Miklas had again refused to nominate a
National Socialist as Chancellor, Keppler stated that at 8 o’clock—not
as originally declared—they would march in and he stated his fear for
the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as was said in Austria, things
were generally in commotion and the situation appeared very unsafe. The
Chancellery building was occupied by the police and by the guards and
was put in a state of defense. I informed the Landesleitung of this
situation and asked them to take protective measures so that willful
acts would not cause unnecessary misfortune. In consequence of the
measures which were then introduced, I estimate that no earlier than 10
o’clock in the evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes,
stating that he and his men had been assigned to protect the
negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step excessive but I asked
him to take the measure into consideration, and he then allowed these
men to pass through the police and guards, and they were admitted to the
courtyard of the Chancellery building. There was never any pressure nor
were there acts of force; it was merely a precautionary measure.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were Gauleiter of Carinthia. Did you also
have administrative powers during the war in the neighboring area of
Italian sovereignty?
RAINER: Yes. In September 1943, I was appointed Supreme Commissioner in
the operational zone “Adriatic Coastland,” with my seat in Trieste, and
I had six provinces under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you recruit foreign workers there for employment in
Germany?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner was this done?
RAINER: It was done through recruiting, that is to say, without
employing coercion, since for many decades these workers were accustomed
to go north to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: These workers were put to work in your Gau, were they?
RAINER: The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts
of the Alpine regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the living conditions of these people in your
Gau?
RAINER: Their living conditions were the general and normal ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Where were they accommodated? In camps? Did you see any
such camps?
RAINER: They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of
them existed they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian
consulate and the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Labor Front supervise matters in practice?
RAINER: Yes, it was bound by an agreement to that effect, of which I was
informed, and it took great pains to carry out that task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself inspect any camps?
RAINER: Yes. I inspected camps repeatedly and I found conditions to be
in good order. In the case of certain industries, for instance the water
works, I found that conditions were exceptionally good.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you give us the names of these camps?
RAINER: A particularly good impression was made on me by one camp
attached to some water works at Münd on the Drau River; the same applies
to Schwabeck.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did these foreign workers behave at the end of the
war? Were there riots?
RAINER: No. Due to the considerable number of workers in my small Gau I
was worried about the food supply. Relations with the population were
good because the Carinthian is a good-natured and agreeable type of
person. I myself have experienced that French workers who had already
been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back
to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than in the camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in
Carinthia?
RAINER: Yes. There were so many National Socialists in Carinthia that
Schuschnigg said on one occasion: “One ought to put barbed wire around
that county and the concentration camp would be complete.”
DR. SERVATIUS: But their relations with the foreign workers were good?
RAINER: Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this
Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the Party as you stated in
your letter? When did you change your mind about that?
RAINER: I did not learn until fairly late after the Anschluss that he
was not a member of the Party. I cannot tell you the exact year any
more.
MR. DODD: But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that
you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so? You had
misunderstood?
RAINER: In that report I made various attempts to describe matters in a
manner favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the
Prosecution against Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact
that you found out soon after you wrote this letter that you were in
error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the Party. Now
you can answer that very directly, I think, without any long statement.
RAINER: I do not believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
MR. DODD: Well, when was it? That is all we want to know. If at any time
you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it?
RAINER: That I can no longer say and it did not appear important to me
at the time.
MR. DODD: All right. Now when did you change your mind or find that you
were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated
in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations
which were to take place in Vienna? When did you find that that was
misinformation or a mistake?
RAINER: I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in
demonstrations in Vienna.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am
sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a
little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question from Dr.
Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he
could not prevent them at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you
was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans
was true. You know what you say in your letter or your report, do you
not? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart
and his participation?
RAINER: The details of my report are no longer in my memory.
MR. DODD: Would you like to look at it?
RAINER: Yes, please.
MR. DODD: While you are waiting for it I can clear some other things up
here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November,
swearing that this was true, did you not?
RAINER: I specifically stated in this connection that I was partly
relying on information received from authoritative individuals and that
afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had
been correctly represented. I also stated specifically, and had it
included in the record, that I had made these statements with a certain
bias. A supplement to my affidavit was also made.
MR. DODD: Just a minute. On 15 November 1945, right here in Nuremberg,
under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you
confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the
best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you
received since 15 November and from whom, that warrants you in making
statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal?
RAINER: I wish to state in this connection that the point of view which
I adopted on 15 November is maintained by me today.
MR. DODD: Well, is this report true or not in its entirety, as you told
us it was on 15 November?
RAINER: The report must not be taken literally. Partly it is based on
statements made by reliable people, and I made it to the best of my
knowledge and belief according to the situation existing, I believe, in
July 1939, with a certain bias.
MR. DODD: Well, you told us it was true in November, did you not?
RAINER: I did not say that. I said specifically...
MR. DODD: I will show you your affidavit. Your affidavit is attached to
that document that you have, and that is your signature, is it not, and
you have sworn to the truth of it?
RAINER: I made a specific statement in connection with it, and as a
precaution I made a short note about it afterward. The formulation of
the reservations was discussed at length.
MR. DODD: Now you answer my question. Is that the affidavit that you
executed under oath on 15 November here in Nuremberg? Yes or no?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, in there you say that you testify and confirm that “The
facts which form the basis of the above-mentioned letters and reports
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief,” and you also say
further up that you have read the letters and the report.
Now, is that affidavit true? Were you telling the truth when you said
that to us under oath in November?
RAINER: That affidavit is correct, but I demand that the explanations
which I gave in connection with it and which were made apart from the
record at that time—at least they were taken down in shorthand—be
added to it.
MR. DODD: Why did you not ask that there be included in the affidavit
anything that you wanted about this report if it was not altogether
true? You were swearing to it. Did you ask that something be added to it
or that it be changed?
RAINER: I considered this statement to be a statement of the genuine
character of the documents which had been submitted to me. The record of
my statements contained my opinion of the contents of these documents,
and as a precaution I added a statement that in this case, too, I wished
certain reservations to be taken down. They were subsequently formulated
by one of the gentlemen interrogating me, stating “...to the best of my
knowledge and belief...” and then he went on to say that all these
reservations which I had stated had been expressed in accordance with
the method customary with you.
MR. DODD: Now, are you really serious in telling this to this Tribunal
today about this affidavit? Are you really serious about this last
statement?
RAINER: I am absolutely serious about it. I have nothing to hide.
MR. DODD: Now maybe we can shed a little more light on the kind of
reports that you make. I have another one here that you have not seen.
You made a speech in 1942. This is Document 4005-PS. It becomes USA-890.
You had better have a copy of this in front of you, USA-890. Do you
remember that speech that you made on 11 March 1942 in Klagenfurt before
the Leader Corps and the bearers of honor insignia and blood orders of
the Gau Carinthia, in which you told the whole story of the development
of the events of March 1938? Do you remember the day you made that
speech?
RAINER: I did make a speech of that kind.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, let us look at it. Were you telling the truth
the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I represented the events in a way in which my audience would
understand.
MR. DODD: Were you telling the truth when you made that speech? I did
not ask you if you made it interesting; I asked you if you told the
truth.
RAINER: I believe I spoke the truth at the time, but I also believe that
there were certain things on which I was not correctly informed.
MR. DODD: Now, let us take a look and see what you said in 1942 with
reference to this report, 812-PS.
Now, if you will turn to—I think it is Page 8 of your text, I am trying
to locate for you the sentence that begins:
“Only in co-operation with us, Jury, and a number of co-workers
of Leopold, and also with Leopold’s consent, was it possible to
achieve Seyss-Inquart’s appointment to the post of State
Councillor. More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever
negotiator. We knew he was the one who would best represent the
interests of the Movement in the political forefield. He also
unconditionally subordinated himself to Klausner’s leadership.
He always conducted himself as Klausner’s deputy and
conscientiously followed Klausner’s instructions.
“With Seyss’ appointment to the post of Staatsrat, we found a
new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time
there were a number of grotesque situations. We were informed on
events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus; our
own connection to Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler we had via
Keppler.”
Did you say that in your speech as reported there in the text of it, and
how do you reconcile that now with what you have told the Tribunal about
the report to Bürckel?
RAINER: It is not known to me where that record of the speech
originates. I should have to have an opportunity....
MR. DODD: I will tell you. It is a captured document that was found down
there in the files, so you need not worry about that. What I want to
know is whether or not you now admit that you made this speech and you
said these things at the time that you made it.
RAINER: I made the speech, but I declare emphatically that whatever I
have said under oath today about that point is the true version. This is
a broad statement designed for the audience of that time, which cannot
be taken as literally as something which I say today, conscious of my
responsibility.
MR. DODD: You are not speaking broadly for the benefit of an audience
here today, are you?
RAINER: That is correct.
MR. DODD: Let us turn a page and see what you said about Papen, and
about the conference. You go on to say how you got information, how you
met in the Ringstrasse, and so on. If you will follow right along now,
we will not lose the places.
“Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the
conference confidentially. In Austria, only Schuschnigg,
Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our
side only Papen was informed. Papen, too, thought that only he
knew about it, but we too were informed and had had
conversations with Seyss about the subject.”
That is the Berchtesgaden conference. Now, were you telling the truth
when you said this in 1942, or not? Or was that a broad statement for
the benefit of the audience?
RAINER: I cannot today check this document against a correct
reproduction of what I said then.
MR. DODD: Well, why not? It was in 1942. Do you not remember? Do you
mean that you do not know whether you told the truth or not, or you do
not know whether you said this or not?
RAINER: In those days I gave a description before the simple people of
Carinthia and I...
MR. DODD: Did you lie to them or did you tell them the truth?
RAINER: No, but I speak to people like that differently than I would
speak under oath before this Tribunal, having to make concrete
statements about concrete points. It seems impossible to me that I
should today be required to confirm individual points of a speech which
was made 4 years ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have an answer? He is not answering your
question.
MR. DODD: No, Sir, he is not.
[_Turning to the witness._] I asked you whether or not you made these
statements on that day, and if you did so, were they true? Now, you can
tell us that very simply and we do not need any long answer. You have
read it over and you have heard me read it. Now, please give us an
answer.
You do not need to read any more. You have read it once and I have read
it to you. Was that true and did you say it?
RAINER: In details it is not correct.
MR. DODD: Well, is it true in any respect? Is it true that Papen was
informed and that Seyss-Inquart knew about that conference long before
it took place or sometime before it took place? That is what we want to
know.
RAINER: When we met during the Olympic winter games in Garmisch, we
encountered...
MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. You are not answering my question. That is
the next paragraph or the next sentence which you have been reading. I
know that is coming and I am going to ask you about the meeting in
Garmisch. I am now asking you if what you said about Von Papen and
Seyss-Inquart is the truth, and that is all I want to know.
RAINER: It is correct that at about this time we were informed about the
intention of having a conference.
M. DODD: And that Seyss-Inquart knew about it.
Now, let us go on a little bit further and find out about this Garmisch
meeting. You were invited down there to the Olympic games, you say, and
you had a meeting with Papen and Seyss-Inquart and they went through
some negotiations, and then you went on to Berlin.
Now, I want to move down a little bit. There is a lot of interesting
material here. We do not have the time to go into it all just now. You
go on down quite a bit, and I want to ask you about what you say you had
already prepared.
“We had already prepared the following”—and you are talking about
Schuschnigg and the impending conference. It is on the back of Page 9 of
your text, Witness, and it is on Page 5 of the English text, the last
paragraph. You say:
“We had already prepared the following:
“The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in
a shop in the Kärntnerstrasse. I called the telephone number
where Globus was to be reached in Berlin....
By the way, for the benefit of the Tribunal, Globus is Globocznik, is he
not? He is the same person, is he not?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: “....and told him about the negative result of the
conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had
a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a
terrible dialect so that not a soul would have understood us.
Globus immediately wrote down this report....”
and so on.
“In the meantime, Keppler had gone to Munich by sleeping car.”
Then, a sentence or two further down:
“I then forwarded instructions by Party member Mühlmann, who
proved to be an excellent liaison man to government offices in
the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as
Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg
and spent the night there and went on by car to the
Obersalzberg, Mühlmann continued on and got to Berchtesgaden.
Keppler and he went to the Führer before Schuschnigg and were
able to tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning,
was received, and experienced boundless surprise that the Führer
took up the negotiations where they had been broken off without
results the day before between Seyss and him. The Führer did not
conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the
whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time, in a manner
one can hardly imagine. The Führer got hold of him, assaulted
him, and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty
tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the past years.
Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. There was connection even
with his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was
smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now, in the presence of the
Führer, he was not allowed to smoke. Schuschnigg could not even
smoke.
“Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood
at attention before the Führer, held his hands against the seams
of his trousers and all he said was ‘Yes, sir,’ ‘Jawohl.’”
Now, what about that? You say all these things in your speech and were
they true when you said them? Right up to that point, Witness, you have
read it with me. Did you say this or not, and was it true when you said
it?
RAINER: The events as I have described them here are, as a whole,
correct. Individual expressions which I read here are not mine. In that
point this document has been supplemented by somebody else. Whether the
events described here are correct in detail, is something I cannot say
for certain because much of it did not happen in my presence.
MR. DODD: I just wanted to know if you said it; that is all. Very well,
we will go on.
You also told them that Schmidt finally went to Ribbentrop and asked him
to give Schuschnigg one cigarette and so they gave him one. Let us go on
quite a few pages to a more important matter. It is on Page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you be able to finish tonight, because we
were going to adjourn at a quarter to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will. I shall need only 2 more minutes to finish. I do
not think it takes much time. I just have one or two items in this
speech.
[_Turning to the witness._] You know in this speech you told your
listeners about the day that Seyss-Inquart came to a meeting and told
you that he had been bound by his word of honor not to talk about the
plebiscite. You know what you told your listeners that day. You will
find it on—well, you can find it, I can assure you it is in the text
and it will save time if you believe me. It is on Page 13 of the English
text. You say:
“We asked Seyss: Is it true? Seyss said: I am bound by my word
of honor not to speak, but we want to act as if it is true.”
“Diplomat that he was ...”—was your observation—“... the
matter was clear to us.”
He let you know, did he not, that Schuschnigg had told him about the
plebiscite. He let you know, did he not? Please, can you not answer my
question without—you will not find the answer to that on that page.
RAINER: The description here coincides with my memory.
MR. DODD: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] Just one last matter and I am not
going to have many more questions for him.
You also told your listeners that in the night from Thursday, 10 March
to Friday, 11 March, all Gauleiter were in Vienna waiting for
information:
“On 10 March we issued orders to the SA and SS, Lukesch and
Kaltenbrunner, to call out, beginning Friday, half of the
formations, and that the best men were to remain armed in their
barracks in the event of a civil war,” and so on.
Did you say that?
RAINER: With arms and in barracks? That cannot be right. The
instructions at that time were, and it is unlikely that I recounted them
otherwise, that half the strength should remain assembled at home, that
is, in assembly areas. There is no question of barracks, and weapons we
had almost none.
MR. DODD: You know, in this whole speech almost everything, except in
more detail, that you wrote in your report to Bürckel, is contained. The
truth of the matter is that you were telling, in both instances, what
you believed to be the truth, is it not? That is the truth of the
matter. When you made your report to Bürckel and when you made the
speech to the leaders and the members of the blood order, you were
reporting what you thought were the facts, and what of course, you know
now are still the facts.
RAINER: I cannot recognize this matter as being authentic.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not have many more questions, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH DAY
Thursday, 13 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the question of the time to
be taken by counsel in their concluding speeches. The provisions of
Article 18 of the Charter directing the Tribunal to confine the Trial
strictly to an expeditious hearing must be observed, and counsel clearly
could not be permitted to speak at any length they choose. Necessity
dictates that there must be some limitation, or this already lengthy
Trial might be prolonged beyond all reason.
The Tribunal understands that the Prosecution will voluntarily limit
their concluding speeches to 3 days in all, and some voluntary
limitation should be made by Counsel for the Defense. The evidence for
the defendants has been fully heard in great detail, and what is now
needed is not a detailed analysis of the evidence but a concise review
of the main matters.
The Tribunal wishes to make clear that no admission will be inferred
from failure to mention any particular matter in argument. On this view,
in the opinion of the Tribunal, the speeches of the Counsel for the
Defense—including the speech to be made on behalf of all the defendants
on the submission of law—should be concluded in 14 days in all. This
will allow the Defense double the time taken by the Prosecution, both in
opening and in summing up. By mutual arrangement between counsel, these
14 days could be apportioned as they think fit; and the Tribunal would
prefer that they make the apportionment rather than make the
apportionment itself.
The Tribunal expects, therefore, that Counsel for the Defense will
prepare their speeches in accordance with what I have said and will
advise the Tribunal as soon as possible of the apportionment of time
that they have made. If they find themselves unable to agree on this
apportionment, the Tribunal will give further consideration to the
matter.
The Tribunal desires also to point out to counsel—both for the
Prosecution and for the Defense—that it will materially help the
Tribunal if counsel would submit translations of their speeches at the
time they make them.
That is all.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the
decision which you have just announced to us has surprised the Defense,
since they have not been previously heard with reference to this
question. This appears to us to be all the more regrettable since the
decision is against the most elementary rights of the Defense, because
it prevents us from stating in Court what, in this most important Trial,
has to be said with regard to the defendants and the problems with which
they are confronted.
At this moment we are not yet in any position to survey the entire
material. If I were to state, without wishing to forestall the other
defendants’ counsel, the case of the Defendant Keitel as an example, you
will understand that the material alone which has appeared after the
cross-examination puts me in an extremely difficult position. I am sure
that a large number of the other defendants’ counsel will also share my
opinion that these matters cannot be dealt with collectively. While
every attempt should be made to deal comprehensively with these matters,
nevertheless, in my opinion, the cases of the individual defendants
should be dealt with separately.
Fourteen days appears to me a very short time. In practice, it is almost
impossible to make a fair apportionment, that is, to deal properly with
the individual questions.
Might I suggest, therefore, that the decision which you have just
announced—I am not sure whether it was only a suggestion—should be
reconsidered after consultation with the Defense. Without wanting to
anticipate the argument which the whole Counsel for the Defense intends
to offer, I wish, nevertheless, formally to raise objection now to the
decision limiting the Defense beyond the limits of what is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Do counsel either for the Prosecution or the Defense wish
to make any other observations to the Tribunal upon this subject?
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to state that I take exception to
Dr. Nelte’s argument. What I wish to say very briefly is that with
respect to Dr. Nelte’s argument that a restriction in time with respect
to the final argument is a violation of a fundamental right of these
defendants, I wanted to call the Tribunal’s attention that in our
country it is, I would say, rather common practice for our courts to
restrict counsel in time in final argument, as the Tribunal has pointed
out.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel wish to make any other
observations?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Mr. President, to begin with, I should like to make some remarks
regarding the limit imposed upon our time. If we are limited to 14 days,
then that means approximately 4 hours per defendant for our final
speeches. But in reality these 4 hours are not 4 hours, since, because
of the technical arrangements in this courtroom, we are forced to speak
much more slowly than we would speak in a direct final speech, in a free
statement. That is to say, from the 4 hours left to us on an average, we
must deduct the time which we lose through having to speak more slowly.
In my opinion, 4 hours would in reality amount to only 3 hours.
Mr. President, I believe that if you consider these facts you will agree
with us that in these 3 hours we cannot possibly do justice to all the
material available for every defendant, and thus fulfill that purpose
which the final address is intended to fulfill.
The main purpose of this Tribunal, which is unique in history, is to
establish the truth; but we cannot establish the truth by merely making
an arbitrary selection of individual actions. Our main task must be to
show what led to these individual actions. Accordingly, it is for me in
my capacity as defense counsel for the Defendant Von Neurath, who was
the responsible leader of the foreign policy of the Reich until 1938, to
show that all the actions of which my client is accused were logically
and unavoidably the outcome of the circumstances as they developed. This
sequence of historical events explains everything that happened up to
the day when my client handed in his resignation. But I can make that
clear only if I am able to present the different stages of development,
at least in broad outline. Moreover, Gentlemen, if you take into
consideration that I still have to deal with the activities of my client
as a Reich Protector, which for legal reasons is not altogether as
simple as it might appear, you will no doubt admit that I cannot
possibly do that in a period which is tantamount to only 3 hours.
I want to say to the statement of the American prosecutor, that we are
not before an American court here. I have just been trying to make
inquiries about this, and there is no information to the effect that in
international tribunals, such as, for instance, the Hague Courts, or the
courts in Egypt, a limitation has ever been imposed upon the duration of
the final speeches of the defense. That is why I beg to take into
consideration that we are not before an American court here but that
this is an international tribunal and that this International Tribunal
goes far beyond anything that has existed before. It also goes far
beyond the task of any military tribunal in Germany which has up to now
dealt with small particles of this tremendous complexity, and never have
the military tribunals imposed a time limit upon the defense when making
their final speeches.
Gentlemen, if you take all this into consideration, then I hope you will
allow me to ask you once more to reconsider your decision and not have
us give the impression that we are not able to do our duty in presenting
our cases for our clients.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Gentlemen of
the Tribunal, I will only add very little to what my colleague Mr. Dodd
has already said. The penal code of our country admits the right of the
tribunal to impose limitations upon both the prosecution and the defense
in their final plea.
I believe that the argument of the Defense, to the effect that this
decision of the Tribunal is putting limits on their rights and is
unjust, is unfounded. In practice the Defense is already submitting
evidence now in the case of their clients and has every opportunity to
give a complete presentation. I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that
justice does not consist in the endless conduct of the present Trial.
I therefore uphold the argument of Mr. Dodd and consider the decision of
the Tribunal quite just.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, will you please permit me to make a brief
statement? At no stage of the proceedings can the duration of a trial be
foreseen.
At the beginning one cannot foresee the time required and therefore one
cannot limit the time which the taking of evidence will require. Neither
can the following stages of the proceedings, the length of the
statements presented by the Defense, be forecast and cannot therefore be
limited. The value of the Defense—and, after all, that is the only
reason why a defense is included in these proceedings at all—is that a
man who is given that professional task and who possesses the necessary
qualities must be able to put before the Tribunal all the material
which, after long hours of work and intimate conversations with his
client, he has found worthy of presentation.
That must be done through such an intermediary; and to what extent he
should state his case is something that he, as an expert, must be able
to decide. Nobody participating in the proceedings, whether of the
Tribunal or of the defendants’ counsel, can even approximately foresee
what might be necessary in this connection.
That is why I believe that no dates should be fixed for the case for the
Prosecution or the hearing of evidence or the case for the Defense.
During the other stages of this Trial we have had to contend with the
same difficulties. In limiting the proceedings as to time we can only be
guided by what is relevant and expedient. Thus in this Court we have
witnessed again and again how the President has steered the proceedings
with skill and benevolence, always keeping them within the necessary
limits. I cannot understand why the same procedure should not be applied
to the final speeches, and I believe that the self-discipline which
naturally every experienced counsel applies to himself, will keep the
speeches within suitable limits. But I honestly believe that no one,
with the exception of the immediate participant, and he probably only
after all the evidence has been heard, can anticipate how much time will
be required; and this, in my opinion, precludes the imposing of a time
limit at this stage. If the statement made by the Tribunal should be
considered as a suggestion to limit our speeches—and in this connection
we are particularly grateful for the indication given as to the way the
evidence should be handled—then by following the Tribunal’s suggestion
we shall most certainly be able to impose upon ourselves a limitation
which will do justice to all parties.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t propose to go fully or at all into the argument
which led the Tribunal to make the announcement which I made this
morning, but I think it would be desirable for Counsel for the Defense,
before they make any formal objection to that announcement, to study it.
But I do desire to say on behalf of the Tribunal that that announcement
was not made without consultation both with Counsel for the Prosecution
and Counsel for the Defense and that was done in closed session; and we
heard both Counsel for the Prosecution and counsel whom we understood to
be representative counsel for the Defense, and they made the suggestion
which they thought right to us at that time, and we fully considered it.
We intimated to them that they should draw the attention of their
brethren to what passed at that hearing in closed session. Therefore, it
is entirely inaccurate to say, as Dr. Nelte did, that the announcement
was made without hearing Counsel for the Defense.
I only desire to add to that that in the circumstances the Tribunal will
give further consideration to the matter, but the suggestion made in the
announcement was that the 14 days, which the Tribunal thought sufficient
for the speeches for the defendants, should be apportioned voluntarily
among counsel. Those 14 days are full days and will not be taken up at
all by any argument on the organizations; and until the defendants’
counsel have attempted to make that apportionment, it must be obviously
impossible for them to know whether they will be able to make their
speeches, which are not speeches that are necessarily detailed
examinations of the evidence but are arguments drawing the attention of
the Tribunal to the main points which they desire to draw the attention
of the Tribunal to. It will not be possible for them to know whether
they can make their speeches satisfactorily within the 14 days. The
Counsel for the Defense ought, therefore, to go into the matter
together, as the Tribunal understood they were doing, and see whether
they can satisfactorily present their speeches within that time. All the
arguments which have been presented to us this morning were fully
presented to us by Counsel for the Defense who appeared before us at the
closed session, one of whom has addressed us this morning.
Now the Tribunal will go on with the hearing of the case.
[_The witness Rainer resumed the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in answer to the last question put by the
American prosecutor yesterday you stated that you wrote your letter with
a certain purpose, and I now ask you what that purpose was?
RAINER: Some time after the Anschluss there were hostile activities,
intrigues against Dr. Seyss-Inquart and some other people. They came
from dissatisfied radical elements in Austria and the Reich. They took
advantage of Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s hesitant attitude on 11 March, his
clinging to the revolutionary line and to the principles of the two
agreements between the two States, to accuse him of being a separatist
or even worse...
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps, Witness, you can be a little more brief.
RAINER: These people seemed to be dangerous, because Bürckel and, I
believe, Heydrich too, were behind them. I considered these attacks to
be unfair and therefore I brought out certain facts and arguments and
worded my report in such a way that the addressees would understand it
and be calmed down.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that, if I have understood you correctly, in this
letter you sought to stress the merits of the Party on the one hand, and
to claim indulgence for Seyss-Inquart on the other hand?
RAINER: Yes. That is how I would express it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, my second question. In this letter you mentioned
that Seyss-Inquart had taken a letter of ultimatum to Schuschnigg. Have
you any recollection to the effect that he himself dictated it and had
this letter written in his office?
RAINER: Dr. Steinbauer, you mean the letter of ultimatum written in the
afternoon of 11 March?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is the one.
RAINER: I believe that that letter was written in his office and I also
believe I participated in writing it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you go on to say, in the letter put to you by the
prosecutor, that, through the collaboration of Dr. Jury and Dr. Leopold,
Seyss-Inquart had become State Councillor. I ask you whether Dr. Jury
and Dr. Leopold had any influence at all on Schuschnigg?
RAINER: No, that cannot have been the intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: The prosecutor, in support of his statement yesterday,
submitted a second document. It was a speech which you had made as Gau
speaker in Carinthia. Do you remember that?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was that a typical Gau speech? I mean, from the point of
view of the propaganda of Goebbels? A speech which gives prominence to
one’s own merits and disparages one’s opponents?
RAINER: I would not say that. It was a comradely meeting of the Old
Guard on the occasion of the 11th of March. We drank beer and there was
music and I described events rather like telling a story; I spoke for a
very long time: in fact, it was the longest speech I ever made. I spoke
more than 3 hours. I spoke quite freely and without any notes, and the
shorthand record which is submitted here appears to me not to tally with
my statements on every point.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean, therefore, that it was more your intention to
procure an effect upon the members of the Party than to write history?
RAINER: Yes, of course.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much. That is enough for me and I have no
further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the cross-examination yesterday it was mentioned
that on one occasion you were with Von Papen at Garmisch. What did you
talk about to Von Papen at the time, and how did that conversation come
about at all?
RAINER: Dr. Seyss-Inquart and I had been invited to Garmisch by the
Reich Sport Leader. The German-Austrian Alpine Club was to be discussed.
Together with Von Tschammer we were watching the bobsled races at the
Riesser Lake and there we met Von Papen. Herr Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart,
and I then walked from there to Garmisch, and on the way we discussed
the political situation and the...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you don’t need to give the details of it.
I suppose the point of the question is that the conversation was not
political. Is that the point of the question?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The conversation was political, but it is a question of
the type of political conversation it was.
Perhaps, Witness, you can confine yourself to the facts. You just said
it was an accidental meeting. You were coming back from the bobsled
track. What did you talk about?
RAINER: We talked about the situation in Austria, about the pacification
of the country; and while we did not exhaust the subject, we did discuss
other matters which interested us and which dealt with the immediate
future.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: So that nothing was discussed which could not have been
put before the Austrian public?
RAINER: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were these matters in keeping with the July Agreement?
RAINER: Yes, of course they were.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But then, in the course of the speech which has already
been mentioned, you said that you had been with others in Von Papen’s
apartment on the evening of 9 March 1938. I should like to know whether
that was a prearranged meeting or whether it was a more or less chance
meeting?
RAINER: It was just a casual meeting. I do not remember who arranged it.
The conversation dealt, naturally, with the situation arising out of
Schuschnigg’s plan for the plebiscite, which was an entirely new and
most surprising move, so that we had to think it over from every point
of view and clarify it by discussion.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What stand did Von Papen take during that conference?
RAINER: I remember that Von Papen, who just happened to be in Vienna
that evening, acted in a reserved way. I think he considered that an
affirmative vote would have met the situation perfectly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What reason had you for thinking he considered that an
affirmative vote was plausible and necessary? Was it for practical
reasons or was it due to the plebiscite which the Austrian Government
had suggested?
RAINER: It was because of the plebiscite.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Once again, my question is: Would the matters which were
discussed have led one to believe it was a specially called conference,
or rather was it a social gathering during which political questions
cropped up and this topical matter came up for discussion?
RAINER: It was a casual meeting which had been improvised because Von
Papen’s presence in Vienna coincided with the new political situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were any resolutions passed?
RAINER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall now call the
witness Dr. Guido Schmidt.
[_The witness Schmidt took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
GUIDO SCHMIDT (Witness): Dr. Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what positions did you hold in the Austrian
Republic?
SCHMIDT: I was a diplomat by profession. I was in the Austrian Foreign
Service under Dr. Seipel and for about 6 years I was a member of the
Austrian Legation in Paris. In 1936 I was recalled and assigned to the
Austrian State for service with the diplomatic corps and the Foreign
Office. In 1936 I became State Secretary under Dr. Schuschnigg, and
later Foreign Minister.
I was a member of the Schuschnigg Government until his resignation by
violence. From that time on, I had no political activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what were the reasons in regard to foreign
policy and economics which led to the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
SCHMIDT: At the beginning of 1936, the situation of Austria with regard
to foreign policy had changed to Austria’s disadvantage. After the
events of July 1934, England, France, and Italy drew up a three-power
declaration at Stresa concerning the maintenance of Austrian
independence. Over and above the international obligations existing up
to that time, the three powers now set up a new guarantee for the
maintenance of Austria, the Stresa Front, which during the whole year of
1935 gave protection to Austria. The collapse of the Stresa Front, as a
result of Mussolini’s Abyssinian enterprise, meant for Austria the loss
of the only practical international guarantee, and for Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg the creation of a completely new situation.
According to his conception of foreign policy, Austrian independence
should rest not only on the shoulders of Italy, but if possible on other
shoulders as well, that means of England and France. Then there were
difficulties resulting from the developments of the situation in Europe
from 7 March 1936, the day on which Adolf Hitler started his surprise
tactics by occupying the Rhineland without encountering serious
resistance from the Western Powers. This gave the Austrian Government
cause for anxiety and fear lest some day the Austrian question as well
might be solved by surprise or, as we later saw, by violence.
These are the reasons we must give if we are asked about the
considerations on which the agreement was based. There was also the
_rapprochement_ between Rome and Berlin which began at this time and was
due to the sanctions policy of the League of Nations. Austria, lying
between Italy and Germany, had to expect that one day that
Austrian-Italian friendship, which had existed since the time of
Dollfuss, would fall victim to the closer relationship between Rome and
Berlin.
For this reason and for other considerations, Dr. Schuschnigg sought a
means to improve relations, that is, to restore relations, between
Austria and the German Reich.
It would perhaps be useful in this connection to give a few of the
guiding rules of Austria’s foreign policy. The underlying idea was the
maintenance of Austrian independence. Austrian foreign policy was
furthermore based on the knowledge of the extremely difficult and
delicate geographical situation of the country between two totalitarian
states at the crossroad of European ideologies. Therefore, it had to be
the task of Austrian foreign policy to reach an understanding with her
big neighbor, the German Reich. The foreign policy further had to be
based on the determination to avoid everything that could lead to a
conflict with the German Reich, to avoid everything that could
antagonize the Reich, in order to prevent any violent action which,
after 7 March, was to be feared.
There were reasons in practical politics which were decisive in this
determination to restore relations with the German Reich, to the
ethnographic area of which we belonged, relations which had been
unnaturally interrupted. Apart from the reasons of foreign policy, there
were also economic considerations. Because of Austria’s economic
constitution, which, although alive, was nevertheless extremely weak,
the world economic crisis had affected Austria very seriously.
This can be understood only if we look back to the beginnings of this
young state. From the very start, all Austria’s neighbors had carried on
an economic policy of egotism, of chauvinistic self-interest, and in no
case had it been possible to reach really close co-operation of all the
Danube countries. It is true that some separate agreements had been
reached, such as the Rome Protocols; but the mutual distrust which all
had brought from their former home, their common home, the Austrian
Monarchy, continued to exist and obstructed any healthy development.
From 1931, the beginning of the world economic crisis, there were a
number of attempts to relieve the situation. I will mention them one
after the other. It begins with the attempt of the Government to create
a customs union, which failed because of the resistance of the League of
Nations. In 1932, there was an attempt by France to bring Austria and
Hungary into the Little Entente and to reach economic co-operation here.
Germany and Italy opposed this. England was also against it. In 1933,
the economic crisis was aggravated by the internal struggle against
National Socialism. That also had its effect on the economic life of
Austria, because the economic life of Austria was also used as a weapon
in the internal struggle.
THE PRESIDENT: This is undoubtedly interesting, but it has rather a
remote bearing, perhaps, upon the questions which the Tribunal has to
decide. I don’t know whether the witness has dealt with it sufficiently
for your purposes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this presentation of the facts I
wanted to show that from the economic and foreign policy point of view
the situation was such that the role of the defendant was forced into
the background; but we can continue now.
Witness, will you speak quite briefly.
SCHMIDT: All this led to the breaking-off of economic relations with the
German Reich, and now Austria’s life-and-death struggle for economic
existence entered upon a very serious phase. Because of these
considerations, that is, for economic reasons, too, Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg attempted to reach an agreement with the German Reich and to
restore economic relations which had been completely broken off, to
remove the “1,000 mark blockade,” to restore tourist traffic, to restore
the flow of economic goods, to silence the complaints which were coming
from the provinces in Austria because of the lack of a market for
agricultural products, wood, grain, cattle and so forth. These were,
generally speaking, the main considerations.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I now ask you: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart help in
preparing or concluding this Agreement of July 1936?
SCHMIDT: No. The Chancellor worked with Glaise-Horstenau who represented
the so-called National Opposition.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there is a defect in the sound equipment, so
we had better adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in the spring of 1937 Seyss-Inquart entered
politics, and presumably you met him then.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I met him first in the summer of 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I shall go on, and I should like to ask you what
reasons in domestic and foreign policy led to the well-known meeting
between Adolf Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: This question calls for a detailed answer. I ask for permission
to express myself in somewhat more detail.
By New Year 1938, the Austrian foreign policy situation had become
worse. Italy had entered into an engagement in Spain in favor of Franco,
which reduced still further her military and political influence in
Central Europe. What we called “The Watch at the Brenner” had in effect
ceased to exist, and Germany had more or less a free hand with regard to
Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal has common knowledge of the
history of this time. It is not necessary, really, to go into it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I should like to ask you to tell me if you were
present at the Obersalzberg at that time.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I should like to add, if I am to pass over the historical
events—that is how I understood the question—that the Federal
Chancellor accepted the invitation in order to prevent Austria’s being
reproached for having refused a peaceful attempt to clear up existing
differences between Austria and the German Reich. The Chancellor was by
no means optimistic, the more so because the existing differences of
opinion were very great and also because of the personality of his
partner in the talks. I recall that Schuschnigg, before leaving for this
meeting, told me that he was of the opinion that instead of him it might
have been better to send Professor Wagner-Jauregg, the greatest
psychiatrist of Vienna; but he believed, in view of the exposed position
of Austria, that he had to accept in order to forestall a coup and to
gain time until the international situation should improve in Austria’s
favor.
Unfortunately, we were right. Our fear of a coming attack or of coming
difficulties was justified. The fear that Austria would be left entirely
alone was also justified. The realization of the fact that we were
completely deserted was perhaps one of the primary reasons which carried
greatest weight with Schuschnigg together with the need of bridging over
this difficult period and gaining time. Austria had to tread this path
in the dark winter days from the end of 1937 until March 1938 without
the hope of any immediate or prospective assistance. And then we came to
Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: As Foreign Minister, did you inform the big powers of
the events of Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes. Contrary to frequent press reports, the interested big
powers were informed in detail both before and after Berchtesgaden. I
gave all the material to the head of the political section to whom the
diplomatic corps applied first. The Federal Chancellor himself and I
gave detailed reports to the accredited foreign representatives in
Vienna and drew their attention to the dangerous situation of the
country.
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you. We don’t want the details.
You said you informed the foreign powers beforehand and after. That is
sufficient.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we return to the defendant. Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart
take part in these talks?
SCHMIDT: What talks?
DR. STEINBAUER: The talks in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: He became Minister of the Interior and Police Minister,
and went to see Hitler in Berlin. Did he report to Schuschnigg the
substance of his first talk with Adolf Hitler?
SCHMIDT: I do not know, but I do know of individual statements by State
Secretary Zernatto, the head of the Fatherland Front, from which I can
conclude that a conversation between Minister Zernatto and
Seyss-Inquart, at which this talk was mentioned, must have taken place.
DR. STEINBAUER: It can therefore be assumed that, through Zernatto,
Schuschnigg also learned of it?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will pass over events until we come to March.
Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Do you know whether Schuschnigg
informed Seyss-Inquart of this and discussed it with him?
SCHMIDT: Yes, Seyss-Inquart was informed of it. I learned that an
agreement between Seyss-Inquart and the Federal Chancellor was reached
on or about 10 March. The Chancellor told me that Seyss-Inquart had
declared himself willing to speak on the radio in favor of the election.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Glaise-Horstenau reported that there was a threat
of invasion, did you, in your capacity as Foreign Minister, inform the
foreign powers of this?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I did not receive a direct report from Glaise-Horstenau. I
learned of the critical situation only from the ultimatum which demanded
the cancellation of the plebiscite planned by the Federal Chancellor on
13 March. From then on there was constant contact during 11 March with
the diplomatic corps in Vienna and later, during the hours which
followed, with our foreign representatives also.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the demands of the German Reich followed closely
upon one another. Especially, the demand was made that Schuschnigg
should resign. The ministers were assembled, and a member of the
Government is said to have told Seyss-Inquart the following: “We now see
clearly that the Reich is putting an end to Austria. It would be best
for Seyss-Inquart to take over the office of Chancellor so that the
transition may at least be bearable.”
Do you remember such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. Only later did I hear of a statement by Minister
Glaise-Horstenau which contained this request to Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the impression that with the farewell
speech of Schuschnigg, the Fatherland Front which was directed by him
had also collapsed?
SCHMIDT: I believe the question does not quite fit the situation. The
resignation of the Chancellor was demanded by ultimatum; and finally the
State itself was taken over, so that the Fatherland Front no longer
existed. With the entry of the German troops, National Socialism had
become a reality and developments showed that it did not permit the
Fatherland Front to live any longer.
DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart was then appointed Chancellor. He set up
his Cabinet; and you, Witness, were proposed as Foreign Minister, is
that correct?
SCHMIDT: That is correct. I refused. I was approached again, and I
refused again, and I was asked to give my reasons. Seyss-Inquart told me
that he intended to keep Austria independent as long as possible; but he
was afraid that with his Government, which had a National Socialist
majority, he would encounter difficulties in the West. Therefore, he
wanted to retain my diplomatic experience and connections for the
Government. He added that he intended to create a broader platform for
this Government by calling in positive Austrian representatives.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you find the names of such positive Austrians on the
list of ministers?
SCHMIDT: There were names of such men. I have been puzzled about it
myself, but I cannot recall any individual names with any certainty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know why another list of ministers was drawn up
which was the final list?
SCHMIDT: In the evening State Secretary Keppler arrived from Berlin; and
as I learned later, he rejected me, and others too, I believe. I think I
can remember one name. I believe that he suggested at the request of
Berlin that Weber should take over the Foreign Ministry. Thus this list
was discarded and Seyss-Inquart no longer tried to persuade me to go
back on my decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of
keeping Austria independent, even under National Socialist leadership?
SCHMIDT: As a witness, I can only say what I know. Opinions are very
difficult to express. I have stated what he told me.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to a statement by the American Ambassador in
Vienna at that time, Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen, at the beginning
of his activity in Vienna, is said to have stated that his real task in
Vienna was the economic and political incorporation of southeast Europe
into Germany, and that southeast Europe was the natural hinterland of
Germany.
Did you, Witness, ever hear of such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. In view of the close contact which I had already with Mr.
Messersmith before my appointment as a member of the Government, and
especially later, I would probably have heard of it. I assume, however,
that no special significance was attached to this question at the time,
because in first visits between diplomats, as a rule, a _tour d’horizon_
is usually made and questions are discussed which interest both
countries, that is, general political questions. Nor did I observe later
that a southeast Europe policy was being carried on from the German
Legation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen is supposed
to have said at that time that he was working to weaken and undermine
the Austrian Government.
Did the witness Messersmith report such a statement by Herr Von Papen to
you?
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Austrian Government consider it advisable and
necessary to normalize relations with the Reich by an agreement in July
1936?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I have already explained the reasons for conducting a
realistic policy which were of an economic nature and based on foreign
policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In these and in later negotiations, did the international
political situation, particularly the settlement of the Party question,
also have a part in deciding this?
SCHMIDT: Of course, it was the task of the Government to ease inner
political tension. The Federal Chancellor had to try to find a way out
of the difficult situation which he had inherited from Dollfuss by
liquidating the inner political fronts.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you believe that Herr Von Papen concluded the July
1936 Agreement with treacherous intent?
SCHMIDT: No, I have no reason to disbelieve that he considered this
agreement a serious endeavor to create a _modus vivendi_ between Austria
and the Reich. The fact that it resulted in a _modus male vivendi_ does
not alter this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Germans complain that after the Agreement of 11
July 1936 there was no essential change in the inner political course of
the Austrian Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, many reproaches were made; and thus we come to the last
and the real cause of the conflict with the Reich. The struggle against
National Socialism within the country in the interests of maintaining
the independence of the country and, on the basis of the Agreement of 11
July, insuring co-operation with the German Reich, whose leaders were
National Socialists—these were the two imperative demands which, after
a time, the Austrian Government found to be irreconcilable. This also
explains the difficulties encountered by all persons entrusted with
carrying out this agreement in Vienna, including the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a result of these conditions, particularly those
arising out of the July Agreement, were questions of internal policy,
such as questions of policy and personnel of the so-called National
Opposition, the subject of discussions between the Federal Chancellor
and Herr Von Papen?
SCHMIDT: The situation as just described shows that such discussions
were unavoidable; and talks on the inner political situation also took
place between the Chancellor and the German Minister, as well as with
the Italian Minister, in a general way that is not unusual. I know of no
diplomatic memoirs which do not contain such entries. The Chancellor
would never have tolerated interference of any kind. In questions of
personnel Schuschnigg was especially reticent, because, if I may say so,
he was afraid of “Trojan Horses.”
That, more or less, represents the situation which was discussed in
talks between the Chancellor and the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen make it clear that he was opposed to
the methods of the illegal Party?
SCHMIDT: Yes. According to the information received by the Government,
Papen opposed the leaders of the illegal Party, that is, Leopold in
particular. This was doubtless due to fundamental differences, differing
political ideas and differing political methods, which Von Papen on the
one hand and the leaders of the illegal Party on the other were
determined to pursue.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen, on the basis of the July Agreement,
ever adopt an aggressive attitude in Austrian foreign policy?
SCHMIDT: There existed between Austria and the Reich, not only in
cultural and inner political relations, but also in the field of foreign
policy, irreconcilable differences of opinion. I will only mention the
demand of the Reich that Austria should leave the League of Nations,
which we rejected by pointing to the fact that Austria, by reason of her
geographical position and her history, had a continental mission, and
also to the loans received from the League of Nations. A second point
was Austria’s attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this at all answering the questions that you have put
to him?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He is introducing the answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Try and get on with the answer to it, will you? Get the
witness on to the answer rather than the introduction.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to know whether Herr Von Papen took
advantage of the opportunities for an aggressive intervention in
Austrian foreign policy in the individual cases mentioned by you.
SCHMIDT: I wanted to say that in spite of the deeply rooted differences
this did not occur and that an ambassador with a more radical point of
view would certainly have had the opportunity and the occasion to adopt
a more severe attitude towards Austria. There was not a single case
where we reached an agreement with the German Reich on a joint foreign
policy. Von Papen did remind us of that, but that was all. As for
aggression, or aggressive activities, I cannot say anything about this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did Herr Von Papen act on occasion as
mediator? I would like to recall the Pinkafeld case.
SCHMIDT: The Pinkafeld flag incident is an example of Von Papen’s
activity as mediator. In itself it was a minor incident, but it led to
threats of invasion by Hitler. Von Papen was called to Berlin and had a
great deal of difficulty in calming down Hitler’s fury, who, as I said,
threatened to invade Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, if it is convenient to you, it would be more
convenient to the Tribunal if you spoke a little faster.
SCHMIDT: He succeeded in settling the matter and there were no
consequences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He settled the matter. Did Herr Von Papen speak to you
about the reasons for his being recalled on 4 February 1938?
SCHMIDT: On the occasion of a visit on the 5th he expressed his
astonishment—and I might say his anger—at his being recalled, which in
his opinion and also in our opinion was due to the events of 4 February
1938, the dismissal of General Von Fritsch and of 30 other generals, and
the dismissal of Von Neurath. He thought that Austria would not be
unaffected either, especially in view of the man who had been proposed
to succeed him. At that time, Bürckel or Consul General Kriebel was
proposed. That was approximately what Von Papen said to me and I believe
also to the Federal Chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then he believed and feared that his successor would
adopt a more severe policy against Austria?
SCHMIDT: That conclusion was inevitable in view of the two persons just
mentioned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Von Papen take part in the pressure exerted on you
and Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden talks?
SCHMIDT: No, he did not.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did he not, insofar as he had any
opportunity of taking part in the negotiations, attempt to tone down
Hitler’s demands?
SCHMIDT: In view of the atmosphere of violence which prevailed and the
program of demands which was presented, this was not difficult. I
believe that he, like many others who were present, endeavored to
restore calm and thus enable the negotiations to proceed in an
atmosphere of reason.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the course of the negotiations, a number of
concessions were made. Do you believe that Von Papen’s attitude and his
part in these negotiations had a restraining effect, and led to your
obtaining these practical results?
SCHMIDT: His attitude on the whole was no doubt mediatory. One cannot
speak of success at Berchtesgaden as far as the result is concerned; but
that is not Von Papen’s fault.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, do you think you will be able to finish in
a few moments?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] In order to answer my question I believe it
would be better if you would not consider the final result of
Berchtesgaden but rather the fact that Hitler had presented to you a
very large program of demands going far beyond the final results, and if
you would consider that actually some points which were of great
importance to you were changed in the course of the negotiations.
SCHMIDT: As far as there was any help coming from the other side it came
from Von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you perhaps recall that the Hitler-Schuschnigg
negotiations were especially violent because Hitler was trying to win
Schuschnigg over to his German attitude and Von Papen came to
Schuschnigg’s aid and thereby put Schuschnigg in a better position to
negotiate than at the beginning?
SCHMIDT: I was not present for the first hour or two of the talk. I
cannot answer the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: My last question is this: Did Herr Von Papen, after 26
February, the day on which he took leave of the Austrian President,
still carry on any official activity in Vienna?
SCHMIDT: No; the Vienna Embassy was administered by the Chargé
d’Affaires, Embassy Counsellor Von Stein, who made the two official
_démarches_ of the Reich, on the afternoon of the 9th or the morning of
the 10th, against the plebiscite planned by Schuschnigg. Von Stein,
together with General Muff and State Secretary Keppler, also handed to
the Austrian President the ultimatum demanding the resignation of
Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. This shows that Ambassador Von Papen was
no longer active.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until a quarter past two.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask the indulgence of the Court and have permission
to put one more question to witness Schmidt, a question which I had
overlooked putting before the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, in November 1937, in the course of measures
introduced against the illegal movements, certain materials were
confiscated which were given the name “Tafs papers.” Is Herr Von Papen
referred to personally in these “Tafs papers”?
SCHMIDT: As far as I can recollect, a number of documents were
discovered one after the other along with this material which we called
the “Tafs plan.” I think I can remember that in one of these documents
Papen was mentioned. An attempt on the life of the German Ambassador to
Vienna was to be the cause for internal disturbances in Austria, which
were to be followed by repressive measures by the Government; and then
later this was to lead to measures on the part of the German Reich. I
cannot remember the details of that plan any more.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: With the permission of the Tribunal, I should now
like to put a few questions to this witness.
Dr. Schmidt, when and on what occasion did you meet Herr Von Neurath?
SCHMIDT: I met Von Neurath in November 1937 in Berlin, where I paid him
a visit in response to his invitation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us what attitude Von Neurath, as
German Foreign Minister, had with regard to the relations of the German
Reich with Austria? In particular, can you tell us his views regarding
the Agreement of 11 July 1936? In this connection I should like to draw
your attention to the fact that the Prosecution has alleged that, as it
is expressed, Von Neurath concluded this agreement in a deceptive way.
SCHMIDT: During the few times I met Von Neurath he always expressed the
view that he was in favor of an independent Austria, and together with
this he wanted the closest possible co-operation in the foreign
political, economic, and military spheres. Our negotiations always
proceeded on the basis of the 11th of July Agreement, and differences of
opinion arose only about the interpretation of the agreement. Neurath,
on behalf of the German Government, held that the agreement should, if
possible, work actively in his interest, while we, for defensive
reasons, preferred a different interpretation. At any rate, Neurath
rejected means of violence and followed approximately the line of an
Austria which was independent, but as close as possible to Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Neurath’s attitude toward the extreme
factions of the Party in the Reich which, in practice, followed a policy
of intervention in the internal affairs of Austria?
SCHMIDT: As I already mentioned, Neurath rejected methods of violence,
and with them the methods of intervention, and also the methods of the
illegal party in Austria. From conversations which I had with him I
believe that I can state this unequivocally. This is also attested by
his complete rejection of the activity of State Secretary Keppler and
Veesenmeyer, who were certainly among the pioneers of the new
development in the Southeast and primarily in Austria. The expressions
which he used, in that connection allow no doubt regarding his attitude.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr.
President, may I have permission to represent my colleague Dr. Stahmer,
who is absent, and put a few questions on behalf of Defendant Göring to
the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have just stated that in November 1937 you paid
an official visit to Berlin?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: On that occasion, did you also talk to the then Field Marshal
Göring?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even at that time Field Marshal Göring
already told you that the Austrian problem could only be solved by the
complete union of the two sister nations, that is to say, by the
annexation of Austria to the Reich, and that he for his part would do
everything to achieve that end?
SCHMIDT: It was not told me in those words. The former Reich Marshal
probably did refer in an insistent way to close co-operation with
Austria, but a demand for an Anschluss was not mentioned, as far as I
can remember. As an illustration of that, I might say that at that time
the events of 25 July 1934 were discussed. I expressed the view that the
Agreement of July 1936 ought to put a final touch to that development,
and Reich Marshal Göring stated that he had called the wire-puller of
this affair to account—I believe he mentioned Habicht—and had banished
him to some obscure part of Germany. From this remark alone it appears,
therefore, that there can have been no talk of an Anschluss. The former
Reich Marshal welcomed the development caused by the 11th of July 1936,
that is, that a full stop had been put to the then existing development,
which one had to describe as a state of war, as it had been up to the
11th of July 1936.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the morning of the Anschluss, that is
to say, the morning of 12 March 1938, Göring had you come to Berlin by
airplane?
SCHMIDT: No. That was either Monday or Tuesday; it must have been the
15th or 16th.
DR. SEIDL: When you were in Berlin, did he put the question to you
whether you yourself or Schuschnigg had asked for help from foreign
powers, military help, on the day before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember having heard that question.
DR. SEIDL: You stated this morning that with the Anschluss National
Socialism in Austria became a reality. I now ask you, was not National
Socialism also a political reality in Austria even before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly a political reality, but I am talking of a
political reality in the sense of an organized power in the State.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are going a little too fast—well, I do
not know what it was. Anyhow, you had better repeat it, because the
interpreters do not seem to have it.
DR. SEIDL: The question was whether or not National Socialism in Austria
had been a political reality even before the Anschluss, and I put this
question with reference to the fact that the witness had said this
morning that National Socialism did not become a reality in Austria
until the German troops marched in.
SCHMIDT: By the term “political reality” I meant that National Socialism
had then got the State power into its hands, because until then it
represented a prohibited party, which of course after the agreement of
February 12 was supposed to be drawn within the framework of the
Fatherland Front for responsible co-operation in political affairs.
In other words, I wanted to show the basic change which came about for
National Socialism with the arrival of the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question: After the Anschluss, did you not
repeatedly tell the Reich Marshal that the Fatherland Front, on the
occasion of the Anschluss, collapsed like a house of cards?
SCHMIDT: Yes; of course, I cannot remember individual statements, but
the collapse of the Fatherland Front did naturally come about when the
Chancellor resigned. The Fatherland Front was the gathering point of the
resistance, and with 11 March the resistance collapsed.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Dr. Schmidt, when, for the first time—if you know—did the
Defendant Von Papen suggest to Chancellor Schuschnigg that he,
Schuschnigg, have a meeting with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Late in the autumn of 1937—it must have been November—Von
Papen made the suggestion for such a meeting. These discussions did not,
however, have any concrete results at the time. The official invitation
was brought by Von Papen on or about 6 or 7 February, after he had
returned from his visit to Hitler. I heard about the invitation on that
day.
MR. DODD: Will you also tell us if you know whether or not Von Papen
assured Schuschnigg that this meeting would be restricted to very
well-defined points, and that it would concern itself only with matters
that were agreed upon between Schuschnigg and Von Papen before the
conference took place?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor himself demanded exact wording for the agenda of
the conference, that is, as a basic topic the 11th of July, the final
removal of existing differences, and so on and so forth. That had been
agreed between Von Papen and Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: And did Von Papen assure Schuschnigg that the meeting would
proceed favorably for Austria?
SCHMIDT: Assure him? No. But a declaration was given by Von Papen to the
effect that the situation at the time was favorable. In this connection,
Von Papen referred to the conditions such as had been created on 4
February. He believed then that Hitler would need a foreign political
success, following these events, and so a certain success could be
scored by the Chancellor for a low price.
MR. DODD: Of course, what I am trying to clear up here—and you can
answer briefly, which, I think, will help us—is that: You and
Schuschnigg had the impression that advantage would accrue to you and to
Austria if you attended the meeting, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I said earlier that the Chancellor was not optimistic. An
improvement of the situation, therefore, was hardly expected, only a
removal of the existing differences.
MR. DODD: Now, the night before you left for Berchtesgaden, you had a
conversation with a man by the name of Hornbostel, is that so? The
Minister.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And had you already had a conversation with Seyss-Inquart that
same evening, you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: It is possible. During those days, repeated discussions took
place.
MR. DODD: Well, maybe I can help you a little. Do you not recall that
Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were drawing up a memorandum of some sort
about domestic questions, while you and, I believe, Hornbostel, or
someone else, were preparing a paper or papers on international matters
or matters of foreign policy? Does that help you any?
SCHMIDT: I could not understand.
MR. DODD: Well, I am referring to the time when you and some of your
associates were preparing a memorandum of some sort about the foreign
questions, and Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were preparing papers about
domestic affairs. You remember that, do you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, you were alarmed that night about Seyss-Inquart, were you
not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And why were you alarmed? What was the cause of your alarm?
What did you fear at the hands of Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: The drafts which I saw before my departure and which had been
worked out by Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart as a basis for a part of the
political discussions appeared to me to be politically useless and
impracticable. It was my impression that two men were at work here who
perhaps enjoyed making up stories, but who did not do justice to the
seriousness of the situation. There were expressions used, such as the
difference between the Austrian National Socialist ideology and the
National Socialist. But there is no difference. An Austrian National
Socialist ideology can only be National Socialist. I criticized these
matters in one of my talks.
MR. DODD: Will you agree that he was in some kind of combination with
Hitler and that bad things would result from it for Austria? By “him” I
mean Seyss-Inquart.
SCHMIDT: No, at that time I had no fear that there was a secret
agreement between Hitler and Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now, when you got to Berchtesgaden the next day, you found
that much of the material that had been discussed between Zernatto and
yourself and Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg was the basis for Hitler’s
demands on Schuschnigg, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And were you not convinced, at least that day, that
Seyss-Inquart had been in communication with Hitler some time before you
got to Berchtesgaden and had communicated to him these basic demands?
SCHMIDT: We merely had the impression that the basis for this conference
was a draft which had been prepared by men who knew the conditions.
Therefore, this list of demands was based on a large portion of the
Zernatto-Seyss-Inquart agreements. The entire program of demands had not
been made known to us previously.
MR. DODD: You and Schuschnigg represented Austria that day at
Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Hitler, Von Papen, Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Sperrle, and
Reichenau, is that not so, were there for Germany?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: You and Von Papen and Schuschnigg rode from the border
together in the same railroad coach, did you, to Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And in the course of that...
SCHMIDT: Whether Papen was in the same coach I am not sure, but we were
together on the way back.
MR. DODD: Well, he was on the train, was he not, whether he was in the
same coach or not? Did he not get on the train at the border and ride on
with you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: That I no longer know.
MR. DODD: Did he not meet you at the border?
SCHMIDT: He was waiting for us at the border.
MR. DODD: Perhaps I am confused, but what I am getting at is a
particular conversation that you and Schuschnigg had with Von Papen,
either right at the time you met him at the border, or in the course of
your trip up to Berchtesgaden, when he told you that, “Oh, by the way,
there are going to be a few generals up here. I hope you would not
mind.” Do you remember Von Papen saying that?
SCHMIDT: Well, generals were mentioned, yes. Schuschnigg had
said—whether Keitel’s name was mentioned, that I can no longer
remember—that he would be there.
MR. DODD: Well, it was rather casually said, and you did not have any
opportunity to object at all, did you? And up to that time you had not
known there were to be military men there?
SCHMIDT: No, up to then we did not know.
MR. DODD: Now, you got to Berchtesgaden at what time of day? Early in
the morning or midmorning? What time of the day?
SCHMIDT: In the course of the morning.
MR. DODD: Yes, and I wish you to tell the Tribunal, as well as you can,
just what happened there that day. We have heard much testimony about
this meeting at Berchtesgaden, and you are the first person on the stand
who was actually there. I guess that is not so—Keitel was there also.
Well, but at any rate, you participated in the discussion. How did the
discussion start?
SCHMIDT: To begin with, the discussion started with a conversation
between Hitler and Schuschnigg. That conversation took place privately,
so that neither I nor the other gentlemen were present. Later, the
gentlemen were called in individually, and then there were also
conferences without Hitler with the then Foreign Minister Ribbentrop,
during which the points of the program which had been submitted to us
before were discussed. In the course of these conversations, individual
demands were canceled.
MR. DODD: While Hitler and Schuschnigg were talking, who were you
talking with, if you were talking with anybody, or what were you doing?
SCHMIDT: I was together with the other gentlemen whom you have already
mentioned; some of us were in the large hall and some of us sat and
waited in the anteroom right outside the room where the four-man
conference was taking place.
MR. DODD: Did you talk to Von Ribbentrop, for example, while Schuschnigg
was talking to Hitler? What was going on there? What were you talking
about with Ribbentrop, if you were talking to him?
SCHMIDT: In the afternoon session we went through the list of demands
with Ribbentrop—I did that partly on my own—and I succeeded in having
certain points eliminated.
MR. DODD: Well, during the morning—I wish you would limit yourself to
time here, so that we will know the exact sequence of events. During
that morning session between Hitler and Schuschnigg were you just
sitting around in an informal conversation or were you actually in
conversation about Austria and Germany with Ribbentrop or with anybody
else?
SCHMIDT: Not in the morning, no, because we, or at least I, had not yet
seen the program, and the political talks could only take place on the
basis of the demands presented by both sides.
MR. DODD: Well, there were recesses, were there not, so to speak,
between the conferences, and during those recesses, did you not have a
chance to talk to Schuschnigg? During those few intervals?
SCHMIDT: Yes, after about an hour Schuschnigg came out, gave me a
summary of the situation, and discussed it with me.
MR. DODD: Tell us what he told you, right there at first hand.
SCHMIDT: He first of all described the atmosphere, the violence of the
language used, and then said that the demands which had been presented
had the character of an ultimatum.
MR. DODD: Try to tell us what he said if you remember. What did he say
about the atmosphere, about the language used? That is what we want to
know.
SCHMIDT: First of all, he began with the greeting he had received. He
said that the Führer had accused him of not being a German, or that
Austria was not following a German policy. It had always been so, even
during the time of the Hapsburgs. He also held the Catholic element in
Austria responsible for this. Austria was always a stumbling-block in
the way of every national movement, and the same was true today. Then
Hitler also mentioned the fact that Austria had not left the League of
Nations. Then there were very serious arguments between Hitler and
Schuschnigg personally, during which the Federal Chancellor felt that
even he personally was being attacked badly. The details of this
conference I cannot now remember, but the atmosphere, according to the
Federal Chancellor’s description, was extremely rough.
MR. DODD: You had luncheon there, I assume, at midday or shortly after?
SCHMIDT: After the conference, at or about 12:00 or 12:30, there was a
joint luncheon. Here there was a perfectly normal tone of conversation
again. In the meantime the tense feeling had subsided once more.
MR. DODD: Now, was Schuschnigg quite a heavy smoker?
SCHMIDT: You mean then, or when?
MR. DODD: I mean at that time, of course.
SCHMIDT: Of course, Schuschnigg was a heavy smoker.
MR. DODD: Now, we have heard that during that day of conferences, he was
not permitted to smoke, until you pleaded with Ribbentrop to let him
have one cigarette. Now, what about that? Is that so, or is that a
story?
SCHMIDT: We were told at the time that there could be no smoking in
Hitler’s presence. That is true. Then I tried to find a chance for the
Chancellor to be allowed to smoke one cigarette. Whether I asked
Ribbentrop about it I cannot remember exactly, because that detail was
not of any importance.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Anyhow, at this conference did Schuschnigg
tell you that Hitler demanded that Seyss-Inquart should be made Minister
of Security of the Government?
SCHMIDT: That was one of the demands on the program.
MR. DODD: Made by Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that Glaise-Horstenau be named Minister for
the Army?
SCHMIDT: That was the second position which was demanded.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that certain expelled students from the
universities in Austria be reinstated?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the expelled students were to be pardoned and admitted to
the universities.
MR. DODD: And certain discharged officials were to be reinstated in
their offices?
SCHMIDT: That too.
MR. DODD: Second, certain discharged members of the police forces of
Austria were to be restored to their places as well?
SCHMIDT: That was included in the chapter “Acts of Reprieve.”
Accordingly, officials who had been discharged from executive positions
were to be returned to status again.
MR. DODD: Were there also demands made with regard to currency exchange
and customs unions?
SCHMIDT: Yes, economic demands of this kind were discussed. The
expression customs union itself was not used. However, there were
demands that came close to it.
MR. DODD: Now, as soon as Schuschnigg heard these demands, of course,
you knew that the conference was exceeding the limitations that had been
placed upon it by the agreement between Von Papen and Schuschnigg, did
you not? You knew that right away?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the program was more far-reaching than we expected, that
is quite true, but I do not know whether Von Papen knew the program
beforehand. I assume not.
MR. DODD: Well, I did not ask you that, but that is all right, if you
want to say something for Von Papen. My question is however: Did you not
immediately go to Von Papen or did you not go to Schuschnigg and say:
“There, this is not what you told us we came here to do”? Did you not
have any such conversation with him during one of these recesses?
SCHMIDT: Of course, statements were made to the effect that this program
was more far-reaching than we had expected.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: We had the impression that Von Papen himself was unpleasantly
affected by certain points.
MR. DODD: Did he not suggest, however, that you agree to Hitler’s terms?
SCHMIDT: Papen certainly recommended that the final conditions be
accepted, that is, after we had already obtained some of the concessions
because in his opinion an agreement ought to be reached. The Federal
Chancellor, too, gave his personal word, because he did not want to go
away without a result being reached, so as not to endanger Austria’s
position.
MR. DODD: Now, also, Hitler agreed that he would dissolve the new
National Socialist Party in Austria, did he not? Did he not assure you
that day that he would do so?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
MR. DODD: That he would recall Dr. Tafs and Dr. Leopold, the leaders of
the Nazi Party in Austria?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And also, you agreed to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Minister for
Security?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor agreed with this decision.
MR. DODD: And you agreed to take men by the names of, or men like,
Fischböck and Wolf, into the Austrian press service?
SCHMIDT: They were to be admitted. Fischböck was to be in the Ministry
of Commerce, and Wolf in the press section. Nothing was said about the
form in which that was to take place.
MR. DODD: And you agreed also to try to absorb some of the National
Socialists into the Fatherland Front, to absorb them into your own
political group?
SCHMIDT: The expression “some of the Nazis into the Fatherland Front”
does not meet the situation. It was the question of incorporating the
National Opposition—which at that time was described as the Austrian
National Socialist ideology—into the Fatherland Front, and so insure
the co-operation of this entire group in the political life of Austria.
MR. DODD: All right; now, Hitler told you that you had until 15 December
to accept his terms, did he not? I mean, 15 February.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And he told you that if you did not do so, he would use force?
SCHMIDT: The ultimatum was—yes, it was an ultimatum—to the effect that
Hitler intended to march into Austria as early as February, and was
still prepared to make one last attempt.
MR. DODD: And what about these generals, were they walking in and out
while the conference was going on? Men like the Defendant Keitel?
SCHMIDT: The generals were called in several times.
MR. DODD: Were you and Schuschnigg frightened? Did you think at one time
that you were to be taken either into custody or to be shot?
SCHMIDT: We were worried that possibly we might not be allowed to leave,
yes; but that we might be shot, no.
MR. DODD: Well, do you remember Schuschnigg telling you, when on your
way back to Vienna, that he was frightened when Keitel was called in,
that Schuschnigg thought he was going to be shot, or something drastic
was to be done to him, and you told Schuschnigg that you, too, were
frightened at that time, that the end had come, or words to that effect?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not remember that conversation. There was never any
talk about shooting, but as I have already said, we were just afraid.
The Chancellor was also of that opinion that if the negotiations did not
go well we might not get away.
MR. DODD: Very well. What was Von Papen doing while the generals were
moving in and out? Did he see that as well as you?
SCHMIDT: After such a heated discussion it is quite difficult to say,
after 8 years, what each individual was doing at the time.
MR. DODD: There were not too many of you there—six or eight. Were you
pretty generally in a group?
SCHMIDT: There were continuous changes. We were not always in there
together. Various combinations were certainly made.
MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: There was not any possibility
of Von Papen failing to see the generals there that day, was there?
SCHMIDT: On that day he must have seen them when we were there.
MR. DODD: Von Ribbentrop told you that Hitler was in a very angry frame
of mind, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, we were all agreed on that.
MR. DODD: And he also urged that you, of course, accept the terms as the
best thing for you and for Schuschnigg, did he not?
SCHMIDT: At any rate, Ribbentrop at the time did not take part in this
pressure. He represented the German demands, too, yes, but not in an
unpleasant or forceful way. I mentioned that to the Chancellor even at
the time.
MR. DODD: Yes, this is what the situation was, was it not: Von
Ribbentrop was playing the role of the nice man, while Hitler inside was
playing the role of the horrid man, and you and Schuschnigg were being
passed back and forth from one to another?
SCHMIDT: It was my impression, at the time, that Ribbentrop was not
acquainted with the subject very well and that for that reason alone he
had kept himself somewhat in the background.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is interesting, and it is not altogether news in
this case; but in any event, is it not a fact that you were being played
off, so to speak, as between the nice man Von Ribbentrop and the bad man
Hitler?
SCHMIDT: It cannot be described like that. That was not the case. We had
to negotiate the details with Ribbentrop. Hitler had stated that we
should discuss the detail together with the experts.
MR. DODD: Well, could it be that you do not realize it yet? Are you sure
that that was not the situation, or is it only that you have not
realized it to this day?
SCHMIDT: About what?
MR. DODD: That situation that I suggested—that you were being
maneuvered between the good man and the bad man.
SCHMIDT: No.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand, I do not think we need to go
on with it.
Now, how late did you stay there that day, and what time did you leave
Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: In the late hours of the evening. It must have been between 9
and 10, as far as I remember.
MR. DODD: And when you got back to Vienna, did you tell Seyss-Inquart
about what had happened in Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: First of all there was a conference between Zernatto and
Seyss-Inquart in which Zernatto gave Seyss-Inquart an exact picture of
the situation, since Zernatto had been informed by the Federal
Chancellor as well as by myself. Later I joined in this conversation.
However, I had the impression that most of the description was already
over and only details were still being mentioned.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal this morning that Seyss-Inquart told you
that he wanted to retain some independence for Austria—some semblance
of independence, anyway. Now, you did not believe that, did you, when he
told you?
SCHMIDT: I cannot say either “yes” or “no” to that. I turned him down,
and therefore I did not bother my head any more about Seyss-Inquart’s
political ideas because I did not intend to enter the Government. The
demand had to be regarded as being meant seriously.
MR. DODD: Well, you used some particular language when you turned him
down, did you not? What did you say about wanting to be truthful and
decent?
SCHMIDT: I stated at that time that I belonged to Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg, that the laws of decency and loyalty still applied for me,
and that therefore I would resign with him.
MR. DODD: Then did you not use the language, “I still believe in the
rules of truth and decency”?
SCHMIDT: No, the laws regarding loyalty and decency were still
applicable to me. That is what I said. I had been with Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg all the time, and I would also resign with him.
In this connection you would have to know my relationship to the
Chancellor; anyone who knows that knows what it means and that I could
not have acted any differently.
MR. DODD: Now, I am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that
you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indicated that
you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I did not mean that by it. What I said then referred to myself,
to my reason for refusing. There was indeed a difference, was there not,
which arose from the fact that I was on terms of friendship with the
Chancellor.
MR. DODD: Well, you know we have your testimony down there in Vienna
where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember
telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the
violent removal of Schuschnigg.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I stated that I could not belong to Seyss-Inquart’s
Government since it was, after all, partly responsible for the removal
of Schuschnigg’s Government. Since I was a friend of Schuschnigg, I
could not participate in such a Government.
MR. DODD: Well, the point of it all is that, knowing Seyss-Inquart, and
as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had
your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious when you tell the
Tribunal that you really thought—you really believed Seyss-Inquart when
he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria?
SCHMIDT: I doubted that, too, at the time, just as I still doubt it
today. What went on in his head I cannot say.
MR. DODD: I am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in
your head.
Now, you had a conversation with the Defendant Von Papen about
Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago, did you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, tell the Tribunal when and where that conversation took
place.
SCHMIDT: I met Von Papen in Turkey—it must have been in the late autumn
of 1943. Our conversation turned on the events of 11 March 1938. At the
time Von Papen expressed himself in a severely critical way about the
procedure at that time, about Seyss-Inquart, for the reason, he thought,
that he had done nothing for the independence of Austria, and also
because the procedure had not served German interests either. He wanted
to express his criticism by this, and I had the impression that he was
indeed against a violent solution, that is, against a solution by
violence such as had occurred.
MR. DODD: Well, I want you particularly to tell the Tribunal just what
it was that Von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart—and this was 1943, was
it not, not 1940? It was when you were in Turkey and so was Von Papen?
Or was he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, he was.
MR. DODD: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Did
not Von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: He did say that. He said that he would—that he would have—it
must have been some time after the Anschluss—refused to shake hands
with him, and actually he referred to his behavior in 1938.
MR. DODD: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible?
Is that not the language that Von Papen used about Seyss-Inquart, or
some of the language?
SCHMIDT: He did express himself in that way.
MR. DODD: What were the other things that he said? You told down there
in Vienna that Von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in
describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is
of some interest to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly
what it was. It is only 3 years ago, you know, that you and Von Papen
had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it.
SCHMIDT: He spoke in a very vehement way, passing judgment to the effect
that Seyss had offered no protection to the Austrians and that he had
done nothing to keep order in Austria, that is, to safeguard Austria’s
individuality and Austria’s interests.
That was Papen’s basic thought. His second thought was that the German
interests had not been served by this either, by which he meant more or
less that a quite justified interest of the German Reich had been made
to look wrong in the eyes of the world because of the way in which it
had been handled and that the foreign political interests of the Reich
had been damaged thereby.
That was the principal thought in his conversation, and I think he made
similar remarks during conversations with other people.
MR. DODD: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and
have omitted something that is probably of some importance.
Do you remember—some time, I guess not long before you broke up your
session there—Hitler turning to Von Papen and saying, “Von Papen, you
made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it.”
Did you hear Hitler say that to Von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes, some such remark was made.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: That I can no longer tell you.
MR. DODD: He said, “Yes, my Führer,” or something like that, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had
to give an answer.
MR. DODD: He certainly did not deny it, did he?
SCHMIDT: I do not assume he did, but I cannot remember the answer. I can
only remember the question.
MR. DODD: The night in Vienna, when the SS and the SA people were
climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellery, did Seyss-Inquart
do anything to have them excluded?
SCHMIDT: Not to my knowledge. I do not know; I was on the other side.
MR. DODD: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of
fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, were
you not?
SCHMIDT: It was a very tense situation.
MR. DODD: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the
Chancellery?
SCHMIDT: We left in three cars—the Federal Chancellor in one, the
President in the other, and I was in the third. The departure was
escorted and organized and accompanied by SS men.
MR. DODD: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart’s private
automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so?
SCHMIDT: No, they left in a car together. I myself heard Seyss-Inquart
say: “Then I will take him home.” Whether it was the Federal
Chancellor’s car or Seyss-Inquart’s car, I do not know, but at any rate
they traveled in the same car.
MR. DODD: Escorted by the SS?
SCHMIDT: No, that was not the case. The SS, as far as—I do not know
whether there were SS in the Chancellor’s car. The SS only escorted us
during the actual departure, that is, out of the house. There was nobody
else in my car, or the President’s car, after that.
MR. DODD: That is not what you told the court in Vienna. Down there you
said, “Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS.”
SCHMIDT: No, I said the SS escorted or conducted us during the departure
from the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who
conducted the departure from there. Whether someone remained in the car
after that, I do not know.
MR. DODD: All right. You probably can help us clear up one other
question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually
a member of the Government, was he, or was he not?
SCHMIDT: There has been a lot of debate about that question. The Federal
Chancellor had resigned in the afternoon session. At first, the
President had not accepted the resignation, so therefore he was still
Chancellor, and Seyss was still Minister. Whether the resignation was
accepted later on I cannot say. Some are of the opinion that the
President may, for all practical purposes, have entrusted the Federal
Chancellor with the continuation of business, and Seyss-Inquart along
with him. Others think that that would not have happened. Only the head
of the State himself can answer that question.
MR. DODD: As a former member of that Government, I want you to look at
one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen
it before.
It is Document 4015-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-891.
That states that President Miklas had relieved not only Schuschnigg as
the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the Federal Government,
as well as all secretaries of state, of their respective offices; and
that is March 11.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: That establishes, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was not in
office when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it.
Is that so?
SCHMIDT: Well, I believe that I have had a lot of experience in this
question, because I worked with the Federal President for a long time.
Releases of this kind go...
MR. DODD: Just tell us exactly—is that true or not? Is our
understanding correct?
SCHMIDT: It does not necessarily have to be interpreted in that way.
Releases of this kind go out to the offices days later, because red tape
will have its way, despite revolutions and in disregard of history.
Therefore, it cannot be said when that was actually done. I assume that
this release was not issued until long after 11 March.
MR. DODD: Did Seyss-Inquart use the term “Trojan Horse” quite often in
the days preceding the events of 12 March? Was that a common expression
of his?
SCHMIDT: He has stated a few times that he was not a “Trojan Horse
leader,” by which he wanted to express his loyalty, and wanted to
explain that it was not his job to open the back doors to National
Socialism.
MR. DODD: Did you ever think he protested too much?
SCHMIDT: Against what?
MR. DODD: About not being a Trojan Horse.
SCHMIDT: I did not hear that expression more than two or three times and
it was used by Zernatto.
MR. DODD: That is all.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have only one brief question in connection with these
last events. Witness, did Seyss-Inquart not also post men from the
guards battalion outside the Minister’s room?
SCHMIDT: Guards were present.
DR. STEINBAUER: At what time did Schuschnigg’s actual resignation occur?
SCHMIDT: Well, it is difficult to say when that happened; at any rate
when the new Government was formed. I assumed that it must have taken
place roughly between 9 and 10 o’clock, since the Federal President had
conducted serious negotiations at this time about the choice of a new
Chancellor, and I think the former Federal Chancellor, Dr. Enders, was
up for debate.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call
Chief of Police Dr. Skubl as witness.
[_The witness Skubl took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
MICHAEL SKUBL (Witness): Michael Skubl.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the absolute truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what offices did you hold in the Austrian
Republic?
SKUBL: At the end I was Chief of Police in Vienna, and State Secretary
for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector
General of the Austrian executive authorities.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of
Dr. Dollfuss, in accordance with instructions he gave before he died?
SKUBL: Dr. Dollfuss had appointed me Inspector General of the Police the
day before he was murdered on 24 July. I had enjoyed his full
confidence.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can one, therefore, describe you as having had the
confidence of his successor and friend, Dr. Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Seyss-Inquart became Minister, were you attached to
him in your capacity as State Secretary and Inspector General at the
same time?
SKUBL: Yes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior
and of Security, I was attached to him as State Secretary. Consequently,
I was directly subordinate to him, whereas until that time I had been
subordinated directly to the Federal Chancellor as Chief of Security.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were the police and the constabulary in your hands or in
the hands of Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking?
SKUBL: Practically speaking, they had been in my hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the particular task of combating illegal
movements?
SKUBL: As Chief of Police and State Secretary for Matters of Public
Security, one of my leading tasks was, of course, to combat illegal
movements, and particularly National Socialist aggression.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you observe any connection between Seyss-Inquart and
the July 1934 Putsch? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
SKUBL: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was his attitude in general towards National
Socialism?
SKUBL: Dr. Seyss-Inquart admitted being a National Socialist. However,
as far as I know, the so-called 120 or 150 percent National
Socialists—that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement—did not
consider him a 100 percent National Socialist. He was, however,
considered a very suitable person to be used as a piece on the
chessboard of the National Socialist movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, he was more a
person who was led than a person who was leading?
SKUBL: It was my impression that he was more led than leading.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, how did you work together with Seyss-Inquart in his
capacity as Minister of the Interior?
SKUBL: There were no rifts in our understanding. It was a completely
harmonious understanding.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he exert any influence upon the police? Did he, for
instance, bring National Socialists into the police corps?
SKUBL: No; that happened in no case.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have an opportunity to by-pass the Minister and
report directly to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg was the chief of the Government,
and in that capacity he was naturally my highest superior. It was
natural that I should make reports to the Federal Chancellor regularly
and upon special summons, and that I should also have received
instructions from him in return.
DR. STEINBAUER: Soon after Dr. Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister he
went to visit Hitler in the Reich. Was that an official journey, or was
it kept secret?
SKUBL: It was official.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you come to that conclusion?
SKUBL: It had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg, so far as I know, also knew about the journey.
It was also suggestive that in his capacity as liaison man between the
Austrian Government and the Reich he must necessarily have an
opportunity to speak to Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well then, when Seyss-Inquart came back, did he make a
report on the contents of his discussions with the Führer?
SKUBL: Yes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I
asked him how the conferences with Hitler had gone off. Seyss-Inquart,
still being fresh under the impression of the meeting and discussions,
informed me of what he had stated to the Führer. I still remember the
individual points exactly. Seyss-Inquart told the Reich Chancellor the
following:
“Herr Reich Chancellor:
“1. I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I have taken an oath
of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have taken an
oath, therefore, to Austria’s autonomy and independence.
“2. I am a believer and an active Catholic, and therefore, I
could not follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle.
“3. I come from a country where a totalitarian regime is out of
the question.”
DR. STEINBAUER: In spite of these views, did the Reich appoint a new
Landesleiter for the illegal NSDAP?
SKUBL: Yes. As far as is known to me, on 21 February Klausner was
appointed Landesleiter.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite, did he
order any special security measures?
SKUBL: The order for the plebiscite naturally had the effect of a
bombshell on the National Socialists, not only on the National
Socialists in Austria, but also in the Reich. There was feverish
activity, therefore, and preventive measures naturally had to be
introduced.
This special activity can be explained by the fact that the National
Socialists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite they would
suffer a great defeat, for the election slogans would have been accepted
by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian population.
In this connection it is most interesting to draw your attention to an
article which appeared on 11 March in the _Deutsch-Österreichische
Tageszeitung_, in which the fear could be read that this plebiscite
would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the formation of a
people’s front, and subsequently as a result of this, for
bolshevization. From this one could recognize the consciousness that the
Austrian National Socialists were a minority.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we come to the memorable 11th of March 1938. When
did you, as chief of the executive authorities, learn that German troops
were marching in?
SKUBL: The 11th of March was, of course, an exceptionally exciting and
eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those
hours. I know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me
showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could
not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that
unusually alarming troop movements were taking place on the Austrian
border.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg’s resignation,
say on the radio that in order to avoid chaos he was asking the
population to remain quiet and orderly since he was still Minister of
Security?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart did make that statement on the radio.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you make any observations to the effect that before
Schuschnigg’s resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, gave instructions, sent
telegrams, made telephone calls, or transmitted any other information
regarding the seizure of power in the State by himself?
SKUBL: What I observed was that Seyss-Inquart’s behavior until the
critical moment was certainly very passive, and as I have already said
earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was being
led rather than a man who was leading, and indeed there were clear
indications that he felt embarrassed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not yourself, in the afternoon or evening,
receive an offer from President Miklas to take over the Federal
Chancellorship?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg first summoned me in the late
afternoon, and he stated to me there had been an ultimatum from
Germany—that is to say, from Hitler—to the effect that he would no
longer be satisfied with calling off the plebiscite, but was demanding
Schuschnigg’s resignation. Then Schuschnigg told me that he personally
was ready to resign, but that he could not expect his staff to accept
Seyss-Inquart’s appointment as Federal Chancellor. He had a question to
ask me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the
Chancellor’s office. He did this in agreement with the President who, a
few moments later, made me the same offer.
I refused this offer, and I refused it because I considered that my
appointment as Chancellor would, in Hitler’s eyes, mean a declaration of
war. As State Secretary for Matters of Public Security I was at the head
of the defensive front against National Socialist aggression, and
consequently was also in personal opposition to Hitler. Therefore, had I
accepted the Chancellorship, this would have offered Hitler a welcome
opportunity to have his troops march in. My acceptance of the
Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the
struggle against invasion, and such a struggle was probably hopeless, in
view of the superiority of the German Armed Forces compared with the
Austrian Armed Forces and Austrian executive personnel.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then Seyss-Inquart formed his Cabinet and took you over,
too, as State Secretary. Why did you join that Ministry?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart proposed that I retain direction of matters of
public security in the State Secretariat under his Government. I
accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember
the conditions which he had stipulated with the Führer; that is, that he
would be Federal Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that,
I was impelled by the desire and hope that I could keep the executive
force in my hands, and that in the event that Seyss-Inquart had
difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, I could be of
assistance to him. In other words, there should be an Austrian strong
point, an Austrian enclave, in the Cabinet of the Austrian Federal
Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart still at that time speak in favor of
Austrian independence?
SKUBL: He did not speak about it in detail. We took that for granted
during the conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you leave the Cabinet, and why?
SKUBL: During the night between March 11 and 12 I took over the task of
going to the airfield to receive the Reichsführer SS Himmler, who had
been announced from Berlin. On that occasion he did not arrive alone,
but with a whole entourage. I can no longer remember the names of the
individuals, the number was too large; one name I understood very
clearly, and that was the name of Meissner—Meissner, the Austrian naval
officer who had joined the National Socialist uprising on 25 July, and
who then, after the collapse of this uprising, had fled to the Reich and
now had returned under Himmler’s protection.
That to me was such an impossible situation that I made the firm
decision not to have any more to do with all this, and so when I entered
the Federal Chancellery at noon and received the surprising news from
Glaise-Horstenau that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered,
“He can have that very cheaply, because I had already decided on that in
the early hours of the morning.”
Subsequently I also informed Federal Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart that I
had had knowledge of Himmler’s request, and that I had naturally decided
to resign and asked him to take official notice of my resignation.
Upon this Seyss-Inquart replied, “It is true that Himmler has demanded
your resignation, but I am not going to have anything dictated to me
from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it is
perhaps better for you to disappear for a few weeks, but then you must
come back because I consider your co-operation important.”
Naturally I declared that I would not do that. And the following day, in
writing, I handed in my resignation as Chief of Police and State
Secretary, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually
handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been
attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive force.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were then confined and have not gone back to Vienna
to this day?
SKUBL: First of all, I was held prisoner in my official apartment under
SS and police guard and then, on 24 May, two officials of the Kassel
Gestapo conducted me to a forced residence in Kassel, where I remained
until my liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr.
President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions? The Prosecution?
MR. DODD: No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr.
Friedrich Wimmer?
[_The witness Wimmer took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH WIMMER (Witness): Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have finished the questions concerning
Austria with the cross-examination of the witness Skubl and I shall now
proceed to deal with the Netherlands.
Witness, were you, from July 1940 until May 1945, commissioner general
for internal administration and justice in the Netherlands?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In that position did you have to deal with internal
administration, justice, education, health, archives, museums, and the
legislature?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the
Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: In exceptional cases, not otherwise.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also participate in the regular weekly official
conferences of the commissioners general and the secretaries general
with the Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Therefore, you were fully informed about events in the
occupied Netherlands?
WIMMER: In general, yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I ask you: Was the German Police a part of the
offices of the RK, or the Reich Commissioner, or was it not rather
independently subordinate to the Berlin central offices?
WIMMER: The German Police was a distinct office, separate from the Reich
Commissioner’s office, and was subordinate to the respective central
offices in the Reich, both administratively and actually.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is to say, then, directly subordinate to the
Reichsführer SS Himmler?
WIMMER: It was directly subordinate to the Reichsführer SS.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, did the German Police, apart from the duties of the
Regular and Security Police, have other special duties in the
Netherlands?
WIMMER: They had a number of special duties in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you enumerate them?
WIMMER: I could not enumerate them completely but, for example, the
combating of resistance movements in the Netherlands belonged
exclusively to their sphere of activity; furthermore, the establishment,
direction, and supervision of concentration camps belonged to their
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the removal of Jews from the body of the
Dutch nation belonged exclusively to their sphere of activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we come to internal administration. At the head of
each of the former ministries there was a secretary general, that is to
say, a Dutchman. Were these men persecuted in any way if they resigned?
WIMMER: No. The Reich Commissioner had told the Dutch secretaries
general upon assuming office that if they should feel in any way
embarrassed by the decrees or demands of the occupation authorities,
they should apply to him without any fear and explain their difficulties
to him, and that then, if so desired, he would let them resign from
their office in such a manner that in no way would they ever have to
fear any unpleasantness, of any kind whatsoever, and that they would
also be assured of financial security and get their pensions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner also dismiss provincial
commissioners?
WIMMER: He probably dismissed provincial commissioners also, but these
changes also occurred—I can recall two cases—through the death of the
provincial commissioner.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the mayors?
WIMMER: As far as the appointment of mayors is concerned, in principle
the same thing holds true as for all other officials in the Netherlands.
The mayors in the Netherlands, contrary to the rule in many other
nations, are not elected to office, but are civil servants in the true
sense of the word. They were appointed by the Queen, even the mayors of
the small communities. Since the head of the State was not present in
the Netherlands, the Reich Commissioner was confronted with the
necessity of regulating the appointment and dismissal of mayors and he
made the regulations in such a way that insofar as the most important
positions of the State were concerned, he reserved for himself the right
to make appointments, whereas he placed the appointments and dismissals
of lesser importance in the hands of the Dutch Secretary General.
DR. STEINBAUER: So if you look back today and examine the question of
how conditions were between 1940 and 1945 regarding the offices and
civil servants in the Netherlands, what can you state in that respect?
WIMMER: I believe I may say that at the end of the period of German
occupation the majority of the civil servants who had been in office
when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands were still in
office.
DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart has been accused of dissolving the
political parties. When and why did that take place?
WIMMER: The dissolution of the political parties was necessitated by the
fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, especially
in critical times, the occupying power could not tolerate, apart from
the fact that in an occupied territory it is generally difficult, if not
impossible, to deal with political parties. Report after report came
from our intelligence services about conspiracies of the most various
kinds, and so the Reich Commissioner felt himself called upon to
dissolve the parties. Nevertheless, he did not constitutionally remove
the parties as such; the institution of parties, as such, still
remained.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was suggested on the part of the Reich that the
administration be reorganized and that the Netherlands be divided into
five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces. Did
Seyss-Inquart do that?
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner refused such suggestions or demands every
time, and indeed he could do that all the more easily because the Dutch
administration was on a high level and primarily because the Reich
Commissioner expected, and on the basis of all kinds of assurances was
able to expect, that the Dutch administration would co-operate with the
occupying power.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we also have a party which was very close to the
National Socialists, the NSB, led by Mussert. Did this NSB party gain a
leading influence in the administration or not?
WIMMER: The NSB, as a party, gained no influence at all in the
administration. It was only that the occupying power, as was very
natural, applied to the NSB and consulted it in certain cases, for no
occupying power, in history, I believe, as well as in our day, is going
to approach those parties or groups which assume a hostile attitude
towards it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a
similar situation as existed in Norway under Quisling; that is, for him
to become Prime Minister of the Netherlands?
WIMMER: Mussert did have that aim. He expressed it persistently, again
and again, and I can say that by doing so he put the Reich Commissioner
into disagreeable situations.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, briefly, the Reich Commissioner...
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner rejected this every time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Another question. Did Seyss-Inquart in any way exert
pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied
territory?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he, in the field of education, issue decrees which
reduced the rights of the Netherlands?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he not encourage the Dutch Red Cross, although there
were cells of the illegal resistance movement in it?
WIMMER: He not only permitted the Red Cross to carry out its functions
without hindrance, but, as you say, he even encouraged it. As far as the
political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to
interfere because broadcasting stations, illegal broadcasting stations,
had been found under Red Cross control.
DR. STEINBAUER: They were resistance centers?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Furthermore, he has been accused of interfering with the
existing legislation by issuing laws concerned with citizenship and also
with marriage. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can
you say about that, quite briefly?
WIMMER: Acts of interference of that kind did occur. However, they
occurred because they were necessary from the point of view of the
conduct of the war and for the Armed Forces in particular for, to
mention the question of citizenship, those Dutchmen who had entered the
German Army wanted to have the assurance of also obtaining German
citizenship. The Reich Commissioner, however, who was of the opinion
that by acquiring German citizenship they should not incur any
disadvantage in Holland, decreed—and this can be found in the
corresponding decree—that these Dutchmen who acquired German
citizenship should retain their Dutch citizenship, so that by so doing
they would not be alienated from their people and their nation.
So far as marriage laws are concerned, the necessity arose that if
soldiers, in particular, wanted to marry Dutch girls, the parents’
approval of the marriage was not asked, and not for political reasons.
This approval was of some importance in that connection because the
parents, contrary to the rule in many other nations, retained this right
of approval until, I believe, the thirtieth year of the daughter
concerned.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of
the so-called summary courts-martial (Standgericht). Will you tell us
how these courts-martial were organized and how long and when they were
in session?
WIMMER: The creation of courts-martial was seen as a necessity after a
general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and we wanted to have a legal
basis for future cases so as to prevent future strikes as far as
possible, that is, to be able to combat them effectively after they had
broken out on the basis of the proper law.
How these courts-martial were organized and when they had to function is
exactly set down in the corresponding decree of the Reich Commissioner.
However, if I am to answer your specific question here about the
composition of these summary courts-martial, I can in any case only say
from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, and moreover
a judge who fulfilled all the requirements which a judge in the German
Reich had to fulfill.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, that is the essential point, and if I understand
you correctly, before these courts became police courts a judicial
functionary was president of these courts-martial. Is that correct?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you whether Seyss-Inquart had so-called
collective fines imposed on certain cities and communities?
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner actually imposed such collective fines.
The largest which was imposed, I believe, was the one which was imposed
once on Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have
already mentioned. The fines were decreed in accordance with established
procedure on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed in
an official decree by the police.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, therefore, these
collective fines—you mentioned the words “general strike”—were imposed
when actions of a large community were involved, and not actions by
individuals.
WIMMER: The collective fines were imposed in cases of violations which
were charged to a fairly large portion of the community in question.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you did
not tell me how long these so-called police courts-martial were in
session.
WIMMER: The police courts-martial were in session as long as police
martial law was in force. That was 2 weeks. Moreover, that was the only
time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich
Commissioner, that is, if you do not count the state of emergency that
was declared after the invasion as such.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to one of the most severe accusations brought
against my client. That is the accusation that he had hostages shot
illegally and contrary to international law, or participated in their
execution.
With the permission of the Tribunal I submit two statements to you which
were put to my client yesterday by the Prosecution. One is a statement
by General of the Air Force Christiansen, as a defendant, dated 20
February 1946, and the other one is also an interrogation of a
defendant, a higher police official, Dr. Schöngarth. It is F-886.
Will you please look at it and tell me what you know about these
questions. Take your time—I remind you of your oath—and answer these
questions as far as you can do it in good faith.
Have you read it?
WIMMER: No, not yet.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I will help you. Are you through?
WIMMER: No, I am not through yet, but please go ahead.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that hostages were shot in August 1942, on
the occasion of an act of sabotage in Rotterdam?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Why were these hostages shot? On whose orders?
WIMMER: It is well known what the Rotterdam incident was all about. It
was an attempt to blow up an Armed Forces leave train. In this affair,
the Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner and therefore...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was:
Who gave the order?
WIMMER: The order for what?
DR. STEINBAUER: For shooting the hostages.
WIMMER: The order for the execution was, I believe, given by the Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did the Reich Commissioner have to do with it? You
have read here how Christiansen accuses him in that connection.
WIMMER: The Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner, because it
was customary in fairly important matters for the two offices, that is,
the commander of the Armed Forces and the Reich Commissioner, to get
together and discuss these things. I recall that the commander of the
Armed Forces appeared in a very determined manner and demanded that an
example should be made so that such cases might be prevented in the
future as far as possible. It was stated on the part of the Armed Forces
that they considered hardly any other means possible than the shooting
of a considerable number of hostages.
I no longer recall the figure very exactly today, but as far as I do
remember it was about 50. I also recall that it was stated on the part
of the Armed Forces that they could dispense with such a selection of
hostages if the assurance could be given by the Police that on the basis
of some sort of material which the Police had in their possession there
was a chance that the perpetrators might be found and brought to
punishment by a German court, that is to say, by the court of the Armed
Forces.
On the part of the Armed Forces it was also pointed out that at the time
resistance in the Netherlands was beginning to develop in increasing
measure, and that this was finding expression in an increase in sabotage
and other acts hostile to the occupation forces. I also recall that it
was pointed out that if the Armed Forces and the Police had been present
in larger numbers than was actually the case, it would perhaps not have
been necessary to take a severe step of that kind. The forces at that
time at the Army’s disposal in the Netherlands were extremely small and
in case of an increase in the resistance movement the position of the
Armed Forces in the Netherlands might have been seriously endangered.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I shall ask you several questions so that we
can go ahead.
You have stated that the commander of the Armed Forces came and reported
that in view of this outrage he would have to shoot some hostages.
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that there was a Reich decree stating
that saboteurs in the occupied western territory should not be tried by
the courts but turned over to the Police? Can you remember that?
WIMMER: I do not think that was the case at this particular time,
especially if you refer to the so-called “Night and Fog Decree” which,
to my recollection, is of a later date. I remember very clearly that an
order was mentioned at that time, but I believe this order was one which
applied exclusively to the military sector, so I do not know the wording
of that order.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that the Reich Commissioner used his
influence to see that instead of the 50 you mentioned—in reality, it
was only 25 hostages—the number was reduced to 5?
WIMMER: That is known to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And that he also succeeded in having this done?
WIMMER: And that he succeeded.
DR. STEINBAUER: And that he particularly succeeded in having fathers of
families excluded?
WIMMER: Yes, indeed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That concluded one case. There is another case which has
been presented to you. That is the case of the attempt made on the life
of the Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter when, in fact, more than 150
persons were shot as hostages. Have you finished reading that?
WIMMER: Partly.
DR. STEINBAUER: Please read it all then.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, why is it necessary for the witness to
read the whole document? You can put the facts to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
Witness, at that time it was demanded that as a reprisal for the attempt
on the Police and SS Leader hostages should be shot?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who ordered that and who carried it out?
WIMMER: I know of the case because—that is, I know of it from the
report of Brigadeführer Schöngarth, who was at that time the Chief of
the Security Police. He had applied to me to find out what his proper
title was, after Rauter had become incapacitated for duty and he had to
sign a proclamation and in so doing add his official title. On that
occasion he told me this story and he also told me that he had gotten in
touch with Berlin, to find out what they would consider necessary as
reprisals for the attempt on Rauter. Berlin wanted a considerable number
of hostages shot. He mentioned a figure to me which was something like
500, at any rate, not less than 500, but rather more than 500. Then he
also told me that he had talked to the Reich Commissioner and told him
about this wish on the part of Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Would you be more specific please; Berlin is large and
had various Reich offices.
WIMMER: That was the Reichsführer SS, of course; it was quite clear that
where one of the highest functionaries in the sphere of the Police and
SS was concerned one had to approach the Reichsführer SS personally, and
not only his office. He also told me he reported it to the Reich
Commissioner, and that the Reich Commissioner, who as such was not
authorized to deal with that matter, had asked him to tell the
Reichsführer SS that he asked and advised him to refrain from carrying
out such a large number of executions. Thereupon—naturally everything
was done only by telephone—the Reichsführer agreed to reduce the number
and I believe that in the end, on the basis of several telephone
conversations back and forth, a number of about 200 or 150—I no longer
know it exactly today—was decided upon.
I am convinced that if this advice and this request and these
representations had not been offered by the Reich Commissioner through
Schöngarth, the number originally demanded by Berlin would have lost
their lives, so that one can say with full right that in this case the
Reich Commissioner saved the lives of several hundred Netherlanders.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were the people who were actually shot collected at
random in the streets or were they people who had already been
officially condemned?
WIMMER: Of course, on this point, I can only report what Brigadeführer
Schöngarth told me at that time during the conference. Indeed I have no
reason to assume that he did not tell me the truth. He informed me that
only such persons were considered who had already been condemned, so
that it was only a question of advancing the time of the execution, and
if the number should not suffice, then possibly others might be selected
who in any case were already in prison and would certainly be sentenced
to death.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this chapter by asking you what
happened to the hostages who were sent as such to Buchenwald by way of a
so-called Dutch East Indian reprisal.
WIMMER: After some time, I no longer remember just how long, when
complaints were received about their treatment, a large number of these
hostages, or perhaps all of them, were brought back into the Netherlands
and a very large number of them were released; not all together and at
once, as I remember, but a few at a time.
DR. STEINBAUER: A small town, Putten, was destroyed because of serious
acts of sabotage; was this ordered by the Reich Commissioner or someone
else?
WIMMER: Since it was a purely military affair, just like the Rotterdam
incident, where a plot was directed against the Armed Forces the
incident was handled by the Armed Forces. The order was given by the
commander of the Armed Forces and if I remember correctly, the Reich
Commissioner—in any case, I—only learned about the incident after the
execution had taken place.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I pass over to the next chapter, and that is the
combating of so-called enemies of the State.
Yesterday it was mentioned that the property of the Freemasons and
Jehovah’s Witnesses was confiscated. I should like to ask you, so that
there may be no mistake, whether it was only the property of the
organizations which was claimed, or was it also the property of the
individual members? And so, taking the Freemasons as an example, was the
property of the individual Freemason claimed as well as the property of
the lodges?
WIMMER: In all these cases property that belonged to organizations was
demanded, never that belonging to individuals. If there were individual
cases where this happened, then these were abuses by individuals, but I
cannot recall any such abuses.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Dutch Jews were also counted among the so-called
enemies of the State. Who was responsible for handling the Jewish
question in the Netherlands—you have really already told me that.
WIMMER: From the very beginning, the Police laid claim to the handling
of the Jews, to jurisdiction over the treatment of the Jews, as a matter
of fundamental principle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we have an entire list of decrees here which bear
the name of Seyss-Inquart and which indicate encroachments on the right
of the Jews. Can you remember when the legislation against the Jews was
introduced and in what form?
WIMMER: The development was briefly more or less as follows:
Seyss-Inquart was opposed to the entire idea of taking up the Jewish
question at all in the Netherlands, and in one of the Reich
Commissioner’s first conferences it was ordered that this question was
not to be dealt with.
After a certain time—it may have been a few months—the Reich
Commissioner informed us that he had received an order from Berlin to
take up the Jewish problem because Jews had participated in a relatively
large number in various movements and actions in the Netherlands which
at that time, indeed, could only be characterized essentially as
conspiracies.
Apart from that, one had to expect that if the war should last a fairly
long time, the Jews who naturally because of the treatment they had
undergone were not, and could not be, friends of the Germans, might
become dangerous, and, therefore, that they should be considered as
enemies—if not in the formal sense of the word, at least, practically
so.
The Reich Commissioner began to carry out this order with much
hesitation, although in the official conference he pointed out that he
could not help doing so because he could not assume such a
responsibility.
So far as I remember, this can be ascertained immediately from the Reich
Commissioner’s ordinance bulletin. At first, steps were taken to
register the property of the Jews, then to prevent German maidservants
from being in Jewish households; the Police requested that especially,
because naturally all kind of information could be carried back and
forth in this way. Then, when Berlin became more insistent in that
question, the Reich Commissioner finally decided to decree and regulate
a registration of all Jews by ordinance. It was pointed out particularly
that we would at least have to know where the Jews were, because only in
this way could the proper Security Police control and supervision be
made possible.
In themselves those were measures which were far behind those which were
already being carried out in the Reich at that time.
Then more pressure was exerted; I do not know whether it was perhaps
Heydrich who did this at that time, whether he was already in the
Netherlands at that time—I never saw him. I know only that he visited
the Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands at least twice.
At any rate, in the course of the year 1941 and particularly in 1942, a
comprehensive treatment of the question was urged. At first the Reich
Commissioner still believed that he could meet these demands by bringing
the Jews in the Netherlands together in one place where they could be
more easily supervised, and therefore the idea arose that in Amsterdam
one, two, or three districts of the city might be used to house the Jews
there, which was also connected with the necessity of resettling a part
or a considerable number of non-Jewish Netherlanders because there was
not yet a completely separate Jewish quarter at that time. The
non-Jewish Dutch did not live completely apart from them.
THE PRESIDENT: All this evidence that the witness is giving is all in
the decree and has already been given by the defendant, has it not? What
is the difference?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I wanted to say only one thing, and that
is that on such an important question I wanted to have confirmation
briefly by the witness.
WIMMER: I have not much more to say.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, I shall now summarize. Is it true that one
wanted to put the Jews together in a ghetto in Amsterdam?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that Heydrich demanded the evacuation of the
Jews?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner tried, insofar as
was possible under existing conditions, to use more humane methods in
this deportation of the Jews?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that I have now finished that chapter, too.
There were also concentration camps in the Netherlands. Is it known to
you that Seyss-Inquart had these camps inspected by judicial commissions
and corrected abuses found there?
WIMMER: Yes. Not only in concentration camps, but in camps of this kind
in general.
DR. STEINBAUER: At the end of 1944 and early in 1945 there was a
large-scale operation to deport all the men in Holland able to bear
arms. Was that operation directed by the Reich Commissioner or by a
different office?
WIMMER: That was an operation by the Reich, primarily an operation by
the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Why did that operation take place?
WIMMER: It took place because during those critical times there were
objections to the fact that men who were able to bear arms remained in
Holland. First, because a large number of former prisoners of war who
were released by order of the Führer in 1940 were later on mostly
brought back to the Netherlands and a part of them remained there.
Secondly, the resistance movements increased greatly during that time,
and so it was stated that, from the military point of view, the
responsibility of leaving those people able to bear arms in the
Netherlands could not be assumed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner, in order to moderate that
operation, issue so-called “release certificates”
(Freistellungsscheine)?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not a part escape this operation by way of the
Allocation of Labor?
WIMMER: As far as I know, yes; but I have no detailed knowledge of it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know what happened to the diamonds confiscated
after the battle of Arnhem?
WIMMER: These diamonds were placed in safety in Arnhem, during artillery
fire, by a German office, the Economic Testing Office I believe, and
then after some time they were taken to Berlin, from where, as indeed I
learned in Holland, after the surrender they were brought back to
Amsterdam again.
DR. STEINBAUER: How was the financial economy in the administration? Was
the tax money used sparingly, or was a very lax management displayed?
WIMMER: I am not really competent in this field. The Commissioner
General for Finance and Economy could say much more about that and with
much greater authority than I can, but so far as my impressions went, I
may say...
THE PRESIDENT: If he is not competent to speak about it, I do not see
why he should speak about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the witness Fischböck cannot be found.
However, as a deputy of the Reich Commissioner, this witness must know
something about the general features of it. I will ask him for details.
Did the Reich Commissioner save fairly large sums of money in his budget
and deposit them in a special fund?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know nothing about foreign currency restrictions,
apparently?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: How were raw materials, manufactured items, and
foodstuffs requisitioned in the civilian branch of the administration?
WIMMER: It was regulated by an ordinance in the Reich Commissioner’s
ordinance bulletin and can be seen there. As a matter of principle, the
requisitions were sent from the Reich to the Reich Commissioner and the
Reich Commissioner passed them on to the Dutch offices concerned, which
then carried out those requisitions themselves.
DR. STEINBAUER: So it was not the German offices, but the Dutch offices
headed by the Dutch secretaries general?
WIMMER: Yes. They also were authorized to do this by a special decree.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner or his offices take anything
from the large museums?
WIMMER: I did not quite understand that. From where?
DR. STEINBAUER: From the public museums.
WIMMER: No. I do not recall a single case, and I would have had to know
about it because the museums were under me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is why I asked you. Were there possibly any
archives that were carried away?
WIMMER: In general, no; but an exchange of archives was probably worked
out during the occupation, which had been under consideration even
before the war. There was an exchange of archives between, in
particular, the “Hausarchiv,” but also other Dutch archives, and German
archives, and—to be exact, this was done according to where they came
from—on the so-called principle of origin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was it possible for everybody to confiscate what he
wanted, or was that controlled in any way?
WIMMER: No, that was controlled, and the respective regulations were
again repeated in an especially stern decree of the Reich Commissioner
during the last year. Those who transgressed or intended to transgress
these regulations were given serious warning. There were only two
agencies which, according to the decree, were allowed to carry out
confiscations at all, and these were the Police and the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: In conclusion, I should like to refer back once again to
the Armed Forces operations. Was that discontinued in the fall? By
“Armed Forces operation” I mean the deportation of those members of the
population able to carry arms.
WIMMER: That was stopped on the basis of an objection made by myself on
behalf of the Reich Commissioner to General Student, who at that time
was chief of the army group, and under whose jurisdiction the
Netherlands also came at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then one last question. Can you remember the Jewish
Library Rosenthaliana?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened to that?
WIMMER: As far as I know, it remained in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was that not to have been removed?
WIMMER: Yes. There were such intentions, but since this library was
public property, the property of the City of Amsterdam, the Reich
Commissioner, upon my suggestion, ordered that this library was to
remain in Holland.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded the questioning of this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. DEBENEST: Witness, you were selected to fill the office of
commissioner general in the Netherlands by Seyss-Inquart himself?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You had known Seyss-Inquart for several years?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not been one of his assistants ever since 1938?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Is it true that during the occupation of the Netherlands a
large number of members of the NSB and pro-German elements were
appointed not only to leading positions, but also to subordinate
positions in the Dutch police, and that they were charged with executing
orders issued by the occupation authorities, such as the arresting of
Jews, members of the resistance, and hostages?
WIMMER: I can confirm the fact that members of the NSB and of groups
friendly to the Germans were employed in high and low positions by the
Reich Commissioner. However, as to their proportional part within the
total of Dutch civil servant employment in the civilian branch, I
believe that even at the end of the occupation period the participation
of these groups in proportion to the Dutch population was not greater...
M. DEBENEST: I spoke to you expressly about the police; reply to that
point.
WIMMER: You mean only the police?
M. DEBENEST: I told you, the police.
WIMMER: Yes, that is known to me. However, I do not believe that those
members of pro-German groups received special assignments, but rather I
believe that they received their assignments in exactly the same way as
the other civil servants in the same positions. I cannot, however, say
anything in detail about that, because I had very little to do with the
police.
M. DEBENEST: When officials of the Dutch police refused to carry out
orders which had been given to them by the occupation authorities and
abandoned their posts, did not the German authorities take members of
their families as hostages—women and children, for instance?
WIMMER: I cannot recall that.
M. DEBENEST: In no case?
WIMMER: That relatives of police officials were arrested? Members of
their families?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, of those who were not carrying out the orders of the
German authorities.
WIMMER: I do not remember that.
M. DEBENEST: That is fine. Well, perhaps you may remember that members
of families of Dutch citizens who offered resistance in one way or
another were arrested as hostages?
WIMMER: I have heard about that.
M. DEBENEST: There were some hostages arrested in such cases, for
example, were there not? There were hostages arrested in those cases?
WIMMER: You call it “hostages.” Do you also use that expression in cases
where the individuals concerned did not have to expect that they would
lose their lives, that it would cost them their heads?
M. DEBENEST: So far I have been asking you the questions, and you have
been answering them.
For instance, did you not receive protests from the Board of the
University of Amsterdam against the fact that the wife and children of a
professor of that university had been arrested as hostages?
WIMMER: I do not remember that. It is possible, however, that such a
complaint came to the Main Department for Education, which belonged to
my Commissariat.
M. DEBENEST: In any case, you do not deny the fact?
WIMMER: I could not deny it 100 percent, but I do not know anything
about it.
M. DEBENEST: Another question. Following the declaration of loyalty
which was imposed on the students, those who refused, were they not
forced to present themselves immediately for work, and were they not
deported to Germany without waiting for their group to be called up?
WIMMER: Yes, but not by the Labor Service. Do you mean the Office for
the Allocation of Labor?
M. DEBENEST: That is of little importance; but they were deported to
Germany for that reason, were they not?
WIMMER: Yes, by virtue of a decree by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
M. DEBENEST: Is it not true that numerous and extensive reforms were
introduced by the Reich Commissioner in all the activities of the life
of the Dutch people, and that these reforms were all contrary to the
Constitution?
WIMMER: One cannot say that.
M. DEBENEST: But there were reforms, were there not?
WIMMER: Certainly, yes, which were caused by the necessities of war and
the fact of the occupation. And there is a third factor involved, too,
which was that there were measures necessitated by the absence of the
head of the State and the Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, would it not be better to put the
particular points you want to him, rather than general questions, which
will enable him to deal with the matter at length?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did the civil administration service in the
Netherlands enjoy a certain freedom?
WIMMER: Yes, a great deal of freedom.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to read to you a passage from a report by the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, a report drafted on 19 July 1940. You shall
tell me whether you still maintain the reply that you have just given
me. This is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:
“The civil administration”—he means the civil administration in
the Netherlands—“at present finds itself in a sufficient and
otherwise progressive way under the direction and control of the
German authorities.”
Is the answer which you have just made in agreement with what
Seyss-Inquart wrote?
WIMMER: If mention is made in Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s reply that the control
was in German hands, that can only mean that the supervision was in the
hands of German authorities, for it is naturally to be taken for granted
that the German occupation authorities reserved for themselves a certain
control and supervision over Dutch legislation, as well as over all
important acts of administration and government; and if everything went
as it should, important decrees could not be issued without the approval
of the occupying power.
M. DEBENEST: That is enough. The Tribunal will judge your answer with
regard to this document.
Will you explain why a civilian government was established in the
Netherlands, whereas no such government was set up in other countries,
such as Belgium, for instance?
WIMMER: I do not know the real reason for that, but from what I have
heard and could find out myself the main reason was that Germany
attached the greatest value to establishing a good relationship with the
Netherlands, and the leaders in the Reich probably thought that this
could be more easily done through men of the civilian administration
than through the Armed Forces.
M. DEBENEST: More exactly, were they not pursuing a political goal in
this, the goal of placing the country in the hands of the National
Socialists, in order to bring about some sort of Germanic federation of
Germanic states?
WIMMER: Whenever I spoke with the Reich Commissioner about such things,
the Reich Commissioner expressed the point of view that the Dutch people
had all the characteristics of a distinct and independent people and
therefore should remain independent and sovereign as a state. It goes
without saying that during the occupation period the Reich Commissioner
and the German administration maintained fairly close contact with these
parties and groups which were pro-German, and I do not have to give any
reasons for that. But that the Netherlands, especially during a period
of occupation, were not going to accept completely the political
ideology of the occupying power was quite clear to the Reich
Commissioner, as indeed to anyone who was able to judge the conditions
at all reasonably.
M. DEBENEST: You said a few moments ago, if I understood correctly, that
the Reich Commissioner did not want to force the secretaries general of
the Netherlands to make decisions which might be contrary to their
conscience, and if they felt uneasy about it, they could ask for their
dismissal. Is that what you stated?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did he dismiss any secretaries general who had not asked to
resign?
WIMMER: There was only one exception, that of Secretary General Spitzen.
That was the Secretary General to the Ministry of Waterways who did not
carry out an order of the Reich Commissioner and in spite of this did
not hand in his resignation.
M. DEBENEST: What secretary general was this? In which department?
WIMMER: That was the Ministry of Waterways; that was the Ministry that
was responsible for canals, reclaimed land, highways, inland waterways,
and so forth.
M. DEBENEST: Is that the only case that you knew of?
WIMMER: That is the only case of which I knew.
M. DEBENEST: In what year was that?
WIMMER: That, I believe—one moment—at any rate, that was in 1944; in
the summer, I believe.
M. DEBENEST: Do you not remember the dismissal of the Secretary General
for National Defense, Mr. Ringeling?
WIMMER: The dismissal of the Secretary General for National Defense was
not a matter for the Reich Commissioner, but fell within the
jurisdiction of the military commander, since by virtue of the Führer’s
decree all military matters fell within the jurisdiction of the military
commander.
M. DEBENEST: Why was he dismissed?
WIMMER: That is not known to me.
M. DEBENEST: Try to refresh your memory with the aid of Seyss-Inquart’s
report and then we will see whether this was in agreement with the head
of the Armed Forces. This is what the defendant writes:
“One of the secretaries general tried....”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the witness does not know anything about it,
apparently.
M. DEBENEST: He says that he does not know the reasons, Mr. President,
but he adds—he had previously added—that it was in agreement with the
military authorities.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter which would come under the competence of
the military authorities; and he does not know about it. That is what he
said.
WIMMER: All the matters of the Ministry for National Defense fell within
the jurisdiction of the military commander, for it is perfectly clear
that everything of a military nature which took place or was directed in
the Netherlands there was directed by this Ministry, and it is clear
that the commander, the German military representative of the Reich, was
competent in this sphere.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have a document which proves that the man’s
dismissal was done by Seyss-Inquart, I suppose you can put it to him.
M. DEBENEST: I wanted simply to demonstrate that the answer he gave was
inexact, merely by reading four lines of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: As I said, if you have a document which proves that the
man’s dismissal was by Seyss-Inquart, you can put it to him.
M. DEBENEST: That is what I intended to do, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do it; put it to him, then.
M. DEBENEST: I do not have the original in German. I handed it in
yesterday evening to the Secretary of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Read it to him, M. Debenest. Read it to him.
M. DEBENEST: That is what I am going to do, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Here is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:
“One of the secretaries general tried to appeal to the authority
of Winkelmann”—Winkelmann was the military chief—“concerning
the question of the continuation of work in armament factories
for the Armed Forces, but this official....”
WIMMER: I did not understand that. Will you please read the last two
sentences once more?
M. DEBENEST: “....concerning the matter of the continuation of
armament factories for the Armed Forces. But this official was
immediately dismissed.”
WIMMER: But that does not say that the Reich Commissioner dismissed this
official.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly it is not said that the Reich Commissioner did
it; but it is none the less clear in this report that the Reich
Commissioner indicates here that when an official, no matter who he may
be, does not obey the orders which are given to him, he is dismissed
from his office and he quotes this case as an example.
WIMMER: But here it is a question of the military branch. What I have
said before deals exclusively with the civilian sector branch, the Reich
Commissioner’s branch. It is perfectly clear and possible that in a
report to Hitler the Reich Commissioner should speak about other things
also, because he was the guardian of the interests of the Reich. And he
reported about other things to his superior, besides those which were
exclusively within his sphere of activity. Nor do I know whether by
these officials or these workers, for example, the secretary general is
meant, the Secretary General for National Defense.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. We will leave this question.
Did you not require that the Secretary General for Education should
place the Kammerlingh Onnes laboratories in Leyden at the disposal of
the German authorities for research on atomic energy?
WIMMER: But only in the Netherlands; not in Germany.
M. DEBENEST: But if it was not for Germany, the Secretary General for
Education had perfect freedom to decide for himself; you did not have to
intervene, did you?
WIMMER: No. That was a German measure which had been demanded by the
Reich and which was now carried out in such a manner that all the
materials, machinery, and so on, remained in the Netherlands, and German
scientists were to have the opportunity to carry out their researches
there. Moreover I do not believe that that had anything to do with
atomic matters. Who said that?
M. DEBENEST: You claim that important public libraries and private
libraries were not confiscated or transported to the Reich? You said so
just now, is that not a fact?
WIMMER: Just now? I did not talk about libraries at all just now.
M. DEBENEST: But just now when Seyss-Inquart’s defense counsel was
questioning you, you certainly said, unless I misunderstood you, that no
libraries had been transported to the Reich which came from the
Netherlands.
WIMMER: I did not say that. Will you please show me that in the
transcript?
M. DEBENEST: Then it is doubtless a mistake. Were not the professors of
the University of Amsterdam threatened with the death penalty if they
handed in their resignations, and did you not threaten them yourself?
WIMMER: I neither expressed such a threat, nor do I know of any such
threat. I consider it quite impossible that anybody could have uttered
such a threat.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH DAY
Friday, 14 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Wimmer resumed the stand._]
M. DEBENEST: I still have a few questions to put to this witness.
Witness, in view of the answers which you made yesterday about the
libraries which have been looted and taken to Germany, I would like to
read to you a few lines taken from a document which I submitted the day
before yesterday to the Tribunal. This document is F-803, Exhibit
RF-1525, on Page 34 of the French text. This is a report from the
Minister of Education and Art of the Netherlands. We find the following:
“The collections as well as the libraries of the International
Institute for Social History at Amsterdam have been closed down.
The library, which has about 150,000 volumes, as well as a very
important collection of newspapers, has been taken to Germany.
The Library Rosenthaliana of the University of Amsterdam, which
belongs to the city, has been packed in 153 crates and has also
been taken to Germany. Famous collections concerning natural
history of the College of St. Ignace at Valkenburg and the
Museum of Natural History at Maastricht have also been taken to
Germany, as well as the library which belonged to it.
“In 1940 all the property of the Freemasonry Lodges was
confiscated and taken away to Germany. It included the
well-known Klossiana Library.”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you put enough for the purpose of
your question now? We have got the document already, and you have put
about half a dozen libraries which you are suggesting to him were taken
to Germany, and you want to know what he has to say to it, I suppose. It
is not necessary to go into the whole detail.
M. DEBENEST: What do you think about this story, Witness? Are these
facts correct?
WIMMER: The question which you have put to me was answered in part
yesterday, as far as it concerns the property of Freemasons. It was said
yesterday, and I confirmed it, that it is known to me that the property
of the organizations, but not of the individual members, was
confiscated.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question is,
was it true that these libraries were moved to Germany?
WIMMER: I know nothing of the removal of these libraries.
M. DEBENEST: But you did, nevertheless, claim that the Rosenthaliana
Library had remained in the Netherlands, did you not?
WIMMER: The Rosenthaliana, I said that.
M. DEBENEST: The Rosenthaliana, yes; the report specifies that it was
packed in 153 crates and taken to Germany.
WIMMER: I do know that instructions were given by the Reich Commissioner
that this library was to remain in Amsterdam. If it was removed in spite
of this, the action was contrary to instructions and I have no knowledge
of it.
M. DEBENEST: But still it was you who were responsible for education, or
at least for supervising education in arts?
WIMMER: Yes, but not of the arts.
M. DEBENEST: No, but as far as the libraries and universities were
concerned?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: It is rather curious that you should not have been kept
informed of this.
WIMMER: I do not know whether the library was removed or not.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, then. According to the statements which you made
yesterday evening you seem to claim that the Reich Commissioner did all
he could for the Dutch nation; is that not so?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: At any rate, he always did everything he could to avoid the
worst; is that so?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: On the other hand, you know that numerous people in that
country were interned, deported, and shot; that that nation was hampered
and coerced in every sphere, under threat of heavy penalties and
reprisals. Finally you know that that country was looted. Who were then
the people who ordered these crimes and committed them?
WIMMER: I said that the Reich Commissioner did for the country what he
could, and prevented as much as he could. In a 5-year period of
occupation measures had to be taken which were difficult for the country
to bear. I do not deny the fact; it is undeniable. I would ask you to
formulate your question more concretely, and to mention the actions
which you call crimes. The question is too general for me to answer it
“yes” or “no,” or even briefly.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the arrests?
WIMMER: Which arrests?
M. DEBENEST: The arrests of the Dutch people, of course.
WIMMER: The arrests were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader; he
was chief of police.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the internments?
WIMMER: Which internments? Do you mean internments in the concentration
camps?
M. DEBENEST: In concentration camps and in internment camps.
WIMMER: They were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader. That was
his department.
M. DEBENEST: Who chose the hostages?
WIMMER: The Police.
M. DEBENEST: Who appointed Rauter as Commissioner for Public Security?
WIMMER: As Commissioner General for Public Security? He was appointed by
the Reich Commissioner, but his main function was that of the Higher SS
and Police Leader. For this function he was appointed by the
Reichsführer SS.
M. DEBENEST: But he had been appointed—I suppose you know the order—to
assist the Reich Commissioner in his job of helping with the Police and
for security.
WIMMER: He was to be at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, but the
Reich Commissioner did not have the unconditional right to issue
instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leader. The Reichsführer SS had
this right. The appointment as Secretary General for Security was a
formality. It was made because the Reichsführer SS wished the Higher SS
and Police Leader to have this title too. Originally he was not to be
appointed Commissioner General.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore consider that Seyss-Inquart had no authority
over Rauter?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case I am going to read a document to
you, and you will tell me what you think of it, whether Seyss-Inquart
had no authority; and you can also make any explanations you choose.
That is Document 3430-PS, which has already been submitted as Exhibit
USA-708. This is an excerpt from Seyss-Inquart’s speeches made in
Holland, and is to be found on Pages 124 and 125 of the German text. I
submit it to the Tribunal. It will most probably also be found in the
trial brief of Seyss-Inquart. I am afraid I do not have the exact page
but I think it is Page 57 or 58.
[_Turning to the witness._]
Seyss-Inquart in that speech of 29 January 1943 said:
“I will give the orders, and they must be strictly carried out
by everybody. In the present situation, the refusal to carry out
such an order cannot be called anything except sabotage. It is
equally certain that we must, more than ever, eliminate and do
away with all resistance directed against the struggle for
life.”
And further on, he says:
“At a time when our husbands, our sons, our fathers are fighting
and meeting death in the East with bravery and fortitude and
without weakening and are making the greatest sacrifices, it is
unthinkable that we should tolerate conspiracies which seek to
render insecure the rear of the front in the East. The person
who dares to do that must perish.”
If Seyss-Inquart had had no authority over the Police, would he have
been able to make such a speech and say that he would issue the orders?
WIMMER: I did not say that Seyss-Inquart had no authority with regard to
the Police, I only said that the orders were given by the Higher SS and
Police Leader. The relationship with the Police was as follows:
The Reich Commissioner could, of, course, turn to the Police in any case
in which he needed them; but this only amounted to a wish and not a
binding order. In such cases, if they were important, the Police first
consulted the Reichsführer SS or his office; and only if this office
approved could a wish of the Reich Commissioner be carried out by the
Police.
M. DEBENEST: The question is simpler than that. Could he—“yes” or
“no”—issue orders in cases such as are mentioned in his speech? He
himself mentioned this, you know.
WIMMER: He could make a request but not give orders.
M. DEBENEST: I merely note that you do not agree with Seyss-Inquart’s
speech.
I will now speak to you of another document; and you will tell us how
you explain that. Seyss-Inquart could only make requests, as you term
it, and not give orders. This is Document F-860, which I submitted
yesterday. This document is a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Lammers.
In this letter he writes that he had wanted to reorganize the Dutch
police in order to adapt it to the German police organization; and in
the same document he states the opinion that the police must be the
strongest expression of the internal administration of a country, which
should not be transferred to another agency. That is what Seyss-Inquart
says in that document. How can you then co-ordinate your answer with
what Seyss-Inquart writes?
WIMMER: This reorganization was not suggested by the Reich Commissioner
but originated from the Police itself. The Reich Commissioner by this
reorganization—and I myself, too—tried to have the Dutch police at
least not completely separated from the administration, which in the
main was already the case in Germany, and was what the German Police in
the Netherlands also wanted.
M. DEBENEST: You contradict what Seyss-Inquart himself wrote in this
document. How do you explain what Seyss-Inquart wrote further on in the
same document:
“I would not like to appoint expressly as administrator of court
procedure the Higher SS and Police Leader here, for this
appointment suggests to the Dutch a limitation of the authority
of the Reich Commissioner. This is of particular importance
because the Reich Commissioner was appointed as the guardian of
the interests of the Reich by order of the Führer. But I have
myself given to the Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers
which an administrator of courts needs.”
WIMMER: Would you please read the first two sentences again?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the document is before us, don’t you think?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is scarcely worth while to argue with the witness
about it.
M. DEBENEST: I will not insist upon it, Mr. President.
Witness, how do you explain the fact that Schöngarth—you saw the
document yesterday, did you not, which counsel for the defense submitted
to you, the interrogatory of Schöngarth—how do you explain the fact
that Schöngarth, on the very morning after the attempt on Rauter’s life,
went to Seyss-Inquart and that Seyss-Inquart gave him the order, as he
himself states in the document, to take increased measures of reprisal
and to execute 200 prisoners, and this with the aim of intimidating the
population?
WIMMER: Yesterday, I believe, I exhausted this subject. I said
everything I knew about it.
M. DEBENEST: Will you give me the explanation I am asking you to make?
WIMMER: I said yesterday that Brigadeführer Schöngarth came to me
and—to be brief about it—represented the matter to me to the effect
that the Reichsführer SS had demanded 500 shootings and that Schöngarth,
on the advice and the request of the Reich Commissioner, had succeeded
in reducing the number to 200. That is what I said yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You maintain that he had received orders previous to the
ones he received from the Reich Commissioner then?
WIMMER: Not from the Reich Commissioner but from the Reichsführer SS.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, from the Reichsführer?
WIMMER: I can only say that Brigadeführer Schöngarth reported the matter
to me in that way. I was not there when he telephoned the Reichsführer
SS.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Didn’t you yourself take part in a meeting
during which hostages were chosen?
WIMMER: A meeting?
M. DEBENEST: A meeting—a conference, if you prefer.
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: On what occasion?
WIMMER: I recall that in the Rotterdam case the Reich Commissioner had a
conference with the Commissioners General, and the matter was reported.
M. DEBENEST: Were you present at the meeting with General Christiansen?
WIMMER: I cannot say with certainty; I believe I was.
M. DEBENEST: Do you know what Seyss-Inquart said during that meeting,
what his attitude was?
WIMMER: His attitude was that the intention of the Armed Forces to carry
out 50—or as I heard yesterday, 25 shootings—was going too far and
could not be done. In this connection, I already testified yesterday
that the Reich Commissioner was able, after repeated remonstrations, to
persuade the Armed Forces to agree finally to have only five hostages
shot.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, this has all been gone over with
Seyss-Inquart, has it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And with this witness?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. I just wished to see whether the
witness agreed with the document which I submitted to the Tribunal.
I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no questions to put to the witness, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the approval of the Court, I shall call the witness
Dr. Hirschfeld to the stand.
[_The witness Hirschfeld took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HEINZ MAX HIRSCHFELD (Witness): Heinz Max Hirschfeld.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when the Netherlands was occupied on 12 May
1940, were you Secretary General of the Economic and Agricultural
Ministries?
HIRSCHFELD: Before I answer your question, I should like to state that I
would have preferred to speak Dutch, but in order not to delay the
proceedings, I will speak the foreign language which I speak best; I
will speak in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
HIRSCHFELD: As for your question, I can say “yes.”
DR. STEINBAUER: In this same capacity, did you direct the affairs of
both Ministries until the end of the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in the first
conference, told all the secretaries general that he expected loyal
fulfillment of their duties, but that no one would have to fear any
disadvantage if he should resign?
HIRSCHFELD: In answer to that, I should like to say that the Netherlands
secretaries general, who were ordered by the Netherlands Government to
remain in the Netherlands, told the Reich Commissioner at that time
that, in the interests of the Netherlands people, they would remain in
office after they had received approval to do so from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Army who, at that time, was the
authorized representative of the Netherlands Government. In answer to
the question of the Reich Commissioner we said, yes, under those
conditions.
As for his remark about not fearing disadvantages if we should resign,
we answered that that had nothing to do with our decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the secretaries general who resigned receive their
pension? For example, Mr. Trip, who was president of the Netherlands
Bank.
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Secretary General of the Interior, Frederiks,
remain in office until September 1944?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will speak of your own department, Agriculture
and Economy.
Did the Reich Commissioner interfere in the administration of your
Ministry? In particular, did he release or transfer officials from the
food service?
HIRSCHFELD: The Reich Commissioner personally did not interfere. His
officials attempted to do so several times, but we refused to allow it.
DR. STEINBAUER: A so-called State Political Secretariat of the NSB
existed. Did it have any influence on the administration?
HIRSCHFELD: According to the order of the Reich Commissioner, this State
Political Secretariat had no influence on the Netherlands
administration. However, I should like to add that through the
appointments of NSB secretaries general later such influence actually
took place in various departments, though not in mine.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner have the head of the food
service, Louwes—who was known as being hostile to the Germans—retained
in the interest of the food supply for the population?
HIRSCHFELD: I believe the Netherlands officials left behind by the
Government had in general the same attitude as M. Louwes. However, M.
Louwes was left in his office.
DR. STEINBAUER: Although it was demanded that he should be removed?
HIRSCHFELD: This was reported to me by M. Van der Vense at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the trade economy was reorganized, was this done by
order of the Reich Commissioner or by the secretary general?
HIRSCHFELD: The reorganization of the trade economy was carried out on
the basis of an order signed by me; although there was originally a
draft, which was to be signed by the Reich Commissioner. I refused this
because I was of the opinion that this was a Dutch affair, and if the
order was signed by me the danger of German influence could be
prevented.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Reich Commissioner organized agriculture in the
so-called “Landstand.” Did this Landstand receive any executive powers?
HIRSCHFELD: The Landstand did not receive any executive powers. I should
like to add that in a personal talk I advised the Reich Commissioner not
to form the Landstand.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was the so-called Conscription Order of 1941 enforced to
a great extent, particularly in the Netherlands?
HIRSCHFELD: As far as I know, the Conscription Order was only enforced
to a limited extent in the Netherlands; but it was applied all the more
to the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: There was also a drive to remove members of the
population who were capable of military service, especially from
Rotterdam and The Hague—who carried out this drive?
HIRSCHFELD: Which drive do you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: To remove members of the population capable of military
service.
HIRSCHFELD: In 1944?
DR. STEINBAUER: 1944.
HIRSCHFELD: This drive was carried out by the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner weaken this action by making
exemptions, particularly in your department?
HIRSCHFELD: As for issuing exemptions, I heard very little of this at
the time.
DR. STEINBAUER: The shipyards and dock installations in Rotterdam and
Amsterdam were to be blown up. Do you know the attitude of the Reich
Commissioner on this subject?
HIRSCHFELD: I only know, from statements of the deputy of the Reich
Commissioner, Völkers, in Rotterdam, that he resisted these measures in
the face of the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I must remark that Völkers’ affidavit has
not yet arrived and at the moment cannot be traced at all; that is why I
am putting this question to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you confirm the fact that through the
intervention of the Reich Commissioner the area which was to be flooded
was reduced by about 100,000 hectares?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that through the intervention of the Reich
Commissioner, or his office, the area to be flooded in 1933 was reduced;
I do not know exactly to what extent.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean 1943. You made a mistake; you said 1933; it
must be 1943.
HIRSCHFELD: 1943.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it possible that this figure of 100,000 hectares is
correct?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that it might be about half of what the Armed
Forces had intended to flood at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in view of the
blockade, changed agriculture over to the production of food at an
opportune moment?
HIRSCHFELD: When in 1940 the Netherlands was invaded and occupied by the
Germans, the authorities who dealt with agriculture were of the opinion
that a reorganization of agriculture was necessary. The Reich
Commissioner and his office did not oppose us in this work.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true, in particular, that the stock of high
quality cattle in the Netherlands was retained by these measures?
HIRSCHFELD: The livestock in the Netherlands was, to my knowledge,
reduced by about 30 percent in the period of occupation. These measures
of reorganization of agriculture made it possible to retain this 70
percent of the livestock throughout the war. Pigs, however, had been
reduced to a much greater extent and it was necessary to slaughter
almost all the poultry.
DR. STEINBAUER: The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in
detail here. I have one question to put to you:
When did you speak to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for the first time
about lifting the embargo?
HIRSCHFELD: In answering this question, I must go back a little. When
the railroad strike was proclaimed, M. Louwes and I on 17 September—I
beg your pardon, on 22 September 1944—were visited by Van der Vense who
on behalf of the Reich Commissioner told us that he expected that M.
Louwes and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men in order to put
an end to the railroad strike in the interests of the food supply for
the country. If we did not do so, countermeasures would immediately be
taken to threaten the Netherlands population in the west of the country
with famine.
We refused to issue such a statement, and we told Van der Vense that he
should report to the Reich Commissioner that reprisals against the
population in connection with the railroad strike would place
responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissioner. That was the
decisive discussion. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being.
Thereupon protests were issued on this subject to the various agencies
of the Reich Commissioner, and on 16 October 1944 the first discussion
took place in which it was announced that the intention was to lift this
embargo.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that unfortunately in this particular year
the frost came earlier than in other years?
HIRSCHFELD: Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in
Holland the question of frost is always uncertain. From the Dutch side
it was pointed out—I did this myself in a press report—that we always
have to expect an early frost.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the invasion threatened and a large part of the
population was drawn upon to build fortifications, did the Reich
Commissioner agree to your suggestion that a large number of the
agricultural workers should be allowed to go home early?
HIRSCHFELD: I know of two cases. In the first place, it was a question
of workers from the big cities who were sent to the northeastern
provinces in order to dig potatoes; and the promise was made that these
workers would not be used for fortification work. This promise was kept.
Secondly, at the same time a large number of agricultural workers in the
province of Drente, who were already being used for fortification work,
were released for digging potatoes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I was unfortunately not able to ask the witness
Fischböck about questions relating to finance. Do you know that M. Trip,
who resigned on the question of the foreign currency blockade, was left
in the Bank for International Payments by the Reich Commissioner in
agreement with Funk, the Minister for Economy?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall in this connection that M. Trip intended to resign
as a member of the administrative council of the International Bank.
When this became known, the Germans were apparently somewhat scared; and
M. Trip was asked not to hand in his resignation. I know that he did not
hand it in. What this implied and what reasons were behind it, I do not
know from my own experience.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have two last questions, which are extremely
important. We know of an order of the Reich authorities under the title
“scorched earth.” It was actually issued in March 1945 for the
Netherlands. Locks, pump stations, dikes, et cetera, were to be
destroyed. Do you know what was the opinion of the Reich Commissioner
with respect to this important matter? Did you speak with him about this
question?
HIRSCHFELD: This question was discussed for the first time in a
conversation which I had with the defendant on 14 December 1944. In this
conversation he told me that in view of military developments he feared
that the Armed Forces might receive an order to destroy the western part
of the country. At that time he discussed with me to what extent it
would be possible to keep the western part of the Netherlands out of
hostilities. On 7 January 1945 this conversation was continued. As a
result of this conversation I attempted to establish contact with London
on this question. I did not succeed in obtaining an answer. These
reports had to be made by secret radio stations. I never learned whether
it was even possible to get one through. Then the Reich Commissioner
visited me on 2 April and told me that the “scorched earth” order had
arrived and that he had called on Speer for that reason. Speer had told
him that the Reich Commissioner did not need to carry out this order in
the civilian sphere. But Speer could not speak for the Armed Forces.
Therefore, the Reich Commissioner had also talked with General
Blaskowitz. Blaskowitz had told him that orders were orders, but if a
way could be found to avoid this order he would be ready to do so. Then
the Reich Commissioner asked me what possibilities I could see. This
discussion was the result of a communication which I reported to London
by telegram in April 1945. It was confirmed to me that this report had
reached London. Further conversations followed then.
DR. STEINBAUER: The last question: Did the Reich Commissioner, in
contrast to the central authorities, establish any contact with the
agents of the resistance movement in order to stop the war prematurely?
HIRSCHFELD: A few days after the conversation on 2 April 1945 I had a
talk with the deputy of the Reich Commissioner, Schwebel. He asked me to
what extent the Reich Commissioner could have been in contact with the
agents and whether the few men designated by Herr Schwebel were the
proper men. I then confirmed this.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions?
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): I should like to ask the
witness a few questions.
Dr. Hirschfeld, you just said that the former president of the Dutch
State Bank, Dr. Trip, was in the administrative council of the Bank for
International Payments at Basel and remained there after he had resigned
his office as bank president in Holland. You just confirmed that. I
should like to ask you, do you know that the Reich Minister of Economy,
Funk, urged the bank in Basel to allow Dr. Trip to remain in the
International Bank in Basel although Dr. Trip was no longer authorized
to represent Dutch interests?
THE PRESIDENT: How are we concerned with this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: In questioning the Defendant Seyss-Inquart the French
Prosecution brought out the fact that the former president of the Dutch
State Bank, Dr. Trip, was forced to resign or did resign; and the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart was charged with this. As defense counsel for
the Defendant Funk I should like to prove that the Defendant Funk took
the part of Dr. Trip as president of the Netherlands State Bank and saw
to it that Dr. Trip was retained in the International Bank at Basel.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks it so remote and so
trivial that really it is quite a waste of time for the Tribunal to
listen to this sort of thing.
DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President, then I will ask another question.
Witness, do you know that at the time when Dr. Funk was president of the
Reichsbank, the Reichsbank shares in the possession of Dutch capitalists
were taken over and that Dutch circles generally acknowledged that this
was done in a fair and satisfactory way by Dr. Funk?
HIRSCHFELD: I know nothing at all about taking over shares in the
Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything, Dr. Hirschfeld, about the opinion Dr.
Funk expressed to you on the question of the treatment of the clearing
debts?
HIRSCHFELD: After the outbreak of the war between Holland and Germany I
never spoke to Funk. Therefore he did not express any opinion at all to
me during the war.
DR. SAUTER: Did you not learn from any other source what Funk’s point of
view was on the action to be taken in regard to the clearing debts?
HIRSCHFELD: I know from various reports and from publications during
that time that the Germans represented these clearing debts as actual
debts. We Dutch, however, never believed this; and if an expert on
national economics had observed the development from the time when
central clearing was organized during the war, he could have realized
without difficulty that these debts could not represent any de facto
value. In the course of the war they rose to more than 42,000 million
marks. When the president of the Dutch Bank, who was appointed by
Seyss-Inquart, compared the Reichsmark to the pound sterling in his
annual reports, we in Holland laughed at it.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hirschfeld, you just spoke of a president of the Dutch
State Bank who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. I believe that was M.
Rost van Tonningen?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Funk, who was the president
of the German Reichsbank at that time, endeavored to prevent the
appointment of Rost van Tonningen and wanted Dr. Trip to remain in
office as president of the Dutch State Bank?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question again, isn’t it? That is
practically the same question as we have already said we did not want to
hear about—about Funk’s support of Dr. Trip?
DR. SAUTER: If I may say so, Mr. President, the first time I wanted to
ask whether Funk tried to have Dr. Trip retained on the administrative
council of the International Bank in Basel although he was actually no
longer competent to represent Dutch interests, you said that that
question was immaterial. The present question refers to whether Dr. Funk
endeavored to have the Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the
Dutch Bank. That is the last question which I have to ask, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to the witness._] Well, do you know?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. I should like to explain this a little. To understand
this matter it is necessary...
THE PRESIDENT: Please, be very short about it then.
HIRSCHFELD: It is necessary to know that the Reich Commissioner and Dr.
Fischböck were in favor of Rost van Tonningen, although it was known
that we in the Netherlands considered Rost van Tonningen a traitor. When
Trip was forced to resign, Wohlthat, the German Reichsbank Commissioner,
told me that this matter was discussed in Berlin, and the basis of this
information...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I think what you were asked was whether Funk
tried to get Trip appointed to the presidency of the Dutch Bank when
this other man was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. Do you know whether
Funk...
HIRSCHFELD: I only know from Wohlthat that Funk attempted to do so and
that Göring made a different decision at the suggestion of the Reich
Commissioner and Dr. Fischböck.
DR. SAUTER: Anyway, you confirm that Funk attempted to have the
Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the Dutch State Bank?
HIRSCHFELD: I confirm that, having been told so by Wohlthat.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
M. DUBOST: Of what nature were the orders left to you by the Dutch
Government when it left for England?
HIRSCHFELD: There were written instructions by the Dutch Government for
all Netherlands officials of the administration. These instructions were
based on the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare.
M. DUBOST: These orders, therefore, did not imperil the German Army?
HIRSCHFELD: No.
M. DUBOST: Will you then please explain, if you are capable of doing so,
why Holland had an exceptional regime, since she was the only country in
the West to have a Gauleiter immediately after the invasion?
HIRSCHFELD: We considered the appointment of a Reich Commissioner who
was chief of the civilian administration in the Netherlands as an
indication that the German Government had political intentions in the
Netherlands and not purely the intentions of an occupying power.
M. DUBOST: In your opinion, therefore, Seyss-Inquart was appointed the
day after the invasion had started because the German Government had the
intention of altering the Dutch national institutions in contravention
of international law?
HIRSCHFELD: We were convinced—and this was confirmed by
experience—that all possible forms of National Socialist institutions
would be introduced in the Netherlands and that one would attempt to
force them upon the Netherlands.
M. DUBOST: This attempt was made?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that during the occupation a great number of the
members of the Dutch National Socialist Party were at the head of the
police and carried out German orders to arrest Jews or members of the
resistance movement or to take hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: When the Dutch police itself became involved in these
arrests, did it make them only because it was forced to do so?
HIRSCHFELD: The conditions were such that old Netherlands policemen, if
they ever took part in such matters, did so because they were forced to;
but there were Dutch policemen who had been appointed by the German
authorities. They were, in general, members of the NSB and they, in
part, volunteered for such malodorous tasks.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that the wives and children of those members of
the Dutch police who refused to carry out German orders were taken as
hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that in various cases the families were taken as
hostages when police officials refused to carry out orders. It is
further known that this did not happen only in the case of the police,
but also in other cases.
M. DUBOST: It has been alleged here that the diamonds taken at Arnhem
had all been found in Holland. Does that agree with the facts?
HIRSCHFELD: What was stolen at Arnhem?
M. DUBOST: Diamonds.
HIRSCHFELD: Diamonds. The diamonds affair is a typical example of how
they wanted to deal with Dutch property. These diamonds were in a bank
safe in Arnhem. After the invasion of Normandy attempts were made by the
Germans to seize these diamonds. The director of the Netherlands agency
which is concerned with diamonds and later I myself were asked for the
keys to the bank safe. We refused. And then on the day of the airborne
landings near Arnhem, the German Armed Forces blew up this safe.
Apparently only half of the diamonds were found and they were sent to
the Reichsbank in Berlin.
When I protested, Fischböck said that they had only been put in the
custody of the Reichsbank in Berlin. Then I demanded that these diamonds
should be given back. Meanwhile, it was learned that half of the
diamonds were still in Arnhem. The Currency Protection Command again
demanded the keys which were in my personal possession. I refused and
had another discussion with Fischböck. The matter was obviously
distasteful to him; and he agreed to the concession that the remaining
diamonds, which we later found in Arnhem, be returned to the owner. But
they were willing to give back the half which had been sent to Berlin
only if they could be placed under German lock in a bank in the eastern
Netherlands. I demanded from Fischböck that they be turned over without
restrictions. Apparently Fischböck could not agree, and for this reason,
after the liberation of the Netherlands, these diamonds were not given
back; and as far as I know they have not yet been returned.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart return the property of the 1,000 Jews who
were deported to Theresienstadt?
HIRSCHFELD: As to the Jews who were deported to Theresienstadt, I know
that these people, on the basis of a promise given to my colleague
Frederiks, were to be given preferential treatment; but that their
property had been given back is not known to me and I do not believe it.
M. DUBOST: Was that property returned to them?
HIRSCHFELD: It had been confiscated. I did not hear that it was returned
to them.
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart said that in February 1941, 400 Jews had been
transported from Amsterdam to Mauthausen as a measure of reprisal for
the fact that a member of the NSB was supposedly murdered at Amsterdam
by Jews. What do you know about this?
HIRSCHFELD; I know that in February 1941 there were two difficult
situations in Amsterdam. One referred to shipyard workers. I believe
3,000 of them were to be forcibly sent to Germany. I intervened with
Seyss-Inquart and succeeded in preventing this. There was, however,
unrest in Amsterdam on this subject. In the second place, Jews were
already being arrested in Amsterdam, which was the occasion for a
strike. The incident of these 400 Jews of whom you speak took place
after this strike in Amsterdam as far as I recall, because they wanted
to make the Jews responsible for the strike. Fischböck told me so
himself, and I said that I did not believe it and that this was only an
excuse.
M. DUBOST: If I have understood you correctly, these Jews were arrested
because the population in Amsterdam was opposed to their deportation.
There were demonstrations and riots during which members of the NSB were
killed. These Jews were therefore not deported in reprisal for the
murder of the members of the NSB; on the contrary, the men of the NSB
were killed at the time when they were going to arrest the Jews, before
there was any idea of reprisal.
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that in these days the Amsterdam workers resisted
when the Jews were being arrested, and this led to an uprising in
Amsterdam and to the strike. Exactly what happened I do not know from my
own experience.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart prohibit ration cards to be given to
workers who evaded deportation to Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: When in May 1943 the so-called age groups were called up for
labor commitment in Germany, instructions were sent on 6 May to the
competent Netherlands authorities announcing that workers who were
called in these age groups could no longer receive any food cards. That
was a decree of 6 May 1943, signed by an official of the Reich
Commissariat by the name of Effger. We received this instruction; and
although it reached us when martial law was in effect, the instruction
was not carried out by the Netherlands authorities. What the German
authorities argued, in effect, was: “Whoever does not work for Germany
gets nothing to eat.”
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart claimed that the Dutch people who left to work
in Germany up to 1942 were all volunteers. Is that correct?
HIRSCHFELD: No, they could not all be volunteers. The unemployed in the
Netherlands received unemployment compensation, and shortly after the
occupation a directive was issued that people who were suited for work
in Germany and refused to volunteer for this work were no longer
entitled to receive unemployment compensation. Thus they were under
economic pressure.
M. DUBOST: Much has been said here as to whether Rauter was subordinate
to Seyss-Inquart. Could you inform us on this?
HIRSCHFELD: So far as we in the occupied territories knew, Rauter was
appointed by Seyss-Inquart at the beginning of June 1940 as Commissioner
General for Security. No order which was then known indicated that
Rauter had any kind of special position. The decree of the German Reich
Chancellor of 18 May 1940 made it clear to us Dutch that the Reich
Commissioner was the only responsible man in the Netherlands for the
occupying power within the civilian sphere. Much later, from talks, I,
and perhaps others who were better informed, realized that Rauter
received direct orders from Himmler or from the Reich Security Main
Office. But the population of the Netherlands could not know this.
M. DUBOST: Perhaps you know the result of the abolition of the “currency
frontier” and its repercussion on life in Holland.
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. I will try to describe this matter in a few words. At
the outbreak of war there was a clearing agreement between the
Netherlands and Germany. Thus we Netherlands officials, at the beginning
of the occupation, were able to exercise special control for deliveries
of goods and such to Germany, because there was not only border control
by customs officials, but we could also control payment. It was
particularly disagreeable to Fischböck that Dutch authorities could
still refuse anything, and this was a cause for friction. He attempted
to remove this clearing, and on the 1st of April 1941 the foreign
currency border was removed. This made it possible for all goods to be
bought in the Netherlands for Reichsmark, and they could be taken to
Germany under the protection of the German authorities. I will give an
example: According to an investigation, which I ordered at that time,
there were a few hundred buyers of jewelry and gold and silver articles
in the Netherlands. These articles are easy to carry with one. If there
had been control of payment, it would not have been possible that in
1942 alone, according to our estimate, 80 to 100 million guilders’ worth
of such goods was taken away at high prices to Germany. The important
point was that by lifting this control of foreign currency one could
operate more freely. Furthermore, this was a possibility of buying Dutch
securities on the Amsterdam stock exchange, for one of the German aims
at that time was to tie Netherlands and German economy together. The
easiest way to do this was to lift the “currency frontier,” or more
exactly, the currency control between the occupied territories and
Germany; and thus Netherlands interests were prejudiced more severely
than those of other occupied territories where this currency control was
retained. I should like to add that of course even there ways of
carrying out this exploitation were found.
The lifting of the currency control made the German policy in this
connection much easier. This was clearly shown by an order of Hermann
Göring of 1942, in which the control of the Netherlands German border
was abolished and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan could write that
there must be no control at the border even when price regulations or
rationing regulations were infringed. That was what Hermann Göring
added.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that this should be
shortened, this discussion of the question of the abolition of the
frontier policy for money.
M. DUBOST: I have no more questions on this point, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] What amount of money did Holland pay Germany
for the cost of occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: The total sum which was paid by the end of the occupation
was 8,500 million guilder.
M. DUBOST: In what form were these payments demanded?
HIRSCHFELD: These 8,500 million guilder consisted of credits which the
Armed Forces demanded for the direct occupation costs in the
Netherlands; furthermore, for the cost of the machinery of the Reich
Commissariat; and third, payments which were imposed on the Netherlands
under the expression which was used at first, “outside occupation
costs,” that is, expenses which the Armed Forces incurred in Germany in
the interest of the occupation forces in the Netherlands. The form in
which it was paid, as far as it concerned payments in the Netherlands,
was in Dutch money. Payments in Germany were made in gold, which was
demanded from the Netherlands Bank, or were taken from the account which
the Netherlands Bank had with the Reichsbank.
M. DUBOST: Were these payments the result of one of the conditions of
capitulation?
HIRSCHFELD: I know the capitulation conditions of 14 May 1940 and they
do not mention anything about occupation costs.
M. DUBOST: What is the damage sustained by Holland in other ways as a
result of the looting of the means of construction, machinery, stocks,
ships, and so forth?
HIRSCHFELD: It is extremely difficult to give an exact figure because it
could not be determined during the occupation. But, after the German
capitulation, the Netherlands Government reported the sum of about
25,000 million guilders to the Reparation Committee in Paris as damages
for occupation. This would include the 8,500 million in occupational
costs which I just mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, isn’t this all contained in the Dutch report?
M. DUBOST: Oh no, Mr. President, certainly not.
How did Seyss-Inquart’s attitude change during the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: I should like to make a clear distinction with regard to his
point of view after September, after the autumn of 1944, and during the
first 4½ years. After the autumn of 1944 he was much more outspoken in
the Netherlands’ interests than previously.
M. DUBOST: Before being the secretary general of the various
administrations, which you administered during the German occupation,
you were Director of Foreign Trade in Holland; and as such you were
present at international negotiations, and in particular, you negotiated
with the representatives of Germany about economic questions concerning
your country. You therefore knew Schacht?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes, I believe I first met Schacht in 1933 at the World
Economic Conference in London.
M. DUBOST: During your negotiations with Schacht were you not led to ask
him to restrict the rearmament of Germany which was ruining her credit?
HIRSCHFELD: If I am to answer this question, I must go back to a
conversation in 1936, when I was in Berlin and saw Schacht in connection
with trade treaty negotiations. During this conversation the
international financial situation came up for discussion because there
were various currency devaluations at that time affecting the French
franc, the Swiss franc, and the Dutch guilder. The situation of German
currency was also discussed in this connection. When I voiced my
criticism, Schacht said, “How would you do it?”
I said I could only give him my private opinion. Then I asked if
Germany—a question under discussion at that time—when taking up more
international loans, would be ready to assume the consequences, as the
interests and amortizations would imply a blocking of the importation of
raw materials which would have an unfortunate effect on the labor market
and on rearmament. Would Germany be willing to accept such consequences?
If so, then, according to what was my private opinion in 1936,
international loans might be discussed. If not, such a discussion would
have little point.
Then Schacht gave me his opinion. Germany needed rearmament in order to
be equal to the other great powers in international politics. Only on
such a basis could one negotiate. And Schacht said to me in his own
ironical pointed way, “I want a big and strong Germany; and to achieve
that, I would even ally myself with the devil.” In the course of this
discussion, Schacht asked a few questions. First, he wanted to clear up
the currency question, and secondly, he considered the colonial question
important.
Regarding the colonial question, he said to me that in his opinion it
was possible for Germany to take over colonies again and that she would
accept the responsibility not to arm these colonies and not to set up
any naval bases there. If such a policy was to be adopted, he believed
that German economic and foreign policy might be reoriented. In this
connection Schacht told me that he did not approve of the anti-Semitic
tendencies then prevalent in Germany. He gave me examples of his
attitude toward anti-Semitism and how he rejected it. I may add one
example here that he gave me, his conversation with a certain Klagges,
who was Prime Minister of Brunswick, and who made Hitler a German
citizen.
M. DUBOST: That is of no interest to me. Schacht told you he had
defended the Jews.
Now, as to the General Staff, was it not the German General Staff who
gave the order to have raids carried out in Rotterdam?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of German
Armed Forces): Mr. President, if I understood the question correctly,
the witness is to be questioned about the charges against the General
Staff and the OKW. I object to this question for the following
reasons...
THE PRESIDENT: You go too fast. Do you not see the light?
DR. LATERNSER: As defense counsel for the General Staff and the OKW, I
was prohibited by a court decision promulgated on 8 June to question or
cross-examine any witnesses. The same ought to apply to the Prosecution.
If I am not allowed to question witnesses, then the Prosecution must not
be allowed to question them either since the rules must be the same for
Prosecution and Defense.
M. DUBOST: I will forego my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear what you said, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: I said, Mr. President, that I would forego my question about
the General Staff; and I have two more questions about Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, just one moment—go on, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart give the order to have raids carried out in
all the large Dutch cities?
HIRSCHFELD: Not to my knowledge.
M. DUBOST: Who gave the order for these roundups to be carried out? Who
was it?
HIRSCHFELD: These raids were carried out by the German Armed Forces. I
do not know who gave the orders. It is only known that in Rotterdam,
when these raids—I believe it was on 11 November 1944—were carried
out, the divisional commander in Rotterdam made a speech in the town
hall on the subject and organized this raid.
M. DUBOST: But didn’t Seyss-Inquart have orphan children from the
hospitals taken away for work in Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: The question is not clear.
M. DUBOST: Was it Seyss-Inquart who had orphan children seized and sent
to work in the service of Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: From my own experience I know nothing about this.
M. DUBOST: Were orphan children compelled to serve in certain of the SS
units, on Seyss-Inquart’s orders?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that the SS in the Netherlands recruited soldiers. As
far as I know from the newspapers, bulletins, and handbills, it was
always done by the SS as such.
M. DUBOST: Who pledged himself not to use chemical products made in
Holland for war? Was it Seyss-Inquart who had pledged himself not to do
so?
HIRSCHFELD: I beg your pardon?
M. DUBOST: Who had pledged himself not to use chemical products made in
Holland for warfare and to have them reserved exclusively for Dutch
agricultural purposes?
HIRSCHFELD: This is the question of the nitrogen fertilizer?
M. DUBOST: Yes.
HIRSCHFELD: With regard to the nitrogen fertilizer, the promise was made
from the beginning that the nitrogen fertilizer industries in the
Netherlands should only produce artificial fertilizers. This was done
until about the middle of August 1944, when instructions came that the
nitrogen fertilizer industry was to change its production over to
explosives. These instructions had been issued by an office of the Reich
Commissioner. It was signed by a certain Herr Brocke. Thereupon, after I
had spoken to an official of the industry, I attempted to speak to
Seyss-Inquart personally on this matter and to intervene. I was given
the answer by his adjutant that he had already made his decision and
that I could establish contact with Herr Fiebig, the representative of
Speer in the Netherlands. I discussed the matter with Herr Fiebig and
told him that Netherlands industry and Netherlands labor could not work
on explosives. Thereupon I was told...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, cannot this question be answered a little more
shortly? The question is, did Seyss-Inquart promise that chemicals
should be used, I suppose, on the land in Holland and not used for
purposes in the Reich? Isn’t that the question?
M. DUBOST: You have heard what Mr. President has said. Try to answer
more briefly.
HIRSCHFELD: We had the promise that only artificial fertilizer would be
produced. Then the demand was made to produce explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, we do not want it all again. Can’t you get the
question answered?
M. DUBOST: I did not hear the answer of the witness, Mr. President. It
did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. DUBOST: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall ask the witness
one more question.
Witness, do you know under what conditions and for what reasons the
newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed by the agencies of the
Reich Commissioner?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Can you tell us?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. The newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed
because the employees of this newspaper refused to publish an article
which spoke against the railroad strike—an article which had been
compiled by the information chief of the Reich Commissioner. That was
the reason for refusing to publish it.
M. DUBOST: Yes. It was destroyed by means of dynamite, was it not? The
buildings and machinery were blown up, were they not?
HIRSCHFELD: The equipment was blown up with dynamite.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal, I should
like to call my last witness to the witness stand, Ernst Schwebel.
[_The witness Schwebel took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST AUGUST SCHWEBEL (Witness): Ernst August Schwebel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what functions did you have before you assumed
service in the Netherlands?
SCHWEBEL: I was Oberverwaltungsgerichtsrat at the Prussian
Administrative Court in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you come to the Netherlands?
SCHWEBEL: On 18 May 1940.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that, beginning with June 1940, you were the
delegate or plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissioner in the province of
South Holland, including the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this capacity, as plenipotentiary for this province,
did you have constant contact with the Dutch administrative authorities
in this province and with the local authorities?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many of the former mayors in the
province were left in their office?
SCHWEBEL: At the end, about one-half to two-thirds.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner replace and change many of
the officials of the province and of the local government?
SCHWEBEL: No, he made very few changes. Shall I discuss these changes?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but briefly. Perhaps you can just cite the reasons
for the changes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the changes have already been stated by
other witnesses, have they not, and have not been cross-examined to. Is
not that right? Did not Seyss-Inquart state the changes, and they were
not cross-examined to?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall turn to another question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it true that in the second half of the
year 1944 a state of emergency was declared?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, on 4 September.
DR. STEINBAUER: And the executive powers were turned over to the Armed
Forces within a radius of 30 kilometers?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, but this transfer did not take place due to the
regulation declaring this emergency state but as a result of a special
military regulation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Due to military developments?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that at the beginning of the year 1945
special Kommandos of the Reichsführer SS Himmler began to place time
bombs in the public buildings of your province in case of an evacuation
of this territory?
SCHWEBEL: As far as these special Kommandos of Himmler’s were concerned,
I know nothing about them. I know only one case in which an Oberleutnant
appeared, but I believe that that was prior to the time you mentioned.
He wanted to take such steps. I immediately got in touch with the Reich
Commissioner and the military commander, and I learned that none of
these gentlemen knew about this. Thereupon, at the request of the Reich
Commissioner, this Oberleutnant was told to cease his activity, to
remove the bombs which he had already planted, and to leave immediately.
I know of no other cases like that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that difficulties arose in Gouda as a result
of the so-called “Wehrfähige ins Reich” drive, meaning that these who
were fit for military service should be taken into the Reich?
SCHWEBEL: Yes; the Armed Forces was carrying through this drive at the
time and with them a deputy of Minister Goebbels in his capacity as
Reich Delegate for Total War Effort. They set up special agencies in
Gouda and in two other places in the province. The director of the Gouda
office carried these duties out in an improper way—rather harshly.
Thereupon I discussed this matter with the Reich Commissioner, and he
immediately got in touch with the commanding general and had this
officer dismissed on the spot.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know anything about the extent of the resistance
movement in your province?
SCHWEBEL: The resistance movement was fought by the Security Police in
connection with the Armed Forces. What I know is not from my own
experience in my administrative post, but knowledge I received through
my connection with the agencies. Thereby I know that the resistance
movement approached 50,000, as an estimate. These were people who might
be counted as such. By that I do not mean that they were people who were
organized in groups or in permanent action.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Reich Commissioner started a food
drive for 250,000 Dutch children?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, I know that he initiated this drive.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were an eye and ear witness to the attempt on the
part of Seyss-Inquart to end the war quickly. Will you tell us briefly
how connections were established with the Chief of Staff of General
Eisenhower?
SCHWEBEL: At the beginning of April 1945 a M. Van der Vlugt approached
me. He was the leader of the so-called IKO. That was an
interdenominational organization to assist in the food problems.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, please speak a little more slowly and clearly.
I cannot understand you even in German.
SCHWEBEL: I was approached by M. Van der Vlugt, who was the director of
an interchurch group whose purpose was to supply the population with
special foodstuffs. I knew him for that reason. He told me that he was
acting on behalf of the Dutch Government in London. He asked me whether
the Reich Commissioner would be ready to negotiate with him briefly on
three questions:
1. A more extensive food supply for the Netherlands people through the
Allies,
2. The stopping of flooding, and
3. The cessation of the fight against the resistance movement.
I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissioner and he
immediately declared himself ready to enter into discussions. Then, 2
days after that, we dealt with M. Van der Vlugt and another
representative...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the yellow light means that you are going too
fast, you see. So when you see the yellow light go a little more slowly.
SCHWEBEL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You were telling us what Seyss-Inquart did.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. Seyss-Inquart declared himself ready to negotiate about
these questions immediately. A discussion then took place between us and
M. Van der Vlugt and another representative of the Dutch Government in
London. That was Jonkheer Six. This discussion took place among the four
of us.
On this occasion we agreed first of all about one point, to the effect
that any combating of the resistance movement was definitely to be
stopped immediately; and the resistance group, on its part, undertook to
dispense with sabotage.
Secondly, the Reich Commissioner declared himself ready to give his
permission to a generous food supply for the population on the part of
the Allies and to stop the floodings. However, there were to be more
detailed negotiations in this respect.
The result of this discussion was communicated to London and I brought
two Dutchmen through one part of the front line as truce officers. Then,
after various negotiations had been going on for some time, we received
an inquiry from London as to whether the Reich Commissioner was ready to
negotiate with the Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, and deal with
him about these questions. The immediate answer was “yes.” Thereupon,
first of all, I crossed the front line on 28 April at Amersfoort, and
there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the
Chief of Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery, and...
THE PRESIDENT: You do not need any more detail about it, do you?
SCHWEBEL: ...and in this discussion with Sir Francis Gengard we agreed
that another discussion was to take place 2 days later between...
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we are not really concerned with the details.
We are concerned with the results of this conversation, and how it
worked out in the interests of the Dutch population.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. This discussion took place on 30 April, between the Reich
Commissioner and the Chief of Staff of General Eisenhower, who was
General Bedell Smith. In this discussion the Reich Commissioner agreed
completely to the wishes of General Bedell Smith that there should be a
very generous food supply for the Dutch population.
THE PRESIDENT: If he said he agreed with the demands of General Bedell
Smith, surely that is all you want, isn’t it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is quite sufficient.
[_Turning to the witness._] Through these negotiations—I would like to
ask you—the war was ended 2 months earlier, was it not?
SCHWEBEL: One cannot say that exactly. The situation was as follows. For
the Dutch population, of course, the war ended, practically speaking, on
that day, because the supplies that could be carried by air, over
highways, over canals, rivers, and by sea to Rotterdam, were so
generous. In order to make these transports possible, an armistice had
to be arranged from place to place, so that in fact, though not
formally, we had a general armistice and the population at that time
immediately benefited by it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this
witness.
SCHWEBEL: May I just make a few remarks, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I think not. If counsel has finished examining you, we do
not want any more remarks.
Do any other counsel wish to ask questions?
Is there any cross-examination?
M. DEBENEST: Witness, you spoke a short while ago of the negotiations
which you undertook with delegates of the London Government. Are you
aware of the fact that these delegates, before undertaking the
negotiations with the Reich Commissioner in April 1945, laid down as a
condition that no more people would be shot because of attacks against
any German civil or military authority unless a court sentence had first
been pronounced?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: As a further question did those delegates not request the
Reich Commissioner whether the SS would conform to the conditions of an
agreement which would put an end to hostilities?
SCHWEBEL: That also took place. After that time, nothing more was
undertaken against the resistance movement.
M. DEBENEST: Very good. Is it correct to say that the Reich Commissioner
replied that in his capacity as Obergruppenführer of the SS he was in a
position to force the SS to observe the conditions of this agreement and
that he could answer for it?
SCHWEBEL: An agreement in its true sense—all these conversations were
gentlemen’s agreements...
M. DEBENEST: Wait a minute. No, I am asking you whether the Reich
Commissioner made that reply to the negotiators, that is, the delegates
of the London Government?
SCHWEBEL: He said he was Obergruppenführer of the SS as well, and in
that capacity he was able to see to it that the SS would comply with
this agreement.
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. The last question is this: Did you know Kiehl?
He was an official in the Reich Commissariat.
SCHWEBEL: Kiehl? Yes, I knew him.
M, DEBENEST: Didn’t he give instructions to flood the Wieringer Sea in
April 1945?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl, to my knowledge, did not give any instructions; he
could not do so. Herr Kiehl was an expert on waterworks, and he was a
very good expert. But orders for the flooding could be given only by the
highest military authority, and that was Generaloberst Blaskowitz.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I object to this manner of questioning the
witness. The Prosecution is again questioning this witness in order to
charge the General Staff and the OKW. In the objection I mentioned
previously I said that if I must not question the witnesses with a view
to exoneration, the same must apply to the Prosecution with regard to
incriminating questions. I ask that the last statement be stricken from
the record.
M. DEBENEST: I beg your pardon.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I merely wanted to say that if I ask this
question, it is based on the information that was given to me. There is
no question of the Army; but of instructions that were given by a civil
servant of the Reich Commissioner, and therefore originating from the
Reich Commissariat. Therefore, I do not understand the interference of
the defense counsel. There is no question of the Army and I am
completely ignorant as to whether the witness is going to tell me
whether the Army was responsible or an office of the Reich Commissioner,
when I was talking of an official of the Reich Commissioner.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You may ask the question.
M. DEBENEST: Will you proceed?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl was the hydrostatic expert for the Reich
Commissioner; but at the same time, he was a hydrostatic expert under
the military commander. He was consulted by both authorities as an
expert only. He was a very fine expert. But nobody had given him any
right to give instructions...
M. DEBENEST: Please, do not make any speeches; answer directly. “Yes” or
“no,” did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: But I must say how it was! Kiehl? No. He could not have done
that.
M. DEBENEST: I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking
whether he merely transmitted this order.
SCHWEBEL: I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far
Kiehl was involved in this order.
M. DEBENEST: That is sufficient.
What was the interest at that time in flooding the Wieringer Sea? Did
not people think that the war was over?
SCHWEBEL: No. When the Wieringer Sea—the Wieringer Polder—was flooded,
the war had not yet ended and these agreements had not been concluded
either. When the Wieringer Polder was flooded—and I found this out
later from military men—there was the danger that an aerial landing on
the terrain of the Wieringer Sea would take place, which might place the
dike in the hands of the enemy, giving them access to Friesland and
North Holland. That was the reason why the military authorities
considered this flooding necessary. That is what I was told.
M. DEBENEST: But at that moment in Holland wasn’t the war considered as
being lost for Germany?
SCHWEBEL: No. At that time, it was not considered lost. At any rate, our
Army had, at that time, the order to defend us which it had to carry
out. There was the danger that this landing would take place.
M. DEBENEST: I have finished, Mr. President.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would not have had to put another question to you if
the French prosecutor had not broached a certain subject. What did
General Smith tell you about the flooding of the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: General Smith said toward the end of the negotiation that any
flooding that had been undertaken up to that time could be justified on
the basis of military necessity. But no more was to be undertaken from
that moment.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was any undertaken after that?
SCHWEBEL: No, none was undertaken after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, with this I have concluded my examination
of witnesses. Now I should like to refer to those documents contained in
my document books and which I have submitted to the Tribunal. I was
notified that Document Book Number 3 has been submitted to the Tribunal,
and to conclude my case I should like to submit another document, as
Number Seyss-Inquart-91, concerning the Apostolic letter of the Catholic
bishops on the plebiscite in Austria. In this statement, reference is
made to the attitude of Gauleiter Bürckel. We can gather from it that
the persecution of the Churches cannot be charged to Seyss-Inquart, but
rather the responsibility is to be placed on Bürckel. In order to save
time, I should like to ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of
this document without my reading it, and I conclude herewith my
presentation of evidence on the case of Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, have you offered all the documents that
you want to offer in your books? Have you offered them as evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you offered all the documents that you want to offer
as evidence and given them exhibit numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. Only a few affidavits are missing,
affidavits which were admitted by the High Tribunal: Völkers’, Bolle’s,
and Rauter’s. I hope that we shall have them within a short time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, you must offer each of these documents as
evidence; you must say so. Merely putting them in the book does not
offer them as evidence; and, therefore, you must offer these things to
us as evidence, if you wish to do so, giving them the numbers. You can
offer them all together, saying you offer...
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to offer your Documents Numbers 1 to—I do
not know what the last number is; 105 seems to be the last one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. I ask that all numbers in my three
document books be included, up to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, are the numbers given in the books the
exhibit numbers which you wish to give to the documents?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. They are in numerical order and they
are found in that order in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish, then, to offer Numbers 1 to—whatever the last
number is, as evidence. Is that right?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You offered some in the course of your presentation of
the witnesses.
DR. STEINBAUER: Some of them I submitted and quoted according to the
numbers given in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You now wish, then, to offer the remainder?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the remainder as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the numbers which they bear in your document book?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are offering all the originals under those
numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Insofar as they are in my possession and I can say upon
oath that the extracts tally with the books.
THE PRESIDENT: You have certified that they are true copies of the
originals in accordance with the Tribunal’s rules?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I ask
the permission of the High Tribunal that the Defendant Fritzsche be
absent Monday and Tuesday of next week. He requires this time for the
preparation of his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I wanted to put the same request on behalf
of my client, as he will be in the witness box immediately after Von
Papen, who is the next, and I ask that he have permission to be absent
Monday or Tuesday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall only take a little of the
Tribunal’s time, but I must make a motion which is particularly
important to me, a motion which concerns procedure; and I should like to
give the reasons for my motion.
I move that the Tribunal, first of all, rescind the resolution given on
8 June 1946, and secondly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Latemser, if your motion is an important motion, it
should be in writing. If it is not in writing, it must be put in
writing. You know perfectly well that is the rule of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it is very important to me that this
motion should appear in the record. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Laternser, it will appear in the record if you
make the motion in writing. You have been here for many months and you
know perfectly well what the rule of the Tribunal is, that motions be
made in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but since we are concerned with a motion which
applies to procedure and which applies to a resolution announced by word
of mouth, I believe I am justified in putting my motion in this manner.
THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal does not think so. The Tribunal would
wish to have your motion in writing in accordance with the rule of the
Tribunal.
Now the Tribunal will continue with the case against the Defendant Von
Papen, which is, I believe, the next.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am beginning with my presentation of evidence on behalf
of my client, Von Papen, by calling the Defendant Von Papen as a
witness.
[_The Defendant Von Papen took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRANZ VON PAPEN (Defendant): Franz von Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the High Tribunal, briefly, a picture of your
life, especially from the time you entered politics.
VON PAPEN: In order to describe my life briefly, I shall emphasize only
such points as are essential for the High Tribunal to form a judgment of
my personality and how they influenced my life and my political attitude
and opinion.
I was born on soil which has been in the possession of my family for 900
years. I grew up with conservative principles which unite a man most
closely to his own folk and his native soil, and as my family has always
been a strong supporter of the Church, I of course grew up in this
tradition as well.
As the second son I was destined for a military career. At the age of 18
I became a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment and I went...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you gave us the date of your birth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the date of your birth.
VON PAPEN: The date of my birth is 29 October 1879.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us you joined a cavalry regiment at the age
of 18.
VON PAPEN: Important for my development was my marriage with the
daughter of a Saar industrialist, Geheimrat Von Boch. The relatives of
this family brought me in contact with many French and Belgian families,
and in this way I acquired an intimate knowledge of the spiritual and
cultural factors of these neighboring countries, which made a very
strong impression on me at the time. From that time on, that is from
1905, I have been convinced of how wrong a certain political attitude
can be, namely, that France and Germany should be condemned to consider
themselves eternal enemies. I felt how much these two peoples had to
offer each other on a mutual basis, provided their peaceful development
was not disturbed.
In the years that followed I graduated from the Kriegsakademie (War
Academy), and in 1913, after training for 5 years, I was taken into the
General Staff. At the end of 1913, at the command of His Imperial
Majesty, I was appointed military attaché in Washington and Mexico. In
this capacity, in the summer of 1914, I accompanied the U.S.A.
Expeditionary Corps, which was dispatched to Vera Cruz as a result of
the incident at Tampico. In Mexico, I was surprised by the outbreak of
the first World War. Until the end of 1915 I remained at my post in
Washington.
This period is of decisive significance for my political life. Our
strife, carried on with legal methods, against the unilateral supplying
of our enemies with war materials, led to heated polemics and
propaganda. This propaganda, which was fostered by the enemy, tried by
all means to cast suspicion upon the military attachés of Germany,
accusing them of illegal acts and especially of having organized acts of
sabotage.
At the end of 1915 I left the United States. I regret to say that I
never tried to rectify and correct this false propaganda; but this
propaganda followed me until the thirties and even until today, and has
impressed its stamp upon me. In order to cite just one example, even
after 1931, the Lehigh Valley Company stated before the Mixed Claims
Commission that their claim of $50,000,000 against the German Reich was
justified, since I, the German military attaché, had caused an explosion
which had taken place in the year 1917, 2 years after I had left the
United States.
I am just mentioning this fact, Mr. President, since this propaganda
honored me with titles such as “master spy,” “chief plotter,” and other
pretty names; for this propaganda was the background for the judging of
my personality, as I found out in 1932 when I entered public life.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendants Funk and Speer are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, we stopped when you were talking about the
formation of public opinion concerning you personally. Please continue
telling us of your career.
VON PAPEN: I had spoken about the propaganda about myself which was
carried on in the United States at the time of the first World War. No
effort was in fact ever made to investigate whether this opinion was
true or false. What I was able to accomplish in those years, that is,
the fact that I opposed sabotage and fought against submarine warfare,
never became known.
This propaganda was public defamation, and it reached its height in 1941
in a pamphlet published in New York, with the beautiful title “The Devil
in Top Hat.” It repeats all these fairy stories without criticism, and
adds new ones. Thus a so-called public opinion was formed about me
which, I believe, gives a completely distorted picture of my character,
my opinions, and above all my motives during the period from 1932 to
1945. I ask the Tribunal to keep in mind these psychological
associations as I attempt to give now a true picture of my thoughts and
my acts.
After returning to Germany in 1916 I did my duty as a soldier, as a
battalion commander and as a General Staff officer in the war in France.
In 1917 I became Chief of the Operational Section of Army Group
Falkenhayn in Turkey. When Falkenhayn was recalled in 1918, I became
Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish Army until the
Armistice.
Perhaps I may recall briefly—after so many bad things have been said
about me by the world—an episode which shows that I was able to do
something useful for the history of humanity. On 8 December 1918, after
a hard struggle with the German and Turkish headquarters, I succeeded in
getting Falkenhayn to evacuate Jerusalem. Because of this decision the
city was not shelled or destroyed by the British Army.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I thought, the 8th of
December 1918. That must have been 1917.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, My Lord, 1918.
VON PAPEN: 8 December 1918.
When in November 1918 I was negotiating with Ataturk about the
evacuation of the German troops, we received the news of the collapse of
the German armies and the abdication of the German Kaiser. This fact
meant for me not only the loss of the war, a whole world had collapsed
for me. The German Reich had collapsed after a thousand years of
development, and everything that we had believed in was shrouded in the
mists of the future. At this juncture I decided to face the issue.
After my return to Germany, I asked for and received my release from the
Army. I went back to my home where I lived on a modest agricultural
estate. There I was on traditional soil and devoted myself to home
tasks. Before long my farmer friends entrusted me with the
administration of their community affairs. They elected me honorary
mayor and in 1923 they sent me to the Prussian Parliament.
When I was requested to do this, I decided not to join the Right, the
German National Party, but the Center Party. This decision was
influenced by my conviction that in this party I would be able to do
much more in making adjustments in the social sphere than among the
Conservatives. At the same time this party represented the principles of
a Christian concept of the State.
The 8 years in which I belonged to Parliament were filled with struggles
for the internal recovery and strengthening of the German Republic. In
the Center Party I represented the conservative ideas of my agricultural
electors. I endeavored to make this party, which in Prussia had formed a
coalition with the Left, form a coalition with the Right also. Thus I
wanted to help create an outlet for the tensions out of which National
Socialism was really born. Also, into the same period fall my efforts to
remove the discriminations against Germany through the numerous terms of
the Versailles Treaty, and that by way of reaching a better
understanding with the French people. I became a member of the
German-French Study Committee, a committee founded by the Luxembourg
industrialist Meirisch, comprising a large number of outstanding men of
both countries. Close relations and conversations also united me with
the veterans’ organizations of both countries, on the French side with
the well-known leader of the Gueules Cassées, Colonel Piccat. I took an
active part in the congresses of German-French Catholic circles which
took place in Paris and Berlin. All these efforts had as their aim to
place European peace on the basis of a deeper knowledge and closer
co-operation of our two countries.
This realization of mine was further strengthened when I moved to the
Saar in 1929 which at that time was, as is well-known, under
international control. When in 1929 the Young Plan was accepted by
Germany I asked Herr Stresemann to arrange with M. Briand a settlement
of the Saar question without plebiscite, because I was always of the
opinion that a candid solution of this thorny question by both sides
would leave less resentment and an increased sense of solidarity than a
decision brought about by an election campaign carried on heatedly on
both sides. Unfortunately, this did not come about.
Then in 1930 the great economic world crisis set in embracing victors
and vanquished alike. Germany’s new democratic regime was not able to
cope with such a burden, and under the ever-increasing economic pressure
and increasing internal tension, the Papen Cabinet was formed in the
spring of 1932. Here starts the political development which I am pleased
to be able to account for before the Tribunal. I should like to add a
request to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ruled that the defendants have
to be brief because the Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has completely
presented the history of National Socialism. I ask that it be taken into
consideration that I am not speaking here for National Socialism. My
defense will be that of the other Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In questioning the witness it will be necessary to go
into the details of the events and the activities of the witness as
Reich Chancellor in the year 1932. The Indictment covers the time from 1
June 1932, the date of the appointment of Herr Von Papen as Reich
Chancellor. The Indictment sees in the conduct of his official activity
as Reich Chancellor the preparation for Hitler’s Government.
The defense will set forth that the Papen Government consistently fought
for a new program, entirely independent of the ideas of National
Socialism, a program representing Papen’s own basic political ideas to
which he remained loyal in the following period also. As the
Indictment...
THE PRESIDENT: It is not proper for a counsel to make a statement of
that sort. You must elicit the evidence from the witness by questions;
and the questions ought to be questions which are not leading questions,
which do not suggest the answers. You are now telling us what the
witness is going to say. We want to hear it from the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I wanted only to point out that this
period of time before 1933 must also be discussed and I wish to ask for
your indulgence. We shall...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not attempted to stop you from giving the
evidence—from eliciting the evidence. Ask the witness. But you must not
state the facts yourself.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you explain to the Court what the situation
was in Germany when Hindenburg called upon you on 1 June 1932 to form a
Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: Before I answer this question, will you please permit me, as
one of the last Chancellors of the Reich, to make a brief statement on
the Government directed by me? If and to what extent the Charter of the
Tribunal, in our opinion, is compatible with the sovereignty of the
Reich and its different governments, will later be expounded by one of
the other counsels.
When the Prosecution deals with my activity as Reich Chancellor in 1932,
I assume that this is done in order to get a clear, historically
accurate picture of the developments and to form a judgment on my
character as a whole. For this reason I will comment on this part of the
accusation. However, I must state here emphatically that this Cabinet of
1932 governed, to the best of its knowledge and ability under the
Constitution and under the emergency powers of the President, at a time
of the most severe internal economic depression. It is a historical fact
that the activity of my Cabinet would not justify the slightest
suspicion of a crime in the sense of the Charter. I believe I must make
this statement, My Lord, to uphold the integrity of my ministerial
colleagues, and above all, the integrity of the President, Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg, the last great historical figure of Germany.
As to your question: Dr. Brüning, my predecessor in office, was highly
esteemed by all of us and had been welcomed with great expectations.
During his period of office came the great economic crisis, the customs
blockades by other countries, with production and trade almost
completely at a standstill, with no foreign currency for the procurement
of necessary raw materials, increasing unemployment, youth out on the
streets, and the economic world depression leading to bankruptcy of the
banks. Government was possible only through emergency decrees; that is,
by one-sided legislative acts of the President. Support of the
unemployed empties the Treasury, is unproductive, and is no solution. As
a result of the wide-spread unemployment, the radical parties were
increasing. The political splitting up of the German people reached its
height. In the last Reichstag election there were 32 parties.
After the war we had all hoped that we might be able to build up an
orderly democracy in Germany. The English democracy was our model, but
the Weimar Constitution had given the German people a great number of
rights which did not correspond to its political maturity. In 1932 it
had long been clear that the Weimar Constitution made the mistake of
giving the Government too little authority. I remind you that the
forming of governments often took weeks because all parties wanted to
participate.
In Prussia, the Social Democrats had ruled since 1919. They shared with
the “Zentrum” in filling political offices in Prussia. The dualism
between Prussia, the greatest of the provinces, and the Reich was
constantly increasing. My wish that Brüning should return to the old
construction of Bismarck’s, to be Reich Chancellor and at the same time
Prime Minister of Prussia, in order to co-ordinate the policy of the
greatest province with that of the Reich, was rejected by Brüning. In
all these years, in the last years, nothing was done to restrain the
ever-increasing National Socialist movement, that is to direct it into a
politically responsible course.
The entire political confusion and the realization that something had to
be done in order to make it possible for the Reich Government to govern
and to make it more independent, forced Hindenburg to the decision to
appoint a Cabinet independent of the parties, directed by experts. The
members of this Cabinet of mine were all experts in their fields. Von
Neurath was an old diplomat; the Minister of the Interior, Gall, was an
old administrative official; the Agricultural Minister was general
director of great agricultural societies; the Finance Minister was
formerly Ministerial Director in his Ministry; the Railroad Director,
Eltz, had been president of the board of directors of a railroad, and so
forth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the intention to govern authoritatively bring about a
struggle of the parties?
VON PAPEN: Field Marshal Hindenburg had great confidence in Brüning, but
he did not forgive him for failing to succeed in winning over the
rightist parties, which had elected Hindenburg for the first time in
1925, for his re-election as President in 1932. At that time Hindenburg
had been elected over the determined opposition of the Left and the
Center. Now, in 1932, he was to be elected precisely by these leftist
parties who had opposed him, and against the Right.
Beside the great old soldier of the World War, the opposing candidate
was an unknown steel-helmeted soldier. This, of course, hurt the Field
Marshal deeply. I wish to point out that in the presidential election in
1932 Hitler had already received over 11 million votes, which was more
than 30 percent of the total in the presidential election.
Why the President chose me as Chancellor, I do not know. I can only say
that I myself did not lift a finger. The course of events was the
following.
I am telling this, My Lord, in order to answer the charge that this
formation of a Cabinet was the beginning of an intrigue and a
conspiracy. On 26 May 1932 I was on my estate in the Saar. Herr Von
Schleicher, the Defense Minister, called me up there and asked me to
come to Berlin. On the evening of the 27th I arrived in Berlin. On the
28th I went to see Herr Von Schleicher. Herr Von Schleicher said to me:
“There is a Cabinet crisis; we are looking for a Chancellor.” He
discussed various personalities with me, and finally he said: “The
President would like to have you.” I was greatly surprised, and said as
much. I then asked for time to think it over. On the next day I
discussed the matter with my friends. On the 30th I went to see Herr Von
Schleicher again. I said to him: “I have decided not to accept.” Herr
Von Schleicher said: “That won’t do you any good, the President wants
you under all circumstances.” I answered Herr Von Schleicher: “The
President probably has a wrong conception of the political forces which
I would bring to him for this government; he probably thinks that the
Center would support me politically. But that is out of the question.”
On the afternoon of this day I went to see the head of the Center Party.
I asked him and he said: “Herr Von Papen, do not accept the office; the
party would immediately oppose you.” I said: “Thank you, that is what I
thought.”
I then went to see Hindenburg and presented the situation to him.
Hindenburg stood up and said: “I did not call you because I wanted the
support of any party through you; I called you because I want a cabinet
of independent men.” Then he reminded me of my duty toward the
fatherland. When I continued to contradict him, he said: “You cannot
leave me, an old soldier, in the lurch when I need you.” I said: “No,
under these circumstances I will not leave you in the lurch; I will
accept.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof for that discussion...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal think this might be dealt
with in slightly less detail. The facts could be stated with less
detail.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We will act accordingly.
As proof for the discussion with the Center Party I refer to Document
Book 1, Document 1, Page 1. I submit Document Book 1 as Exhibit Number
1.
Witness, you have been accused of having intrigued against Brüning in
some way. Is that true?
VON PAPEN: In no way. I have already said that I had a very high opinion
of Dr. Brüning personally, and that from the day when Herr Von
Schleicher called me in—that is, 3 days before my appointment—I never
had the slightest idea of being appointed Brüning’s successor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you previously talk to Hitler about the government to
be formed by you?
VON PAPEN: No, that is a completely false imputation on the part of the
Prosecution. The _History of the NSDAP_ by Volz, in which that is
stated—and that is Document 3463-PS—is a purely private work and was
probably sponsored by Goebbels and his Ministry. I state that my
government, according to the wish of the Reich President, was to be
created by a _fait accompli_, without any negotiations with any party or
the head of any party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You did not promise Hitler the dissolution of the
Reichstag beforehand either?
VON PAPEN: This statement of the Prosecution is also untrue. I did not
previously discuss the dissolution of the Reichstag with Hitler for the
Reichstag was dissolved on 4 June, and I saw Hitler for the first time
in my life 5 or 6 days later. The dissolution of the Reichstag, as such,
was a matter of course, because the new Government wished to have the
opinion of the electors on the new course and on the Government’s
program.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the political aims of your Cabinet? Please
state this briefly.
VON PAPEN: The central problem which occupied us was the economic one:
The big economic crisis, and the 1½ million unemployed young people, the
6 to 7 million completely unemployed, and the 12 to 13 million in
part-time employment. Attempts of my predecessors to help with purely
State means proved inadequate. They were a burden on finances and had no
result. The aim of my Government, therefore, was to employ private
economy to solve this problem. We wanted to bring the whole production
machinery into working order again. With the investment of 2,200 million
marks we wanted to put this process into operation and expected to
return into the production process 1¾ million workers in the current
year.
Such a program could not have been agreed upon with the parties. The
political aim was to achieve, simultaneously with the reorganization of
the economy, the practical co-operation of the strongest of the
opposition parties, the NSDAP. That was the central problem of German
internal policy. It had been shown, through National Socialist
Government in Thuringia, in Brunswick, and in Oldenburg, that this
attempt could be made without becoming exposed to the danger of
revolutionary movements. I could hope, therefore, through a national and
social program to find the approval of the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For the Government’s statement, I refer to Document 1,
Exhibit 1, Pages 2 and 3.
You spoke of the solution of the social problem as the main task of your
Government. Will you please explain briefly how you regarded the problem
and how you attempted to solve it?
VON PAPEN: In no country in the world, I believe, was the problem of
capital and labor as acute as it was in Germany, as a result of
overindustrialization and alienation of the soil. The reason is known; I
need not speak of it. However, one of the reasons, which is generally
overlooked, was the German inflation which had destroyed all mobile
fortunes in Germany. This inflation had deprived the middle class and
the workers, who form the backbone of the nation, of their savings and
fortunes and it had proletarianized the workers, tradesmen, and the
middle class.
Simultaneously with the social processes in Germany, a new social order
had arisen in our great neighboring country, the order of a classless
society and the totalitarian state. The democratic powers of the world
resisted the exportation of this system. They took protective measures
in the economic field, but these protective measures, the “New Deal,”
and “Ottawa,” weakened the German position all the more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I think the defendant must realize that
this is all very familiar ground to the Tribunal, and it is not
necessary to restate it in detail.
VON PAPEN: I only wanted to explain to the Tribunal that this social
problem was the basis for the whole historical development.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of the social problem is at the same time a
question of the development of the NSDAP, and the witness is going to
comment later from this point of view.
Witness, you said a little while ago that you had no contact with Hitler
before the formation of the government. When did you see Hitler for the
first time and what agreements did you reach?
VON PAPEN: I have already said that I saw Hitler for the first time on 9
or 10 June. The aim of the talk was to determine under what conditions
Hitler would be willing to tolerate my Government. My program contained
so many points in the social field that an approval of that program by
the National Socialists was to be expected. Hitler’s condition for such
an approval of the Government program was the lifting of the ban on
uniforms for the SS; that is, the political equalization of his party
with the other parties.
I agreed to that at that time; all the more so as the ban of the SS by
the Brüning Government was an obvious injustice. The SS, or rather the
SA, had been prohibited; but the uniformed formations of the Socialists
and the Communists, that is, the “Rotfront” and the “Reichsbanner,” had
not been prohibited.
The result of my promise to Hitler was that Hitler obligated himself to
tolerate my Government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to correct a mistake made by the witness.
He spoke of the SS, meaning the SA. There was no SS at that time.
I refer to Document 1, Page 3, which is a statement of the President
concerning the lifting of the ban against the SA. The President points
out that he decreed the lifting of this ban under the express condition
that there would be no more acts of violence in the future. He says
furthermore that he was determined—that he would use all constitutional
means at his disposal to act against all violations of any kind if this
expectation were not fulfilled.
Will you, Witness, make a brief statement concerning your efforts, and
the course of the Lausanne Conference in June 1932 which had such a
great influence on the growth of the NSDAP?
VON PAPEN: I ask for permission to go somewhat more into detail about
this conference, because the result was closely connected with the
enormous increase of the NSDAP immediately thereafter. This conference
had been prepared long beforehand, as is known. It was to abolish
reparations.
But I went to Lausanne with many other aims and hopes. The abolition of
reparations was, so to speak, a _cause jugée_. But what was necessary
was to remove Germany’s moral discomfort, if Europe was to return
peacefully to normalcy. This moral dissatisfaction had many causes.
Germany had become a “second-rate nation.” It had been deprived of
important attributes of its sovereignty: No military sovereignty; the
Rhineland unprotected; the Corridor, the Saar, and others. I have
already described the economic conditions. These economic and political
difficulties helped advance political radicalism, and the extremists
increased in every election.
If therefore help was to be forthcoming, then not merely the reparations
question had to be solved—that was a negative help—but positive, moral
aid was required. My program was the restoration of the sovereignty of
the Reich. In the first place, the famous Article 231 of the Versailles
Treaty was to be struck out. That was the article which stated Germany’s
sole responsibility for the war. Historians of all countries had long
established that we were not the only ones responsible. In the second
place, relations with France based on confidence were to be established.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal do not think that this really
is very important for them.
VON PAPEN: I shall briefly...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I explain quite generally that the events of 1932,
the internal and foreign political events, formed the key for judging
the growth of the NSDAP which, after all, led to the 30th of January
1933. If we discuss certain questions here, we will be able to refer to
them when we discuss the events of 1933. I believe we will thus save
time. Therefore, I ask that a discussion of this period be permitted in
somewhat greater detail.
VON PAPEN: I will make it as brief as possible, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better go on, as you suggest, from 1933.
Is that not what you were suggesting, that you should go on to 1933, and
then possibly comeback to 1932, if it is necessary?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not what I suggested. I said that the
discussion of conditions in 1932 provides the key for the growth of the
NSDAP and the formation of the Hitler Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but the defendant has been discussing the conditions
of 1932 for a long time now. Surely we can get on to something which has
something to do with the National Socialist Party, now.
VON PAPEN: I will come to that immediately, Mr. President. I wanted only
to say that I took up these subjects at Lausanne and tried to bring
about understanding for the internal situation in Germany. I negotiated
with the French Prime Minister, M. Herriot, about the cancellation of
that famous article. I negotiated a consultation pact with him, but
nothing came of all this, for reasons which I do not want to discuss any
further. The final result of the conference of Lausanne at any rate was
negative, so that the elections which were subsequently held...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your point of view in the armament question?
VON PAPEN: I had established my point of view in the armament question,
which played a role even in the year 1933, already at that time in
Lausanne. I had discussed it with the British Prime Minister, Mr.
Macdonald, and M. Herriot. Later, in an interview, I discussed this
point of view with M. Herriot, so that it is on record. It is Document
55. In this document I said that it was not a question of German
rearmament, but a question of the fulfillment of the disarmament promise
of the other nations. Nothing is said about German rearmament, but only
about German equality and equal treatment for Germany.
I need not quote this document. It is in the hands of the Court,
Document 55.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I submit Document 55 as Exhibit 55, and further refer to
Document 1, which has already been submitted, Page 9; and Document 6,
which I submitted as Exhibit 3, Page 22.
VON PAPEN: At the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference, I told
Macdonald and Herriot, “You must provide me with a foreign political
success, for my Government is the last bourgeois government in Germany.
After me there will be only extremists of the Right and the Left.” But
they did not believe me, and I returned from Lausanne with only partial
success.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you said that the outcome of the Lausanne
Conference did not come up to your expectations. Why did you, in spite
of that, sign the Treaty of Lausanne?
VON PAPEN: In the first place, I had to sign it because otherwise the
conference would have ended in a complete failure and Germany would have
been confronted with an economic vacuum. We were faced also with the
Reichstag election and I had to try to make the best of the situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, I should like to submit
Document Number 7, to become Exhibit Number Papen-4. This document is a
statement by Von Papen, in the _Trierische Landeszeitung_ of 12 July
1932, about Lausanne. I take the liberty of reading a short extract in
which Papen says:
“But just as little as we are unable to erase by a one-sided act
the signatures given since 1918 by former governments, just as
little was this possible with regard to the solemn obligations
which were undertaken by the then governing parties in the name
of the German people. The present Government simply had to
liquidate a situation which had been created by all the former
governments since the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The
question as to whether this situation can be liquidated by
Germany’s denying the validity of her signature and thus, at the
same time, placing herself outside the conception of cultural
and other standards, must be answered with an emphatic ‘no.’”
In mentioning this quotation, I should like to point out that this
attitude under the then prevailing situation and especially in view of
the propaganda by the NSDAP is especially noteworthy.
On 18 July 1932 the Reich Minister of the Interior decreed a general ban
on demonstrations after, as you have already said, the ban on uniforms
had been lifted for National Socialists on 16 June. What were the
reasons for the new ban on demonstrations?
VON PAPEN: The condition under which Hindenburg had rescinded the ban on
uniforms for the SA was not fulfilled. Election campaigns became more
and more radical and therefore I decided to suggest to the Reich
President a decree prohibiting demonstrations. Contrary to the decree
banning the uniforms, this decree applied to all parties equally.
Therefore it did not only prohibit the SA, but all fighting formations
of the other parties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I shall turn to the 20th of July 1932. The
Prosecution calls your action on that date a _coup d’état_. The witness
Severing has also fully elaborated on that point. What was the reason
for your action on the 20th of July 1932?
VON PAPEN: The action was based on the necessity of restoring orderly
conditions. I had received reports about the co-operation of the police
department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior with the Communists.
The situation of the Reich Government in Berlin must in this case be
specifically taken into consideration, and I do not know whether the
High Tribunal is cognizant of the legal position. The Reich Government
at Berlin was not an extraterritorial area like Washington, D. C., in
the United States, but came within the police power of the Prussian
State. My own protection, that is, the protection of the Reich
Chancellor, lay in the hands of the Prussian police. If, therefore,
combinations with the Communists were made in the Prussian Police
Ministry, then this affected the security of the Reich Government. This
action against the Prussian Government did by no means constitute an
action against Socialism as such. Neither did a Nazification of the
republican police take place, as the witness Severing testified here.
The officials, with the exception of a few higher officials, remained
completely unchanged. How I regarded the situation there, I made known
to the German people in a radio speech on the evening of the 20th of
July. The High Tribunal will find this speech in Document 1, Page 4.
However, I shall forego the reading of this speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should further like to point to Document 2, which I
wish to submit as Exhibit Number 5. I should like to point out, on Page
15, the part where the Defendant Von Papen gives his account about the
necessity of this measure.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was this action of yours on the 20th of
July brought before the highest German tribunal, the Reich Supreme
Court, and was any decision made?
VON PAPEN: Yes. The Prussian Cabinet brought an action against the Reich
Government before the Reich Supreme Court at Leipzig; there the matter
was properly argued and judgment passed. This sentence upheld entirely
the action of the Reich President. It is therefore impossible for the
Prosecution to characterize this matter as a Putsch.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to call your attention to Document 8, which
I wish to submit as Exhibit Number 6. This is an extract—I beg your
pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, is it necessary for you to give the
document exhibits numbers different from the document numbers? You see,
it becomes a little bit confusing. Each one of these documents has got,
at the head of the document, a number; 1, 2, 3, and so forth, and they
follow each other...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to acquiesce to the suggestion of the High
Tribunal and retain the same number. Therefore, Document 5 shall become
Exhibit Number 5.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be much less confusing, I think, if you could.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, My Lord. This Exhibit Number 5 is an extract
from the judgment of the Reich Supreme Court, dated 25 October 1932. On
Page 19, at the beginning, is the opinion which says that the decree of
the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was entirely legal.
How did the Prussian Government, and specifically Prime Minister Braun,
react to this judgment of the Supreme Court?
VON PAPEN: The Prussian Government and the Prussian Prime Minister
absolutely accepted the judgment, which became apparent from the
discussions which I personally had later on in October with the Prussian
Prime Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding the position taken by the Prussian Government,
I should like to submit Document Number 86, which is contained in Volume
III of my document book, which, however, because of technical
difficulties, is not completely translated and cannot be submitted
today.
Witness, on 29 July 1932 you had an interview with a United Press
correspondent and you stated in detail your position on the armament
problem. Since this topic is of special significance for your case and
your defense, I should like to have you comment on this matter.
VON PAPEN: I should like to clarify my attitude on the armament
question, for it is the same which I held at the time when I was Vice
Chancellor in the Government of Hitler. I should like to refer to
Document 1, which sets forth my interview for the United Press, and I
will quote from Document Number 86, which is the radio speech which I
made on 12 September. On that occasion I said:
“We want disarmament....”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Perhaps, Witness, you could just give us the contents in
a few words.
VON PAPEN: If the Tribunal would like to check on the contents of my
speech, in Document 86 the Tribunal will find that I was speaking for
disarmament and for peace. On that occasion I appealed to the major
powers, and I would like to quote this sentence:
“In these days Germany is undertaking a gigantic attempt,
through the mobilization of her last internal reserves, to bring
about work and social peace. That gives us a right to expect
that the leading statesmen of the major powers, now, for their
part, will decide to bring to an end the poisoning of foreign
political relations through agreements which cannot be kept.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 31 July 1932 the Reichstag election took place. First
of all, I should like to submit a diagram in which the election results
of the various elections held in the years 1930 to 1933 are tabulated.
This is Exhibit Number 98, which I hereby submit. From the figures shown
there we can see the internal political development of Germany.
Witness, what was the result, and what were the political conclusions
you drew from the result of the elections?
VON PAPEN: On 30 July, the eve of the elections, I spoke to the United
States and I said:
“The world does not realize that Germany is confronted with a
civil war. The world did not help us to overcome our
difficulties at Lausanne, and it is unbearable that 14 years
after the end of the war there is no equality of rights for us.”
The election of 31 July brought more than a doubling of the Nazi votes,
from 6.4 million to 13.7 million votes, or 230 members of the Reichstag
as against 110. The conclusions to be drawn from the results of this
election were that no majority could be formed, from the extreme right
to the Social Democrats, without the NSDAP. With that, the Party had
achieved a parliamentary key position. The Prosecution is trying to
ascribe the increase of the Nazi vote to the lifting of the ban on
uniforms. That is an explanation which is altogether too simple.
Actually, the ban on uniforms was lifted from 16 June till 18 July, for
1 month. And already 2 weeks prior to the election I had issued a decree
prohibiting demonstrations. The real reason for the increase in the Nazi
votes was the desperate economic situation of Germany and the fact of
the general disappointment about the lack of foreign political successes
at Lausanne.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now, what was your conclusion from the results of this
election?
VON PAPEN: The conclusion I drew was the same opinion which I had held
before. On the next day I gave an interview to the Associated Press, and
through this interview I told the entire world:
“The National Socialists have to be given responsibility, and
when that has been done we have to bring about a reform of the
Constitution.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding these historical facts I refer to Exhibit
Number 1 which has already been submitted, and especially to Pages 4, 5,
and 6.
Witness, please tell the Tribunal briefly about your negotiations with
Hitler.
VON PAPEN: As a result of this opinion of mine I had a long discussion
with Hitler on 12 August. I impressed upon him the necessity of his
participation, and my own readiness to resign as Chancellor in a few
months if the co-operation should prove successful, and after Von
Hindenburg had gained confidence in Hitler.
Of the political parties, the rightist parties, as is well known, had
supported my Cabinet. The Center Party was in opposition. Now, after
these elections, the Center Party wanted Hitler as Chancellor, but
Hitler himself did not want to become the head of a majority government.
The correctness of my statements is shown in Document 1, Page 6, the
first paragraph, last line. I quote:
“Kaas, the leader of the Center Party, demands a so-called total
solution of this crisis by the full responsible participation of
the former opposition in the Reich Government.”
I made an offer to Hitler that he should enter my Cabinet as Vice
Chancellor. Hitler declined. On the next day we continued with our
negotiations in the presence of the Reich President.
Hitler voiced the demand to the Reich President to join the Government
with his Movement, but only on condition that he himself be appointed
Chancellor. And this may be seen in this document on Page 6.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is Document Number 1, Page 6, Your Honor.
VON PAPEN: The Reich President did not believe that he should transfer
complete authority to Hitler and rejected his proposal. At this point
our efforts of drawing National Socialism into a responsible government
activity had failed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Defendant Von Papen voiced his opinions about this in
a speech at Munich, which can be found in the document book, Exhibit
Number 1, Pages 10 and 11.
After the failure of these negotiations, the National Socialists entered
into the most intense opposition against the Government. Did this in any
way change your basic course?
VON PAPEN: The oppositional attitude of the Nazis against my Government
did not change my basic course at all. I spoke fully about this matter
at Münster on 28 August.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] This speech may be found in
Document Number 1, Exhibit Number 1, Page 7. And on this page I would
also like to call your attention to a report on a judgment of a special
court at Beuthen. There the first death sentence was passed on the basis
of the terror decree of 9 August. This terror decree, with which the
Prosecution wishes to incriminate the Defendant Von Papen, resulted in
the death sentence against five National Socialists.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 4 September you issued an emergency
decree to revitalize economy. As this decree is the nucleus of your
Government’s activity in the solution of economic problems, I should
like to have you comment on this emergency decree.
VON PAPEN: I have already discussed this emergency decree and stated
that it concerned a program involving 2,200 million Reichsmark with the
aim of creating work for 1¾ million workers. We made this gigantic
effort without increasing our foreign debt by a penny. It was, if I may
characterize it in these words, the straining of our utmost and our last
reserves of strength. The success became noticeable already in the first
month through a decrease of 123,000 in the number of unemployed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1 month?
VON PAPEN: Yes, in 1 month.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Within this general labor procurement program was
rearmament contemplated?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. My Government did not spend a penny for
rearmament.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The details of this emergency decree may be found in
Document 1, Pages 8 and 9.
Why was there another dissolution of the Reichstag on 12 September? What
did you say about this on that evening over the radio?
VON PAPEN: The new Reichstag met according to the Constitution. My
Government, as I have already said, could not obtain a majority; but the
formation of any other government without Hitler was quite impossible.
Therefore, I was justified in the hope that this Reichstag would give my
Government time to test itself, especially as I had submitted to it a
comprehensive and decisive economic program. But just then something
unexpected and unheard-of happened.
The thing that happened was, so to speak, the prostitution of the German
Parliament. Herr Göring, the President of the German Reichstag, gave to
the Communist delegate, Clara Zetkin, the floor for a vehement attack on
my Government. When I, the responsible Chancellor of this Government,
asked for the floor in order to give an account of what I wanted to do,
I was refused permission to speak, and the Reichstag President asked for
a vote on a motion of no confidence brought in by the Communists, the
Socialists and the National Socialists. The fact of this concerted
motion on the part of the three parties should really show what would
have taken place in Germany if these three parties were to have ruled in
Germany together, and should also show how imperative it was for me to
try not to crowd National Socialism into the leftist wing, but to bring
it into my Government instead.
I was forced to put the order for the dissolution of the Reichstag on
the table, and to leave.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: These historic facts may be found in Document 1, Page 8,
and in the document which I have already referred to without having
submitted it, Document 86, Page 192.
In a speech in Munich on 12 October you also dealt with the question of
reforming the Constitution. Please tell us briefly just what opinion you
voiced on that occasion.
VON PAPEN: The reform of the Constitution, as I have already mentioned,
was one of the most urgent aims of my Government. The reasons for it are
set forth in this document, on Page 9. This reform was to include an
electoral reform, in order to end the multiplicity of parties, and the
creation of an upper House. Above all, it was to give the Government
more authority and more opportunities to govern than was possible under
the Weimar Constitution.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As an explanation I should like to mention that the
reform of the Constitution which was to do away with the conditions at
that time—that Government measures were issued solely on the authority
of Article 48, the emergency decree. To what extent this took place may
be seen in Document 4, which gives a picture of the great number of
emergency decrees which were issued.
Witness, on 6 November 1932 the election for the Reichstag took place.
What was the election slogan of the Government and what was your opinion
about the result?
VON PAPEN; Unfortunately, we had to vote once again. The program of my
Government was the same as it had been before—that is, the endeavor to
establish a new state leadership, a state leadership with the
co-operation of an effective parliament with a government vested with
strong authority.
In this manifesto to the electors of 4 November I addressed Hitler and I
told him:
“It is the exclusiveness of your Movement, your demand for
everything or nothing, which the Reich President could not
recognize and which led to his decision of 13 August. What is at
stake today is this: The question is not whether this or that
party leader occupies the Chancellor’s chair, whether his name
is Brüning, Hitler, or Von Papen, but rather that we meet on
common ground so that the vital interests of the German people
can be assured.”
I hoped that through this Reichstag election the National Socialists
whom I opposed would be weakened in such a way that this party would be
squeezed out of the central parliamentary position.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the result?
VON PAPEN: This result was not achieved. The National Socialists lost 34
seats, but that was not sufficient to crowd them out of their key
position, for again the formation of a majority in the Reichstag from
the Socialists to the extreme Right was possible only with Hitler;
without him, no majority.
In order that we might be in a position to continue governing in a
constitutional way, I tried once more to negotiate with the various
parties and the National Socialists.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us a description of these negotiations.
VON PAPEN: These negotiations are interesting, and the Tribunal must be
made familiar with them so that they can judge the events of 30 January
1933.
First of all, I tried to clear the situation with those parties that
were in opposition to my Government, and especially with the Social
Democrats and with the Center Party. The Center Party took an adverse
position. They desired a majority government with Hitler, but Hitler did
not wish to govern with a parliamentary majority. From Document 2, Page
13, we can see what the attitude of the Center Party was.
Since Hitler’s collaboration in a coalition government was out of the
question, I again turned to Hitler in order to ask him whether he was
now ready to enter my Government. I did this out of a sense of
responsibility in order to achieve any sort of result at all; and,
therefore, I wrote him the letter dated 13 November 1932, which is
Document D-633, which was submitted by the Prosecution as an
“undignified” document because, after all of my failures, I had once
more turned to Hitler. In this letter I said:
“I would consider it a violation of duty if I did not turn to
you, in spite of everything; and I am of the opinion that the
leader of such a great Movement, whose service to the country
and the people I always appreciated despite much that I had to
criticize, that this leader should not refuse to confer with the
responsible statesman.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then on 8 November you again turned to the foreign press
and spoke to them on foreign political matters...
VON PAPEN: May I interrupt you for a moment? I should like to add here,
with regard to the opinion on the letter as voiced for the Prosecution
by Mr. Barrington: It is customary in every parliamentary state that, if
the leader of the government turns to the opposition in order to obtain
its co-operation, he writes a courteous and cordial letter to the leader
of the opposition; that he does not call him an ass. Therefore, I cannot
quite see why these remarks of mine are characterized as lacking
dignity.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 8 November you turned to the foreign press and spoke
about the revision of the Versailles Treaty. Can you explain briefly the
statement you made at that time?
VON PAPEN: I only mention the speech made to the representatives of the
foreign press in order to show to the High Tribunal the frequency of my
appeals to foreign countries—appeals to foreign countries, to the
victorious powers—to urge them to undertake a moral reconciliation; for
then, Gentlemen, the radical tendencies in Germany would have
disappeared of their own accord.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech before the foreign press will be found in
Document 1, Pages 11 and 12.
What were the consequences of the failure of your negotiations with the
party leaders?
VON PAPEN: The failure of my negotiations with the party leaders and
Hitler led to my resignation on 17 November. I was instructed to carry
on the affairs of the Government until a new government could be formed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What efforts were made by the Reich President, after your
Cabinet resigned, towards forming a new government?
VON PAPEN: My resignation gave the Reich President the opportunity to
try once more to form a parliamentary majority.
He immediately tried to do that and beginning on 18 November he received
all the party leaders, from the Right to the Center; and on the 19th he
received Hitler. The topic was: How can we form a parliamentary majority
government? He instructed Hitler to form a majority government; Hitler
would then be Chancellor.
On 23 November Göring presented Hitler’s answer to Hindenburg; it was:
“Hitler could not undertake the formation of a majority government.”
On the 24th, Hindenburg received Monsignor Kaas, the leader of the
Center Party. He declared that Hitler had not even tried to find out
whether a majority government could be formed, but Monsignor Kaas
promised the Reich President to try once more to form a majority
government. On 25 November he reported to Hindenburg that the attempt
had been in vain, that the leader of the Nazi faction, at that time Herr
Frick, had stated that the Party would not be interested in such
discussions. The result: The formation of a majority government with
Hitler is impossible.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did other possibilities for a coalition present
themselves? Were there other possibilities for a coalition?
VON PAPEN: No. There was only the possibility of a cabinet such as I had
had, or a majority cabinet.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With regard to these negotiations I should like to refer
you to Document 2, Pages 14 and 15.
After the discussion between the Reich President and the party leaders
had failed, a conference took place on 1 December between the Reich
President and you and General Von Schleicher. This consultation is
especially important for the future political development and has a
considerable historical significance. Therefore I ask you to go into the
details of this conversation.
VON PAPEN: The Field Marshal on 1 December asked General Von Schleicher
and me to meet him for a conference. I should like to remark that
previously no conversation between Herr Von Schleicher and myself about
the possibilities for the formation of a future government had taken
place. Herr Von Hindenburg asked us about our attitude; I set forth the
following:
The attempt to include the Nazi movement into the Presidential Cabinet
of Hindenburg had twice failed. Hitler equally refuses to form a
majority government. On the other hand, he is exercising a tremendous
amount of opposition and is trying to have all my decrees rescinded by
the Reichstag. If therefore there is no possibility to form a
parliamentary government or to include Hitler in our Government without
making him Chancellor, then a state of emergency has arisen which
requires extraordinary measures. Therefore, I proposed a recess of
Parliament for several months and immediate preparation of a
constitutional reform bill later to be presented to the Reichstag or to
a national assembly. This proposal involved a violation of the
Constitution.
I emphasized that I knew how the great soldier and statesman cherished
the sacredness of his oath, but my conscience led me to believe that a
violation of the Constitution seemed to be justified in view of the
extraordinary situation, for which the German Constitution provided no
remedy.
Then Herr Von Schleicher spoke. He said:
“Field Marshal, I have a plan which will make it unnecessary for
you to break your oath to the Constitution, if you are willing
to put the Government into my hands. I hope that I will be able
to obtain a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag by splitting
the National Socialist Party.”
During the discussion of this plan, I said that it was doubtful to me
whether a splitting of the Party which had sworn loyalty to Hitler could
be achieved. I reminded the Field Marshal of the fact that he should
free himself of weak parliamentary majorities through a basic reform.
However, the proposals were thrown overboard through the solution
offered by Schleicher. The solution offered by Schleicher was only a
provisional matter, and a very doubtful one.
DR. KUBUS CHOK: What was the decision of the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: The decision of the Field Marshal was perhaps the most
difficult that he had to make in his long life. Without giving any
further reasons, he told me: “I have decided in favor of the solution of
Herr Von Papen, and I request you to start immediately negotiations for
the formation of a government to which I can give the instructions in
accordance with your proposals.” The conference was over.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did Herr Von Schleicher do then?
VON PAPEN: I exchanged only a few brief words with Herr Von Schleicher
and tried to persuade him to recognize the decision that the Reich
President had made. Herr Von Schleicher said “no.”
Then, the same evening, I started discussions with several ministers
with regard to the formation of a new government. These ministers told
me, “The plan is excellent, but Herr Von Schleicher has told us that we
will have a civil war and in that case the Reichswehr will not be in a
position to keep law and order in the country.”
I interrupted the discussion and called the Cabinet together the next
morning, presenting the situation and informing them of Hindenburg’s
decision. Then I asked Herr Von Schleicher to tell the Cabinet now why
he believed that there would be a civil war and why the Reichswehr would
not be in a position to keep law and order in the country. Herr Von
Schleicher called on one of his General Staff officers to tell the
Cabinet that this case had been considered from a practical and
theoretical point of view and that they had come to the decision that
the Reichswehr and the police were not in a position to keep law and
order in the country. Then I said to the gentlemen: “This is a new
situation which I have to report to the Reich President.”
I went to Hindenburg and reported to him. Herr Von Hindenburg, deeply
stirred about my report, said to me, “I am an old man and I cannot face
a civil war of any sort in my country. If Herr Von Schleicher is of this
opinion, then I must—as much as I regret—withdraw the task with which
I charged you last night.” With that, Herr Von Schleicher was appointed
Chancellor on the conditions which he had offered to the Reich President
at this meeting.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Schleicher offer you the post of Ambassador
to Paris?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Schleicher, who for a long time knew of my interest
in German-French relations, asked me whether I wanted to become
Ambassador in Paris. This would have been quite in accordance with my
inclinations. But the Reich President objected to this, and...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal think that this is going in
far too great detail into all this, all of which is known through
history, and most of which we have heard before.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now we shall turn to the year 1933. On 4 January a
conference between Hitler and you took place at the home of the banker,
Schröder. The Prosecution is presenting this conference as the actual
beginning of your common conspiracy. Please give the Tribunal a
description of how this conference came about.
VON PAPEN: I was...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we have been hearing for the whole of the
afternoon the background of the conference. Surely we can hear of the
conference now.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The defendant is charged with the fact that he was the
promoter of the negotiations, which supposedly started on 4 January, for
the formation of the government formed on 30 January. The role which Von
Papen played in it is of decisive importance. Therefore, I consider it
necessary that he tells us briefly about the background...
THE PRESIDENT: The negotiations did not start on 4 January. The
defendant told us earlier, about a couple of hours ago, that they
started on 12 August 1932. The negotiations started earlier than this.
VON PAPEN: I may perhaps quite briefly say, Mr. President, what it
concerns. This conference on 4 January, on the occasion of which the
Prosecution asserts that I pledged myself to National Socialism, was a
conference which took place on the initiative of Hitler. At this
conference nothing was said about the overthrow of the Government of Von
Schleicher; and there was nothing said about the formation of a
government by Hitler, as it later actually took place on 30 January. We
merely discussed the necessity for Hitler to decide to take a
responsible part, not as Chancellor, but with his Party. And, My Lord,
that I did not engineer this conference or have it called may be seen
clearly from the statement of Herr Von Schröder, at whose home this
conference took place.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This may be seen from Document 9, Page 26.
Witness, you are accused of the fact that in this conference you
discussed plans for the overthrow of the Cabinet of Von Schleicher. Did
you keep the fact of this conference from Herr Von Schleicher?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary. Immediately after this conference at
Cologne, I wrote a letter to Herr Von Schleicher, which must have
reached him the next morning. And after I had returned to Berlin, I went
at once to Herr Von Schleicher and told him just what had been discussed
at this conference. Thereupon, Herr Von Schleicher caused an official
communiqué to be issued. Document Number 9.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 9(a)—I submit Document 9(a).
VON PAPEN: In this document it says:
“The conversation revealed the complete lack of foundation for
the assertions deduced from this meeting by the press about
controversies between the Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher and
Herr Von Papen.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then, that is, during the time until 22 January,
participate in any political discussions about the formation of a new
government?
VON PAPEN: No. Between 9 and 22 January I did not participate in any
political discussions about the formation of a government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us a short summary of the political
development from 10 until 21 January.
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution asserts that now, in the interval between 9
and 30 January, I was the chief factor in forming the government of
Hitler on 30 January. A chronological recapitulation of the days between
the 11th and the 30th will reveal how completely wrong this assertion of
the Prosecution actually is. Therefore, I shall have to mention a few
dates in this connection.
On 11 January: Hitler was in Berlin. He did not see Von Schleicher,
Hugenberg, or Von Papen. But the Reichstag decided through the Council
of Elders: “We have to give a reprieve to the Government of Von
Schleicher.”
On 13 January: Schleicher receives Hugenberg, the chief of the rightist
movement.
On the 14th: Hindenburg receives Hugenberg.
Later on we shall see that on both of these days, Hugenberg, the leader
of the Right, negotiated with Von Schleicher about his entry into the
Cabinet, not about the formation of a government with Hitler.
Then on 15 January, the well-known elections in Lippe took place. The
Lippe elections gave the National Socialists a new impetus.
On 20 January, the Reichstag, the Council of Elders, decided to postpone
their meeting from the 24th to the 31st.
The State Secretary of the Reich Government, Schleicher, declared in
this connection: “The Reich Government intends to clarify the political
situation as quickly as possible, but the Reich Government is not
interested in majority questions.”
From that can be seen that Herr Von Schleicher no longer considered the
formation of a government on the basis of a majority.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now we can leave the political developments and turn to
your personal...
THE PRESIDENT: If you are going into another subject, we had better
adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH DAY
Monday, 17 June 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, report is made that the Defendants
Fritzsche and Speer are absent.
[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am now going to deal with the events of January 1933
and I should like to say that I shall then not require any more time.
The rest of the examination will be shorter so that I shall be able to
conclude my examination of the defendant in the course of today.
Witness, on Friday you told the Tribunal that during the well-known
conversation with Hitler on 4 January 1933 at the home of Schröder, you
did not discuss the formation of the Cabinet which took place later, on
30 January. You also said that up to 22 January you did not take part in
any political discussion. The Prosecution, however, asserts that you
influenced the Reich President to name Hitler Chancellor on 30 January.
Did you influence Hindenburg to that effect?
VON PAPEN: Before I reply, may I make a brief correction? Your Lordship
asked me on Friday for the date of the evacuation of Jerusalem. I said
it was 1918, but of course Your Lordship was right; it was in 1917. I
beg your pardon.
Now in reply to your question: I did not exert any such influence on
Reich President Von Hindenburg, but even if I had done so, it would not
have carried any weight in the final decision of the Reich President.
The political situation, as we shall see, left the Reich President only
the choice between a violation of the Constitution and a Hitler Cabinet.
Furthermore, and I already mentioned this at the conclusion of the last
session, it is plain from the historical events of January as reproduced
in Document 9, Pages 27 through 31, that during the entire month of
January until the 22d almost daily negotiations without my participation
took place between the Reich Government and the various parties or among
the parties themselves. All of these negotiations were concerned with
the possible formation of a majority in the Reichstag, but all of them
were of no avail. I have explained that the Reich Chancellor, Von
Schleicher, was trying to bring about a majority in the Reichstag by
splitting the Party. This attempt, too, finally failed on 20 January;
and that was obvious to the world, for on that day the Reich Chancellor
authorized a statement in the Reichstag to the effect that he no longer
attached importance to forming a majority in the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 9
in the first document book. I shall just read a few extracts from this
document, Document 9, Page 27. The heading is:
“January 11, Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher receives leader of
the German People’s Party, Dingeldey.”
On the next page, Page 28, is proof that on 12 January efforts to split
the NSDAP through Strasser had not yet been abandoned. I shall quote
from the beginning of the page:
“At the same time it has only now become known that the Reich
President received Gregor Strasser last week for a conference.
Strasser apparently expressed his intention of keeping in the
background for the time being; only in the event of an
unexpectedly sharp conflict between Hitler and Schleicher’s
Reich Cabinet would Strasser be likely to play a definite part.”
In the meantime the Lippe elections took place and gave a clear picture
of the development of the NSDAP.
I am quoting now from the middle of the paragraph under 15 January:
“The electoral victory of the NSDAP not only surprisingly
refutes the assertions of the opposition concerning a decline of
the National Socialist movement, but is also proof that the
Movement is no longer at a standstill, and that a sharp rise has
now become apparent.”
Significant for the talks on the creation of a parliamentary majority
were Schleicher’s negotiations with the Center Party, led by Prelate Dr.
Kaas. I quote from the last paragraph on Page 28:
“Reich Chancellor Von, Schleicher receives Prelate Dr. Kaas,
Chairman of the Center Party, for a lengthy conference.
“In regard to the predictions on a reorganization of the
Cabinet, the fiction is kept up in government circles that a
Strasser-Hugenberg-Stegerwald combination is possible, despite
the difficulties which these plans have undoubtedly encountered.
Privy Councillor Hugenberg is said to have laid down the
condition that undisturbed activity within the Cabinet for at
least 1 year should be guaranteed.”
On the next page, Page 29, I would like to refer to the last 10 lines or
so of the statement of State Secretary Planck before the Council of
Elders of the Reichstag.
“In the conversations referred to, the National Socialists are
to assume the lead and to attempt to form all groups, from the
National Socialists to the Center, into a majority front of the
sort which failed to materialize at the end of 1932. The conduct
of these negotiations, in which the Schleicher Cabinet is in no
way involved, rests with Hitler. If on 31 January the Reichstag
should be summoned and a conflict arise between Government and
Reichstag or if such a conflict is brought about by other
events, the proclamation of the often discussed state of
emergency must to an increased extent be expected. The
Government would then dissolve the Reichstag and set the date
for the new elections in the early fall.”
On the following page, Page 30, I should like to refer finally to the
first heading...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal does not think it necessary
to read all this detail. It is evident from the headlines of these
entries that there were political negotiations which led to the
assumption of power by the National Socialist Party. Is that not all
that you want to say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I want to prove that the formation of the Government on
30 January was an imperative solution arising out of the political
parliamentary incidents of the day. Therefore, it is of relevance to
note what took place at the time, what attempts failed, what other
possibilities existed, and what...
THE PRESIDENT: What I mean is this: It appears, does it not, from the
headlines of these entries. Really, you can read the headlines without
reading the details. For example, on Page 30, the entry on 21 January,
and those other entries, give the substance of the matter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, Mr. President. May I then be permitted to read
Page 31, part of the text describing the historical events of the
overthrow of Chancellor Schleicher on the 28th? Regarding the decisive
conversation between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President the
following was officially announced:
“Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher submitted to the Reich
President today his report on the situation, and declared that
the present Reich Cabinet, on account of its character as a
minority Government, would be in a position to represent its
program and its views in the Reichstag only if the Reich
President placed the dissolution order at his disposal. Reich
President Von Hindenburg stated that in view of the prevailing
situation he could not accept this proposition. Reich Chancellor
Von Schleicher hereupon submitted the collective resignation of
the Reich Cabinet, which the Reich President accepted; the
Cabinet was entrusted with continuing provisionally to discharge
official business.”
As proof for the fact that the possibility of Hitler forming a
parliamentary government did not exist, I want to refer to a brief
extract on Page 32:
“National Socialist sources again state categorically that for
the National Socialists only a Hitler government can be
considered. Any other attempts towards a solution must be
prevented with the utmost vigor. This, of course, applies to a
Papen cabinet; but a Schacht cabinet also is out of the
question.”
I should now like to refer to the next document, Document 8. In this
document all the possibilities for the formation of a government are
discussed in detail.
Witness, how did Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher react to this political
situation?
VON PAPEN: After his efforts to split the Party and to bring about a
majority in the Reichstag had failed, Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher
asked the Reich President to give him dictatorial powers, which meant a
violation of the Constitution. Thus he wanted the very thing which I had
proposed to the Reich President on 1 December 1932 as the only way out
of the situation, a proposal which the Reich President had accepted at
that time but which General Von Schleicher had thwarted.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A discussion took place on 22 January at the home of Von
Ribbentrop at which, besides yourself, Göring, Meissner, and Oskar von
Hindenburg were present. Was this discussion arranged on your
initiative, or who suggested it?
VON PAPEN: The initiative for this discussion on the 22d was Hitler’s,
and he also suggested that Herr Von Ribbentrop should place his home at
our disposal. The Reich President wished to know what Hitler thought
about the solution for the political crisis, and what his proposals
were. Therefore, the conversation of the 22d concentrated exclusively on
the demands of the National Socialists, while the formation of a
government as it took place on the 30th was not discussed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 28 January, at noon, the Reich President instructed
you to begin negotiations for the formation of a new government. What
possibilities for the formation of a government did you consider the
political situation offered?
VON PAPEN: The idea of forming a parliamentary majority government had
been abandoned since 20 January; it was impossible. Hitler was not
willing to lead or participate in such a government.
Secondly, further support of the Schleicher presidential cabinet by
means of a declaration of a state of emergency and the prorogation of
the Reichstag, which was against the Constitution, had been rejected by
the Reich President on the 23d. He had rejected these proposals, as we
know, because Von Schleicher had told him in December that a violation
of the Constitution would mean civil war and a civil war would mean
chaos, “because I am not in a position,” he said, “to maintain law and
order with the Army and with the Police.”
Thirdly, since Hitler offered to participate in a presidential cabinet,
this was the only remaining possibility, and all the forces and
political parties which had supported my Government in 1932 were
available for this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the instructions which the Reich President gave
you?
VON PAPEN: The instructions given me by Von Hindenburg were as follows:
Proposal for the formation of a government under the leadership of
Hitler, with the utmost restriction of National Socialist influence and
within the framework of the Constitution.
I should like to add that it was quite unusual for the Reich President
to ask any person to form a government which would not be headed by the
person himself. In the normal course of events Hindenburg should, of
course, have entrusted Hitler himself with the formation of a
government; and he entrusted me with this task because he wished to
minimize Hitler’s influence in the government as far as possible.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And with whom did you negotiate?
VON PAPEN: I negotiated with the leaders of the rightist groups which
might participate in the formation of this government; namely, the
NSDAP, the German National People’s Party, the “Stahlhelm,” and the
German People’s Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On what lines did you suggest the formation of the new
cabinet to the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: I suggested the only possibility which existed, namely, a
coalition cabinet consisting of these groups.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks that the defendant is
going into far too much detail about this, because he has given his
account of why the President sent for him and why he had anything to do
with it. And that is the only matter that concerns him. After he has
given that explanation, it should not be necessary to go into any
further detail about it at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the Prosecution has made the charge that
the very act of forming the government was a crime; he is therefore
defending himself by stating that he tried to provide for a safeguard
against the preponderant influence of Hitler in the government. It is
relevant...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but that is what I said. He has given that
explanation. He does not need to add all sorts of details to support
that explanation.
I have written down, some moments ago, that the President asked him
because he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler. Now he is going
on with all sorts of details.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, he is merely trying to set forth in what
way he wanted to limit Hitler’s influence, and that is a very important
point. He is going to tell us for what safeguards within this government
he provided; the selection of personalities, all the other restrictions
which were agreed upon to rule out the possibility of Hitler’s influence
becoming overpowering. This is a very important point in reply to the
Prosecution’s charges.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can do it as shortly as possible, and not
do it in too great detail. That is all the Tribunal wants.
VON PAPEN: I shall be very brief, My Lord.
The safeguarding measures which I introduced at the request of the Reich
President were the following: 1) A very small number of National
Socialist ministers in the new cabinet; only 3 out of 11, including
Hitler. 2) The decisive economic departments of the cabinet to be placed
in the hands of non-National Socialists. 3) Experts to be put into the
ministry posts as far as possible. 4) Joint reports of Reich Chancellor
Hitler and Vice Chancellor Von Papen to Hindenburg in order to minimize
the personal influence of Hitler on Hindenburg. 5) I tried to form a
parliamentary bloc as a counterbalance against the political effects of
the National Socialist Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: To what extent did Reich President Von Hindenburg himself
select the members of the new cabinet?
VON PAPEN: The Reich President reserved the right to appoint the Foreign
Minister and the Reichswehr Minister. The first of these two key posts
was given to Herr Von Neurath, in whom the President had special
confidence; and the Reich Defense Ministry was given to General Von
Blomberg, who also enjoyed the particular confidence of the Reich
President. The National Socialist members of this cabinet were only the
Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, whose activity as Minister of the
Interior for the State of Thuringia had been completely moderate, and
the Minister without Portfolio, and later Prussian Minister of the
Interior, Göring.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
Book 3, Document Numbers 87 and 93, namely, an affidavit of the former
Minister, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, and an interrogatory of Freiherr von
Lersner.
THE PRESIDENT: What page in Book 3 did you say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Hugenberg’s statement is on Pages 194-195; Lersner’s on
Pages 210-212.
The Prosecution asserts that the Government formed on 30 January took
over the program of the NSDAP as its own. Will you explain now, Witness,
what the basis of that Government’s policy was.
VON PAPEN: The view held by the Prosecution is completely incorrect. The
program which on 30 January we decided to adopt was not the program of
the Nazi Party, but it was a coalition program. And this is perfectly
plain from the proclamation which this Government issued to the German
people on 1 February. And to give historical proof of this, may I quote
two sentences from that proclamation? It says:
“The National Government will consider it as its first and
foremost task to restore the spiritual and political unity of
our people. It will consider Christianity as the basis of its
general moral outlook and will firmly protect the family as the
determining unit of the nation and the State.
“The tremendous problem of reorganizing our economy will be
solved with two large Four Year Plans.”
I should like to add just one sentence:
“This Government is fully conscious of the magnitude of its duty
to support the maintenance and affirmation of peace, which the
world now needs more than ever.”
In addition, this coalition program, which the Prosecution describes as
the Nazi program, contained the following points: Continued existence of
the Länder and the federal character of the Reich; protection of justice
and the legal system, permanent tenure of office for judges; reform of
the Constitution; safeguarding of the rights of the Christian churches;
and, above all, abolition of the class conflict through a solution of
social problems, the restoration of a true national community.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you yourself do anything else to assure the
application of your own political ideas?
VON PAPEN: I did everything within my power, together with my political
friends, to carry through the ideas which I myself had contributed to
this political program. At that time the essential point seemed to me
the creation of a counterbalance to National Socialism; and therefore, I
asked the leaders of the rightist parties to give up the old party
programs and to unite in a large, common political organization with the
aim of fighting for the principles which we had enunciated. However, the
party leaders did not act on this suggestion. Party differences were too
marked and no changes took place. The only thing I accomplished was the
establishment of a voting bloc of all three parties, and on behalf of
this voting bloc I made many speeches in which I presented this program,
this coalition program, to the country.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I want to refer to a speech delivered by the witness on
11 February on behalf of the voting bloc; it may be found in Document
12, Pages 54 and 55. I quote from about the middle of Page 55, the
following brief passage:
“Therefore, I consider the circumstance that the present Reich
Cabinet is not made up of one single party or movement, but of
various groups of the national movement, of free politicians and
experts, not a disadvantage, but rather an advantage.”
What specific questions were emphasized and underlined in the program of
this voting bloc? You spoke of these questions in various speeches. In
order to save time, I should like only to submit to the Tribunal the
document dealing with this point, Document Number 10. Will you briefly
explain your attitude, and comment on the various questions; first of
all, the social problem?
VON PAPEN: The social problem was, of course, at the head of my program,
because this question dominated all others. It was our task to make
well-satisfied citizens out of the workers who were now engaged in class
conflict and to give to each the opportunity of a livelihood and a home.
I stated in the speech, which is contained in this document, that there
would always be differences in property but that a small group should
not possess everything while the great mass of the people had nothing.
And above all, I again and again emphasized the fact that if we could
succeed in solving the social problem we would, in that way, make an
eminent contribution to peace in Europe.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your program in foreign political matters?
VON PAPEN: The program was very simple. It consisted merely of the
desire to do away, in a peaceful manner, with the discriminations
against the German people and against our sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your platform on religious questions?
VON PAPEN: It is plain from all of my speeches that I considered the
regeneration of the German people in a Christian sense as the
prerequisite for the solution of the social and all other problems which
confronted us. I shall return to this point later.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to submit as evidence the document which I
have already mentioned, Document Number 10; and I ask that the High
Tribunal take judicial notice of it. Since a mistake affecting the sense
of the translation has been made on Page 39 and since the question of
dissolving the trade unions will play an important role later, I should
like to read a brief paragraph on Page 39, about the middle of the page:
“I recognize that the trade unions have done much to imbue the
working classes with professional honor and professional pride.
Many trade unions, for instance the Union of Clerks, have made
exemplary achievements in this respect. The conception of class
conflict, however, stood in the way of real reform and
constructive work in this direction.
“The Socialist parties prevented the trade unions’ efforts to
convert the workers into a class. If the trade unions would
recognize the signs of the times and remain out of politics to a
greater extent, then they could, especially now, become a strong
pillar of the national life.”
Please comment on the results of the elections on 5 March 1933.
I just want to draw the Court’s attention in this connection to Document
Number 98, in which I have set down a diagram of the election results in
the years in question.
VON PAPEN: This election became extremely significant for later
developments. First of all, I should like to state that this election
was a truly free one, for it was conducted together with the old
functionaries of the Republic; and that it was actually free is also
shown by the fact that the votes of the Communists and of the Social
Democrats did not decrease at all. I, personally, had expected that the
NSDAP would be successful at the polls. In November 1932 I had taken
away 36 of its seats in the Reichstag, and I expected that it would
regain some of those seats. I had also hoped that my own voting bloc
would be very successful. I hoped that the people would realize the
necessity of creating a counterbalance. However, this did not happen...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the figures are sufficient for us. We can form our
own conclusions from the figures. We can see the figures. We do not need
to have them all explained and commented on to us. There are very much
more important things for us to consider.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you now describe the events leading up to
the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933.
VON PAPEN: The Enabling Act arose out of the necessity to have the
economic measures carried out in an untroubled Reichstag session.
Negotiations were conducted with the Center Party to obtain a 1-year
parliamentary truce, but these negotiations failed. Hence this law which
had some parallels in the past became a necessity. The Prosecution has
emphasized this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy.
May I say, therefore, that I myself tried to provide for a certain check
by desiring to maintain the veto power of the Reich President. The
Cabinet records of 15 March show, however, that State Secretary Meissner
did not consider the participation of the Reich President necessary.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Number 25, which is
identical with Exhibit USA-578, to the attitude taken by Von Papen in
this Cabinet discussion and to the standpoint just mentioned of State
Secretary Meissner.
“Meissner, State Secretary of the minority Cabinet, of the
Cabinet of the Reich President, and his excellent assistant.”
I should also like to refer to Document 23, because from the enumeration
of the emergency decrees in that document it is clear that in the state
of emergency which obtained then it was not possible to govern by means
of Reichstag laws and that the Enabling Act was to be a substitute for
these emergency decrees which were being repeatedly issued.
I must make one correction: The standpoint of State Secretary Meissner
is contained in Document 91, Exhibit USA-578.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 21 March 1933, an amnesty decree was
issued. The Prosecution has described this decree as an unheard-of law.
What can you say about it?
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution calls this law “sanction of political
murder.”
I should like to say the following about it: This law was issued in an
emergency decree of the Reich President, not of the Cabinet; and it was
a natural end of a revolutionary period which had lasted 7 weeks. There
are very many historical parallels for this amnesty decree; for example,
the law which was issued by the young German Republic on 21 July 1922
and which includes murder in the amnesty measures.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now refer to Document 28, Page 99 of Document Book
1. This contains the law of 21 July 1922, which concludes “the period of
a state of unrest which obtained in the years 1920 and 1921.” May I also
refer to Page 100 of this Document Number 28 which contains the law of
20 December 1932 which has been mentioned.
On 23 March the law dealing with the special courts was issued. What can
you say in that connection?
VON PAPEN: These special laws, or special court laws, are also not
entirely new. I, personally, as Chancellor of the Reich issued such a
law on 9 August 1932; and I based my action then on a directive of the
Brüning Cabinet dated 6 October 1931. In revolutionary periods
punishable political acts must be brought to speedy trial under the law.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now point out Document 27, Page 89 of Document Book
1, especially the introduction preceding Paragraph 1, which shows that
this emergency decree was based on the Brüning emergency directive of
1931.
On 1 April 1933 the Jewish boycott was carried out. Was this a measure
taken by the Government? Did you participate in it in any way?
VON PAPEN: The assertion of Dr. Goebbels that the Cabinet had approved
this measure was completely false. On the contrary, at the suggestion of
the Cabinet Hitler had on 10 and 12 March made public announcements
which my counsel will submit.
The Prosecution refers to the telegram which I sent to New York on the
25th as a “white lie of the greatest magnitude”; I can only say,
however, that this assertion is completely unfounded. The public
statements of Hitler gave us, in fact had to give us, the assurance that
such excesses would not take place again. In that belief I sent my
telegram. It would be inconceivable that on the 25th I should send a
telegram to New York...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I thought your question was: Did the
defendant participate in these measures? I do not know what his answer
is. He has been answering for some minutes, but I do not know what the
answer is.
The question was: Did you participate? And I do not know what he has
answered.
VON PAPEN: I said that the assertion of Goebbels that the Cabinet had
approved this Jewish boycott was a lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Why not answer directly; did you or did you not
participate?
VON PAPEN: No, we did not participate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I refer to Document 33, Page 113, a statement by
Hitler on 10 March, the last two lines:
“Annoying individuals, obstructing automobiles, or disturbing
business life must absolutely be discontinued.”
On the same page, Page 113, a declaration of Hitler on 12 March, last
sentence of the paragraph next to the last:
“Whoever, from now on, attempts by individual action to cause
disturbances in our administrative or business life, acts
consciously against the National Government.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I did not intend to prevent the defendant
telling the Tribunal what he had done with reference to his telegram to
the _New York Times_, but I wanted him in the first instance to answer
your question.
Now, if he wants to add anything about what he telegraphed to the _New
York Times_, let him do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you then, please, go back to this point in
connection with the _New York Times_.
VON PAPEN: I can only add, My Lord, that it would be quite inconceivable
that on 25 April I should send this telegram to New York knowing that 3
or 4 days later a new Jewish boycott would be carried out; that is
completely nonsensical. Moreover, I might point out that on the same day
Herr Von Neurath sent a similar wire to Cardinal O’Connell.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you now give an account of your attitude to the
Jewish problem?
VON PAPEN: My attitude toward the Jewish problem can be briefly
delineated; it has always, throughout my life, been the attitude
expected by the Catholic Church of its members. I stated my view on the
question of race, as regards National Socialist doctrine, quite publicly
in a speech in Gleiwitz in the year 1933, and my counsel will submit
that speech as evidence.
A completely different question not connected with my basic attitude
toward the Jewish problem was, however, the kind of foreign monopoly,
the overwhelming influence of the Jewish element in the spheres which
form the nation’s public opinion, such as press, literature, theater,
film, and especially law. There seemed no doubt in my mind that this
foreign monopoly was unhealthy and that it should be remedied in some
way. But as I said, that had nothing whatever to do with the racial
question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer now to Document 16, Page 68, which contains an
extract from the speech which, as the defendant mentioned, he made in
the year 1934 at Gleiwitz. I quote:
“There are certainly no objections to race research and eugenics
which endeavor to keep the characteristics of a nation as pure
as possible and at the same time to kindle the feeling of a
racial community. This love of one’s own race will never
degenerate into hatred of other nations and races. That is the
decisive point. Eugenics must never be brought into conflict
with Christianity for they are not opposed, they only differ. It
was Christianity which first made of the German tribes a German
nation, and it is really not necessary to create a new
Nordic-Germanic religion in order to give testimony to our
race.”
May I refer also to Document 29, Page 103, which deals with the second
topic discussed by the defendant; it is an excerpt from the diary of Mr.
Dodd on 4 July. I then refer to Document 35, Page 115, which contains an
article from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ dated 19 August 1932. The
heading of that, article is:
“The Papen Government Has Inscribed the Protection of Jews on
its Banner.”
THE PRESIDENT: That was August 1932? Where is it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 35, Page 115. I just read the heading of this
article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ dated 19 August 1932.
“The Papen Government Has Inscribed the Protection of Jews on
its Banner.”
The article deals with a statement of Herr Kareski, Berlin, as
representative of the Jewish People’s Party. Kareski was head of the
synagogue in Berlin. He stated at that time—and I quote the last
paragraph of this article:
“Fortunately, the Constitution of the German Republic still
protects the legal position of the Jews and the Papen Government
has inscribed the protection of the Jews on its banner.”
The Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933 contains certain exceptions
applying to Jews. Originally these exceptions were planned to be much
more extensive; did you do anything to restrict them to the form in
which they were then issued?
VON PAPEN: May I just add one thing? I believe you forgot to submit to
the Tribunal Document 33, relevant to the question of foreign monopoly
in the German legal system.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall submit that document after your answer to the
question I have just put.
VON PAPEN: I approved of the Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933 only
insofar as it applied to Jewish civil servants appointed after the year
1918. For after the war large-scale immigration into Germany had taken
place from the east, especially from Poland, a country which was
strongly anti-Semitic at the time.
I successfully pleaded with Hindenburg that soldiers who had taken part
in the war should under no circumstance be affected by this law, for I
always held the view that a German, no matter of what race, who had done
his duty to his country should not be restricted in his rights.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer now to Document 33, Page 114. It is a report of
the Ministry of Justice, which shows that when the Civil Service Law was
issued 3,515 Jewish attorneys were practicing. On the basis of the
mitigation which the witness has just mentioned, 735 ex-service men and
1,383 other attorneys who had been admitted to the bar before 1914 were
exempted from this law. Thus 2,158 Jewish attorneys remained, whereas
923 had to resign from office.
What was your view of the Civil Service Law as a whole?
VON PAPEN: I think it was completely normal that the National
Socialists, since they were partners in the coalition government and
controlled more than 50 percent of the German people’s vote, should have
a part in filling civil service posts.
I might point out that the National Socialists, in the propaganda which
they conducted for years, fought with all means against the so-called
“Bonzentum” (boss rule); but one could not, of course, predict that they
themselves would later make that same mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to adjourn?
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We have been speaking of the Civil Service Law, which in
the points we have discussed corresponds to some extent to the trend of
thought of the NSDAP. Why did you feel impelled to urge certain
concessions which were then, in fact, made?
VON PAPEN: I was convinced at the time that with this Civil Service Law
we were creating something basic. I did not anticipate, and I could not
guess, that the Party would continually in the following years introduce
new laws in this field and would thereby completely ruin the civil
service.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your attitude towards the dissolution of the
parties?
VON PAPEN: The exclusion of parties was a necessary result of the
Enabling Act. For 4 years Hitler had demanded the reforms which we
wanted to make. Document 25 shows that I asked Hitler to create a new
basic State law, and, in his speech of 23 March Hitler promised that. In
that speech he spoke of a reform of the Constitution to be carried
through by the appropriate existing constitutional organs. That reform
would have given us, in my opinion, in a revolutionary way, a new and
sounder democratic and parliamentary form of government. Moreover, I
must say that I saw no danger in the temporary use of the one-party
system. There were excellent examples for it in other states, for
instance in Turkey and Portugal, where this one-party system was
functioning very well. Finally, I should like to point out that in my
speech at Marburg on 17 June 1934 I criticized this development and said
that one could only regard it as a transitional stage which a
reconstructed Constitution would have to terminate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What is your view of the Reichsstatthalter Law of April
1933? Will you also state your attitude to the question of German
federation?
VON PAPEN: This question, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, has been brought up
by the Prosecution in order to accuse me of duplicity, untruthfulness,
or deceit. The Prosecution has alleged that in 1932 my views on the
federal character of Germany were different from those I expressed in
1933. But even if I had changed my mind in this respect, I cannot see
why the question of a federal or a central government should be a crime
within this Charter. Besides, I did not change my mind at all. The view
I expressed in 1932 was this: I recognized the advantages of a federal
system for Germany, and I wanted to maintain it; but I always wished,
even in 1932, that there should be joint agreement on the bigger
political issues in Germany. That a federal country is governed on
uniform principles is surely a matter of course. That was the only
question, and it was also the basis of my intervention in Prussia on 20
July.
If one knows the history of Germany, one will be aware that Bismarck
overcame that difficulty by combining the offices of the Reich
Chancellor and the Prussian Prime Minister. Therefore, when in 1933 we
appointed Reichsstatthalter in the various Länder, we merely intended to
establish a common political line. Besides, the rights of the Länder
remained unaffected. They had their own financial, legal, and
educational systems, and their own parliaments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With regard to the Reichsstatthalter Law, may I refer to
Document 31, particularly Page 111 of that document. The passage quoted
there from the Pfundtner-Neubert works shows that the authority of the
Länder was abolished only by the later Reichsstatthalter Law in the year
1935, when the Defendant Von Papen was no longer in office.
Why did you on 7 April 1933 resign as Prime Minister of Prussia?
VON PAPEN: My letter to Hitler dated 10 April 1934 has been submitted by
the Prosecution. It contains the reasons for my resignation. In
Prussia—I have already stated this—I had already carried through the
co-ordination of political aims on 20 July. The Reichsstatthalter Law
enabled the Reich Chancellor to be Prime Minister of Prussia himself or
to nominate a substitute. And so my task in Prussia was completed. Apart
from that, I should like to mention the following point: The elections
of 5 March had given the National Socialists a strong majority also in
the Prussian Parliament. The Prussian Parliament then met and naturally
desired that a National Socialist should become Prime Minister of
Prussia. For all these reasons I resigned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution charges that, as a prominent lay member
of the Catholic Church, you were particularly able to consolidate the
Nazi regime in the field of the churches. We must therefore discuss your
attitude regarding the Church. Will you give an account of the situation
of the German Church at that time?
VON PAPEN: This charge, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, is for me the most
serious of the entire Indictment—the charge that I, as a Catholic,
contributed to this conspiracy against world peace. May I be permitted,
therefore, to discuss my attitude in the Church question quite briefly.
The Catholics in Germany had organized themselves in the Center Party.
Before 1918 the Center Party, as a moderate party, had always endeavored
to establish a balance between the left and the right political wings.
After the war that picture was altered entirely.
We then find the Center Party mostly in coalition with the left. In
Prussia, this coalition was maintained during all the years from 1918
until 1932. Undeniably the Center Party deserves much credit for the
maintenance of the life of the State during the years after the
collapse; but the coalition with the Social Democrats made co-operation
of the Center Party with the right impossible, particularly with regard
to Church policy. In political questions and matters of internal party
policy the Center Party, therefore, followed a line of compromise which
was the result obtained through the concessions of others in the field
of Church policy. That this state of affairs...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, to what is this all relevant?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has said:
“Papen used his position of a prominent Catholic to consolidate
the Nazi regime. He was double-faced, and that characteristic is
especially obvious in this connection and throws light on his
personality.”
The defendant is now explaining what his attitude in Church matters has
been from the beginning of his political activity. Since he was first a
member of the Center Party and then left it, it is necessary to discuss
the split which developed between him and the leaders of the party.
Later we shall...
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into this extreme detail?
Surely the thing that he wants to show is that he was not assisting the
Nazi Party. He was undoubtedly a Catholic, and he wants to show that he
was not assisting the Nazi Party. He does not want to go into all of
these details about Catholic influences and his part in Catholic
influences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, may I say quite generally that in dealing
with the case of Papen it is our intention to prove that from the very
beginning the defendant consistently adhered to his principles. For this
purpose it is essential that the conditions prevailing at particular
times should be elucidated. We are now not very far from the point at
which we can leave the internal political conditions, and the other
subjects will be very much briefer. I do think, however, that for the
sake of completing the picture of the defendant’s personality, I must go
into certain details; but of course we shall make every effort to omit
all superfluous and avoidable particulars.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we are perfectly well aware that the case
of every one of these 21 defendants is different from the others. We are
perfectly aware of that, but what we desire is that their cases should
be put forward fairly but without unnecessary and burdensome detail.
They hope that you will try to confine the defendant to the really
essential matters. Will you go on?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, Mr. President. We shall do our best.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue, please.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may wind up this question by saying that my
opposition within the Party, my plea for the use of conservative forces,
gave me the reputation of being a bad Catholic. A foreign judge, a
non-German judge cannot know that in those years a Catholic who was not
a member of the Center Party but belonged to the right-wing parties was
regarded as a bad and inferior Catholic; and that is the state of
affairs against which I always fought.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In his government statement of 4 June 1932 Von Papen
referred to the fact that the outcome of the previous coalition policy
in Prussia was fully evidenced in the entire public life of Germany. I
refer to Document 1, Page 2, and I quote the last part of the first long
paragraph:
“The disintegration of atheistic-Marxist thoughts has already
too deeply invaded all the cultural fields of public life,
because the Christian forces of the State were all too easily
ready for compromises. The purity of public life cannot be
maintained or re-established by way of compromises for the sake
of parity. A clear decision must be made as to what forces are
willing to help reconstruct the new Germany on the basis of the
unchangeable principles of the Christian ideology.”
I also refer to Document Number 37, on Page 119, a speech at Munich on 1
March 1933, when the witness discussed the aspects which he has just
mentioned.
Witness, how did you think the position of the churches was safeguarded
by the new Government, and what did you do in that respect?
VON PAPEN: First of all, I asked Hitler to make a clear-cut statement on
this question; and he did so in a positive manner. In the foreword to my
speeches made at that time, there is the observation that it is the
first and most important task to revise the Nazi program with reference
to the religious problem, since such a revision is a prerequisite for a
united front of the two Christian confessions in that coalition.
Secondly, I attempted to protect Church policy by giving it, after the
conclusion of the Concordat, a certain foreign political context.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection may I refer to Document 37, Pages 119
and 120, containing an extract from several speeches delivered by the
witness, and to Volume I, Document 38, further down on Page 119, which
is a speech made at Dortmund in February 1933. In it the Defendant Von
Papen said...
THE PRESIDENT: We have that document before us.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 37, Page 119.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have got that, yes. All I was suggesting was that
it was sufficient to refer us to the document. As a matter of fact, you
have already got to the time when he resigned his post as Prime Minister
of Prussia in 1934, and now you are going back to 1933.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He resigned in Prussia in 1933. May I draw the Tribunal’s
attention, then, to this speech on Page 120.
THE PRESIDENT: Did he resign in 1933 or 1934?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1933.
I draw the Court’s attention to this speech, and to Page 120, a
proclamation of the Reich Government of 1 February 1933.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were the events leading up to the
Concordat?
VON PAPEN: I reiterate that I wanted to secure a Christian basis for the
Reich at all costs. For that reason, I suggested to Hitler in April 1933
that the rights of the Church should be firmly laid down in a Concordat,
and that this Concordat should be followed by an agreement with the
Evangelical Church. Hitler agreed, although there was strong opposition
in the Party; and thus the Concordat was concluded. The Prosecution has
adopted the view that this Concordat was a maneuver intended to deceive.
Perhaps I may in this connection point to the facts that the gentlemen
with whom I signed this Concordat were Secretary of State Pacelli, the
present Pope, who had known Germany personally for 13 years, and
Monsignor Kaas, who for years had been the Chairman of the Center Party,
and that if these two men were willing to conclude a Concordat, then one
can surely not maintain that this was a maneuver intended to deceive.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 39, Page 121. I should like to read
now a quotation from Document 40, on Page 122. After the conclusion of
the Concordat, Hitler published a decree, which is worded as
follows—near the middle of Page 122:
“I therefore order:
“1. All Catholic organizations which are recognized by the
present Treaty and which were dissolved without directions from
the Government are to be immediately reinstated.
“2. All measures of coercion against members of the clergy and
other leaders of these Catholic organizations are to be
rescinded. A revival of such measures is prohibited in the
future and will be punished under prevailing laws.”
I read that quotation to prove that only later did Hitler change his
mind, probably under the influence of the circle nearest to him.
I refer to Document 41, Page 123, a telegram of Von Papen. In the
English translation of this telegram there is a mistake which changes
the sense considerably. Paragraph 2 of the telegram says, “Thanks to
your generous and wise statesmanlike conception....” The English
translation reads “sportsmanlike” instead of “statesmanlike.”
On the next page I draw attention to the telegram addressed by Von Papen
to the Bishop of Treves. There are also affidavits relevant to the
questions which have been discussed. Document 43, Page 127 is the
affidavit of Freiherr von Twickel, and it takes the place of an
affidavit which the late Cardinal Von Galen was to have signed. The
matter had already been discussed with Cardinal Von Galen; but before
being able to put it into writing, he died. Freiherr von Twickel, who
discussed the questions with him, has now stated the details in his
affidavit, Document 43, on Page 127.
I also draw particular attention to Document 52, on Page 139. This is an
affidavit of the Abbot of the Benedictine Abbey at Grüssau, Schmitt, who
for many years had been the spiritual adviser of the defendant. In the
last but one paragraph on Page 139, he discusses the question of the
Concordat, and says:
“Herr Von Papen was deeply upset by the disloyal attitude of the
German Government, which became apparent soon after the
conclusion of the Concordat. He continually and fully discussed
with me his great anxiety in this respect, and he pondered ways
and means of ending these violations. I can also testify, from
my own experience, that he personally worked actively in the
interests of the Church to assure a loyal observance of the
Concordat.”
Witness, did you, apart from the Concordat, endeavor to see to it that
your views on Church policy were adopted?
VON PAPEN: Yes. On 15 June 1933 I created an organization in Berlin
which we called the “Cross and Eagle,” and a little later I founded the
Union (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) of Catholic Germans. Catholic forces were to
gather within these two organizations, outside the political parties.
The Union of Catholic Germans had the particular task of collecting
complaints and reporting them to me, so that I could try my best to
help.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution charges that by dissolving the Union of
Catholic Germans you yourself violated the Concordat. What can you say
to that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and furthermore the Prosecution already describes the
period which followed the Concordat as “the characteristic development
of the Church policy of the conspirators, and Papen’s participation in
it.”
The accusation raised by the Prosecution, with regard to my own sabotage
of the Concordat, is a tremendous accusation, which is connected with
the dissolution of the Union which I have just mentioned. The documents
show that this Union had already been paralyzed during the Röhm Putsch
on 30 June 1934 and that its later dissolution through me was merely a
formal affair. Moreover, this Union had no connection whatever with the
Concordat. It was a political union which never enjoyed the protection
of the Concordat.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 45, on Page 129. It is an exchange of
telegrams between Hitler and Hindenburg on the question of the
appeasement of the Evangelical Church.
For the subject of the Union of Catholic Germans I refer to Document 74,
Pages 130 to 132. This document contains an affidavit—I beg your
pardon, I gave a wrong figure—I refer to Document 47, on Page 130,
which is an affidavit of the executive of the Union of Catholic Germans,
Count Roderich Thun. He discusses the dissolution on Page 131, and I
quote the second paragraph:
“On 30 June 1934 the office of the Union of Catholic Germans was
occupied by officials of the Gestapo. The files were confiscated
and taken away. I myself was arrested.”
The fact that as a result of these measures the dissolution became a
mere formality is mentioned in the last paragraph of Page 131:
“Even after my release, which was effected after a time, the
confiscated files were not returned. In view of the attitude
taken up by the Party authorities, a revival of any further
activity on the part of the organization could no longer be
considered. Furthermore, in practice, any further activity of
the Union of Catholic Germans was no longer possible, as the
only person who could have undertaken the constantly necessary
interventions, Herr Von Papen, was out of the picture since he
had moved to Vienna. The only question which remained for the
heads of the Union was that of officially declaring an end of
the Union’s activities, which in practice had already occurred.
But one had to consider that in the event of an official
announcement of the enforced dissolution, the large number of
Catholics who had distinguished themselves through their work
for the organization would be persecuted. In order to prevent
this the dissolution was pronounced by the Union’s own leaders.”
Then I quote the last sentence:
“In order to do everything still possible to safeguard Catholic
interests, this pronouncement did not neglect to point out again
that official authorities, above all Hitler himself, had
solemnly vowed to protect Christian and ecclesiastical
interests.”
THE PRESIDENT: Will you remind me of the date when the Defendant Von
Papen moved to Vienna?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 15 August 1934 he went to Vienna; he was appointed at
the end of July 1934.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the summer of 1934 it became obvious
that the Party was sabotaging the Concordat, and that Hitler’s
assurances were not being kept. How do you explain Hitler’s behavior in
this respect?
VON PAPEN: I believe that in those days Hitler himself had been entirely
willing to keep peace with the Church, but that the radical elements in
his Party did not wish it, that most of all Goebbels and Bormann
continually instigated Hitler to violate assurances in the Church
question. Often and repeatedly I protested to Hitler, and in my speech
at Marburg I branded these violations publicly. I stated at Marburg,
“How can we fulfill our historic mission in Europe if we ourselves
strike our name from the list of Christian peoples.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw attention to Document Number 85 on Page 186 and
ask that judicial notice be taken of it. It is an affidavit by Dr.
Glasebock, former leader of the Front of German Conservative Catholics.
Witness, on 14 March 1937 Pope Pius XI expressed his burning anxiety in
an Encyclical and solemnly protested against the interpretation and the
violations of the Concordat. The Prosecution said that if you had been
serious in giving the assurances contained in the Concordat, you would
at that point have had to resign from your official post. What do you
say to that?
VON PAPEN: What could I have improved by resigning? Apart from the
Austrian affair, I no longer had any political influence at all on
Hitler; and my own conviction that in the critical time of 1937 there
was an urgent necessity for me to remain in Austria did not permit me to
leave my post there. We shall see that later from the developments.
Besides, if the Prosecution assumes that on account of the certainly
quite justified Encyclical of the Pope I should have left my post, then
I must ask what did the Church do? The Church did not recall the Papal
Nuncio from Berlin, and Bishop Berning did not leave the State Council
in which he represented Catholic interests. No doubt all this was quite
justified, because all of us at that time still hoped for inner changes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw attention to Document 48, Page 133. The document
has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-356; it is on Page 133 in my
document book. It is the speech of Pope Pius XII on 2 June 1945. I
quote:
“It must, nevertheless, be recognized that the Concordat, in the
years that followed, brought some advantages, or at least
prevented worse evils. In fact, despite all the violations to
which it was subjected, it gave Catholics a juridical basis for
their defense, a stronghold behind which they could shield
themselves in their opposition—as long as this was possible—to
the ever-growing campaign of religious persecution.”
A practical effect of the Concordat is shown in Document 49, on Page 134
of my document book. It has already been presented as Exhibit USA-685.
It is a letter from the Deputy of the Führer to the Reich Minister of
Education and deals with the dissolution of the theological faculties of
the universities. I quote the last paragraph of that letter:
“In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter,
the directives of the Concordat and the Church treaties are to
be taken into consideration. In the case of those faculties
which are not mentioned by a specific directive in the Concordat
and the Church treaties, as for example, Munich and a few
others, the dissolution may begin at once. This is equally true
of the theological faculties in Austria: Vienna and Graz.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] During the following years public
discussion of questions regarding Church policy was almost entirely
suppressed, since the Catholic press and, in violation of the Concordat,
even Catholic Church papers were to a large extent banned. What did you
do against this?
VON PAPEN: It appeared to me necessary, since the Catholic press had
been completely muzzled, to do something to continue public discussion
of the struggle against tendencies inimical to the Church. I very often
talked about this question with Bishop Hudal, an outstanding churchman
in Rome, whose book written in 1936 will be submitted to the Tribunal by
my counsel. This book contains my severe criticism of the antireligious
tendencies and contains also an objective appreciation of the positive
social ideas of National Socialism; it is all the more notable because a
high authority of the Church was then, in 1936, making yet another
attempt to create a synthesis between Christian ideas and the healthy
doctrines of National Socialism.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In what way do you consider the book of importance with
regard to the charge brought by the Prosecution?
VON PAPEN: I consider it to be relevant for the following reason: The
Prosecution makes its task very easy: In view of the criminal end of
National Socialism, it shifts all blame to the initial years of
development and brands as criminals all those who, out of pure motives,
attempted to give the Movement a constructive and creative character.
But here in this book of 1936 a churchman of high rank lifts his voice
in an attempt, made on his own initiative, to bring about an improvement
of conditions. Today we know that all such attempts failed and that a
world crumbled in ruins. But is it right, on that account, to accuse
millions of people of crimes because they tried to attain something good
in those days?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to extracts from Bishop Hudal’s book, contained
in Document 36, Page 116, and ask that judicial notice be taken of that
document. With reference to the subject which the witness has just
mentioned, the attitude of high-ranking churchmen to the question of a
possible synthesis of ideas, I refer to Document Number 50, Page 135,
which is an appeal made by Cardinal Innitzer on behalf and at the
request of the Austrian bishops.
Witness, as you have said, Bishop Hudal aimed at a change in Hitler’s
ways along the lines proposed in his book. What was Hitler’s reaction to
the book?
VON PAPEN: At first Hitler was, I thought, very much impressed by this
book; but then the anti-Christian forces among his advisers gained the
upper hand once more and convinced him that it would be dangerous in the
extreme to allow such a book to appear in Germany. The book had been
printed in Austria, and therefore a permit for its publication in
Germany was required. All I could obtain was permission to print 2,000
copies, which Hitler wanted to distribute among leading Party members
for a study of the problem.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you think that the foreign policy of the Reich was
being pursued on the principles laid down when the Government was
formed?
VON PAPEN: Yes. While I was a member of the Cabinet it was certainly
conducted on the agreed principles. I might mention the Pact of
Friendship with Poland, which was concluded at that time and which was
an important step towards peace. Hitler concluded this treaty although,
on account of the problem of the Corridor, it was most unpopular. I
might also mention the Four Power Pact concluded in the summer of 1933,
which affirmed the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. I mention also
the visit in January 1934 of Mr. Eden, to whom we submitted proposals
for the demilitarization of the SA and the SS. Thus we tried to remove
the discriminations against Germany by peaceful means. In my opinion,
the great powers made a disastrous mistake by not showing understanding
and assisting Germany during that phase and thus checking radical
tendencies.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 14 October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament
Conference. Was this a departure from the previous policy which you have
just discussed?
VON PAPEN: The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference was not in any
way intended to be a departure from our political principles, but it
took place because the equality of which we had been definitely assured
on 11 December 1932 was then revoked.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, would you tell me, is the defendant saying
that the principles adopted in 1933 were contained in any document or
not?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The proclamation of the Reich Government of 1 February
1933 contains the principles of the policy of the new Cabinet. These
principles are supplemented in the statement of the Reich Government
dated 23 March 1933, a statement which deals with the Enabling Act.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give me the reference to the first document
that you mentioned?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall give it to you after the recess, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were the reasons for, and what was
the attitude regarding Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations?
VON PAPEN: The withdrawal from the League of Nations was a question on
which there could be many differences of opinion. I myself was in favor
of remaining in the League of Nations; and I remember that on the day
before Hitler decided on this step, I myself traveled to Munich in an
effort to persuade him to remain a member of the League. I was of the
opinion that we would have gained much by remaining in the League, where
we had many good connections dating even from the time of Stresemann.
Nevertheless, if we left the League it was perhaps a tactical question
insofar as we might then hope that direct negotiations with the major
powers would be more promising. Besides, Herr Von Neurath’s discussion
with Ambassador Bullitt, which is Document L-150, shows—Herr Von
Neurath says in that document that Germany had proposed a reorganized
League of Nations, which she would rejoin.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Lersner’s interrogatory, Document 93. In
question Number 5, the witness speaks of Von Papen’s journey to Munich;
this is Page 213, Document 93.
Mr. President, I come now to a rather more lengthy question; may I ask
therefore whether this would be a suitable moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before the recess, I was questioned about the documents
on the Governmental Proclamations of 1 March 1933 and of 23 March 1933.
Excerpts from the Governmental Proclamation of 1 March 1933 are
contained in Document Papen-12, Page 53. This is only a short extract. I
shall submit the proclamation in its entirety later.
The Proclamation of 23 March 1933, in Document Papen-12, Pages 56 to 58,
has also been submitted in extract form. This proclamation has already
been submitted in full under USA-568.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 2 November 1933, in a speech in Essen,
you stated your opinion in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite on
the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and you approved the
Government’s policy. The Prosecution has drawn conclusions from this
speech which are unfavorable to you.
What reasons caused you to make that speech at that time?
VON PAPEN: Our withdrawal from the League of Nations was an
exceptionally important decision of foreign policy. We wished to
emphasize to the world that this withdrawal was not to be construed as a
change in our methods of foreign policy. Therefore, Hindenburg and
Hitler in free appeals emphasized that the German people should decide
by means of a plebiscite the question of whether a withdrawal from the
League of Nations would be in the exclusive interests of peace and our
equality of rights.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Papen-60, Page 167,
and Documents Papen-61 and Papen-62, on Pages 147 to 152 of the document
book. These are the statements made by Hitler, by the Reich Government,
and by Hindenburg. The purport of all these proclamations: Only a change
in method, not a change in our attitude toward affairs.
[_Turning to the defendant._] At that time you were Reich Commissioner
for the return of the Saar. What policy did you follow in connection
with the Saar question?
VON PAPEN: As far as the Saar question was concerned, I always worked on
the basis of a friendly understanding with France, and with a view to
finding a solution for the Saar problem without recourse to a
plebiscite. Our reasons for not wanting this plebiscite were not in any
way selfish, for the plebiscite was at all times certain to be in favor
of Germany. My proposal was rather a sacrifice willingly made in the
interest of understanding, and at the same time I proposed that France
should receive compensation to the amount of 900 million francs for the
return of the Saar mines. And I should like to repeat that even after
our withdrawal from the League of Nations, my commissioner for Saar
questions, Freiherr von Lersner, always negotiated with the League of
Nations organs about the Saar on the principle of a friendly settlement
of the Saar. In the summer of 1934 my commissioner negotiated with the
French Foreign Minister M. Barthou on this question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Papen-59, Page 145.
This document contains the published comments of the witness with regard
to the Saar problem. Freiherr von Lersner in his interrogatory (Document
Papen-93, Page 212) in reply to Question 3 defined his attitude on this
question of the Saar.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Were there any signs that after leaving
the League of Nations this generally peaceful policy was just a policy
of expediency and that a policy of aggression was planned for the more
remote future?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. Leaving the League of Nations was for us simply a
change in method. And at that time we were conducting direct
negotiations with the major powers. The fact that we were pursuing a
policy of peace was something I emphasized in many public statements.
And in this connection I should like to refer to Document Papen-56,
which will be submitted by my counsel.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document Papen-56, Page 44, contains a speech made by the
witness at Kottbus on 21 January 1934. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of this document.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know of any rearmament measure
which might have led to the expectation of an aggressive policy in the
future?
VON PAPEN: It seems to me that the proceedings so far conducted before
this Tribunal have shown clearly that the actual rearmament did not
begin until much later. If Hitler, in fact, did take steps to rearm in
1933 or 1934, then he discussed these measures personally with the
Defense Minister and the Air Minister. In any event I was never
concerned with such measures. Apart from that, it has already been
ascertained here that this much-talked-of Reich Defense Committee in
1933 and 1934 was purely a committee of experts under the direction of a
lieutenant colonel.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A short time ago you mentioned the safeguards adopted
when the Hitler Government was formed, in order to minimize the
influence of the Party. How did Hitler’s position and the influence of
the NSDAP develop in the course of the year 1933 and at the beginning of
1934?
VON PAPEN: A confidential relationship gradually developed between
Hitler and Hindenburg.
This led in the end to the joint report which was agreed upon at that
time. The influence exerted by Hitler on Reichswehrminister Blomberg was
a very decisive factor in this development. Even at that time, in 1933,
Hitler tried to exert a decisive influence on the Army. He wanted to
have the then General Von Hammerstein removed and replaced by General
Von Reichenau, who at that time passed for a friend of the Party. At
that time I persuaded the Reich President not to grant Hitler’s wish in
this connection and advised him to take General Von Fritsch. Another
reason for this development was the integration of the “Stahlhelm,” that
is, a rightist conservative group, into the SA of the NSDAP. Then there
were new cabinet members who were selected from the Party. Hugenberg,
the leader of the conservative Right, left the Cabinet, and the two
important ministries which he filled, the Ministries of Economy and
Agriculture, were occupied by National Socialists. A decisive
psychological factor, as I have already mentioned, was the election
result of 5 March, for the governments of all the Länder had National
Socialist majorities, and these local governments exerted constant
pressure on Hitler. Hitler drew his support now from Party dynamics and
thus changed in an ever-increasing degree from a coalition partner ready
for compromise into an autocrat who knew no compromise.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to the affidavit of the former
Minister Hugenberg, Document Number Papen-88, Pages 196 to 198 in the
document book. I should further like to refer to Document Papen-13,
Pages 59 to 61 in the document book, an affidavit by Dr. Conrad Josten.
On what was your position as Vice Chancellor based?
VON PAPEN: As Vice Chancellor it was intended that I should be the Reich
Chancellor’s deputy, but without a department of my own. It very soon
became apparent that the position of deputy was quite impossible, as
Hitler dealt with every question himself. The fact that I had no
department of my own weakened my position, for this position was now
based upon nothing but the confidence of Hindenburg, a confidence which
decreased proportionately with the growth of Hitler’s importance.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the constitutional basis of Hitler’s position in
the Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: The position of the Reich Chancellor in the Cabinet is
constitutionally provided for in Article 56 of the Constitution of the
Reich. This article says: “The Reich Chancellor will lay down the
general principles of policy and will be responsible for them to the
Reichstag.” If the policy of a department minister is not in accordance
with these principles laid down by the Reich Chancellor, no decision
will be made by the Cabinet on a majority ruling, but the Reich
Chancellor alone will decide the point in question. And under Article 58
of the Constitution, it says: “The Reich Chancellor cannot be outvoted
by the Cabinet in cases where his policy is opposed.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, which has so far been
incorrectly submitted in the evidence taken, I should like to refer to
the leading commentary on the Weimar Constitution by Gerhard Anschütz,
Document Papen-22, Pages 80 and 81 of the document book.
I should like to refer to Page 81, Note 4 to Article 56. This note
states clearly that if differences of opinion should arise as to the
application of the basic principles of the policy, the Reich Chancellor
alone will decide, and that in these basic problems no vote will be
taken and no majority decision made.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What conclusions did you think had to be
drawn from this development of affairs?
VON PAPEN: In the middle of the year 1934 the internal tension in
Germany grew more and more serious. The situation was such that the
concessions which we as partners of the coalition had made did not lead
to any definite internal agreements but were considered by the Party as
being only the beginning of a new revolutionary movement. This was quite
obviously a divergence from the Coalition Pact concluded on 30 January.
The many objections which I made in the Cabinet were without success.
Then, since there was no possibility in the Cabinet of forcing the Reich
Chancellor to change his policy, as we have just shown from the
Constitution, the only possibilities left were a resignation or a public
statement. If I resigned, I should no longer be in a position to speak.
Therefore, I decided to speak at once, and publicly, and I decided to
appeal on principle in this matter to the German people. If, as the
Prosecution asserts, I had been an opportunist, I would have kept silent
and remained in office, or I would have accepted another office. But now
I decided to put my case before the public and to shoulder all the
consequences that might follow.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 17 June 1934 you made that speech at Marburg. What did
you expect to accomplish with this speech?
VON PAPEN: In this speech I brought up for discussion and put up to
Hitler for decision all those points which were essential for the
maintenance of a reasonable policy in Germany. In this speech I opposed
the demand of a certain group or party for a revolutionary or national
monopoly. I opposed the coercion and abuse of others. I opposed
anti-Christian endeavors and totalitarian encroachment on religious
domain. I opposed the suppression of all criticism. I opposed the abuse
and regimentation of the spirit. I opposed violation of fundamental
rights and inequality before the law, and I also opposed the Byzantine
principles followed by the Party. It was clear to me that if I succeeded
in penetrating, even at one point only, the circle of Nazi ideology, we
could force the system into order and restore, for instance, freedom of
thought and speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech may be found in Document Papen-11, Page 40.
The Prosecution has already stressed its significance. First of all, I
may say that the English text contains a misprint. The date is not 7
July, as appears in the translation, but 17 June. Because of the basic
significance of this speech, the critical nature of which is unique in
German history since 1933, I am going to read a few passages from it.
I am starting at Page 41, about the middle of the page:
“We know that rumors and whispering propaganda must be brought
out from the darkness where they have taken refuge. Frank and
manly discussion is better for the German people than, for
instance, a press without an outlet, described by the Minister
for Propaganda ‘as no longer having a face.’ This deficiency
undoubtedly exists. The function of the press should be to
inform the Government where deficiencies have crept in, where
corruption has settled down, where grave mistakes have been
committed, where incapable men are in the wrong places, where
offenses are committed against the spirit of the German
revolution. An anonymous or secret information service, however
well organized it may be, can never be a substitute for this
task of the press. For the newspaper editor is responsible to
the law and to his conscience, whereas anonymous news sources
are not subject to control and are exposed to the danger of
Byzantinism. When, therefore, the proper organs of public
opinion do not shed sufficient light into the mysterious
darkness, which at present seems to have fallen upon the German
public, the statesman himself must intervene and call matters by
their right names.”
Then on Page 42, just below the middle of the page:
“It is a matter of historical truth that the necessity for a
fundamental change of course was recognized and urged even by
those who shunned the path of revolution through a mass-party. A
claim for revolutionary or nationalist monopoly by a certain
group, therefore, seems to be exaggerated, quite apart from the
fact that it disturbs the community.”
And now Page 43, a sentence from approximately the middle of the page:
“All of life cannot be organized; otherwise it becomes
mechanized. The State is organization; life is growth.”
And on Page 45, just a little beyond the center of the page:
“Domination by a single party replacing the majority party
system, which rightly has disappeared, appears to me
historically as a transitional stage, justified only as long as
the safeguarding of the new political change demands it and
until the new process of personal selection begins to function.”
As to the religious question, the witness states his view on Page 46,
near the middle of the page:
“But one should not confuse the religious State, which is based
upon an active belief in God, with a secular State in which
earthly values replace such belief and are embellished with
religious honors.”
Then, about five lines following:
“Certainly the outward respect for religious belief is an
improvement on the disrespectful attitude produced by a
degenerate rationalism. But we should not forget that real
religion is a link with God, and not substitutes such as have
been introduced into the consciousness of nations especially by
Karl Marx’s materialistic conception of history. If wide circles
of people, from this same viewpoint of the totalitarian State
and the complete amalgamation of the nation, demand a uniform
religious foundation, they should not forget that we should be
happy to have such a foundation in the Christian faith.”
Then, the third line from the end on this page:
“It is my conviction that the Christian doctrine clearly
represents the religious form of all occidental thinking and
that with the reawakening of religious forces the German people
also will be permeated anew by the Christian spirit, a spirit
the profundity of which is almost forgotten by a humanity that
has lived through the nineteenth century. A struggle is
approaching the decision as to whether the new Reich of the
Germans will be Christian or is to be lost in sectarianism and
half-religious materialism.”
Then, on Page 48, just a little beyond the center of the page:
“But once a revolution has been completed, the Government only
represents the people as a whole and is never the champion of
individual groups.”
Then, a little further down, about 10 lines from the bottom:
“It is not permissible, therefore, to dismiss the intellect with
the catchword of ‘intellectualism.’ Deficient or primitive
intellects do not justify us in waging war against
intellectualism. And when we complain frequently today about
those of us who are 150 percent Nazis, then we mean those
intellectuals without a foundation, people who would like to
deny the right of existence to scientists of world fame just
because they are not Party members.”
Then, on the first line of the next page—Page 49—it says:
“Nor should the objection be made that intellectuals lack the
vitality necessary for the leaders of a people. True spirit is
so vital that it sacrifices itself for its conviction. The
mistaking of brutality for vitality would reveal a worship of
force which would be dangerous to a people.”
In the next paragraph he speaks of equality before the law. I read the
last few lines:
“They oppose equality before the law, which they criticize as
liberal degeneration, whereas in reality it is the prerequisite
for any fair judgment. These people suppress that pillar of the
State which always—and not only in liberal times—was called
justice. Their attacks are directed against the security and
freedom of the private sphere of life which the German has won
in centuries of hardest struggle.”
In the next paragraph he speaks against Byzantinism; the second sentence
reads:
“Great men are not made by propaganda, but rather grow through
their deeds and are recognized by history. Even Byzantinism
cannot make us believe that these laws do not exist.”
He deals with education in the next paragraph, and I should like to
begin with the second sentence:
“But we must have no illusions regarding the biological and
psychological limits of education. Coercion, too, ends at the
will for self-expression of the true personality. Reactions to
coercion are dangerous. As an old soldier I know that the most
rigid discipline must be balanced by certain liberties. Even the
good soldier who submitted willingly to unconditional authority
counted his days of service, because the need for freedom is
rooted in human nature. The application of military discipline
to the whole life of a people must remain within limits
compatible with human nature.”
Then on the next page—Page 50—I should like to read the second
sentence of the last paragraph:
“The Movement must come to a standstill sometime; a solid social
structure must sometime come into existence which is held
together by an impartial administration of justice and by an
undisputed governmental power. Nothing can be achieved by means
of everlasting dynamics, Germany must not go adrift on uncharted
seas toward unknown shores.”
As my last quotation, I shall read the first paragraph on the following
page:
“The Government is well informed on all the self-interest, lack
of character, want of truth, unchivalrous conduct, and arrogance
trying to rear its head under cover of the German revolution. It
is also not deceived about the fact that the rich store of
confidence bestowed upon it by the German people is threatened.
If we want a close connection with and a close association among
the people, we must not underestimate the good sense of the
people; we must return their confidence and not try to hold them
everlastingly in bondage. The German people know that their
situation is serious, they feel the economic distress, they are
perfectly aware of the shortcoming of many laws born of
emergency; they have a keen feeling for violence and injustice;
they smile at clumsy attempts to deceive them by false optimism.
No organization and no propaganda, however good, will in the
long run be able to preserve confidence. I therefore viewed the
wave of propaganda against the so-called foolish critics from a
different angle than many others did. Confidence and readiness
to co-operate cannot be won by provocation, especially of youth,
nor by threats against helpless segments of the people, but only
by discussion with the people with trust on both sides. The
people know what great sacrifices are expected from them. They
will bear them and follow the Führer in unflinching loyalty, if
they are allowed to have their part in the planning and in the
work, if every word of criticism is not taken for ill-will, and
if despairing patriots are not branded as enemies of the State.”
Witness, what were the consequences of the Marburg speech?
VON PAPEN: This speech was banned at the instigation of Propaganda
Minister Goebbels. Only one or two papers were able to publish the
contents, but that sufficed to attract attention to it both at home and
abroad. When I heard of the ban placed on it by the Propaganda Minister,
I went to the Reich Chancellor and tendered my resignation. I told him:
“It is an impossible situation for the Vice Chancellor of your
Government to be forbidden to open his mouth. There is nothing to be
done but to take my leave.”
However, Hitler said: “That is a blunder on the part of the Propaganda
Minister; I shall speak to him and have him rescind this decree.”
In that way he stalled me along for several days. Today I know that even
at that time he lied to me because my Codefendant Funk had stated that
he was instructed by Hitler to go to Hindenburg and tell Hindenburg that
the Vice Chancellor had uttered sentiments contrary to the policy of the
Cabinet and of Hitler, and must be dismissed. If the witness Gisevius
testified here to the effect that Herr Von Papen was silent and that he
should at least have mobilized the diplomats then I should like to point
out that Mr. Dodd’s diary makes it very evident that the world—the
outside world—was well informed of this last appeal of mine.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to the last remark made by the
witness, which may be found in Document Papen-17, Pages 71 and 72, in
Ambassador Dodd’s diary.
I beg your pardon, it is on Pages 69 and 70 of the English text. I quote
from the second paragraph, the first line:
“There is great excitement everywhere in Germany.”
He had previously mentioned the Marburg speech.
“All the older and more educated Germans are highly delighted.”
Then, under the date of 21 June, he reports that the speech was cabled
to _The New York Times_, that the papers in London and Paris were
featuring the “Von Papen episode,” as he calls the Marburg speech. I
refer in this connection to the beginning of Page 72, in the English
text on Page 70.
As regards the Government’s measures against the Marburg speech and its
propagation, I want to refer you to Document Papen-15, Page 66, an
affidavit by Westphalen, which shows that even possession of a copy of
the speech was sufficient to cause disciplinary action to be taken
against an official.
Witness, the events of 30 June 1934 took place in the meantime. To what
extent did these incidents affect you personally?
VON PAPEN: On the morning of 30 June, I received a telephone call from
Minister Göring, asking me to come to have a talk with him. I went to
see Göring; he told me that a revolution had broken out in the Reich—an
SA revolution—that Hitler was in Munich to put down this uprising
there, and that he, Göring, was charged with restoring law and order in
Berlin. Herr Göring asked me, in the interests of my own safety, as he
said, to return to my apartment and stay there. I protested quite
vehemently against this demand, but Herr Göring insisted. On my way back
to my apartment, I went first to my office in the Vice Chancellery. On
arriving there, I found my office occupied by the SS, and I was
permitted only to enter my own room and get my files. I went on home to
my apartment, where I found a large number of SS. The telephone was
disconnected; the radio was disconnected; and I was completely cut off
from the outside world for 3 whole days.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What measures were taken against your staff?
VON PAPEN: I naturally did not hear about the measures taken against my
staff until 3 July, after I had regained my freedom. I learned that my
press adviser, Herr Von Bose, had been shot in his office. I further
learned that two of my male secretaries, Herr Von Tschirschsky and
another gentleman, had been taken to a concentration camp and a few days
later, I learned of the death of my friend and colleague—a private
colleague of mine—Herr Edgar Jung.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you try to inform the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: I finally succeeded, on the third day of my arrest, in
contacting Göring by telephone. I demanded to be set free at once. Herr
Göring apologized and said that it was only a mistake that I had been
kept under arrest for this long period of time. I then went immediately
to the Reich Chancellery. There I met Hitler, who was about to start a
Cabinet session. I asked him to step into the next room so that I could
speak to him and I refused to comply with his request that I should
attend the Cabinet meeting. I said to him: “What has happened here to a
member of your government is so incredible and fantastic that there is
only one answer for me to give: A repetition of my request to
resign—and at once.”
Herr Hitler tried to persuade me to remain. He said: “I will explain to
you in the Cabinet and later in the Reichstag how everything happened,
and why it happened.”
I said to him: “Herr Hitler, there is no explanation and no excuse for
this incident; I demand that the fate of these members of my staff be
made the subject of immediate investigation and the facts be cleared
up.” I demanded that he publish my resignation immediately.
When he saw that I could not be persuaded to remain, Herr Hitler told me
that he could not make my resignation public because the agitation among
the German people was too great. He said that he could not make my
resignation public for some 3 or 4 weeks.
When I left Hitler, I tried personally and through one of my secretaries
to get in touch with Hindenburg, but that attempt failed. My secretary
found out—I must add that Herr Von Hindenburg was then in Neudeck in
East Prussia—my secretary, who had gone to East Prussia, found that it
was impossible to reach Hindenburg. He was completely cut off. My own
telephone calls did not get through.
I went to my friend General Von Fritsch, the Chief of the Armed Forces,
and said to him: “Why don’t the Armed Forces intervene? The Armed Forces
are the only means for maintaining order that we still have in the
country. When General Von Schleicher and his wife were murdered, as well
as other officers, it would in my opinion have been quite proper for the
Wehrmacht itself to try to restore order in this situation.”
Herr Von Fritsch said to me: “I can take action only when I have Field
Marshal Von Hindenburg’s order in my hands.”
But Hindenburg was not accessible to us. He had obviously been informed
by the other side of the complete legality of the events which had taken
place, and which Hitler declared in the Reichstag to be in conformity
with the law. I did not attend that session of the Reichstag, either, as
the witness Gisevius testified; and during the time that elapsed between
30 June and my appointment to Austria, I did not participate in a single
act carried out by the Government.
I should like to add that at the same time I asked the Reich Chancellor
to hand over to me the body of my friend Bose. We knew that the Gestapo
had cremated the bodies of the others. I succeeded
THE PRESIDENT: I believe it would be a good time to recess now.
[_A recess was taken._]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is not present
in this session.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you please go on. You were just answering the last
question.
VON PAPEN: I was only going to finish the question by saying that I
succeeded in having the mortal remains of my friend Bose properly buried
and that on that occasion, at his grave, I made a speech emphasizing
that one day this injustice would be avenged.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I draw your attention to Document
Number Papen-14, Pages 62 and 63, an affidavit by Maria Rose, who for
years was the private secretary of the witness. On Page 63 she refers to
Bose’s funeral service which we have just discussed.
I further refer to Document Number Papen-19, Pages 77 and 78, an
affidavit by Schaffgotsch who devotes particular attention to the
witness’ vain attempts to reach Hindenburg in Neudeck. This was Document
Number 19, Pages 77 and 78.
Witness, you were offered a Vatican post at that time—a post as
Ambassador to the Vatican. Will you please tell us the exact
circumstances?
VON PAPEN: It is true that Hitler tried to keep me attached to his
staff, and that about a week after the incidents I have described he
sent State Secretary Lammers to ask me if I was prepared to accept the
post of Ambassador to the Vatican. Of course, I refused this
unreasonable request, which I mention here only because a few weeks
later I accepted the Vienna post for an entirely different reason, and
to prove that I was not interested in obtaining a post as such. I
refused this request of Hitler’s most bluntly at the time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Document Number Papen-18, Pages 75 and 76
of the document book; an affidavit by Martha von Papen, the wife of the
witness, who describes Lammers’ visit.
With regard to the subject with which the witness has been dealing,
namely, nonparticipation in the Reichstag meeting of 13 July, I refer to
Document Number Papen-21, Page 79, an extract from the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ regarding the Reichstag meeting.
The names of the ministers present are listed there. The name of the
witness Von Papen does not appear.
[_Turning to the witness._] When did Hitler approach you on the subject
of going to Vienna as Ambassador Extraordinary?
VON PAPEN: It was on the day of the murder of Dollfuss, 25 July 1934...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you remind me, Dr. Kubuschok, whether any question
was put to the witness Lammers about this offer?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, a question was put to the witness Lammers. The
witness Lammers was asked about it when he was examined.
THE PRESIDENT: What did he say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He said that Papen had refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON PAPEN: On 25 July, the day of the murder of Dollfuss, Hitler rang me
up in the middle of the night, and asked me to go to Vienna at once as
his Ambassador. I asked: “What gave you this odd idea?” He informed me
of Dollfuss’ murder, of which I had not yet heard, and said: “It is
absolutely essential that someone who knows the conditions there should
take over affairs at once.” I replied that I could not possibly give my
decision on such a step over the telephone, whereupon he asked me to
come to Bayreuth at once to discuss it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: How did these negotiations in Bayreuth turn out? Did you
state your own terms for accepting the appointment?
VON PAPEN: In the discussion in Bayreuth, Hitler put it to me that I was
the only available person who could re-establish a favorable situation
in Austria, because, of course, Hitler knew my attitude toward that
problem from the numerous protests I had raised in the Cabinet against
Austria’s treatment. He also knew that I had been a friend of the
murdered Dr. Dollfuss and that I knew Herr Von Schuschnigg. I stated my
conditions and these conditions were: The immediate recall of the Party
Gauleiter, Herr Habicht, who was in Austria by Hitler’s order. Hitler
was of the opinion that if he did this it would amount to an admission
of guilt.
THE PRESIDENT: Gauleiter of where?
VON PAPEN: Habicht?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said that was his name. I wanted to know
what Gau he was the Gauleiter of.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps “Gauleiter” is the wrong word. He had been sent to
Austria by Hitler as a liaison man, to exert influence on the affairs of
the Austrian National Socialists.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, perhaps you ought to point out that his title
was “Landesleiter,” which probably corresponds to the title “Gauleiter”
in Germany.
VON PAPEN: He was Landesleiter, which was the title given to people who
directed the Party organization abroad. Hitler replied that if he
recalled this man, it would look like a confession of complicity in the
Dollfuss murder. I replied that the whole world was in any case
convinced of the complicity of the Party in Germany or its
organizations, generally speaking; and that as far as I was concerned,
it was only important that those connections should be broken off
forthwith. I further demanded an assurance in writing from Hitler that
the German-Austrian policy of the future—what is generally termed the
Anschluss policy—would move on a purely evolutionary level, that is to
say, that no recourse would be had to forcible measures, and aggression.
Hitler immediately ordered this man Habicht to be recalled and gave me a
written assurance with reference to the second question. And finally, I
said that I was prepared to take over the pacification program in
Austria, but only until normal and friendly relations had been
re-established. This meant that later on in Austria I had the additional
title of “Ambassador on a Special Mission.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, we have heard of your political break with
Hitler after the speech at Marburg, your resignation from the Cabinet
and your treatment on 30 June. I should now like you to give us your
reasons for accepting that post in Austria in spite of the events
already described.
VON PAPEN: My decision to go to Austria has been made the subject of a
special charge by the Prosecution. In order to understand this decision
of mine you must be acquainted with German history and you must know
that the Austrian problem was the central problem of German policy
generally. As Dr. Seyss-Inquart has discussed this problem at length, I
can dismiss it quite briefly; and I need only add that the achievement
of German unity, for which we had fought for three centuries, was
considered by Germany herself to be the most significant and important
aim of our national policy. The events of 30 June had brought about the
collapse of the coalition which I had formed on 30 January. It had been
historically established that I had failed to achieve my intentions and
aims in home policy. After the Dollfuss murder, the danger existed that
Germany would now suffer bankruptcy also in her one great foreign
political aim of the desired unity. All this was in my mind when I
weighed the very serious decision as to whether I should accede to
Hitler’s request. If he put a Party man in that post, then obviously all
hope would be lost. If he appointed a diplomat from the Foreign Office,
it could be assumed that that official would have no personal influence
on Hitler. Therefore, if the situation was to be saved, it would have to
be someone who was at least in a position to influence Hitler and
moreover someone who, like myself, was independent and had his own
political line. Today, just as at that time, I am fully aware that many
of my friends did not understand the step I took and that they
interpreted it as lack of character. But I hold the view that this is a
question which the individual has to settle with his conscience, without
regard to understanding or the lack of it; and my conscience told me
that I must do everything to restore order in this one question at
least.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to the subject of Austria generally, I
call your attention mainly to the documentary material which has been
submitted in the previous case. To supplement this, I will only refer to
Document Number Papen-64, Page 157, Document Number Papen-65, Page 158
and Document Number Papen-81, Page 178. This last document has already
been presented in connection with the case of Seyss-Inquart. It refers
to the views held by State Chancellor Dr. Renner on the Anschluss
question. I should like only to quote the last four lines on Page 179:
“As a Social Democrat, and therefore as a champion of the right
of self-determination of nations, as first Chancellor of the
Austro-German Republic and former president of its peace
delegations to St. Germain, I shall vote in the affirmative.”
I have produced the document at this particular point in order to
support the testimony of the defendant, who considered the Austro-German
question from both points of view as a fateful problem; and the fact
that this leading statesman, Dr. Renner, also placed in a difficult
situation, expressed himself as in favor of Austro-German friendship is
best shown here.
Witness, on 26 July Hitler wrote a letter to you confirming your
appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna. That letter has been
mentioned by the Prosecution. What is the explanation of the contents of
that letter?
VON PAPEN: The contents of that letter can be explained very easily. If
I was to have a chance of re-establishing normal and friendly relations,
if I was to have a chance of creating a proper position for myself in
relation to the Austrian Government, then after the events of 30 July a
public statement of confidence had to be made. In that letter Hitler was
to certify that my mission was one of pacification, and that he intended
to disavow his terrorist methods. That is stated in the letter. And I
find the Prosecution’s statement that this letter was a “masterpiece of
deceit” quite impossible to understand.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith, in his affidavit, 2385-PS, alleges that
you pursued from Vienna a policy of aggression towards the states of
southeastern Europe and quotes as your personal verbatim statement, made
on the occasion of the return visit he paid to you, the following:
“....southeast Europe as far as Turkey constitutes the German
hinterland; and I have been assigned to carry out the task of
incorporating it into the Reich. Austria is the first country on
this program.”
Did you make any such statement?
VON PAPEN: I took up my position in Vienna in the autumn of 1934; and
one of the first colleagues whom I saw was Mr. Messersmith. I never
received an assignment to pursue a policy such as Mr. Messersmith
describes in his affidavit; and I never made any such statement to Mr.
Messersmith.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I refer to Horthy’s interrogatory,
Document Number Papen-76, Pages 172 and 173.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, before you turned to the Messersmith
affidavit, you were speaking, or the defendant was speaking, of some
letter. Is that letter a document which is before us?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the Prosecution have already presented that letter.
It is the letter written on the occasion of the defendant’s appointment.
It is Number 2799-PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, if Your Lordship has the British Document Book Number 11, it is
Page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness has just dealt with the statement in the
Messersmith affidavit, 2385-PS. The same question, namely the return
visit paid to Papen by Mr. Messersmith, is treated in a further
affidavit by Messersmith, 1760-PS.
I should like to point out that the wording of the statement referring
to the influence of Germany on the states of southeast Europe differs
considerably in Messersmith’s two affidavits.
As I have already indicated in my previous question, Mr. Messersmith
says in 2385-PS that Papen said that he had been assigned to carry out
the task of incorporating southeast Europe into the Reich. In contrast
to that, the statement is worded very differently in 1760-PS. There Mr.
Messersmith states that Papen said on that occasion that he had been
ordered to see to it that the whole of southeast Europe, up to the
Turkish border, should be regarded as Germany’s natural hinterland, and
that German economic control over that entire area should be facilitated
by his work; thus, in one affidavit, incorporation is mentioned and in
the other the facilitation of economic control.
In connection with this latter much less strongly-worded affidavit
1760-PS, I ask the witness whether he did at that time make such a
statement, namely, that the whole of southeastern Europe as far as the
Turkish border was Germany’s natural hinterland and that he had been
called upon to facilitate German economic control throughout the entire
area on Germany’s behalf.
Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: The actual remark I made to Mr. Messersmith is perhaps...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: [_Interposing._] My Lord, I don’t know whether
it would be useful for the Tribunal to have the two references, the two
passages. The passage in 2385-PS Your Lordships will find in Document
Book 11a, that is, the second document book, at Page 24 at the bottom of
the page. The reference in 1760-PS is in Document Book 11, Page 22,
about one-third down the page, and then it goes on to the next third of
the page.
VON PAPEN: My actual remark to Mr. Messersmith is perhaps not quite so
far from my defense counsel’s last quotation as the difference between
Mr. Messersmith’s two statements would seem to indicate. It is perfectly
possible that we discussed the question of southeast Europe and I can
well imagine pointing out to him that the economic and political
questions of the southeastern area were of great importance not only for
Germany’s policy, but also for Austria; for the expansion of our trade
toward the Balkans was a perfectly legitimate aim. I kept Berlin
informed of everything that I learned in Vienna regarding the policy of
the countries of the southeastern area because naturally that was one of
the functions of the Ambassador to Vienna. But except for that I did
nothing in the whole course of my work in Vienna which tallies in any
way with what Mr. Messersmith alleges here.
Apart from that, may I say that it would be extremely foolish and
contrary to the most elementary rules of diplomacy if I had made such a
disclosure to an unknown ambassador in the course of my first conference
with him. That would have made a sensation and would certainly have come
to the ears of the Austrian Government and the whole world the next day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On this point, I refer to Prince Erbach’s interrogatory,
Document Papen-96, Page 238, Questions 8 and 9, which deal with this
subject. Page 232 of the English text.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps, My Lord, I might add that the Prosecution are in
possession of all my reports from the Vienna period, and that these
reports are bound to show whether I was pursuing such an objective.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you ever, during your time in Vienna, negotiate with
Hungary and Poland about a division of Czechoslovakia? Mr. Messersmith
makes such a statement.
VON PAPEN: No, I never did. The policy of the Reich in Czechoslovakia
was the exclusive responsibility of our Legation in Prague.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the Horthy interrogatory already presented as
Document Papen-76. I also refer to Document Papen-68, Page 162, a report
from Papen to Hitler, dated 31 August 1935.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Mr. Messersmith asserts in the affidavit
mentioned that you stated during this conference that you were in
Austria for the purpose of undermining and weakening the Austrian
Government. Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: May I make a general statement with reference to this
affidavit. If I may express myself in diplomatic terms, I must describe
it as in the highest degree astonishing. In this affidavit, Mr.
Messersmith himself relates that on the occasion of my first visit he
received me icily. That is perfectly correct. I was quite well aware
that Mr. Messersmith was the keenest opponent of the Nazi system. It is
therefore all the more astonishing to read here that during the second
visit I opened my heart, so to speak, to Mr. Messersmith; the passage
quoted here—that I came to undermine and weaken the Austrian
Government—is, of course, not true either, because such a statement
would naturally have been communicated to the Austrian Government by Mr.
Messersmith at once, and would have rendered all my work of pacification
and my position generally impossible from the outset. May I refer in
this connection to the statement made by the Austrian Foreign Minister
Schmidt, to whom such activities on my part were entirely unknown.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer in this connection also to Glaise-Horstenau’s
deposition in the case of Seyss-Inquart. Mr. Messersmith further alleges
that you said to him during the discussion that you were trading on your
reputation as a good Catholic with, among others, certain Austrians like
Cardinal Innitzer. Further on in his affidavit he even asserts that you
used your wife’s reputation as a fervent and devout Catholic for this
purpose, without scruples or qualms of conscience. Will you kindly state
your views on this assertion of Mr. Messersmith’s.
VON PAPEN: I think that of all the accusations raised against me, this
is the most mortifying. I can understand that the policy pursued by a
diplomat may be criticized and misinterpreted, but I cannot understand
why anyone should be accused of misusing his own religious convictions
for dirty, political, commercial purposes; I can understand even
less—and find it the height of bad taste—that anyone should say that I
even used the religious convictions of my wife for such purposes.
Perhaps I can leave this to the judgment of this High Tribunal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith in his affidavit also refers to a
document whose author he does not, however, mention. This document is
alleged to have been shown him by Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg in
January 1935, and is said to reveal the substance of your conference
with Hitler, Schacht, and Von Neurath on the occasion of your visit to
Berlin. An agreement is alleged to have been made at that conference to
the effect that for the next 2 years intervention in the internal
political affairs of Austria was to be avoided. Finally Dr. Schacht is
said to have made available 200,000 marks monthly for support of the
National Socialists in Austria.
What do you say about Mr. Messersmith’s statement?
VON PAPEN: The details given by Mr. Messersmith show that this is
obviously an agent’s report received by the Austrian Foreign Minister on
my trip to Berlin. The contents of that report are largely incorrect.
The inaccuracy of the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been
shown by Dr. Schacht’s testimony. But in that report there is something
which is true. At that time there was a so-called relief fund in
Austria, which was managed by a certain Herr Langot.
It has already been testified here in the witness box that this relief
measure, which was intended to benefit wives and children of Austrian
National Socialists who had emigrated to Germany, existed with the
knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I neither requested
Herr Schacht to make available official funds for this relief fund, nor
did I myself pay out such money. Obviously this money originated from
Party sources in Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to the testimony of
Glaise-Horstenau, who stated here that the Austrian Government knew of
the Langot relief fund.
Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the
Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, he can reproduce the
following statement made by you at the beginning of 1935: “Yes, now you
have your French and English friends, and you can maintain your
independence a little longer.”
Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: Such a statement would have been not only extremely foolish
from a diplomatic point of view, but actually impossible, because it
would certainly have put an end to all diplomatic activity. In no case
could the co-operation, which Mr. Messersmith states was carried on
successfully for years, or the political activity which he describes as
also having been carried on for years, have been reconciled with an open
admission of this kind to the effect that I wanted Austrian independence
to be of short duration only.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in this affidavit that you
had publicly stated you wished to get rid of certain members of the
Austrian Government, among them Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that
true?
VON PAPEN: The contrary is true. I never aimed at the removal of
Chancellor Schuschnigg; it was rather my aim to give him confidence in
my policy, in the policy of reconciliation. I know Herr Von Schuschnigg
as an upright Austrian patriot, but also as a man who was far from
wishing to deny his German ties, and in spite of many differences in
policy these German antecedents of his made an excellent basis for
collaboration. I can only ask in addition whether a diplomat who desires
a change to come about in the government to which he is accredited would
proclaim it from the roof tops.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution have submitted a report which you made to
Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, as proof of your desire to steer Schuschnigg
into a government including the National Socialists. This is Exhibit
USA-64, included again in my document book as Document Papen-66, on
Pages 159 and 160.
Witness, what were your intentions, actually?
VON PAPEN: I must be a little more explicit with reference to this
document. This report was written 8 months after the Dollfuss murder,
that is, within the first 2 years, during which period the Prosecution
themselves admit that I had instructions to remain entirely passive.
When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg, in
conjunction with Mussolini, was pursuing a policy which would have put
serious difficulties in the way of an understanding between Austria and
Germany. For this reason I suggested to Hitler a drastic intervention: I
proposed that Schuschnigg and the Christian Socialist elements, which
were hostile to a Heimwehr dictatorship, should be played off against
Starhemberg by the offer of a final agreement on German-Austrian
interests. This report states that if Germany were to recognize the
national independence of Austria and were to undertake to refrain from
influencing the National Opposition in Austria, by which I meant the
Nazis, a coalition between these factors would be bound to result. The
consequence would be that Germany would participate in the Danube
Agreement, which would be tantamount to a peaceful solution of the
entire European situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just explained that you were pursuing an honest
policy of balancing interests?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more
clearly what the defendant means, by what he just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the translation came over very
badly; the English translation is said to have come through very badly.
Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire
answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is
very unlikely that the English translation came over badly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you please repeat your answer but rather
more slowly so that the interpreters will have no difficulty?
VON PAPEN: When this report was written, we had news that
Starhemberg—Starhemberg was the chief of the Heimwehr—wanted to link
himself with Mussolini in a policy which would be hostile in future to
any Germanophile tendencies in Austria. In order to counter Prince
Starhemberg’s maneuver, I advised Hitler to suggest to Schuschnigg that,
instead of forming a coalition with the Heimwehr, he should do so with
the Christian Socialist elements, who were not opposed to a
reconciliation of Germany with Austria. In order to induce Schuschnigg
to enter into such a coalition, Hitler was to offer him a final
settlement of German and Austrian interests. In other words, Hitler was
to tell him that Germany would recognize the national independence of
Austria and would undertake not to interfere in future in the internal
affairs of Austria.
And I went on to say to Hitler that if we achieved this pacification and
established good and friendly relations with Austria, we could even join
in the Danube Pact. This was the combination of the French, the
Italians, and the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favor of a pact of
the Danube powers including Austria. We in Germany had opposed the
policy of those powers at the time, because we feared that if Austria
joined a Danube Pact, she would be estranged from Germany once and for
all. If, on the other hand, we were on good terms with Austria and
friendly relations were established again, we could, as I pointed out to
Hitler, join in this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something
extraordinarily constructive for the cause of European peace.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes that you expressed this
morning?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just said that you pursued an honest policy of
the amicable settlement of interests.
Is it true that you persuaded Hitler to make a statement in favor of
Austria’s independence in his Reichstag speech on 21 May 1936?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the
prerequisite for any normalcy and settlement of interests in a
revolutionary way; for our joint policy could only be advanced by
Austria. Austria had been ordered by the Peace Treaty of St. Germain and
the Geneva Protocol to remain aloof from Germany. If Austria, therefore,
were to take the initiative and improve her relations with Germany, it
was essential that we should first recognize her sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the
translation. In the English translation, instead of the words spoken by
the defendant, the words “revolutionary way” were said instead of
“evolutionary way.”
Will you please comment on the pact of 11 July 1936?
VON PAPEN: The Agreement of 11 July has been described by Sir David as a
deceptive maneuver and an attempt to get the Austrian Government into
new difficulties, to undermine it by introducing men of pro-German
sympathies, like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This
judgment passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think
historically untenable; and I think that that has been demonstrated here
by the hearings and testimony of the Austrian Foreign Minister.
The pact was the result of my efforts over 2 years to re-establish
normal relations between the sister nations. The agreement was desired
by both Governments, not by the German Government only, and Chancellor
Schuschnigg admitted that himself, as mentioned in a report of mine
dated 1 September 1936 on a speech made by Schuschnigg to Austrian
workers. Why should the Austrian Government have concluded this pact?
They were not compelled to conclude it, unless they themselves wanted to
bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich.
For that very reason I had asked Hitler to proclaim Austrian sovereignty
in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was certainly not intended to
imply our willingness to give up the idea of union at a later date,
which we wanted, but it acknowledged Austria’s full independence of
action. But the aim of union of the two States was now to be pursued in
a regular and evolutionary manner.
This corresponded with the agreement which I had made with Hitler on 26
July. There was a second part to that agreement which was not published.
That second part contained all the elements necessary for pacification:
an amnesty, the regulation of our press relations, and the lifting of
the so-called “1,000 mark bar.” This was a frontier bar imposed by
Hitler’s decree upon people traveling into Austria. Any German wishing
to go to Austria at that time had to pay 1,000 marks. This bar was
removed. Herr Schuschnigg, for his part, promised in this unpublished
part of the agreement that men in his confidence who were members of the
National Opposition were to be drawn in to co-operate in Austria. It
appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian Opposition in Austrian
parliamentary procedure was an essential condition for any further
peaceful solution. In other words, the Party was gradually to lose its
illegal status and become a legal factor.
Mr. Messersmith, if I may add, stated incorrectly in his affidavit:
“Part II of this pact contained a clause that a number of persons who
were in the Chancellor’s confidence should be called to positions in the
Cabinet.” That, obviously, is a mistaken conclusion on Mr. Messersmith’s
part, because we were not concerned with people who had Hitler’s
confidence, but with those who had Schuschnigg’s confidence. This was an
agreement made by Schuschnigg. Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says
with reference to this agreement that:
“....the first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian
Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido
Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”
This is entirely wrong. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and made Austrian
policy; he represented Austrian interests, as was natural, and at no
time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign
Minister.
On the whole, world public opinion at that time regarded this agreement
as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the
Prosecution to call it a deceptive maneuver.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Prince Erbach’s affidavit, Document Number
Papen-96 of the English book, Pages 233 and 234, Questions 4 to 7 and
Questions 12 and 13, dealing with the subject which we have just
discussed.
Did you, after the conclusion of the July Agreement, regard your mission
in Austria as terminated?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I regarded it as terminated. That is proved by the
resignation which I tendered to Hitler on 16 July 1936.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Papen-71, Page 165 of the second
document book. I quote the beginning:
“On 26 July 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I
should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission to restore
normal and friendly relations.
“With the Agreement signed on 11 July, the decisive step has
been taken in this direction.”
In a later part of the document, he asks to be recalled; I go on to
quote the second paragraph from the end:
“Even though the ‘German question’ will need very careful and
considerate handling in the future too—especially after the
incredible difficulties which have gone before—I would like
now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to place my
resignation in your hands.”
The Prosecution have used the report you made to Hitler on 1 September
1936, 2246-PS, and they accuse you of remaining in contact with the
illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, of attempting to
bring that Opposition into the Fatherland Front, and of desiring to
change the Schuschnigg regime.
VON PAPEN: In the report mentioned I wrote:
“In the normalization of relations to Germany, progress has been
hindered by the staying power of the Ministry of Security, where
the old anti-National Socialist officials are located. Changes
in personnel are, therefore, urgently required.”
The expression which I used in this report: “Changes in the regime,”
actually means “Changes in personnel”; in that connection I also go on
to say, in the following sentence, that economic negotiations will
follow in the near future. This shows quite clearly that these words do
not refer to a removal of Schuschnigg’s person. Apart from that, this
report speaks of the gravity of the situation in the Danube area, and
makes proposals for a peaceful solution.
If I am accused by the Prosecution of having had contacts with the Nazi
Opposition, although the July Agreement had excluded all intervention in
Austrian affairs, I must point out that I was perfectly entitled to
these contacts because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how
far Herr Schuschnigg kept his promise to take in men from the
nationalist Opposition in whom he had confidence for collaboration. Just
how far the Nazi Opposition submitted to that Agreement of 11 July is
shown by Leopold’s statement in January 1937, which Mr. Messersmith has
attached to his own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number Papen-75, Page 171, which
contains this file note of Leopold’s. The document is identical with the
appendix, which has the number Exhibit USA-57. There is an error in the
English translation. In the fifth line from the end, on Page 1, the word
“Anschluss” has been translated by “annexation.”
Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold’s proposals?
VON PAPEN: Leopold’s proposals show the following. The leaders of the
Austrian Nazis fully accepted the policy of the July Agreement. They
recognized that in future the question of the Anschluss would be an
internal Austrian affair to be settled by the Austrian Government. They
proposed that this solution should be found in an evolutionary manner by
the Austrian Government and the Party. In favor of this solution is the
fact that by means of the declaration of the sovereignty of Austria
these arguments could in the future no longer represent foreign
political dangers for Austria, that is, that the Agreement of July was
understood by the Austrian National Socialists and approved of, and that
they were prepared to proceed in a legal way with the Austrian
Government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH DAY
Tuesday, 18 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Guido Schmidt has referred to an incident
involving a flag at Pinkafeld, in May 1937. Would you please describe
your activities in settling that incident.
VON PAPEN: The flag incident at Pinkafeld is mentioned by myself, or
rather by my defense counsel, because it is a typical example of
Hitler’s attempts to pass on to an aggressive policy in Austria, even in
the days before 1938.
On 1 May 1937 in the small hamlet of Pinkafeld a flag of the German
Reich was hauled down by an Austrian official. There was great
excitement in the press; I instantly tried to settle the matter amicably
with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereupon I received a
telegram to proceed to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported
to Hitler. Hitler did not receive me. I waited for 3 days. After 3 days,
I wrote and told him, “It appears that you are trying to use the flag
incident at Pinkafeld to introduce an aggressive policy against Austria.
In that case there is nothing more for me to do, and I beg to hand in my
resignation.” A quarter of an hour later he called me to the Reich
Chancellery. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour, furious
and beside himself with rage over the humiliations which the German
Reich could no longer tolerate. After his rage had spent itself I told
him that our agreement of 26 June ruled that the policy concerning
Austria was to be conducted on evolutionary lines. The Agreement of 11
July emphasized that. “If you wish to pursue a different policy, then
dismiss me,” I said.
As a result of this very serious conversation he said, “No, no. Go back
and settle everything; we do not want to change our peaceful policy.” I
returned to Vienna, and the incident was settled satisfactorily with the
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs within 24 hours.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you talk to representatives of other powers regarding
the policy which you pursued in Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I repeatedly discussed this policy with representatives
of other powers. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I discussed it with
the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been
produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: “I wrote
a letter.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we have not got that letter, neither have we a copy
of it. The files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin by air attacks.
VON PAPEN: May I add, Mr. President, that the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs has confirmed the incident in Court and the course it
took. Herr Von Neurath also knows this incident very well indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs who confirmed
it?
VON PAPEN: The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, who was
here as a witness; the witness Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON PAPEN: With reference to that question, may I remark that I, of
course, very often spoke to representatives of other powers about our
Austrian policy. For instance, in June 1938 I discussed it with Sir
Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin. In October 1937 I
visited Paris, incognito, and there talked to many of the leading
politicians about this problem, among them the President of France, M.
Daladier, and M. Léon Blum. I assured these gentlemen that we would seek
a solution of the Austrian problem exclusively on an evolutionary basis
and that the hoped-for union of the two States would never prove a
threat to the interests of France, that on the contrary we were only
looking for that solution within the European framework, that is, with
the consent of France.
At that time, I was under the impression that in England as well as in
France it was being increasingly understood that a general settlement
was necessary.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof that the defendant could actually have been
convinced that the other powers—by virtue of an evolutionary
development in Austria—might eventually be prepared to come to a
peaceable agreement, I submitted Document Number 74, Page 169. It is a
report from Von Papen to Hitler on the conversation just outlined with
Sir Nevile Henderson on 1 June 1937.
I draw your attention to this document and should like to point out that
Henderson has stated that he was well disposed toward an amicable
solution of the Austrian problem and trusted that he too could exercise
a corresponding influence in Paris.
I further draw your attention to Document Number 80, Page 177. It is a
statement of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Spaak, after the
Anschluss. I invite your attention to the last sentence: “I have
believed, for a long time past, that the Anschluss complied with the
logic of facts and had it been ratified in a normal manner, I should not
have been surprised.”
Mr. Messersmith alleged that Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid
for out of German funds. Did you ever give or arrange for any funds for
that purpose?
VON PAPEN: The Party never received a penny, either from me personally
or through the German Embassy. It is, however, quite possible—and even
probable—that German Party funds did pour into Austria. I was never
informed of this, for it was a well-known fact that I did not enjoy the
confidence of the Party in either country.
There is, however, one exception which I particularly wish to emphasize,
namely, the donation—and it was known to me—of funds in support of the
“Langot” subsidy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has reproached you for your anti-Semitic
attitude in connection with your report to Hitler of 12 May, in which
you suggested giving financial aid to the Freedom League for the
furtherance of their fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom League?
VON PAPEN: The Freedom League was a focal point, a union of the former
Christian Trade Unions and the Christian Workers’ Union, under the
leadership of the president of the Trade Unions. Dollfuss took over the
leadership in 1934. It would be utterly ridiculous to accuse this
Freedom League, mainly composed of Catholic workers, of an anti-Semitic
attitude in the National-Socialist sense.
The Freedom League fought to purge the administration of Vienna of
unsuitable Jewish elements. The problem of this undue alien penetration
was absolutely similar to conditions then existing in Germany,
conditions which I mentioned yesterday in detail. This fact is also
proved by the report submitted yesterday to the Prosecution. I learned
that the Czechs were endeavoring to establish close relations with the
Freedom League and that for this purpose they desired to support the
League with large sums of money.
I thereupon suggested to Hitler that this possible influencing of the
Freedom League by Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it
ourselves. But we could not of course tell the Freedom League: “We are
now going to subsidize you so that you do not go over to the Czechs.” So
I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys in consideration
of the League’s continued fight against Jewry, which was pure
camouflage. Had I wanted to give this money specifically for the fight
against Jewry, I would not have written “in consideration of” but “for
the furtherance of its fight.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 32, Page 112 of the document
book. It is an excerpt from the Austrian _Yearbook_ of 1933-1934, which
is an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of
the second paragraph, where it is explained that the Freedom League
originated in the Christian Workers’ Unions and the Christian Trade
Unions.
I further draw your attention to the fifth line from the bottom, and I
quote, “At the beginning of 1934 the late Federal Chancellor, Dr.
Dollfuss, took over the supreme leadership of the Freedom League.”
I also draw your attention to Document Number 72, Page 166. It is a
report of Von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes a report from the
Prague Secret Service. Of interest, in this connection, is a reference
to the fact that the Freedom League was striving for an understanding
with Social Democracy.
The next document, Number 70, has already been presented as GB-243. I
draw your attention to the first paragraph which reflects the efforts of
the Czech diplomats. Document Number 70, Page 164. This is the document
mentioned by the Prosecution, part of which has been submitted under
GB-243. The first paragraph is important in that it deals with the
activities of Czech diplomacy, mentioned a short time ago by the
defendant. Furthermore, there is, with reference to this Freedom League,
Von Papen’s report, Document Number 73, Page 176, to which I wish to
invite your attention.
Another report of Von Papen’s is interesting, Document Number 69, Page
163. It shows the efforts of the Freedom League to gain a foothold in
the political constellation of that day.
Witness, in the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to
persuade the National Opposition to collaborate. What do you know about
it and what were the subsequent developments?
VON PAPEN: In the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to keep
his promise to induce the National Opposition to collaborate. The visit
of Minister Glaise-Horstenau to Hitler in June 1938 took place with
Schuschnigg’s consent.[1] This choice of members was effected without
any participation on my part. But with regard to this “Committee of
Seven” I should like to make a statement. Obviously the Chancellor’s
attempts for appeasement were either not sufficiently far-reaching for
the Party in Austria, or they were too slow. In November 1937 the
Austrian police discovered in the office of this “Committee of Seven”
documents known as the “Tafs Papers” which led us to believe that new,
illegal, and radical purposes were already prevailing. The Austrian
Government did not inform me of these papers, and no official _démarche_
took place. But I did learn that amidst the documentation was a plan for
my assassination. It was suggested that an attempt be made on my life
which would provide a pretext for marching into Austria.
-----
[1] Later he founded the so-called “Committee of Seven” with Dr. Jury
and Dr. Tafs.
-----
The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, confirmed this fact
the day before yesterday before the Tribunal, and it appears to me that
this suggestion, this plan against me, best proves exactly how great was
the harmony between my policy and that of the Austrian or German
National Socialists, which the Prosecution insists on taking for
granted.
At that time I was very pleased that the Austrian Chancellor had also
included Dr. Seyss-Inquart, whom I knew personally, in this work of
appeasement. At this point I consider it only fair to make a correction.
The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has reported a conversation
which he had with me at Ankara, in October 1943. I told him at the
time—and I also repeated my statement during my preliminary
interrogation—that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had proved to be the greatest
disappointment of my life. I had assumed that it was he who had called
for the entry of the German troops into Austria and who was responsible
for the Nazification of Austria after the Anschluss. In the light of the
knowledge we have gained from various documents, I must correct my
previous verdict.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: At the end of 1936 your foremost collaborator, Counsellor
of Embassy Prince Erbach, was recalled from Vienna. His successor was
Counsellor of Embassy Von Stein. Since he took over your duties after
you had been recalled on 4 February 1938, it would be interesting to
know what his attitude was toward both the Party and you.
VON PAPEN: Later I learned that Counsellor of Embassy Baron von Stein
was appointed my Embassy Counsellor by special request of the Party
because he was to have control over my policy as regards the Party. Herr
Von Stein was an ardent National Socialist. His relations with me were
entirely different from those I had with his predecessor, Prince Erbach.
But I want to state that also during that period I continued to pursue
my original line of policy and that Von Stein merely had the management
of technical matters.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Hossbach Document of 5 November 1937 has been
frequently mentioned—did you know of this conference at Berchtesgaden
that this report was based on?
VON PAPEN: Of this sensational conference, of this truly important
document in the hands of the Prosecution, I, of course, never even had
an inkling. I first became acquainted with the document here in this
courtroom. But if I may be permitted to say something more: The
concatenation of ideas between the events of 11 March and this document
appears to be rather tenuous. This document indicates that Hitler only
intended to march into Austria by force, only intended to carry out the
Anschluss by force, if a certain European constellation would make this
possible. He expected this constellation to appear between 1943 and
1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this is mere argument, isn’t it? He says
he never saw the document until he came into this Court. He is now
arguing to us about his connection with the events of March 1938. Well,
that is a matter for you, not for the defendant.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, then I shall deal with that later.
Witness, on 4 February 1938 you were, much to your surprise, dismissed
from your post in Vienna. Please inform the Tribunal on the matter.
VON PAPEN: At the end of January 1938 I had been to Berlin to see
Hitler; I talked to him about the conversation which I had had with Dr.
Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch, and I received no indication of any kind that
he intended to dismiss me from his service. I was notified to this
effect by a telephone call from Dr. Lammers on 4 February. This sudden
dismissal, for which I was given no reasons, coinciding with the
dismissals of Von Fritsch and Blomberg and of other leading diplomats,
led however to one final conclusion. I was quite aware of the fact that
this recall meant a change, at the very least, of the political
direction. The following day I discussed the situation with the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and told him of my troubles. Subsequently I
took leave of the Austrian Government in an official note, and on the
following day I went to see Hitler. I must, however, introduce the
following: I considered this development, through the very fact of my
recall, so serious that I decided on the evening of the 4th that all my
political reports, compiled during those 4 years, were to be removed to
Switzerland. I wanted to be in a position to prove to the whole world
that I had pursued a peaceful and evolutionary policy in Austria during
those 4 years; I wanted to be in a position to prove this to the outside
world in case Hitler should commit an act of aggression. This decision,
particularly on the part of a high-ranking official, was certainly not
an easy one to reach, because I would have to suffer all the
consequences which this forbidden action might entail.
On the following day, I went to Hitler. I felt the urge to tell him that
even if he no longer wanted me, he should at least send another
reasonable and moderate man to Austria. During the discussion I had with
him he did not mention the reasons for my dismissal. I had suspected
that this was due to a wish of Herr Von Ribbentrop, who had become
Minister for Foreign Affairs on this 4 February; but Hitler told me that
this was not the case. During the discussion on the Austrian situation I
told Hitler, inter alia, that I very much regretted that he had recalled
me because, particularly during recent weeks, Chancellor Schuschnigg had
declared himself willing to have a personal discussion with Hitler in
order to eliminate all differences between the two States. When Hitler
heard this, he told me, “If that is the case, then I should be very glad
if you would go back to arrange for this discussion with Herr
Schuschnigg.” I told him, “That is rather a peculiar task. Yesterday you
recalled me, and today you want me to go back. But if there is something
I can do in the interest of the Austrian problem—if I can bring about
such a discussion, I am only too willing to do it.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: How did you prepare that conference?
VON PAPEN: On my return, I went to see Herr Schuschnigg, and with him
too, I discussed the change in the situation created by my recall and
the appointment of the new German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told
Herr Schuschnigg, “It appears to me that in this situation a discussion
between the two heads of State regarding the differences which have
arisen from the interpretation of the July Agreement could be nothing
but helpful.” The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has, as a matter
of fact, confirmed that we had discussed those personal meetings as far
back as November 1937. The proposal was that there should be in
Berchtesgaden discussions about all the differences. No definite program
was drafted. It was arranged that these conferences should take place on
the basis of the July Agreement, that is to say, on the basis of the
maintenance of Austria’s sovereignty. The only essential problem
discussed was the inclusion of a minister in the Austrian Cabinet who
would act as the _homme de confiance_ of both States and whose task
would be to keep the peace between the Austrian and German National
Socialist Parties, in other words, to eliminate in future all
interference by the German Party in Austrian affairs.
Later on, during the Berchtesgaden conference, it was demanded that the
Ministry for Security should be handed to Dr. Seyss-Inquart. This demand
was entirely unknown to me, nor had I discussed it with Schuschnigg. It
was merely mentioned that a suitable man, perhaps Seyss-Inquart, should
be given the Ministry of the Interior. Today we know from the testimony
of witnesses that, in addition to this official conference of mine,
there were Austrian Party channels through which proposals were sent to
Hitler, proposals that were unknown to me.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us an idea of the course of the discussion at
Berchtesgaden.
VON PAPEN: This conference has been repeatedly described here. I
accompanied Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt there personally; and it
is quite possible that when I received them at the Austrian or the
German frontier, I told them that, in addition to Hitler, they might
find one or several generals up there, because quite possibly I had
telephoned to Berchtesgaden in the morning and learned that these
generals were present.
The course of the conference differed, of course, very much from that of
customary conferences of diplomatic life; but it was not quite so
dramatic as has been described here by various sources. To my knowledge,
these generals, called in by Hitler on the previous evening and unknown
to me, were merely effective by their presence and were only meant to
have that effect. As far as I know and within the framework of my own
participation, they were not called in to join the political
conferences.
The tone in which Hitler negotiated, the accusations which he hurled
against Schuschnigg, were to my mind most unpleasant; and for that
reason I repeatedly intervened as a mediator. I remember very well an
incident which occurred when Hitler and Schuschnigg were negotiating
together and the discussion became extraordinarily loud. I entered the
conference room to find that Hitler was accusing Herr Schuschnigg of
being no German, of lacking in national feeling, so that I intervened
and told Herr Hitler, “You are completely misjudging Herr Schuschnigg.
Herr Schuschnigg’s way of thinking is as German as yours and mine, only
he does not want a union of our two countries under the state doctrine
which you are now representing in Germany.” During this conference, a
program was submitted to Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt, which was
unknown to me personally, as I already said. After negotiating, a number
of points were removed from this program, for instance, the commanding
of the Austrian Army by General Von Glaise, and all economic demands;
and therefore, toward evening, when the conference was coming to an end,
I told Herr Schuschnigg that he had better accept the remainder so that
further peaceful development should not be prejudiced. Apart from this,
Herr Schuschnigg only made the express reservation in connection with
this program or this agreement that the stipulations would have to be
confirmed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian President.
Therefore the possibility for later correction on the part of Austria
certainly was provided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In one point your relation has not been quite clear. Did
you arrive at Berchtesgaden only when Schuschnigg and Dr. Schmidt did?
Were you already in Berchtesgaden, or had you spent the night elsewhere?
VON PAPEN: I traveled from Vienna to Salzburg with Herr Schuschnigg,
spent the night there with him, and went on with him the next morning to
Berchtesgaden. In other words, I was not in Berchtesgaden before him.
However, Herr Schuschnigg has alleged that the morning before our visit
I told him that generals were up there. I cannot remember that; but it
is possible, because it may be that I put a telephone call through from
Salzburg in the morning and was told of it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is one more point to be supplemented. Schuschnigg
said that you met him at the border. Perhaps you can clear up that
point, too.
VON PAPEN: Well, Herr Schuschnigg and I had spent the night together in
Salzburg, as I have said. The next morning I went ahead as far as the
border, and waited for him at the German border.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Berchtesgaden agreement differ basically from the
Agreement of 11 July 1936?
VON PAPEN: The result of the Berchtesgaden arrangements was certainly an
enlargement compared with the Agreement of July. But there was no
departing from the basis of the July Agreement—from its principles,
that is, the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty. This is evident also
from the two communiqués by the Governments which were issued on the
occasion of the acceptance of the agreement.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the official communiqué, Document Number 78,
Page 174; and also to Document Number 79, Page 175, Hitler’s Reichstag
speech of 20 February, with reference to this question.
On 26 February you paid an official farewell visit to Schuschnigg. The
Prosecution have presented a file memorandum in this connection. Please
tell us about this farewell visit.
VON PAPEN: This note from the files obviously contains the information I
gave Herr Von Ribbentrop over the telephone regarding my farewell visit.
In this note I drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this note?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The file note is dated 26 February and was submitted by
the Prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Book 11a, Page 1.
VON PAPEN: In this memorandum I mention the pressure brought to bear on
Schuschnigg and under which he acted. The fact that I informed the
Foreign Office should really indicate that I personally disapproved of
this pressure; otherwise I would not have made a report on it. On 26
February my temporary activities, then, were also fully at an end.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 9 March 1938 Schuschnigg proclaimed the plebiscite.
Kindly comment on this.
VON PAPEN: The plebiscite announced by Herr Schuschnigg was, of course,
a complete surprise. In my view it was contrary to the spirit of the
arrangements agreed upon at Berchtesgaden and contrary to the tendency
of a peaceful settlement of the tension.
The plebiscite was a violation of the Austrian Constitution, too. It was
not a decision of the Austrian Government but was a spontaneous measure
of the Austrian Chancellor, and in my opinion it was quite evident that
those elements in Austria who were in favor of a union of the two States
were most displeased with this plebiscite.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Rainer has said in his testimony, and in the
speech which was quoted, that on the evening of 9 March he was at your
apartment. Was this a prearranged conference, a conference at all, or an
exchange of views?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. I was absent from Vienna from the evening of the
26th, as far as I remember, until about 9 March. On that day I returned
to Vienna, and it is naturally possible that these gentlemen came to my
Embassy and talked to me there. There was no question of anything
prearranged on my part.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you in Berlin on 11 March?
VON PAPEN: On the evening of 10 March a telephone call from the Reich
Chancellery reached me at the Embassy with the order from Hitler to go
to Berlin immediately that very night. I flew to Berlin the following
morning and approximately between 9 and 10 in the morning I arrived at
the Reich Chancellery. Why Hitler sent for me I do not know; I assumed
that as this crisis developed he might want my advice; perhaps, too, he
may have thought that my presence in Vienna would interfere with his
plans. At any rate, on this fateful day, 11 March, I was in Berlin and
at the Reich Chancellery. I met Hitler surrounded by numerous ministers,
Herr Göring, Dr. Goebbels, Von Neurath, state secretaries, and also
military people. He greeted me with the words: “The situation in Austria
has become intolerable; Herr Schuschnigg is betraying the German idea
and we cannot admit this forced plebiscite.”
And when I saw how aroused he was, I reminded him again of his promise
to me at Bayreuth and warned him urgently against over-hasty decisions.
But on this morning he told me, “Either the plebiscite must be canceled
or the Government must resign.”
Today we know from the letter, which he sent to Dr. Seyss by special
courier, of this ultimatum to the Austrian Government. At that time he
did not inform me of this active intervention on his part. Then during
the day I, along with most of the persons present, remained in the large
hall while Göring telephoned from Hitler’s private office. What was
telephoned is something we, who were waiting in the large hall, could
only gather fragmentarily; but of course today we know it from the
documents here.
There is only one incident which I want to mention. Toward 5 o’clock in
the afternoon, the report came from Vienna that Schuschnigg’s Government
was prepared to resign. Thereupon I pressed Hitler to cancel his
military orders. Herr Hitler did that. Between 5 and 6 o’clock in the
afternoon the order to the military forces standing by was withdrawn. On
that occasion I congratulated General Keitel and General Von
Brauchitsch, who were present, on our being spared this issue. But 1
hour later the situation was once more entirely different. When a
telephone call came through from Vienna stating that the Federal
President refused to nominate a Seyss-Inquart Government, Hitler again
issued the orders to the troops. Following that, late in the evening, it
was learned that the Austrian Government had requested the entry of
German troops, since otherwise they could not control the situation. I
can still see Herr Von Neurath standing next to me telling me, “This is
such an important report from Vienna that we absolutely have to have it
in writing.”
Thus we were under the impression that this call for assistance came to
us from Vienna. The further events of the evening are known, and I can
only say that I personally was deeply shaken by this turn of events
because it was perfectly clear that marching in with the Army could lead
to incidents and to bloodshed, and new bloodshed between our two nations
would not only have badly compromised the German problem again, but
would also leave the worst possible impression of the conduct of German
policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw your attention here to Document Number 97, Page
241, of the third document book. I beg your pardon, it is not yet
contained in the book, it is just being presented—Document 97, Page
241. It is an affidavit by Thass, a friend of the witness Papen, who
talked to him on the evening of 11 March. I quote approximately from the
middle of the document:
“On 11 March 1938, the beginning of the march of German troops
into Austria, Herr Von Papen appeared at the Union Club late in
the evening where he very excitedly and despairingly declared:
“‘I have just come from the Reich Chancellery. I tried to talk
Hitler out of marching into Austria and strongly advised against
it, but he has carried through with the madness and has just
given the order to march into Austria.’”
Did you, Witness, know anything about the military plan “Case Otto”?
VON PAPEN: I have heard about this Case Otto for the first time during
this Trial. The Case Otto was, it was stated, a theoretical preparation
for a military attack in the event that, as a consequence of the
restoration of the Hapsburgs, the Czechs and Hungarians should march
into Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: This is exactly what the defendant was doing just now
when I interrupted you. He said he did not know anything about the
document and he is now trying to explain it. This is argument, not
evidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, quite, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Let us pass on to the next question. A
little while ago you mentioned that you had decided that the files which
were documentary proof for your activity in Vienna should be taken to
Switzerland. Was this actually carried out later on?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that was done. My secretary, Herr Von Ketteler, took the
files to Switzerland at the beginning of March 1938.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Describe briefly the circumstances of the assassination
of your assistant, Baron von Ketteler, after the entry of German troops
into Austria. In particular, what did you do to have that case cleared
up?
VON PAPEN: During the days of the march into Vienna my secretary and
friend, Herr Von Ketteler, had suddenly disappeared. I informed the
Viennese police at once, as well as Herr Himmler, Herr Heydrich, and Dr.
Kaltenbrunner. They promised investigation. The investigation was for a
long time without success. Originally I had assumed that Herr Von
Ketteler had fled, since his relations with the Austrian Party had been
very bad. But then a few weeks later it transpired that Von Ketteler’s
body was found in the Danube below Vienna. I filed a charge of murder by
an unknown person with the public prosecutor. I requested a post-mortem
examination of the body. The post-mortem examination took place with the
result that no signs of death by force were found.
Nevertheless, I am perfectly certain that this new act was an act of
revenge by the Gestapo against me and my policies and my friends. I
addressed myself to Göring, who was in command of the Gestapo, and asked
for his assistance. Göring demanded the files from the Gestapo and told
me that there was proof that Herr Von Ketteler had prepared an attempt
on Hitler’s life. I stated that that was quite out of the question. But
then it was ascertained by Göring, through the Gestapo, that I had taken
my files to Switzerland and that Herr Von Ketteler had assisted in this.
Herr Göring promised me to negotiate with Hitler and to demand the
punishment of the Gestapo people who had taken part in this case. I
believe that he did that, but this intervention met with no success.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After your departure from Vienna you retired to private
life. Did you have new offers for posts abroad?
VON PAPEN: I retired to private life, since my experiences after the
30th of June and later in Austria were not such as to make me desire a
new post. I can only say that, during the period following, Herr Von
Ribbentrop asked me twice to go to Ankara as Ambassador and that I
refused it twice.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a last question with reference to the Austrian
complex, I want to ask whether Hitler awarded you the Golden Party Badge
after the march into Vienna? Please make a statement on that.
VON PAPEN: That is correct. As we know, Hitler was accustomed to make
sudden dismissals; and he had dismissed me abruptly on 4 February and
solved the Austrian question without me. For public consumption he used
to camouflage such acts with cordial letters and decorations. Perhaps I
should have turned down this Golden Party Badge at that time, because I
was no longer in any official position and there was no reason for my
accepting it. However my position in those days was so difficult that I
did not want to make it any worse. My assistant Ketteler had
disappeared, and I had to expect that I might be involved in a State
trial because I had removed my files to Switzerland. Thus I accepted the
badge. But I deny that doing this established my Party membership. I
believe that no one who knows me—even among the gentlemen sitting in
this dock with me—will maintain that I was ever in my life a National
Socialist.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I now come to the discussion of a relatively brief
period, that is, your time in Turkey. May I start on that now?
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into the affairs after the
Anschluss in March 1938, in view of what the Prosecution has stated? I
mean, does it throw any light upon the past? As I understand it...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have finished then with the entire
Austrian complex. I now have to deal only with a brief subject, the
defendant’s activities during his time as Ambassador to Ankara. I am
only asking whether this would be a suitable moment to begin with this,
or whether the Court wishes to recess. I shall have completely finished
in about an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: We will in a moment, but what I was asking you was why is
it necessary to go into the history of the defendant in Ankara in view
of what the Prosecution have said with reference to their charges
against the defendant? As I understand it, the Prosecution have said
that they make no charges against the defendant in connection with his
work at Ankara. Unless the history of that time throws light upon the
past, upon the time up to March 1938, it does not appear to be relevant
to this Trial.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In discussing his activities in Turkey, I shall confine
myself to a few points, for the sole purpose, as the Tribunal have
observed, of throwing light on the previous activities of the Defendant
Von Papen. The evidence will, therefore, refer to the fact that through
his activities the defendant made it quite clear that he was a definite
opponent of the war in every phase, and that in every phase of the war
he merely tried to achieve peace. This material from the period in
Turkey is, therefore, to furnish the counterevidence against the charge
that previously the defendant had been in any way an active participant
in the war policy. We must also get a complete picture of a man who is
under the indictment of conspiracy. If he was in an official position
directly before the outbreak of the war and during the war, then
certainly we must investigate whether his attitude during that time does
not supply precise counterevidence against his having been previously in
any way in agreement with the plans which, it is true, were first
executed during his early days in office. The questions are brief, and
we shall...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Under what circumstances were you appointed Ambassador to
Ankara in April 1939? Why did you accept this post?
VON PAPEN: I accepted the post, after I had refused it twice, under
quite extraordinary circumstances. On the day of Italy’s occupation of
Albania, Herr Von Ribbentrop called me up and urgently asked me to come
to Berlin. There he explained to me that the post in Ankara, which had
been vacant for 6 months, would have to be filled immediately because of
the complications which might arise in the southeast from the occupation
of Albania. Before I accepted this post I carefully considered whether I
could do and had to do anything more for the Hitler Government. After 15
March, the entry into Prague, we knew that we were sitting on a powder
keg. In this European problem there were two possibilities of conflict;
one was the Polish problem, where I could do nothing; the other was the
southeast problem which had become acute through the occupation of
Albania. I felt that I could do something here and could contribute to
the maintenance of peace in Europe. For that reason I offered to go to
Ankara at this moment.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: First you went to Ankara to obtain information; you
obtained a picture of the situation there, and then in an oral and a
written report you explained your opinion. Please comment on this.
VON PAPEN: In Ankara I immediately obtained a picture of the whole
situation because I knew all the leading personalities there.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren’t proposing to take the defendant
through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention. The problem is dealt with
in a report which the defendant made in Berlin not only to Hitler but
also to other offices. The making of this report and its contents show a
positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I have gone
into this affair briefly. And, Witness, I ask you to outline...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report is also in the files of the Foreign
Office to which I do not have access.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you had better deal with the subject, but
deal with it shortly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, please continue.
VON PAPEN: I will be very brief, My Lord. I came back from Turkey, and
told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to maintain
European peace. I sent this memorandum also to Keitel and Brauchitsch. I
stated in this report that it was necessary, in order to keep the
situation in the southeast under control, for Italy immediately to give
positive promises indicating that her military forces would be withdrawn
from Albania and her relations with Turkey would be adjusted, in order
to remove there any doubt in the sincerity of Italian policy. A very
heated discussion on this advice followed between Count Ciano and
myself. Count Ciano was in Berlin on that day to sign the German-Italian
Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was most indignant at
these demands and complained about me to Herr Von Ribbentrop. A very
heated discussion then took place with Herr Von Ribbentrop who told me
that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I, and that it
was after all not my task to make suggestions for keeping the peace.
Then I offered my resignation to Herr Von Ribbentrop and told him it was
useless under the circumstances to send me to Ankara; but Herr Von
Ribbentrop withdrew his statement, and I returned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this report, did you warn in general against a war
adventure and what reasons did you give for this warning?
VON PAPEN: The memorandum which I gave also to General Keitel and
General Brauchitsch also contained a military presentation of the
situation, in which I stated that to begin a war over the Polish
Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war
were to break out, Germany’s position would be hopeless, for there was
no doubt that England would keep its promise to Poland and that England
and France would come to Poland’s aid.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your reaction to the news about the outbreak of
war on 1 September 1939?
VON PAPEN: When the news of the outbreak of the Polish war reached me in
Ankara, I was profoundly shocked. I had, of course, hoped that Hitler
would avoid this step which must plunge us into the greatest misfortune.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 14, Page 62, an affidavit of the lady
who was for long years private secretary of the witness Von Papen. I
will quote a brief passage from Page 64, the second paragraph from the
end:
“I heard the radio announcement of the outbreak of war in the
Embassy at Ankara with the Ambassador and the entire staff.
Afterwards I walked in the Embassy park with the Ambassador. The
Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and shaken. I had never
seen him like this, not even after the darkest days of June 1934
and not even after the murder of his friend Ketteler.
“That is why I can recall exactly every word which the
Ambassador said to me on that occasion: ‘Remember my words: To
have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the greatest
madness which Hitler and his people could have committed.
Germany cannot win this war. All will be buried under the
ruins.’”
Witness, what were your decisions for the future?
VON PAPEN: What could I do? I could either protest—then, in order not
to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain abroad. I
could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I have always believed
that one can work better in one’s own country than as an emigrant. I
could resign; then I would return to Germany and become a soldier. The
best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and where I could
best help my fatherland.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I come to discuss your various efforts toward peace.
Please describe first your negotiations with the Dutch Minister, Dr.
Visser.
VON PAPEN: Immediately after the Polish campaign I had negotiations with
the Dutch Minister in Ankara, at that time Dr. Visser, who declared
himself willing to have his Foreign Minister mediate in London. The
condition for a peace would, of course, have been the restoration of
Poland with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor problem, the
problem of the German sections.
I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Herr Von
Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin;
and therefore in November 1939 I went to Berlin myself. Herr Von
Ribbentrop told me, “The Führer does not want to hear anything of peace
negotiations; please do not undertake any further steps.”
Nevertheless I went to Hitler, reported the Dutch offer to him, and
expressed the wish of the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin
personally. Unfortunately Hitler rejected all my arguments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of the Court
an interrogatory on this subject was sent to Minister Dr. Visser, but
the interrogatory has not yet been received.
Did you make further suggestions as to ending the war in 1939? I am
thinking in this connection of a report on the restoration of legal life
in Germany.
VON PAPEN: Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report for Hitler
to Herr Von Ribbentrop, and in this report I said that the first
condition for any conclusion of peace and for any readiness abroad to
conclude a peace would be the renunciation of the present government
methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional conditions in
Germany. Then I told Hitler, “If you do this, you will have more credit
abroad; and it might be possible to prepare the way for peace
negotiations.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the instruction which you received from Berlin
in regard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless?
VON PAPEN: The Reich Foreign Minister repeatedly issued strict orders to
the chiefs of missions under no circumstances to extend any peace
feelers. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, such attempts would be a
sign of weakness.
I did not observe this ruling because I was determined on my own
initiative to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the
spring of 1941 before the Balkan crisis, I addressed myself to His
Majesty the King of Sweden with the request to begin a peace mediation.
I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, to consider the
possibilities of mediating. President Inönü agreed to do so, while His
Majesty the King of Sweden refused, saying that the situation did not
seem to him suited to such efforts. The Turkish President asked only
that he be officially requested to mediate. That, of course, was not
done.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you think about the events of 10 May 1940, the
entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium; and what statement, did
you make in this connection?
VON PAPEN: On 10 May 1940 I visualized the impression which had
dominated the whole first World War, the question of why Germany had
violated Belgian neutrality. It was completely incomprehensible to me
that this psychological error should be repeated a second time and I
expressed this opinion of mine in a letter which I sent to the Dutch
Minister, Dr. Visser, on 10 May.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do in order to check the spread of the war
to the Balkans?
VON PAPEN: When the Yugoslav crisis broke out and our troops marched
through Bulgaria, I had Hitler send a personal letter to the Turkish
President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that under no
circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason he had
ordered German troops to keep at 40 kilometers distance from the Turkish
border.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1941 you concluded a treaty of friendship with.
Turkey. Will you state briefly the reasons for that?
VON PAPEN: The reasons were very simple: To limit the war. Turkey was to
know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the war in
the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never threaten
Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to advance
through Turkey to the Suez Canal. The negotiations were very long and
difficult, because Herr Von Ribbentrop did not want in this treaty any
mention of Turkey’s contractual obligations to the Allies. I then
pointed out to Herr Von Ribbentrop by cable that the Turks were faithful
to their treaties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know of Hitler’s intentions against Russia? What
did you think about this war?
VON PAPEN: The beginning of the war with Russia was, of course, a
complete surprise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both
sides, but of course I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact
with Russia and that he would not begin this war. I considered the
beginning of the war against Russia a crime, from the point of view of
German as well as European interests.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, after you returned from a visit to Germany in
the fall of 1943, continue your efforts toward peace?
VON PAPEN: In the fall of 1943, after Stalingrad, it had become clear
that no peace could be established with the Hitler Government. Regarding
this, there was much discussion between me and my friends, including my
military friends. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the so-called
Beck Plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness Gisevius. At
that time this plan did not intend to eliminate Hitler through an attack
on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters surrounded
by troops and then to put Hitler on trial. The reasons for this were
obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war had to
be stopped, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler because
they were of the opinion that Hitler still enjoyed very great prestige.
Moreover, there was the further difficulty that if Hitler were removed,
no one knew what the Allies would do with us.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more shortly,
Dr. Kubuschok.
VON PAPEN: As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to learn
what the Allies would do with Germany in such a case; and for this
purpose I turned to the American Minister, at that time Mr. Earle, who
reported on the matter in the press, too.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 93, Page 214. This is the
interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call as a
witness but who could not come here because of transportation
difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to Question 7 is:
“My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were
always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt to
mediate general world peace between all belligerent states.
Prior to all peace measures, I engaged in detailed discussions
with Ambassador Von Papen and was always warmly supported by him
to the utmost, although every peace measure was forbidden him
and was at least as perilous for him as for me.
“He also made me acquainted with a number of foreigners, above
all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop
Roncalli.
“When in 1942 I resolved to go to the Vatican, not only did
Ambassador Von Papen urgently advise me to make the trip; but he
also personally procured for me all the necessary papers and
passports for Rome, where in spite of the express prohibition of
the Reich Government I suggested to Cardinal Maglione and the
diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop Montini, a world peace
drive by Pope Pius XII with all belligerent powers.
“When in April 1944 I had the opportunity to establish contact
with Mr. George Earle, the former American Minister to Vienna
and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt, with whom I had
long been personally acquainted, Papen again helped me in every
way. He even took it upon himself....”
THE PRESIDENT: These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that the
defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace? Then you
can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which
confirm what the defendant says.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will dispense with any further reading of
this answer to Question Number 7, and I refer then to Document 94, Page
217, a letter of the witness Lersner to Mr. Kirkpatrick. He makes
reference in the letter to the fact that as early as 1939 the Defendant
Von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so that on the basis of
his international connections he could work for peace. He describes the
difficulties in connection with this plan, which, however, was carried
out by Papen. The letter also mentions further peace efforts with
Admiral Von Horthy and with King Boris of Bulgaria. I should like
briefly to give documentary corroboration to the questions raised by the
witness Gisevius. I wish to present evidence that Von Papen was by no
means unfavorably received in the circle of the conspirators of 20 July,
but that on the contrary he was scheduled for the office of Foreign
Minister. I refer to the affidavit of Count Bismarck, Document Number
90, Page 201. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events following 20
July, was sent to a concentration camp. This indicates the character of
the witness. In Document Number 90 Bismarck points out that in case of a
change of government Papen would have placed himself at their disposal.
There was an agreement to send communications through Herr Von Trott,
who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was condemned to death following
the events of 20 July.
Finally I refer to Document Number 89, Page 199, a letter from Pfeil to
the son of the witness Papen. Pfeil points out that Colonel Count von
Stauffenberg, the would-be murderer of 20 July, had proposed to the
defendant that he serve as Foreign Minister later. The Court has already
admitted this letter.
Witness, what was your position as regards the Party during your period
in Turkey?
VON PAPEN: My position as regards the Party was exceptionally bad. For
years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in
Turkey. This man told my Embassy officials, “Herr Von Papen belongs in a
concentration camp, or he must be shot.” I had to struggle a long time
to have this man removed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do during this time regarding Church
matters?
VON PAPEN: During the war I did everything in my power to counteract an
intensification of the fight against the Church. That means that I took
all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer here to Document Number 53, Page 141, and
Document Number 51, Page 138.
What did you do with respect to the Jewish problem during your period in
Turkey?
VON PAPEN: I opposed all measures of the German Government against
German Jews. A long Party trial took place because German members of my
Embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these officials of
mine against this charge, and I refused to take away the passports of
the German Jews in Turkey and to deprive them of their citizenship.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 227, the
interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In Questions 4, 5, and 6 he
discusses this problem. In the answer to Question 6, the last paragraph
is very noteworthy, and as the witness Von Papen has not yet mentioned
it I should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer
to Question 6:
“I remember particularly clearly an incident in the spring of
1944, when I called upon Herr Von Papen at the request of Mr.
Barlas, the Refugee Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in order
to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from
deportation to Poland for extermination. These Jews had formerly
held Turkish nationality but they had later given it up. Herr
Von Papen complied with my wish and through his intervention the
lives of these Jews were saved, as I learned later from Mr.
Barlas himself.”
I continue to quote:
“Details of this incident, on which Mr. Steinhardt, then United
States Ambassador in Ankara, and Numan Menemencioglu, then
Foreign Minister of Turkey, were also informed, can be obtained
by questioning Mr. Barlas.”
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr. Kubuschok,
that you have taken very much longer than you said you were going to
take.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very short time, in a few minutes, I will be
through.
I ask the last question of the witness: When, on 2 August 1944 Turkey
broke off relations with Germany, you returned to Germany, why did you
not remain in Turkey and separate finally from Germany?
VON PAPEN: I can state that on the day of the severance of relations
between Turkey and Germany the British Prime Minister Mr. Churchill said
the following in the House of Commons: “The breaking-off of relations
between Turkey and Germany will have many consequences, including
consequences for Herr Von Papen. On 30 June he escaped the blood bath.
This time he will not succeed.”
As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey. I
refused to do so. I said, “I shall return to Germany where I belong. I
will not emigrate, for perhaps I might still do something for my
fatherland.” Thus I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed
that as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after 20
July there was no possibility at all of doing anything. For the rest of
the time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 226, which has
already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. I
refer to the answer to Question 3 and I should like very briefly to read
the last half of this answer in connection with the problem just
mentioned by the witness:
“The last conversation on this subject took place on 2 August
1944, on the day before his final departure from Ankara after
the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between Germany and
Turkey.
“To my advice not to leave Turkey, but to address an appeal from
here to the German people and the German Army to overthrow
Hitler and discontinue the senseless war immediately, Von Papen
answered in substance as follows:
“‘I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done
away with from a foreign country; one must be in the country
itself in order to fight the regime effectively. Therefore, I
have determined to return to Germany and to conduct the fight
against the Hitler regime there and thus hasten the end of the
war.’”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have finished questioning the witness Von Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of Defense Counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Papen, I should like to ask you a few
questions, with the permission of the Court.
How long have you known Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Since 1932.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Is it true that it was the express wish of the
then Reich President Von Hindenburg that Herr Von Neurath was to be
taken into the Government which you formed in 1932, as Reich Foreign
Minister?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is entirely true.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you aware, or did you know from previous
activities of Herr Von Neurath in his various positions as Ambassador
but especially in his last post in London, that Herr Von Neurath was a
faithful follower and an impassioned champion of a policy of peace?
VON PAPEN: That was known to me and to everyone in Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And you yourself approved of this also?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself also approve of this peace
policy?
VON PAPEN: Of course I approved of this policy. Otherwise we would not
have found ourselves side by side in this Cabinet engaged in common
work.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, a few months later, take any
part in the negotiations leading to the transfer of the Reich
Chancellorship to Hitler?
VON PAPEN: In no way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know that Reich President Von
Hindenburg made the express condition that Herr Von Neurath was to
remain as Reich Foreign Minister also in the new Hitler Government?
VON PAPEN: I have already mentioned here that this was an express
condition of Hindenburg’s.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was Hitler’s attitude to that in
principle? Did he accept it only in order to be able to form the
Government at all, or did he approve of Hindenburg’s choice?
VON PAPEN: I believe that Hitler approved completely of the choice of
Neurath as Foreign Minister.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this?
VON PAPEN: Yes, frequently. And I learned from Hitler that he thought
highly of Herr Von Neurath’s personality and capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And did you ever talk to Herr Von Neurath himself
about it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he make the decision to form this Cabinet
readily?
VON PAPEN: I imagine that Herr Von Neurath also had the same inner
reservations I had at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, according to your knowledge, as far as you
could learn from statements of Hitler’s, what were Hitler’s foreign
political aims and efforts at that time?
VON PAPEN: Hitler’s foreign political aims at that time were quite
limited: Abolition of discrimination by peaceful means and by
strengthening Germany’s position in the world.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Until the end of 1937, did you ever hear any
statements from Hitler indicating that he might be determined to use
armed force if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
VON PAPEN: I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then it is always asserted that in leading
Party circles he expressed such sanguinary intentions?
VON PAPEN: I never heard that in the Party, even among the most radical
National Socialists, anyone ever spoke of the idea of a war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then to sum up, you agreed fully with the aims of
a peaceful policy that were intended and advocated by Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now the charge is made against Herr Von Neurath of
having co-operated in the rearmament of Germany. What was Hitler’s
reason and motive for this rearmament, which it may be supposed started
before the actual taking over of the military sovereignty?
VON PAPEN: I stated yesterday that the actual rearmament began only
after I had resigned from the Cabinet. But as far as I am informed, all
of my former colleagues held the view that a rearmament was only to
serve the purpose of giving Germany a defensive protection for her
borders.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know
the attitude of Herr Von Neurath concerning the Austria problem?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath’s attitude concerning the Austria problem
was the same as mine. Like myself, he constantly protested in the
Cabinet against the terror measures staged by the Party in 1933 and
1934.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you yourself, when Hitler sent you on an
extraordinary mission to Vienna, under Herr Von Neurath? And did you
receive your instructions from him or only from Hitler?
VON PAPEN: I was not subordinate to Herr Von Neurath but had asked that
I might be directly subordinate to Hitler. But, of course, I reported
all steps which I took to Herr Von Neurath and the Foreign Office, as is
proved by the documents submitted here.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the
negotiations in the summer of 1936 which led to the Agreement of 11 July
between Germany and Austria?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath had exactly the same opinion as I had, that
this agreement was to serve and had to serve the cause, once and for
all, of peace between these two peoples of the same race.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he influence Hitler in this direction, too?
VON PAPEN: I do not know, but I certainly assume he did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that he was honest and sincere in this
agreement? What is your opinion? I point out here that the Prosecution
asserts and makes it a charge against Herr Von Neurath that this
agreement was concluded with a treacherous intention.
VON PAPEN: I spoke in detail on that point yesterday, and protested
against the Prosecution’s charging us with treacherous intentions. Herr
Von Neurath had such intentions just as little as I did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I have two more brief questions.
Do you know what attitude Herr Von Neurath took as to Germany’s leaving
the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I know that very well. Herr Von Neurath was of the
opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference. But,
like me, he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League
of Nations. With his approval, as I told the Court yesterday, I followed
Hitler to Munich at that time in order to persuade him not to leave the
League of Nations.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
DR. SEIDL: With the approval of the Court, substituting for my absent
colleague, Dr. Stahmer, I should like to ask a question on behalf of the
Defendant Göring.
Witness, this morning you said that in connection with the murder of
your friend Ketteler in 1938 you turned to Göring because he was in
charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this
fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively
under Himmler and was formally under the Reich Minister of the Interior?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that through my 4 years’ absence from Germany
in Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, of
course. In any case, I had the feeling when I turned to Göring that he
was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo; and after Hitler had
refused to speak to me on this matter, it was only natural that I should
turn to him as the second man in Germany.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the
documents arranged then and it might be more convenient for the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1355 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember saying in your
interrogation on 19 September of last year that your present view was
that Hitler was the greatest crook that you had ever seen in your life?
VON PAPEN: That is quite true. That is the opinion which I arrived at
after I learned here of all the crimes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was on 19 September 1945. But I am
more interested in your next answer. Was that not when you were asked
when you made your mind up that Hitler was the greatest crook you had
ever seen in your life, “only after I have known the facts after which
he started to go to war”?
Do you remember saying that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was not that rather a long time for you to
discover that somewhat obvious truth after your close co-operation with
Hitler?
VON PAPEN: My opinion about Hitler and his inner political significance
was completely clear after 30 June 1934. But, like all other human
beings, I could assume that in the field of foreign politics at least he
would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich
Agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see whether you had not
had an opportunity of forming that view much earlier. When you were
Reich Chancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to acquaint yourself
with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party, was it
not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you did so, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember—I do not want to delay by
referring to the document, but you may take it as an exact
quotation—that on 16 November 1932 Hitler wrote to you and said: “You
must be aware of my attitude and the attitude of my Party.”
VON PAPEN: Of course, I knew the aims of his Party; but I may add, if a
party forms a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a great
deal from its program and form a coalition program. That was what Hitler
did on 30 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before we come to 30 January I want to
ask you—get your view in 1932. You had very little doubt in 1932,
during the period of your Chancellorship, that if Hitler got into power
Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and unconstitutional
methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power?
VON PAPEN: Doubtless the program of the National Socialists was
revolutionary in this connection, but I explained in detail to the Court
that when we came to this forced solution of 30 January we established a
number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our
opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was very strongly the view of President Von
Hindenburg in the middle of 1932 that it would be most dangerous to put
power into Hitler’s hands, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that was indeed his opinion, that Hitler had to be
controlled by restricting his power.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just will give you one sentence from the
affidavit of Herr Meissner, which the Tribunal will find in Document
Book 11a on Page 43. This will be GB-495. The number is 3309-PS.
This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner:
“Hindenburg stated that because of the tense situation he could
not with a clear conscience risk transferring the power of
government to a new party, such as the National Socialists,
which did not command a majority and which was intolerant,
noisy, and undisciplined.”
That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President’s views at that
time, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you know, Defendant—I am not talking about
a coalition, I am talking about if the National Socialists came into
power themselves—it was obvious to you that they had few scruples and
would make short work of their political opponents, is that not so?
VON PAPEN: One cannot say that. In political life it always happens that
a radical party—any party, but particularly a radical party—if it
comes to power and is made responsible, has to eliminate much of its
program. For example, we have seen that in the case of the socialist
parties of all countries.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, is it true, as the Defendant Göring stated
under oath, that he told you in 1932 that whatever else the Nazis would
do Hitler would not become a “Vice” or second man; that he would oppose
any political set-up which did not give him the first place? Is that
correct?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Hitler always told me that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And therefore you realized that Hitler and his
accomplices wanted a full opportunity to put their program and
intentions into effect, did you not?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that. That is a statement which you make
here which does not reflect the conditions at that time. You need only
read the government program, our coalition of 1 February.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do not be afraid that I am not coming
to the period of your coalition of 30 January. For the moment I am just
asking you one or two questions about your view of Hitler, and
Hindenburg’s view of Hitler in 1932 because I want to take it by very
quick but very clear stages.
I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: Did you
realize that if Hitler and his accomplices came into power they wanted,
and would be content only with, a full opportunity of putting their
program and intentions into effect?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that; otherwise I would not have made the
attempt in 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you have told us, I think, but I just want
to get it quite clear, that your views as to what was necessary for
Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the political
differences and strife internally, and an adjustment of relations with
the Western Powers to ease the requirements of Versailles. I am trying
to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And were these aims—I think your first approach
was to invite Hitler to be Vice Chancellor in your Government in August
1932, was it not?
VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Hitler refused that and he refused a repetition
of your offer in November 1932, is that not right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, in order to save time I just want to see if
Herr Meissner puts the position correctly in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of his
affidavit. I will summarize it for you, and believe me, I will be most
pleased to read anything of which you have any doubt. He puts it in this
way: That in November 1932 you thought that the general situation and
the Nazi Party, in particular, could be controlled if the President gave
you the power to make decrees under Article 48 and you had the support
of the Reichswehr and the Police, and at that time General Von
Schleicher disagreed because he thought that the Reichswehr was not
capable of keeping order in Germany. Is that right?
VON PAPEN: It is incorrect insofar as this process cannot be covered by
any paragraph of the Constitution, but constitutes a breach of the
Constitution. Otherwise it is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That he might have had to use
ultra-constitutional methods to keep control, is that what you mean?
VON PAPEN: Yes. As I have said here he gave me this assignment on 1
December.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but originally, is Meissner right in saying
that you desired, after you had failed to get Hitler into your
Government, to rule by decree and by keeping control with the
Reichswehr, and General Von Schleicher said that it could not be done?
VON PAPEN: Now, that is not true. After President Von Hindenburg had
decided that he did not want to break the Constitution he appointed
General Von Schleicher Reich Chancellor, as is well known. At that time
Herr Von Schleicher wanted to create a majority by splitting the Party
and, of course, I supported this attempt of Herr Von Schleicher’s.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just in case it is any mistake of mine may I
just give you Meissner’s own words. It is Paragraph 5, Page 44 of
Document Book 11a. I think, Defendant, it would be convenient for you to
follow it, if you do not mind, so that there is no possibility of
mistake.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 5 of Herr Meissner’s statement:
“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg
would probably have taken place if he had been prepared to take
up an open fight against the National Socialists, which would
have involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time
of his resignation Papen and some of the other ministers agreed
on the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by
employing all means at the disposal of the State and taking
recourse to Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might
lead to armed conflict. But the other ministers believed that
such a course would lead to civil war.
“The decision was provided by Schleicher who earlier had
recommended energetic action against the National Socialists
even if this meant the use of the Police and the Army. Then in
the decisive Cabinet meeting he abandoned this idea and declared
himself ready for an understanding with Hitler.”
Is that correct?
VON PAPEN: In part it is correct, and in part it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell us as shortly as you can the part which
is not correct.
VON PAPEN: My reappointment as Chancellor by Hindenburg, as Herr
Meissner puts it, would have been possible if I had been ready to wage
an open battle against the Nazis. That is completely false historically.
On 1 December I suggested to Hindenburg that he violate the Constitution
and thereby wage open battle against the Nazi Party. Herr Von Schleicher
contradicted that. That is the historical truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just so that we will have it in sequence, if you
will look at Paragraph 6 of the same document, about the second
sentence, it begins:
“When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter
Schleicher’s Cabinet, and that Schleicher on his part was unable
to split the National Socialist Party as he had hoped to do with
the help of Gregor Strasser, the policy for which Schleicher had
been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked. Schleicher was aware
that Hitler was particularly embittered against him and would
never agree to co-operate with him. Therefore he changed his
mind and decided to fight against the Nazis, which meant that he
now wanted to pursue the policy which he had sharply opposed a
few weeks before, when Papen had suggested it.”
Is that right?
VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you see—I want to get the position quite
clear. You told us that you had approached Hitler first in August;
before you approached Hitler you had already legalized the position of
the SA and the SS, which had been made illegal by Chancellor Brüning.
You did that on 14 June, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I had lifted the prohibition, yes, but only for 4 weeks.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it was a good thing to lift the
prohibition against the SA, the terror of the streets?
VON PAPEN: I stated expressly to the Court how the lifting of this
prohibition came about. The intention was to bring Hitler and his Party
to tolerate my Cabinet. The second reason was that the prohibition of
these formations was one-sided, if the socialist and communist fighting
formations were not also prohibited.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on 20 July you had forcefully got rid of the
Braun-Severing Government and got control of Prussia and the Prussian
police under your own hand?
VON PAPEN: It cannot be expressed in that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you had got rid of the Braun-Severing
Government and got power over Prussia and the Prussian police under your
own hands, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I did not have the Prussian police in my hands. The Reich
Commissioner for Prussia, whom I had appointed—a very moderate man—now
had charge of the Prussian police.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under the Weimar Constitution you, as
Chancellor, had the right to dictate all lines of broad policy, and the
Commissioner for Prussia and every other minister had to take his broad
policy from you; was that not right?
VON PAPEN: After I had appointed a commissioner, I had the right to
determine the general lines of policy for Prussia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to look at a speech
of yours which you made at Essen in November 1933, where you speak about
this time.
It is Document Book 11, Page 54, and it is Page 47 of the German
document book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you see the introductory words:
“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of
the national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I
have tried to support with all my strength the work of the
National Socialist movement and its leader.”
Is that true?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely, yes, that refers to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you if it is true. I may come back
to it again.
“Just as I, when I took over the Chancellorship”—that refers to
you, your taking over the Chancellorship—“advocated paving the
way to power for the young fighting liberation movement.”
Was your work in paving the way to power for the young fighting
liberation movement to legalize the SA and to turn out the moderate
Government in Prussia and centralize the control of the police?
VON PAPEN: No, that would have been a very bad comparison.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause there and tell me if that was not
what you had done. Tell the Tribunal how you had paved the way to power
for the young fighting liberation movement, if it was not by doing that.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I will say that very exactly. The program of the
National Socialist Party provided for the liberation of Germany from the
discrimination to which we were subjected by the Versailles Treaty. I
have spoken here in detail about this. I have explained what efforts I
made to obtain the co-operation of the big powers in this connection. We
wanted to become a big power again, after being a second-rate nation.
That was the meaning of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I do not want to stop you, and the
Tribunal will give you every opportunity of repeating what you said on
that point, but I do want you to answer my question. If I am wrong in
what I have put to you as the two things you have done to pave the way,
just tell us quite shortly: What else had you done to pave the way for
this fighting liberation movement? That is the question. What had you
done?
VON PAPEN: I had asked Hitler twice to join my own Government, and, when
at the end of January 1933 there was no other way out, I formed a
coalition at Hindenburg’s request with the National Socialist Party.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you believe at that time that Hitler
was absolutely necessary for Germany?
VON PAPEN: I was of the opinion that a man who in March 1932, before I
was in the Government, had 36.8 percent of all German votes in the
presidential election, that that man and his party had to be included in
responsible government work.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But beyond his electoral success, did you think
that Hitler, from his personality, aims, and program, was essential for
Germany at that time?
VON PAPEN: I do not know how a party which controlled 36.8 percent of
all German votes could be dealt with by means of the police.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at your own words in the next paragraph of
that letter. You do not seem to refer to merely electoral success:
“The dear Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep
distress a leader who will lead it through all crises and
moments of danger, with the assured instinct of the statesman,
into a happy future.”
That was, shall we say—we will not say extravagant—but rather strong
language for an ex-cavalry officer to use of a political figure if he
did not think, or if he did not want other people to think, that he
firmly believed in him. Did you really mean what you are saying there?
VON PAPEN: May I say the following in answer? After I had formed the
coalition with Hitler, I was convinced that he would keep this pact of
coalition, and repeatedly—not only in this speech—I professed my
allegiance to Hitler and to our joint program, and I have already told
the Court why I took his part precisely in this speech. This was a
question of stating before the whole world that Hitler’s solemn promise
to keep peace was a serious promise to which we all subscribed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am not going to delay. You
understand that what I am putting to you, Defendant, is this: That
during the early months of your Chancellorship you took action and tried
to get Hitler to come in with you. When he refused you for the second
time, you then, according to Meissner, were prepared to use force
against him. When that was refused to you through Schleicher, you
resigned. When Schleicher took over and got into difficulties, you
turned around to Hitler again. That is what I am putting to you; and it
was at your request, was it not, that you and Hitler had the meeting at
the house of Kurt von Schröder on 4 January 1933?
VON PAPEN: No, that is a completely false idea. Unfortunately, the Court
did not permit me to go into detail about this meeting on 4 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you disagree with Von Schröder that it
was at your request that the meeting took place?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. This meeting took
place at Hitler’s wish.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him to tell us about that meeting on 4
January?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly; I am going to deal with it.
Well, now, do you say that Hitler asked for the meeting? I am suggesting
to you, you see, that Von Schröder, who was the intermediary, says that
you asked for the meeting. Do you disagree with that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. What Herr Von
Schröder says does not correspond to the facts. Herr Von Schröder...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you tell the Tribunal who arranged it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I object to the use of the Schröder affidavit. The
document was to be submitted when the Prosecution presented its
evidence. I asked that the witness be called since he is located nearby.
The Court asked the Prosecution to bring the witness. The Prosecution
chose not to call the witness. Now, in cross-examination, the affidavit
is to be used. I do not believe that that is permissible, since the
decision of the Court would be crossed. The Court decided on the use of
the affidavit in conjunction with the witness. Now it would be used
without the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is quite true. I should submit that
it is a different matter using it in cross-examination when Dr.
Kubuschok has put in as part of his own evidence—evidence from
Schulthess’ _Calendar of European History_—an account of this very
meeting, which you will find in Volume I, Page 27, of his document book,
and then, surely, if evidence of this kind has been put in a document
book, I am entitled to challenge that evidence in cross-examination by
the affidavit of Von Schröder.
My Lord, I am sorry, I should have gone further. My friend has put in an
actual statement from Baron von Schröder, which appears on Page 26. He
says that at the same time Baron von Schröder handed the following
declaration to the County Bureau to correct the false press news.
“The initiative for bringing about a discussion between former
Reich Chancellor Von Papen, as the representative of the widest
National Conservative circles, and Herr Hitler, as the sole
leader of the National Socialist movement, emanated solely from
me personally.”
I should have thought that, inasmuch as a statement from Von Schröder
has been put in, I am entitled to challenge that with another statement
of Von Schröder.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I say something, Mr. President?
There are two entirely different things here. Sir David is referring to
a document which I produced from Schulthess’ _Calendar of History_. That
is a joint communiqué by Papen and Schröder, which was published in the
papers at the time. I object, however, to an affidavit of the witness
Schröder, and I pointed it out at the time. The Prosecution agreed with
me at that time that Schröder was a person open to suspicion under the
Indictment and that he himself was involved in the matter to such an
extent that producing an affidavit is possible only if we have an
opportunity to put the appropriate question to Von Schröder. At any
rate, what is here is nothing but a copy of contemporary documents from
the historical calendar by Schulthess. These documents, in agreement
with the Prosecution, were accepted by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, can you not put the facts without relying on
the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I can quite easily, My Lord; I will do that.
At this meeting, Defendant, did you not suggest—I am sorry, I
apologize. I think we should have gotten the surroundings. First we will
get where it was and who was there.
It was in Baron von Schröder’s house in Cologne, I think, or his flat in
Cologne; is that not right?
VON PAPEN: Yes, but no friend of mine.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the people who were in the house—and I
will come to who were present at the meeting: Hitler’s party, that is,
himself, the Defendant Hess, Himmler, and Keppler, was it not?
VON PAPEN: That is possible, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keppler is the gentleman of whom the Tribunal
have heard as being in Vienna in March of 1938, is that not so?
VON PAPEN: He was a man who was always in Hitler’s entourage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the actual discussion took place between
you and Hitler, with Von Schröder present. Is that not so?
VON PAPEN: No. Perhaps I might give the Court a short account of the
conference as the Court desired.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I think it is easier to put the facts to
you. I will take them quite shortly. I am in the hands of the Tribunal.
Do you say that Von Schröder was not present?
VON PAPEN: Schröder may have been present for parts of the conversation.
I recall that in the main I talked to Hitler alone.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The meeting started at about 11:30 in the
morning, did it not? The meeting between you and Hitler?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the first point that you raised was to
explain to Hitler that although you had not been able to release the two
Nazis who had been condemned for killing a Communist, that you had tried
to get President Von Hindenburg to pardon them. Is that not right?
VON PAPEN: I recall that Hitler strongly reproached me because of the
death sentence against these National Socialists.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the second point that you raised as an
explanation to Hitler was that it was not through any intrigue or
machinations of yours that President Von Hindenburg had refused to
discuss with Hitler the question of Hitler’s becoming Chancellor. Was
that not the second point; it was not you who had caused Von Hindenburg
to refuse the discussion?
VON PAPEN: Yes. I explained that my offer to him of 13 August 1932 had
been meant absolutely honestly.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that was an answer to your question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not explain to Hitler that it was not
your fault that Von Hindenburg had refused to discuss the question of
making Hitler Chancellor in August of 1932...
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...when Hitler had met Von Hindenburg?
VON PAPEN: No, that cannot be right, for according to the evidence of
historical documents Hitler had a talk with Von Hindenburg on 13 August,
and Hindenburg explained to him the reasons why he did not agree to
Hitler’s Chancellorship.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you is that you told Hitler
on 4 January, when you had that talk with Von Hindenburg: “I want you to
understand it was not my fault that Von Hindenburg was not ready to
discuss the question of your being Chancellor.” Did you not tell him
that, that it was not your fault, that you thought Von Hindenburg would
have been ready?
VON PAPEN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, that is what Herr Von Schröder says; but
that is not right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, what do you say was said on the point
of Von Hindenburg and Hitler? If you do not accept what I suggest to
you, what do you say?
VON PAPEN: What Hindenburg told Hitler can be read in all the books;
that is a well-known matter of history.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no. What we want to know—if I may say so,
with great respect to the Tribunal—is what you told Hitler on 4
January. What did you tell him, if you told him anything, about the
position between President Von Hindenburg and himself?
VON PAPEN: If you had permitted me to make an explanation about the
course of the conference, I would already have explained that.
In the course of this talk I did nothing but call Hitler’s attention to
the fact of how necessary it was to reach an agreement with Herr Von
Schleicher, how necessary it was to enter his Government. In other
words, I continued those efforts which I had made in 1932 to induce the
Nazi Party to co-operate.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that you
told Hitler that he should go into a Schleicher Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: I told him he should enter a Schleicher Cabinet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I put to you. I am suggesting that
is entirely wrong. What you suggested to Hitler was that it would be a
sound thing for the conservatives and nationalists, whose political
views coincided with yours, to join with Hitler in forming a government,
that you put to him what actually happened on 30 January, you suggested
it to him at this meeting. Do you say that is untrue?
VON PAPEN: Not one word is true; that is absolutely false. As proof of
this, I state the following:
Immediately after the conversation I wrote a letter to Schleicher, on 4
January, in the afternoon. He probably received this letter on the
morning of the 5th. However, even before Herr Von Schleicher received
this letter of mine on the actual substance of the talk, the morning
papers of 5 January started a tremendous campaign against me, asserting
that this talk with Schröder showed disloyalty to Schleicher. Returning
to Berlin, I went to see Herr Von Schleicher immediately, and I
explained to him what the substance of our talk had actually been. Herr
Von Schleicher then published a communiqué on this subject. This
communiqué...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But he was not the only person, you know, that
published a communiqué. You and Hitler published a communiqué.
I want you to remember, Defendant, I put to you that the suggestion from
you was that you and Hitler would form a coalition with the conservative
forces behind you, and the National Socialist forces behind Hitler. Now
just look at the communiqué that you and Hitler issued.
Will you give the defendant Document Number D-637. My Lord, this is a
new document, which will become GB-496.
Look at the foot of it, Defendant, the end of the document:
“Adolf Hitler and Herr Von Papen publish the following joint
declaration:
“In answer to false deductions which have in many cases been
circulated in the press regarding Adolf Hitler’s meeting with
the former Reich Chancellor Von Papen, the undersigned declare
that the conversation dealt exclusively with the question of the
possibility of a great national political united front and that
in particular the opinions of both parties on the present Reich
Cabinet were not touched on at all in this general discussion.”
Now, Defendant, when you have been reminded of what you published
yourself, is it not correct what I have put to you, that you suggested
to Hitler that you should form this coalition of conservatives and
nationalists who agreed with you, and the Nazi Party under Hitler?
VON PAPEN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, this communiqué states two things: In the
first place, I point out that we did not speak at all about overthrowing
the Schleicher Cabinet or replacing it by another government, as the
press generally assumed. Then I state that it is necessary to create “a
great national, political united front.” Herr Von Schleicher headed the
same Cabinet that I had headed, with the same political forces. So if I
called on Hitler to enter this Cabinet, then that is exactly the same
political combination as if I had asked him to join my Cabinet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am not going to argue with you. If
you say that that communiqué is your way of expressing that you had
asked Hitler to take the Nazis into Von Schleicher’s Government, and
that you had not discussed forming the coalition, if you say that that
is what that communiqué expresses, I have no further questions, and I
will pass on to another point. I have made my suggestion, and I suggest
the communiqué bears it out.
But now, let us come to the next action of yours. Do you deny that
during January you were active in making contact with Hitler, and on
Hitler’s behalf with President Von Hindenburg, in order to bring Hitler
into the Government? Or do you agree with that?
VON PAPEN: That is true, and I will say in what respect. I had two
official talks with Hindenburg. On 9 January, when I returned to Berlin,
I went from Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher to Reich President Von
Hindenburg. Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher, being of the opinion that
in the Schröder talk I had been disloyal to him, had asked Von
Hindenburg not to receive me any more. I informed Von Hindenburg of the
actual contents of the Schröder talk and, after I had reached an
agreement with Von Schleicher, Hindenburg was also convinced that the
whole thing had been a big misunderstanding.
Then, to the best of my memory, I did not talk officially to Herr Von
Hindenburg about these governmental matters again until 22 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see what the Chief of the
Presidential Chancellery says about it, and see whether he can reinforce
your memory. Would you look at Herr Meissner’s affidavit, at the second
part of Paragraph 6?
[_A document was handed to the defendant._]
My Lord, it is 11a, Page 45, about 7 lines from the foot of the page.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You see, just after the first section of
Paragraph 6, Defendant, the second part, it begins:
“Schleicher first made these suggestions to Hindenburg in the
middle of January....”
Then the next sentence is:
“In the meantime Papen had returned to Berlin and, through
arrangements with Hindenburg’s son, had several talks with the
President. When Schleicher renewed his demand for emergency
powers, Hindenburg declared that he was unable to give him such
blank authority and must reserve for himself decisions in every
individual case. Schleicher, for his part, said that under these
circumstances he was unable to stay in the Government and
tendered his resignation on 28 January 1933.”
Then, Paragraph 7:
“In the middle of January, when Schleicher first asked for
exceptional powers, Hindenburg was not aware of the meetings
between Papen and Hitler, particularly the meeting which had
taken place in the house of the Cologne banker, Kurt von
Schröder. In the second part of January Papen played an
increasingly important role in the house of the Reich President,
but in spite of Papen’s persuasions Hindenburg was extremely
hesitant, until the end of January, to appoint Hitler
Chancellor. He wanted to have Papen as Chancellor once more.
Papen finally won him to Hitler with the argument that the
representatives of the other right-wing parties which would
belong to the government would restrict Hitler’s freedom of
action. In addition Papen expressed his misgivings that, if the
present opportunity were once again neglected, a revolt of the
National Socialists and civil war would be likely.”
Is that right?
VON PAPEN: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I make a comment on the use of the Meissner
affidavit? The case is similar to but not quite the same as the Schröder
case. The Meissner affidavit was not offered to the Court during the
proceedings. But during the Prosecution’s case it came to my knowledge
that a Meissner affidavit was to be used. I talked to the Prosecution
and pointed out that I would not under any circumstances be satisfied
with the submitting of the Meissner affidavit, but would insist on
calling Meissner as a witness. The reason is the same. The personality
of the witness Meissner, who was very involved in these affairs, makes
extreme caution advisable. The Prosecution told me that they would not
use the affidavit, and finally told me that they would not call Schröder
as a witness. I had no reason to call the witness myself. Now I am in a
position where the affidavit is being submitted in cross-examination,
and I am unable to question or expose the suspect witness Meissner
before the Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, concerning the position with regard to
this affidavit, Major Barrington tells me that he did not have it when
he presented the individual case against Von Papen. I am using it now.
If the Tribunal thinks there is sufficient divergence between what the
witness accepts and the affidavit to justify it, I have not the
slightest objection to Dr. Kubuschok’s making application for Meissner
to be cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about the allegation of Dr. Kubuschok
that the Prosecution says they were not going to use the affidavit?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not say that. Major Barrington,
who was with me, had no recollection of my saying that at all. Major
Barrington certainly never said that. It was never our intention,
because it clearly was a most important document for us to use.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The 28th of November. We gave a copy to Dr.
Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
Mr. President, may I explain? The British Prosecution did not make a
binding statement that they would not submit the affidavit and not call
the witness. I always said that if an affidavit were to be used, I would
call the witness. I asked the Prosecution repeatedly, “Are you going to
call the witness or not?” They said, “No.” Then I said, “Then I am not
interested in it. We will drop this whole subject, and I will not call
the witness.”
THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit seems to have been made a long time ago.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Actually, it was almost as soon as the Tribunal began. I
think that perhaps you ought to use the facts and not use the affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am perfectly prepared to do whatever
the Tribunal wants. If there is any question, and Dr. Kubuschok wants
Meissner for cross-examination, as far as I am concerned, he can have
him. I mean, I am in a slightly different position from that with
respect to Von Schröder. As far as fairness is concerned, I want Your
Lordship to understand that certainly none of my staff thought for a
moment that the Defense understood we were not going to use it, because
we always intended to use it. We gave a copy of this affidavit to the
Defense so that there would be ample notice of this affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, that was done, and I gratefully acknowledged it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am really anxious not to occupy too
much of the Tribunal’s time. I would rather go on and put the facts in
and save any discussion about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, do that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you said, Defendant—you put it that you
had two meetings with President Von Hindenburg and then, I think, after
18 January you had meetings with Hitler, and after 22 January you had
meetings with the Defendant Göring, as he said in his evidence, is that
not so?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not meet with Hitler from 4 January until 22
January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will call it about 4 days, the dates of the
Nazi Party say that you began negotiations on the 18th, but we will not
quarrel about a day or two. The crucial meeting was the meeting which
was arranged with Oskar von Hindenburg at the Defendant Von Ribbentrop’s
house, was it not?
VON PAPEN: It was a preliminary talk; it was at any rate the first
contact with the National Socialists, with Hitler, and with Göring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Oskar von Hindenburg had private
conversations with Hitler which lasted for about an hour, at that
meeting at Von Ribbentrop’s house; is that not so?
VON PAPEN: That is possible. I do not recall it any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And thereafter, the decision was come to that
Hitler would become Chancellor in the new Government and that he would
bring into the Government the Defendant Frick as Minister of the
Interior, and the Defendant Göring as Minister without Portfolio, and he
himself would head the Government as Chancellor?
VON PAPEN: No; on the 22d, we did not reach any agreement as to this;
rather we limited ourselves to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said only within a few days that had been
agreed between you, had it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, but it is very important to establish—forgive me if I
add this—that we did not begin these talks until after it was certain
that Herr Von Schleicher could not form a government, after the attempt
to split the Nazi Party had failed. That is very important.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, are you telling the Tribunal that at this
time you did what you have agreed you have done to bring Hitler into
power, simply because he was head of the biggest party in the Reichstag,
or because you thought he was the most suitable man to be Chancellor of
Germany at that date; which was your motive?
VON PAPEN: My motive, Mr. Prosecutor, was very simple. In the situation
existing after 23 January, there were only two possibilities, either to
violate the Constitution, which would result in civil war, or to form a
government headed by Hitler. I believe I explained that in great detail
to the Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I really want to know, Defendant, is that
at this time you had had these contacts with Hitler. You have been
Chancellor of Germany yourself. At this time did you think that Hitler
personally, and Hitler’s aims and intentions and personality, were a
good thing for Germany to have as Chancellor? It is a perfectly simple
question. I want a straight answer. Did you think it was a good thing to
have Hitler, as you knew him then, as Chancellor of Germany?
VON PAPEN: To that I can say only that the coalition which I formed on
behalf of the Reich President was a forced solution. There was no
question of whether it was better or worse. We had to accept it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just let us see. I think you said
that you were not certain that Hitler would eliminate opposition before
he came into power. How long did it take you, after Hitler became
Chancellor, to find out that his desire was to eliminate all opposition?
VON PAPEN: I realized that finally when I made the last attempt in my
Marburg speech to hold him to the joint program, and when this attempt
failed...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 18 months later, on 17 June 1934. Are
you telling the Tribunal that it took you 17 months to realize that
Hitler wanted to break down the opposition?
VON PAPEN: No, I told the Court...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you of one or two things. Do
you remember Herr Ernst Heilmann, who had been the leader of the Social
Democrats in the Prussian Diet?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was, I think, for 10 years a member of the
Prussian Diet with you. He went into a concentration camp at once and
was treated with the most terrible cruelty, was he not?
VON PAPEN: I learned of that later, here, for the first time. I did not
know it at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not
know in 1933 that Ernst Heilmann went into a concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: I knew only that a number of political opponents, Communists
and Socialists, had been sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo.
That I knew.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, answer my question. Here was the leader of
the Social Democrats in the Prussian Diet, a man who sat in Parliament
with you for 10 years. Do you say that you did not know that he had gone
to a concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: I do not recall, no. I believe I learned of it only here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let me give you a famous name, Karl
von Ossietzki, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, the author and
journalist. Did you not know that he had gone into a concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: I remember Herr Ossietzki only as the publisher of a
periodical; otherwise I know nothing about him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know that he was the 1936 winner of
the Nobel Peace Prize, did you?
VON PAPEN: I could not possibly have known that in 1933.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but you did not know he won it later on? Did
you not know that he was put in prison?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought I might have connected his name with
you. Let me take somebody else. Take Dr. Ernst Eckstein, who had been a
Reichstag Deputy, who was a well-known lawyer from Breslau. Did you not
know that he was put in a concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know Dr. Eckstein, unfortunately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Or Dr. Joachim, the Social Democrat lawyer from
Berlin. Did you know he was put in a concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him and I did not know this either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, apart from individuals, did you not
know that within a few months of Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, hundreds,
if not thousands, of Social Democrats and Communists went into a
concentration camp?
VON PAPEN: Thousands?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us say hundreds, if you like. That is
the figure Defendant Göring agreed to, so let us take, as the inside
figure, hundreds of Social Democrats and Communists. Minister Severing
put it at 1,500 of each; did you not know that?
VON PAPEN: I recall very exactly that the Defendant Göring came to the
Cabinet one day after he had had the headquarters of the Communist
Party, the Liebknecht Haus, taken over by the Police. He told the
Cabinet that he had found a great number of documents which showed to
what extent the Communists and other elements were trying to disturb
public order and overthrow the new Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you answer my questions. Did you not
know that hundreds of Social Democrats and Communists had been put in
concentration camps?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know there were hundreds. I knew that
individual leaders had been thrown into concentration camps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you mentioned, in giving your evidence to
the Court, that the Amnesty Decree of 21 March was only the sort of
thing that had happened before; that was a concretely one-sided amnesty,
was it not? It was an amnesty to those who had fought in the national
revolution, that is, an amnesty for Nazis. It was not an amnesty for
Communists or Social Democrats or anyone who had been on the other side,
was it?
VON PAPEN: Quite true, yes. It was an amnesty for the people who had
worked against the formation of the Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you knew these things. Well, in your speech
at Essen, let us just look at it again; your own account of what you
have done. It is Page 54 of Document Book 11. You just told me that it
was true what you said in that speech—this was in November—that you
had tried to support with all your strength the work of the National
Socialist movement and its leader and, if you will notice, you say later
on that you were “selected by a gracious fate to put the hand of our
Chancellor and Führer into the hand of our beloved Field Marshal.” By
November 1933 you must have had a very good idea about the way that
Hitler, your Chancellor and Führer, was dealing with those who were
politically opposed to him. Why were you—you told us your point of
view—why were you saying how proud you were to have supported with all
your strength the work of the National Socialist Party unless you agreed
with it?
VON PAPEN: Hitler’s and the Party’s acts in violation of the coalition
policy we opposed to the best of our power within the Cabinet.
Certainly, we knew of these violations. I, personally, in many speeches
which have not been submitted to the Court, referred to these
violations, but as long as this coalition pact was in existence I had to
hope that we would put our views through, and only for this reason did I
therefore assure Hitler of my loyalty so that he, on his part, would be
loyal to the others of us.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just give you the last words. Here you are
appealing in a careful and special appeal to your Catholic fellow
citizens, and you say:
“Let us in this hour say to the Führer and the new Germany that
we believe in him and his work.”
Why did you talk like that when you must have known, in November 1933,
that his program was to smash opposition, smash his political opponents,
smash the trade unions and put himself in complete control of Germany?
Why were you making speeches like that unless you believed and agreed
with everything Hitler wanted to do?
VON PAPEN: I will tell you that very precisely. You know that in July of
that year I concluded the Concordat, and that I received Hitler’s
assurance that he would make religious peace the basis of his policy.
The more conservative elements could be brought to back the Government,
so much the better it would be for the fulfillment of my program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your answer, we will pass to another
point. I think you said today, or you said a few moments ago, that you
began to realize what sort of team you were running with when you made
the Marburg speech on 17 June. Now, please do not think I am being
offensive...
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I request of the Tribunal that
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow my client, Herr Von Neurath, be
absent from the session so that he may prepare and complete his own
defense?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you have told the Tribunal a
considerable amount about your Marburg speech. Was one of your
associates a gentleman called Jung?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And—believe me I do not mean it in any
offensive way—Herr Jung had helped you considerably with the
composition of the Marburg speech, had he not?
VON PAPEN: Herr Jung quite frequently drafted outlines for speeches of
mine, and the same applies to the Marburg speech.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. He was shot after the 30th of June, was he
not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a man for whom you had not only great
affection, but for whose political views—I think you would call him a
progressive conservative—you had great respect and agreement, is that
not so?
VON PAPEN: Perfectly right, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have told us about Herr Von Bose. He was
shot. Herr Von Tschirschsky was arrested by two different lots of
people, was he not, after this occasion?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was Herr Von Savigny arrested?
VON PAPEN: I cannot remember. I do not think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, in all—it does not matter about the
names—there were two members of your staff who were shot, and three
were arrested, were they not?
VON PAPEN: One member of my staff was shot, and two were arrested. Herr
Jung was not a member of my staff.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Jung was not a member of your staff, but he
was a close associate of yours. Now...
VON PAPEN: He was an associate who, as I said, quite often assisted me,
when I was very busy, by drafting outlines for speeches, and with whom I
exchanged conservative ideas.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, of course, it is common knowledge that
General Von Schleicher and his wife were also shot, and—I think my
recollection is right—that General Von Bredow was shot too, was he not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were placed under arrest, as you have
told us, for 3 days, and I think your files were taken, were they not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did this performance shake your faith in the
regime?
VON PAPEN: My faith in what? I beg your pardon.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did this performance shake your faith in the
regime and in Hitler?
VON PAPEN: Quite. I explained to the Tribunal yesterday that by this
action the Pact of 30 January had been broken.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you offered your resignation on 2 July, I
think.
VON PAPEN: No, I offered it even earlier.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had already offered it on 18 or 19 June, and
you reaffirmed your offer on 2 July.
VON PAPEN: Quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite right; my mistake. Now, do you tell the
Tribunal that you reaffirmed your offer of resignation because you had
lost your faith in the regime, or because of the insult to your own
pride, because of your being arrested and having your files taken and
your secretaries shot?
VON PAPEN: I offered my resignation, first, because of the unbearable
affront to my own person and my staff and, secondly, because by this
action the Pact of 30 January had been broken by Hitler and because any
political co-operation with him in domestic matters had become
impossible for me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, just look at Document Number D-714,
will you. My Lord, this will be GB-497.
This is a letter from you to Hitler written on 4 July, and you say:
“Yesterday at 10 in the morning I had the honor of informing you
orally of my attitude towards the events of the last days, after
my term in police custody had been suspended on 2 July at 9
o’clock in the evening. At this time I pointed out to you that I
could not possibly take my seat in the Cabinet until my honor
and that of my officials has been restored.
“On 30 June five of my co-workers were arrested; one of them was
shot. My files have been confiscated, my office sealed, and my
private secretary also arrested. This is still the position at
the moment.
“A procedure of this kind against the second highest official of
the State could be justified only if he and his officials were
guilty of complicity in the plot against Führer and nation.
“It is in the interest not only of protecting my personal honor
but even more so of protecting the authority and decency of the
State that either the guilt in this case be proved at once or
honor restored.”
Then you say:
“The events have become known abroad, in part in distorted
form....”
And that for that reason not a single hour should be lost. You appeal to
his soldierly sense of honor, and you ask that the case should be put in
the hands of the Prosecutor General, or a communiqué published stating:
“....that the investigations had established no evidence of any
complicity in the plot, in order that my honor and that of my
officials thus be restored.
“If you do not wish to undertake these steps, my remaining in
the Cabinet any longer would be an impossibility.”
Now look at the rest of the letter.
“I had placed my office at your disposal, Chancellor, as early
as 18 and 19 June. I can ask for my dismissal with a much
lighter heart today since the work jointly commenced by us on 30
January 1933 now appears to have been made secure against
further revolts. At the same time I request to be relieved of my
position as Commissioner for the Saar.
“I assume that you will make your decision regarding the
restoration of my honor, for which I am asking you, within the
next few hours.
“I remain loyally devoted to you and to your work for our
Germany.”
Was it true that it lightened your heart that the work of Hitler now
appeared to be secured against further revolts?
VON PAPEN: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it true what you say there, that it lightened
your heart that the work of Hitler now appeared to be secured against
further revolt?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I was under the impression that there had been a
revolution which he had suppressed. This letter was written one day
after I was released from custody, and I had the feeling there had been
a revolution and now it was settled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that General Von Schleicher and his
wife had been killed?
VON PAPEN: I do not think I knew that at this moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You just knew that Herr Von Bose had been shot?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is mentioned in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you knew there was not the slightest reason
on earth for General Von Schleicher, Jung, and Bose being shot, did you
not?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know the reason. As far as I remember...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you knew that there was no reason, did you
not?
VON PAPEN: No, to my question regarding the reason Hitler replied that
Herr Von Bose had been involved in a matter of giving information to the
foreign press.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So that we may take it that you were
speaking with your head and your heart, and with complete confidence and
sincerity when you said: “I remain loyally devoted to you and to your
work for our Germany,” on 4 July 1934, is that right?
VON PAPEN: Yes, because I had to hope that his further work would not
lead to any disadvantages for Germany, even though he might separate
himself from me as far as matters of domestic policy were concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You need not go on with the letters. You may
take it that I shall deal with them in time, so do not read the others
in advance.
As a result of that, you saw Hitler on that day, did you not?
Would you mind just answering my questions. I assure you I will take you
through these letters.
You saw Hitler on that day?
VON PAPEN: I saw him earlier.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also saw him after.
VON PAPEN: I saw him the day before. In the letter it says...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but you saw him after this letter, and did
you not agree with Hitler to remain Vice Chancellor until September, and
that you would then take employment under the Foreign Office?
VON PAPEN: I do not believe so, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you do not believe that, look at the
next letter which is D-715, which becomes Exhibit GB-498.
This is a letter of 10 July, and it begins:
“Our agreement of 4 July”—that is the date of the last
letter—“to the effect that I am to retain my position as Vice
Chancellor until September and then be employed in the Foreign
Service was based between us on the following condition: The
immediate and complete restoration of my authority and honor,
which will enable me to remain in the service of the Reich, in
whatever capacity.”
Now, do you tell the Tribunal that on 10 July you did not know that
General Von Schleicher and his wife had been killed and General Von
Bredow had been killed and that Jung as well as Bose had been murdered?
You say you did not know on 10 July?
VON PAPEN: I am not denying by any means that I knew that, but as I have
already told the Tribunal I demanded that an investigation regarding all
these matters be conducted so that we might know the precise reasons for
them.
It was stated to the public that Schleicher was shot in self-defense, so
that all these matters at the time were not at all clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is correct, of course, as you write here,
that you had agreed with Hitler to carry on as Vice Chancellor until
September and then to be employed in the Foreign Service on this
condition, is that right?
VON PAPEN: No, that is not correct, for I have already explained...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your letter, Defendant, it is your own
letter.
VON PAPEN: Yes, but this letter was written because Hitler had promised
me a clarification, an investigation which would enable me, after my
honor had been restored and all these crimes cleared up, to remain in
the service of the Reich. But that was never done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Von Bose and Jung had been working with you in
close co-operation and if anyone knew whether they were innocent men or
not it was you. Why did you, with that knowledge, agree with Hitler to
carry on as Vice Chancellor and then to enter the Foreign Service?
VON PAPEN: I have stated that I had resigned. The sentence dealing with
my possibly remaining in office is only a supposition.
_De facto_ I had resigned and _de facto_ I did not exercise any
governmental activity from 4 July on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next words in this letter:
“To this end I submitted to you on 5 July my proposal for a
statement to be issued officially, explaining why the arrest of
a number of officials of my staff had taken place and how Von
Bose had lost his life, and averring the nonparticipation of all
the members of my staff in the SA revolt. This statement
requested by me was approved and published by you only in part,
inasmuch as the release and innocence of Herr Von Tschirschsky,
Herr Von Savigny, and of my private secretary, Stotzingen, were
announced.”
You had put before Hitler your own version and asked him to pass it and
he would not pass it. He would not clear the people who were working
closely with you and yet you had agreed with him. You had agreed with
him to continue as Vice Chancellor and to go into the Foreign Service.
You see what I am putting to you? I am putting to you quite clearly that
all you cared about was your own personal position, your dignity being
restored. You were prepared to serve these murderers so long as your own
dignity was put right.
VON PAPEN: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot give better proof for my intentions
to separate myself from the regime than lies in the fact of my actual
resignation. If everything had been clarified, if the fact that my
employees and officials had been innocent when they were arrested and
murdered had been made clear, then perhaps it might have been possible
for me to remain in the service of the Reich, but not as Vice
Chancellor, from which position I had resigned. But you can see from
this letter that Hitler made no attempt to give such a declaration.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And as a result of his making no such attempts
you wrote an even more fulsome statement of your admiration for his
actions. Look at Document Number D-716, which will become Exhibit
GB-499.
“Most honored Reich Chancellor:
“I reflected a long time on our conversation of yesterday, and
the statements made to me, in particular what you told me about
your intentions regarding your Reichstag speech, have occupied
me constantly in view of the enormous importance of the speech
and its special effect on Germany’s position in the sphere of
foreign politics as well. I therefore feel impelled, in fact I
feel it my duty, to let you know my opinion, as I have
frequently done on previous occasions.
“You explained to me yesterday that you intend publicly to
accept responsibility for everything that happened in connection
with the crushing of the SA revolt. Allow me to tell you how
manly and humanly great I consider this intention. The crushing
of the revolt and your courageous and firm personal intervention
have met with nothing but recognition throughout the entire
world.
“What are, however, at the moment a burden on Germany are solely
those events that took place outside the bounds of your own
initiative and without any immediate connection with the revolt,
such as the examples you yourself gave me. This has been given
expression particularly in the British and American press.”
Then, leaving out three paragraphs, you say:
“Allow me to assure you once again that my person or my
position, except for the restoration of my personal honor, do
not matter at all and are at issue only insofar as the events in
the Vice Chancellery on 30 June are being regarded by the public
as the consequence of a breach between you and me.”
Then, after some more of the same you finish up:
“With unchanged admiration and loyalty....”
Did it not come to this, Defendant, that so long as you could get your
dignity cleared it did not matter whether your collaborators were shot
or the Government of which you had been a member had adopted murder as
an instrument of policy? These things did not matter to you so long as
you kept your own dignity and the chance of a future job in the Foreign
Service.
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you write stuff like that to the
head of a gang of murderers who had murdered your collaborators? Why did
you write to him:
“The crushing of the revolt, your courageous and firm personal
intervention have met with nothing but recognition throughout
the entire world.”
Why did you write it?
VON PAPEN: Because at that time it was my opinion that there actually
had been a revolution and that Hitler had crushed it. That on the other
hand numerous people had been murdered, members of my own office staff,
that was something about which Hitler was to ascertain the truth.
When he told me that he himself would assume responsibility, I
considered this an excellent act on his part, though not, as it was
actually done afterwards by Hitler, when he stated to the Reichstag that
these events were proper. I understood it to mean that if he himself
assumed responsibility for these events he would clarify them to the
world and not state to the world in a law without any investigation that
they were proper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you tell the Tribunal that on 12 July you
thought there was any doubt or any possibility that your friend Jung
could be guilty of treason against the Reich or of a plot against
Hitler? Did you believe that for an instant?
VON PAPEN: Herr Hitler explained to me at that time that the shooting of
Bose was first of all only a...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I asked first of all about yourself. I
asked, did you believe for a moment that Jung had been guilty of treason
against the Reich or of a plot against Hitler?
VON PAPEN: No, certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you knew very well that Hitler was
worried from the point of view of foreign opinion as to publicity being
given to the effect of a break between you and him, did you not?
You knew that the support, after the blood purge, of an ex-Chancellor of
the German Reich and, as you have told us, a Catholic of old family with
great position amongst the German population—the support of someone of
that kind would be of great value to him after this blood purge, which
had caused foreign opinion to be very disturbed, did you not? You knew
that?
VON PAPEN: No, it seems clear from this letter that I constantly asked
Herr Hitler to ascertain why and for what reasons action had been taken
in this manner against my associates and me. He was to explain this to
the world.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, if you, as an ex-Chancellor of
the Reich and, as you said yourself, one of the leading Catholic laymen
of Germany, an ex-officer of the Imperial Army, had said at that time “I
am not going to be associated with murder, cold-blooded murder as an
instrument of policy,” you might at some risk to yourself have brought
down the whole of this rotten regime, might you not?
VON PAPEN: That is possible, but had I said it publicly, then quite
probably I would have disappeared somewhere just as my associates did.
And, apart from that, the world knew from my resignation that I did not
identify myself with this affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you were writing. If you
look at Document Number D-717, which will become Exhibit GB-500, that
emphasizes the importance that Hitler was attaching to your adherence.
If you will look at the second paragraph—I will read it, it is quite
short. You say:
“I hope you have received my letter of yesterday and that you
received it in the spirit in which it was intended.
“Today I ask you, for personal reasons, to excuse me from
participating in the session of the Reichstag. Yesterday you
were, indeed, of the opinion that my staying away might create
the impression that there was disagreement between us. But this
impression can surely not arise if in your statements you refer
to the case of the Vice Chancellery in the way in which you
promised me you would.
“During all these days I have behaved with the greatest possible
reserve towards the outside world and have shown myself as
little as possible, and you will surely understand my not
wanting to appear in public again until every shadow has been
removed from me.
“I have also asked the Party Chairman to excuse my absence.”
Who is the Party Chairman? Is that the Chairman of the Nazi Party?
VON PAPEN: No, I believe the Chairman of the Party was Dr. Frick.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was the Government Party, was it?
VON PAPEN: Yes. The letter shows that I requested Hitler to give an
account of the actions undertaken against me and my associates before
the Reichstag.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You wanted a statement saying that you had never
swerved from your loyalty towards him; that is what you wanted, was it
not?
VON PAPEN: No, I wanted...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you disagree with that, look at
Document Number D-718, which will become Exhibit GB-501, and see what
you say the next day:
“Most honored Chancellor:
“After you have given the nation and the world last night your
great account of the internal developments which led up to 30
June, I feel the need to shake your hand, as I did on 30 January
1933, and to thank you for all you have given anew to the German
nation by crushing the intended second revolution and by
announcing irrevocable and statesmanlike principles.
“Painful, tragic circumstances have prevented me for the first
time since 30 January from appearing at your side. You yourself
excused me and showed understanding for the fact that a Vice
Chancellor cannot take his seat on the ministerial bench as long
as he finds himself subjected to special treatment. (My
confiscated files have still not been returned to me, in spite
of Göring’s and your own orders.)
“Your statements clearly show to history that any suspicion of a
connection between my person and these treasonable practices was
an intentional defamation and calumniation. I thank you for
stating this.”
Then, after saying that people are still believing it, in the
penultimate paragraph you say:
“I should, therefore, be grateful if you could soon find the
occasion to point out positively that up to today”—that was 14
July—“I have loyally stood by and fought for you, your
leadership, and your work for Germany.”
Now, Defendant, do you deny what I put to you a moment ago, that all you
wanted was your loyalty to the regime to be made clear to the world? It
was not worrying you at all that Von Schleicher and his wife, and Von
Bose, and Jung, and all these other people had been murdered by the
Government of the Reich; otherwise, why did you write a letter like
that?
VON PAPEN: I wrote this letter, as the letter itself shows, because I
was still being accused of having agreed to the attempts on the lives of
Goebbels and Göring and of various other conspiracies. That is the
reason why it was important to me to have Chancellor Hitler state that I
was not involved in any conspiracies against him in connection with the
various actions of this revolt. Of course, first of all I dealt in this
letter with my position and the position of my associates. The
restoration of General Von Schleicher’s honor was the task of the Army,
and not my task.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will come to that when we deal with the
Army, but at the moment, you see, what I am putting to you is this: That
even after you knew that your own friends had been murdered, to say
nothing of your old colleagues, your own friends had been murdered, you
again and again protest your loyalty and the fact that you had always
worked and co-operated with Hitler in all his work. Was that honest? Is
what is contained in these letters honest, or do you say they were just
lies in order to protect yourself?
VON PAPEN: No, I wrote that because, in fact, the entire action against
me, Himmler’s attempt to murder me, the fact that I was arrested, were
all based on the supposition that I had participated in a conspiracy
against Hitler’s Government. It had therefore to be clarified that as
long as I was a member of this Government, I had acted toward it with
absolute loyalty. That is the reason why I was asking for this
clarification.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember your learned counsel, on your
instructions, putting an interrogatory to Baron von Lersner? It is
Number 2(a) on Page 212 of Defense Document Book 3, Question 2(a):
“Did the Defendant Von Papen continue to hope to change Hitler’s
policy to his own way of thinking by impregnating it with
conservative ideas, until the murders taking place on 30 June
1934 and Hitler’s justification of them had convinced him that
his efforts and his hope had been in vain?”
And Baron von Lersner, not unnaturally, answers “yes” to that question.
Does that correctly express your point of view “....until the murders
taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler’s approval of them had convinced
him....”—that is you—“that your efforts and your hopes had been in
vain”? Do you agree with that? It is an interrogatory put by your own
learned counsel.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I agree with that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your view, why did you write these
letters expressing this fulsome admiration of Hitler?
VON PAPEN: What I wished to express in the interrogatory, or rather what
I wanted Herr Von Lersner to be asked was the following: Is it
correct...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The answers the witness expects are in his
question. It is one of the best examples of a leading question I have
ever seen. You say that your interrogatory expresses your view, do you
not?
VON PAPEN: I might say that if I were of this opinion that with the 30th
of June it became apparent that further co-operation with Hitler was no
longer possible and that, therefore, the coalition program which had
been agreed upon between us had collapsed...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say again that you have an unchanged loyalty
and admiration and that you have co-operated?
“I remain loyally devoted to you for your work, for our
Germany.”
If your view is put in that interrogatory, that the foundations of your
faith had been shaken, why do you write that you remain loyally devoted
to Hitler’s work for Germany?
VON PAPEN: I have already told you and the Tribunal that I hoped that,
in spite of the collapse of the domestic situation, Hitler would at
least in the field of foreign policy pursue a reasonable course. He was
there; we could not remove him. We had to reckon with Hitler and his
Government. All the gentlemen continued to co-operate; I was the only
one who stepped out. All these letters with which you are trying to
prove I am insincere or that I am not truthful, or, as you call it, that
I am a liar or a deceiver, cannot deny to the world the fact that I
resigned at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took another job within 11 days. Eleven
days after the last letter you had taken the job of representing
this—well, I will not say a gang of murderers—this Government which
had adopted murder as an instrument of policy, as Plenipotentiary to
Austria, within 11 days of your last letter.
Let us just see whether the murder motif did not come into that. Did you
think that Hitler had been behind the July Putsch in Austria, which had
resulted in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss?
VON PAPEN: I know that Herr Habicht, who had been appointed by him to
lead the Austrian Party, at any rate had some connection with this
affair. That Herr Hitler himself had approved this act, that was not
known to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, did you think that the German Foreign
Office had been behind the July Putsch?
VON PAPEN: The German Foreign Office, in my opinion, had nothing at all
to do with the July Putsch.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that Dr. Rieth—if I have his
name, yes, Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna—did you think that he
had been behind the Putsch?
VON PAPEN: No. I knew only that Dr. Rieth had negotiated with the
Austrian Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know that Hitler had been behind it.
You deny that the German Foreign Office had been behind it. You did not
know that Dr. Rieth had been behind it. Just look at Page 96 of Document
Book 11a. It is Pages 79 and 80 of the German book.
This is a report, your report a year later. I am taking it slightly out
of time because of this sentence where you recapitulate the facts, and
if you will look at paragraph—I think it is the last paragraph on Page
79 in the German text.
My Lord, it is the second last paragraph on Page 96 in the Document Book
11a.
“The hope that the personal conversation between the Führer and
Reich Chancellor and the head of the Italian State at Stresa
would lead to a settlement of German-Italian differences has
been changed into the exact opposite by the threatening attitude
taken up by Mussolini because of the assassination of his friend
Dollfuss, and by the partial mobilization of Italian corps on
the Brenner. It became apparent that the attempt to
‘re-establish normal and friendly relations’ by sending me to
Vienna was not immediately possible after what had just
happened. Mistrust of the forcible methods of the Austrian
NSDAP”—now look at the next words—“influenced, as became more
and more apparent from the trials which were held, by leading
Reich-German persons, was too strong. The impression caused by
the terrorist methods and the death of the Federal Chancellor
was too lasting in the widest circles.”
Now, Defendant, tell the Tribunal who the leading German personalities
were to whom you were referring as supporting the Putsch in July 1934
and the murder of Dollfuss? Who were they?
VON PAPEN: By no means the former German Minister to Vienna, Herr Rieth,
but only Herr Habicht and the persons subordinate to him who at the time
were running the Austrian Nazi policy at Hitler’s order.
But I might point out that it says in this sentence that mistrust of the
methods of force employed by the Austrian Nazis had become more and more
apparent from the trials held, and that is something which we discovered
a year later and not at the time when I was given the task.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know is this. My question was:
Who were the leading German personalities? You are not going to tell the
Tribunal that Habicht, who was a liaison man with the NSDAP in Austria,
was a leading Reich-German personality. Who were they? You are not going
to say that Austrian Nazis were leading Reich-German personalities. Who
were they? Who were the leading Reich-German personalities that you were
talking about?
VON PAPEN: The leading personality was, no doubt, Herr Habicht. But this
letter was written to tell Hitler: “Here, look what you have done.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you seriously want the Tribunal to understand
this as a statement on which they will judge your veracity, that by a
leading Reich-German personality you mean Herr Habicht, and you have no
one else in mind although you use the plural? Is that what you want the
Tribunal to understand? I do not know if you remember, Defendant—just
think of it before you answer—but General Glaise-Horstenau could not
even remember Habicht’s name when he was giving his evidence.
You cannot seriously mean that you meant a liaison agent with the
Austrian NSDAP when you referred to prominent Reich-German
personalities. Surely you can do better than that.
Think again and tell the Tribunal whom you had in mind.
VON PAPEN: Mr. Prosecutor, Herr Habicht was not an agent. Herr Habicht
had been appointed by Hitler as the leader of the Party in Austria, so I
am surely justified in calling him a leading personality. If Herr Hitler
himself had knowledge of these matters at that time, then when reading
my letter he would know what I was hinting at.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even if I were to allow you Herr Habicht, which
I certainly never would, he is only one man. Who were the others? You
referred to Reich-German personalities. Who were the other people who
had been behind this Putsch and this murder?
VON PAPEN: Quite candidly I must tell you that after the 12 or 15 years
which have passed since then I can no longer remember which people I
might have had in mind when I wrote that. At any rate, the purpose of
the letter was—and you will appreciate this—to tell Hitler that the
methods which had been employed were doing more damage and were much
more incredible than we had known at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will accept it. We will go on from the
point that you knew there were some unspecified prominent Reich-German
personalities who had been behind the murder of Dollfuss.
Now, let us just, advancing from that, let us consider what you say with
regard to Mr. Messersmith. As I understand it, you deny—if I may say
so, with some vigor—what Mr. Messersmith says regarding you. Therefore,
let us just look at what he says and see how much of it you can
seriously suggest is not true.
I think I gave Your Lordship the references yesterday. The reference to
the affidavit 1760-PS is Document Book 11, and Page 22 is the relevant
part; and the other affidavit, Document 2385-PS, is 11a, Page 24. This
is rather shorter.
I think the one that I would like you to look at, Defendant, is 1760-PS,
and I think it begins on Page 3. I want you to come to the bit in the
affidavit—and I am afraid I cannot give you the exact German
place—where he deals with yourself.
It is Page 22, My Lord.
The paragraph begins:
“That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was
confirmed to me by Franz Von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as
German Minister.”
Have you got the passage, Defendant?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you look down a few lines in Mr.
Messersmith’s statement, he says:
“When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation he greeted
me with: ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of southwestern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government, and
from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the governments in
the other states to the south and southeast. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
toward that end. He said that he was telling me this because the
German Government was bound on this objective of getting this
control of southwestern Europe and there was nothing which could
stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England
was not realistic.”
Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was shocked, and that
you merely smiled and said that, of course, this conversation was
between you and Mr. Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to
other people. Then he says:
“I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation
as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness
with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.”
Now, you have told the Tribunal that you said nothing like that to Mr.
Messersmith. Apart from whether you said it to Mr. Messersmith or not,
do you deny that these were your aims and intentions?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims were those
which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit here. I told the
Court yesterday...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to take these quickly. Would you
just refer back to the document you were looking at a short time ago,
which is Document 2248-PS?
That is Page 96, My Lord. It starts there, in 1la, and I want to pass on
to Page 97. That is Page 81 of the German book.
Now, Defendant, this was your view in 1935, if you will look at the
beginning of Page 81 of the German text.
My Lord, it is the first break in Page 97.
“The great historical speech of the Führer’s on 21 May of this
year, and later the naval treaty, caused a strong _détente_ in
the field of foreign policy as regards England. But the clear
and final definition of the attitude of National Socialism to
the Soviet doctrine of state naturally doubled Franco-Russian
attempts to cripple us in the east and southeast, without at the
same time achieving a _détente_ in the other direction by
clearly renouncing the annexation, or Anschluss, of Austria.
“Any attempt at an economic and, even more so, at a political
offensive by the newly-formed Third Reich in the direction of
southeastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front
formed by the whole of Europe.”
Who put into your mind the question of a commercial or a political
offensive in the direction of southeastern Europe? Had you discussed
that with the Defendant Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: No, not at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you think you spoke for yourself?
VON PAPEN: Certainly. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David,
namely, that an advance into the southeastern area would come up against
a front formed by all of Europe. I am thus warning of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Herr Von Papen, that I cannot
make any comments at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to
matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had got that idea from,
say, the Foreign Minister, or whether it was your own idea. You say it
is your own idea.
Just look on Page 82.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 82. There is a paragraph—My Lord, it is
the same page, 97, in the English version—where you go on to say:
“This realistic political survey of the European constellation
shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem cannot, at
least in the near future, be successfully approached from the
direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be
content with not allowing Austria’s international status to
deteriorate in view of a later solution. In this connection the
danger of a nonintervention pact with bilateral treaties of
assurance seems to be successfully prevented. The maturing of a
solution was and still remains dependent on nothing but the
shape of German-Austrian relations.”
Why were you so afraid of a nonintervention pact, if your idea was that
there should only be an evolutionary solution of Austria based on
Austria’s will? Why were you afraid of a nonintervention pact which
would bind the Reich to not interfering in Austria?
VON PAPEN: For a very simple reason. All political combinations which
our opponents were making at the time had only one end, that Austria
should be pushed into such a situation, whether it was a Danube pact or
a pact with Italy and France, which would make it impossible to advance
the thought of the Anschluss. For that reason it had to be and remain
our natural political aim that the international status of Austria
should not be allowed to deteriorate, as I have expressed it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. That is the answer which I thought you
would have to give. Now, just look at Page 83, which is in the very next
paragraph:
“The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a veritable
path of suffering in order to secure its unity. With the dawn of
National Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by means
of the final overthrow of all particulars, an opportunity,
unique and never to be repeated, seemed to present itself to
complete Bismarck’s work and to bring relations between Germany
and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of
internal events in Germany.”
I will see if I can put quite shortly what you mean by the completion of
this man’s work, because I hope we shall not disagree about ancient
history, whatever we do about the other. As I understand, your view is
that this, Bismarck’s setting up the German Empire in 1871, was merely
an attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg Empire separated from
Germany, and the final completion of his work was that the old Hapsburg
dominions should be brought back with the states which had been in the
Holy Roman Empire. Is that roughly the truth?
VON PAPEN: Quite right; not all the Hapsburg states, but Austria, the
German part.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The original Hapsburg domains?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite right. I hope I am putting it objectively
enough.
VON PAPEN: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With regard to that, what did you mean by saying
that the solution of the relations between Germany and Austria should be
brought about by “dynamic consequences of internal events in Germany”?
What did you mean by that?
VON PAPEN: By that I mean the following: Never in Germany’s history had
it happened that a large party whose aim was Germany’s unity existed in
both nations. That was a unique historical event. And I wished to state
that the dynamic force of this movement in the two countries, which was
urging unity, gave promise of a solution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, Defendant, the difficulty that I want
you to explain is: How do you square an approval of centralization in
Germany with a Nazi Government whose unscrupulous message you then knew
after the affairs since 30 June 1934—how do you square an unscrupulous
centralized Germany with an evolutionary solution of the Austrian
problem?
That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am suggesting is
that it means a much simpler thing than you have told us. It means that
you were out to get an annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity
under the National Socialist Reich.
VON PAPEN: Of course, I had to reckon with existing conditions, and I
did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I wanted to
attempt, with the help of the factors present in the National Socialist
Party in both countries, to come to a solution. But I see no
contradiction, Sir David. You are saying, how could I achieve my aim by
centralization. But if you would be good enough to look at the end of
this report of mine, then you will find that I am proposing
decentralization to Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the moment, you see, I was really asking you
for an explanation of what you meant by the expression, “dynamic result
of internal events in Germany.” In short, I want you to realize,
Defendant—I am not going to argue with you, because I ought not
to—that the first point of Mr. Messersmith was a question of this
action in southeastern Europe; the second point, that Austria was the
first line, the first thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will
be good enough to take the same bundle and turn over to Page 102 which
is a report of your own dated 8 October 1935. I want you to deal with
Mr. Messersmith’s third suggestion against you, which you deny, that you
were going to work in Austria by a weakening of the regime.
Now I will just read the first sentence so that you will get the point
into your mind. The report that I am dealing with is of 18 October 1935.
You are dealing with the Austrian Government reshuffle, and you are
saying—My Lord, this is a new document. It is GB-502, Document Number
D-718. It is in 11a, Page 106. It begins:
“Yesterday’s Cabinet reshuffle resembles a bloodless
insurrection led by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr
(Austrian Home Defense Organization). It is clear that Minister
Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that as early as
yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna
occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The
Government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing
the occupation by Police forces.”
Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the beginning of the
report. Then, if you turn to the next page, at 102, and refer about
halfway down the page, you say this:
“In spite of the Vice Chancellor’s clear victory and of the
strenuous efforts of the Austrian press to make it appear
plausible that the Cabinet reshuffle was carried out for reasons
of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards a
completely uncertain development prevails in the Austrian
public, as also in the Heimwehr circles.
“From our point of view the change of affairs is only too
welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of advantage, even
if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The
fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to
keep them moving.”
Now, Defendant, by that it is quite clear, is it not, that you meant
that so long as there is political uncertainty or political trouble in
the Austrian State, it does not matter whether the move may be an
anti-German one, so long as the struggle grows with distrust spreading?
That was an advantage to Germany, and that is what you want. That is
what the lines mean, is it not?
VON PAPEN: No, not quite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not quite?
VON PAPEN: I should like to make the following remarks about your
explanation, Sir David. Here in this report we are concerned with a
change in the Austrian Government, with Prince Starhemberg and the
Heimwehr involved. You know that Starhemberg and the Heimwehr had allied
themselves with Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening-up of
this inner political front which was working against the interests of a
union could be only advantageous, in the light of my policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what I do not understand is this. You see,
you have said, “In spite of the Vice Chancellor’s clear victory and of
the diligent efforts of the Austrian press....” and you go on to say,
“....every new weakening of the system is of advantage.” You see, Prince
Starhemberg and the Italian party, according to you, had won, because
you say, “In spite of....” this “....clear victory.”
Then you say, “every new weakening of the system.” That could not be
Starhemberg’s alliance, because that had been successful. By “the
system” you mean the Government of Austria, do you not? You cannot mean
anything else.
My Lord, perhaps I should not continue the argument. But it is a
somewhat complicated subject.
VON PAPEN: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should perhaps draw attention to
the few remaining sentences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, certainly I will read on:
“The continuation of negotiations for a settlement which I had
recommended since the Geneva declaration, seems to be entirely
superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to
continue the increasingly excited public feeling against the
Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press
without, however, giving the Government justifiable cause for
having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new
propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the
Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced
journalists to work in this connection.
“For the rest, we can confidently leave further developments to
the near future. I am convinced that the shifting of powers on
the European chess board will permit us in the not too distant
future to take up actively the question of influencing the
southeastern area.”
Extraordinary—if I may so—extraordinary how Mr. Messersmith had got
your ideas if you had never had this conversation with him, was it not?
My Lord, perhaps this will be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
VON PAPEN: But may I come back to that question tomorrow?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 19 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 19 June 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant
Von Neurath is absent.
[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, Defendant,
I want to ask you three questions about the other countries in
southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that
the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement
among the Sudetendeutschen?
VON PAPEN: I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In
1935, when this report was written, the Sudeten-German question was not
acute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When did you learn about it?
VON PAPEN: Mainly here in this room.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Did you know that the Reich was
supporting Mr. Codreanu and the Iron Guard in Romania?
VON PAPEN: I believe that that was also much later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You learned that sometime later than 1935, did
you? When did you learn that?
VON PAPEN: I cannot say; but I believe that events in connection with
the Iron Guard in Romania took place about 1937. I may be wrong; but I
do not think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a
little too near you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I am sorry.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know that in 1944 you were
discussed in a Reich state paper edited by the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange
for Hungary’s acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside
Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired? Did you know that?
VON PAPEN: No. In the first place, I did not know that; and in the
second place I may say that the idea is impossible, because I was a
close friend of the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. In my
interrogatory to Admiral Horthy I asked him a question which he
unfortunately failed to answer because he did not remember. It says that
in the autumn of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior,
Keresctes-Fischer, handed me a document showing that German or German
and Hungarian forces wanted to bring about the incorporation of Hungary
into the Reich through a revolt. At Regent Horthy’s desire, I at once
handed this document over to Herr Von Ribbentrop and asked him to take
the appropriate measures to prevent it. That is all set down in the
files, and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior will be able to
confirm it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my point. I do not mind whether you
would have taken it or not. The point that I am putting is that you were
the choice. Don’t you know that? You know the document I am referring
to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbrunner, in which you were
discussed as being the possible person to do the internal work in
Hungary.
My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11, and Page 46 of the German
Document Book 11.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I went over this note the day before yesterday
after you submitted it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you with it if you only
learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in
1944 that you were being suggested in a German state document as being
the person who might do the internal work in Hungary in order that
Hungary might be acquired by the Reich? If you say you do not know, I
shall not trouble you with it any further. You say you only knew that
since the day before yesterday?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and in the second place, it is a historical fact that I
repeatedly opposed these efforts in Hungary which aimed in one way or
another, ultimately by occupation, at making Hungary a part of the
German Reich. I considered that the most mistaken and most impossible
policy imaginable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you about the documents since
you have not known; we will come to another point.
You remember Gauleiter Rainer, the gentleman with whom you had the
fortuitous and I am sure very interesting talk on the eve of the
Anschluss; Dr. Rainer, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr.
Rainer’s view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal
whether you agree with that.
My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812-PS. It
starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page
8.
Have you got the passage that begins:
“Thus began the first phase of battle, which ended with the July
uprising of 1934. The decision for the July uprising was right;
but many mistakes were made in carrying it out. The result was
the complete destruction of the organization, the loss of entire
groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the
‘Altreich,’ and, with regard to the political relationship
between Germany and Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the
existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With
the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal
relationships between the two States, the Führer liquidated the
first stage of the battle and began a new method of political
penetration.”
Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, “a new
method of political penetration”?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. That is a very inaccurate description of my
activity.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you don’t agree with Dr. Rainer, tell
me—you know, you must know very well, the witness Dr. Paul Schmidt. You
know him?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. Now I think you will agree with me
that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word
during this Trial. Do you agree? I haven’t heard a word of criticism of
Paul Schmidt. Don’t you agree with me?
VON PAPEN: Do you mean the witness—the interpreter Schmidt or the
Foreign Minister Schmidt?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter.
VON PAPEN: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. I will give you my opinion on
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you agree that he is a trustworthy
person or not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?
VON PAPEN: I have nothing to say against the human qualities of Herr
Schmidt, but I have a very strong objection to the fact that Herr
Schmidt takes the liberty of criticizing my political activities in
Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, before you explain it, just have a look at
it. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt’s affidavit on Page 41 of Document
Book 11, that is Page 37 of the German document book, Document 3308-PS.
Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt’s view, Paragraph 8:
“Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi
program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder
of Dollfuss necessitated a more cautious approach to this
problem for a time; but the application of sanctions against
Italy by the League of Nations plus the rapid increase of German
military strength, made the resumption of the Austrian program
safer. When Göring visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that
the union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and must be
expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in
German, remained silent and uttered only a mild protest when I
translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss
was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to
preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the
Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the
expected move.”
Then, Defendant, so that we are being quite clear, he makes a
mistake, and it is a speech of Hitler’s on 18 February to which,
unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not
relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree
with is that it was your role, “....to preserve smooth
diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more
devious ways....” Do you agree with that as a correct
description of your program, your mission in Austria?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, Sir David, the exact opposite is the case. I
explained my task in Austria very clearly and distinctly to the
Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see.
VON PAPEN: It was a task of pacification and normalization and a
continuation of the policy of the grafting together of the two States in
an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this
affidavit of Dr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this
chair we established the fact that this affidavit was placed before him
when he was still in bed in the hospital after a severe illness, and
this document was given to him for his signature...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, with respect to that, the Tribunal will
deal with it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been
cross-examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know
everything about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have
anything to comment on the contents of it, I am sure the Tribunal would
willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That
is all before the Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: I will comment on the contents, I will state that Minister
Schmidt, who later played a highly influential role with Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here
had a very subordinate position in the Foreign Office which did not
afford him insight—any exact insight—into conditions in Austria and
into my policy and my reports.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is so...
VON PAPEN: Sir David, Herr Von Neurath will be able to confirm that for
you tomorrow or the day after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we won’t argue that any further. The
Tribunal have the whole of Dr. Schmidt’s record before them and the
affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of
your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in
Austria, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the
explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going
back to the development of the “top hat” idea to which you objected so
strongly, wasn’t it?—Well, if you don’t remember, let me remind you. It
is Document D-689, Page 101.
The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90
and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11, becoming GB-504.
This is the opening of the Grossglockner Road, which, as you know, is a
road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Carinthia. Do
you remember that, after your description about the people being in
Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then
the German drivers competing, in the third and next paragraph you say:
“The building of this road is undoubtedly a first-class work of
culture, in which Reich-German construction firms took the main
and decisive part. The chief engineer of the Reich-German firm
which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me
of the position of the explosive chambers in this tunnel. I sent
him to the military attaché.”
That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German
road constructions with obtaining the position of the explosives of the
tunnel at the important strategic portion of the road. Why did you
consider that of sufficient importance to send it to Hitler with three
copies to the Foreign Office?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I am giving an exact account of what happened at
the inauguration of this road.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want that. The Tribunal can get that.
What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the
Reich-German engineer was disclosing to you the explosive chambers on
the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why
were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the
Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: Because it seemed interesting to me that this man approached
me voluntarily and told me, “At this and this point, the tunnel can be
blown up.” You know that at that time our relations with Italy were very
strained and that Italy mobilized on the Brenner border. For that reason
it seemed of interest to me that this new connection between Italy and
Germany could be broken again at any suitable time. Moreover, I referred
the matter to my military attaché because it did not interest me
personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you had then moved out of the class of doing
that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was
a matter for the military attaché.
But was that your plan, Defendant, that, when you introduced German
Kultur as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the
strategic information which you could pass on to your Government,
undermining the Austrian Government’s strategic plans to use the road?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which
joined Germany to Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The road actually goes from
Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Carinthia in
south Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and south
in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it
connect Austria with Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Austria.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, let’s take something else in which
you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian
supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be
situated, were you not?
VON PAPEN: I do not remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t recall it, look at it
yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on.
It is Page 110, My Lord, in the English book; Page 108 of the German
book. It will become Exhibit GB-505. Its date is 26 November 1935. It is
Page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is Page 111.
Defendant, you ought to find it just at the top of Page 112 of the
German version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose
Jewish extraction you referred to, and then you go on to Prince
Starhemberg. It reads:
“After the manufacture of munitions for Italy in Hirtenberg had
to be stopped because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, loaded
the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work
in Italy.”
Then, note the next words in brackets:
“Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria’s supply of
munitions....”
Was that one of your conceptions of restoring normal relations, that you
should report on the movements in the Austrian munition manufacture?
VON PAPEN: No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir
David, that I was repeating a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski,
who told me that this munitions factory, the only one which existed in
Austria, was being moved to Italy. I wrote, with regard to this, that it
is a remarkable circumstance if a country has to get its munitions
supplies from a foreign country. You must surely admit that that is a
peculiar situation and one that deserves inclusion in a report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your explanation. I won’t waste time on
it.
Now, I want to pass—and again I want to deal with it very quickly—to
your own personal experiences in Austria.
You remember when you went to the Salzburg Festival in 1935, when you
had been there about a year; do you remember? I don’t know because you
probably went every year.
The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you
went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made
such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to
telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German
Ambassador had caused a great Nazi demonstration? Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at Page 102,
Document D-689, which I have already referred to, Page 102 of Document
Book 11.
Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of
the comrades of the first World War at Wels?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937,
was it not?
VON PAPEN: Quite right, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And all the preparations had been made for a
nonpolitical meeting, a reunion of the Austrian regiments and old
comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to
have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish
in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That meeting was addressed by General
Glaise-Horstenau and yourself?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Glaise-Horstenau—without any disrespect
to him—I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was
your impression, wasn’t it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but
not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am
merely trying to get the point.
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You made a speech which lasted for quite a short
time, didn’t you? Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: After your speech, there was beating and
shooting through the streets of Wels, wasn’t there? There was a riot
there, wasn’t there?
VON PAPEN: May I give you a more exact description?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the
fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no document on this.
VON PAPEN: A meeting had been arranged in Wels between organizations of
the old German Army from the first World War, the so-called Warriors’
Society, (Kriegerverein) and the veterans’ associations of Austria. It
was perfectly legitimate and in the spirit of our joint policy that the
mutual experiences during the first World War should be renewed between
these formations. At this meeting, which according to my wish and that
of the Austrian Government was to be completely nonpolitical in
character, the following events took place: When I arrived, the place
where this meeting of veterans’ associations was held, was surrounded by
between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive
their German guests, brought an honor company of the Army, and when the
Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these
10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem,
for the tune is the same, as you know.
When in the course of the celebration I made a brief speech I found
myself constantly interrupted by thousands of people, in a demonstrative
manner. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National
Socialists had planned a big political demonstration here; so I broke
off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place, and left Wels
also.
It is quite true, as Sir David said, that when the celebration broke up
and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of
persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurred.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the
facts of the incident. Now I want to pass to another point, because I
can only give examples of your activities in Austria.
Before you heard the evidence of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, do you
remember the phrase “the Trojan Horse technique” being referred to with
regard to Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes. Seyss-Inquart did not want to lead the Trojan Horse.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred
to the Trojan Horse technique.
My Lord, it is Document Book 11, Page 133. The passage I am referring to
is from Page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is
Page 163, Sergeant Major.
That is your report of 21 August 1936, where you quote an instruction of
the Prague Secret Service to its Vienna branch, which says:
“Unfortunately it must be noted that the wild National Socialist
excesses of 29 July of this year have not had the result we
expected. Austria’s approach to the Third Reich in the field of
foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the
process of cultural collaboration between the two sister
nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that
the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing greater
confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and
particularly into the ranks bf the Heimatschutz (Home Guard).
Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations,
which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears
nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously lacks
only good organization.”
Now, does that Czech report describe correctly what was going on, the
superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse movement
working inside the country?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service
and perhaps of the Czech Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I remind you, Defendant, that it is the
opinion quoted by you in your report to the Führer, and not
contradicted. There is not a word in your report suggesting that it is
not the truth. In fact you say you introduce it, “To illustrate the
present position in Austria...”
You are introducing it as correct information for the Führer, so you
cannot, I suggest, write it off by saying it is merely a Czech report.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I do. Let me point out that this report was written on
21 August 1936. That is 1 month after the conclusion of our July
Agreement, which you asserted was a deceitful maneuver, but which we and
the Austrian Foreign Minister established as a very seriously intended
agreement. We were now on a completely different basis with Austria and
for that reason I quoted this peculiar Czech report as an interesting
document to show how, in spite of our efforts for normalization, the
Czechs regarded matters in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you leaving that document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the last paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I will certainly deal
with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 134.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
It goes on:
“Besides, it appears hopeless and also impracticable for us to
strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwehr
movement. There are, on the other hand, comparatively strong
elements in Austrian Catholicism which could, with certain
reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are
gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund (Freedom
League) and which are inclined on principle to work for an
agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion,
that group which would in certain circumstances be inclined to
bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria.”
Did you put that forward as also representing your view?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I gave the Court a most exact explanation of the
aims and character of the Freiheitsbund yesterday; and the Court knows
from the report that the Czech Government endeavored to exert a certain
amount of political influence on this Freiheitsbund. That is quite clear
from the connection. This is all in the Czech report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you were putting it forward, were you not,
as your view to Hitler that, to speak loosely, the Catholic Left might
be used as a means of approach by you. That is really what you are
saying.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, surely you do not want to impute that I submitted
a Czech report to Hitler in order to identify myself with this report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I am accusing you of. If you
write to the head of the State, “To illustrate the present position in
Austria, I append an extract from a report....” then what I am
suggesting is that that means this report accurately represents the
position, as I see it. That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: No, for another report which you also submitted to the Court
shows that I asked Hitler to work against these efforts made by the
Czech Government to exert influence on the Freiheitsbund by binding it
to ourselves. I am of quite different opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you asked Hitler to give 100,000
Reichsmarks to the Freiheitsbund. That is exactly what you are following
out in what you have suggested here, that they might be a body who would
be a useful _point d’appui_ for you in order to gain an influence with
another section of Austrian opinion. I am suggesting to you that the two
things are quite consistent. You tell Hitler that they are useful.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you support them with 100,000 Reichsmarks.
That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That you were all the time burrowing under one
section of Austrian opinion after another in order to work towards the
suppression of the freedom of Austria—that is what I am putting to you.
I do not think there is any doubt about it.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if this report shows anything clearly, it is the
fact that, apart from the National Socialists in Austria, there were
other groups, namely, the Christian Trade Unions and the Freiheitsbund,
who worked politically towards the union of the two countries. And you
cannot say I am committing a crime if, as a diplomat who wants to bring
about such an aim in an evolutionary way, I co-operate with the
interests of these groups.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was not anything very evolutionary about
the Trojan Horse, was there? However, that may be comment. Let us go on
to another point.
Did you know Baron Gudenus?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that he was the closest confidant of
the Archduke Otto. Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is shown in my report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well now, let us just look and see what
Baron Gudenus had to say.
Your Lordship will find that on Page 93, and it is 72 to 75 of the
German version, Document D-687 which will become GB-507. It is Paragraph
2 (b) and it appears on Page 74, Defendant.
“Baron Gudenus, the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto,
writes to....”
There is a mistake there, my Lord. The “me” should be “one.”
“....one of my acquaintances on 30 March:
“....I brought back many gratifying impressions of the progress
of our Movement with me from Austria; but I cannot deny that in
some respects the Government’s policy worries me greatly. Of
what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July
1934—or those of them who were caught—are sentenced, if the
Government is too weak, too slovenly, or intentionally too
tolerant, to prevent ‘brown’ and ‘red’ propaganda being carried
on privately unhindered in the cinema, in the press, and on the
radio, and mainly by State officials or organs of the Fatherland
Front, supported and paid by financial and other means which are
pouring in bountifully from Germany. What is that learned
idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that
Papen and the other ‘brown’ agents in his own country
continually spit into the hand so persistently held out to them?
He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria,
as long as Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown
inside and out. The methods over there have, it is true, become
more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more
dangerous.”
That was about 7 months after your arrival.
“Sinister also are the continual differences between Schuschnigg
and Starhemberg....” and so on.
Now, isn’t it correct, Defendant, that anyone, that everyone, even a
visiting monarchist agent, knew that these activities were going on with
you on the top and the Austrian National Socialist Party working
underneath?
Before you answer, it is only fair to look at your own comment on that.
“The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could
hardly be described more graphically than in this letter.”
Why did you not say to Hitler, if these were the facts: “Baron Gudenus
is talking nonsense. I am carrying out a perfectly honest moral
assignment for the normalizing of relations with Austria.” Why did you
not deny it, if it was not true?
VON PAPEN: It seems to me that this report shows, in the first place,
that I passed on to Hitler with complete frankness all the reports which
I received, even that of an adherent of the Hapsburg restoration.
Obviously to 100 percent...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting, Defendant, that you passed them
on because they were true; you adopted them and passed them on to Hitler
because they were true reports; that that was a true picture of the
situation. That is what I am suggesting to you. You just tell the
Tribunal, were they true or were they not? If they were not true, why
did you pass them on without saying they were not true? That is what I
am asking you.
VON PAPEN: If you read this report by Baron Gudenus, you will see that
he speaks of internal conditions in Austria and of the sinister
differences existing between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, the rivalry
between their guards, and the constant underground Republican sentiment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is 3 lines out of 20. There is a lot
more before you come to that part. That is what I am asking you about;
the other 17 lines of the report.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, the points which I have just mentioned are proof
of the internal weaknesses of the Austrian Government, on which I am
reporting. If you mean that I should have explained to Hitler that I was
not a “brown” agent, well surely on 26 July we came to a very clear
agreement as to under what conditions my work in Austria was to be done.
There was no necessity for me to explain that to Hitler in a report. I
sent this report for his information only.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your explanation, just look at the
next paragraph of your letter. It shows in another way how you were
working. Paragraph 3:
“The film ‘The Old and the Young King’ ...”—the Tribunal may not
remember, but you correct my recollection. That is a film, if I remember
rightly, dealing with Friedrich—the relations of Friedrich Wilhelm I
and Friedrich the Great. Am I right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The film ‘The Old and the Young King’
was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence
of Herr Jannings.”—That is Emil Jannings, the actor.—“It
provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. The scene where the king
stresses the fact that ‘French trash and Roman books do not mean
anything to Prussia’ led to particularly vociferous applause.
The police wanted to ban it. Together with Herr Jannings, we
explained to them that, should this film be banned, we would
take steps to prohibit the showing of all Austrian films in
Germany. This had the desired effect. The film—except for the
above-mentioned scene, which was expunged—is being shown now
and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within
the next few days.
“Yesterday I received Jannings and a number of actors from the
Burgtheater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his
success, and we discussed in detail plans for a Bismarck picture
for the production of which I recommended Beumelburg to write
the script.”
That is, you were forcing a film which contained Prussian propaganda to
be shown in Austria on the threat of excluding Fräulein Wessely and
“Maskerade” and the other Austrian films of that time from the German
market; you were forcing your propaganda on the threat of excluding
Austrian films; is that right?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and I will also tell you the reason. I must enlarge your
historical knowledge of these things, Sir David. Frederick the Great
played a very important part in the relations between Germany and
Austria, as you know; and at that time we were trying, in the
relationship between our two countries, to clear up the historical
inaccuracies which originated in the time of Frederick the Great. For
this purpose the famous Austrian historian, Professor Srbik, wrote a big
work. The film which we are discussing served the purpose of showing
that a great German history is common to both peoples alike. To help the
cultural _rapprochement_ of the two countries I insisted that this film
should be shown, and this was done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not the slightest doubt about your
motives in wanting the film to be shown, Defendant, but what I am asking
you is, why you pressed it against the wish of the Austrian authorities
by threat of excluding Austrian film production from the German market?
Why did you threaten the Austrian authorities in that way?
VON PAPEN: It frequently happened that the Austrian police were afraid
that certain films might be made a basis for demonstrations. But after
we had talked matters over with the police, and had agreed that certain
parts of the film should be cut, they were quite ready to admit it; and
of course, I also told them that if we did not reach an agreement, the
consequences would be that Germany would send no more films to Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I put the point. Do you remember
telling the Tribunal that you did not keep up contacts with the NSDAP in
Austria? Is that Correct?
VON PAPEN: No, it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did keep up contacts?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Close contacts?
VON PAPEN: I did not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Intimate contacts? Were your contacts close?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if they were not, will you just turn a
page back. It is probably Page 72 of your report. It is the same report.
My Lord, it is Page 93 of Your Lordship’s book.
You began that report by saying:
“I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:
“On 23 March complete agreement was reached in Krems between
Captain Leopold, (Retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In
accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold
in every way and recognized him as Führer for Austria. As soon
as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he will
become deputy leader, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant
of Leopold, will be consulted on every important question.”
Furthermore, Leopold has nominated somebody else and asked him to be
deputy, while:
“Major General Klupp, (Retd.) will be taken into consultation in
strict confidence,” and I want to read the last lines:
“Furthermore, Leopold expressed the desire that at long last,
the continual intrigues against him on the part of _émigrés_
living in the Reich—of the type of Frauenfeld and his
friends—be stopped.”
That is a pretty complete picture of the set-up of the Party in Austria,
wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Well, Sir David, may I call to your attention the fact that
this report is dated 4 April 1935, a date previous to the July
Agreement, when my interest in these Party affairs can still be readily
understood.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you attach importance to the date, just
look at the report of 1 September 1936, which is on Page 33 of Document
Book 11, Page 26 of the German book. You remember this is the report
which you referred to, and you said:
“For the method to be employed (Marschroute) I recommend on the
tactical side continued and patient psychological treatment,
with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the
regime.”
You told the Tribunal that that meant you wanted a change in the
officials of the Ministry of the Interior. I am not going to trouble
about a statement like that, but just go on for a moment:
“The conference on economic relations proposed for the end of
October will be a very useful tool for the realization of some
of our projects.
“In discussion both with Government officials and with leaders
of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who take their
stand entirely on the Agreement of 11 July, I am trying to
direct the next developments so as to aim at corporative
representation of the Movement in the Fatherland Front.”
Now, it is quite clear, is it not, that you were on 1 September 1936,
after the agreement, having discussions with the leaders of the illegal
Party, Leopold and Schattenfroh, so may we take it—I don’t want to
spend time on it—that throughout your time in Austria you were in close
and constant touch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialist
Party?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David, the conference which you just mentioned refers
to and is justified by the July Agreement; I have already explained that
to the Court yesterday. In the July Agreement Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg promised that members of the National Opposition would be
called upon for co-operation. Consequently it was, of course, my duty to
be interested in whether and to what extent the co-operation of such
forces was actually sought by Schuschnigg. That was the subject of this
talk with the leaders, and I can state expressly that my contact with
the Austrian Party, after the July Agreement, was only in this
connection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, I am not going to go into that
further. I have referred the Tribunal to two documents, and there are
other references which I need not worry about.
I want you to come now to November 1937. Could you fix as carefully and
closely as you can the date of your meeting with the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I met the Defendant Seyss-Inquart by accident—that is,
not by appointment—at the Olympic Winter Games at
Garmisch-Partenkirchen in January 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: January 1938. I just want to collate these
dates. You had become very friendly with the Foreign Minister Guido
Schmidt, who gave evidence here, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I was on very friendly terms with the Foreign Minister, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you gave him the “Du,” although you were 20
years his senior; you had given him the “Du” for some time? You had been
on intimate relations? Is that right?
VON PAPEN: I do not think that a friendship can be measured by 20 years’
difference in age. I regarded Herr Schmidt, as I have said, as an
upright man.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will agree with me that it is
unusual for an Ambassador to be on terms with a Foreign Minister,
especially one 20 years his junior—not his contemporary—on such terms
that he used the familiar “Du” to him. Won’t you agree with me that it
is a quite unusual form of intimacy between an Ambassador and a Foreign
Minister?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if you had ever been in Austria in your life, you
would know that in Austria almost everyone says “Du” to everyone else,
and to clear up this incident, may I add the following: On the day of
our separation, when I left Austria, I said to Foreign Minister Schmidt,
of whom I am very fond, “Dear friend, we have worked together so much,
now we can say ‘Du’ to each other.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am interested in is this: It was in
November 1937 that you and Dr. Guido Schmidt first began to discuss the
question of Herr Schuschnigg meeting Hitler, was it not?
VON PAPEN: I believe that I discussed this matter not only with Foreign
Minister Schmidt but also with Herr Von Schuschnigg himself at that
time. After a discussion between them...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment; will you answer my question? You
discussed with Schmidt—you heard Dr. Schmidt give his evidence that the
Defendant Göring had told him with great frankness, as the Defendant
Göring said he told everyone else and has told this Court, that he was
out for the union of Germany and Austria by any means and at all costs.
You heard Dr. Schmidt say that Göring had told him that that was his
view, and I say, in all fairness, it is perfectly consistent. It is the
view he has expressed here and apparently to a lot of other people. Do
you remember that Dr. Schmidt said that? You can take that from me.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard that the Defendant Göring said
that, not only to Dr. Schmidt, but to Mussolini and to the High
Tribunal, and I think to several other people. Had he never said it to
you?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. With regard to the Austrian...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that it was his view?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know that was Göring’s view?
VON PAPEN: Please let me say something. Of course, I knew that Göring’s
wish was to bring about a union of the two States, and I myself was
present at the talk with Mussolini.
Please consider, however, that at that time Herr Göring was not
competent to decide foreign policy. The question of what our policy in
Austria should be had been agreed upon between Hitler and myself
exclusively and I do not remember discussing it with Marshal Göring in
the years between 1936 and 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am dealing with November 1937, at the moment,
and 3 months later the Defendant Göring was very competent in foreign
politics in the Austrian question, as you, who listened to the accounts
of his telephone conversations, must know.
I just want you to take the dates as we have got them now. Göring had
told Schmidt his views; you and Schmidt were discussing this meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler. In January you had a political
discussion with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch.
I am one date out of order. On 11 November, as Mr. Dodd put to Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, he had written a letter to Dr. Jury saying, “I don’t
think anything will happen this year, but the developments will take
place in the spring.” Then, after that letter, he sees you at Garmisch
in January, and in February you finally arrange this meeting between
Schuschnigg and Hitler.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you know very well that the whole object
of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to the Reich’s
wishes, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart, a general political amnesty
which would release all the members of the Nazi Party in Austria and put
them at the disposal of their leaders, and a declaration of equal rights
for the Party? Didn’t you know that the whole object of the meeting was
to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to these terms so that you would have
the Austrian National Socialist Party unfettered and free to work for
Germany’s interests in Austria?
VON PAPEN: In my talk with Dr. Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch-Partenkirchen
we discussed the necessity of making the Austrian Nazi Party
independent, that is, under all circumstances removing it from the
influence of the Reich, in the form agreed upon in the July Agreement,
and with the aim that the way should be paved for a union of our two
countries, and that that aim should be pursued from the Austrian side in
terms of foreign policy, and not by the Reich.
When I met Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch no mention was ever made of this
meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg. I was at that time not in a
position to know whether such a talk would ever take place. That was not
decided until 5 February, as you will recall. In other words, we
discussed only the perfectly general question of how we could get nearer
to our goal.
May I further recall to your memory that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had received
an official commission from the Federal Chancellor to investigate all
existing possibilities of incorporating the National Opposition, that
is, the Austrian National Socialist Party, into Schuschnigg’s political
program. That was his official mission, so that after all I had a right
to discuss these things with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Dr. Rainer—the witness that the Tribunal
has seen—wasn’t he present at the Garmisch meeting too?
VON PAPEN: That seems to have been the case, Sir David; I do not
remember it any more. Seyss-Inquart has told me that it is possible that
Dr. Rainer joined us on a walk. I personally do not remember. I did not
carry on any political discussion with Rainer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you have given your explanation as of
the turn of the year. I just want to remind you of one other point. You
were very well aware of the Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch crisis in the
Army, were you not? I don’t want to go into disagreeable details again,
because it is not at present before the Tribunal, but you knew that that
crisis had arisen?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you will see the importance of this.
General Von Fritsch had been at the War Academy with you, had he not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was an old friend, and you knew, as I think
everyone who has mentioned his name in this Court has said, that General
Von Fritsch was a man of the highest character and that the sort of
charge that was brought against him was one which anyone who knew him
would regard with ridicule if it wasn’t so tragic, and they would regard
it with contempt? That was your view?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had a pretty good idea, had you not,
apart from the treatment of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, that Von Fritsch
had been the subject of a trumped-up charge in order to prevent him
becoming head of the Armed Forces? You knew that, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: In any case, that became clear to me later, when I learned of
the circumstances.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, that is not the important thing,
Defendant, your state of mind on 5 February 1938. You knew by then that
the Nazi clique in the Government had brought a framed-up charge against
a man whom you regarded as the soul of honor, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now with that knowledge, on 5 February, after
you see Hitler, you tell him about the fact that Schuschnigg may come,
and he jumps to it at once. He says, “Go and get Schuschnigg,” doesn’t
he? He was quite bored, if I may put it that way, with what you had to
say up to that point. As soon as you say there is a chance of a meeting
with Schuschnigg, Hitler seizes it like a trout to a May fly, doesn’t
he, or rather, like a lion to the kill; that is right, isn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Sir David. I described to the Court the impression made
on me by events in Berlin and by my own dismissal on 4 February. Do you
think it is surprising that I now tried, just because I was afraid
another course would be adopted, to bring about this long-desired
discussion between the two chiefs of state which I hoped would clear up
the differences and prevent the adoption of a radical course? I told
Foreign Minister Schmidt and Chancellor Schuschnigg that, when I asked
them both to take part in a discussion to clear up matters if they could
possibly do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to go through the
circumstances of the meeting of 12 February, because I went through them
with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the Court is well aware of them.
I want to ask you this one question, and I do ask you to consider it
carefully because the question of your own veracity may depend on it.
Are you now saying that there was no pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg at
that interview?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I never made such a statement—you know that
yourself, because it is in my reports; I myself said that pressure was
exerted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am asking you is this, and please let me
make it quite clear because the Court have heard the evidence of your
friend Dr. Schmidt and a lot of other evidence. I only want to ask you
the one question, and please get it clear.
Do you now, on this day, say that pressure was not put on Chancellor
Schuschnigg to make him agree to the terms of 12 February? That is the
one question I want to ask you, and I give you the chance of answering.
What do you say today? Was or was not pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I never denied it. I do not understand why you ask me. I
never denied it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Ribbentrop denied it quite strongly,
but we won’t go into that.
Now, one other question and then I am finished with Austria.
Did you arrange a meeting between Hitler and Cardinal Innitzer?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I did; and that was...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange that the leaders of the Church
and the diplomatic corps, apart from the French and British
representatives, should be present at Hitler’s entry into Vienna?
VON PAPEN: As for the leaders of the Church, it is not customary for
them to be present at parades, and I certainly did not suggest it. As to
the diplomats...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange for the diplomatic corps to be
present?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that some of my diplomatic colleagues asked me
if they could attend this ceremony, and I said that of course they could
attend; why should they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue about the way you
put it.
My Lord, I have now finished with Austria. I have three very minor
matters which I hope will take a short time, but this might be a
convenient period in which to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, are the Tribunal to take it that
broadly you were against the anti-Semitic movement and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, it was my aim and my desire, and it
constituted the entire program of my work, to contribute as far as
possible to a union between the two countries, because that was the
great wish of the German nation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you can have understood my
question. Let me repeat it. I am now coming to the Jews.
VON PAPEN: Oh, the Jews?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, let me repeat it again. Are the
Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against anti-Semitic action
and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I have already told the High Tribunal just what my
attitude in principle was toward the racial question and toward the
question of the elimination of foreign influence in certain cultural
aspects of public life. These are two entirely different questions,
however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I appreciate that. Now, will you look at
Document 3319-PS, which is Exhibit GB-287?
My Lord, it begins at Page 48 of Document Book 11a. It is on Pages 44
and 45 of the German book.
The part I want you to refer to is on Pages 58 and 59. This, Defendant,
is from a confidential report of the work session of the consultants on
Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe, on 3 and 4 April
1944. I want you just to look at Page 44, I think, of the German
version, Page 58 of the English, at the contribution to this discussion
of a certain Herr Posemann, from Turkey. Was he from your staff? If you
would not mind, just say “yes” or “no,” because it must go to a short
end...
VON PAPEN: May I tell you just who Herr Posemann was?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said, if you would tell me, was he a member of
the Embassy staff, and if not, what was he; that is what I want to know.
VON PAPEN: No; certainly not. Herr Posemann was a German bookseller who
had settled in Ankara. He was certainly not a member of my Embassy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, at any rate, he was a consultant of
the German Foreign Office for this discussion. Now, just listen to what
he says:
“Early last year the Turkish Government struck a blow at Jewry
in connection with an attempt to solve the minorities problem.
Very drastic measures were taken to carry out this action.
Suspicions on the part of Allied circles that purely anti-Jewish
measures were concerned were countered by Turkey with references
to simultaneous measures taken against the minorities. At any
rate, Turkey abandoned further measures to find a solution of
the minorities problem and therewith of the Jewish problem. For
this reason it is impossible to continue to practice anti-Jewish
propaganda under our direction at the present moment, as it is
undesirable and would be a burden on Turkey’s present foreign
policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, apart
from caricatures and comic books about Jews. The first signs of
realization of the extent of international Jewish domination are
evident in the translation of the _Protocol of the Elders of
Zion_ and of Ford’s book, _The International Jew_. The sale and
distribution of these brochures have been promoted by the
Embassy. For the time being, work is possible only within this
narrow range since, as was already emphasized, an anti-Jewish
propaganda obviously inspired by Germany might cause us
unfavorable political complications.”
Now, do you believe in the _Protocol of the Elders of Zion_? Do you
believe it is a correct and authentic work?
VON PAPEN: Not at all, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why was the marketing of these brochures
being promoted by the Embassy?
VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may give the Tribunal a very brief explanation on
the whole connection of this meeting. The meeting had been called by the
Foreign Office, and was to be attended by experts from the embassies and
legations who had been specifically employed to deal with the Jewish
problem. In my Embassy there was no such expert, as I always refused to
have one. For this reason the Party had of its own accord instructed the
bookseller Herr Posemann to deal with this problem, and had delegated
him to attend this conference.
If Herr Posemann here sets forth that the Embassy circulated the
propaganda brochures which are mentioned here, then he is gravely
mistaken. Firstly, the Turkish Government would never have tolerated the
circulation of such material, and secondly, you, Sir David, can convince
yourself today that all these brochures are still lying in the basement
of my Embassy at Ankara.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that this statement made at the Foreign
Office meeting, you say, is wrong?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you had nothing to do with that;
that is your answer? I want to ask you one or two things about the
Catholic Church. You remember the Fulda Declaration of the Bishops?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right, is it not? That was made and
based on an assurance which Hitler gave to the Church of his good
intentions, on 23 March 1933? Do you remember Hitler’s making a
statement like that?
VON PAPEN: Not only on the 23d, but also in the Government declaration
Hitler expressly stated his view that every policy must be based on both
the Christian denominations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that in turn was the result, at least in
part, of a statement of yours at a Cabinet meeting on 15 March 1933,
when you stressed the importance of incorporating political Catholicism
into the new State; that is a correct and factual statement, is it not?
That is the way the thing works out?
VON PAPEN: Completely, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
VON PAPEN: I made every effort to induce Hitler to establish this
Christian basis of his policy firmly by means of solemn engagements; and
I think I have already explained to the High Tribunal that I really made
every effort to carry through this program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now let me ask you to look once again at
Document 11, Page 96; Page 78 of the German version, which is Document
2248-PS. It is your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935. Now in that report
you use these words: “....the clever hand which eliminates political
Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany....”
My Lord, it is on Page 99 of the English text and it is Page 86 of the
German text. My Lord, it is the first paragraph, Page 99:
“Cultural problems have a special significance. The way in which
Germany deals with her political and religious difficulties, the
clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without
weakening the Christian foundations of Germany will not only
have a decisive reaction on England or Catholic Poland. We may
rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question
stands or falls with it.”
Now, what I want you to bear in mind: This is your account to Hitler in
July 1935, over 2 years after the Concordat: “....the clever hand which
eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian
foundations of Germany....” Now your counsel quoted one passage of His
Holiness the Pope’s allocution, and I would just like you to look and
tell the Tribunal whether you agree with the next passage, which occurs
after the bit quoted by Dr. Kubuschok.
My Lord, this is a new document—no, My Lord, I am sorry. It is an old
exhibit. It is Document 3268-PS, which is Exhibit USA-356. Your Lordship
remembers that Dr. Kubuschok quoted a portion, in his document book, of
the Pope’s allocution. My Lord, I have some extra copies.
Now after the bit which Dr. Kubuschok quoted as to the Concordat having
prevented worse evils, His Holiness goes on to say:
“The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become more and
more embittered: the disbanding of Catholic organizations; the
progressive suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools,
both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from
family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the
conscience of the citizens, and especially of civil servants;
the systematic defamation, by means of clever, closely organized
propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, and of the
Church’s institutions, teaching, and history; the closing,
disbanding, and confiscation of religious houses and other
ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the
Catholic press and publishing houses.”
Do you agree with His Holiness that that is a correct description of the
action of the German Reich against the Catholic Church?
VON PAPEN: Completely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you also to look at
the “Mit Brennender Sorge,” which is Document 3280-PS.
Your Lordship will find it at Page 40 of Document Book 11—I am sorry,
My Lord, it is Page 47. I said 40. It is 40 of the German text.
Now, if you notice, that is quite early, on 14 March 1937, 4 years after
the Concordat, and he says in the second sentence at the beginning:
“It discloses intrigues which from the first had no other aim
than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had
labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others—like the enemy
in Holy Scripture—sowed the tares of suspicion, discord,
hatred, calumny, of secret and open basic hostility to Christ
and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and
employing every available means. They, and they only, along with
their silent or vocal protectors are responsible for the fact
that on the horizon of Germany there is now to be seen, not the
rainbow of peace, but the threatening stormcloud of destructive
religious wars.”
Now, Defendant, what I want you to tell the Tribunal—do you agree with
that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you agree with these statements of the head
of the Church, how could you possibly write to Hitler, 2 years after the
Concordat, in July 1935, that he had “eliminated political Catholicism
without touching the Christian foundations of Germany”? It was
absolutely wrong, wasn’t it, that Hitler and the Nazis had not touched
the Christian foundations of Germany? They had uprooted them and were in
process of destroying them?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, you are confusing two completely different things,
political Catholicism...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I don’t want to interrupt you, but I
have made that point quite clear. The point I am putting to you is not
the elimination of political Catholicism. I am not, for the moment,
dealing with the relation between you and Monsignor Kaas. What I am
dealing with is your other statement, that it had been done without
touching the Christian foundations of Germany. What I am putting to you
is what His Holiness is saying, that the Christian foundations of
Germany were being destroyed. I don’t mind, for the moment, about the
views that Monsignor Kaas had of you or you had of Monsignor Kaas. I
know what they are.
VON PAPEN: Let me explain these things to you. The struggle against the
Church and its institutions, against which His Holiness the Pope
inveighs in his encyclicals in the years 1937 and 1945, and in which he
recognized the intensification of the situation obtaining during the
war—all of these things were an attack on the Christian foundations of
Germany, an attack which I always condemned most strongly. But this has
no connection at all with the elimination of so-called political
Catholicism for which I hoped and which I demanded. These are two
completely different things. Perhaps it is hard for you to understand,
since you are not familiar with circumstances in Germany.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please believe, Defendant, that I have spent a
great deal of time in pursuing the troubles between you and Monsignor
Kaas. I am not going to bring them out before the Tribunal because they
are not important. I appreciate and agree—not as well as you do, but I
appreciate the position of political Catholicism and I am not asking you
about that. I am asking you about your statement. Why did you say to
Hitler that he had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany?
That is what I want to know. You must have known in 1935 that that
wasn’t true?
VON PAPEN: But, Sir David, that is a complete distortion of the contents
of this report. I am telling Hitler that the Christian foundations of
Germany must not be weakened and that may still be read in the report
today: “Political Catholicism must be eliminated without weakening the
Christian foundations of Germany.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you appreciate how it begins. You say
“....that a clever hand which eliminates it without touching....” Just
let me remind you: Didn’t you say, in your interrogation, that your
trouble—part of your trouble in the summer of 1934, before you made the
Marburg speech, was due to the nonfulfillment of the Concordat, that
after it had been signed, with the consent of Hitler, “....he treated it
just as a scrap of paper and I couldn’t do anything”? Then there was the
persecution of the Churches and the Jews at the same time. That was late
in 1933 and in 1934. Is that your view in 1934, “....that there had not
only been treating of the Concordat as a scrap of paper but persecution
of both the Churches and the Jews”?
VON PAPEN: I do not know which document you are quoting from, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is your interrogation on the morning of 19
September 1945.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course. When I delivered the Marburg speech, I
believed that the State was violating all these things; otherwise, I
would not have made the speech. But in this speech, Sir David, I again
expressly emphasized the fact that no European occidental state can
exist without a Christian foundation, and that by disregarding our
Christian basis we would cut ourselves off from the group of Christian
peoples and from our mission in Europe. I could scarcely say it more
clearly than that. And perhaps I can tell you something else on the
subject of political Catholicism. You have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do as you want to. I especially want to avoid
burdening the Tribunal with the exchanges between you and Monsignor
Kaas, because both of you used harsh language and it might not sound
very good if I repeated it now. If you want to go into it, do, but don’t
open it up unless you must.
VON PAPEN: I regard this accusation which you are making against me as
one of the most tremendous for it violates my whole conception.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you remember you told the Tribunal
just before the adjournment that you had introduced Cardinal Innitzer to
Hitler when you went into Austria. You remember that after the statement
to which Dr. Kubuschok has referred, that Cardinal Innitzer in a
broadcast from Rome made it clear that he was only accepting the Nazi
rule of Austria on certain conditions. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like to see what happened to
Cardinal Innitzer.
This is a new document, My Lord, D-903, which becomes GB-508. My Lord,
this is a statement in the form of an affidavit from a priest, Dr.
Weihbacher, which I only got from Vienna on 7 June.
You will see that this priest—well, at any rate I take it he is a
priest; he is the archbishop’s secretary in the cathedral chapter. Let’s
just look at it.
“On 8 October 1938”—that is a little over 6 months after you
had arranged for Cardinal Innitzer to meet Hitler—“a serious
attack was made by youthful demonstrators on the archbishop’s
palace in Vienna. I was present during the attack and can
therefore describe it from my own experience.”
Then he describes how they smashed window panes, broke in the gate. The
priests took the archbishop into an inner room and hid him there. They
took the cardinal to safety in the personalia archive and locked the
iron door behind him, and:
“....then we two priests, seeing ourselves opposed by a crowd of
invaders, personally took up a stand at the entrance to the
cardinal’s house chapel in order to prevent any destruction from
being wrought there at least.”
My Lord, this is about 10 lines from the foot of the page.
“Shortly after we had reached the chapel, the invaders stormed
into the cardinal’s rooms adjoining the chapel. As soon as they
reached the door we warded them off. Pieces of wood came flying
into the chapel; I received a push that knocked me over; but we
managed to prevent them from entering the chapel. The
demonstrators were youths aged from 14 to 25 and numbering about
a hundred. After we had warded off the first troop, we opened up
the Tabernacle and consumed the consecrated wafers so as to
prevent the Most Holy from being desecrated. But new invaders
were already storming in; and we warded them off. In the
meantime an indescribable orgy of destruction was going on in
the remaining rooms among all the fittings. With the brass rods
holding the carpet in place on the staircase, the youths
destroyed tables and chairs, candelabras and valuable paintings,
and in particular all the crucifixes.”
Then it describes the plate-glass doors and so on, and there was an
alarm when the cardinal was discovered. This priest himself was dragged
from the chapel by about six people and dragged across the anteroom to
the window with shouts of “We’ll throw the dog out of the window.”
And then, eventually, the police came, and you will notice their idea of
what was proper reparation.
“Then a lieutenant colonel of police arrived and apologized. He
was followed by a representative of the Gestapo who expressed
his regret that the police had not been very active in their
intervention.
“Meanwhile other demonstrators attacked the cathedral rector’s
house at 3 Stephansplatz where they threw the cathedral curate
Krawarik out of the window into the yard. This priest lay in
hospital until February with both thighs fractured.”
Now I ask you to look at the penultimate paragraph:
“That the demonstration was not the result of youthful
wantonness or embitterment, but a well-laid plan known to
official quarters, is obvious from the speech of Gauleiter
Bürckel who, on 13 October on the Heldenplatz, in the basest
possible manner represented the cardinal as guilty.”
Now, Herr Von Papen, you had a great responsibility in relation to
Cardinal Innitzer, had you not? You had introduced him to Hitler. You
must have learned from the ramifications and communications of the
Catholic Church of this attack on the cardinal’s house 6 months after
the Anschluss, did you not? You must have learned of this.
VON PAPEN: I heard about it later, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What protest did you make when you heard of this
disgraceful attack on the principles of the Church, the throwing of the
cathedral curate out of the window and breaking both his thighs, the
desecration of the chapel, the breaking of crucifixes? What protest did
you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I should like to remind you, Sir David, that I had resigned
from office more than 6 months before and no longer had anything
whatsoever to do with these matters. Naturally the details of the
incident were in the highest degree regrettable and, indeed, amounted to
criminal attacks; but the details did not appear in the German press, so
that I am probably seeing them for the first time in this form here. But
let me add...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Defendant, you haven’t answered the question. The
question was: What complaint did you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I made no protest, for I was no longer in an official
position at the time. I was a private citizen, and all I learned
officially about these things was what the German papers were allowed to
publish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, Defendant, surely you have told us that you
were one of the leading Catholic laymen in Germany. You are not going to
tell the Tribunal that in the Catholic Church it wasn’t known to every
bishop in Germany and probably to every parish priest that this
abominable and sacrilegious insult had been offered to a prince of the
Church in his own house in Vienna. Surely it would permeate through the
Church in a few days.
VON PAPEN: That is quite possible, Sir David; but would you expect me, a
private citizen, to do anything? What could I do? The Tribunal did not
take notice of the discussion which I brought about between Cardinal
Innitzer and Hitler. You mentioned that for the first time here today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly why I am putting this incident
to you, that you were responsible for bringing about the meeting between
Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler in March of 1938. When His Eminence is
attacked in October, I should have thought—it is not for me to express
my thoughts—that you might have taken the trouble to protest to Hitler,
and all that you do is to take another job under Hitler within 6 months,
in April 1936.
What I am asking you is why you didn’t make a protest. You could have
written to Hitler. The Defendant Göring has expressed his great
religious interests. A number of the other defendants have said that
they had great religious sympathies. Why couldn’t you have got in touch
with them?
VON PAPEN: Because in autumn 1938 I retired from political life; I was
living in the country and was no longer taking any active interest in
politics. But perhaps I may say just why I was responsible for promoting
a meeting with Cardinal Innitzer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not the point that I am interested
in at the moment, the meeting on 15 March. I am interested in the fact
that this took place, that you knew of it, and made no protest.
Now I am going to come to another point. Dr. Kubuschok can raise it
later on, if he wants.
Defendant, you have heard a number of your codefendants giving evidence
and saying that they didn’t know of the terrible repressive measures
that were taking place in Germany. You knew very well about these
repressive measures, did you not? You knew about the action of the
Gestapo, the concentration camps, and later you knew about the
elimination of the Jews, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I only knew this much, that in the years 1933 and 1934
political opponents were interned in the concentration camps. I very
frequently protested against the methods used in concentration camps. In
various cases I liberated people from these camps; but at that time I
was quite unaware that murders had even been committed in them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let me take that up. It is good
to get down to a concrete instance.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that at the beginning of 1935 your
secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was ordered to return from Vienna to
Berlin for examination by the Gestapo. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember that he refused to go and he
sent you a detailed report of his reasons for not going? Do you remember
that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us look at that together very shortly.
My Lord, that is Document D-685, which would become Exhibit GB-509; Your
Lordship will find it at Page 87 of Document Book 11, and it is at Page
60 of the German version.
Now, at Page 87 there is Herr Von Tschirschsky’s own letter to you, in
which he says, at the end of the second paragraph: “I am not in a
position ... to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for
interrogation.”
And then he says that—to quote his own words—that he has been
influenced only by the “human, understandable desire to live” and then
he sends a report, he encloses a report, to you of what had happened to
him on 30 June which got him into the bad books of the Gestapo.
Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And summarizing the beginning of it, which would
be almost humorous if it did not show such a dreadful state of affairs,
your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was arrested simultaneously by
two competing groups of Reich policemen, I think the Criminal Police and
the Gestapo, and there was a severe danger of Herr Von Tschirschsky and
some of the police being shot before they could decide who was to take
him into custody. But I want you to come to when he is taken into
custody.
My Lord, it is at Page 89, and it is at the end of Page 65 of the German
version, Defendant.
You see, this is after, I think, the Gestapo had won the internecine
struggle and it got possession of the body of Herr Von Tschirschsky, and
then he says, just toward the end—My Lord, it is the middle of Page 89.
He is told the other police are following the Gestapo and he says:
“....we went to the Gestapo building in the Prinz
Albrecht-Strasse and through a courtyard to a back entrance.
There was another exchange of words between the two groups of
Criminal Police. I again joined in this debate and suggested as
a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each
of the groups should see some higher authority in the building
and let him decide what should be done. There would still be
three Criminal Police officials and four SS men available to
guard me and the other two gentlemen. This course was adopted;
and eventually they came back and explained that the
misunderstanding was now cleared up and we could be taken away.
Whereupon we were taken by three SS men, not accompanied by the
Criminal Police officials, on a lengthy trip through the
building into the basement. There we were handed over without
comment and were ordered by the SS men on duty there to go and
sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then
forbidden to talk to each other. I spent a few hours like this
sitting on the bench. It would make too long a story to give
further details of the events which took place during this time.
I will therefore restrict myself to the case of the shooting of
a well-known personality who was publicly stated to have
committed suicide.
“The person in question was brought in under the escort of three
SS men and led past us into a cell running parallel to our
corridor. The leader of the detachment was an SS
Hauptsturmführer, short, dark, and carrying an Army pistol in
his hand. I heard the command ‘Guard the door!’ The door leading
from our corridor into the other one was shut. Five shots were
fired and immediately after the shots the Hauptsturmführer came
out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand,
muttering under his breath, ‘That swine is settled.’ Feverish
excitement reigned all around; cries and shrieks of terror were
heard from the cells. One of the SS men on duty, a comparative
youngster, was so excited that he apparently lost all
consciousness of the entire situation and informed me,
illustrating his remarks with his fingers, that the person
concerned had been liquidated by means of three shots in the
temple and two in the back of the head.”
You had a pretty good idea of SS and Gestapo methods after Herr Von
Tschirschsky had given you that report, hadn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and you can also see that this report...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us, before we leave that elevating extract
which I have just read, who was the well-known person who was supposed
to have committed suicide and who was shot with three shots in the
temple and two in the back of the head. Who was it?
VON PAPEN: I cannot tell you. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you mean to say that Herr Von Tschirschsky
was on your staff for several months afterwards and he never told you
who this was?
VON PAPEN: I do not recall, Sir David, that he discussed this matter
with me; and in any case I may have forgotten it. In any event one of
the personalities who died on 30 June.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause. You say you might have forgotten. Do
you mean that dreadful occurrences like this were so familiar to you
that you cannot remember the account of the actual shooting of a
supposed suicide who was a prominent person?
Have another think. Cannot you tell the Tribunal who this unfortunate
man was?
VON PAPEN: If I remembered that, I would willingly tell you. I have no
reason to conceal the information.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let the Tribunal see how you
passed this on to Hitler. You believed, did you not, that Herr Von
Tschirschsky was telling the truth? You said so. You believed he was
telling the truth, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at page...
My Lord, it is Page 86 of the English version; and, Defendant, it is 58
of the German book, Page 58.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you going to investigate the facts as to
what happened to the man who made this report?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes, I will clear that up, I am so
sorry.
Defendant, just before we come to what happened when he made the report,
Herr Von Tschirschsky himself was—I think he went to a concentration
camp and had his head shaved and then eventually after a certain period
he was released and rejoined your service and was in your service up
until February of 1935. Is not that so, Defendant?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord. That takes up the story
until we come to February 1935. He is then asked to report to the
Gestapo and then this correspondence takes place.
Now, you see that in your letter to Hitler of 5 February, which is
Document D-684, Exhibit GB-510, you say:
“As already reported yesterday by telegram, I have passed on to
Herr Von Tschirschsky the order of 2d instant, repeating the
demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo, 5
February.
“He then announced to me officially that he would not comply
with this order as he was convinced that he would be killed in
one way or another. He will give all his reasons for this
refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.
“Yesterday I finally relieved Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I had
already suspended for the duration of the proceedings, of his
post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all
connections of an official nature as soon as the files and such
have been handed over tomorrow.”
Then you say you telegraphed the Defendant Von Neurath and you had given
Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave. Then just look at the last paragraph.
“After I had repeatedly asked that Herr Von Tschirschsky be
given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the
charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that
the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce
Herr Von Tschirschsky to take the course indicated to him of
submitting to interrogation by the Gestapo.”
Defendant, is that right, that you left nothing undone to get this man
in your staff sent to his death to be murdered by the Gestapo?
VON PAPEN: I think it would be fair, Sir David, to call the attention of
the High Tribunal to the other letters which show that I asked Hitler
not only once, but repeatedly, to have the matter of Tschirschsky
investigated by means of a regular trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite true and it was referred to in
that letter.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course, but please let me finish...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite true.
VON PAPEN: When this proposal was turned down and the Führer would not
agree to have a regular trial, he, Hitler, let me know that he would use
his personal influence, and that he would assume personal responsibility
that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky if he was
investigated by the Gestapo. You will also find that in these letters.
The Führer promised him exceptional immunity if he would allow himself
to be interrogated by the Gestapo. Therefore, after the suggestion for a
regular trial had been turned down and Hitler had promised that nothing
would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky, I asked Herr Von Tschirschsky to
submit to the investigation, as the charges made against him had to be
cleared up somehow. But I believe...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn back to your letter of 31
January, which you will find...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think you should read the whole of this
letter which you have just been on, 5 February, at some stage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will. My Lord, I am so sorry. My
Lord, I do not want to omit anything; but I am, of course, trying to
shorten the matter; but I will read anything Your Lordship wants.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ought to be in possession of the whole
letter. You stopped at the word “courier,” in the middle, with reference
to reporting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. With reference to reporting his
dismissal to the Austrian Government:
“With regard to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian
Government, I am afraid that if I dismiss him abruptly tomorrow,
the matter will become the theme of public discussion. I think
this scandal should be avoided and I have therefore given Herr
Von Tschirschsky sick leave in the meantime, as far as the
public is concerned. I shall report his dismissal later.
“I shall return to the Tschirschsky affair and its connections
with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later, in a
detailed report.”
My Lord, I am grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You left off after the word “Gestapo” in the next
paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will read the whole thing again.
“After I had repeatedly asked....”
THE PRESIDENT: No, you read that down to “Gestapo,” but you did not go
on with the rest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But if he persists in his resolve to
avoid this interrogation, even though he knows that this means
social and material ruin for himself and his family, and as he
has given me his word that he will do nothing while an _émigré_
which would be harmful to the Führer and to the country, I can
only add my wish that everything should be avoided which could
turn this affair into an open scandal.”
I am grateful, My Lord.
Now, Defendant, you had already said to Hitler on 31 January, which was
5 days before that—Page 84, My Lord, and the foot of Page 55 and the
beginning of 56 of the German book:
“Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I have, incidentally, for the time
being relieved of his duties, has now learned from several
sources which he—and I myself as well, unfortunately—regards
as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have
for some considerable time been planning to liquidate him.”
My Lord, that will be Document D-683, Exhibit GB-511.
You believed that it was authentic on 31 January that the Gestapo wished
to neutralize him. On 5 February, in the part that the Tribunal just
asked me to read, you say it will be the ruin of his social and material
position for himself and his family, but if the thing is kept quiet,
your wish is that everything be done to avoid a scandal.
Now, Defendant...
VON PAPEN: My wish was first of all that everything possible should be
done to have the matter cleared by means of a public trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first wish, but you very soon gave
that up.
VON PAPEN: Just a moment, please. After Hitler had refused to agree to
my wish, and after he had determined that Von Tschirschsky would enjoy
the personal protection of Hitler during his investigation by the
Gestapo—that is, if the head of the State says “I will be responsible
for the fact that nothing will happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky!” then
you will allow that naturally the only course of action open to me is to
say to Herr Von Tschirschsky, “Take this course and let them interrogate
you; for after all you have to clear yourself of the suspicion resting
on you.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, let me remind you that there is not a
word in your letter of 5 February about any promise from Hitler to give
an indemnity to Herr Von Tschirschsky. All that you are saying is that
he will disappear into disgrace. There is nothing in any other letter
either.
VON PAPEN: Yes. It is in one of Tschirschsky’s reports. I cannot find it
at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can find anything about an
indemnity, I can only tell you that I have not been able to find it in
any of your letters.
VON PAPEN: But it is there.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could look for this document at the
recess, at 1 o’clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, very well. My Lord, if there is such a
document, I am very sorry; I don’t know about it.
Yes, My Lord; I am sorry. I think I have got the reference. On Page 91,
My Lord. It is not in the defendant’s letter, but there is a reference
in Herr Von Tschirschsky’s report. On Page 91, My Lord. Page 69. It
says:
“In conclusion—the reason why I feel myself under no obligation
either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at
all, in spite of the extraordinary protection promised me by the
Führer and Reich Chancellor—I make the following declaration:
“During the period of my activities in Berlin, information had
already frequently reached me to the effect that there existed
in the Reich a terror organization which had sworn the oath of
mutual allegiance in life and death. It is expressly pointed out
to men who are or who may be accepted into this brotherhood that
they are under an obligation to submit to the secret court and
that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to
feel that they belong in a high degree to the brotherhood and
only in a smaller degree to Adolf Hitler. I could not have
believed this monstrous thing, had I not been informed of it
about 6 months previously by a man in the Reich—I wish to
stress this particularly—who is not opposed to the Third Reich,
but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions
believes in Adolf Hitler’s mission, a Reich-German and a
National Socialist of many years’ standing, who himself at one
time was to be asked to join this brotherhood but who was able
to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his
willingness publicly to announce the names which he mentioned to
me of members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to
this effect in case these people should be already dead. He must
only be assured that this terrorist brotherhood is no longer
active, especially as there are persons belonging to this
brotherhood who are among those most trusted by the Führer and
Reich Chancellor.”
I am sorry; I knew there was nothing in the letters from the defendant,
but I had forgotten that there was this passage in the letter.
Now, that was Von Tschirschsky. You told us that Baron von Ketteler was
murdered at the end of your time in Vienna. You remember Baron von
Ketteler’s father was murdered, if my memory is right, and that caused
the German expedition against the Boxers in China. That is the family
the gentlemen belonged to, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the effect of this, the murder of Von
Ketteler, on you after the experience with Von Tschirschsky was that you
were ready to take new employment under the Nazi Government in Turkey.
There is just one other point that I want to put to you.
VON PAPEN: May I add just a few remarks on this point? I told the
Court...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, I will finish on that because I
think we have the other reference to Marchionini’s affidavit, and then
you can make all the other remarks you like.
Why didn’t you after this series of murders which had gone on over a
period of 4 years, why didn’t you break with these people and stand up
like General Yorck or any other people that you may think of from
history, stand up for your own views and oppose these murderers? Why
didn’t you do it?
Now you can give your explanation.
VON PAPEN: Very well. You can see that I submitted Von Tschirschsky’s
report on these murders to Hitler, in all its details, but what you do
not know is the fact that I myself frequently told Hitler that such a
regime could not possibly last; and if you ask me, Sir David, why
despite everything I remained in the service of the Reich, then I can
say only that on 30 June I personally broke off the relations into which
we had entered on 30 January. From that day onward I did my duty—my
duty to Germany, if you wish to know. I can understand very well, Sir
David, that after all the things we know today, after the millions of
murders which have taken place, you consider the German people a nation
of criminals, and that you cannot understand that this nation has its
patriots as well. I did these things in order to serve my country, and I
should like to add, Sir David, that up to the time of the Munich
Agreement, and even up to the time of the Polish campaign, even the
major powers tried, although they knew everything that was going on in
Germany, to work with this Germany.
Why do you wish to reproach a patriotic German with acting likewise, and
with hoping likewise, for the same thing for which all the major powers
hoped?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The major powers had not had their servants
murdered, one after the other, and were not close to Hitler like you.
What I am putting to you is that the only reason that could have kept
you in the service of the Nazi Government when you knew of all these
crimes was that you sympathized and wanted to carry on with the Nazis’
work. That is what I am putting to you—that you had this express
knowledge; you had seen your own friends, your own servants, murdered
around you. You had the detailed knowledge of it, and the only reason
that could have led you on and made you take one job after another from
the Nazis was that you sympathized with their work. That is what I am
putting against you, Herr Von Papen.
VON PAPEN: That, Sir David, is perhaps your opinion; my opinion is that
I am responsible only to my conscience and to the German people for my
decision to work for my fatherland; and I shall accept their verdict.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have finished.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Had you finished, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I had finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Did any of the other prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
Dr. Kubuschok?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the cross-examination yesterday it was pointed out to
you that in your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935—British Document Book
11a, Page 79—you point out that, according to legal findings, leading
Reich-German personalities applied the use of force in Austria in July
1934. In this connection you mentioned the name Habicht. I should like
to receive some information about the personality of Habicht. Was
Habicht a Reich-German?
VON PAPEN: Habicht was a Reich-German and had his headquarters in
Munich. He was Provincial Inspector (Landesinspekteur) of the entire
National Socialist Party in Austria. That means the following:
The Austrian Party had a Gauleiter in Austria, but it was directed from
Munich from the Reich Party Directorate by a specially appointed
Landesleiter, Provincial Inspector Habicht. Since this man had charge of
the whole Austrian Party, his position in the Party was, of course,
considered as a leading one. One could not call him a “liaison officer,”
but a leading Reich-German personality.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In cross-examination yesterday various letters were
submitted to you which you wrote to Hitler between 4 and 17 July 1934.
These letters should be gone into more closely. What was the purpose of
the letters?
VON PAPEN: I am glad to have an opportunity to go into this
correspondence once more. One must consider the situation which existed
at that time: Bose shot, three co-workers arrested, great excitement;
and everyone who was in any way in opposition was under suspicion of
being connected with this SA revolt. It was similar to the situation
after 20 July 1944.
Therefore the first goal was to clear up the Bose case as well as the
other cases through legal proceedings. I requested that in my first
letter of 4 July. I also demanded this rehabilitation in further
letters, but it was a prerequisite to establish first of all that we
were not in any way connected with the SA conspirators.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the letters you assure Hitler of your faithfulness and
loyalty. Is this not astonishing after the events of 30 June?
VON PAPEN: It may seem astonishing to an outsider, but not to a person
who remembers the hysterical atmosphere of those days, for at that time
everyone who had been in any opposition at all or who had criticized the
system was branded as a co-conspirator. For that reason I thought it
advisable to make it clear, by means of such a letter, that I and the
Vice Chancellery had nothing to do with this conspiracy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution thinks your letters
have only the purpose of rehabilitating your own person. What do you
have to say about this?
VON PAPEN: I ask that the Tribunal study these letters. In them it can
be seen that I repeatedly pointed out that my co-workers too must be
absolutely rehabilitated. In the letter of 12 July, on Page 3, I say
that the honor of my own officials is also my own honor; and I
repeatedly demanded that the Bose case be cleared up.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you believe to be able to achieve through the
legal proceedings which you suggested?
VON PAPEN: Legal proceedings would have had two effects: In the first
place, nonparticipation in the Putsch would have been established; and
that would necessarily have shown that the arrest of my co-workers and
the killing of Bose had been an arbitrary act, an act for which those
responsible were to be punished.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a letter of 14 July you welcomed Hitler’s speech of
justification before the Reichstag on 13 July. What comment do you have
to make on this?
VON PAPEN: I may ask you to look at the text of this letter. I welcomed
the suppression of the intended second revolution, but this must by no
means be taken as recognition of the acts of violence carried out
against persons not participating in the revolution; and furthermore,
the following is to be considered: The events of 30 June were divided
into two parts. In the first place, Hitler himself had turned against
the revolting SA; the fact that such a revolt was actually planned
seemed quite credible to all of us, for the rumors of a second
revolution had been current in the country for weeks. In Marburg I had
already made reference to it. The revolt of the SA leaders, who
represented an effective power, could be considered a danger to the
State; and the executions had been directed against SA leaders who were
especially well-known and whose names were connected with the excesses
of 1933.
The second part of the action had been directed against persons outside
this circle. Slowly the news of the individual cases leaked out. The
justification for taking steps against these persons was in part
explained by saying that they had some sort of connection with SA
leaders and that some of them had offered resistance. That had to be
cleared up, for here an emergency law could be referred to; but it was
not possible to deviate from an orderly legal procedure. Hence my letter
to Hitler of 12 July, in which I asked him not to deviate from the
orderly legal procedure. I warned him against identifying himself with
these events, and I demanded from him—referring to the Bose case—the
latter’s rehabilitation and legal proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got the letters, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the purpose of this questioning is to clear up the
matter and to explain the contents of the letters, but I believe the
defendant has said enough and we can go on to another question now.
Your letter of 17 July is signed without a complimentary closing, and
also deviates from other letters in its general form. How do you explain
this?
VON PAPEN: On 17 July, I had to consider my efforts to achieve legal
proceedings as having failed. I had not even received my files back. For
that reason, I gave up further efforts and there was no longer any
reason to announce my resignation publicly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You mean to put it off.
Now I come back to a document which the British Prosecution referred to
today. It is 2248-PS in the British Document Book 11a, Page 99. The
representative of the British Prosecution has tried to obtain an
explanation from the defendant. I believe difficulties in the
translation and the manner of expression in general have made it a bit
hard to understand. I will read the sentence in question once more and
ask the defendant to explain this sentence. I will quote on Page 99 of
the English text, the second paragraph from the top.
“The way Germany....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we have had a very long explanation
already.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the explanation suffered from the fact
that the defendant did not understand the translation correctly or that
the British Prosecution did not understand the defendant. The form of
the German text is not clear. The defendant will be able to explain it
very easily. The explanation goes...
THE PRESIDENT: All right, go on then, go on.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: “The way in which Germany deals with
politico-religious difficulties, the clever hand which
eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian
foundation of Germany, will not only have a decisive effect on
England,” _et cetera_.
Please explain the sense of this sentence which I have just read.
VON PAPEN: I meant to say to Hitler, “You must eliminate political
Catholicism with a clever hand, but the religious foundation must under
no circumstances be touched.” It depended upon the clever solution of
this question...
THE PRESIDENT: No question of translation arises. The passage was read
to us _verbatim_ as it is before us, and it was read by Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant, and the defendant has given the same
answer over and over again in answer to Sir David.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, may I point out the following: The whole
sentence was in the future tense, the whole sentence...
THE PRESIDENT: It was read to us just now by the interpreter _verbatim_
in the words which are before us in the book and the words which were
put by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant. There is no question of
difference of tense at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, there is a special language difficulty,
because in the first part the first two verbs are in the present tense
in connection with the auxiliary “wird” used later; and in accordance
with German language usage the present is to be understood as meaning
the future also. In the opinion of the British Prosecution, the first
two verbs “deals” and “eliminates” are to be considered past tense, and
that is the difference.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter of verbal argument on the words of the
document.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. Now one last question to the witness.
A while ago Cardinal Innitzer’s talk to Hitler in Vienna was discussed.
What occasioned you to arrange this meeting of Hitler with Cardinal
Innitzer?
VON PAPEN: With our march into Austria and the Anschluss of Austria to
the Reich, Hitler had joined a Catholic country to Germany; and the
problem, which was to be solved, was winning this country from the
interior as well. That was possible only if Hitler recognized the
religious basis, recognized what rights Catholicism had in this country;
for this reason I arranged a talk between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler
in order to make sure that Hitler in the future would follow a policy
which stood on a Christian basis in Austria.
By arranging this interview, I thought I would be able to do one last
service for Austria; that was the reason.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is the end of the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I have just two or three questions I should like to ask
you.
When did you first hear about the murder of Jews?
VON PAPEN: I believe, My Lord, that that was during the war.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the war lasted 6 years. When during the war?
VON PAPEN: I cannot say with certainty, My Lord. I cannot say on my oath
when it was.
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot say with more certainty than that?
VON PAPEN: No; our general knowledge was that the Jews were sent to
camps in Poland. But we knew nothing of a systematic extermination of
Jews such as we have heard of here.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness whose affidavit your counsel has put in
evidence, Marchionini, what do you know about him?
VON PAPEN: Marchionini, My Lord, is a very well-known professor who was
employed by the Model Hospital in Ankara and who was also my family
doctor.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got your volumes of exhibits before you?
VON PAPEN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Could the defendant have Volume III?
[_The documents were handed to the defendant._]
Volume III; it’s in the affidavit from Marchionini, the last paragraph
of the answer to Question 6.
VON PAPEN: One moment, My Lord. I have not found it yet.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no hurry.
VON PAPEN: I have the affidavit now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have Question 6, or rather the answer to Question
6?
VON PAPEN: The questions are not numbered here.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the last question but one.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to that question, he says this:
“I clearly remember an incident in spring 1944 when I called
upon Von Papen at the request of Herr Barlas, the Refugee
Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, to request his assistance in
saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for
extermination. These Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality
which they later renounced.”
Then, he says, through your intervention “....the lives of these Jews
were saved.” Is that statement true?
VON PAPEN: Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: So at any rate by the spring of 1944 you knew that 10,000
Jews in France were about to be deported for extermination?
VON PAPEN: I believe they were to be deported to Poland, My Lord. But we
did not know in 1944 that they were to be exterminated. We wanted to
protect them from deportation.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said the statement was true.
VON PAPEN: For the purpose of exterminating—I believe that was not said
to us at the time. The question was only whether I was willing to help
keep 10,000 Jews who were in France from being deported to Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. You may return to the dock.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I had three witnesses approved by the Tribunal. The
witness Freiherr von Lersner could not come here at the time because of
transportation difficulties. He cannot be here before the end of July.
After the questioning of the defendant and considering the fact that
Lersner has answered an interrogatory, I believe I can dispense with the
witness. I regret this, because he is a man who was a companion of the
defendant during his whole political career, a witness who would have
been especially valuable because of his objectivity in these questions.
He was president of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have the affidavit or the interrogatory, you can
put it in. We do not need any further statements about it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
The second witness was Count Kageneck. Since the questions which were to
be asked of Kageneck have been covered in the questioning of the
defendant and the cross-examination did not touch upon them, I can also
dispense with this witness.
There remains only the witness Dr. Kroll, whom I now call to the stand.
[_The witness Kroll took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS KROLL (Witness): Hans Kroll.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath, after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, what was your occupation in Ankara?
KROLL: I was the First Counsellor of the Embassy, and later Minister. I
was in Ankara from the fall of 1936 until April 1943; from April 1939
until April 1943 I worked together with Ambassador Von Papen as his
principal collaborator. Daily, mostly in the morning and in the
afternoon, we conferred together for several hours, so that I believe I
am well informed about the various phases of his activity during this
period in Turkey; that is, about his activity during the war.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For explanatory purposes I would like to say that these
questions will refer mostly to the peace policy of the defendant.
Did you know Herr Von Papen before he became Ambassador in Ankara?
KROLL: No. We met in Ankara.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you a member of the NSDAP?
KROLL: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After taking over the position as Ambassador, Herr Von
Papen came to Ankara for a short stay. What was the purpose of this
visit?
KROLL: Herr Von Papen wanted, first of all, to present himself to the
Turkish Government and to obtain information on the general situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen at that time, through his conduct and
his statements, express his agreement with German foreign policy and, in
particular, with the policy toward Poland? Or did he, as far as he was
able, attempt to work against this policy?
KROLL: After the arrival of Herr Von Papen, I was, of course, interested
to learn what he imagined the future development of the general
situation would be and, in particular, the Polish question. I assumed,
of course, that as he came from Germany he was well informed about
Hitler’s plans; and I was disappointed to find that he knew no more than
I did, which was nothing at all.
Then we discussed the situation in detail; as far as I was able to tell,
Herr Von Papen, who spoke very frankly with me about these things,
distrusted Hitler’s foreign policy. He was an enemy of war, a true and
sincere enemy of war; and, of course, he was also an enemy of war
against Poland. He was quite convinced that an agreement could be
reached on the Polish question if it could only be made clear to Hitler
that a conflict with Poland would of necessity lead to a World War. He
then endeavored, and I must say in very open, clear, and courageous
language, to point out this view in his reports. And in his talks with
the Turkish statesmen, as well as with the accredited diplomats in
Ankara, he attempted to prove that, in fact, a conflict with Poland
would of necessity lead to a conflict with England and France. I often
told myself later that he was convinced that if everyone, Germans as
well as foreigners, had spoken to Hitler in this clear manner, the war
would have been avoided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After the outbreak of the Polish war, what was the
attitude of Herr Von Papen toward the spread of the war to the Nordic
States, Holland, Belgium, and finally, Russia?
KROLL: Herr Von Papen, of course, hoped that during this winter pause
some agreement would be reached or at least a meeting arranged. He knew
that once the action spread to the west, the war would break out in all
its horror and that then it would probably be too late to talk things
over. Of course, as far as possible, he looked for mediation in Turkey
and he was glad and willing to consider any opportunity, such as had
resulted from talks with his friend, the Dutch Minister in Ankara, Van
Visser. The motive behind this offer of Visser was Holland’s wish to
have the war ended before spring and along with that the fighting in the
west, and the goal was to be a talk between Germany and England.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am interested in knowing what Herr Von Papen’s opinion
of such a peace was. Did he think that it would be possible to achieve
annexation by way of peace, or what was the purpose of this peace which
he had in mind?
KROLL: I believe it is known from the previous activity of Herr Von
Papen that he was a friend and believer in European understanding. He
knew that this war had not begun because of a territorial problem but
because of a principle; that is to say, the prevention of future
one-sided aggressive wars. And so, in the restoration of the legal
status before the beginning of the war, that is, in the restoration of
the _status quo ante_ on the basis of 1938, including the restoration of
Poland and Czechoslovakia, he saw the prerequisite for instituting
_pourparlers_.
He considered the second prerequisite for the successful carrying on of
such _pourparlers_ the restoration of confidence in the German
signature, which was known to have been destroyed through Hitler’s
foreign policy. The only question was how this confidence could be
restored. He clearly realized that the prerequisite for this was a basic
reform of the regime, with the aim of making Germany a legal state once
more. Finally, Herr Von Papen, posted as he was in Turkey, believed he
saw the possibility of ending the war by reaching an understanding,
because Turkey was in a better position for mediation than practically
any other state of equal importance in foreign politics. It enjoyed the
confidence of both belligerent parties, and that is essential for
arranging a _pourparler_. And so he endeavored, in all his talks with
Turkish statesmen, to win Turkey over for a mediation. During all his
years in Turkey that was the leitmotif of his work, namely, to bring the
war to an end as soon as possible. It is a fact that he finally enjoyed
the satisfaction of hearing the Turkish President, in 1942 in a big
public speech before the Turkish National Assembly, offering the
services of Turkey for mediation between the belligerents.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you have knowledge of the efforts of Herr Von Papen
to avert a spread of the war toward Turkey, contrary to the efforts of
certain circles of the Axis partners around Hitler? During the war there
were several crises which you might briefly mention.
KROLL: I should like to say first that Papen’s activity in Turkey can be
summed up in one word. He considered it his mission to make one and the
same the interests of Germany, his country, and the interests of peace.
That meant, in effect, that he endeavored to prevent the spreading of
the war to Turkey and the Near East and thus create the prerequisite for
having Turkey intervene as mediator at the proper time.
Now, as to the crises. I should like to limit myself to those cases in
which Herr Von Papen had the impression that the neutrality of Turkey
was endangered by the intentions of the Axis partners.
THE PRESIDENT: I think I did before draw your attention to the fact that
there was no charge against Von Papen in connection with his activities
at Ankara; and also, I may add, that this was a summing-up in one word,
I thought.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There are only a very few cases, Your Lordship. He will
tell us about them briefly to complete the general picture.
THE PRESIDENT: The only way in which the evidence can be relevant at all
is insofar as it throws light upon Von Papen’s activities before he went
to Ankara. That is what I pointed out to you before.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I said the other day, Your Lordship, that the personality
of a person charged with war conspiracy cannot be judged correctly if
only one period of his activity is mentioned. He was at a post where he
could do only negative or positive things. It is certainly not
irrelevant if at least it may be presented in brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this witness has been telling us for a
considerable time that Papen’s activities were entirely peaceful and
that they were endeavors to make Turkey mediate; and what he is doing
now is simply going on with further details on the same subject, and it
is over a period when, as I say, no charge is made against Von Papen at
all by the Prosecution.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If the Tribunal understands that the Defendant Von Papen
actually interpreted his mission in Ankara as a peace mission, I need
put no further questions to the witness. Then I come to my last
questions.
What was the position of Herr Von Papen in regard to the Party,
especially as to the Landesleitung in Ankara?
KROLL: On his arrival Von Papen was received with unconcealed distrust.
No wonder, for it was known that he was no National Socialist. During
these 4 years in Turkey I did not meet anyone who considered him a
National Socialist. His relationship to the Party became worse in the
course of the years, and finally it resulted in open conflict. That was
in 1942, when the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Ankara once told
his colleagues, if it rested with him he would have Herr Von Papen shot.
Then he was challenged about it and corrected himself. He said he didn’t
say that; he only said he would have him put in a concentration camp.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Von Papen to the Jewish
question?
KROLL: In repeated public speeches as well as in his actions, Herr Von
Papen quite clearly opposed the anti-Jewish policy of the Party. He was
acquainted with Jewish emigrants. He had Jewish doctors; he bought in
Jewish stores. In short, I believe that was one of the main reasons
which caused this tension between him and the Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen even employ a Jewish woman in the
Embassy?
KROLL: As far as I know, yes. I believe that was the wife of his
servant, his porter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: She was employed as a telephone operator there? Frau
B...., is that right?
KROLL: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know a Herr Posemann? Did he have any connection
with the German Embassy?
KROLL: At my time, Posemann was not in the German Embassy. I recall that
he had a bookstore in Ankara. He had nothing to do with the Embassy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Herr Von Papen in the personnel
question? Did he employ National Socialists in the Embassy, or what
preferences did he have?
KROLL: It is well known that the Party was never quite satisfied with
Von Papen’s choice of workers. That was shown by the very severe
consequences on 30 June and after the Anschluss. It was somewhat
dangerous to be one of his first co-workers.
Of course, he was regarded with suspicion because he did not make a
National Socialist command post out of the Embassy, as was done in the
Balkans, and because, when he asked for personnel, he chose people who
he knew were not National Socialists. I think I need only mention two
names, Herr Von Haeften and Legationsrat Von Trott zu Solz, two men who
I believe were executed in connection with 20 July. Of course, it was
especially held against Von Papen that he opposed all efforts to remove
me from my post. I do not know whether I should go into that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please do, briefly.
KROLL: Repeatedly—I could really say every month—an attempt was made
to have me eliminated as deputy of Von Papen. Finally when that did not
do any good, since Von Papen always opposed these attempts, the
Landesgruppenleiter, beating the war drum, and the Ortsgruppenleiter of
Ankara and Istanbul in the spring of 1942 came to see Von Papen and
officially in the name of the Party demanded that I should be removed
from my post. Von Papen refused this once more but finally in 1943 the
pressure of the Party became too great, especially since other sources
conspired against me, and so then I was excluded.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A final question: During the years you worked together
you became well acquainted with the activity of Von Papen and his
personality. Perhaps you can give us a brief picture of the defendant.
KROLL: I already said before...
THE PRESIDENT: No, he has already sketched it at very considerable
length and we don’t want it briefly reiterated.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then I shall dispense with this question. I have finished
the examination of the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no questions, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions? Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I only need to refer briefly to a few documents. In
Document Book 1, I submit Document 24, Page 86. I refer to the note:
“An agreement was reached with the Prosecution to the effect
that the fact should be accepted that the Enabling Act of 24
March 1933 was preceded by two Enabling Acts in 1923.”
I refer to Document Book 2, Document 63, an article from _The Stars and
Stripes_ of 27 March 1946. These are the peace efforts through Earle.
The article is to supplement the interrogatory of Lersner.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 36?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Number 63, Page 153.
Furthermore, I refer to Volume II...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. This document that you just put before us is
a document of 27 March 1946. What are we going to do with that? It is a
newspaper article.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is a newspaper article on an interview with Earle. He
was speaking with Lersner. To supplement the testimony of Lersner, which
we do not have here, I should like to use this newspaper article. It
enlarges on something which is briefly mentioned in Lersner’s written
testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: But you had the opportunity of getting an affidavit from
Lersner or for putting what questions you wanted to Lersner, and now you
are putting in a newspaper article dated 1946 whilst the Trial is going
on.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, since I cannot hear Lersner himself
because of his absence—we intended to hear him as a witness—the
question in the interrogatory was answered rather briefly. To complete
it...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Lersner interrogatory is dated 15 April 1946. It is
Document 93. Date of the interrogatory, 15 April 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal doesn’t think that this document ought
to be admitted. Newspaper articles whilst the Trial is going on are not
the sort of evidence which the Tribunal thinks it right to admit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In Volume III I submit Document 99, an affidavit by
Schaffgotsch, Page 245. It is just being submitted, Mr. President. It is
a brief affidavit concerning Papen’s vain efforts in the spring of 1934
to reach Hindenburg.
Finally, as Document 100, I shall submit the appeal of the Reich
Government of 1 February 1939, which was mentioned yesterday, and also
an excerpt on foreign policy from Hitler’s speech of 23 March. Yesterday
it was referred to during the proceedings.
Furthermore, I refer to all documents in all three document books which
have been submitted and ask that you take judicial notice of them.
Then I have one final request. Yesterday parts of the discussion of the
affidavits of Schröder and Meissner were read into the record. I believe
the Prosecution, since they have not made use of the affidavits, will be
willing that these parts be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: It was Meissner’s affidavit which was used to some
extent, wasn’t it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it was. My Lord, I should have
thought the most convenient course was that the Tribunal would take it
that I have merely put the facts out of the affidavit and would not
consider that the evidence of the affidavit was before them. Otherwise,
I think it would be very difficult to correct the record, but of course
I accept that position.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we think so. We will treat it as those facts having
been put to the witness and the witness having answered them, without
considering it as a sworn statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, purely as my questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am now finished with the case of the Defendant Von
Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit on Saturday in open session from 10
to 1.
I call on counsel for the Defendant Speer.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Perhaps the
High Tribunal will recall the fact that when we were discussing the
evidence material which I had suggested for presentation in this case I
dispensed with the testimony of witnesses and stated that I would limit
myself to the use of interrogatories and to the questioning of witnesses
outside of the courtroom.
I had hoped I should thus be able to produce my entire evidence.
However, I am not in possession of all the interrogatories I sent out. I
have only received part of them. I will use those replies which are at
my disposal to the best of my ability in the examination of the
defendant so that a special presentation of those interrogatories and of
the depositions will be superfluous. Despite everything, I hope to
conduct the examination of the defendant in such a manner that in my
estimation I shall be finished in a day and at the most 7 hours.
Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should like to call the
Defendant Speer to the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Defendant Speer took the stand._]
Will you state your full name, please?
ALBERT SPEER (Defendant): Albert Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: Sit down.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you please tell the Tribunal about your
life up until the time you were appointed Minister?
SPEER: I was born on 19 March 1905. My grandfather and my father were
successful architects. At first I wanted to study mathematics and
physics; but then I took up architecture, more because of tradition than
inclination. I attended the universities at Munich and Berlin; and in
1929 at the age of 24, I was the first assistant at the technical
college in Berlin. At the age of 27, in 1932, I went into business for
myself until 1942.
In 1934 Hitler noticed me for the first time. I became acquainted with
him and from that period of time onward I exercised my architect’s
profession with joy and enthusiasm, for Hitler was quite fanatical on
the subject of architecture; and I received many important construction
contracts from him. Along with putting up a new Reich Chancellery in
Berlin and various buildings on the Party Rally grounds here in
Nuremberg, I was entrusted with the replanning of the cities of Berlin
and Nuremberg. I had sketched buildings which would have been among the
largest in the world, and the carrying through of these plans would have
cost no more than 2 months of Germany’s war expenditure. Through this
predilection which Hitler had for architecture I had a close personal
contact with him. I belonged to a circle which consisted of other
artists and his personal staff. If Hitler had had any friends at all, I
certainly would have been one of his close friends.
Despite the war, this peaceful construction work was carried on until
December 1941, and only the winter catastrophe in Russia put an end to
it. The German part of the manpower was furnished by me for the
reconstruction of the destroyed railroad installations in Russia.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution, in Document 1435-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-216, has quoted a remark from your first speech as a Minister, dated
February 1942, in which you state that at that time you had placed
10,000 prisoners of war at the disposal of the armament industry.
Mr. President, this remark may be found in my document book, on Page 4
of the English text and Page 1 of the French text.
Herr Speer, what do you have to say about this document?
SPEER: At that time in my capacity as an architect I had nothing to say
as to whether these workers were to be taken into armaments or not. They
were put at the disposal of the Stalag, the prisoner-of-war installation
of the OKW. I took it as a matter of course that they would be put at
the disposal of armaments in the larger sense.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, did you ever participate in the planning and
preparation of an aggressive war?
SPEER: No. Since I was active as an architect up until the year 1942,
there can be no question about that whatsoever. The buildings which I
constructed were completely representative of peacetime building. As an
architect I used up material, manpower, and money in considerable
amounts for this purpose. This material, in the last analysis, was lost
to armaments.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you...
SPEER: One moment, please.
The carrying out of these large building plans which Hitler had
supported was, actually and especially psychologically, an obstacle to
armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution asserts you had been a Reichsleiter.
SPEER: No, that is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You wore the Golden Party Badge. When and why did you
receive it?
SPEER: I received the Golden Party Badge from Hitler in 1938. It was
because I had completed the plans for a new building program in Berlin.
Besides myself, five other artists received this Golden Party Badge at
the same time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you a member of the Reichstag?
SPEER: In 1941 I was called into the Reichstag by Hitler, that is,
outside of an election, as replacement for a member who had left the
Reichstag. Hitler at that time told me that in my person he also wanted
an artist represented in the Reichstag.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you ever receive a donation?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How did your activity as a Minister start?
SPEER: On 8 February 1942, my predecessor, Dr. Todt, was killed in an
airplane crash. Several days later Hitler declared I was to be his
successor in his many offices. At that time I was 36 years of age. Up
until that time, Hitler considered the main activity of Todt to be in
the building sphere, and that is why he called me to be his successor. I
believe that it was a complete surprise to everyone when I was called to
office as a Minister.
Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be seen that not building
but the intensification of armaments was to be my main task, for the
heavy losses of material in the battles in Russia during the winter of
1941-1942 was a great blow. Hitler called for considerable
intensification of armament production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When you assumed office, did you find an office
completely set up in the Reich Ministry for Arms and Munitions?
SPEER: No, Dr. Todt had neglected this function of his up until that
time; and in addition, in the fall of 1941 Hitler issued a decree
according to which the armament of the Army was to take second place to
the armament of the Air Force. At that time he foresaw a victorious
outcome of the war in Russia and had decreed that armament was to be
concentrated on the imminent war against England and was to be converted
to that end. Because of this unbelievable optimism of his, the
rescinding of that order was postponed until January 1942; and only from
that date onward—that is, during the last month of his life—did Dr.
Todt start to build up his organization. Therefore I had the difficult
task first of all to work myself into a completely new field; secondly,
at the same time to create all organizational prerequisites for my task;
and thirdly, to restore the decreasing armament production for the Army
and to increase production as much as possible within the next few
months. As is very well known today, I succeeded in doing that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What promises did you receive from Hitler about the
duration of your task and about the set-up of your staff of
collaborators?
SPEER: Hitler promised me that I should consider my task only as a war
task and that after the war I might once more resume my profession of
architect.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: At this point I should like to mention a passage from
Document 1435-PS, which deals with a speech delivered by Speer on 24
February 1942, 10 days after he assumed office. This document shows that
he was very reluctant about changing his profession of architect for
that of Minister. I quote:
“Finally I can say for myself that my personal contribution is a
very large one. Up until very recently I lived in a world of
pure ideals.”
In Document 1520-PS, which is Exhibit GB-156, found on Page 2 of my
document book, Page 5 of the English text and Page 2 of the French and
Russian texts, on 8 May 1942 Hitler stated; and I quote: “The Führer
thereupon stated several times that the Reich Ministry Speer would be
dissolved on the day when peace was concluded.”
I should further like to submit Document Number Speer-43 which is a
memorandum from Speer to Hitler, dated 20 September 1944. Mr. President,
this may be found on Page 6 of the English text, Page 3 of the French
and Russian texts. From this document you can see that Speer was
considered hostile to the Party (“parteifremd” and “parteifeindlich”) by
Bormann and Goebbels because of his circle of collaborators. Speer
writes in his memorandum, and I quote:
“The task which I have to fulfill is a nonpolitical one. I was
content in my work as long as I personally and my work were
evaluated only according to professional achievements and
standards. I do not feel strong enough to carry out successfully
and without hindrance the technical work to be accomplished by
myself and my co-workers if it is to be measured by Party
political standards.”
Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles according to
which you built up your Ministry?
THE PRESIDENT: What exhibit number are you giving that?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Exhibit Number 1, Mr. President.
Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles which you
followed in building up your Ministry?
SPEER: I personally was no expert, and I did not want to act as an
expert. Therefore, I selected the best possible experts to be found in
Germany as my co-workers. I believed that these men were to be found
within industry itself. Therefore, I made up my Ministry of honorary
industrial workers. This was done in the United States in a similar way
during the war in matters of production. Professional civil servants
were lacking in my Ministry, and you cannot really consider my Ministry
as one set up along normal lines. In June 1944 I delivered a speech in
Essen about the fundamental principles upon which I founded my Ministry
and its work, to defend myself against the various attacks against my
system in Party circles.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I regret, but I believe that the High
Tribunal is not yet in possession of my document book containing the
interrogatories. I would have been glad to point out that the statements
given by witnesses Saur and Schieber in this connection are summed up in
this answer. Now I shall submit...
THE PRESIDENT: If you will give us the references—give us the names of
the witnesses; we can take notice of them afterwards. What is the name?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The witness Saur and we are dealing with his answers to
Points 4, 5, and 8 of the interrogatory. The witness Schieber gives a
statement regarding this point under Figure 12 of his interrogatory.
Now I should like to submit the speech given by Speer on 9 June 1944 as
Exhibit Number 2. It confirms the testimony which the defendant has made
about the set-up of his Ministry by engaging honorary industrial
co-workers. I shall quote it. I am sorry to say that this speech also is
not contained in Your Honor’s supplementary volume. I am very sorry. I
will just have to read it, and I quote:
“These honorary co-workers drawn from industry....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, it is a little bit inconvenient to the
Tribunal not to have these documents before them. You could not possibly
postpone the particular documents that you have not got here until
tomorrow morning? Shall we have the supplementary volume then?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The promise was given me that it would be at my disposal
by this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; well, then, would it be convenient to leave those
parts which are contained in the supplementary volume over until
tomorrow?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the Supplementary Volume Number 5 we find a document,
very short in part, with which I shall not concern myself today. Only
this one speech which I am mentioning now is...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I quote:
“These honorary co-workers, drawn from industry, carry the
responsibility to the last detail for what is manufactured in
the various enterprises and industries and how it is
manufactured.”
Then a few lines further down:
“Among your main tasks, next to the awarding of contracts to
these industries, is to supervise the restrictions on types, the
specialization of industries, involving under certain
circumstances the closing-down of certain enterprises; to
further rationalization from the point of view of raw materials,
construction, and production; as well as unconditional exchange
of experience, without regard to patents.”
From various passages of this document it can be seen clearly that Speer
considered his office an improvised instrument which made use of the
existing authorities of the Reich for the fulfillment of his tasks but
without burdening himself with these tasks. The decree of 10 August,
which is mentioned in the speech of Speer, shows that he expressly
prohibited his offices from turning into administrative offices. The
defendant did not want bureaucratic official methods of working in his
Ministry.
THE PRESIDENT: What speech of Speer are you referring to?
You said the decree of 10 August.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is still the same speech, Mr. President, which I just
mentioned. The decree is mentioned therein.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t get what the year was when you began. What was
the year?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The year was 1942, 10 August; and the speech was given in
the year 1944. Therefore, he was referring to a decree which had been in
force for some time.
Just how important it was to the defendant to have new non-bureaucratic
forces in his Ministry is shown in the passage from his speech which I
would like to quote now:
“Any institution which has lasted for some period of time and
which exceeds a certain size has a tendency to become
bureaucratic. Even if, in one of the first large attacks on
Berlin, large parts of the current files of the Ministry were
burned, and therefore, for some time, we were lucky enough to
have unnecessary ballast taken from us, we cannot expect that
occurrences of that sort will continuously bring new vigor into
our work.”
Herr Speer, so far as the Tribunal wishes, will you please briefly
supplement these statements about the tasks of your Ministry from the
technical point of view?
SPEER: I shall try to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you, Dr. Flächsner, you read us the speech.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The speech, yes...
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be very remote to every issue, even as it is,
and why you should want to supplement it, I don’t know.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I thought it might be of interest to the High Tribunal to
hear about the sphere of activity which the defendant had in his
capacity as Minister. This speech was made to experts and is, therefore,
really only of interest to an expert. I assumed that the High Tribunal
would wish to know just what the task of the Production Ministry of Herr
Speer was. I think the Prosecution imagined its sphere of activity to be
considerably greater than it actually was.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to know what he says about the tasks of his
Ministry, you can ask him. But you have just been reading his speech,
and we don’t want to...
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No, no, I do not want that either. He is just to give us
briefly some of the technical tasks of his Ministry. That is what I
wanted to know.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to be hearing me accurately. Wouldn’t it
be better if you put your earphones on?
What I said was that you had read the speech and we didn’t want to hear
any more argument upon the speech from the defendant. If you want to ask
the defendant what the tasks of his Ministry are, ask him. What you
asked him was, “Do you wish to supplement the speech?”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you please tell us what the tasks were
which your Ministry had to carry out and please do not refer to the
things that I mentioned in the speech.
SPEER: I believe the tasks of a production ministry are well known in
all industrial states. I just wanted to summarize briefly which
functions I had to concern myself with in detail in this Ministry.
For one, we had to surmount the deficiency, in raw materials, metals,
and steel. Then, by the introduction of assembly-line work, which is
customary in the United States but was not yet current in Germany, the
work was systematized; and thus machinery and space were utilized to the
utmost. Also, it was necessary to amplify the production programs, for
example, for fine steel, aluminum, and individual parts like ball
bearings and gear wheels.
One of the most important tasks was the development of new weapons and
their serial production; and then, beginning with 1943, the reparation
of the damage caused by the extraordinarily sudden bombing attacks,
which forced us to work with improvised means and methods.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was the importance of this activity in the sphere of
your Ministry?
SPEER: It is to be taken as a matter of course that this sphere of
activity was the most important in our country, if only because it
included providing equipment for the Army. I claimed that during the war
the rest of the economy would have to be regulated according to the
exigencies of armament. In times of war, at home, there are only two
tasks which count: To furnish soldiers for the front, and to supply
weapons.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Why was the task of your Ministry purely a war function?
SPEER: Because during peacetime the giving of orders is normally
regulated according to supply and demand, but in wartime this regulating
factor is lacking.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Therefore it was one of the main tasks of your Ministry
to exercise a State control over the distribution of orders?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Then, at first, you had responsibility only for armaments
production for the Army; but at the end of 1944, you were responsible
for the entire field of armament and war production. Can you briefly
tell me the stage of this development, and how thereby the extent of
your task grew?
SPEER: It would be best for me to tell you about the development by
dealing with the number of workers I had.
In 1942 I took over the armaments and construction programs with
altogether 2.6 million workers. In the spring of 1943 Dönitz gave me the
responsibility for naval armament as well, and at this point, I had 3.2
million workers. In September of 1943, through an agreement with the
Minister of Economy, Herr Funk, the production task of the Ministry of
Economy was transferred to me. With that I had 12 million workers
working for me.
Finally, I took over the air armament from Göring on 1 August 1944. With
that the total production was marshaled under me with 14 million
workers. The number of workers applies to the Greater German Reich, not
including the occupied countries.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How was it possible to have a task of that magnitude
directed by a Ministry that consisted almost exclusively of honorary
members, who moreover had no practical routine experience in purely
administrative matters?
SPEER: The administrative sectors in the various armament offices
retained their tasks. In that way, for example, in the Army, the
Heereswaffenamt—the Army Ordnance Office—which contained several
thousand workers, gave the orders, supervised the carrying out of these
orders, and saw to it that delivery of the orders and payment were
carried out in a proper manner. Only in that way did I succeed in having
the entire armament production—which amounted to 3,000 or 4,000 million
marks a month—carried through with an honorary co-worker staff of 6,000
people.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were all armament enterprises of a Wehrmacht branch
subordinate to you?
SPEER: No. There actually was a small group of enterprises which were
run directly by the Wehrmacht branches with their own workers. These
were excepted. They were the munition plants and similar industries, and
also the enterprises of the SS.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution is changing you with the fact you share
the responsibility for the recruiting of foreign workers and prisoners
of war and for taking manpower from concentration camps. What do you say
to this?
SPEER: Neither I nor the Ministry was responsible for this. The Ministry
was a new establishment, which had a technical problem to deal with. It
took no competence in any field away from an existing authority. The
conditions of work were still handled through the old existing
authorities. The Food Ministry and the various offices connected with it
were responsible for the food supply, and the occupation-supervising
agencies in the Reich Labor Ministry were responsible for the
maintenance of safe and bearable conditions at the places of work; the
Trustees of Labor, working under the Plenipotentiary for Labor
Commitment, were responsible for the salaries and the quality and
quantity of work done; and the Health Office of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior was responsible for health conditions. The Justice
Department and the Police Department were responsible for violations
against labor discipline, and, finally, the German Labor Front was
responsible for representing the interests of labor with the employers.
The centralizing of all of these authorities lay in the hands of the
Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commissioner. The fact that the SS put itself
and its concentration camp internees outside the control of the State is
not a matter with which I or my Ministry was concerned.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Your Codefendant Sauckel testified to the effect that
with the carrying out of the recruiting of workers for the industries,
his task was finished. Is that correct in your opinion?
SPEER; Yes, certainly, as far as the placing of workers is concerned,
for one of the subjects of dissension between Sauckel and me was that
the appropriate employment of workers in industry itself had to be a
matter of the works manager and that this could not be influenced by the
labor office. It applied however only to labor recruitment and not to
the observance of labor conditions. In this connection, the office of
Sauckel was partly responsible as supervising authority.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: To what extent could the works manager conform with the
decrees of Sauckel as to labor conditions and so on?
SPEER: The decrees issued by Sauckel were unobjectionable, but the works
managers did not always find it possible to carry through the decrees
for reasons which were outside their power. The bombing attacks brought
about difficulties, disorganized transportation, or destroyed living
quarters. It is not possible to make the managers responsible for the
observance of these decrees under circumstances which often took on
catastrophic proportions after the summer of 1944. These were times of
crises and it was a matter for the Reich authorities to determine just
how far it was possible to carry through these decrees and it is not
right to push this responsibility on the little works manager.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How far was the factory manager responsible to your
Ministry in this regard?
SPEER: Within the framework of the above-mentioned responsibility which
industry enjoyed, the armament factory managers had received a
semiofficial function from me. This, of course, applied only to
technical tasks.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any industries making secret items which were
not permitted to be inspected by the Gauleiter? I recall evidence given
here where this was reported.
SPEER: There were some industries which concerned themselves with secret
matters; but in such cases the works trustee of the Labor Front was
represented, and he could report to the Gauleiter on conditions in the
factory through the Gauobmann (chief of the Labor Front in a Gau).
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you approve the punishment of people who were
unwilling to work?
SPEER: Yes, I considered it right that workers who violated labor
discipline should be punished, but I did not demand supplementary
measures in this regard. As a matter of principle, I represented the
view that a satisfactory work output on the part of 14 million workers
could be achieved in the long run only through the good will of the
worker himself. This is a bit of experience which applies generally,
causing every employer in the world to do all in his power to have his
workers satisfied.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you support the efforts made by Sauckel to improve
the social conditions of the workers, and if so, why did you?
SPEER: Naturally I supported them, even though I did not have any
jurisdiction along that line; and the same reasons which I have just
mentioned applied, for our experience showed that labor which is
satisfied has much less loss in the way of material. This for me was
very important, considering our deficiency in raw materials. It is
obvious moreover that the better quality produced by satisfied laborers
is of special significance in time of war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the records of your discussions with Hitler, there are
various directives made by Hitler dealing with the care and the
treatment of foreign workers. Did you cause Hitler to give these
directives?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit three pieces
of evidence—first of all, Document Speer-11. Mr. President, this is
found on Page 10 of the English text, Page 7 of the French text. In this
document, upon Speer’s request in March 1942, it was put down; and I
quote:
“That the Russians under all circumstances were to receive
sufficient food and that civilian Russians were not to be put
behind barbed wire and be treated as prisoners of war.”
As my next piece of evidence, which will be Exhibit Number 4, I would
like to submit Document Number Speer-13. According to this document, in
May 1943 Hitler decided, at the suggestion of Speer, that the German as
well as Russian miners should receive a substantial amount of
supplementary rations and it is specified there that especially the
Russian prisoners of war are to receive compensation in the form of
tobacco and similar items for special efforts and achievements.
The next piece of evidence is Exhibit Number Speer-5, and it is Document
Number 9. Mr. President, this is found on Page 12 of the English text
and Page 9 of the German text in the document book. According to this
document the food supply in Italian armament plants is to be put at
about the level of the German rations. In this connection it is
important that Speer, at the same time, issued directives that also the
families of these workers receive equivalent care.
I had other documents of this type at my disposal but in order to save
the time of the translation department, I did not include them in my
document book.
Herr Speer, to whom did the bonuses of the armament industry go, and
what did they consist of?
SPEER: We gave out many millions of packages to armament plants. They
contained additional food, chocolate, cigarettes, and so forth; and
these bonuses were given in addition to all the extra food rations which
were determined by the Food Ministry for those who worked longer hours
or who did heavy work. In the industries, these bonuses were given to
all workers without distinction, including the foreign workers,
prisoners of war, and the workers from concentration camps.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall again refer to the fact that these bonuses were
also given to armament workers from concentration camps later on when
discussing another document.
In what form did your Ministry put its demands to the industries?
SPEER: It is important to note that the demands made of industries were
only in the manner of production schedules and it was up to the
industries to place their demands as to manpower, machinery, and
material on the basis of these schedules.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was there often an unusual increase in working hours in
industry and how did this happen?
SPEER: Working time should remain uniform in modern assembly-line
production during the entire month. Due to the bombing attacks, delays
in supplying tools and raw materials set in. As a result the number of
hours of work varied from 8 to 12 a day. The average, according to our
statistics, might have been 60 hours to 64 hours a week.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were the working hours of the factory workers who
came from concentration camps?
SPEER: They were exactly the same as for all the other workers in the
industry, for the workers from concentration camps were on the whole
only a part of the workers employed; and these workers were not called
upon to do any more work than the other workers in the factory.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How is that shown?
SPEER: There was a demand on the part of the SS that the inmates of
concentration camps be kept in one part of the factory. The supervisors
consisted of German foremen and specialists. The working hours, for
inherent reasons, had to be co-ordinated with those of the entire
industry, for it is a known fact that there is only one rhythm of work
in a given industry.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is shown unequivocally from two documents which I
shall submit in another connection that the workers from concentration
camps in army and naval armament and in the air armament branch worked
on an average 60 hours per week.
Why, Herr Speer, were special KZ Camps, the so-called work camps,
established next to the industries?
SPEER: The work camps were established so that long trips to the
factories could be avoided and in this way permit the workers to arrive
fresh and ready for work.
Furthermore, the additional food which the Food Ministry had granted for
all workers, including the workers from concentration camps, would not
have been received by these men if they had come directly from big
concentration camps; for then this additional food would have been used
up in the concentration camp. In this way, those workers who came from
concentration camps received, in full measure, bonuses which were
granted in the industry, such as cigarettes or additional food.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you know, during your activities, that the workers
from concentration camps had advantages if they worked in factories?
SPEER: Yes. My co-workers called my attention to this fact, and I also
heard it when I inspected the industries. Of course, a wrong impression
should not be created about the number of concentration camp inmates who
worked in German industry. In toto, 1 percent of the labor personnel
came from concentration camps.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When you inspected establishments, did you ever see
concentration camp inmates?
SPEER: Of course, when on inspection tours of industries I occasionally
saw inmates of concentration camps who, however, looked well fed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Concerning the report which Herr Speer made about
concentration camps and the treatment which the inmates received in
factories, I refer to a confidential letter from the office chief
Schieber to Speer, dated 7 May 1944. I submit it as Document Number
Speer-44, Exhibit Number 6.
Mr. President, I am sorry, this will also be found in the second
document book, which has not yet been submitted. But it would be a pity
if I were not to discuss it at this time, for it fits so well into this
pattern. Therefore, I should like to quote briefly from it.
The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister as follows...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the Tribunal thinks it would be much more
helpful to them to have the document before them.
We are told that the book will be ready tomorrow afternoon, and that it
will not be ready before tomorrow afternoon.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything possible
at the time to see that the documents were put at the disposal of the
translation department in good time. The difficulty must have arisen
from the fact that the interrogatories did not come back in time. I
assume that that is what happened.
The quotation from this document is not long, Mr. President. I believe I
might as well quote from it now. Or do you wish that...
THE PRESIDENT: No; go on, if it is more convenient to you. I do not
mind. You may go on.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you very much.
The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister:
“Considering the care which the manpower from camps received
from our factory managers in spite of all the difficulties and
considering the general decent and humane treatment which
foreign and concentration camp laborers received, both the
Jewesses and concentration camp laborers work very efficiently
and do everything in order not to be sent back to the
concentration camp.
“These facts really demand that we transfer still more
concentration camp inmates into armament industries.”
And a few lines further down:
“I have discussed this whole matter in great detail with the
delegate of Obergruppenführer Pohl, Sturmbannführer Maurer, and
especially pointed out that by a decentralized dividing-up of
concentration camp laborers it might be possible appropriately
to utilize their forces while affording them better nourishment
and satisfactory lodging.”
Then it says:
“Moreover, Maurer especially points out....”
THE PRESIDENT: You need not make such long pauses as you are making.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: “Aside from that, Maurer especially points out
that Obergruppenführer Pohl constantly improved the food
situation of concentration camp inmates working in factories and
that by granting additional protein foods, given under constant
medical supervision, a marked increase in weight was obtained
and thereby better work achieved.”
In another document we see that the employment of concentration camp
workers in armament industries is recommended, in that advantages accrue
to these workers and that for this reason concentration camp inmates are
glad to work in armament industries.
I refer, in this connection, to Document 1992-PS, which may be found on
Page 11 of the document book. It is Page 14 in the English text. This
document shows that already in 1937 inmates of concentration camps were
being employed in workshops and that this work was quite popular.
Herr Speer, what do you know about the working conditions in
subterranean factories?
SPEER: The most modern equipment for the most modern weapons had been
housed in subterranean factories. Since we did not have many of these
subterranean works at our disposal, we had to house in the main this
latest equipment there. This equipment required perfect conditions of
work—air which was dry and free from dust, good lighting facilities,
big fresh air installations, so that the conditions which applied to
such a subterranean factory would be about the same as those in a night
shift in a regular industry.
I should like to add that contrary to the impression which has been
created here in Court, these subterranean factories, almost without
exception, were staffed with German workers, because we had a special
interest in having these modern installations manned by the best workers
which were at our disposal.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us about how many of these factories there
were?
SPEER: It was an insignificant number at the end of the war. We were
using 300,000 square meters of subterranean premises and were planning
for 3,000,000 square meters.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, in the year 1943 you visited the
concentration camp at Mauthausen? Why did you visit this camp?
SPEER: I learned, when I inspected industries at Linz, that along the
Danube, near the camp at Mauthausen, a large harbor installation and
numerous railroad installations were being put up so that the paving
stone coming from the quarry at Mauthausen could be transported to the
Danube. This was purely a peacetime matter which I could not tolerate at
all, for it violated all the decrees and directives which I had issued.
I gave short notice of an impending visit, for I wanted to ascertain on
the spot whether this construction work was an actual fact and request
stoppage of the work. This is an example for giving directives in this
field even within the economic administrative sphere of the SS. I stated
on that occasion that it would be more judicious to have these workers
employed during wartime in a steel plant at Linz rather than in
peacetime construction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Will you describe the visit to the camp?
SPEER: My visit ostensibly followed the prescribed program as already
described by the witness Blaha. I saw the kitchen barracks, the washroom
barracks, and one group of barracks used as living quarters. These
barracks were made of massive stone and were models as far as modern
equipment is concerned. Since my visit had only been reported a short
time in advance, in my opinion it is out of the question that big
preparations could have been made before my visit. Nevertheless, the
camp or the small part of the camp which I saw made a model impression
of cleanliness. However, I did not see any of the workers, any of the
camp inmates, since at that time they were all engaged in work. The
entire inspection lasted perhaps 45 minutes, since I had very little
time at my disposal for a matter of that kind and I had inner repulsive
feelings against even entering such a camp where prisoners were being
kept.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The main purpose of your visit then was to request the
stoppage of the work which you considered nonessential to the war
effort?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: On your visit were you able to learn about the working
conditions in the camp?
SPEER: No, I could not do that, since no workers were to be seen in the
camp and the harbor installations were so far from the street that I
could not see the men who were working there.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation that came through to me was that it was
against him spiritually to enter such places. Was that correct? Well,
what did you say?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No. I asked him whether on the occasion of this visit he
was able to learn about the working conditions which applied in this
camp. That was my question.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you say anything about “spiritually”?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No.
Did you learn, on your visit at Mauthausen or on another occasion, about
the cruelties which took place at this concentration camp and at other
concentration camps?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Now, I should like to conclude my questions on the
utilization of workers by asking you: Did you have any interest in the
fact that a healthy and sufficiently trained labor supply should be at
your disposal?
SPEER: Naturally I had the utmost interest along this line even though I
was not competent for this. As from 1942 we had mass production in
armament, and this system with assembly-line workers demands an
extraordinary large percentage of skilled workers. Because of drafting
for military service, these skilled laborers had become especially
important, so that any loss of a worker or the illness of a worker meant
a big loss for me as well.
Since a worker needed an apprenticeship of 6 to 12 weeks and since even
after this for a period of about 6 months a great amount of scrap must
be allowed for—for it takes about that much time before quality work
can be expected—it is evident that the care of skilled workers in
industry was an added worry for us.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has mentioned the so-called extermination
by work. Could a change of personnel, which would have taken place
through extermination by work, be tolerated at all by an industry?
SPEER: No. A change in the workers, in the way in which it was described
here, cannot be borne by any industry. It is out of the question that in
any German industry anything like that took place without my hearing
about it; and I never heard anything of that sort.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution asserts that you applied
means of terror and brutality so that the achievements of the compulsory
workers would be increased to the utmost...
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Just a moment. I have not finished. The Prosecution is of
the opinion that you used SS and Police against recalcitrant workers and
favored and recommended the use of concentration camps for such. Is that
correct?
SPEER: No, not in that form, for that was against my interests. There
were efforts in Germany to bring about increased productivity through
very severe compulsory measures. These efforts did not meet with my
approval. It is quite out of the question that 14 million workers can be
forced to produce satisfactory work through coercion and terror, as the
Prosecution maintains.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, please refer to Page 7 of the English
text, Page 4 of the French text. I should like to quote from Document
Number Speer-43. It says there:
“I do not believe that the second system which might be applied
in our economy, the system of compulsion by plant commissars, or
extensive proceedings and punishment when output is
insufficient, can lead to success.”
Now, Mr. President, I have come to the end of my first part.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH DAY
Thursday, 20 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. In the first place,
supplementary witnesses will be heard at the end of the case for the
defendants. Secondly, interrogatories and other documents received by
that time must be offered in evidence then. Thirdly, interrogatories and
other documents allowed before the end of the evidence but received at a
later date will be received and considered by the Tribunal up to the end
of the Trial. That is all.
[_The Defendant Speer resumed the stand._]
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yesterday we finished talking about the utilization of
labor in industry, and now we shall turn to the question of how the
factories were supplied with manpower; that is to say, the question of
mass and special demands for laborers.
Herr Speer, you stated in your testimony of 18 October 1945 first, that
you categorically demanded new laborers from Sauckel; secondly, that you
knew that among these laborers there would be foreigners; thirdly, that
you had known that some of these foreign workers were working in Germany
against their will. Please comment on this statement.
SPEER: This voluntary statement is quite correct. During the war I was
very grateful to Sauckel for every laborer whom I got through him. Many
a time I held him responsible for the fact that through lack of manpower
the armament industry did not achieve the results it might have, but I
always emphasized the merits which accrued to him because of his
activity on behalf of armaments.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Now, when in your testimony of 18 October 1945, and at
present again, you refer to manpower, do you mean all manpower in
general, including German workers, foreigners from occupied countries,
and foreigners from friendly or annexed states, and also prisoners of
war?
SPEER: Yes. Beginning with the middle of 1943, I was at odds with
Sauckel over questions of production and about the insufficient
availability of reserves of German labor. But that has nothing to do
with my fundamental attitude toward Sauckel’s work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What percentage of the total number of laborers assigned
was Sauckel obliged to furnish upon your demands?
SPEER: You mean of the total labor supply, not foreigners?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes.
SPEER: Up to August, 1944—that is up till the time when I took over the
air armament as well—perhaps 30 or 40 percent of all the workers
provided. Of course, by far the majority of them were German workers.
When in August 1944 I took over the air armament I had no appreciable
demand for workers because the bomber attacks on the transportation
system in the Reich resulted in a steady decline of armament production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was your need for labor unlimited?
SPEER: No. The volume of armament production and also of our entire
production with my corresponding need for labor was governed by our raw
material supply.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: That means, your need was restricted by the amount of raw
materials available?
SPEER: My need for labor was limited by the amount of raw materials.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You achieved a marked increase in production figures for
armament. In order to achieve this increase, did the workers employed
increase proportionally?
SPEER: No. In 1944 7 times as many weapons were manufactured as in 1942,
5½ times as many armored vehicles, and 6 times as much ammunition. The
number of workers in these branches was increased by only 30 percent.
This success was not brought about through a greater exploitation of
labor but rather through the abolition of obsolete methods of production
and through an improved system of controlling the production of
armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was meant by the concept “war
production”—“Kriegsproduktion”?
SPEER: The concept which is frequently used here, “war production,” is
nothing else but the ordinary concept, production. It comprises
everything which is manufactured industrially or by artisans, including
the civilian needs.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was meant in Germany by the concept of “armaments”?
What did that include?
SPEER: The concept of “armaments” was in no way restricted to that
sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war agreement.
The modern concept of “armaments” is a much more comprehensive one. It
includes a much wider sphere of activity. There were no basic principles
set down for our concept of “armaments.” The characteristic of an
armament factory was that as an intermediary authority, the Armament
Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for
instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to armament; all
rolling mills, foundries and forges; the production or the manufacture
of aluminum and modern synthetic materials; the chemical production of
nitrogen or fuel or synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wool;
the manufacture of individual items the use of which in armament cannot
be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as ball bearings,
gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth, or the production of tool
machinery; the setting up of assembly lines; similarly the manufacture
of motor cars and the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships,
also textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather goods or
wooden wares.
In the interrogatories which I sent to my witnesses, I tried to have
stated what percentage of the German armament industries produced
armaments as defined by the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give
you the figures. My co-workers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20
percent of our armament program was concerned with the production of
weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equipment which
the various branches of the Armed Forces required. The bulk of the
material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva
Convention. The reason for the expansion of the concept of “armament” in
Germany was, besides manufacturing reasons, the preferential treatment
which applied to these industries, a treatment which resulted in
numerous industries clamoring to be called armament industries.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in the questionnaires which have not yet
been submitted to the Tribunal because the book is not yet ready, the
witness Sauer under Figures 7 and 10, the witness Schieber under Figures
6 to 9, and the witness Kehrl under Figures 4 to 7, concern themselves
with the definition as applied to the concept of armament.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the last name?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Kehrl.
Herr Speer, by way of example, you know Krupp’s at Essen. How far did
this concern produce armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva
prisoner-of-war agreement, that is, weapons, munitions, and objects
which are necessary for the direct conduct of war?
SPEER: Krupp’s are an excellent example of the fact that an armament
concern only reserves a fraction of its production for war equipment. Of
course, I must point out the fact that especially this Krupp concern was
one of those armament industries which, among others, had the smallest
production of armament, on a percentage basis.
Krupp’s main interest lay in mines, and in three large works which
produced unprocessed and highly tempered steel. The manufacture of
locomotives and products for the chemical industry were specialties of
Krupp’s. On the other hand, the actual armament specialty of
Krupp’s—the construction of armored turrets for warships, and large
special guns—was not at all exploited during this war. Only in 1944 did
Krupp erect the first big factory for the production of guns near
Breslau. Up to that time Krupp was mainly concerned with the designing
of new weapons, while for the production other firms were licensed. All
in all, one can say that at Krupp’s, 10 to 15 percent of the personnel
turned out armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva Agreement, even
though the entire works were classified as armament works.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What did you and your Ministry have to say as to whether
a factory would receive German or foreign workers?
SPEER: My Ministry had no influence in that direction at all. The need
for workers was reported to my Ministry by the industries which were
subordinate to me. They reported a total figure of workers needed, and
there were no specifications as to whether foreign workers, prisoners of
war, or German workers were wanted. This total figure was forwarded to
the Plenipotentiary General for Labor. Sauckel refused to accept
detailed demands, and he was quite right in this respect, for he could
not issue detailed directives to the offices subordinate to him
concerning the percentage of German or foreign workers which were to be
allocated locally to the various factories.
The ultimate distribution of workers to the factories was taken care of
by the labor offices without any intervention of my offices or agencies.
Therefore, here too, we did not exert influence as to whether Germans,
foreigners or prisoners of war were allocated to any factory. The
factory then had to report back to us about the number of workers newly
received. This report was turned in to my Ministry in a lump figure so
that I could not tell whether and what number of foreign workers or
prisoners of war the total figure contained. Of course, I knew that
foreign workers worked on armament equipment, and I quite agreed to
that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, to facilitate matters for the Tribunal I
would like to remark that Figures 1, 7, 8, and 17 of the questionnaire
of the witness Schmelter deal with these questions. In the questionnaire
of Schieber, Numbers 10, 11, 30, and 31 deal with this point.
Furthermore, in the questionnaire of Kehrl relevant material is
contained in the answers to Numbers 8 and 9.
Herr Speer, who sent in the demands for manpower needed in armament to
the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?
SPEER: The demands for workers were split up into various sectors,
according to the different economic branches. There were approximately
15 different sectors which placed their demands. I placed demands for
Army and Navy armament and for construction, and beginning with
September of 1943, for the sectors chemistry, mining, and other
production. Air armament had its special labor allocation department,
and their demands were voiced by the Reich Air Ministry.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the questionnaires, the witness Schmelter has dealt
with this matter in his answer to Question 2; the witness Schieber in
his answers to Questions 2, 3, and 5; and the witness Kehrl under
Questions 2 and 3.
Weren’t the demands for labor for the three branches of the Armed Forces
centralized in your Ministry?
SPEER: No. Of course, beginning with March 1942, I had nominally taken
over the Armament Office under General Thomas from the OKW, and this
Armament Office was a joint office of all three Armed Forces branches,
where labor allocation problems were discussed too. Through an agreement
between Göring and me it was decided that air armament, independently of
me, should look after its own interests. This agreement was necessary
since at first, as Minister for Army Armament, I had a biased interest
and therefore did not want to make decisions regarding the demands for
labor of a unit that was not subordinate to me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How far are you responsible for the employment of
prisoners of war in armament, and here I mean armament in a restricted
sense and in contradiction to the Geneva Convention?
SPEER: I did not exert my influence to have prisoners of war employed
contrary to the directives given out by the OKW. I knew the point of
view held by the OKW, according to which the Geneva Convention was to be
strictly observed. Of course, I knew as well that these Geneva
regulations did not apply to Russian prisoners of war and Italian
military internees. I could not exert any influence on the allocation of
prisoners of war to the individual factories. This allocation was
determined by the labor offices in connection with the offices depending
on the chief of Prisoner of War Affairs, the “Stalag.”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to the
questionnaire of the witness Schmelter, to his reply to Question 14.
Herr Speer, who was the competent officer on the intermediate level
under the OKW?
SPEER: The supervision of the proper allocations of prisoners of war was
carried out by the Military Economy Officer (Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier) as
the intermediary authority. He was incorporated in the office of the
Military Area Commander who was under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Deuss,
who is an American statistics expert. This is Document 2520-PS.
According to this affidavit, 400,000 prisoners of war were employed in
the production of war equipment. These figures are supposed to originate
from statistics in your Ministry. Will you comment on this figure?
SPEER: The figures are well known to me through my activity as a
Minister, and they are correct. This figure of 400,000 prisoners of war
covers the total number of prisoners of war employed in armament
production.
It is a wrong conclusion drawn in this affidavit that all these
prisoners of war were connected with the production of objects of
armament as specified by the Geneva Convention. Statistics concerning
the number of prisoners of war employed in those industries which
produced armament goods as specified in the Geneva Convention were not
kept by us and, therefore, no such figure can be compiled from my
documents.
Apart from that, this figure of 400,000 prisoners of war includes
200,000 or 300,000 Italian military internees, all of whom were brought
into my production field at that time. This affidavit does not prove,
therefore, that prisoners of war were employed in the production of
armament goods as such.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Central Planning Board was mentioned here frequently.
You were a member of this board. Can you describe in detail the origin
of the Central Planning Board and its sphere of activity?
SPEER: When in 1942 I assumed my office it was imperative to centralize
the allocation and distribution of various materials for the three
branches of the Armed Forces, and to guarantee the proper direction of
war economy for a long time to come. Up to that time this matter had
been taken care of in the Ministry of Economy, and partly in the OKW.
Both these agencies were much too weak to prevail against the three
Armed Forces branches.
In pursuance of my proposal, in March 1942 the Central Planning Board
was established by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Its three
members, Milch, Körner, and myself, were entitled to make joint
decisions only, which, however, could always be reached without any
difficulty. It is obvious that through my predominant position I was the
decisive factor in this Central Planning Board.
The tasks of the Central Planning Board were clearly outlined and laid
down in Göring’s decree, which I had drafted. To make statistics on the
demands for labor or on the allocation of workers was not a matter which
was laid down in this decree. This activity was not carried out
systematically by the Central Planning Board despite the documents
presented here. As far as the decisions regarding demands and allocation
of labor were concerned, I tried to have this done by the Central
Planning Board, since this would have been an essential factor in the
directing of the entire economy. This, however, always met with
Sauckel’s refusal because he considered it as interfering with his
rights.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: To this point I submit the decree of Göring regarding the
establishment of a Central Planning Board under the Four Year Plan. It
was published on 25 April 1942, and this shall be Document Number
Speer-42, Exhibit Number 7.
Mr. President, this text may be found on Page 17 of the English document
book.
The sphere of activity of the Central Planning Board...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What number are you giving to it? On the
document here it has got Speer Number 142.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No, that must be a typographical error. It should be 42,
Mr. President; it may be found...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Exhibit Number Speer-7.
THE PRESIDENT: What does 42 mean? What is the point of putting 42 on it
if its exhibit number is 7?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, that is the number according to which the
document was admitted when we compiled the document book. However, the
Exhibit Number 7 is the decisive number in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is only meant to facilitate finding it in the document
book. It is on Page 17 of the English text; and I might be allowed to
call the attention of the High Tribunal to Figure 3 of the decree.
According to this, the Central Planning Board had to decide on all the
necessary new industrial projects, on the increase in the production of
raw materials and their distribution, and also on the co-ordination of
the demands on the transportation system. This decree does not provide
for any regulation of the labor problem.
Herr Speer, how did it come about that, despite this, labor demands were
discussed in the Central Planning Board?
SPEER: These minutes of all the 60 meetings of the Central Planning
Board which took place from 1942 until 1945 are contained in the
stenographic records. These 5,000 typed pages give a clear report on the
tasks and the activities carried out by the Central Planning Board. It
is quite obvious to any expert that there was no planning with regard to
manpower allocation, for it is clear that a plan regarding labor
allocation would have to be revised at least every 3 months, just as we
had to do for raw materials. In fact, three to four meetings took place
in the Central Planning Board which were concerned with labor
allocation. These three or four discussions were held for the following
reasons: In the years 1942 and 1943, that is, before I took over the
management of the total production, whenever soldiers were recruited for
the Armed Forces, I had reserved for myself the right to distribute the
various recruitment quotas in the different sectors of production. At
one meeting this distribution was effected by the Central Planning Board
as a neutral committee. At this session, of course, there was a
representative of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor, since at the same time the problem of replacements had to be
dealt with. Another problem which was discussed by the Central Planning
Board was the distribution of coal for the following year. Just as in
England, coal was the decisive factor in our entire war economy, too. At
these discussions we had to determine at the same time how the demands
for labor supply for the mines could be satisfied by the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor, because only in agreement with him
could proper plans be made for the following year. From this discussions
resulted on the allocation of Russian prisoners of war in mines, a
matter which has been mentioned here. Furthermore, two sessions took
place in which the demands put forward by all interested parties were
actually discussed, and in a way which the Prosecution would like to
generalize as applying to the entire activities of the Central Planning
Board. These two sessions took place in February and March of 1944, and
no others were held either before or after. Besides, these two sessions
took place during my illness. Even at that time it was not quite clear
to me why it was that just when I was ill Sauckel first complied with my
wish to have the Central Planning Board included, and then later went
back on his promise.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution have submitted various extracts dealing
with sessions of the Central Planning Board.
As far as you know, are these extracts taken from the stenographic
records, or are they taken from the minutes?
SPEER: They are taken from the stenographic records. Besides these
stenographic records, minutes were taken on the result of the meeting.
These minutes are the actual result of the meeting. No material from the
actual minutes has so far been submitted by the Prosecution. The
contents of the stenographic records are, of course, remarks and debates
which always take place when matters of such importance are dealt with,
in every war economy of every country, even when the authorities
involved are not directly responsible for questions such as those
dealing with labor allocation.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Therefore, do these quotations which have been heard here
concern decisions made by the Central Planning Board or by you?
SPEER: I have already answered that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I would like to put one more question to you. You were
the Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Four Year Plan? What about
that?
SPEER: In March 1942, Göring, giving heed to my proposal, created the
office of Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, in the Four
Year Plan, and I was appointed to that office. This was purely a matter
of form. It was generally known that Göring had quarreled with my
predecessor, Todt, since armament problems for the Army had not been put
under his control in the Four Year Plan. In assuming this capacity as
Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, I had subordinated
myself to Göring. In fact, the Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War
Production never achieved any influence. I issued no directives
whatsoever in that capacity. As Minister I possessed sufficient
authority, and it was not necessary that I should use the authority
which I had under the Four Year Plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: For the benefit of the High Tribunal, when dealing with
the question of the Central Planning Board perhaps I might refer to the
fact that statements were made relative to it by the witness Schieber in
his questionnaire under Figures 4 and 45, and by the witness Kehrl in
his questionnaire under Figure 2.
Now I shall turn to the problem of the responsibility for the number of
foreign workers in general.
Herr Speer, the Prosecution charges you with coresponsibility for the
entire number of foreign workers who were transported to Germany. Your
Codefendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that first of all
he worked for you in this matter, so that his activity was primarily
determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this?
SPEER: Of course, I expected Sauckel to meet above all the demands of
war production, but it cannot be maintained that he primarily took care
of my demands, for beginning with the spring of 1943 I received only
part of the workers I needed. If my maximum had been met, I should have
received all of them. For this I need cite but one example. During that
same period some 200,000 Ukrainian women were made available for
housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they
could be put to better use in armaments production. It is also clear
that the German labor reserve had not been fully utilized. In January
1943 these German reserves were still ample. I was interested in having
German workers—including, of course, women—and this nonutilization of
German reserves also proves that I cannot be held solely responsible for
covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labor.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses
have made statements in connection with this problem in their respective
questionnaires: The witness Schmelter in Points 12, 13, and 16; the
witness Schieber, in Point 22; the witness Rohland in Points 1 and 4;
and the witness Kehrl in Point 9.
Herr Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then of course you
knew that you would receive foreign workers among them. Did you need
these foreign workers?
SPEER: I needed them only in part, in view of my requirements for
production. For instance, the coal mines could not get along without
Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to employ
German reserves, which consisted mainly of women, in these mines. There
were, furthermore, special assignments for which it was desirable to
have foreign skilled labor, but the majority of the needs could be met
by German workers, even German female workers. The same principle was
followed in the armament industries in England and America and certainly
in the Soviet Union, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you go on, Dr. Flächsner? There is no need to wait.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes. In my documentary evidence I shall return to this
point in more detail.
Herr Speer, I should like to go back to your testimony of 18 October
1945. In it you stated several times that you knew that the workers from
occupied countries were being brought to Germany against their will. The
Prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror.
Will you comment on that?
SPEER: I had no influence on the method by which workers were recruited.
If the workers were being brought to Germany against their will that
means, as I see it, that they were obliged by law to work for Germany.
Whether such laws were justified or not, that was a matter I did not
check at the time. Besides, this was no concern of mine. On the other
hand, by application of force and terror I understand police measures,
such as raids and arrests, and so on. I did not approve of these violent
measures, which may be seen from the attitude I took in the discussion I
had with Lammers on 11 July 1944. At that time I held the view that
neither an increase in police forces, nor raids, nor violent measures
were the proper thing. In this document I am, at the same time, referred
to as one of those who expressed their objections to the violent
measures which had been proposed.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, that is Document 3819-PS, which the
Prosecution submitted in the cross-examination of, I believe, the
Defendant Keitel and of the Defendant Sauckel. I did not include it in
my document book.
Herr Speer, why were you against such violent measures?
SPEER: Because through violent measures of that kind a regular
allocation of manpower in the occupied countries would not have been
possible in the long run. However, I wanted production to be regulated
and orderly in the occupied countries. Measures of violence meant to me
a loss of manpower in the occupied countries, because there was the
danger that these people would in increasing numbers take to the woods
so as not to have to go to Germany, and thus strengthen the lines of the
resistance movements. This, in turn, led to increased acts of sabotage
and that, in turn, to a decrease of production in the occupied
countries.
Therefore, time and again the military commanders, and the commanders of
the army groups, as well as myself, protested against large-scale
measures of violence as proposed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you especially interested in the recruiting of
workers from specific countries, and if so, why?
SPEER: Yes. I was especially interested in labor recruitment from
France, Belgium and Holland—that is, countries in the West—and from
Italy, because, beginning with the spring of 1943, the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor had decreed that mainly workers from
these regions were to be assigned for war production. On the other hand,
the workers from the East were mainly to be used for agriculture, for
forestry, and for the building of railroads. This decree was repeatedly
stressed to me by Sauckel, even as late as 1944.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190. This document is found on Page 19 of
the English text, and Page 16 of the French text of my document book. I
quote from the conference of the Economic Inspectorate South in Russia.
Peuckert—the delegate of Sauckel in Russia—states here, and now I
quote:
“....provisions have been made for employing workers from the
East principally in agriculture and in the food economy, while
the workers from the West, especially those skilled workers
required by Minister Speer, are to be made available to the
armament industry....”
Document 1289-PS, which is Exhibit Number RF-71, may be found on Page 42
of the English text of my document book and Page 39 of the French and
German texts. Here we are concerned with a file note by Sauckel on 26
April 1944 and I quote:
“Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied
western territories can the urgent need of German armament for
skilled workers be satisfied. For this purpose the reserves from
other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in
quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of
agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent
of the workers from the West have always been allocated to
armament.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, speaking for myself, I don’t know what the
problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are
putting forward, in the very least. I don’t know what relevance this has
at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether
they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant’s
argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does
not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into
armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned
with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what
is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?
I mean, I only want to know because I don’t understand in the least what
you are getting at.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is to prepare for the problem to
which we are now turning, and that is the problem of the blocked or
protected factories (Sperrbetriebe). By setting up these blocked
factories, Speer, if I may put it that way, wanted to put an effective
stop to the transfer of workers from the West to Germany. Therefore I
first have to show that up to that time his workers, the labor for his
industries, mainly came from the West. I want to establish that...
THE PRESIDENT: Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the
West; what difference does it make?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Speer is being charged with actively
having taken part in the deportation of workers from the West, workers
who were used in his armament industries. Now, the date is important
here. Beginning with the year 1943 he followed a different policy.
Before that time, as may be seen from the evidence, the workers who had
come to Germany had to a large extent been voluntary workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were all voluntary
workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing
evidence to that at all.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final goal of my evidence. I
should like to carry it on through, if possible, to the end.
THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don’t understand what the
end is.
Go on; don’t wait any further.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor designated Italy and the occupied western
territories as the countries from which foreign laborers would mainly be
recruited for armament purposes.
How far did you endorse Sauckel’s measures in these countries?
SPEER: Up to the spring of 1943 I completely endorsed them. Up to that
time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning
with the spring of 1943, workers from the West refused in
ever-increasing numbers to go to Germany. That may have had something to
do with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on
Germany. Up to the spring of 1943, to my knowledge, the labor
obligations were met with more or less good will. However, beginning
with the spring of 1943, frequently only part of the workers who had
been called up came to report at the recruiting places.
Therefore, approximately since June 1943, I established the so-called
blocked factories through the military commanders in France. Belgium,
Holland, and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these blocked
industries. It is important to note that every worker employed in one of
these blocked factories was automatically excluded from allocation to
Germany; and any worker who was recruited for Germany was free to go
into a blocked factory in his own country without the labor allocation
authorities having the possibility of taking him out of this blocked
factory.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What consequences did this have on the recruitment of
laborers in the occupied western territories?
SPEER: After the establishment of the blocked factories, the labor
allocation from the occupied countries in the West to Germany decreased
to a fraction of what it had been. Before that between 80,000 and
100,000 workers came for instance from France to Germany every month.
After the establishment of the blocked factories, this figure decreased
to the insignificant number of 3,000 or 4,000 a month, as is evident
from Document RF-22. It is obvious, and we have to state the facts, that
the decrease in these figures was also due to the resistance movement
which began to expand in the West at that time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you and your offices endorse the policies followed by
Sauckel at that time?
SPEER: No. At that time the first serious difference arose about the
“blocking” of these workers from labor allocation in Germany. This came
about through the fact that the loss of laborers, which I had in the
production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of
workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West.
This may be seen from Document RF-22. According to it perhaps 400,000
workers came from France to Germany in 1943, especially during the first
half of the year. Industrial workers in France, however, decreased by
800,000, and the French workers in France who worked for Germany
decreased by 450,000.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Why did you demand to take over the entire German
production from the Ministry of Economics in the summer of 1943?
SPEER: According to my opinion there was still a considerable latent
reserve in the German production, since the German peace economy had not
been converted into a war economy on a sufficiently large scale. Here
was, in my opinion, next to the German women workers, the largest
reserve of the German home labor supply.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What did you undertake when the total production was
handed over to you by the Ministry of Economy?
SPEER: At that time, I had already worked out the following plan. A
large part of the industry in Germany produced so-called consumer goods.
Consumer goods were, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other
necessary articles for the Armed Forces and for the civilian
requirements. In the occupied western territories, however, the
industries which supplied these products were kept idle, as the raw
materials were lacking. But they nevertheless had a great potential. In
carrying through this plan I deprived German industries of the raw
materials which were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, and
sent them to the West. Thereby, in the long run, a million more workers
could be supplied with work in the country itself; and thus I obtained 1
million German workers for armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you not thereby want to increase armament production
or help it along in France as well?
SPEER: No. All these plans failed. Before the outbreak of war the French
Government did not succeed in building up armament production in France,
and I also failed, or rather my agencies failed, in this task.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were your intentions with this new plan? What
advantages did you gain?
SPEER: I will comment on it quite briefly. Through this plan I could
close down whole factories in Germany for armament; and in that way I
freed not only workers, but also factory space and administrative
personnel. I also saved on electricity and transportation. Apart from
that, since these factories had never been of importance for the war
effort they had received hardly any foreign workers; and thus I almost
exclusively obtained German workers for the German production, workers,
of course, who were much more valuable than any foreign workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did not such a plan entail dangers and disadvantages for
the German industrial development?
SPEER: The disadvantages were considerable, since any closing down of a
factory meant the taking out of machinery, and at the end of the war a
reconversion to peacetime production would take at least 6 to 8 months.
At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted
to be successful in this war, we would have to be those to make the
greater sacrifices.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How was this plan put into effect?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the
details of these plans? What do we care whether his plans were efficient
or whether they were inefficient? The only question this Tribunal has
got to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the
character of international law. It does not matter to us whether his
plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans
were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of
these plans.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I wanted to show that the tendencies, or rather the
tendency, followed by the defendant in his labor allocation policy was
to employ foreigners in their own country and to use the German reserves
solely for his own purpose, that is, for armament proper. Thus
everything which...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Flächsner, that is a question of efficiency, not
of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers,
good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of
producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his
industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other
western countries.
What have we got to do with that? If they were forced to work there, it
is just as illegal as if they had been brought to Germany to be forced
to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the
Prosecution.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, but I thought and believed...
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear defendants’ counsel at 2 o’clock
tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the
defendants’ counsels’ speeches.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, please tell us briefly how you and M.
Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, agreed on your program; but
please be concise.
SPEER: Immediately after taking over production in September 1943, I
agreed with Bichelonne that a large-scale program of shifting industry
from Germany to France should be put into operation, according to the
system I already described. In an ensuing conference, Bichelonne stated
that he was not authorized to talk about labor allocations with me, for
Minister Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to
point out, he said, that a further recruitment of workers on the present
scale would make it impossible to adhere to the program which we had
agreed upon. I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the
entire French production, beginning with coal, right up to the finished
products, should be declared as “blocked industries.” In this connection
both of us were perfectly aware of the fact that this would almost
inhibit the allocation of workers for Germany, since, as I have already
explained, every Frenchman was free to enter one of these blocked
factories once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave
Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a
protracted period, and, in spite of all difficulties which occurred, I
kept my promise to him.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in connection with this I should like to
quote from Document R-124, which is Exhibit USA-179. It is on Page 37 of
the English document book. It is a speech of Sauckel’s before the
Central Planning Board and has been mentioned frequently. I shall quote
from it only what follows:
“....when I came to France the next time my agencies in France
stated:.... Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with
Minister Speer according to which only French workers are to be
considered for allocations in France and none of them need go to
Germany any more. This coincided with the first large-scale
conference.”
Herr Speer, what were the consequences of this change-over of labor
allocation from Germany to France?
SPEER: I have already mentioned that. Beginning with 1 October
recruiting of labor came almost to a complete standstill.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Later on I shall comment in detail, on the strength of
documents, on the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and on the
tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to
apply this principle. At the moment I shall therefore discontinue the
questions on the subject and will confine myself to quoting from the
official French document, RF-22, Page 20 of the English text of my
document book, Page 17 of the German and French texts. I quote:
“Finally a real hostility arose between Sauckel and Speer, who
was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the
occupied territories.”
And then a few lines further on:
“The superiority of the former over the latter which made itself
felt more and more during the ... occupation facilitated to a
large degree the resistance against the removal of workers.”
The text shows that the first-mentioned, the Defendant Speer, and the
military commander...
THE PRESIDENT: That is all cumulative; that’s what you have been proving
three or four times already.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well, I shall not continue with it.
I only want to rectify a mistake, Herr Speer. It is mentioned in the
document that you had something to do with organizing forced labor in
France; is that true?
SPEER: No, the organization of labor in France was not under my control.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have already mentioned that this shifting of the
labor program was not only confined to France. Will you tell me to which
other countries it also applied?
SPEER: Summarizing the last question: The program was extended to
Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The entire production in
these countries was also declared blocked, and the laborers in these
blocked industries were given the same protection as in France, even
after the meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944, during which the new
program for the West for 1944 was fixed. I adhered to this policy. The
result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from
France to Germany as compared with 500,000, proposed during that
conference; and from other countries, too, only about 10 percent of the
proposed workers were taken to Germany.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What about the figures applying to workers from the
Protectorate?
SPEER: Everywhere only a fraction of the numbers proposed was sent.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: A document, Number 1739-PS, Exhibit RF-10, has been
submitted by the Prosecution. It is on Page 23 of the English text of my
document book and is a report by Sauckel dated December 1942; also there
is a document, Number 1290-PS, on Page 24 of the English text, which has
also been submitted. These documents appear to show that, according to
Sauckel’s personal assertions, from the beginning of his activities
until March inclusively there was an excess supply of labor. Is that
true?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Document 16-PS, Exhibit USA-168, which is on Page 25 of
the English text of my document book, shows that Sauckel was not in
favor of using German women in all the armament industry, but in the
summer of 1942 he had several hundred thousand Ukrainian girls placed at
the disposal of German households.
These three documents together show that Speer in his Ministry cannot be
held responsible for the total number of workers who came to Germany.
I should also like to present another document as Exhibit Number
Speer-8. Mr. President, it is given Number 02 in the document book, and
it is on Page 26 of the English text. It refers to a meeting of the
Central Planning Board.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of
any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in
evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some
numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit Number 8?
THE PRESIDENT: What about the one before? Oh, that is already in.
Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper
exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall be glad to do that. I should
like to quote—this is a remark made by Speer:
“For this it is necessary to supply the industries with new
German workers, even unskilled labor, because I cannot replace
all those which we have to give up as soldiers, with foreigners.
The German supply is simply becoming too scanty. Already today
we are having one case of sabotage after another and we do not
know their origin. Cases of sabotage will arise. The measures
which will have to be taken in order to switch at least 1
million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard
and will, in my opinion, lower the entire living standard of the
upper classes. Therefore this means that, roughly speaking, we
are going to be proletarians for the duration of the war, if it
lasts a long time. This matter has to be faced coolly and
soberly. There is no alternative.”
This opinion and project of Speer, namely, to exploit ruthlessly the
labor reserve within Germany, was not realized until the summer of 1944.
And this was a subject for argument between Speer on one side, and
Sauckel and the Gauleiter on the other. The testimony of the witnesses
in the questionnaires will deal with it. To assist the Tribunal I should
like to state that with Schieber, it is the answer to Question 22; with
Rohland, it is the answer to 1 and 4; with Kehrl, it is answer Number 9;
and in the case of Schmelter it is Questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I
cannot quote the pages of the English book, Mr. President, because I
have not yet seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the filled-in questionnaires in the
supplement volume of my document book, which I hope is now in the hands
of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Besides, I should like to reserve the right to submit
these documents _in toto_ at the end of my examination. I am only taking
the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses have dealt
with this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Furthermore, we are informed about the different opinions
presented by Sauckel and Speer through a conference of Speer’s during a
meeting of the Central Planning Board on 21 December 1943. I refer to
Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my
Exhibit Number 9. I quote...
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t need to quote it, Dr. Flächsner; I thought I
had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency
or the inefficiency of these plans.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, there is an important document submitted by
the Prosecution. It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on 4 January
1944. It has been submitted as 1292-PS, Exhibit USA-225. I refer to Page
28 of the English text of my document book. How was this meeting
arranged?
SPEER: It was called by request of Hitler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: For what reason?
SPEER: To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And what was Hitler’s decision?
SPEER: His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with
Hitler. These blocked factories were to be maintained, and for this
purpose Sauckel was given the order to obtain 3,500,000 workers from the
occupied territories. Hitler gave the strictest instructions through the
High Command of the Armed Forces to the military commanders that
Sauckel’s request should be met by all means.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you agree to this decision?
SPEER: No, not at all; for if it were executed my program of shifting
industries to the West had to collapse.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And what action did you take after that?
SPEER: Contrary to the Führer’s decision during that meeting, I informed
the military commander of the way I wanted it, so that in connection
with the expected order from the High Command of the Armed Forces the
military commander would have two interpretations of the meeting in his
hands. Since the military commander was agreeable to my interpretation,
it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document which is on
Page 29 of the English text of my document book, Page 26 of the German
and French texts. This is a teletype message from Speer to General Studt
in Paris. It will be Exhibit Number 10. Two things appear from this
letter. First, Speer wrote, and I quote:
“Gauleiter Sauckel will start negotiations with the appropriate
agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in
order to achieve clarity on the manner and possibility of the
execution.”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flächsner?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the Prosecution has submitted this
document, 1292-PS, to prove...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant just told us what’s in the document. He has
told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the
difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: This document shows the reaction on the part of the
defendant, namely what he did, so that Hitler’s decision, as such, would
be contravened or at least weakened. In this letter the defendant said
to General Studt...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest
possible indication of the view they take about these matters of
different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why
don’t you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other
part of it?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument
between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as
to put his point of view into practice. This does not refer to...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just now, the
defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all
out to us again.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a
document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book,
Page 27 of the German and French texts; Exhibit Number Speer-11. It is a
letter from Speer to Sauckel dated 6 January 1944, and it is ascertained
in this letter that for the French industrial firms working in France
400,000 workers should be reserved at once, and another 400,000 workers
during the following months, who therefore would not be deported.
What results did these two letters have, Herr Speer, with reference to
Hitler’s order that 1 million workers should be taken from France to
Germany?
SPEER: I should like to summarize the entire subject and say a few words
about it. We had a technique of dealing with inconvenient orders from
Hitler that permitted us to by-pass them. Jodl has already said in his
testimony that for his part he had developed such a technique too. And
so, of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only clear
to the expert as to their meaning and the results they would have to
have.
From the document which is being presented now, from Sauckel’s speech on
1 March 1944, Document Number R-124, it is evident, too, what the
results were in regard to the labor allocation in the occupied
territories. The result is clear and I have already described it here,
and I think we can therefore pass to Page 49.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, can you give me a description of the results
of the air attacks on the occupied western territories?
SPEER: Yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few
points. The invasion was preceded by heavy air attacks on the
transportation system in the occupied western territories. As a result
of that, beginning with May and June 1944, production in France was
paralyzed and 1 million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of
shifting production had collapsed as far as I was concerned; and
according to normal expectations of the French officials, too, the
impression was general that a large-scale movement toward Germany would
now set in.
I gave the order that in spite of the fact that the entire French
industry was paralyzed the blocked factories should be kept up, although
I knew as an expert that their rehabilitation, considering the damage to
the transportation system, would not be possible in less than 9 or 12
months, even if the air attacks should cease entirely. I was, therefore,
acting against my own interests here.
The French Prosecution has confirmed this in Document RF-22. The
corresponding passages are indicated in the document book.
Between 19 and 22 June I had a conference with Hitler and I obtained a
decree according to which the workers in the occupied territories, in
spite of the difficulties of transport, had to remain on the spot no
matter what happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar
decision applied to Holland. Upon my orders the workers in these blocked
factories even continued to receive their wages.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I submit Exhibit Number Speer-12. It
is an extract from the Führer conference from 19 to 22 June 1944, and I
beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The document is on Page
22 of the English text of my document book.
Herr Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that following
this decision of yours at least 1 million unemployed workers in all the
western territories would be unproductive for quite a long time. How
could you justify such a decision?
SPEER: I must say quite openly that this was the first decision of mine
which had its inner justification in the war situation having
deteriorated so disastrously. The invasion was a success. The heavy air
attacks on production were showing decisive results. An early end of the
war was to be forecast and all this altered the situation as far as I
was concerned. The practical conclusions I drew from this situation will
become apparent through various other examples which I shall put forward
in the course of the Trial. Of course, Hitler was not of the same
opinion during that period. On the contrary, he believed that everything
ought to be done in order to utilize the last reserves of manpower.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please describe briefly your attitude toward the meeting
of 11 July 1944, to which we have already referred once before. This was
Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.
SPEER: During this meeting of 11 July I maintained my point of view.
Once again I pointed to Germany’s reserves, as becomes apparent from the
minutes, and I announced that the transport difficulties should not be
allowed to influence production, and that the blocked factories were to
be kept up in those territories. Both I and the military commanders of
the occupied territories were perfectly aware of the fact that with this
the well-known consequences for these blocked factories would be the
same as before, that is, that the transfer of labor from the occupied
western territories to Germany would be stopped.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution has presented a Document Number
814, Exhibit RF-1516. It presented it during the session of 30 May, if I
remember correctly. It came up during the cross-examination of your
Codefendant Sauckel.
According to this order troops were to round up workers in the West.
Please give a brief statement on that. So as to refresh your memory, I
want to say that reference is made in this telegram to the meeting of 11
July.
SPEER: The minutes of the meeting show, as I said before, that I opposed
measures of coercion. I did not see Keitel’s actual order.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Number 824 is another document submitted by the French
Prosecution on the same subject. It is a letter by General Von Kluge
dated 25 July 1944; Exhibit RF-515. It refers to the telegram from
Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about
it, and whether that order was ever actually carried out?
SPEER: I know that the order was not carried out. To understand the
situation, it is necessary to become familiar with the atmosphere
prevailing about 20 July. At that time not every order from headquarters
was carried out. As the investigations after 20 July proved, at that
time in his capacity as Commander, West, Kluge was already planning
negotiations with the western enemies for a capitulation and probably he
made his initial attempts at that time. That, incidentally, was the
reason for his suicide after the attempt of 20 July had failed. It is
out of the question...
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Number 824 is the number which the French
Prosecution has given to this document. That is the number under which
it has submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit
number. I have made inquiries, but I have not had an answer yet.
I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit
number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SPEER: It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge, in the
military situation in which he found himself, and considering his views,
should have given orders for raids and measures of coercion at that
moment. The release of the Sauckel-Laval agreement, which was mentioned
in this document, had no practical significance, since the blocked
factories were maintained, and thus this agreement could not become
effective. This was well known to the officials in France, and the best
proof for the fact that the order was not carried out is Document RF-22
of the French Prosecution, which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000
workers came to Germany from France. If the military authorities had
used measures of coercion, it would have been a simple matter to send a
very much larger number of workers than these 3,000 from France to
Germany.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you use your influence to stop completely the
allocation of labor from occupied territories to Germany?
SPEER: No; I must state quite frankly that although I did use my
influence to reduce the recruitment of labor or to put an end to
measures of coercion and raids, I did not use it to stop the allocation
of labor completely.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall now pass to another problem.
The Prosecution has touched upon and mentioned the Organization Todt.
Can you briefly explain the tasks of the Organization Todt to the
Tribunal?
SPEER: Here, again, I shall give a little summary. The tasks of the
Organization Todt were exclusively technical ones, that is to say, they
had to carry out technical construction work; in the East, particularly
road and rail construction, and in the West the construction of concrete
dugouts which became known as the so-called Atlantic Wall. For this
purpose the Organization Todt used foreign labor to a disproportionately
high degree. In the West there were about 20 foreigners to 1 German
worker; in Russia there were about 4 Russians to 1 German. This could
only be carried out in the West if the Organization Todt could use local
construction firms and their work-yards to a considerable extent. They
supplied the technical staff and recruited their own workers, it being
clear that these firms had no possibility to recruit by coercion.
Accordingly a large number of workers of the Organization Todt were
volunteers; but naturally a certain percentage always worked in the
Organization Todt under the conscription system.
Here the Organization Todt has been described as part of the Armed
Forces. As a technical detail it should be stated in this connection
that foreign workers did not, of course, belong to it, but only German
workers who naturally in occupied territories had to figure as members
of the Armed Forces in some way or other. The Prosecution had a
different opinion on this matter.
Apart from the Organization Todt there were certain transport units
attached to my Ministry, which were working in occupied territories, and
it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were on
principle recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution has alleged that the
Organization Todt was the comprehensive organization for all military
construction work in the occupied territories. That is not the case.
They only had to carry out one-quarter to one-fifth of the construction
program.
In May 1944 the Organization Todt was taken over by the Reich and
subsequently made responsible for some of the large-scale construction
programs and for the management of the organization of the
Plenipotentiary for Control of Building in the Four Year Plan. This
Plenipotentiary for Control of Building distributed the contingents
coming from the Central Planning Board and was responsible for other
directive tasks, but he was not responsible for the carrying out and for
the supervision of the construction work itself. There were various
official building authorities in the Reich, and in particular the SS
Building Administration had their own responsibility for the building
programs which they carried out.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has alleged that you had concentration
camp inmates employed in the armament industry and has submitted
Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179.
Mr. President, this document is on Page 47 of the English text in my
document book. It is about a conference with Hitler in September 1942.
How did that conference come about, Herr Speer?
SPEER: When in February 1942 I took over the armament department of the
Army there were demands for considerable increases all along the line;
and to meet them it was necessary to construct numerous new factories.
For this purpose Himmler offered his concentration camps both to Hitler
and to me. It was his plan that some of these necessary new
constructions, as well as the necessary machinery, should be housed
within the concentration camps, and were to be operated there under the
supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the Army,
Generaloberst Fromm, was against this plan, and so was I. Apart from
general reasons for this, the first point was that uncontrolled arms
production on the part of the SS was to be prevented. Secondly, this
would certainly entail my being deprived of the technical management in
these industries. For that reason when planning the large armaments
extension program in the spring of 1942, I did not take into
consideration these demands by the SS. Himmler went to see Hitler and
the minutes of this conference, which are available here, show the
objections to the wishes which Hitler put to me upon Himmler’s
suggestions.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw
your attention to Page 44 of the German text, which is Page 47 of the
English text. It is Point 36 of a Führer protocol. There it says, and I
quote:
“....beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to
organize armament production in the concentration camps....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the witness has just given us the
substance of it, has he not?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, according to this document you proposed that
factories should be staffed entirely with internees from concentration
camps. Did you carry that out?
SPEER: No, it was not carried out in this form because it soon became
clear that it was Himmler’s intention to gain influence over these
industries and in some way or other he would undoubtedly have succeeded
in getting these industries under his control. For that reason, as a
basic principle, only part of the industrial staff consisted of
internees from concentration camps, so as to counteract Himmler’s
efforts. And so it happened that the labor camps were attached to the
armament industries. But Himmler never received his share of 5 to 8
percent of arms, which had been decided upon. This was prevented due to
an agreement with the General of the Army Staff in the OKW, General
Buhle. The witness will testify to this.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I further draw your attention to Document 1584-PS, on
Page 48 of the English text in my document book. It is Exhibit USA-221,
and is a letter from Himmler to Göring dated 9 March 1944. Himmler is
emphasizing the fact that if his responsibility, that is to say, that of
the SS, would be extended, a speeding-up and an increase in production
could be expected. The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows
that it was proposed to supervise and control the employment of
concentration camp inmates and even to use the SS as responsible works
manager. According to his experience and knowledge, it would not be
sufficient merely to assign the internees to other industries. The SS,
therefore, wished to supervise and control the labor employment in these
industries.
This document shows something else, however; for it confirms the
statement of the Defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps
were also paid premiums if they proved particularly efficient;
furthermore, it shows on the last page that on an average the working
hours of all internees were 240 hours per month, which would correspond
to 60 working hours per week.
I also refer to a document which has already been mentioned yesterday;
it is Number 44 and has already been submitted by me as Exhibit Number
6; it is in the second document book. Mr. President, that is the first
book in the supplementary volume.
This document shows clearly how far the extension of the SS industries
was determined by Himmler’s and Pohl’s ambition. The document also
states, and I quote:
“....the monthly working hours contributed by concentration camp
inmates did not even amount to 8 million hours, so that most
certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from
concentration camps can be working in our armaments industries.
This number is constantly diminishing.”
Mr. President, this sentence is on Page 90, at the bottom. You will find
it there in the English text.
The letter also shows that the author computes nearly the same number of
working hours as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours
per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week.
Herr Speer, through this letter you learned of the fact that workers,
particularly foreigners, were not returned to their old places of work
when for certain acts they had become involved with the Police, but that
they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take then?
SPEER: Here again I should like to summarize several points. I received
the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin, when I returned after my
illness. Its contents greatly upset me because, after all, this is
nothing more than kidnaping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the
number of people thus being removed from the economic system. The round
figure was 30,000 to 40,000 a month. The result was my declaration in
the Central Planning Board on 22 May 1944, where I demanded that these
workers, even as internees, as I called them, should be returned to
their old factories at once. This remark, as such, is not logical
because, naturally, the number of crimes in each individual factory was
very low, so that such a measure was not practicable. Anyhow, what I
wished to express by it was that the workers would have to be returned
to their original places of work. This statement in the Central Planning
Board has been submitted by the Prosecution.
Immediately after the meeting of the Central Planning Board I went to
see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944. The minutes of
the Führer conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for
any such procedure, and I cited many arguments founded entirely on
reason, since no other arguments would have been effective. Hitler
declared, as the minutes show, that these workers would have to be
returned to their former work at once, and that after a conference
between Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision
of his to Himmler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I submit Exhibit Number 13, which is an extract from the
Führer conference of 3 to 5 June 1944; you will find this document on
Page 92 of the document book.
SPEER: Immediately after this conference I went to see Himmler and
communicated to him Hitler’s decision. He told me that no such number
had ever been arrested by the Police. But he promised me that he would
immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler’s demands;
namely, that the SS would no longer be permitted to detain these
workers. I informed Hitler of this result, and I asked him once more to
get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to
mistrust Himmler’s promise because, after all, it is not customary for
Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much. But anyhow, I did not
have any further complaints from my assistants concerning this affair. I
must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my
affair, but the information appeared so incredible to me that I
intervened at once. Had I known that already 18 months before Himmler
had started a very similar action, and that in this letter, which has
been submitted here...
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is Document 1063-PS, and it is
Exhibit USA-219. I have reproduced it on Page 51 of the English text of
my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now
referring.
How far did your efforts go to get workers for the armaments industry
from concentration camps?
SPEER: I wanted to make a brief statement with reference to the
document.
Had I known this letter, I would never have had enough confidence in
Himmler to expect that he would correctly execute his order as
instructed by Hitler.
For this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept
secret from other offices. These other offices could only be the office
of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor or my own
office.
Finally, I want to say in connection with this problem that it was my
duty as Minister for Armament to put to use as many workers as were
possibly available for armaments production, or any other production. I
considered it proper, therefore, that workers from concentration camps,
too, should work in war production or armament industries.
The main accusation by the Prosecution, however, that I deliberately
increased the number of concentration camps, or caused them to be
increased, is by no means correct. On the contrary I wanted just the
opposite, looking at it from my point of view of production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I refer in this connection to the answers of the
witness Schmelter to Numbers 9 and 35 in the questionnaire which was
submitted to him, and to the answer of the witness Schieber to Number
20.
Herr Speer, Document Number R-124, Exhibit USA-179, which was submitted
by the Prosecution, contains several remarks you made during the
meetings of the Central Planning Board.
Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 53 of the English text
of my document book.
Herr Speer, what do you mean to say by your remark concerning “idlers”
in the meeting of 30 October 1942?
SPEER: I made the remark as reproduced by the stenographic record. Here,
however, I had an opportunity to read all the shorthand notes of the
Central Planning Board and I discovered that this remark was not
followed up in any way and that no measures by me were demanded.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: On the same page of the document book, Mr. President,
there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943.
Herr Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark
regarding Russian prisoners of war?
SPEER: It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that
the conception “armaments” must be understood in the way I have
explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians
employed in armaments originated, according to this document, were the
iron, steel, and metal industries with 29,000; and the industries
constructing engines, boilers, vehicles and apparatuses of all sorts
with 63,000.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution has also mentioned a remark
made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on Page 53 of the
English text of the document book. There you said at a conference with
Keitel and Zeitzler that in accordance with Hitler’s instructions the
groups of auxiliary volunteers were to be dissolved, and that you would
effect the transfer of the Russians from the rear army areas.
SPEER: Here, again, I read through the shorthand notes. It can be
explained briefly. The “Hiwi” mentioned in the document are the
so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in
Russia. As the months went by, they took on large proportions, and
during the retreat they followed along, as they would probably have been
treated as traitors in their own country. These volunteers were not,
however, as I desired it, put into industry, since the conference which
was planned did not take place.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please make a brief statement concerning Sauckel’s
memorandum, 556-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution, of a
telephone call on 4 January 1943 which refers to labor allocation.
SPEER: After this telephone call further measures were to be taken in
France to increase the number of workers available for allocation.
Minutes of a Führer conference which I found recently, namely, those of
the meeting of 3 to 5 January 1943, show that at that time Hitler’s
statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people
in France for local industry and economy.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because
up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long you are going to be,
Dr. Flächsner?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be through before 5
o’clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you
already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been
adducing up to date?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I will not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, this morning we stopped at a discussion of
Sauckel’s telephone message of 4 January 1943 regarding the matter of
labor allocation. As you have already stated, the minutes of a Führer
conference of 3 to 5 January, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later
on, are connected with this. Will you please make a brief statement on
the subject of that discussion?
SPEER: This record states that measures must be taken to raise economy
in France to a higher level. It contains stern injunctions from Hitler
concerning the ways and means that he contemplated using to this end. It
states that acts of sabotage are to be punished with the most rigorous
means and that “humanitarian muddleheadedness” is out of place.
These minutes also show that at that time I asked Hitler to transfer the
management of production questions in France to me, a step which was
actually taken several months later.
I mention this only for the purpose of making it clear, while I am still
in a position to testify as a witness, that I did not carry out Hitler’s
policy of abandoning all “humanitarian muddleheadedness” in France.
My attention was drawn to one case in which 10 hostages were to be shot
as a reprisal for acts of industrial sabotage committed in the
Meurthe-et-Moselle district. At that time I managed to prevent the
sentence from being carried out. Roechling, who was at that time in
charge of iron production in the occupied western territories, is my
witness in this case. That is the only case I know of where hostages
were to be shot on account of sabotage in production.
I can also prove that, through a decision by Hitler dated September
1943, I was responsible for providing a supplementary meal in addition
to the existing ration for factory workers employed in France. In a
letter which I sent to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor in December 1943, I strongly urged the necessity not only of
paying wages to the workers in the occupied western territories, but
also of making available to them a corresponding quantity of consumer
goods—a line of policy which doubtless does not accord with the policy
of plundering the western regions, on which so much stress has been laid
by the French Prosecution.
All three documents are in my possession and they can be produced. I
only mention these facts to show that I neither approved nor followed
the very harsh policy laid down by Hitler for application in France in
the records of 3 to 5 January.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I now turn to another point. Herr Speer, what did you
have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?
SPEER: We have already discussed this at sufficient length. No armament
goods were manufactured, only bottleneck parts and consumer goods.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well. I merely wanted to get that clear.
The Prosecution has submitted to you minutes of a Führer
conference—R-124—dated March 1944 and containing a statement that you
discussed with Hitler the Reich Marshal’s proposal to deliver prisoners
of war to France.
What can you say to that?
SPEER: This record is dated 3 March 1944. From January until May 1944 I
was seriously ill, and the discussion took place without me. A member of
my staff was in charge of this discussion—a man who enjoyed the
confidence of Hitler in an unusually high degree. In any case, the
proposal was not carried out.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, you attended the session of 30 May, at which
the question was discussed of how the office of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor came to be established. Will you
comment briefly on that point?
SPEER: I should like to say that I wanted a delegate to deal with all
labor allocation problems connected with my task of military armament
production. My chief concern in the allocation problem, at the beginning
of my term of office, was with the Gauleiter, who carried on a policy of
Gau particularism. The nonpolitical offices of the Labor Ministry could
not proceed against the Gauleiter, and the result was that manpower
inside Germany was frozen. I suggested to Hitler that he should appoint
a Gauleiter whom I knew to this post—a man named Hanke. Göring, by the
way, has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed. Two days later, Bormann
made the suggestion that Sauckel be chosen. I did not know Sauckel well,
but I was quite ready to accept the choice. It is quite possible that
Sauckel did not know anything about the affair and that he assumed—as
he was entitled to do—that he was chosen at my suggestion.
The office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
was created in the following way:
Lammers declared that he could not issue special authority for a
fraction of labor allocation as that would be doubtful procedure from an
administrative point of view, and for that reason the whole question of
manpower would have to be put into the hands of a plenipotentiary. At
first they contemplated a Führer decree. Göring protested on the grounds
that it was his task under the Four Year Plan. A compromise was made,
therefore, in accordance with which Sauckel was to be the
Plenipotentiary General within the framework of the Four Year Plan,
although he would be appointed by Hitler.
This was a unique arrangement under the Four Year Plan. Thereby Sauckel
was in effect subordinated to Hitler; and he always looked upon it in
that way.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have heard that Sauckel, in giving his testimony on
30 May, said that Göring participated in the meetings of the Central
Planning Board. Is that true?
SPEER: No, that is in no way correct. I would not have had any use for
him, for after all, we had to carry out practical work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted a statement by Sauckel
dated 8 October 1945, according to which arrangements for his delegates
to function in the occupied territories were supposed to have been made
by you. Is that true?
SPEER: No. In 1941 I had not yet anything to do with armament; and even
later, during the period of Sauckel’s activity, I did not appoint these
delegates and did not do much to promote their activities. That was a
matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution quoted from the record of
Sauckel’s preliminary interrogation on 27 September 1945. According to
this record you gave a special order for transport trains with foreign
workers.
SPEER: I believe it would be practical to deal at the same time with all
the statements made by Sauckel which apply to me; that will save time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please go ahead.
SPEER: Arrangements for transport trains were made by Sauckel and his
staff. It is possible that air raids or a sudden change in the
production program made it necessary for my office to ask for transport
trains to be rerouted; but the responsibility for that always rested
with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
Sauckel also testified here that after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started
on the “total war effort.” But that is not correct in this form.
Stalingrad was in January 1943, and Goebbels started on his “total war
effort” in August 1944. After Stalingrad a great reorganization program
was to be carried out in Germany in order to free German labor. I myself
was one of those who demanded this. Neither Goebbels nor I, however, was
able to carry out this plan. A committee of three, Lammers, Keitel, and
Bormann, was formed; but owing to their lack of technical knowledge they
were unable to carry out their task.
My Labor Allocation Department was further mentioned by Sauckel in his
testimony. This worked as follows: Every large factory and every
employer of labor had an allocation department which, naturally, came
under mine. None of these departments, however, encroached in the
slightest degree on Sauckel’s tasks. Their sphere of activity was not
very great, as may be seen from the fact that each was one of 50 or 60
departments coming under my office. If I had attached very much
importance to it, it would have been one of my six or eight branch
offices.
Sauckel further mentioned the Stabsleiter discussions which took place
in his office. A representative of my Labor Allocation Department for
Army and Navy armament and for building attended these conferences. At
these meetings, which were attended by about 15 people who were in need
of labor, the question of priority was settled on the basis of Sauckel’s
information on the state of economy generally. These were really the
functions erroneously ascribed here to the Central Planning Board.
In addition it was asserted that I promoted the transport of foreign
workers to Germany in April 1942 and that I was responsible for the fact
that foreign workers were brought to Germany at all. That, however, is
not true. I did not need to use any influence on Sauckel to attain that.
In any case, it is evident from a document in my possession—the minutes
of a Führer conference of 3 May 1942—that the introduction of
compulsory labor in the western region was approved by the Führer at
Sauckel’s suggestion.
I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on 18 April 1942,
showing that at that period I was still of the opinion that the German
building industry, which employed approximately 1.8 million workmen, was
to be discontinued to a large extent to divert the necessary labor to
the production of armaments. This speech which I made to my staff, in
which I explained my principles and also discussed the question of
manpower, does not contain any mention of the planning of a foreign
labor draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans, surely
I would have mentioned the subject in this speech.
Finally, in connection with Sauckel’s testimony, I must correct the plan
of the organization submitted here. It is incorrect in that the separate
sectors enumerated in it are classified under various ministries. In
reality these sectors of employers of labor were classified under
various economic branches, independently of the ministries. They only
corresponded where my own Ministry and the Air Ministry were concerned.
It is also incorrect in stating that the building industry was
represented in the Ministry of Economics. That came under my
jurisdiction. From 1943 on, the chemical and mining industries, both of
which are listed under the Ministry of Economics, were under my
jurisdiction. To my knowledge, these branches were represented through
plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan even prior to September 1943 and
stated their requirements directly to Sauckel independently of the
Ministry of Economics.
This plan further is incorrect in stating that the demands for these
workers from individual employers went directly to Hitler. It would have
been impossible for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers.
As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter conferences,
over which Sauckel presided.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, what did you do with your documents at the
end of the war?
SPEER: I felt bound to preserve my documents so that the necessary
transition measures could be taken during reconstruction. I refused to
allow these documents even to be sifted. They were turned over in their
entirety to the Allied authorities here in Nuremberg, where I had a
branch archive. I handed them over when I was still at liberty in the
Flensburg zone. The Prosecution is thus in possession of all my
documents to the number of several thousand, as well as all public
speeches, Gauleiter speeches, and other speeches dealing with armament
and industry; some 4,000 Führer decisions, 5,000 pages of stenographic
records of the Central Planning Board, memoranda, and so forth. I
mention this only because these documents show conclusively to what
extent my task was a technical and economic one.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In your documents, as far as you remember, did you ever
make statements regarding ideology, anti-Semitism, _et cetera_?
SPEER: No; I never made any statements of the kind, either in speeches
or memoranda. I assume that otherwise the Prosecution would be in a
position to produce something like that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, you also figured as armament Minister on the
list of members of the new Government drawn up by the men responsible
for the Putsch of 20 July. Did you participate in the attempted
assassination of 20 July?
SPEER: I did not participate, nor was I informed of it in advance. At
that time I was against assassinating Hitler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this point is mentioned in interrogatories
by the witness Kempf under Point 9 and the witness Stahl under Point 1.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the reason why you, as the only
minister from the National Socialist regime, were on the opposition
list?
SPEER: At that period I was working in collaboration with Army experts
of the General Staff and the commander of the Home Defense Forces. Both
staffs were the nucleus of the attempt of 20 July. I had particularly
close relations with Generaloberst Fromm, chief of the Home Defense
Forces, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the Chief of the Army
General Staff. After 20 July Fromm was hanged and Zeitzler was dismissed
from the Army. A close contact developed through this collaboration, and
these circles recognized my technical achievements. I assumed at that
time that that was why they wanted to retain me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: So political reasons did not play any part in that
connection?
SPEER: Certainly not directly. Of course, I was well known for the fact
that for a long time I had spoken my mind emphatically and in public
regarding the abuses which took place in Hitler’s immediate circle. As I
found out later, I shared the opinions of the men of 20 July in many
points of principle.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were your relations with Hitler in regard to your
work?
SPEER: My closest contact with him, in my capacity of architect, was
probably during the period from 1937 to September 1939; after that, the
relationship was no longer so close on account of the circumstances of
the war. After I was appointed successor to Todt a closer but much more
official working relationship was again established. Because of the
heavy demands made upon me by my armament work, I had very little
opportunity to go to headquarters. I only visited the Führer’s
headquarters about once in 2 or 3 weeks. My 4 months’ illness in the
spring of 1944 was exploited by many people interested in weakening my
position, and after 20 July the fact that I had been scheduled for the
Ministry undoubtedly occasioned a shock to Hitler—a fact which Bormann
and Goebbels used to start an open fight against me. The details are
shown by a letter which I sent to Hitler on 20 December 1944 and which
has been submitted as a document.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you able to carry on political discussions with
Hitler?
SPEER: No, he regarded me as a purely technical minister. Attempts to
discuss political or personnel problems with him always failed because
of the fact that he was unapproachable. From 1944 on, he was so averse
to general discussions and discussions on the war situation that I set
down my ideas in memorandum form and handed them to him. Hitler knew how
to confine every man to his own specialty. He himself was therefore the
only co-ordinating factor. This was far beyond his strength and also his
knowledge. A unified political leadership was lacking in consequence, as
was also an expert military office for making decisions.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Then, as technical minister, do you wish to limit your
responsibility to your sphere of work?
SPEER: No; I should like to say something of fundamental importance
here. This war has brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German
people, and indeed started a world catastrophe. Therefore it is my
unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for this
disaster before the German people. This is all the more my obligation,
all the more my responsibility, since the head of the Government has
avoided responsibility before the German people and before the world. I,
as an important member of the leadership of the Reich, therefore, share
in the total responsibility, beginning with 1942. I will state my
arguments in this connection in my final remarks.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Do you assume responsibility for the affairs covered by
the extensive sphere of your assignments?
SPEER: Of course, as far as it is possible according to the principles
generally applied and as far as actions were taken according to my
directives.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Do you wish to refer to Führer decrees in this
connection?
SPEER: No. Insofar as Hitler gave me orders and I carried them out, I
assume the responsibility for them. I did not, of course, carry out all
the orders which he gave me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I turn now to a second part of my evidence
in the case of the defendant. This presentation is not meant to
exonerate the defendant from those charges, brought against Speer by the
Prosecution, which apply to his actual sphere of activity.
This part concerns itself rather with the accusations raised by the
Prosecution against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint
conspiracy. This second part is relatively brief and I assume that I
shall be able to conclude my entire presentation of evidence within an
hour.
In this matter we are concerned with Speer’s activity in preventing
Hitler’s destructive intentions in Germany and the occupied countries
and with the measures he took and the attempts he made to shorten a war
which he believed already lost.
I assume that the High Tribunal will agree to my presentation.
Herr Speer, up to what time did you devote all your powers to obtaining
the strongest possible armament and thus continuing the war?
SPEER: Up to the middle of January 1945.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Had not the war been lost before that?
SPEER: From a military point of view and as far as the general situation
was concerned, it was certainly lost before that. It is difficult,
however, to consider a war as lost and to draw the final conclusions as
regards one’s own person if one is faced with unconditional surrender.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did not considerations arising out of the production
situation, of which you were in a position to have a comprehensive view,
force you to regard the war as lost long before that?
SPEER: From the armament point of view not until the autumn of 1944, for
I succeeded up to that time, in spite of bombing attacks, in maintaining
a constant rise in production. If I may express it in figures, this was
so great that in the year 1944 I could completely re-equip 130 infantry
divisions and 40 armored divisions. That involved new equipment for 2
million men. This figure would have been 30 percent higher had it not
been for the bombing attacks. We reached our production peak for the
entire war in August 1944 for munitions; in September 1944 for aircraft;
and in December 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats. The new weapons
were to be put into use a few months later, probably in February or
March of 1945. I may mention only the jet planes which had already been
announced in the press, the new U-boats, the new antiaircraft
installations, _et cetera_. Here too, however, bombing attacks so
retarded the mass production of these new weapons—which in the last
phase of the war might have changed the situation—that they could no
longer be used against the enemy in large numbers. All of these attempts
were fruitless, however, since from 12 May 1944 on our fuel plants
became targets for concentrated attacks from the air.
This was catastrophic. 90 percent of the fuel was lost to us from that
time on. The success of these attacks meant the loss of the war as far
as production was concerned; for our new tanks and jet planes were of no
use without fuel.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you tell Hitler about the effect on production, of
the bombing attacks?
SPEER: Yes, I told him of this in great detail, both orally and in
writing. Between June and December 1944 I sent him 12 memoranda, all
with catastrophic news.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to submit
to the Tribunal a document, a Speer memorandum of 30 June 1944. It is
reproduced on Page 56 of the English document book and will be Exhibit
Number 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer writes to Hitler:
“But in September of this year the quantities required to cover
the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot possibly be
supplied any longer, which means that from that time on there
will be a deficiency which cannot be made good and which must
lead to tragic consequences.”
Speer informed Hitler in another memorandum, dated 30 August 1944, on
the situation in the chemical industry and the fuel production industry.
This is Page 62 of the English text, Exhibit Number 15. I quote only one
sentence:
“....so that these are shortages in important categories of
those materials necessary for the conduct of modern warfare.”
Herr Speer, how was it possible that you and the other co-workers of
Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do
everything possible to continue the war?
SPEER: In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. From the
summer of 1944 on he circulated, through Ambassador Hewel of the Foreign
Office, definite statements to the effect that conversation with foreign
powers had been started. Generaloberst Jodl has confirmed this to me
here in Court. In this way, for instance, the fact that several visits
were paid to Hitler by the Japanese Ambassador was interpreted to mean
that through Japan we were carrying on conversations with Moscow; or
else Minister Neubacher, who was here as a witness, was reported to have
initiated conversations in the Balkans with the United States; or else
the former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin was alleged to have been in
Stockholm for the purpose of initiating conversations.
In this way he raised hopes that, like Japan, we would start
negotiations in this hopeless situation, so that the people would be
saved from the worst consequences. To do this, however, it was necessary
to stiffen resistance as much as possible. He deceived all of us by
holding out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of
diplomatic steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victories
through the use of new troops and new weapons and by systematically
spreading rumors to encourage the people to believe in the appearance of
a miracle weapon—all for the purpose of keeping up resistance. I can
prove that during this period I made continual reference in my speeches
and in my letters, which I wrote to Hitler and Goebbels, as to how
dishonest and disastrous I considered this policy of deceiving the
people by promising them a miracle weapon.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, were orders given to destroy industry in
Belgium, Holland, and France?
SPEER: Yes. In case of occupation by the Allies, Hitler had ordered a
far-reaching system of destruction of war industries in all these
countries; according to planned preparations, coal and mineral mines,
power plants, and industrial premises were to be destroyed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you take any steps to prevent the execution of these
orders?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And did you prevent them?
SPEER: The Commander, West was responsible for carrying out these
orders, since they concerned his operational zone. But I informed him
that as far as I was concerned this destruction had no sense and no
purpose and that I, in my capacity of Armament Minister, did not
consider this destruction necessary. Thereupon no order to destroy these
things was given. By this, of course, I made myself responsible to
Hitler for the fact that no destruction took place.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When was that?
SPEER: About the beginning of July 1944.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How could you justify your position?
SPEER: All the military leaders whom I knew said at that time that the
war was bound to end in October or November, since the invasion had been
successful.
I myself was of the same opinion in view of the fuel situation. This may
be clearly seen from the memorandum, which I sent to Hitler on 30
August, in which I told him that in view of this development in the fuel
situation no operational actions by the troops would be possible by
October or November. The fact that the war lasted longer than that can
be ascribed only to the standstill of the enemy offensive in 1944. This
made it possible to throttle our fuel consumption and to give the
Western Front new supplies of tanks and ammunition. In these
circumstances I was perfectly willing to accept responsibility for
abandoning the industries in the western countries to the enemy in an
undamaged condition, for they could be of no use to them for at least 9
months, the transport system having been destroyed beforehand. This
memorandum coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in
the blocked factories—a matter which I dealt with this morning.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler sanction these measures?
SPEER: He could not sanction these measures for he knew nothing about
them. It was a period of such hectic activity at headquarters that he
never thought of checking up on the measures taken for destruction.
Later, in January 1945, reports appeared in the French press on the
rapid reconstruction of their undestroyed industries. Then, of course,
serious charges were raised against me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution has submitted a document, RF-132.
This is a report by the field economics officer attached to the
Wehrmacht commander for the Netherlands. According to this report, a
decree by the Commander, West was still in existence in September 1944.
This said that destructive measures were to be taken only in the coastal
towns and nowhere else, and the field economics officer for the
Netherlands stated, as may be seen from the document, that the order
issued by the Commander West was obsolete and that he himself had
therefore decreed on his own initiative that the industries in Holland
should be destroyed. How was this possible and what did you do about it?
SPEER: As a matter of fact, some overzealous lower officials caused the
basic decrees not to destroy in the West to be ignored. Our
communications system for orders had been largely destroyed through
bombing attacks. Seyss-Inquart had drawn my attention to the fact that
destruction was to take place in Holland. He has already testified that
I authorized him not to take destructive measures. This was in September
1944. In addition, in order to prevent such destruction, on 5 September
1944, acting without authorization, I directed the managers of the coal
and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in
Luxembourg to prevent destruction in the Minette ore mines, in the Saar
coal mines, and the coal mines of Belgium and Holland, et cetera. In
view of the hopeless war situation at that time, I, as the person
responsible for supplying electric current, continued to furnish current
to the undertakings on the other side of the front so that the pump
stations in the coal mines would not have to stop working, because if
these pump stations had stopped the mines would have been flooded.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I am submitting a copy of a letter
from Speer to Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Exhibit Number
Speer-16, Page 57 of the English text in my document book.
Herr Speer, with regard to the other occupied countries apart from
France, Belgium, and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent
destruction?
SPEER: From August 1944, in the industrial installations in the
Government General, the ore mines in the Balkans, the nickel works in
Finland; from September 1944, in the industrial installations in Upper
Italy; beginning with February 1945, in the oil fields in Hungary and
the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this
connection that I was supported to a great extent by Generaloberst Jodl,
who quietly tolerated this policy of non-destruction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were Hitler’s intentions with regard to the
preservation of industry and means of existence for the German
population at the beginning of September 1944, when enemy troops
approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich from all sides?
SPEER: He had absolutely no intention of preserving industry. On the
contrary, he ordered the “scorched earth” policy with special
application to Germany. That meant the ruthless destruction of all
animate and inanimate property on the approach of the enemy. This policy
was backed by Bormann, Ley, and Goebbels, while the various branches of
the Wehrmacht and the competent ministries opposed it.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Since these efforts by Speer to prevent the application
of destructive measures, which had been considerably intensified, also
applied to areas then considered part of the German Reich, such as
Polish Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine, Austria, the Protectorates of
Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part
of my evidence.
Herr Speer, did the commanders of the armies in the wider German area
that I have just defined have executive powers to carry out orders of
destruction?
SPEER: No. As far as industries were concerned, those executive powers
were vested in me. Bridges, locks, railroad installations, et cetera,
were the affair of the Wehrmacht.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In your measures for the protection of industry, did you
differentiate between the territory of the so-called Altreich and those
areas which were added after 1933?
SPEER: No. The industrial region of Upper Silesia, the remaining
districts of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, and Austria,
of course, were protected against destruction in the same way as the
German areas. I made the necessary arrangements by personal directives
on the spot—particularly in the Eastern Territories.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What steps did you take against the scorched earth
policy?
SPEER: I returned from a trip to the Western Front on 14 September 1944
and found the decree awaiting me that everything was to be destroyed
ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counterdecree officially ordering all
industrial installations to be spared. At that time I was very much
upset about the fact that industries were now to be destroyed in Germany
in the hopeless war situation, and I was all the more upset because I
thought I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western
territories from destruction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I should like to submit a document in this connection, a
decree by Speer dated 14 September 1944 for the protection of
industries. It is on Page 58 of the English text of my document book;
Exhibit Number 17.
Herr Speer, did you succeed in getting this order carried out?
SPEER: The scorched earth policy was officially proclaimed in the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ at the same time in an official article by the
Reich press chief, so that I realized quite clearly that my
counterdecree could not be effective for any length of time. In this
connection I used a method which is perhaps typical of the means
employed by Hitler’s immediate circle. In order to dissuade him from the
scorched earth policy, I made use of the faith which he induced in all
his co-workers that the lost territories would be recaptured. I made him
decide between the two situations: Firstly, if these industrial areas
were lost, my armament potential would sink if they were not recaptured;
and secondly, if they were recaptured they would be of value to us only
if we had not destroyed them.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You thereupon addressed a letter to Bormann.
I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit Number 18, Mr. President;
Page 59 of the English text of the document book. This teletype...
SPEER: I think we can dispense with the quotation.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes. You sent this teletype message to Bormann before you
discussed the contents with Hitler?
SPEER: Yes. I should like to summarize...
THE PRESIDENT: Would you give the French page as well so that the French
members may have it?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is Page 56 of the French text of the document book.
SPEER: Hitler approved of the text which I suggested to him, in which I
gave him the alternative of either considering the war as lost or of
leaving the areas intact. For the time being there was in any case no
danger, because the fronts remained stable. Hitler insisted particularly
on the destruction of the Minette ore mines in France; but in this case
too I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing
the destruction of these mines—again by exploiting Hitler’s hopes of a
successful counterattack.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant has
just referred is an extract from the Führer decree of 18 to 20 August
1944; and I submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-19. It is reproduced in
the supplement to my document book, Page 101.
Herr Speer, how did this order originate?
SPEER: I have already told you.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The term “paralysis” frequently occurs in your document
in connection with industrial installations, et cetera. Will you tell
the Tribunal just what you mean by the use of this term?
SPEER: I can only say briefly that this concerns the removal of specific
parts, which put the plant temporarily out of commission; but these
parts were not destroyed; they were merely concealed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You emphasized a few minutes ago that up to January 1945
you tried to achieve the highest possible degree of armament. What were
your reasons for giving up the idea after January 1945?
SPEER: From January 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter begins: The
last phase of the war and the realization that Hitler had identified the
fate of the German people with his own; and from March 1945 onward, the
realization that Hitler intended deliberately to destroy the means of
life for his own people if the war were lost. I have no intention of
using my actions during that phase of the war to help me in my personal
defense, but this is a matter of honor which must be defended; and for
that reason I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, what was the production situation in the
various activities under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?
SPEER: The fuel production had been quite inadequate since the beginning
of the attacks on fuel plants in May 1944, and the situation did not
improve afterwards. The bombing of our transportation centers had
eliminated the Ruhr area as a source of raw material for Germany as
early as November 1944; and with the successful Soviet offensive in the
coal areas of Upper Silesia, most of our supply of coal from that region
had been cut off since the middle of January 1945.
Thus we could calculate precisely when economy must collapse; we had
reached a point at which, even if there were a complete cessation of
operations on the part of the enemy, the war would soon be lost, since
the Reich, because of its lack of coal, was on the verge of an economic
collapse.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I submit a memorandum which Hitler
received from Speer on 11 December 1944, as Exhibit Speer-20. Mr.
President, you will find an extract on Page 64 of the English document
book, Page 61 of the German and French books. It states, and I quote:
“In view of the whole structure of the Reich economy, it is
obvious that the loss of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area
will in the long run spell ruin for the whole German economy and
the further successful prosecution of the war. This would mean,
in fact, the total loss of the Ruhr territory as far as the
German economy is concerned, with the exception of products
manufactured locally within the sector.... It is superfluous to
discuss the consequence resulting for the whole German Reich if
it is deprived of the Ruhr territory....”
On 15 December 1944, in connection with the Ardennes Offensive which was
then imminent, Speer pointed out to Hitler in detail the consequences
entailed by a possible loss of Upper Silesia.
In this connection I submit Speer’s memorandum—Page 102 of the
supplementary volume of my document book in the English text and the
same page in the French text. This is an extract from a memorandum
addressed to the Chief of the Army General Staff, dated 15 December
1944, Exhibit Number 21.
SPEER: This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is not necessary to quote from this memorandum. It
points out that a possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting
impossible even after a few weeks and that the Wehrmacht could in no way
be supplied with armaments. A large part of Upper Silesia was actually
lost shortly afterwards. On 30 January 1945, Speer again sent a
memorandum to Hitler—Page 67 of the English text of the document book,
Page 64 in the French text. I submit this document as Exhibit Number 22,
and I quote only the following:
“After the loss of Upper Silesia, the German armament production
will no longer be in a position to cover even a fraction of the
requirements of the front as regards munitions, weapons and
tanks, losses on the front, and equipment needed for new
formations.”
By way of special emphasis, there follows this sentence—and I quote:
“The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer
be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers.”
Herr Speer, what did you mean by the last sentence I quoted?
SPEER: At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in defense of the
fatherland the soldiers’ bravery would increase tremendously and that
_vice versa_ the Allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied
territories, would have less will to fight. That was also the main
argument employed by Goebbels and Bormann to justify the use of all
means to intensify the war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, did other sources advise Hitler in the same
way that you yourself did?
SPEER: In this connection I shall take several points together.
Guderian, the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop at that
time to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to
Hitler. Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of
February that pessimistic statements of the nature of those contained in
my memorandum or the step I had taken in regard to the Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs would in future be considered as high treason and
punished accordingly. In addition, some days later, in a situation
conference, he forbade his other close collaborators to make any
statements about the hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who disobeyed
would be shot without regard for position or rank and his family would
be arrested.
The statements which Guderian and I made to Hitler about the
hopelessness of the war situation had precisely the opposite effect from
that which we desired. Early in February, a few days before the
beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler sent for his press expert and
instructed him, in my presence, to announce in the most uncompromising
terms and in the entire German press, the intention of Germany never to
capitulate. He declared at the same time that he was doing this so that
the German people should in no case receive any offer from the enemy.
The language used would have to be so strong that enemy statesmen would
lose all desire to drive a wedge between himself and the German people.
At the same time Hitler once again proclaimed to the German people the
slogan “Victory or Destruction.” All these events took place at a time
when it should have been clear to him and every intelligent member of
his circle that the only thing that could happen was destruction.
At a Gauleiter meeting in the summer of 1944 Hitler had already
stated—and Schirach is my witness for this—that if the German people
were to be defeated in the struggle it must have been too weak, it had
failed to prove its mettle before history and was destined only to
destruction. Now, in the hopeless situation existing in January and
February 1945, Hitler made remarks which showed that these earlier
statements had not been mere flowers of rhetoric. During this period he
attributed the outcome of the war in an increasing degree to the failure
of the German people, but he never blamed himself. He criticized
severely this alleged failure of our people who made so many brave
sacrifices in this war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Generaloberst Jodl has already testified before this
Court that both Hitler and his co-workers saw quite clearly the
hopelessness of the military and economic situation. Was no unified
action taken by some of Hitler’s closer advisers in this hopeless
situation to demand the termination of war?
SPEER: No. No unified action was taken by the leading men in Hitler’s
circle. A step like this was quite impossible, for these men considered
themselves either as pure specialists or else as people whose job it was
to receive orders—or else they resigned themselves to the situation. No
one took over the leadership in this situation for the purpose of
bringing about at least a discussion with Hitler on the possibility of
avoiding further sacrifices.
On the other side there was an influential group which tried, with all
the means at their disposal, to intensify the struggle. That group
consisted of Goebbels, Bormann, and Ley, and, as we have said, Fegelein
and Burgsdorff. This group was also behind the move to induce Hitler to
withdraw from the Geneva Convention. At the beginning of February Dr.
Goebbels handed to Hitler a very sharp memorandum demanding our
withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitler had already agreed to this
proposal, as Naumann, who was State Secretary to Goebbels, told me. This
step meant that the struggle was to be carried on with all available
means and without regard for international agreements. This was the
sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler.
It must be said that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed on
account of the unanimous resistance offered by the military leaders, as
Naumann also told me later.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the witness Stahl said in his written
interrogatory that about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded
from him a supply of the new poison gas in order to assassinate Hitler,
Bormann, and Goebbels. Why did you intend to do this then?
SPEER: I thought there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to
take this step as it had become obvious to me since the beginning of
February that Hitler intended to go on with the war at all costs,
ruthlessly and without consideration for the German people. It was
obvious to me that in the loss of the war he confused his own fate with
that of the German people and that in his own end he saw the end of the
German people as well. It was also obvious that the war was lost so
completely that even unconditional surrender would have to be accepted.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you mean to carry through this assassination
yourself, and why was your plan not realized?
SPEER: I do not wish to testify to the details here. I could only carry
it through personally because from 20 July only a limited circle still
had access to Hitler. I met with various technical difficulties...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear the particulars, but will
hear them after the adjournment.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what circumstances
hindered you in your undertaking?
SPEER: I am most unwilling to describe the details because there is
always something repellent about such matters. I do it only because it
is the Tribunal’s wish.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please, continue.
SPEER: In those days Hitler, after the military situation conference,
often had conversations in his shelter with Ley, Goebbels, and Bormann,
who were particularly close to him then because they supported and
co-operated in his radical course of action. Since 20 July it was no
longer possible even for Hitler’s closest associates to enter this
shelter without their pockets and briefcases being examined by the SS
for explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had
an air-conditioning plant similar to the one installed in this
courtroom.
It would not be difficult to introduce the gas into the ventilator of
the air-conditioning plant, which was in the garden of the Reich
Chancellery. It was then bound to circulate through the entire shelter
in a very short time. Thereupon, in the middle of February 1945, I sent
for Stahl, the head of my main department “Munitions,” with whom I had
particularly close relations, since I had worked in close co-operation
with him during the destructions. I frankly told him of my intention, as
his testimony shows. I asked him to procure this new poison gas for me
from the munitions production. He inquired of one of his associates,
Oberstleutnant Soika of the armament office of the Army, on how to get
hold of this poison gas; it turned out that this new poison gas was only
effective when made to explode, as the high temperature necessary for
the formation of gas would then be reached. I am not sure whether I am
going too much into detail.
An explosion was not possible, however, as this air-conditioning plant
was made of thin sheets of tin, which would have been torn to pieces by
the explosion. Thereupon I had conferences with Hänschel, the chief
engineer of the Chancellery, starting in the middle of March 1945. By
these discussions I managed to arrange that the antigas filter should no
longer be switched on continuously. In this way I would have been able
to use the ordinary type of gas. Naturally, Hänschel had no knowledge of
the purpose for which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time
came, I inspected the ventilator shaft in the garden of the Chancellery
along with Hänschel; and there I discovered that on Hitler’s personal
order this ventilator had recently been surrounded by a chimney 4 meters
high. That can still be ascertained today. Due to this it was no longer
possible to carry out my plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall now come to another problem. Herr Speer, you have
heard the testimony of the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this courtroom;
and they have already testified to your activities after the middle of
February 1945, which you undertook in order to secure the food position.
What do you yourself have to say in regard to your work in that
direction?
SPEER: I can say quite briefly that the preferential food supplies which
I finally put into effect were arranged at the time for the purpose of
planned reconversion from war to peace. This was at the expense of
armament, which I personally represented. The tremendous number of
measures which we introduced would be too extensive to describe here.
All of these decrees are still available. It was a question of
arranging, contrary to the official policy, that shortly before their
occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food and of
taking every step to insure that, despite the catastrophe in
transportation, the 1945 crop should be insured by sending the seed in
good time, which was a burning problem just then. Had the seeds arrived
a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad.
These measures had, of course, a direct, disadvantageous effect on
armament production which cannot be measured. But at any rate, armaments
were only able to maintain production through reserves until the middle
of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning.
This was due to the fact that we had only 20 to 30 percent of the
transportation capacity at our disposal, which necessitated preference
for food transports over armaments. Therefore transportation of
armaments was, practically speaking, out of the question.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was it possible to carry out such measures, which were
openly against the official war plans of “Resistance to the Last,” on a
large scale? Were there any people at all who were prepared to approve
such measures as you suggested and to put them into practice?
SPEER: All these measures were not so difficult; and they were not so
dangerous, as one might perhaps imagine, because in those days—after
January 1945—any reasonable measure could be carried out in Germany
against the official policy. Any reasonable man welcomed such measures
and was satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of
these conferences took place among a large circle of specialists. Every
one of these participants knew the meaning of these orders without its
ever being said. During those days I also had close contacts with
reference to other similar measures with the State Secretaries of the
Ministries of Transport, of Food, of Propaganda, and later even with the
State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, that is, Bormann himself. They
were all old Party members and in spite of that they did their duty to
the nation at that time differently from the way in which many leading
men in the Party were doing it. I kept them currently informed—in spite
of Hitler’s prohibition—of the developments in the military situation,
and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the
insane orders of those days.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In which sectors did you see a danger for the bulk of the
German people through the continuation of the war?
SPEER: By the middle of March 1945 the enemy troops were once more on
the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those
territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied. That
included the territories of Polish Upper Silesia and others outside the
borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during
retreat was actually the greatest danger, because a bridge blown up by
engineers is much more difficult to repair than a bridge which has been
destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to
the destruction of the entire life of a modern state.
In addition, beginning with the end of January, radical circles in the
Party were making demands for the destruction of industry; and it was
also Hitler’s opinion that this should be so. In February 1945 therefore
I stopped production and delivery of the so-called industrial dynamiting
materials. The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines
and in private possession should be diminished. As a witness of mine has
testified, these orders were actually carried out. In the middle of
March Guderian and I tried once more to stop the ordered destruction of
bridges or to reduce it to a minimum. An order was submitted to Hitler
which he refused bluntly, on the contrary demanding intensified orders
for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on 18 March 1945, he had
eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in
connection with the destruction of a bridge. He announced this fact in
the Armed Forces bulletin so that it should serve as a warning for
future cases. Thus it was extremely difficult to disobey orders for the
destruction of bridges. In spite of this existing prohibition I sent a
new memorandum to Hitler on 18 March 1945, the contents of which were
very clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the
measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the attention of
numerous of his associates.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on
Page 69 of the English text of the document book (Exhibit Speer 23).
Will you continue, please?
SPEER: I shall quote something more from that memorandum; on Page 69,
Mr. President:
“The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic
installations. Economic transportation has thereby been
considerably reduced.... In 4 to 8 weeks the final collapse of
German economy must therefore be expected with certainty....
After that collapse, the war cannot even be continued
militarily.... We at the head have the duty to help the nation
in the difficult times which must be expected. In this
connection we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask
ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the
more remote future. If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation
and the basis of its existence, then he must do the job himself.
We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most
primitive manner, a basis of existence for the nation to the
last.”
Then there follow a few of my demands, and I shall summarize them
briefly. I quote:
“It must be insured that, if the battle advances farther into
the territory of the Reich, nobody has the right to destroy
industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply
facilities, as well as traffic facilities and inland shipping
routes, _et cetera_. The blowing-up of bridges to the extent
which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would
be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last
years have been able to achieve. Their destruction means the
removal of any further possibilities of existence for the German
nation.”
Then, I shall quote briefly the conclusion of the memorandum:
“We have no right, at this stage of the war, to carry out
destructions on our part which might affect the life of the
people. If the enemies wish to destroy this nation, which has
fought with unique bravery, then this historical shame shall
rest exclusively upon them. We have the obligation of leaving to
the nation all possibilities which, in the more remote future,
might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction.”
This expressed clearly enough something which Hitler must know in any
case, because there was no need for much economic insight to realize the
results of such destruction for the future of the nation.
On the occasion of the handing over of the memorandum Hitler knew of the
contents, since I had discussed it with some of his associates.
Therefore his statements are typical of his attitude toward this basic
question.
I would not have raised the severe accusation which I made here by
saying that he wanted to draw Germany into the abyss with him, if I had
not confirmed his statements in that respect in the letter of 29 March
1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you meaning May or March?
SPEER: March 1945, Mr. President.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, you will find this document on Page 75 of
the English text of the document book, and it is Page 72 in the French
text. I submit it as Exhibit Number 24. It is Speer’s letter to Hitler
dated 29 March 1945.
Will you continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read this letter?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The defendant wishes to read it himself.
Will you read it?
SPEER: I quote:
“When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you, I was of the
firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the
present situation for the maintenance of our national power
would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had
once determined that it was the task of the Government to
preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.
“However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the
tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as
follows: If the war were lost, the nation would also perish.
This fate was inevitable. There was no necessity to take into
consideration the basis which the people would need to continue
a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better
to destroy these things ourselves, because this nation will have
proved to be the weaker one and the future belongs solely to the
stronger eastern nation. Besides, those who would remain after
the battle were only the inferior ones, for the good ones had
been killed.”
I go on to quote:
“After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next
day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the
strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward
the realization of these intentions....”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, may I in this connection submit as a Speer
document the destruction order of Hitler dated 19 March 1945, which the
Tribunal will find on Page 73 of the French and Page 76 of the English
text of the document book.
I also submit to the Tribunal the execution order for the traffic and
communication systems which you will find on Page 78 of the English text
and Page 75 of the French text. They become Exhibit Number Speer-26.
Then I submit the order for destruction and evacuation by Bormann, dated
23 March 1945, which is contained on Page 102 of my document book. The
latter document bears the Exhibit Number Speer-27.
Herr Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you
please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?
THE PRESIDENT: You said that last one was at Page 102 of the second
volume. In my copy is a document of General Guderian of 15 December
1944.
Dr. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake.
It is not Page 102, it is Pages 93 and 94, I beg to apologize. I have
only just received the document today.
Herr Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?
SPEER: I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the
Gauleiter to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, all
important electrical facilities, water works, gas works, and so on, and
also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My
jurisdiction had specifically been excluded by that order, and all my
orders for the maintenance of industry had been canceled.
The military authorities had given the order that all bridges should be
destroyed, and in addition all railway installations, postal systems,
communication systems in the German railways, also the waterways, all
ships, all freight cars, and all locomotives. The aim was, as is stated
in one of the decrees, the creation of a traffic desert.
The Bormann decree aimed at bringing the population to the center of the
Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and
prisoners of war were to be included. These millions of people were to
be sent upon their trek on foot. No provisions for their existence had
been made, nor could it be carried out in view of the situation.
The carrying out of these orders alone would have resulted in an
unimaginable hunger catastrophe. Add to this that on 19 March 1945 there
was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiter that
the battle should be conducted without consideration for our own
population.
With the carrying out of these orders, Hitler’s pledge of 18 March would
be kept, namely, that it would not be necessary “....to take into
consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most
primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better to destroy
these things ourselves....” Considering the discipline which came into
force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its
contents, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out.
These orders also applied to those territories which had been included
in the Greater German Reich.
During journeys into the most endangered territories, and by means of
discussions with my associates, I now quite openly tried to stop the
carrying out of these orders. I ordered that the high explosives which
were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and
that the stores of high explosives which were on the building sites
should be hidden.
We distributed submachine guns to the most important plants so that they
could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat
exaggerated; but the situation at the time was such that if a Gauleiter
had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was a single
submachine gun available, then it would have been fired.
I tried to convince the local army commanders of the nonsensical
character of the task of exploding bridges, which had been given to
them, and furthermore by talking to the local authorities I succeeded in
stopping most of the evacuation which had been ordered. In this
connection the State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klopper,
deserves credit in that he held up the evacuation orders which were to
be sent to the Gauleiter.
When I came back from this journey, I was called before Hitler at once.
This was on 29 March 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so
openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiter
that my insubordination must have become known to him. Witnesses are
available from that period who know that that is what I wanted to
achieve.
I did not want to betray him behind his back. I wanted to put the
alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference he stated
that he had had reports from Bormann to the effect that I considered the
war as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He
demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not
consider the war lost, and I replied, “The war is lost.” He gave me 24
hours to think, and it was during those 24 hours that the letter was
written from which the extract has been quoted and which has been
submitted to the Tribunal in full.
After this period of reflection, I intended to hand him this letter as
my reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that
he could rely on me in the future, and in that way I was able to get him
to hand over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, may I submit Hitler’s order dated 30
March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English and
79 of the French text in the document book. It will be Exhibit Number
28.
Then what did you do on the strength of this new order which you had?
SPEER: I had the text of it drawn up and it gave me the possibility of
circumventing the destruction which had been ordered. I issued an order
at once re-establishing all my old orders for the safeguarding of
industry. In this connection, I did not submit this new order of mine
for Hitler’s approval, although he had expressly made this proviso in
his order.
Contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely, that I would
stand behind him unconditionally, I left as early as the following day
to see Seyss-Inquart, who has testified to that here, and two other
Gauleiter to tell them too that the war was lost and to discuss the
consequences with them.
On that occasion I found Seyss-Inquart very understanding. Both my
decree for the prevention of destruction and my discussions were
contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on 29 March. I considered
that this was my natural duty.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I submit as Exhibit Number Speer-29 the instructions
issued by Speer on 30 March for carrying out the order which has already
been mentioned. In the French and German texts of the document book it
appears on Page 81 and in the English document book on Page 85.
SPEER: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still
remained in force; and everywhere in Germany, Austria, and Poland and
elsewhere you can see the results today. I made numerous journeys to the
front and had many conferences with the commanders of the front-line
troops. Perhaps that may have brought about relief in some form or
other. Finally, I succeeded in persuading the commander of the Signal
Corps, on 3 April 1945, to forbid at least the destruction of the
signal, postal, railway, and wireless installations by means of a new
order.
Finally, on 5 April I issued six OKW orders under the name of General
Winter, who has been a witness in this courtroom. These orders were to
insure the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still
in existence. I issued these orders through my command channels and the
channels of the Reich railways; and considering the tremendous mix-up of
orders at the time, such orders, which I was not empowered to give,
would at least have a confusing effect.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, a number of attempts on your part to shorten
the war became known to the press. Could you please describe to the
Court the situation which has been hinted at in the press.
SPEER: I do not want to spend too much time on things which did not
succeed. I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the
Government and to force them to account for their deeds. To carry out
that and other plans, eight officers from the front joined me, all of
whom held high decorations. The State Secretary of the Propaganda
Ministry made it possible for me on 9 April to speak briefly over the
entire German radio system. All preparations were made, but at the last
moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should approve
the text of my speech. I submitted to him a very modified text. But he
forbade even this very modified text.
On 21 April 1945 it was possible for me first of all to record a speech
at the broadcasting station at Hamburg. This was to be broadcast as the
instructions for the final phase. The recording officials, however,
demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler’s death,
which would relieve them of their oath of allegiance to him.
Furthermore, I was in contact with the chief of staff of an army group
in the East, the Army Group Vistula. We were both agreed that a fight
for Berlin must not take place and that, contrary to their orders, the
armies should by-pass Berlin. To begin with, this order was carried out;
but later several persons empowered with special authority by Hitler
were sent outside Berlin and succeeded in leading some divisions into
Berlin. The original intention however that entire armies should be led
into Berlin was thus not carried through. The chief of staff with whom I
had these conferences was General Kinzler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these attempts still of any avail at the beginning
of April and later on?
SPEER: Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, for Churchill,
too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the
end of July 1945.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have described here how much you did to preserve
industrial plants and other economic installations. Did you also act on
behalf of the foreign workers?
SPEER: My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty,
therefore, in the first place to hand over my sector undamaged. Yet
several attempts of mine were also in favor of foreign workers in
Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war,
through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were
quite obviously cobeneficiaries of my work during the last phase.
Secondly, during local discussions on the prevention of blastings,
contrary to the evacuation orders which had been received from the
Party, I made it possible for the foreign workers and prisoners to
remain where they were. Such discussions took place on 18 March in the
Saar district, and on 28 March in the Ruhr district. At the beginning of
March I made the proposal that 500,000 foreigners should be repatriated
from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say,
the Dutch to Holland, the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The Reichsbahn,
however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the
traffic system had already been so damaged that the carrying out of this
plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in the speech I intended to
make over the German broadcasting system on 9 April and in the attempted
Hamburg speech, I pointed out the duties which we had toward the
foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the prisoners from concentration
camps during this last phase.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 88 of
the English text in this connection; it is Page 84 of the French, and I
submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-30.
Herr Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of
the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not
resign?
SPEER: I had a chance to resign on three occasions; once in April 1944,
when my powers had been considerably reduced; the second time in
September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my
resignation; and the third time on 29 March 1945, when Hitler himself
demanded that I should go on permanent leave, which was equivalent to
resignation. I turned down all these opportunities because, beginning
with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect
that the last phase of the war, that is, from January 1945, was
justified from the point of view that the nation should be spared
unnecessary sacrifices. Were you of that same opinion?
SPEER: No. It was said that military protection against the East would
have been necessary to protect refugees. In reality, until the middle of
April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and
munitions were used for the fight against the West. The tactical
principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if
the fight had been carried out with the aims which have been stated
here. The destruction of bridges in the West and the destruction orders
against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The
sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were
senseless. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man
responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler. The same
is true of the ruined cities, which in this last phase had to lose
tremendous cultural values and where innumerable dwellings suffered
destruction. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is
suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic
installations, trucks, locomotives, and ships. The German people
remained loyal to Adolf Hitler until the end. He betrayed them with
intent. He tried to throw them definitely into the abyss. Only after 1
May 1945 did Dönitz try to act with reason, but it was too late.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I have one last question.
Was it possible for you to reconcile your actions during the last phase
of the war with your oath and your conception of loyalty to Adolf
Hitler?
SPEER: There is one loyalty which everyone must always keep; and that is
loyalty toward one’s own people. That duty comes before everything. If I
am in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation
are acted against in such a way, then I too must act. That Hitler had
broken faith with the nation must have been clear to every intelligent
member of his entourage, certainly at the latest in January or February
1945. Hitler had once been given his mission by the people; he had no
right to gamble away the destiny of the people with his own. Therefore I
fulfilled my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in everything,
but I am glad today that by my work I was able to render one more
service to the workers in Germany and the occupied territories.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my
examination of the Defendant Speer.
May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that
statements have been made on the theme which was the subject of this
afternoon’s session by the witnesses: Kehrl, in his interrogatory under
10 and 12; Rohland, under 5, 6, and 8; Schieber, under 25; Guderian,
under 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and on point 6; Stahl, named by Speer, under
Points 1 and 2 of his testimony; and Kempf, under Number 10 of her
testimony.
Still outstanding are an interrogatory from the witness Malzacher and an
interrogatory—which is most important to the defense—of the witness
Von Poser, since he was the liaison officer between the General Staff of
the Army and Speer’s Ministry; these will be handed in when received.
Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory of General Buhle,
who was the Chief of the Army Staff, and Colonel Baumbach, who was
commander of a bomber squadron. The remaining documents I shall submit
to the Tribunal at the end of the final examination of the Defendant
Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the negotiations which Sauckel had in
1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present
who came from your department and did they support Sauckel’s demands?
SPEER: During these conferences representatives from my departments were
sometimes present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the
blocked factories and also to see to it that there were no encroachments
on the production interests which I planned to protect.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives were, therefore, not acting
to support Sauckel’s demands but were against them?
SPEER: It was not the task of these representatives to act for or
against Sauckel’s demands, because Sauckel stated his demands in such a
definite way that a subordinate official was not in a position to speak
either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a
task which I would have had to carry out myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives did not fulfill any task?
SPEER: My representatives were the representatives from the armament,
from the heavy armament and war production in the occupied territories,
and as such they had their special tasks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you in 1943, acting independently and
without consultation with Sauckel, transfer 50,000 French Organization
Todt workers to the Ruhr district?
SPEER: Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Möhne Dam and the Eder
Dam in April and May 1943, I went there and in that period I ordered
that a special group from the Organization Todt should take over the
restoration of these plants. I did this because I also wanted the
machinery and the technical staff on the spot. This special group right
away without asking me brought the French workers along. This had
tremendous repercussions for us in the West because the workers on the
building sites on the Atlantic Wall, who had up to that time felt safe
from Sauckel’s reach...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done
there. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 OT workers
were obtained without Sauckel’s agreement and by yourself independently;
and that you have confirmed, haven’t you?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hours
in these plants. Do you know that the 10-hour day was later on ordered
by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare,
applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?
SPEER: That is probably true. I do not directly recollect it, but I
assume it is right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not
applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was
not recognized for Soviet prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied _de
facto_, and that there were orders to that effect?
SPEER: I cannot give you any information about that, because it was too
much of a detail and was dealt with by my departments directly. I should
like to confirm it for you.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit to the Tribunal a document which
confirms this.
Do you know that Italian civilian internees, that is, those who came
from the Italian Armed Forces, were transferred to the status of free
workers and therefore did not come under the Convention?
SPEER: Yes, that is true, and it was done on Sauckel’s request.
DR. SERVATIUS: The factory managers were responsible for carrying out
Sauckel’s orders in the factories. Is that right?
SPEER: As far as they could be carried out, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you have said that if, on account of special events
such as air attacks, it was not possible to carry them out, the supreme
authorities in the Reich would have had to take them over?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?
SPEER: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: That would be Sauckel?
SPEER: Yes. And the German Labor Front, which was responsible for
accommodations and working conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to
stop these abuses? Was this a matter of practical assistance then?
SPEER: No. I think you have misunderstood me. The “catastrophe
emergency” comprised conditions brought about by _force majeure_. Nobody
could remedy them, even with the best will in the world, because every
day there were new air attacks. But it is impossible, as Sauckel has
testified, to hold the factory manager also responsible for the fact
that these conditions could not be alleviated. I wanted to indicate that
in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and
decide whether conditions were still bearable or not. In that connection
it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the official who made the reports
and gave the orders, to convene such meetings.
DR. SERVATIUS: To whom then was he supposed to make such
recommendations?
SPEER: To the Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have explained your own administrative
organization and you have said that you were an opponent of a
bureaucratic administration. You introduced self-administration for the
factories; and on the professional side, you formed “rings” and above
them committees which were directed by you.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And it was a closed administration which could not be
penetrated from the outside by other authorities?
SPEER: Yes, I would not have allowed that.
DR. SERVATIUS: So you were actually the representative of these firms
toward the higher authorities.
SPEER: Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned, as I have
stated here.
DR. SERVATIUS: You limited yourself to the technical tasks?
SPEER: Well, otherwise I would have been responsible for food
conditions, or health conditions, or matters which concerned the Police;
but that was expecting too much. In that case one would have had to give
me another post.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not refer earlier to the fact that,
particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions
which would benefit the workers; and are you not in that way confirming
my view that you bore the entire responsibility for that sector?
SPEER: Not in the least. I believe that I undertook the actions of the
last phase within my general responsibility, but not the particular
responsibility for that sector.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, Witness, you spoke about the responsibility of the
Gauleiter as Reich defense commissioners with reference to the armament
industries. Could you describe in more detail the scope of that
responsibility, because I did not understand it.
SPEER: From 1942, responsibility was transferred to the Gauleiter as
Reich defense commissioners to an ever-increasing degree. This was
mostly the effort of Bormann...
DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have?
SPEER: Just a minute ... who desired the centralization of all the
forces of the State and the Party in the Gauleiter. This state of
centralization had almost been achieved in full after 1943, the only
exception which still existed being my armament offices, the so-called
Armament Inspectorates. These, since they had previously come under the
OKW, were military establishments which were staffed by officers; and
that made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction of the
Gauleiter. But the Gauleiter was the central authority in his Gau, and
he assumed the right to give orders where he did not have it. The
situation with us was, as you know, that it was not so important as to
who was vested with authority; it was a question of who assumed the
right to give orders. In this case most Gauleiter did assume all the
rights, by which means they were the responsible and central authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you mean by “central authority”? Perhaps I may
put something to you: The Gauleiter, as Reich defense commissioner, only
had the task of centralizing the offices if a decision was necessary in
the Gau, for instance, after an air attack, the removal of the damage,
construction of a new plant, or acquisition of new grounds, so that the
various departments would be brought to one conference table; but he did
not have the authority to give orders or make decisions. Is that right?
SPEER: No. I should like to recommend that you talk to a few Gauleiter
who will tell you how it was.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, I will drop the question. I will submit the
law. You then went on to say, Witness, that during a certain period
there was a surplus of labor in Germany. Was this due to the fact that
Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?
SPEER: There may be an error here. My defense counsel has referred to
two documents according to which during the time from April 1942 until
April 1943 Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than
armament had requested. I do not know if that is the passage you mean.
DR. SERVATIUS: I can only remember that you said that there had been
more workers than were required.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You do not mean to say that this had been caused by the
fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign
countries?
SPEER: No. I wanted to prove by that answer that even according to
Sauckel’s opinion at the time he did not endeavor to bring workers to
Germany from France, _et cetera_, corresponding to my maximum demands.
For if in a report to Hitler he asserts that he brought more workers to
the armament sector than I demanded, as can be seen from the letter,
then it would be clear that he did more than I asked him to do.
Actually, it was quite different. In actual fact, he did not supply
these workers at all, and we had a heated argument because it was my
opinion that he had supplied a far smaller number and had boosted his
report to Hitler. However, for this Trial the document is valid.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have just pointed out also that there was an argument
between you and Sauckel as to whether there were sufficient labor
reserves in Germany; and if I have understood you rightly, you said that
if workers had been mobilized in the manner used by England and the
Soviet Union, one would not have needed any foreign workers at all. Is
that true?
SPEER: No, I did not say that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, how am I to understand it?
SPEER: I have expressed clearly enough that I considered Sauckel’s labor
policy of bringing foreigners into Germany to be the proper course. I
did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there did exist
considerable reserves of German labor; that again is only proof of the
fact that I was not responsible for the maximum demands made, and that
was all I wanted to prove.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are the laws known to you according to which German women
and youths were used to a very considerable degree?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you also know that officers’ wives and the wives of
high officials also worked in factories?
SPEER: Yes, as from August 1944.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, where were these labor reserves of which you
are speaking?
SPEER: I was talking about the time of 1943. In 1943 I demanded in the
Central Planning Board that the German labor reserves should be drawn
upon, and in 1944 during the conversation of 4 January with Hitler I
said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated—and that can be seen
from his speech of 1 March 1944, which has been submitted as a
document—that there were no longer any reserves of German workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
SPEER: But at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded
in 1944 in mobilizing a further 2 million workers from Germany, whereas
at a conference with Hitler on 1 January 1944 he considered that to be
completely impossible. Thus he has himself proved here that at a time
when I desired the use of internal labor he did not think there was any,
although he was later forced by circumstances to mobilize these workers
from Germany after all; therefore my statement at the time was right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these 2 million workers you have mentioned, were
they people who could be employed in industry?
SPEER: Yes, of course.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they employed directly as skilled workers in
industry?
SPEER: No, they had to be trained first.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not first of all have to go through complicated
transfers to be released from one firm to another?
SPEER: Only partly, because we had a possibility of using them in the
fine-mechanical industry and other kinds of work; and also, as everyone
who is familiar with American and British industry knows, these modern
machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for
difficult work.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not interested in all these details, Dr.
Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am very interested in the basic
question, because if workers were obtained from foreign countries in
excess numbers and if, therefore, there was no necessity for the State
to have them, it is of the greatest importance from the point of view of
international law in considering the question as to whether labor can be
recruited. That is what I wish to clarify.
I have two more questions, and perhaps I may put them now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those
details.
DR. SERVATIUS: No, they are questions on other points.
Witness, you have stated that your attempt to subordinate Sauckel to
yourself failed. Did you not achieve that subordination in practice by
the fact that on the intermediate level Sauckel’s Gau labor exchanges
would have to do what your armament commissions ordered?
SPEER: No. That is a matter into which I shall have to go in greater
detail. If you want an explanation...
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said “no”...
SPEER: Yes. But these are entirely new conceptions which should first be
explained to the Court, but if “no” is sufficient for you...
DR. SERVATIUS: There is no need for any lengthy statement, because if
you clearly say “no,” the matter is settled.
Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel decided the question
of distributing labor within his working staff.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: He himself says that the Führer made certain decisions.
Must not one differentiate between the wholesale demands for a program
where it is a problem of the distribution of labor over a lengthy
period, and the distribution which was effected currently according to
the progress of the program?
SPEER: According to my recollection, and also from having read the
records I received of the Führer conferences, there are two phases to be
distinguished. The first one ended in October 1942, during which there
were frequent joint conferences with Sauckel, which I attended. During
these conferences the distribution of labor for the next months was
discussed in detail. After that time there were no longer any
conferences with Hitler, which went into detail, at which I was present.
I only know of the conferences of January 1944, and then there was
another conference in April or May 1944 which has not yet been mentioned
here. During those conferences there was only a general discussion, and
the distribution was then carried out in accordance with the directives,
as Sauckel says.
DR. SERVATIUS: But that is just what I am asking you. These were lump
demands referring to a program, and the basic decision was made that 2
million workers were to be obtained from foreign countries; the
subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.
SPEER: Yes, that is right, and I can confirm Sauckel’s testimony that
his orders concerning the occupied territories always came from Hitler,
since he needed Hitler’s authority to assert himself in occupied
territory.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH DAY
Friday, 21 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Speer resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do any other defendants’ counsel want to ask
any questions?
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, on
25 January 1946 you handed two statements to my client here in the
prison at Nuremberg. During his examination Dr. Schacht made brief
mention of these, and for the sake of brevity I should like the Tribunal
to allow me to read out the statement which the defendant gave me that
day so that its truth may be confirmed. It is very brief. The first
statement reads as follows:
“I was on the terrace of the Berghof on the Obersalzberg waiting
to submit my building plans”—this was in the summer of
1937—“when Schacht appeared at the Berghof. From where I was on
the terrace I could hear a loud argument between Hitler and
Schacht in Hitler’s room. Hitler’s voice grew louder and louder.
At the end of the discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and,
visibly excited, he told the people about him that he could not
collaborate with Schacht, that he had had a terrible argument
with him, and that Schacht was going to upset his plans with his
finance methods.”
Now, that is the first statement. Is it correct?
SPEER: Yes, it is.
DR. KRAUS: It is correct. The second statement deals with the events
after 20 July. It reads as follows:
“It was on or about 22 July that Hitler said in my presence to a
fairly large group of people....”
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
DR. KRAUS: 1944, Your Lordship.
“....that Schacht, as one of the opponents of the authoritarian
system, should be one of those to be arrested. Hitler went on to
speak harshly of Schacht’s activities and of the difficulties
which he, Hitler, had experienced through Schacht’s economic
policy as regards rearmament. He said that actually a man like
Schacht should be shot for his oppositional activity before the
war.”
The last sentence of the statement says:
“After the harshness of these remarks, I was surprised to meet
Schacht here alive.”
Is this statement correct, too?
SPEER: Yes, it is.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions?
Then, do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
Defendant, your counsel divided your examination into two parts which he
described first as your personal responsibilities, and secondly as the
political part of the case, and I will follow the same division.
You have stated a good many of the matters for which you were not
responsible, and I want to make clear just what your sphere of
responsibility was.
You were not only a member of the Nazi Party after 1932, but you held
high rank in the Party, did you not?
SPEER: Correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was the position which you held in the
Party?
SPEER: I have already mentioned that during my pre-trial interrogations.
Temporarily in 1934 I became a department head in the German Labor Front
and dealt with the improvement of labor conditions in German factories.
Then I was in charge of public works on the staff of Hess. I gave up
both these activities in 1941. Notes of the conference I had with Hitler
about this are available. After 8 February 1942 I automatically became
Todt’s successor in the central office for technical matters in the
Reichsleitung of the NSDAP.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was your official title?
SPEER: Party titles had just been introduced, and they were so
complicated that I cannot tell you at the moment what they were. But the
work I did there was that of a department chief in the Reichsleitung of
the NSDAP. My title was Hauptdienstleiter or something of the kind.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In the 1943 directory it would appear that you were
head of the “Hauptamt für Technik.”
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your rank appears to be “Oberbefehlsleiter”?
SPEER: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which as I understand corresponds roughly to a
lieutenant general in the army?
SPEER: Well, compared to the other tasks I had it was very little.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you attended Party functions from time to time
and were informed in a general way as to the Party program, were you
not?
SPEER: Before 1942 I joined in the various Party rallies here in
Nuremberg because I had to take part in them as an architect, and of
course besides this I was generally present at official Party meetings
or Reichstag sessions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you heard discussed, and were generally
familiar with, the program of the Nazi Party in its broad outlines, were
you not?
SPEER: Of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You—there is some question as to just what your
relation to the SS was. Will you tell me whether you were a member of
the SS?
SPEER: No, I was not a member of the SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You filled out an application at one time, or one
was filled out for you, and you never went through with it, I believe,
or something of that sort.
SPEER: That was in 1943 when Himmler wanted me to get a high rank in the
SS. He had often wanted it before when I was still an architect. I got
out of it by saying that I was willing to be an ordinary SS man under
him because I had already been an SS man before. Thereupon,
Gruppenführer Wolff provisionally filled out an application form and
wanted to know what my previous SS activities had been in 1932. It came
up during his inquiries that in those days I was never registered as a
member of the SS, and because of this they did not insist on my joining
as I did not want to become a new member now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And why did you not want to be a member of the SS,
which was after all one of the important Party formations?
SPEER: No, I became well known for turning down all these honorary
ranks. I did not want them because I felt that one should only hold a
rank where one had responsibility.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did not want any responsibility in the SS?
SPEER: I had too little contact with the SS, and did not want any
responsibility in that connection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now there has been some testimony about your
relation to concentration camps, and, as I understand it, you have said
to us that you did use and encourage the use of forced labor from the
concentration camps.
SPEER: Yes, we did use it in the German armament industry.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you also recommended that persons in
labor camps who were slackers be sent to the concentration camps, did
you not?
SPEER: That was the question of the so-called “Bummelanten,” and by that
name we meant workers who did not get to their work on time or who
pretended to be ill. Severe measures were taken against such workers
during the war, and I approved of these measures.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, in the 30 October 1942 meeting of the
Central Planning Board you brought the subject up in the following
terms, did you not—quoting Speer:
“We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the
sick list decreases to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories
where doctors are on the staff who examine the sick men. There
is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps
and putting those known to be slackers into concentration camp
factories. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times,
and the news will soon get around.”
That was your recommendation?
SPEER: Correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the workmen stood in considerable
terror of concentration camps, and you wanted to take advantage of that
to keep them at their work, did you not?
SPEER: It is certain that concentration camps had a bad reputation with
us, and the transfer to a concentration camp, or threat of such a
possibility, was bound to reduce the number of absentees in the
factories right from the beginning. But at that meeting, as I already
said yesterday, there was nothing further said about it. It was one of
the many remarks one can make in wartime when one is upset.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, it is very clear—and if I misinterpret
you I give you the chance to correct me—that you understood the very
bad reputation that the concentration camps had among the workmen and
that the concentration camps were regarded as being much more severe
than the labor camps as places to be in.
SPEER: That is correct. I knew that. I did not know, of course, what I
have heard during this Trial, but the other thing was a generally known
fact.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was known throughout Germany, was it not,
that the concentration camps were pretty tough places to be put?
SPEER: Yes, but not to the extent which has been revealed in this Trial.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the bad reputation of the concentration camp,
as a matter of fact, was a part of its usefulness in making people
fearful of being sent there, was it not?
SPEER: No doubt concentration camps were a means, a menace used to keep
order.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to keep people at work?
SPEER: I would not like to put it in that way. I assert that a great
number of the foreign workers in our country did their work quite
voluntarily once they had come to Germany.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will take that up later. You used the
concentration camp labor in production to the extent that you were
required to divide the proceeds of the labor with Himmler, did you not?
SPEER: That I did not understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you made an agreement finally with Himmler
that he should have 5 percent, or roughly 5 percent, of the production
of the concentration camp labor while you would get for your work 95
percent?
SPEER: No, that is not quite true.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, tell me how it was. That is what the
documents indicate, if I read them aright.
SPEER: Yes, it is put that way in the Führer minutes, but I should like
to explain the meaning to you. Himmler, as I said yesterday, wanted to
build factories of his own in his concentration camps. Then he would
have been able to produce arms without any outside control, which
Hitler, of course, knew. The 5 percent arms production which was to have
been handed to Himmler was to a certain extent a compensation for the
fact that he himself gave up the idea of building factories in the
camps. From the psychological point of view it was not so simple for me
to get Himmler to give up this idea when he kept on reminding Hitler of
it. I was hoping that he would be satisfied with the 5 percent arms
production we were going to give him. Actually this 5 percent was never
handed over. We managed things quietly with the Operations Staff of the
OKW and with General Buhle, so that he never got the arms at all.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am not criticizing the bargain, you
understand. I don’t doubt you did very well to get 95 percent, but the
point is that Himmler was using, with your knowledge, concentration camp
labor to manufacture arms, or was proposing to do so, and you wanted to
keep that production within your control?
SPEER: Could the translation come through a bit clearer? Would you
please repeat that?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew at this time that Himmler was using
concentration camp labor to carry on independent industry and that he
proposed to go into the armament industry in order to have a source of
supply of arms for his own SS?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also knew the policy of the Nazi Party and the
policy of the Government towards the Jews, did you not?
SPEER: I knew that the National Socialist Party was anti-Semitic, and I
knew that the Jews were being evacuated from Germany.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, you participated in that evacuation, did
you not?
SPEER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I gather that impression from Document L-156,
Exhibit RF-1522, a letter from the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of
Labor which is dated 26 March 1943, which you have no doubt seen. You
may see it again, if you wish. In which he says...
SPEER: I know it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “At the end of February, the Reichsführer
SS, in agreement with myself and the Reich Minister for
armaments and munitions, for reasons of state security, has
removed from their places of work all Jews who were still
working freely and not in camps, and either transferred them to
a labor corps or collected them for removal.”
Was that a correct representation of your activity?
SPEER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell me what part you had in that? There
is no question that they were put into labor corps or collected for
removal, is there?
SPEER: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now you say you did not do it, so will you tell me
who did?
SPEER: It was a fairly long business. When, in February 1942, I took
over my new office, the Party was already insisting that Jews who were
still working in armament factories should be removed from them. I
objected at the time, and managed to get Bormann to issue a circular
letter to the effect that these Jews might go on being employed in
armament factories and that Party offices were prohibited from accusing
the heads of these firms on political grounds because of the Jews
working there. It was the Gauleiter who made such political accusations
against the heads of concerns, and it was mostly in the Gau Saxony and
in the Gau Berlin. So after this the Jews could remain in these plants.
Without having any authority to do so, I had had this circular letter
from the Party published in my news sheet to heads of factories and had
sent it to all concerned, so that I would in any case receive their
complaints if the Party should not obey the instruction. After that the
problem was left alone, until September or October of 1942. At that time
a conference with Hitler took place, at which Sauckel also was present.
At this conference Hitler insisted emphatically that the Jews must now
be removed from the armament firms, and he gave orders for this to be
done—this will be seen from a Führer protocol which has been preserved.
In spite of this we managed to keep the Jews on in factories and it was
only in March 1943, as this letter shows, that resistance gave way and
the Jews finally did have to get out.
I must point out to you that, as far as I can remember, it was not yet a
question of the Jewish problem as a whole, but in the years 1941 and
1942 Jews had gone to the armament factories to do important war work
and have an occupation of military importance; they were able to escape
the evacuation which at that time was already in full swing. They were
mostly occupied in the electrical industry, and Geheimrat Bücher, of the
electrical industry—that is AEG and Siemens—no doubt lent a helping
hand in order to get the Jews taken on there in greater numbers. These
Jews were completely free and their families were still in their homes.
The letter by Gauleiter Sauckel you have before you was not, of course,
submitted to me; and Sauckel says that he himself had not seen it. But
it is certainly true that I knew about it before action was taken; I
knew because the question had to be discussed as to how one should get
replacements. It is equally certain, though, that I also protested at
the time at having skilled labor removed from my armament industries
because, apart from other reasons, it was going to make things difficult
for me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point that I want to emphasize.
As I understand it, you were struggling to get manpower enough to
produce the armaments to win a war for Germany.
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this anti-Semitic campaign was so strong that
it took trained technicians away from you and disabled you from
performing your functions. Now, isn’t that the fact?
SPEER: I did not understand the meaning of your question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your problem of creating armaments to win the war
for Germany was made very much more difficult by this anti-Jewish
campaign which was being waged by others of your codefendants.
SPEER: That is a certainty; and it is equally clear that if the Jews who
were evacuated had been allowed to work for me, it would have been a
considerable advantage to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, has it been proved who signed that
document, L-156? It has got a signature apparently on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is a signature on it, I believe the
plenipotentiary general for the employment of labor is my thought on it.
We will look at that.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could tell what the signature is.
[_The document was shown to the defendant._]
SPEER: I do not know the man. Yes, he must be one of the smaller
officials in the offices of the Plenipotentiary for Labor, because I
knew all the immediate associates of Sauckel personally—no; I beg your
pardon, the document comes from the Regierungspräsident in Koblenz, as I
see here. Then it is an assistant in the Government District of Koblenz,
whom of course I did not know.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In any event, there is no question about the
statement as you have explained it?
SPEER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I want to ask you about the recruiting of
forced labor. As I understand it, you know about the deportation of
100,000 Jews from Hungary for subterranean airplane factories, and you
told us in your interrogation of 18 October 1945 that you made no
objection to it. That is true, is it not?
SPEER: That is true, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you told us also, quite candidly, on that day
that it was no secret to you that a good deal of the manpower brought in
by Sauckel was brought in by illegal methods. That is also true, is it
not?
SPEER: I took great care at the time to notice what expression the
interrogating officer used; he used the expression “they came against
their wish”; and that I confirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not say that it was no secret to you that
they were brought in an illegal manner? Didn’t you add that yourself?
SPEER: No, no. That was certainly not so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in any event, you knew that at the Führer
conference in August of 1942 the Führer had approved of all coercive
measures for obtaining labor if they couldn’t be obtained on a voluntary
basis, and you knew that that program was carried out. You, as a matter
of fact, you did not give any particular attention to the legal side of
this thing, did you? You were after manpower; isn’t that the fact?
SPEER: That is absolutely correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And whether it was legal or illegal was not your
worry?
SPEER: I consider that in view of the whole war situation and of our
views in general on this question it was justified.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, it was in accordance with the policy of the
Government, and that was as far as you inquired at the time, was it not?
SPEER: Yes. I am of the opinion that at the time I took over my office,
in February 1942, all the violations of international law, which
later—which are now brought up against me, had already been committed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you don’t question that you share a certain
responsibility for that program for bringing in—whether it is a legal
responsibility or not, in fact—for bringing in this labor against its
will? You don’t deny that, do you?
SPEER: The workers were brought to Germany largely against their will,
and I had no objection to their being brought to Germany against their
will. On the contrary, during the first period, until the autumn of
1942, I certainly also took some pains to see that as many workers as
possible should be brought to Germany in this manner.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had some participation in the distribution of
this labor, did you not, as among different plants, different
industries, that were competing for labor?
SPEER: No. That would have to be explained in more detail—I do not
quite understand it like that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you finally entered into an agreement with
Sauckel, did you not, in reference to the distribution of the labor
after it reached the Reich?
SPEER: That was arranged according to the so-called priority grades. I
had to tell Sauckel, of course, in which of my programs labor was needed
most urgently. But that sort of thing was dealt with by general
instructions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you established the priorities of
different industries in their claim for the labor when it came into the
Reich?
SPEER: That was a matter of course; naturally that had to be done.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Now, as to the employment of prisoners of war,
you—whatever disagreement there may be about the exact figures, there
is no question, is there, that prisoners of war were used in the
manufacture of armament?
SPEER: No, only Russian prisoners of war and Italian military internees
were used for the production of arms. As for the use of French and other
prisoners of war in this production I had several conferences with
Keitel on the subject. And I must tell you that Keitel always adopted
the view that these prisoners of war could not be used in violation of
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. I can claim that on the strength
of this fact I no longer used my influence to see that these prisoners
of war should be used in armament industries in violation of the Geneva
Convention. The conception, of course, “production of arms” is very much
open to argument. It always depends on what position one takes, whether
you have a wide conception of “armaments” or a narrow one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you succeeded to Dr. Todt’s organization, and
you had all the powers that he had, did you not?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And one of his directives was dated 31 October
1941, a letter from the OKW which is in evidence here as Exhibit 214,
Document EC-194, which provides that the deputies of the Reich Minister
for arms and munitions are to be admitted to prisoner-of-war camps for
the purpose of selecting skilled workers. That was among your powers,
was it not?
SPEER: No. That was a special action which Dr. Todt introduced on the
strength of an agreement with the OKW. It was dropped later, however.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, on 22 April 1943, at the thirty-sixth meeting
of this Planning Board, you made this complaint, did you not, Herr
Speer? Quoting:
“There is a statement showing in what sectors the Russian PW’s
have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting.
It shows that the armament industry only received 30 percent. I
always complained about that.”
That is correct, is it not?
SPEER: I believe that has been wrongly translated. It should not say
“munitions industry”; it should say, “The armament industry received 30
percent.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I said “armament.”
SPEER: Yes. But this is still no proof that these prisoners of war were
employed in violation of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, because
in the sector of the armament industry there was ample room to use these
workers for production articles which, in the sense of the Geneva
Prisoner of War Agreement, were not armament products. However, I
believe that in the case of the Russian prisoners of war, there was not
the same value attached to strict observance of the Geneva Convention as
in the case of prisoners from western countries.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it your contention that the prisoners were not
used—I now speak of French prisoners of war—that French prisoners of
war were not used in the manufacture of materials which directly
contributed to the war, or is it your contention that although they were
used it was legal under the Geneva Convention?
SPEER: As far as I know, French prisoners of war were not used contrary
to the rules of the Convention. I cannot check that, because my office
was not responsible for controlling the conditions of their employment.
During my numerous visits to factories, I never noticed that any
prisoner of war from the western territories was working directly on
armament products.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Just tell exactly what French prisoners of war did
do by way of manufacture. What were they working on?
SPEER: That I cannot answer. I already explained yesterday that the
allotment of prisoners of war, or foreign workers, or German workers to
a factory was not a matter for me to decide, but was carried out by the
labor office, together with the Stalag, when it was a question of
prisoners of war. I received only a general survey of the total number
of workers who had gone to the factories, and so I could get no idea of
what types of labor were being employed in each individual factory. So I
cannot give a satisfactory answer to your question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us take the 50,000 skilled workers that you
said yesterday you removed and put to work in a different location, that
Sauckel complained about. What did you put them to work at?
SPEER: Those were not prisoners of war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us take those workers. What were you doing with
them?
SPEER: Those workers had been working on the Atlantic Wall. From there
they were transferred to the Ruhr to repair the two dams which had been
destroyed by an air attack. I must say that the transfer of these 50,000
workers took place without my knowledge, and the consequences of
bringing 50,000 workers from the West into Germany amounted to a
catastrophe for us on the Atlantic Wall. It meant that more than
one-third of all the workers engaged on the Atlantic Wall left because
they, too, were afraid they might have to go to Germany. That is why we
rescinded the order as quickly as possible, so that the French workers
on the Atlantic Wall should have confidence in us. This fact will show
you that the French workers we had working for the Organization Todt
were not employed on a coercive basis, otherwise they could not have
left in such numbers when they realized that under certain circumstances
they, too, might be taken to Germany. So these measures taken with the
50,000 workers from the Organization Todt in France were only temporary
and were revised later. It was one of those mistakes which can happen if
a minister gives a harsh directive and his subordinates begin to carry
it out by every means in their disposal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are you familiar with Document EC-60, which reports
that the labor organization of Todt had to recruit its manpower by
force?
SPEER: At the moment I cannot recollect it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I beg your pardon?
SPEER: At this moment I cannot recollect it. Could I see the document?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, if you would like to. I just remind you that
the evidence is to the contrary of your testimony on that subject.
Page 42, the paragraph which reads:
“Unfortunately the assignments for the Organization Todt on the
basis of Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare have
for some time decreased considerably, because the larger part of
the manpower allocated does not turn up. Consequently further
compulsory measures must be employed. The prefect and the French
labor exchanges co-operate quite loyally, it is true, but they
have not sufficient authority to carry out these measures.”
SPEER: I think that I have perhaps not understood correctly. I do not
deny that a large number of the people working for the Organization Todt
in the West had been called up and came to their work because they had
been called up, but we had no means whatsoever of keeping them there by
force. That is what I wanted to say. So if they did not want to work,
they could leave again; and then they either joined the resistance
movement or went into hiding somewhere else.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well. But this calling-up system was a system
of compulsion, was it not?
SPEER: It was the calling-up of French workers for service in the Reich
or in France. But here again I must add something. This report is dated
June 1943. In October 1943 the whole of the Organization Todt was given
the status of a “blocked factory” and thereby received the advantages
which other blocked factories had. I explained that sufficiently
yesterday. Because of this, the Organization Todt had large offers of
workers who went there voluntarily, unless, of course, you see direct
coercion in the pressure put on them through the danger of their
transfer to Germany, and which led them to the Organization Todt or the
blocked factories.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were they kept in labor camps?
SPEER: That is the custom in the case of such building work. The
building sites were far away from any villages, and so workers’ camps
were set up to accommodate the German and foreign workers. But some of
them were also accommodated in villages, as far as it was possible to
accommodate them there. I do not think that on principle they were only
meant to be accommodated in camps, but I cannot tell you that for
certain.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the document been introduced before?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was just going to give it to you. The document
from which I have quoted is United States Exhibit 892.
Now, leaving the question of the personal participation in this...
THE PRESIDENT: Is it new, Mr. Justice Jackson?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, it has been in.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been in before?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am told that I am wrong about that, and that it
is new. 892 is a new number.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Leaving the part of your personal
participation in this program...
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us what the document is and where it comes
from? I see it is EC-60; so it must be captured. But...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is one of the economic documents. It is a very
large document.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us what it is or who signed it? It is a
very long document, apparently, is it?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is a long document, and it is a report of the
Oberfeldkommandant—L-i-l-l-e is the name of the signer.
Now, coming to the question...
THE PRESIDENT: Let me look at the document, will you?
You see, Mr. Justice Jackson, my attention has been drawn to the point
that as far as the record is concerned, we have only this extract which
you read. We have not got the date, and we do not have the signature, if
any, on the document.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was merely refreshing his recollection to get out
the facts, and I was not really offering the document for its own sake.
I will go into more detail about it, if Your Honor wishes. There is a
great deal of irrelevant material in it.
THE PRESIDENT: If you do not want to offer it, then we need not bother
about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: A great part of it is not relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The quotation is adequately verified.
THE PRESIDENT: In that case you may refer to it without the document
being used. Then we need not have the document identified as an exhibit.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Turning to the defendant._] Leaving the question
of your personal participation in these matters and coming to the
questions dealt with in the second part of your examination, I want to
ask you about your testimony concerning the proposal to denounce the
Geneva Convention.
You testified yesterday that it was proposed to withdraw from the Geneva
Convention. Will you tell us who made those proposals?
SPEER: This proposal, as I already testified yesterday, came from Dr.
Goebbels. It was made after the air attack on Dresden, but before this,
from the autumn of 1944 on, Goebbels and Ley had often talked about
intensifying the war effort in every possible way, so that I had the
impression that Goebbels was using the attack on Dresden and the
excitement it created merely as an excuse to renounce the Geneva
Convention.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the proposal made at that time to resort
to poison gas warfare?
SPEER: I was not able to make out from my own direct observations
whether gas warfare was to be started, but I knew from various
associates of Ley’s and Goebbels’ that they were discussing the question
of using our two new combat gases, Tabun and Sarin. They believed that
these gases would be of particular efficacy, and they did in fact
produce the most frightful results. We made these observations as early
as the autumn of 1944, when the situation had become critical and many
people were seriously worried about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about these two gases and
about their production and their effects, their qualities, and the
preparations that were made for gas warfare?
SPEER: I cannot tell you that in detail. I am not enough of an expert.
All I know is that these two gases both had a quite extraordinary
effect, and that there was no respirator, and no protection against them
that we knew of. So the soldiers would have been unable to protect
themselves against this gas in any way. For the manufacture of this gas
we had about three factories, all of which were undamaged and which
until November 1944 were working at full speed. When rumors reached us
that gas might be used, I stopped its production in November 1944. I
stopped it by the following means. I blocked the so-called preliminary
production, that is, the chemical supplies for the making of gas, so
that the gas-production, as the Allied authorities themselves
ascertained, after the end of December or the beginning of January,
actually slowed down and finally came to a standstill. Beginning with a
letter which is still in existence and which I wrote to Hitler in
October 1944, I tried through legal methods to obtain his permission to
have these gas factories stop their production. The reason I gave him
was that on account of air raids the preliminary products, primarily
cyanide, were needed urgently for other purposes. Hitler informed me
that the gas production would have to continue whatever happened, but I
gave instructions for the preliminary products not to be supplied any
more.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you identify others of the group that were
advocating gas warfare?
SPEER: In military circles there was certainly no one in favor of gas
warfare. All sensible Army people turned gas warfare down as being
utterly insane since, in view of your superiority in the air, it would
not be long before it would bring the most terrible catastrophe upon
German cities, which were completely unprotected.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The group that did advocate it, however, consisted
of the political group around Hitler, didn’t it?
SPEER: A certain circle of political people, certainly very limited. It
was mostly Ley, Goebbels and Bormann, always the same three, who by
every possible means wanted to increase the war effort; and a man like
Fegelein certainly belonged to a group like that too. Of Himmler I would
not be too sure, for at that time Himmler was a little out of favor with
Hitler because he allowed himself the luxury of directing an army group
without being qualified.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, one of these gases was the gas which you
proposed to use on those who were proposing to use it on others, and I
suppose your motive was...
SPEER: I must say quite frankly that my reason for these plans was the
fear that under certain circumstances gas might be used, and the
association of ideas in using it myself led me to make the whole plan.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your reasons, I take it, were the same as the
military’s, that is to say, it was certain Germany would get the worst
of it if Germany started that kind of warfare. That is what was worrying
the military, wasn’t it?
SPEER: No, not only that. It was because at that stage of the war it was
perfectly clear that under no circumstances should any international
crimes be committed which could be held against the German people after
they had lost the war. That was what decided the issue.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what about the bombs, after the war was
plainly lost, aimed at England day after day; who favored that?
SPEER: You mean the rockets?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
SPEER: From the point of view of their technical production the rockets
were a very expensive affair for us, and their effect compared to the
cost of their output was negligible. In consequence we had no particular
interest in developing the affair on a bigger scale. The person who kept
urging it was Himmler, in this case. He gave one Obergruppenführer
Kammler the task of firing off these rockets over England. In Army
circles they were of the same opinion as I, namely, that the rockets
were too expensive; and in Air Force circles, the opinion was the same,
since for the equivalent of one rocket one could almost build a fighter.
It is quite clear that it would have been much better for us if we had
not gone in for this nonsense.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to the characteristics of this gas, was
one of the characteristics of this gas an exceedingly high temperature?
When it was exploded it created exceedingly high temperature, so that
there could be no defense against it?
SPEER: No, that is an error. Actually, ordinary gas evaporates at normal
atmospheric temperature. This gas would not evaporate until very high
temperatures were reached and such very high temperatures could only be
produced by an explosion; in other words, when the explosives detonated,
a very high temperature set in, as you know, and then the gas
evaporated. The solid substance turned into gas, but the effects had
nothing to do with the high temperature.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Experiments were carried out with this gas, were
they not, to your knowledge?
SPEER: That I can tell you. Experiments must certainly have been carried
out with it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was in charge of the experimentations with the
gases?
SPEER: As far as I know it was the research and development department
of the OKH in the Army ordnance office. I cannot tell you for certain.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And certain experiments were also conducted and
certain researches conducted in atomic energy, were they not?
SPEER: We had not got as far as that, unfortunately, because the finest
experts we had in atomic research had emigrated to America, and this had
thrown us back a great deal in our research, so that we still needed
another year or two in order to achieve any results in the splitting of
the atom.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The policy of driving people out who didn’t agree
with Germany hadn’t produced very good dividends, had it?
SPEER: Especially in this sphere it was a great disadvantage to us.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I have certain information, which was placed
in my hands, of an experiment which was carried out near Auschwitz and I
would like to ask you if you heard about it or knew about it. The
purpose of the experiment was to find a quick and complete way of
destroying people without the delay and trouble of shooting and gassing
and burning, as it had been carried out, and this is the experiment, as
I am advised. A village, a small village was provisionally erected, with
temporary structures, and in it approximately 20,000 Jews were put. By
means of this newly invented weapon of destruction, these 20,000 people
were eradicated almost instantaneously, and in such a way that there was
no trace left of them; that it developed, the explosive developed,
temperatures of from 400° to 500° centigrade and destroyed them without
leaving any trace at all.
Do you know about that experiment?
SPEER: No, and I consider it utterly improbable. If we had had such a
weapon under preparation, I should have known about it. But we did not
have such a weapon. It is clear that in chemical warfare attempts were
made on both sides to carry out research on all the weapons one could
think of, because one did not know which party would start chemical
warfare first.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The reports, then, of a new and secret weapon were
exaggerated for the purpose of keeping the German people in the war?
SPEER: That was the case mostly during the last phase of the war. From
August, or rather June or July 1944 on I very often went to the front. I
visited about 40 front-line divisions in their sectors and could not
help seeing that the troops, just like the German people, were given
hopes about a new weapon coming, new weapons and wonder-weapons which,
without requiring the use of soldiers, without military forces, would
guarantee victory. In this belief lies the secret why so many people in
Germany offered their lives, although common sense told them that the
war was over. They believed that within the near future this new weapon
would arrive. I wrote to Hitler about it and also tried in different
speeches, even before Goebbels’ propaganda leaders, to work against this
belief. Both Hitler and Goebbels told me, however, that this was no
propaganda of theirs but that it was a belief which had grown up amongst
the people. Only in the dock here in Nuremberg, I was told by Fritzsche
that this propaganda was spread systematically among the people through
some channels or other, and that SS Standartenführer Berg was
responsible for it. Many things have become clear to me since, because
this man Berg, as a representative of the Ministry of Propaganda, had
often taken part in meetings, in big sessions of my Ministry, as he was
writing articles about these sessions. There he heard of our future
plans and then used this knowledge to tell the people about them with
more imagination than truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did it become apparent that the war was lost?
I take it that your attitude was that you felt some responsibility for
getting the German people out of it with as little destruction as
possible. Is that a fair statement of your position?
SPEER: Yes, but I did not only have that feeling with regard to the
German people. I knew quite well that one should equally avoid
destruction taking place in the occupied territories. That was just as
important to me from a realistic point of view, for I said to myself
that after the war the responsibility for all these destructions would
no longer fall on us, but on the next German Government, and the coming
German generations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where you differed with the people who wanted to
continue the war to the bitter end, was that you wanted to see Germany
have a chance to restore her life. Is that not a fact? Whereas Hitler
took the position that if he couldn’t survive, he didn’t care whether
Germany survived or not?
SPEER: That is true, and I would never have had the courage to make this
statement before this Tribunal if I had not been able to prove it with
the help of some documents, because such a statement is so monstrous.
But the letter which I wrote to Hitler on 29 March, in which I confirmed
this, shows that he said so himself.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if I may comment, it was not a new idea to us
that that was his viewpoint. I think it was expressed in most of the
other countries that that was his viewpoint.
Now, were you present with Hitler at the time he received the telegram
from Göring, suggesting that Göring take over power?
SPEER: On 23 April I flew to Berlin in order to take leave of several of
my associates, and—I should like to say this quite frankly—after all
that had happened, also in order to place myself at Hitler’s disposal.
Perhaps this will sound strange here, but the conflicting feelings I had
about the action I wanted to take against him and about the way he had
handled things, still did not give me any clear grounds or any clear
inner conviction as to what my relations should be toward him, so I flew
over to see him. I did not know whether he knew of my plans, and I did
not know whether he would order me to remain in Berlin. Yet I felt that
it was my duty not to run away like a coward, but to stand up to him
again. It was on that day that Göring’s telegram to Hitler arrived. This
telegram was not to Hitler, but from Göring to Ribbentrop; it was
Bormann who submitted it to him.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Submitted it to Hitler?
SPEER: Yes, to Hitler.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did Hitler say on that occasion?
SPEER: Hitler was unusually excited about the contents of the telegram,
and said quite plainly what he thought about Göring. He said that he had
known for some time that Göring had failed, that he was corrupt, and
that he was a drug addict. I was extremely shaken, because I felt that
if the head of the State had known this for such a long time, then it
showed a lack of responsibility on his part to leave such a man in
office, when the lives of countless people depended on him. It was
typical of Hitler’s attitude towards the entire problem, however, that
he followed his statement up by saying: “But let him negotiate the
capitulation all the same.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he say why he was willing to let Göring
negotiate the capitulation?
SPEER: No. He said in an offhand manner: “It doesn’t matter anyway who
does it.” He expressed all his disregard for the German nation in the
way he said this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, his attitude was that there was nothing
left worth saving, so let Göring work it out. Is that a fair statement
of his position?
SPEER: That was my impression, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this policy of driving Germany to destruction
after the war was lost had come to weigh on you to such a point that you
were a party to several plots, were you not, in an attempt to remove the
people who were responsible for the destruction, as you saw it, of your
country?
SPEER: Yes. But I want to add...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There were more plots than you have told us about,
weren’t there?
SPEER: During that time it was extremely easy to start a plot. One could
accost practically any man in the street and tell him what the situation
was, and then he would say: “This is insane”; and if he had any courage
he would place himself at your disposal. Unfortunately, I had no
organization behind me which I could call upon and give orders to, or
designate who should have done this or that. That is why I had to depend
on personal conversations to contact all kinds of people. But I do want
to say that it was not as dangerous as it looks here because actually
the unreasonable people who were still left only amounted perhaps to a
few dozen. The other 80 million were perfectly sensible as soon as they
knew what it was all about.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Perhaps you had a sense of responsibility for
having put the 80 million completely in the hands of the Führer
Principle. Did that occur to you, or does it now, as you look back on
it?
SPEER: May I have the question repeated, because I did not understand
its sense.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have 80 million sane and sensible people facing
destruction; you have a dozen people driving them on to destruction and
they are unable to stop it. And I ask if you have a feeling of
responsibility for having established the Führer Principle, which Göring
has so well described for us, in Germany?
SPEER: I, personally, when I became Minister in February 1942, placed
myself at the disposal of this Führer Principle. But I admit that in my
organization I soon saw that the Führer Principle was full of tremendous
mistakes, and so I tried to weaken its effect. The terrible danger of
the authoritarian system, however, became really clear only at the
moment when we were approaching the end. It was then that one could see
what the principle really meant, namely, that every order should be
carried out without criticism. Everything that has become known during
this Trial in the way of orders carried out without any consideration,
finally proved—for example the carrying-out of the order to destroy the
bridges in our own country—to be a mistake or a consequence of this
authoritarian system. The authoritarian system—or let me put it like
this—upon the collapse of the authoritarian system it became clear what
tremendous dangers there are in a system of that kind, quite apart from
the personality of Hitler. The combination of Hitler and this system,
then, brought about these terrible catastrophes in the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now—Hitler is dead; I assume you accept
that—and we ought to give the devil his due. Isn’t it a fact that in
the circle around Hitler there was almost no one who would stand up and
tell him that the war was lost, except yourself?
SPEER: That is correct to a certain extent. Among the military leaders
there were many who, each in his own sphere, told Hitler quite clearly
what the situation was. Many commanders of army groups, for instance,
made it clear to him how catastrophic developments were, and there were
often fierce arguments during the discussions on the situation. Men like
Guderian and Jodl, for instance, often talked openly about their sectors
in my presence, and Hitler could see quite well what the general
situation was like. But I never observed that those who were actually
responsible in the group around Hitler, ever went to him and said, “The
war is lost.” Nor did I ever see these people who had responsibility
endeavor to unite in undertaking some joint step with Hitler. I did not
attempt it for my part either, except once or twice, because it would
have been useless, since at this stage, Hitler had so intimidated his
closest associates that they no longer had any wills of their own.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let us take the Number 2 man, who has told us
that he was in favor of fighting to the very finish. Were you present at
a conversation between Göring and General Galland, in which Göring, in
substance, forbade Galland to report the disaster that was overtaking
Germany?
SPEER: No; in that form, that is not correct. That was another
conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, tell us what there is about General Galland’s
conversation with Göring, as far as you know it.
SPEER: It was at the Führer’s headquarters in East Prussia in front of
Göring’s train. Galland had reported to Hitler that enemy fighter planes
were already escorting bomber squadrons as far as Liége and that it was
to be expected that in the future the bomber units would travel still
farther from their bases escorted by fighters. After a discussion with
Hitler on the military situation Göring upbraided Galland and told him
with some excitement that this could not possibly be true, that the
fighters could not go as far as Liége. He said that from his experience
as an old fighter pilot he knew this perfectly well. Thereupon Galland
replied that the fighters were being shot down, and were lying on the
ground near Liége. Göring would not believe this was true. Galland was
an outspoken man who told Göring his opinion quite clearly and refused
to allow Göring’s excitement to influence him. Finally Göring, as
Supreme Commander of the Air Force, expressly forbade Galland to make
any further reports on this matter. It was impossible, he said, that
enemy fighters could penetrate so deeply in the direction of Germany,
and so he ordered him to accept that as being true. I continued to
discuss the matter afterward with Galland and Galland was actually later
relieved by Göring of his duties as Commanding General of Fighters. Up
to this time Galland had been in charge of all the fighter units in
Germany. He was the general in charge of all the fighters within the
High Command of the Air Force.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was going to ask.
SPEER: It must have been toward the end of 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, I wanted to ask you
whether it was known in the days when you were struggling for manpower
enough to make armaments for Germany, that Göring was using manpower to
collect art and transport art for his own purposes. Was that known to
you at the time?
SPEER: He did not need many workers for that purpose.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, very few were very valuable, were they not?
SPEER: The art treasures were valuable, not the workers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To him?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON; Well, let me ask you about your efforts in
producing, and see how much difficulty you were having. Krupp’s was a
big factor in the German armament production, was it not?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The biggest single unit, wouldn’t you say?
SPEER: Yes, but not—just to the extent I said yesterday. It produced
few guns and armaments, but it was a big concern, one of the most
respected ones in the armament industry.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you had prevented, as far as possible, the use
of resources and manpower for the production of things that were not
useful for the war, is not that true?
SPEER: That is true.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the things which were being created, being
built in Krupp’s, whether they were guns or other objects, were things
which were essential to carrying on the economy or to conducting the
war? That would be true, would it not?
SPEER: Generally speaking one can say that in the end every article
which in wartime is produced in the home country, whether it is a pair
of shoes for the workers, or clothing, or coal is, of course—is made to
assist in the war effort. That has nothing to do with the old
conception, which has long since died out, and which we find in the
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at the moment I am not concerned with the
question of the application of the Geneva Convention. I want to ask you
some questions about your efforts to produce essential goods, whether
they were armament or not armament, and the conditions that this regime
was imposing upon labor and adding, as I think, to your problem of
production. I think you can give us some information about this. You
were frequently at the Krupp plant, were you not?
SPEER: I was at the Krupp plant five or six times.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had rather close information as to the progress
of production in the Krupp plant, as well as others?
SPEER: Yes, when I went to visit these plants, it was mostly in order to
see how we could do away with the consequences of air attacks. It was
always shortly after air raids, and so I got an idea of the production.
As I worked hard I knew a lot about these problems, right down to the
details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Krupp also had several labor camps, did they not?
SPEER: Of course, Krupp had labor camps.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Krupp was a very large user of both foreign labor
and prisoners of war?
SPEER: I cannot give the percentage, but no doubt Krupp did employ
foreign workers and prisoners of war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I may say to you that we have investigated
the Krupp labor camps, and from Krupp’s own charts it appears that in
1943 they had 39,245 foreign workers and 11,234 prisoners of war, and
that this steadily increased until in September 1944 Krupp had 54,990
foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war.
Now, would that be somewhere near what you would expect from your
knowledge of the industry?
SPEER: I do not know the details. I do not know the figures of how many
workers Krupp employed in all. I am not familiar with them at the
moment. But I believe that the percentage of foreign workers at Krupp
was about the same as in other plants and in other armament concerns.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what would you say that percentage was?
SPEER: That varied a great deal. The old established industries which
had their old regular personnel had a much lower percentage of foreign
workers than the new industries which had just grown up and which had no
old regular personnel. The reason for this was that the young age groups
were drafted into the Armed Forces and therefore the concerns which had
a personnel of older workers still retained a large percentage of the
older workers. Therefore the percentage of foreign workers in Army
armaments, if you take it as a whole and as one of the older industries,
was lower than the percentage of foreign workers in air armaments,
because that was a completely new industry which had no old regular
personnel.
But with the best will in the world I cannot give you the percentage.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the foreign workers who were assigned to
Krupp—let us use Krupp as an example—were housed in labor camps and
under guard, were they not?
SPEER: I do not believe that they were under guard, but I cannot say. I
do not want to dodge giving information here, but I had no time to worry
about such things on my visits. The things I was concerned about when I
went to a factory were in an entirely different sphere. In all my
activities as Armament Minister I never once visited a labor camp, and
cannot, therefore, give any information about them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, I am going to give you some information
about the labor camp at Krupp’s, and then I am going to ask you some
questions about it. And I am not attempting to say that you were
personally responsible for these conditions. I merely give you the
indications as to what the regime was doing and I am going to ask you
certain questions as to the effect of this sort of thing on your work of
production.
Are you familiar with Document D-288, which is United States Exhibit
202, the affidavit of Dr. Jäger, who was later brought here as a
witness?
SPEER: Yes, but I consider that somewhat exaggerated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You don’t accept that?
SPEER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have no personal knowledge of the
conditions. What is the basis of your information that Dr. Jäger’s
statement is exaggerated?
SPEER: If such conditions had existed, I should probably have heard of
them, since when I visited plants the head of the plant naturally came
to me with his biggest troubles. These troubles occurred primarily after
air raids when, for example, both the German workers and foreign workers
had no longer any proper shelter. This state of affairs was then
described to me, so that I know that what is stated in the Jäger
affidavit cannot have been a permanent condition. It can only have been
a condition caused temporarily by air raids, for a week or a fortnight,
and which was improved later on. It is clear that after a severe air
raid on a city all the sanitary installations, the water supply, gas
supply, electricity, and so on, were out of order and severely damaged,
so that temporarily there were very difficult conditions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I remind you that Dr. Jäger’s affidavit relates to
the time of October 1942, and that he was a witness here. And, of
course, you are familiar with his testimony.
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, I call your attention to a new document,
which is D-361, and would become United States Exhibit 893, a document
signed by the office chief of the locomotive construction works,
describing conditions of his labor supply, foreign labor.
And I am not suggesting—I repeat I am not suggesting that this was your
responsibility. I am suggesting it is the responsibility of the regime.
I should like to read this despite its considerable length. This is
dated at the boilermaking shop, 25 February 1942, addressed to Hupe by
way of Winters and Schmidt.
“I received the enclosed letter of the 18th of this month from
the German Labor Front, sent to my private address, inviting me
to the Office of the German Labor Front. I tried to settle the
business, which I did not know about, by telephone. The answer
from the German Labor Front was that the matter was very
important and called for my personal appearance. Thereupon I
asked Herr Jüngerich of the Department for Social Labor Matters
whether I had to go. He answered, ‘You probably do not have to,
but it would be better if you went.’ About 9:50 I went to Room
20 at the place indicated and met Herr Prior.
“The following provided the subject of this conversation, which
Herr Prior carried on in a very excited manner, and which lasted
about half an hour:
“On the 16th, 23 Russian prisoners of war were assigned to
Number 23 Boiler Shop. The people came in the morning without
bread and tools. During both breaks the prisoners of war crept
up to the German workers and begged for bread, pitifully
pointing out their hunger. (For lunch on the first day the
factory was able to distribute among the Russians rations which
remained over from French PW’s.) In order to alleviate these
conditions, I went to the Weidkamp kitchen on the 17th, on
instructions from Herr Theile, and talked to the head of the
kitchen, Fräulein Block, about the provision of the midday meal.
Fräulein Block promised me the food immediately, and also lent
me the 22 sets of eating utensils which I asked for. At the same
time I asked Fräulein Block to give any food left over by the
800 Dutchmen messing there to our Russian PW’s at noon until
further notice. Fräulein Block promised to do this too, and the
following noon she sent down a container of milk soup as an
extra. The following noon the ration was short in quantity.
Since a few Russians had collapsed already, I telephoned
Fräulein Block and asked for an increase in the food, as the
special ration had ceased from the second day onwards. As my
telephone conversation was unsuccessful, I again visited
Fräulein Block personally. Fräulein Block refused in a very
abrupt manner to give any further special ration.
“Now, regarding the discussion in detail, Herr Prior, two other
gentlemen of the DAF and Fräulein Block, head of the Weidkamp
kitchen, were present in the room. Herr Prior commenced and
accused me, gesticulating, and in a very insulting manner, of
having taken the part of the Bolsheviks in a marked way. He
referred to the law paragraphs of the Reich Government which
spoke against it. I was unfortunately not clear about the legal
position, otherwise I would have left the conference room
immediately. I then tried to make it clear to Herr Prior, with
special emphasis, that the Russian PW’s were assigned to us as
workers and not as Bolsheviks; the people were starved and not
in a position to perform the heavy work with us in the boiler
shop which they were supposed to do; sick people are a dead
weight to us and not a help to production. To this remark Herr
Prior stated that if one was no good, then another was; that the
Bolsheviks were a soulless people; and if 100,000 of them died,
another 100,000 would replace them. On my remarking that with
such a coming and going we would not attain our goal, namely the
delivery of locomotives to the Reichsbahn, who were continually
cutting down the time limit, Herr Prior said, ‘Deliveries are
only of secondary importance here.’
“My attempts to get Herr Prior to understand our economic needs
were not successful. In closing, I can only say that as a German
I know our relations to the Russian prisoners of war exactly,
and in this case I acted only on behalf of my superiors and with
the view to the increase in production which is demanded from
us.”
It is signed, “Söhling, Office Chief, Locomotive Construction Works.”
And there is added this letter as a part of the communication, signed by
Theile:
“I have to add the following to the above letter:
“After the Russian PW’s had been assigned to us on the 16th of
this month by labor supply, I got into touch with Dr. Lehmann
immediately about their food. I learned from him that the
prisoners received 300 gr. of bread each between 0400 and 0500
hours. I pointed out that it was impossible to last until 1800
hours on this ration of bread, whereupon Dr. Lehmann said that
the Russians must not be allowed to get used to western European
feeding. I replied that the PW’s could not do the work required
of them in the boiler shop on that food, and that it was not
practical for us to have these people in the works any longer
under such conditions. At the same time I demanded that if the
Russians continued to be employed, they should be given a hot
midday meal, and that if possible the bread ration should be
split so that one-half was distributed early in the morning and
the second half during our breakfast break. My suggestion has
already been carried out by us with the French PW’s and has
proved to be very practicable and good.
“Unfortunately, however, Dr. Lehmann took no notice of my
suggestion, and on this account I naturally had to take matters
into my own hands and therefore told Herr Söhling to get the
feeding of the Russian PW’s organized on exactly the same lines
as for the French PW’s, so that the Russians could as soon as
possible carry out the work they were supposed to do. For the
whole thing concerns an increase in production such as is
demanded from us by the Minister of munitions and armaments and
by the DAF.”
Now, I ask you, in the first place, if the position of the chief of the
locomotive construction works was not entirely a necessary position in
the interests of production?
SPEER: It is clear that a worker who has not enough food cannot achieve
a good work output. I already said yesterday that every head of a plant,
and I too at the top, was naturally interested in having well-fed and
satisfied workers, because badly fed, dissatisfied workers make more
mistakes and produce poor results.
I should like to comment on this document. The document is dated 25
February 1942. At that time there were official instructions that the
Russian workers who came to the Reich should be treated worse than the
western prisoners of war and the western workers. I learned of this
through complaints from the heads of concerns. In my document book,
there is a Führer protocol which dates from the middle of March
1942—that is, 3 or 4 weeks after this document—in which I called
Hitler’s attention to the fact that the feeding both of Russian
prisoners of war and of Russian workers was absolutely insufficient and
that they would have to be given an adequate diet, and that moreover the
Russian workers were being kept behind barbed wire like prisoners of war
and that that would have to be stopped also. The protocol shows that in
both cases I succeeded in getting Hitler to agree that conditions should
be changed and they were changed.
I must say furthermore that it was really to Sauckel’s credit that he
fought against a mountain of stupidity and did everything so that
foreign workers and prisoners of war should be treated better and
receive decent food.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will go on with the conditions later.
Because I am going to ask you, if you are not responsible and Sauckel is
not responsible, who is responsible for these conditions, and you can
keep it in mind that is the question that we are coming up to here.
I will show you a new document, which is a statement, D-398, which would
be Exhibit USA 894-A, taken by the British-American team in the
investigation of this work camp at Krupp’s.
Well, D-321. I can use that just as well. We will use Document D-321,
which becomes 893.
THE PRESIDENT: 894 was the last number you gave us. What number is this
document that you are now offering?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 398 was 894. 321 will be 895.
Now, this relates to the—this is an employee of the Reich Railways.
None of our investigation, I may say, is based upon the statements of
the prisoners themselves.
“I, the undersigned, Adam Schmidt, employed as Betriebswart on
the Essen-West Railway Station and residing ... state
voluntarily and on oath:
“I have been employed by the Reich Railways since 1918 and have
been at Essen-West Station since 1935. In the middle of 1941 the
first workers arrived from Poland, Galicia, and the Polish
Ukraine. They came to Essen in trucks in which potatoes,
building materials and also cattle had been transported, and
were brought to perform work at Krupp’s. The trucks were jammed
full with people. My personal view was that it was inhuman to
transport people in such a manner. The people were packed
closely together and they had no room for free movement. The
Krupp overseers laid special value on the speed with which the
slave workers got in and out of the trucks. It was enraging for
every decent German who had to watch this to see how the people
were beaten and kicked and generally maltreated in a brutal
manner. In the very beginning when the first transport arrived
we could see how inhumanly these people were treated. Every
truck was so overfilled that it was incredible that such a
number of people could be jammed into one. I could see with my
own eyes that sick people who could scarcely walk (they were
mostly people with foot trouble, or with injuries, and people
with internal trouble) were nevertheless taken to work. One
could see that it was sometimes difficult for them to move. The
same can be said of the Eastern Workers and PW’s who came to
Essen in the middle of 1942.”
He then describes their clothing and their food. In the interest of
time, I will not attempt to read the entire thing.
Do you consider that that, too, is an exaggerated statement?
SPEER: When the workers came to Germany from the East, their clothing
was no doubt bad, but I know from Sauckel that while he was in office a
lot was done to get them better clothes, and in Germany many of the
Russian workers were brought to a considerably better condition than
they had previously been in in Russia. The Russian workers were quite
satisfied in Germany. If they arrived here in rags, that does not mean
that that was our fault. We could not use ragged workers with poor shoes
in our industry, so conditions were improved.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, I would like to call your attention to
D-398.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, before you pass from that, what do you say about
the conditions of the transports? The question you were asked was
whether this was an exaggerated account. You have not answered that
except in reference to clothing.
SPEER: Mr. President, I cannot give any information about this transport
matter. I received no reports about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will ask you about Exhibit 398, which
becomes USA-894. I mean Document 398, which becomes Exhibit 894, a
statement by Höfer, living in Essen:
“From April 1943 I worked with Löwenkamp every day in Panzer
Shop 4. Löwenkamp was brutal to the foreigners. He confiscated
food which belonged to the PW’s and took it home. Every day he
maltreated Eastern Workers, Russian PW’s, French, Italian, and
other foreign civilians. He had a steel cabinet built which was
so small that one could hardly stand in it. He locked up
foreigners in the box, women too, for 48 hours at a time without
giving the people food.
“They were not released even to relieve nature. It was forbidden
for other people, too, to give any help to the persons locked
in, or to release them. While clearing a concealed store he
fired on escaping Russian civilians without hitting any of them.
“One day, while distributing food, I saw how he hit a French
civilian in the face with a ladle and made his face bleed.
Further, he delivered Russian girls without bothering about the
children afterwards. There was never any milk for them so the
Russians had to nourish the children with sugar water. When
Löwenkamp was arrested he wrote two letters and sent them to me
through his wife. He tried to make out that he never beat
people.”
There is a good deal more of this, but I will not bother to put it into
the record.
Is it your view that that is exaggerated?
SPEER: I consider this affidavit a lie. I would say that among German
people such things do not exist, and if such individual cases occurred
they were punished. It is not possible to drag the German people in the
dirt in such a way. The heads of concerns were decent people too, and
took an interest in their workers. If the head of the Krupp plant heard
about such things, he certainly took steps immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what about the steel boxes? The steel box
couldn’t have been built? Or don’t you believe the steel-box story?
SPEER: No, I do not believe it; I mean I do not believe it is true.
After the collapse in 1945 a lot of affidavits were certainly drawn up
which do not fully correspond to the truth. That is not your fault. It
is the fault of—after a defeat, it is quite possible that people lend
themselves to things like that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I would like to have you examine Document
258, and I attach importance to this as establishing the SS as being the
guards:
“The camp inmates were mostly Jewish women and girls from
Hungary and Romania. The camp inmates were brought to Essen at
the beginning of 1944 and were put to work at Krupp’s. The
accommodation and feeding of the camp prisoners was beneath all
dignity. At first the prisoners were accommodated in simple
wooden huts. These huts were burned down during an air raid and
from that time on the prisoners had to sleep in a damp cellar.
Their beds were made on the floor and consisted of a
straw-filled sack and two blankets. In most cases it was not
possible for the prisoners to wash themselves daily, as there
was no water. There was no possibility of having a bath. I could
often observe from the Krupp factory, during the lunch break,
how the prisoners boiled their under-clothing in an old bucket
or container over a wood fire, and cleaned themselves. An
air-raid trench served as shelter, while the SS guards went to
the Humboldt shelter, which was bombproof. Reveille was at 5 a.
m. There was no coffee or any food served in the morning. They
marched off to the factory at 5.15 a. m. They marched for
three-quarters of an hour to the factory, poorly clothed and
badly shod, some without shoes, and covered with a blanket, in
rain or snow. Work began at 6 a. m. The lunch break was from 12
to 12:30. Only during the break was it at all possible for the
prisoners to cook something for themselves from potato peelings
and other garbage. The daily working period was one of 10 or 11
hours. Although the prisoners were completely undernourished,
their work was very heavy physically. The prisoners were often
maltreated at their work benches by Nazi overseers and female SS
guards. At 5 or 6 in the afternoon they were marched back to
camp. The accompanying guards consisted of female SS who, in
spite of protests from the civil population, often maltreated
the prisoners on the way back with kicks, blows, and scarcely
repeatable words. It often happened that individual women or
girls had to be carried back to the camp by their comrades owing
to exhaustion. At 6 or 7 p. m. these exhausted people arrived
back in camp. Then the real meal was distributed. This consisted
of cabbage soup. This was followed by the evening meal of water
soup and a piece of bread which was for the following day.
Occasionally the food on Sundays was better. As long as it
existed there was never any inspection of the camp by the firm
of Krupp. On 13 March 1945 the camp prisoners were brought to
Buchenwald Concentration Camp, from there some were sent to
work. The camp commandant was SS Oberscharführer Rick. His
present whereabouts is unknown.”
The rest of it doesn’t matter. In your estimation that, I suppose, is
also an exaggeration?
SPEER: From the document...
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: May I hear the answer. I thought the defendant said
something.
DR. FLÄCHSNER; May I call the attention of the Court to the document
itself, of which I have only a copy? It is headed “Sworn on oath before
a military court,” and there is an ordinary signature under it. It does
not say that it is an affidavit or a statement in lieu of oath, or any
other such thing, it says only, “Further inquiries must be made,” and it
is signed by Hubert Karden. That is apparently the name of the man who
was making the statement. Then there is another signature,
“Kriminalassistent Z. Pr.” That is a police official who is on probation
and who may later have the chance of becoming a candidate in the
criminal service. He has signed it. Then there is another signature, “C.
E. Long, Major, President.” There is not a word in this document to the
effect that any of these three people want to vouch for the contents of
this as an affidavit. I do not believe this document can be used as an
affidavit in that sense.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Justice Jackson? Do you wish to say anything?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I—the document shows for itself. I am not—as I
have pointed out to this witness, I am giving him the result of an
investigation. I am not prosecuting him with personal responsibility for
these conditions. I intend to ask him some questions about
responsibility for conditions in the camp.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is a statement at the top of the copy that I
have got, “Sworn on oath before a military court.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, they were taken in Essen, in this
investigation. And of course, if I were charging this particular
defendant with the responsibility there might be some argument about it.
They come under the head—they clearly come under the head of the
Charter, which authorizes the receipt here of proceedings of other
courts.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original document here?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
[_A document was submitted to the Tribunal._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal sees no objection to the document being used
in cross-examination.
Did you give it an exhibit number?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should have; it is USA-896.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Turning to the defendant._] I now want to call
your attention to Exhibit Number 382.
SPEER: I wanted to comment on the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there are some photographs which
have been put before us. Are they identified and do they form part of an
exhibit?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They form part of the exhibit which I am now
offering.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the witness desires to comment on the last
document, and I will listen to that before we go ahead.
Yes?
SPEER: First I should like to say, as you have so often mentioned my
nonresponsibility, that if in general these conditions had been true, on
the basis of my statement yesterday I should consider myself
responsible. I refuse to evade responsibility. But the conditions were
not what they are said to have been here. There are only individual
cases which are quoted.
As for this document I should only like to say from what I have seen of
it that this seems to concern a concentration camp, one of the small
concentration camps near the factories. The factories could not inspect
these camps. That is why the sentence is quite true where it says that
no factory representative ever saw the camp. The fact that there were SS
guards also shows that it was a concentration camp.
If the question which you asked me before, as to whether the labor camps
were guarded—those for foreign workers—if that refers to this
document, then your conclusion was wrong. For as far as I know, the
other labor camps were not guarded by SS or by any other organizations.
My position is such that I feel it is my duty to protect the heads of
plants from any injustice which might be done them. The head of a plant
could not bother about the conditions in such a camp. I cannot say
whether conditions were as described in this camp. We have seen so much
material on conditions in concentration camps during the Trial.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I will ask to have you shown Exhibit Number
D-382—I should say Document D-382—which would be United States Exhibit
897. Now that is the statement of several persons as to one of those
steel boxes which stood in the foreign workers’ camp in the grounds of
Number 4 Armor Shop, and of those in the Russian camp. I do not know
that it is necessary to read the complete descriptions.
Is that merely an individual instance, or what is your view of that
circumstance?
SPEER: What is pictured here is quite a normal locker as was used in
every factory. These photographs have absolutely no value as evidence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well. I will ask to have you shown Exhibit
D-230. Together with D-230 is an interoffice record of the steel
switches, and the steel switches which have been found in the camp will
be shown to you. Eighty were distributed, according to the reports.
SPEER: Shall I comment on this?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you wish.
SPEER: Yes. Those are nothing but replacements for rubber truncheons. We
had no rubber; and for that reason, the guards probably had something
like this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the same inference that I drew from the
document.
SPEER: Yes, but the guards did not immediately use these steel switches
any more than your police use their rubber truncheons. But they had to
have something in their hands. It is the same thing all over the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we won’t argue that point.
SPEER: I am not an expert. I only assume that that is the case. I cannot
testify on oath that that was the case. That was only an argument.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give a number to that?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 898, Your Honor.
Now, 899 would be our Document D-283, which is a 1943 report from the
Krupp hospitals taken from the files of Krupp’s.
“The subject:
“Cases of Deaths of Eastern Workers.
“Fifty-four Eastern Workers have died in the hospital in
Lazarettstrasse, 4 of them as a result of external causes and 50
as a result of illness.
“The causes of death in the case of these 50 Eastern Workers who
died of illnesses were the following: Tuberculosis, 36
(including 2 women); malnutrition, 2; internal hemorrhage, 1;
disease of the bowels, 2; typhoid fever, 1 (female); pneumonia,
3; appendicitis, 1 (female); liver trouble, 1; abscess of the
brain, 1. This list therefore shows that four-fifths died of
tuberculosis and malnutrition.”
Now, did you have any reports from time to time as to the health
conditions of the labor which was engaged in your production program?
SPEER: First I should like to comment on the document. The document does
not show the total number of the workers to which the number of deaths
refers, so that one cannot say whether that is an unnaturally high
proportion of illness. At a session of the Central Planning Board which
I read here again, I observed it was said that among the Russian workers
there was a high rate of tuberculosis. I do not know whether you mean
that. That was a remark which Weiger made to me. But presumably through
the health offices we tried to alleviate these conditions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was an abnormally high rate of deaths from
tuberculosis; there is no doubt about that, is there?
SPEER: I do not know whether that was an abnormal death rate. But there
was an abnormally high rate of tuberculosis at times.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the exhibit does not show whether the death
rate itself was abnormally high, but it shows an abnormal proportion of
deaths from tuberculosis among the total deaths, does it not? Eighty
percent deaths from tuberculosis is a very high incidence of
tuberculosis, is it not?
SPEER: That may be. I cannot say from my own knowledge.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I would like to have you shown...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give that a number? That would be 899, would it
not?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: 899, Your Honor.
Now, let me ask you to be shown Document D-335. This is a report from
the files of Krupp, dated at Essen on 12 June 1944, directed to the “Gau
Camp Physician, Herr Dr. Jäger,” and signed by Stinnesbeck:
“In the middle of May I took over the medical supervision of the
PW Camp 1420 in the Nörggerathstrasse. The camp contains 644
French PW’s.
“During the air raid on 27 April of this year the camp was
largely destroyed and at the moment conditions are intolerable.
“315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these
are no longer in huts, but in the tunnel in Grunerstrasse on the
Essen-Mülheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is not
suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The rest
of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories in
Krupp’s works.
“Medical attention is given by a French military doctor who
takes great pains with his fellow countrymen. Sick people from
Krupp’s factories must be brought to the sick parade too. This
parade is held in the lavatory of a burned-out public house
outside the camp. The sleeping accommodations of the four French
medical orderlies is in what was the urinal room. There is a
double tier wooden bed available for sick bay patients. In
general, treatment takes place in the open. In rainy weather it
has to be held in this small room. These are insufferable
conditions! There are no chairs, tables, cupboards, or water.
The keeping of a register of sick is impossible.
“Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce, although people
badly hurt in the works are often brought here for first aid and
have to be bandaged before being taken to the hospital. There
are many strong complaints about food, too, which the guard
personnel confirm as being justified.
“Illness and less manpower must be reckoned with under these
circumstances.
“The construction of huts for the accommodation of the prisoners
and the building of sick quarters for the proper treatment of
the sick persons is urgently necessary.
“Please take the necessary steps.
“(Signed) Stinnesbeck.”
SPEER: That is a document which shows what conditions can be after
severe air raids. The conditions were the same in these cases for
Germans and foreign workers. There were no beds, no cupboards, and so
forth. That was because the camp in which these things had been provided
had been burned down. That the food supply was often inadequate in the
Ruhr district during this period was due to the fact that attacks from
the air were centered on communication lines, so that food transports
could not be brought into the Ruhr to the necessary extent. These were
temporary conditions which we were able to improve when the air raids
ceased for a time. When conditions became even worse after September or
October of 1944, or rather after November of 1944, we made every effort
to give food supplies the priority for the first time over armament
needs, so that in view of these difficulties the workers would be fed
first of all, while armaments had to stand back somewhat.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then you did make it your business to get
food and to see to the conditions of these workers? Do I understand that
you did it, that you took steps?
SPEER: It is true that I did so, and I am glad that I did, even if I am
to be reproached for it. For it is a universal human obligation when one
hears of such conditions to try to alleviate them, even if it is
somebody else’s responsibility. But the witness Riecke testified here
that the whole of the food question was under the direction of the Food
Ministry.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was an essential part of production, was it
not, to keep workers in proper condition to produce? That is elementary,
is it not?
SPEER: No. That is wrongly formulated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you formulate it for me as to what the
relation is between the nourishment of workers and the amount of
production produced.
SPEER: I said yesterday that the responsibility for labor conditions was
divided up between the Food Ministry, the Health Office in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, the Labor Trustee in the office of the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, and so on. There
was no comprehensive authority in my hands. In the Reich, because of the
way in which our state machine was built up, we lacked a comprehensive
agency in the form of a Reich Chancellor, who would have gathered all
these departments together and held joint discussions. But I, as the man
responsible for production, had no responsibility in these matters.
However, when I heard complaints from factory heads or from my deputies,
I did everything to remove the cause of the complaints.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Krupp works...
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any time you say, Sir.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish to hear from, defendants’ counsel what
arrangements they have found it possible to make with reference to the
apportionment of time for their speeches.
DR. NELTE: I should like first of all to point out that the defendants’
counsel, with whom the Tribunal discussed the question of final defense
speeches during an earlier closed session, did not inform the other
defendants’ counsel, since they were under the impression that the
Tribunal would not impose any restrictions on the Defense in this
respect. I personally, when I raised my objections, had no knowledge of
this discussion, as my colleagues who conferred with you earlier have
authorized me to explain.
On the suggestion of the Tribunal, counsel for the individual defendants
have discussed the decision announced in the session of 13 June 1946,
and I am now submitting to the Tribunal the outcome of the discussion;
in doing so, however, I shall have to make certain qualifications, since
some of my colleagues are either not present or differ in their opinion
on the apportionment of time.
The defendants’ counsel are of the opinion that only the conscientious
judgment of each counsel can determine the form and length of the final
defense pleas in this unusual Trial, notwithstanding the generally
recognized right of the Tribunal, as part of its responsibility for
guiding the proceedings, to prevent a possible misuse of the freedom of
speech. They also believe that, in view of this fundamental
consideration and in view of the usual practice of international courts,
the Tribunal will understand and approve that the defendants’ counsel
voice their objection to a preventive restriction of the freedom of
speech, for a misuse on their part must not simply be taken as a
foregone conclusion. This fundamental attitude is, of course, in accord
with the readiness of the Defense to comply with the directives and the
wishes of the Tribunal as far as is reconcilable with a proper
conception of the defense in each case. Under this aspect the individual
defendants’ counsel have been asked to make their own estimates of the
probable duration of their final pleas. The result of these estimates
shows that, despite the limitations counsel have imposed upon
themselves, and with due respect to the wishes of the High Tribunal, a
total duration of approximately 20 full days in court is required by the
Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal asked Defense Counsel for an
apportionment of the 14 days between them.
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, my statement makes clear that it
appears impossible to accept that principle. If the Tribunal consider
these 14 full days as indisputable, then the entire Defense will submit
to that decision. But so far as I know, it will be quite impossible,
under such circumstances, to obtain agreement among Defense Counsel, and
considerable danger therefore exists that counsel who make their pleas
later will be under pressure of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think the Tribunal probably fully understands that
you think 14 days—you and your brethren consider that 14 days is too
short—but, as I say, what the Tribunal asked for was an apportionment
of the time, and there is nothing in what you have said to indicate that
you have made any apportionment at all, either of the 14 days or of the
20 days which you propose.
DR. NELTE: The period of 20 days was arrived at when each defendant’s
counsel had stated the presumed duration of his speech. It would,
therefore, be perfectly possible to say that if the Tribunal would
approve the duration of 20 days, then we could state our solution for
the length of the individual speeches. But it is impossible, in
practice, to apportion the time, if the total number of days is only 14.
You can rest assured, Mr. President, that we have all gone into the
question conscientiously and that we have also reflected on the manner
in which individual subjects can be divided among individual defendants’
counsel; but the total number of about 20 days appears to us, without
wanting to quote a maximum or minimum figure, to be absolutely essential
for an apportionment. It is perfectly possible, Mr. President, that in
the course of the speeches...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, as I have indicated to you, what the Tribunal
wanted to know was the apportionment, and presumably you have some
apportionment which adds up to the 20 days which you say is required;
and the Tribunal would like, if you have such an apportionment, that you
should let them see the apportionment, or if you have no such
apportionment, then they would wish to hear from each individual counsel
how long he thinks he is going to take. If you have got a list, it seems
to the Tribunal that you could hand it in.
DR. NELTE: The figures are available and they will be handed to the
Tribunal, but some of my colleagues have said that their estimates are
only valid on the assumption that no more than a specific number of days
was to be granted. That is the point of view of which I said earlier
that it differed in some respect. But we all thought that the decision
of the Tribunal was only a suggestion, and not a maximum to be
apportioned. I hope, Mr. President, that your words now are also to be
understood in that way, and that the Tribunal will still consider
whether the proposed period of 14 days could not be extended to
correspond with the time which we consider necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: What the Tribunal wants is an apportionment of the time
as between the various counsel. That is what they asked for and that is
what they want; and either we would ask you to give it to us in writing
now, or we would ask you, each one of you, to state how long you
anticipate you will take in your speech.
DR. NELTE: I think that I may speak on behalf of my colleagues and say
that we shall submit our estimates to the Tribunal in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that it would like to have
the apportionment now. It gave notice before, yesterday I think it was,
that they were wishing to hear defendants’ counsel upon the question of
the apportionment this afternoon at 2 o’clock; and they would,
therefore, like to have that apportionment now.
DR. NELTE: In that case, I can only ask that the Tribunal hear each
individual counsel, since naturally I cannot say from memory how each
made his estimate.
THE PRESIDENT: You could have had it written down; but if you have not
got it written down, no doubt you cannot remember. But perhaps you had
better give us what you would take.
DR. NELTE: I estimated 7 hours. My colleague Horn, for Ribbentrop, just
tells me he requires 6 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take each counsel in turn, if you please.
Yes, Dr. Stahmer?
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Seven hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): May I, on behalf
of Dr. Siemers and Dr. Kranzbühler, ask to allot each of them 8 hours?
DR. SAUTER: For the case of Funk, 6 hours, and for the case of Von
Schirach, 6 hours.
DR. SERVATIUS: For Sauckel, 5 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I cannot write as quickly as all this. Who
was it that Dr. Horn wished to represent? Siemers and who else? And how
many hours was it?
DR. HORN: Dr. Siemers and Dr. Kranzbühler, 8 hours each.
DR. SERVATIUS: For Sauckel, 5 hours.
DR. KAUFFMANN: For Kaltenbrunner, approximately 4 to 5 hours.
DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): For Streicher, 4
hours.
DR. SEIDL: For Hess and Frank, 11 hours together.
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): For Frick, 5 hours.
I remember from the list that Dr. Bergold wants 3 hours for Bormann. Dr.
Bergold is not present, but I remember that the list said 3 hours.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): For Schacht, 5 hours.
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): For Jodl, 5
hours.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For Papen, approximately 5 hours.
DR. STEINBAUER: For Dr. Seyss-Inquart, 5 hours.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: For Speer, 4 hours.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For myself, Mr. President, 8 hours. For Professor
Jahrreiss, who before the final pleas will deal with a technical
subject, 4 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: What will Professor Jahrreiss speak about?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: About a subject approved by the Tribunal, namely
the general question of international law.
DR. SEIDL: The defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg said that he
would require 8 hours.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I would ask the Tribunal to take into
consideration that the case of Fritzsche has not yet been presented and
that therefore I cannot give exact information; but I estimate
approximately 4 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal would like to know first of
all whether counsel propose to write down and then read their speeches.
DR. NELTE: As far as I have been informed, all defense counsel will
write down their speeches before delivery. Whether they will actually
read every word of the text, or whether they will read parts of it and
submit other parts, is not yet certain.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they considered whether they will submit them for
translation, because, as the Tribunal has already pointed out, it would
be much more convenient for the members of the Tribunal who do not read
German to have a translation before them. It would not only greatly
assist the Tribunal, but the defendants themselves if they do that.
DR. NELTE: This question has not yet been settled. We discussed it, but
have so far not come to a final conclusion. We think that the short time
now available may perhaps make it impossible to translate the
manuscripts into all four languages.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendants’ counsel, of course, understand that the
speeches, if they are submitted for translation, will not be
communicated to anybody until the speech is actually made. So they will
not be given beforehand either to the Tribunal or the Prosecution or
anything of that sort, so that the speech will remain entirely private
until it is made. And the second thing is that, of course, a great
number of the speeches will be delayed by the counsel who precede them
and, therefore, there will be very considerable time during either the
14 days or some longer period, if such a longer period is given, which
will enable the speeches to be translated, and Defense Counsel will
appreciate that if their speeches are written down they can tell exactly
how long they will take to deliver, or almost exactly.
And there is one other thing I want to bring to their attention. There
are 20 or 21 defendants, and naturally, there are a variety of subjects
which are common to them all; and there ought to be, therefore, an
opportunity, as it appears to the Tribunal, for counsel to divide up the
subjects to some extent between them and not each one to deal with
subjects which have been dealt with already, any more than they ought to
have been dealt with in evidence over and over again; and I do not know
whether Counsel for Defense have fully considered that in making this
estimate of the time they laid before us.
Anyway, the Tribunal hopes that they will address their minds to these
three matters: First of all, as to whether they can submit their
speeches for translation in order to help the Tribunal; secondly,
whether they will be able, when they have got their speeches written
down, to assess the time accurately; and thirdly, whether they cannot
apportion the subjects to some extent among them so that we shall not
have to listen to the same subjects over and over again.
I do not know whether the Prosecution would wish to say anything. The
Tribunal has said, I think, in the order which we made with reference to
this question of limitation of time, that they anticipated, that the
Prosecution would take only 3 days. Perhaps it would be convenient to
hear from the Prosecution whether that is an accurate estimate.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, the Prosecution do not ask for any
more than the 3 days. It might conceivably be a little less, but we do
not ask for any more than the 3 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, Your Honor, to call your attention
to this. I hope it is not expected that we will mimeograph and run off
on our mimeograph machines, 20 days of speeches or anything of that
sort. We simply cannot be put under that kind of a burden. I think it
is—a citizen of the United States is expected to argue his case in the
highest court of the land in one hour, and counsel’s own clients here
have openly scoffed at the amount of time that has been asked. This is
not a sensible amount of time to give to this case, and I must protest
against being expected to mimeograph 20 days of speeches. It really is
not possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know whether the Prosecution
intend to let them have copies of their speeches at the time that they
are delivered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As far as the closing speech of the Attorney
General is concerned, we certainly did expect and hope to give the
Tribunal copies of the speech.
THE PRESIDENT: And translations?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that will be done. My Lord, I just
wondered, out of optimism—it was Dr. Nelte who said that it would take
a long time to translate. I know, as far as translating into English is
concerned, we had the problem of a 76-page speech the other day, and
that was done by our own translators in one day. So I hope that perhaps
Dr. Nelte has been a little pessimistic about that side of the problem.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.
Now, the Tribunal will go on with the cross-examination.
[_The Defendant Speer resumed the stand._]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think perhaps, Your Honor, the photographs in
evidence are left a little unintelligible, if the record does not show
the description of them. I shall read it briefly.
“Torture cabinets which were used in the foreign workers’ camp
in the grounds of Number 4 Armor Shop and those in the dirty
neglected Russian Camp were shown to us, and we depose the
following on oath:
“Photograph ‘A’ shows an iron cupboard which was specially
manufactured by the firm of Krupp to torture Russian civilian
workers to an extent that cannot possibly be described by words.
Men and women were often locked into a compartment of the
cupboard, in which hardly any man could stand up for long
periods. The measurements of this compartment are: Height 1.52
meters; breadth and depth 40 to 50 centimeters each. Frequently
even two people were kicked and pressed into one compartment.
The Russian....”
I will not read the rest of that.
“Photograph ‘B’ shows the same cupboard as it looks when it is
locked.
“Photograph ‘C’ shows the cupboard open.
“In Photograph ‘D’ we see the camp that was selected by the
Krupp Directorate to serve as living quarters for the Russian
civilian workers. The individual rooms were 2 to 2½ meters wide,
5 meters long, and 2 meters high. In each room up to 16 persons
were accommodated in double tier beds.” (Document USA-897)
I think that covers it.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, one moment. I think you ought to
read the last three lines of the second paragraph, beginning, “At the
top of the cupboard....”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh yes, I am sorry.
“At the top of the cupboard there are a few sievelike air holes
through which cold water was poured on the unfortunate victims
during the ice-cold winter.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the last three lines of the
penultimate paragraph in view of what the defendant said about the
evidence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are enclosing two letters which Camp
Commandant Löwenkamp had smuggled out of prison in order to
induce the undersigned Höfer to give evidence favorable to him.”
And perhaps I should read the last:
“The undersigned, Dahm,”—one of the signers—“personally saw
how three Russian civilian workers were locked into the
cupboard, two in one compartment, after they had first been
beaten on New Year’s Eve 1945. Two of the Russians had to stay
the whole of New Year’s Eve locked in the cupboard, and cold
water was poured on them as well.”
I may say to the Tribunal that we have upwards of a hundred different
statements and depositions relating to the investigation of this camp. I
am not suggesting offering them, because I think they would be
cumulative, and I shall be satisfied with one more, D-313, which would
become Exhibit USA-901, which is a statement by a doctor.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, was this camp that you are referring
to a concentration camp?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was, as I understand it, a prisoner-of-war
camp and a labor camp. There were labor camps and prisoner-of-war camps
at Essen. I had not understood that it was a concentration camp, but I
admit the distinction is a little thin at times.
This document reads:
“I, the undersigned, Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, a physician in the
Polish Army, was taken prisoner by the Germans on 3 January 1941
and remained as such until the entry of the Americans. I gave
medical attention to the Russian, Polish, and French prisoners
of war who were forced to work in various places of Krupp’s
factories. I personally visited the Russian PW camp in the
Raumastrasse in Essen, which contained about 1,800 men. There
was a big hall in the camp which could house about 200 men
comfortably, in which 300 to 400 men were thrown together in
such a catastrophic manner that no medical treatment was
possible. The floor was cement and the mattresses on which the
people slept Were full of lice and bugs. Even on cold days the
room was never heated and it seemed to me, as a doctor, unworthy
of human beings that people should find themselves in such a
position. It was impossible to keep the place clean because of
the overcrowding of these men who had hardly room to move about
normally. Every day at least 10 people were brought to me whose
bodies were covered with bruises on account of the continual
beatings with rubber tubes, steel switches, or sticks. The
people were often writhing with agony and it was impossible for
me to give them even a little medical aid. In spite of the fact
that I protested, made complaints and petitions, it was
impossible for me to protect the people or see that they got a
day off from work. It was difficult for me to watch how such
suffering people could be dragged to do heavy work. I visited
personally, with danger to myself, gentlemen of the Krupp
administration, as well as gentlemen from the Krupp Directorate,
to try to get help. It was strictly forbidden, as the camp was
under the direction of the SS and Gestapo; and according to
well-known directives I had to keep silent, otherwise I might
have been sent to a concentration camp. I have brought my own
bread innumerable times to the camp in order to give it to the
prisoners, as far as it was possible, although bread was scarce
enough for me. From the beginning in 1941 conditions did not get
better, but worse. The food consisted of a watery soup which was
dirty and sandy, and often the prisoners of war had to eat
cabbage which was bad and stank. I could notice people daily
who, on account of hunger or ill-treatment, were slowly dying.
Dead people often lay for 2 or 3 days on the beds until their
bodies stank so badly that fellow prisoners took them outside
and buried them somewhere. The dishes out of which they ate were
also used as toilets because they were too tired or too weak
from hunger to get up and go outside. At 3 o’clock they were
wakened. The same dishes were then used to wash in and later for
eating out of. This matter was generally known. In spite of this
it was impossible for me to get even elementary help or
facilities in order to get rid of these epidemics, illnesses, or
cases of starvation. There can be no mention of medical aid for
the prisoners. I never received any medical supplies myself. In
1941 I alone had to look after these people from a medical point
of view; but it is quite understandable that it was impossible
for me as the only one to look after all of these people, and
apart from that, I had scarcely any medical supplies. I could
not think what to do with a number of 1,800 people who came to
me daily crying and complaining. I myself often collapsed daily,
and in spite of this I had to take everything upon myself and
watch how people perished and died. A report was never made as
to how the prisoners of war died.
“I have seen with my own eyes the prisoners coming back from
Krupp’s and how they collapsed on the march and had to be
wheeled back on barrows or carried by their comrades. It was in
such a manner that the people came back to the camp. The work
which they had to perform was very heavy and dangerous and many
cases happened where people had cut their fingers, hands or
legs. These accidents were very serious and the people came to
me and asked me for medical help. But it was not even possible
for me to keep them from work for a day or two, although I had
been to the Krupp Directorate and asked for permission to do so.
At the end of 1941, two people died daily, and in 1942 the
deaths increased to three and four per day.
“I was under Dr. May and I was often successful in getting him
to come to the camp to see the terrible conditions and listen to
the complaints, but it was not possible for him to get medical
aid from the Medical Department of the Armed Forces or Krupp’s,
or to get better conditions, treatment, or food. I was a witness
during a conversation with some Russian women who told me
personally that they were employed in Krupp’s factory and that
they were beaten daily in the most bestial manner. The food
consisted of watery soup which was dirty and inedible and its
terrible smell could be perceived from a distance. The clothing
was ragged and torn and on their feet they had rags and wooden
shoes. Their treatment, as far as I could make out, was the same
as that of the prisoners of war. Beating was the order of the
day. The conditions lasted for years, from the very beginning
until the day the American troops entered. The people lived in
great anxiety and it was dangerous for them to describe to
anyone anywhere the conditions which reigned in their camps. The
directions were such that they could have been murdered by any
one of the guards, the SS, or Gestapo if they noticed it. It was
possible for me as a doctor to talk to these people; they
trusted me and knew that I was a Pole and would never betray
them to anyone.
“Signed: Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now you have explained that some of these
conditions were due, in your judgment, to the fact that bombing took
place and the billets of the prisoners and workers were destroyed.
SPEER: That is true, but I should like to point out that the conditions
described in this affidavit cannot be considered as general; apart from
that, I do not believe that this description is correct, but I cannot
speak about these things since you will not expect me to be intimately
acquainted with what happened in the camps of the firm of Krupp.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in the first place, was it considered proper
by you to billet forced workers and prisoners of war so close to
military targets as these prisoners were?
SPEER: I would rather not tell you here things which every German has at
heart. No military targets were attacked, and the camps, therefore,
could not be near military targets.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You would not consider the Krupp plants proper
targets?
SPEER: The camps were not in the Krupp works, they were near the city of
Essen. On principle, we did not construct camps near the works which we
expected would be bombed; and we did not want the camps to be destroyed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you notice that one of the photographs in
evidence shows the camp directly against the works?
SPEER: May I see it again, please?
[_A photograph was shown to the defendant._]
Some large factory is recognizable in the background of this photograph,
but that does not affect my statement that in almost all cases we
constructed the camps outside the cities. I do not know why this
particular instance is different, and I cannot even say whether this is
a camp or just a hut for changing clothes, or anything which had to be
near the camp. I still believe that these cabinets were cabinets for
clothes, and this is one of the many huts which were necessary so that
the workers could change clothes before and after their work. Any expert
in Germany can tell you that these are wardrobes and not some special
cabinets, because they are mass-produced articles; this is also
confirmed by the fact that there are air vents at the top, for every
wardrobe has these ventilation holes at the top and bottom.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As production Minister, you were vitally interested
in reducing the sickness rate among workers, were you not?
SPEER: I was interested in a high output of work, that is obvious; and
in addition, in special cases...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, special cases—part of production is in all
cases, is it not, dependent upon the sickness rate of your labor force,
and is it not a fact—as a man engaged in production you will know
this—that the two greatest difficulties in manpower and production are
sickness and rapid turnover, and that those factors reduce production?
SPEER: These two factors were disturbing for us, but not as extensively
as your words might suggest. Cases of sickness made up a very small
percentage which in my opinion was normal. However, propaganda pamphlets
dropped from aircraft were telling the workers to feign illness, and
detailed instructions were given to them on how to do it. And to prevent
that, the authorities concerned introduced certain measures, which I
considered proper.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were those measures?
SPEER: I cannot tell you in detail, because I myself did not institute
these penalties, nor did I have the power to do so; but as far as I
know, they were ordered by the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor in collaboration with the Police or State
authorities; but the jurisdiction in this connection was with the
authorities responsible for legal action.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, if you did not know what they were, how can
you tell us that you approved of them? We always get to this blank wall
that nobody knew what was being done. You knew that they were at least
penalties of great severity, did you not?
SPEER: When I say that I approved I am only expressing my wish not to
dodge my responsibility in this respect. But you must understand that a
minister of production, particularly in view of the air attacks, had a
tremendous task before him and that I could only take care of matters
outside my own field if some particularly important factor forced me to
do so. Otherwise, I was glad if I could finish my own work and, after
all, my task was by no means a small one.
I think that if during the German air attacks on England you had asked
the British Minister of Production whether he shared the worries of the
Minister of Labor and whether he was dealing with them, then he would
with justification have told you that he had something else to do at
that time, that he had to keep up his production and that he expected
the Minister of Labor to manage affairs in his sector; and no one would
have raised a direct accusation against the British Minister of
Production on that account.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, production was your enterprise, and do you
mean to tell me that you did not have any records or reports on the
condition of the manpower which was engaged in production, which would
tell you if there was anything wrong in the sick rate or anything wrong
in the general conditions of the labor?
SPEER: What I knew is contained in the reports of the Central Planning
Board; there you will get a picture of what I was told. Although there
were many other meetings I cannot tell you in detail what I knew,
because these were things outside my sphere of activity. Naturally, it
is a matter of course that anyone closely concerned with the affairs of
State will also hear of matters not immediately connected with his own
sphere, and of unsatisfactory conditions existing in other sectors; but
one is not obliged to deal with these conditions and later on one will
not remember them in detail. You cannot expect that of me. But if you
have any particular passage, I shall be glad to give you information on
it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right; assume that these conditions had been
called to your attention and that they existed. With whom would you have
taken it up to have them corrected? What officer of the Government?
SPEER: Normally, a minister would send a document to the Government
authorities responsible for such conditions. I must claim for myself
that when I heard of such deficiencies I tried to remedy them by
establishing direct contact with the authority responsible, in some
cases the German Labor Front, where I had a liaison officer, or in other
cases my letter was transmitted to Sauckel through my office of manpower
deployment. My practice in this respect was that if I did not receive a
return report I considered the matter settled; for I could not then
again pursue those things and make further inquiries whether they had
been dealt with or not.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: With Krupp’s, then, you would not have taken it up?
You think they had no responsibility for these conditions?
SPEER: During visits to Krupp’s discussions certainly took place on the
conditions which generally existed for workers after air attacks; this
was a source of great worry for us, particularly with regard to Krupp. I
knew this well, but the reports from Krupp were not different from—I
cannot remember ever being told that foreign workers or prisoners of war
were in a particularly bad position. Temporarily they all lived under
very primitive conditions; German workers lived in cellars during those
days, and six or eight people were often quartered in a small basement
room.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your statement some time ago that you had a certain
responsibility as a Minister of the Government for the conditions—I
should like to have you explain what responsibility you referred to when
you say you assume a responsibility as a member of the Government.
SPEER: Do you mean the declaration I made yesterday that I...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your common responsibility, what do you mean by
your common responsibility along with others?
SPEER: Oh, yes. In my opinion, a state functionary has two types of
responsibility. One is the responsibility for his own sector and for
that, of course, he is fully responsible. But above that I think that in
decisive matters there is, and must be, among the leaders a common
responsibility, for who is to bear responsibility for developments, if
not the close associates of the head of State?
This common responsibility, however, can only be applied to fundamental
matters, it cannot be applied to details connected with other ministries
or other responsible departments, for otherwise the entire discipline in
the life of the State would be quite confused, and no one would ever
know who is individually responsible in a particular sphere. This
individual responsibility in one’s own sphere must, at all events, be
kept clear and distinct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, your point is, I take it, that you as a
member of the Government and a leader in this period of time acknowledge
a responsibility for its large policies, but not for all the details
that occurred in their execution. Is that a fair statement of your
position?
SPEER: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that concludes the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): Defendant Speer, when you told your biography to the Tribunal
and answered the questions of Justice Jackson, I think you omitted some
substantial matters. I would like to ask you a few questions.
SPEER: I left out such points as I did not wish to contest, since they
are, at any rate, contained here in the documents; I would have a
tremendous task if I were to go into all these points in detail.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I would like to recall these points, and I
would like to ask you to answer them briefly.
Did I understand you correctly that, in addition to your ministerial
position, you were also the personal architect of Hitler after the death
of Professor Todt? Did you hold this position?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Were you Inspector General of Roads?
SPEER: Only after Dr. Todt’s death.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, of course. Were you Inspector General of
Waterpower and Power Plants?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Plenipotentiary for Building in the Central
Administration of the Four Year Plan?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Director of the Organization Todt?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You were associated with the Technological
Office of the National Socialist Party? You were the leader of the Union
of National Socialist Technicians?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And in addition to these posts, did you have
any other leading positions?
SPEER: Oh, I had 10 or 12 positions. I cannot give you a list of them
all now.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Were you not one of the leaders of the Reich
Chamber of Culture?
SPEER: No, no, that is not correct. I cannot tell you for certain, but I
think I was a senator there or something like that.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Were you a member of the presidency of the
academy of culture? Were you a member of the presidency of the Academy
of Arts?
SPEER: Yes, that also.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall not mention the other posts you have
held, in order to shorten the cross-examination. Do you remember your
statements during the interrogation by Colonel Rosenblith on 14 November
1945?
SPEER: No, not in detail.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I will remind you of one question, and will you
tell me whether or not your answer was put down correctly. It was the
question whether you acknowledged that in his book _Mein Kampf_ Hitler
stated bluntly his aggressive plans for the countries of the East and
West and, in particular, for the Soviet Union. You answered, “Yes, I
acknowledge it.” Do you remember that?
SPEER: Yes, that is perfectly possible.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And do you confirm that now?
SPEER: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You do not confirm that now?
SPEER: I shall have to tell you that at the time I was ashamed to say
that I had not read the whole of Mein Kampf. I thought that would sound
rather absurd.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right, we shall not waste time. You were
ashamed to admit that, or are you ashamed now? Let us go on to another
question.
SPEER: Yes, I cheated at that time.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You cheated at that time; maybe you are
cheating now?
SPEER: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It does not matter. You worked on the staff of
Hess, did you not?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You worked with Ley?
SPEER: Yes, in the Labor Front.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, the German Labor Front. You had a high
rank in the Nazi Party, as you stated here today; you said that today in
Court, did you not?
SPEER: No, it was not a high rank; it did not in any way correspond to
the position which I occupied in the State.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You had better listen to my questions and then
answer them. I repeat; you were collaborating with Hess, and you worked
with Ley in the Labor Front. You were one of the leaders of the
technicians in the Nazi Party. We will not discuss whether it was a very
high rank or not, but you did have a rank in the Nazi Party.
Yesterday, in Court, you said that you were one of Hitler’s close
friends. You now want to say that so far as the plans and intentions of
Hitler were concerned, you only learned about them from the book _Mein
Kampf_?
SPEER: I can say a few words in this connection. I was in close contact
with Hitler, and I heard his personal views; these views of his did not
allow the conclusion that he had any plans of the sort which have
appeared in the documents here, and I was particularly relieved in 1939,
when the Nonaggression Pact with Russia was signed. After all, your
diplomats too must have read _Mein Kampf_; nevertheless, they signed the
Nonaggression Pact. And they were certainly more intelligent than I
am—I mean in political matters.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I will not now examine who read _Mein Kampf_
and who did not; that is irrelevant and does not interest the Tribunal.
So you contend that you did not know anything about Hitler’s plans?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right, please tell us this. As Chief of the
Main Office of Technology of the Nazi Party, what were your tasks?
SPEER: In the Party?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You probably know it better than I, since you
were the head of that office.
SPEER: I only took over that task or that office in 1942; and in 1942,
during the war, this Main Office of Technology of the NSDAP had no task
to perform.
I took over the officials who were in that department into my Ministry,
and there they worked as State functionaries. Detailed information on
this is available in the written testimony of the witness Saur, and that
is contained in my document book.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: What is contained in the testimony of the
witness Saur?
SPEER: The document book also contains a decree which I issued at the
end of 1942, and in which I ordered the transfer of these tasks to the
State.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did not answer my question. In order to
clarify this, I will read what Saur said on this point, and you will
please state whether it is correct or not.
On the tasks of the Main Office of Technology of the Party, Saur said:
“The task of the Main Office of Technology of the Party was the
unified direction of technical organizations of German engineers
in scientific, professional, and political respects.”
It was a political organization, was it not?
SPEER: No, it was chiefly a technical organization.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: A technical organization which occupied itself
with political questions.
In the document book which has been presented and partly quoted by your
defense counsel there are indications of the tasks of the Main Office of
Technology. From one document it is obvious that the engineers were to
be taught the National Socialist ideology, and that this organization
was also a political and not only a technical one.
SPEER: Where does it say so? May I have the document?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Of course, the document book of the Defense. I
shall hand it to you, if you like to have it. You will see there the
structure of the Kreisleitung.
SPEER: The translation said it was from my document book, but it is not
from my document book. It is from the organizational handbook of the
NSDAP, and...
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is the structure of the NSDAP. That is
Document 1893-PS, which has been presented by your defense counsel.
SPEER: Yes, but in my document book it says that the Main Office of
Technology in the NSDAP did not have a political task. This is an
extract from the organizational handbook of the NSDAP, and I would not
have included it in my document book if I had not had the precise
impression that it demonstrates particularly well that, in contrast to
all other agencies, the Main Office of Technology had a nonpolitical
task within the Party.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was the National Socialist Union of German
Technicians a political organization?
SPEER: By no means.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: By no means? Tell me, please, did not the
leaders of this Union have to be members of the Nazi Party?
SPEER: They did not have to be members, as far I know. I never paid any
attention to whether they were members or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You were one of the leaders of the Central
Planning Board. Was the search for new sources of raw materials part of
your program?
SPEER: I do not understand the meaning of the question.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was the search for new sources of raw materials
part of the program of the Central Planning Board?
SPEER: No, not actually.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. I shall read to you from your
document book. Will you listen, please? Otherwise, we shall lose too
much time with you. This is the order dated 22 April 1942 and signed by
Göring; it is in your document book, in Volume I, Page 14 of the Russian
text, and Page 17 of the English text, Exhibit Speer-7. It states:
“With a view to assuring priority of armaments as ordered by the
Führer, and to embrace all the demands which are thereby made on
the total economy during the war, and in order to bring about an
adjustment between a secure food supply and the raw material and
manufacturing facilities in the economy, I order:
“In connection with the Four Year Plan a Central Planning Board
shall be organized.”
Further on it mentions who the members of the Central Planning Board
were. In the third part the tasks of the Central Planning Board are
enumerated. I shall read that into the record:
“Point C: The distribution of existing raw materials, especially
iron and metals, among the places requiring them.
“Point B: The decision as to the creation of new plants for
production of raw materials, or enlargement of the existing
plants.”
This is written in your document book.
SPEER: Well, there is a difference. I was told “sources of raw
materials”; I understand “sources of raw materials” to mean ore, for
example, or coal beds. What this paragraph says is the “creation of new
means of producing raw materials,” that means the building of a factory
for steel production, for instance, or an aluminum factory.
I myself said that expanding the supply of raw materials for industry
was important, and that I took over this task.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes. Of course, it is rather difficult to deny
it, since it is written here in the document.
SPEER: No, it is only that these are technical expressions, and it may
be that since they were retranslated into German they were rendered
falsely. The meaning of the paragraph is actually quite clear, and every
expert can confirm it. It is the same activity...
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I understand the sense. Tell us, when you
enumerated the members of the Central Planning Board, was it just
accidental that you did not name Funk as a member of that board?
SPEER: No. Actually, Funk worked hardly at all in the Planning Board,
and therefore I did not list him. He became a member officially only in
September 1943, but even after that time he took part in only one or two
meetings, so that his activity was very slight.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I did not ask you about his activity; I am
asking you whether Funk was a member of the Central Planning Board.
SPEER: Yes, from September 1943.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And it was purely through accident that you did
not name him? Or did you have any particular purpose in not naming him?
SPEER: I actually named only the three members who were on the Central
Planning Board from the very beginning, since its foundation, because I
was speaking only of the foundation of the board. That explains the
error. I did not want to occupy the Court’s time with something which
was generally known.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. You have maintained here that you
were concerned only with peaceful construction, and that, as far as the
appointment to the post of Minister for armaments was concerned, you
accepted it without any particular desire, and you even had your qualms
about it. Do you still maintain the same view?
SPEER: May I have the question repeated?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: If you please. You stated here several times,
in replying to the questions of your defense counsel, that you accepted
the post of Minister for armaments without any special desire, and that
you had your qualms about it; and you did not particularly care to
accept it. Do you still maintain that now?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall remind you of what you said to the
representatives of industry in the Rhine-Westphalia district. Do you
remember what you said to them? I shall quote one paragraph from your
speech. You said:
“I did not hesitate long in the spring of 1942, and soon one
demand of the Führer after another was taken up by us to be
carried out and was laid down in program form—programs the
realization of which had been pronounced impracticable or been
made dependent on impossible conditions by the agencies formerly
dealing with them.” (Document Number Speer-2)
Did you say that?
SPEER: Yes. But this has nothing to do with your statement. The demands
which are meant here are demands for an increase in military armaments.
Those are the demands I accepted. But in addition it was a matter of
course that I immediately accepted the appointment as armament Minister
without any qualms. I have never denied that. I only said that I would
rather be an architect than an armament Minister, and that can probably
be understood.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And now we shall listen to what you said to the
Gauleiter in your speech in Munich:
“I gave up all my activity, including my actual profession,
architecture, to dedicate myself without reservations to the war
task. The Führer expects that of all of us.” (Document 1435-PS)
Is that what you are saying now?
SPEER: Yes. I believe that was the custom in your State too.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am not asking you about our State. We are now
talking about your State. I am asking you whether you now affirm before
the Tribunal what you then said to the Gauleiter.
SPEER: Yes. I only wanted to explain this to you, because apparently you
do not appreciate why in time of war one should accept the post of
armament Minister. If the need arises that is a matter of course, and I
cannot understand why you do not appreciate that and why you want to
reproach me for it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I understand you perfectly.
SPEER: Good.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: When you made your speech before the Gauleiter,
you did not, of course, think that you would be held responsible before
the International Military Tribunal for the words which you then spoke.
SPEER: Excuse me; one moment, please. I must say something in answer to
your question: That this is my view, and that I think it quite proper,
is evident from the fact that you quoted it from my document book,
otherwise I would not have included it in my own document book. I hope
you consider me sufficiently intelligent to be capable of setting up my
document book correctly.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But these documents are also in the possession
of the Prosecution. However, we shall pass on to the next question.
In response to the questions of your defense counsel you testified about
the principles and tasks of your Ministry. In connection with this, I
should like to ask you a few questions. Do you remember the contents of
your article entitled “Increase of Production,” which was published in
_Das Reich_ on 19 April 1942?
You will be given a copy of this article in a second.
Mr. President, I submit this article as Exhibit USSR-479.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I shall remind you briefly what you wrote
about the principles of your Ministry.
“One thing, however, will be necessary, and that is energetic
action, including the most severe punishment, in cases when
offenses are committed against the interests of the State ...
severe prison sentences or death.... The war must be won.”
Did you write this?
SPEER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now, I shall remind you of another article of
yours. You will also be given a copy of it.
SPEER: Just a moment. May I ask you to read the whole paragraph? You
left out a few sentences in the middle.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, yes, I omitted something, but I shall ask
you some questions on that later.
SPEER: But it shows for what offenses prison and death sentences were
provided. That is surely relevant. I believe you should quote the
passage fully, otherwise the context will be lost.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You will give your consents or explanations to
the questions afterward. But meanwhile listen to the questions as I put
them to you. If you want to give your explanation with regard to this,
you are entitled to do so later.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, General Raginsky, the Tribunal would prefer to
have the comments now.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, if the defendant wishes to give
an explanation with regard to this article, I shall let him do so, of
course.
SPEER: The text which you omitted reads as follows:
“At my suggestion, the Führer ordered that those heads of
concerns and employees, and also those officials and officers,
who attempt to secure material or labor by giving inaccurate
information will receive severe prison sentences or the death
sentences.”
The reasons for this were as follows: When I took over my office, the
demands addressed to the central departments were increased by the
intermediate departments handling the demands. Each of the many
intermediate departments added something of its own, so that the demands
reaching me were quite enormous and incredible, and made planning quite
impossible. For example, because of these additions the demands which I
received for copper in one year amounted to more than the whole world’s
yearly production of copper. And in order to prevent this and to obtain
accurate indications, I issued an order to deter these officials,
officers, heads of concerns, and employees from giving false figures.
In my Gauleiter speech I spoke of this, and I said the result of this
decree would surely be that no one would any longer dare to forward
false information to higher offices, and that was the purpose of the
decree; I said that it would never be necessary to put the decree into
effect, since I did not believe that the heads of concerns, employees,
officials, and officers would in view of such a severe penalty have
enough boldness to continue supplying false indications.
In fact, no penalty was ever imposed, but the result of the decree was
that demands for materials and workers reaching me decreased
considerably.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You maintained that your obligations and duties
as a Minister included only production. Did I understand you correctly?
SPEER: Yes, armaments and war production.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And the supply of industry with raw materials,
was that not included in your duties?
SPEER: No, that was my task from September 1943 onwards, when I took
over the whole of production. It is true that from then on I was in
charge of the whole of production, from raw materials to the finished
products.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In the book _Germany at War_ (_Deutschland im
Kampf_), which was published in November 1943—you will be given this
volume now, and I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number
USSR-480—it says:
“On the basis of the Führer decree of 2 September 1943 relative
to the concentration of war economy, and of the decree of the
Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich and the
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan for Central Planning of 4
September 1943, Reich Minister Speer will now direct the entire
war economic production in his capacity as Reich Minister for
Armaments and War Production. He alone is competent and
responsible for guiding, directing, and applying the industrial
war economy.”
Is this correct? I ask you to answer briefly, is it correct or not?
SPEER: This is expressed rather unprofessionally, because the term
“industrial war economy” does not quite cover the concept “armament and
war production.” This was not drawn up by an expert, but otherwise it
agrees with what I have testified. I said that war production embraced
the whole of production.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, but after September 1943, you were
responsible not only for war industry but for the whole war economy as
well, and those are two different things.
SPEER: No, exactly that is the mistake. It says here “industrial war
economy,” which means something like production, war economy, or
production, in trade and industry, with that qualification; and when it
says earlier “the entire war economic production,” the person who wrote
this also meant production. But the concept...
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You mentioned here already that having accepted
the post of Minister in 1942, you inherited a great and heavy task. Tell
us briefly, please, what was the situation with regard to strategic raw
materials, and in particular with regard to alloy metals used in the war
industry?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, General Raginsky, is it necessary for us to go into
details? Is it not obvious that a man who was controlling many millions
of workers had a large task? What is this directed to?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, the question is preparatory; it
leads to another question, and inasmuch as it is connected...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what is the ultimate object of the
cross-examination? You say it is leading to something else. What is it
leading to?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The object is to prove that the Defendant Speer
participated in the economic plundering and looting of occupied
territories.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then ask him directly about that.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am just coming to that now.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you acknowledge the fact that you
participated in economic plundering of occupied territories?
SPEER: I participated in the economic exploitation of the occupied
countries, yes; but I do not believe the term “plundering” is very
clearly defined. I do not know what is meant by “plundering of an
occupied territory.”
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: To make up the deficit of strategic raw
materials, did you not export alloy metals for the war industry from
Belgium, France, and other occupied territories?
SPEER: Of course, I did not export them myself; but certainly I
participated in some way. I was not responsible for it, but certainly I
urged strongly that we should obtain as much metal from there as
possible.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am satisfied with your answer and the
Tribunal will draw its conclusions.
Do you remember Hitler’s decree about the concentration of war economy,
published on 2 September? You will be given a copy of this decree at
once. This document is being submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-482. I do
not intend to read all of this as it will take too much time, but I
would like to read into the record a few paragraphs of this decree,
which begins:
“Taking into consideration the stricter mobilization and uniform
commitment of all economic forces required by the exigencies of
war, I order the following:”
Paragraph 2:
“The powers of the Reich Minister for Economy in the sphere of
raw materials and production in industry and trade are given to
the Reich Minister for armaments and munitions. The Reich
Minister for armaments and munitions, in view of the extended
scope of his tasks, will be known as Reich Minister for
Armaments and War Production.”
Did you see this decree?
SPEER: Yes, I know it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Will you, in connection with this decree, tell
us briefly and concisely how the functions between you and Funk were
divided?
SPEER: Well, that is shown in the text. I was in charge of all
production, from raw materials to the finished product, and Funk was in
charge of all general economic questions, primarily the questions of
financial transactions, securities, commerce, foreign trade, and so
forth. This, however, is not exhaustive, but just approximate
information.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That answer satisfies me. In connection with
this decree, did you receive plenipotentiary powers for the regulation
of goods exchange and goods traffic?
SPEER: I do not quite understand what you mean.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. So as not to lose any time, then,
you will be given a document signed by you and Funk, and dated 6
September 1943. This document I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit
Number USSR-483. I shall read the first sentence of the first paragraph:
“Insofar as existing laws establish the authority of the Reich
Minister of Economy in the regulation of goods traffic, this
authority for the period of the war will be exercised by the
Minister for Armaments and War Production.”
In this way your role in the war effort of Germany, your role as head of
the German war economy during the period of the war, was much wider in
scope than that which you have described here to the Tribunal, is that
not so?
SPEER: No, I did not try to picture the situation differently, and I
said that during the war the Minister for armaments held the most
important position of all in the Reich; and that everyone had to work
for him. I do not believe that I could have given a more comprehensive
description of my task. This matter of goods traffic is of quite
subordinate significance. I cannot even say what is meant here by “goods
traffic.” It is a technical term which I do not quite understand.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, but this document is signed by you, and
now you do not know exactly what is meant by it. You signed it together
with Funk?
SPEER: Of course.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Tell us, how was contact between your Ministry
and the German Labor Front maintained and was there contact between the
two organizations?
SPEER: There was a liaison man between the German Labor Front and me,
just as between all other important offices in the Reich.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you not name that officer?
SPEER: It was my witness Hupfauer, who later was chief of the central
office under me.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You testified that a number of concerns, such
important concerns as the textile industry, processing of aluminum and
lumber, et cetera, should not be included in the list of war economy
concerns. Did I understand you correctly? Did you maintain that?
SPEER: No, that is a mistake. That must have been wrongly translated.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: How should I understand it correctly?
SPEER: I think there are two mistakes here in the translation. In the
first place, I did not speak of war economy in my testimony, but I used
the term “armament.” I said that this term “armament” includes textile
concerns and wood and leather processing concerns. But armament and war
economy are two entirely different terms.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And the textile industry is wholly excluded
from the term “armament”?
SPEER: I said that various textile concerns were incorporated in
armament industry, although they did not produce armaments in the strict
sense of the word.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Did not the textile industry manufacture
parachute equipment for the Air Force?
SPEER: Yes, but if you consult the Geneva Agreement on prisoners of war,
you will see that it is not forbidden to manufacture that—for prisoners
of war to manufacture that. I have the text here, I can read it to you.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And do you want us seriously to accept that
powder can be manufactured without cellulose, and are you for that
reason narrowing down the conceptions of war industry and war
production?
SPEER: No, you have misunderstood me completely. I wanted to make the
concept “armament industry” as broad as possible, in order to prove that
this modern conception of armament industry is something entirely
different from the industries producing armaments in the sense of the
Geneva Convention.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. You spoke of your objection to using
foreign workers, and your motives for this objection were indicated by
Schmelter in his testimony. He was in charge of labor in your Ministry.
This testimony was presented by your defense counsel; I shall read only
one paragraph, and will you please confirm whether it is correct or not:
“Insofar as he—Speer—repeatedly mentioned to us that
utilization of foreign workers would create great difficulties
for the Reich with regard to the food supply for these
workers....”
Were these the motives for your objection?
SPEER: The translation must be incorrect here. I know exactly how the
text reads and what the sense of this statement is. The sense is
entirely correct. The question was this: If we brought new workers to
Germany, we had first of all to make available to them the basic
calories necessary to feed a human being. But the German laborers still
working in Germany had to receive these basic calories in any case.
Therefore, food was saved if I employed German workers in Germany and
the additional calories for persons doing heavy work and working long
hours could again have been increased. That was the sense of Schmelter’s
statement.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Defendant Speer, you have evaded a direct
answer to my question.
SPEER: I will gladly...
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You are now going into details which are of no
interest to me. I asked you whether I understood this particular
passage, which I read from the testimony of Schmelter, correctly or not.
SPEER: No, it was falsely translated. I should like to have the original
in German.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The original is in your document book and you
can read it. I will pass to the next question.
SPEER: Yes, but it is necessary to show it to me now. In
cross-examination by the Russian prosecutor I do not really need to
bring my document book to the stand with me.
THE PRESIDENT: You must give him the document, if you have got the
document.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, this document is contained in
the document book presented by the defense counsel. The Tribunal has the
original, I have only the Russian translation. Schmelter’s affidavit was
submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it, Dr. Flächsner?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SPEER: On what page, approximately?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It is Page 129 in the Russian translation,
answer to Question 13, the last paragraph.
SPEER: Yes. It says in the German text:
“He—that is, Speer—referred repeatedly to the fact that the
employment of foreign workers would cause greater difficulties
in production and would mean that the Reich would have to supply
additional food.” (Document Speer-38)
I explained that. I explained the reasons for that; I think, if you are
not convinced, that this explanation of mine is also mentioned later in
the affidavit.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Your deputy, Schieber, in reply to the question
whether Speer knew that the workers which he requested from Sauckel were
brought from occupied territories, answered:
“Well, that was the great debatable question. We always said
that Sauckel would only create partisans if he brought workers
to Germany against their will.” (Document Speer-37)
In connection with this, I am saying that you not only knew that the
people who were working in your industries were enslaved workers, but
that you also knew of the methods which Sauckel used. Do you confirm
that?
SPEER: I knew that some of the workers were brought to Germany against
their will. I have already said so. I also said that the effects of this
compulsory recruitment I considered wrong and disastrous for production
in the occupied territories. This is a repetition of my testimony.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It is of no use to repeat your testimony. Tell
me, did you not insist that Sauckel supply you with forcibly recruited
workers beyond the demands which you had already made? I shall remind
you of your letter to Sauckel; this will expedite the proceedings. On 6
January 1944 you wrote to Sauckel:
“Dear Party-Comrade Sauckel, I ask you, in accordance with your
promise to the Führer, to assign these workers so that the
orders issued to me by the Führer may be carried out on time. In
addition there is an immediate need of 70,000 workers for the
Todt Organization to meet the time limit set on the Atlantic
Wall by the Führer in Order Number 51; notification of the need
for this labor was given more than 6 months ago, but it has not
yet been complied with.” (Document Speer-11)
Did you write this letter? Do you admit it?
SPEER: Yes. I even admit that I included this letter in my document
book, and for the following reasons: The conference at which Hitler
ordered that 1 million workers were to be brought from France to Germany
took place on 4 January 1944. On the same day I told General Studt, my
representative in France, that the requirements for blocked industries
in France were to be given priority over the requirements for Germany.
Two days later I told Sauckel, in the letter which you now have in your
hand, that my need in France amounted to 800,000 workers for French
factories and that in addition requirements for workers on the Atlantic
Wall had not yet been fully met, that this labor was therefore to be
provided first, before the 1 million workers were sent to Germany. I
said yesterday already that through these two letters the program which
had been ordered by Hitler was brought to a standstill, and that it was
the purpose to inform the military commander, who also received this
letter, that the workers were to be used first in France; that
information was very valuable to the military commander.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Defendant Speer, did you know that in the
factories of which you were in charge, some of the forced laborers were
convicts whose prison terms had already expired? Did you know that?
SPEER: During my period of office I did not know it; I learned of it
here from a document.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You claim that you did not know it?
SPEER: I know what you mean; it is mentioned in the Schieber letter of 4
May 1944, which is in my document book, but I could not possibly
remember all these details.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You cannot remember, but Schieber, on 4 May
1944, in a special letter addressed to you personally, wrote to you
about it and you could not possibly not have known it. The fact that
this letter is included in your document book does not change the
situation.
SPEER: On the basis of this letter I then wrote to Himmler with regard
to the workers who had finished their prison sentences. I can submit
this letter at any time, I left it out to avoid making the document book
too long. This letter shows that I asked Himmler to let those workers
who had served their sentences remain free. Himmler’s point of view was
that these workers should remain in custody.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Do you remember the letter from the OKW of 8
July 1943, on the subject of manpower for mining? Do you remember this
letter and the contents of this letter?
SPEER: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall remind you.
This document was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-455
and has been quoted here several times. I think, therefore, that it is
not necessary to read all of it into the record, but I will read just a
few basic points.
The Führer’s order to assign 300,000 Russian prisoners of war to coal
mining is mentioned in this letter. Do you remember this order?
SPEER: I should like to see it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You will be given a chance to see it. In
Paragraph 2 of this document it is mentioned that:
“All prisoners of war taken in the East after 5 July 1943 are to
be brought to the camps of the OKW and from there, either
directly or by barter through other employing agencies, will be
turned over to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor for commitment in coal mining.”
In Paragraph 4 of this document it is mentioned that:
“All male prisoners from 16 to 55 years of age captured in
guerrilla fighting in the operational army area of the Eastern
commissariats, the Government General, and the Balkans, will in
the future be considered prisoners of war. The same applies to
males in the newly conquered regions of the East. They are to be
sent to prisoner-of-war camps and from there committed for labor
in the Reich.”
This letter was also sent to you and therefore you knew what kind of
methods were used to obtain workers for your coal industry. Do you admit
that?
SPEER: No, I do not admit it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right.
SPEER: I do not know whether you mean that the prisoners who were taken
in the fighting against partisans in the operational area were to be
sent to the mines. I assumed at the time that they were taken prisoner
in battle, and a partisan captured in battle is, of course, a prisoner
of war. Here the assertion was made that in particular the prisoners
taken in the partisan areas were not treated as prisoners of war. But
this document seems to me to be evidence to the contrary. It shows that
prisoners taken in the partisan areas were treated as prisoners of war.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am definitely not interested in your comments
on this document. I asked you whether you knew in what particular way
and through what particular methods you were receiving workers for your
coal industry, and you answered that you did not admit knowledge of it;
I think that covers the question with regard to the document. We will
pass on to the next document.
On 4 January 1944 you participated in a meeting which took place in
Hitler’s headquarters and at which the question of utilization of
manpower for 1944 was discussed. You stated that you would have to have
an additional 1.3 million workers. During this meeting it was decided
that Sauckel would furnish not less than 4 million workers from occupied
territory in 1944, and that Himmler would help him to supply this
number. The minutes of the meeting, signed by Lammers, stated that the
decision of all participants in the meeting was unanimous. Do you
acknowledge that, as a participant in this meeting and as a Reich
Minister, you are among those responsible for the forced deportation to
Germany of a few million workers?
SPEER: But the program was not carried through in any way. This program,
specifically, was not carried through.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Defendant Speer, if you do not answer my
questions, we shall lose too much time.
THE PRESIDENT: But, General Raginsky, from the outset of this
defendant’s evidence, if I understand it, he admitted that he knows that
prisoners of war and other workers were brought to Germany forcibly,
against their will. He has never denied it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, Mr. President, he admitted it. But the
question now is whether he admits that he himself is responsible for the
decision taken at this meeting which he attended on 4 January. He did
not answer that and I am asking him again.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I shall repeat my question. I am not
asking you whether Sauckel really carried through this program. I am
asking you whether on 4 January you participated in a decision taken at
Hitler’s headquarters that Sauckel, with the assistance of Himmler,
should deport 4 million people to forced labor. You participated in that
decision, did you not? It is obvious from the minutes which state that
the decision was unanimous. Now, on that basis, do you accept
responsibility for this decision?
SPEER: As far as my sector and my responsibility in it are concerned, I
assume that the Tribunal will decide the extent of my responsibility. I
cannot establish it myself.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now, I shall read to you an excerpt from a
document presented to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-184. This
document mentions a decision of Sauckel to the effect that a levy and
recruitment of two age classes—1926 and 1927—will be carried through
in all newly occupied Eastern Territories. This document also states
that “the Reich Minister for armaments and munitions approved this
order,” and the document ends with the following sentence:
“Levy and recruitment must be speeded up and carried through
with the greatest energy and all appropriate measures must be
applied.”
Do you remember this order?
SPEER: I read this document here; it is correct.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now we shall pass on to the next question. You
stated here that you were highly critical of Hitler’s entourage. Will
you please name the persons whom you criticized?
SPEER: No, I will not name them.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You will not name these persons because you did
not criticize anybody; am I to understand you in that way?
SPEER: I did criticize them, but I do not consider it right to name them
here.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, I will not insist on an answer to this
question.
You had some differences with Hitler. Tell us, did they begin after you
had convinced yourself that Germany had lost the war?
SPEER: I made clear statements on this point yesterday.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You spoke here quite extensively about your
opposition to the destruction of industries in the western section of
the Reich before the withdrawal of the German Armed Forces. But did you
not do that only because you counted upon the reoccupation of these
regions in the near future and because you wanted to save these
industries for your own use?
SPEER: No, that was not the reason. I explained in detail yesterday that
this served as my pretext to prevent the destruction. If, for instance,
you look at my memorandum dealing with the motor fuel situation, it is
obvious that I did not believe a reoccupation was possible, and I do not
think that any military leader in 1944 considered a reoccupation of
France, Belgium, or Holland possible. That also applies to the Eastern
Territories, of course.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I think it would be better if we referred to
the document. That is the right way of doing it and it would save time.
It is a draft of a telegram which you prepared for Gauleiter Bürckel,
Wagner, and others.
I shall read from Page 56, of your document book:
“The Führer has stated that he can in a short time accomplish
the reoccupation of the territories which are at present lost to
us, since in continuing the war the western areas are of great
importance for armament and war production.”
What you stated in your testimony is quite different from what you wrote
to the Gauleiter.
SPEER: No, my counsel quoted and explained all this yesterday. I should
like to see the document again. I do not know whether it is necessary to
repeat this whole explanation; it was given yesterday and lasted about
10 minutes. Either my explanation of yesterday is believed or not.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I do not want you to repeat what you said
yesterday; if you do not want to answer me, I prefer to pass on to the
next question.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, if you asked him a question which was
asked yesterday, he must give the same answer if he wants to give a
consistent answer.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not think it is necessary
to repeat yesterday’s question; it would be an absolute waste of time.
If he does not want to answer truthfully, then I shall pass on to the
next question.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness says: “I did answer the question truthfully
yesterday, but if you want me to repeat it again, I will do it, but it
will take 10 minutes to do it.” That is what he said and it is a
perfectly proper answer.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I prefer to pass on to the next question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Tell us why you sent this telegram about
the destruction of industries to the Gauleiter.
SPEER: It was not sent only to the Gauleiter; it was sent to my
representatives as well as to the Gauleiter. The Gauleiter had to be
informed because they could on their own initiative have ordered
destruction to be carried out, and since they were not subordinate to me
but to Bormann I had to send this teletype message which I had drafted
to Bormann with the request to forward it to the Gauleiter.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You stated that the adherents of Hitler’s
“scorched earth” policy were Ley, Goebbels, and Bormann. Now, what about
those who are alive today, those who are now sitting in the dock. Did
not any of them support Hitler in this policy?
SPEER: As far as I recall, none of those now in the dock were in favor
of the scorched earth policy. On the contrary, Funk, for example, was
one of those who opposed it very strongly.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This policy was advocated only by people who
are now dead?
SPEER: Yes, and probably they killed themselves because they advocated
this policy and did other such things.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Your defense counsel has submitted to the
Tribunal several letters addressed to Hitler, dated March 1945. Tell us,
did Hitler, after receiving these letters, lose confidence in you?
SPEER: I said yesterday already that violent disputes followed these
letters, and that Hitler wanted me to go on leave, on permanent leave;
that is, in effect he wanted to dismiss me. But I did not want to go.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have heard this before. But nevertheless,
Hitler appointed you on 30 March 1945 to be in charge of the total
destruction of all industries.
SPEER: Yes; that is, I was competent for the destruction or
non-destruction of industry in Germany until 19 March 1945. Then a
Hitler decree which has also been submitted took away from me this power
to carry out destruction, but Hitler’s decree of 30 March 1945, which I
drew up, returned this power to me. The main thing, however, is—I have
also submitted the orders which I issued on the strength of this power;
they show clearly that I prohibited the carrying-out of destruction, and
thereby my purpose was achieved. Not Hitler’s decree, but the wording of
my executional order was decisive. That order is also among the
documents.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In spite of the fact that Hitler received such
letters from you, he did not regard you as a man opposing him?
SPEER: Hitler said in the talk which I had with him at that time that
both for domestic and for foreign political reasons he could not
dispense with my services. That was his explanation. I believe that
already then his confidence in me was shaken, since in his will he named
another as my successor.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And the last question. In April 1945, you
wrote, in the Hamburg radio studio, a speech which you intended to
deliver if Berlin fell. In this speech, which was not delivered, you
advocated the banning of werewolf organization. Tell us, who was in
charge of the werewolves?
SPEER: Reichsleiter Bormann was in charge of the werewolves.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And besides Bormann, who?
SPEER: No, just Bormann, as far as I know—I am not quite certain—the
werewolf organization was subordinate to Bormann.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Naturally. If Bormann were still alive, then
you would have said that Himmler was the leader of this organization. I
did not expect another answer from you. I have no more questions of the
defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, did you want to ask something which arises
out of the cross-examination?
DR. SERVATIUS: I have only a few questions on the cross-examination.
Witness, you stated that after air raids deficiencies arising in the
concerns were reported by you to the DAF or to Sauckel. That is correct,
is it not?
SPEER: No, not quite in this form. I was asked whether I received
occasional reports on such conditions. I said “yes,” I passed them on to
Sauckel or to the DAF because they were the competent authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did these reports which were sent to Sauckel
contain?
SPEER: As far as I remember I said in the examination that I do not
exactly recall receiving such reports. In any case the question was only
a theoretical one: What would I have done if I had received such
reports? I thought that reports had certainly reached me, but I can no
longer recall their specific contents.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was Sauckel to do?
SPEER: Against the air raids Sauckel could not do anything either.
DR. SERVATIUS: If you sent the reports to him it meant that he was to
provide help?
SPEER: Yes, or that he, as the competent authority, would have precise
information on conditions in his field of work, even if he could not
help.
DR. SERVATIUS: His field was the recruiting of manpower.
SPEER: No, also labor conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Labor conditions could be improved only through material
deliveries, through food deliveries, and so forth.
SPEER: Of course, but in the last analysis the Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor was responsible for working conditions. That
is obvious from the decree which Göring signed. Naturally it was also
the concern of other authorities to create good working conditions; that
is quite clear.
DR. SERVATIUS: But, after all, it was not a question of issuing a
decree, but of giving practical help.
SPEER: Practical help after air raids was not given by the central
agency; that was impossible since transportation and telephone
connections were generally cut. It was given by the local authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: In other words, Sauckel could not do anything?
SPEER: No, not personally, but his local offices under him participated
in rendering aid.
DR. SERVATIUS: But he had to turn to you for any material, since
everything was confiscated for armament?
SPEER: As far as building material was concerned, he could get it only
from me, and he did in fact receive large amounts of it. I must add that
Sauckel himself did not receive them but, as far as I recall, generally
the German Labor Front, since the DAF actually took care of the camps.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which were the responsible agencies? Were you not the
agency which cared for the concerns?
SPEER: Not in the sense which you mean. You want me to answer that I was
responsible for the working conditions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal thinks that we have been over
all this already with the witness.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I think this question has not yet been
dealt with. Yesterday internal administration was discussed. A second
series of agencies existed for taking care of the factories, namely,
through the Armament Commission and the Armament Inspection Office; and
there was a third possibility open to the witness Speer for making
contact with the factories through the Reich Labor Efficiency Engineers.
In this connection I wanted to ask him another question.
SPEER: I shall be glad to explain it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Labor Efficiency Engineers constitute your
only real possibility of improving conditions in the concerns, and did
you have direct supervision?
SPEER: I must define for you the task of the labor engineers; it was an
engineering task, that is shown in their designation.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was limited to this engineering task?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no more questions.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I have only two questions arising out of
the cross-examination.
One of the questions is this: Herr Speer, I refer once more to the
answer which you gave to Justice Jackson at the end of the
cross-examination, and to clarify that answer I would like to ask you
this: In assuming a common responsibility, did you want to acknowledge
measurable guilt or coresponsibility under the penal law, or did you
want to record a historical responsibility before your own people and
before history?
SPEER: That question is a very difficult one to answer; it is actually
one which the Tribunal will decide in its verdict. I only wanted to say
that even in an authoritarian system the leaders must accept a common
responsibility, and that it is impossible for them to dodge that common
responsibility after the catastrophe, for if the war had been won the
leaders would also presumably have laid claim to common responsibility.
But to what extent that is punishable under law or ethics I cannot
decide, and it was not my purpose to decide.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Secondly, the American Prosecution showed you
a number of documents on conditions which for the most part, I believe
even entirely, concerned the firm of Krupp. You said that you yourself
had no knowledge of these conditions. Did I understand you correctly?
SPEER: I did not know the details necessary to be able to judge these
documents individually.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I have no more questions, Mr. President. However, I must
reserve the right, in connection with these affidavits which are
evidence against my client—the position is actually not quite clear to
me—to decide whether it is necessary to cross-examine the person who
made the affidavits. I regret that, but I may possibly have to do it. I
had no previous knowledge that these documents would be introduced here.
Then, Mr. President, I need just 5 minutes to finish my documentary
evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Flächsner, with reference to these affidavits,
if you want to cross-examine any witness you must apply in writing to do
so, and you must do so promptly. Because I think I am correct in saying
that there are only two other of the defendants to be examined, and
unless the application comes in soon, it will not be possible to find
the witnesses or to bring them here in time.
Now, you say you will finish in 5 minutes?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you may as well finish now, then. However, Dr.
Flächsner, the Tribunal has one or two questions to put to the
defendant.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, you spoke of not using the western
prisoners in war industry and in the making of munitions, do you
remember?
SPEER: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were there regulations to that effect?
SPEER: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): There were regulations to that effect?
SPEER: Yes, as far as I know, but my knowledge need not be precise. I
only recall talks with Keitel about employment in individual cases, and
these Keitel turned down. Otherwise I had no knowledge.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You never saw any regulation which made that
distinction, did you?
SPEER: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And with respect to civilians from
nonoccupied countries, they were used in war industries, I suppose, were
they not?
SPEER: Foreign workers were employed without consideration for any
agreement.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is just what I want to know.
Now, you said the concentration camps had a bad reputation? I think
those were your words, were they not, a bad reputation? Is that right?
SPEER: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you mean by that phrase “bad
reputation”? What sort of reputation, for what?
SPEER: That is hard to define. It is—it was known in Germany that a
stay in a concentration camp was an unpleasant matter. I also knew that
but I did not know any details.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, even if you did not know any details,
is not “unpleasant” putting it a little mildly? Was not the reputation
that violence and physical punishment were used in the camps? Was not
that the reputation that you meant? Is it not fair to say that, really?
SPEER: No, that is going a little too far, on the basis of what we knew.
I assumed that there was ill-treatment in individual cases, but I did
not assume that it was the rule. I did not know that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you not know that violence or physical
force was used to enforce the regulations if the internees did not obey
them?
SPEER: No, I did not know it in this form. I must say that during the
time in which I was a Minister, strange though as it sounds, I became
less disturbed about the fate of concentration camp inmates than I had
been before, because while I was in office I heard only good and calming
reports about the concentration camps from official sources. It was said
that the food was being improved, and so on and so forth.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Only one other question. I was interested in
what you said at the end about all of the leaders being responsible for
certain general principles, certain great things. Can you say any one of
those things? What did you mean? What principles? Did you mean going on
with the war, for instance?
SPEER: I think that, for example, the beginning of the war or the end of
the war are such basic principles. I think...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You deem the beginning of the war and the end
of the war basic principles for which the leaders were responsible?
SPEER: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
You may as well finish tonight, Dr. Flächsner.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, gladly.
I should like, supplementing yesterday’s evidence, to submit a letter
from Speer to Sauckel of 28 January 1944, which was quoted here
yesterday; I shall give it Exhibit Number 31.
Then, another letter from Speer to Sauckel of 11 March 1944; that will
be Exhibit Number 32.
Then, the execution order for the destruction decree mentioned by the
defendant yesterday, which the Tribunal will find on Page 81 of the
English document book; I submit it as Exhibit 33.
Then, as Exhibit 34, I should like to submit a letter from Hitler to
Speer dated 21 April 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the date of Exhibit 33? You said Page
81. Did you mean Page 81 of the original, which is 85 in the English?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No, in the English text, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the document?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is an execution order for the Führer decree of 19
March 1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The next document, Mr. President, is on Page 55 of the
English text and Page 52 of the original, the same as the French text.
It is the letter from Hitler to Speer, already mentioned, dealing with
the commission given to Dorsch for the construction of fighter planes.
That is Exhibit Number 34.
I have to submit Number 35 later.
As Exhibit Number 36 I submit the interrogatory of Kehrl. It is signed
by the witness Hans Kehrl, and the signature is certified by an officer
of the internment camp; the signature of a representative of the
Prosecution and my own signature are also on it.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that—36?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: 36 is on Page 105 in the original.
On Page 113 of the Document Book 2, Mr. President, is an excerpt from
the interrogation of the witness Schieber, which I submit as Exhibit
Number 37. It is submitted in German and English. The record is
certified by a member of the Prosecution and by me.
In the second book, on Page 127, the Court will find the interrogation
of the witness Schmelter, which I submit as Exhibit Number 38. It is
certified in the same way.
On Page 136 of Document Book 2 I submit the testimony of the witness
Hupfauer, who was also mentioned here today. That will be Exhibit Number
39.
On Page 142 of Document Book 2 the Court will find the interrogation of
the witness Saur. I submit this as Exhibit Number 40, again in English
and German. The English record is certified by a member of the
Prosecution and by me.
On Page 148 of my second document book the Court will find the record of
the examination of Frank, carried out in Ludwigsburg by the Prosecution
and by me. The record is certified by the Prosecution and by me.
THE PRESIDENT: That was 41, was it not?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: That was Number 41, Mr. President.
On Page 153 of the document book is the record of the examination of
Rohland, which will be Exhibit Number 42. This also is in English and in
German, and is certified in the usual way.
On Page 165 of the document book is the record of the examination of the
witness Kempf, carried out on 3 May at Kransberg by the Prosecution and
by me. It is certified in the usual way, and will be Exhibit Number 43.
THE PRESIDENT: How many more have you got?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: There are two more.
On Page 176 of the document book is the interrogatory of Guderian, who
was questioned at Hersbruck. The record is in English and German, and
the English is certified by me and the Prosecution. That is Exhibit
Number 44.
On Page 181 of the document book—this will be Exhibit Number 45—the
Court will find the testimony of the witness Stahl, also in English and
German, the English being certified by the Prosecution and by me.
Finally, on Page 186 of the document book there is the interrogatory of
Karl Brandt, which is certified by the camp authorities. It is in
English and German, and will be Exhibit Number 46.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: That is all.
Mr. President, yesterday the defendant referred to excerpts of the
Führer conference of 3 to 5 January. This document has not yet been
translated, and with your permission I shall submit it later. The
Prosecution has already seen it and has no objection.
Those are the documents I wanted to submit. I believe that the Court
does not wish to hear comments on the documents in the document book,
especially as the documents have already been presented by the Russian
Prosecution in great detail. That concludes my case of the Defendant
Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST DAY
Saturday, 22 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal sees that you have a
supplementary request for an additional witness, Ambassador
François-Poncet; is that so? And for some additional documents?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. May I, with reference to the
application for M. François-Poncet, make the following remarks. The
Ambassador, François-Poncet, has in the meantime replied to the summons
which he received and I got this letter 2 days ago through the French
Delegation, though only a copy thereof. The French Prosecution, however,
have promised me that the original will be submitted to the Tribunal and
they, as well as the British Delegation, have no objections to its being
used. Therefore, the application for the interrogation of the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: The letter being used, you mean?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The calling and examination of the witness is
therefore unnecessary, likewise this application of mine.
THE PRESIDENT: That seems a convenient course to the Tribunal, subject,
of course, to any question of relevance in the actual subject matter of
the letter.
Now, as to the documents which you are asking for, does the Prosecution
object to those or not?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, in two cases, which I have already crossed
off. The two documents which I also wanted to submit and which have been
objected to by the Prosecution I eliminated, and they are no longer in
my document books.
THE PRESIDENT: On the document before me the Prosecution appears to have
objected to three of them. I do not know whether that is true or not.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Two, Numbers 93 and 101 from my document
books—they have been objected to and I have dropped them.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I beg your pardon, I was wrong. Well then, you have
dropped them; that is all right. You may continue, please.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I first of all say that up to
now the translations have been completed only for Document Book Number
1. That book is already available. The others, however, are not yet
ready. I should nevertheless like to be permitted first of all to cite
the documents from the document books in connection with the respective
questions, giving their numbers and short descriptions and also possibly
quoting short passages from them, so that the context may remain intact
and we may be saved the trouble of submitting the documents again after
they have been translated, which after all would be a waste of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to use the documents before you have called
the defendant?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, no, in the course of the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes—then you propose to call the defendant?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
[_The Defendant Von Neurath took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH (Defendant): Constantin von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, will you please give us a brief
account of your family background, your education at home, and your
schooling?
VON NEURATH: I was born on 2 February 1873. On my father’s side I come
from an old family of civil servants. My grandfather, my
great-grandfather, and my great-great-grandfather were Ministers of
Justice and Foreign Affairs in Württemberg. On my mother’s side I come
from a noble Swabian family whose ancestors were mostly officers in the
Imperial Austrian Army.
Until my twelfth year I was brought up in the country in extreme
simplicity, with particular emphasis laid on the duty of truthfulness,
responsibility, patriotism, and a Christian way of life, along with
Christian tolerance of other religions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later you took your school certificate examination
and went to the university. Where and when?
VON NEURATH: After having graduated from high school I studied law in
Tübingen and Berlin and there passed the two state law examinations.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After your examinations, what official positions
did you hold up until the moment when you were appointed Reich Foreign
Minister?
VON NEURATH: In 1901 I entered the Foreign Service of the Reich. First
of all, I worked at the central office in Berlin, and then in 1903 I was
assigned to the consulate general in London. From there I returned to
the Foreign Office in Berlin and I worked there in all the departments
of that office. In 1914...
THE PRESIDENT: When?
VON NEURATH: 1914.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean you were in London for 11 years?
VON NEURATH: Nearly, yes. Then I was sent to Constantinople as an
Embassy Counsellor. At the end of 1916 I retired from the diplomatic
service because of disagreement with the policy of Reich Chancellor Von
Bethmann-Hollweg. Then I became the head of the Cabinet of the King of
Württemberg until the revolution at the end of 1918.
In February 1919 the Social Democrat People’s Commissioner, Ebert,
requested me to return to the diplomatic service. I did so, with the
reservation that I might keep my own political opinions, and then became
Minister to Denmark, where my principal task was to handle the
differences we had with Denmark over the so-called Schleswig question.
In December 1921 I became Ambassador to Rome, with the Italian
Government, where I remained until 1930. There I experienced the Fascist
revolution, with its bloody events and results. At the outset I had
sharp arguments with Mussolini, which gradually, however, developed into
a relationship of confidence on his part toward me.
During the first World War I was a captain in a grenadier regiment, and
in December 1914 I was decorated, for bravery in action, with the Iron
Cross, First Class. I was wounded, and then returned to my post in
Constantinople.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What is your attitude toward the Church and
religion?
VON NEURATH: As I have already told you, I was educated as a Christian,
and at all times I have considered the Christian Church and Christian
morality the foundation of the State. Therefore I tried again and again
to persuade Hitler not to allow the anticlerical attitude of certain
groups in the Party to become effective. In the case of excesses
committed by Party organizations and individuals against the Church and
the monasteries and so on I have always intervened, insofar as I was
able.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
quote from the affidavit given by Provincial Bishop Wurm in Stuttgart.
This affidavit is Number Neurath-1 in my Document Book 1. I quote:
“I became acquainted with Herr Von Neurath at the time of the
Church struggle. I thought that I could turn to him as a man
from the same province and as a descendant of a family which was
friendly toward the Protestant Church. His father was a member
of the Protestant provincial synod. I was not disappointed in
this confidence. He received me frequently and often arranged
conferences for me with other members of the Reich Cabinet. In
particular he assisted me in the autumn of 1934, together with
Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick and Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Gürtner, when I had been removed from my office and interned
in my apartment because of illegal interventions on the part of
Reich Bishop Ludwig Müller as a result of my resistance to the
domination of the Church by the German Christians. He obtained
my release from detention and my reinstatement by the State as
Bishop. He also brought about a discussion in the Reich
Chancellery, the result of which was a repeal of the illegal
legislation on the part of the Reich Bishop. Also during later
periods of the Church struggle I always found a friendly
reception and full understanding on his part for the concerns of
the Church.”
I should also like to refer to an affidavit which appears under Number
Neurath-2 in my document book. It is an affidavit from an old and
intimate friend of the defendant, the lawyer and notary Manfred
Zimmerman of Berlin. I should like to quote just a brief passage from
this affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to read all of it. The
Tribunal will, of course, consider it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, but I had attached importance to it
because this second document comes from a man who has known the
defendant very closely for 40 years. I was interested, for that reason,
in quoting, besides the declaration of Bishop Wurm, a statement by a man
who knows his daily life. However, Mr. President, if you believe that it
is not necessary for me to read it here, then I shall only refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it at all, but you can draw our
attention to the most material passages.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the passage which I was going to
quote is on Page 5 of that affidavit, under Paragraph 5. It begins:
“Constantin von Neurath, according to his family, education, and
development, is a man of sound character in every respect....”
Then I can dispense with that.
I should like to present a statement from Pastor Roller and the Mayor of
Enzweihingen. This is the community in which Von Neurath resides. This
is Number Neurath-24 in my Document Book 1.
Herr Von Neurath, what, in this connection, was your attitude toward the
Jewish problem?
VON NEURATH: I have never been anti-Semitic. My Christian and
humanitarian convictions prevented that. A repression of the undue
Jewish influence in all spheres of public and cultural life, as it had
developed after the first World War in Germany, however, I regarded as
desirable. But I opposed all measures of violence against the Jews as
well as propaganda against the Jews; I considered the entire racial
policy of the National Socialist Party wrong, and for that reason I
fought against it.
After the Jewish laws had been put in force, I opposed their being
carried out and kept non-Aryan members of the Foreign Office as long as
was possible. Not until after the Party had obtained the decision
regarding the appointment of civil servants did I have to confine myself
to defending individual persons. I enabled several of them to emigrate.
The so-called racial law was drawn up by a racial fanatic in the Party,
and was passed in Nuremberg in spite of my emphatic protest.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to and
read a short sentence from an affidavit by the former Ambassador Dr.
Curt Prüfer. This document is Number Neurath-4 in my document book.
Ambassador Prüfer was Ministerial Director in the Foreign Office when
Von Neurath was Foreign Minister. I should like to quote briefly
concerning his attitude toward officials of different faiths.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the page?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is Page 9 of the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and our Page 21?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
“Neurath in many cases intervened in behalf of officials of the
Foreign Office who, because of their race, their religion, or
their former membership in other parties, were objected to by
the National Socialists. Thus, until Hindenburg’s death, and as
long as Neurath still had sole power in all questions relating
to civil servants, a number of officials of Jewish or mixed
blood remained in their positions. In fact, there were even some
promotions of such officials.
“Not until after Hindenburg’s death, when the Reich Ministers as
well as other department chiefs were deprived of the final
decision in all questions relating to civil servants by a decree
of the Führer, and this power was transferred to the Deputy of
the Führer, did the radicalism of the Party penetrate this
sector too, and then, particularly after Neurath’s resignation,
it assumed increasingly harsh forms.”
THE PRESIDENT: Which answer was that?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That was the affidavit of the former Ambassador
Dr. Curt Prüfer.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know that. I wanted to know which answer it was.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I see, Number 4. It is an affidavit, it is not a
questionnaire in this sense.
THE PRESIDENT: It is paragraphed in our copy, at any rate.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Number 18; it is the answer to Question 18.
May I also draw your attention to an affidavit by Baroness Ritter of
Munich. Baroness Ritter is a distant relative of the defendant. She is
the widow of the former Bavarian Ambassador to the Holy See. She has
known Von Neurath for many years and is very familiar with his way of
thinking.
This is Number Neurath-3 in my Document Book 1, and I should like to
quote from Page 3, just one short passage:
“The same tolerant attitude which he had toward Christian
denominations he also had toward the Jewish question. Therefore
he rejected Hitler’s racial policy as a matter of principle. In
practice he also succeeded in preventing any elimination of Jews
under his jurisdiction until the year 1937.
“Furthermore, he helped all persons who were close to him
professionally or personally, and who had been affected by the
legislation concerning Jews, insofar as he was able, in order to
protect them from financial and other disadvantages.”
Herr Von Neurath, what was your attitude toward Hitler’s anti-Jewish
tendencies and measures?
VON NEURATH: In them I saw an anti-Semitism which was not altogether
rare in the German people, but had had no practical effects. I protested
to Hitler against all excesses of which I knew, and not simply for
foreign political reasons. I begged him, in particular, to restrain
Goebbels and Himmler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this matter I should like to
interpose a question. What did you know about the activities and
excesses committed by the Gestapo, the SA, and the SS?
In this connection I should like to put to you the testimony of the
witness Gisevius, who was examined here some time ago. He said:
“Beyond that, I submitted to one of the closest associates of
the Foreign Minister at that time,”—that was you—“Ambassador
Von Bülow-Schwante, the Chief of Protocol, as much material as I
possibly could and, according to the information which
Bülow-Schwante gave me, he submitted that material repeatedly.”
This is material supposed to refer to excesses, particularly against
foreigners, of course.
VON NEURATH: The statement by this witness Gisevius that my Chief of
Protocol would generally have had to inform me about the activities of
the Gestapo is a thoroughly wrong conclusion. Officially, through
complaints from ambassadors and ministers, I heard of brawls and also of
arrests by the Police and the SA, but I knew nothing about the general
official institutions of the Gestapo and its activities.
In every case which became known to me I demanded, above all, that the
Minister of the Interior, the Chief of the Police, and the Gestapo give
me an explanation and punish the persons guilty.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did you know or what did you learn about
concentration camps? When did you first hear of this institution at all,
and when and from whom did you hear of the conditions which prevailed in
these camps?
VON NEURATH: The institution of the so-called concentration camps was
known to me from the Boer War. The existence of such camps in Germany
became known to me in 1934 or 1935 when two officials of my office,
among them the Chief of Protocol mentioned by Herr Gisevius, were
suddenly arrested. When I investigated their whereabouts, I discovered
that they had been removed to a so-called concentration camp. I sent for
Himmler and Heydrich and remonstrated with them, which resulted in a
very heated argument. I complained at once to Hitler, and these two
officials were released. I then asked them how they had been treated,
and both of them agreed in saying that, apart from the lack of freedom,
the treatment had not been bad.
The concentration camp to which they had been taken was the camp at
Oranienburg. Later on I learned of the existence of a camp at Dachau,
and in 1939 I also heard of Buchenwald, because the Czech students who
had been arrested by Himmler were taken there.
The extent of the concentration camps as it has become known here, and
in particular the treatment of the prisoners and the existence of the
extermination camps, are things which I learned about for the first time
here in Nuremberg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: By whom and when were you appointed Reich Foreign
Minister, and how did that appointment come about?
VON NEURATH: I was appointed Foreign Minister on 2 June 1932 by Reich
President Von Hindenburg. Already in 1929, after Stresemann’s death,
Hindenburg had wanted to appoint me Foreign Minister. At that time I
refused, because in view of the party conditions existing in the
Reichstag in those days I saw no possibility for a stable foreign
policy. I was not a member of any of the 30 or so parties, so that I
would not have been able to have found any kind of support in the
Reichstag of those days.
Hindenburg, however, obtained my promise that I would answer his call if
the fatherland should find itself in an emergency.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection may I quote the telegram in
which the Foreign Office informed Herr Von Neurath of the fact that the
Reich President desired that he should take a leading position in the
Government at this time. This is a copy of the telegram which was
transmitted to him by telephone, Number 6 in my document book:
“For the Ambassador personally, to be deciphered by himself.
“Berlin, 31 May 1932.”
It was addressed to London.
“The Reich President requests you, in view of your former
promise, to take over the Foreign Ministry in the presidential
cabinet now being formed, which will be made up of right-wing
personalities free from political party allegiance and will be
supported not so much by the Reichstag as by the authority of
the Reich President. The Reich President addresses an urgent
appeal to you not to refuse your services to the fatherland in
this difficult hour. Should you not be able to give an
affirmative answer immediately I ask you to return at once.”
It is signed by Bülow, who was at that time the State Secretary of the
Foreign Office.
I also draw your attention to a copy of the letter from the chief of the
Political Affairs Department of the Foreign Office about Neurath’s
appointment to the post of Reich Foreign Minister, a letter which had
been written to a friend of his, Ambassador Rümelin, at the time. The
writer of this letter, Ministerial Director Dr. Köpke, will confirm the
correctness of the letter, in his examination before this Tribunal, that
is to say, the fact that this is the carbon copy of the original
addressed to Ambassador Rümelin.
I believe, therefore, that at this moment I need not read the document.
The document is Number Neurath-8 in my document book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you light-heartedly decide to answer
Von Hindenburg’s call and take over that difficult post, doubly
difficult as it was in those days?
VON NEURATH: No, not at all. I was not the least bit keen on taking over
the post of Foreign Minister at that time. I liked my post as Ambassador
in London, enjoyed good relations there with the Government and the
Royal Family, and I was hoping, therefore, that I could continue to be
of service to both countries, Great Britain and Germany. I could not
simply overlook Hindenburg’s appeal, but even then I did not decide
until after I had had a lengthy personal discussion with him in which I
stated my own aims and ideas regarding German foreign policy and in
which I assured myself of his support of a peaceful development and the
means of attaining equality for Germany, the strengthening of her
position in the council of nations and the regaining of sovereignty over
German national territory.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I in this connection refer to the affidavit of
former Ambassador Prüfer, which I have already cited and which is Number
Neurath-4 in my document book. I should like to quote from this
document, Paragraph 7, which refers to the appointment of the defendant
by Hindenburg. In my German text this is Page 27.
“In the circles of the higher officials of the Foreign Office it
was a well-known fact that when Hindenburg appointed Hitler
Reich Chancellor he practically attached the condition that
Neurath should remain in office as Foreign Minister. Baron
Neurath in no way pushed himself into this office when he
assumed it in 1932. On the contrary, as early as 1929, when
Hindenburg had asked him to accept the post as Minister, he had
declined on the grounds that, not being a member of a party and
thus being without party support, he could not consider himself
suited to take over a Ministry in a State ruled according to the
parliamentary principle. It was not until 1932, when Reich
President Von Hindenburg, whom he especially revered, formed his
first so-called Presidential Cabinet that Neurath dropped his
misgivings and entered this Cabinet as Foreign Minister.”
What was your judgment of the internal situation at the time?
VON NEURATH: The development of party relations in 1932 had come to such
a head that I was of the opinion that there were only two possibilities:
Either there would have to be some participation of the National
Socialist Party, which had grown strong in numbers, in the Government;
or, should this demand be turned down, there would be civil war.
The details regarding the formation of the Government in 1933 and
Hitler’s coming to power have been thoroughly described by the Defendant
Von Papen.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your own judgment of, and your attitude
toward Hitler, toward National Socialism in general and National
Socialist ideas and, in particular, toward the Party?
VON NEURATH: I did not know Hitler personally. I despised the methods of
the Party during its struggle for power in the State; its ideas were not
known to me in detail. Some of them, particularly in the socialist
sphere, seemed good to me; others I considered revolutionary phenomena
which would be gradually worn away in the manner I had observed during
the German revolution in 1918, and later during the Fascist revolution
in Italy as well. On the whole, however, I was not in sympathy with
them; in any case, in those days I considered that a decisive role
played by Hitler and the National Socialist Party in German politics, or
Hitler’s solo leadership of German politics, was wrong and not in the
interest of Germany, especially not in the interest of German foreign
policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I in this connection quote another passage
from the afore-mentioned affidavit of Ambassador Prüfer, Number
Neurath-4 in my document book on Page 28. It is interesting insofar as
Prüfer was an official in the defendant’s Ministry:
“Baron von Neurath was not a National Socialist. By reason of
his origin and tradition he was decidedly opposed to the
National Socialist doctrine, insofar as it contained radical and
violent principles. This aversion, which he did not attempt to
conceal, was particularly directed toward excesses by branches
of the Party against people with different views, especially
against the Jews and persons of partly Jewish ancestry; beyond
that it was directed against the general interference of the
National Socialist Party in every vital expression of the German
people and State; in other words, against the claim to
totalitarianism, the Führer Principle, in short, against
dictatorship. During the years 1936 to 1938, when in my capacity
as head of the budget and personnel section I saw him very
frequently, Freiherr von Neurath told me, and others in my
presence, in unmistakable terms how much the increasingly
extreme tendency in German internal and foreign policy filled
him with anxiety and disgust.”
Mr. President, may I also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
the questionnaire of Count Schwerin von Krosigk, the former Reich
Minister of Finance, which is Number Neurath-25 in my document book.
Now, proceeding to your foreign political ideas, thoughts, and
principles, what was your attitude toward the Treaty of Versailles and
the League of Nations?
VON NEURATH: It is in the senseless and impossible provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, by which the economic system of the entire world was
brought into a state of disorder, that the roots of National Socialism
and with it the causes of the second World War are to be found. By
combining this Treaty with the League of Nations and by making the
League of Nations to a certain extent the guardian of the provisions of
this Treaty, its original purpose, namely, of creating understanding
among the nations and preserving the peace, became illusory. To be sure,
the statute allowed for the possibility of revision. But the League of
Nations Assembly made no use of this possibility. After the United
States had withdrawn from participation, and Russia, and later Japan
also, stood outside this so-called League of Nations, it consisted in
the large majority only of a collection of interested parties desiring
to maintain the status quo, which had been created precisely by the
Treaty of Versailles. Instead of removing the tensions which appeared
again and again in the course of time, it was the aim of this assembly
not to alter the existing state of affairs at all. That a great and
honor-loving nation, discriminated against as it was by the Versailles
Treaty, could not stand for this for any length of time was something
which any farsighted statesman could recognize. And it was not only in
Germany that it was pointed out again and again that this must lead to
an evil end; but in Geneva, the playground of eloquent and vain
politicians, this fell upon deaf ears.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is undeniably a historic fact that German
foreign policy under all governments preceding Hitler’s had aimed at
bringing about a change in the Treaty of Versailles, though exclusively
by peaceful means. Was this policy also that of Hindenburg, or would
Hindenburg perhaps have been disposed to choose another solution, a
solution by violence and war?
VON NEURATH: No, in no case; not even if Germany had had the military
means for that purpose. He told me again and again that a new war would
have to be avoided at all costs.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to, and
ask you to take judicial notice of, an extract from a speech made by
Count Bernstorff, who was Germany’s representative in the League of
Nations, on 25 September 1928. It is Number Neurath-34 of my Document
Book 2. The translation, however, is not yet available. It will be
submitted, I hope, on Monday. I also refer to, and beg you to take
judicial notice of, an extract from the speech of former Reich
Chancellor Brüning in Kiel on 19 May 1931, which is Number Neurath-36 in
my Document Book 2. Also to an extract from the speech made by former
Reich Foreign Minister Curtius, the successor and friend of Reich
Chancellor Stresemann who had died shortly before, to the League of
Nations Assembly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was telling Herr Von Lüdinghausen
that I have got Volume II. I do not know if the Tribunal have the
English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I do not think we have. Sir David, have the
Prosecution agreed to relevancy, the admissibility of these documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we are not going to make an objection
to such short references as have been given so far. Your Lordship will
appreciate that I have already stated the position of the Prosecution
with regard to the Treaty of Versailles, but as long as it is kept
within reasonable bounds as a matter of introduction, I am not taking
any formal objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Herr Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal has ruled out of
evidence a variety of documents which are alleged to show the injustice
of the Treaty of Versailles; as the Prosecution have adopted the
attitude which they have, the Tribunal will regard these as mere
historical documents, but the matter is really irrelevant. The only
question is whether the defendants have attempted to overturn the Treaty
of Versailles by force. We are not concerned with the justice or
injustice.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I did not submit the document
in order to criticize the Versailles Treaty. I merely wanted to
establish the fact that previous governments, too, had pursued with
peaceful means the same aims which my client later pursued as Reich
Foreign Minister, so that under his direction, therefore, there was no
change whatsoever in the nature and aims of German foreign policy with
reference to the Western Powers. That was the reason, and not criticism
as such.
THE PRESIDENT: I know, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, but all the evidence that
the defendant has been giving in the last few minutes was criticism of
the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, that was his general introduction, but I was
only trying to prove the continuity of policy.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were your own views regarding the
continuation of the foreign policy of the Reich with reference to the
question which we have just dealt with?
VON NEURATH: It was my view that the solution of the various political
problems could be achieved only by peaceful means and step by step.
Complete equality for Germany in all fields, in the military field
therefore as well, and also the restoration of sovereignty in the entire
territory of the Reich and the elimination of any discrimination were
prerequisite conditions. But to achieve this was primarily the first
task of German foreign policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should once
more like to refer you to the affidavit by Ambassador Prüfer, which is
Number Neurath-4 in my document book, and I should like, with the
permission of the Tribunal, to quote from this, in order to support the
statements just made by the defendant, a part of Paragraph 12:
“Neurath’s policy was one of international understanding and
peace. This policy was not inconsistent with the fact that Herr
Von Neurath also strove for a revision of the severe provisions
of the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about
exclusively by negotiation and in no case by force. All
utterances and directives of his which I as his co-worker ever
heard or saw moved in this direction. The fact that Baron
Neurath considered himself a defender of the peace is perhaps
best illustrated by a statement he made when leaving the Foreign
Office. He declared at that time to a small group of his
colleagues that now war could probably no longer be avoided. He
presumably meant by this that now foreign policy would be
transferred from his hands into those of reckless persons.”
Herr Von Neurath, then you agreed entirely with Hindenburg in absolutely
rejecting any use of force for the purpose of achieving this objective,
the revision of the Treaty of Versailles; and you considered the
attainment of this goal possible and were a determined opponent of any
belligerent developments, which you considered the greatest possible
misfortune, not only for Germany but for the entire world?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Germany and the whole world were still in the midst of
the serious economic crisis which had been caused by the regulations of
the Treaty of Versailles. Any new development of belligerency,
therefore, could lead only to a great disaster.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On 2 June 1932, a few days after you had entered
your new office as Foreign Minister, the meeting of the so-called
Reparations Conference began in Lausanne, and you and the new Reich
Chancellor, Von Papen, participated. Will you tell us very briefly what
the purpose of that conference was?
VON NEURATH: The reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, which
had never been definitely fixed, were now formally to be settled
completely, that is, the final sum was to be decided on. This purpose
was accomplished.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At the same time, was there not a meeting of the
Disarmament Conference at Geneva?
VON NEURATH: Yes, at almost the same time these negotiations were also
taking place.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection, for the purpose
of general understanding, I should like to point out that the
institution of the Disarmament Conference goes back to a resolution
passed by the League of Nations on 25 September 1928, in which the close
connection between international security, that is to say, peace among
all the European States, and the limitation of armament was emphasized.
In this connection, I should like to refer to the text of the resolution
passed by the League of Nations, which is Number Neurath-33 in my
document book. That is on Page 90 of Document Book 2.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Can you give us a brief account of the
course of these disarmament negotiations?
VON NEURATH: Well, naturally it is very difficult to give a short
account. The Disarmament Conference had been created by the League of
Nations for the purpose of bringing about the disarmament of all
nations, which was provided for in Article 8 as an equivalent for the
German disarmament which had already been carried out by 1927. The
negotiations during this Disarmament Conference were, however, suspended
after a short time, despite the objections of the German
representatives. The preceding negotiations and this adjournment made it
quite clear, even at that time, that those states which had not disarmed
were not prepared to carry through their own disarmament in accordance
with the standards and methods applied to Germany’s previous
disarmament. This fact made it impossible for Germany to accept a
resolution which had been proposed to the Disarmament Conference at this
time, and the German representative therefore received instructions to
declare that Germany would not participate in the work of the
Disarmament Conference as long as Germany’s equal right to equal
participation in the results of the conference was not recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, shall we adjourn now?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in regard to the question just put
and answered, I should like to refer to several documents and ask you to
take official notice of them. I am submitting, or have submitted in my
Document Book 2, excerpts from the German memorandum of 29 August 1932,
in Document Number Neurath-40; excerpts from an interview of Von Neurath
with the representative of the Wolff Telegraph Bureau, the official news
bureau of the German Reich, in Document Number Neurath-41 of Document
Book 2; excerpts from a statement by Herr Von Neurath to the
representatives of the German press on 30 September 1932, in Document
Number Neurath-45 of Document Book 2; an excerpt from a letter of the
defendant to the President of the Disarmament Conference, Number
Neurath-43 of Document Book 2; and finally, I should like to refer to a
speech by the German representative at the Disarmament Conference in
Geneva, which is Number Neurath-39 in my document book which shows the
development of the views and attitude of the defendant, and thereby that
of German policy, toward the disarmament negotiations which were resumed
on the 16th at the Disarmament Conference.
Herr Von Neurath, in the documents submitted above you emphasize that
the disarmament question must be solved exclusively by peaceful means,
and that no violence of any kind should be used. Did this tendency, as
expressed here, actually correspond to your conviction, and did it
represent the guiding principle, and indeed the exclusive guiding
principle, of your policy?
VON NEURATH: Yes. During the whole period when I was Reich Foreign
Minister no means were used which were not internationally customary and
permissible.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the 16th the negotiations in the Disarmament
Conference were to begin again. What was the result of this meeting of
the Disarmament Conference?
VON NEURATH: England finally suggested a—at first the Disarmament
Conference accomplished nothing; but later there resulted the so-called
Five-Power Declaration in December 1932, which had been suggested by
England. This declaration recognized Germany’s claim to equal rights and
to the elimination of those provisions of the Versailles Treaty which
discriminated against Germany.
After this declaration, which was made by the war powers and later by
the Disarmament Conference or the Council of the League of Nations
itself, Germany’s equal rights were recognized for all time. Therefore,
Germany could assert her right to renounce Part V of the Versailles
Treaty by referring to the obligation of general disarmament undertaken
by the signatory powers. This Five-Power Declaration provided the
necessary condition for Germany’s taking part in the deliberations of
the Disarmament Conference once more.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer to the text
of the Five-Power Declaration of 11 December 1932. It is Number
Neurath-47a in my Document Book 2. I should also like to refer to an
article by the defendant in the _Heimatdienst_ on this recognition of
equal rights for Germany. The text is in Number Neurath-48 of my
Document Book 2. That was prior to the seizure of power.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, in January 1933 Hitler was appointed
Reich Chancellor; and thus there came about the so-called seizure of
power by the NSDAP. Did you participate in any form whatsoever in this
seizure of power and in Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor?
VON NEURATH: No, I had no part in any stage of the negotiations
regarding the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. No one, not
even the Reich President, and certainly no party leader, asked me for my
opinion. I had no close relations with any of the party leaders,
especially not with the leaders of the National Socialist Party. With
regard to this Göring and Papen have testified with absolute
correctness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What feelings did you yourself have on this
question of Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor, in other words, on
the question of the seizure of power by the Party?
VON NEURATH: I had serious misgivings, but, as I said at the beginning,
in view of the party situation and the impossibility of forming a
government against the National Socialists I saw no other possibility
unless one wanted to start a civil war, about the outcome of which there
could be no doubt in view of the overwhelming number of Hitler’s
followers.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In view of your attitude as you have just
expressed it, for what reason did you remain Reich Foreign Minister in
the newly-formed Hitler Government?
VON NEURATH: At the urgent desire of Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like in this connection to refer to the
affidavit of Baroness Ritter, Number Neurath-3 in my Document Book 1,
which has already been mentioned, and with the permission of the Court I
should like to read a short passage from it:
“When in 1933 a new Government was formed, with Hitler as Reich
Chancellor, Hindenburg required from Hitler the condition that
Neurath should remain as Foreign Minister. Accordingly
Hindenburg asked Neurath to stay, and Neurath complied with
Hindenburg’s wish in accordance with his previous promise. I
know that in the course of time Neurath frequently had serious
misgivings, but that he was of the opinion that it was his
patriotic duty to remain.
“In this connection I recall the especially fitting comparison
of a large rock which by its position right in the middle of the
river can decrease the force of the raging current, while on the
shore it would remain without influence. He frequently declared,
‘When the Germans often wonder why I am co-operating with this
Government, they are always thinking only of the prevailing
deficiencies, without appreciating how much additional disaster
I am still able to prevent. They forget what strength it takes
to advance alone through the wall of “Myrmidons”....’”
By that Baroness von Ritter means the close circle surrounding
Hitler—to advance through this to Hitler.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know for what reasons Hindenburg
wanted you to remain, that is, to enter Hitler’s Cabinet as Foreign
Minister?
VON NEURATH: To secure the continuation of a peaceful foreign policy,
and to prevent Hitler from taking the rash steps which were so possible
in view of his impulsive nature; in one word, to act as a brake.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did not Hindenburg make it an actual condition for
Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor that you should remain as
Foreign Minister, that is, enter Hitler’s Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes, he told me so later.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to the
affidavit of former Ambassador Curt Prüfer, Number Neurath-4 in my
document book, and I should like to read a short excerpt from it: “Since
Hindenburg was a conservative, his basic political attitude....”
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Page 27, Exhibit Number 4.
“Since Hindenburg was a conservative, his political attitude was
probably about the same as that of Baron Neurath. There was no
doubt in the mind of anybody who was even slightly aware of the
conditions that Hindenburg himself, in vesting power in Hitler,
did this reluctantly and only under the heavy pressure of
domestic political developments. If under such circumstances he
insisted, and actually made it a condition, that Baron Neurath,
his former foreign political adviser, should remain in office,
this undoubtedly was due to the fact that he wanted to assure
himself of at least one steady pillar for foreign policy, that
is, for peace, in the midst of the seething new forces which
certainly appeared sinister and displeasing to him personally.”
Did you talk to Hindenburg about this, and did you tell him of your
reluctance, your misgivings, about joining the Hitler Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I did not leave him in any doubt about that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did Hindenburg answer?
VON NEURATH: He told me that I would have to make this sacrifice, else
he would no longer have a single quiet hour; that Hitler had not yet had
any experience whatsoever in matters of foreign policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it only then and for this reason that you
decided to join Hitler’s Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: Yes. The British prosecutor, Sir David, in the session of 1
March of this year, declared that by joining Hitler’s Cabinet I had sold
my honor and reputation. I refrain from commenting further on this most
serious insult.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like in this connection to
quote a sentence from the _Diary of Ambassador Dodd 1933-37_ which is
Number Neurath-13 in my document book. I should like to quote the entry
under 6 April 1934, on Page 100; that is Page 55 of the German text,
which reads as follows. It is a remark of Dodd’s which refers to Herr
Von Neurath:
“I am sorry for these clear-headed Germans who know world
affairs very well and who must work for their country and yet
submit to the ignorance and autocracy of Hitler and his
followers.”
In these talks with Hindenburg did you promise him that you would remain
in the Cabinet as long as it would be at all possible for you to guide
the foreign political course in a peaceful direction and avoid warlike
developments, even if at some future time Hindenburg should die?
VON NEURATH: Yes. He repeatedly expressed that wish to me.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This was, no doubt, the reason why you remained in
office after the death of Hindenburg?
VON NEURATH: Yes. But also because in the meantime I had discovered that
Hitler, because of his excitable temperament, often let himself be
carried away to take rash steps and in this way could endanger peace. On
many occasions, however, I had also learned by experience that in such
cases he would listen to my objections.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution, as you are aware, has
particularly charged you with entering and remaining in Hitler’s Cabinet
as Foreign Minister, above all, with remaining in the Cabinet after
Hindenburg’s death.
VON NEURATH: How they can reproach me for that is completely
inexplicable to me. I never belonged to a party; I never swore
allegiance to party programs, and I never swore any allegiance to party
leaders either. I served under the Imperial Government, was asked to
re-enter the diplomatic service by the Socialist Government under Ebert,
and was appointed Minister and Ambassador by it. I have served under
Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative governments. Without identifying
myself with their various programs, and often in opposition to the party
government of the time, I have pursued only the interests of my
fatherland in co-operation with the other powers.
There was no reason for me not to attempt to do the same under Hitler
and the National Socialist Party. One could put opposition opinions into
effect with any prospect of success only from the inside as a member of
the Government. Freedom of speech and the use of the press were
forbidden in Germany, or at least made difficult. Personal freedom was
endangered. Moreover, it is not greatly different in other countries; I
mean by that participation in the governments of various parties, and I
might cite the example of Reynaud, or of Lord Vansittart, whom I know
well and who was in the English Foreign Office as an influential State
Secretary under conservative as well as labor governments.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, after 30 June 1934 and the bloody events of
that time, why did you still remain in the Government? Why did you not
resign at that time? You know that the Prosecution has reproached other
defendants with remaining in the Government under these circumstances.
VON NEURATH: Aside from the fact that from the description which Hitler
gave of the events of the Röhm Putsch at that time I had to conclude
that it had been a serious revolt, I have known a number of revolutions
from my own experience, for example, the Russian revolution and, as I
already said, the Fascist revolution in Rome, and I have seen that in
such revolutions innocent people very often have to suffer. In addition
I adapted myself entirely to Hindenburg’s attitude; even if I had wanted
to resign he would never have let me do so.
As an illustration that I had to acknowledge the seriousness of this
revolt and the truth of Hitler’s description of it, I should like to
mention briefly that on this day, 30 June, a brother of the Emperor of
Japan was in Berlin and I had to invite him to dinner. Generaloberst Von
Fritsch was also present at this dinner and a number of other high
officers and officials of the Foreign Office. The Prince did not make
his appearance at the dinner; that is, he came an hour late. When I
asked for the reason I learned that my house had also been surrounded by
the SA and the Prince had been prevented by them from entering my house.
A few days later Generaloberst Von Fritsch, after he had described the
events on the military side, asked me whether I knew that he himself,
and I as well, had been on Herr Röhm’s list. Thus this revolt was not
quite as harmless as was described here, I believe, by the witness
Gisevius.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Before you decided to enter the Hitler Cabinet,
did you talk to Hitler himself about the principles and the line of
foreign policy which you intended to pursue?
VON NEURATH: Yes, in detail. I explained to him that only by way of
negotiation and by a policy conforming to the international situation
could we achieve our ends. This would demand patience. Hitler seemed to
understand this at the time, and I had the same impression during the
following years, too. I am convinced that he at that time entirely
approved the continuation of this policy and honestly meant it. He
repeatedly emphasized that he knew what war was like and did not want to
experience another one.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like once more to refer to the affidavit
of Ambassador Prüfer, Number Neurath-4 in my Document Book 1, and, with
the permission of the Court I should like to quote the following:
“Neurath’s policy was one of international understanding and
peace....”—That is Page 29—“This policy was not consistent
with the fact that Herr Von Neurath also strove for a revision
of the severe provisions of the Versailles Treaty. However, he
wanted to bring this about exclusively by negotiation, in no
case by force.”
Then on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you not read this already?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I want now to read a passage following this:
“I am certain that Freiherr von Neurath, as well as other career
officials in the Foreign Office, had no concrete knowledge of
any possible plans for violence on Hitler’s part. On the
contrary, during the first years after the change of government
one generally lent credence to the oft-repeated declaration of
peaceful intentions by the National Socialist leaders. I am even
of the opinion that the latter themselves, during the first
years, did not want to bring about a war. Rather was it believed
and hoped in the highest circles of the Party, to which Neurath
did not belong at all, that it would be possible to continue
winning cheap laurels without war through the hitherto
successfully practiced tactics of bluff and sudden surprise. It
was not until later that the megalomania arising from the belief
in their own luck and their own infallibility and invincibility,
which had assumed mystic proportions caused by unrestrained
sycophancy, led Hitler and his immediate entourage to include
war among their instruments of political power. We, the
officials of the foreign service, and with us Baron von Neurath,
our chief, became aware of this development only gradually and
as outsiders. Until about the beginning of 1936 only a very few
officials had been admitted into the Party which, for its part,
treated the staff of the Foreign Office, including the recently
admitted members, with suspicion and distrust.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is this not really all argument?
You are reading at great length.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have already finished, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you yourself see in the Party program
of the National Socialists any intention or desire to break with other
powers?
VON NEURATH: No. Contrary to the allegations of the Prosecution, which
do not gain in accuracy by repetition, I cannot possibly detect any
intention to resort to armed hostilities in the event of failure to
reach these aims, and from Hitler’s various statements I know that he
himself at that time, that is, at the beginning of his term of
Government, had no such intentions. He wanted as close an understanding
as possible with England, and a stable, peaceful relationship with
France, which would remove the ancient enmity of the two peoples. The
latter, he told me, was the special reason for his publicly declaring
after the Saar plebiscite that he was renouncing once and for all any
attempts to regain Alsace.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution charges in particular that from
the following sentences of the Party program you must have known that
the Nazis were pursuing aggressive foreign political ends and that they
thus were aiming at war from the very beginning. It reads:
“We demand the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany on the
basis of the right of nations to self-determination. We demand
equal rights for the German people in respect to other nations,
the repeal of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty of St.
Germain.”
Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: Even today I fail to detect any aggressive spirit in these
sentences which have just been quoted. The right of self-determination
is a basic condition in the modern state, recognized by international
law. It was also the basis, theoretically at least, of the Treaty of
Versailles, and on the same basis the plebiscites were carried out in
the border areas. The union of all Germans on the basis of this
recognized principle was therefore an absolutely permissible political
postulate, as far as international law and foreign policy are concerned.
The removal of the discriminatory terms of the Treaty of Versailles by
changing the terms of the Treaty was the essential aim of German foreign
policy, as also of all bourgeois and Social Democrat governments which
preceded the National Socialists. I cannot see how one can deduce any
aggressive intention if a people strives to free itself from the burdens
of a treaty which it feels to be unjust, provided that this is done by
peaceful means.
And I should like to add that this was the foreign policy which I
represented until the moment, at the end of 1937, when I had to realize
that Hitler was also considering war a means in his policy. Before, as
stated above, there had never been any mention of that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the effect of Hitler’s seizure of power
in Germany on foreign countries?
VON NEURATH: A perceptible tension and distrust of the new Government
was the immediate result. The antagonism was unmistakable. It was
especially clear to me at the World Economic Conference in 1933 in
London, where I had an opportunity to talk to many old friends and
members of other delegations and to inform myself definitely of this
change of feeling. The practical effect of this feeling was greater
caution in all negotiations, including the session of the Disarmament
Conference which was just reopening.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer in this
connection to a letter which is Number Neurath-11 in my document book.
It is a report by Herr Von Neurath to Reich President Von Hindenburg
from the London Conference. It is dated 19 June 1933. I shall quote only
a very short passage: “Unfortunately I have to state that the
impressions I received here are most alarming.”
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Page 47.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: “In view of the reports of the chiefs of
our foreign missions I was prepared for many bad manifestations,
many gloomy events, and disturbing opinions on the part of
foreign countries. Nevertheless, despite all my apprehensions, I
had hopes that much of this would perhaps be only transitory,
that much could straighten itself out. However, my apprehensions
proved more justified than my hopes. I hardly recognized London
again. I found a mood there, first in the English world and then
in international circles, which showed a retrogression in the
political and psychological attitude toward Germany which cannot
be taken seriously enough.”
Now further negotiations were held in the main committee of the
Disarmament Conference in the winter of 1933-34. Can you briefly
describe the course of these negotiations? It is important in view of
later events.
VON NEURATH: A French plan of 14 November 1932 was the basis of the
negotiations at that time. This plan, surprisingly enough, provided for
the transformation of professional armies into armies with a short
period of service, for according to the opinion presented by the French
representative at that time only armies with a short period of service
could be considered defensive armies, while standing armies consisting
of professional soldiers would have an offensive character.
This point of view on the part of France was completely new and was not
only exactly the opposite of France’s previous point of view, but it was
also a change from the provisions laid down in the Versailles Treaty for
the disarmament of Germany. This meant for Germany—at whom it was
obviously aimed—the elimination of its standing army of 100,000 men. In
addition, by this new plan France let it be seen that she herself did
not want to disarm. A statement by the French representative,
Paul-Boncour, in the session of 8 February 1933 confirmed this.
France also maintained the same point of view in the subsequent
discussions about the so-called working program presented by England on
30 January 1933 by means of which England wanted to speed up the
negotiations of the conference. This attempt to expedite the
negotiations, which aimed at adjusting the diverging tendencies of the
various powers, failed because of the stubborn attitude of France. A
change in the program was then made in an attempt to get over these
difficulties, whereby the question of army strength was first discussed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to submit, and
ask the Court to take judicial notice of, Document Number 49 in my
Document Book 2. It contains excerpts from the English working program
of 30 January 1933, and also from my Documents Numbers 46 and 47, which
are likewise in Document Book 2. They contain excerpts from the French
plan for the unification of continental European army systems. Finally,
Number 47 of my Document Book 2 contains excerpts from the speech by
Herr Von Neurath at the session of the League of Nations Assembly on 7
December 1932, which describes the negotiations up to that time.
What was the attitude of the Disarmament Conference on the question of
the treatment of disarmament as such, that is, the reduction of army
strength?
VON NEURATH: To discuss this I must refer to notes to a great extent,
because it is not possible to keep all these details, motions, and
formulations in one’s head. The subject matter goes into detail so much
that I can only do it by means of notes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we have been the whole morning at
this, and we haven’t yet really got up to 1933. The Tribunal thinks this
is being done in far too great detail. As I have already pointed out, a
great deal of it is an attempt to show that the Treaty of Versailles was
unjust, which is irrelevant.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, if I may say the following, I do
not wish to show the injustice of the Versailles Treaty; but I must...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, will you kindly get on? As I
say, we think you are going into it in far too great detail.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
What happened now, Herr Von Neurath, in order to get the negotiations
going again? On 16 March the British Prime Minister submitted a new
plan...
THE PRESIDENT: We have nothing to do with the disarmament program.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must nevertheless show what the
entire background and mood were, in order to explain more exactly the
motives for our withdrawal from the League of Nations, with which we
have been reproached; for Germany’s withdrawal followed in the fall of
1933...
THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing against Von Neurath in having influenced
Germany to resign from the League of Nations, is there?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, there is. I can explain the withdrawal from
the League of Nations only on the basis of the preceding events. I
cannot say in three words that this and that was the reason; rather must
I explain how gradually a certain atmosphere came about, and what the
circumstances were which left no other choice to the German Government
except to leave the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations,
for these factors explain the decision of the German Government to
rearm. In history and in politics decisions and actions are always the
consequence of what went before them. In the development of these
political conditions we are indeed concerned with a period of
development extending over several years, not with a spontaneous event
or a spontaneous decision. In the case of a military order, to be sure,
I cannot say that this order came about through orders of the other
side; rather must I describe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we do not need all this argument.
We only desire you to get on. I am pointing out to you that you have
been nearly the whole of the morning, and we have not yet got up to
1933.
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I shall try to be very brief in coming to
this period of time, the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference.
The negotiations, as I said, dragged on the whole year, into the summer
of 1933. In the fall there was again a Disarmament Conference session in
which the same subject was more or less debated over again. Well, the
result of this conference was that disarmament was definitely refused by
the Western Powers and that was the reason why we then first of all
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference, since we considered useful
work there no longer possible. Following this, we also withdrew from the
League of Nations, since we had witnessed its failure in the most widely
different fields.
And so, quite briefly, that brings us up to the point which caused us to
withdraw from the League of Nations. The reasons which caused us to do
so at that time I have discussed explicitly in a speech which my defense
counsel can perhaps submit.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What date do you mean, Herr Von Neurath?
VON NEURATH: October 1933—16 October, a speech to the foreign press. In
this speech I said that the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference
and the League of Nations by no means meant that Germany refused to take
part in any negotiations or discussions, especially with the Western
Powers.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this speech is the excerpt on Page
59 in my document book. Since it is essentially the same thing that Herr
Von Neurath has just stated, except that it is in more detail, I am
prepared to forego reading the actual excerpt, as I had intended to do.
In this connection I must call attention to the documents which I have
submitted for this entire period of time which we have rather skipped
over, so that they will at least provide a picture of how things had
gradually come to a head by the middle of October. In this connection I
should like to refer to Document Neurath-56, a speech by Herr Von
Neurath to the foreign press; then Hitler’s appeal to the German people,
Number Neurath-58; to the document just quoted, Number Neurath-59; to
the German memorandum on the question of armament and equal rights of 18
December 1933, Document Neurath-61; Number Neurath-62, an interview with
Herr Von Neurath by the Berlin representative of _The New York Times_ on
29 December 1933; the German answer to the French memorandum of 1
January 1934, Number Neurath-64 in my Document Book 3; the German
memorandum of 13 March 1934, Number Neurath-67; the speech of the
President of the Disarmament Conference, Sir Nevile Henderson, of 10
April 1934, Number Neurath-68; and finally, the _aide-mémoire_ of the
Reich Government to the British Disarmament memorandum of 16 April,
Number Neurath-69.
I have just been informed that I gave the wrong first name. That was
Arthur Henderson.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the middle of April 1934 a very
important event occurred. Will you comment on this; for this
declaration, this note, caused a complete _volte-face_, a change in
European politics.
VON NEURATH: This was a French note which was addressed to the British
Government as an answer to a British inquiry and to a German memorandum
of 13 March 1934, which had dealt with the continuation of the
negotiations. The details are contained in this speech to the Berlin
press which has just been cited. With this French note, however, the
efforts to come to a settlement in the disarmament question again failed
because of the French Government’s “no.”
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to various documents on
this, which I have submitted in my Document Book 3; Number Neurath-66,
an excerpt from a speech by the Belgian Premier, Count Broqueville, of
March 1934; an excerpt from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, Number
Neurath-63; then Number Neurath-70, an excerpt from the note of the
French Government, which was just mentioned, to the British Government
on 17 April 1934; the speech of Foreign Minister Von Neurath, the
defendant, to representatives of the Berlin press, in which he commented
on this French note, Number Neurath-74 in my document book; finally, an
excerpt from the speech of the American delegate at the Disarmament
Conference, Norman Davis, of 29 May 1934. In these the sudden change in
European politics which I have just alluded to...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the number of that?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The last one, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Number Neurath-76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
VON NEURATH: I think that before I answer this question, I might perhaps
comment on something else. The Prosecution showed me a speech by Hitler
on 23 September 1939 to the commanders of the Army, in which he speaks
of the political and organizational measures which preceded the war.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that was on 23 September?
VON NEURATH: 23 September 1939. The Prosecution sees in the mention of
the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference
a sign of aggressive intentions which were already in existence at that
time, and reproaches me with this.
As I have repeatedly emphasized, up to 1937 there had never been any
talk at any time of any aggressive intentions or preparations for a war
of aggression. The speech mentioned by the Prosecution was made by
Hitler 6 years after these events and 18 months after my resignation as
Foreign Minister. It is clear that to a man like Hitler these events, at
such a moment, after the victorious termination of the Polish war,
appeared different from what they had actually been. These events,
however, cannot be judged afterwards, that is, before the date of the
speech, any more than German foreign policy can be judged today, but
they must be regarded from the point of view prevailing at the time at
which they took place.
And now in answer to your question: In my opinion the reasons lie, first
of all, more or less in the fact that the course of the preceding
diplomatic negotiations had shown that England and Italy no longer stood
unconditionally behind France and were no longer willing to support
France’s strictly antagonistic attitude toward the question of equal
rights for Germany. The same point of view was held by the neutral
states—Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—in a note
addressed to the Disarmament Conference on 14 April 1934. Therefore, at
the time France apparently feared being isolated and thus falling into
the danger of not being able to maintain her refusal to undergo any form
of disarmament. I myself commented in detail on this attitude on the
part of France, from the German point of view, in my afore-mentioned
speech to the German press on 27 April 1934, I believe.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the further consequences of this French
note of 17 April, as far as the attitude of French foreign policy was
concerned?
VON NEURATH: Just a few days after this note the French Foreign
Minister, M. Louis Barthou, undertook a trip to the East, to Warsaw and
Prague. As was soon apparent, the purpose of this trip to Poland and
Czechoslovakia was to prepare the ground for a resumption of diplomatic
relations between these countries, and the other countries of the
so-called “Little Entente,” and the Soviet Union and thus to smooth the
way for the inclusion of Russia as a participant in European politics.
Barthou’s efforts were successful. Poland as well as Czechoslovakia and
Romania resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On a second trip
Barthou was able to get the agreement of all the states of the Little
Entente to the Eastern pact proposed by France and Russia.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were not negotiations undertaken at the same time
for an Eastern pact which later also proved to be an instrument directed
against Germany?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I just mentioned it. An Eastern pact was worked out
and presented which we would have accepted, as far as the basic
principle was concerned, but which then came to naught because we were
supposed to undertake obligations which we could not keep, namely an
obligation to give aid in all cases of conflict which might arise among
the Eastern nations. We were in no position to do this, and thus the
Eastern pact came to naught.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I, in connection with the statements just
made, refer to three documents in my Document Book 3; Number Neurath-72,
an official communiqué on 24 April 1934 about the Warsaw discussions of
the French Foreign Minister; Number Neurath-73, an official communiqué
about the Prague discussions of the French Foreign Minister on 27 April
1934; and an excerpt from a speech of the French Foreign Minister of 30
May 1934, Number Neurath-77.
What was your further policy after the rather abrupt breaking-off of
negotiations caused by this French note?
VON NEURATH: We tried first of all by means of negotiations with the
individual powers to bring about permanent and real peace on the basis
of the practical recognition of our equal rights and general
understanding with all peoples. I had given the German missions abroad
the task of carrying on talks to this effect with the respective
governments.
In order to get negotiations going again, Hitler had decided to accept
an invitation from Mussolini for a friendly talk in Venice. The purpose
of this meeting, as Mussolini later said, was to attempt to disperse the
clouds which were darkening the political horizon of Europe.
A few days after his return from Venice Hitler made an important speech
in which he reaffirmed Germany’s desire for peace.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like in this connection to
refer to my Document Number Neurath-80 in Document Book 3, which is an
excerpt from this Hitler speech in Gera on 17 June 1934—only the part
of interest from the foreign political point of view, of course.
Would you like to break off now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal hopes that on Monday,
when you continue, you will be able to deal in less detail with this
political history, which, of course, is very well known to everyone who
has lived through it, and particularly to the Tribunal who have heard it
all gone into before here.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I shall endeavor to do so, Mr. President.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND DAY
Monday, 24 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, I have been told, and I also
heard it on the radio, that yesterday apparently a mistake arose,
possibly due to poor translation, regarding your activity from 1903 to
1914. Perhaps you can repeat it, for I believe that the Court also
misunderstood your statement.
VON NEURATH: It probably concerns my stay in London. From 1903 to 1907 I
was in London, and after that I was in the Foreign Office in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then we will continue the presentation of your
policy as Foreign Minister. I should like to ask the following
questions:
In the fact that during your period of office as Foreign Minister, in
the spring of 1935, general rearmament was begun, compulsory military
service was reintroduced, and the Luftwaffe was created, the Prosecution
sees proof of your guilt in the alleged conspiracy against peace. Will
you comment on this?
VON NEURATH: First, I should like to emphasize that there was no
question of war plans in Germany in this year and in the following
years. I am also perfectly convinced that at that time neither Hitler
nor his entourage had any aggressive plans, or even considered any
aggressive plans, for that would not have been possible without my
knowing about it.
Rearmament as such involves no threat to peace unless it is decided to
use the newly made weapons for purposes other than defense. There was no
such decision and no such preparation at that time. The same charge of
preparations for aggressive war could be held against all the
neighboring states of Germany, who were rearming in precisely...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this is argument, not
evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must hear how things appeared to
him. Decisions for action can only be excused if I explain...
THE PRESIDENT: No, we are not prepared to hear argument in the course of
evidence. It is evidence for him to say that there were no plans made at
that time for offensive action, but it is argument to say that
rearmament does not necessarily involve offensive action. We do not
desire to hear argument at this stage.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
Then please answer the question once more, whether there were in fact no
plans to use the weapons created by rearmament for any aggressive
purposes or for other violent action?
VON NEURATH: That is what I just said. I do not believe I need repeat
it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What reasons were there, what facts, which made
the situation of Germany appear particularly perilous?
VON NEURATH: At that time Germany could not help feeling she was
encircled by her highly armed neighbors. Russia and France had concluded
a mutual assistance pact which could only be called a military alliance.
It was immediately followed by a similar treaty between Russia and
Czechoslovakia. According to her own statements, Russia had increased
the peacetime strength of her army by more than half. How strong it
actually was could not be ascertained. In France, under the leadership
of Pétain, efforts were being made to strengthen the Army considerably.
Already in 1934 Czechoslovakia had introduced 2-year military service.
On 1 March 1935 France issued a new defense law, which also increased
the period of military service. This whole development, which had come
about in a few months, could only be considered as an immediate threat.
Germany could no longer be a defenseless and inactive spectator. In view
of these facts the decision which Hitler then made to reintroduce
compulsory military service and gradually to build up an army of 36
divisions was not an act which seriously threatened the neighboring
countries bound together by alliances.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
ask you to take judicial notice of the following documents in my
document book:
Number 87, a document on the entry of the Soviet Union into the League
of Nations of 18 September 1934, in Document Book 3. Number 89, also in
Document Book 3, is a statement of the reporter of the Army Committee of
the French Chamber, of 23 November 1931, on the entente with Russia.
Number 91, in Document Book 3, is the Russian-French Protocol to the
Eastern Pact negotiations of 5 December 1934.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I should like to say that Document 89 has
not been submitted to us as yet. Therefore, it has not been possible to
examine this document and to say whether or not this document is
relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get the book you will have the right to object
to the document, if necessary. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen is only telling us
what documents he contends support the evidence which has just been
given, that is all. He is offering these documents in evidence, and as
soon as you get the book and can scrutinize the document, you will have
the opportunity of making an objection to its admissibility.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly the point, Mr. President. I wished to
reserve for myself the right to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we agree with you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then comes Document 92, in Document Book 3, the
call to the Army made by the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic
on 28 December 1934.
In Document Book 3, Number 96 is the French Government declaration of 15
March 1935.
In Document Book 3, Number 79 is a report of the Czech Minister in
Paris, Osusky, of 15 June 1934.
Document 101 is the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact of 2 May 1935.
Document 94 is an excerpt from the speech of the French President,
Flandin, to the French Chamber on 5 February 1935.
I ask you to take judicial notice of these documents.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was Germany’s decision to rearm intended
to mean that she would discontinue all further co-operation in
international efforts to limit general rearmament?
VON NEURATH: No, by no means. An English inquiry as to whether Germany
would be ready to continue to participate in general disarmament
negotiations in the same manner and to the same extent as laid down in
the so-called London Communiqué of February 1935 was immediately
answered in the affirmative. On 18 March—that is, 2 days after the
introduction of military service—the Embassy in London was instructed
to resume negotiations and, in particular, to suggest an agreement to
limit the strength of the Navy.
In May 1935 Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag, in which he expounded
a concrete German plan for peace. He emphasized particularly the German
will for peace, and again declared himself willing to co-operate in any
system of international agreements for the maintenance of peace, even
collective agreements. The only condition he made, and this he had
always done, was the recognition of Germany’s equal rights. He also
declared himself willing to rejoin the League of Nations. By so doing he
wanted to prove that Germany, in spite of the conclusion of military
alliances which she felt to be a threat, and our own rearmament,
continued to desire peace.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I wish to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of the following documents in my Document Book 3:
Number 95, answer of the Reich Government of 15 February 1935, to the
so-called London Communiqué.
Number 97, an excerpt from the appeal of the Reich Government of 16
March 1935, for the reintroduction of the German military service.
Number 98 is the communiqué of 26 March 1935 on the talks of the British
Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, and the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Eden,
with the Reich Government.
Number 102 is the communiqué of 15 May 1935 on the speech of Foreign
Minister Laval in Moscow.
Number 104, Hitler’s speech of 21 May 1935 on the Russian-French Pact.
Number 105, the note of the Reich Government of 25 May 1935 to the
signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did the German efforts and willingness to
negotiate have any success?
VON NEURATH: Yes; they led to the conclusion of the first and only
agreement to limit armaments which was actually put into effect on the
basis of the German proposals by the signing of the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement in June 1935. Of course, I would have preferred it if the
negotiations with all countries concerning proposals for armament
limitation had been successful. Nevertheless, this agreement between
only two states was warmly welcomed by us as the first step in this
direction. We know that at least England held aloof from the decision of
the League of Nations stating that Germany had broken the Versailles
Treaty by rearming. The German step was thus recognized as justified.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to ask the Court
to take judicial notice of two documents from my Document Book 3:
Document Number 106 is a statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, over the British radio on 19 June 1935.
The second is Document Number 119, an excerpt from the statement of the
Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Shakespeare, in the House
of Commons on the occasion of the ratification of the London Naval
Agreement on 20 July 1936.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was German activity in the direction of
disarmament limited to the German-English Naval Agreement?
VON NEURATH: No; our willingness to co-operate in a positive way for the
limitation of armaments, which had been declared by us on many
occasions, also found expression in the negotiations for disarmament in
the air. Right from the outset, as early as 1933, Hitler had stressed
the importance of this point for the maintenance of peace. Germany was
ready to accept any limitation, and even the complete abolition of air
armament, if it was done on a reciprocal basis. But only England reacted
to such suggestions. The difficulty was to persuade France to
participate in the negotiations. She did this only after 3 months
through the efforts of England. But France stipulated conditions which
made it practically impossible for these negotiations to succeed.
Apart from a general agreement embracing all European states, special
bilateral agreements were to be permitted. In addition, the continuation
of negotiations on air armament was to be made dependent on negotiations
concerning the Eastern Pact. Germany could not participate in this
Eastern Pact, since she would have had to assume military obligations
whose consequences could not be foreseen.
Owing to this and the outbreak of the Italian-Abyssinian war, which
brought the differences among the Western Powers into the open, the
negotiations came to a standstill.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: One year later, in March 1936, the Rhineland was
reoccupied by German troops. The Prosecution see in this a breach of the
Locarno Treaty and further proof of your coresponsibility in the alleged
conspiracy against peace. Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: This assertion is completely untrue. There was no decision
or plan to wage aggressive war any more than there had been the year
before. The restoration of full sovereignty in all parts of the Reich
had no military, but only political significance.
The occupation of the Rhineland was carried out with only one division
and this fact alone shows that it had only a purely symbolic character.
It was clear that a great and industrious people would not tolerate
forever such a drastic limitation of its sovereignty as had been imposed
by the Versailles Treaty. It was simply a dynamic development which the
leaders of German foreign policy could not oppose.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did the reoccupation of the Rhineland take place
according to a plan which had been made some time beforehand, or was the
decision spontaneous?
VON NEURATH: It was one of those sudden decisions of Hitler which was to
be carried out within a few days.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the events which led to this immediate
decision?
VON NEURATH: On 16 January 1936, the French Foreign Minister, M. Laval,
announced that after his return from Geneva he would present the
Russian-French Pact to the French Chamber for ratification. The fact
that Hitler, in an interview with M. de Jouvenel, the correspondent of
the reputable French paper Paris Midi, while pointing out the dangers of
this pact, once again held out his hand to France in an attempt to bring
about an honorable and permanent understanding between the two peoples,
was of no avail. I had previously discussed this interview in detail
with Hitler, and I received the definite impression that he was
absolutely serious in his desire for a permanent reconciliation of the
two peoples. But this attempt also was in vain. The strong opposition to
the pact from large portions of the French people, under the leadership
of the _Union Nationale des Combattants_, and in Parliament itself could
not prevent the French Government from ratifying the pact. The voting
took place on 27 February 1936 in the French Chamber.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take note of the
following two documents from my Document Book 4: The first is Number
108, Hitler’s interview with the correspondent of _Paris Midi_, M. de
Jouvenel, of 21 February 1936. The second is Number 107, an excerpt from
the speech of the Deputy Montigny in the French Chamber on 13 February
1936.
On 7 March 1936, by way of answer to the ratification of this treaty,
the German troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland zone. What
considerations caused the German Government to take this very serious
step? In view of the hostile attitude of the French, there was a danger
that this time the Western Powers would not be satisfied with paper
protests and resolutions by the League of Nations, but would proceed by
force of arms against this one-sided...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is this a question or a statement?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is a question. I should like to know the
attitude of the Government at that time. If I may make a comment, I must
hear these explanations on the grounds for the decisions taken at that
time from the defendant himself, for when in my final address...
THE PRESIDENT: You were stating a number of facts. It is not for you to
state facts. It is your duty to ask the witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to state facts. I wanted to know
from the witness what considerations led to the decision.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you please describe to us what
factors entered into your consideration at that time?
VON NEURATH: In my previous answers I have already stated why we saw in
the Franco-Russian Pact and in France’s whole attitude a most serious
threat. This accumulation of power in French hands through the various
mutual assistance pacts could be directed only against Germany. There
was no other country in the world at which it could be directed. In the
event of hostilities—a possibility which, in view of the whole
situation, any responsible government would have to reckon with—the
western border of Germany was completely open owing to the
demilitarization of the Rhineland. This was not only a discriminating
provision of the Versailles Treaty, but also one which threatened
Germany’s security most. However, it had become obsolete through the
decision of 11 December 1932 by the Five Powers in Geneva.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal thinks this is all
argument. If there are any facts as to what the German Government did at
the time, after the French and Russian Pact and before the entry into
the Rhineland, the witness can give these facts, but this is mere
argument and the Tribunal is well aware of the argument. It does not
require them to be restated, and certainly not to be restated in the
course of the evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I merely wanted to avoid that when
later in my final speech I refer to this point, the objection might be
made that these are my opinions. I want to show...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, that is quite a wrong conception.
We are now hearing evidence. When we hear you we shall be hearing
arguments and we shall be prepared to hear any argument from you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I want to avoid it being said these are
my arguments. These arguments come from the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I am pointing out to you that it is the function of
counsel to argue and it is the function of the Tribunal to listen to
argument. It is not the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument
in the course of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
VON NEURATH: Perhaps I may make one statement. In the course of the
winter of 1936, we had learned through our military intelligence service
that the French General Staff already had a military plan for invading
Germany. This invasion was to take place through the Rhineland and along
the so-called Main River line toward Czechoslovakia in order to join the
Russian ally.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the basis of what the President just said, I
shall dispense with the evidence, or rather with your considerations,
and reserve for myself the right to bring this up in my final speech. I
should like to ask just one more question. Did the decision to reoccupy
the Rhineland constitute any aggressive intention for the moment or
later on?
VON NEURATH: No, none whatever. The reoccupation, as can be seen from my
statements, had a purely defensive character and was not intended to
have any other purpose. The occupation by such a weak force as a single
division made it clear that it was a purely symbolic act. It has been
testified to here by the military—the witness Milch, for example—that
the Luftwaffe had no part whatever and had learned of the action only 2
or 3 days before. That there were no aggressive plans for the future is
shown by the fact that the German Government, at the suggestion of
England, on 12 March 1936 undertook, until such time as an understanding
had been reached with the Western Powers, particularly with France, not
to increase the garrisons in the Rhineland and not to move the troops
any closer to the border than they were already, on condition, however,
that France would do the same. France did not want to accept this offer.
Then, in the memorandum of 7 March 1936 addressed to the signatory
powers of Locarno, which the Prosecution has already submitted here,
Germany not only made definite suggestions for an agreement with France,
Belgium, and the other Locarno Powers, but also declared her willingness
to sign a general Air Pact to avoid the danger of sudden air raids, and
in addition to join the League of Nations again. In a speech to the
Reichstag on 7 March 1936 Hitler explained to the world the reasons for
the reoccupation of the Rhineland. This speech, as well as the
memorandum, I had discussed beforehand with Hitler, and I can only
repeat that I did not have the slightest suspicion that Hitler was not
honest or that he was trying to conceal his real intentions which tended
toward war. Even today I have the firm conviction that at that time
Hitler was not thinking of war. I need not emphasize that any such
intention was far from my own thoughts. On the contrary, I considered
the restoration of sovereignty throughout the Reich a step toward peace
and understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us get on. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you are allowing the
defendant to make long, long speeches. That is not the object of
evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit various documents in this
connection and ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following
documents in my Document Book 4. First, Number 109, memorandum of 7
March 1936 from the Reich Government to the signatory powers of the
Locarno Treaty; Number 112, the official statement of the German Reich
Government on 12 March 1936, and Number 113, the communication from the
German Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Minister Mr. Eden, on
12 March 1936; and Number 116, a memorandum dated 3 January 1936 sent by
the German Government to the British Government through the Ambassador
Extraordinary in London, Herr Von Ribbentrop.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were the consequences of the
reoccupation of the Rhineland as far as foreign policy was concerned?
VON NEURATH: In consideration of the wishes of the President of the
Court, I will not comment on this question.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did the Western Powers do? Did they take any
political or diplomatic steps?
VON NEURATH: Foreign Minister Eden said in the House of Commons that
Germany’s procedure did not constitute any threat and promised to give
careful considerations to the German peace proposals.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit and ask the Court to take
judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 4: Number
125, excerpts from a speech by the American Under Secretary of State,
Mr. Sumner Welles, on the Versailles Treaty and Europe, of 7 July 1937;
Document Number 120, excerpt from the decree of the People’s Commissars
of Russia on the reduction of the age for military service; and Number
117, a report from the Czechoslovakian Minister in The Hague dated 21
April 1936.
Herr Von Neurath, did you or the Foreign Office forego any further steps
and attempts toward a peaceful understanding with the other European
powers, or did they continue?
VON NEURATH: These efforts were continued. The next opportunity was
provided by our relations with Austria. The development of these
relations since 1933 has already been described in detail before the
Court; but I should like especially to stress the fact that in our
relations with Austria my views remained unchanged from start to finish,
that is, I wanted a close economic connection, such as a customs union,
between the two countries and a foreign policy run on common lines on
the basis of state treaties and close contact between the two
Governments, but whatever happened I wanted to see the full independence
of Austria guaranteed. For that reason I was always a determined
opponent of any interference in the internal political affairs of
Austria, and I was against any support being given to the Austrian
National Socialists by the German National Socialists in the fight of
the former against Dollfuss and Schuschnigg; and I constantly urged
Hitler to take the same line. I need not repeat that I sharply condemned
the murder of Dollfuss from the moral as well as the political point of
view and that the Foreign Office under my direction had nothing whatever
to do with this murder, as the Prosecution recently asserted. But that
Hitler too had absolutely nothing to do with the murder, I can confirm
from various statements which he made to me. The deed was carried out by
Austrian National Socialists, some of whom were much more radical than
the Germans. This attitude of mine is best proved by the fact that when
shortly after the murder of Dollfuss the German Minister in Vienna, Herr
Rieth, without my knowledge demanded of the Austrian Government safe
conduct to Germany for several persons involved in the murder, I at once
recalled him from Vienna and dismissed him from the Foreign Service. I
myself, as well as a number of other ministers, also opposed the travel
embargo imposed on Austria by Germany.
But I did welcome the efforts for an understanding with Austria, which
started in 1935 and were carried through with success by Herr Von Papen,
and I always tried to influence Hitler to bring this about. As to Von
Papen’s actions in Vienna during this time, I was only imperfectly
informed, as Herr Von Papen was not subordinate to me and received his
orders directly from Hitler. It was only during this Trial that I
learned about the series of letters which Von Papen wrote to Hitler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two passages; one is from a
letter from Herr Von Neurath to the head of the political section of the
Foreign Office dated 28 June 1934, Number 84 in my Document Book 3, Page
227, which says in regard to conditions at that time:
“The development of events in Austria cannot be foreseen. It
appears to me, however, that the acute danger....”
THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. You did not observe
the light. Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: “The development of events in Austria
cannot be foreseen. It appears to me, however, that the acute
danger has been averted due to rapid action. We should act with
great reserve now and to this end I spoke to the Reich
Chancellor yesterday. I found complete understanding.”
Then I should like to quote a passage from the affidavit of Bishop Wurm,
already submitted by me as Number 1 in my Document Book 1, on Page 3. It
says:
“I remember especially his”—Herr Von Neurath’s—“severe
condemnation of the occurrences in Vienna during which
Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, and of the person used by
Hitler during the agitation in Austria.”
Then, in this connection, I should like to refer to a document which
Herr Seyss-Inquart, or his defense counsel, has already submitted under
Number Seyss-Inquart-32, which is an interview of the State Chancellor,
Dr. Renner, of 3 April 1938. As a precaution, I have included it once
more in my Document Book 4, under Number 130.
Herr Von Neurath, you know that the charge is made against you that on
11 July 1936 a treaty was made between Germany and Austria in the course
of these negotiations by Von Papen, and that this treaty, which has been
discussed here in detail, was concluded with intent to deceive, that is,
with the purpose of lulling Austria into a sense of security and
preparing for her future incorporation into the Reich. Will you please
comment on this point?
VON NEURATH: This assertion is absolutely untrue. In effect I honestly
and gladly welcomed this treaty. It corresponded to my point of view in
every respect. I saw therein the best means of clearing up the unnatural
dissensions, and for that reason I did everything I could to bring it
about. The assertion of the Prosecution has been disproved by the
statements of the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido Schmidt. I
found satisfaction in the fact that the treaty had a special
significance as regards foreign policy. By this treaty, in which the
Reich clearly recognized Austrian independence, the German-Austrian
differences, which were of danger to peace in Europe, were removed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I submit the
agreement between Germany and Austria of 11 July 1936 under Number 118
in Document Book 4, and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it.
Herr Von Neurath, apart from clearing up the Austrian question in the
years before 1937, you also carried on negotiations with eastern
European states. In the affidavit of the American Consul General Mr.
Messersmith, which the Prosecution has submitted as USA-68, 2385-PS, it
is asserted that the purpose of these negotiations was to get these
southeastern states to acquiesce in the destruction and splitting up of
Czechoslovakia contemplated by Germany, and even to take an active part
in it. For this purpose, in the course of these negotiations, you are
even supposed to have promised these states, or got others to promise
them, that they would receive parts of Czechoslovakia and even Austrian
territory as a reward. Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: These assertions of Mr. Messersmith are pure invention and
a figment of the imagination from beginning to end. There is not one
word of truth in them. I can only describe this affidavit as
fantastical. It is not even true that he was, as he says, a close friend
of mine. I met Mr. Messersmith a few times at large gatherings, but I
avoided discussing politics with him, because I knew that in his reports
and other statements about talks which he had had with diplomats he
repeated things in a way which did not always correspond to the truth.
It is significant that incidentally this affidavit contains hardly any
accurate indications of the sources he employed.
My negotiations with the southeastern countries, as well as my personal
trips to their capitals, in reality had the sole purpose of
strengthening the existing economic relations and promoting mutual trade
and exchange of goods. In addition, I wanted to gain information about
the political situation in the Balkans, which is always difficult to
grasp.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In my Document Book 2, under Number 30, Page 87, I
have a short excerpt from another affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, dated 29
August 1945. The Prosecution has already submitted it as Exhibit
USA-750, Document Number 2386-PS, in another connection. I should like
to quote one passage from this excerpt. It is on Page 87 of my Document
Book 2, and reads:
“During the years 1933 and 1934 the Nazi Government left the
German Foreign Office for the most part in charge of
conservative officials of the old school. Generally speaking,
this situation continued throughout the period during which
Baron Von Neurath was Foreign Minister. After Von Ribbentrop
became chief of the Foreign Office, the situation gradually
changed as regards the political officials. During Von Neurath’s
incumbency, the German Foreign Office had not been brought into
line with Nazi ideology, and Von Neurath and his assistants can
hardly be blamed for acts of German foreign policy during this
period, though his continuation in office may appear to indicate
his agreement with National Socialist aims. In defense of these
activities Von Neurath might easily adduce reasons of patriotic
motives.”
Then, in regard to these trips and the policy of the defendant in the
Southeast, I am submitting the three communiqués on Von Neurath’s visit
to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937 under Numbers 122, 123,
and 124 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Court to take judicial notice
of them.
Herr Von Neurath, the Prosecution is using your speech of 29 August
1937, made in Stuttgart at a demonstration of Germans living abroad, to
bring a charge against you, inasmuch as it sees in one of your remarks
the aggressive intentions of your policy. It quotes the following words
which you are alleged to have used in your speech:
“The unity of the heroic national will created by National
Socialism in its unparalleled _élan_ has made possible a foreign
policy by which the terms of the Versailles Dictate are
exploded, freedom to arm is regained, and sovereignty is
restored throughout the state. We are again masters in our own
house, and we have created the power to remain so in the future.
In our foreign political actions we have taken nothing from
anyone. From the words and deeds of Hitler the world should see
that he has no aggressive desires.”
I should like to point out that these sentences can be understood only
if taken with their context. I should like to ask the permission of the
Court to state briefly what the context is. This excerpt from the speech
is submitted by me in Document Book 4, Number 126. I quote:
“We have again become masters in our own house. We have created
the means to remain so....”
THE PRESIDENT: You have just read that. You have read it once.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I should like to read the sentence in
between.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read anything which is relevant and which was
omitted, of course.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The quotation that I am submitting reads:
“But this attitude of the new German Reich is in reality the
strongest bulwark for safeguarding peace, and will always prove
itself as such in a world in turmoil. Just because we have
recognized the danger of certain destructive tendencies which
are attempting to assert themselves in Europe, we are not
looking for differences between countries and peoples, but are
trying to find connecting links. We are not thinking of
political isolation. We want political co-operation between
governments, a co-operation which, if it is to be successful,
cannot be based on theoretical ideas of collectivity, but on
living reality, and which must devote itself to the concrete
tasks of the present. We can state with satisfaction that in
pursuing such a realistic peace policy, we are working hand in
hand with our friend Italy. This justifies the hope that we may
also reach a friendly understanding with other governments
regarding important questions of foreign policy.”
Do you, Herr Von Neurath, wish to add any comment to this?
THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, just before the recess I
confronted you with a quotation from your speech of 29 August 1937 and I
asked you whether you wished to make any statement.
VON NEURATH: I should think this statement shows exactly the opposite of
what the Prosecution is trying to make out. The peaceful character of my
speech could hardly have been brought out in a more convincing way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As proof for their assertion that your whole
policy could be summarized as the breaking of a treaty, the Prosecution
adduces further from the following sentences in a speech made by you
before the Academy for German Law on 30 October 1937, when you said; and
I quote:
“Realizing these fundamental facts, the Reich Cabinet was always
in favor of handling each concrete international problem by the
methods which are appropriate, and was against merging it
unnecessarily with other problems and thus complicating matters,
and insofar as problems exist between two powers only, of
choosing the way for an immediate understanding between these
two powers. We are in a position to state that these methods
have proved to be good ones, not only in the interests of
Germany, but also in the general interests.”
What is your comment on this?
VON NEURATH: First of all this quotation is torn completely from its
context. The entire speech was a presentation of the reasons why I,
representing Germany’s policy, considered the conclusion of bilateral
agreements to work better in the interests of peace than the so-called
collective agreements, and only from this angle can the passage just
quoted be understood. Therefore, I would ask that you quote the passage
with its context.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This speech of Herr Von Neurath on the League of
Nations and international law, which he delivered on 30 October 1937
before the Academy of German Law, will be found under Number 128 of my
Document Book 4. With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to
quote this particular passage in its entirety and we shall see that the
passage selected by the Prosecution has not the meaning which the
Prosecution has given it. It says here:
“I am convinced that the same or similar considerations will
also arise in other cases where it is intended to set up a
schematic structure, such as an absolutely mutual system of
assistance for a more or less large group of states. Such
projects, even in favorable cases, namely, when intended to be
an equal guarantee by all participants, will only remain as a
piece of paper....”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it not sufficient to refer to the document? The
defendant has just said that the speech contained the reasons why he
considered bilateral rather than general agreements possible. He said
that. The document appears to confirm that. Could you not refer to the
document without reading the words?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I read it because it was torn from its context and
I believed that I would be permitted to quote the context as well.
However, if the Tribunal wish to read the matter I shall not continue
quoting it.
THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to me to add to it. It is just the words
which the defendant has quoted the substance of.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I omitted one sentence as I thought it was
superfluous. But it may be seen from the context. If the Tribunal
prefers to read the entire speech with reference to my quotations, then,
of course, I shall be satisfied.
Herr Von Neurath, under Number L-150, USA-65, the Prosecution have
submitted a note by Mr. Bullitt, who was American Ambassador in Paris at
that time, regarding a discussion he had with you in May 1936, and the
Prosecution adduced, on Page 8 of the English trial brief, that as
Foreign Minister you participated in the planning of aggressive war
against Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Will you please comment on this document which is known to you, and on
this accusation which is leveled against you?
VON NEURATH: At first the occupation of the Rhineland had naturally
created unrest in the cabinets and public opinion and among the
signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to
France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was natural, if a reasonable
German foreign policy was to be conducted, to allow this unrest to die
down, so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing
aggressive plans, but only wanted to restore full sovereignty in the
Reich. The erection of fortifications was to serve only to decrease the
temptation to our highly armed neighbors to march at any time they saw
fit into German territory, lying there unprotected. Despite all the
negotiations and efforts, it had not been possible to get them to
observe the disarmament clause in the Treaty of Versailles.
As I have already said, France and Czechoslovakia especially, instead of
disarming, continued to arm, and by concluding agreements with Soviet
Russia increased their military superiority.
In my discussion with Mr. Bullitt I attempted to bring all this out when
I said that we would not start any further diplomatic actions for the
time being. By making any military attack more difficult I hoped to get
France and Czechoslovakia to change their policy, which was hostile to
Germany, and to create better relations with both these countries in the
interests of peace. These hopes and views which I held can be seen
clearly in the last part of Mr. Bullitt’s report—and with this Mr.
Bullitt was in full agreement.
As to the remark about British policy on Page 2, Paragraph 2 of this
report, at that time Great Britain was trying to prevent a
_rapprochement_ between Germany and Italy, with whom her relations were
strained to a breaking-point because of the Abyssinian question.
The Foreign Office thought the _rapprochement_ could be prevented by
making it known that it would no longer oppose the Anschluss between
Germany and Austria. At that time Mussolini was still entirely opposed
to the Anschluss. The realization of this specious intention on the part
of Britain was one of the motives for the conclusion of the
German-Austrian Agreement of 11 July 1936. The British statement which I
had hinted at and expected was forthcoming in November 1937 on the
occasion of the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin. Lord Halifax told me at
that time—and I took care to make a note of his statement, which I
quote in English word for word:
“People in England would never understand why they should go to
war only because two German countries wish to unite.”
But at the same time, the Foreign Office, in a directive to the British
Minister in Vienna, the wording of which is now well known, called upon
the Austrian Government to offer stubborn resistance to the Anschluss,
and promised every support.
The Bullitt report also shows that I said that Hitler’s greatest wish
was a real understanding with France. Apart from that I also told Mr.
Bullitt—and he himself states that right from the beginning—that the
German Government would do everything to prevent an uprising of the
National Socialists in Austria.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I ask the Tribunal to take special notice of these
notes of Mr. Bullitt, so that we can save time by not quoting this
paragraph. This is Document Book 1, Neurath Document Number 15, Page 60,
last paragraph.
What was your own personal attitude and opinion about the policy to be
pursued by Germany with reference to Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: Czech policy towards us was always characterized by a
profound mistrust. This was to be explained partly by the geographical
position of the country between Germany and Austria, and partly by the
diversity of nationalities within the country. These were swayed by
strong feelings. The country’s being drawn into the Franco-Russian
military and friendship pact did not contribute to the establishment of
closer relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
As Reich Foreign Minister I always worked to improve political
relations. I also tried to strengthen our economic connections, which
were of manifest importance. In so doing I no more thought of using
force, or of military occupation, than I did in our relations with all
the other neighboring states.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your attitude to the Sudeten-German
question?
VON NEURATH: I have to be a little more explicit in this case.
The Germans living in the Sudetenland as a compact group had been given
the assurance, at the peace negotiations in 1919 when they were attached
to the Czechoslovak State, that they would be given autonomy on the
model of the Swiss Confederation, as expressly stated by Mr. Lloyd
George in the House of Commons in 1940. The Sudeten-German delegation at
that time, as well as Austria, had demanded an Anschluss with the Reich.
The promise of autonomy was not kept by the Czech Government. Instead of
autonomy, there was a vehement policy of “Czechification.” The Germans
were forbidden to use their own German language in the courts, as well
as in their dealings with administrative authorities, et cetera, under
threat of punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, can not the defendant go on to the
time with which we have to deal, namely, 1938, and tell us what his
policy was then, without telling us all these facts beforehand about
1919?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I just wanted to show the background for his later
policy. However, if the Tribunal thinks that this is unnecessary,
because it is well known, then I shall be satisfied with the testimony
which has already been given.
Herr Von Neurath, what were your official and personal relations with
Hitler during your time as Foreign Minister?
VON NEURATH: From the personal point of view I had no close connection
of any kind with Hitler. I did not belong to his close circle either. In
the beginning I had frequent discussions with him concerning foreign
policy and on the whole, found him open to my arguments. However, in the
course of time this changed when other organizations, especially the
Party, began to concern themselves with foreign policy and came to
Hitler with their plans and their ideas. This applied especially to the
so-called Ribbentrop Bureau. Ribbentrop became more and more a personal
adviser of Hitler in matters of foreign policy, and gained more and more
influence. It was often difficult to dissuade Hitler from proposals
which had been submitted to him through these channels. German foreign
policy was to a certain extent going two different ways. Not only in
Berlin but also in its offices abroad the Foreign Office had constantly
to contend with difficulties caused by the working methods and the
sources of information of this Ribbentrop Bureau. I personally was
always opposed to the Party exercising any influence on foreign policy.
I was especially opposed to Ribbentrop’s direct handling of important
questions and his official interference in matters of foreign policy in
cases where they had not been removed from my control. For that reason I
handed in my resignation several times, and for a time I succeeded in
getting Hitler to dispense with Ribbentrop’s meddlesome methods which he
had hitherto supported.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to submit, and
have the Tribunal take judicial notice of, an extract from an article in
the American periodical _Time_ dated 10 April 1933, Number 9 of my
Document Book 1, Page 44. I should also like to refer...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that mere newspaper reports
or comments are in the nature of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In addition, I have submitted in my Document Book
1, under Number 17, an extract from the well-known book by Henderson,
the former British Ambassador in Berlin, _Failure of a Mission_, and I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it so that I shall not have
to read it, paying special attention to Paragraph 2, Page 69.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that this document—the article from
_Time_—may be admitted, but it is not necessary to refer to it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. This is Document Number 9, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is Document Number 9. I say it may be
admitted.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Thank you.
Finally, I should like to submit and call the attention of the Tribunal
to Document Number 16 which is a communication addressed by Defendant
Von Neurath to Hitler, dated 27 July 1936, requesting to be relieved of
his post because of the intended appointment of Herr Von Ribbentrop as
State Secretary. It is not necessary to read this document, but I should
like to call the Tribunal’s attention not only to the contents, but also
to the mode of address and the ending. Hitler is addressed only as
“Esteemed Reich Chancellor,” and the ending is “Yours very
respectfully.”
I mention this because the Prosecution has often made the accusation
that flowery phrases were used in addressing letters to Hitler which
exceeded ordinary courtesy. Herr Von Neurath has never done so.
I also call your attention to Document 14, which will be found in my
Document Book 1. That is also an offer to resign, dated 25 October 1935,
and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well.
Herr Von Neurath, apart from your official policy, were there not other
offices which took independent action, which signed treaties, in which
you had no part?
VON NEURATH: Yes. That was the case, for instance, in the so-called
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo policy. Hitler pursued this plan stubbornly, and
Ribbentrop supported him in this. I rejected this policy, as I
considered it detrimental and in some ways fantastic, and I refused to
allow my staff to carry this through. Ribbentrop therefore, in his
capacity as Ambassador with a special mission, carried on these
negotiations independently, and on Hitler’s instructions concluded the
so-called Anti-Comintern Pact. Hence this pact bore Ribbentrop’s
signature and not my own, even though I was still Foreign Minister at
that time and in the ordinary way would have had to sign the pact.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: We now come to the change in policy. Herr Von
Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler’s foreign policy plans, above
all the achieving of equal rights for Germany, went beyond peaceful
means, and that the waging of wars and the use of violence began to be
considered as a possibility?
VON NEURATH: I realized it for the first time when I heard Hitler’s
speech to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 5 November
1937, which has been mentioned here frequently, and at which I was
present. It is true that the notes on the contents of this speech, as we
have seen from the Hossbach minutes, were made from memory 5 days later
as an excerpt from a speech which lasted 2 or 3 hours.
Although the plans set forth by Hitler in that long speech had no
concrete form, and various possibilities were envisaged, it was quite
obvious to me that the whole tendency of his plans was of an aggressive
nature. I was extremely upset at Hitler’s speech, because it knocked the
bottom out of the whole foreign policy which I had consistently
pursued—the policy of employing only peaceful means. It was evident
that I could not assume responsibility for such a policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to
the affidavit of Baroness Ritter already mentioned by me as Number 3 in
Document Book 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph
under Figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems to me to be
so important that I should like to ask the Tribunal to grant me
permission to quote this paragraph. I quote:
“When for the first time Herr Von Neurath recognized from
Hitler’s statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to
achieve his political aims by the use of force toward the
neighboring states, he was so severely shaken that he suffered
several heart attacks.
“He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his
visit on New Year’s Day 1938, and we saw that this had affected
him both physically and spiritually. Above all, he was very
upset because meanwhile Hitler had refused to receive him and in
these circumstances he could not see how Hitler was to be
dissuaded from his plans, which he severely condemned. He often
said ‘It is horrible to play the part of Cassandra.’ He
categorically declared that on no account could he support this
policy, and that he would face the issue. He did not falter in
this decision when on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his
sixty-fifth birthday, Hitler told him that he could not do
without him as Foreign Minister. He told us about this the same
evening in a telephone conversation when we sent him birthday
greetings.”
What did you do when this speech forced you to realize these things?
VON NEURATH: About 2 days after this speech I went to see General Von
Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and
together with him and the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, I discussed
what could be done to get Hitler to change his ideas. We agreed that
first of all General Von Fritsch, who was due to report to Hitler during
the next few days, should explain to him all the military considerations
which made this policy inadvisable. Then I intended to explain the
political reasons to him.
Unfortunately Hitler left for the Obersalzberg soon afterward and could
not or did not wish to receive me before his departure. I could not see
Hitler until 14 or 15 January. On that occasion I tried to show him that
his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in
it. Many of his plans could be realized by peaceful means, even if the
process was slower. He answered that he could not wait any longer. I
called his attention to the danger of war and to the serious warnings of
the generals. I reminded him of his speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in
which he himself had declared every new war to be sheer madness, and so
forth. When despite all my arguments he still held to his opinions, I
told him that he would have to find another Foreign Minister, and that I
would not be an accessory to such a policy. At first Hitler refused to
accept my resignation, but I insisted, and on 4 February he granted my
release without further comment.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression, Herr Von Neurath,
that Hitler decided to grant your release with reluctance, or that by
your request to be allowed to resign you met his wishes halfway?
VON NEURATH: I believe the latter was the case. I believe Hitler had
been wanting this for some time...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not evidence. You cannot say what you think
another man thought.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, simultaneously with your resignation as
Foreign Minister, you were made president of the newly instituted Secret
Cabinet Council. What did that appointment mean?
VON NEURATH: As the witness Göring has already stated here, the Secret
Cabinet Council was set up for the sole purpose of masking the
reorientation in foreign policy and the changes on the military side.
Several witnesses have testified to the fact that the Secret Cabinet
Council never convened. I might add that in actual practice it would not
have been able to function, for after my resignation on 4 February I was
cut off from all access to news concerning foreign policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, after your resignation as Foreign Minister
you kept your title as Reich Minister. But were you still a member of
the Reich Cabinet or not?
VON NEURATH: No. Apart from the fact that as far as I know the Reich
Cabinet no longer functioned, because there were no longer any sessions
of the Reich Cabinet, the title “Reich Minister” was just a title of
form, which was not connected with any activity or with any Government
department. Unlike the members of the Reich Government, I did not
receive any legislative bills for signature.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution states that in March of 1938 you
represented Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister during his absence and they
adduce this from an entry in the diary of General Jodl which says,
“Neurath in the meantime is taking over the Foreign Office.” Will you
please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: After my resignation on 4 February I was quite out of touch
with my former colleagues and I withdrew completely. However, I still
remained in Berlin. On 11 March 1938, late in the afternoon, Hitler
suddenly rang me up in my apartment and asked me to come and see him. In
the anteroom I met, besides Herr Von Papen, General Von Brauchitsch and
a number of other high officials and officers of his immediate
entourage. Göring was also in the room with Hitler when I came in.
Hitler told me that the Anschluss with Austria was a fact, and that
German troops would cross the border during the night of the 11th and
12th. When I raised the question whether that had to be, Hitler told me
the reason why he did not wish to wait any longer. He asked me what the
Foreign Office should do, as the Foreign Minister was absent and in
London at the time. I told him quite clearly that we would probably
receive protests to which a reply would have to be sent. Apart from that
we on our part should make a statement to the powers. There should be no
formal negotiations. I also told him that the Foreign Minister should be
immediately recalled from London. Göring opposed this. Finally Hitler
asked me to tell the State Secretary of the Foreign Office what he had
just told me, so that the Foreign Office would know what was happening.
On 12 March, in the morning, I did as Hitler had instructed me, and
passed on his description of events to the State Secretary, who was the
official representative of Ribbentrop. Göring was appointed by Hitler to
be his deputy during the time he was absent. On 12 March I personally
told the former about the letter addressed to me by the British
Ambassador containing the British protest against the occupation of
Austria. I told him that the Foreign Office would submit a note of
reply.
When the draft of this note had been prepared I told Göring about the
contents of the note over the telephone. Göring as Hitler’s deputy asked
me to sign the reply in his stead, since the British Ambassador’s letter
had been addressed to me. Göring has already stated this as a witness
here in this courtroom; hence the phrase in this letter which says “in
the name of the Reich Government.”
I repeatedly asked Göring to have Ribbentrop recalled from London and to
keep him informed. From the telephone conversation between Göring and
Ribbentrop, which has already been mentioned here, it appears that
Göring did this. The explanation why the British note was addressed to
me I learned only here through the testimony of Göring, when he said
that on the evening of the 11th he himself had told the British
Ambassador that he, Göring, was representing Hitler during his absence
and that Hitler had asked me to advise him, if need be, on matters of
foreign policy.
The entry in Jodl’s diary, about which I heard only here in this Court,
and which, strangely enough, is dated 10 March—a time when I had not
even put in an appearance—can probably be attributed to the fact that
somebody had seen me on 11 March in the Reich Chancellery. In any case,
I was not active in any other way as Ribbentrop’s deputy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Also you did not use stationery with the heading
“Foreign Office,” or the signature of the Foreign Office.
VON NEURATH: The fact that I used stationery with the heading “President
of the Secret Cabinet Council,” which I found in a room of the
Chancellery, and which was the only indication that this legendary
institution actually existed, also proves that I did not represent the
Foreign Office or the Foreign Minister, otherwise I would have used
Foreign Office stationery.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You answered the note of the British Ambassador on
12 March by the letter just described. The Prosecution reproaches you,
asserting that the reasons given by you in this letter and the
description of events in Austria which preceded the entry into the
country, are not correct. As I assume the Tribunal is familiar with the
passages which form the subject of this accusation, I think it is not
necessary to quote them. You also know these passages and I should like
to have your opinion.
VON NEURATH: The accusation that the contents of this reply are partly
incorrect is quite true. This is explained by the fact that I had no
other information except Hitler’s communications and the note is based
on these communications. This is the information which I had transmitted
to the Foreign Office, which was completely ignorant of the events. That
was the basis of the draft.
I should like to add that the incidents which led to the Austrian
Anschluss were never planned during my period of office, and nothing of
the kind was ever mentioned. Hitler never had any definite foreign
policy plans at all, rather did he take decisions very suddenly and
immediately translated them into action, so that even his closest
associate had knowledge of them only a few days in advance. The
expression “Austrian Anschluss,” as it is used here and generally, does
not express that which actually happened later, which was in fact the
incorporation of Austria. It is this incorporation of Austria that we
are now concerned with. This incorporation of Austria was conceived by
Hitler at the very last moment, in Linz, as the troops were marching in.
A further proof that the plan for invasion had not been made in advance
is the fact that Hitler a few days earlier had sent his Foreign Minister
to London to clear up some diplomatic formalities.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to an
excerpt from the book by Sir Nevile Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_,
which has already been mentioned. This excerpt is Number 129 in my
Document Book 4. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this
document.
During the Austrian crisis, on 12 March, the day after the marching-in,
you made a statement to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin regarding
the measures taken in respect to Austria, and their effects on
Czechoslovakia. According to a report made by Dr. Mastny, the
Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin, about this discussion, you declared
that the German Government did not intend to take any steps against
Czechoslovakia, but to uphold the arbitration treaty concluded in the
twenties with Czechoslovakia. Will you please comment on this report,
which is known to you and which is to be found under Number 141 in my
Document Book 5.
VON NEURATH: It is quite correct that on 12 March I made the said
statement to M. Mastny. Only the reason for the conversation and its
gist were somewhat different from the way he has described it. On 12
March Ministerial Director Von Weizsäcker telephoned me at my home,
telling me that the Czechoslovakian Minister Mastny was with him and
wanted to know whether he could see me sometime during the course of the
day. I asked M. Mastny to come to my apartment during the afternoon. M.
Mastny asked me whether I believed that Hitler, after the Austrian
Anschluss, would now undertake something against Czechoslovakia as well.
I replied that he could set his mind at rest, that Hitler had told me on
the previous evening, in reply to my suggestion that the Austrian
Anschluss might create unrest in Czechoslovakia, that he had no thoughts
of undertaking anything against Czechoslovakia. Mastny then asked me
whether Germany still considered herself bound by the agreement
concluded in 1925. On the strength of the answer given to me by Hitler I
was able to confirm this with a clear conscience. Hitler had added in
this connection that he believed the relations with Czechoslovakia would
even improve considerably. The settlement of the Austrian Anschluss was
after all a domestic affair.
M. Mastny’s report states that I spoke on Hitler’s instructions.
However, that is not true. I merely referred to my discussion with
Hitler which was fresh in my mind. When M. Mastny in this report
stresses the fact that I spoke as the president of the Secret Cabinet
Council, he may have been using a manner of speech in order to give more
weight to his report.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution alleges a certain divergence
between the statement made by you and the plans as expounded by Hitler
in November 1937 and accuses you, asserting that you knew very well what
these plans were, of being somewhat credulous when you made that
reassuring statement to Mastny.
VON NEURATH: In this discussion Hitler talked about war plans only in a
general way. There was no talk about an aggressive plan against
Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that if events led to a war, Czechoslovakia
and Austria would have to be occupied first so that our right flank be
kept free. The form of this or any other attack on Czechoslovakia, and
whether there would be any conflict at all in the East, was doubtful and
open to discussion.
In effect, the Sudetenland, which strategically held the key position of
the Czech defense, was subsequently ceded in a peaceful manner by
agreement with the Western Powers. Concrete plans for a war against
Czechoslovakia, as General Jodl has testified, were not given to the
General Staff for elaboration until the end of May 1938. I learned for
the first time here about the existence of these plans. For the rest,
when Hitler told me that he would undertake nothing against
Czechoslovakia, I could not but believe that this was his real
intention; in other words, that he had relinquished his plans for
alternative action as set forth on 5 November 1937.
That is all I can say about the Czechoslovakian question.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, in the Indictment there is
mention of a conference of 28 May 1938 at which Hitler, Von Ribbentrop,
Göring, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces branches were
present, at which it is asserted in the affidavit of Herr Wiedemann that
you also attended.
VON NEURATH: I cannot at all remember any such conference, nor the
statement of Hitler which was mentioned by Wiedemann. Moreover, Keitel,
Ribbentrop, Göring, and Raeder knew nothing of this conference. Perhaps
it is a mistake or it is being confused with the conference mentioned by
Schmundt of 22 or 28 April 1938, but I was not present at this
conference; I was not in Berlin at all.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After your resignation, you had withdrawn
completely to private life. In the Sudeten crisis, in the autumn of
1938, did you take an active part and advocate a peaceful policy?
VON NEURATH: Yes. After my dismissal in February 1938 I lived on my
estate. On about 26 September I received a telephone call from one of my
former ministerial colleagues informing me that Hitler had instructed
the Armed Forces to be ready to march by 28 September. Apparently he
wanted to solve the Sudeten question by force. I was asked to come to
Berlin immediately and attempt to dissuade Hitler from this intention.
During the night I went to Berlin. After my arrival I inquired at the
Foreign Office about the situation and reported to Hitler that I was
there. I was sent away. Nevertheless, on the 28th I went to the Reich
Chancellery and there I met Hitler’s entire entourage ready to march. I
inquired for Hitler and was told that he was in his room, but would
receive no one. Nevertheless, I went to the door and entered Hitler’s
room. When he saw me he asked, in a harsh voice: “What do you want
here?” I answered that I wanted to point out to him the consequences of
his intended step. I explained to him that he would bring on a European
war, and probably a world war, if he were to march into Czechoslovakia
while negotiations were still in progress on the Sudeten problem; that
Czechoslovakia would doubtless resist and that it would not be an easy
struggle, and in any case it would involve France and England and
Poland. I told him that it would be a crime he could never answer for to
shed so much blood unless all possibilities of peaceful settlement had
been exhausted. I knew that Mr. Chamberlain was prepared to come to an
agreement and that he was also prepared to induce the Czechs to turn
over the Sudetenland if that could prevent war.
THE PRESIDENT: How did you know that Mr. Chamberlain would be willing to
come?
VON NEURATH: Because I had met the British Ambassador on the street.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON NEURATH: Hitler refused to consider such a conference. During our
talk, however, Göring had appeared and he supported me in my efforts to
persuade Hitler to have a conference. Finally Hitler agreed, if I could
bring Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to Berlin by the next day.
Since that was impossible for Mussolini, I suggested Munich as the place
for negotiations. I immediately established contact with the British and
French Ambassadors, who were both on their way to see Hitler. Hitler
himself telephoned directly to Mussolini, and by 6 o’clock the promises
and answers had been received.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take judicial
notice of Document Number 20 in my Document Book 1, Page 72b, an excerpt
from the book by Ambassador Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you personally take part in the Munich
Conference which then took place?
VON NEURATH: Yes. In view of Hitler’s irritated frame of mind, I was
concerned about the course of the conference and I told him that I
considered it expedient that I should go to Munich too, since I knew the
foreign representatives personally and for that reason could serve as
mediator. When he agreed, Göring invited me to come along in his special
train. Later, in the course of the long session, I frequently talked to
the three persons and to Hitler and tried to mediate in the differences
which arose.
Mr. Chamberlain, at the end of this discussion, asked me to arrange a
talk with the Führer alone, without Ribbentrop, on the next day, since
he would like to make a new suggestion. The Führer did not want to at
first, but finally I persuaded him. At this talk, a “consultation
agreement” was reached between England and Germany, which France later
joined. Chamberlain, who was staying at the same hotel as I was, showed
me this agreement with great joy after the talk, and I also was glad to
see it. I hoped that Anglo-German relations, which had suffered in the
Godesberg and Berchtesgaden meetings, might be brought back to normal by
this agreement and that the way would be opened for further conferences.
As in the summer of 1937, Chamberlain invited me to visit him in
England. I immediately told him that I did not believe that Hitler, who
had forbidden me to go to England in the summer of 1937, would now give
his approval, especially since I was no longer Foreign Minister. In
January 1938 the British Ambassador repeated the invitation, but I had
to tell him that I had had no opportunity of obtaining Hitler’s
approval.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
submit Document 21 in my document book. It is a letter of the French
Ambassador at that time, François-Poncet, dated 18 October 1938, a few
weeks after the Munich Conference. I should like to quote only two
sentences from it.
“But of the two of us it is I who have contracted the greater
debt of gratitude. I have always had from you, even at the most
delicate moments, the most kind, the most considerate and the
most confident reception. You made a difficult task easy for me.
I shall never forget what I owe you.”
Mr. President, at this point I should like to submit a letter from the
Ambassador Poncet, which was received only a few days ago and which I
mentioned with the same request at the beginning of my case. I asked
that the French Ambassador be called as a witness, and in answer to this
a letter from the Ambassador of 7 June was addressed to the French
Prosecution, of which I received a copy through the General Secretary’s
office last week—I believe Thursday or Friday.
In spite of the fact that this letter is not in the prescribed form of
an affidavit but is a private letter to the Prosecution, I would ask
that you accept it as if it were in the form of an affidavit. The
original of this letter is in the possession of the French Prosecution,
and the French Prosecution has promised to submit the original on the
request of the Court. I take the liberty to submit the certified copy.
THE PRESIDENT: The original document should be presented to the Court
now, or as soon as it conveniently can be.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The day before yesterday I talked to a member of
the French Prosecution who said they did not have it here at the moment.
I do not know where they have it. Therefore, I ask that it be submitted;
otherwise I would already have submitted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but it must be submitted as soon as possible.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to offer it in evidence, do you?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 162.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection, I take it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No objection, My Lord.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This letter reads, if I may quote at least one
brief passage:
“He”—that is Herr Von Neurath—“never aggravated the incidents;
on the contrary, he always sought a personal and peaceful
solution. He made every effort to facilitate the task of the
foreign diplomats in the German capital. They, like myself, were
grateful to him. I do not doubt that he often pointed out to
Hitler the dangers to which he was exposing Germany by the
excesses of his regime, and that he let him hear the voice of
prudence and moderation.”
Now I come to another subject, and I should like to present the
following:
The documents presented by the Prosecution show that during your period
in office as Reich Foreign Minister, a representative of the Foreign
Office took part in sessions of the Reich Defense Council, and by the
Reich Defense Law of 1938, you, as president of the Secret Cabinet, were
a member of this Reich Defense Council.
Will you comment on this?
VON NEURATH: Neither as Reich Foreign Minister nor as president of the
Secret Cabinet did I have anything to do with the affairs of the Reich
Defense Council. I never took part in any session or talk. As has been
stated here, all ministries from the time before 1933 had so-called
Reich defense experts who were to deal with interministerial questions
resulting from possible mobilization in case of a defensive war. As Dr.
Schacht has already testified, the Reich Defense Council of 1935 was
nothing but the legalization of a committee which had existed before
1933.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the existence of such a committee or council
for the defense of the Reich, did you see signs of preparation for a war
of aggression?
VON NEURATH: No, in no way. The designation already indicates that it
had to do with preparations for the defense of the Reich against attack,
and not preparations for attack. Moreover, I know that in France, as
well as in England, such arrangements had existed for a long time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document
78, which is on Page 213 of my Document Book 3. It is an excerpt from a
statement made by the French War Minister, Pétain, on 6 June 1934 before
the Army Commission of the French Chamber, which mentions the necessity
of a defense council or committee.
THE PRESIDENT: Just wait a minute. The Tribunal doesn’t think that any
evidence that other countries had other organizations is really relevant
to this case.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution asserts that Hitler awarded you
more honors than some of the Nazi leaders themselves, and concludes that
you were especially close to Hitler. Will you please comment on this.
VON NEURATH: That is a rather remarkable assumption. It was clear that,
being the oldest minister who had served the State for over 40 years,
Hitler could not overlook me in awarding honors and honorary titles, but
they were limited to what is customary for incumbents of high State
positions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to name the individual awards on
which a charge is made against you. You held the Order of the German
Eagle and the War Merit Cross First Class.
VON NEURATH: Yes. The Order of the German Eagle was founded in 1937 and
was to be awarded only to foreigners. It would however have had no great
value abroad but would have been considered more a type of special
order, such as a colonial order, if no German had held it. For that
reason in my capacity as Foreign Minister, immediately when the order
was founded, Hitler awarded me the Grand Cross of the order and thus
also heightened the value of this order...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is it not sufficient for the
defendant to have said that it was usual to give these titles? It is not
necessary for us to investigate the particular merits of the particular
order, is it? It seems to me to be very remote.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I mentioned it only because the
Prosecution also brought it out especially.
The further charge is made by the Prosecution that on 30 January 1937,
in that well-known Cabinet meeting, you received the golden Party
insignia from Hitler and thus became a member of the Nazi Party. What
about that?
VON NEURATH: As to the way in which this was awarded, Herr Schacht as
well as Raeder have testified here. I was not a member of any party.
Between 1933 and 1937 I had several times been requested to join the
Party but had refused. My attitude toward the Party was generally known.
For that reason I was repeatedly attacked by the Party. I believe that
the reason why I—why this insignia was awarded on 30 January 1937 to
various members of the Cabinet, and also to generals who were not
allowed to become members of the Party at all, I believe that has been
described in enough detail and that I need not go into it again.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, surprisingly, Hitler also made you an
honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS.
VON NEURATH: Yes, that was a complete surprise to me. In September 1937
Mussolini had announced his visit to Germany. For some days just before
this visit I was not in Berlin. When I returned in the morning I found
my tailor at the entrance of my house with the uniform of an SS
Gruppenführer. I asked him what that meant. He told me the Reich
Chancellery had instructed him to make me a uniform immediately. I then
went to Hitler and asked him why he had done this. He said he wanted all
the people who were to be present at the reception of Mussolini to be in
uniform. I told him that was not very agreeable to me and I had to
explain that in no case would I be subordinate to Himmler and I did not
want to have anything to do with the SS. Hitler assured me solemnly that
this would not be asked of me and that I need have no obligation to the
SS; and this actually did not happen. Moreover, I had no power to issue
orders, and my later appointment as Obergruppenführer was apparently
done in the course of general promotions without any special emphasis.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you wear this uniform at all?
VON NEURATH: Only twice as far as I can recall; at the reception of
Mussolini and then when in 1938 I was sent to Ankara for the funeral of
Kemal Pasha. On official occasions I always wore the uniform of a civil
servant without any insignia, which had been designed in the meantime.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On your seventieth birthday, on 2 February 1943,
you received congratulations and other expressions of appreciation of
your person and your activities from various sources. You were
congratulated, among others, by Hitler and you received, besides, a
check for 250,000 marks. Will you please tell us what was the
significance of this donation, if one may call it that.
VON NEURATH: The American prosecutor recently mentioned this gift. Only
he forgot to add that I refused it. The events were as follows:
On the day of my seventieth birthday, in the morning, an envoy of Hitler
called on me and brought me a congratulatory letter from Hitler and an
oil painting by a young German painter, showing an Italian landscape.
The letter contained a check for 250,000 marks. I was painfully
surprised and immediately told the envoy that I considered this
so-called donation an insult, that I was not a lackey whom one paid with
a tip, and that he should take the check back with him. He said he was
not authorized to do so. The next morning I went to the Reich Finance
Minister to give him the check for the Reich treasury. He said that for
formal reasons—I believe because the check was on a special account of
Hitler’s—he could not accept it. At his advice I turned the check over
to the Reich Credit Association to a special account and informed the
competent finance office in writing. I never touched one penny of this
sum. The painting, the value of which was not especially great, I did
not refuse, because it was entirely within the limits of a normal
birthday gift and sending it back would have been considered a
deliberate insult.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission in this
connection, to submit two letters of the Reich Credit Association, which
I received from them on Saturday upon my request. They contain
confirmation that this sum of 250,000 marks in its full extent, plus the
interest which has accumulated, is still today in a special account with
the Reich Credit Association. This is proof that Herr Von Neurath did
not, in fact, withdraw a penny of this so-called donation, or use it in
any other way.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number of it?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 160 and 161. Mr. President, in my haste I have
only been able to have the English translation made in my office. The
French and Russian translations will be given to the French and the
Russian Prosecution in the next few days. As I have said, I received it
myself only on Saturday afternoon.
The further charge is made against you that in the conservative circles
of Germany you worked as a sort of member of a Fifth Column to induce
them to reconcile themselves with and agree to the National Socialist
regime, because the fact that you remained in the Government would be
considered an example by them. What have you to say about that?
VON NEURATH: That statement is nonsense, because it was known throughout
Germany and abroad that I was no National Socialist, but rather that I
combated National Socialist excesses against the Church and the Jews and
that, in addition, I obstructed any policy which endangered peace. This
was clearly shown by my dismissal in February 1938, and the fact that
the general consternation about this was not publicly expressed in the
German press was simply because there was no press available for this.
It is therefore completely absurd that these conservative circles could
have assumed that I was with all my heart with the Nazis, as the
Indictment says. Other countries knew this just as well and saw in me an
obstacle to Nazi policy. That I was not regarded as a blind adherent to
Nazi theories, as is stated in the Indictment, is best known to the
foreign diplomats in Berlin, since they could observe my constant
struggle against the Party from close at hand.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit in this connection an
excerpt from the magazine _Archiv_, of 1937, and an excerpt from an
article in the _Pester Lloyd_, containing the speech which the doyen of
the Berlin Diplomatic Corps made in the name of the whole Diplomatic
Corps to Herr Von Neurath on his sixty-fifth birthday on 2 February
1938. Both documents are contained in my Document Book 4, Number 127,
and in Document Book 1, Number 18.
With this I have finished the part dealing with foreign politics, and
the personal points in the charge against Herr Von Neurath. Now I come
to the second aspect of the charge, your activity as Reich Protector for
Bohemia and Moravia.
After the settlement of the Sudeten crisis you had withdrawn completely
from political life; is that true?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I was very rarely in Berlin. For the most part I was
on my estate in Württemberg or in the mountains.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In September 1939, were you in Berlin, and did you
have any knowledge of Hitler’s plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: You mean in the late winter of 1939?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the late winter, yes.
VON NEURATH: No, I had kept aloof. The differences between Germany,
Czechoslovakia...
THE PRESIDENT: September 1939?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That was my mistake. I meant in the late winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Of 1938, you mean?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1939.
VON NEURATH: 1938-1939.
The differences between us and Czechoslovakia on the treatment of the
Sudeten Germans by the Czechs had been solved by the separation of the
Sudetenland. The way to friendly co-operation was paved. One of the
focal points of danger for the peace of Europe had been eliminated.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then there came the famous dispute between Hitler
and the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Hacha, in the night
of 14 to 15 March 1939 in Berlin. This conference has already been
discussed here. I do not believe I need go into it in much detail.
Anyhow you know of it.
I should like to ask you, did you know of these events as described,
particularly as given in Document Number 2798-PS?
VON NEURATH: No, I did not know of them. I learned of them only much
later. I only learned here of the notes of Herr Hewel, but after I
learned of these events I disapproved strongly, and I would not have
taken office as Reich Protector under any circumstances if I had known
of these things at the time. I was completely surprised by the events in
March 1939. I no longer received any foreign political information, as I
have already said. I was dependent upon the radio and the newspapers.
The preparation for attack on Czechoslovakia in 1938 I considered to
have been eliminated after the Munich Agreement.
I learned of Hacha’s visit to Berlin, like every other German, by radio
and newspapers the next morning. The official statement of the taking
over of protection of the remainder of Czechoslovakia seemed not
improbable to me after Slovakia had become independent, and after I
learned that the Czech Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in the course of
the winter 1938-39 had said in Berlin that Czechoslovakia’s former
policy must be completely changed and that closer connections would have
to be sought with Germany. However, I was concerned about how the
signatory powers of Munich would react to this development, which was in
contravention of the agreement which had been reached in Munich. My
first question to Hitler, when I went to Vienna at his request, was
whether England and France had been informed beforehand and had given
their approval. When he said no, that that was quite unnecessary, and
that the Czech Government itself had asked us to take over the
protection, I immediately realized how dangerous the situation was, and
said so to Hitler.
However, at the time I still believed that it had, in fact, been a free
decision of the Czech Government. Hitler’s request that I should take
the post of Reich Protector was a complete surprise to me, the more so
since I had discovered that he had very much taken amiss my spontaneous
intervention in September 1938, which led to the Munich conference. I
had misgivings about taking the office, which I also expressed to
Hitler. I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would, at the very
least, strongly offend the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement,
even if Hacha had asked for protection of his own accord, and it was
also clear to me that any aggravation of the situation through bad
treatment of the Czechs would bring about an immediate danger of war.
The patience of England and France must surely be exhausted. I mentioned
this to Hitler, too. Hitler’s answer was that that was precisely the
reason why he was asking me to take over the post—to show that he did
not wish to carry on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was generally
known abroad as a peaceful and moderate man, and he would give me the
most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten
German element. When I still hesitated and said that I did not know
conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator, Hitler
said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time. He gave
me two experienced men who knew the conditions. I did not realize at the
time that the fact that the Police and the SS were not subordinate to
any higher authority, already a practice then, would make it impossible
for me to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his agencies.
But I cannot refrain from pointing out that great responsibility for
further developments lies with the other powers, especially the
signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making protest on paper, I had
expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then,
perhaps, the tension might have increased for the moment, but the German
people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler
would have avoided taking further aggressive steps and the war could
have been prevented.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The charge is made that you took this office so
that by misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression
could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated
moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment
briefly on this point?
VON NEURATH: That is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt
to reconcile the Czechs to the new conditions and to keep from excesses
the German population which was filled with hatred by the years of
struggle over nationality and measures of suppression.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to
your office?
VON NEURATH: He assured me that he would support me in every way and at
all times in my work of settling the national conflicts justly and
winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy. In
particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by
political radicals, above all by the SS and Police and Sudeten Germans;
I had pointed out this danger particularly.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you convinced at that time that, in making
these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious
and honest?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I definitely had that impression.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then you believed that he would abide by the
assurances he gave you?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At that time did you know of any plans or even
intention with regard to forcible Germanization of the Czechs?
VON NEURATH: No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have
considered that such nonsense that I would not have believed that anyone
could have such an idea.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you still believe that Hitler’s assurances and
expressed intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they
were only made illusory through further developments?
VON NEURATH: Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to a
document in my Document Book 5, under Number 142, which contains an
excerpt from Henderson’s _Failure of a Mission_. I should like to ask
the Court to take judicial notice of that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In connection with that period, the
conclusion of the German-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 concerning the
independence of Slovakia is charged against you by the Prosecution.
Did you have anything at all to do with drawing up this treaty or with
declaring Slovakia autonomous?
VON NEURATH: No. I learned of the declaration of autonomy for Slovakia
and of all these events only after they had been made public.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the principles of your program for your
administration in Prague?
VON NEURATH: It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech
people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only
gradually, by sparing their national feelings as far as possible, and
without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would
have taken several generations. I therefore attempted a gradual
adjustment and a diminishing of the previously hostile policies.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to
Document 143 in my Document Book 5. This is a reproduction of an article
which Herr Von Neurath published about the aims of his administration in
Prague in the _Europäische Revue_ at the end of March 1939. I ask the
Court to take judicial notice of this.
This article shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what
tendencies Herr Von Neurath took up his office at that time. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
What were the conditions which you found in Prague when you took over
your office in April?
VON NEURATH: The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of
their former allies in the autumn of 1938. To a large extent they seemed
ready to be loyal and to co-operate. However, the influence of
anti-Czech and Sudeten-German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS,
was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the
Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed my State
Secretary at Himmler’s instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with
him from the very beginning, because he favored a completely different
policy toward the Czechs.
The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of
the administration was an experienced administration official, State
Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the
various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin
ministries.
In the provincial administration German “Oberlandräte” were appointed as
supervisory officers for each Czech district. They were appointed by the
Reich Ministry of the Interior.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were the Police subordinate?
VON NEURATH: The police force was completely independent of my office.
It was directly under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
Police; that is to say, Himmler.
Himmler appointed my own State Secretary Frank as Higher SS and Police
Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank, in turn, was the
commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by
Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office without
a request for my approval, without my even having been informed
previously. From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which
I constantly had to struggle in Prague.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The treatment of the position of the Police in a
Czechoslovakian report under Number USSR-60, which was submitted by the
Prosecution, presents the matter in a somewhat different light. Do you
adhere to the description which you have just given?
VON NEURATH: Yes, absolutely.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You were informed of police measures only
afterward, but were not asked for your approval beforehand?
VON NEURATH: Yes, and I was informed afterward only sporadically. I
frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private
persons, of incidents which I was not informed about by the Police even
afterward; then I had to inquire of Frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer in this connection to the
decree of 1 September 1939, which I have submitted verbatim as Number
149 in my Document Book 5, and I should like to point out the following:
This order is divided into two completely separate sections. Part I
concerns the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector;
and Part II, completely separated therefrom, deals with the
establishment of the German Security Police, which is directly under the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. Already this external
form of the order, this ostentatious separation of the two
administrative branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that
the Police and the police power were only under Himmler or under his
Berlin authorities. This already emphasized the fact that the Reich
Protector could exert no influence on them. This is the great tragedy of
Herr Von Neurath’s activities as Reich Protector. Matters are
automatically charged against him for which he never can and never did
take the responsibility. The Prosecution refers particularly to
Paragraph 13 in this order, which mentions administrative measures
according to which the Reich Protector, and the Reichsführer SS in
agreement with the former, can take administrative measures necessary
for the maintenance of security and public order in the Protectorate
even beyond the limits determined for this purpose.
What does this mean?
VON NEURATH: I do not know what this order means by “administrative
measures.” It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably
referring to the issuing of general instructions. At any rate, as long
as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsführer SS made any use of
this power. Arrests were all made without informing me previously, on
the basis of Paragraph 11 of the order which has just been read, and
which does not in any way subordinate the Police in the Protectorate to
me.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Hitler not assure you, in Vienna, that you
were to have full executive powers in the Protectorate, and that that
would include the Police?
VON NEURATH: No; I have already mentioned that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you attempt to change this situation and to
obtain from Hitler control over the Police, or at least exert influence
over the Police?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I repeatedly made representations to Hitler in
connection with the recurring violations and excesses of the Police. He
promised me repeatedly that he would investigate these circumstances,
but nothing was changed. The influence of Himmler, who considered the
Police throughout the Reich to be his own domain, was too powerful.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian report on which the Indictment
is based, in addition to the Police Chief, also holds the Reich
Protector until September 1941—that is you— responsible for the terror
acts of the Gestapo. On the basis of the statements which you have just
made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent?
VON NEURATH: No. I must deny it very emphatically. I have already
explained what the real circumstances were, that I had no influence
whatever.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in
this connection from Document 153 in my Document Book 5, which consist
of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the
Czechoslovakian delegation on 30 May 1945. These minutes from Frank’s
testimony say:
“Neither the Reich Protector nor I myself was responsible for
the actions of the Police. The highest responsibility was with
Heinrich Himmler as Chief of the German Police. The Gestapo
received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from
Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Main Office.”
By your presence in Prague could you actually do anything in practice to
modify at least the worst measures inflicted by the Police or the
Gestapo, or to minimize the most severe effects afterward? Will you
please describe how you intervened and how you attempted to influence
Frank in these matters?
VON NEURATH: I received continual requests from President Hacha, the
Czech Government, and private persons. My office was for the most part
busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me
personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified,
I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report to me and
tried to influence them in favor of releasing the arrested person. It
was, however, an incessant struggle with Frank and the Police, although
it was successful in many cases. In the course of time many hundreds of
persons who had been arrested were released at my instigation. In
addition many sentences were mitigated with respect to postal
communication, sending of food, and so forth.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Soon after you took office did you not prevent the
arrest and subjection to so-called atonement measures of the members of
the families remaining in Prague of the Ministers Netschas and
Feierabend, who had fled abroad?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right. Frank had ordered the arrest of the
members of the families of these two ministers. When I learned about it
I induced him to desist from taking this step.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break
off now, because this section is finished and I come now to individual
questions?
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, first of all, I should like to refer to
individual police measures for which you have been held responsible to a
greater or lesser degree by the Prosecution. Were there many arrests of
Czechoslovak nationals already in the summer of 1939?
VON NEURATH: No; the activity of the Police in the summer of 1939 was
slight, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict these police
measures increasingly.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian Indictment, under USSR-60, in
Appendix Number 6, Supplement 1, submits a proclamation which you, as
Reich Protector, issued in August 1939, that is, just prior to the
outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve as a
warning to the people of the Protectorate against acts of sabotage. I
shall have this proclamation submitted to you at this point.
I should like you to comment on it. This appendix is attached to the
Document USSR-60 as Appendix 1. The proclamation, which I have just had
given to the defendant, reads as follows—if I may, with the permission
of the Tribunal, read the most important part:
“1.) Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater
German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate,
and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted with
unrelenting harshness, and will be punished most severely.
“2.) By sabotage as described in Paragraph 1, is meant all
disturbances of the public and economic life, particularly the
damaging of essential installations such as railroads,
telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, waterworks,
electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the
hoarding of consumer goods, raising of prices, and the spreading
of rumors by word or in writing.
“3.) The population must observe all special directives of the
organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have
been published or such as will be published in the future.
Refusal to obey or acting against any organs of the Reich will
be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly.
Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not only
on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the
entire Czechoslovakian population.
“I expect under all circumstances that the Czechoslovakian
population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will
prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Führer has
guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.”
Will you please comment on this?
VON NEURATH: I cannot imagine from what point of view the release of
this public warning against sabotage can be used as the basis of an
accusation against me. At this period of the greatest political tension,
it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in
order to commit acts of sabotage which could damage public services. In
my opinion, this would not have been tolerated in any state at such a
time without severe punishment. Through this warning we wanted to try to
eliminate all incentives for committing acts of sabotage. Moreover, as
far as I recall, this warning had the desired effect and practically no
acts of sabotage actually took place. Besides, the threat of special
punishment is not contained in this warning at all, but it refers only
to provisions for severe punishment which already existed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Shortly after the publication of this proclamation
the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?
VON NEURATH: I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for
on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was
convinced that England would keep her promise to Poland, and that
therewith the war against England and France would also commence, in
which the United States, with its tremendous production capacity, would
stand behind these powers. That was clear to me from all the statements
made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war. I also
rejected and condemned the rather reckless beginning of this war because
of my ethical convictions and my ideology.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For what reasons did you remain in your office
instead of resigning?
VON NEURATH: I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the
Czechs would try, if not to throw off German rule, at least to disturb,
either openly or secretly, through uprisings, sabotage, _et cetera_, the
military measures of the Armed Forces taken in the Protectorate and that
on the other hand due to this the severest measures would be taken
against the population on the part of Germany, which would cause the
Police, above all the Gestapo, to proceed with all kinds of terrorist
acts. Through my remaining in office I wanted to prevent both of these
things, and I also wanted to prevent a harsher treatment of the Czech
population by the policy of conciliation and compromise which I
followed.
To lay down my office at a moment like that would have been desertion.
But, on the other hand, I believed that in a war in which the existence
of the German people was at stake I could not, as a German—which I am,
with full devotion—refuse my services and my knowledge. After all, it
was not a question of Hitler or the Nazi regime, but rather of my people
and their existence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Therefore, by remaining in office you did not wish
to indicate your approval of this war, which was brought about by
Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Never. For it was an accomplished fact, to which I had not
contributed; and I told Hitler my attitude and my opinion about the
insanity of the war quite clearly. But I would have considered myself a
traitor to the German and Czech peoples if, in this hour of need, I had
abandoned the difficult task which I had undertaken for the benefit and
welfare of both peoples, as long as I could even in a restricted measure
live up to my task. I do not believe that any decent person would have
acted differently, for, above all, and beyond personal wishes, there is
one’s duty to one’s own people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the
Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive
measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests, involving at any
rate more than a thousand persons, especially representatives of the
intelligentsia insofar as they were considered politically unreliable.
Were you advised of these arrests in advance, as should have been done
according to Paragraph 11 of the order of 1 September 1939, which has
been quoted earlier?
VON NEURATH: No, not even afterward. I learned of these arrests through
President Hacha.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did you have done then?
VON NEURATH: First of all, I had Frank come to me and remonstrated with
him. He said that he had not been informed either, and that this was a
general police preventive measure.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Which came directly from Berlin?
VON NEURATH: Yes, which Himmler had ordered the Gestapo and SD to take.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you now try to have the people liberated who
had been arrested, and who had for the most part been taken into the
Reich?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I constantly exerted pressure on Frank, and on Himmler
and Heydrich in Berlin, to that end.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how successful were your efforts?
VON NEURATH: Hundreds of these people who had been arrested—whose names
I had to get from the Czechs with great difficulty as the German Police
refused to give me these names—were released in the course of time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On 28 October 1939 public demonstrations occurred
in Prague for the first time on the occasion of the Czech Independence
Day. On this occasion, some of the demonstrators and some policemen were
either killed or injured; for the Police took rather strong measures
against the people demonstrating.
Regarding these police measures before, during, and after this
demonstration, did you have knowledge of them and did you endorse them?
VON NEURATH: At that time I was not in Prague, and only on 29 October
did Frank inform me over the telephone about the unrest. The details I
did not learn until I returned on 30 or 31 October. I told Frank that
through his personal interference on the streets and through the use of
the SS he had intensified the tumult instead of leaving the restoration
of order to the Czech police.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Frank sent a report dealing with these cases of
unrest to Berlin, which he mentioned when he was interrogated by the
Czech delegation on 5 May 1945.
I have submitted an excerpt from the record of this interrogation which
will be found in my Document Book 5 under Number 152. I should like to
quote a few sentences from this report:
“This was the first time that the population demonstrated
publicly and that these slogans”—that were mentioned
earlier—“were heard in the open. This matter was therefore
taken seriously, and I personally reported to Berlin about all
incidents. I should like to say that I was an eyewitness to
these demonstrations and that I had the impression that they
were of a dangerous nature. In the report which I sent to Berlin
I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations,
and that, therefore, special importance was to be attached to
them since they took place in the open street. I asked for
directives which I received immediately from the Führer’s
headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to
the Security Police and I received knowledge of their contents.
The entire program was carried through directly by the Police.”
Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank’s, and the measures which
are mentioned therein, before it was sent off, or afterward?
VON NEURATH: No. This report was completely unknown to me until now in
Nuremberg; but Frank always reported directly to Berlin. Apart from
that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration, which was
carried on mostly by young people, should be considered especially
important or that it should necessitate special police measures.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At the funeral on 15 November of one of the
students who was killed on 28 October there were fresh demonstrations in
Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others
arrested, and the universities closed. What do you know about these
incidents?
VON NEURATH: When this student, Opletal, who was injured in the fracas,
died of his wounds, the Police, in order to prevent new demonstrations,
prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to
take place on 15 November. Despite this, crowds collected, and when the
Police attempted to disperse them, renewed demonstrations and shootings
resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly
enraged and called me, Frank, and the Military Plenipotentiary, General
Friderici, to a conference to be held in Berlin. Hitler had also asked
the Czech Minister, Chvalkovsky, the former Foreign Minister, to be
present at this conference. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him,
but despite that he made serious charges against the Czech Minister and
gave him instructions to tell the Czech Government that if such events
should recur he would take the most severe measures against the people
who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the
entire Czech Government liable. The language used by Hitler was quite
uncontrolled and the proceeding was extremely distressing to us who were
listening. After the Czech Minister had left, we stayed with Hitler for
a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin and
I told him 1 to 2 days. Then we were asked to dinner, but there was no
further discussion about these incidents. Hitler asked State Secretary
Frank to come back later. Hitler said no word about the shooting of the
leaders of the demonstration or taking the students to concentration
camps; neither did he mention the closing of the universities.
When, toward evening, I asked after the pilot of my airplane in order to
give him instructions, I was told at the airport that he had flown back
to Prague in my airplane together with Frank. The following day I
returned to Prague by train and only then did I learn that Hitler had
decreed the closing of all Czech universities for 3 years, the arrest of
some 1,200 students and their transfer to a concentration camp, as well
as the shooting of the ringleaders of the demonstration. At the same
time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was submitted to me
in which these orders were announced which had been published in the
press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and
challenged him with these unheard-of things which had taken place
without my knowledge. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler’s. I
had not even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed to it
illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing
this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank
often misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of
these decrees of Hitler—and, of course, he had the opportunity to reach
me by telephone in Berlin—I would naturally have objected to these
decrees and at that time would have asked to resign.
Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler
personally and tried going to Himmler, and gradually most of them were
released, I believe more than 800 in all, the last of their number being
released in the summer of 1941.
Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I
complained bitterly to Hitler about his conduct toward me. He evaded an
answer, as far as I recall, but he promised me that the students would
be released very soon and that the Czech universities would be reopened
after 1 year. Neither of these promises did he keep.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to read to you the answer of
Legation Counsellor Von Holleben, who at that time participated in the
Protectorate Government, to Question 21 of his interrogatory of 18 May
1946. This interrogatory may be found under Number 158 in my Document
Book 5. The answer of Herr Von Holleben reads as follows:
“The student riots of October and November 1939 were a turning
point in the history of the Protectorate. I cannot give you a
chronological repetition of the events from memory. However, I
can state the following: The manifestations which took place on
28 October 1939, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of
the constitution of the Czechoslovak State, in Prague and Brno,
mainly by the academic youth, were to be expected. Therefore,
Herr Von Neurath, previous to 28 October 1939, issued orders to
ignore them quietly as far as possible and only to interfere
when they assumed the character of a serious danger to public
peace and safety. Because of noncompliance with this order the
greater part, if not the whole of the disaster resulted.
Immediately after the conference with Hitler Frank returned to
Prague. The office of the Reich Protector, who himself was still
in Berlin, had only received knowledge of the measures taken
against the students on 15 and 16 November on the following
morning, partly through the numerous appeals which the members
of the families of the arrested students made at the office of
Herr Von Neurath. In my opinion Herr Von Neurath did not learn
of these sanctions against students until after they had taken
place. I personally did not report this matter to him, and I
cannot tell you just who did report to Von Neurath on this
matter. It is my firm conviction that the proclamation in
question, addressed to the Czech people, was given out without
the knowledge of Herr Von Neurath, and through misuse of his
name. I remember distinctly that because of this he had heated
arguments with Frank. At that time he remained in office, for he
believed that by remaining he could prevent much more disaster.
He considered the closing of the universities an unwarranted
intervention in the life of the Czech people. He tried with all
the means at his disposal to have the Czech university teachers
and students, who had been taken to German concentration camps,
liberated subsequently, and until such liberation, to have them
accommodated in special sections.”
In this connection, I should also like to submit to the Tribunal an
affidavit which I just received a few days ago from the secretary of
Herr Von Neurath at that time, Fräulein Irene Friedrich. This is dated 6
June 1946, and from it we can see quite clearly that at the time this
announcement was issued and published, Herr Von Neurath had not yet
returned from Berlin, and therefore that it was quite impossible for
Herr Von Neurath to have had knowledge of this proclamation.
I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this
affidavit.
I should also like to refer...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the affidavit?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Number 159, Mr. President. I should like to refer
further to a document of the Czech Prosecution: Appendix 5 of Supplement
Number 1, a memorandum of Herr Von Neurath dated 26 March 1940 which has
been submitted. This deals with the discussion with President Hacha
regarding the arrested students and also shows that Herr Von Neurath
tried, and kept on trying, to have these students released.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number for that? You said Document
Book 5.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-60,
and is not in my document book. I was only referring to that.
Apart from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally,
did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of
your office?
VON NEURATH: No, but single instances of arrest did take place
recurrently, and I continually intervened anew to have them investigated
and perhaps rescinded, at the suggestion of the Czech Government and
private people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few more sentences
from the document of the Czech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on Page
59 of the English text. I quote:
“Immediately after the occupation representatives of the ‘Sokol’
(Falcon) athletic association, which had 1 million members,
joined a movement for the liberation of the country; this
included the underground movement at home and the movement
abroad. The idea of the ‘Sokol’ united the army members abroad
and gave strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest time. This
was true at home to an even larger extent. The Gestapo was aware
of this danger, and therefore proceeded with the utmost
severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but
when they realized the firm resolve of the ‘Sokols,’ they began
to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of
arrests on 1 September 1939. Then extensive arrests of single
individuals and of organizations followed.”
Will you please comment on this.
VON NEURATH: The “Sokol” was the most dangerous organization hostile to
the State in the Protectorate. The extent of its activity can be seen
especially from the sentences of the Czech Indictment which have just
been read. It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could
not be tolerated, especially in war, and the report itself characterizes
the first police measures as “still moderate.” I am convinced that in no
other country would such intrigues (underground movements) have been
treated any differently. In such cases of undoubted high treason or
cases of sabotage, I could not possibly intervene for the people
responsible, and moreover, the Czech Government quite understood this.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions shootings under
martial law. Did such shootings occur during your period of office?
VON NEURATH: No, apart from the case of the nine students which has
already been mentioned I know of no shootings under martial law during
my time in office.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Frank, aside from his disastrous activity as
Higher SS and Police Leader, as your State Secretary try to use his
influence in the policy and administration of the Protectorate, and did
you work closely with him in that respect?
VON NEURATH: Frank represented one-sided, radical German interests. That
was the old Sudeten-German hatred of the Czechs. I repeatedly curbed
these tendencies, but as my representative he, in practice, took part in
the general policy and in the administration.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal relationship to Frank?
VON NEURATH: From the very beginning it was bad because of the fact that
he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized that very
frequently he did not tell me the truth.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal and official relationship
to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?
VON NEURATH: In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was
convinced of the fact that my intentions for fair and just treatment of
the Czech population were quite sincere, and that I did everything
within my power to realize my intentions. On the other hand, I fully
understood and recognized in every respect the efforts of the Czech
Government to represent primarily the interests of the people. As to my
personal relationship to President Hacha, I might go so far as to say it
was very good. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha’s difficult task
as far as I could, for I knew that he, too, through his assumption of
the post of President and through his remaining in office was making a
great personal sacrifice. He and the members of the Government were
always invited to all occasions which did not have a purely German
character, and were treated with distinction in accordance with their
rank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the manner of work of your office in
Prague? Were you quite independent in your work or were you in your
office bound by directives from Berlin?
VON NEURATH: My answer in this respect is a rather tedious matter. The
fundamentals of policy and the administration of the departments were
determined in Berlin as far as they applied to the Protectorate, that
is, by Hitler himself or by department ministers. My field was the
supervision of the execution and application of these principles as they
applied to the Protectorate, always considering the special
circumstances which arose from the ethical, cultural, and economic
structure of the country. Obviously, above all in war, the Protectorate,
which was situated in the center of the Reich, could not be treated as
an independent unit but had to be incorporated into the general pattern.
As I have already stated, the various branches of my authority had been
established by the central offices in Berlin. The officials of these
branches, therefore, from the beginning, had certain practical
connections with their parent ministries, even though they were later
subordinate to me. The individual heads of the branches received their
directives in regard to specific problems direct from their department
ministries in Berlin. Then those directives were submitted to Under
State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was the head of the administration,
or, if they were very fundamental matters, also to me. The carrying-out
of these measures in the Protectorate was in that way discussed, and
subsequently settled with the Czech Minister. Thus were established the
decrees and basic directives which were signed by me or by my deputy.
Frequently these dealt with the introduction of legal or administrative
measures which already existed in the Reich, or which were newly issued
in the Reich. Apart from that, a series of directives applying to the
Protectorate were issued directly by the competent Berlin ministries.
The Reich Minister of the Interior had been designated as the so-called
central agency for the release of these Reich directives.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
refer to the following documents to be found in my Document Book 5:
Documents Number 145, a decree from the Führer and Reich Chancellor
dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, supplementing the
decree of 22 March 1939; Number 146, extracts from basic regulations
applying to the Protectorate, dealing with commercial transactions with
the Protectorate, dated 28 March 1939; Number 147, a directive as to the
administration of criminal justice in the Protectorate, dated 14 April
1939; Number 148, a directive dealing with statutory law in the
Protectorate, dated 7 June 1939; and I should like to refer to a
document which has already been submitted, Number 149, the regulation
dealing with the structure of the administration and the German Security
Police. In this connection I should like to remark that all these
directives were signed, not by the Reich Protector, but rather by the
competent Reich department minister, and sometimes also by Reich Marshal
Göring as Chairman of the Reich Defense Council. The legal basis for the
authority of the Protector is the decree by the Führer and Reich
Chancellor in regard to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia dated 16
March 1939, signed by Hitler, Frick...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask the defendant to clear up what his concern
was with these decrees of the Reichsführer and of the Defendant Göring.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I wanted to show that he had
nothing to do with these matters but that he was obliged to carry them
out. According to the decree which put him in office it was his duty to
supervise these measures, which were issued by agencies in the Reich.
That was what I wanted to prove, that all these directives did not
originate with him, but rather with the Reichsführer.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I should like to remark that I was chiefly concerned
with seeing that these matters were duly published in the Protectorate,
and then having my agencies supervise their execution.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How far did the autonomy of the Protectorate reach
in all these decisions?
VON NEURATH: The extent of autonomy was not clearly defined. Basically
the Protectorate was autonomous, and it was administered by its own
Czech authorities and Czech officials. But in the course of time
considerable restrictions were placed on this state of autonomy, as was
provided for in the decree which you have just read. The introduction of
these restrictions was regarded as practical by the Reich Government and
resulted, in part, from general tendencies toward centralization in
Berlin, but it was also necessitated to a large extent by the general
political development in view of the war and of the so-called
totalization of the war effort. I constantly objected to these
restrictions insofar as in my opinion they did not correspond with the
vital needs of the Protectorate and of its people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
refer to Article 3 of the order which has already been quoted, a decree
issued by the Führer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia; Number 144 of my Document Book 5. This reads:
“1.) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and
administers itself.
“2.) Its sovereign rights as a Protectorate are exercised on the
basis of the political, military, and economic interests of the
Reich.
“3.) These sovereign rights are upheld by its own organizations,
its own authorities, and with its own officials.”
How about the Armed Forces offices in the Protectorate? Were you
connected with them?
VON NEURATH: No, they were subordinate to a special Plenipotentiary of
the Armed Forces who was to keep me advised about the basic military
questions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to specific points
which are mentioned in the Czech report, USSR-60, and of which you are
accused.
To which extent were you competent for administering criminal justice in
the Protectorate? Specifically, did you have to confirm death sentences
against the Czechs?
VON NEURATH: The criminal justice of the German courts was under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. The Czech courts were
not under my jurisdiction at all. I was concerned only with decisions in
cases of appeals for clemency against verdicts of German courts in the
Protectorate, which were submitted to me by the President of the
Provincial Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).
These, in special cases, might also apply to Czechs. However, they did
not concern political crimes. Political proceedings against Czechs were,
as far as I recall, handled by the Peoples’ Court (Volksgerichtshof) in
Berlin, insofar as they dealt with high treason. As far as I know, in
these proceedings against Czechs the same basic principles were applied
as against Germans.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the right to grant pardon when the
Peoples’ Court gave decisions against Czechs?
VON NEURATH: No, I had no possibility of influence, and I did not have
the right to pardon.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In your time did you know anything about the
activity of special courts in the Protectorate?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot recall that special courts were active during
the time I was there. In my opinion, this could apply only to German
courts for the prosecution of specific offenses, for example, violations
of radio regulations; such courts were established at the beginning of
the war in the Reich. However, these courts were not under my
jurisdiction, but directly subordinate to the Reich Minister of Justice.
He appointed the judges, gave them their directives, and the judges
reported directly to him. I had no opportunity of using influence in any
way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Regarding the activity of these special courts, I
should like to quote one sentence from the Czech report, USSR-60. This
may be found on Page 106 of the German text and Page 92 of the English
text. It deals with orders and decrees that were to be applied by these
special courts. I quote:
“A large number of these orders and decrees violate principles
that all civilized countries consider irrevocable.”
Is that report correct?
VON NEURATH: Yes, in this case I agree entirely with the Czech
Prosecution report. But I should imagine that in the latest developments
this principle has been considerably attenuated even among civilized
peoples.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to know something about the
alleged plans dealing with the Germanization of the areas in the
Protectorate inhabited by Czechs. You said previously that, when you
assumed office, you knew nothing about such plans. Who later revealed
the pattern of these plans to you?
VON NEURATH: These plans in part originated with Sudeten-German circles,
but in the main they could be traced back to the organizations of
Himmler and also to suggestions on the part of the Gauleiter of Lower
Danube.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In regard to this problem of alleged efforts at
Germanization, I should like to read to you a report to the OKW dated 15
October 1940 by the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary General in the
Protectorate, General Friderici. This is the document which has been
submitted by the Prosecution under Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-313; and it is concerned with statements about basic policy
pursued in the Protectorate, which State Secretary Frank made in an
official discussion with your office. In this document Frank mentions a
memorandum in which, after careful investigation, the Reich Protector
had defined his attitude toward the various plans of numerous offices.
He mentions three possibilities of solution to the question of the
possible Germanization of the Czech territory. You probably know this
document and I do not believe that it is necessary for me to read it.
What do you know about this memorandum? Did you compose it yourself?
Tell us what you have to say about it.
VON NEURATH: The memorandum refers to the proposals which I just
mentioned on the part of various Party offices for the possible
resettlement of the Czechs. I objected to this plan from the very
beginning as being quite absurd and incapable of execution. Frank, who
agreed with me on this point, therefore at my direction drew up this
memorandum which you have just mentioned, in which the radical measures
of the SS and of the Party were rejected and in which the so-called
gradual assimilation was considered as the only possible solution of
this problem. In this way I wanted to postpone the matter and thwart the
plans of the SS. Since these plans for resettlement had already been put
by Himmler before the Führer, I required a rather stringent directive
from the latter in order to quash them. However, for tactical reasons I
had to make some sort of proposal: Hence, that of the policy of
assimilation, because with this suggestion the matter was in practice
postponed. In order to forestall countermeasures by the SS and Himmler,
I reported to the Führer personally about the matter and asked him to
issue a stringent directive, which he did. Thus the matter was buried
and was not taken up again. The sentence found in this memorandum to the
effect that “....Germanization would have to be carried out for a number
of years by the office of the Reich Protector....” means specifically
that the SS could no longer interfere in this matter. The Reich
Protector alone was to be the competent authority, and the Reich
Protector did nothing. Moreover, the statement of General Friderici, who
was equally opposed to radical fantasy, to the effect that “....as far
as the Armed Forces were concerned there would be no important
consequences, since he had always adhered to this concept....” goes to
show the same. If after this report Frank said that “....the elements
which were working contrary to the intended Germanization would have to
be handled roughly and would have to be eliminated....”; these were
merely his words and the type of language that was used in speeches of
that kind. Actually, as I have said, nothing further was done to
assimilate the people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I now ask your permission to quote
a few sentences from the affidavit that we have mentioned, which was
made by Baroness Ritter, Number 3 in my Document Book 1. They are found
on Page 18. It says there:
“With regard to the plans for the Germanization, that is, the
gradual assimilation, of the Czechs, Neurath stated as follows
in a letter:
“‘Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people who
are simply to be resettled arouse pity in one’s soul. However, I
believe I have discovered a way now to prevent the disaster.
Time won is everything won, and frequently to postpone a thing
is to do away with it!’”
Mr. President, if it is permissible for me to make a suggestion, I would
ask that we stop now, since the problem of Germanization is now
completed.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are going to be? You have
already been a day and a half.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the Indictment contained in the
Czech report is not well substantiated and not very concrete, so that I
must mention each individual point contained therein. I have
approximately 20 more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: One hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will expect you to conclude in an
hour.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I hope so, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in
the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 16_, by Various.]
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