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Title: The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War
Author: Abel, Annie Heloise
Language: English
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Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

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[Illustration: Facsimile of Negro Bill of Sale]


_Professor of History, Smith College_


My former colleagues and students at Goucher
College and in the College Courses for
Teachers, Johns Hopkins University
this book is affectionately dedicated


       MORE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS                          13
       MOVEMENT OF THE "WHITE AUXILIARY"              125
       SUPERINTENDENCY                                171
       AGENCY                                         203
       INCLUSIVE                                      243
       INCLUSIVE                                      283
XIII ASPECTS, CHIEFLY MILITARY, 1864-1865             313
APPENDIX                                              337
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                 353
INDEX                                                 369


FACSIMILE OF NEGRO BILL OF SALE                         4
PORTRAIT OF COLONEL W.A. PHILLIPS                      93


The Indian alliance, so assiduously sought by the Southern Confederacy
and so laboriously built up, soon revealed itself to be most unstable.
Direct and unmistakable signs of its instability appeared in
connection with the first real military test to which it was
subjected, the Battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn, as it is better known
in the South, the battle that stands out in the history of the War
of Secession as being the most decisive victory to date of the Union
forces in the West and as marking the turning point in the political
relationship of the State of Missouri with the Confederate government.

In the short time during which, following the removal of General
Frémont, General David Hunter was in full command of the Department of
the West--and it was practically not more than one week--he completely
reversed the policy of vigorous offensive that had obtained under men,
subordinate to his predecessor.[1] In southwest Missouri, he abandoned
the advanced position of the Federals and fell back upon Sedalia
and Rolla, railway termini. That he did this at the suggestion
of President Lincoln[2] and with the tacit approval of General
McClellan[3] makes no

[Footnote 1: _The Century Company's War Book_, vol. i, 314-315.]

[Footnote 2: _Official Records_, first ser., vol. iii, 553-554.
Hereafter, except where otherwise designated, the _first series_
will always be understood.]

[Footnote 3:--Ibid., 568.]

difference now, as it made no difference then, in the consideration
of the consequences; yet the consequences were, none the less, rather
serious. They were such, in fact, as to increase very greatly the
confusion on the border and to give the Confederates that chance of
recovery which soon made it necessary for their foes to do the work of
Nathaniel Lyon all over again.

It has been most truthfully said[4] that never, throughout the period
of the entire war, did the southern government fully realize the
surpassingly great importance of its Trans-Mississippi District;
notwithstanding that when that district was originally organized,[5]
in January, 1862, some faint idea of what it might, peradventure,
accomplish did seem to penetrate,[6] although ever so vaguely, the
minds of those then in authority. It was organized under pressure from
the West as was natural, and under circumstances to which meagre and
tentative reference has already been made in the first volume of this
work.[7] In the main, the circumstances were such as developed out of
the persistent refusal of General McCulloch to coöperate with General

There was much to be said in justification of McCulloch's obstinacy.
To understand this it is well to recall that, under the plan, lying
back of this first

[Footnote 4: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 781-782;
Edwards, _Shelby and His Men_, 105.]

[Footnote 5:--Ibid., vol. viii, 734.]

[Footnote 6: It is doubtful if even this ought to be conceded in view
of the fact that President Davis later admitted that Van Dorn entered
upon the Pea Ridge campaign for the sole purpose of effecting "a
diversion in behalf of General Johnston" [_Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government_, vol. ii, 51]. Moreover, Van Dorn had
scarcely been assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi
District before Beauregard was devising plans for bringing him
east again [Greene, _The Mississippi_, II; Roman, _Military
Operations of General Beauregard_, vol. i, 240-244].]

[Footnote 7: Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, 225-226 and _footnote_ 522.]

appointment to the Confederate command, was the expectation that he
would secure the Indian Territory. Obviously, the best way to do that
was to occupy it, provided the tribes, whose domicile it was, were
willing. But, if the Cherokees can be taken to have voiced the opinion
of all, they were not willing, notwithstanding that a sensationally
reported[8] Federal activity under Colonel James Montgomery,[9] in the
neighborhood of the frontier posts, Cobb, Arbuckle, and Washita, was
designed to alarm them and had notably influenced, if it had not
actually inspired, the selection and appointment of the Texan

Unable, by reason of the Cherokee objection thereto, to enter the
Indian country; because entrance in the face of that objection would
inevitably force the Ross faction of the Cherokees and, possibly
also, Indians of other tribes into the arms of the Union, McCulloch
intrenched himself on its northeast border, in Arkansas, and there
awaited a more favorable opportunity for accomplishing his main
purpose. He seems to have desired the Confederate government to add
the contiguous portion of Arkansas to his command, but in that he
was disappointed.[11] Nevertheless, Arkansas early interpreted his
presence in the state to imply that he was there primarily for her
defence and, by the middle of June, that idea had so far gained
general acceptance that C.C. Danley, speaking for the Arkansas
Military Board, urged President Davis "to meet

[Footnote 8: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 679.]

[Footnote 9: The name of Montgomery was not one for even Indians to
conjure with. James Montgomery was the most notorious of bushwhackers.
For an account of some of his earlier adventures, see Spring,
_Kansas_, 241, 247-250, and for a characterization of the man
himself, Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 435.]

[Footnote 10: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 682.]

[Footnote 11: Snead, _Fight for Missouri_, 229-230.]

the exigent necessities of the State" by sending a second general
officer there, who should command in the northeastern part.[12]

McCulloch's relations with leading Confederates in Arkansas seem
to have been, from the first, in the highest degree friendly, even
cordial, and it is more than likely that, aside from his unwillingness
to offend the neutrality-loving Cherokees, the best explanation for
his eventual readiness to make the defence of Arkansas his chief
concern, instead of merely a means to the accomplishment of his
original task, may be found in that fact. On the twenty-second of May,
the Arkansas State Convention instructed Brigadier-general N. Bart
Pearce, then in command of the state troops, to coöperate with the
Confederate commander "to the full extent of his ability"[13] and,
on the twenty-eighth of the same month, the Arkansas Military Board
invited that same person, who, of course, was Ben McCulloch, to
assume command himself of the Arkansas local forces.[14] Sympathetic
understanding of this variety, so early established, was bound to
produce good results and McCulloch henceforth identified himself most
thoroughly with Confederate interests in the state in which he was, by
dint of untoward circumstances, obliged to bide his time.

It was far otherwise as respected relations between McCulloch and
the Missouri leaders. McCulloch had little or no tolerance for the
rough-and-ready methods of men like Claiborne Jackson and Sterling
Price. He regarded their plans as impractical, chimerical, and their
warfare as after the guerrilla order, too much like

[Footnote 12: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement,

[Footnote 13:--Ibid., 687.]

[Footnote 14:--Ibid., 691.]

that to which Missourians and Kansans had accustomed themselves
during the period of border conflict, following the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill. McCulloch himself was a man of system. He
believed in organization that made for efficiency. Just prior to the
Battle of Wilson's Creek, he put himself on record as strongly opposed
to allowing unarmed men and camp followers to infest his ranks,
demoralizing them.[15] It was not to be expected, therefore, that
there could ever be much in common between him and Sterling Price. For
a brief period, it is true, the two men did apparently act in fullest
harmony; but it was when the safety of Price's own state, Missouri,
was the thing directly in hand. That was in early August of 1861.
Price put himself and his command subject to McCulloch's orders.[16]
The result was the successful engagement, August 10 at Wilson's Creek,
on Missouri soil. On the fourteenth of the same month, Price reassumed
control of the Missouri State Guard[17] and, from that time on, he and
McCulloch drifted farther and farther apart; but, as their aims were
so entirely different, it was not to be wondered at.

Undoubtedly, all would have been well had McCulloch been disposed to
make the defence of Missouri his only aim. Magnanimity was asked of
him such as the Missouri leaders never so much as contemplated showing
in return. It seems never to have occurred to either Jackson or
Price that coöperation might, perchance, involve such an exchange of
courtesies as would require Price to lend a hand in some project that
McCulloch might devise for the well-being of his own particular

[Footnote 15: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 721.]

[Footnote 16:--Ibid., 720.]

[Footnote 17:--Ibid., 727.]

charge. The assistance was eventually asked for and refused, refused
upon the ground, familiar in United States history, that it would be
impossible to get the Missouri troops to cross the state line. Of
course, Price's conduct was not without extenuation. His position
was not identical with McCulloch's. His force was a state force,
McCulloch's a Confederate, or a national. Besides, Missouri had yet
to be gained, officially, for the Confederacy. She expected secession
states and the Confederacy itself to force the situation for her.
And, furthermore, she was in far greater danger of invasion than
was Arkansas. The Kansans were her implacable and dreaded foes and
Arkansas had none like them to fear.

In reality, the seat of all the trouble between McCulloch and Price
lay in particularism, a phase of state rights, and, in its last
analysis, provincialism. Now particularism was especially pronounced
and especially pernicious in the middle southwest. Missouri had always
more than her share of it. Her politicians were impregnated by it.
They were interested in their own locality exclusively and seemed
quite incapable of taking any broad survey of events that did not
immediately affect themselves or their own limited concerns. In the
issue between McCulloch and Price, this was all too apparent. The
politicians complained unceasingly of McCulloch's neglect of Missouri
and, finally, taking their case to headquarters, represented to
President Davis that the best interests of the Confederate cause in
their state were being glaringly sacrificed by McCulloch's too literal
interpretation of his official instructions, in the strict observance
of which he was keeping close to the Indian boundary.

President Davis had personally no great liking for

Price and certainly none for his peculiar method of fighting. Some
people thought him greatly prejudiced[18] against Price and, in the
first instance, perhaps, on nothing more substantial than the fact
that Price was not a Westpointer.[19] It would be nearer the truth to
say that Davis gauged the western situation pretty accurately and knew
where the source of trouble lay. That he did gauge the situation and
that accurately is indicated by a suggestion of his, made in early
December, for sending out Colonel Henry Heth of Virginia to command
the Arkansas and Missouri divisions in combination.[20] Heth had no
local attachments in the region and "had not been connected with any
of the troops on that line of operations."[21] Unfortunately, for
subsequent events his nomination[22] was not confirmed.

Two days later, December 5, 1861, General McCulloch was granted[23]
permission to proceed to Richmond, there to explain in person, as he
had long wanted to do, all matters in controversy between him and
Price. On the third of January, 1862, the Confederate Congress
called[24] for information on the subject, doubtless under pressure of
political importunity. The upshot of it all was, the organization of
the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2 and the appointment
of Earl Van Dorn as major-general to command it. Whether or no, he was
the choice[25] of General A.S. Johnston, department commander, his
appointment bid fair, at the

[Footnote 18: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement,

[Footnote 19: Ibid., 762.]

[Footnote 20:--Ibid., vol. viii, 725.]

[Footnote 21:--Ibid., 701.]

[Footnote 22: Wright, _General Officers of the Confederate Army_,
33, 67.]

[Footnote 23: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 702.]

[Footnote 24: _Journal of the Congress of the Confederate
States_, vol. i, 637.]

[Footnote 25: Formby, _American Civil War_, 129.]

time it was made, to put an end to all local disputes and to give
Missouri the attention she craved. The ordnance department of the
Confederacy had awakened to a sense of the value of the lead mines[26]
at Granby and Van Dorn was instructed especially to protect them.[27]
His appointment, moreover, anticipated an early encounter with the
Federals in Missouri. In preparation for the struggle that all knew
was impending, it was of transcendent importance that one mind and one
interest should control, absolutely.

The Trans-Mississippi District would appear to have been constituted
and its limits to have been defined without adequate reference to
existing arrangements. The limits were, "That part of the State of
Louisiana north of Red River, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas,
and the States of Arkansas and Missouri, excepting therefrom the tract
of country east of the Saint Francis, bordering on the Mississippi
River, from the mouth of the Saint Francis to Scott County,
Missouri...."[28] Van Dorn, in assuming command of the district,
January 29, 1862, issued orders in such form that Indian Territory was
listed last among the limits[29] and it was a previous arrangement
affecting Indian Territory that was most ignored in the whole scheme
of organization.

It will be remembered that, in November of the preceding year, the
Department of Indian Territory had been created and Brigadier-general
Albert Pike assigned to the same.[30] His authority was not explicitly

[Footnote 26: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 767,

[Footnote 27: Van Dora's protection, if given, was given to little
purpose; for the mines were soon abandoned [Britton, _Memoirs of the
Rebellion on the Border, 1863_, 120].]

[Footnote 28: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 734.]

[Footnote 29:--Ibid., 745.]

[Footnote 30:--Ibid., 690.]

superseded by that which later clothed Van Dorn and yet his department
was now to be absorbed by a military district, which was itself merely
a section of another department. The name and organization of the
Department of Indian Territory remained to breed confusion, disorder,
and serious discontent at a slightly subsequent time. Of course, since
the ratification of the treaties of alliance with the tribes, there
was no question to be raised concerning the status of Indian Territory
as definitely a possession of the Southern Confederacy. Indeed, it
had, in a way, been counted as such, actual and prospective, ever
since the enactment of the marque and reprisal law of May 6, 1861.[31]

Albert Pike, having accepted the appointment of department
commander in Indian Territory under somewhat the same kind of a
protest--professed consciousness of unfitness for the post--as he had
accepted the earlier one of commissioner, diplomatic, to the tribes,
lost no time in getting into touch with his new duties. There was much
to be attended to before he could proceed west. His appointment had
come and had been accepted in November. Christmas was now near at hand
and he had yet to render an account of his mission of treaty-making.
In late December, he sent in his official report[32] to President
Davis and, that done, held himself in readiness to respond to any
interpellating call that the Provincial Congress might see fit to
make. The intervals of time, free from devotion to the completion
of the older task, were spent by him in close attention to the
preliminary details of the newer, in securing funds and in purchasing
supplies and equipment

[Footnote 31: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Confederacy_, vol. i, 105.]

[Footnote 32: The official report of Commissioner Pike, in manuscript,
and bearing his signature, is to be found in the Adjutant-general's
office of the U.S. War Department.]

generally, also in selecting a site for his headquarters. By command
of Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, Major N.B. Pearce[33] was
made chief commissary of subsistence for Indian Territory and Western
Arkansas and Major G.W. Clarke,[34] depot quartermaster. In the sequel
of events, both appointments came to be of a significance rather

The site chosen for department headquarters was a place situated near
the junction of the Verdigris and Arkansas Rivers and not far from
Fort Gibson.[35] The fortifications erected there received the name of
Cantonment Davis and upon them, in spite of Pike's decidedly moderate
estimate in the beginning, the Confederacy was said by a contemporary
to have spent "upwards of a million dollars."[36] In view of the
ostensible object of the very formation of the department and of
Pike's appointment to its command, the defence of Indian Territory,
and, in view of the existing location of enemy troops, challenging
that defence, the selection of the site was a reasonably wise one;
but, as subsequent pages will reveal, the commander did not retain it
long as his headquarters. Troubles came thick and fast upon him and he
had barely reached Cantonment Davis before they began. His delay in
reaching that place, which he did do, February 25,[37] was caused
by various occurrences that made it difficult for him to get his
materials together, his funds and the like. The very difficulties
presaged disaster.

Pike's great purpose--and, perhaps, it would be no exaggeration to
say, his only purpose--throughout the

[Footnote 33: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 764.]

[Footnote 34:--Ibid, 770.]

[Footnote 35:--Ibid, 764.]

[Footnote 36: Britton, _Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border_,

[Footnote 37: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 286.]

full extent of his active connection with the Confederacy was to save
to that Confederacy the Indian Territory. The Indian occupants in and
for themselves, unflattering as it may seem to them for historical
investigators to have to admit it, were not objects of his solicitude
except in so far as they contributed to his real and ultimate
endeavor. He never at any time or under any circumstances advocated
their use generally as soldiers outside of Indian Territory in regular
campaign work and offensively.[38] As guerrillas he would have used
them.[39] He would have sent them on predatory expeditions into Kansas
or any other near-by state where pillaging would have been profitable
or retaliatory; but never as an organized force, subject to the rules
of civilized warfare because fully cognizant of them.[40] It is
doubtful if he would ever have allowed them, had he consulted only his
own inclination, to so much as cross the line except under stress of
an attack from without. He would never have sanctioned their joining
an unprovoked invading force. In the treaties

[Footnote 38: The provision in the treaties to the effect that
the alliance consummated between the Indians and the Confederate
government was to be both offensive and defensive must not be taken
too literally or be construed so broadly as to militate against this
fact: for to its truth Pike, when in distress later on and accused of
leading a horde of tomahawking villains, repeatedly bore witness. The
keeping back of a foe, bent upon regaining Indian Territory or of
marauding, might well be said to partake of the character of offensive
warfare and yet not be that in intent or in the ordinary acceptation
of the term. Everything would have to depend upon the point of view.]

[Footnote 39: A restricted use of the Indians in offensive guerrilla
action Pike would doubtless have permitted and justified. Indeed, he
seems even to have recommended it in the first days of his interest in
the subject of securing Indian Territory. No other interpretation can
possibly be given to his suggestion that a battalion be raised
from Indians that more strictly belonged to Kansas [_Official
Records_, vol. iii, 581]. It is also conceivable that the force
he had reference to in his letter to Benjamin, November 27, 1861
[Ibid., vol. viii, 698] was to be, in part, Indian.]

[Footnote 40: Harrell, _Confederate Military History_, vol. x,

which he negotiated he pledged distinctly and explicitly the opposite
course of action, unless, indeed, the Indian consent were first
obtained.[41] The Indian troops, however and wherever raised under the
provisions of those treaties, were expected by Pike to constitute,
primarily, a home guard and nothing more. If by chance it should
happen that, in performing their function as a home guard, they should
have to cross their own boundary in order to expel or to punish an
intruder, well and good; but their intrinsic character as something
resembling a police patrol could not be deemed thereby affected.
Moreover, Pike did not believe that acting alone they could even be a
thoroughly adequate home force. He, therefore, urged again and again
that their contingent should be supplemented by a white force and by
one sufficiently large to give dignity and poise and self-restraint
to the whole, when both forces were combined, as they always ought to

At the time of Pike's assumption of his ill-defined command, or
within a short period thereafter, the Indian force in the pay of the
Confederacy and subject to his orders may be roughly placed at four
full regiments and some miscellaneous troops.[43] The dispersion[44]
of Colonel John Drew's Cherokees, when about to attack
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, forced a slight reörganization and that, taken
in connection with the accretions to the command that came in the
interval before the Pea Ridge campaign brought the force approximately
to four full

[Footnote 41: In illustration of this, take the statement of the Creek
Treaty, article xxxvi.]

[Footnote 42: Aside from the early requests for white troops, which
were antecedent to his own appointment as brigadier-general, Pike's
insistence upon the need for the same can be vouched for by reference
to his letter to R.W. Johnson, January 5, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 795-796].]

[Footnote 43: Pike to Benjamin, November 27, 1861, Ibid, vol.
viii, 697.]

[Footnote 44: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 8, 17-18.]

regiments, two battalions, and some detached companies. The four
regiments were, the First Regiment Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted
Rifles under Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, the First Creek Regiment under
Colonel D.N. McIntosh, the First Regiment Cherokee Mounted Rifles
under Colonel John Drew, and the Second Regiment Cherokee Mounted
Rifles under Colonel Stand Watie. The battalions were, the Choctaw
and Chickasaw and the Creek and Seminole, the latter under
Lieutenant-colonel Chilly McIntosh and Major John Jumper.

Major-general Earl Van Dorn formally assumed command of the newly
created Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2, January 29,
1862.[45] He was then at Little Rock, Arkansas. By February 6, he had
moved up to Jacksonport and, a week or so later, to Pocahontas, where
his slowly-assembling army was to rendezvous. His call for troops had
already gone forth and was being promptly answered,[46] requisition
having been made upon all the state units within the district,
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, also Texas. Indian Territory, through
Pike[47] and his subordinates,[48] was yet to be communicated with;
but Van Dorn had, at the moment, no other plan in view for Indian
troops than to use them to advantage as a means of defence and as a
corps of observation.[49] His immediate object, according to his own
showing and according to the circumstances that had brought about the
formation of the district, was to protect Arkansas[50] against

[Footnote 45: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 745-746.]

[Footnote 46:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 776-779, 783-785,
790, 793-794.]

[Footnote 47:--Ibid., vol. viii, 749, 763-764.]

[Footnote 48:--Ibid., 764-765.]

[Footnote 49: Van Dorn to Price, February 14, 1862, Ibid.,

[Footnote 50: Arkansas seemed, at the time, to be but feebly
protected. R.W. Johnson deprecated the calling of Arkansas troops
eastward. They were (cont.)]

invasion and to relieve Missouri; his plan of operations was to
conduct a spring campaign in the latter state, "to attempt St. Louis,"
as he himself put it, and to drive the Federals out; his ulterior
motive may have been and, in the light of subsequent events, probably
was, to effect a diversion for General A.S. Johnston; but, if that
were really so, it was not, at the time, divulged or so much as hinted

Ostensibly, the great object that Van Dorn had in mind was the relief
of Missouri. And he may have dreamed, that feat accomplished, that it
would be possible to carry the war into the enemy's country beyond the
Ohio; but, alas, it was his misfortune at this juncture to be called
upon to realise, to his great discomfiture, the truth of Robert Burns'
homely philosophy,

  The best-laid schemes o' mice and men
  Gang aft a-gley.

His own schemes and plans were all rendered utterly futile by the
unexpected movement of the Federal forces from Rolla, to which safe
place, it will be remembered, they had been drawn back by order
of General Hunter. They were now advancing by forced marches via
Springfield into northwestern Arkansas and were driving before them
the Confederates under McCulloch and Price.

The Federal forces comprised four huge divisions and were led by
Brigadier-general Samuel R. Curtis. Towards the end of the previous
December, on Christmas Day in fact, Curtis had been given "command of
the Southwestern District of Missouri, including the

[Footnote 50: (cont.) text of continuation: needed at home, not only
for the defence of Arkansas, but for that of the adjoining territory
[_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 781-782]. There were,
in fact, only two Arkansas regiments absent and they were guarding the
Mississippi River [Ibid., 786]. By the middle of February, or
thereabouts, Price and McCulloch were in desperate straits and
were steadily "falling back before a superior force to the Boston
Mountains" [Ibid., 787].]

country south of the Osage and west of the Meramec River."[51] Under
orders of November 9, the old Department of the West, of which Frémont
had had charge and subsequently Hunter, but for only a brief period,
had been reorganized and divided into two distinct departments, the
Department of Missouri with Halleck in command and the Department of
Kansas with Hunter. Curtis, at the time when he made his memorable
advance movement from Rolla was, therefore, serving under Halleck.

In furtherance of Van Dorn's original plan, General Pike had been
ordered to march with all speed and join forces with the main army.
At the time of the issuance of the order, he seems to have offered no
objections to taking his Indians out of their own territory. Disaster
had not yet overtaken them or him and he had not yet met with the
injustice that was afterwards his regular lot. If his were regarded
as more or less of a puppet command, he was not yet aware of it and,
oblivious of all scorn felt for Indian soldiers, kept his eye single
on the assistance he was to render in the accomplishment of Van Dorn's
object. It was anything but easy, however, for him to move with
dispatch. He had difficulty in getting such of his brigade as was
Indian and as had collected at Cantonment Davis, a Choctaw and
Chickasaw battalion and the First Creek Regiment, to stir. They had
not been paid their money and had not been furnished with arms and
clothing as promised. Pike had the necessary funds with him, but time
would be needed in which to distribute them, and the order had been
for him to move promptly. It was something much more easily said than
done. Nevertheless, he did what he could, paid outright the Choctaws
and Chickasaws, a performance that occupied

[Footnote 51: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, vol.
viii, 462.]

three precious days, and agreed to pay McIntosh's Creek regiment at
the Illinois River. To keep that promise he tarried at Park Hill
one day, expecting there to be overtaken by additional Choctaws and
Chickasaws who had been left behind at Fort Gibson. When they did not
appear, he went forward towards Evansville and upward to Cincinnati, a
small town on the Arkansas side of the Cherokee line. There his Indian
force was augmented by Stand Watie's regiment[52] of Cherokees and at
Smith's Mill by John

[Footnote 52: Watie's regiment of Cherokees was scarcely in either
marching or fighting trim. The following letter from John Ross to
Pike, which is number nine in the John Ross _Papers_ in the
Indian Office, is elucidative. It is a copy used in the action against
John Ross at the close of the war. The italics indicate underscorings
that were probably not in the original.


To BRIG. GEN'L.A. PIKE, Com'dy Indian Department.

Sir: I have deemed it my duty to address you on the present
occasion--You have doubtless ere this received my communication
enclosing the action of the National Council with regard to the final
ratification of our Treaty--Col. Drew's Regiment promptly took up the
line of march on the receipt of your order from Fort Smith towards
Fayetteville. _I accompanied the Troops some 12 miles East of this
and I am happy to assure you in the most confident manner that in my
opinion this Regiment will not fail to do their whole duty, whenever
the Conflict with the common Enemy shall take place_. There are so
many conflicting reports as to your whereabouts and consequently much
interest is felt by the People to know where the Head Qrs. of
your military operations will be established during the present
emergencies--_I had intended going up to see the Troops of our
Regiment; also to visit the Head Qrs of the Army at Cane Hill in view
of affording every aid in any manner within the reach of my power to
repel the Enemy_. But I am sorry to say I have been dissuaded from
going at present in consequence of some unwarrantable conduct on the
part of many _base, reckless and unprincipled persons belonging to
Watie's Regiment who are under no subordination or restraint of their
leaders in domineering over and trampling upon the rights of peaceable
and unoffending citizens_. I have at all times in the most
unequivocal manner assured the People that you will not only promptly
discountenance, but will take steps to put a stop to such proceedings
for the protection of their persons and property and to _redress
their wrongs_--This is not the time for _crimination_ and
_recrimination_; at a proper time _I have certain specific
complaints to report for your investigation_. Pardon me for again
reiterating that (cont.)]

Drew's.[53] The Cherokees had been in much confusion all winter. Civil
war within their nation impended.[54] None the less, Pike, assuming
that all would be well when the call for action came, had ordered
all the Cherokee and Creek regiments to hurry to the help of
McCulloch.[55] He had done this upon the first intimation of the
Federal advance. The Cherokees had proceeded only so far, the Creeks
not at all, and the main body of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, into
whose minds some unscrupulous merchants had instilled mercenary
motives and the elements of discord generally, were lingering far in
the background. Pike's white force was, moreover, ridiculously small,
some Texas cavalry, dignified by him as collectively a squadron,
Captain O.G. Welch in command. There had as yet not been even a
pretense of giving him the three regiments of white men earlier asked
for. Toward the close of the afternoon of March 6, Pike "came up with
the rear of McCulloch's division,"[56] which proved to be the very
division he was to follow, but he was one day late for the fray.

The Battle of Pea Ridge, in its preliminary stages, was already being
fought. It was a three day fight, counting the skirmish at Bentonville
on the sixth between General Franz Sigel's detachment and General
Sterling Price's advance guard as the work of the first day.[57] The
real battle comprised the engagement at

[Footnote 52: (cont.) the mass of the People _are all right
in Sentiment for the support of the Treaty of Alliance with the
Confederate States_. I shall be happy to hear from you--I have the
honor to be your ob't Serv't

John Ross, Prin'l Chief, Cherokee Nation.]

[Footnote 53: Pike's Report, March 14, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. viii, 286-292.]

[Footnote 54: James McIntosh to S. Cooper, January 4, 1862,
Ibid., 732; D.H. Cooper to Pike, February 10, 1862,
Ibid., vol. xiii, 896.]

[Footnote 55:--Ibid., 819.]

[Footnote 56:--Ibid., vol. viii, 287.]

[Footnote 57:--Ibid., 208-215, 304-306.]

Leetown on the seventh and that at Elkhorn Tavern[58] on the eighth.
At Leetown, Pike's Cherokee contingent[59] played what he, in somewhat
quixotic fashion, perhaps, chose to regard as a very important part.
The Indians, then as always, were chiefly pony-mounted, "entirely
undisciplined," as the term discipline is usually understood,
and "armed very indifferently with common rifles and ordinary
shot-guns."[60] The ponies, in the end, proved fleet of foot, as
was to have been expected, and, at one stage of the game, had to
be tethered in the rear while their masters fought from the
vantage-ground of trees.[61] The Indian's most effective work was
done, throughout, under cover of the woods. Indians, as Pike well
knew, could never be induced to face shells in the open. It was he who
advised their climbing the trees and he did it without discounting, in
the slightest, their innate bravery.[62] There came a time, too, when
he gave countenance to another of their

[Footnote 58: The Elkhorn Tavern engagement is sometimes referred to,
and most appropriately, as the Sugar Creek [Phisterer, _Statistical
Record_, 95]. Colonel Eugene A. Carr of the Third Illinois Cavalry,
commanding the Fourth Division of Curtis's army, described the
tavern itself as "situated on the west side of the Springfield and
Fayetteville road, at the head of a gorge known as Cross Timber Hollow
(the head of Sugar Creek) ..." [_Official Records_, vol. viii,
258]. "Sugar Creek Hollow," wrote Curtis, "extends for miles, a gorge,
with rough precipitate sides ..." [Ibid., 589]. It was there
the closing scenes of the great battle were enacted.]

[Footnote 59: The practice, indulged in by both the Federals and the
Confederates, of greatly overestimating the size of the enemy force
was resorted to even in connection with the Indians. Pike gave the
number of his whole command as about a thousand men, Indians and
whites together [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 288; xiii, 820]
notwithstanding that he had led Van Dorn to expect that he would have
a force of "about 8,000 or 9,000 men and three batteries of artillery"
[Ibid., vol. viii, 749]. General Curtis surmised that Pike
contributed five regiments [Ibid., 196] and Wiley Britton, who
had excellent opportunity of knowing better because he had access to
the records of both sides, put the figures at "three regiments of
Indians and two regiments of Texas cavalry" [_Civil War on the
Border_, vol. i, 245].]

[Footnote 60: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 819.]

[Footnote 61:--Ibid., vol. viii, 288.]

[Footnote 62:--Ibid.]

peculiarities. He allowed Colonel Drew's men to fight in a way that
was "their own fashion,"[63] with bow and arrow and with tomahawk.[64]
This, as was only meet it should, called down upon him and them the
opprobrium of friends and foes alike.[65] The Indian war-whoop was
indulged in, of itself enough to terrify. It was hideous.

The service that the Cherokees rendered at different times during the
two days action was not, however, to be despised, even though not
sufficiently conspicuous to be deemed worthy of comment by Van
Dorn.[66] At Leetown, with the aid of a few Texans, they managed to
get possession of a battery and to hold it against repeated endeavors
of the Federals to regain. The death of McCulloch and of McIntosh made
Pike the ranking officer in his part of the field. It fell to him to

[Footnote 63: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 289.]

[Footnote 64:--Ibid., 195.]

[Footnote 65: The northern press took up the matter and the New York
_Tribune_ was particularly virulent against Pike. In its issue of
March 27, 1862, it published the following in bitter sarcasm:

"The Albert Pike who led the Aboriginal Corps of Tomahawkers and
Scalpers at the battle of Pea Ridge, formerly kept school in
Fairhaven, Mass., where he was indicted for playing the part of
Squeers, and cruelly beating and starving a boy in his family. He
escaped by some hocus-pocus law, and emigrated to the West, where
the violence of his nature has been admirably enhanced. As his name
indicates, he is a ferocious fish, and has fought duels enough to
qualify himself to be a leader of savages. We suppose that upon
the recent occasion, he got himself up in good style, war-paint,
nose-ring, and all. This new Pontiac is also a poet, and wrote 'Hymns
to the Gods' in _Blackwood_; but he has left Jupiter, Juno, and
the rest, and betaken himself to the culture of the Great Spirit, or
rather of two great spirits, whisky being the second."]

[Footnote 66: Van Dorn did not make his detailed official report of
this battle until the news had leaked out that the Indians had mangled
the bodies of the dead and committed other atrocities. He was probably
then desirous of being as silent as he dared be concerning Indian
participation, since he, in virtue of his being chief in command, was
the person mainly responsible for it. In October of the preceding
year, McCulloch had favored using the Indians against Kansas
[_Official Records_, vol. iii, 719, 721]. Cooper objected
strongly to their being kept "at home" [Ibid., 614] and one
of the leading chiefs insisted that they did not intend to use the
scalping knife [Ibid., 625].]

McCulloch's broken army and with it to join Van Dorn. On the eighth,
Colonel Watie's men under orders from Van Dorn took position on the
high ridges where they could watch the movements of the enemy and
give timely notice of any attempt to turn the Confederate left flank.
Colonel Drew's regiment, meanwhile, not having received the word
passed along the line to move forward, remained in the woods near
Leetown, the last in the field. Subsequently, finding themselves
deserted, they drew back towards Camp Stephens, where they were soon
joined by "General Cooper, with his regiment and battalion of Choctaws
and Chickasaws, and" by "Colonel McIntosh with 200 men of his regiment
of Creeks."[67] The delinquent wayfarers were both fortunate and
unfortunate in thus tardily arriving upon the scene. They had missed
the fight but they had also missed the temptation to revert to the
savagery that was soon to bring fearful ignominy upon their neighbors.
To the very last of the Pea Ridge engagement, Stand Watie's men were
active. They covered the retreat of the main army, to a certain
extent. They were mostly half-breeds and, so far as can be definitely
ascertained, were entirely guiltless of the atrocities charged against
the others.

General Pike gave the permission to fight "in their own fashion"
specifically to the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles, who were, for the
most part, full-blooded Indians; but he later confessed that, in his
treaty negotiations with the tribes, they had generally stipulated
that they should, if they fought at all, be allowed to fight as they
knew how.[68] Yet they probably did not mean, thereby, to commit
atrocities and the Cherokee National Council lost no time, after the
Indian shortcomings

[Footnote 67: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 292.]

[Footnote 68:--Ibid., vol. xiii, 819.]

at the Battle of Pea Ridge had become known, in putting itself on
record as standing opposed to the sort of thing that had occurred,

    _Resolved_, That in the opinion of the National Council,
    the war now existing between the said United States and the
    Confederate States and their Indian allies should be conducted on
    the most humane principles which govern the usages of war among
    civilized nations, and that it be and is earnestly recommended to
    the troops of this nation in the service of the Confederate States
    to avoid any acts toward captured or fallen foes that would be
    incompatible with such usages.[69]

The atrocities committed by the Indians became almost immediately
a matter for correspondence between the opposing commanders. The
Federals charged mutilation of dead bodies on the battle-field and the
tomahawking and scalping of prisoners. The Confederates recriminated
as against persons "alleged to be Germans." The case involving the
Indians was reported to the joint committee of Congress on the
_Conduct of the Present War_;[70] but at least one piece of
evidence was not, at that time, forthcoming, a piece that, in a
certain sense, might be taken to exonerate the whites. It came to the
knowledge of General Blunt during the summer and was the Indians' own
confession. It bore only indirectly upon the actual atrocities but
showed that the red men were quite equal to making their own plans in
fighting and were not to be relied upon to do things decently and
in order. Drew's men, when they deserted the Confederates after the
skirmish of July third at Locust Grove, confided to the Federals the
intelligence "that the killing of the white rebels by the Indians in"
the Pea Ridge "fight was determined

[Footnote 69: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 826.]

[Footnote 70: By vote of the committee, General Curtis had been
instructed to furnish information on the subject of the employment of
Indians by the Confederates [_Journal_, 92].]

upon before they went into battle."[71] Presumptively, if the
Cherokees could plot to kill their own allies, they could be found
despicable enough and cruel enough to mutilate the dead,[72] were the
chance given them and that without any direction, instruction, or
encouragement from white men being needed.

The Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge was decisive and, as far as Van
Dorn's idea of relieving Missouri was concerned, fatally conclusive.
As early as the twenty-first of February, Beauregard had expressed a
wish to have him east of the Mississippi[73] and March had not yet
expired before Van Dorn was writing in such a way as to elicit the
consummation of the wish. The Federals were in occupation of the
northern part of Arkansas; but Van Dorn was very confident they would
not be able to subsist there long or "do much harm in the west."
In his opinion, therefore, it was incumbent upon the Confederates,
instead of dividing their strength between the east and the west, to
concentrate on the saving of the Mississippi.[74] To all appearances,
it was there that the situation was most critical. In due time, came
the order for Van Dorn to repair eastward and to take with him all the
troops that might be found available.

The completeness of Curtis's victory, the loss to the Southerners, by
death or capture, of some of their best-loved and ablest commanders,
McCulloch, McIntosh, Hébert, and the nature of the country through
which the Federals pursued their fleeing forces, to say nothing of the
miscellaneous and badly-trained character of

[Footnote 71: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 486.]

[Footnote 72: The same charge was made against the Indians who fought
at Wilson's Creek [Leavenworth _Daily Conservative_, August 24,

[Footnote 73: Roman, _Military Operations of General Beauregard_,
vol. i, 240.]

[Footnote 74: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 796.]

those forces, to which, by the way, Van Dorn ascribed[75] much of
his recent ill-success, all helped to make the retirement of the
Confederates from the Pea Ridge battle-ground pretty much of a
helter-skelter affair. From all accounts, the Indians conducted
themselves as well as the best. The desire of everybody was to get
to a place of safety and that right speedily. Colonel Watie and his
regiment made their way to Camp Stephens,[76] near which place the
baggage train had been left[77] and where Cooper and Drew with their
men had found refuge already. Some two hundred of Watie's Indians
were detailed to help take ammunition back to the main army.[78] The
baggage train moved on to Elm Springs, the remainder of the Indians,
under Cooper, assisting in protecting it as far as that place.[79]
At Walnut Grove, the Watie detail, having failed to deliver the
ammunition because of the departure of the army prior to their
arrival, rejoined their comrades and all moved on to Cincinnati, where
Pike, who with a few companions had wandered several days among the
mountains, came up with them.[80]

In Van Dorn's calculations for troops that should accompany him east
or follow in his wake, the Indians had no place. Before his own plans
took final shape and while he was still arranging for an Army of the
West, his orders for the Indians were, that they should make their way
back as best they could to their own country and there operate "to cut
off trains, annoy the enemy in his marches, and to prevent him as far
as possible from supplying his troops from Missouri and

[Footnote 75: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 282.]

[Footnote 76:--Ibid.. 291.]

[Footnote 77:--Ibid., 317.]

[Footnote 78:--Ibid., 318.]

[Footnote 79:--Ibid.; Britton, _Civil War on the Border_,
vol. i, 273.]

[Footnote 80: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 292.]

Kansas."[81] A little later, but still anterior to Van Dorn's summons
east, more minute particulars of the programme were addressed to Pike.
Maury wrote,

    The general commanding has decided to march with his army against
    the enemy now invading the northeastern part of the State. Upon
    you, therefore, will devolve the necessity of impeding his advance
    into this region. It is not expected that you will give battle to
    a large force, but by felling trees, burning bridges, removing
    supplies of forage and subsistence, attacking his trains,
    stampeding his animals, cutting off his detachments, and other
    similar means, you will be able materially to harass his army and
    protect this region of country. You must endeavor by every means
    to maintain yourself in the Territory independent of this army.
    In case only of absolute necessity you may move southward. If the
    enemy threatens to march through the Indian Territory or descend
    the Arkansas River you may call on troops from Southwestern
    Arkansas and Texas to rally to your aid. You may reward your
    Indian troops by giving them such stores as you may think proper
    when they make captures from the enemy, but you will please
    endeavor to restrain them from committing any barbarities upon the
    wounded, prisoners, or dead who may fall into their hands. You may
    purchase your supplies of subsistence from wherever you can most
    advantageously do so. You will draw your ammunition from Little
    Rock or from New Orleans via Red River. Please communicate with
    the general commanding when practicable.[82]

It was an elaborate programme but scarcely a noble one. Its note of
selfishness sounded high. The Indians were simply to be made to serve
the ends of the white men. Their methods of warfare were regarded as
distinctly inferior. Pea Ridge was, in fact, the first and last time
that they were allowed to participate in the war on a big scale.
Henceforth, they were rarely ever anything more than scouts and
skirmishers and that was all they were really fitted to be.

[Footnote 81: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 282, 790; vol. liii,
supplement, 796.]

[Footnote 82:--Ibid., vol. viii, 795-796.]


The Indian Expedition had its beginnings, fatefully or otherwise,
in "Lane's Kansas Brigade." On January 29, 1861, President Buchanan
signed the bill for the admission of Kansas into the Union and the
matter about which there had been so much of bitter controversy was at
last professedly settled; but, alas, for the peace of the border, the
radicals, the extremists, the fanatics, call them what one may, who
had been responsible for the controversy and for its bitterness, were
still unsettled. James Lane was chief among them. His was a turbulent
spirit and it permitted its owner no cessation from strife. With
President Lincoln's first call for volunteers, April 15, 1861, Lane's
martial activities began. Within three days, he had gathered together
a company of warriors,[83] the nucleus, psychologically speaking,
of what was to be his notorious, jayhawking, marauding brigade. His
enthusiasm was infectious. It communicated itself to reflective men
like Carl Schurz[84] and was probably the secret of Lane's

[Footnote 83: John Hay records in his _Diary_, "The White House
is turned into barracks. Jim Lane marshaled his Kansas warriors to-day
at Willard's and placed them at the disposal of Major Hunter,
who turned them to-night into the East Room. It is a splendid
company--worthy such an armory. Besides the Western Jayhawkers it
comprises some of the best _material_ in the East. Senator
Pomeroy and old Anthony Bleecker stood shoulder to shoulder in the
ranks. Jim Lane walked proudly up and down the ranks with a new sword
that the Major had given him. The Major has made me his aid, and
I labored under some uncertainty, as to whether I should speak to
privates or not."--THAYER, _Life and Letters of John Hay_, vol.
i, 92.]

[Footnote 84: It would seem to have communicated itself to Carl
Schurz, although Schurz, in his _Reminiscences_, makes no
definite admission of the fact. Hay (cont.)]

mysterious influence with the temperate, humane, just, and so very
much more magnanimous Lincoln, who, in the first days of the war, as
in the later and the last, had his hours of discouragement and deep
depression. For dejection of any sort, the wild excitement and
boundless confidence of a zealot like Lane must have been somewhat of
an antidote, also a stimulant.

The first Kansas state legislature convened March 26, 1861, and set
itself at once to work to put the new machinery of government into
operation. After much political wire-pulling that involved the promise
of spoils to come,[85] James H. Lane and Samuel C. Pomeroy[86] were
declared to be elected United States senators, the term of office of
each to begin with the first session of the thirty-seventh congress.
That session was

[Footnote 84: (cont.) says, "Going into Nicolay's room this morning,
C. Schurz, and J. Lane were sitting. Jim was at the window, filling
his soul with gall by steady telescopic contemplation of a Secession
flag impudently flaunting over a roof in Alexandria. 'Let me tell
you,' said he to the elegant Teuton, 'we have got to whip these
scoundrels like hell, C. Schurz. They did a good thing stoning our
men at Baltimore and shooting away the flag at Sumter. It has set the
great North a-howling for blood, and they'll have it.'

"'I heard,' said Schurz, 'you preached a sermon to your men

"'No, sir! this is not time for preaching. When I went to Mexico there
were four preachers in my regiment. In less than a week I issued
orders for them all to stop preaching and go to playing cards. In a
month or so, they were the biggest devils and best fighters I had.'

"An hour afterwards, C. Schurz told me he was going home to arm his
clansmen for the wars. He has obtained three months' leave of absence
from his diplomatic duties, and permission to raise a cavalry
regiment. He will make a wonderful land pirate; bold, quick,
brilliant, and reckless. He will be hard to control and difficult to
direct. Still, we shall see. He is a wonderful man."--THAYER, _Life
and Letters of John Hay_, vol. i, 102-103.]

[Footnote 85: In Connelley's _James Henry Lane, the "Grim Chieftain"
of Kansas_, the following is quoted as coming from Lane himself:

"Of the fifty-six men in the Legislature who voted for Jim Lane,
five-and-forty now wear shoulder-straps. Doesn't Jim Lane look out for
his friends?"]

[Footnote 86: John Brown's rating of Pomeroy, as given by Stearns in
his _Life and Public Services of George Luther Stearns_, 133-134,
would show him to have been a considerably less pugnacious individual
than was Lane.]


the extra one, called for July, 1861. Immediately, a difficulty arose
due to the fact that, subsequent to his election to the senatorship
and in addition thereto, Lane had accepted a colonelcy tendered by
Oliver P. Morton[87] of Indiana, his own native state.[88] Lane's
friends very plausibly contended that a military commission from one
state could not invalidate the title to represent another state in the
Federal senate. The actual fight over the contested seat came in the
next session and, quite regardless of consequences likely to prejudice
his case, Lane went on recruiting for his brigade. Indeed, he
commended himself to Frémont, who, in his capacity as major-general of
volunteers and in charge of the Western Military District, assigned
him to duty in Kansas, thus greatly complicating an already delicate
situation and immeasurably heaping up difficulties, embarrassments,
and disasters for the frontier.

The same indifference towards the West that characterized the
governing authorities in the South was exhibited by eastern men in the
North and, correspondingly, the West, Federal and Confederate,
was unduly sensitive to the indifference, perhaps, also, a trifle
unnecessarily alarmed by symptoms of its own danger. Nevertheless, its
danger was real. Each state gave in its adherence to the Confederacy
separately and, therefore, every single state in the slavery belt had
a problem to solve. The fight for Missouri was fought

[Footnote 87: Morton, war governor of Indiana, who had taken
tremendous interest in the struggle for Kansas and in the events
leading up to the organization of the Republican party, was one of the
most energetic of men in raising troops for the defence of the Union,
especially in the earliest stages of the war. See Foulke's _Life of
Oliver P. Morton_, vol. i.]

[Footnote 88: Some doubt on this point exists. John Speer, Lane's
intimate friend and, in a sense, his biographer, says Lane claimed
Lawrenceburg, Indiana, as his birthplace. By some people he is thought
to have been born in Kentucky.]

on the border and nowhere else. The great evil of squatter sovereignty
days was now epidemic in its most malignant form. Those days had bred
intense hatred between Missourian and Kansan and had developed a
disregard of the value of human life and a ruthlessness and brutality
in fighting, concomitant with it, that the East, in its most primitive
times, had never been called upon to experience. Granted that the
spirit of the crusader had inspired many a free-soiler to venture into
the trans-Missouri region after the Kansas-Nebraska bill had become
law and that real exaltation of soul had transformed some very
mercenary and altogether mundane characters unexpectedly into martyrs;
granted, also, that the pro-slavery man honestly felt that his
cause was just and that his sacred rights of property, under the
constitution, were being violated, his preserves encroached upon, it
yet remains true that great crimes were committed in the name of great
causes and that villains stalked where only saints should have trod.
The irregular warfare of the border, from fifty-four on, while it may,
to military history as a whole, be as unimportant as the quarrels of
kites and crows, was yet a big part of the life of the frontiersman
and frightful in its possibilities. Sherman's march to the sea or
through the Carolinas, disgraceful to modern civilization as each
undeniably was, lacked the sickening phase, guerrilla atrocities, that
made the Civil War in the West, to those at least who were in line
to experience it at close range, an awful nightmare. Union and
Confederate soldiers might well fraternize in eastern camps because
there they so rarely had any cause for personal hostility towards each
other, but not in western. The fight on the border was constant and to
the death.

The leaders in the West or many of them, on both sides, were men of
ungovernable tempers, of violent and unrestrained passions, sometimes
of distressingly base proclivities, although, in the matter of both
vices and virtues, there was considerable difference of degree among
them. Lane and Shelby and Montgomery and Quantrill were hardly types,
rather should it be said they were extreme cases. They seem never to
have taken chances on each other's inactivity. Their motto invariably
was, to be prepared for the worst, and their practice, retaliation.

It was scarcely to be supposed that a man like Lane, who had never
known moderation in the course of the long struggle for Kansas or been
over scrupulous about anything would, in the event of his adopted
state's being exposed anew to her old enemy, the Missourian, be able
to pose contentedly as a legislator or stay quietly in Washington,
his role of guardian of the White House being finished.[89] The
anticipated danger to Kansas visibly threatened in the summer of 1861
and the critical moment saw Lane again in the West, energetic beyond
precedent. He took up his position at Fort Scott, it being his
conviction that, from that point and from the line of the Little
Osage, the entire eastern section of the state, inclusive of Fort
Leavenworth, could best be protected.[90]

[Footnote 89: As Villard tells us [_Memoirs_, vol. i, 169],
Lane was in command of the "Frontier Guards," one of the two special
patrols that protected the White House in the early days of the war.
There were those, however, who resented his presence there. For
example, note the diary entry of Hay, "Going to my room, I met the
Captain. He was a little boozy and very eloquent. He dilated on the
troubles of the time and bewailed the existence of a garrison in the
White House 'to give _éclat_ to Jim Lane.'"--Thayer, op. cit.,
vol. i, 94. The White House guard was in reality under General Hunter
[_Report of the Military Services of General David Hunter_, 8].]

[Footnote 90: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 453, 455.]

Fort Scott was the ranking town among the few Federal strongholds in
the middle Southwest. It was within convenient, if not easy, distance
of Crawford Seminary which, situated to the southward in the Quapaw
Nation, was the headquarters of the Neosho Agency; but no more
perturbed place could be imagined than was that same Neosho Agency at
the opening of the Civil War. Bad white men, always in evidence at
moments of crisis, were known to be interfering with the Osages,
exciting them by their own marauding to deviltry and mischief of the
worst description.[91] As a

[Footnote 91: A letter from Superintendent W.G. Coffin of date, July,
30, 1861 [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Schools_, C.
1275 of 1861] bears evidence of this as bear also the following
letters, the one, private in character, from Augustus Wattles, the
other, without specific date, from William Brooks:


MONEKA, KANSAS, May 20, 1861.

Dear Sir, A messenger has this moment left me, who came up from the
Osages yesterday--a distance of about forty miles. The gentleman lives
on the line joining the Osage Indians, and has, since my acquaintance
with him about three years.

A short time ago, perhaps three weeks, a number of lawless white men
went into the Nation and stole a number of ponies. The Indians made
chase, had a fight and killed several, reported from three to five,
and retook their ponies.

A company of men is now getting up here and in other counties, to go
and fight the Indians. I am appealed to by the Indians to act as their

They represent that they are loyal to the U.S. Government and will
fight for their Great Father, at Washington, but must be protected
from bad white men at home. The Government must not think them enemies
when they only fight thieves and robbers.

Rob't B. Mitchell, who was recently appointed Maj. General of this
State by Gov. Robinson, has resigned, and is now raising volunteers to
fight the Indians. He has always been a Democrat in sympathy with the
pro-slavery party, and his enlisting men now to take them away from
the Missouri frontier, when we are daily threatened with an attack
from that State, and union men are fleeing to us for protection from
there, is certainly a very questionable policy. It could operate no
worse against us, if it were gotten up by a traitor to draw our
men off on purpose to give the Missourians a chance when we are
unprepared. (cont.)]

tribe, the Osages were not very dependable at the best of times and
now that they saw confusion all around

[Footnote 91: (cont.) I presume you have it in your power to prevent
any attack on the Indians in Kansas till such time as they can be
treated with. And such order to the Commander of the Western Division
of the U.S. Army would stop further proceedings.

I shall start to-morrow for Council Grove and meet the Kansas Indians
before General Mitchell's force can get there. As the point of attack
is secret, I fear it may be the Osages, for the purpose of creating
a necessity for a treaty with himself by which he can secure a large
quantity of land for himself and followers. He is acquainted with all
the old Democratic schemes of swindling Indians.

The necessity for prompt action on the part of the Indian Department
increases every day. The element of discord in the community here
now, was once, the pro-slavery party. I see their intention to breed
disturbances with the Indians is malicious and selfish. They are
active and unscrupulous, and must be met promptly and decisively.

I hope you will excuse this, as it appears necessary for me to step
a little out of my orders to notify you of current events. I am very
respectfully Your Ob't Ser'vt AUGUSTUS WATTLES, _Special Agent_

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201.]

Washington, D.C.

Hon. Sir: Permit me to inform you, by this means, of the efforts that
have been and are now being made in Southern Kansas to arouse both the
"Osages" and "Cherokees" _to rebel_, and bear arms against the
U.S. Government--At a public meeting near the South E. corner of the
"Osage Nation" called by the settlements for the devising of some
means by which to protect themselves from "unlawful characters," Mr.
John Mathis, who resides in the Osage Nation and has an Osage family,
also Mr. "Robert Foster" who lives in the Cherokee Nation and has a
Cherokee family endeavered by public speeches and otherwise to induce
"Osages", "Cherokees", as well as Americans who live on the "Neutral
Lands" to bear arms against the U.S. Government--_aledging that
there was no U.S. Government_. There was 25 men who joined them and
they proceeded to organise a "_Secession Company_" electing as
Capt R.D. Foster and 1st Lieutenant James Patton--This meeting was
held June 4th 1861--at "McGhees Residence"--The peace of this section
of country requires the removal of these men from the Indian country,
or some measures that will restrain them from exciting the Indians in
Southern Kansas.

Yours Respectfully WM BROOKS.

You will understand why you are addressed by a private individual on
this subject instead of the Agent, since A.J. Dorn, the present Indian
Agent, is an avowed "Secessionist" and consequently would favor,
rather than suppress the move. WM BROOKS.

[Ibid., _Southern Superintendency_, B567 of 1861]]

them their most natural inclination was to pay back old scores and
to make an alliance where such alliance could be most profitable to
themselves. The "remnants" of tribes, Senecas, Shawnees, and Quapaws,
associated with them in the agency, Neosho, that is, although not of
evil disposition, were similarly agitated and with good reason.
Rumors of dissensions among the Cherokees, not so very far away, were
naturally having a disquieting effect upon the neighboring but less
highly organized tribes as was also the unrest in Missouri, in the
southwestern counties of which, however, Union sentiment thus far
dominated.[92] Its continuance would undoubtedly turn upon military
success or failure and that, men like Lyon and Lane knew only too

As the days passed, the Cherokee troubles gained in intensity, so
much so that the agent, John Crawford, even then a secessionist
sympathiser, reported that internecine strife might at any hour be
provoked.[93] So confused was everything that in July the people of
southeastern Kansas were generally apprehensive of an attack from the
direction of either Indian Territory or Arkansas.[94] Kansas troops
had been called to Missouri; but, at the same time, Lyon was
complaining that men from the West, where they were greatly needed,
were being called by Scott to Virginia.[95] On August 6 two emergency
calls went forth, one from Frémont for a brigade from California that
could be stationed at El Paso and moved as occasion might require,
either upon San Antonio or into the Indian Territory,[96]

[Footnote 92: Branch to Mix, June 22, 1861, enclosing letter from
Agent Elder, June 15, 1861 [Indian Office Files, _Neosho_, B 547
of 1861].]

[Footnote 93:--Ibid., _Cherokee_, C 1200 of 1861].

[Footnote 94: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 405.]

[Footnote 95:--Ibid., 397, 408.]

[Footnote 96:--Ibid., 428.]

the other from Congressmen John S. Phelps and Francis P. Blair junior,
who addressed Lincoln upon the subject of enlisting Missouri troops
for an invasion of Arkansas in order to ward off any contemplated
attack upon southwestern Missouri and to keep the Indians west of
Arkansas in subjection.[97] On August 10 came the disastrous Federal
defeat at Wilson's Creek. It was immediately subsequent to that event
and in anticipation of a Kansas invasion by Price and McCulloch that
Lane resolved to take position at Fort Scott.[98]

The Battle of Wilson's Creek, lost to the Federals largely because of
Frémont's failure to support Lyon, was an unmitigated disaster in more
than one sense. The death of Lyon, which the battle caused, was of
itself a severe blow to the Union side as represented in Missouri; but
the moral effect of the Federal defeat upon the Indians was equally
worthy of note. It was instantaneous and striking. It rallied the
wavering Cherokees for the Confederacy[99] and their defection was
something that could not be easily counterbalanced and was certainly
not counterbalanced by the almost coincident, cheap, disreputable, and
very general Osage offer, made towards the end of August, of services
to the United States in exchange for flour and whiskey.[100]

The disaster in its effect upon Lane was, however, little short of
exhilarating. It brought him sympathy, understanding, and a fair
measure of support from people who, not until the eleventh hour, had
really comprehended their own danger and it inspired him to redouble
his efforts to organize a brigade that should

[Footnote 97: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 430.]

[Footnote 98:--Ibid., 446.]

[Footnote 99: The Daily Conservative (Leavenworth), October 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 100:--Ibid., August 30, 1861, quoting from the Fort
Scott _Democrat_.]

adequately protect Kansas and recover ground lost. Prior to the
battle, "scarcely a battalion had been recruited for each" of the five
regiments, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Kansas, which
he had been empowered by the War Department to raise.[101] It was in
the days of gathering reinforcements, for which he made an earnest
plea on August 29,[102] that he developed a disposition to utilize the
loyal Indians in his undertaking. The Indians, in their turn, were
looking to him for much needed assistance. About a month previous to
the disaster of August 10, Agent Elder had been obliged to make Fort
Scott, for the time being, the Neosho Agency headquarters, everything
being desperately insecure at Crawford's Seminary.[103]

[Footnote 101: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 122.]

[Footnote 102: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 465.]

[Footnote 103: The following letter, an enclosure of a report from
Branch to Dole, August 14, 1861, gives some slight indication of its

Fort Scott, July 27, 1861.

Sir--I deem it important to inform the Department of the situation
of this Agency at this time. After entering upon the duties of this
office as per instructions--and attending to all the business that
seemed to require my immediate attention--I repaired to Franklin Co.
Kan. to remove my family to the Agency.

Leaving the Agency in care of James Killebrew Esq the Gov't Farmer for
the Quapaw Nation. Soon after I left I was informed by him that the
Agency had been surrounded by a band of armed men, and instituted an
inquiry for "_that Abolition Superintendent and Agent_." After
various interrogatories and answers they returned in the direction of
Missouri and Arkansas lines from whence they were supposed to
have come. He has since written me and Special Agent Whitney and
Superintendent Coffin told me that it would be very unsafe for me to
stay at that place under the present excited state of public feeling
in that vicinity. I however started with my family on the 6th July and
arrived at Fort Scott on the 9th intending to go direct to the Agency.
Here I learned from Capt Jennison commanding a detachment of Kansas
Militia, who had been scouting in that vicinity, that the country
was full of marauding parties from Gov. Jackson's Camp in S.W. Mo.
I therefore concluded to remain here and watch the course of events
believing as I did the Federal troops (cont.)]

Lane, conjecturing rightly that Price, moving northwestward from
Springfield, which place he had left on the twenty-sixth of August,
would threaten, if he did not actually attempt, an invasion of Kansas
at the point of its greatest vulnerability, the extreme southeast,
hastened his preparations for the defence and at the very end of the
month appeared in person at Fort Scott, where all the forces he could
muster, many of them refugee Missourians, had been rendezvousing. On
the second of September, the two armies, if such be not too dignified
a name for them, came into initiatory action at Dry Wood Creek,[104]
Missouri, a reconnoitering party of the Federals, in a venture across
the line, having

[Footnote 103: (cont.) would soon repair thither and so quell the
rebellion as to render my stay here no longer necessary. But as yet
the Union forces have not penetrated that far south, and Jackson with
a large force is quartered within 20 or 25 miles of the Agency--I was
informed by Mr. Killebrew on the 23d inst. that everything at the
Agency was safe--but the house and roads were guarded--Hence I have
assumed the responsibility of establishing my office here temporarily
until I can hear from the department.

And I most sincerely hope the course I have thus been compelled to
pursue will receive the approval of the department.

I desire instructions relative to the papers and a valuable safe
(being the only moveables there of value) which can only be moved
_at present_ under the protection of a guard. And also
instructions as to the course I am to pursue relative to the locality
of the Agency.

I feel confident that the difficulty now attending the locality at
Crawford Seminary will not continue long--if not then I shall move
directly there unless instructions arrive of a different character.

All mail matter should be directed to Fort Scott for the Mail Carrier
has been repeatedly arrested and the mails may be robbed--Very
respectfully your Obedient Servant

PETER P. ELDER, _U.S. Neosho Agent_.

H.B. BRANCH Esq, Superintendent of Ind. Affairs C.S.
  St. Joseph, Mo.
[Indian Office Files, _Neosho_, B 719 of 1861].]

[Footnote 104: For additional information about the Dry Wood Creek
affair and about the events leading up to and succeeding it, see
_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 436; Britton, _Civil
War on the Border_, vol. i, chapter x; Connelley, _Quantrill and
the Border Wars_, 199.]

fallen in with the advance of the Confederates and, being numerically
outmatched, having been compelled to beat a retreat. In its later
stages, Lane personally conducted that retreat, which, taken as a
whole, did not end even with the recrossing of the state boundary,
although the pursuit did not continue beyond it. Confident that Price
would follow up his victory and attack Fort Scott, Lane resolved to
abandon the place, leaving a detachment to collect the stores and
ammunition and to follow him later. He then hurried on himself to
Fort Lincoln on the north bank of the Little Osage, fourteen miles
northwest. There he halted and hastily erected breastworks of a
certain sort[105]. Meanwhile, the citizens of Fort Scott, finding
themselves left in the lurch, vacated their homes and followed in the
wake of the army[106]. Then came a period, luckily short, of direful
confusion. Home guards were drafted in and other preparations made to
meet the emergency of Price's coming. Humboldt was now suggested as
suitable and safe headquarters for the Neosho Agency[107]; but, most
opportunely, as the narrative will soon show, the change had to wait
upon the approval of the Indian Office, which could not be had for
some days and, in the meantime, events proved that Price was not the
menace and Fort Scott not the target.

It soon transpired that Price had no immediate intention of invading
Kansas[108]. For the present, it was

[Footnote 105: In ridicule of Lane's fortifications, see Spring,
_Kansas_, 275.]

[Footnote 106: As soon as the citizens, panic-stricken, were gone, the
detachment which Lane had left in charge, under Colonel C.R. Jennison,
commenced pillaging their homes [Britton, _Civil War on the
Border_, vol. i, 130.]]

[Footnote 107: H.C. Whitney to Mix, September 6, 1861, Indian Office
Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, W 455 of 1861.]

[Footnote 108: By the fifth of September, Lane had credible
information that Price had broken camp at Dry Wood and was moving
towards Lexington [Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i,

enough for his purpose to have struck terror into the hearts of the
people of Union sentiments inhabiting the Cherokee Neutral Lands,
where, indeed, intense excitement continued to prevail until there was
no longer any room to doubt that Price was really gone from the near
vicinity and was heading for the Missouri River. Yet his departure was
far from meaning the complete removal of all cause for anxiety, since
marauding bands infested the country roundabout and were constantly
setting forth, from some well concealed lair, on expeditions of
robbery, devastation, and murder. It was one of those marauding bands
that in this same month of September, 1861, sacked and in part burnt
Humboldt, for which dastardly and quite unwarrantable deed, James G.
Blunt, acting under orders from Lane, took speedy vengeance; and the
world was soon well rid of the instigator and leader of the outrage,
the desperado, John Matthews.[109]

[Footnote 109: (a)

Sept. 25, 1861.

HON. WM.P. DOLE, Com. of Ind. Af'rs

Dear Sir, We have just returned from a successful expedition into the
Indian Country, And I thought you would be glad to hear the news.

Probably you know that Mathews, formerly an Indian Trader amongst the
Osages has been committing depredations at the head of a band of half
breed Cherokees, all summer.

He has killed a number of settlers and taken their property; but as
most of them were on the Cherokee neuteral lands I could not tell
whether to blame him much or not, as I did not understand the
condition of those lands.

A few days ago he came up to Humbolt and pillaged the town. Gen. Lane
ordered the home guards, composed mostly of old men, too old for
regular service, to go down and take or disperse this company under

He detailed Lieut. Col. Blunt of Montgomery's regiment to the command,
and we started about 200 strong. We went to Humbolt and followed down
through the Osage as far as the Quapaw Agency where we came up with
them, about 60 strong.

Mathews and 10 men were killed at the first fire, the others (cont.)]

As soon as Lane had definite knowledge that Price had turned away from
the border and was moving northward, he determined to follow after and

[Footnote 109: (cont.) retreated. We found on Mathews a Commission
from Ben. McCulloch, authorizing him to enlist the Quapaw and other
Indians and operate on the Kansas frontier.

The Osage Indians are loyal, and I think most of the others would be
if your Agents were always ready to speak a word of confidence for our
Government, and on hand to counteract the influence of the Secession

There is no more danger in doing this than in any of the Army service.
If an Agent is killed in the discharge of his duty, another can be
appointed the same as in any other service. A few prompt Agents, might
save a vast amount of plundering which it is now contemplated to do in

Ben. McCulloch promises his rangers, and the Indians that he will
winter them in Kansas and expel the settlers.

I can see the Indians gain confidence in him precisely as they loose
it in us. It need somebody amongst them to represent our power and
strength and purposes, and to give them courage and confidence in the
U.S. Government.

There is another view which some take and you may take the same, i.e.
let them go--fight and conquer them--take their lands and stop their

I can only say that whatever the Government determines on the people
here will sustain. The President was never more popular. He is the
President of the Constitution and the laws. And notwithstanding what
the papers say about his difference with Frémont, every heart reposes
confidence in the President.

So far as I can learn from personal inquiry, the Indians are not yet
committed to active efforts against the Gov. AUG. WATTLES.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Central Superintendency_,
W 474 of 1861.]


SACK AND FOX AGENCY, Dec. 17th 1861.

HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Indian Affairs

Dear Sir: After receiving the cattle and making arrangements for their
keeping at Leroy I went and paid a visit to the Ruins of Humboldt
which certainly present a gloomy appearance. All the best part of the
town was burnt. Thurstons House that I had rented for an office tho
near half a mile from town was burnt tho his dwelling and mill near
by were spared. All my books and papers that were there were lost. My
trunk and what little me and my son had left after the sacking were
all burnt including to Land Warrents one 160 acres and one 120. Our
Minne Rifle and ammunition Saddle bridle, etc.... About 4 or 5 Hundred
Sacks of Whitney's Corn were burnt. As soon as I can I will try to
make out a list of the Papers from the (cont.)]

him, if possible, in the rear. Governor Robinson was much opposed[110]
to any such provocative and apparently purposeless action, no one
knowing better than he Lane's vindictive mercilessness. Lane persisted
notwithstanding Robinson's objections and, for the time being, found
his policies actually endorsed by Prince at Fort Leavenworth.[111] The
attack upon Humboldt, having revealed the exposed condition of the
settlements north of the Osage lands, necessitated his leaving a much
larger force in his own rear than he had intended.[112] It also
made it seem advisable for him to order the building of a series of
stockades, the one of most immediate interest being at Leroy.[113] By
the fourteenth of September, Lane found himself within twenty-four
miles of Harrisonville but Price still far ahead. On the
twenty-second, having made a detour for the purpose of destroying some
of his opponent's stores, he performed the atrocious and downright
inexcusable exploit of burning Osceola.[114] Lexington, besieged,
had fallen into Price's hands two days before. Thus had the foolish
Federal practice of acting in

[Footnote 109: (cont.) Department [that] were burnt. As I had some at
Leavenworth I cannot do so til I see what is there. As Mr. Hutchinson
is not here I leave this morning for the Kaw Agency to endeavour to
carry out your Instructions there and will return here as soon as I
get through there. They are building some stone houses here and I am
much pleased with the result. The difference in cost is not near
so much as we expected but I will write you fully on a careful
examination as you requested. Very respectfully your obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, _Superintendent of Indian Affairs_
Southern Superintendency

[Indian Office Files, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1432 of

[Footnote 110: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 468-469.]

[Footnote 111:--Ibid., 483.]

[Footnote 112:--Ibid., 490.]

[Footnote 113:--Ibid.]

[Footnote 114:--Ibid., 196; vol. liii, supplement, 743;
Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 147-148; Connelley,
_Quantrill and the Border Wars_, 208-209, 295.]

detachments instead of in force produced its own calamitous result.
There had never been any appreciable coördination among the parts
of Frémont's army. Each worked upon a campaign of its own. To some
extent, the same criticism might be held applicable to the opposing
Confederate force also, especially when the friction between Price and
McCulloch be taken fully into account; but Price's energy was far in
excess of Frémont's and he, having once made a plan, invariably saw
to its accomplishment. Lincoln viewed Frémont's supineness with
increasing apprehension and finally after the fall of Lexington
directed Scott to instruct for greater activity. Presumably, Frémont
had already aroused himself somewhat; for, on the eighteenth, he had
ordered Lane to proceed to Kansas City and from thence to coöperate
with Sturgis,[115] Lane slowly obeyed[116] but managed, while obeying,
to do considerable marauding, which worked greatly to the general
detestation and lasting discredit of his brigade. For a man,
temperamentally constituted as Lane was, warfare had no terrors and
its votaries, no scruples. The grim chieftain as he has been somewhat
fantastically called, was cruel, indomitable, and disgustingly
licentious, a person who would have hesitated at nothing to accomplish
his purpose. It was to be expected, then, that he would see nothing
terrible in the letting loose of the bad white man, the half-civilized
Indian, or the wholly barbarous negro upon society. He believed that
the institution of slavery should look out for itself[117] and, like
Governor Robinson,[118] Senator Pomeroy, Secretary Cameron, John

[Footnote 115: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 500.]

[Footnote 116:--Ibid., 505-506.]

[Footnote 117:--Ibid., 516.]

[Footnote 118: Spring, _Kansas_, 272.]

Cochrane,[119] Thaddeus Stevens[120] and many another, fully endorsed
the principle underlying Frémont's abortive Emancipation Proclamation.
He advocated immediate emancipation both as a political and a military

There was no doubt by this time that Lane had it in mind to utilize
the Indians. In the dog days of August, when he was desperately
marshaling his brigade, the Indians presented themselves, in idea, as
a likely military contingent. The various Indian agents in Kansas
were accordingly communicated with and Special Agent Augustus
Wattles authorized to make the needful preparations for Indian
enlistment.[122] Not much could be done in furtherance of the scheme
while Lane was engaged in Missouri but, in October, when he was
back in Kansas, his interest again manifested itself. He was then
recruiting among all kinds of people, the more hot-blooded the better.
His energy was likened to frenzy and the more sober-minded took
alarm. It was the moment for his political opponents to interpose
and Governor Robinson from among them did interpose, being firmly
convinced that Lane, by his intemperate zeal and by his guerrilla-like
fighting was provoking Missouri to reprisals and thus precipitating
upon Kansas the very troubles that he professed to wish to ward off.
Incidentally, Robinson, unlike Frémont, was vehemently opposed to
Indian enlistment.

Feeling between Robinson and Lane became exceedingly tense in October.
Price was again moving

[Footnote 119: _Daily Conservative_, November 22, 1861.]

[Footnote 120: Woodburn, _Life of Thaddeus Stevens_, 183.]

[Footnote 121: Lane's speech at Springfield, November 7, 1861
[_Daily Conservative_, November 17, 1861].]

[Footnote 122: For a full discussion of the progress of the movement,
see Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, 227

suspiciously near to Kansas. On the third he was known to have left
Warrensburg, ostensibly to join McCulloch in Bates County[123] and, on
the eighth, he was reported as still proceeding in a southwestwardly
direction, possibly to attack Fort Scott.[124] His movements gave
opportunity for a popular expression of opinion among Lane's
adherents. On the evening of the eighth, a large meeting was held in
Stockton's Hall to consider the whole situation and, amidst great
enthusiasm, Lane was importuned to go to Washington,[125] there to lay
the case of the piteous need of Kansas, in actuality more imaginary
than real, before the president. Nothing loath to assume such
responsibility but not finding it convenient to leave his military
task just then, Lane resorted to letter-writing. On the ninth, he
complained[126] to Lincoln that Robinson was attempting to break
up his brigade and had secured the coöperation of Prince to that
end.[127] The anti-Robinson press[128] went farther and accused
Robinson and Prince of not being big enough, in the face of grave
danger to the commonwealth, to forget old scores.[129] As a
solution of the problem before them, Lane suggested to Lincoln the
establishment of a new military district that should include Kansas,
Indian Territory, and Arkansas, and be under his command.[130] So
anxious was Lane to be

[Footnote 123: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 525, 526, 527.]

[Footnote 124:--Ibid, 527.]

[Footnote 125: _Daily Conservative_, October 9, 10, 1861.]

[Footnote 126: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 529.]

[Footnote 127: _Daily Conservative_, October 9, 15, 1861.]

[Footnote 128: Chief among the papers against Robinson, in the matter
of his longstanding feud with Lane, was the _Daily Conservative_
with D.W. Wilder as its editor. Another anti-Robinson paper was
the Lawrence _Republican_. The Cincinnati _Gazette_ was
decidedly friendly to Lane.]

[Footnote 129: _Daily Conservative_, October 15, 1861.]

[Footnote 130: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 529-530. Lane
outlined his plan for a separate department in his speech in
Stockton's Hall [_Daily Conservative_, October 9, 1861]. (cont.)]

identified with what he thought was the rescue of Kansas that he
proposed resigning his seat in the senate that he might be entirely
untrammelled.[131] Perchance, also, he had some inkling that with
Frederick P. Stanton[132] contesting the seat, a bitter partisan fight
was in prospect, a not altogether welcome diversion.[133] Stanton,
prominent in and out of office in territorial days, was an old
political antagonist of the Lane faction and one of the four
candidates whose names had been before the legislature in March. In
the second half of October, Lane's brigade notably contributed to
Frémont's show of activity and then, anticipatory perhaps to greater
changes, it was detached from the main column and given the liberty
of moving independently down the Missouri line to the Cherokee

Lane's efforts towards securing Indian enlistment did not stop with
soliciting the Kansas tribes. Thoroughly aware, since the time of his
sojourn at Fort Scott, if not before, of the delicate situation
in Indian Territory, of the divided allegiance there, and of the
despairing cry for help that had gone forth from the Union element to
Washington, he conceived it eminently fitting and practicable that
that same Union element should have its loyalty put to good uses and
be itself induced to take up arms in behalf of the cause it affected
so ardently to endorse. To an ex-teacher among the Seminoles, E.H.
Carruth, was entrusted the task of recruiting.

The situation in Indian Territory was more than

[Footnote 130: (cont.) Robinson was opposed to the idea [Ibid.,
November 2, 6, 1861].]

[Footnote 131: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 530.]

[Footnote 132: Martin, _First Two Years of Kansas_, 24;
_Biographical Congressional Directory_, 1771-1903.]

[Footnote 133: _Daily Conservative_, November 1, 1861, gives
Robinson the credit of inciting Stanton to contest the seat.]

[Footnote 134: _Daily Conservative_, October 30, 1861.]

delicate. It was precarious and had been so almost from the beginning.
The withdrawal of troops from the frontier posts had left the
Territory absolutely destitute of the protection solemnly guaranteed
its inhabitants by treaty with the United States government.
Appeal[135] to the War Department for a restoration of what was a
sacred obligation had been without effect all the summer. Southern
emissaries had had, therefore, an entirely free hand to accomplish
whatever purpose they might have in mind with the tribes. In
September,[136] the Indian Office through Charles E. Mix, acting
commissioner of Indian affairs in the absence of William P. Dole, who
was then away on a mission to the Kansas tribes, again begged the War
Department[137] to look into matters so extremely urgent. National
honor would of itself have dictated a policy of intervention before

[Footnote 135: Secretary Cameron's reply to Secretary Smith's first
request was uncompromising in the extreme and prophetic of his
persistent refusal to recognize the obligation resting upon the United
States to protect its defenceless "wards." This is Cameron's letter of
May 10, 1861:

"In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor
to state that on the 17th April instructions were issued by this
Department to remove the troops stationed at Forts Cobb, Arbuckle,
Washita, and Smith, to Fort Leavenworth, leaving it to the discretion
of the Commanding Officer to replace them, or not, by Arkansas

"The exigencies of the service will not admit any change in these
orders." [Interior Department Files, _Bundle no. 1 (1849-1864)

Secretary Smith wrote to Cameron again on the thirtieth [Interior
Department _Letter Press Book_, vol. iii, 125], enclosing Dole's
letter of the same date [Interior Department, _File Box, January 1
to December 1, 1861_; Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12,
176], but to no purpose.]

[Footnote 136: Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 218-219.]

[Footnote 137: Although his refusal to keep faith with the Indians is
not usually cited among the things making for Cameron's unfitness for
the office of Secretary of War, it might well and justifiably be. No
student of history questions to-day that the appointment of Simon
Cameron to the portfolio of war, to which Thaddeus Stevens had
aspirations [Woodburn, _Life of Thaddeus Stevens_, 239], was
one of the worst administrative mistakes Lincoln ever made. It was
certainly one of the four cabinet appointment errors noted by Weed
[_Autobiography_, 607].]

the poor neglected Indians had been driven to the last desperate
straits. The next month, October, nothing at all having been done in
the interval, Dole submitted[138] to Secretary Smith new evidence of
a most alarmingly serious state of affairs and asked that the
president's attention be at once elicited. The apparent result was
that about the middle of November, Dole was able to write with
confidence--and he was writing at the request of the president--that
the United States was prepared to maintain itself in its authority
over the Indians at all hazards.[139]

Boastful words those were and not to be made good until many precious
months had elapsed and many sad regrettable scenes enacted. In early
November occurred the reorganization of the Department of the West
which meant the formation of a Department of Kansas separate and
distinct from a Department of Missouri, an arrangement that afforded
ample opportunity for a closer attention to local exigencies in both
states than had heretofore been possible or than, upon trial, was
subsequently to be deemed altogether desirable. It necessarily
increased the chances for local patronage and exposed military matters
to the grave danger of becoming hopelessly entangled with political.

The need for change of some sort was, however, very evident and the
demand for it, insistent. If the southern Indians were not soon
secured, they were bound to menace, not only Kansas, but Colorado[140]
and to help materially in blocking the way to Texas, New Mexico,

[Footnote 138: Indian Office _Report Book_ no. 12, 225.]

[Footnote 139: Dole to Hunter, November 16, 1861, ibid., _Letter
Book_, no. 67, pp. 80-82.]

[Footnote 140: On conditions in Colorado Territory, the following are
enlightening: ibid., _Consolidated Files_, C 195 of 1861; C 1213
of 1861; C 1270 of 1861; C 1369 of 1861; V 43 of 1861; _Official
Records_, vol. iv, 73.]

and Arizona. Their own domestic affairs had now reached a supremely
critical stage.[141] It was high time

[Footnote 141: In addition to what may be obtained on the subject from
the first volume of this work, two letters of slightly later date
furnish particulars, as do also the records of a council held by Agent
Cuther with certain chiefs at Leroy.

(a). LAWRENCE, KANSAS, Dec. 14th, 1861.

HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Ind. Affairs

Dear Sir, It is with reluctance that I again intrude on your valuable
time. But I am induced to do so by the conviction that the subject
of our Indian relations is really a matter of serious concern: as
involving the justice and honor of our own Government, and the deepest
interests--the very existence, indeed--of a helpless and dependent
people. And knowing that it is your wish to be furnished with every
item of information which may, in any way, throw light on the subject,
I venture to trouble you with another letter.

Mico Hat-ki, the Creek man referred to in my letter of Oct. 31st has
been back to the Creek Nation, and returned about the middle of
last month. He was accompanied, to this place, by one of his former
companions, but had left some of their present company at LeRoy. They
were expecting to have a meeting with some of the Indians, at LeRoy,
to consult about the proper course to be pursued, in order to
protect the loyal and peaceable Indians, from the hostility of the
disaffected, who have become troublesome and menacing in their

With this man and his companion, I had considerable conversation, and
find that the Secessionists and disaffected Half-breeds are carrying
things with a high hand. While the loyal Indians are not in
a condition to resist them, by reason of the proximity of an
overwhelming rebel force.

From them (repeating their former statements, regarding the defection
of certain parties, and the loyalty of others, with the addition of
some further particulars) I learn the following facts: Viz. That
M Kennard, the Principal Chief of the Lower Creeks, most of the
McIntoshes, George Stidham, and others have joined the rebels, and
organized a military force in their interest; for the purpose of
intimidating and harrassing the loyal Indians. They name some of the
officers, but are not sufficiently conversant with military terms to
distinguish the different grades, with much exactness. Unee McIntosh,
however, is the highest in rank, (a Colonel I presume) and Sam
Cho-co-ti, George Stidham, Chilly McIntosh, are all officers in the
Lower Creek rebel force.

Among the Upper Creeks, John Smith, Timiny Barnet and Wm. Robinson,
are leaders.

Among the Seminoles, John Jumper, the Principal Chief, is on the side
of the rebels. Pas-co-fa, the second chief, stands neutral. Fraser
McClish, though himself a Chickasaw, has raised a company (cont.)]

for the Federal government to do something to attest its own
competency. There was need for it to do that,

[Footnote 141: (cont.) among the Seminoles in favor of the rebellion.
They say the full Indians will kill him.

The Choctaws are divided in much the same way as the other Tribes, the
disaffected being principally among the Half-breeds.

The Chickasaw Governor, Harris, is a Secessionist; and so are most, if
not all, the Colberts. The full Indians are loyal to the Government,
as are some of the mixed bloods also, and here, I remark, from my own
knowledge, that this Governor Harris was the first to propose the
adoption of concerted measures, among the Southern Tribes, on the
subject of Secession. This was instantly and earnestly opposed by John
Ross, as being out of place, and an ungrateful violation of the Treaty
obligations, by which the Tribes had placed themselves under the
exclusive protection of the United States; and, under which, they had
enjoyed a long course of peace and prosperity.

They say, there are about four hundred Secessionists, among the
Cherokees. But whether organized or not, I did not understand. I
presume they meant such as were formerly designated by the term
Warriors, somewhat analogous to the class among ourselves, who are fit
for military duty, though they may or may not be actually organized
and under arms. So that the _Thousands of Indians_ in
the secession papers, as figuring in the armies, are enormous
exaggerations; and most of them sheer fabrications.

Albert Pike, of Little Rock, boasts of having visited and made treaty
alliances with the Comanches, and other tribes, on behalf of the
"Confederate States," but the Indians do not believe him. And, in
blunt style, say "he tells lies."

They make favorable mention of O-poth-le-yo-ho-lo, an ex-Creek Chief,
a true patriot of former days. But, it seems, he has been molested and
forced to leave his home to avoid the annoyance and violence of the
rebel party. There are, however, more than three thousand young men,
of the warrior class, who adhere to his principles, and hold true
faith and allegiance to the United States.

They say also that John Ross is not a Secessionist, and that there are
more than four thousand patriots among the Cherokees, who are true to
the Government of the United States. This agrees, substantially, with
my own personal knowledge, unless they have changed within a very
short time, which is not at all probable, as the Cherokees, of this
class, are pretty fully and correctly informed about the nature of the
controversy. And I may add, that much of their information is, through
one channel and another, communicated to the Creeks, and much of their
spirit too.

On the whole, judging from the most reliable information, I have been
able to obtain, I feel assured that the Full Indians of the Creeks,
Cherokees, Seminoles, and the small bands living in the Creek Nation,
are faithful to the Government. And the same, to a great extent, is

moreover, on recognizably loyal ground, causes for dissatisfaction
among Kansas emigrant tribes to be

[Footnote 141: (cont.) true of the Choctaws and Chickasaws. And were
it not for the proximity of the rebel force, the loyal Indians would
put down the Secession movement among themselves, at once. Or rather,
they would not have suffered it to rise at all.

The loyal Indians say, they wish "to stand by their Old Treaties." And
they are as persistent in their adherence to these Treaties, as we
are, to our Constitution. And I have no doubt that, as soon as the
Government can afford them protection, they will be ready, at the
first call, to manifest, by overt action, the loyalty to which they
are pledged.

They are looking, with great anxiety and hope, for the coming of the
great army. And I have no doubt that a friendly communication from the
Government, through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, would have a
powerful effect in removing any false impressions, which may have been
made, on the ignorant and unwary, by the emissaries of Secession, and
to encourage and reassure the loyal friends of the Government, who, in
despair of timely aid, may have been compelled to yield any degree of
submission, to the pressure of an overwhelming force. I was expecting
to see these Indians again, and to have had further conversation with
them. But I am informed by Charles Johnnycake that they have gone to
Fort Leavenworth and expect to go on to Washington. Hearing this, I
hesitated about troubling you with this letter at all, as, in that
case, you would see them yourself. But I have concluded to send it, as
affording me an opportunity to express a few thoughts, with which it
would hardly be worth while to occupy a separate letter.

Hoping that the counsels and movements of the Government may be
directed by wisdom from above, and that the cause of truth and right
may prevail, I remain with great respect, Dear Sir, Your Obedient

P.S. I rec. a note from Mr. Carruth, saying that he was going to
Washington, with a delegation of Southern Indians, and I suppose Mico
Hatki and his companions are that Delegation, or at least a part of

I will just say in regard to Mr. Carruth that I was acquainted with
him, several years ago, as a teacher in the Cherokee Nation. He
afterwards went to the Creek Nation, I _think_, as teacher of a
Government school, and I believe, has been there ever since. If so,
he must know a good deal about the Creeks. Mr. Carruth bore a good
character. I think he married one of the Missionary ladies of the
Presbyterian Mission.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, J 530 of 1861.]

(b). Wichita Agency, L.D., December 15, 1861.

All well and doing well. Hear you are having trouble among
yourselves--fighting one another, but you and we are friendly. Our

removed and drastic measures taken with the indigenous of the plains.

The appointment of Hunter to the command of the

[Footnote 141: (cont.) brothers the Comanches and all the other tribes
are still your friends. Mode Cunard and you were here and had the talk
with Gen. Pike; we still hold to the talk we made with Gen. Pike, and
are keeping the treaty in good faith, and are looking for him back
again soon. We look upon you and Mode Cunard and Gen. Pike as
brothers. Gen. Pike told us at the council that there were but few
of us here, and if any thing turned up to make it necessary he would
protect them. We are just as we were when Gen. Pike was up here and
keeping the treaty made with him. Our brothers the wild Comanches have
been in and are friendly with us.

All the Indians here have but one heart. Our brothers, the Texans,
and the Indians are away fighting the cold weather people. We do not
intend to go North to fight them, but if they come down here, we will
all wait to drive them away. Some of my people are one-eyed and a
little crippled, but if the enemy comes here they will all jump out
to fight him. Pea-o-popicult, the principal Kiowa chief, has recently
visited the reserve, and expressed friendly intentions, and has gone
back to consult the rest of his people, and designs returning.

Hoseca X Maria} Ke-Had-a-wah } Chiefs of the Camanches Buffalo Hump }
Te-nah Geo. Washington Jim Pockmark

[Indian Office, Confederate Papers, Copy of a letter to John Jumper,
certified as a true copy by A.T. Pagy.]

(c). LEROY, COFFEY CO., KANSAS, NOV. 4, 1861.

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir: Enclosed I send you a statement of delegation of Creeks,
Chickasaw, and Kininola who are here for assistance from the
Government. You will see by the enclosed that I have held a Council
with them the result of which I send verbatim. They have travelled
some 300 or 400 miles to get here, had to take an unfrequented
road and were in momentary fear of their lives not because the
secessionists were stronger than the Union party in their nation, but
because the secessionists were on the alert and were determined that
there should be no communication with the Government.

They underwent a great many privations in getting here, had to bear
their own expenses, which as some of them who were up here a short
time ago have travelled in coming and going some 900 miles was

I am now supplying them with everything they need on my own
responsibility. They dare not return to their people unless troops

Department of Kansas was open to certain objections, no doubt; but, to
Lane, whose forceful personality had

[Footnote 141: (cont.) are sent with them and they assure me the
moment that is done, a large portion of each of the tribes will rally
to the support of the Government and that their warriors will gladly
take up arms in its defence.

I write to you from Topeka and urge that steps be taken to render them
the requisite protection. I am satisfied that the Department will
see the urgent necessity of carrying out the Treaty stipulations and
giving these Indians who are so desirous of standing firm by the
Government and who have resisted so persistently all the overtures of
the secessionists, the assistance and protection which is their due. I
am informed by these Indians that John Ross is desirous of standing by
the Government, and that he has 4000 warriors who are willing to do
battle for the cause of the Union.

They also inform me, that the Washitas, Caddos, Tenies, Wakoes,
Tewakano, Chiekies, Shawnees, and Kickapoos are almost unanimously
Union. Gen. Lane is anxious to do something to relieve the Union
Indians in the southern tribes, by taking prompt and energetic steps
at this time--it can be done with little expense and but little
trouble, while the benefit to be derived will be incalculable. Let me
beg of you and more that the matter be laid before the Department and
the proper steps be taken to give the Indians that protection which is
their due and at the same time take an important step in sustaining
the supremacy of the Government. Your obedient Servant, GEO.A. CUTLER,
_agent_ for the Indians of the Creek agency.


At a Council of the Creeks, held at Leroy in Coffey County, Kansas, at
the house of the Agent of said Indians, Maj. Geo. A. Cutler, who was
unable to visit their Country owing to the rebellion existing in the
Country, the following talk was had by the Chiefs of said nation,
eight in number--Four Creeks, Two Seminoles, Two Chickasaws.

Oke-Tah-hah-shah-haw-choe, Chief of Creek Upper District says, he will
talk short words this time--wants to tell how to get trouble in Creek
nation. First time Albert Pike come in he made great deal trouble.
That man told Indian that the Union people would come and take away
property and would take away land--now you sleep, you ought to wake up
and attend to your own property. Tell them there ain't no U.S.--ain't
any more Treaty--all be dead--Tell them as there is no more U.S. no
more Treaty that the Creeks had better make new Treaty with the South
and the Southern President would protect them and give them their
annuity--Tell them if you make Treaty with southern President that he
would pay you more annuity and would pay better than the U.S. if they
the Indians would help the Southern President--Mr. Pike makes the half

impressed itself, for good or ill, upon the trans-Missouri region, it
was, to say the least, somewhat

[Footnote 141: (cont.) breeds believe what he says and the half breeds
makes some of the full blood Indians believe what he says that they
(the Indians) must help the secessionists. Then that is so--but as for
himself he don't believe him yet. Then he thought the old U.S.
was alive yet and the Treaty was good. Wont go against the U.S.
himself--That is the reason the Secessions want to have him--The
Secessionists offered 5000$ for his head because he would not go
against the U.S. Never knew that Creek have an agent here until he
come and see him and that is why I have come among this Union people.
Have come in and saw my agent and want to go by the old Treaty.
Wants to get with U.S. Army so that I can get back to my people as
Secessionists will not let me go. Wants the Great Father to send the
Union Red people and Troops down the Black Beaver road and he will
guide them to his country and then all his people will be for the
Union--That he cannot get back to his people any other way--Our Father
to protect the land in peace so that he can live in peace on the land
according to the Treaty--At the time I left my union people I told
them to look to the Beaver Road until I come. Promised his own people
that the U.S. Army would come back the Beaver Road and wants to go
that way--The way he left his country his people was in an elbow
surrounded by secessions and his people is not strong enough against
them for Union and that is the reason he has come up for help--Needed
guns, powder, lead to take to his own people. Own people for the Union
about 3350 warriors all Creeks--Needed now clothing, tents for winter,
tools, shirts, and every thing owned by whites,--wants their annuity
as they need it now--The Indians and the Whites among us have done
nothing against any one but the Secessionists have compelled us to
fight and we are willing to fight for the Union. Creek half breeds
joined secessionists. 32 head men and leaders-27 towns for the Union
among Creeks

_Signed_: Oke-tah-hah-shah-haw Choe
his X mark.

_Talk of Chickasaw Chief, Toe-Lad-Ke_

Says--Will talk short words--have had fever and sick--Secessionists
told him no more U.S. no more Treaty--all broken up better make new
Treaty with Secessionists--Although they told him all this did not
believe them and that is reason came up to see if there was not still
old U.S.--Loves his country--loves his children and would not believe
them yet--That he did not believe what the Secessionists told him and
they would not let him live in peace and that is the reason he left
his country--The secessionists want to tie him--whip him and make him
join them--but he would not and he left.

  100 warriors for secession--
  2240    do    "   Union


disconcerting, not because Lane was hostile to Hunter personally--the
two men had long had a friendly acquaintance

[Footnote 141: (cont.) The secessionists plague him so much talk he
asks for his country that the army go down and that is what his people
wants same as Creek and Seminole--Have seen the agent of the Creeks
but have not seen our agent but want to see him--wants agent sent--He
has always done no wrong--Secessionists would not let him live in
peace--and if have to fight all his people will fight for Union--That
is all the chance that he can save his lands and property to
children--by old U.S. and Treaty--Chickasaw--Seminoles and Creeks all
in no difference--all for the Union--all want annuity and have had
none for some time--Now my Great Father you must remember me and my
people and all our wants. _Signed_: TOE-LAD-KE, his X mark.

_Talk of Seminole Chief, Choo-Loo-Foe-Lop-hah-Choe_

Says: Pike went among the Seminoles and tell them the same as he
told the Creek. The talk of Pike he did not believe and told him
so himself--Some of my people did believe Pike and did join the
secessionists also he believed the old U.S. is alive and Treaty not
dead and that is the reason he come up and had this talk--Never had
done any thing against Treaty and had come to have Great Father
protect us--Secession told him that Union men was going to take away
land and property--could get no annuity old U.S. all gone--come to
see--find it not so--wants President to send an agent don't know who
agent is--wants to appoint agent himself as he knows who he wants.
Twelve towns are for the Union

  500 warriors for the Union
  100     do    "  Secession

All people who come with Billy Bowlegs are Union--Chief in place of
Billy Bowlegs Shoe-Nock-Me-Koe this is his name--Need everything that
Creeks need--arms clothing, etc. etc. wants to go with army same way
and same road with Creek--This is what we ask of our Great Father live
as the Treaty says in peace--and all Seminole warriors will fight for
the Union. This is the request of our people of our Great Father They
need their annuity have not had any for nearly a year and want it

_Signed_: CHOO-LOO-FOE-LOP-HAH-CHOE, his X mark.

We the Chiefs of the three nations Creeks, Chickasaws and Seminoles
who are of this delegation and all for the Union and the majority of
our people are for the Union and agree in all that has been said by
the Chiefs who have made this talk, and believe all they have said to
be true--

  OKE-TAH-HAH-SHAH-HAW-CHOE          his X mark       Creek
  WHITE CHIEF                        his X mark       Creek

  BOB DEER                           his X mark       Creek
  PHIL DAVID                         his X mark       Creek


with each other[142]--but because he had had great hopes of receiving
the post himself.[143] The time was now drawing near for him to repair
to Washington to resume his senatorial duties since Congress was to
convene the second of December.

To further his scheme for Indian enlistment, Lane had projected an
inter-tribal council to be held at his own headquarters. E.H. Carruth
worked especially to that end. The man in charge of the Southern
Superintendency, W.G. Coffin, had a similar plan in mind for less
specific reasons. His idea was to confer with the representatives of
the southern tribes with reference to Indian Territory conditions
generally. It was part of the duty appertaining to his office.
Humboldt[144] was the place selected by him for the meeting;
but Leroy, being better protected and more accessible, was soon
substituted. The sessions commenced the

[Footnote 141: (cont.)

  TOE-LAD-KE                 his X mark    Chickasaw
  CHAP-PIA-KE                his X mark    Chickasaw

  CHOO-LOO-FOE-LOP-HAH-CHOE  his X mark    Seminole
  OH-CHEN-YAH-HOE-LAH        his X mark    Seminole

  _Witness_: C.F. Currier
                  W. Whistler

LEROY, COFFEY CO. KAN., Nov. 4 1861.

I do certify that the within statement of the different chiefs were
taken before me at a council held at my house at the time stated and
that the talk of the Indian was correctly taken down by a competent
clerk at the time.

GEO.A. CUTLER, _Agent_ for the Creek Indians.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1400 of 1861.]]

[Footnote 142: Their acquaintance dated, if not from the antebellum
days when Hunter was stationed at Fort Leavenworth and was not
particularly magnanimous in his treatment of Southerners, then from
those when he had charge, by order of General Scott, of the guard at
the White House. _Report of the Military Services of General David
Hunter_, pp. 7, 8.]

[Footnote 143: _Daily Conservative_, November 13, 1861.]

[Footnote 144: Coffin to Dole, October 2, 1861, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, _Report_, 1861, p. 39.]

sixteenth[145] of November and were still continuing on the
twenty-third.[146] It had not been possible to hold them earlier
because of the disturbed state of the country and the consequent
difficulty of getting into touch with the Indians.

Upon assuming command of the Department of Kansas, General Hunter took
full cognizance of the many things making for disquietude and turmoil
in the country now under his jurisdiction. Indian relations became, of
necessity, matters of prime concern. Three things bear witness to this
fact, Hunter's plans for an inter-tribal council at Fort Leavenworth,
his own headquarters; his advocacy of Indian enlistment, especially
from among the southern Indians; and his intention, early avowed, of
bringing Brigadier-general James W. Denver into military prominence
and of entrusting to him the supervisory command in Kansas. In some
respects, no man could have been found equal to Denver in conspicuous
fitness for such a position. He had served as commissioner of Indian
affairs[147] under Buchanan and, although a Virginian by birth,
had had a large experience with frontier life--in Missouri, in the
Southwest during the Mexican War, and in California. He had also
measured swords with Lane. It was in squatter-sovereignty days when,
first as secretary and then as governor of Kansas Territory, he
had been in a position to become intimately acquainted with the
intricacies of Lane's true character and had had both occasion and
opportunity to oppose some of that worthy's autocratic and thoroughly

[Footnote 145: _Daily Conservative_, November 17, 1861.]

[Footnote 146:--Ibid., November 23,1861.]

[Footnote 147: Denver was twice appointed Commissioner of Indian
Affairs by Buchanan. For details as to his official career, see
_Biographical Congressional Directory_, 499, and Robinson,
_Kansas Conflict_, 424.]

maneuvers.[148] As events turned out, this very acquaintance with Lane
constituted his political unfitness for the control that Hunter,[149]
in December, and Halleck,[150] in the following March, designed to
give him. With the second summons to command, came opportunity for
Lane's vindictive animosity to be called into play. Historically, it
furnished conclusive proof, if any were needed, that Lane had supreme
power over the distribution of Federal patronage in his own state and
exercised that power even at the cost of the well-being and credit of
his constituency.

When Congress began its second session in December, the fight against
Lane for possession of his seat in the Senate proceeded apace; but
that did not, in the least, deter him from working for his brigade.
His scheme now was to have it organized on a different footing from
that which it had sustained heretofore. His influence with the
administration in Washington was still very peculiar and very
considerable, so much so, in fact, that President Lincoln, without
taking expert advice and without consulting either the military men,
whose authority would necessarily be affected, or the civil officials
in Kansas, nominated him to the Senate as brigadier-general to have
charge of troops in that state.[151] Secretary Cameron was absent from
the city

[Footnote 148: Robinson, _op. cit_., 378 ff., 424 ff.]

[Footnote 149: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 456.]

[Footnote 150:--Ibid., 832.]

[Footnote 151: The Leavenworth _Daily Conservative_ seemed
fairly jubilant over the prospect of Lane's early return to military
activity. The following extracts from its news items and editorials
convey some such idea:

"General Lane of Kansas has been nominated to the Senate and
unanimously confirmed, as Brigadier General, to command Kansas troops;
the express understanding being that General Lane's seat in the Senate
shall not be vacated until he accepts his new commission, which he
will not do until the Legislature of Kansas assembles, next month. He
has no idea of doing anything that shall oblige Governor Robinson and
his appointee (Stanton) (cont.)]

at the time this was done and apparently, when apprised of it, made
some objections on the score, not so much of an invasion of his own
prerogative, as of its probable effect upon Hunter. Cameron had his
first consultation with Lane regarding the matter, January second, and
was given by him to understand that everything had been done in strict
accordance with Hunter's own wishes.[152] The practical question of
the relation of Lane's brigade to Hunter's command soon, however,
presented itself in a somewhat different light and its answer required
a more explicit statement from the president than had yet been made.
Lincoln, when appealed to, unhesitatingly repudiated every suggestion
of the idea that it had ever been his intention to give Lane an
independent command or to have Hunter, in any sense, superseded.[153]

The need for sending relief to the southern Indians, which, correctly
interpreted meant, of course, reasserting authority over them and thus
removing a menacing and impending danger from the Kansas border, had
been one of Lane's strongest arguments in gaining his way with the
administration. The larger aspect of his purpose was, however, the one
that appealed to Commissioner Dole, who, as head of the Indian Bureau,
seems fully to have appreciated the responsibility that

[Footnote 151: (cont.) who has been in waiting for several months to
take the place."--_Daily Conservative_, January 1, 1862.

"Rejoicing in Neosho Battalion over report that Lane appointed to
command Kansas troops."--Ibid., January 4, 1862.

"General Lane will soon be here and General Denver called to another
command."--Ibid., January 7, 1862.]

[Footnote 152: Cameron to Hunter, January 3, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 512-513.]

[Footnote 153: Martin F. Conway, the Kansas representative in
Congress, was under no misapprehension as to Lane's true position;
for Lincoln had told him personally that Lane was to be under Hunter
[_Daily Conservative_, February 6, 1862].]

assuredly rested in all honor upon the government, whether conscious
of it or not, to protect its wards in their lives and property. From
the first intimation given him of Lane's desire for a more energetic
procedure, Dole showed a willingness to coöperate; and, as many things
were demanding his personal attention in the West, he so timed a
journey of his own that it might be possible for him to assist in
getting together the Indian contingent that was to form a part of the
"Southern Expedition."[154]

The urgency of the Indian call for help[155] and the

[Footnote 154: Lane's expedition was variously referred to as "the
Southern Expedition," "the Cherokee Expedition," "the great jayhawking
expedition," and by many another name, more or less opprobrious.]

[Footnote 155: Representations of the great need of the Indians for
assistance were made to the government by all sorts of people. Agent
after agent wrote to the Indian Office. The Reverend Evan Jones wrote
repeatedly and on the second of January had sent information, brought
to him at Lawrence by two fugitive Cherokees, of the recent battle in
which the loyalists under Opoethle-yo-ho-la had been worsted, at
the Big Bend of the Arkansas [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201,
_Southern Superintendency_, J 540 of 1862]. In the early winter,
a mixed delegation of Creeks and others had made their way to
Washington, hoping by personal entreaty to obtain succor for their
distressed people, and justice. Hunter had issued a draft for their
individual relief [Ibid., J523 of 1861], and passes from Fort
Leavenworth to Washington [Ibid., C1433 of 1861]. It was not so
easy for them to get passes coming back. Application was made to the
War Department and referred back to the Interior [Ibid., A 434
of 1861]. The estimate, somewhat inaccurately footed up, of the total
expense of the return journey as submitted by agents Cutler and
Carruth was,

  "11 R.R. Tickets to Fort Leavenworth by way of New York City
  $48                                                        $ 528.00

  11 men $2 ea (incidental expenses)                            22.00

  2 1/2 wks board at Washington $5                             137.50

  Expenses from Leavenworth to Ind. Nat                         50.00

  Pay of Tecumseh for taking care of horses                     25.00

  [Ibid., C 1433 of 1861].                             $ 960.50"

Dole had not encouraged the delegation to come on to Washington.
He pleaded lack of funds and the wish that they would wait in Fort
Leavenworth and attend Hunter's inter-tribal council so that they
might go back to their people carrying definite messages of what was
to be done (cont.)]

evident readiness of the government to make answer to that call before
it was quite too late pointed auspiciously to a successful outcome for
Senator Lane's endeavors; but, unfortunately, Major-general Hunter had
not been sufficiently counted with. Hunter had previously shown much
sympathy for the Indians in their distress[156] and also a realization
of the strategic importance

[Footnote 155: (cont.) [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67,
p. 107]. Dole had been forwarned of their intention to appear in
Washington by the following letter:

FORT LEAVENWORTH KAN., Nov. 23rd 1861.
HON WM.P. DOLE, Com. Indian Affs.

Sir: On my arrival in St. Louis I found Gen'l Hunter at the Planters
House and delivered the message to him that you had placed in my hands
for that purpose. He seemed fully satisfied with your letter and has
acted on it accordingly. I recd from Gen'l Hunter a letter for Mr.
Cutler, and others of this place, all of which I have delivered.
Having found Cutler here, he having been ordered by Lane to move the
council from Leroy to Fort Scott. But from some cause (which I have
not learned) he has brought the chiefs all here to the Fort, where
they are now quartered awaiting the arrival of Gen'l Hunter. He has
with him six of the head chiefs of the Creek, Seminole and Cherokee
Nations, and tells me that they are strong for the Union. He also says
that John Ross (Cherokee) is all right but dare not let it be known,
and that he will be here if he can get away from the tribe.

These chiefs all say they want to fight for the Union, and that they
will do so if they can get arms and ammunition. Gen'l Hunter has
ordered me to await his arrival here at which time he will council
with these men, and report to you the result. I think he will be
here on Tuesday or Wednesday. Cutler wants to take the Indians to
Washington, but I advised him not to do so until I could hear from
you. When I met him here he was on his way there.

You had better write to him here as soon as you get this, or you will
see him there pretty soon.

I have nothing more to write now but will write in a day or two.

Yours Truly R.W. DOLE.

P.S. Coffin is at home sick, but will be here soon. Branch is at St.
Joe but would not come over with me, cause, too buissie to attend to

[Indian Office Special Files, no 201, _Southern Superintendency_,
D 410 of 1861].]

[Footnote 156: In part proof of this take his letter to
Adjutant-general Thomas, January 15, 1862.

"On my arrival here in November last I telegraphed for permission to

of Indian Territory. Some other explanation, therefore, must be found
for the opposition he advanced to Lane's project as soon as it was
brought to his notice. It had been launched without his approval
having been explicitly sought and almost under false pretences.[157]
Then, too, Lane's bumptiousness, after he had accomplished his object,
was naturally very irritating. But, far above every other reason,
personal or professional, that Hunter had for objecting to a command
conducted by Lane was the identical one that Halleck,[158] Robinson,
and many another shared with him, a wholesome repugnance to such
marauding[159] as Lane had permitted his men to indulge in in the
autumn. It was to be feared that Indians under Lane would inevitably
revert to savagery. There would be no one to put any restraint upon
them and their natural instincts would be given free play. Conceivably
then, it was not mere supersensitiveness and pettiness of spirit that
moved General Hunter to take exception to Lane's appointment but
regard for the honor of his profession, perchance, also, a certain
feeling of personal dignity that

[Footnote 156: (cont.) muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the
service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in
maintaining their loyalty. Had this permission been promptly granted,
I have every reason to believe that the present disastrous state of
affairs, in the Indian country west of Arkansas, could have been
avoided. I now again respectfully repeat my request."--Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 157: To the references given in Abel, _The American Indian
as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, add Thomas to Hunter, January 24,
1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 525.]

[Footnote 158: The St. Louis _Republican_ credited Halleck with
characterizing Hunter's command, indiscriminately, as "marauders,
bandits, and outlaws" [_Daily Conservative_, February 7, 1862].
In a letter to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, Halleck said some pretty
plain truths about Lane [_Official Records_, vol. vii, 532-533].
He would probably have had the same objection to the use of
Indians that he had to the use of negroes in warfare [_Daily
Conservative_, May 23, 1862, quoting from the Chicago

[Footnote 159: On marauding by Lane's brigade, see McClellan to
Stanton, February 11, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii,

legitimately resented executive interference with his rights. His
protest had its effect and he was informed that it was entirely within
his prerogative to lead the expedition southward himself. He resolved
to do it. Lane was, for once, outwitted.

The end, however, was not yet. About the middle of January, Stanton
became Secretary of War and soon let it be known that he, too, had
views on the subject of Indian enlistment. As a matter of fact, he
refused to countenance it.[160] The disappointment was the most keen
for Commissioner Dole. Since long before the day when Secretary Smith
had announced[161] to him that the Department of War was contemplating
the employment of four thousand Indians in its service, he had hoped
for some means of rescuing the southern tribes from the Confederate
alliance and now all plans had come to naught. And yet the need
for strenuous action of some sort had never been so great.[162]
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and his defeated followers were refugees on the
Verdigris, imploring help to relieve their present

[Footnote 160: Note this series of telegrams [Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, D 576 of 1862]:

"Secretary of War is unwilling to put Indians in the army. Is to
consult with President and settle it today."--SMITH to Dole, February
6, 1862.

"President cant attend to business now. Sickness in the family. No
arrangements can be made now. Make necessary arrangements for relief
of Indians. I will send communication to Congress today."--Same to
Same, February 11, 1862.

"Go on and supply the destitute Indians. Congress will supply the
means. War Department will not organize them."--Same to Same, February
14, 1862.]

[Footnote 161: Smith to Dole, January 3, 1862 [Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Central Superintendency_, I 531 of 1862;
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 150].]

[Footnote 162: On the second of January, Agent Cutler wired from
Leavenworth to Dole, "Heopothleyohola with four thousand warriors is
in the field and needs help badly. Secession Creeks are deserting him.
Hurry up Lane."--Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1443 of 1862.]

necessities and to enable them to return betimes to their own
country.[163] Moreover, Indians of northern antecedents and sympathies
were exhibiting unwonted enthusiasm for the cause[164] and it seemed
hard to have to repel them. Dole was, nevertheless, compelled to do
it. On the eleventh of February, he countermanded the orders he had
issued to Superintendent Coffin and thus a temporary quietus was put
upon the whole affair of the Indian Expedition.

[Footnote 163: Their plea was expressed most strongly in the course of
an interview which Dole had with representatives of the Loyal Creeks
and Seminoles, Iowas and Delawares, February 1, 1862. Robert Burbank,
the Iowa agent, was there. White Cloud acted as interpreter [_Daily
Conservative_, February 2, 1862].]

[Footnote 164: Some of these had been provoked to a desire for war by
the inroads of Missourians. Weas, Piankeshaws, Peorias, and Miamies,
awaiting the return of Dole from the interior of Kansas, said,
"they were for peace but the Missourians had not left them alone"
[Ibid., February 9, 1862].]


The thing that would most have justified the military employment of
Indians by the United States government, in the winter of 1862, was
the fact that hundreds and thousands of their southern brethren were
then refugees because of their courageous and unswerving devotion to
the American Union. The tale of those refugees, of their wanderings,
their deprivations, their sufferings, and their wrongs, comparable
only to that of the Belgians in the Great European War of 1914, is
one of the saddest to relate, and one of the most disgraceful, in the
history of the War of Secession, in its border phase.

The first in the long procession of refugees were those of the army
of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la who, after their final defeat by Colonel James
McIntosh in the Battle of Chustenahlah, December 26, 1861, had fled up
the valley of the Verdigris River and had entered Kansas near Walnut
Creek. In scattered lines, with hosts of stragglers, the enfeebled,
the aged, the weary, and the sick, they had crossed the Cherokee Strip
and the Osage Reservation and, heading steadily towards the northeast,
had finally encamped on the outermost edge of the New York Indian
Lands, on Fall River, some sixty odd miles west of Humboldt. Those
lands, never having been accepted as an equivalent for their Wisconsin
holdings by the Iroquois, were not occupied throughout their entire
extent by Indians and only here and there

encroached upon by white intruders, consequently the impoverished
and greatly fatigued travellers encountered no obstacles in settling
themselves down to rest and to wait for a much needed replenishment of
their resources.

Their coming was expected. On their way northward, they had fallen
in, at some stage of the journey, with some buffalo hunters, Sacs and
Foxes of the Mississippi, returning to their reservation, which lay
some distance north of Burlington and chiefly in present Osage County,
Kansas. To them the refugees reported their recent tragic experience.
The Sacs and Foxes were most sympathetic and, after relieving the
necessities of the refugees as best they could, hurried on ahead,
imparting the news, in their turn, to various white people whom they
met. In due course it reached General Denver, still supervising
affairs in Kansas, and William G. Coffin, the southern
superintendent.[165] It was the first time, since his appointment the
spring before, that Coffin had had any prospect of getting in touch
with any considerable number of his charges and he must have welcomed
the chance of now really earning his salary. He ordered all of the
agents under him--and some[166] of them had not previously entered
officially upon their duties--to assemble at Fort Roe, on the
Verdigris, and be prepared to take charge of their

[Footnote 165: These facts were obtained chiefly from a letter, not
strictly accurate as to some of its details, written by Superintendent
Coffin to Dole, January 15, 1862 [Indian Office Special Files, no.
201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1474 of 1862].]

[Footnote 166: For instance, William P. Davis, who had been appointed
Seminole Agent, despairing of ever reaching his post, had gone into
the army [Dole to John S. Davis of New Albany, Indiana, April 5, 1862,
Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, p. 39]. George C. Snow of
Parke County, Indiana, was appointed in his stead [Dole to Snow,
January 13, 1862, Ibid., no. 67, p. 243].]

several contingents; for the refugees, although chiefly Creeks, were
representative of nearly every one of the non-indigenous tribes of
Indian Territory.

It is not an easy matter to say, with any show of approach to exact
figures, how many the refugees numbered.[167] For weeks and weeks,
they were almost continually coming in and even the very first reports
bear suspicious signs of the exaggeration that became really notorious
as graft and peculation entered more and more into the reckoning.
Apparently, all those who, in ever so slight a degree, handled the
relief funds, except, perhaps, the army men, were interested in
making the numbers appear as large as possible. The larger the need
represented, the larger the sum that might, with propriety, be
demanded and the larger the opportunity for graft. Settlers, traders,
and some government agents were, in this respect, all culpable

There was no possibility of mistake, however, intentional or
otherwise, about the destitution of the refugees. It was inconceivably
horrible. The winter weather of late December and early January had
been most inclement and the Indians had trudged through it, over
snow-covered, rocky, trailless places and desolate prairie, nigh three
hundred miles. When they started out, they were not any too well
provided with clothing; for they had departed in a hurry, and, before
they got to Fall River, not a few of them were absolutely naked. They
had practically no tents, no bed-coverings, and no provisions. Dr.
A.B. Campbell, a surgeon sent out by General Hunter,[168] had reached

[Footnote 167: Compare the statistics given in the following:
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1861, p. 151; 1862,
pp. 137, 157; Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1525 of 1862; General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1602 of 1862.]

[Footnote 168: The army furnished the first relief that reached them.
In its issue (cont.)]

towards the end of January and their condition was then so bad, so
wretched that it was impossible for him to depict it. Prairie grasses
were "their only protection from the snow" upon which they were
lying "and from the wind and weather scraps and rags stretched upon
switches." Ho-go-bo-foh-yah, the second Creek chief, was ill with a
fever and "his tent (to give it that name) was no larger than a small
blanket stretched over a switch ridge pole, two feet from the ground,
and did not reach it by a foot from the ground on either side of
him." Campbell further said that the refugees were greatly in need of
medical assistance. They were suffering "with inflammatory diseases
of the chest, throat, and eyes." Many had "their toes frozen off,"
others, "their feet wounded." But few had "either shoes or moccasins."
Dead horses were lying around in every direction and the sanitary
conditions were so bad that the food was contaminated and the
newly-arriving refugees became sick as soon as they ate.[169]

Other details of their destitution were furnished by Coffin's son
who was acting as his clerk and who was among the first to attempt
alleviation of their misery.[170] As far as relief went, however, the
supply was so out of proportion to the demand that there was never
any time that spring when it could be said that they were fairly
comfortable and their ordinary wants satisfied. Campbell frankly
admitted that he "selected the nakedest of the naked" and doled out to
them the few articles he

[Footnote 168: (cont.) of January 18, 1862, the _Daily
Conservative_ has this to say: "The Kansas Seventh has been ordered
to move to Humboldt, Allen Co. to give relief to Refugees encamped on
Fall River. Lt. Col. Chas. T. Clark, 1st Battalion, Kansas Tenth, is
now at Humboldt and well acquainted with the conditions."]

[Footnote 169: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
pp. 151-152.]

[Footnote 170: O.S. Coffin to William G. Coffin, January 26, 1862,
Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_,
C 1506 of 1862.]

had. When all was gone, how pitiful it must have been for him to see
the "hundreds of anxious faces" for whom there was nothing! Captain
Turner, from Hunter's commissary department, had similar experiences.
According to him, the refugees were "in want of every necessary of
life." That was his report the eleventh of February.[171] On the
fifteenth of February, the army stopped giving supplies altogether
and the refugees were thrown back entirely upon the extremely limited
resources of the southern superintendency.

Dole[172] had had warning from Hunter[173] that such would have to
be the case and had done his best to be prepared for the emergency.
Secretary Smith authorized expenditure for relief in advance of
congressional appropriation, but that simply increased the moral
obligation to practice economy and, with hundreds of loyal Indians on
the brink of starvation,[174] it was no

[Footnote 171: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
pp. 152-154.]

[Footnote 172: Dole had an interview with the Indians immediately upon
his arrival in Kansas [Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. iv, 59-60,
Doc. 21].]

[Footnote 173: Hunter to Dole, February 6, 1862, forwarded by Edward
Wolcott to Mix, February 10, 1862 [Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, W 513 and D 576 of 1862;
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 150].]

[Footnote 174: Agent G.C. Snow reported, February 13, 1862, on the
utter destitution of the Seminoles [Indian Office General
Files, _Seminole_, 1858-1869] and, on the same day, Coffin
[Ibid., _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1526] to
the same effect about the refugees as a whole. They were coming in,
he said, about twenty to sixty a day. The "destitution, misery and
suffering amongst them is beyond the power of any pen to portray, it
must be seen to be realised--there are now here over two thousand men,
women, and children entirely barefooted and more than that number that
have not rags enough to hide their nakedness, many have died and they
are constantly dying. I should think at a rough guess that from 12 to
15 hundred dead Ponies are laying around in the camp and in the river.
On this account so soon as the weather gets a little warm, a removal
of this camp will be indespensable, there are perhaps now two thousand
Ponies living, they are very poor and many of them must die before
grass comes which we expect here from the first to the 10th of March.
We are issuing a little corn to (cont.)]

time for economy. The inadequacy of the Indian service and the
inefficiency of the Federal never showed up more plainly, to the utter
discredit of the nation, than at this period and in this connection.

Besides getting permission from Secretary Smith to go ahead and supply
the more pressing needs of the refugees, Dole accomplished another
thing greatly to their interest. He secured from the staff of General
Lane a special agent, Dr. William Kile of Illinois,[175] who
had formerly been a business partner of his own[176] and, like
Superintendent Coffin, his more or less intimate friend. Kile's
particular duty as special agent was to be the purchasing of supplies
for the refugees[177] and he at once visited their encampment in order
the better to determine their requirements. His investigations more
than corroborated the earlier accounts of their sufferings and
privations and his appointment under the circumstances seemed fully
justified, notwithstanding that on the surface of things it appeared
very suggestive of a near approach to nepotism, and of nepotism Dole,
Coffin, and many others were unquestionably guilty. They worked into
the service just as many of their own relatives and friends as they
conveniently and safely could. The official pickings were considered
by them as their proper perquisites. "'Twas ever thus" in American
politics, city, county, state, and national.

The Indian encampment upon the occasion of

[Footnote 174: (cont.) the Indians and they are feeding them a
little...." See also Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. iv, 30.]

[Footnote 175: Dole was from Illinois also, from Edgar County; Coffin
was from Indiana [Indian Office Miscellaneous Records, no. 8, p.

[Footnote 176: _Daily Conservative_, February 8, 1862.]

[Footnote 177: Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, D 576 of 1862; _Letter Book_, no. 67, pp.

Kile's[178] visit was no longer on Fall River. Gradually, since first
discovered, the main body of the refugees had moved forward within the
New York Indian Lands to the Verdigris River and had halted in the
neighborhood of Fort Roe, where the government agents had received
them; but smaller or larger groups, chiefly of the sick and their
friends, were scattered all along the way from Walnut Creek.[179] Some
of the very belated exiles were as far westward as the Arkansas, over
a hundred miles distant. Obviously, the thing to do first was to get
them all together in one place. There were reasons why the Verdigris
Valley was a most desirable location for the refugees. Only a very few
white people were settled there and, as they were intruders and had
not a shadow of legal claim to the land upon which they had squatted,
any objections that they might make to the presence of the Indians
could be ignored.[180]

For a few days, therefore, all efforts were directed, at large
expense, towards converting the Verdigris Valley, in the vicinity of
Fort Roe, into a concentration camp; but no precautions were taken
against allowing unhygienic conditions to arise. The Indians
themselves were much diseased. They had few opportunities for personal
cleanliness and less ambition. Some of the food doled out to them was
stuff that the army had condemned and rejected as unfit for use. They
were emaciated, sick, discouraged. Finally, with

[Footnote 178: Indian Office Land Files, 1855-1870, _Southern
Superintendency_, K 107 of 1862.]

[Footnote 179: Some had wandered to the Cottonwood and were camped
there in great destitution. Their chief food was hominy [_Daily
Conservative_, February 14, 1862].]

[Footnote 180: For an account of the controversy over the settlement
of the New York Indian Lands, see Abel, _Indian Reservations in
Kansas and the Extinguishment of their Title_, 13-14.]

the February thaw, came a situation that soon proved intolerable. The
"stench arising from dead ponies, about two hundred of which were
in the stream and throughout the camp,"[181] unburied, made removal
imperatively necessary.

The Neosho Valley around about Leroy presented itself as a likely
place, very convenient for the distributing agents, and was next
selected. Its advantages and disadvantages seemed about equal and had
all been anticipated and commented upon by Captain Turner.[182] It
was near the source of supplies--and that was an item very much to
be considered, since transportation charges, extraordinarily high in
normal times were just now exorbitant, and the relief funds very, very
limited. No appropriation by Congress had yet been made although one
had been applied for.[183] The great disadvantage of the location was
the presence of white settlers and they objected, as well they might,
to the near proximity of the inevitable disease and filth and,
strangely enough, more than anything else, to the destruction of the
timber, which they had so carefully husbanded. The concentration on
the Neosho had not been fully accomplished when the pressure from the
citizens became so great that Superintendent Coffin felt obliged to
plan for yet another removal. Again the sympathy of the Sacs and
Foxes of Mississippi manifested itself and most opportunely. Their

[Footnote 181: Annual Report of Superintendent Coffin, October 15,
1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 136.
Compare with Coffin's account given in a letter to Dole, February 13,

[Footnote 182: February 11, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
_Report_, 1862, p. 153; Indian Office Special Files, no. 201,
_Southern Superintendency_, D 576 of 1862.]

[Footnote 183: _Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second
session, part I, pp. 815, 849. Dole's letter to Smith, January 31,
1862, describing the destitution of the refugees, was read in the
Senate, February 14, 1862, in support of joint resolution S. no. 49,
for their relief.]

lay about twenty-five miles to the northward and they generously
offered it as an asylum.[184] But the Indians balked. They were
homesick, disgusted with official mismanagement[185] and indecision,
and determined to go no farther. They complained bitterly of the
treatment that they had received at the hands of Superintendent Coffin
and of Agent Cutler and, in a stirring appeal[186] to President
Lincoln, set forth their injuries, their grievances, and
their incontestable claim upon a presumably just and merciful

The Indians were not alone in their rebellious attitude. There was
mutiny seething, or something very like it, within the ranks of the
agents.[188] E.H. Carruth

[Footnote 184: Coffin to Dole, March 28, 1862 [Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1565 of 1862].]

[Footnote 185: Mismanagement there most certainly had been. In no
other way can the fact that there was absolutely no amelioration in
their condition be accounted for. Many documents that will be cited in
other connections prove this point and Collamore's letter is of itself
conclusive. George W. Collamore, known best by his courtesy title of
"General," went to Kansas in the critical years before the war under
circumstances, well and interestingly narrated in Stearns' _Life and
Public Services of George Luther Stearns_, 106-108. He had been
agent for the New England Relief Society in the year of the great
drouth, 1860-1861 [_Daily Conservative_, October 26, 1861] and
had had much to do with Lane, in whose interests he labored, and who
had planned to make him a brigadier under himself as major-general
[Stearns, 246, 251]. He became quartermaster-general of Kansas
[_Daily Conservative_, March 27, 1862] and in that capacity made,
in the company of the Reverend Evan Jones, a visit of inspection to
the refugee encampment. His discoveries were depressing [Ibid.,
April 10, 1862]. His report to the government [Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1602 of 1862] is
printed almost _verbatim_ in Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
_Report_, 1862, 155-158.]

[Footnote 186: Coffin's letter to Dole of April 21, 1862 [Indian
Office General Files, _Wichita_, 1862-1871, C 1601 of 1862] seems
to cast doubt upon the genuineness of some of the signatures attached
to this appeal and charges Agent Carruth with having been concerned in
making the Indians discontented.]

[Footnote 187: Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and other prominent refugees
addressed their complaints to Dole, March 29, 1862 [Indian Office Land
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870, O 43 of 1862] and
two days later to President Lincoln, some strong partisan, supposed by
Coffin to be Carruth, acting as scribe.]

[Footnote 188: On the way to the Catholic Mission, whither he was
going in order (cont.)]

who had been so closely associated with Lane in the concoction of the
first plan for the recovery of Indian Territory, was now figuring as
the promoter of a rising sentiment against Coffin and his minions, who
were getting to be pretty numerous. The removal to the Sac and Fox
reservation would mean the getting into closer and closer touch with
Perry Fuller,[189] the contractor, whose dealings in connection with
the Indian refugees were to become matter, later on, of a notoriety
truly disgraceful. Mistrust of Coffin was yet, however, very vague in
expression and the chief difficulty in effecting the removal from the
Neosho lay, therefore, in the disgruntled state of the refugees,
which was due, in part, to their unalleviated misery and, in part, to

[Footnote 188: (cont.) to coöperate with Agent Elder in negotiating
with the Osages, Coffin heard of "a sneaking conspiracy" that was "on
foot at Iola for the purpose of prejudicing the Indians against us
[himself and Dole, perhaps, or possibly himself and the agents]."
The plotters, so Coffin reported, "sent over the Verdigris for E.H.
Carruth who" was "deep in the plot," which was a scheme to induce the
Indians to lodge complaint against the distributers of relief. One of
the conspirators was a man who had studied law under Lane and who had
wanted a position under Kile. Lane had used his influence in the man's
behalf and the refusal of Coffin to assign him to a position was
supposed to be the cause of all the trouble. Coffin learned that
his enemies had even gone so far as to plan vacancies in the Indian
service and to fill them. They had "instructed Lane, Pomeroy, and
Conway accordingly," leaving graciously to Lane the choice of
superintendent. A Mr. Smith, correspondent of the Cincinnati
_Gazette_ was their accredited secretary [Coffin to Dole,
April 2, 1862, Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1571 of 1862].

Further particulars of the disaffection came to Coffin's ears before
long and he recounted them to Dole in a letter of April 9, 1862
[Ibid., General Files, _Southern Superintendency_,

[Footnote 189: Perry Fuller had been in Kansas since 1854 [U.S.
House _Reports_, 34th congress, first session, no. 200, p. 8 of
"Testimony"]. The first time that his name is intimately used in the
correspondence, relative to the affairs of the refugees, is in a
letter from Kile to Dole, March 29, 1862 [Indian Office Consolidated
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, K 113 of 1862, which also
makes mention of the great unwillingness of the Indians to move to the
Sac and Fox reservation.]]

tribal discord. There was a quarrel among them over leadership, the
election of Ock-tah-har-sas Harjo as principal chief having
aroused strong antagonistic feeling among the friends of
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la.[190] Moreover, dissatisfaction against their agent
steadily increased and they asked for the substitution of Carruth; but
he, being satisfied with his assignment to the Wichitas,[191] had no
wish to change.[192]

[Footnote 190: Carruth gave particulars of this matter to Dole, April
20, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Wichita_, 1862-1871, C
1601 of 1862].]

[Footnote 191: Dole to Carruth, March 18, 1862 [Indian Office
_Letter Book_, no. 67, pp. 493-494].]

[Footnote 192: Carruth to Dole, April 10, 1862 [Ibid.,
General Files, _Wichita_, 1862-1871, C 1588 of 1862; _Letters
Registered_, vol. 58].]


Among the manifold requests put forward by the refugees, none was so
insistent, none so dolefully sincere, as the one for means to return
home. It is a mistake to suppose that the Indian, traditionally
laconic and stoical, is without family affection and without that
noblest of human sentiments, love of country. The United States
government has, indeed, proceeded upon the supposition that he is
destitute of emotions, natural to his more highly civilized white
brother, but its files are full to overflowing with evidences to the
contrary. Everywhere among them the investigator finds the exile's
lament. The red man has been banished so often from familiar and
greatly loved scenes that it is a wonder he has taken root anywhere
and yet he has. Attachment to the places where the bones of his people
lie is with him the most constant of experiences and his cry for those
same sacred places is all the stronger and the more sorrowful because
it has been persistently ignored by the white man.

The southern Indians had not been so very many years in the Indian
Territory, most of them not more than the span of one generation, but
Indian Territory was none the less home. If the refugees could only
get there again, they were confident all would be well with them. In
Kansas, they were hungry, afflicted with disease, and dying daily by
the score.[193] Once at home

[Footnote 193: And yet they did have their amusements. Their days of
exile were not filled altogether with bitterness. Coffin, in a letter
to the (cont.)]

all the ills of the flesh would disappear and lost friends be
recovered. The exodus had separated them cruelly from each other.
There were family and tribal encampments within the one large
encampment,[194] it is true, but there were also widely isolated
groups, scattered indiscriminately across two hundred miles of bleak
and lonely prairie, and no amount of philanthropic effort on the part
of the government agents could mitigate the misery arising therefrom
or bring the groups together. The task had been early abandoned as,
under the circumstances, next to impossible; but the refugees went on
begging for its accomplishment, notwithstanding that they had
neither the physical strength nor the means to render any assistance
themselves. Among them the wail of the bereaved vied in tragic cadence
with the sad inquiry for the missing.

When Dole arrived at Leavenworth the latter part of January,
representatives of the loyal Indians interviewed him and received
assurances, honest and well-meant at the time given, that an early
return to Indian Territory would be made possible. Lane, likewise
interviewed,[195] was similarly encouraging and had every reason to
be; for was not his Indian brigade in process of formation? Much
cheered and even exhilarated in spirit, the Indians went away to
endure and to wait. They had great confidence in Lane's power to
accomplish; but, as the days and the weeks passed and he did not come,
they grew tired of waiting. The waiting

[Footnote 193: (cont.) _Daily Conservative_, published April 16,
1862, gives, besides a rather gruesome account of their diseases, some
interesting details of their camp life.]

[Footnote 194: On their division into tribal encampments, see Kile
to Dole, April 10, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862, K 119 of 1862].]

[Footnote 195: They had their interview with Lane at the Planters'
House while they were awaiting the arrival of Dole. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la
(Crazy Dog) and a Seminole chief, Aluktustenuke (Major Potatoes) were
among them [_Daily Conservative_, January 28, February 8, 1862].]


seemed so hopeless to them miserable, so endlessly long. Primitive as
they were, they simply could not understand why the agents of a great
government could not move more expeditiously. The political and
military aspects of the undertaking, involved in their return home,
were unknown to them and, if known, would have been uncomprehended.
Then, too, the vacillation of the government puzzled them. They became
suspicious; for they had become acquainted, through the experience of
long years, with the white man's bad faith and they had nothing to go
upon that would counteract the influence of earlier distrust. And so
it happened, that, as the weary days passed and Lane's brigade did not
materialize, every grievance that loomed up before them took the shape
of a disappointed longing for home.

So poignant was their grief at the continued delay that they despaired
of ever getting the help promised and began to consider how they could
contrive a return for themselves. And yet, quite independent of Lane's
brigade, there had been more than one movement initiated in their
behalf. The desire to recover lost ground in Indian Territory, under
the pretext of restoring the fugitives, aroused the fighting instinct
of many young men in southern Kansas and several irregular expeditions
were projected.[196] Needless to say they came to nothing. In point of
fact, they never really developed, but died almost with the thought.
There was no adequate equipment for them and the longer the delay,
the more necessary became equipment; because after the Battle of Pea
Ridge, Pike's brigade had been set free to operate, if it so willed,
on the Indian Territory border.

[Footnote 196: In addition to those referred to in documents already
cited, the one, projected by Coffin's son and a Captain Brooks, is
noteworthy. It is described in a letter from Coffin to Dole, March 24,

Closely following upon the Federal success of March 6 to 8, came
numerous changes and readjustments in the Missouri-Kansas commands;
but they were not so much the result of that success as they were
a part of the general reorganization that was taking place in the
Federal service incident to the more efficient war administration of
Secretary Stanton. By order of March 11, three military departments
were arranged for, the Department of the Potomac under McClellan,
that of the Mountain under Frémont, and that of the Mississippi under
Halleck. The consolidation of Hunter's Department of Kansas with
Halleck's Department of Missouri was thus provided for and had long
been a consummation devoutly to be wished.[197] Both were naturally
parts of the same organic whole when regarded from a military point
of view. Neither could be operated upon independently of the other.
Moreover, both were infested by political vultures. In both, the army
discipline was, in consequence, bad; that is, if it could be said to
be in existence at all. If anything, Kansas was in a worse state than
Missouri. Her condition, as far as the military forces were concerned,
had not much improved since Hunter first took command and it was then
about the worst that could possibly be imagined. Major Halpine's
description[198] of it, made by him in his capacity as assistant
adjutant-general, officially to Halleck, is anything but flattering.
Hunter was probably well rid of his job and Halleck, whom Lincoln much
admired because he was "wholly for the service,"[199] had asked for
the entire command.[200]

[Footnote 197: Halleck, however, had not desired the inclusion of
Kansas in the contemplated new department because he thought that
state had only a remote connection with present operations.]

[Footnote 198: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 615-617.]

[Footnote 199: Thayer, _Life and Letters of John Hay_, vol. i,

[Footnote 200: Badeau, _Military History of U.S. Grant_, vol. i,
53, _footnote_.]

Halleck's plans for remodeling the constituent elements of his
department were made with a thorough comprehension of the difficulties
confronting him. It is not surprising that they brought General Denver
again to the fore. Hunter's troubles had been bred by local politics.
That Halleck well knew; but he also knew that Indian relations were a
source of perplexity and that there was no enemy actually in Kansas
and no enemy worth considering that would threaten her, provided her
own jay-hawking hordes could be suppressed. Her problems were chiefly
administrative.[201] For the work to be done, Denver seemed the
fittest man available and, on the nineteenth, he, having previously
been ordered to report to Halleck for duty,[202] was assigned[203] to
the command of a newly-constituted District of Kansas, from which
the troops,[204] who were guarding the only real danger zone,
the southeastern part of the state, were expressly excluded. The
hydra-headed evil of the western world then asserted itself, the
meddling, particularistic spoils system, with the result that Lane and
Pomeroy, unceasingly vigilant whenever and wherever what they regarded
as their preserves were likely to be encroached upon, went to
President Lincoln and protested against the preferment of Denver.[205]
Lincoln weakly yielded and wired to Halleck to suspend

[Footnote 201: Halleck to Stanton, March 28, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 202:--Ibid., 612]

[Footnote 203:--Ibid., 832.]

[Footnote 204: Those troops, about five thousand, were left under
the command of George W. Deitzler, colonel of the First Kansas
(Ibid., 614), a man who had become prominent before the war in
connection with the Sharpe's rifles episode (Spring, _Kansas_,
60) and whose appointment as an Indian agent, early in 1861, had been
successfully opposed by Lane (Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 458).
There will be other occasions to refer to him in this narrative. He is
believed to have held the secret that induced Lane to commit suicide
in 1866 [Ibid., 457-460].]

[Footnote 205: Stanton to Halleck, March 26, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516].]

the order for Denver's assignment to duty until further notice.[206]
Stanton, to whom Halleck applied[207] for an explanation,
deprecated[208] the political interference of the Kansas senators and
the influence it had had with the chief executive, but he, too, had to
give way. So effective was the Lane-Pomeroy objection to Denver that
even a temporary[209] appointment of him, resorted[210] to by Halleck
because of the urgent need of some sort of a commander in Kansas, was
deplored by the president.[211] Denver was then sent to the place
where his abilities and his experience would be better appreciated, to
the southernmost part of the state, the hinterland of the whole Indian
country.[212] Official indecision and personal envy pursued him
even there, however, and it was not long before he was called
eastward.[213] The man who succeeded him in command of the District of
Kansas[214] was one who proved to be his ranking officer[215] and his
rival, Brigadier-general S.D. Sturgis. Blunt succeeded him at Fort

[Footnote 206: Lincoln to Halleck, March 21, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516.]

[Footnote 207: Halleck to Stanton, March 26, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 208: "Deprecated" is, perhaps, too mild a word to describe
Stanton's feeling in the matter. Adjutant-general Hitchcock is
authority for the statement that Stanton threatened "to leave the
office" should the "enforcement" of any such order, meaning the
non-assignment of Denver and the appointment of a man named Davis
[Davies?], believed by Robinson to be a relative of Lane [_Kansas
Conflict_, 446], be attempted [Hitchcock to Halleck, March 22,
1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 832-833].]

[Footnote 209:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 210:--Ibid., vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 211:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 212: Concerning the work, mapped out for Denver, see Halleck
to Sturgis, April 6, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 668]
and Halleck to Stanton, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., 672].]

[Footnote 213: May 14, 1862 [Ibid., vol. iii, part i,
supplement, 249].]

[Footnote 214:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 520.]

[Footnote 215: "It is stated that the commission of Gen. Sturgis is
dated April 10 and that of Gen. Denver Aug. 14 and consequently Gen.
Sturgis is the ranking officer in this military District."--_Daily
Conservative_, April 10, 1862.]

The elimination of Kansas as a separate department marked the revival
of interest in an Indian expedition. The cost of supporting so huge
a body of refugees had really become a serious proposition and, as
Colonel C. R. Jennison[216] had once remarked, it would be economy to
enlist them.[217] Congress had provided that certain Indian annuity
money might be diverted to their maintenance,[218] but that fund was
practically exhausted before the middle of March.[219] As already
observed, the refugees very much wished to assist in the recovery of
Indian Territory.[220] In fact they were determined to go south if the
army went and their disappointment was likely to be most keen in the
event of its and their not going.[221] It was under circumstances such
as these that Commissioner Dole recommended to Secretary Smith, March
13, 1862, that he

  Procure an order from the War Department detailing two
  Regiment of Volunteers from Kansas to go with the Indians
  to their homes and to remain there for their protection as long
  (as) may be necessary, also to furnish two thousand stand of
  arms and ammunition to be placed in the hands of the loyal

Dole's unmistakable earnestness carried the day. Within less than a
week there had been promised[222] him all that he had asked for and
more, an

[Footnote 216: Jennison, so says the _Daily Conservative_,
March 25, 1862, had been ordered with the First Cavalry to repair to
Humboldt at the time the Indian Expedition was under consideration the
first of the year and was brevetted acting brigadier for the purpose
of furthering Dole's intentions.]

[Footnote 217: _Daily Conservative_, February 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 218: _Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second
session, part i, 835, 878.]

[Footnote 219: Dole to Smith, March 13, 1862 [Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 331-332].]

[Footnote 220: Coffin to Dole, March 3, 1862 [Ibid.,
Consolidated Files, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1544 of 1862;
_Letters Registered_, no. 58].]

[Footnote 221: _Daily Conservative_, March 5, 1862.]

[Footnote 222: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

expeditionary force of two white regiments and two[223] thousand
Indians, appropriately armed. To expedite matters and to obviate any
difficulties that might otherwise beset the carrying out of the plan,
a semi-confidential agent, on detail from the Indian Office, was sent
west with despatches[224] to Halleck and with an order[225] from the
Ordnance Department for the delivery, at Fort Leavenworth, of the
requisite arms. The messenger was Judge James Steele, who, upon
reaching St. Louis, had already discouraging news to report to Dole.
He had interviewed Halleck and had found him in anything but a helpful
mood, notwithstanding that he must, by that time, have received and
reflected upon the following communication from the War Department:


WASHINGTON CITY, D. C, March 19, 1862.

Commanding the Department of Mississippi:

General: It is the desire of the President, on the application of the
Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that
you should detail two regiments to act in the Indian country, with a
view to open the way for the friendly Indians who are now refugees in
Southern Kansas to return to their homes and to protect them there.
Five thousand friendly Indians will also be armed to aid in their
own protection, and you will please furnish them with necessary

Please report your action in the premises to this Department. Prompt
action is necessary.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-general[226]

[Footnote 223: Two thousand was most certainly the number, although
the communication from the War Department gives it as five.]

[Footnote 224: Dole to Halleck, March 21, 1862 [Indian Office
_Letter Book_, no. 67, 516-517].]

[Footnote 225:--Ibid., 517-518.]

[Footnote 226: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 624-625.]

Steele inferred from what passed at the interview with Halleck that
the commanding general was decidedly opposed to arming Indians. Steele
found him also non-committal as to when the auxiliary force would be
available.[227] Dole's letter, with its seeming dictation as to
the choice of a commander for the expedition, may not have been to
Halleck's liking. He was himself at the moment most interested in the
suppression of guerrillas and jayhawkers, against whom sentence of
outlawry had just been passed. As it happened, that was the work in
which Dole's nominee, Colonel Robert B. Mitchell,[228] was to render
such signal service[229] and, anticipating as much, Halleck may have
objected to his being thought of for other things. Furthermore, Dole
had no right to so much as cast a doubt upon Halleck's own ability to
select a proper commander.

A little perplexed but not at all daunted by Halleck's lack of
cordiality, Steele proceeded on his journey and, arriving at
Leavenworth, presented his credentials to Captain McNutt, who was in
charge of the arsenal. Four hundred Indian rifles were at hand, ready
for him, and others expected.[230] What to do next, was the question?
Should he go on to Leroy and trust to the auxiliary force's showing up
in season or wait for it? The principal part of his mission was yet
to be executed. The Indians had to be enrolled and everything got in
train for their expedition southward. Their homes

[Footnote 227: Steele to Dole, March 27, 1862 [Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862, S 537 of 1862].]

[Footnote 228: Robert B. Mitchell was colonel, first of the Second
Kansas Infantry, then of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He raised the
former, in answer to President Lincoln's first call, 1861 [Crawford,
_Kansas in the Sixties_, 20], chiefly in Linn County, and the
latter in 1862.]

[Footnote 229: Connelley, _Quantrilt and the Border Wars_, 236

[Footnote 230: Steele to Dole, March 26, 1862 [Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862].]

once recovered, they were to be left in such shape as to be able to
"protect and defend themselves."[231]

Halleck's preoccupation, prejudice, or whatever it was that prevented
him from giving any satisfaction to Steele soon yielded, as all
things sooner or later must, to necessity; but not to the extent of
sanctioning the employment of Indians in warfare except as against
other "Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes." The
Pea Ridge atrocities were probably still fresh in his mind. On the
fifth of April, he instructed[232] General Denver with a view to
advancing, at last, the organization of the Indian expedition and
Denver, Coffin, and Steele forthwith exerted all their energies in
coöperating effort[233]. Some time was spent in inspecting arms[234]
but, on the eighth, enough for two thousand Indians went forward in
the direction of Leroy and Humboldt[235] and on the sixteenth were
delivered to the superintendent[236]. Coffin surmised that new
complications would arise as soon as the distribution began; for all
the Indians, whether they intended to enlist or not, would try to
secure guns. Nothing had yet been said about their pay and nothing
heard of an auxiliary force[237]. Again the question was, what,

[Footnote 231: Dole to Steele, March 21, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 67, 508-509.]

[Footnote 232: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 665.]

[Footnote 233: Dole's name might well be added to this list; for he
had never lost his interest or relaxed his efforts. On the fifth of
April, he communicated to Secretary Smith the intelligence that he
had issued instructions to "the officers appointed to command the two
Regiments of Indians to be raised as Home Guard to report at Fort
Leavenworth to be mustered into service ... "--Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 357.]

[Footnote 234: Steele to Dole, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, S 538 of 1862].]

[Footnote 235: Denver to Halleck, April 8, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. viii, 679].]

[Footnote 236: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

[Footnote 237: "... I fear we shall have trouble in regard to the guns
as many will take guns that will not go and whether they will give up
their arms is doubtful. I had a long talk with Opothly-Oholo on that
point and told (cont.)]

in the event of its not appearing, should the Indian agents do?[238]

The time was propitious for starting the expedition; for not the
shadow of an enemy had been lately seen in the West, unless count be
taken of Indians returning home or small roving bands of possible
marauders that the people of all parties detested[239]. But the order
for the supplanting of Denver by Sturgis had already been issued,
April sixth[240], and Sturgis's policy was not yet

[Footnote 237: (cont.) him you could only get 2000 guns and you wanted
every one to go and an Indian with it and that if any of them got guns
that did not go they must give up their guns to those that would go
but I know enough of the Indian character to know that it will be next
thing to an impossibility to get a gun away from one when he once gets
it and I shall put off the distribution of the guns till the last
moment and it would be best to send them on a day or two before being
distributed but that would make them mad and they would not go at all
and how we are to know how many to look out for from others than those
we have here I am not able to see but we will do all that we can but
you may look out for dificulty in the matter they all seem anxious now
to go and make no objections as yet nor have they said anything about
their pay but as they were told before when we expect them to go into
the Hunter Lane expedition that they would get the same pay as white
troops and set off a part of it for their families it was so indelibly
impressed upon their minds that I fear we will have a blow up on that
score when it comes up we hear nothing yet of any troops being ordered
to this service and I very much fear they will put off the matter so
long that there will be no crop raised this season ... the mortality
amongst them is great more since warm weather has set in than during
the cold weather they foolishly physic themselves nearly to death danc
[dance] all night and then jump into the river just at daylight to
make themselves bullet proof they have followed this up now every
night for over two weeks and it has no doubt caused many deaths
Long Tiger the Uchee Chief and one of the best amongst them died
to-day--yesterday we had 7 deaths and there will not be less
to-day"--Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1862, Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1578 of 1862.]

[Footnote 238: This was the query put to Dole by Steele in a letter of
the thirteenth of April, which acknowledged Dole's of the third and
ventured the opinion that Postmaster-general Blair "must be imitating
General McClellan and practicing strategy with the mails." Steele
further remarked, "Gen'l Denver, Maj. Wright and I are in the dark as
to the plans of the Indian Expedition. Gen. Denver thinks I
should proceed at once to Leroy without waiting for your
instructions."--Ibid., S 539 of 1862.]

[Footnote 239: Curtis to Halleck, April 5, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. viii, 662].]

[Footnote 240: Sturgis, upon the receipt of orders of this date,
assumed command of (cont.)]

known. It soon revealed itself, however, and was hostile to the whole
project that Dole had set his heart upon. Apparently that project, the
moment it had been taken up by Denver, had ceased to have any interest
for Lane on the score of its merits and had become identified with
the Robinson faction in Kansas politics. At any rate, it was the
anti-Robinson press that saw occasion for rejoicing in the complete
removal of Denver from the scene, an event which soon took place[241].

The relieving of Denver from the command of the District of Kansas
inaugurated[242] what contemporaries described as "Sturgis' military
despotism,"[243] in amplification of which it is enough to say that
it attempted the utter confounding, if not the annihilation, of the
Indian Expedition, a truly noble undertaking to be sure, considering
how much was hoped for from that expedition, how much of benefit and
measure of justice to a helpless, homeless, impoverished people and
considering, also, how much of time and thought and

[Footnote 240: (cont.) the District of Kansas; but Denver was not
called east until the fourteenth of May. On the twenty-first of April,
it was still expected that he would lead an expedition "down the
borders of Arkansas into the Indian country." [KELTON to Curtis, April
21, 1862, Ibid., vol. xiii, 364].]

[Footnote 241: The _Daily Conservative_, for instance, rejoiced
over this telegram from Sidney Clark of May 2, which gave advanced
information of Denver's approaching departure: "Conservative: The
Department of Kansas is reinstated. Gen. Blunt takes command. Denver
reports to Halleck; Sturgis here." The newspaper comment was, "We
firmly believe that a prolongation of the Denver-Sturgis political
generalship, aided as it was by the corrupt Governor of this
State, would have led to a revolution in Kansas ..."--_Daily
Conservative_, May 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 242: General Sturgis assumed command, April 10, 1862
[_Official Records_, vol. viii, 683], and Denver took temporary
charge at Fort Scott [Ibid., 668].]

[Footnote 243: Quoted from the _Daily Conservative_ of May 20;
but not with the idea of subscribing thereby to any verdict that would
bear the implication that all of Sturgis's measures were arbitrary
and wrong. Something strenuous was needed in Kansas. The arrest of
Jennison and of Hoyt [Ibid., April 19, 23, 1862] because of
their too radical anti-slavery actions was justifiable. Jennison had
disorganized his regiment in a shameful manner [Ibid., June 3,

energy, not to mention money, had already been expended upon it.

Sturgis's policy with reference to the Indian Expedition was initiated
by an order[244], of April 25, which gained circulation as purporting
to be in conformity with instructions from the headquarters of the
Department of the Mississippi, although in itself emanating from those
of the District of Kansas. It put a summary stop to the enlistment
of Indians and threatened with arrest anyone who should disobey its
mandate. Superintendent Coffin, in his inimitable illiteracy, at once
entered protest[245] against it and coolly informed Sturgis that, in
enrolling Indians for service, he was acting under the authority, not
of the War, but of the Interior Department. At the same sitting, he
applied to Commissioner Dole for new instructions[246].

[Footnote 244: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 365.]

[Footnote 245:

  LE ROY COFFEE COUNTY, KANSAS, April 29th 1862.
  BRIG. GENL S.D. STURGIS, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

Dear Sir: A Special Messenger arrived here last night from Fort
Leavenworth with your orders No. 8 and contents noted. I would most
respectfully inform you that I am acting under the controle and
directions of the Interior and not of the War Department. I have
been endeavoring to the best of my humble ability to carry out the
instructions and wishes of that Department, all of which I hope will
meet your aprobation.

Your Messenger reports himself Straped, that no funds were furnished
him to pay his expenses, that he had to beg his way down here. I have
paid his bill here and furnished him with five dollars to pay his way
back. Very respectfully your Obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, _Sup't. of Indian Affairs_, Southern
Superintendency. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 246: LEROY COFFEY CO., KANSAS, April 29th, 1862.

SIR: Enclosed please find a communication from Brigadier General
Sturgis in regard to the organising of the Indians and my reply to the
same, the officers are here, or at least four of them. Col Furnace
Agutant Elithurp Lieutenant Wattles and Agutant Dole I need scarcely
say to you that we shall continue to act under your Instructions til
further orders, the Officers above alluded to have been untiring in
their efforts to get acquainted with and get the permanent (cont.)]

Colonel John Ritchie[247] of the inchoate Second Regiment Indian Home
Guards did the same[248].

The reëstablishment[249] of the Department of Kansas, at this critical
moment, while much to be regretted as indicative of a surrender to
politicians[250] and an abandonment of the idea, so fundamentally
conducive to military success, that all parts must contribute to the
good of the whole, had one thing to commend it, it restored vigor
to the Indian Expedition. The department was reëstablished, under
orders[251] of May second, with James G. Blunt in command. He entered
upon his duties, May fifth, and on that selfsame day authorized the
issue of the following most significant instructions, in toto, a
direct countermand of all that Sturgis had most prominently stood for:

[Footnote 246: (cont.) organization of the Indians under way and have
made a fine impression upon them, and I should very much regret any
failure to carry out the programe as they have been allready so
often disappointed that they have become suspicious and it all has a
tendency to lessen their confidence in us and to greatly increase
our dificulties All of which is most Respectfully Submitted by your
obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, Sup't of Indian Affairs. [Indian Office Special Files,
no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 247: For an inferential appraisement of Ritchie's character
and abilities, see Kansas _Historical Collections_, vol. iii,

[Footnote 248: Ritchie to Dole, April 26, 1863 [Indian Office
Miscellaneous Files, 1858-1863].]

[Footnote 249: The reëstablishment, considered in the light of the
first orders issued by Blunt, those set out here, was decidedly in
the nature of a reflection upon the reactionary policy of Halleck and
Sturgis; but Halleck had no regrets. Of Kansas, he said, "Thank God,
it is no longer under my command." [_Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 440.] Ever since the time, when he had been urged by the
administration in Washington, peculiarly sensitive to political
importunities, not to retain, outside of Kansas, the Kansas troops
if he could possibly avoid it, there had been more or less of rancor
between him and them. His opinion of them was that they were a
"humbug" [Ibid., vol. viii, 661].]

[Footnote 250: Almost simultaneously, Schofield was given independent
command in Missouri, a similar surrender to local political pressure.]

[Footnote 251: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 368-369.]

General Orders,                HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,
No. 2.                         Fort Leavenworth, Kans., May 5, 1862.

I. General Orders, No. 8, dated Headquarters District of Kansas, April
25, 1862, is hereby rescinded.

II. The instructions issued by the Department at Washington to the
colonels of the two Indian regiments ordered to be raised will be
fully carried out, and the regiments will be raised with all possible

By order of Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,[252]

and Assistant Adjutant-general_.[253]

The full extent, not only of Sturgis's failure to coöperate with
the Indian Office, but also of his intention utterly to block the
organization of the Indian Expedition, is revealed in a letter[254]
from Robert W. Furnas, colonel commanding the First Regiment Indian
Home Guards, to Dole, May 4, 1862. That letter best explains itself.
It was written from Leroy, Kansas, and reads thus:

    Disclaiming any idea of violating "Regulations" by an "Official
    Report" to you, permit me to communicate certain facts extremely
    embarrassing, which surround the Indian Expedition.

    In compliance with your order of Ap'l 5th. I reported myself
    "forthwith" to the U.S. mustering officer at Ft. Leavenworth and
    was "mustered into the service" on the 18th. of April. I "awaited
    the orders from Genl Halleck" as directed but rec'd none. On the
    20th. Ap'l I rec'd detailed

[Footnote 252: The promotion of Blunt to a brigadier-generalship had
caused surprise and some opposition. Referring to it, the _Daily
Conservative_, April 12, 1862, said, "Less than three months ago
Mr. Lincoln informed a gentleman from this State that no Kansas man
would be made a Brigadier 'unless the Kansas Congressional delegation
was unanimously and strenuously in his favor' ... Either the President
has totally changed his policy or Lane, Pomeroy and Conway are
responsible for this most unexpected and unprecedented appointment

[Footnote 253: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 370.]

[Footnote 254: Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862, F 363 of 1862.]

    instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, authorizing me to proceed
    and raise "from the loyal Indians now in Kansas a Regiment of
    Infantry." I immediately repaired to this place and in a very
    few days enrolled a sufficient number of Indians to form a
    minimum[255] Regiment. I am particularly indebted to the Agts.
    Maj. Cutler of the Creeks and Maj. Snow of the Seminoles, for
    their valuable services. Immediately after the enrolling, and
    in compliance with my instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, I
    notified Lieut. Chas. S. Bowman U.S. mustering officer at Ft.
    Leavenworth of the fact, to which I have rec'd no answer.

    At this point in my procedure a special messenger from Gen'l
    Sturgis reached this place with a copy of his "Order No. 8," a
    copy of which I herewith send you. On the next day Maj. Minor in
    command at Iola, Kansas, and who had been furnished with a copy of
    General Sturgis' "Order" came with a company of Cavalry to this
    place "to look into matters." I showed him my authority, and
    informed him what I had done. He made no arrest, seeming utterly
    at a loss to understand the seemingly _confused_ state of
    affairs. Whether Gen'l Sturgis will on the reception of my notice
    at the Fort arrest me, or not, I know not. I have gone to the
    limits of my instructions and deem it, if not my duty, prudent at
    least to notify you of the condition of affairs, that you may be
    the better enabled to remove obstacles, that the design of the
    Department may be fully and promptly executed....[256]

[Footnote 255: The regiment, according to the showing of the muster
roll, comprised one thousand nine men. Fifteen hundred was the more
usual number of a regiment, which, normally, had three battalions with
a major at the head of each.]

[Footnote 256: The remainder of the letter deals with the muster roll
of the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, which was forwarded to Dole,
under separate cover, the same day, and of which Dole acknowledged the
receipt, May 16, 1862 [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, pp.
240-241]. The roll shows the captain and number of each company as

  Company A   Billy Bowlegs               106
  Company B   A-ha-luk-tus-ta-na-ke       100
  Company C   Tus-te-nu-ke-ema-ela        104
  Company D   Tus-te-nuk-ke               100
  Company E   Jon-neh (John)              101
  Company F   Mic-co-hut-ka (White Chief) 103
  Company G   Ah-pi-noh-to-me             103


It soon developed that General Halleck had been equally at fault
in disregarding the wishes of the government with respect to the
mustering in of the loyal Indians. He had neglected to send on
to Kansas the instructions which he himself had received from
Washington.[257] It was incumbent, therefore, upon Blunt to ask for
new. He had found the enlisted Indians with no arms, except guns, no
shot pouches, no powder horns, although they were attempting to supply
themselves as best they could.[258] Blunt thought they ought to be
furnished with sheath, or bowie, knives; but the Indian Office had no
funds for such a purpose.[259] The new instructions, when they came,
were found to differ in no particular from those which had formerly
been issued. The Indian Home Guards were to constitute an irregular
force and were to be supported by such white troops, as Blunt should
think necessary. They were to be supplied with transportation and
subsistence and Blunt was to "designate the general to command."
Blunt's own appointment was expected to remove all difficulties that
had stood in the way of the Indian Expedition while under the control
of Halleck.[260] On

[Footnote 256: (cont.)

  Company H   Lo-ga-po-koh        94
  Company I   Jan-neh (John      100
  Company J   Lo-ka-la-chi-ha-go  98]

[Footnote 257: Coffin to Dole, May 8, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 258: Same to Same, May 13, 1862, Ibid., Land Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870.]

[Footnote 259: Dole to Coffin, May 20, 1862, Ibid., _Letter
Book_, no. 68, p. 252.]

[Footnote 260: "I visited the War Department today to ascertain what
orders had been forwarded to you and your predecessor relative to the
organization of two thousand Indians as a home guard, which when
so organized would proceed to their homes in the Indian country in
company with a sufficient number of white troops to protect them at
their homes.

"I learn from Adjutant General Thomas that all necessary orders have
been forwarded to enable you to muster these Indian Regiments into the
service as an irregular force; and to send such white force with them
as (cont.)]

May 8 came the order from Adjutant-general Thomas, "Hurry up the
organization and departure of the two Indian regiments,"[261] which
indicated that there was no longer any question as to endorsement by
the Department of War.

As a matter of fact, the need for hurry was occasioned by the activity
of secessionists, Indians and white men, in southwest Missouri, which
would, of itself, suggest the inquiry as to what the Indian allies of
the Confederacy had been about since the Battle of Pea Ridge. Van
Dorn had ordered them to retire towards their own country and, while
incidentally protecting it, afford assistance to their white ally by
harassing the enemy, cutting off his supply trains, and annoying him
generally. The order had been rigidly attended to and the Indians had
done their fair share of the irregular warfare that terrorized and
desolated the border in the late spring of the second year of the war.
Not all of them, regularly enlisted, had participated in it, however;
for General Pike had, with a considerable part of his brigade, gone
away from the border as far as possible and had intrenched himself at
a fort of his own planning, Fort McCulloch, in the Choctaw Nation, on
the Blue River, a branch of the Red.[262] Furthermore,

[Footnote 260: (cont.) in your judgment may be deemed necessary, also
that the difficulties we experienced while the expedition was under
the control of Gen'l Halleck are now removed by your appointment, and
that you will designate the general to command the whole expedition
and see that such supplies for the transportation and subsistence as
may be necessary are furnished to the whole expedition (Indians as
well as whites). Lieut. Kile informs me that there was doubt whether
the Quarter Master would be expected to act as Commissary for
the Regiment. I suppose that you fully understand this was the
intention...."--Dole to Blunt, May 16, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 68, pp. 241-242.]

[Footnote 261: _Daily Conservative_, May 9, 1862.]

[Footnote 262: "... General Albert Pike retreated from the battle of
Pea Ridge, Arkansas, a distance of 250 miles, and left his new-made
wards to the mercy (cont.)]

Colonel Drew and his men, later converts to secessionism, had, for a
good part of the time, contented themselves with guarding the Cherokee
Nation,[263] thus leaving Colonel Cooper and Colonel Stand Watie, with
their commands, to do most of the scouting and

[Footnote 262: (cont.) of war, stringing his army along through the
Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Nations, passing through Limestone Gap, on
among the Boggies, and halted at Carriage Point, on the Blue, 'away
down along the Chickasaw line.' Cherokee Knights of the Golden Circle
followed Pike's retreat to Texas ... "--Ross, _Life and Times of
Hon. William P. Ross_, p. viii.]

[Footnote 263: These two letters from John Ross are offered in
evidence of this. They are taken from Indian Office Miscellaneous
Files, John Ross _Papers_:



SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23rd. inst. I have no doubt
that forage can be procured for Col. Drew's men in this vicinity by
hauling it in from the farms of the surrounding Districts. The subject
of a Delegate in Congress shall be attended to so soon as arrangements
can be made for holding an election. I am happy to learn that Col.
Drew has been authorized to furlough a portion of the men in his
Regiment to raise corn. I shall endeavor to be correctly informed of
the movements of the enemy and advise you of the same. And I shall be
gratified to receive any important information that you may have to
communicate at all times. I am very respectfully and truly, Yours,
etc. John Ross, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.



SIR: I beg leave to thank you for your kind response to my letter of
the 22nd ulto and your order stationing Col. Drew's Regiment in this
vicinity. Though much reduced by furloughs in number it will be
useful for the particular purposes for which it was ordered here. The
unprotected condition of the country however is a source of general
anxiety among the People, who feel that they are liable to be overrun
at any time by small parties from the U.S. Army which remains in the
vicinity of the late Battle Ground. This is more particularly the case
since the removal of the Confederate Forces under your command and
those under Major Gen'l Price. Without distrusting the wisdom that has
prompted these movements, or the manifestation of any desire on my
part to enquire into their policy it will be nevertheless a source
of satisfaction to be able to assure the people of the country that
protection will not be withheld from them and that they will not
be left to their own feeble defense. Your response is respectfully
requested, I have the honor to be Sir with high regards, Your Obt
Servt. JOHN ROSS, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.

To Brig. Gen'l A. Pike Com'dg, Department Indian Territory, Head Qrs.
Choctaw Nation.]

skirmishing. So kindly did the Indians take to that work that Colonel
Cooper recommended[264] their employment as out-and-out guerrillas.
That was on May 6 and was probably suggested by the fact that, on
April 21, the Confederate government had definitely authorized the
use of partisan rangers.[265] A good understanding of Indian military
activity, at this particular time, is afforded by General Pike's
report[266] of May 4,

    ... The Cherokee[267] and Creek troops are in their respective
    countries. The Choctaw troops are in front of me, in their
    country, part on this side of Boggy and part at Little Boggy, 34
    miles from here. These observe the roads to Fort Smith and by
    Perryville toward Fort Gibson. Part of the Chickasaw battalion is
    sent to Camp McIntosh, 11 miles this side of the Wichita Agency,
    and part to Fort Arbuckle, and the Texan company is at Fort Cobb.

    I have ordered Lieutenant-colonel Jumper with his Seminoles to
    march to and take Fort Larned, on the Pawnee Fork of the Arkansas,
    where are considerable stores and a little garrison. He will go as
    soon as their annuity is paid.

    The Creeks under Colonel McIntosh are about to make an extended
    scout westward. Stand Watie, with his Cherokees, scouts along the
    whole northern line of the Cherokee country from Grand Saline to
    Marysville, and sends me information continually of every movement
    of the enemy in Kansas and Southwestern Missouri.

    The Comanches, Kiowas, and Reserve Indians are all peaceable and
    quiet. Some 2,000 of the former are encamped about three days'
    ride from Fort Cobb, and some of them come in at intervals to
    procure provisions. They have sent to me to know

[Footnote 264: Cooper to Van Dorn, May 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 823-824.]

[Footnote 265: _Journal of the Congress of the Confederate
States_, vol. v, 285.]

[Footnote 266: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 819-823.]

[Footnote 267: This situation, so eminently satisfactory to John Ross,
did not continue long, however, and on May 10, the Cherokee Principal
Chief had occasion to complain that his country had been practically
divested of a protecting force and, at the very moment, too, when the
Federals were showing unwonted vigor near the northeastern border
[Ross to Davis, May 10, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii,

    if they can be allowed to send a strong party and capture any
    trains on their way from Kansas to New Mexico, to which I have no
    objection. To go on the war-path somewhere else is the best way to
    keep them from troubling Texas ...

Stand Watie's scouting had brought him, April 26,[268] into a slight
action with men of the First Battalion First Missouri Cavalry at
Neosho, in the vicinity of which place he lingered many days and where
his men[269] again fought, in conjunction with Colonel Coffee's, May
31.[270] The skirmish of the later date was disastrous to the Federals
under Colonel John M. Richardson of the Fourteenth Missouri State
Militia Cavalry and proved to be a case where the wily and nimble
Indian had taken the Anglo-Saxon completely by surprise.[271] From
Neosho, Stand Watie moved down, by slow and destructive stages,
through Missouri and across into Indian Territory. His next important
engagement was at Cowskin Prairie, June 6.

Meanwhile, the organization of the Indian Expedition, or Indian Home
Guard, as it was henceforth most commonly styled, was proceeding
apace.[272] The

[Footnote 268: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 61-63; Britton,
_Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 281-282.]

[Footnote 269: Stand Watie's whole force was not engaged and he,
personally, was not present. Captain Parks led Watie's contingent and
was joined by Coffee.]

[Footnote 270: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 90-92, 94-95.]

[Footnote 271:--Ibid., 92-94, 409. Watie, although not
present, seems to have planned the affair [Ibid., 95].
Lieutenant-colonel Mills, who reported upon the Neosho engagement, was
of the opinion that "the precipitate flight" of the Federals could
be accounted for only upon the supposition that the "screaming and
whooping of the Indians" unnerved them and "rendered their untrained
horses nearly unmanageable."--Ibid., 93.]

[Footnote 272: The progress in organization is indicated by these
communications to the Indian Office:


The enrollment, organizing etc. etc. of the Indians, and preparations
for their departure, are progressing satisfactorily, though as I
anticipated, it will be difficult to raise two Regiments, and I have
some fears of our success in getting the full number for the 2nd
Regiment. But if we get one full company of Delawares and Shawnees,

completion of the first regiment gave little concern. It was composed
of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companies of the former and two of the
latter. The second regiment was miscellaneous in its composition and
took longer to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) as promised, and four companies of Osages,
which the chiefs say they can raise, I think we shall succeed.

Two Regiments of white troops and Rabb's Battery have already started
and are down by this time in the Cherokee Nation. Col. Doubleday, who
is in command, has notified the officers here to prepare with all
possible despatch, for marching orders. We are looking for Aliens
Battery here this week and if it comes I hope to make considerable
addition to the Army from the loyal Refugee Indians here, as they have
great confidence in "_them waggons that shoot_," this has been a
point with them all the time.

We were still feeding those that are mustered in and shall I suppose
have to do so until the requisitions arive. The Dellawares and
Shaw-nees also, I had to make arrangements to feed from the time of
their arrival at the Sac and Fox Agency. But from all the indications
now we expect to see the whole Expedition off in ten days or two
weeks.--Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1661.


It has been some time since I wrote you and to fill my promise I again
drop you a line. I presume you feel a lively interest in whatever
relates to the Indians. The 1st. Regt. is now mustered into the
service and will probably to-day number something over a minimum Regt.
It is composed entirely of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companys of the
former and two of the latter.

I have understood that the report of the Creek Agent gave the number
of Creek men at 1990--If this is a fact it is far from a correct
statement--The actual number of Creek men over 14 years of age
(refugees) will not number over 900. Some of these are unable to be
soldiers. The actual number of Seminoles (men) will not excede 300
over 14 years of age, many of them are old and disabled as soldiers.
Thus you will see that but one Regt. could be raised from that
quarter. You are aware that the Creeks and Seminoles speak one
language nearly and are thus naturally drawn together and they were
not willing to be divided.

The second regt. is now forming from the various other tribes and I
have no doubt will be filled, it would have been filled long ago, but
Col. Ritchie did not repair here for a long time in fact not till
after our Regt. was raised--Adjutant Dole came here promptly to do his
duty--but in the absence of his Col. could not facilitate his regt.
without assuming a responsibility that would have been unwise. I
regret that he could not have been placed in our regt. for he will
prove a faithful and reliable officer and should I be transfered to

organize, largely because its prospective commander, Colonel John
Ritchie, who had gone south to persuade the Osages to enlist,[273] was
slow in putting in an appearance at Humboldt. The Neosho Agency, to
which the Osages belonged, was in great confusion, partly due to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) any other position which I am strongly in hopes
I may be, I hope you will exercise your influence to transfer him
to my place, this will be agreable to all the officers of the 1st.
regiment and desirable on his part.

The condition of the Indians here at the present writing is very
favorable, sickness is abating and their spirits are reviving. I
think I have fully settled the fact of the Indians capability and
susceptibility to arive at a good state of military disipline. You
would be surprised to see our Regt. move. They accomplish the feat of
regular time step equal to any white soldier, they form in line with
dispatch and with great precission; and what is more they now manifest
a great desire to learn the entire white man's disiplin in military
matters. That they will make brave and ambitious soldiers I have no
doubt. Our country may well feel proud that these red men have at
last fell into the ranks to fight for our flag, and aid in crushing
treason. Much honor is due them. I am sorry that Dr. Kile did
not accept the appointment of Quartermaster but owing to some
misunderstanding with Col. Ritchie he declines.

You will please remember me to Gen'l Lane and say that I have not
heard from him since I left Washington.--A.C. ELITHORPE to Dole, June
9, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_,
1859-1862, C 1661.


The Indian Brigade, consisting of about one thousand Creeks and
Seminoles, sixty Quapaws, sixty Cherokees and full companies of wild
Delawares, Kechees, Ironeyes, Cadoes, and Kickapoos, left this place
(Leroy) yesterday for Humboldt, at which place I suppose they will
join the so much talked of Indian expedition. Although I have not as
yet fully ascertained the exact number of each Tribe, represented in
said Brigade, but they may be estimated at about Fifteen Hundred,
all of the Southern Refugee Indians who have been fed here by the
Government, besides sixty Delawares from the Delaware Reservation, and
about two Hundred Osages, the latter of which I have been assured will
be increased to about four or five hundred, ere they get through the
Osage Nation ...

The news from the Cherokee Nation is very cheering and encouraging; it
has been reported that nearly Two Thousand Cherokees will be ready to
join the expedition on its approach into that country....--Coffin to
Dole, June 15, 1862, Ibid., C 1684.]

[Footnote 273: Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid.,
_Neosho_, C 1662 of 1862. See also Carruth to Coffin, September
19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

the fact that, at this most untoward moment, the Osages were being
approached for a cession of lands, and partly to the fact that
Indians of the neighborhood, of unionist sympathies, Cherokees and
Delawares[274] from the Cherokee country, Shawnees, Quapaws,[275] and
Seneca-Shawnees, were being made refugees, partly, also, to the fact
that Agent Elder and Superintendent Coffin were not working in harmony
with each other. Their differences dated from the first days of their
official relationship. Elder had been influential, for reasons most
satisfactory to himself and not very complimentary to Coffin,
in having the Neosho Agency transferred to the Central
Superintendency.[276] Coffin had vigorously objected and with such
effect that, in March, 1862, a retransfer had been ordered;[277] but
not before Coffin had reported[278] that everything was now amicable
between him and Elder. Elder was evidently of a different opinion and
before long was asking to be allowed again to report officially
to Superintendent Branch at St. Joseph.[279] There was a regular
tri-weekly post between that place and Fort Scott, Elder's present
headquarters, and the chances were good that Branch would be in a
position to attend to mail more promptly than was Coffin.[280] The
counter arguments

[Footnote 274: F. Johnson to Dole, April 2, 1862, Indian Office,
_Central Superintendency_, Delaware, J 627 of 1862.]

[Footnote 275: The propriety of permitting the refugee Quapaws to
"return to their homes by accompanying the military expedition" was
urged upon the Indian Office in a letter from Elder to Coffin, May
29, 1862 [Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., _Southern
Superintendency_, Neosho, C 1663 of 1862].]

[Footnote 276: Office letter of June 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 277: Mix to Branch, March 1, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 67.]

[Footnote 278: Coffin to Dole, February 28, 1862, Ibid.,
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1541 of

[Footnote 279: Elder to Dole, May 16, 1862, Ibid., Neosho, E
106 of 1862.]

[Footnote 280: Coffin was spending a good deal of his time at Leroy.
Leroy was one hundred twenty-five miles, so Elder computed, from
Leavenworth, where he (cont.)]

of Coffin[281] were equally plausible and the request for transfer

The outfit for the Indians of the Home Guard was decidedly inferior.
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wanted batteries, "wagons that shoot."[282] His
braves, many of them, were given guns that were worthless, that would
not shoot at all.[283] In such a way was their eagerness to learn the
white man's method of fighting and to acquire his discipline rewarded.
The fitting out was done at Humboldt, although Colonel William
Weer[284] of the Tenth Kansas Infantry, who was the man finally
selected to command the entire force, would have preferred it done at
Fort Scott.[285] The Indians had a thousand and one excuses for not
expediting matters. They seemed to have a deep-seated distrust of what
the Federal intentions regarding them might be when

[Footnote 280: (cont.) directed his mail, and sixty or seventy from
Fort Scott. His communications were held up until Coffin happened to
go to Leavenworth. Moreover, Coffin was then expecting to go soon
"into the Indian country."]

[Footnote 281: Coffin complained that Elder neglected his duties. It
was Coffin's intention to remove the headquarters of the Southern
Superintendency from Fort Scott to Humboldt. It would then be very
convenient for Elder to report to him, especially if he would go back
to his own agency headquarters and not linger, as he had been doing,
at Fort Scott [Coffin to Dole, June 10, 1862, Ibid., C 1668 of

[Footnote 282: _Daily Conservative_, May 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 283: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 418; Coffin to Dole, June 17, 1862, Indian
Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 284: Weer was one of the men in disfavor with Governor
Robinson [_Daily Conservative_, May 25, 1862]. He had been
arrested and his reinstatement to command that came with the
appearance of Blunt upon the scene was doubtless the circumstance that
afforded opportunity for his appointment to the superior command
of the Indian Expedition. Sturgis had refused to reinstate him. In
December, 1861, a leave of absence had been sought by Weer, who was
then with the Fourth Kansas Volunteers, in order that he might go
to Washington, D.C., and be a witness in the case involving Lane's
appointment as brigadier-general [Thomas to Hunter, December 12, 1861,
_Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second session, part i,

[Footnote 285: Weer to Moonlight, June 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 419.]

once they should be back in their own country. They begged that some
assurance be given them of continued protection against the foe and
in their legal rights. And, in the days of making preparations, they
asked again and again for tangible evidence that white troops were
really going to support them in the journey southward.

The main portion of the Indian Expedition auxiliary white force had
all this time been more or less busy, dealing with bushwhackers and
the like, in the Cherokee Neutral Lands and in the adjoining counties
of Missouri. When Blunt took command of the Department of Kansas,
Colonel Frederick Salomon[286] of the Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer
Infantry was in charge at Fort Scott and the troops there or reporting
there were, besides eight companies of his own regiment, a part of
the Second Ohio Cavalry under Colonel Charles Doubleday, of the Tenth
Kansas Infantry under Colonel William F. Cloud, and the Second Indiana
Battery.[287] Blunt's first thought was to have Daubleday[288] lead
the Indian Expedition, the auxiliary white force of which was to be
selected from the regiments at Fort Scott. Doubleday accordingly made
his plans, rendezvoused his men, and arranged that the mouth of Shoal
Creek should be a rallying point and temporary headquarters;[289] but
events were already in train for Colonel

[Footnote 286: Salomon was born in Prussia in 1826 [Rosengarten,
_The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States_, 150]. He
had distinguished himself in some of the fighting that had taken place
in Missouri in the opening months of the war and, when the Ninth
Wisconsin Infantry, composed solely of German-Americans, had been
recruited, he was called to its command [Love, _Wisconsin in the War
of the Rebellion_, 578].]

[Footnote 287: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 371-372, 377.]

[Footnote 288: for an account of Doubleday's movements in April that
very probably gained him the place, see Britton, _Civil War on the
Border_, vol. i, 296.]

[Footnote 289: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 397, 408.]

Weer to supersede him and for his own assignment to the Second Brigade
of the expedition.

Previous to his supersedure by Weer, Doubleday conceived that it might
be possible to reach Fort Gibson with ease,[290] provided the
attempt to do so should be undertaken before the various independent
secessionist commands could unite to resist.[291] That they were
planning to unite there was every indication.[292] Doubleday[293] was
especially desirous of heading off Stand Watie who was still hovering
around in the neighborhood of his recent adventures, and was believed
now to have an encampment on Cowskin Prairie near Grand River.
Accordingly, on the morning of June 6, Doubleday started out, with
artillery and a thousand men, and, going southward from Spring River,
reached the Grand about sundown.[294] Watie was three miles away
and, Doubleday continuing the pursuit, the two forces came to an
engagement. It was indecisive,[295] however, and Watie slipped away

[Footnote 290: Doubleday to Moonlight, May 25, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 397.]

[Footnote 291: Doubleday to Blunt, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 408.]

[Footnote 292: General Brown reported on this matter, June 2
[Ibid., 409] and June 4 [Ibid., 414], as did also
General Ketchum, June 3 [Ibid., 412]. They all seem to have had
some intimation that General Pike was to unite with Stand Watie as
well as Coffee and others, and that was certainly General Hindman's
intention. On May 31, the very day that he himself assumed command,
Hindman had ordered Pike to advance from Fort McCulloch to the Kansas
border. The order did not reach Pike until June 8 and was repeated
June 17 [Ibid., 40].]

[Footnote 293: The idea seems to have obtained among Missourians that
Doubleday was all this time inactive. They were either ignorant of or
intent upon ignoring the Indian Expedition. June 4, Governor Gamble
wrote to Secretary Stanton asking that the Second Ohio and the Ninth
Wisconsin, being at Fort Scott and unemployed, might be ordered to
report to Schofield [Ibid., 414, 438], who at the instance of
politicians and contrary to the wishes of Halleck [Ibid., 368]
had been given an independent command in Missouri.]

[Footnote 294: Doubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 102].]

[Footnote 295: Doubleday reported to Weer that it was a pronounced
success, so did Blunt to Schofield [Ibid., 427]; but subsequent
events showed that it was (cont.)]

cover of the darkness. Had unquestioned success crowned Doubleday's
efforts, all might have been well; but, as it did not, Weer, who had
arrived at Fort Scott[296] a few days before and had been annoyed
to find Doubleday gone, ordered him peremptorily to make no further
progress southward without the Indians. The Indian contingent had in
reality had a set-back in its preparations. Its outfit was incomplete
and its means for transportation not forthcoming.[297] Under such
circumstances, Weer advised the removal of the whole concern to Fort
Scott, but that was easier said than done, inasmuch, as before any
action was taken, the stores were _en route_ for Humboldt.[298]
Nevertheless, Weer was determined to have the expedition start before
Stand Watie could be reinforced by Rains.[299] Constant and insistent
were the reports that the enemy was massing its forces to destroy the
Indian Expedition.[300]

[Footnote 295: (cont.) anything but that and the _Daily
Conservative_ tried to fix the blame upon Weer [Weer to Moonlight,
June 23, 1862, Ibid., 446]. The newspaper account of the whole
course of affairs may be given, roughly paraphrased, thus: Doubleday,
knowing, perhaps, that Weer was to supersede him and that his time for
action was short, "withdrew his detachment from Missouri, concentrated
them near Iola, Kansas, and thence directed them to march to the
mouth of Shoal Creek, on Spring River, himself taking charge of the
convoying of a train of forty days supplies to the same place ..." He
arrived June 4. Then, "indefatigible in forwarding the preparations
for a blow upon the camp of organization which the rebels had occupied
unmolested on Cowskin Prairie," he made his plans for further advance.
At that moment came the news that Weer had superseded him and had
ordered him to stop all movement south. He disregarded the order and
struck, even though not fully prepared [_Daily Conservative_,
June 13, 1862].]

[Footnote 296: Weer to Moonlight, June 5, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 418.]

[Footnote 297:--Ibid.; Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862,
Ibid., 418-419.]

[Footnote 298: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862, Ibid., 430.]

[Footnote 299: Same to same, June 7, 1862, Ibid., 422.]

[Footnote 300: The destruction of the Indian Expedition was most
certainly the occasion for the massing, notwithstanding the fact that
Missourians were apprehensive for the safety of their state only and
wanted to have Weer's white troops diverted to its defence. Curtis,
alone, of the commanders in Missouri seems to have surmised rightly in
the matter [Curtis to Schofield, Ibid., 432].]

Weer, therefore, went on ahead to the Osage Catholic Mission and
ordered the Fort Scott troops to meet him there. His purpose was to
promote the enlistment of the Osages, who were now abandoning the
Confederate cause.[301] He would then go forward and join Doubleday,
whom he had instructed to clear the way.[302]

Weer's plans were one thing, his embarrassments, another. Before the
middle of June he was back again at Leroy,[303] having left Salomon
and Doubleday[304] at Baxter Springs on the west side of Spring
River in the Neutral Lands, the former in command. Weer hoped by his
presence at Leroy to hurry the Indians along; for it was high time the
expedition was started and he intended to start it, notwithstanding
that many officers were absent from their posts and the men of
the Second Indian Regiment not yet mustered in. It was absolutely
necessary, if anything were going to be done with Indian aid, to get
the braves away from under the influence of their chiefs, who were
bent upon delay and determent. By the sixteenth he had the warriors
all ready at Humboldt,[305] their bullet-proof medicine taken, their
grand war dance indulged in. By the twenty-first, the final packing
up began,[306] and it was not long thereafter before the Indian
Expedition, after having experienced so many vicissitudes, had
definitely materialized and was on its way south. Accompanying Weer
were the Reverend Evan Jones, entrusted with

[Footnote 301: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 302: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 303: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 304: On the twentieth, General Brown requested Salomon to
send Doubleday to southwest Missouri [_Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 440] and Salomon so far complied with the request as to post
some companies of Doubleday's regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel
Ratliff, at Neosho [Ibid., 445, 459].]

[Footnote 305:--Ibid., 434.]

[Footnote 306:--Ibid., 441.]

a confidential message[307] to John Ross, and two special Indian
agents, E.H. Carruth, detailed at the instance of the Indian Office,
and H.W. Martin, sent on Coffin's own responsibility, their particular
task being to look out for the interests and welfare of the Indians
and, when once within the Indian Territory, to take careful stock of
conditions there, both political and economic.[308] The Indians were
in fine spirits and, although looking

[Footnote 307: The message, addressed to "Mutual Friend," was an
assurance of the continued interest of the United States government
in the inhabitants of Indian Territory and of its determination to
protect them [Coffin to Ross, June 16, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684].]

[Footnote 308: "... You will assure all loyal Indians in the Indian
Territory of the disposition and the ability of the Government of the
United States to protect them in all their rights, and that there is
no disposition on the part of said government to shrink from any of
its Treaty Obligations with all such of the Indian Tribes, who
have been, are now, and remaining loyal to the same. Also that the
government will, at the earliest practicable period, which is
believed not to be distant, restore to all loyal Indians the rights,
privileges, and immunities, that they have enjoyed previous to the
present unfortunate rebellion.

"If, during the progress of the Army you should find Indians in a
suffering condition whose loyalty is _beyond doubt_, you will,
on consultation with the officers, render such assistance, as you may
think proper, with such aid as the officers may render you.

"You will carefully look into the condition of the country, ascertain
the quantity of Stock, Hogs, and Cattle, also the quantity of Corn,
wheat etc. which may be in the hands of the loyal Indians, and the
amount of the crops in the ground the present season, their condition
and prospects.

"You are requested to communicate with me at this office at every
suitable opportunity on all the above mentioned points, in order to
enable me to keep the Hon. Com'r of Indian Aff'rs well advised of the
condition of affairs in the Indian Territory, and that the necessary
steps may be taken at the earliest possible moment, consistent with
safety and economy, to restore the loyal Indians now in Kansas to
their homes.

"Should any considerable number of the Indians, now in the Army,
remain in the Indian Territory, or join you from the loyal Indians,
now located therein you will very probably find it best, to remain
with them, until I can get there with those, who are now here. But of
these matters you will be more able to judge on the ground."--Extract
from Coffin's instructions to Carruth, June 16, 1862, Ibid.,
Similar instructions, under date of June 23, 1862, were sent to H.W.

somewhat ludicrous in their uniforms,[309] were not much behind their
comrades of the Ninth and Tenth Kansas[310] in earnestness and in
attention to duty.[311] Nevertheless, they had been very reluctant to
leave their families and were, one and all, very apprehensive as to
the future.

[Footnote 309: "I have just returned from Humboldt--the army there
under Col. Weer consisting of the 10th Kansas Regiment 4 Companys of
the 9th Kansas Aliens Battery of Six Tenths Parrot Guns and the first
and second Indian Regements left for the Indian Territory in good
stile and in fine spirits the Indians with their new uniforms and
small Military caps on their Hugh Heads of Hair made rather a Comecal
Ludecrous apperance they marched off in Columns of 4 a breast singing
the war song all joining in the chourse and a more animated seen is
not often witnessed. The officers in command of the Indian Regements
have labored incessantly and the improvement the Indians have made in
drilling is much greater than I supposed them capabell of and I think
the opinion and confidence of all in the eficency of the Indian
Regements was very much greater when they left than at any previous
period and I have little doubt that for the kind of service that will
be required of them they will be the most efecient troops in the
Expedition."--COFFIN to Dole, June 25, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684.]

[Footnote 310: Weer took with him as white anxiliary "the Tenth
Kansas, Allen's battery, three companies Ninth Kansas..." [_Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 441]. It seems to have been his intention to
take the Second Kansas also; but that regiment was determined to stay
at Humboldt until it had effected a change in its colonels in favor of
Owen A. Bassett [Ibid., 434].]

[Footnote 311: Weer was disgusted with conditions surrounding his
white force. This is his complaint, on the eve of his departure:

"Commissions to officers from the Governor are pouring in daily. I am
told that the Tenth is rapidly becoming a regiment of officers. To add
to these difficulties there are continual intrigues, from colonels
down, for promotions and positions of command. Officers are leaving
their posts for Fort Leavenworth and elsewhere to engage in these
intrigues for more prominent places. The camps are filled with rumors
of the success of this or that man. Factions are forming, and a
general state of demoralization being produced..."--WEER to Moonlight,
June 21, 1862, Ibid., 441-442.]


Towards the end of June, the various elements designed to comprise the
First Indian Expedition had encamped at Baxter Springs[312] and two
brigades formed. As finally organized, the First Brigade was put under
the command of Colonel Salomon and the Second, of Colonel William
R. Judson. To the former, was attached the Second Indian Regiment,
incomplete, and, to the latter, the First. Brigaded with the Indian
regiments was the white auxiliary that had been promised and that the
Indians had almost pathetically counted upon to assist them in their
straits. Colonel Weer's intention was not to have the white and red
people responsible for the same duties nor immediately march together.
The red were believed to be excellent for scouting and, as it would
be necessary to scout far and wide all the way down into the Indian
Territory, the country being full of bushwhackers, also, most likely,
of the miscellaneous forces of General Rains, Colonel Coffee, and
Colonel Stand Watie, they were to be reserved for that work.

The forward movement of the Indian Expedition began at daybreak on the
twenty-eighth of June. It was then that the First Brigade started, its
white contingent, "two sections Indiana Battery, one battalion of

[Footnote 312: Baxter Springs was a government post, established on
Spring River in the southwest corner of the Cherokee Neutral Lands,
subsequent to the Battle of Pea Ridge [Kansas Historical Society,
_Collections_, vol. vi, 150].]

Second Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and six companies of Ninth Wisconsin
Volunteer Infantry,"[313] taking the military road across the Quapaw
Strip and entering the Indian Territory, unmolested. A day's journey
in the rear and travelling by the same route came the white contingent
of the Second Brigade and so much of the First Indian as was
unmounted.[314] Beyond the border, the cavalcade proceeded to Hudson's
Crossing of the Neosho River, where it halted to await the coming of
supply trains from Fort Scott. In the meantime, the Second Indian
Regiment, under Colonel John Ritchie, followed, a day apart, by the
mounted men of the First under Major William A. Phillips,[315] had
also set out, its orders[316] being to leave the military road and to
cross to the east bank of Spring River, from thence to march southward
and scour the country thoroughly between Grand River and the Missouri
state line.

The halt at Hudson's Crossing occupied the better part of two days and
then the main body of the Indian Expedition resumed its forward march.
It crossed the Neosho and moved on, down the west side of Grand River,
to a fording place, Carey's Ford, at which point, it passed over to
the east side of the river and camped, a short distance from the ford,
at Round Grove, on Cowskin Prairie, Cherokee ground, and the scene of
Doubleday's recent encounter with the enemy. At this

[Footnote 313: Salomon to Weer, June 30, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 458.]

[Footnote 314: James A. Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 456].]

[Footnote 315: William A. Phillips, a Scotsman by birth, went out to
Kansas in the autumn of 1855 as regular staff correspondent of the New
York _Tribune_ [Kansas Historical Society _Collections_,
vol. v, 100, 102]. He was a personal friend of Dana's [Britton,
_Memoirs_, 89], became with Lane an active Free State man and
later was appointed on Lane's staff [_Daily Conservative_,
January 24, 31, 1862]. He served as correspondent of the _Daily
Conservative_ at the time when that newspaper was most guilty of

[Footnote 316: James A. Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 456.]

place it anxiously awaited the return of Lieutenant-colonel Ratliff,
who had been despatched to Neosho in response to an urgency call from
General E.B. Brown in charge of the Southwestern Division of the
District of Missouri.[317]

The Confederates were still in the vicinity, promiscuously wandering
about, perhaps; but, none the less, determined to check, if possible,
the Federal further progress; for they knew that only by holding the
territorial vantage, which they had secured through gross Federal
negligence months before, could they hope to maintain intact the
Indian alliance with the Southern States. Stand Watie's home farm was
in the neighborhood of Weer's camp and Stand Watie himself was even
then scouting in the Spavinaw hills.[318]

In the latter part of May, under directions from General
Beauregard[319] but apparently without the avowed knowledge of the
Confederate War Department and certainly without its official[320]
sanction, Thomas C.

[Footnote 317: Weer to Moonlight, June 23, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 445, and same to same, July 2, 1862,
Ibid., 459-461.]

[Footnote 318: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 18.]

[Footnote 319: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 28.]

[Footnote 320: The emphasis should be upon the word, _official_,
since the government must assuredly have acquiesced in Hindman's
appointment. Hindman declared that the Secretary of War, in
communicating on the subject to the House of Representatives, "ignored
facts which had been officially communicated to him," in order to
convey the impression that Hindman had undertaken to fill the post
of commander in the Trans-Mississippi Department without rightful
authority [Hindman to Holmes, February 8, 1863, Ibid., vol.
xxii, part 2, p. 785]. The following telegram shows that President
Davis had been apprised of Hindman's selection, and of its tentative

BALDWIN, June 5, 1862.

(Received 6th.)


Do not send any one just now to command the Trans-Mississippi
District. It will bring trouble to this army. Hindman has been sent
there temporarily. Price will be on to see you soon.

EARL VAN DORN, Major-General.

[Ibid., vol. lii, part 2, supplement, p. 320.]]

Hindman had assumed the command of the Trans-Mississippi
Department.[321] As an Arkansan, deeply moved by the misfortunes and
distress of his native state, he had stepped into Van Dorn's place
with alacrity, intent upon forcing everything within his reach to
subserve the interests of the Confederate cause in that particular
part of the southern world. To the Indians and to their rights,
natural or acquired, he was as utterly indifferent as were most other
American men and all too soon that fact became obvious, most obvious,
indeed, to General Pike, the one person who had, for reasons best
known to himself, made the Indian cause his own.

General Hindman took formal command of the Trans-Mississippi
Department at Little Rock, May 31. It was a critical moment and he was
most critically placed; for he had not the sign of an army, Curtis's
advance was only about thirty-five miles away, and Arkansas was yet,
in the miserable plight in which Van Dorn had left her in charge of
Brigadier-general J.S. Roane, it is true, but practically denuded of
troops. Pike was at Fort McCulloch, and he had a force not wholly to
be despised.[322] It was to him, therefore, that Hindman

[Footnote 321: _Department_ seems to be the more proper word
to use to designate Hindman's command, although _District_ and
_Department_ are frequently used interchangeably in the records.
In Hindman's time and in Holmes's, the Trans-Mississippi Department
was not the same as the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No.
2 [See Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff, to Hindman, July 17, 1862,
_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 855]. On the very date of
Hindman's assignment, the boundaries of his command were defined as

"The boundary of the Trans-Mississippi Department will embrace the
States of Missouri and Arkansas, including Indian Territory, the
State of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and the State of
Texas."--Ibid., 829.]

[Footnote 322: Yet Hindman did, in a sense, despise it and, from the
start, he showed a tendency to disparage Pike's abilities and efforts.
On the nineteenth of June, he reported to Adjutant-general Cooper,
among other things, that he had ordered Pike to establish his
headquarters at Fort Gibson and added, "His force does not amount to
much, but there is no earthly need of its (cont.)]

made one of his first appeals for help and he ordered him so to
dispose of his men that some of the more efficient, the white, might
be sent to Little Rock and the less efficient, the red, moved upward
"to prevent the incursions of marauding parties," from Kansas.[323]
The orders were repeated about a fortnight later; but Pike had already
complied to the best of his ability, although not without protest[324]
for he had collected his brigade and accoutered it by his own energies
and his own contrivances solely. Moreover, he had done it for the
defence of Indian Territory exclusively.

Included among the marauders, whose enterprises General Hindman was
bent upon checking, were Doubleday's men; for, as General Curtis
shrewdly surmised,[325] some inkling of Doubleday's contemplated
maneuvers had most certainly reached Little Rock. Subsequently, when
the Indian Expedition was massing at Baxter Springs, more vigorous
measures than any yet taken were prepared for and all with the view
of delaying or defeating it. June 23, Pike ordered Colonel Douglas H.
Cooper to repair to the country north of the Canadian River and to
take command of all troops, except Jumper's Seminole battalion, that
should be there or placed there.[326] Similarly, June 26, Hindman, in
ignorance of Pike's action, assigned Colonel J.J. Clarkson[327] to the
supreme command, under

[Footnote 322: (cont.) remaining 150 miles south of the Kansas line
throwing up intrenchments." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii,

[Footnote 323: Hindman to Pike, May 31, 1862 [Ibid., 934].]

[Footnote 324: Pike to Hindman, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 936-943].]

[Footnote 325:--Ibid., 398, 401.]

[Footnote 326: General Orders, Ibid., 839, 844-845.]

[Footnote 327: Of Clarkson, Pike had this to say: "He applied to me
while raising his force for orders to go upon the Santa Fe' road and
intercept trains. I wrote him that he could have such orders if
he chose to come here, and the next I heard of him he wrote for
ammunition, and, I learned, was going to make (cont.)]

Pike, "of all forces that now are or may hereafter be within the
limits of the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole countries."[328] As fate
would have it, Clarkson was the one of these two to whom the work in
hand first fell.

The Indian Expedition was prepared to find its way contested; for its
leaders believed Rains,[329] Coffey, and Stand Watie to be all in the
immediate vicinity, awaiting the opportunity to attack either singly
or with combined forces; but, except for a small affair between a
reconnoitering party sent out by Salomon and the enemy's pickets,[330]
the march was without incident worth recording until after Weer had
broken camp at Cowskin Prairie. Behind him the ground seemed clear
enough, thanks to the very thorough scouting that had been done by the
Indians of the Home Guard regiments, some of whom, those of Colonel
Phillips's command, had been able to penetrate Missouri.[331] Of
conditions ahead of him, Weer was not so sure and he was soon made
aware of the near presence of the foe.

Colonel Watie, vigilant and redoubtable, had been on the watch for the
Federals for some time and, learning of their approach down the east
side of Grand River, sent two companies of his regiment to head off
their advance guard. This was attempted in a surprise movement at
Spavinaw Creek and accomplished with some measure of success.[332]
Colonel Clarkson was at

[Footnote 327: (cont.) forays into Missouri. I had no ammunition for
that business. He seized 70 kegs that I had engaged of Sparks in Fort
Smith, and soon lost the whole and Watie's also. Without any notice
to me he somehow got in command of the northern part of the Indian
country over two colonels with commissions nine months older than
his."--Pike to Hindman, July 15, 1862, _Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 858.]

[Footnote 328: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 845-846.]

[Footnote 329: Rains had made Tahlequah the headquarters of the Eighth
Division Missouri State Guards.--PIKE to Hindman, July 15, 1862,
Ibid., 858.]

[Footnote 330:--Ibid., vol. xiii, 458, 460.]

[Footnote 331:--Ibid., 460.]

[Footnote 332: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 18. This
incident is most (cont.)]

Locust Grove and Weer, ascertaining that fact, prepared for an
engagement. His supplies and camp equipage, also an unutilized part of
his artillery he sent for safety to Cabin Creek, across Grand River
and Lieutenant-colonel Lewis R. Jewell of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry
he sent eastward, in the direction of Maysville, Arkansas, his
expectation being--and it was realized--that Jewell would strike
the trail of Watie and engage him while Weer himself sought out

The looked-for engagement between the main part of the Indian
Expedition and Clarkson's force, a battalion of Missourians that had
been raised by Hindman's orders and sent to the Indian Territory "at
the urgent request of Watie and Drew,"[334] occurred at Locust Grove
on the third of July. It was nothing but a skirmish, yet had very
significant results. Only two detachments of Weer's men were actively
engaged in it.[335] One of them was from the First Indian Home Guard
and upon it the brunt of the fighting fell.[336]

[Footnote 332: (cont.) likely the one that is referred to in Carruth
and Martin's letter to Coffin, August 2, 1862, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 162.]

[Footnote 333: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i,

[Footnote 334: Report of General Hindman, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 40.]

[Footnote 335: Weer to Moonlight, July 6, 1862, Ibid., 137.]

[Footnote 336: Carruth and Martin reported to Coffin, August 2, 1862,
that the Indians did practically all the fighting on the Federal side.
In minor details, their account differed considerably from Weer's.

"When near Grand Saline, Colonel Weer detached parts of the 6th,
9th, and 10th Kansas regiments, and sent the 1st Indian regiment in
advance. By a forced night march they came up to the camp of Colonel
Clarkson, completely surprising him, capturing all his supplies, and
taking one hundred prisoners; among them the colonel himself.

"The Creek Indians were first in the fight, led by Lieutenant Colonel
Wattles and Major Ellithorpe. We do not hear that any white man fired
a gun unless it was to kill the surgeon of the 1st Indian regiment.
We were since informed that one white man was killed by the name of
McClintock, of the 9th Kansas regiment. In reality, it was a victory
gained by the 1st Indian regiment; and while the other forces would,
no doubt, have acted well, it is the height of injustice to claim
this victory for the whites...."--Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
_Report_, 1862, p. 162.]

The Confederates were worsted and lost their train and many prisoners.
Among the prisoners was Clarkson himself. His battalion was put to
flight and in that circumstance lay the worst aspect of the whole
engagement; for the routed men fled towards Tahlequah and spread
consternation among the Indians gathered there, also among those who
saw them by the way or heard of them. Thoroughly frightened the red
men sought refuge within the Federal lines. Such conduct was to be
expected of primitive people, who invariably incline towards the
side of the victor; but, in this case, it was most disastrous to the
Confederate Indian alliance. For the second time since the war began,
Colonel John Drew's enlisted men defected from their own ranks[337]
and, with the exception of a small body under Captain Pickens
Benge,[338] went boldly over to the enemy. The result was, that the
Second Indian Home Guard, Ritchie's regiment, which had not previously
been filled up, had soon the requisite number of men[339] and there
were more to spare. Indeed, during the days that followed, so many
recruits came in, nearly all of them Cherokees, that lists were opened
for starting a third regiment of Indian Home Guards.[340] It was not
long before it was organized, accepted by Blunt, and W.A. Phillips
commissioned as its colonel.[341] The regular mustering in of the new
recruits had to be done at Fort Scott and thither Ritchie sent the
men, intended for his regiment, immediately.

The Indian Expedition had started out with a very definite preliminary
programme respecting the

[Footnote 337: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 138.]

[Footnote 338: Hindman's Report, Ibid., 40.]

[Footnote 339: Ritchie to Blunt, July 5, 1862, Ibid., 463-464.]

[Footnote 340: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 488.]

[Footnote 341: Blunt to Salomon, August 3, 1862, Ibid., 532;
Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 304.]

management of Indian affairs, particularly as those affairs might
be concerned with the future attitude of the Cherokee Nation. The
programme comprised instructions that emanated from both civil and
military sources. The special Indian agents, Carruth and Martin, had
been given suitable tasks to perform and the instructions handed them
have already been commented upon. Personally, these two men were very
much disposed to magnify the importance of their own position and
to resent anything that looked like interference on the part of the
military. As a matter of fact, the military men treated them with
scant courtesy and made little or no provision for their comfort and
convenience.[342] Colonel Weer seems to have ignored, at times, their
very existence. On more than one occasion, for instance, he deplored
the absence of some official, accredited by the Indian Office, to take
charge of what he contemptuously called "this Indian business,"[343]
which business, he felt, greatly complicated all military
undertakings[344] and was decidedly beyond the bounds of his peculiar

[Footnote 342: Pretty good evidence of this appears in a letter, which
Carruth and Martin jointly addressed to Coffin, September 4, 1862,
in anticipation of the Second Indian Expedition, their idea being to
guard against a repetition of some of the experiences of the first.
"We wish to call your attention," wrote they, "to the necessity of
our being allowed a wagon to haul our clothing, tents, etc. in the
Southern expedition.

"In the last expedition we had much annoyance for the want of
accommodations of our own. Unless we are always by at the moment of
moving, our things are liable to be left behind, that room may be made
for _army baggage_ which sometimes accumulates amazingly....

"The cold nights of autumn and winter will overtake us in the next
expedition and we ought to go prepared for them. We must carry many
things, as clothing, blankets, etc."--General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 343: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 344:--Ibid., 487.]

[Footnote 345: Weer, nevertheless, was not long in developing some
very pronounced ideas on the subject of Indian relations. The earliest
and best indication of (cont.)]

The military instructions for the management of Indian affairs
outlined a policy exceedingly liberal, a policy that proceeded upon
the assumption that stress of circumstances had conditioned the Indian
alliance with the Confederacy. This idea was explicitly conveyed in
a communication from Weer, through his acting assistant
adjutant-general, to John Ross, and again in the orders issued
to Salomon and Judson. Ross and his people were to be given an
opportunity to return to their allegiance, confident that the United
States government would henceforth protect them.[346] And the military
commanders were invited to give their "careful attention to the
delicate position" which the Indian Expedition would occupy

    In its relation to the Indians. The evident desire of the
    government is to restore friendly intercourse with the tribes and
    return the loyal Indians that are with us to their homes. Great
    care must be observed that no unusual degree of vindictiveness be
    tolerated between Indian and Indian. Our policy toward the rebel
    portion must be a subject of anxious consideration, and its
    character will to a great degree be shaped by yourself (Judson) in
    conjunction with Colonel Salomon. No settled policy can at
    present be marked out. Give all questions their full share of
    investigation. No spirit of private vengeance should be

After the skirmish at Locust Grove, Colonel Weer deemed that the
appropriate moment had come for approaching John Ross with suggestions
that the Cherokee Nation abandon its Confederate ally and return to
its allegiance to the United States government. From

[Footnote 345: (cont.) that is to be found in his letter of July
twelfth, in which he gave his opinion of the negroes, whom he found
very insolent. He proposed that the Cherokee Nation should abolish
slavery by vote.]

[Footnote 346: J.A. Phillips to Ross, June 26, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 450.]

[Footnote 347: Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862, Ibid., 456.
Orders, almost identically the same, were issued to Salomon. See
Phillips to Salomon, June 27, 1862, Ibid., 452.]

his camp on Wolf Creek, therefore, he addressed a conciliatory
communication[348] to the Cherokee chief, begging the favor of an
interview and offering to make full reparation for any outrages or
reprisals that his men, in defiance of express orders to the contrary,
might have made upon the Cherokee people through whose country they
had passed.[349] Weer had known for several days, indeed, ever since
he first crossed the line, that the natives were thoroughly alarmed at
the coming of the Indian Expedition. They feared reprisals and Indian
revenge and, whenever possible, had fled out of reach of danger, many
of them across the Arkansas River, taking with them what of their
property they could.[350] Weer had done his best to restrain his
troops, especially the Indian, and had been very firm in insisting
that no "outrages perpetrated after Indian fashion" should occur.[351]

Weer's message to Ross was sent, under a flag of truce, by Doctor
Gillpatrick, a surgeon in the Indian Expedition, who had previously
served under Lane.[352] Ross's reply,[353] although prompt, was
scarcely satisfactory from Weer's standpoint. He refused pointblank
the request for an interview and reminded Weer that the Cherokee
Nation, "under the sanction and authority of the whole Cherokee
people," had made a formal alliance with the Confederate government

[Footnote 348: Weer to Ross, July 7, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 464.]

[Footnote 349: That there had been outrages and reprisals, Carruth and
Martin admitted but they claimed that they had been committed by white
men and wrongfully charged against Indians [Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 162-163].]

[Footnote 350: Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 351:--Ibid., 452, 456, 461.]

[Footnote 352: _Daily Conservative_, December 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 353: Ross to Weer, July 8, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 486-487; Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. v, 549.]

proposed to remain true, as had ever been its custom, to its treaty
obligations. To fortify his position, he submitted documents
justifying his own and tribal actions since the beginning of the
war.[354] Weer was naturally much embarrassed. Apparently, he had had
the notion that the Indians would rush into the arms of the Union
with the first appearance of a Federal soldier; but he was grievously
mistaken. None the less, verbal reports that reached his headquarters
on Wolf Creek restored somewhat his equanimity and gave him the
impression that Ross, thoroughly anti-secessionist at heart himself,
was acting diplomatically and biding his time.[355] Weer referred[356]
the matter to Blunt for instructions at the very moment when Blunt,
ignorant that he had already had communication with Ross, was
urging[357] him to be expeditious, since it was "desirable to
return the refugee Indians now in Kansas to their homes as soon as

There were other reasons, more purely military, why a certain haste
was rather necessary. Some of those reasons inspired Colonel Weer
to have the country around about him well reconnoitered. On the
fourteenth of July, he sent out two detachments. One, led by Major
W.T. Campbell, was to examine "the alleged position of the enemy south
of the Arkansas," and the other, led by Captain H.S. Greeno, to repair
to Tahlequah and Park Hill.[358] Campbell, before he had advanced far,
found out that there was a strong Confederate force at Fort Davis[359]
so he halted at Fort Gibson and was

[Footnote 354: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 487. The documents are to be found
accompanying Weer's letter, Ibid., 489-505.]

[Footnote 355: Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, Ibid., 486.]

[Footnote 356: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Ibid.,

[Footnote 357: Blunt to Weer, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 488-489.]

[Footnote 358: Weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Ibid.,

[Footnote 359: Campbell to Weer, July 14, 1862, Ibid., 161.]

there joined by Weer. Meanwhile, Greeno with his detachment of one
company of whites and fifty Cherokee Indians had reached Tahlequah and
had gone into camp two and one-half miles to the southward.[360] He
was then not far from Park Hill, the residence of Chief Ross. All the
way down he had been on the watch for news; but the only forces he
could hear of were some Indian, who were believed to be friendly to
the Union although ostensibly still serving the Confederacy. It was a
time of crisis both with them and with him; for their leaders had just
been summoned by Colonel Cooper, now in undisputed command north
of the Canadian, to report immediately for duty at Fort Davis, his
headquarters. Whatever was to be done would have to be done quickly.
There was no time to lose and Greeno decided the matter for all
concerned by resorting to what turned out to be a very clever
expedient. He made the commissioned men all prisoners of war[361] and
then turned his attention to the Principal Chief, who was likewise in
a dilemma, he having received a despatch from Cooper ordering him,
under authority of treaty provisions and "in the name of President
Davis, Confederate States of America, to issue a proclamation calling
on all Cherokee Indians over 18 and under 35 to come forward and
assist in protecting the country from invasion."[362] Greeno thought
the matter over and concluded there was nothing for him to do but to
capture Ross also and to release him, subsequently, on parole. These
things he did and there were many people who thought, both then and

[Footnote 360: Greeno to Weer, July 15, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 473; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 19, 1862,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 158-160.]

[Footnote 361: Greeno to Weer, July 17, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 161-162.]

[Footnote 362: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 473.]

afterwards, that the whole affair had been arranged for beforehand and
that victor and victim had been in collusion with each other all the
way through.

Up to this point the Indian Expedition can be said to have met with
more than a fair measure of success; but its troubles were now to
begin or rather to assert themselves; for most of them had been
present since the very beginning. Fundamental to everything else was
the fact that it was summer-time and summer-time, too, in a prairie
region. Troops from the north, from Wisconsin and from Ohio, were
not acclimated and they found the heat of June and July almost
insufferable. There were times when they lacked good drinking
water, which made bad matters worse. The Germans were particularly
discontented and came to despise the miserable company in which they
found themselves. It was miserable, not so much because it was largely
Indian, but because it was so ill-equipped and so disorderly. At
Cowskin Prairie, the scouts had to be called in, not because their
work was finished, but because they and their ponies were no longer
equal to it.[363] They had played out for the simple reason that they
were not well fitted out. The country east of Grand River was "very
broken and flinty and their ponies unshod." It has been claimed,
although maybe with some exaggeration, that not "a single horse-shoe
or nail" had been provided for Colonel Salomon's brigade.[364]

The supplies of the Indian Expedition were insufficient and, although
at Spavinaw Creek Colonel Watie's entire commissary had been
captured[365] and Clarkson's at Locust Grove, there was great
scarcity. Weer had

[Footnote 363: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 364: Love, _Wisconsin in the War of Rebellion_, 580.]

[Footnote 365: Anderson, Life of General Stand Watìe, 19.]

been cautioned again and again not to cut himself off from easy
communication with Fort Scott.[366] He had shown a disposition to
wander widely from the straight road to Fort Gibson; but Blunt had
insisted that he refrain altogether from making excursions into
adjoining states.[367] He had himself realized the shortness of his
provisions and had made a desperate effort to get to the Grand
Saline so as to replenish his supply of salt at the place where the
Confederates had been manufacturing that article for many months. He
had known also that for some things, such as ordnance stores, he would
have to look even as far as Fort Leavenworth.[368]

The climax of all these affairs was reached July 18, 1862. On that
day, Frederick Salomon, colonel of the First Brigade, took matters
into his own hands and arrested his superior officer. It was
undoubtedly a clear case of mutiny[369] but there was much to be said
in extenuation of Salomon's conduct. The reasons for his action, as
stated in a _pronunciamento_[370] to his associates in command
and as submitted to General Blunt[371] are here given. They speak for

  Headquarters Indian Expedition,
  Camp on Grand River, July 18, 1862.

To Commanders of the different Corps constituting Indian Expedition:

Sirs: In military as well as civil affairs great and violent wrongs
need speedy and certain remedies. The time had arrived, in my
judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong
ever perpetrated upon any troops was about

[Footnote 366: Consider, for example, Blunt's orders of July 14
[_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 472].]

[Footnote 367: Blunt to Weer, July 3, 1862, Ibid., 461.]

[Footnote 368: Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 369: As such the Indian agents regarded it. See their
communication on the subject, July 19, 1862, Ibid., 478.]

[Footnote 370: Ibid., 475-476.]

[Footnote 371: Ibid., 484-485.]

to fall with crushing weight upon the noble men composing the command.
Some one must act, and that at once, or starvation and capture were
the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.

As next in command to Colonel Weer, and upon his express refusal to
move at all for the salvation of his troops, I felt the responsibility
resting upon me.

I have arrested Colonel Weer and assumed command.

The causes leading to this arrest you all know. I need not reiterate
them here. Suffice to say that we are 160 miles from the base of
operations, almost entirely through an enemy's country, and without
communication being left open behind us. We have been pushed forward
thus far by forced and fatiguing marches under the violent southern
sun without any adequate object. By Colonel Weer's orders we were
forced to encamp where our famishing men were unable to obtain
anything but putrid, stinking water. Our reports for disability and
unfitness for duty were disregarded; our cries for help and complaints
of unnecessary hardships and suffering were received with closed ears.
Yesterday a council of war, convened by the order of Colonel Weer,
decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point from
which we could reopen communication with our commissary depot. Colonel
Weer overrides and annuls the decision of that council, and announces
his determination not to move from this point. We have but three days'
rations on hand and an order issued by him putting the command on half
rations. For nearly two weeks we have no communication from our rear.
We have no knowledge when supply trains will reach us, neither has
Colonel Weer. Three sets of couriers, dispatched at different times
to find these trains and report, have so far made no report. Reliable
information has been received that large bodies of the enemy were
moving to our rear, and yet we lay here idle. We are now and ever
since our arrival here have been entirely without vegetables or
healthy food for our troops. I have stood with arms folded and seen my
men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn because I
thought myself powerless to save them.

I will look upon this scene no longer. I know the responsibility I
have assumed. I have acted after careful thought

and deliberation. Give me your confidence for a few days, and all that
man can do, and with a pure purpose and a firm faith that he is right,
shall be done for the preservation of the troops.

  F. Salomon, _Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols_.,
              _Comdg. Indian Expedition_.

  Headquarters Indian Expedition,
  Camp on Wolf Creek, Cherokee Nation, July 20, 1862.
  Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,

_Commanding Department of Kansas_:

Sir: I have the honor to report that I have arrested Col. William
Weer, commanding the Indian Expedition, and have assumed command.
Among the numerous reasons for this step a few of the chief are as

From the day of our first report to him we have found him a man
abusive and violent in his intercourse with his fellow-officers,
notoriously intemperate in habits, entirely disregarding military
usages and discipline, always rash in speech, act, and orders,
refusing to inferior officers and their reports that consideration
which is due an officer of the U.S. Army.

Starting from Cowskin Prairie on the 1st instant, we were pushed
rapidly forward to the vicinity of Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas River,
a distance of 160 miles from Fort Scott. No effort was made by him to
keep communication open behind us. It seemed he desired none. We
had but twenty-three days' rations on hand. As soon as he reached
a position on Grand River 14 miles from Fort Gibson his movements
suddenly ceased. We could then have crossed the Arkansas River, but it
seemed there was no object to be attained in his judgment by such a
move. There we lay entirely idle from the 9th to the 19th. We had at
last reached the point when we had but three days' rations on hand.
Something must be done. We were in a barren country, with a large
force of the enemy in front of us, a large and now impassable river
between us, and no news from our train or from our base of operations
for twelve days. What were we to do? Colonel Weer called a council of
war, at which he stated that the Arkansas River was now impassable
to our forces; that a train containing commissary stores had been
expected for three days; that three different sets of couriers sent
out some time previous had

entirely failed to report; that he had been twelve days entirely
without communication with or from the department, and that he had
received reliable information that a large force of the enemy were
moving to our rear via the Verdigris River for the purpose of cutting
off our train.

Upon this and other information the council of war decided that our
only safety lay in falling back to some point where we could reopen
communication and learn the whereabouts of our train of subsistence.
To this decision of the council he at the time assented, and said that
he would arrange with the commanders of brigades the order of march.
Subsequently he issued an order putting the command on half rations,
declaring that he would not fall back, and refused utterly, upon my
application, to take any steps for the safety or salvation of his
command. I could but conclude that the man was either insane,
premeditated treachery to his troops, or perhaps that his grossly
intemperate habits long continued had produced idiocy or monomania.
In either case the command was imperiled, and a military necessity
demanded that something be done, and that without delay. I took the
only step I believed available to save your troops. I arrested this
man, have drawn charges against him, and now hold him subject to your

On the morning of the 19th I commenced a retrograde march and have
fallen back with my main force to this point.

You will see by General Orders, No. 1, herewith forwarded, that I have
stationed the First and Second Regiments Indian Home Guards as a corps
of observation along the Grand and Verdigris Rivers; also to guard the
fords of the Arkansas. Yesterday evening a courier reached me at Prior
Creek with dispatches saying that a commissary train was at Hudson's
Crossing, 75 miles north of us, waiting for an additional force as an
escort. Information also reaches me this morning that Colonel Watie,
with a force of 1,200 men, passed up the east side of Grand River
yesterday for the purpose of cutting off this train. I have sent out
strong reconnoitering parties to the east of the river, and if the
information proves reliable will take such further measures as I deem
best for its security.

I design simply to hold the country we are now in, and will make
no important moves except such as I may deem necessary for the
preservation of this command until I receive specific

instructions from you. I send Major Burnett with a small escort to
make his way through to you. He will give you more at length the
position of this command, their condition, &c.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. Salomon, _Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols_.,
_Comdg. Indian Expedition_.

Salomon's insubordination brought the Indian Expedition in its
original form to an abrupt end, much to the disgust and righteous
indignation of the Indian service. The arrest of Colonel Weer threw
the whole camp into confusion,[372] and it was some hours before
anything like order could be restored. A retrograde movement of the
white troops had evidently been earlier resolved upon and was at once
undertaken. Of such troops, Salomon assumed personal command and
ordered them to begin a march northward at two o'clock on the morning
of the nineteenth.[373] At the same time, he established the troops,
he was so brutally abandoning, as a corps of observation on or near
the Verdigris and Grand Rivers. They were thus expected to cover his
retreat, while he, unhampered, proceeded to Hudson's Crossing.[374]

With the departure of Salomon and subordinate commanders in sympathy
with his retrograde movement, Robert W. Furnas, colonel of the First
Indian, became the ranking officer in the field. Consequently it was
his duty to direct the movements of the troops that remained. The
troops were those of the three Indian regiments, the third of which
had not yet been formally recognized and accepted by the government.
Not all of these troops were in camp when the arrest of Weer took
place. One of the last official acts of Weer as

[Footnote 372: Carruth and Martin to Blunt, July 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 373: Blocki, by order of Salomon, July 18, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 477.]

[Footnote 374: Carruth and Martin to Coffin, August 2, 1862.]

commander of the Indian Expedition had been to order the First Indian
to proceed to the Verdigris River and to take position "in the
vicinity of Vann's Ford." Only a detachment of about two hundred men
had as yet gone there, however, and they were there in charge of
Lieutenant A.C. Ellithorpe. A like detachment of the Third Indian,
under John A. Foreman, major, had been posted at Fort Gibson.[375]
Salomon's _pronunciamento_ and his order, placing the Indian
regiments as a corps of observation on the Verdigris and Grand Rivers,
were not communicated to the regimental commanders of the Indian Home
Guard until July 22;[376] but they had already met, had conferred
among themselves, and had decided that it would be bad policy to take
the Indians out of the Territory.[377] They, therefore agreed to
consolidate the three regiments into a brigade, Furnas in command,
and to establish camp and headquarters on the Verdigris, about twelve
miles directly west of the old camp on the Grand.[378]

The brigading took place as agreed upon and Furnas, brigade commander,
retained his colonelcy of the First Indian, while Lieutenant-colonel
David B. Corwin took command of the Second and Colonel William
A. Phillips of the Third. Colonel Ritchie had, prior to recent
happenings, been detached from his command in order to conduct a party
of prisoners to Fort Leavenworth, also to arrange for the mustering in
of Indian recruits.[379] But two days' rations were on hand, so jerked
beef was accepted as the chief article of diet until other supplies
could be obtained.[380] There was likely to be plenty of

[Footnote 375: Furnas to Blunt, July 25, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 512.]

[Footnote 376:--Ibid., 512.]

[Footnote 377: Britton, _Civil War on the border_, vol. i, 309.]

[Footnote 378: _Official Records_, vol. xii, 512; Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 163.]

[Footnote 379: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

[Footnote 380: Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 25, 1862,
Ibid., 160.]

that; for, as Weer had once reported, cattle were a drug on the market
in the Cherokee country, the prairies "covered with thousands of
them."[381] The encampment on the Verdigris was made forthwith; but it
was a failure from the start.

The Indians of the First Regiment showed signs of serious
demoralization and became unmanageable, while a large number of the
Second deserted.[382] It was thought that deprivation in the midst of
plenty, the lack of good water and of the restraining influence of
white troops had had much to do with the upheaval, although there had
been much less plundering since they left than when they were present.
With much of truth back of possible hatred and malice, the special
agents reported that such protection as the white men had recently
given Indian Territory "would ruin any country on earth."[383]

With the hope that the morale of the men would be restored were they
to be more widely distributed and their physical conditions improved,
Colonel Furnas concluded to break camp on the Verdigris and return to
the Grand. He accordingly marched the Third Indian to Pryor Creek[384]
but had scarcely done so when orders came from Salomon, under cover of
his usurped authority as commander of the Indian Expedition, for
him to cross the Grand and advance northeastward to Horse Creek and
vicinity, there to pitch his tents. The new camp was christened Camp
Wattles. It extended from Horse to Wolf Creek and constituted a point
from which the component parts of the Indian Brigade did

[Footnote 381: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862.]

[Footnote 382: Furnas to Blunt, July 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 383: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

[Footnote 384: Named in honor of Nathaniel Pryor of the Lewis and
Clark expedition and of general frontier fame, and, therefore,
incorrectly called Prior Creek in Furnas's report.]

extensive scouting for another brief period. In reality, Furnas was
endeavoring to hold the whole of the Indian country north of the
Arkansas and south of the border.[385]

Meanwhile, Salomon had established himself in the neighborhood of
Hudson's Crossing, at what he called, Camp Quapaw. The camp was on
Quapaw land. His idea was, and he so communicated to Blunt, that he
had selected "the most commanding point in this (the trans-Missouri)
country not only from a military view as a key to the valleys of
Spring River, Shoal Creek, Neosho, and Grand River, but also as the
only point in this country now where an army could be sustained with a
limited supply of forage and subsistence, offering ample grazing[386]
and good water."[387] No regular investigation into his conduct
touching the retrograde movement, such as justice to Weer would seem
to have demanded, was made.[388] He submitted the facts to Blunt and
Blunt, at first alarmed[389] lest a complete abandonment of Indian
Territory would result, acquiesced[390] when, he found that the Indian
regiments were holding their own there.[391] Salomon, indeed, so far
strengthened Furnas's hand as to supply him with ten days rations and
a section of Allen's battery.

[Footnote 385: For accounts of the movements of the Indian Expedition
after the occurrence of Salomon's retrograde movement, see the
_Daily Conservative_, August 16, 21, 26, 1862.]

[Footnote 386: On the subject of grazing, see Britton, _Civil War on
the Border_, vol. i, 308.]

[Footnote 387: Salomon to Blunt, July 29, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 521.]

[Footnote 388: H.S. Lane called Stanton's attention to the matter,
however, Ibid., 485.]

[Footnote 389: Blunt to Salomon, August 3, 1862, Ibid.,

[Footnote 390: He acquiesced as, perforce, he had to do but he was
very far from approving.]

[Footnote 391: In November, Dole reported to Smith that Salomon's
retrograde movement had caused about fifteen hundred or two thousand
additional refugees to flee into Kansas. Dole urged that the Indian
Expedition should be reenforced and strengthened [Indian Office
_Report Book_, no. 12, 503-504].]


The retrograde movement of Colonel Salomon and the white auxiliary of
the Indian Expedition was peculiarly unfortunate and ill-timed since,
owing to circumstances now to be related in detail, the Confederates
had really no forces at hand at all adequate to repel invasion. On the
thirty-first of May, as earlier narrated in this work, General Hindman
had written to General Pike instructing him to move his entire
infantry force of whites and Woodruff's single six-gun battery to
Little Rock without delay. In doing this, he admitted that, while
it was regrettable that Pike's force in Indian Territory should be
reduced, it was imperative that Arkansas should be protected, her
danger being imminent. He further ordered, that Pike should supply the
command to be sent forward with subsistence for thirty days, should
have the ammunition transported in wagons, and should issue orders
that not a single cartridge be used on the journey.[392]

To one of Pike's proud spirit, such orders could be nothing short
of galling. He had collected his force and everything he possessed
appertaining to it at the cost of much patience, much labor, much
expense. Untiring vigilance had alone made possible the formation of
his brigade and an unselfish willingness to advance his own funds had
alone furnished it with quartermaster and commissary stores. McCulloch
and Van

[Footnote 392: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 934.]

Dorn[393] each in turn had diverted his supplies from their destined
course, yet he had borne with it all, uncomplainingly. He had even
broken faith with the Indian nations at Van Dorn's instance; for,
contrary to the express terms of the treaties that he had negotiated,
he had taken the red men across the border, without their express
consent, to fight in the Pea Ridge campaign. And with what result?
Base ingratitude on the part of Van Dorn, who, in his official report
of the three day engagement, ignored the help rendered[394] and left
Pike to bear the stigma[395] of Indian atrocities alone.

With the thought of that ingratitude still rankling in his breast,
Pike noted additional features of Hindman's first instructions to him,
which were, that he should advance his Indian force to the northern
border of Indian Territory and hold it there to resist invasion from
Kansas. He was expected to do this unsupported

[Footnote 393: Van Dorn would seem to have been a gross offender in
this respect. Similar charges were made against him by other men and
on other occasions [_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement,

[Footnote 394: It was matter of common report that Van Dorn despised
Pike's Indians [Ibid., vol. xiii, 814-816]. The entire Arkansas
delegation in Congress, with the exception of A.H. Garland, testified
to Van Dorn's aversion for the Indians [Ibid., 815].]

[Footnote 395: How great was that stigma can be best understood from
the following: "The horde of Indians scampered off to the mountains
from whence they had come, having murdered and scalped many of the
Union wounded. General Pike, their leader, led a feeble band to the
heights of Big Mountain, near Elk Horn, where he was of no use to
the battle of the succeeding day, and whence he fled, between roads,
through the woods, disliked by the Confederates and detested by the
Union men; to be known in history as a son of New Hampshire--a poet
who sang of flowers and the beauties of the sunset skies, the joys of
love and the hopes of the soul--and yet one who, in the middle of the
19th century, led a merciless, scalping, murdering, uncontrollable
horde of half-tame savages in the defense of slavery--themselves
slave-holders--against that Union his own native State was then
supporting, and against the flag of liberty. He scarcely struck a blow
in open fight.... His service was servile and corrupt; his flight
was abject, and his reward disgrace."--_War Papers and Personal
Recollections of the Missouri Commandery_, 232.]

by white troops, the need of which, for moral as well as for physical
strength, he had always insisted upon.

It is quite believable that Van Dorn was the person most responsible
for Hindman's interference with Pike, although, of course, the very
seriousness and desperateness of Hindman's situation would have
impelled him to turn to the only place where ready help was to be had.
Three days prior to the time that Hindman had been assigned to the
Trans-Mississippi Department, Roane, an old antagonist of Pike[396]
and the commander to whose immediate care Van Dorn had confided
Arkansas,[397] had asked of Pike at Van Dorn's suggestion[398] all the
white forces he could spare, Roane having practically none of his own.
Pike had refused the request, if request it was, and in refusing it,
had represented how insufficient his forces actually were for purposes
of his own department and how exceedingly difficult had been the task,
which was his and his alone, of getting them together. At the time of
writing he had not a single dollar of public money for his army and
only a very limited amount of ammunition and other supplies.[399]

Pike received Hindman's communication of May 31 late in the afternoon
of June 8 and he replied to it that same evening immediately after
he had made arrangements[400] for complying in part with its

The reply[401] as it stands in the records today is a strong
indictment of the Confederate management of Indian

[Footnote 396: Pike had fought a duel with Roane, Roane having
challenged him because he had dared to criticize his conduct in
the Mexican War [Hallura, _Biographical and Pictorial History of
Arkansas_, vol. i, 229; _Confederate Military History_, vol.
x, 99].]

[Footnote 397: Maury to Roane, May 11, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 827.]

[Footnote 398: Maury to Pike, May 19, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 399: Pike to Roane, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 935-936.]

[Footnote 400: General Orders, June 8, 1862, Ibid., 943.]

[Footnote 401: Pike to Hindman, June 8, 1862, Ibid., 936-943.]

affairs in the West and should be dealt with analytically, yet also as
a whole; since no paraphrase, no mere synopsis of contents could ever
do the subject justice. From the facts presented, it is only too
evident that very little had been attempted or done by the Richmond
authorities for the Indian regiments. Neither officers nor men had
been regularly or fully paid. And not all the good intentions, few as
they were, of the central government had been allowed realization.
They had been checkmated by the men in control west of the
Mississippi. In fact, the army men in Arkansas had virtually exploited
Pike's command, had appropriated for their own use his money, his
supplies, and had never permitted anything to pass on to Indian
Territory, notwithstanding that it had been bought with Indian funds,
"that was fit to be sent anywhere else." The Indian's portion was the
"refuse," as Pike so truly, bitterly, and emphatically put it, or, in
other words of his, the "crumbs" that fell from the white man's table.

Pike's compliance with Hindman's orders was only partial and he
offered not the vestige of an apology that it was so. What he did send
was Dawson's[402] infantry regiment and Woodruff's battery which went
duly on to Little Rock with the requisite thirty days' subsistence and
the caution that not a single cartridge was to be fired along the way.
The caution Pike must have repeated in almost ironical vein; for the
way to Little Rock lay through Indian Territory and cartridges like
everything else under Pike's control had been collected solely for its

Respecting the forward movement of the Indian troops, Pike made not
the slightest observation in his

[Footnote 402: C.L. Dawson of the Nineteenth Regiment of Arkansas
Volunteers had joined Pike at Fort McCulloch in April [_Fort Smith

reply. His silence was ominous. Perhaps it was intended as a warning
to Hindman not to encroach too far upon his department; but that is
mere conjecture; inasmuch as Pike had not yet seen fit to question
outright Hindman's authority over himself. As if anticipating an echo
from Little Rock of criticisms that were rife elsewhere, he ventured
an explanation of his conduct in establishing himself in the extreme
southern part of Indian Territory and towards the west and in
fortifying on an open prairie, far from any recognized base.[403] He
had gone down into the Red River country, he asserted, in order to be
near Texas where supplies might be had in abundance and where, since
he had no means of defence, he would be safe from attack. He deplored
the seeming necessity of merging his department in another and larger
one. His reasons were probably many but the one reason he stressed
was, for present purposes, the best he could have offered. It
was, that the Indians could not be expected to render to him as a
subordinate the same obedience they had rendered to him as the chief
officer in command. Were his authority to be superseded in any degree,
the Indians would naturally infer that his influence at Richmond had
declined, likewise his power to protect them and their interests.

During the night Pike must have pondered deeply

[Footnote 403: His enemies were particularly scornful of his work
in this regard. They poked fun at him on every possible occasion.
Edwards, in _Shelby and His Men_, 63, but echoed the general

"Pike, also a Brigadier, had retreated with his Indian contingent out
of North West Arkansas, unpursued, through the Cherokee country, the
Chickasaw country, and the country of the Choctaws, two hundred and
fifty miles to the southward, only halting on the 'Little Blue', an
unknown thread of a stream, twenty miles from Red river, where he
constructed fortifications on the open prairie, erected a saw-mill
remote from any timber, and devoted himself to gastronomy and poetic
meditation, with elegant accompaniments..."]

over things omitted from his reply to Hindman and over all that was
wanting to make his compliance with Hindman's instructions full and
satisfactory. On the ninth, his assistant-adjutant, O.F. Russell,
prepared a fairly comprehensive report[404] of the conditions in and
surrounding his command. Pike's force,[405] so the report stated, was
anything but complete. With Dawson gone, there would be in camp, of
Arkansas troops, one company of cavalry and one of artillery and, of
Texas, two companies of cavalry. When men, furloughed for the wheat
harvest, should return, there would be "in addition two regiments
and one company of cavalry, and one company of artillery, about 80
strong."[406] The withdrawal of white troops from the Territory would
be interpreted by the Indians to mean its abandonment.

Of the Indian contingent, Russell had this to say:

    The two Cherokee regiments are near the Kansas line, operating on
    that frontier. Col. Stand Watie has recently had a skirmish there,
    in which, as always, he and his men fought gallantly, and were
    successful. Col. D.N. McIntosh's Creek Regiment is under orders to
    advance up the Verdigris, toward the Santa Fé road. Lieut. Col.
    Chilly McIntosh's Creek Battalion, Lieut. Col. John Jumper's
    Seminole Battalion, and Lieut. Col. J.D. Harris' Chickasaw
    Battalion are under orders, and part of them now in motion toward
    the Salt Plains, to take Fort Larned, the post at Walnut Creek,
    and perhaps Fort Wise, and intercept trains going to New Mexico.
    The First Choctaw (new)[407] Regiment, of Col. Sampson Folsom,
    and the Choctaw Battalion (three companies), of Maj. Simpson (N.)
    Folsom, are at Middle Boggy, 23 miles northeast of this point.
    They were under orders to march northward to

[Footnote 404: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 943-945.]

[Footnote 405: For tabulated showing of Pike's brigade, see
Ibid., 831.]

[Footnote 406: Compare Russell's statement with Hindman's
[Ibid., 30]. See also Maury to Price, March 22, 1862
[Ibid., vol. viii, 798].]

[Footnote 407: The parentheses appear here as in the original.]

    the Salt Plains and Santa Fé road; but the withdrawal of Colonel
    Dawson's regiment prevents that, and the regiment is now ordered
    to take position here, and the battalion to march to and take
    position at Camp McIntosh, 17 miles this side of Fort Cobb, where,
    with Hart's Spies, 40 in number, it will send out parties to
    the Wichita Mountains and up the False Wichita, and prevent, if
    possible, depredations on the frontier of Texas.

    The First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment, of Col. Douglas H.
    Cooper, goes out of service on the 25th and 26th of July. It is
    now encamped 11 miles east of here.... The country to the westward
    is quiet, all the Comanches this side of the Staked Plains being
    friendly, and the Kiowas[408] having made peace, and selected
    a home to live at on Elk Creek, not far from the site of Camp
    Radziwintski, south of the Wichita Mountains.

    The Indian troops have been instructed, if the enemy[409] invades
    the country, to harass him, and impede his progress by every
    possible means, and, falling back here as he advances, to assist
    in holding this position against him.

Included in Russell's report there might well have been much
interesting data respecting the condition of the troops that Pike
was parting with; for it can scarcely be said that he manifested any
generosity in sending them forth. He obeyed the letter of his order
and ignored its spirit. He permitted no guns to be taken out of the
Territory that had been paid for with money that he had furnished.
Dawson's regiment had not its full quota of men, but that was scarcely
Pike's fault. Neither was it his fault that its equipment was so
sadly below par that it could make but very slow progress on the nine
hundred mile march between Fort McCulloch and Little Rock. Moreover,
the health of the

[Footnote 408: Pike had just received assurances of the friendly
disposition of the Kiowas [Bickel to Pike, June 1, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 936].]

[Footnote 409: The enemy in mind was the Indian Expedition. Pike had
heard that Sturgis had been removed "on account of his tardiness in
not invading the Indian country...." [Ibid., 944].]

men was impaired, their duties, especially the "fort duties, throwing
up intrenchments, etc.,"[410] had been very fatiguing. Pike had no
wagons to spare them for the trip eastward. So many of his men had
obtained furloughs for the harvest season and every company, in
departing, had taken with it a wagon,[411] no one having any thought
that there would come a call decreasing Pike's command.

So slowly and laboriously did Dawson's regiment progress that Hindman,
not hearing either of it or of Woodruff's battery, which was slightly
in advance, began to have misgivings as to the fate of his orders of
May 31. He, therefore, repeated them in substance, on June 17, with
the additional specific direction that Pike should "move at once to
Fort Gibson." That order Pike received June 24, the day following his
issuance of instructions to his next in command, Colonel D.H. Cooper,
that he should hasten to the country north of the Canadian and there
take command of all forces except Chief Jumper's.

The receipt of Hindman's order of June 17 was the signal for Pike
to pen another lengthy letter[412] of description and protest.
Interspersed through it were his grievances, the same that were
recited in the letter of June 8, but now more elaborately dwelt upon.
Pike was getting irritable. He declared that he had done all he could
to expedite the movement of his troops. The odds were unquestionably
against him. His Indians were doing duty in different places. Most
of the men of his white cavalry force were off on furlough. Their
furloughs would not expire until the

[Footnote 410: Dawson to Hindman, June 20, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 945-946.]

[Footnote 411: Dawson had allowed his wagons to go "of his own motion"
[Pike to Hindman, June 24, 1862, Ibid., 947].]

[Footnote 412:--Ibid., 947-950.]

twenty-fifth and not until the twenty-seventh could they be
proceeded against as deserters. Not until that date, too, would the
reorganization, preliminary to marching, be possible. He was short of
transportation and half of what he had was unserviceable.

Of his available Indian force, he had made what disposition to
him seemed best. He had ordered the newly-organized First Choctaw
Regiment, under Colonel Sampson Folsom, to Fort Gibson and had
assigned Cooper to the command north of the Canadian, which meant,
of course, the Cherokee country. Cooper's own regiment was the First
Choctaw and Chickasaw, of which, two companies, proceeding from
Scullyville, had already posted themselves in the upper part of the
Indian Territory, where also were the two Cherokee regiments, Watie's
and Drew's. The remaining eight companies of the First Choctaw and
Chickasaw were encamped near Fort McCulloch and would have, before
moving elsewhere, to await the reorganization of their regiment, now
near at hand. However, Cooper was not without hope that he could
effect reorganization promptly and take at least four companies
to join those that had just come from Scullyville. There were six
companies in the Chickasaw Battalion, two at Fort Cobb and four on the
march to Fort McCulloch; but they would all have to be left within
their own country for they were averse to moving out of it and were
in no condition to move. The three companies of the Choctaw Battalion
would also have to be left behind in the south for they had no
transportation with which to effect a removal. The Creek commands,
D.N. McIntosh's Creek Regiment, Chilly McIntosh's Creek Battalion, and
John Jumper's Seminole Battalion, were operating in the west, along

the Santa Fé Trail and towards Forts Larned and Wise.

June 17 might be said to mark the beginning of the real controversy
between Pike and Hindman; for, on that day, not only did Hindman
reiterate the order to hurry that aroused Pike's ire but he encroached
upon Pike's prerogative in a financial particular that was bound,
considering Pike's experiences in the past, to make for trouble.
Interference with his commissary Pike was determined not to brook,
yet, on June 17, Hindman put N. Bart Pearce in supreme control at
Fort Smith as commissary, acting quartermaster, and acting ordnance
officer.[413] His jurisdiction was to extend over northwestern
Arkansas and over the Indian Territory. Now Pike had had dealings
already with Pearce and thought that he knew too well the limits of
his probity. Exactly when Pike heard of Pearce's promotion is not
quite clear; but, on the twenty-third, Hindman sent him a conciliatory
note explaining that his intention was "to stop the operations of the
commissaries of wandering companies in the Cherokee Nation, who"
were "destroying the credit of the Confederacy by the floods of
certificates they" issued and not "to restrict officers acting under"
Pike's orders.[414] All very well, but Pearce had other ideas as to
the functions of his office and lost no time in apprising various
people of them. His notes[415] to Pike's officers were most
impertinently prompt. They were sent out on the twenty-fourth of June
and on the twenty-sixth Pike reported[416] the whole history of his
economic embarrassments to the Secretary of War.[417]

[Footnote 413: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 967.]

[Footnote 414:--Ibid., 946.]

[Footnote 415:--Ibid., 968, 968-969, 969.]

[Footnote 416:--Ibid., 841-844.]

[Footnote 417: George W. Randolph.]

His indignation must have been immense; but whether righteously so or
not, it was for others higher up to decide. That Pike had some sort of
a case against the men in Arkansas there can be no question. The tale
he told Secretary Randolph was a revelation such as would have put
ordinary men, if involved at all, to deepest shame. Hindman, perforce,
was the victim of accumulated resentment; for he, personally, had
done only a small part of that of which Pike complained. In the main,
Pike's report simply furnished particulars in matters, such as the
despoiling him of his hard-won supplies, of which mention has already
been made; and his chief accusation was little more than hinted at,
the gist of it being suggested in some of his concluding sentences:

    ... I struggled for a good while before I got rid of the curse of
    dependence for subsistence, transportation, and forage on officers
    at Fort Smith. I cannot even get from that place the supplies I
    provide myself and hardly my own private stores. My department
    quartermaster and commissary are fully competent to purchase what
    we need, and I mean they shall do it. I have set my face against
    all rascality and swindling and keep contractors in wholesome
    fear, and have made it publicly known by advertisement that I
    prefer to purchase of the farmer and producer and do not want any
    contractors interposed between me and them. My own officers will
    continue to purchase subsistence, transportation, forage, and
    whatever else I need until I am ordered to the contrary by you,
    and when that order comes it will be answered by my resignation.
    Mr. White's[418] contract will not be acted under here. I have
    beef enough on hand and engaged, and do not want any from him. I
    have had to buy bacon at 20 to 26 cents, and he ought to be made
    to pay every cent of the difference between that price and fifteen
    cents. I also strenuously object to receiving mules or anything
    else purchased at Fort Smith.

[Footnote 418: "George E. White, formerly a partner, I believe, of
Senator Oldham of Texas..."--_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 842.]

    I could get up a mule factory now with the skeletons I have,
    and there are a few miles from here 600 or 800 sent up by Major
    Clark[419] in even a worse plight.

    I know nothing about Major Pearce as a quartermaster nor of
    any right Major-General Hindman has to make him one. He is an
    assistant commissary of subsistence, with the rank of major, and
    Major Quesenbury, my brigade or department quartermaster, is major
    by an older commission....

    While I am here there will be no fine contracts for mules, hay,
    keeping of mules, beef on the hoof at long figures, or anything of
    the kind. Fort Smith is very indignant at this, and out of this
    grief grows the anxious desire of many patriots to see me resign
    the command of this country or be removed....[420]

Subsequent communications[421] from Pike to Randolph reported the
continued despoiling of his command and the persistent infringement of
Pearce upon his authority, in consequence of which, the Indians were
suffering from lack of forage, medicines, clothing, and food.[422]
Pearce, in his turn, reported[423] to Hindman Pike's obstinacy and
intractability and he even cast insinuations against his honesty. Pike
was openly defying the man who claimed to be his superior officer,
Hindman. He was resisting his authority at every turn and had already
boldly declared,[424] with special reference to Clarkson, of course,

    No officer of the Missouri State Guard, whatever his rank, unless
    he has a command adequate to his rank, can ever exercise or assume
    any military authority in the Indian country, and much less assume
    command of any Confederate troops or

[Footnote 419: George W. Clark, _Official Records_, vol. xiii.]

[Footnote 420: For an equally vigorous statement on this score, see
Pike to Randolph, June 30, 1862 [Ibid., 849].]

[Footnote 421:--Ibid., 846-847, 848-849, 850-851, 852.]

[Footnote 422: Chilly McIntosh to Pike, June 9, 1862, Ibid.,
853; Pike to Chilly McIntosh, July 6, 1862, Ibid., 853-854.]

[Footnote 423: July 5, 1862 [Ibid., 963-965]; July 8, 1862
[Ibid., 965-967].]

[Footnote 424:--Ibid., 844-845.]

    compare rank with any officer in the Confederate service. The
    commissioned colonels of Indian regiments rank precisely as if
    they commanded regiments of white men, and will be respected and
    obeyed accordingly.

With the same confidence in the justness of his own cause, he
called[425] Pearce's attention to an act of Congress which seemed "to
have escaped his observation," and which Pike considered conclusively
proved that the whole course of action of his enemies was absolutely

In some of his contentions, General Pike was most certainly on strong
ground and never on stronger than when he argued that the Indians were
organized, in a military way, for their own protection and for the
defence of their own country. Since first they entered the Confederate
service, many had been the times that that truth had been brought home
to the authorities and not by Pike[426] alone but by several of his
subordinates and most often by Colonel Cooper.[427] The Indians had
many causes of dissatisfaction and sometimes they murmured pretty
loudly. Not even Pike's arrangements satisfied them all and his
inexplicable conduct in establishing his headquarters at Fort
McCulloch was exasperating beyond measure to the Cherokees.[428] Why,
if he were really sincere in saying that his supreme duty was the
defence of Indian Territory, did he not place himself where he could
do something, where, for instance, he could take precautions against
invasions from

[Footnote 425: Pike to Pearce, July 1, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 967.]

[Footnote 426: One of the best statements of the case by Pike is to
be found in a letter from him to Stand Watie, June 27, 1862
[Ibid., 952].]

[Footnote 427: For some of Cooper's statements, illustrative of his
position, see his letter to Pike, February 10, 1862 [Ibid.,
896] and that to Van Dorn, May 6, 1862 [ibid., 824].]

[Footnote 428: It was at the express wish of Stand Watie and Drew that
Hindman placed Clarkson in the Cherokee country [Carroll to Pike, June
27, 1862, ibid., 952].]

Kansas? And why, when the unionist Indian Expedition was threatening
Fort Gibson, Tahlequah, and Cherokee integrity generally, did he not
hasten northward to resist it? Chief Ross, greatly aggrieved because
of Pike's delinquency in this respect, addressed[429] himself to
Hindman and he did so in the fatal days of June.

In addressing General Hindman as Pike's superior officer, John Ross
did something more than make representations as to the claims, which
his nation in virtue of treaty guaranties had upon the South. He urged
the advisability of allowing the Indians to fight strictly on the
defensive and of placing them under the command of someone who would
"enjoy their confidence." These two things he would like to have done
if the protective force, which the Confederacy had promised, were not
forthcoming. The present was an opportune time for the preferring
of such a request. At least it was opportune from the standpoint of
Pike's enemies and traducers.[430] It fitted into Hindman's scheme of
things exactly; for he had quite lost patience, granting he had ever
had any, with the Arkansas poet. It was not, however, within his
province to remove him; but it was within his power so to tantalize
him that he could render his position as brigade and department
commander, intolerable. That he proceeded to do. Pike's quick
sensibilities were not proof against such treatment and he soon lost
his temper.

His provocations were very great. As was perfectly

[Footnote 429: Ross to Hindman, June 25, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 950-951. A little while before, Ross had
complained, in a similar manner, to President Davis [Ibid.,

[Footnote 430: Pike had his traducers. The Texans and Arkansans
circulated infamous stories about him. See his reference to the same
in a letter to Hindman, July 3, 1862 [Ibid., 955].]

natural, the Confederate defeat at Locust Grove counted heavily
against him.[431] On the seventh of July, Hindman began a new attack
upon him by making requisition for his ten Parrott guns.[432] They
were needed in Arkansas. On the eighth of July came another attack in
the shape of peremptory orders, two sets of them, the very tone of
which was both accusatory and condemnatory. What was apparently the
first[433] set of orders reached Pike by wire on the eleventh of July
and commanded him to hurry to Fort Smith, travelling night and day,
there to take command of all troops in the Indian Territory and in
Carroll's district.[434] Almost no organization, charged Hindman, was
in evidence among the Confederate forces in the upper Indian country
and a collision between the two Cherokee regiments was impending. Had
he been better informed he might have said that there was only one of
them now in existence.

The second[435] set of orders, dated July 8, was of a tenor much the
same, just as insulting, just as peremptory. The only difference of
note was the substitution of the upper Indian country for Fort Smith
as a point for headquarters. In the sequel, however, the second
set proved superfluous; for the first so aroused Pike's ire that,
immediately upon its receipt, he prepared his resignation and sent it
to Hindman for transmission to Richmond.[436]

Hindman's position throughout this affair was not

[Footnote 431: July 3.]

[Footnote 432: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 854.]

[Footnote 433: First, probably only in the sense that it was the first
to be received.]

[Footnote 434: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 857.]

[Footnote 435:--Ibid., 856-857.]

[Footnote 436: Pike to Hindman, July 15, 1862 [Ibid., 858];
Pike to Secretary of War, July 20, 1862 [Ibid., 856].]

destitute of justification.[437] One has only to read his general
reports to appreciate how heavy was the responsibility that rested
upon him. It was no wonder that he resorted to questionable expedients
to accomplish his purposes, no wonder that he instituted martial
law[438] in a seemingly refractory country, no wonder that he took
desperate measures to force Pike to activity. Pike's leisurely way of
attending to business was in itself an annoyance and his leisurely way
of moving over the country was a positive offence. He had been ordered
to proceed with dispatch to Fort Gibson. The expiration of a month and
a half found him still at Fort McCulloch. He really did not move from
thence until, having sent in his resignation, he made preparations for
handing over his command to Colonel Cooper. That he intended to do at
some point on the Canadian and thither he wended his way.[439] By the
twenty-first of July, "he had succeeded in getting as far as Boggy
Depot, a distance of 25 miles;[440] but then he had not left Fort
McCulloch until that very morning.[441]

Pike's definite break with Hindman was, perhaps, more truly a
consummation of Hindman's wishes than of Pike's own. On the third
of July, as if regretting his previous show of temper, he wrote to
Hindman a long letter,[442] conciliatory in tone throughout. He
discussed the issues between them in a calm and temperate spirit,

[Footnote 437: In September, Hindman declared he had never had any
knowledge of the order creating Pike's department [_Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 978].]

[Footnote 438: He instituted martial law, June 30, 1862 and, although
he believed he had precedent in Pike's own procedure, Pike criticized
him severely. See Pike to J.S. Murrow, Seminole Agent, October 25,
1862, Ibid., 900-902. Hindman had authorized Pearce, June 17,
1862, to exercise martial law in the cities of Fort Smith and Van
Buren and their environs [Ibid., 835].]

[Footnote 439: Pike to Hindman, July 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 440: Hindman's Report [_Official Records_, vol. xiii,

[Footnote 441: Pike to the Secretary of War, July 20, 1862
[Ibid., 859].]

[Footnote 442:--Ibid., 954-962.]

changing nothing as regarded the facts but showing a willingness to
let bygones be bygones. Considering how great had been his chagrin,
his indignation, and his poignant sense of ingratitude and wrong, he
rose to heights really noble. He seemed desirous, even anxious, that
the great cause in which they were both so vitally interested should
be uppermost in both their minds always and that their differences,
which, after all, were, comparatively speaking, so very petty, should
be forgotten forever. It was in the spirit of genuine helpfulness that
he wrote and also in the spirit of great magnanimity. Pike was a man
who studied the art of war zealously, who knew the rules of European
warfare, and a man, who, even in war times, could read Napier's
_Peninsular War_ and succumb to its charm. He was a classicist
and a student very much more than a man of action. Could those around
him, far meaner souls many of them than he, have only known and
remembered that and, remembering it, have made due allowances for his
vagaries, all might have been well. His generous letter of the third
of July failed utterly of its mission; but not so much, perhaps,
because of Hindman's inability to appreciate it or unwillingness
to meet its writer half-way, as because of the very seriousness
of Hindman's own military situation, which made all compromises
impossible. The things he felt it incumbent upon him to do must be
done his way or not at all. The letter of July 3 could scarcely have
been received before the objectionable orders of July 8 had been

The last ten days of July were days of constant scouting on the part
of both the Federal and Confederate Indians but nothing of much
account resulted. Colonel W.A. Phillips of the Third Indian Home

whose command had been left by Furnas to scout around Tahlequah and
Fort Gibson, came into collision with Stand Watie's force on the
twenty-seventh at Bayou Bernard, seven miles, approximately, from the
latter place. The Confederate Cherokees lost considerably in dead
and prisoners.[443] Phillips would have followed up his victory by
pursuing the foe even to the Verdigris had not Cooper, fearing that
his forces might be destroyed in detail, ordered them all south of the
Arkansas and thereby circumvented his enemy's designs. Phillips
then moved northward in the direction of Furnas's main camp on Wolf

Pike had his own opinion of Cooper and Watie's daring methods of
fighting and most decidedly disapproved of their attempting to meet
the enemy in the neighborhood of Fort Gibson. That part of the Indian
Territory, according to his view of things, was not capable of
supporting an army. He discounted the ability of his men to conquer,
their equipment being so meagre. He, therefore, persisted in advising
that they should fight only on the defensive. He advised that,
notwithstanding he had a depreciatory[445] regard for the Indian
Expedition, and, both before and after the retrograde movement
of Colonel Salomon, underestimated its size and strength. He Was
confident that Cooper would have inevitably to fall back to the
Canadian, where, as he said, "the defensible country commences." Pike
objected strenuously to the courting of an open battle and, could he
have followed the bent of his own inclinations, "would have sent only

[Footnote 443: Phillips to Furnas, July 27, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 181-182.]

[Footnote 444: Same to same, August 6, 1862, Ibid., 183-184.]

[Footnote 445: Cooper reported that Pike regarded the Indian
Expedition as only a "jayhawking party," and "no credit due" "for
arresting its career" [Cooper to Davis, August 8, 1862, Ibid.,
vol liii, supplement, 821].]

small bodies of mounted Indians and white troops to the

No doubt it was in repudiation of all responsibility for what Cooper
and Watie might eventually do that he chose soon to bring himself,
through a mistaken notion of justice and honor, into very disagreeable
prominence. Discretion was evidently not Pike's cardinal virtue. At
any rate, he was quite devoid of it when he issued, July 31, his
remarkable circular address[447] "to the Chiefs and People of the
Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles, Chickasaws, and Choctaws." In that
address, he notified them that he had resigned his post as department
commander and dilated upon the causes that had moved him to action. He
shifted all blame for failure to keep faith with the Indian nations
from himself and from the Confederate government to the men upon whom
he steadfastly believed it ought to rest. He deprecated the plundering
that would bring its own retribution and begged the red men to be
patient and to keep themselves true to the noble cause they had

    Remain true, I earnestly advise you, to the Confederate States
    and yourselves. Do not listen to any men who tell you that the
    Southern States will abandon you. They will not do it. If the
    enemy has been able to come into the Cherokee country it has not
    been the fault of the President; and it is but the fortune of war,
    and what has happened in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee,
    and even Arkansas. We have not been able to keep the enemy from
    our frontier anywhere; but in the interior of our country we can
    defeat them always.

    Be not discouraged, and remember, above all things, that you can
    have nothing to expect from the enemy. They will have no mercy on
    you, for they are more merciless than wolves and more rapacious.
    Defend your country with what help you

[Footnote 446: Pike to the Secretary of War, July 20, 1862,
_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 859-860.]

[Footnote 447:--Ibid., 869-871.]

    can get until the President can send you troops. If the enemy ever
    comes to the Canadian he cannot go far beyond that river. The war
    must soon end since the recent victories near Richmond, and no
    treaty of peace will be made that will give up any part of your
    country to the Northern States. If I am not again placed in
    command of your country some other officer will be in whom you
    can confide. And whatever may be told you about me, you will soon
    learn that if I have not defended the whole country it was because
    I had not the troops with which to do it; that I have cared for
    your interest alone; that I have never made you a promise that I
    did not expect, and had not a right to expect, to be able to keep,
    and that I have never broken one intentionally nor except by the
    fault of others.

The only fair way to judge Pike's farewell address to his Indian
charges is to consider it in the light of its effect upon them,
intended and accomplished.[448] So little reason has the red man had,
in the course of his long experience with his white brother, to trust
him that his faith in that white brother rests upon a very slender
foundation. Pike knew the Indian character amazingly well and knew
that he must retain for the Confederacy the Indian's confidence at all
cost. Were he to fail in that, his entire diplomatic work would have
been done in vain. To stay the Cherokees in their desertion to
the North was of prime necessity. They had already gone over in
dangerously large numbers and must be checked before other tribes
followed in their wake. Very possibly Pike had been made aware

[Footnote 448: Pike gives this as the effect of his proclamation:

"... it effected what I desired. The Choctaw force was immediately
increased to two full regiments; the Creek force to two regiments
and two companies; the Seminole force was doubled; the Chickasaws
reorganized five companies and a sixth is being made up. The Indians
looked to me alone, and for me to vindicate myself was to vindicate
the Government. We lost half the Cherokees solely because their moneys
and supplies were intercepted..."--Ibid., 904-905. See also
Pike to Holmes, December 30, 1862. Another effect was, the creation of
a prejudice self-confessed in General Holmes's mind against Pike.]

of Chief Ross's complaint to Hindman. If so, it was all important
that he should vindicate himself. So maligned had he been that his
sensitiveness on the score of the discharge of his duties was very
natural, very pardonable. After all he had done for the Confederacy
and for the Indians, it seemed hardly right that he should be blamed
for all that others had failed to do. His motives were pure and could
not be honestly impugned by anybody. The address was an error of
judgment but it was made with the best of intentions.

And so the authorities at Richmond seem to have regarded it; that is,
if the reference in President Davis's letter[449] to Pike of August 9
is to this affair. Pike wrote to the president on the same day that he
started his address upon its rounds, but that letter,[450] in which
he rehearsed the wrongs he had been forced to endure, also those more
recently inflicted upon him, did not reach Richmond until September
20. His address was transmitted by Colonel D.H. Cooper, who had
taken great umbrage at it and who now charged the author with having
violated an army regulation, which prohibited publications concerning
Confederate troops.[451] Davis took the matter under advisement and
wrote to Pike a mild reprimand. It was as follows:

    Richmond, Va., August 9, 1862.

    Brig. Gen. Albert Pike,

    Camp McCulloch, Choctaw Nation:

    General: Your communication of July 3 is at hand. I regret the
    necessity of informing you that it is an impropriety for an
    officer of the Army to address the President through a printed
    circular.[452] Under the laws for the government of

[Footnote 449: Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 822.]

[Footnote 450:--Ibid., vol. xiii, 860-869.]

[Footnote 451:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 820-821.]

[Footnote 452: It is possible that the printed circular here referred
to was some other one that was directly addressed to the president but
none such has been found.]

    the Army the publication of this circular was a grave military
    offense, and if the purpose was to abate an evil, by making an
    appeal that would be heeded by me, the mode taken was one of the
    slowest and worst that could have been adopted.

    Very respectfully, yours, Jefferson Davis.

The sympathy of Secretary Randolph was conceivably with Pike; for, on
the fourteenth of July, he wrote assuring him that certain general
orders had been sent out by the Adjutant and Inspector General's
Office which were "intended to prevent even the major-general
commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department from diverting from their
legitimate destination (the Department of Indian Territory) munitions
of war and supplies procured by 'him' for that department."[453]
That did not prevent Hindman's continuing his pernicious practices,
however. On the seventeenth he demanded[454] that Pike deliver to
him his best battery and Pike, discouraged and yet thoroughly beside
himself with ill-suppressed rage,[455] sent it to him.[456] At
the same time he insisted that he be immediately relieved of his
command.[457] He could endure the indignities to which he was
subjected no longer. The order for his relief arrived in due course
and also directions for him to report in person at Hindman's
headquarters.[458] He had not then issued his circular; but, as

[Footnote 453: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 903; Pike to
Holmes, December 30, 1862, Pike _Papers_, Library of the
Supreme Council, 33º. Pike did not receive Randolph's letter of July
fourteenth until some time in August and not until after he had had an
interview with Holmes. See Pike to Holmes, December 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 454: Official Records, vol. xiii, 970.]

[Footnote 455: This is inferred from the very peculiar _General
Orders_ that issued from Fort McCulloch that selfsame day. They
were sarcastic in the extreme. No general in his right senses would
have issued them. They are to be found, Ibid., 970-973.]

[Footnote 456:--Ibid., 973, 974.]

[Footnote 457:--_Ib id_., 973.]

[Footnote 458: Pike to Hindman, July 31, 1862, Ibid., 973.]

soon as he had, the whole situation changed. He had deliberately put
himself in the wrong and into the hands of his enemies. The address
was, in some respects, the last act of a desperate[459] man. And there
is no doubt that General Pike was desperate. Reports were spreading in
Texas that he was a defaulter to the government and, as he himself in
great bitterness of spirit said, "The incredible villainy of a slander
so monstrous, and so without even any ground for suspicion," was
"enough to warn every honest man not to endeavor to serve his

Not until August 6 did General Pike's circular address reach Colonel
D.H. Cooper, who was then at Cantonment Davis. Cooper wisely
suppressed all the copies he could procure and then, believing Pike to
be either insane or a traitor, ordered his arrest,[461] sending out
an armed force for its accomplishment. Hindman, as soon as notified,
"indorsed and approved" his action.[462] This is his own account of
what he did:

    ... I approved his action, and ordered General Pike sent to Little
    Rock in custody. I also forwarded Colonel Cooper's letter to
    Richmond, with an indorsement, asking to withdraw my approval
    of General Pike's resignation, that I might bring him before a
    court-martial on charges of falsehood, cowardice, and treason. He
    was also liable to the penalties prescribed by section 29 of the
    act of Congress regulating intercourse with the Indians and to
    preserve peace on the frontiers, approved April 8, 1862....

    But his resignation had been accepted....[463]

[Footnote 459: And yet, August 1, 1862, Pike wrote to Davis one of the
sanest papers he ever prepared. It was full of sage advice as to the
policy that ought to be pursued in Indian Territory [_Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 871-874].]

[Footnote 460: Pike to S. Cooper, August 3, 1862, Ibid., 975.
See also Pike to Newton, August 3, 1862, Ibid., 976.]

[Footnote 461: D.H. Cooper to Hindman, August 7, 1862, ibid., 977.]

[Footnote 462: Pike to Anderson, October 26, 1862, Ibid., 903.]

[Footnote 463: Hindman's Report, Ibid., 41.]


The mismanagement of southern Indian affairs of which General Pike so
vociferously complained was not solely or even to any great degree
attributable to indifference to Indian interests on the part of
the Confederate government and certainly not at all to any lack of
appreciation of the value of the Indian alliance or of the strategic
importance of Indian Territory. The perplexities of the government
were unavoidably great and its control over men and measures, removed
from the seat of its immediate influence, correspondingly small.
It was not to be expected that it would or could give the same
earnestness of attention to events on the frontier as to those nearer
the seaboard, since it was, after all, east of the Mississippi that
the great fight for political separation from the North would have to
be made.

The Confederate government had started out well. It had dealt with the
Indian nations on a basis of dignity and lofty honor, a fact to be
accounted for by the circumstance that Indian affairs were at first
under the State Department with Toombs at its head;[464] and, in this
connection, let it be recalled that it was under authority of the
State Department that Pike had

[Footnote 464: Toombs did not long hold the portfolio. Among the
Pickett _Papers_, is a letter from Davis to Toombs, July 24,
1861, accepting with regret his resignation [Package 89].]

entered upon his mission as diplomatic agent to the tribes west of
Arkansas.[465] Subsequently, and, indeed, before Pike had nearly
completed his work, Indian affairs were transferred[466] to the
direction of the Secretary of War and a bureau created in his
department for the exclusive consideration of them, Hubbard receiving
the post of commissioner.[467]

The Provisional Congress approached the task of dealing with Indian
matters as if it already had a big grasp on the subject and intended,
at the outset, to give them careful scrutiny and to establish, with
regard to them, precedents of extreme good faith. Among the

[Footnote 465: In evidence of this, note, in addition to the material
published in Abel, _The American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, the following letters, the first from Robert Toombs
to L.P. Walker, Secretary of War, dated Richmond, August 7, 1861;
and the second from William M. Browne, Acting Secretary of State, to
Walker, September 4, 1861:

1. "I have the honor to inform you that under a resolution of
Congress, authorizing the President to send a Commissioner to the
Indian tribes west of Arkansas and south of Kansas, Mr. Albert Pike of
Arkansas was appointed such Commissioner under an autograph letter of
the President giving him very large discretion as to the expenses
of his mission. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, above
named, Congress passed a law placing the Indian Affairs under the
control of your Department and consequently making the expenses of
Mr. Pike and all other Indian Agents, properly payable out of
the appropriation at your disposal for the service of the Indian
Bureau."--Pickett _Papers_, Package 106, Domestic Letters,
Department of State, vol. i, p.86.

2. "The accompanying letters and reports from Commissioner Albert Pike
addressed to your Department are respectfully referred to you,
the affairs to which they relate being under your supervision and
control."--Ibid., P-93.]

[Footnote 466: A re-transfer to the State Department was proposed
as early as the next November [_Journal of the Congress of the
Confederate States_, 489].]

[Footnote 467: President Davis recommended the creation of the
bureau, March 12, 1861 [Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Confederacy_, vol. i, p. 58: Journal of the Congress of the
Confederate States, vol. i, p. 142]. On the sixteenth, he nominated
David Hubbard of Alabama for commissioner [Pickett Papers, Package
88]. The bill for the creation of the bureau of Indian Affairs was
signed the selfsame day [Journal, vol. i, 151]. S.S. Scott became
Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs before the year was out.]

things[468] it considered and in some cases favorably disposed of
were, the treaties of amity and alliance negotiated by Albert Pike,
the transfer of Indian trust

[Footnote 468: The preliminaries of the negotiations with the Indians
have not been enumerated here, although they might well have been. On
the twentieth of February, 1861, W.P. Chilton of Alabama offered a
resolution to inquire into the expediency of opening negotiations
[_Journal_, vol. i, 70]. March 4, Toombs urged that a special
agent be sent and offered a resolution to that effect [Ibid.,
105]. The day following, Congress passed the resolution [Ibid.,
107]: but left the powers and duties of the special agent, or
commissioner, undefined. Davis appointed Pike to the position and,
after Congress had expressed its wishes regarding the mission in the
act of May 21, 1861, had a copy of the act transmitted to him as his
instructions [Richardson, vol. i, 149].

The act of May 21, 1861, carried a blanket appropriation of $100,000,
which was undoubtedly used freely by Pike for purposes connected
with the successful prosecution of his mission. In December, the
Provisional Congress appropriated money for carrying into effect the
Pike treaties. The following letter is of interest in connection

Richmond, Va., 9" December 1861.

Sir: On the 1st or 2nd of August 1861, after I had made Treaties with
the Creeks and Seminoles, I authorized James M.C. Smith, a resident
citizen of the Creek Nation, to raise and command a company of Creek
Volunteers, to be stationed at the North Fork Village, in the Creek
country, on the North Fork of the Canadian, where the great road from
Missouri to Texas crosses that river, to act as a police force, watch
and apprehend disaffected persons, intercept improper communications,
and prevent the driving of cattle to Kansas.

The Company was soon after raised, and has remained in the service
ever since. At my appointment George W. Stidham acted as Quartermaster
and Commissary for it, and without funds from the Government, has
supplied it.

By the Treaty with the Seminoles, made on the 1st of August, they
agreed to furnish, and I agreed to receive, five companies of mounted
volunteers of that Nation. Two companies, and perhaps more, were
raised, and have since been received, I understand, by Col. Cooper,
and with Captain Smith's company employed in putting down the
disaffected party among the Creeks. Under my appointment, Hugh
McDonald has acted as Quartermaster and Commissary for the Seminole
companies, and made purchases without funds from the Government. After
I had made the Treaties with the Reserve Indians and Comanches, in
August 1861, Fort Cobb being about to be abandoned by the Texan
Volunteers who had held it, I authorized M. Leeper, the Wichita
agent, to enlist a small force, of twenty or twenty-five men, under a
Lieutenant, for the security of the Agency. He enlisted, (cont.)]

funds from the United to the Confederate States government,[469] the
payment of Indian troops and their pensioning.[470] Its disposition to
be grateful and generous came out in the honor which it conferred upon
John Jumper, the Seminole chief.[471]

A piece of very fundamental work the Provisional Congress did not have
time or opportunity to complete.

[Footnote 468: (cont.) I learn, only some fifteen, and he has had them
for some time in the service.

I also appointed a person named McKuska, formerly a soldier, to take
charge of what further property remained at Fort Cobb, and employed
another person to assist him, agreeing that the former should be paid
as Ordnance Sergeant, and the latter as private; and directing the
Contractor for the Indians to issue to the former two rations, and to
the latter one.

In consequence of the collection of some force of disaffected Creeks
and others, and an apprehended attack by them, Col. Douglas H. Cooper
called for troops from all the Nations, and I understand that several
companies were organized and marched to join his regiment. I think
they are still in the service.

I am now empowered to receive all the Indians who offer to enter the
service. To induce them to enlist, what is already owing them must be
paid; and I earnestly hope that Congress will pass the bill introduced
for that purpose. Respectfully your obedient servant

Albert Pike, _Brig. Genl Commd Dept of Ind. Terr'y_.
Hon. W. Miles, Chairman Com. on Mil. Affs.

[War Department, Office of the Adjutant-General, Archives Division,
_Confederate Records_.]]

[Footnote 469: Journal, vol. i, 650, 743, 761. The Confederate
government took, in the main, a just, reasonable, and even charitable
view on the subject of the assumption of United States obligations.
Pike had exceeded his instructions in promising the Indians that
monetary obligations would be so assumed. See his letter to Randolph,
June 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 470: This matter went over into the regular Congress,
which began its work, February 18, 1862. For details of the bill for
pensions see _Journal_, vol. i, 43, 79.]

[Footnote 471: "_The Congress of the Confederate States of America
do enact_, That the President of the Confederate States be
authorized to present to Hemha Micco, or John Jumper, a commission,
conferring upon him the honorary title of Lieutenant Colonel of the
army of the Confederate States, but without creating or imposing the
duties of actual service or command, or pay, as a complimentary mark
of honor, and a token of good will and confidence in his friendship,
good faith, and loyalty to this government...."--_Statutes at Large
of the Provisional Government_, 284.]

That work was, the establishment of a superintendency of Indian
Affairs in the west that should be a counterpart, in all essentials,
of the old southern superintendency, of which Elias Rector had been
the incumbent. Elias Rector and the agents[472] under him, all
of whom, with scarcely a single exception, had gone over to the
Confederacy, had been retained, not under authority of law, but
provisionally. The intention was to organize the superintendency
as soon as convenient and give all employees their proper official
status. Necessarily, a time came when it was most expedient for army
men to exercise the ordinary functions of Indian agents;[473] but
even that arrangement was to be only temporary. Without doubt, the
enactment of a law for the establishment of a superintendency of
Indian affairs was unduly delayed by the prolonged character of Pike's
diplomatic mission. The Confederate government evidently did not
anticipate that the tribes with which it sought alliance would be so
slow[474] or so wary in accepting the protectorate it offered. Not
until January 8, 1862, did the Provisional Congress have before it
the proposition for superintendency organization. The measure was
introduced by Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas and it

[Footnote 472: Quite early a resolution was submitted that had in
view "the appointment of agents to the different tribes of Indians
occupying territory adjoining this Confederacy..." [_Journal_,
vol. i, 81.]]

[Footnote 473: _Journal_, vol. i, 245.]

[Footnote 474: Pike was not prepared beforehand for so extended a
mission. In November, he wrote to Benjamin, notifying him that he was
enclosing "an account in blank for my services as commissioner to the
Indian nations west of Arkansas.

"It was not my intention to accept any remuneration, but the great
length of time during which I found it necessary to remain in the
Indian Country caused me such losses and so interfered with my
business that I am constrained unwillingly to present this account. I
leave it to the President or to Congress to fix the sum that shall
be paid me...."--Pike to Benjamin, November 25, 1861, Pickett
_Papers_, Package 118.]

went in succession to the Judiciary and Indian Affairs committees; but
never managed to get beyond the committee stage.[475]

February 18, 1862, saw the beginning of the first session of the
first congress that met under the Confederate constitution. Six
days thereafter, Johnson, now senator from Arkansas, again took
the initiative in proposing the regular establishment of an Indian
superintendency.[476] As Senate Bill No. 3, his measure was referred
to the Committee[477] on Indian Affairs and, on March 11, reported
back with amendments.[478] Meanwhile, the House was considering a
bill of similar import, introduced on the third by Thomas B. Hanly,
likewise from Arkansas.[479] On the eighteenth, it received Senate
Bill No. 3 and substituted it for its own, passing the same on April
Fool's day. The bill was signed by the president on April 8.[480]

The information conveyed by the journal entries is unusually meagre;
nevertheless, from the little that is given, the course of debate on
the measure can be inferred to a certain extent. The proposition as
a whole carried, of course, its own recommendation, since the
Confederacy was most anxious to retain the Indian friendship and it
certainly could not be retained were not some system introduced into
the service. In matters of detail, local interests, as always in
American legislation, had full play. They asserted themselves most
prominently, for example, in the endeavor made

[Footnote 475: _Journal_, vol. i, 640, 672, 743.]

[Footnote 476:--Ibid., vol. ii, 19.]

[Footnote 477: The Committee on Indian Affairs, at the time, consisted
of Johnson, chairman, Clement C. Clay of Alabama, Williamson S. Oldham
of Texas, R.L.Y. Payton of Missouri, and W.E. Simms of Kentucky.]

[Footnote 478: _Journal_, vol. ii, 51-52.]

[Footnote 479: _Journal_, vol. v, 47.]

[Footnote 480:--Ibid., 210.]

to make Fort Smith, although quite a distance from all parts of the
Indian Territory except the Cherokee and Choctaw countries, the
permanent headquarters, also in that to compel disbursing agents to
make payments in no other funds than specie or treasury notes. The
amendment of greatest importance among those that passed muster was
the one attaching the superintendency temporarily to the western
district of Arkansas for judicial purposes. It was a measure that
could not fail to be exceedingly obnoxious to the Indians; for they
had had a long and disagreeable experience, judicially, with Arkansas.
They had their own opinion of the white man's justice, particularly
as that justice was doled out to the red man on the white man's
ground.[481] Taken in connection with regulations[482] made by the War
Department for the conduct of Indian affairs, the Act of April 8 most
certainly exhibited an honest intention on the part of the Confederate
government to carry out the provisions of the Pike treaties. The
following constituted its principal features: With headquarters at
either Fort Smith or Van Buren, as the president might see fit to
direct, the superintendency was to embrace "all the Indian country
annexed to the Confederate States, that lies west of Arkansas and
Missouri, north of Texas, and east of Texas and New Mexico." A
superintendent and six agents were immediately provided for,
individually bonded and obligated to continue resident during the term
of office, to engage in no mercantile pursuit or gainful occupation

[Footnote 481: The Confederacy, as a matter of fact, never did keep
its promise regarding the establishment of a judiciary in Indian
Territory. Note Commissioner Scott's remarks in criticism, December i,
1864 [_Official Records_, vol. xli, part iv, 1088-1089].]

[Footnote 482: The regulations referred to can be found in
_Confederate Records_, chap. 7, no. 48.]

whatsoever, and to prosecute no Indian claims against the government.
In the choice of interpreters, preference was to be given to
applicants of Indian descent. Indian trade privileges were to be
greatly circumscribed and, in the case of the larger nations, the
complete control of the trade was to rest with the tribal authorities.
In the case, also, of those same larger nations, the restrictions
formerly placed upon land alienations were to be removed. Intruders
and spirituous liquors were to be rigidly excluded and all payments
to Indians were to be carefully safeguarded against fraud and graft.
Indian customs of citizenship and adoption were to be respected. No
foreign interference was to be permitted. Foreign emissaries were to
be dealt with as spies and as such severely punished. The Confederate
right of eminent domain over agency sites and buildings, forts, and
arsenals was to be recognized, as also the operation of laws against
counterfeiting and of the fugitive slave law. In default of regular
troops, the Confederacy was to support an armed police for protection
and the maintenance of order. The judicial rights of the Indians were
to be very greatly extended but the Confederacy reserved to itself the
right to apprehend criminals other than Indian.

The intentions of the Confederate government were one thing, its
accomplishments another. The act of April 8 was not put into immediate
execution, and might have been allowed to become obsolete had it not
been for the controversy between Pike and Hindman. On the first of
August, while the subject-matter of the address, which he had so
imprudently issued to the Indians, was yet fresh in his mind, General
Pike wrote a letter of advice, eminently sound advice, to President
Davis.[483] Avoiding all captiousness, he set forth a

[Footnote 483: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 871-874.]

programme of what ought to be done for Indian Territory and for the
Indians, in order that their friendly alliance might be maintained. He
urged many things and one thing very particularly. It was the crux
of them all and it was that Indian Territory should be absolutely
separated from Arkansas, in a military way, and that no troops
from either Arkansas or Texas should be stationed within it. Other
suggestions of Pike's were equally sound. Indeed, the entire letter of
the first of August was sound and in no part of it more sound than in
that which recommended the immediate appointment of a superintendent
of Indian affairs for the Arkansas and Red River Superintendency, also
the appointment of Indian agents for all places that had none.[484] It
was high time that positions in connection with the conduct of Indian
affairs should be something more than sinecures.

Aspirants for the office of superintendent had already made their
wants known. Foremost among them was Douglas H. Cooper. It was not in
his mind, however, to separate the military command from the civil
and he therefore asked that he be made brigadier-general and _ex
officio_ superintendent of Indian affairs in the place of Pike
removed.[485] His own representations of Pike's grievous offence had
fully prepared him for the circumstance of Pike's removal and he
anticipated it in making his own application for office. Subsequent
knowledge of Pike's activities and of his standing at Richmond must
have come to Cooper as a rude awakening.

Nevertheless, Cooper did get his appointment. It

[Footnote 484: In his message of August 18, 1862 [Richardson, vol. i,
238], President Davis remarked upon the vacancies in these offices and
said that, in consequence of them, delays had occurred in the payment
of annuities and allowances to which the Indians were entitled.]

[Footnote 485: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 821.]

came the twenty-ninth of September in the form of special orders from
the adjutant-general's office.[486] Pike was still on the ground, as
will be presently shown, and Cooper's moral unfitness for a position
of so much responsibility was yet to be revealed. The moment was
one when the Confederacy was taking active steps to keep its most
significant promise to the Indian nations, give them a representation
in Congress. The Cherokees had lost no time in availing themselves of
the privilege of electing a delegate, neither had the Choctaws
and Chickasaws. Elias C. Boudinot had proved to be the successful
candidate of the former and Robert M. Jones[487] of the latter. Over
the credentials of Boudinot, the House of Representatives made some
demur; but, as there was no denying his constitutional right, under
treaty guarantee, to be present, they were accepted and he was given
his seat.[488] Provisions had, however, yet to be determined for
regulating Indian elections and fixing the pay and mileage, likewise
also, the duties and privileges of Indian delegates.[489] Perhaps it
is unfair to intimate that the provisions would have been determined
earlier, had congress not preferred to go upon the assumption that
they would never be needed, since it was scarcely likely that the
Indians would realize the importance of their rights and act upon

[Footnote 486: War Department, _Confederate Records, Special Orders
of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office_, C.S.A., 1862, p.
438; _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 885.]

[Footnote 487: See document of date, October 7, 1861, signed by
Douglas H. Cooper, certifying that Robert M. Jones had received the
"greatest number of votes cast" as delegate in Congress for the
Choctaws and Chickasaws [Pickett _Papers_, Package 118].]

[Footnote 488: _Journal_, vol. v, 513, 514.]

[Footnote 489:--Ibid., vol. ii, 452, 457, 480; vol. v, 514,
523, 561.]

[Footnote 490: Davis had thrown the responsibility of the whole matter
upon Congress, when he insisted that the "delegate" clauses in the
treaties should (cont.)]

While Congress was debating the question of Indian delegate
credentials and their acceptance, a tragedy took place in
Indian Territory that more than confirmed General Pike's worst
prognostications and proved his main contention that Indian affairs
should be considered primarily upon their own merits, as an end in
themselves, and dealt with accordingly. Had the Arkansas and Red River
Superintendency been regularly established, the tragedy referred to
might never have occurred; but it was not yet established and for
many reasons, one of them being that, although Douglas H. Cooper's
appointment had been resolved upon, he had not yet been invested with
the office of superintendent.[491] His commission was being withheld
because charges of incapacity and drunkenness had been preferred
against him.[492]

General Pike's disclosures had aroused suspicion and grave
apprehension in Richmond, so much so, indeed, that the War Department,
convinced that conditions in Indian Territory were very far from being
what they should be, decided to undertake an investigation of its own
through its Indian bureau. Promptly, therefore, S.S. Scott, acting
commissioner, departed for the West. General Pike was in Texas.

Now one of the contingencies that Pike had most constantly dreaded was
tribal disorder on the Leased

[Footnote 490: (cont.) be so modified as to make the admission of the
Indians dependent, not upon the treaty-making power, but upon the
legislative. See his message of December 12, 1861, Richardson, vol. i,

[Footnote 491: Elias Rector, who had been retained as superintendent
under the Confederate government, seems never to have exercised the
functions of the office subsequent to the assumption by Pike of his
duties as commander of the Department of Indian Territory. He
was probably envious of Pike and resigned rather than serve in a
subordinate capacity. He seems to have made some troube for Pike
[_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 964, 976].]

[Footnote 492:--Ibid., 906, 908, 910-911, 927-928.]

District,[493] a disorder that might at any moment extend itself to
Texas and to other parts of the Indian Territory, imperiling the whole
Confederate alliance. So long as there was a strong force at Fort
McCulloch and at the frontier posts of longer establishment,
particularly at Fort Cobb, the Reserve Indians could be held in check
with comparative ease. Hindman, ignorant of or indifferent to the
situation, no matter how serious it might be for others, had ordered
the force to be scattered and most of it withdrawn from the Red River

The so-called Wichita, or Reserve, Indians, to call them by a
collective term only very recently bestowed, had ever constituted a
serious problem for the neighboring states as well as for the central
government. It was with the Confederacy as with the old Union. The
Reserve Indians were a motley horde, fragments of many tribes that
had seen better days. They were all more or less related, either
geographically or linguistically. Some of them, it is difficult
to venture upon what proportion, had been induced to enter into
negotiations with Pike and through him had formed an alliance with
the Confederacy. Apparently, those who had done this were chiefly
Tonkawas. Other Reserve Indians continued true to the North. As time
went on hostile feelings, engendered by living in opposite camps,
gained in intensity, the more especially because white men, both north
and south, encouraged them to go upon the war-path, either against
their own associates or others. Reprisals, frequently bloody, were
regularly instituted. With Pike's departure from Fort McCulloch an
opportunity for greater vindictiveness offered, notwithstanding the
fact that the Choctaw and Chickasaw

[Footnote 493: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 868.]

troops had been left behind and were guarding the near-by country,
their own.

Sometime in the latter part of August or the early part of September,
Matthew Leeper, the Wichita agent under the Confederate government, a
left-over from Buchanan's days, went from the Leased District,[494]
frightened away, some people thought, perhaps afraid of the inevitable
results of the mischief his own hands had so largely wrought, and
sojourned in Texas, his old home. The sutler left also and a man named
Jones was then in sole charge of the agency. The northern sympathizers
among the Indians thereupon aroused themselves. They had gained
greatly of late in strength and influence and their numbers had
been augmented by renegade Seminoles from Jumper's battalion and by
outlawed Cherokees. They warned Jones that Leeper would be wise not to
return. If he should return, it would be the worse for him; for they
were determined to wreak revenge upon him for all the misery his
machinations in favor of the Confederacy and for his own gain had cost
them. Presumably, Jones scorned to transmit the warning and, in course
of time, Leeper returned.

The twenty-third of October witnessed one of the bloodiest scenes ever
enacted on the western plains. The northern Indians of the Reserve
together with a lot of wandering Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos,
many of them good-for-nothing or vicious, some Seminoles and Cherokees
attacked Leeper unawares, killed him,[495] as also three white male
employees of the agency.

[Footnote 494: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 828.]

[Footnote 495: On the murder of Agent Leeper, see Scott to Holmes,
November 2, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 919-921; Holmes
to Secretary of War, November 15, 1862, Ibid., 919: F. Johnson
to Dole, January 20, 1863, Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, 329-330, _footnote_; (cont.)]

They then put "the bodies into the agency building and fired it." The
next morning they made an equally brutal attack upon the Tonkawas and
with most telling effect. More than half of them were butchered. The
survivors, about one hundred fifty, fled to Fort Arbuckle.[496] Their
condition was pitiable. The murderers, for they were nothing less than
that, fled northward, they and their families, to swell the number of
Indian refugees already living upon government bounty in Kansas.

Commissioner Scott then at Fort Washita hurried to the Leased District
to examine into the affair. He had made many observations since
leaving Richmond, had talked with Pike, now returned from Texas,
and had come around pretty much to his way of thinking. His
recommendations to the department commander that were intended to
reach the Secretary of War as well were in every sense a corroboration
of Pike's complaints in so far as the woeful neglect of the Indians
was concerned. Better proof that Hindman's conduct had been highly
reprehensible could scarcely be asked for.

[Footnote 495: (cont.) Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. vi, 6;
W.F. Cady to Cox, February 16, 1870, Indian Office _Report Book_,
no. 19, 186-188; Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1863, 177.]

[Footnote 496: S.S. Scott asked permission of Governor Winchester
Colbert, November 10, 1862, to place the fugitive Tonkawas
"temporarily on Rocky or Clear Creek, near the road leading from Fort
Washita to Arbuckle." Colbert granted the permission, "provided they
are subject to the laws of the Chickasaw Nation, and will furnish
guides to the Home Guards and the Chickasaw Battalion, when called
upon to do so."]


The tragedy at the Wichita agency brought General Pike again to the
fore. His resignation had not been accepted at Richmond as Hindman
supposed was the case at the time he released him from custody. In
fact, as events turned out, it looked as though Hindman were decidedly
more in disrepute there than was Pike. His arbitrary procedure in the
Trans-Mississippi District had been complained of by many persons
besides the one person whom he had so unmercifully badgered.
Furthermore, the circumstances of his assignment to command were being
inquired into and everything divulged was telling tremendously against

The irregularity of Hindman's assignment to command has been already
commented upon in this narrative. Additional details may now be given.
Van Dorn had hopes, on the occasion of his own summons to work farther
east, that Sterling Price would be the one chosen eventually to
succeed him or, at all events, the one to take the chief command of
the Confederate forces in the West. He greatly wished that upon him
and upon him alone his mantle should fall.[497] The filling of the
position by Hindman was to be but tentative, to last only until
Price,[498] perhaps also Van Dorn,

[Footnote 497: Van Dorn to President Davis, June 9, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 831-832.]

[Footnote 498: Price was preferred to H.M. Rector; because Van Dorn
felt that Rector's influence with the people of Arkansas had greatly
declined. The truth was, Governor Rector had become incensed at the
disregard shown for Arkansas by Confederate commanders. In a recent
proclamation, he had announced that the state would henceforth look
out for herself.]

could discuss matters personally with the president and remove the
prejudice believed to be existing in his mind against Price; but the
War Department had quite other plans developed, a rumor of which soon
reached the ears of Van Dorn. It was then he telegraphed, begging
Davis to make no appointment for the present to the command of the
Trans-Mississippi District and informing him that Hindman had been
sent there temporarily.[499] The request came to Richmond too late. An
appointment had already been resolved upon and made. The man chosen
was John Bankhead Magruder, a major-general in the Army of Northern
Virginia. However, as he was not yet ready to take up his new duties,
Hindman was suffered to assume the command in the West; but Magruder's
rights held over. They were held in abeyance, so to speak, temporarily

The controversy between Pike and Hindman would seem to have impelled
Secretary Randolph to wish to terminate early Magruder's delay; but
Magruder was loath to depart. His lack of enthusiasm ought to have
been enough to convince those sending him that he

[Footnote 499: The orders for Hindman to repair west, issuing from
Beauregard's headquarters, were explicit, not upon the point of the
temporary character of his appointment, but upon that of its having
been made "at the earnest solicitation of the people of Arkansas."
[_Official Records_, vol. x, part ii, 547].]

[Footnote 500: Price, nothing daunted, continued to seek the position
and submitted plans for operations in the West. His importunities
finally forced the inquiry from Davis as to whether Magruder's
appointment had ever been rescinded and whether, since he seemed in
no hurry to avail himself of it, he really wanted the place. Randolph
reported that Magruder had no objection to the service to which he had
been ordered but desired to remain near Richmond until the expected
battle in the neighborhood should have occurred. Randolph then
suggested that Price be tendered the position of second in command
[Randolph to Davis, June 23, 1862, _Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 837], an arrangement that met with Magruder's hearty approval
[Magruder to R.E. Lee, June 26, 1862, Ibid., 845].]

was hardly the man for the place. His acquaintance with
Trans-Mississippi conditions was very superficial, yet even he found
out that they were of a nature to admonish those concerned of their
urgency, especially in the matter of lack of arms.[501] By the
fourteenth of July his indecision was apparently overcome. At any
rate, on that day Randolph wrote Pike that Magruder, the real
commander of the Trans-Mississippi District, would soon arrive at
Little Rock and that the offences of which Pike had had reason to
complain would not be repeated.

Letters travelled slowly in those days and Randolph's comforting
intelligence did not reach Pike in time to avert the catastrophe of
his proclamation and consequent arrest. And it was just as well, all
things considered, for Magruder never reached Little Rock. He was a
man of intemperate habits and, while _en route_, was ordered back
to Richmond to answer "charges of drunkenness and disobedience of
orders."[502] His appointment was thereupon rescinded. The man
selected in his place, to the total ignoring of Price's prior claims,
was Theophilus H. Holmes, a native of North Carolina.[503] President
Davis was still possessed of the notion that frontier affairs could be
best conducted by men who had no local attachments there. Late events
had all too surely lent weight to his theory. Nevertheless, in holding
it, Davis was strictly inconsistent and illogical; for loyalty to
the particular home state constituted the strongest asset that the
Confederacy had. It was the lode-star that had drawn Lee and

[Footnote 501: Magruder to Randolph, July 5, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 851-852.]

[Footnote 502: Clark to Price, July 17, 1862, _Official Records_,
vol. liii, supplement, 816-817.]

[Footnote 503: Wright, _General Officers of C.S.A_., 15-16.]

many another, who cared not a whit for political principles in and
for themselves, from their allegiance to the Union. It was the great
bulwark of the South.

Holmes was ordered west July 16;[504] but, as he had the necessary
preparations to make and various private matters to attend to, August
had almost begun before it proved possible for him to reach Little
Rock.[505] The interval had given Hindman a new lease of official life
and a further extension of opportunity for oppression, which he had
used to good advantage. The new department commander, while yet in
Richmond, had discussed the Pike-Hindman controversy with his superior
officers and had arrived at a conclusion distinctly favorable to Pike.
He frankly confessed as much weeks afterwards. Once in Little Rock,
however, he learned from the Hindman coterie of Pike's Indian
proclamation and immediately veered to Hindman's side.[506] Pike
talked with him, recounted his grievances in a fashion that none could
surpass, but made absolutely no impression upon him. So small a thing
and so short a time had it taken to develop a hostile prejudice in
Holmes's mind, previously unbiased, so deep-seated that it never,
in all the months that followed, knew the slightest diminution.
Conversely and most fortuitously, a friendliness grew up between
Holmes and the man whom he had supplanted that made the former, either
forget the orders given him in Richmond or put so new a construction
upon them that they were rendered nugatory. It was a situation,
exceedingly fortunate for

[Footnote 504: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 855.]

[Footnote 505: He had reached Vicksburg by the thirtieth of July and
from that point he issued his orders assuming the command [ibid.,

[Footnote 506: Pike to Holmes, December 30, 1862 (Appendix);
_Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 121-122.]

the service as a whole, no doubt, but most unhappy for Indian

It finally dawned upon Pike that it was useless to argue any longer
upon the matters in dispute between him and Hindman, for Holmes had
pre-judged the case. Moreover, Holmes was beginning to appreciate the
advantage of being in a position where he could, by ignoring Pike's
authority and asserting his own, be much the gainer in a material way.
How he could have reconciled such an attitude with the instructions
he had received from Randolph it is impossible to surmise. The
instructions, whether verbal or written, must have been in full accord
with the secretary's letter to Pike of the fourteenth of July, which,
although Pike was as yet ignorant of it, had explicitly said that no
supplies for Indian Territory should be diverted from their course and
that there should be no interference whatever with Pike's somewhat
peculiar command.[507] All along the authorities in Richmond, their
conflicting departmental regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
had insisted that the main object of the Indian alliance had been
amply attained when the Indians were found posing as a Home Guard.
Indians were not wanted for any service outside the limits of their
own country. Service outside was to be deprecated, first, last, and
always. Indeed, it was in response to a suggestion from Pike, made in
the autumn of 1861, that the Indian Territory ought to be regarded as
a thing apart, to be held for the Confederacy most certainly but not
to be involved in the warfare outside, that Pike's department had been
created and no subsequent

[Footnote 507: Pike to Holmes, December 30, 1862. The same assurance
had apparently been given to Pike in May [_Official Records_,
vol. xiii, 863].]

arrangements for the Trans-Mississippi Department or District,
whichever it may have been at the period, were intended to militate
against that fundamental fact.[508]

Despairing of accomplishing anything by lingering longer in Little
Rock, Pike applied to Holmes for a leave of absence and was granted
it for such time as might have to elapse before action upon his
resignation could be secured.[509] The circumstance of Hindman's
having relieved Pike from duty was thus ignored or passed over in
silence. General Pike had come to Little Rock to see his family[510]
but he now decided upon a visit to Texas. Exactly what he expected to
do there nobody knows; but he undoubtedly had at heart the interests
of his department. He went to Warren first and later to Grayson
County. At the latter place, he made Sherman his private headquarters
and it was from there that he subsequently found it convenient to pass
over again into Indian Territory.

Pike was in Arkansas as late as the nineteenth of August and probably
still there when Randolph's letter of the fourteenth of July, much
delayed, arrived.[511] If angry before, he was now incensed; for he
knew for a certainty at last that Hindman had been a sort of usurper
in the Trans-Mississippi District and, with power emanating from no
one higher than Beauregard, had never legally possessed a flicker of
authority for doing the many insulting things that he had arrogantly
done to him.[512] Next, from some source, came the

[Footnote 508: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 861, 864, 868.]

[Footnote 509: Holmes to the Secretary of War, November 15, 1862
[ibid., 918].]

[Footnote 510: For an account of Pike's movements, see _Confederate
Military History_, vol. x, 126.]

[Footnote 511: Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, 356.]

[Footnote 512: Pike to Holmes, December 30, 1862, "Appendix."]

news that President Davis had refused positively to accept Pike's
resignation.[513] What better proof could anyone want that Pike was
sustained at headquarters? What that view of the matter may have meant
in emboldening him to his later excessively independent actions must
be left to the reader's conjecture. It never occurred to Pike that if
his resignation had been refused, it had probably been refused upon
the supposition that, with Hindman out of the way, all would be well.
One good reason for thinking that that was the Richmond attitude
towards the affair is the fact that no record of anything like
immediate and formal action upon the resignation is forthcoming.
Pike heard that it had been refused and positively, which was very
gratifying; but it is far more likely that it had been put to one side
and purposely; in order that, since Pike was unquestionably the best
man for Indian Territory, all difficulties might be left to adjust
themselves, the less said about Hindman's autocracy the better it
would be for all concerned.

But it was soon apparent that Hindman was not to be put out of the
way. It was to be still possible for him to work mischief in Indian
Territory. With some slight modifications, the Trans-Mississippi
District had been converted into the Trans-Mississippi Department and,
on the twentieth of August, orders[514] issued from

[Footnote 513: There is something very peculiar about the acceptance
or non-acceptance of Pike's resignation. Randolph wrote to Holmes,
October 27, 1862, these words: "... General Pike's resignation having
been accepted, you will be left without a commanding officer in the
Indian Territory..." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 906]. A
letter endorsement, made by Randolph, on or later than September 19th,
was to this effect: "General Pike's resignation has not yet been
accepted" [Ibid., liii, supplement, 821], and another, made by
him, November 5th, to this: "Accept General Pike's resignation, and
notify him of it" [Ibid., 822].]

[Footnote 514: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 877.]

Little Rock, arranging for an organization into three districts, the
Texas, the Louisiana,[515] and the Arkansas. The last-named district
was entrusted to General Hindman and made to embrace Arkansas,
Missouri, and the Indian Territory. Hindman took charge at Fort Smith,
August twenty-fourth and straightway planned such disposition of his
troops as would make for advancing the Confederate line northward of
the Boston Mountains, Fort Smith, and the Arkansas River. The Indian
forces that were concentrated around Forts Smith and Gibson were
shifted to Carey's Ferry that they might cover the military road
southward from Fort Scott. To hold the Cherokee country and to help
maintain order there, a battalion of white cavalry was posted at
Tahlequah and, in each of the nine townships, or districts, of the
country, the formation of a company of home guard, authorized.[516]

The maintaining of order in the Cherokee Nation had come to be
imperatively necessary. John Ross, the Principal Chief, was now
a prisoner within the Federal lines.[517] His capture had been
accomplished by strategy only a short time before and not without
strong suspicion that he had been in collusion with his captors. Early
in August, General Blunt, determined that the country north of the
Arkansas should not be abandoned, notwithstanding the retrograde
movement of Colonel Salomon, had ordered Salomon, now a brigadier in
command of the Indian Expedition, to send

[Footnote 515: Not all of Louisiana was in Holmes's department and
only that part of it west of the Mississippi constituted the District
of Louisiana. Governor Moore had vigorously protested against a
previous division, one that "tacked" "all north of Red River" "onto
Arkansas" [_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 819].]

[Footnote 516:--Ibid., vol. xiii, 46-47.]

[Footnote 517: Nominally, Ross was yet a prisoner, although, as a
matter of fact, he had started upon a mission to Washington, his
desire being to confer with President Lincoln in person regarding the
condition of the Cherokees [Blunt to Lincoln, August 13, 1862, ibid.,

back certain white troops in support of the Indian.[518] Dr.
Gillpatrick, who was the bearer of the orders, imparted verbal
instructions that the expeditionary force so sent should proceed to
Tahlequah and complete what Colonel Phillips had confessed he had not
had sufficient time for, the making of diplomatic overtures to the
Cherokee authorities.[519]

Blunt's expeditionary force had proceeded to Tahlequah and to Park
Hill and there, under the direction of Colonel William F. Cloud, had
seized John Ross and his family, their valuables, also official papers
and the treasury of the Cherokee Nation.[520] The departure of the
Principal Chief had had a demoralizing effect upon the Cherokees;
for, when his restraining influence was removed, likewise the Federal
support, political factions, the Pins, or full-bloods, and the
Secessionists, mostly half-breeds, had been able to indulge their
thirst for vengeance uninterruptedly.[521] Chaos had well-nigh

The departure of the expeditionary force had meant more than mere
demoralization among the Indians. It had meant the abandonment of
their country to the Confederates and the Confederates, once realizing
that, delaying nothing, took possession. The secessionist Cherokees
then called a convention, formally deposed John Ross, and elected
Stand Watie as Principal Chief in his stead.[522] Back of all such
revolutionary work, was General Hindman and it was not long before
Hindman himself was in Tahlequah.[523] Once there, he proceeded to set
his stamp upon things with customary

[Footnote 518: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 531-532.]

[Footnote 519:--Ibid., 182.]

[Footnote 520:--Ibid., 552.]

[Footnote 521:--Ibid., 623, 648.]

[Footnote 522: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 129.]

[Footnote 523: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 42.]

vigor and order was shortly restored both north and south of the
Arkansas. Guerrilla warfare was summarily suppressed, marauding
stopped, and the perpetrators of atrocities so deservedly punished
that all who would have imitated them lost their taste for such
fiendish sport. As far north as the Moravian Mission, the Confederates
were undeniably in possession; but, at that juncture, Holmes called
Hindman to other scenes. A sort of apathy then settled like a cloud
upon the Cherokee Nation[524]. Almost lifeless, it awaited the next

One part of the programme, arranged for at the time of the
re-districting of the Trans-Mississippi Department, had called for a
scheme to reënter southwest Missouri. Hindman was to lead but Rains,
Shelby, Cooper, and others were to constitute a sort of outpost and
were to make a dash, first of all, to recover the lead mines at
Granby. The Indians of both armies were drawn thitherward, the one
group to help make the advance, the other to resist it. At Newtonia on
September 30 the first collision of any moment came and it came and it
ended with victory for the Confederates[525]. Cooper's Choctaws and
Chickasaws fought valiantly but so also did Phillips's Cherokees. They
lost heavily in horses[526], their own poorly shod ponies; but they
themselves stood fire well. To rally them after defeat proved,
however, a difficult matter. Their

[Footnote 524: Report of M.W. Buster to Cooper, September 19, 1862,
_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 273-277.]

[Footnote 525: For detailed accounts of the Battle of Newtonia, see
Ibid., 296-307; Edwards, _Shelby and his Men_, 83-89;
Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 355-363; Anderson,
_Life of General Stand Watie_, 20; Crawford, _Kansas in the
Sixties_, 54; _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 132.]

[Footnote 526: Evan Jones to Dole, January 8, 1864, Indian Office
General Files, Cherokee, 1859-1865, J 401.]

disciplining had yet left much to be desired.[527] Scalping[528] of
the dead took place as on the battle-field of Pea Ridge; but, in other
respects, the Indians of both armies acquitted themselves well and far
better than might have been expected.

The participation of the Indians in the Battle of Newtonia was
significant. Federals and Confederates had alike resorted to it for
purposes other than the red man's own. The Indian Expedition had now
for a surety definitely abandoned the intention for which it was
originally organized and outfitted. As a matter of fact, it had long
since ceased to exist. The military

[Footnote 527: "Since leaving the Fugitive Indians on Dry Wood Creek,
nothing has occurred of material interest other than you will receive
through official Dispatches from the Officers of our Army. The Indians
under Col. Phillips fought well at the Battle Newtonia, they have at
all times stood fire. The great difficulty of their officers is in
keeping them together in a retreat, and should such be necessary on
the field in presence of an enemy in their present state of discipline
it would be almost impossible to again return them to the attack in
good order--Another Battle was fought at this place in which the enemy
were defeated with considerable loss, four of their guns being taken
by a charge of the 2d Kansas.

"In this Contest the Indians behaved well, the officers and soldiers
of our own regiments now freely acknowledge them to be valuable Allies
and in no case have they as yet faltered, untill ordered to retire,
the prejudice once existing against them is fast disappearing from our
Army and it is now generaly conceded that they will do good service
in our border warfare. This we have never doubted and confident as we
have been of their fitness for border warfare we have been content to
await, untill they had proven to the country not only their loyalty
but their ability to fight. Since their organization they have been
engaged in several battles and in every case successfully, one of us
will start in a day or two for Tahlequah and may find something of
interest on the march. We are now in the Cherokee Nation. An effort
is now being made by Gen'l Blunt to punish plundering in the country.
Union People have suffered from this as much as rebels. We have before
called the attention of our Army Officers to this fact; with our
Fifteen Hundred Cherokee Warriors in the service of our government--we
feel that every possible protection should be extended to them as a
people" [Carruth to Coffin, October 25, 1862, enclosed in Coffin to
Dole, November 16, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_ 1859-1862].]

[Footnote 528: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 894.]

organization, of which the Indian regiments in the Federal service now
formed a part, was Blunt's division of the Army of the Frontier and
it had other objects in view, other tasks to perform, than the simple
recovery of Indian Territory.

It is true General Blunt had set his heart upon that particular
accomplishment but he was scarcely a free agent in the matter. Men
above him in rank had quite other aims and his, perforce, had to be
subordinated to theirs. In August, Blunt had planned a kind of second
Indian Expedition to go south to Fort Gibson and to restore the
refugees to their homes.[529] It had started upon its way when the
powers higher up interposed.

General Schofield, anticipating the renewed endeavor of the
Confederates to push their line forward, had called upon Blunt for
assistance and Blunt had responded with such alacrity as was possible,
considering that many of the troops he summoned for Schofield's use
were those that had been doing hard service within and on the border
of the Indian country for full two months. During all that time their
horses had been deprived entirely of grain feed and had been compelled
to subsist upon prairie grass. They were in a bad way.[530] Once
outside the Indian Territory, the Indian regiments, begrudging the
service demanded of them, were kept more fully occupied than were the
white; for there was

[Footnote 529: "Orders have been given by General Blunt for the Indian
Expedition to go South soon; he says the families of the Indians may
go"--CARRUTH to Coffin, August 29, 1862, enclosed in Coffin to
Mix, August 30, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendence_, 1859-1862.

"Enclosed you will find an order from General James G. Blunt in
regard to the removal of the Indian families to their homes. I start
to-morrow for Fort Scott, Kansas, to overtake the second Indian
expedition, commanded by General Blunt in person."--Carruth to Coffin,
September 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, p.

[Footnote 530: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 337.]

always scouting[531] for them to do and frequently skirmishing. On
Cowskin River, Phillips's Third Indian and, near Shirley's Ford on
Spring River, Ritchie's Second had each engaged the Confederates with
success, although not entirely with credit. Ritchie had allowed his
men to run amuck even to the extent of attacking their comrades in
Colonel Weer's brigade, which was the second in Blunt's reorganized
army. On account of his lack of control over his troops, Ritchie was
reported upon for dismissal from the service.[532]

The Battle of Newtonia was inconclusive. Subsequent to it, the
Federals were greatly reënforced and, in the first days of October,
Schofield and Blunt, who had both arrived recently upon the scene,
coming to the aid of Salomon, who had been the vanquished one at
Newtonia, were able, in combination with Totten, to deprive Cooper of
all the substantial fruits of victory. He was obliged to fall back
into Arkansas, whither a part of Blunt's division pursued him and
encamped themselves on the old battle-field of Pea Ridge.[533]

Cooper was far from being defeated, however, and, under orders from
Rains, soon made plans for attempting an invasion of Kansas; but
Blunt, ably seconded by Crawford of the Second Kansas, was too quick
for him. He followed him to Maysville and then a little beyond the
Cherokee border to old Fort Wayne in the present Delaware District of
the Nation. There, on the open prairie, a battle was fought,[534] on
October 22, so

[Footnote 531: Phillips to Blunt, September 5, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 614-615.]

[Footnote 532: Weer to Moonlight, September 12, 1862, ibid., 627; Weer
to Blunt, September 24, 1862, ibid., 665-666; Britton, _Civil War on
the Border_, vol. i, 352.]

[Footnote 533: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 366;
Crawford, _Kansas in the Sixties_, 54.]

[Footnote 534: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 20;
Crawford, _Kansas in the_ (cont.)]

disastrous to the Confederates, who, by the by, were greatly
outnumbered, that they fled, a demoralized host, by way of Fort Gibson
across the Arkansas River to Cantonment Davis,[535] Stand Watie and
his doughty Cherokees covering their retreat. The Federals had then
once again an undisputed possession of Indian Territory north of the

Such was the condition of affairs when Pike emerged from his
self-imposed retreat in Texas. The case for the Confederate cause
among the Indians was becoming desperate. So many things that called
for apprehension were occurring. Cooper and Rains were both in
disgrace, the failure of the recent campaign having been attributed
largely to their physical unfitness for duty. Both were now facing an
investigation of charges for drunkenness. Moreover, the brutal attack
upon and consequent murder of Agent Leeper had just shocked the
community. Hearing of that murder and considering that he was still
the most responsible party in Indian Territory, General Pike made
preparations to proceed forthwith to the Leased District. His plans
were frustrated by his own arrest at the command of General Holmes.

His unfriendliness to Pike was in part due to Holmes's own
necessities. It was to his interest to assert authority over the man
who could procure supplies for Indian Territory and when occasion
offered, if that man should dare to prove obdurate, to ignore his
position altogether. Nevertheless, Holmes had not seen fit in early
October to deny Pike his title of

[Footnote 534: (cont.) _Sixties_, 56-62; Edwards, _Shelby and
his Men, 90; Official Records, vol. xiii, 43, 324. 325, 325-328,
329-331, 331-332, 332-336, 336-337, 759_; Britton, _Civil War on
the Border_, vol. i, _364-375_.]

[Footnote 535: _Official Records, vol. xiii, 765_.]

[Footnote 536: Blunt was ordered "to clean out the Indian country"
[Ibid., 762].]

commander and had personally addressed him by it.[537] Yet all the
time he was encroaching upon that commander's prerogatives, was
withholding his supplies, just as Hindman had done, and was exploiting
Indian Territory, in various ways, for his own purposes. Rumors came
that Pike was holding back munition trains in Texas and then that
he was conspiring with Texan Unionists against the Confederacy. To
further his own designs, Holmes chose to credit the rumors and
made them subserve the one and the same end; for he needed Pike's
ammunition and he wanted Pike himself out of the way. He affected to
believe that Pike was a traitor and, when he reappeared as brigade
commander, to consider that he had unlawfully reassumed his old
functions. Accordingly, he issued an order to Roane,[538] to whom
he had entrusted the Indians, for Pike's arrest; but he had already
called Pike to account for holding back the munition trains and had
ordered him, if the charge were really true, to report in person at
Little Rock.[539]

The order for General Pike's arrest bore date of November 3. Roane,
the man to whom the ungracious task was assigned, was well suited to
it. He had been adjudged by Holmes himself as absolutely worthless
as a commander and, being so, had been sent to take care of the
Indians,[540] a severe commentary upon Holmes's own fitness for
the supreme control of anything that had to do with them or their
concerns. Others had an equally poor opinion of Roane's generalship
and character. John S. Phelps, indeed, was writing at this very time,
the autumn of 1862, to Secretary

[Footnote 537: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 924.]

[Footnote 538:--Ibid., 923, 980, 981.]

[Footnote 539:--Ibid., 904.]

[Footnote 540:--Ibid., 899.]

Stanton in testimony of Roane's unsavory reputation.[541]

The arrest of Pike took place November 14 at Tishomingo in the
Chickasaw country and a detachment of Shelby's brigade was detailed
to convey him to Little Rock.[542] Then, as once before, his reported
resignation saved him from long confinement and from extreme
ignominy. On the fifth of November, President Davis instructed the
adjutant-general to accept Pike's resignation forthwith and five days
thereafter,[543] before the arrest had actually taken place, Holmes
advised Hindman that he had better let Pike go free so soon as he
should leave the Indian country; inasmuch as his resignation was now
an assured thing.[544] Holmes evidently feared to let the release take
place within the limits of Pike's old command; for some of the Indians
were still devotedly attached to him and were still pinning their
faith upon his plighted word. John Jumper and his Seminole braves were
among those most loyal to Pike; and Holmes was afraid that wholesale
desertions from their ranks would follow inevitably Pike's
degradation. Many desertions had already occurred, ostensibly because
of lack of food and raiment. Commissioner Scott had complained to
Holmes of the Indian privations[545] and Holmes had been forced to
concede, although only at the eleventh hour, the Indian claim to some
consideration. He had arbitrarily shared tribal quota of supplies,
bought with tribal money, with white troops and had lamely excused
himself by saying that he had done it to prevent

[Footnote 541: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 752.]

[Footnote 542:--Ibid., 921.]

[Footnote 543:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 821.]

[Footnote 544:--Ibid., vol. xiii, 913.]

[Footnote 545:--Ibid., 920.]

grumbling[546] and the charge of favoritism. One other offence of
which Holmes was guilty he did not attempt to palliate, the taking of
the Indians out of their own country without their consent. To the
very last Pike had expostulated[547] against such violation of treaty
promises; but Holmes and Hindman were deaf alike to entreaty and to

General Pike, poet and student, was now finally deprived of his
command and the Indians left to their own devices or at the mercy of
men, who could not be trusted or were not greatly needed elsewhere. No
one attempted any longer to conceal the truth that alliance with the
Indians was a supremely selfish consideration, and nothing more,
on the part of those who coveted Indian Territory because of its
geographical position, its strategic and economic importance. For a
little while longer, Pike contended with his enemies by means of the
best weapon he had, his facile pen. His acrimonious correspondence
with the chief of those enemies, Hindman and Holmes, reached its
highest point of criticism in a letter of December 30 to the latter.
That letter summed up his grievances and was practically his last
charge. Having made it, he retired from the scene, not to reappear
until near the close of the war, when Kirby Smith found it
advantageous to reëmploy him for service among the red men.

[Footnote 546: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 928.]

[Footnote 547:--Ibid., 905, 963.]


General Blunt's decision to restore the Indian refugees in Kansas to
their own country precipitated a word war of disagreeable significance
between the civil and military authorities. The numbers of the
refugees had been very greatly augmented in the course of the summer,
notwithstanding the fact that so large a proportion of the men had
joined the Indian Expedition. It is true they had not all stayed with
it. The retrograde movement of Colonel Salomon and his failure later
on to obey Blunt's order to the letter[548] that he should return
to the support of the Indians had disheartened them and many of the
enlisted braves had deserted the ranks, as chance offered, and had
strayed back to their families in the refugee camps of southern

[Footnote 548: Blunt to Caleb Smith, November 21, 1862 [Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, I 860].]

[Footnote 549: One of the first notices of their desertion was the

"We are getting along well, very well. The Indians seem happy and
contented, and seemingly get enough to eat and wear. At least I hear
no complaint. For the last two or three days the Indian soldiers have
been stragling back, until now there are some three or four hundred
in, and they are still coming. I held a council with them to-day to
try and find out why they are here. But they don't seem to have any
idea themselves. All I could learn was that Old George started and the
rest followed. The Col. it seems told them to go some where else. I
shall send an express to Col. Furness in the morning to find out if
possible what it means. It seems to me it will not do to give the
provisions purchased for the women and children to the soldiers....

"The soldiers look clean and hearty, and complain of being
treated like dogs, starved etc, which I must say their looks
belie...."--GEO.A. CUTLER to Wm. G. Coffin, August 13, 1862,

Then the numbers had been augmented in other ways. The Quapaws, who
had been early driven from their homes and once restored,[550] had
left them again when they found that their country had been denuded of
all its portable resources. It was exposed to inroads of many sorts.
Even the Federal army preyed upon it and, as all the able-bodied male
Quapaws were gradually drawn into that army, there was no way of
defending it. Its inhabitants, therefore, returned as exiles to the
country around about Leroy.[551]

It was much the same with near neighbors of the Quapaws, with the
Senecas and the Seneca-Shawnees. These Indians had been induced to
accept one payment of their annuities from the Confederate agent[552]
but had later repented their digression from the old allegiance to
the United States and had solicited its protection in order that they
might remain true. Some of them stayed with Agent Elder near Fort
Scott,[553] others moved northward and lived upon the charity of the
Shawnees near Lawrence.[554] But those Shawnees were doomed themselves
to be depredated upon, especially that group of them known as Black
Bob's Band, a band that had been assigned a settlement in Johnson

[Footnote 550: Coffin to Elder, August 9, 1862; Coffin to Mix, August
16, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Neosho_, C 1745 of 1862.]

[Footnote 551: Some of the Quapaws that went to Leroy were not _bona
fide_ refugees. Elder reported them as lured thither by the idea
of getting fed [Elder to Dole, July 9, 1862, Ibid., E 114 of

[Footnote 552: Coffin to Dole, May 31, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Neosho_.]

[Footnote 553: Coffin to Mix, July 30, 1862, Ibid., C 1732 of

[Footnote 554: J.J. Lawler to Mix, August 2, 1862, Ibid.,
_Shawnee_, 1855-1862; Abbott to Branch, July 26, 1862,
Ibid. Some of the Senecas, about one hundred twenty-three, went
as far as Wyandot City. For them and their relief, the Senecas in
New York interceded. See Chief John Melton to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, September 2, 1862, Ibid., _Neosho_, H 541; Mix to
Coffin, September 11, 1862, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 69,

County, adjoining the Missouri border.[555] In August[556] and again
in the first week of September[557] guerrillas under Quantrill,[558]
crossed over the line and raided the Black Bob lands, robbing the
Indians of practically everything they possessed, their clothing,
their household goods, their saddles, their ponies, their provisions,
and driving the original owners quite away. They fired upon them as
they fled and committed atrocities upon the helpless ones who lagged
behind. They then raided Olathe.[559] Somewhat earlier, guerrillas
had similarly devastated the Kansas Agency, although not to the same
extent.[560] The Black Bob Shawnees found a refuge in the western part
of the tribal reserve.[561]

[Footnote 555: This group of Shawnee refugees must be distinguished
from the so-called _Absentee Shawnees_, who also became refugees.
The Shawnees had been very much molested and disturbed during the
period of border strife following the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
Bill. Black Bob's Band was then exceedingly desirous of going south to
dwell with the Seneca-Shawnees [Rector to Greenwood, January 6, 1860,
enclosing Dorn to Greenwood, December 30, 1859, Indian Office General
Files, _Neosho_, R 463 of 1860]. The Absentee Shawnees had
taken refuge in Indian Territory prior to the war, but were expelled
immediately after it began. They obtained supplies for a time from the
Wichita Agent and lived as refugees on Walnut Creek [Paschal Fish and
other Shawnee delegates to Cooley, December 5, 1865, Indian Office
Land Files, _Shawnee_, 1860-1865]. Later on, they seem, at least
some of them, to have gone up to the Shawnee Reserve [Dole to Coffin,
July 27, 1863, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 71, 195; Dole
to Usher, July 27, 1863, Ibid., _Report Book_, no. 13,

[Footnote 556: H.B. Branch to Dole, June 19, 1863, enclosing
various letters from Agent Abbott, Indian Office General Files,
_Shawnee_, 1863-1875, B 343.]

[Footnote 557: Branch to Dole, October 3, 1862, transmitting
letter from Abbott to Branch, September 25, 1862, Ibid.,
_Shawnee_, 1855-1862, B 1583.]

[Footnote 558: Connelley, _Quantrill and the Border Wars_, 269,
says that, from' August 15, 1863, the Confederate government was
directly responsible for the work of Quantrill. From that day, the
guerrillas were regular Confederate soldiers. They were not generally
regarded as such, however; for, in November, 1863, Price was trying
to prevail upon Quantrill and his men to come into the regular army
[_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 907-908].]

[Footnote 559: Governor Robinson issued a proclamation, on the
occasion of this emergency for volunteers against guerrillas.]

[Footnote 560: Farnsworth to Dole, July 23, 1862 [Indian Office
General Files, _Kansas_, 1855-1862, F 386].]

[Footnote 561: Letter of Agent Abbott, June 5, 1863, Ibid.,
_Shawnee_, 1863-1875, B 343.]

Some Wyandot Indians, who before the war had sought and found homes
among the Senecas,[562] were robbed of everything they possessed by
secessionist Indians,[563] who would not, however, permit them to go
in search of relief northward.[564] When all efforts to induce them to
throw in their lot with the Confederacy proved unavailing, the strict
watch over them was somewhat relaxed and they eventually managed to
make their escape. They, too, fled into Kansas. And so did about one
hundred Delawares, who had been making their homes in the Cherokee
country. In the spring of 1862, they had begun to return destitute to
the old reservation[565] but seem not to have been counted refugees
until much later in the year.[566] The Delaware Reservation on the
northern bank of the Kansas River and very near to Missouri was
peculiarly exposed

[Footnote 562: Indian Office General Files, _Neosho_, I 81 of

[Footnote 563: Lawrence and others, Wyandots, to Dole, December 23,
1862, ibid., Land Files, _Shawnee_, 1860-1865, L 12 of 1862. This
letter was answered January 20, 1863, and, on the same day, Coffin was
instructed to relieve their distress.]

[Footnote 564: "Being personally acquainted with the condition of the
Wyandots ... would here state, that a portion of them are living among
the Senecas bordering on the Cherokee Country, and they are in a
suffering condition. The rebel portion of the Senecas and Cherokees
have robbed them of all of their ponies, and in fact all the property
they had, and will not allow them to leave to come to Wyandott, which
is about 2 hundred miles in distance, and their friends in Wyandott
are unable to relieve them (on account of the rebel forces) without
protection of our armies. The Wyandotts that are here are anxious to
go and relieve their friends, and would respectfully request that they
be allowed to form into a military company and be mustered into Gov'nt
service and go with the expedition south to relieve their friends and
assist in reclaiming the rebel Indians. A few of the Wyandotts are in
service ... They are all very anxious to be transferred into a company
by themselves for the purpose above stated...."--CHARLES MOORE to
Dole, February 9, 1862, Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, D 576.]

[Footnote 565: Johnson to Dole, April 2, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Delaware_, 1862-1866.]

[Footnote 566: Johnson to Dole, November 5, 1862, ibid., _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

to ravages, horses and cattle being frequently stolen.[567] For that
reason and because so much urged thereto by Agent Johnson,[568] who
was himself anxious for service, the Delawares were unusually eager to

The Osages had been induced by Ritchie and others to join the Indian
Expedition or to serve as independent scouts.[569] Their families,
consequently, found it safe and convenient to become refugees.[570]
In July, they formed much the larger part of some five hundred from
Elder's agency, who sought succor at Leroy. That did not deter the
Osages, however, from offering a temporary abiding-place, within their
huge reserve, to the homeless Creeks under Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la.[571]

[Footnote 567: Johnson to Dole, May 28, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Delaware_, I 667 of 1862.]

[Footnote 568: Johnson wished to retain his agency and also hold a
commission as colonel of volunteers, Department of the Interior,
_Register of Letters Received_, no. 4, pp. 214, 357. James H.
Lane endorsed his request and it was granted.]

[Footnote 569: The Osages rendered occasionally some good service.
They and the Comanches plundered the Chickasaws very considerably
[Holmes Colbert to N.G. Taylor, April 14, 1868, Indian Office
Consolidated Files, _Chickasaw_, C 716 of 1868. See also Office
letter to Osage treaty commissioners, May 4, 1868]. In October, the
Osage force advanced as far as Iola and then retreated [Henning to
Blunt, October 11, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 726].
Soon after that they were mustered out and in a very disgruntled
condition. They claimed that the government had used them very badly
and had never paid them anything [Henning to Chipman, November 13,
1862, Ibid., 790]. They knew little of the discipline of war
and left the army whenever they had a mind to.]

[Footnote 570: The Osages joined the Indian Expedition only upon
condition that their families would be supported during their absence
[Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Indian Office Consolidated Files,
_Neosho_, C 1662 of 1862]. The families were soon destitute.
Coffin ordered Elder to minister to them at Leroy; but he seems to
have distrusted the southern superintendent and to have preferred to
keep aloof from him. Coffin then appointed a man named John Harris as
special Osage agent [Coffin to Dole, July 7, 1862, Ibid., C
1710]. Elder tried to circumvent Coffin's plans for the distribution
of cattle [Coffin to Elder, July 16, 1862, ibid., C 1717] and Coffin
lodged a general charge of neglect of duty against him [Coffin to
Dole, July 19, 1862, Ibid.].]

[Footnote 571: The invitation was extended by White Hair and Charles
Mograin [Coffin to Dole, November 16, 1862, Ibid., C 1904].
Coffin was anxious for (cont.)]

During the summer the wretched condition of the Indian refugees
had, thanks to fresh air, sunlight, and fair weather, been much
ameliorated. Disease had obtained so vast a start that the medical
service, had it been first-class, which it certainly was not, would
otherwise have proved totally inadequate. The physicians in attendance
claimed to have from five to eight thousand patients,[572] yet one
of them, Dr. S.D. Coffin, found it possible to be often and for
relatively long periods absent from his post. Of this the senior
physician, Dr. William Kile, made complaint [573] and that
circumstance marked the beginning of a serious estrangement between
him and Superintendent Coffin.[574]

In August, General Blunt announced his intention of returning the
Indian families to their homes.[575] He was convinced that some of the
employees of the Indian Office and of the Interior Department were
personally profiting by the distribution of supplies to the refugees
and that they were conniving with citizens of Kansas in perpetrating
a gigantic fraud against the government. The circumstances of the
refugees had been well aired

[Footnote 571: (cont.) Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la who had been rather
obstreperous, to accept [Coffin to Dole, November 14, 1862, Indian
Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862].]

[Footnote 572: Dr. S.D. Coffin, to Dole, July 5, 1862, ibid., General
Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862; J.C. Carter to Dole July
22, 1862, ibid.]

[Footnote 573: Kile to Dole, ibid.]

[Footnote 574: The estrangement resulted in the retirement of Kile
from the service. In September, Dr. Kile asked for a leave of absence.
Shortly afterwards, Secretary Smith instructed Charles E. Mix, the
acting commissioner, that the services of Kile were no longer
needed, since the superintendent could attend to the purchasing and
distributing of supplies [Smith to Mix, September 22, 1862, Indian
Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862]. Mix
promptly informed Kile that his resignation was accepted [Mix to Kile,
September 22, 1862, ibid., Letter Book, no. 69, p. 133].]

[Footnote 575: "Orders have been given by General Blunt for the Indian
Expedition to go South soon; he says the families of the Indians may
go. They wish to do so but no provision is made for their
subsistence or conveyance. We wish immediate instructions in this
particular."--Carruth to Coffin, August 29, 1862, ibid., General
Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862.]

in Congress, first in connection with a Senate resolution for their
relief.[576] On July fifth, Congress had passed an act suspending
annuity appropriations to the tribes in hostility to the United States
government and authorizing the president to expend, at discretion,
those same annuities in behalf of the refugees.[577] At once, the
number[578] of refugees increased and white men rushed forward to
obtain contracts for furnishing supplies.

There was a failure of the corn crop in southern Kansas that year and
Dr. Kile, appreciating certain facts, that the Indian pony is dear,
as is the Arabian horse, to his master, that the Indian ponies were
pretty numerous in spite of the decimation of the past winter, and
that they would have to be fed upon corn, advised a return to Indian
Territory before the cold weather should set in.[579] He communicated
with Blunt[580] and found Blunt of the same opinion, so also
Cutler[581] and Coleman.[582] Contrariwise was Superintendent
Coffin,[583] whose view of the case was strengthened by E.H. Carruth,
H.W. Martin,[584] and A.C. Ellithorpe.[585]

[Footnote 576: _U.S. Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second
session, part i, 815, 849, 875, 891, 940.]

[Footnote 577: _U.S. Statutes at Large_, vol. xii, 528.]

[Footnote 578: In October, Coffin put the number of refugees,
inclusive of the Cherokees on Drywood Creek, at almost seven thousand
five hundred [Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_ 1862,
p. 137] and asked for sixty-nine thousand dollars for their support
during the third quarter of 1862 [Coffin to Mix, September 16,
1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_,

[Footnote 579: Kile to Dole, July 25, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 580: Kile to Blunt, September 2, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 581: Cutler to Coffin, September 30, 1862, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 139.]

[Footnote 582: Coleman to Coffin, September 30, 1862, Ibid.,

[Footnote 583: Coffin to Mix, August 30, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862: same to same,
September 13, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 584: Carruth and Martin to Coffin, September 28, 1862,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 167.]

[Footnote 585: "In replying to the several interrogatorys contained in
your letter of the 11th inst, I shall base my answer entirely upon my
own (cont.)]

In the contest that ensued between the military and civil authorities
or between Blunt and Coffin,[586] Coffin triumphed, although Blunt
made no concealment of his

[Footnote 585: (cont.) observations and experience, obtained during a
six months campaign with the Indians, and in the Creek and Cherokee
countries. Taking a deep interest in the welfare of these loyal
refugee Indians, who have sacrificed _all_, rather than fight
against our Flag, I shall be cautious and advise no policy but that
which will insure their safe restoration to their homes.

"The important question in your letter and that which embodies the
whole subject matter is the following--'Would it be safe in the
present condition of the country to restore the southern refugee
Indians now in southern Kansas, the women and children, the old,
feeble and infirm to their homes in the Indian country?'

"I answer--It would not be safe to take the women and children to the
Creek or Cherokee countries this fall for the following reasons, 1st
The corn and vegetable crop north of the Arkansas River will not
afford them subsistence for a single month. The excessive drouth has
almost completely destroyed it, and what little would have matured is
laid waste by the frequent foraging parties of our own Army, or those
of the Rebels.

"The amount of Military force necessary to restore and safely protect
this people in their homes would far exceed what is at present at the
disposal of the Department of Kansas; and should they be removed to
the Indian country, and our forces again be compelled to fall back for
the protection of Missouri or Kansas, it would again involve their
precipitate flight, or insure their total destruction.

"Again--the effectiveness of our troops would be materially embarased
by the presence of such a vast number of timid and helpless
creatures--I base my judgment upon the following facts--viz.:

"The expedition which I have been with during the summer, exploring
this country, consisted of three Brigades but containing actually only
about 6 thousand men. We routed, captured, and pursued the fragments
of several Rebel commands, driving them south of the Arkansas River,
opposite to, and in the vicinity of Fort Gibson. This done, we found
the whole of Western Arkansas alive, and the numerous rebel squads
were at once reinforced from the guerila parties of Missouri,
Arkansas, Texas, and the various rebel Indian tribes, until they now
number a force of from 30 to 40 thousand strong, under the command of
Pike, Drew, McIntosh, Rains, Stand Watie and others, ready to contest
the passage of the Arkansas River at any point and in fact capable of
crossing to the north side of the river and possessing the country we
have twice passed over. Why did our command fall back? Simply because
we had not force sufficient to cross the Arkansas River and maintain
our position and because we were to remote from our dipo of supplies.

"The Creek country west of the Verdigris River is almost destitute

[Footnote 586: A dispute between Blunt and Coffin had been going on
for some time. In August, Coffin wrote to Mix that "The contrariness
and (cont.)]

suspicions of graft and peculation[587] and the moment, following the
defeat of the Confederates at old Fort Wayne, seemed rather auspicious
for the return of the refugees. In reality, it was not, however; for
the Federals were far from possessing Indian Territory and they had no
force that they could devote to it exclusively.

[Footnote 585: (cont.) of forage for man or beast, owing to the
drouth--Hence to remove these families would involve to the gov't
great additional expense, not only to subsist but to protect
them--Where they are they need no military protection and food is

"You will bear in mind that a large portion of the Indian country is
south of the Arkansas River and is at present the stronghold of the
Rebels. Many portions of it mountainous and rugged, affording secure
retreats that will require a powerful army to dislodge."--A.C.
ELLITHORPE to Coffin, September 12, 1862, Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 586: (cont.) interference manifested by the military
authorities in the Indian Country towards those who are having
charge of the Indians within the Cherokee Nation is so annoying and
embarrassing that it has become unpleasant, difficult, and almost
impossible for them to attend to the duties of their official
capacities with success. If the Military would only make it
their business to rid the Indian Territory of Rebels instead of
intermeddling with the affairs of the Interior Department or those
connected with or acting for the same, the Refugee Indians in
Kansas might have long since been enabled to return to their homes
..."--Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_,
1863-1864, C 466.]

[Footnote 587: It was not long before the Indians were complaining
of the very things that General Blunt suspected. For instance, in
December, the Delawares begged President Lincoln to remove Agent
Johnson because of his peculations and ungovernable temper. They also
asked that the store of Thomas Carney and Co. be ordered away from
their reservation. The latter request had been made before, the
Delawares believing that Leavenworth and Lawrence were sufficiently
near for them to trade independently [Indian Office General Files,
_Delaware_, 1862-1866]. Coffin made a contract with Stettaner
Bros. November 29, 1862, and Dole confirmed it by letter, December 13,
1862 [ibid., _Southern Superintendency_, 1863-1864]. Secretary
Smith was not very well satisfied with the Stettaner bids. They were
too indefinite [Ibid., 1859-1862, 1837]. Nevertheless, Dole,
who was none too scrupulous himself, recommended their acceptance
[Dole to Smith, December 11, 1862]. Number 201 of Indian Office
_Special Files_ is especially rich in matter relating to
transactions of Stettaner Bros., Carney and Stevens, and Perry
Fuller, so also are the files of the Indian Division of the Interior
Department, and also, to some extent, the House Files in the Capitol
Building at Washington, D.C.]

Aside from pointing out the military inadequacy, Coffin had chiefly
argued that provisions could easily be obtained where the refugees
then were; but his opposition to Blunt's suggestion was considerably
vitiated by recommendations of his own, soon given, for the removal of
the refugees to the Sac and Fox Agency upon the plea that they could
not be supported much longer to advantage in southern Kansas. The
drouth was the main reason given; but, as Kile had very truly said,
the settlers were getting pretty tired of the Indian exiles, whose
habits were filthy and who were extremely prodigal in their use of
timber. The Sac and Fox Agency was headquarters for the Sacs and Foxes
of Mississippi, for the Ottawas, and for the confederated Chippewas
and Munsees. C.C. Hutchinson was the agent there and there Perry
Fuller, Robert S. Stevens, and other sharpers had their base of

The removal northward was undertaken in October and consummated in a
little less than two months; but at an expense that was enormous and
in spite of great unwillingness on the part of most of the Indians,
who naturally objected to so greatly lengthening the distance between
them and their own homes.[588] The refugees were distributed in tribal
groups rather generally over the reserves included within the Sac and
Fox Agency. At the request of Agent Elder, the Ottawas consented to
accommodate the Seneca-Shawnees and the Quapaws, although not without
expressing their fears that the dances and carousals of the Quapaws
would demoralize their young men[589] and, finally, not without
insisting upon a mutual agreement that no

[Footnote 588: Coffin to Dole, November 14, 1862, Ibid., Indian
Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 589: C.C. Hutchinson to Dole, August 21, 1863, Indian Office
General Files, _Ottawa_, 1863-1872, D 236.]

spirituous liquors should be brought within the limits of their
Reserve under any circumstances whatsoever.[590] The Creeks, Choctaws,
and Chickasaws found a lodgment on the Sac and Fox Reservation and the
Seminoles fairly close at hand, at Neosho Falls. That was as far north
as they could be induced to go.

Of the Cherokees, more needs to be said for they were not so easily
disposed of. At various times during the past summer, Cherokees,
opposed to, not identified with, or not enthusiastic in the
Confederate cause, had escaped from Indian Territory and had collected
on the Neutral Lands. Every Confederate reverse or Federal triumph,
no matter how slight, had proved a signal for flight. By October, the
Cherokee refugees on the Neutral Lands were reported to be nearly two
thousand in number, which, allowing for some exaggeration for the sake
of getting a larger portion of relief, was a goodly section of the
tribal population.[591] At the end of October, Superintendent Coffin
paid them a visit and urged them to remove to the Sac and Fox Agency,
whither the majority of their comrades in distress were at that very
moment going.[592] The Cherokees refused; for General Blunt had given
them his word that, if he were successful in penetrating the Indian
Territory, they should at once go home.[593] Not long after Coffin's
departure, their camp on Drywood

[Footnote 590: J.T. Jones to Dole, December 30, 1862, Indian Office
General Files, _Sac and Fox_, 1862-1866. The precautions proved
of little value. Whiskey was procured by both the hosts and their
guests and great disorders resulted. Agent Hutchinson did his best
to have the refugees removed, but, in his absence, the Ottawas were
prevailed upon by Agent Elder to extend their hospitality for a while

[Footnote 591: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,

[Footnote 592:--Ibid., 1863, 175.]

[Footnote 593: Coffin to Dole, November 10, 1862, enclosing copies of
a correspondence between him and a committee of the Cherokee refugees,
October 31, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Cherokee_,
1859-1865, C 1892.]

Creek, about twelve miles south of Fort Scott, was raided by
guerrillas;[594] but even that had no effect upon their determination
to remain. The Neutral Lands, although greatly intruded upon by white
people, were legally their own and they declined to budge from them at
the instance of Superintendent Coffin.

Arrangements were undertaken for supplying the Cherokee refugees with
material relief;[595] but scarcely had anything been done to that end
when, to Coffin's utter surprise, as he said, the military authorities
"took forcible possession of them" and had them all conveyed to
Neosho, Missouri, presumably out of his reach. But Coffin would
not release his hold and detailed the new Cherokee agent, James
Harlan,[596] and Special Agent A.G. Proctor to follow them there.

John Ross, his family, and a few friends were, meanwhile, constituting
another kind of refugee in the eastern part of the United States.[597]
and were criticized by some

[Footnote 594: Coffin to Dole, November 14, 1862, Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 595: Coffin to Mix, August 31, 1863, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1863-1864, C 466. A.M. Jordan,
who acted as commissary to the Cherokees at Camp Drywood, reported to
Dole, December 6, 1862, that he was feeding about a thousand who were
then there [ibid., _Cherokee_, I 847 of 1862].]

[Footnote 596: Charles W. Chatterton, of Springfield, Illinois, who
had been appointed Cherokee agent in the place of John Crawford,
removed [Dole to Coffin, March 18, 1862, ibid., _Letter Book_,
no. 67 pp. 492-493] had died, August 31, at the Sac and Fox Agency
[Hutchinson to Mix September 1, 1862, Ibid., General Files,
_Cherokee_, H 538 of 1862]; [Coffin to Dole, September 13,
1862, Ibid., C 1827: W.H. Herndon to Dole, November 15, 1862,
Ibid., H 605]. Harlan was not regularly commissioned as
Cherokee agent until January, 1863 [Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1863,
Ibid., C 143 of 1863; Harlan to Dole, January 26, 1863,
Ibid., H 37 of 1863].]

[Footnote 597: John Ross asked help for his own family and for the
families of various relations, thirty-four persons in all. He wanted
five hundred dollars for each person [Ross to Dole, October 13, 1862,
Ibid., R 1857 of 1862]. Later, he asked for seventeen thousand
dollars, likewise for maintenance [Ross to Dole, November 19, 1862,
Ibid.]. The beginning of the next year, he notified the
department that some of his party were about to return home (cont.)]

of their opponents for living in too sumptuous a manner.[598]

The removal, under military supervision, of the Cherokee refugees,
had some justification in various facts, Blunt's firm conviction that
Coffin and his instigators or abettors were exploiting the Indian
service, that the refugees at Leroy were not being properly cared for,
and that those on the Neutral Lands had put themselves directly under
the protection of the army.[599] His then was the responsibility. When
planning his second Indian Expedition, Blunt had discovered that the
Indian men were not at all inclined to accompany it unless they could
have some stronger guarantee than any yet given that their families
would be well looked after in their absence. They had returned from
the first expedition to find their women and children and aged men,
sick, ill-fed, and unhappy.

It was with knowledge of such things and with the hope that they would
soon be put a stop to and their repetition prevented by a return of
the refugees to Indian Territory, that John Ross, in October, made a
personal appeal to President Lincoln and interceded with him to send
a military force down, sufficient to over-awe the Confederates and to
take actual possession

[Footnote 597: (cont.) [Ibid., R 14 of 1863] and requested that
transportation from Leavenworth and supplies be furnished them [Indian
Office General Files, _Cherokee_, R 13 of 1863]. Dole informed
Coffin that the request should be granted [see Office letter of
January 6, 1863] and continued forwarding to John Ross his share of
the former remittance [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 69, 503].
To make the monetary allowance to John Ross, Cherokee chief, the
Chickasaw funds were drawn upon [Second Auditor, E.B. Trench, to Dole,
June 19, 1863, Ibid., General Files, _Cherokee_, A 202 of
1863; Office letter of June 20, 1863].]

[Footnote 598: Ross and others to Dole, July 29, 1864 [Ibid.,
General Files, _Cherokee_, 1859-1865, R 360]; Secretary of the
Interior to Ross, August 25, 1864 [Ibid., I 651]; John Ross
and Evan Jones to Dole, August 26, 1864 [Ibid., R 378]; Office
letter of October 14, 1864; Coffin's letter of July 8, 1864.]

[Footnote 599: Blunt to Smith, November 21, 1862.]

of the land. Lincoln's sympathies and sense of justice were
immediately aroused and he inquired of General Curtis, in the
field, as to the practicability of occupying "the Cherokee country
consistently with the public service."[600] Curtis evaded the direct
issue, which was the Federal obligation to protect its wards, by
boasting that he had just driven the enemy into the Indian Territory
"and beyond" and by doubting "the expediency of occupying ground so
remote from supplies."[601]

General Blunt's force continued to hold the northeastern part of the
Cherokee country until the end of October when it fell back, crossed
the line, and moved along the Bentonville road in order to meet its
supply train from Fort Scott.[602] Blunt's division finally took its
stand on Prairie Creek[603] and, on the twelfth of November, made its
main camp on Lindsay's prairie, near the Indian boundary.[604] The
rout of Cooper at Fort Wayne had shaken the faith of many Indians in
the invincibility of the Confederate arms. They had disbanded and gone
home, declaring "their purpose to join the Federal troops the first
opportunity" that presented itself.[605] To secure them and to
reconnoitre once more, Colonel Phillips had started out near the
beginning of November and, from the third to the fifth, had made his
way down through the Cherokee Nation, by way of Tahlequah and Park
Hill, to Webber's Falls on the Arkansas.[606] His return was by

[Footnote 600: Lincoln to Curtis, October 10, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 723.]

[Footnote 601: Curtis to Lincoln, October 10, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 602: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i,

[Footnote 603:--Ibid., 379.]

[Footnote 604:--Ibid., 380; Bishop, _Loyalty on the
Frontier_, 56.]

[Footnote 605: Blunt to Schofield, November 9, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 785.]

[Footnote 606: H.W. Martin to Coffin, December 20, 1862, Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1950.]

Dwight's Mission. His view of the country through which he passed must
have been discouraging.[607] There was little to subsist upon and the
few Indians lingering there were in a deplorable state of deprivation,
little food, little clothing[608] and it was winter-time.

So desolate and abandoned did the Cherokee country appear that General
Blunt considered it would be easily possible to hold it with his
Indian force alone, three regiments, yet he said no more about the
immediate return of the refugees,[609] but issued an order for their
removal to Neosho. The wisdom of his action might well be questioned
since the expense of supporting them there would be immeasurably
greater than in Kansas[610] unless, indeed, the military authorities
intended to assume the entire charge of them.[611] Special Agent
Martin regarded some talk that was rife of letting them forage upon
the impoverished people of Missouri as

[Footnote 607: It was not discouraging to Blunt, however. His letter
referring to it was even sanguine [_Official Records_, vol. xiii,

[Footnote 608: Martin to Coffin, December 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 609: The Interior Department considered it, however, and
consulted with the War Department as late as the twenty-sixth. See
_Register of Letters Received_, vol. D., p. 155.]

[Footnote 610: Coffin to Henning, December 28, 1862, Indian Office
Consolidated Files, _Cherokee_, C 17 of 1863.]

[Footnote 611: Coffin's letter to Dole of December 20 [Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1950]
would imply that the superintendent expected that to be the case. He
said, having reference to Martin's report, "... The statement of facts
which he makes, from all the information I have from other sources, I
have no doubt are strictly true and will no doubt meet your serious

"If the Programme as fixed up by the Military Officers, and which I
learn Dr. Gillpatrick is the bearer to your city and the solicitor
general to procure its adoption is carried out, the Indian Department,
superintendent, and agents may all be dispensed with. The proposition
reminds me of the Fable of the Wolves and the Shepherds, the wolves
represented to the shepherds that it was very expensive keeping dogs
to guard the sheep, which was wholly unnecessary; that if they would
kill off the dogs, they, the wolves, would protect the sheep without
any compensation whatever."]

sheer humbug. The army was not doing that and why should the
defenceless Indians be expected to do it. As it was, they seem to
have been reduced to plundering in Kansas.[612] On the whole, it
is difficult to explain Blunt's plan for the concentration of the
Cherokee refugees at Neosho, since there were, at the time, many
indications that Hindman was considering another advance and an
invasion of southwest Missouri.

The November operations of the Federals in northeastern Arkansas
were directed toward arresting Hindman's progress, if progress were
contemplated. Meanwhile, Phillips with detachments of his Indian
brigade was continuing his reconnoissances and, when word came that
Stand Watie had ventured north of the Arkansas, Blunt sent him to
compel a recrossing.[613] Stand Watie's exploit was undoubtedly
a preliminary to a general Confederate plan for the recovery of
northwestern Arkansas and the Indian Territory, a plan, which Blunt,
vigorous and aggressive, was determined to circumvent. In the action
at Cane Hill,[614] the latter part of November, and in the Battle of
Prairie Grove,[615] December seventh, the mettle of the Federals was
put to a severe test which it stood successfully and Blunt's cardinal
purpose was fully accomplished.[616] In both engagements, the Indians
played a part and played it

[Footnote 612: These Indians must have been the ones referred to in
Richard C. Vaughn's letter to Colonel W.D. Wood, December i, 1862
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 796].]

[Footnote 613: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, p.

[Footnote 614:--Ibid., vol. i, chapter xxix.]

[Footnote 615:--Ibid., vol. i, chapter xxx; _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 66-82, 82-158, vol. liii, supplement,
458-461, 866, 867; Livermore, _The Story of the Civil War_, part
iii, bk. 1, 84-85.]

[Footnote 616: One opinion is to the effect that the result of
the Battle of Prairie Grove, Fayetteville, or Illinois Creek, was
virtually to end the war north of the Arkansas River [Ibid., p.
85; _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 82]. (cont.)]

conspicuously and well, the northern regiments so well,[617] indeed,
that shortly afterwards two additional ones, the Fourth and the Fifth,
were projected.[618] Towards the end of the year, Phillips, whom Blunt
had sent upon another excursion into Indian Territory,[619] could

[Footnote 616: (cont.) Bishop wrote, "After the battle of Prairie
Grove, and the gradual retrogression of the Army of the Frontier into
Missouri, Fayetteville was still held as a military post, and those of
us who remained there were given to understand that the place would
not be abandoned ... The demoralized enemy had fallen back to Little
Rock, with the exception of weak nomadic forces that, like Stygian
ghosts, wandered up and down the Arkansas from Dardanelle to Fort
Smith...." [_Loyalty on the Frontier_, 205]. Schofield was of
the opinion, however, that the Battle of Prairie Grove was a hard-won
victory. "Blunt and Herron were badly beaten in detail, and owed
their escape to a false report of my arrival with re-enforcements."
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, p. 6].]

[Footnote 617: And yet it was only a short time previously that Major
A.C. Ellithorpe, commanding the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, had
had cause to complain seriously of the Creeks of that regiment. On
November 7, he wrote from Camp Bowen that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la was
enticing the Indians away from the performance of their duties. "You
will now perceive that we are on the border of the Indian country and
a very large portion of the Indians are now scouting through their own
Territory. What I now desire is that every man who was enlisted as a
soldier shall at once return to his command by the way of Fort Scott
unless otherwise ordered by competent authority...." [Indian Office
Land Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870, C 1933].
Coffin, as usual, appeared as an apologist for the Indians and
attempted to exonerate Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la from all blame [Letter to
Dole, December 3, 1862, Ibid.]. He called the aged chief, "that
noble old Roman of the Indians," and the chief himself protested
against the injustice and untruth of Ellithrope's accusation
[Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la to Coffin, November 24, 1862, Ibid.].]

[Footnote 618: Officers for these two regiments were appointed by the
president, December 26, 1862, and ordered to report to Blunt, who, in
turn ordered them to report to Phillips. When the officers arrived in
Indian Territory, they found no such regiments as the Fourth and Fifth
Indian [_U.S. Senate Report_, 41st congress, third session, no.
359]. They never did materialize as a matter of fact; but the officers
did duty, nevertheless, and were regularly mustered out of the service
in 1863. In 1864, Congress passed an act for the adjudication of their
claim for salary [_U.S. Statutes at Large_, vol. xiii, 413]. It
is rather surprising that the regiments were not organized; inasmuch
as many new recruits were constantly presenting themselves.]

[Footnote 619: Phillips to Blunt, December 25, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 873-874].]

that Stand Watie and Cooper had been pushed considerably below
the Arkansas, that many of the buildings at Fort Davis had been
demolished,[620] that one of the Creek regiments was about to retire
from the Confederate service, and that the Choctaws, once so deeply
committed, were wavering in their allegiance to the South.[621]

[Footnote 620: The buildings at Fort Davis were burnt, and
deliberately, by Phillips's orders. [See his own admission,
Ibid., part ii, 56, 62].]

[Footnote 621: Blunt to Weed, December 30, 1862, Ibid., part i,


As though the Indians had not afflictions enough to endure merely
because of their proximity to the contending whites, life was made
miserable for them, during the period of the Civil War, as much as
before and after, by the insatiable land-hunger of politicians,
speculators, and would-be captains of industry, who were more often
than not, rogues in the disguise of public benefactors. Nearly all
of them were citizens of Kansas. The cessions of 1854, negotiated
by George W. Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, were but a
prelude to the many that followed. For years and years there was in
reality never a time when some sort of negotiation, _sub rosa_
or official, was not going on. The order of procedure was pretty much
what it had always been: a promise that the remaining land should be
the Indian's, undisturbed by white men and protected by government
guarantee, forever; encroachment by enterprising, covetous, and
lawless whites; conflict between the two races, the outraged and the
aggressive; the advent of the schemer, the man with political capital
and undeveloped or perverted sense of honor, whose vision was such
that he saw the Indian owner as the only obstacle in the way of
vast material and national progress; political pressure upon the
administration in Washington, lobbying in Congress; authorization of
negotiations with the bewildered Indians; delimitation of the meaning
of the solemn and grandly-sounding word, _forever_.

When the war broke out, negotiations, begun in the

border warfare days, were still going on. This was most true as
regarded the Osages, whose immense holding in southern Kansas
was something not to be tolerated, so the politicians reasoned,
indefinitely. Petitions,[622] praying that the lands be opened to
white settlement were constantly being sent in and intruders,[623] who
intended to force action, becoming more and more numerous and more
and more recalcitrant. One of the first official communications of
Superintendent Coffin embodied a plea for getting a treaty of cession
for which the signs had seemed favorable the previous year.
Coffin, however, discredited[624] a certain Dr. J.B. Chapman, who,
notwithstanding he represented white capitalists,[625] had yet found
favor with the Osages. To their

[Footnote 622: For example, take the petitions forwarded by M.W.
Delahay, surveyor-general of Kansas [Indian Office Consolidated Files,
_Neosho_, D 455 of 1861]. One of the petitions contains this
statement: "... The lands being largely settled upon and improved and
those adjacent being all claimed and settled upon by residents--while
a large emigration from Texas and other rebellious States are forced
to seek homes in a more northern and uncongenial climate greatly
against their interests and inclinations...."]

[Footnote 623: Intruders upon the Osage lands, as upon the Cherokee
Neutral, were numerous for years before the war. Agent Dorn was
continually complaining of them, chiefly because they were free-state
in politics. He again and again asked for military assistance in
removing them. See his letter to Greenwood, February 26, 1860,
_Neosho_, 1833-1865, D 107. Buchanan's administration had
conceived the idea of locating other Kansas Indians upon the huge
Osage Reserve. See Dorn to Greenwood, March 26, 1860, Ibid., D
119. Apparently, the fragments of tribes in the northeastern corner of
Indian Territory had been approached on the same subject, but they did
not favor it and Agent Dorn was doubtful if the Osages would [Dorn to
Greenwood, April 17, 1860, Ibid., D 129].]

[Footnote 624: He described him as a self-appointed guardian of the
Osages, as a scamp and a nuisance [Coffin to Dole, June 17, 1861,
Ibid., C 1223 of 1861].]

[Footnote 625: Chapman, August 26, 1860, inquired of Greenwood whether
there was any prospect of a treaty being negotiated with the Osages
and whether the capitalists he represented would be likely to secure
railroad rights to the South by it. He asserted that the Delawares had
been "humbugged" by their treaty, it having been negotiated "in the
interests of the Democrats at Leavenworth" [Ibid., C 702 of

everlasting sorrow and despoliation, the Indians have been fated to
place a child-like trust in those least worthy.

The defection of portions of the southern tribes offered an undreamed
of opportunity for Kansas politicians to accomplish their purposes.
They had earlier thought of removing the Kansas tribes, one by one,
to Indian Territory; but the tribes already there had a lien upon
the land, titles, and other rights, that could not be ignored. Their
possession was to continue so long as the grass should grow and the
water should run. It was not for the government to say that they
should open their doors to anybody. An early intimation that the
Kansans saw their opportunity was a resolution[626] submitted by James
H. Lane to the Senate, March 17, 1862, proposing an inquiry into "the
propriety and expediency of extending the southern boundary of Kansas
to the northern boundary of Texas, so as to include within the
boundaries of Kansas the territory known as the Indian territory."
Obviously, the proposition had a military object immediately in view;
but Commissioner Dole, to whom it was referred, saw its ulterior
meaning and reported[627] adversely upon it as he had upon an earlier
proposition to erect a regular territorial form of government in the
Indian country south of Kansas.[628] He was "unable to perceive any
advantage to be derived from the adoption of such a measure, since the
same military power that would be required to enforce the authority
of territorial officers is all-sufficient to protect and enforce the
authority of such officers as are required in the management of our
present system

[Footnote 626: _United State Congressional Globe_, 37th congress,
second session, part ii, p. 1246.]

[Footnote 627: Dole to Smith, April 2, 1862, Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 353-354.]

[Footnote 628: Dole to Smith, March 17, 1862, Ibid., 335-337.]

of Indian relations."[629] And he insisted that the whole of the
present Indian country should be left to the Indians.[630] The honor
of the government was pledged to that end. Almost coincidently he
negatived[631] another suggestion, one advocated by Pomeroy for the
confiscation of the Cherokee Neutral Lands.[632] For the time being,
Dole was strongly opposed to throwing either the Neutral Lands or the
Osage Reserve open to white settlers.

Behind Pomeroy's suggestion was the spirit of retaliation, of meting
out punishment to the Indians, who, because they had been so basely
deserted by the United States government, had gone over to the
Confederacy; but the Kansas politicians saw a chance to kill two birds
with one stone, vindictively punish the southern Indians for their
defection and rid Kansas of the northern Indians, both emigrant and
indigenous. The intruders upon Indian lands, the speculators and the
politicians, would get the spoils of victory. Against the idea of
punishing the southern Indians for what after all was far from being
entirely their fault, the friends of justice marshaled their forces.
Dole was not exactly of their number; for he had other ends to serve
in resisting measures advanced by the Kansans, yet, to his credit be
it said that he did always hold firmly to the notion that tribes like
the Cherokee were more sinned against than sinning. The government
had been the first to shirk responsibility and to violate sacred
obligations. It had failed to give the protection guaranteed by
treaties and it was not giving it yet adequately.

[Footnote 629: Dole to Smith, March 17, 1862, Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 335.]

[Footnote 630: Report of April 2, 1862.]

[Footnote 631: Dole to Smith, March 20, 1862, Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 343-344.]

[Footnote 632: _Daily Conservative_, May 10, 1862. Note the
arguments in favor of confiscation as quoted from the _Western

The true friends of justice were men of the stamp of W.S.
Robertson[633] and the Reverend Evan Jones,[634] who went out of
their way to plead the Indian's cause and to detail the extenuating
circumstances surrounding his lamentable failure to keep faith.
Supporting the men of the opposite camp was even the Legislature of
Kansas. In no other way can a memorial from the General Assembly,
urging the extinguishment of the title of certain Indian lands in
Kansas, be interpreted.[635]

It is not easy to determine always just what motives did actuate
Commissioner Dole. They were not entirely above suspicion and his
name is indissolubly connected with some very nefarious Indian
transactions; but fortunately they have not to be recounted here. At
the very time when he was offering unanswerable arguments against
the propositions of Lane and Pomeroy, he was entertaining something
similar to those propositions in his own mind. A special agent,
Augustus Wattles, who had been sufficiently familiar and mixed-up with
the free state and pro-slavery controversy to be called upon to give
testimony before the Senate

[Footnote 633: Robertson wrote to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 7, 1862, asking most earnestly "that decisive measures be
not taken against the oppressed and betrayed people of the Creek and
Cherokee tribes, until everything is heard about their struggle in the
present crisis" [Department of the Interior, _Register of Letters
Received_, "Indians," no. 4]. The letter was referred to the
Indian Office and Mix replied to it, February 14, 1862 [Indian Office
_Letter Book_, no. 67, p. 357]. The concluding paragraph of
the letter is indicative of the government feeling, "... In reply
I transmit herewith for your information the Annual Report of this
Office, which will show ... what policy has governed the Office as to
this matter, and that it is in consonance with your wish...."]

[Footnote 634: Jones wrote frequently and at great length on the
subject of justice to the Cherokees. One of his most heartfelt appeals
was that of January 21, 1862 [Indian Office Consolidated Files,
_Cherokee_, J 556 of 1862].]

[Footnote 635: Cyrus Aldrich, representative from Minnesota and
chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs referred the
memorial to the Indian Office [_Letters Registered_, vol. 58,
_Southern Superintendency_, A. 484 of 1862].]

Harper's Ferry Investigating Committee[636] and who had been on the
editorial staff of the New York Tribune,[637] had, in 1861, been sent
by the Indian Office to inspect the houses that Robert S. Stevens had
contracted to build for the Sacs and Foxes of Mississippi and for the
Kaws.[638] The whole project of the house-building was a fraud upon
the Indians, a scheme for using up their funds or for transferring
them to the pockets of promoters like Stevens[639] and M.C.
Dickey[640] without the trouble of giving value received.

From a letter[641] of protest, written by Stevens against Wattles's
mission of inspection, it can be inferred that there was a movement on
foot to induce the Indians to emigrate southward. Stevens, not wholly
disinterested, thought it a poor time to attempt changes in tribal

[Footnote 636: Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 358.]

[Footnote 637:--Ibid., 370. For other facts touching Wattles
and his earlier career, see Villard, _John Brown_, index; Wilson,
_John Brown: Soldier of Fortune_, index.]

[Footnote 638; On the entire subject of negotiations with the Indians
of Kansas, see Abel, _Indian Reservations in Kansas and the
Extinguishment of Their Titles_. The house-building project is
fully narrated there.]

[Footnote 639: For additional information about Stevens, see _Daily
Conservative_, February 11, 12, 13, 28, 1862. Senator Lane
denounced him as a defaulter to the government in the house-building
project. See _Lane_ to Dole, April 22, 1862; Smith to Dole, May
13 1862; Dole to Lane, May 5, 1862, _Daily Conservative_, May 21,
1862. In July, Lane, hearing that certificates of indebtedness were
about to be issued to Stevens on his building contract for the
Sacs and Foxes, entered a "solemn protest against such action" and
requested that the Department would let the matter lie over until the
assembling of Congress [Interior Department, _Register of Letters
Received_, January 2, 1862 to December 27, 1865, "Indians," no. 4].
Governor Robinson's enemies regarded him as the partner of Stevens
[_Daily Conservative_, November 22, 1861] in the matter of some
other affairs, and that fact may help to explain Senator Lane's bitter
animosity. The names of Robinson and Stevens were connected in the
bond difficulty, which lay at the bottom of Robinson's impeachment.]

[Footnote 640: Dickey's interest in the house-building is seen in
the following: Dickey to Greenwood, February 26, 1861, Indian Office
General Files, _Kansas_, 1855-1862, D250; same to same, March 1,
1861, Ibid., D 251.]

[Footnote 641: Stevens to Mix, August 24, 1861, Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Sac and Fox_, S439 of 1861.]

policy. His conclusions were right, his premises, necessarily
unrevealed, were false. Wattles became involved in the emigration
movement, if he did not initiate it, and, subsequent to making his
report upon the house-building, received a private communication from
Dole, asking his opinion "of a plan for confederating the various
Indian tribes, in Kansas and Nebraska, into one, and giving them
a Territory and a Territorial Government with political
privileges."[642] This was in 1861, long before any scheme that Lane
or Pomeroy had devised would have matured. Wattles started upon a tour
of observation and inquiry among the Kansas tribes and discovered
that, with few exceptions, they were all willing and even anxious to
exchange their present homes for homes in Indian Territory. Some had
already discussed the matter tentatively and on their own account
with the Creeks and Cherokees. On his way east, after completing his
investigations, Wattles stopped in New York and "consulted with our
political friends" there "concerning this movement, and they not only
gave it their approbation, but were anxious that this administration
should have the credit of originating and carrying out so wise and so
noble a scheme for civilizing and perpetuating the Indian race."
Would Wattles and his friends have said the same had they been fully
cognizant of the conditions under which the emigrant tribes had been
placed in the West?

In February of 1862, the House of Representatives called[643] for the
papers relating to the Wattles mission[644] and, in March, Wattles
expatiated upon the

[Footnote 642: Wattles to Dole, January 10, 1862, Indian Office
Special Files, no. 201, _Central Superintendency_, W 528 of

[Footnote 643: Department of the Interior, _Register of Letters
Received_, "Indians," no. 4, p. 439.]

[Footnote 644: The papers relating to the mission are collected in
Indian Office Special Files, no. 201.]

emigration and consolidation scheme in a report to Secretary
Smith.[645] Then, yet in advance of congressional authorization, began
a systematic course of Indian negotiation, all having in view the
relieving of Kansas from her aboriginal encumbrance. No means were too
underhand, too far-fetched, too villainous to be resorted to. Every
advantage was taken of the Indian's predicament, of his pitiful
weakness, political and moral. The reputed treason of the southern
tribes was made the most of. Reconstruction measures had begun for the
Indians before the war was over and while its issue was very far from
being determined in favor of the North.

As if urged thereto by some influence malign or fate sinister, the
loyal portion of two of the southern tribes, the Creeks and the
Seminoles, took in April, 1862, a certain action that, all unbeknown
to them, expedited the northern schemes for Indian undoing. The action
referred to was tribal reörganization. Each of the two groups of
refugees elected chiefs and headmen and notified the United States
government that it was prepared to do business as a nation.[646] The
business in mind had to do with annuity payments[647] and other dues
but the Indian Office soon extended it to include treaty-making.

[Footnote 645: Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Central
Superintendency_, W 528 of 1862; Department of the Interior,
_Register of Letters Received_, "Indians," no. 4, p. 517.]

[Footnote 646: Ok-ta-ha-ras Harjo and others to Dole, April 5, 1862,
Indian Office General Files, _Creek_, 1860-1869, O 45; Coffin to
Dole, April 15, 1862, transmitting communication of Billy Bowlegs
and others, April 14, 1862 ibid., _Seminole_, 1858-1869, C1594;
_Letters Registered_, vol. 58.]

[Footnote 647: On the outside of the Seminole petition, the office
instruction for its answer of May 7, 1862, reads as follows: "Say that
by resolution of Congress the annuities were authorized to be used to
prevent starvation and suffering amongst them and that being the only
fund in our hands must not be diverted from that purpose at present."]

Negotiations with the Osages had been going on intermittently all this
time. No opportunity to press the point of a land cession had ever
been neglected and much had been made, in connection with the project
for territorial organization, of the fact that the Osages had
memorialized Congress for a civil government, they thinking by means
of it to prevent further frauds and impositions being practiced upon
them.[648] Coffin and Elder, suspicious of each other, jealously
watched every avenue of approach to Osage confidence. On the ninth of
March, Elder inquired if Coffin had been regularly commissioned to
open up negotiations anew and asked to be associated with him if he
had.[649] A treaty was started but not finished for Elder received a
private letter from Dole that seemed to confine the negotiations to
a mere ascertaining of views.[650] Then the Indians grown weary of
uncertainty took matters into their own hands and appointed several
prominent tribesmen for the express purpose of negotiating a treaty
that would end the "suspense as to their future destiny."[651] From
the treaty of cession that Coffin drafted, he having taken a miserably
unfair advantage of Osage isolation and destitution, the Osages turned
away in disgust.[652] In November, some of their leading men journeyed
up to Leroy to invite the dissatisfied Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la to winter
with them.[653] Coffin seized the occasion to reopen the subject of a
cession and the Indians manifested

[Footnote 648: Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, A
476 of 1862. See also Indian Office report to the Secretary of the
Interior, May 6, 1862. The Commissioner's letter and the memorial were
sent to Aldrich, May 9, 1862.]

[Footnote 649: Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, E 94.
of 1862.]

[Footnote 650: Coffin to Dole, April 5, 1862, Ibid., C 1583.]

[Footnote 651: Communication of April 10, 1862, transmitted by Chapman
to Dole, Ibid., C 1640.]

[Footnote 652: Elder to Coffin, July 9, 1862, Ibid., E 114.]

[Footnote 653: Coffin to Dole, November 16, 1862, Ibid., C

a willingness to sell a part of their Reserve; but again Coffin was
too grasping and another season of waiting intervened.

With slightly better success the Kickapoos were approached. Their
lands were coveted by the Atchison and Pike's Peak Railway Company
and Agent O.B. Keith used his good offices in the interest of that
corporation.[654] Good offices they were, from the standpoint of
benefit to the grantees, but most disreputable from that of the
grantors. He bribed the chiefs outrageously and the lesser men
among the Kickapoos indignantly protested.[655] Rival political and
capitalistic concerns, emanating from St. Joseph, Missouri, and from
the northern tier of counties in Kansas,[656] took up the quarrel and
never rested until they had forced a hearing from the government. The
treaty was arrested after it had reached the presidential proclamation
stage and was in serious danger of complete invalidation.[657] It
passed muster only when a Senate amendment had rendered it reasonably
acceptable to the Kickapoos.

Not much headway was made with Indian treaty-making in 1862.[658] In
March, 1863, an element

[Footnote 654: Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Kickapoo_, I
655 of 1862 and I 361 of 1864.]

[Footnote 655:--Ibid., B 355 of 1863 and I 361 of 1864.]

[Footnote 656: Albert W. Horton to Pomeroy, June 20, 1863 and O.B.
Keith to Pomeroy, June 20, 1863, Indian Office Consolidated Files,
_Kickapoo_, G 59 and P 64 of 1863.]

[Footnote 657: Lane and A.C. Wilder requested the Interior Department,
September 1, 1863, "that no rights be permitted to attach to R.R.
Co. until charges of fraud in connection with Kickapoo Treaty are
settled." Their request was replied to, September 12, 1863 [Interior
Department, _Register of Letters Received_, January 2, 1862 to
December 27, 1865, "Indians," no. 4, 361].]

[Footnote 658: Dole, however, seems to have become thoroughly
reconciled to the idea. He submitted his views upon the subject once
more in connection with a memorial that Pomeroy referred to the
Secretary of the Interior "for the concentration of the Indian tribes
of the West and especially those of Kansas, in the Indian country ...
" [Dole to Smith, November 22, 1862, Indian Office _Report Book_,
no. 12, pp. 505-506; Department of the Interior, _Register of
Letters Received_, vol. D, November 22, 1862]. (cont.)]

conditioning a greater degree of success was introduced into the
government policy.[659] That was by the Indian appropriation act,
which, in addition to continuing the practice of applying tribal
annuities to the relief of refugees, authorized the president to
negotiate with Kansas tribes for their removal from Kansas and with
the loyal portion of Indian Territory tribes for cessions of land
on which to accommodate them.[660] As Dole pertinently remarked to
Secretary Usher, the measure was all very well as a policy in prospect
but it was one that most certainly could not be carried out until
Indian Territory was in Federal possession. Blunt was still striving
after possession or re-possession but his force was not "sufficient to
insure beyond peradventure his success."[661]

Scarcely had the law been enacted when John Ross and other Cherokees,
living in exile and in affluence, offered to consider proposals for
a retrocession to the United States public domain of their Neutral
Lands. The Indian Office was not yet prepared to treat and not until
November did Ross and his associates[662] get any

[Footnote 658: (cont.) December 26, 1862, Dole wrote to Smith thus:
"... It being in contemplation to extinguish the Indian title to lands
... in Kansas and provide them with homes in the Indian Territory ...
I would recommend that a commissioner should be appointed to negotiate
... I would accordingly suggest that Robt. S. Corwin be appointed ..."
[Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 13, pp. 12-13]. Now Corwin's
reputation was not such as would warrant his selection for the post.
He was not a man of strict integrity. His name is connected with many
shady transactions in the early history of Kansas.]

[Footnote 659: Presumably, Lane was the chief promoter of it. See
Baptiste Peoria to Dole, February 9, 1863, Indian Office General
Files, _Osage River_, 1863-1867.]

[Footnote 660: _U.S. Statutes at Large_, vol. xii, 793.]

[Footnote 661: Dole to Usher, July 29, 1863, Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 13, p. 211.]

[Footnote 662: His associates were then the three men, Lewis Downing,
James McDaniel, and Evan Jones, who had been appointed delegates with
him, (cont.)]

real encouragement[663] to renew their offer, yet the Cherokees had
as early as February repudiated their alliance with the southern
Confederacy. That the United States government was only awaiting a
time most propitious for itself is evident from the fact that, when,
in the spring following, refugees from the Neutral Lands were given
an opportunity to begin their backward trek, they were told that they
would not be permitted to linger at their old homes but would have to
go on all the way to Fort Gibson, one hundred twenty miles farther
south.[664] That was one way of ridding Kansas of her Indians and a
way not very creditable to a professed and powerful guardian.

Almost simultaneously with Ross's first application came an offer from
the oppressed Delawares to look for a new home in the far west, in
Washington Territory. The majority preferred to go to the Cherokee
country.[665] Some of the tribe had already lived there and wanted to
return. Had the minority gained their point, the Delawares would have
traversed the whole continent within the space of about two and a half
centuries. They would have wandered from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
from the Susquehanna River to the Willamette, in a desperate effort to
escape the avaricious pioneer, and, to their own chagrin, they would
have found him on the western coast also. Never again would there be
any place for them free from his influence.

In the summer of 1863, negotiations were undertaken

[Footnote 662: (cont.) by the newly-constructed national council, for
doing business with the United States government [Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1863, p. 23].]

[Footnote 663: See Office letter of November 19, 1863.]

[Footnote 664: David M. Harlan to Dole, December 20, 1864, Indian
Office General Files, Cherokee 1859-1865, H 1033.]

[Footnote 665: Johnson to Dole, May 24, 1863, ibid., _Delaware_,

in deadly earnest. A commencement was made with the Creeks in May,
Agent Cutler calling the chiefs in council and laying before them
the draft of a treaty that had been prepared, upon the advice
of Coffin,[666] in Washington and that had been entrusted for
transmission to the unscrupulous ex-agent, Perry Fuller.[667] The
Creek chiefs consented to sell a tract of land for locating other
Indians upon, but declared themselves opposed to any plan for
"sectionizing" their country and asked that they might be consulted as
to the Indians who were to share it with them. The month before they
had prayed to be allowed to go back home. Well fed and clothed though
they were, and quite satisfied with their agent, they were terribly
homesick.[668] Might they not go down and clean out their country for
themselves? It seemed impossible for the army to do it.[669]

Coffin next came forward with a suggestion that Indian colonization in
Texas would be far preferable to colonization elsewhere, although if
nothing better could be done, he would advocate the selection of the
Osage land on the Arkansas and its tributaries.[670] Why he wanted to
steer clear of the Indian Territory is not

[Footnote 666: "... I would most respectfully suggest that a Treaty be
gotten up by you and the Sec. of the Interior, and sent to me and Gov.
Carney and some other suitable com. to have ratified in due form and
returned. And you will pardon me for saying that the Treaty should
be a model for all that are to follow with the broken and greatly
reduced, and fragmental tribes in the Indian Territory, and may
be made greatly to promote the interests of the Indians and the
Government especially in view of the removal of the Indians
from Kansas and Nebraska as contemplated by recent Act of
Congress."--COFFIN to Dole, March 22, 1863, Ibid., Land Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870, C 117.]

[Footnote 667: Cutler to Dole, May, 1863, Ibid., General Files,
_Creek_, 1860-1869, C 240.]

[Footnote 668: Ok-ta-ha-ras Harjo and others to "Our Father," April 1,
1863, (Indian Office General Files, _Creek_, 1860-1869).]

[Footnote 669: Same to same, May 16, 1863, Ibid., O 6.]

[Footnote 670: Coffin to Dole, May 23, 1863, Ibid., Land Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870.]

evident. The Pottawatomies[671] asked to be allowed to settle on the
Creek land,[672] but the Creeks were letting their treaty hang fire.
They wanted it made in Washington, D.C., and they wanted one of their
great men, Mik-ko-hut-kah, then with the army, to assist in its
negotiation.[673] Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la had died in the spring[674] and
they were seemingly feeling a little helpless and forlorn.

Thinking to make better progress with the treaties and better terms
if he himself controlled the government end of the negotiations,
Commissioner Dole undertook a trip west in the late summer.[675] By
the third of September the Creek treaty was an accomplished fact.[676]
Aside from the cession of land for the accommodation of Indian
emigrants, its most important provision was a recognition of the
binding force of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. In due course,
the treaty went to the Senate and, in March, was accepted by that body
with amendments.[677] It went back to the

[Footnote 671: A treaty had been made with the Pottawatomies by W.W.
Ross, their agent, November 15, 1861 [ibid., _Pottawatomie_,
I 547 of 1862]. Its negotiation was so permeated by fraud that the
Indians refused to let it stand [Dole to Smith, January 15, 1862].
At this time, 1863, Superintendent Branch, against whom charges of
gambling, drunkenness, licentiousness, and misuse of annuity funds
had been preferred by Agent Ross [Indian Office General Files,
_Pottawatomie_, R 21 and 143 of 1863], was endeavoring to
persuade Father De Smet to establish a Roman Catholic Mission on their
Reserve. De Smet declined because of the exigencies of the war. His
letter of January 5, 1863, has no file mark.]

[Footnote 672: Cutler to Dole, June 6, 1863, Indian Office General
Files, _Creek_, 1860-1869.]

[Footnote 673:--Ibid.]

[Footnote 674: Coffin to Dole, March 22, 1863.]

[Footnote 675: Proctor's letter of July 31, 1863 would indicate that
Dole went to the Cherokee Agency before the Sac and Fox. Proctor was
writing from the former place and he said, "Mr. Dole leaves to-day
for Kansas ..." [Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1863-1864, C 466].]

[Footnote 676: Indian Office Land Files, _Treaties_, Box 3,

[Footnote 677: Usher to Dole, March 23, 1864, Ibid.,]

Indians but they rejected it altogether.[678] The Senate amendments
were not such as they could conscientiously and honorably submit
to and maintain their dignity as a preëminently loyal and
semi-independent people.[679] One of the amendments was particularly
obnoxious. It affected the provision that deprived the southern Creeks
of all claims upon the old home.[680] Dole's Creek treaty of 1863 was
never ratified.

Other treaties negotiated by Dole were with the Sacs and Foxes of
Mississippi,[681] the Osages, the Shawnees,[682]

[Footnote 678: Its binding force upon them was, however, a subject
of discussion afterwards and for many years [Superintendent Byers
to Lewis V. Bogy, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 7, 1867,
Ibid., General Files, _Creek_, 1860-1869, B 94].]

[Footnote 679: For an interpretation of the treaty relative to the
claims of the loyal Creeks, see Dole to Lane, January 27, 1864
[ibid., _Report Book_, no. 13, pp. 287-291]. It is interesting to
note that a certain Mundy Durant who had been sixty years in the Creek
Nation, put in a claim, February 23, 1864, in behalf of the "loyal
Africans." He asked "that they have guaranteed to them equal rights
with the Indians ..." "All of our boys," said he, "are in the army and
I feel they should be remembered ..." [Ibid., General Files,
_Creek_, 1860-1869, D 362].]

[Footnote 680: Article IV. Both the Creeks and the Seminoles, in
apprising the Indian Office of the fact that they had organized as a
nation, had voiced the idea that the southern Indians had forfeited
all their rights "to any part of the property or annuities ..."]

[Footnote 681: The Sacs and Foxes brought forward a claim against
the southern refugees, for the "rent of 204 buildings," amounting to
$14,688.00 [Indian Office Land Files, _Southern Superintendency_,
1855-1870, Letter of May 14, 1864. See also Dole to Usher, March 25,
1865, Ibid., also I 952, C 1264, and C 1298, Ibid.,].
Coffin thought the best way to settle their claim was to give them a
part of the Creek cession [Coffin to Martin, May 23, 1864, and Martin
to Dole, May 26, 1864, Ibid., General Files, _Sac and
Fox_, 1862-1866, M 284]. The Sac and Fox chiefs were willing to
submit the case to the arbitrament of Judge James Steele. Martin was
of the opinion that should their treaty, then pending, fail it would
be some time before they would consent to make another. This treaty
had been obtained with difficulty, only by Dole's "extraordinary
exertions with the tribe" [Martin to Dole, May 2, 1864, Ibid.,
M 270].]

[Footnote 682: Negotiations with the Shawnees had been undertaken in
1862. In June, Black Bob, the chief of the Shawnees on the Big Blue
Reserve in Johnson County, Kansas, protested against a treaty then
before Congress. He claimed it was a fraud (cont.)]

and the New York Indians. He attempted one with the Kaws but
failed.[683] The Osages, who had

[Footnote 682: (cont.) [Telegram, A.H. Baldwin to Dole, June 4, 1862,
ibid., _Shawnee_, 1855-1862, B 1340 of 1862], which was the red
man's usual appraisement of the white man's dealings. A rough draft
of another treaty seems to have been sent to Agent Abbott for the
Shawnees on July 18 and another, substantially the same, December 29.
One of the matters that called for adjustment was the Shawnee contract
with the Methodist Episcopal Church South, Dole affirming that "as the
principal members of that corporation, and those who control it are
now in rebellion against the U.S. Government, the said contract is
to be regarded as terminated...." [Indian Office Land Files,
_Shawnee_, 1860-1865, I 865]. Usher's letter to Dole of December
27, 1862 was the basis of the instruction. Dole's negotiations of 1863
were impeached as were all the previous, Black Bob and Paschal Fish,
the first and second chiefs of the Chillicothe Band of Shawnees,
leading the opposition. Agent Abbott was charged with using
questionable means for obtaining Indian approval [Ibid.,
General Files, _Shawnee_, 1863-1875]. Conditions at the Shawnee
Agency had been in a bad state for a long time, since before the
war. Guerrilla attacks and threatened attacks had greatly disturbed
domestic politics. They had interfered with the regular tribal

"Last fall (1862), owing to the constant disturbance on the border of
Mo., the election was postponed from time to time, until the 12th of
January. Olathe had been sacked, Shawnee had been burned, and the
members of the Black Bob settlement had been robbed and driven from
their homes, and it had not been considered safe for any considerable
number to congregate together from the fact that the Shawnees usually
all come on horseback, and the bushwhackers having ample means to know
what was going on, would take the opportunity to make a dash among
them, and secure their horses.

"De Soto was designated as the place to hold the election it being
some twenty miles from the border ..."--Abbott to Dole, April 6, 1863,
Ibid., Land Files, _Shawnee_, 1860-1865, A 158. In the
summer, the Shawnees made preparations for seeking a new home. Their
confidence in Abbott must have been by that time somewhat restored,
since the prospecting delegation invited him to join it [ibid.,
_Shawnee_, A 755 of 1864]. A chief source of grievance against him
and cause for distrust of him had reference to certain depredation
claims of the Shawnees [Ibid., General Files, _Shawnee_,
1855-1862, I 801].]

[Footnote 683: The Kaw lands had been greatly depredated upon and
encroached upon [Ibid., Land Files, _Kansas_, 1862]. Dole
anticipated that troubles were likely to ensue at any moment. He,
therefore, desired to put the Kaws upon the Cherokee land just as soon
as it was out of danger [Dole to H.W. Farnsworth, October 24, 1863,
ibid., _Letter Book_, no. 72, p. 57]. Jeremiah Hadley, the agent
for a contemplated Mission School among the Kaws, was much exercised
as to how a removal might affect his contract and work. See his letter
to Dole, November 17, 1863.

An abortive treaty was likewise made with the Wyandots, whom Dole

recently[684] so generously consented to receive the unwelcome

[Footnote 683: (cont.) designed to place upon the Seneca-Shawnee
lands. Both the Wyandots and the Seneca-Shawnees objected to the
ratification of the treaty [Coffin to Dole, January 28, 1864, Indian
Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, C 639 of 1864].]

[Footnote 684: They had recently done another thing that, at the time
of occurrence, the Federals in Kansas deemed highly commendable. They
had murderously attacked a group of Confederate recruiting officers,
whom they had overtaken or waylaid on the plains. The following
contemporary documents, when taken in connection with Britton's
account [_Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 228], W.L. Bartles's
address [Kansas Historical Society, _Collections_, vol. viii,
62-66], and Elder's letter to Blunt, May 17, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 286, amply describe the affair:


"I have just returned to this place from the Grand Council of the
Great and Little Osage Indians. I found them feeling decidedly fine
over their recent success in destroying a band of nineteen rebels
attempting to pass through their country. A band of the Little Osages
met them first and demanded their arms and that they should go with
them to Humboldt (as we instructed them to do at the Council at
Belmont). The rebels refused and shot one of the Osages dead. The
Osages then fired on them. They ran and a running fight was kept up
for some 15 miles. The rebel guide was killed early in the action.
After crossing Lightning Creek, the rebels turned up the creek toward
the camp of the Big Hill Camp. The Little Osages had sent a runner
to aprise the Big Hills of the presence of the rebels and they were
coming down the creek 400 strong, and met the rebels, drove them to
the creek and surrounded them. The rebels displayed a white flag but
the Indians disregarded it. They killed all of them as they supposed;
but afterwards learned that two of them, badly wounded, got down a
steep bank of the creek and made their escape down the creek. They
scalped them all and cut their heads off. They killed 4 of their
horses (which the Indians greatly regretted) and captured 13, about 50
revolvers, most of the rebels having 4 revolvers, a carbine and
saber. There were 3 colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, one major and 4
captains. They had full authority to organise enroll and muster into
rebel service all the rebels in Colorado and New Mexico where they
were doubtless bound. Major Dowdney [Doudna] in command of troops at
Humboldt went down with a detachment and buried them and secured the
papers, letting the Indians keep all the horses, arms, etc. I have no
doubt that this will afford more protection to the frontiers of Kansas
than anything that has yet been done and from the frequency and
boldness of the raids recently something of the kind was very much
needed. The Indians are very much elated over it. I gave them all
the encouragement I could, distributed between two and three hundred
dollars worth of goods amongst them. There was a representative at the
Council from the Osages that have gone South, many of them now in the
army. He stated that they were all now very anxious to get back, and
wished to know if they should meet the loyal Osages on the hunt on the
Plains and come in with them if they could be suffered to stay. I gave
him a letter to them promising them if they returned immediately and

refugees on the Ottawa Reserve,[685] were distinctly overreached by
the government representatives, working in the interest of corporate
wealth. In August, the chief men of the Osages had gone up to the Sac
and Fox Agency to confer with Dole,[686] but Dole was being

[Footnote 684: (cont.) joined their loyal brethren in protecting the
frontiers, running down Bushwhackers, and ridding the country of
rebels, they should be protected. I advised them to come immediately
to Humboldt and report to Major Dowdney and he would furnish them
powder and lead to go on the hunt. This seemed to give great
satisfaction to all the chiefs as they are exceedingly desirous to
have them back and the representative started immediately back with
the letter, and the Indians as well as the Fathers of the Mission have
no doubt but they will return. If so, it will very materially weaken
the rebel force now sorely pressing Col. Phillips' command at Fort

"The Osages are now very desirous to make a treaty are willing to sell
25 miles in width by 50 off the east end of their reservation and 20
miles wide off the north side, but I will write more fully of this
in a day or two."--COFFIN to Dole, June 10, 1863, Indian Office
Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, C 299 of 1863.


"It will be remembered that sometime in the month of May last a party
consisting of nineteen rebel officers duly commissioned and authorised
to organise the Indians and what rebels they might find in Colorado
and New Mexico against the Government of the United States while
passing through the country of the Great and Little Osages were
attacked and the whole party slaughtered by these Indians. As an
encouragement to those Indians to continue their friendship and
loyalty to our Government, I would respectfully recommend that medals
be given to the Head Chief of the combined tribes, White Hair, and the
Head Chief of the Little Bear and the chiefs of the Big Hill bands,
Clarimore and Beaver, four in all who were chiefly instrumental in the
destruction of those emissaries.

"I believe the bestowal of the medals would be a well deserved
acknowledgment to those chiefs for an important service rendered and
promotive of good."--COFFIN to Dole, Indian Office Consolidated Files,
_Neosho_. C 596.]

[Footnote 685: Coffin to Dole, July 13, 1863, Ibid., General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1863-1864. Coffin had been
directed, by an office letter of June 24 to have the refugees removed.
See also, Dole to Hutchinson, June 24, 1863, ibid., _Letter
Book_, no. 71, p. 69. Other primary sources bearing upon this
matter are, Hutchinson to ?, June 11, 1863, ibid., _Ottawa_,
1863-1873, H 230; Elder to Dole, August 10, 1863, _Neosho_, E 22
of 1863; Hutchinson to Dole, August 21, 1863, _Ottawa_, D 236 of
1863; Mix to Elder, September 11, 1863, ibid., _Letter Book_, no.
71, p. 383.]

[Footnote 686: "About 100 of the Osages with their Chiefs and headmen
visited the Sac and Fox agency to meet me on the 20th to Council and
probably make a treaty to dispose of a part of their reserve. I was
detained with the Delawares and Quantrels raid upon Lawrence and did
not reach the reserve (cont.)]

unavoidably detained by the Delawares and by Quantrill's raid upon
Lawrence,[687] so, becoming impatient, they left. The commissioner
followed them to Leroy and before the month was out, he was able to
report a treaty as made.[688] It was apparently done over-night and

[Footnote 686: (cont.) until the 25th and found the Osages had left
that day for their homes. I followed them to this place [Leroy] 40
miles south of the Sac and Fox agency and have been in Council with
them for two days. I have some doubt about succeeding in a treaty as
the Indians do not understand parting with their lands in trust. I
could purchase all we want at present for not exceeding 25 cts pr acre
but doubt whether the Senate would ratify such a purchase--as they
have adopted the Homestead policy with the Gov't lands and would not
wish to purchase of the Indians to give to the whites. I propose to
purchase 25 miles by 40 in the S.E. corner of their reserve @ 5 pr.
ct making a dividend of 10,000 annually. I have two reasons for this
purchase. 1st I want the land for other Kansas tribes and 2nd The
Indians are paupers now and must have this much money any way or
starve. Then I propose to take in trust the north half of their
reserve--to be sold for their benefit as the Sac and Fox and other
tribes dispose of their lands. To this last the Indians object they
want to sell outright and I may fail in consequence. We shall not
differ much about the details--if we can agree on the main points--I
shall know to-day--

"From here I return to the Sac and Fox agency where I have some hopes
of making a treaty with them or at least agree upon the main points so
soon as they can be provided with another home--The fact that we have
failed to drive the traitors out of the Indian Country interfers very
much with my operations here--from the Sac and Fox Reserve I may go to
the Pottawatamies but rather expect that I will return to Leavenworth
where I shall again council with the Delawares and from there go to
the Kickapoos--Senator Pomeroy is here with me and will probably
remain with me--Judge Johnston is also with me and assisting me as
Clerk since Mr. Whiting left. This is not considered as a very safe
country as Bush Whackers are plenty and bold--You may show this to Sec
Usher--"--Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, D 195 of

[Footnote 687: Connelley, _Quantrill and the Border Wars_,

[Footnote 688: "I arrived here last night from Leroy, after having
succeeded in effecting a treaty with the Osage Indians by which the
Govt. obtain of them by purchase thirty miles in extent off the East
end of their reserve (at a cost of 300,000$ to remain on interest
_forever_ at _5 pr ct_--which gives them an annuity of
15000$ annually)--They also cede to the U.S. _in trust_ twenty
miles off the North side of the Bal. of their reserve the full extent
east and west--to be disposed of as the Sec. Int. shall direct for
their benefit--with the usual reserves to half breeds--provision for
schools etc.--I have been all this afternoon in Council with the
Delewares who have to the No. of 30 or 40 followed me out here for the
purpose of again talking over (cont.)]

it was not a conclusive thing; for, in October, the Osage chiefs were
still making propositions[689] and

[Footnote 688: (cont.) the proposed treaty with them. They had trouble
after I left them at Leavenworth, but our council today has done good
and they have just left for home with the agreement to call a council
and send a delegation to the Cherokees to look up a new home--When
will Jno. Ross leave for his people. I wish he could be there when the
Delaware delegation goes down--as I am exceedingly anxious that they
get a home of the Cherokees.

"I think there is but little doubt but I shall make a treaty with the
Sac and Foxes as they say they are _satisfied_ to remove to a
part of the Land I have purchased of the Osages--on the line next the
Cherokees--I can make a treaty with the Creeks and may do so but I
think I will make it _conditional_ upon the signatures of some of
the Chiefs now in the army--Those here are very anxious to treat and
sell us a large tract of the country The trouble with the Southern
Indians is their claims for losses by the war I will have to put in
a clause of some kind to satisfy them on that subject--That they are
entitled to it I have no doubt--but what view Congress will take
of it--or the Senate in ratifying the treaty of course I cannot
tell--Some of the Wyandots are here--

"I have just closed a Council with the Sac and Foxes and have heard
many fine speeches. We meet again day after tomorrow--as tomorrow
must be appropriated to the Creeks--I think I shall have a success
here--The Sack and Foxes to the No of say two hundred have a dance out
on the green They are dressed and painted for the occasion and as it
is in honor of my visit I must go out and witness it * * * Well we
have had an extensive dance which cost me a beef and while waiting for
a Chipaway Chief who comes as I learn to complain of his agent I go on
with my Letter--The New York Indians are tolerably well represented
and I shall talk with them tonight--This is a grand jubilee amongst
the Indians here. So many tribes and parts of tribes or their Chiefs
gathered here to see the Comr. Paint and feathers are in great demand
and singing, whooping--and the Drum is constantly ringing in my
ears. I am satisfied that it is a good arrangement to have them here
together it is cheaper and better and saves much time.

"I made a great mistake that I did not bring maps of the reserves
and especially of the Indian Territory--I do the best I can from the

"I have had no mail for Eight Days as my mail is at Leavenworth. I
expect my letters day after tomorrow when I hope to have a late letter
from you as well as one from the Sec.--Will you please send Hutchinson
some money he must have funds to pay for surveying and alloting the
Ottawa reserve The survey is finished and pay demanded."

[Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, D 198 of 1863].]

[Footnote 689: The propositions were in the form of a memorandum,
drawn up by White Hair, principal chief of the Great and Little
Osages, and Little Bear, principal chief of the Little Osages, who, in
conjunction with Charles Mograin, assistant head chief of the Great
and Little Osages, had been (cont.)]

making them after the fashion of the Creeks long before at Indian
Springs.[690] Dole had finally to be told that the rank and file of
the Osages would not allow their chiefs to confer with him except
in general council.[691] As a matter of fact, not one of the Dole
treaties could run the gauntlet of criticism and, consequently, the
whole project of treaty-making in 1862 and 1863 accomplished nothing
beneficial. It only served to complicate a situation already serious
and to forecast that when the great test should come, as come it
surely would, the government would be found wanting, lacking in
magnanimity, lacking in justice, and all too willing to sacrifice its
honor for big interests and transient causes.

[Footnote 689: (cont.) solicited by their people, when in council at
Humboldt, July 4, to proceed to Washington and interview their Great
Father [Coffin to Dole, July 16, 1863, Indian Office Consolidated
Files, _Neosho_, C 365 of 1863]. The propositions were to the
effect that the Osages would gladly sell thirty miles by twenty miles
off the southeast corner of their Reserve and one-half of the Reserve
on the north for $1,350,000, which should draw six per cent interest
until paid [Ibid., D 239 of 1863]. John Schoenmaker of the
Osage Mission was apprehensive that the Roman Catholic interests would
be disregarded as in the Potawatomi Treaty. See letter to Coffin, June

[Footnote 690: Abel, _Indian Consolidation West of the

[Footnote 691: Charles Mograin warned Dole of this.]


As with the war as a whole, so with that part of it waged on the
Arkansas frontier, the year 1863 proved critical. Its midsummer season
saw the turning-point in the respective fortunes of the North and the
South, both in the east and in the west. The beginning of 1863 was a
time for recording great depletion of resources in Indian Territory,
as elsewhere, great disorganization within Southern Indian ranks, and
much privation, suffering, and resultant dissatisfaction among the
tribes generally. The moment called for more or less sweeping changes
in western commands. Those most nearly affecting the Arkansas frontier
were the establishment of Indian Territory as a separate military
entity[692] and the detachment of western Louisiana

[Footnote 692: The establishment of a separate command for Indian
Territory was not accomplished all at once. In December, 1862, Steele
had been ordered to report to Holmes for duty and, in the first
week of January, he was given the Indian Territory post, subject to
Hindman. On or about the eighth, he assumed command [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 28] at Fort Smith. In less than a
week thereafter, his command was separated from that of Hindman
[Ibid., part ii, 771]. The following document shows exactly
what had been the previous relation between the two:

  Head Qrs. Dept. Indn. Terry.
  Ft. Smith, Jan. 31st, 1863.

COLONEL: Your special No. 22, par. viii has been recd. I would
respectfully suggest that when assigned to this command by Maj. Gen'l
Hindman the command was styled in orders, "1st Div'n 1st Corps Trans.
Miss. Army." The special order referred to, it is respectfully
suggested, may be susceptible of misconstruction as there are under my
command two separate Brigades, one under the command (cont.)]

and Texas from the Trans-Mississippi Department.[693] Both were
accomplished in January and both were directly due to a somewhat tardy
realization of the vast strategic importance of the Indian country.
Unwieldy, geographically, the Trans-Mississippi Department had long
since shown itself to be. Moreover, it was no longer even passably
safe to leave the interests of Indian Territory subordinated to those
of Arkansas.[694]

The man chosen, after others, his seniors in rank, had declined the
dubious honor,[695] for the command of Indian Territory was William
Steele, brigadier-general, northern born, of southern sympathies. Thus
was ignored whatever claim Douglas H. Cooper might have been thought
to have by reason of his intimate and long acquaintance with Indian
affairs and his influence, surpassingly great, with certain of the
tribes. Cooper's unfortunate weakness, addiction to intemperance, had
stood more or less in the way of his promotion right along just as
it had decreased his military efficiency on at least one memorable
occasion and had hindered the confirmation of his appointment as
superintendent of Indian affairs in the Arkansas and Red River
constituency. In this narrative, as events are divulged, it will be
seen that the preference for Steele exasperated Cooper, who was not a
big enough man to put love of country before the gratification of his

[Footnote 692: (cont.) of Gen'l D.H. Cooper and one under command of
Col. J.W. Speight.

I am, Col., Very Res'py W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_.,
Col. S.S. Anderson, A.A.G.

P.S. Please find enclosed printed Gen. Order, no. 4, which I have
assumed the responsibility of issuing on receipt of Lt. Gen'l Holmes'
order declaring my command in the Ind'n country independent.

(Sd) W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_.

[A.G.O., _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 65].]

[Footnote 693: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 771-772.]

[Footnote 694:--Ibid., 771.]

[Footnote 695:--Ibid., 843; _Confederate Records_, chap.
2, no. 270, pp. 25-27.]


ambition, consequently friction developed between him and his rival
highly detrimental to the service to which each owed his best thought,
his best endeavor.[696]

Conditions in Indian Territory, at the time Steele took command, were
conceivably the worst that could by any possibility be imagined. The
land had been stripped of its supplies, the troops were scarcely
worthy of the name.[697] Around Fort Smith, in Arkansas, things
were equally bad.[698] People were clamoring for protection against
marauders, some were wanting only the opportunity to move themselves
and their effects far away out of the reach of danger, others were
demanding that the unionists be cleaned out just as secessionists had,
in some cases, been. Confusion worse confounded prevailed. Hindman
had resorted to a system of almost wholesale furloughing to save
expense.[699] Most of the Indians had taken advantage of it and
were off duty when Steele arrived. Many had preferred to subsist at
government cost.[700] There was so little in their own homes for them
to get. Forage was practically non-existent and Steele soon had it
impressed [701] upon him that troops in the Indian Territory ought, as
Hindman had come to think months before,[702] to be all unmounted.

Although fully realizing that it was incumbent upon him to hold Fort
Smith as a sort of key to his entire command, Steele knew it would be
impossible to

[Footnote 696: It might as well be said, at the outset, that Cooper
was not the ranking officer of Steele. He claimed that he was
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1037-1038]; but the
government disallowed the contention [Ibid., 1038].]

[Footnote 697:--Ibid., part i, 28; part ii, 862, 883, 909.]

[Footnote 698: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp.

[Footnote 699: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 895, 909.]

[Footnote 700:--Ibid., part i, 30.]

[Footnote 701: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 31.]

[Footnote 702: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 51.]

maintain any considerable force there. He, therefore, resolved to
take big chances and to attempt to hold it with as few men as his
commissary justified, trusting that he would be shielded from attack
"by the inclemency of the season and the waters of the Arkansas."[703]
The larger portion of his army[704] was sent southward, in the
direction of Red River.[705] But lack of food and forage was, by no
manner of means, the only difficulty that confronted Steele. He was
short of guns, particularly of good guns,[706] and distressingly short
of money.[707] The soldiers had not been paid for months.

The opening of 1863 saw changes, equally momentous, in Federal
commands. Somewhat captiously, General Schofield discounted recent
achievements of Blunt and advised that Blunt's District of Kansas
should be completely disassociated from the Division of the Army of
the Frontier,[708] which he had, at Schofield's own earlier request,
been commanding. It was another instance of personal jealousy,
interstate rivalry, and local

[Footnote 703: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 30.]

[Footnote 704: Perhaps the word, _army_, is inapplicable here.
Steele himself was in doubt as to whether he was in command of an army
or of a department [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p.

[Footnote 705: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 36.
See also, Steele to Anderson, January 22, 1863 [ibid., 50-51], which
besides detailing the movements of Steele's men furnishes, on the
authority of "Mr. Thomas J. Parks of the Cherokee Nation," evidence
of brutal murders and atrocities committed by Blunt's army "whilst
on their march through the northwestern portion of this State in the
direction of Kansas."]

[Footnote 706: Crosby's telegram, February first, to the Chief of
Ordnance is sufficient attestation,

"Many of Cooper's men have inferior guns and many none at all. Can you
supply?" [Ibid., 65-66].]

[Footnote 707: The detention and the misapplication of funds by
William Quesenbury seem to have been largely responsible for Steele's
monetary embarrassment [ibid., 28, 63-64, 75, 76, 77, 79-81, 101,
147]. Cotton speculation in Texas was alluring men with ready money
southward [ibid., 94, 104].]

[Footnote 708: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 6.]

conflict of interests.[709] So petty was Schofield and so much in a
mood for disparagement that he went the length of condemning the work
of Blunt and Herron[710] in checking Hindman's advance as but a series
of blunders and their success at Prairie Grove as but due to an
accident.[711] General Curtis, without, perhaps, having any particular
regard for the aggrieved parties himself, resented Schofield's
insinuations against their military capacity, all the more so, no
doubt, because he was not above making the same kind of criticisms
himself and was not impervious to them. In the sequel, Schofield
reorganized the divisions of his command, relieved Blunt altogether,
and personally resumed the direction of the Army of the Frontier.[712]
Blunt went back to his District of Kansas and made his headquarters at
Fort Leavenworth.

In some respects, the reorganization decided upon by Schofield proved
a consummation devoutly to be wished; for, within the reconstituted
First Division was placed an Indian Brigade, which was consigned to
the charge of a man the best fitted of all around to have it, Colonel
William A. Phillips.[713] And that was not all; inasmuch as the Indian
Brigade, consisting of the three regiments of Indian Home Guards, a
battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and a four-gun battery that had
been captured at the Battle of Old

[Footnote 709: It seems unnecessary and inappropriate to drag into the
present narrative the political squabbles that disgraced Missouri,
Kansas, Arkansas, and Colorado during the war. Lane was against
Schofield, Gamble against Curtis.]

[Footnote 710: Yet both Blunt and Herron were, at this very time, in
line for promotion, as was Schofield, to the rank of major-general
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, II, 95.]]

[Footnote 711:--Ibid., 6, 12, 95; _Confederate Military
History_, vol. x, 195.]

[Footnote 712:--Ibid., 22.]

[Footnote 713: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_ vol. ii,

Fort Wayne,[714] was almost immediately detached from the rest of
Schofield's First Division and assigned to discretionary "service in
the Indian Nation and on the western border of Arkansas."[715] It
continued so detached even after Schofield's command had been deprived
by Curtis of the two districts over which the brigade was to range,
the eighth and the ninth.[716] Thus, at the beginning of 1863, had the
Indian Territory in a sense come into its own. Both the Confederates
and the Federals had given it a certain measure of military autonomy
or, at all events, a certain opportunity to be considered in and for

Indian Territory as a separate military entity came altogether too
late into the reckonings of the North and the South. It was now a
devastated land, in large areas, desolate. General Curtis and many
another like him might well express regret that the red man had to be
offered up in the white man's slaughter.[717] It was unavailing regret
and would ever be. Just as with the aborigines who lay athwart the
path of empire and had to yield or be crushed so with the civilized
Indian of 1860. The contending forces of a fratricidal war had little
mercy for each other and none at all for him. Words of sympathy were
empty indeed. His fate was inevitable. He was between the upper and
the nether mill-stones and, for him, there was no escape.

Indian Territory was really in a terrible condition. Late in 1862, it
had been advertised even by southern men as lost to the Confederate
cause and had been

[Footnote 714: It is not very clear whether or not the constituents of
the Indian Brigade were all at once decided upon. They are listed as
they appear in Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii,
3. Schofield seems to have hesitated in the matter [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 26].]

[Footnote 715:--Ibid., 33.]

[Footnote 716: On the subject of the reduction of Schofield's command,
see Ibid., 40.]

[Footnote 717: Curtis to Phillips, February 17, 1863, Ibid.,

practically abandoned to the jayhawker. Scouting parties of both
armies, as well as guerrillas, had preyed upon it like vultures.
Indians, outside of the ranks, were tragic figures in their utter
helplessness. They dared trust nobody. It was time the Home Guard was
being made to justify its name. Indeed, as Ellithorpe reported, "to
divert them to any other operations" than those within their own gates
"will tend to demoralize them to dissolution."[718]

The winter of 1862-1863 was a severe one. Its coming had been long
deferred; but, by the middle of January, the cold weather had set
in in real earnest. Sleet and snow and a constantly descending
thermometer made campaigning quite out of the question. Colonel
Phillips, no more than did his adversary, General Steele, gave any
thought to an immediate offensive. Like Steele his one idea was to
replenish resources and to secure an outfit for his men. They had been
provided with the half worn-out baggage train of Blunt's old division.
It was their all and would be so until their commander could
supplement it by contrivances and careful management. Incidentally,
Phillips expected to hold the line of the Arkansas River; but not to
attempt to cross it until spring should come. It behooved him to look
out for Marmaduke whose expeditions into Missouri[719] were cause for
anxiety, especially as their range might at any moment be extended.

The Indian regiments of Phillips's brigade were soon reported[720]
upon by him and declared to be in a sad state. The first regiment was
still, to all intents and purposes, a Creek force, notwithstanding
that its fortunes had been varied, its desertions, incomparable.

[Footnote 718: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 49.]

[Footnote 719: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 161, 162.]

[Footnote 720: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 56-58.]

The second regiment, after many vicissitudes, and after having gotten
rid of its unmanageable elements, notably, the Osages and the Quapaws,
had become a Cherokee and the third was largely so. That third
regiment was Phillips's own and was the only one that could claim the
distinction of being disciplined and even it was exposed occasionally
to the chronic weakness of all Indian soldiers, absence without leave.
The Indian, on his own business bent, was disposed to depart whenever
he pleased, often, too, at times most inopportune, sometimes, when he
had been given a special and particular task. He knew not the usages
of army life and really meant no offence; but, all the same, his utter
disregard of army discipline made for great disorder.

It was not the chief cause of disorder, however, for that was the
unreliability of the regimental officers. The custom, from the first,
had been to have the field officers white men, a saving grace; but the
company officers, with few exceptions, had been Indians and totally
incompetent. Strange as it may seem, drilling was almost an unknown
experience to the two regiments that had been mustered in for the
First Indian Expedition. To obviate some of the difficulties already
encountered, Phillips had seen to it that the third regiment had
profited by the mistakes of its forerunners. It had, therefore, been
supplied with white first lieutenants and white sergeants, secured
from among the non-commissioned men of other commands. The result had
fully justified the innovation. After long and careful observation,
Phillips's conclusion was that it was likely to be productive of
irretrievable disaster and consequently an unpardonable error of
judgment "to put men of poor ability in an Indian regiment." Primitive
man has an inordinate respect for a strong

character. He appreciates integrity, though he may not have it among
his own gifts of nature. "An Indian company improperly officered" will
inevitably become, to somebody's discomfiture, "a frightful mess."

If any one there was so foolish as to surmise that the independent
commands, northern and southern, would be given free scope to
solve the problems of Indian Territory, unhampered by contingent
circumstances, he was foreordained to grevious disappointment.
Indian Territory had still to subserve the interests of localities,
relatively more important. It would be so to the very end. In and for
herself, she would never be allowed to do anything and her commanders,
no matter how much they might wish it otherwise--and to their lasting
honor, be it said, many of them did--would always have to subordinate
her affairs to those of the sovereign states around her; for even
northern states were sovereign in practice where Indians were
concerned. General Steele was one of the men who endeavored nobly to
take a large view of his responsibilities to Indian Territory. Colonel
Phillips, his contemporary in the opposite camp, was another; but both
met with insuperable obstacles. The attainment of their objects was
impossible from the start. Both men were predestined to failure.

Foraging or an occasional scouting when the weather permitted was the
only order of the winter days for Federals and Confederates. With
the advent of spring, however, Phillips became impatient for
more aggressive action. He had been given a large programme, no
insignificant part of which was, the restoration of refugees to their
impoverished homes; but his first business would necessarily have to
be, the occupancy of the country. Not far was he allowed to venture

it during the winter; because his superior officers wished him to
protect, before anything else, western Arkansas. Schofield and, after
Schofield's withdrawal from the command of southwestern Missouri,
Curtis had insisted upon that, while Blunt, to whom Phillips, after a
time, was made immediately accountable, was guardedly of another way
of thinking and, although not very explicit, seemed to encourage
Phillips in planning an advance.

Phillips's inability to progress far in the matter of occupancy of
Indian Territory did not preclude his keeping a close tab on Indian
affairs therein, such a tab, in fact, as amounted to fomenting an
intrigue. It will be recalled that on the occasion of his making
the excursion into the Cherokee Nation, which had resulted in his
incendiary destruction of Fort Davis, he had gained intimations of
a rather wide-spread Indian willingness to desert the Confederate
service. He had sounded Creeks and Choctaws and had found them
surprisingly responsive to his machinations. They were nothing loath
to confess that they were thoroughly disgusted with the southern
alliance. It had netted them nothing but unutterable woe. Among
those that Phillips approached, although not personally, was Colonel
McIntosh, who communicated with Phillips through two intimate friends.
McIntosh was persuaded to attempt no immediate demonstration in favor
of the North; for that would be premature, foolhardy; but to bide the
time, which could not be far distant, when the Federal troops would be
in a position to support him.[721] The psychological moment was not
yet. Blunt called Phillips back for operations outside of Indian

[Footnote 721: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 61-62.]

Territory; but the seed of treason had been sown and sown in fertile
soil, in the heart of a McIntosh.[722]

In January, 1863, Phillips took up again the self-imposed task of
emissary.[723] The unionist Cherokees, inclusive of those in the
Indian Brigade, were contemplating holding a national council on
Cowskin Prairie, which was virtually within the Federal lines.
Secessionist Cherokees, headed by Stand Watie, were determined that
such a council should not meet if they could possibly prevent it and
prevent it they would if they could only get a footing north of the
Arkansas River. Their suspicion was, that the council, if assembled,
would declare the treaty with the Confederate States abrogated. To
circumvent Stand Watie, to conciliate some of the Cherokees by making
reparation for past outrages, and to sow discord among others,
Phillips despatched Lieutenant-colonel Lewis Downing on a scout
southward. He was just in time; for the Confederates were on the
brink of hazarding a crossing at two places, Webber's Falls and Fort
Gibson.[724] Upon the return of Downing, Phillips himself moved across
the border with the avowed intention of rendering military support,
if needed, to the Cherokee Council, which convened on the fourth of
February.[725] From Camp Ross, he continued to send out scouting
parties, secret agents,[726] and agents of distribution.

The Cherokee Council assembled without the preliminary formality of a
new election. War conditions

[Footnote 722: This remark would be especially applicable if the
Colonel McIntosh, mentioned by Phillips, was Chilly, the son of
William McIntosh of Indian Springs Treaty notoriety.]

[Footnote 723: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 100.]

[Footnote 724:--Ibid., 85.]

[Footnote 725:--Ibid., 96-97.]

[Footnote 726:--Ibid., 100, 108.]

had made regular pollings impossible. Consequently, the council that
convened in February, 1863 was, to all intents and purposes, the
selfsame body that, in October, 1861, had confirmed the alliance with
the Confederate States. It was Phillips's intention to stand by, with
military arm upraised, until the earlier action had been rescinded.
While he waited, word came that the harvest of defection among the
Creeks had begun; for "a long line of persons"[727] was toiling
through the snow, each wearing the white badge on his hat that
Phillips and McIntosh had agreed should be their sign of fellowship.
Then came an order for Phillips to draw back within supporting
distance of Fayetteville, which, it was believed, the Confederates
were again threatening.[728] Phillips obeyed, as perforce, he had to;
but he left a detachment behind to continue guarding the Cherokee

The legislative work of the Cherokee Council, partisan body that it
was, with Lewis Downing as its presiding officer and Thomas Pegg as
acting Principal Chief, was reactionary, yet epochal. It comprised
several measures and three of transcendant importance, passed between
the eighteenth and the twenty-first:

1. An act revoking the alliance with the Confederate States and
re-asserting allegiance to the United States.

2. An act deposing all officers of any rank or character whatsoever,
inclusive of legislative, executive, judicial, who were serving in
capacities disloyal to the United States and to the Cherokee Nation.

[Footnote 727: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 101.]

[Footnote 728:--Ibid., 111-112.]

[Footnote 729:--Ibid., 115.]

3. An act emancipating slaves throughout the Cherokee country.[730]

His detention in Arkansas was not at all to Phillips's liking. It
tried his patience sorely; for he felt the crying need of Indian
Territory for just such services as his and, try as he would, he could
not visualize that of Arkansas. Eagerly he watched for a chance to
return to the Cherokee country. One offered for the fifth of March but
had to be given up. Again and yet again in letters[731] to Curtis
and Blunt he expostulated against delay but delay could not well be
avoided. The pressure from Arkansas for assistance was too great.
Blunt sympathized with Phillips more than he dared openly admit and
tacitly sanctioned his advance. Never at any time could there
have been the slightest doubt as to the singleness of the virile
Scotchman's purpose. In imagination he saw his adopted country
repossessed of Indian Territory and of all the overland approaches to
Texas and Mexico from whence, as he supposed, the Confederacy expected
to draw her grain and other supplies. Some regard for the Indian
himself he doubtless had; but he used it as a means to the greater
end. His sense of justice was truly British in its keenness.

[Footnote 730: Ross to Dole, April 2, 1863 [Indian Office General
Files, _Cherokee_, 1859-1865, R 87]; Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, _Report_, 1863, p. 23; Britton, _Civil War on the
Border_, vol. ii, 24-25; Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. vi,
50; Eaton, _John Ross and the Cherokee Indians_, 196.]

[Footnote 731: Britton [_Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 27]
conveys the idea that, while Phillips, truly enough, wished to enter
the Indian country at the earliest day practicable, he did not care to
go there before the Indian ponies could "live on the range." He knew
that the refugees at Neosho would insist upon following in his wake.
It would be heartless to expose them to starvation and to the ravages
of diseases like the small-pox. Nevertheless, the correspondence of
Phillips, scattered through the _Official Records_, vol. xxii,
part ii, 121-367, shows conclusively that the weeks of waiting were
weary ones.]

His Indian soldiers loved him. They believed in him. He was able to
accomplish wonders in training them. He looked after their welfare and
he did his best to make the government and its agents of the Indian
Office keep faith with the refugees. Quite strenuously, too, he
advocated further enlistments from among the Indians, especially from
among those yet in Indian Territory. If the United States did not take
care, the Confederates would successfully conscript where the Federals
might easily recruit. In this matter as in many another, he had
Blunt's unwavering support; for Blunt wanted the officers of the
embryo fourth and fifth regiments to secure their commands. Blunt's
military district was none too full of men.

March was then as now the planting season in the Arkansas Valley and,
as Phillips rightly argued, if the indigent Indians were not to be
completely pauperized, they ought to be given an opportunity to be
thrown once more upon their own resources, to be returned home in time
to put in crops. When the high waters subsided and the rivers became
fordable, he grew more insistent. There was grass in the valley of the
Arkansas and soon the Confederates would be seizing the stock that
it was supporting. He had held the line of the Arkansas by means of
scouts all winter, but scouting would not be adequate much longer. The
Confederates were beginning, in imitation of the Federals, to attach
indigents to their cause by means of relief distribution and the
"cropping season was wearing on."

At the end of March, some rather unimportant changes were made by
Curtis in the district limits of his department and coincidently
Phillips moved over the border. The first of April his camp was at
Park Hill. His great desire was to seize Fort Smith; for he

realized that not much recruiting could be done among the Choctaws
while that post remained in Confederate hands. Blunt advised caution.
It would not even do to attempt as yet any permanent occupation south
of the Arkansas. Dashes at the enemy might be made, of course,
but nothing more; for at any moment those higher up might order a
retrograde movement and anyhow no additional support could be counted
upon. Halleck was still calling for men to go to Grant's assistance
and accusing Curtis of keeping too many needlessly in the West. The
Vicksburg campaign was on.

The order that Blunt anticipated finally came and Curtis called for
Phillips to return. La Rue Harrison, foraging in Arkansas,[732] was
whining for assistance. Phillips temporized, having no intention
whatsoever of abandoning his appointed goal. His arguments were
unanswerable but Curtis like Halleck could never be made to appreciate
the plighted faith that lay back of Indian participation in the war
and the strategic importance of Indian Territory. The northern Indian
regiments, pleaded Phillips, were never intended for use in Arkansas.
Why should they go there? It was doubtful if they could ever be
induced to go there again. They had been recruited to recover the
Indian Territory and now that they were within it they were going to
stay until the object had been attained. Phillips solicited Blunt's
backing and got it, to the extent, indeed, that Blunt informed Curtis
that if he wanted Indian Territory given up he must order it himself
and take the consequences. It was not given up but Phillips suffered
great embarrassments in holding it. The only support Blunt could
render him was to send a negro regiment to Baxter Springs to protect

[Footnote 732: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 166-168.]

trains. Guerrillas and bushwhackers were everywhere and Phillips's
command was half-starved. Smallpox[733] broke out and, as the men
became more and more emaciated, gained ground. Phillips continued to
make occasional dashes at the enemy and in a few engagements he was
more than reasonably successful. Webber's Falls was a case in point.

As May advanced, the political situation in Missouri seemed to call
loudly for a change in department commanders and President Lincoln,
quite on his own initiative apparently, selected Schofield to succeed
Curtis,[734] Curtis having identified himself with a faction opposed
to Governor Gamble. The selection was obnoxious to many and to none
more than to Herron and to Blunt, whose military exploits Schofield
had belittled. The former threatened resignation if Schofield were
appointed but the latter restrained himself and for a brief space all
went well, Schofield even manifesting some sympathy for Phillips at
Fort Gibson, or Fort Blunt, as the post, newly fortified, was now
called. He declared that the Arkansas River must be secured its
entire length; but the Vicksburg campaign was still demanding men and
Phillips had to struggle on, unaided. Indeed, he was finally told
that if he could not hold on by himself he must fall back and let
the Indian Territory take care of itself until Vicksburg should have

[Footnote 733: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 26.]

[Footnote 734: A change had been resolved upon in March, E.V. Sumner
being the man chosen; but he died on the way out [Livermore, _Story
of the Civil War_, part iii, book i, 256]. Sumner had had a wide
experience with frontier conditions, first, in the marches of the
dragoons [Pelzer, _Marches of the Dragoons in the Mississippi
Valley_] later, in New Mexico [Abel, _Official Correspondence of
James S. Calhoun_], and, still later, in ante-bellum Kansas. His
experience had been far from uniformly fortunate but he had learned a
few very necessary lessons, lessons that Schofield had yet to con.]

The inevitable clash between Schofield and Blunt was not long
deferred. It came over a trifling matter but was fraught with larger
meanings.[735] It was probably as much to get away from Schofield's
near presence as to see to things himself in Indian Territory that led
Blunt to go down in person to Fort Gibson. He arrived there on the
eleventh of July, taking Phillips entirely by surprise. Vicksburg had
fallen about a week before.

The difficulties besetting Colonel Phillips were more than matched by
those besetting General Steele. He, too, struggled on unaided, nay,
more, he was handicapped at every turn. Scarcely had he taken command
at Fort Smith when he was apprised of the fact that the chief armorer
there had been ordered to remove all the tools to Arkadelphia.[736]
Steele was hard put to it to obtain any supplies at all.[737] Many
that he did get the promise of were diverted from their course,[738]
just as were General Pike's. This was true even in the case of
shoes.[739] He tried to fit his regiments out one by one with the
things the men required in readiness for a spring campaign[740] but it
was up-hill work. And what was perfectly incomprehensible to him was,
that when his need was so great there was yet corn available for
private parties to speculate in and to realize enormous profits
on.[741] In April, the Indian regiments, assembling and reforming
in expectation of a call to action, made special demands upon his
granaries but they were

[Footnote 735: June 9, orders issued redistricting Schofield's
Department of Missouri [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii,

[Footnote 736: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 34.]

[Footnote 737: Steele to Blair, February 10, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 738: Steele to Anderson, February 8, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 739: Duval to Cabell, May 15, 1863, Ibid., 244-245.]

[Footnote 740: Steele to Cabell, March 19, 1863, Ibid., 148.]

[Footnote 741: Steele to Anderson, March 22, 1863, Ibid., 158.]

nearly empty.[742] It was not possible for him to furnish corn for
seed or, finally, the necessaries of life to indigent Indians. Indian
affairs complicated, his situation tremendously.[743] He could get no
funds and no

[Footnote 742: Steele to Anderson, April 3, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, 179-180.]

[Footnote 743: For instance the officers of the First Cherokee
regiment had a serious dispute as to the ranking authority among
them [Ibid., Letter from Steele, March 14, 1863, p. 143]. The
following letters indicate that there were other troubles and other
tribes in trouble also:


"Your communication of 13 Inst. is to hand. I am directed by the
Commanding Gen'l to express to you his warmest sympathy in behalf of
your oppressed people, and his desire and determination to do all
that may be in his power to correct existing evils and ameliorate the
condition of the loyal Cherokees. The Gen'l feels proud to know that a
large portion of your people, actuated by a high spirit of patriotism,
have shown themselves steadfast and unyielding in their allegiance to
our Government notwithstanding the bitter hardships and cruel ruthless
outrages to which they have been subjected.

"It is hoped that the time is not very far distant, when your people
may again proudly walk their own soil, exalted in the feeling, perhaps
with the consciousness that our cruel and cowardly foe has been
adequately punished and humiliated.

"Your communication has been ford. to Lt Gen'l Holmes with the urgent
request that immediate steps be taken to bring your people fully
within the pale of civilized warfare.

"It is hoped that there may be no delay in a matter so vitally

"We are looking daily for the arrival of Boats from below with corn,
tis the wish of the Gen'l that the necessitous Indians sh'd be
supplied from this place. Boats w'd be sent farther up the river, were
we otherwise circumstanced. As it is the Boats have necessarily to run
the gauntlet of the enemy--The Gen'l however hopes to be able to keep
the River free to navigation until a sufficient supply of corn to
carry us through the winter can be accumulated at this place.

"You will receive notice of the arrival of corn so that it may
be conveyed to the Indians needing it."--CROSBY to Stand Watie,
commanding First Cherokee Regiment, February 16, 1863, Ibid.,
pp. 91-93.


"I am directed by Gen'l Steele to say that a delegation from the
Creeks have visited him since your departure and a full discussion has
been had of such matters as they are interested in.

"They brought with them a letter from the Principal Chief Moty Kennard
asking that the Cattle taken from the refugee Creeks be turned over to
the use of the loyal people of the nation. The Gen. Com'dg has ordered
a disposition of these Cattle to be made in accordance with the wishes
of the chief. If necessary please give such instructions as will
attain this object. (cont.)]

instructions from Richmond so he dealt with the natives as best he
could.[744] Small-pox became epidemic

[Footnote 743: (cont.) No Boats yet. Will endeavor to send one up the
river should more than one arrive."--Crosby to D.H. Cooper, February
19, 1863, Ibid., p. 97.


"I enclose, herewith, a letter from the agent of the Seminoles. You
will see from that letter the danger we are in from neglecting the
wants of the Indians. I have never had one cent of money pertaining
to the Indian superintendency, nor have I received any copies of
treaties, nor anything else that would give me an insight into the
affairs of that Department. I wrote, soon after my arrival at this
place, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs but have received
no reply. If you have any knowledge of the whereabouts of the
superintendent who has been lately appointed I hope you will urge
upon him the necessity of coming at once and attending to these
matters."--STEELE to Anderson, April 6, 1863, Ibid., 180.


"I have today received a long letter from the Chief of the Osages,
which I enclose for your perusal. Maj. Dorn came in from Texas a few
days since, and has, I understand, gone down to Little Rock on the
steamer 'Tahlequah.' It is certainly represented that a portion of
the funds in his hands is in specie. Please have the latter surely
delivered. Please return Black Dog's letter unless you wish to forward
it."--STEELE to Holmes, May 16, 1863, Ibid., 249.


"Letters, received today, indicate a great necessity for your presence
with the tribe for whom you are Agent. I wish you, therefore, to visit
them, and relieve the discontent, as far as the means in your hands
will permit. The Osage Chief, 'Black Dog,' now acting as 1st Chief,
claims that certain money has been turned over to you for certain
purposes, for which they have received nothing."--STEELE to A.J. Dorn,
May 16, 1863, Ibid., 249.]

[Footnote 744: "Your letter of May 6th, with letter of Black Dog
enclosed, has been received and the enclosure forwarded to Lieut. Gen.
Holmes for his information. The General Com'dg desires me to express
his regrets that the affairs of the Osage and Seminole tribes should
be in such a deplorable condition, but he is almost powerless, at
present, to remedy the evils you so justly complain of. He has written
again and again to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Richmond
requesting instructions in the discharge of his duties as ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, but not a word has ever been
received in reply to his reiterated requests, owing probably to the
difficulty of communication between this point and the Capital. He has
also requested that funds be sent him to liquidate the just demands of
our Indian Allies, but from the same cause his requests have met with
no response. You must readily appreciate the difficulties under which
Gen. Steele necessarily labors. In fact his action is completely
paralized by the want of instructions and funds. In connection with
this he has been compelled to exert every faculty in defending the
line of the Arkansas River against an enemy, vastly his superior in
arms, numbers, artillery and everything that adds to the efficiency of
an army, and consequently has not been able to pay (cont.)]

among his men,[745] as among Phillips's--and from like causes.

Then General Steele had difficulty in getting his men and the right
kind of men together. Lawless Arkansans were unduly desirous of
joining the Indian regiments, thinking that discipline there would be
lax enough to suit their requirements.[746] Miscellaneous conscripting
by ex-officers of Arkansan troops gave much cause for annoyance[747]
as did also Cooper's unauthorized commissioning of officers to a
regiment made

[Footnote 744: (cont.) that attention to the business of the
superintendency that he would under other circumstances.

"It was stated, some time ago, in the newspapers, that a
superintendent had been appointed in Richmond, and the General Com'dg
has been anxiously expecting his arrival for several weeks. He
earnestly hopes that the superintendent may soon reach the field of
his labors, provided with instructions, funds and everything necessary
to the discharge of his important duties.

"Major Dorn, the Agent for the Osages, was here, a few days ago, but
he is now in Little Rock. The General has written to him, requiring
him to come up immediately, visit the tribe for which he is the Agent
and relieve their necessities as far as the means in his hands will

"The General has been offically informed that Major D. has in his
possession, for the use of the Osages twenty odd thousand dollars.

"I have to apologize, on the part of Gen'l Steele, for the various
letters which have been received from you, and which still remain
unanswered, but his excuse must be that, in the absence of proper
instructions etc. he was really unable to answer your questions or
comply with your requests, and he cannot make promises that there is
not, at least, a _very strong probability_ of his being able
to fulfil. Too much harm has already been occasioned in the Indian
Country by reckless promises, and he considers it better, in every
point of view, to deal openly and frankly with the Indians than to
hold out expectations that are certain not to be realized.

"It is not possible, however, to say in a letter what could be so much
better said in a personal interview, and the Gen'l therefore, desires
me to say that as soon as your duties will admit of your absence, he
will be happy to see and converse with you fully and freely at his
Head Quarters" [Ibid., no. 268, pp. 27-29].

On this same subject, see also Steele to Wigfall, April 15, 1863,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 819-821.]

[Footnote 745: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 220.]

[Footnote 746: Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 747: Same to same, March 1, and 3, 1863, Ibid.,
112-113, 113-114.]

out of odd battalions and independent companies.[748] Cooper, in fact,
seemed bent upon tantalizing Steele and many of the Indians were
behind him.[749] Colonel Tandy Walker was especially his supporter.
Cooper had been Walker's choice for department commander[750] and
continued so, in spite of all Steele's honest attempts to propitiate
him and in spite of his promise to use every exertion to satisfy
Choctaw needs generally.[751] To Tandy Walker Steele entrusted the
business of recruiting anew among the Choctaws.[752]

[Footnote 748: Steele to Anderson, February 13, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, chap 2, no. 270, p. 89.]

[Footnote 749: It was not true, apparently, that the Chickasaws were
dissatisfied with Cooper. See the evidence furnished by themselves,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1116-1117.]

[Footnote 750: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 134,

[Footnote 751: Steele to Tandy Walker, February 25, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2; no. 270, p. 109.]

[Footnote 752: Crosby to Walker, March 11, 1863, Ibid., p.
136. Steele thought that the Indians might as well be employed in a
military way since they were more than likely to be a public charge.
To Colonel Anderson he wrote, March 22, 1863 [Ibid., p. 155],
"I forward the above copy of a letter from Gen'l Cooper for Gen'l
Holmes' information. I purpose if not otherwise directed to call out
all the available force of the Nations within the conscript age....
They have to be fed and might as well be organized and put into a
position to be useful." From the correspondence of Steele, it would
seem that there was some trouble over Walker's promotion. April 10,
Steele wrote again to Anderson on the subject of Indian enrollment in
the ranks and referred to the other matter.

"The enclosed copy of some articles in the Treaty between the C.S.
Govt and the Choctaws with remarks by Gen'l Cooper are submitted for
the consideration of the Lt. Gen'l.

"It appears that Col. Walker was recommended to fill the vacancy made
by the promotion of Col. Cooper, the right being given by the treaty
to appoint to the office of Col., the other offices being filled by
election, and that at the time, the enemy were at Van Buren. Col.
Walker being at the convenient point was put upon duty by Col. Cooper
and has since been recognized by several acts of my own, not however
with a full knowledge of the circumstances. That under instructions
from Gen'l Hindman a Regt was being organized which it was expected
would be commanded by Col. Folsom, the whole of which appears to be a
very good arrangement. The necessity that exists of feeding nearly all
the Indians would seem to present an (cont.)]

Furloughs and desertions were the bane of Steele's existence.[753] In
these respects Alexander's brigade,

[Footnote 752: (cont.) additional reason for having them in service.
Companies are also being organized from the Reserve Indians, with the
view to replace white troops with them who are now engaged protecting
the frontier from the incursions of the wild tribes. Moreover the
enemy's forces being composed partially of Indians, the troops would
be effective against them, when they might not be against other
troops..." [Ibid., pp. 186-187]. Appointments, as well as
promotions, within the Indian service caused Steele much perplexity.
See Steele to Anderson, April 13, 1863, Ibid., pp. 190-191.]

[Footnote 753: Steele thought it desirable to arrest all men, at
large, who were subject to military duty under the conscript act,
unless they could produce evidence "of a right to remain off duty"
[Crosby to Colonel Newton, January 12, 1863, Ibid., p. 32].
Presumably whole companies were deserting their posts [Crosby to
Cooper, February 1, 1863, Ibid., pp. 66-67]. It was suggested
that some deserters should be permitted to organize against jayhawkers
as, under sanction from Holmes, had been the case with deserters
in the Magazine Mountains [Steele to Anderson, February 1, 1863,
Ibid., p. 67]. When word came that the Federals were about to
organize militia in northwestern Arkansas, Steele ordered that
all persons, subject to military duty, who should fail to enroll
themselves before February 6, should be treated as bushwhackers [same
to same, February 3, 1863, Ibid., pp. 69-70]. Colonel Charles
DeMorse, whose Texas regiment had been ordered, February 15, to report
to Cooper [Crosby to DeMorse, February 15, 1863, Ibid.,], asked
to be allowed to make an expedition against the wild tribes. Some two
hundred fifty citizens would be more than glad to accompany it. Steele
was indignant and Duval, at his direction, wrote thus to Cooper, April
19: "... Now if these men were so anxious to march three or four
hundred miles to _find_ the enemy, they could certainly be
induced to take up arms _temporarily_ in defence of their
immediate homes" [Ibid., p. 203]. It was not that Steele
objected to expeditions against the wild tribes but he was disgusted
with the lack of patriotism and military enthusiasm among the Texans
and Arkansans. Colonel W.P. Lane's regiment of Texas Partizan Rangers
was another that had to be chided for its dilatoriness [Ibid.,
pp. 168-169, 199, 234]. Deficient means of transportation was
oftentimes the excuse given for failure to appear but Steele's
complaint to Anderson, April 10 [Ibid., 185-186], was very much
more to the point. He wrote,

"... I find that men are kept back upon every pretext; that QrMasters
and Govt Agents or persons calling themselves such have detailed them
to drive teams hauling cotton to Mexico, and employed them about the
Gov't agencies. This cotton speculating mania is thus doing us great
injury besides taking away all the transportation in the country...."
Public feeling in Texas was on the side of deserters to a very great
extent and in one instance, at least, Steele was forced to defer to
it, "You will desist from the attempt to take the deserters from
Hart's Company or any other in northern Texas if the state of public
feeling is such that it cannot be done without (cont.)]

within which Colonel Phillips had detected traitors to the Confederate
cause,[754] was, perhaps, the most incorrigible.[755] From department
headquarters came impassioned appeals[756] for activity and for
loyalty but

[Footnote 753: (cont.) danger of producing a collision with the
people. The men are no doubt deserters, but we have no men to spare,
to enforce the arrest at the present time" [Steele to Captain
Randolph, July i, 1863, Ibid., p. 116. See also Steele to
Borland, July 1, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 117]. When West's
Battery was ordered to report at Fort Smith it was discovered going
in the opposite direction [Steele to J.E. Harrison, April 25, 1863,
Ibid., no. 270, p. 213; Duval to Harrison, May 1, 1863,
Ibid., p. 221; Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, Ibid.,
p. 233; Steele to Cooper, May 11 1863, Ibid., pp. 237-238].

One expedition to the plains that Steele distinctly encouraged was
that organized by Captain Wells [Steele to Cooper, March 16, 1863,
Ibid., pp. 145-146]. It was designed that Wells's command
should operate on the western frontier of Kansas and intercept
trains on the Santa Fé trail [Steele to Anderson, April 17, 1863,
Ibid., p. 197].]

[Footnote 754: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, p. 62.]

[Footnote 755: For correspondence with Alexander objecting to further
furloughing and urging the need of promptness, see _Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 121-122, 163-164, 170, 178-179,

[Footnote 756: The following are illustrations:

"... Every exertion is being made and the Gen'l feels confident that
the means will be attained of embarking in an early spring campaign.
It only remains for the officers and men to come forward to duty in
a spirit of willingness and cheerfulness to render the result of
operations in the Dept (or beyond it as the case may be) not only
successful but to add fresh renown to the soldiers whom he has the
honor to command ..."--CROSBY to Talliaferro, February 24, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 105-106.

"The Commanding Gen'l would be gratified to grant the within petition
were it compatible with the interests of the service and the cause
which petitioners 'Hold dearer than life.' He is fully aware of the
many urgent reasons which a number of officers and men have for
visiting their homes, providing for their families, etc., etc.

"The Enemy conscious of his superior strength is constantly
threatening the small force that now holds him in check on the line
of the Arkansas river. Speight's Brigade was sent to their present
position--not because they were not needed here--but for the reason
that it was an utter impossibility to subsist it in this region.

"Every consideration of patriotism and duty imperiously demands the
presence of every officer and soldier belonging to this command. The
season of active operations is at hand. The enemy in our front is
actively employed in accumulating supplies and transportation and in
massing, drilling, and disciplining his troops. His advance cannot be
expected to be long (cont.)]

without telling or lasting effect. The Confederate service in Indian
Territory was honeycombed with fraud and corruption.[757] Wastrels,
desperadoes, scamps of every sort luxuriated at Indian expense. It was
no wonder that false muster rolls had to be guarded against.[758]
The Texans showed throughout so great an aversion to the giving of
themselves or of their worldly goods[759] to the salvation of the
country that

[Footnote 756: (cont.) delayed. This enemy is made up of Kansas
Jayhawkers, 'Pin Indians,' and Traitors from Missouri, Arkansas and
Texas. The ruin, devastation, oppression, and tyranny that has marked
his progress has no parallel in history. The last official Report from
your Brigade shews a sad state of weakness. Were the enemy informed on
this point _our line of defence would soon be transferred from the
Arkansas to Red river_. In the name of God, our country and all
that is near and dear to us, let us discard from our minds every other
consideration than that of a firm, fixed, and manly determination to
do our duty and our whole duty to our country in her hour of peril and
need. The season is propitious for an advance. Let not supineness,
indifference and a lack of enthusiasm in a just and holy cause, compel
a retreat Texas is the great Commissary Depot west of the Mississippi.
The enemy must be kept as far from her rich fields and countless
herds, as possible. Let us cheerfully, harmoniously, and in a
spirit of manly sacrifice bend every energy mental and physical to
preparations for a forward movement. The foregoing reasons for a
refusal to grant leave of absence will serve as an answer in all
similar cases and will be disseminated among the officers and men of
the Brigade by the Commanders thereof."--CROSBY, by command of Steele,
March 20, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp.

[Footnote 757: J.A. Scales to Adair, April 12, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 821-822.]

[Footnote 758: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 224.]

[Footnote 759: Holmes, as early as March, warned Steele that he would
have to get his supplies soon from Texas. It would not be possible to
draw them much longer from the Arkansas River. He was told to prepare
to get them in Texas "at all hazard," which instruction was construed
by Steele to mean, "take it, if you cant buy it" [Ibid.,
145-146]. It was probably the prospect of having to use force or
compulsion that made Steele so interested, late in May, in finding
out definitely whether Hindman's acts in Arkansas had really been
legalized [Steele to Blair, May 22, 1863, Ibid., 34].
Appreciating that it was matter of vital concern that the grain crop
in northern Texas should be harvested, Steele was at a loss to know
how to deal with petitions that solicited furloughs for the purpose
[Steele to Anderson, May 4, 1863, Ibid., 227; Duval to Cabell,
May 7, 1863, Ibid., 230-231]. Perhaps, it was a concession
to some such need that induced him, in June, to permit seven day
furloughs [Duval to Cooper, June 27, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p.

Steele in despair cried out, "... it does appear as if the Texas
troops on this frontier were determined to tarnish the proud fame that
Texans have won in other fields."[760] The Arkansans were no better
and no worse. The most fitting employment for many, the whole length
and breadth of Steele's department, was the mere "ferreting out of
jayhawkers and deserters."[761]

The Trans-Mississippi departmental change, effected in January, was of
short duration, so short that it could never surely have been intended
to be anything but transitional. In February the parts were re-united
and Kirby Smith put in command of the whole,[762] President Davis
explaining, not very candidly, that no dissatisfaction with Holmes was
thereby implied.[763] Smith was the ranking officer and entitled to
the first consideration. Moreover, Holmes had once implored that a
substitute for himself be sent out. As a matter of fact, Holmes had
become too much entangled with Hindman, too much identified with all
that Arkansans objected to in Hindman,[764] his intolerance, his
arrogance, his illegalities, for him to be retained longer, with
complacency, in chief command. Hindman and he were largely to blame
for the necessity[765] of suspending the privilege of the writ of
_habeas corpus_ in Arkansas and the adjacent Indian country,
which had just been done. Strong

[Footnote 760: Steele to Alexander, April 23, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, no. 270, pp. 210-211.]

[Footnote 761: Duval to Colonel John King, June 30, 1863,
Ibid., no. 268, p. 110.]

[Footnote 762: Livermore, _Story of the Civil War_, part iii,
book i, p. 255.]

[Footnote 763: Davis to Holmes, February 26, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 849-850.]

[Footnote 764: Davis to Holmes, January 28, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 765: The necessity was exceedingly great. Take, for
instance, the situation at Fort Smith, where the citizens themselves
asked for the establishment of martial law in order that lives and
property might be reasonably secure [Crosby to Mayor Joseph Bennett,
January 10, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp.

political pressure was exerted in Richmond[766] and the Arkansas
delegation in Congress demanded Hindman's recall,[767] Holmes's
displacement, and Kirby Smith's appointment. The loss of that historic
fort, Arkansas Post,[768] also a tardy appreciation of the economic
value of the Arkansas Valley and, incidentally, of the entire
Trans-Mississippi Department,[769] had really determined matters; but,
fortunately, the supersedure of Holmes by Smith did not affect the
position of Steele.

Steele divined that the Federals would naturally make an early attempt
to occupy in force the country north of the Arkansas River and beyond
it to the southward in what had hitherto been a strictly Confederate
stronghold. It was his intention to forestall them. The two Cherokee
regiments constituted, for some little time, his best available troops
and them he kept in almost constant motion.[770] His great reliance,
and well it might be, was upon Stand Watie, whom he had

[Footnote 766: Davis to Garland, March 28, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 861-863; Davis to the Arkansas
delegation, March 30, 1863, Ibid., 863-865.]

[Footnote 767: Hindman was not immediately recalled; but he soon
manifested an unwillingness to continue under Holmes [Ibid.,
848]. He had very pronounced opinions about some of his associates.
Price he thought of as a breeder of factions and Holmes as an honest
man but unsystematic. In the summer, he actually asked for an
assignment to Indian Territory [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii,

[Footnote 768: Livermore, _Story of the Civil War_, part iii,
book i, 85. Davis would fain have believed that so great a disaster
had not befallen the Confederate arms [Letter to Holmes, January 28,
1863, _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 847].]

[Footnote 769: Perhaps, it is scarcely fair to intimate that the
Trans-Mississippi Department was regarded as unimportant at this
stage. It was only relatively so. In proof of that, see Davis to
Governor Flanagin, April 3, 1863, Ibid., 865-866; Davis to
Johnson, July 14, 1863, Ibid., 879-880. When Kirby Smith
tarried late in the assumption of his enlarged duties, Secretary
Seddon pointed out the increasingly great significance of them [Letter
to Smith, March 18, 1863, Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, pp.

[Footnote 770: Steele to Cabell, April 18, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, no. 270, p. 199.]

brought up betimes within convenient distance of Fort Smith[771] and
with whom, in April, Phillips's men had two successful encounters, on
the fourteenth[772] and the twenty-fifth. The one of the twenty-fifth
was at Webber's Falls and especially noteworthy, since, as a Federal
victory, it prevented a convening of the secessionist Cherokee
Council,[773] for which, so important did he deem it, Steele had
planned an extra protection.[774] The completeness of the Federal
victory was marred by the loss of Dr. Gillpatrick,[775] who had so
excellently served the ends of diplomacy between the Indian Expedition
and John Ross.

Through May and June, engagements, petty in themselves but
contributing each its mite to ultimate success or failure, occupied
detachments of the opposing Indian forces with considerable
frequency.[776] Two, devised by Cooper, those of the fourteenth[777]
and twentieth[778] of May may be said to characterize the entire

[Footnote 771: "You will order Colonel Stand Watie to move his
command down the Ark. River to some point in the vicinity of Fort
Smith."--CROSBY to Cooper, February 14, 1863, Ibid., p. 90.]

[Footnote 772: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 37.]

[Footnote 773: Phillips to Curtis, April 26, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 314-315; Britton, _Civil War on the
Border_, vol. ii, 40-41. Mrs. Anderson, in her _Life of General
Stand Watie_, denies categorically that the meeting of the council
was interrupted on this occasion [p. 22] and cites the recollections
of "living veterans" in proof.]

[Footnote 774: "I am directed by the General Com'dg to say that he
deems it advisable that you should move your Hd. Qrs. higher up the
river, say in the vicinity of Webber's Falls or Pheasant Bluff. He is
desirous that you should be somewhere near the Council when that
body meets, so that any attempt of the enemy to interfere with their
deliberations may be thwarted by you."--DUVAL to Cooper, April 22,
1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 209.]

[Footnote 775: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 42.]

[Footnote 776:--Ibid., vol. ii, chapters vi and vii.]

[Footnote 777: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 469.]

[Footnote 778:--Ibid., vol. xxii, part i, 337-338;
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 34.]

series and were nothing but fruitless demonstrations to seize the
Federal grazing herds. A brilliant cavalry raid, undertaken by Stand
Watie and for the same purpose, a little later, was slightly more
successful;[779] but even its fair showing was reversed in the
subsequent skirmish at Greenleaf Prairie, June 16.[780] To the
northward, something more serious was happening, since actions, having
their impetus in Arkansas,[781] were endangering Phillips's line of
communication with Fort Scott, his base and his depot of supplies. In
reality, Phillips was hard pressed and no one knew better than he how
precarious his situation was. Among his minor troubles was the refusal
of his Creeks to charge in the engagement of May 20.

The refusal of the Creeks to charge was not, however, indicative of
any widespread disaffection.[782] So

[Footnote 779: Anderson, 20-21. Interestingly enough, about this time
Cooper reported that he could get plenty of beef where he was and at a
comparatively low price, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268,
pp. 60-61.]

[Footnote 780: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 348-352.]

[Footnote 781: Not all got their impetus there. The following letter
although not sent, contains internal evidence that Cooper was
concocting some of them:

"I learn unofficially that Gen'l Cooper, having received notice of the
approach of a train of supplies for Gibson, was about crossing the
Arkansas with the largest part of his force, to intercept it. It is
reported that the train would have been in 15 miles of Gibson last
night. If Gen'l Cooper succeeds Phillips will leave soon, if not he
will probably remain some time longer. Be prepared to move in case he
leaves."--STEELE to Cabell, June 24, 1863, _Confederate Records_,
chap. 2, no. 268, p. 96.]

[Footnote 782: The following letter shows the nature of the Creek

DEAR GREAT FATHER: Sir, The wicked rebellion in the United States has
caused a division in the Nation. Some of our many loving leaders have
joined the rebels merely for speculation and consequently divided our
people and that brought ruin in our Nation. They had help near and
ours was far so that our ruin was sure. We saw this plain beforehand.
Therefore we concluded to go to you our great father, remembering the
treaty that you have made with us long ago in which you promised us
protection. This was the cause that made us to go and meet you in your
white house about eighteen months ago and there laid our complaint
before you, as a weaker brother wronged of his rights by a stronger
brother and you promised us your protection; but before we got back to
our people they were (cont.)]

honorably had Phillips been conducting himself with reference to
Indian affairs, so promptly and generously had he discharged his
obligations to the refugees who had been harbored at Neosho--they had
all returned now from exile[783]--so successfully had he everywhere
encountered the foe that the Indians, far and wide, were beginning to
look to him for succor,[784] many of them to

[Footnote 782: (cont.) made to leave their humble and peaceful home
and also all their property and traveled towards north in the woods
without roads not only that but they were followed, so that they had
to fight three battles so as to keep their families from being taken
away from them. In the last fight they were overpowered by a superior
force so they had to get away the best way they can and most every
thing they had was taken away from them ... Now this was the way we
left our country and this was the condition of our people when we
entered within the bounds of the State of Kansas ...

Now Great Father you have promised to help us in clearing out our
country so that we could bring back our families to their homes and
moreover we have enlisted as home guards to defend our country and it
will be twelve months in a few weeks ... but there is nothing done as
yet in our country. We have spent our time in the states of Mo. and
Arks. and in the Cherokee Nation. We are here in Ft. Gibson over a
month. Our enemies are just across the river and our pickets and
theirs are fighting most every day ...

There is only three regts. of Indians and a few whites are here. Our
enemy are gathering fast from all sides ...

A soldier's rights we know but little but it seems to us that our
rations are getting shorter all the time but that may be on account
of the teams for it have to be hauled a great ways.--CREEKS to the
President of the United States, May 16, 1863, Office of Indian
Affairs, General Files, _Creek_, 1860-1869, O 6 of 1863.]

[Footnote 783: Britton's account of the return of the Cherokee exiles
is recommended for perusal. It could scarcely be excelled. See,
_Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 34-37.]

[Footnote 784: Certain proceedings of Carruth and Martin would seem to
suggest that they were endeavoring to reap the reward of Phillips's
labors, by negotiating, somewhat prematurely, for an inter-tribal
council. Coffin may have endorsed it, but Dole had not [Dole to
Coffin, July 8, 1863, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 71, p.
116]. The pretext for calling such a council lay in fairly recent
doings of the wild tribes. The subjoined letters and extracts of
letters will elucidate the subject: February 7, Coffin reported to
Dole [General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1863-1864] that
the wild Indians had been raiding on the Verdigris and Fall Rivers
into the Creek and Cherokee countries, "jayhawking property," and
bringing it into Kansas and selling it to the settlers. Some of the
cattle obtained in this way had been (cont.)]

wonder, whether in joining the Confederacy, they had not made a
terrible mistake, a miscalculation beyond all remedying.

To the Confederates, tragically enough, the Indian's tale of woe and
of regret had a different meaning. The

[Footnote 784: (cont.) sold by a settler to the contractor and fed to
the Indians. Jim Ned's band of wild Delawares, returning from such a
jayhawking expedition, had stolen some Osage ponies and had become
involved in a fight in which two Delawares had been killed [Coffin to
Dole, February 12, 1863, ibid., _Neosho_, C 73 of 1863]. Coffin
prevailed upon Jim Ned to stop the jayhawking excursions; inasmuch
as "Considerable bad feeling exists on the part of the Cherokees in
consequence of the bringing up ... a great many cattle, ponies, and
mules, which they allege belong to the Cherokee refugees ..." [Coffin
to Dole, February 24, 1863, Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1863-1864].

Feelings of hostility continued to exist, notwithstanding, between the
civilized and uncivilized red men and "aided materially the emissaries
of the Rebellion in fomenting discords and warlike raids upon whites
as well as Indians ..." [Coffin to Dole, June 25, 1863, Ibid.,
C 325]. It was under such circumstances that Carruth took it upon
himself to arrange an inter-tribal council. This is his report
[Carruth to Coffin, June 17, 1863, Ibid.,]. His action was
seconded by Martin [Martin to Coffin, June 18, 1863, Ibid.,]:

"I left Belmont (the temporary Wichita agency) May 26th to hold a
Council with the Indians of the Wichita Agency, who have not as yet
reached Kansas ... I found ... upon reaching Fall River ... that the
Wichitas alone had sent over 100 men. We reached the Ark. River May
31st. After having been compelled to purchase some provisions for the
number of people, who have come, that were not provided for. The next
day we were joined by the Kickapoos and Sacs, and here I was informed
by the Kickapoos, that no runner had gone through to the Cadoes and
Comanches from them, as we had heard at Belmont, yet I learned, that
these tribes were then camped at the Big Bend, some sixty miles above
and waiting at this point: I sent three Wichitas--among them the
Chief--some Ionies, Wacoes, and Tawa Kuwus through to them calling on
their Chiefs to come and have a 'talk.'

"They reached us on the 8th of June, and after furnishing the presents
I had taken to them all the different tribes were called to Council.
Present were, Arapahoes, Lipans, Comanches, Kioways, Sac and Foxes,
Kickapoos and Cadoes besides the Indians who went out with me.

"All of them are true to the Government of the United States, but some
are at war with each other. I proposed to them to make peace with all
the tribes friendly to our Government, so that their 'Great Father'
might view all of them alike.

"To this they agreed, and a Council was called to which the Osages,
Potawatomies, Shians, Sac and Foxes, in fact all the tribes at
variance, are (cont.)]

tale had been told many times of late and every time with a new
emphasis upon that part of it that recounted delusion and betrayal.
For quite a while now the Indians had been feeling themselves
neglected. Steele was aware of the fact but helpless. When told of
treaty rights he had to plead ignorance; for he had never seen the
treaties and had no official knowledge of their contents. He was
exercising the functions of superintendent _ex officio_, not
because the post had ever been specifically conferred upon him or
instructions sent, but because he had come to his command to find it,
in nearly every aspect, Indian and no agent or superintendent at hand
to take charge [785] of affairs that were

[Footnote 784: (cont.) to be invited, to hold a grand peace Council
near the mouth of the Little Arkansas River within six weeks.
Meanwhile they are to send runners to notify these tribes to gather on
the Arkansas, sixty miles above, that they may be within reach of our
call when we get to the Council ground. Subsistence will have to be
provided for at least 10000 Indians at that time. They will expect
something from the Government to convince them of its power to carry
through its promises. Some of the Cadoes and Comanches connected with
this Agency, after coming to the Arkansas, returned to Fort Cobb.
These will all come back to this Council. Their desire is to be
subsisted on the Little Arkansas, some 70 miles from Emporia until the
war closes.

"They argue like this, 'The Government once sent us our provisions to
Fort Cobb over 300 miles from Fort Smith. We do not want to live near
the whites, because of troubles between them and us in regard to
ponies, timber, fields, green corn, etc. Our subsistence can be hauled
to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, easier by far, than it was
formerly from Fort Smith, and by being at this point we shall be
removed from the abodes of the whites, so they cannot steal our
ponies, nor can our people trouble them.'

"I believe they are right. I have had more trouble the past winter in
settling difficulties between the Indians and whites on account of
trades, stolen horses, broken fences, etc. than from all other causes

"I cannot get all the Indians of this Agency together this side of the
Little Arkansas. That point will be near enough the Texan frontier for
the Indians to go home easily when the war closes. It is on the direct
route to Fort Cobb. They are opposed to going via Fort Gibson ..."]

[Footnote 785: Without legislating on the subject, and without
intending it, the Confederacy had virtually put into effect, a
recommendation of Hindman's that "The superintendencies, agencies,
etc., should be abolished, and a purely military establishment
substituted ..." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, p. 51.].]

ordinarily not strictly within the range of military cognizance.

General Steele, like many another, was inclined to think that the red
men greatly over-estimated their own importance; for they failed to
"see and understand how small a portion of the field"[786] they really
occupied. To Steele, it was not Indian Territory that was valuable but
Texas. For him the Indian country, barren by reason of the drouth,
denuded of its live stock, a prey to jayhawker, famine, and
pestilence, did nothing more than measure the distance between the
Federals and the rich Texan grain-fields, from whence he fondly hoped
an inexhaustible supply of flour[787] for the Confederates was to
come. In short, the great and wonderful expanse that had been given to
the Indian for a perpetual home was a mere buffer.

But it was a buffer, throbbing with life, and that was something
Steele dared not ignore and could not if he would. With such
a consciousness, when the secessionist Cherokees were making
arrangements for their council at Webber's Falls in April, he hastened
to propitiate them ahead of time by addressing them "through the
medium of their wants" for he feared what might be their action[788]
should they assemble with a

[Footnote 786: Steele to Wigfall, April 15, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 820.]

[Footnote 787: Steele's letter books furnish much evidence on
this score. A large portion has been published in the _Official
Records_. During the period covered by this chapter, he was drawing
his supply of flour from Riddle's Station, "on the Fort Smith and
Boggy Road" [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 252]
in charge of which was Captain Hardin of Bass's Texas Cavalry. He
expected to draw from Arkansas likewise [Steele to Major S.J. Lee,
June 9, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 70-71;
Duval to Hardin, June 16, 1863, Ibid., p. 81; Steele to Lee,
June 17, 1863, Ibid., pp. 87-88].]

[Footnote 788: "Enclosed please find a letter to Col. Adair, and
a note from him forwarding it. I send it for the consideration of
General Holmes. The (cont.)]

grievance[789] against the Confederacy in their hearts. Protection
against the oncoming enemy and relief from want were the things the
Indians craved, so, short though his own supplies were, Steele had to
make provision for the helpless and indigent natives, the feeding
of whom became a fruitful and constantly increasing source of

Just and generous as General Steele endeavored to

[Footnote 788: (cont.) subject is one of grave importance. If a
regiment of infantry could be spared to take post at this place and
General Cabell could be permitted to include it in his command, I
would go more into the nation and would be able soon to give the
required protection. The troops from Red River have been ordered up
and should be some distance on the way before this. I fear the meeting
of the Cherokee Council which takes place on the 20th ... unless more
troops arrive before they act."--STEELE to Anderson, April 15, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, no. 270, p. 194.

This was not the first time Steele had expressed a wish to go into the
Nation. March 20th, when writing to Anderson [Ibid., p. 150],
he had thought it of "paramount importance" that he visit all parts of
his command. Concerning his apprehension about the prospective work of
the Cherokee Council, he wrote quite candidly to Wigfall [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 821].]

[Footnote 789: The letter to Colonel W.P. Adair, written by one of his
adjutants, J.A. Scales, April 12, 1863 [Ibid., 821-822], is a
creditable presentation of the Cherokee grievance.]

[Footnote 790: Steele here presents certain phases of the

"... The matter of feeding destitute Indians has been all through a
vexatious one, the greatest trouble being to find in each neighborhood
a reliable person to receive the quota for that neighborhood. These
people seem more indifferent to the wants of others than any I have
seen; they are not willing to do the least thing to assist in helping
their own people who are destitute. I have, in many instances, been
unable to get wagons to haul the flour given them. I have incurred
a great responsibility in using army rations in this way and to the
extent that I have. I have endeavored to give to all destitute and to
sell at cost to those who are able to purchase. In this matter the
Nation has been more favored than the adjacent States. I am told by
Mr. Boudinot that a bill was passed by the Cherokee Council, taking
the matter into their own hands. I hope it is so. In which case I
shall cease issuing to others who have not, like them, been driven
from their homes. Dr. Walker was appointed to superintend this matter,
some system being necessary to prevent the same persons from drawing
from different commissaries ..."--STEELE to D.H. Cooper, June 15,
1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 80-81.]

be in the matter of attention to Indian necessities, his efforts were
unappreciated largely because of evil influences at work to undermine
him and to advance Douglas H. Cooper. Steele had his points of
vulnerability, his inability to check the Federal advance and his
remoteness from the scene of action, his headquarters being at Fort
Smith. Connected with the second point and charged against him were
all the bad practices of those men who, in their political or military
control of Indian Territory, had allowed Arkansas to be their chief
concern. Such practices became the foundation stone of a general
Indian dissatisfaction and, concomitantry, Douglas H. Cooper, of
insatiable ambition, posed as the exponent of the idea that the safety
of Indian Territory was an end in itself.

The kind of separate military organization that constituted Steele's
command was not enough for the Indians. Seemingly, they desired the
restoration of the old Pike department, but not such as it had been in
the days of the controversy with Hindman but such as it always was in
Pike's imagination. The Creeks were among the first to declare that
this was their desire. They addressed[791] themselves to President
Davis[792] and

[Footnote 791: Mory Kanard and Echo Harjo to President Davis, May 18,
1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1118-1119.]

[Footnote 792: Davis, in his message of January 12, 1863 [Richardson,
_Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, vol. i, 295] had
revealed an acquaintance with some Indian dissatisfaction but
intimated that it had been dispelled, it having arisen "from a
misapprehension of the intentions of the Government ..." It was
undoubtedly to allay apprehension on the part of the Indians that
Miles, in the house of Representatives, offered the following
resolution, February 17, 1863:

"_Resolved_, That the Government of the Confederate States has
witnessed with feelings of no ordinary gratification the loyalty and
good faith of the larger portion of its Indian allies west of the
State of Arkansas.

"_Resolved further_, That no effort of the Confederate Government
shall be spared to protect them fully in all their rights and to
assist them in defending their country against the encroachments
of all enemies." [_Journal of the Congress of the Confederate
States_, vol. vi, 113].]

boldly said that their country had "been treated as a mere appendage
of Arkansas, where needy politicians and _protégés_ of Arkansas
members of Congress must be quartered." The Seminoles followed
suit,[793] although in a congratulatory way, after a rumor had reached
them that the Creek request for a separate department of Indian
Territory was about to be granted. The rumor was false and in
June Tandy Walker, on behalf of the Choctaws, reopened the whole
subject.[794] A few days earlier, the Cherokees had filed their
complaint but it was of a different character, more fundamental, more
gravely portentous.

The Cherokee complaint took the form of a deliberate charge of
contemplated bad faith on the part of the Confederate government. E.C.
Boudinot, the Cherokee delegate in the Southern Congress, had recently
returned from Richmond, empowered to submit a certain proposal to his
constituents. The text of the proposal does not appear in the records
but its nature,[795] after account be taken of some exaggeration
attributable to the extreme of indignation, can be inferred from the
formal protest[796] against it, which was drawn up at Prairie Springs
in the Cherokee Nation about fifteen miles from Fort Gibson on the
twenty-first of June and signed by Samuel M. Taylor, acting assistant
chief, John Spears of the Executive Council, and Alexander Foreman,
president of the convention. To all intents and purposes the Cherokees
were asked, in return for some paltry offices chiefly military, to
institute a sort of system of military land grants. White people were
to be induced to enlist in their behalf and were then to

[Footnote 793: June 6, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part
ii, 1120.]

[Footnote 794: June 24, 1863, Ibid., 1122-1123.]

[Footnote 795: Steele's letter to Kirby Smith, June 24, 1863
[Ibid., 883-884], gives some hint of its nature also.]

[Footnote 796:--Ibid., 1120-1122.]

be allowed to settle, on equal terms with the Cherokees, within the
Cherokee country. The proposal, as construed by Taylor and his
party, was nothing more or less than a suggestion that the Cherokees
surrender their nationality, their political integrity, the one thing
above everything else that they had sought to preserve when they
entered into an active alliance with the Confederate States. So sordid
was the bargain proposed, so unequal, that the thought obtrudes
itself that a base advantage was about to be taken of the Cherokee
necessities and that the objectors were justified in insinuating that
Boudinot and his political friends were to be the chief beneficiaries.
The Cherokee country was already practically lost to the Confederacy.
Might it not be advisable to distribute the tribal lands, secure
individual holdings, while vested rights might still accrue; for,
should bad come to worse, private parties could with more chance
of success prosecute a claim than could a commonalty, which in its
national or corporate capacity had committed treason and thereby
forfeited its rights. One part of the Cherokee protest merits
quotation here. Its noble indignation ought to have been proof enough
for anybody.

    ... We were present when the treaty was made, were a party to it,
    and rejoiced when it was done. In that treaty our rights to
    our country as a Nation were guaranteed to us forever, and the
    Confederate States promised to protect us in them. We enlisted
    under the banner of those States, and have fought in defense of
    our country under that treaty and for the rights of the South for
    nearly two years. We have been driven from our homes, and suffered
    severe hardships, privations, and losses, and now we are informed,
    when brighter prospects are before us, that you think it best for
    us to give part of our lands to our white friends; that, to defend
    our country and keep troops for our protection, we must raise and
    enlist them from

    our own territory, and that it is actually necessary that they are
    citizens of our country to enable us to keep them with us. To do
    this would be the end of our national existence and the ruin of
    our people. Two things above all others we hold most dear, our
    nationality and the welfare of our people. Had the war been our
    own, there would have been justice in the proposition, but it is
    that of another nation. We are allies, assisting in establishing
    the rights and independence of another nation. We, therefore, in
    justice to ourselves and our people, cannot agree to give a part
    of our domain as an inducement to citizens of another Government
    to fight their own battles and for their own country; besides, it
    would open a door to admit as citizens of our Nation the worst
    class of citizens of the Confederate States ...


Independence Day, 1863, witnessed climacteric scenes in the war
dramas, east and west. The Federal victories of Gettysburg and
Vicksburg, all-decisive in the history of the great American conflict,
when considered in its entirety, had each its measure of immediate
and local importance. The loss of all control of the Mississippi
navigation meant for the Confederacy its practical splitting in twain
and the isolation of its western part. For the Arkansas frontier and
for the Missouri border generally, it promised, since western commands
would now recover their men and resume their normal size, increased
Federal aggressiveness or the end of suspended. Initial preparation
for such renewed aggressiveness was contemporary with the fall of
Vicksburg and lay in the failure of the Confederate attack upon
Helena, an attack that had been projected for the making of a
diversion only. The failure compelled Holmes to draw his forces back
to Little Rock.

Confederate operations in Indian Territory through May and June had
been, as already described, confined to sporadic demonstrations
against Federal herds and Federal supply trains, all having for their
main object the dislodgment of Phillips from Fort Gibson. What proved
to be their culmination and the demonstration most energetically
conducted occurred at Cabin Creek,[797] while far away Vicksburg was
falling and

[Footnote 797: For an official report of the action at Cabin Creek,
see _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 378-382. While, as
things eventuated, it was an endeavor (cont.)]

Gettysburg was being fought. A commissary train from Fort Scott was
expected. It was to come down, escorted by Colonel Williams who was
in command of the negro troops that Blunt had stationed at Baxter
Springs. To meet the train and to reinforce Williams, Phillips
despatched Major Foreman from Fort Gibson. Cooper had learned of the
coming of the train and had made his plans to seize it in a fashion
now customary.[798] The plans were quite elaborate and involved the
coöperation[799] of Cabell's Arkansas brigade,[800] which was to come
from across the line and proceed down the east side of the Grand
River. Thither also, Cooper sent a

[Footnote 797: (cont.) to cut off the supply train, there was
throughout the possibility that it might also result in heading off
Blunt, who was known to be on his way to Fort Gibson [Steele to
Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to
Cabell, June 29, 1863].]

[Footnote 798: Steele to Cabell, June 25, 1863 [_Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 97; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 885].]

[Footnote 799: Steele to Cabell, June 29, 1863 [_Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 105; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 893-894].]

[Footnote 800: Of W.L. Cabell, the _Confederate Military
History_, vol. x, has this to say: "Maj. W.L. Cabell, who had been
sent to inspect the accounts of quartermasters in the department,
having well acquitted himself of this duty, was, in March 1863,
commissioned brigadier-general and requested to collect absentees from
the service in northwestern Arkansas. Given Carroll's and Monroe's
regiments, he was directed to perfect such organizations as he could
..." He collected his brigade with great rapidity and it soon numbered
about four thousand men. Even, in April, Steele was placing much
reliance upon it, although he wished to keep its relation to him a
secret. He wrote to Cooper to that effect.

"Who will be in command of the Choctaws when you leave? Will they be
sufficient to picket and scout on the other side of the river far
enough to give notice of any advance of the enemy down the river? I do
not wish it to be generally known that Cabell's forces are under my
command, but prefer the enemy should think them a separate command;
for this reason I do not send these troops west until there is a
necessity for it; in the meantime the other troops can be brought
into position, where if we can get sufficient ammunition all can be
concentrated. I cannot direct positively, not having the intimate
knowledge of the country, but you should be in a position which would
enable you to move either down the Ark. River or on to the road
leading from Boggy Depot to Gibson as circumstances may indicate.
Let me hear from you frequently."--STEELE to Cooper, April 28, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 217-218.]

part of his own brigade and at the same time ordered another part
under Stand Watie to go to Cabin Creek and to take such position on
its south bank as to command the crossing. It was a time when the
rivers were all in flood, a circumstance that greatly affected the
outcome since it prevented the forces on the east side of the Grand
from coming to Stand Watie's support. As Foreman proceeded northward
to effect a junction with Williams, he detached some Cherokees from
the Third Indian, under Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons, to reconnoitre. In
that way he became apprised of Watie's whereabouts and enabled to put
himself on his guard. The commissary train, in due time, reached
Cabin Creek and, after some slight delay caused, not by Stand
Watie's interposition, but by the high waters, crossed. Federals
and Confederates then collided in a somewhat disjointed but lengthy
engagement with the result that Stand Watie retired and the train,
nothing the worse for the hold-up, moved on without further
molestation to Fort Gibson.[801]

The action at Cabin Creek, July 1 to 3, was the last attempt of any
size for the time being to capture Federal supplies en route. The
tables were thenceforth turned and the Confederates compelled to keep
a close

[Footnote 801: In describing what appears to be the action at Cabin
Creek, Steele refers to "bad conduct of the Creeks," and holds it
partly responsible for the failure [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 910]. It is possible that he had in mind, however, a
slightly earlier encounter, the same that he described, adversely
to D.N. McIntosh's abilities as a commander, in his general report
[Ibid., part i, 32]. Steele had little faith in the Indian
brigade and frankly admitted that he expected it in large measure,
to "dissolve," if the Confederates were to be forced to fall back at
Cabin Creek [Steele to Blair, July 1, 1863, _Official Records_,
vol. xxii, part ii, 902]. Nevertheless, he anticipated a victory for
his arms there [Steele to Blair, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 903].
From his general report, it might be thought that Stand Watie
disappointed him at this time, as later; but the Confederate failure
was most certainly mainly attributable to the high waters, which
prevented the union of their expeditionary forces [Steele to Blair,
July 5, 1863, Ibid., 905].]

watch on their own depots and trains. Up to date, since his first
arrival at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips had been necessarily on the
defensive because of the fewness of his men. Subsequent to the Cabin
Creek affair came a change, incident to events and conditions farther
east. The eleventh of July brought General Blunt, commander of the
District of the Frontier, to Fort Gibson. His coming was a surprise,
as has already been casually remarked, but it was most timely. There
was no longer any reason whatsoever why offensive action should not
be the main thing on the Federal docket in Indian Territory, as

To protect its own supplies and to recuperate, the strength of
the Confederate Indian brigade was directed toward Red River,
notwithstanding that Steele had still the hope of dislodging the
Federals north of the Arkansas.[802] His difficulties[803] were no
less legion than before, but he thought it might be possible to
accomplish the end desired by invading Kansas,[804] a plan that seemed
very feasible after S.P. Bankhead assumed command of the Northern
Sub-District of Texas.[805] Steele himself had "neither the artillery
nor the kind of force necessary to take a place" fortified as was
Gibson; but to the westward of the Federal stronghold Bankhead might
move. He might attack Fort Scott, Blunt's headquarters but greatly
weakened now, and possibly also some small posts in southwest
Missouri, replenishing his resources from time to time in the fertile
and well settled Neosho River Valley. Again

[Footnote 802: Steele took umbrage at a published statement of Pike
that seemed to doubt this and to intimate that the line of the
Arkansas had been definitely abandoned [Steele to Pike, July 13, 1863,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 925].]

[Footnote 803: For new aspects of his difficulties, see Steele to
Boggs, chief of staff, July 7, 1863, Ibid., 909-911.]

[Footnote 804:--Ibid., p. 910.]

[Footnote 805: Steele to Bankhead, July 11, 1863, Ibid.,

local selfishness rose to the surface[806] and Bankhead, surmising
Steele's weakness and that he would almost inevitably have to fall
back, perhaps vacating Indian Territory altogether, became alarmed for
the safety of Texas.[807]

Steele's recognition and admission of material incapacity for taking
Fort Gibson in no wise deterred him from attempting it. The idea was,
that Cooper should encamp at a point within the Creek Nation, fronting
Fort Gibson, and that Cabell should join him there with a view
to their making a combined attack.[808] As entertained, the idea
neglected to give due weight to the fact that Cabell's men were in no
trim for immediate action,[809] notwithstanding that concerted action
was the only thing likely to induce success. Blunt, with

[Footnote 806: Arkansas betrayed similar selfishness. President
Davis's rejoinder to a protest from Flanagin against a tendency to
ignore the claims of the West struck a singularly high note. Admitting
certain errors of the past, he prayed for the generous coöperation of
the future; for "it is to the future, not to the past, that we must
address ourselves, and I wish to assure you, though I hope it is
unnecessary, that no effort shall be spared to promote the defense of
the Trans-Mississippi Department, and to develop its resources so
as to meet the exigencies of the present struggle" [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 932]. Five days afterwards, Governor
Reynolds, in commending Secretary Seddon for a very able ministry,
expressed confidence that his gubernatorial colleagues in Arkansas,
Texas, and Louisiana would, with himself, "act in no sectional or
separatist spirit." It was saying a good deal, considering how strong
the drift of popular opinion had been and was to be in the contrary
direction. However, in August, the four governors appealed
collectively to their constituents and to "the Allied Indian Nations,"
proving, if proof were needed, that they personally were sincere
[Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 892-894; Moore's _Rebellion
Record_, vol. vii, 406-407].]

[Footnote 807: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 922.]

[Footnote 808: The plans for such concerted action were made as early
as July 8 [Steele to Cooper, July 8, 1863, _Official Records_,
vol. xxii, part ii, 911-912]. Cabell was instructed to take position
between Webber's Falls and Fort Gibson [Duval to Cabell, July 10,
1863, Ibid., 916-917] and more specifically, two days before
the battle, "within 15 or 20 miles of Gibson and this side of where
Gen. Cooper is now encamped on Elk Creek" [Steele to Cabell, July 15,
1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 145].]

[Footnote 809: Steele knew of the deficiencies in their equipment,
however, and of their exhausted state (cont.)]

scouts out in all directions and with spies in the very camps of his
foes, soon obtained an inkling of the Confederate plan and resolved
to dispose of Cooper before Cabell could arrive from Arkansas.[810]
Cooper's position was on Elk Creek, not far from present
Muskogee,[811] and near Honey Springs on the seventeenth of July the
two armies met, Blunt forcing the engagement, having made a night
march in order to do it. The Indians of both sides[812] were on hand,
in force, the First and Second Home Guards, being dismounted as
infantry and thus fighting for once as they had been mustered in. Of
the Confederate, or Cooper, brigade Stand Watie, the ever reliable,
commanded the First and Second Cherokee, D.N. McIntosh, the First
and Second Creek, and Tandy Walker, the regiment of Choctaws and
Chickasaws. The odds were all against Cooper from the start and, in
ways that Steele had not specified, the material equipment proved
itself inadequate indeed. Much of the ammunition was worthless.[813]
Nevertheless, Cooper stubbornly contested every inch of the ground and
finally gave way only when large numbers of his Indians, knowing their
guns to be absolutely useless to them, became disheartened and then
demoralized. In confusion, they led the van in

[Footnote 809: (cont.) [Duval to W.H. Scott, Commanding Post at
Clarksville, Ark., July 8, 1863, _Confederate Records_, p. 133;
Steele to Blair, July 10, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii,
part ii, 917; same to same, July 13, 1863, Ibid., 925].]

[Footnote 810: See Blunt's official report, dated July 26, 1863
[Ibid., part i, 447-448].]

[Footnote 811: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 21.]

[Footnote 812: With respect to the number of white troops engaged on
the Federal side there seems some discrepancy between Blunt's report
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 448] and Phisterer's
statistics [_Statistical Record_, 145].]

[Footnote 813: See Cooper's report, dated August 12, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 457-461]. The following references are
to letters that substantiate, in whole or in part, what Cooper said in
condemnation of the ammunition: Duval to Du Bose, dated Camp Prairie
Springs, C.N., July 27, 1863 [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no.
268, p. 159]; Steele to Blair, dated Camp Imochiah, August 9, 1863
[Ibid., 185-187; _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii,

flight across the Canadian; but enough of those more self-contained
went thither in an easterly or southeasterly direction so as to create
the impression among their enemies that they were retiring to meet the
expected reinforcements from Fort Smith.[814]

But the reinforcements were yet far away. Indeed, it was not until
all was over and a day too late that Cabell came up. A tragic sight
confronted him; but his own march had been so dismal, so inauspicious
that everything unfortunate that had happened seemed but a part of
one huge catastrophe. He had come by the "old Pacific mail route,
the bridges of which, in some places, were still standing in the
uninhabited prairies."[815] The forsaken land broke the morale of his
men--they had never been enthusiastic in the cause, some of them were
conscripted unionists, forsooth, and they deserted his ranks by the
score, by whole companies. The remnant pushed on and, in the far
distance, heard the roaring of the cannon. Then, coming nearer, they
caught a first glimpse of Blunt's victorious columns; but those
columns were already retiring, it being their intention to recross to
the Fort Gibson side of the Arkansas. "Moving over the open, rolling
prairies,"[816] Nature's vast meadows, their numbers seemed great
indeed and Cabell made no attempt to pursue or to court further
conflict. The near view of the battle-field dismayed[817] him; for
its gruesome records all too surely told him of another Confederate

[Footnote 814: Cooper intended to create such an impression
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 460] and he did
[Schofield to McNeil, July 26, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 399-400].]

[Footnote 815: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 199.]

[Footnote 816: Ibid., 200.]

[Footnote 817: Cabell might well be dismayed. Steele had done his
best to hurry him up. A letter of July 15 was particularly urgent
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 933].]

In the fortunes of the Southern Indians, the Battle of Honey Springs
was a decisive event. Fought and lost in the country of the Creeks, it
was bound to have upon them a psychological effect disastrous to the
steady maintenance of their alliance with the Confederacy, so also
with the other great tribes; but more of that anon. In a military
way, it was no less significant than in a political; for it was the
beginning of a vigorously offensive campaign, conducted by General
Blunt, that never ended until the Federals were in occupation of Fort
Smith and Fort Smith was at the very door of the Choctaw country. No
Indian tribe, at the outset of the war, had more completely gone over
to the South than had the Choctaw. It had influenced the others but
had already come to rue the day that had seen its own first defection.
Furthermore, the date of the Confederate rout at Honey Springs marked
the beginning of a period during which dissatisfaction with General
Steele steadily crystallized.

Within six weeks after the Battle of Honey Springs, the Federals were
in possession of Fort Smith, which was not surprising considering
the happenings of the intervening days. The miscalculations that had
eventuated in the routing of Cooper had brought Steele to the decision
of taking the field in person; for there was just a chance that he
might succeed where his subordinates, with less at stake than he, had
failed. Especially might he take his chances on winning if he could
count upon help from Bankhead to whom he had again made application,
nothing deterred by his previous ill-fortune.

It was not, by any means, Steele's intention to attempt the reduction
of Fort Gibson;[818] for, with such artillery

[Footnote 818: Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940-941].]

as he had, the mere idea of such an undertaking would be preposterous.
The defensive would have to be, for some time to come, his leading
role; but he did hope to be able to harry his enemy, somewhat,
to entice him away from his fortifications and to make those
fortifications of little worth by cutting off his supplies. Another
commissary train would be coming down from Fort Scott via Baxter
Springs about the first of August.[819] For it, then, Steele would lie
in wait.

When all was in readiness, Fort Smith was vacated, not abandoned;
inasmuch as a regiment under Morgan of Cabell's brigade was left in
charge, but it was relinquished as department headquarters. Steele
then took up his march for Cooper's old battle-ground on Elk Creek.
There he planned to mass his forces and to challenge an attack. He
went by way of Prairie Springs[820] and lingered there a little while,
then moved on to Honey Springs, where was better grazing.[821] He felt
obliged thus to make his stand in the Creek country; for the Creeks
were getting fractious and it was essential for his purposes that they
be mollified and held in check. Furthermore, it was incumbent upon him
not to expose his "depots in the direction of Texas."[822]

As the summer days passed, Cabell and Cooper drew into his vicinity
but no Bankhead, notwithstanding that Magruder had ordered him to
hurry to Steele's

[Footnote 819: Steele to Bankhead, July 22, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940]]

[Footnote 820: Duval to A.S. Morgan, July 18, 1863 [Ibid.,
933]; Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [Ibid., 940-941].]

[Footnote 821: Steele arrived at Prairie Springs on the twenty-fourth
[Steele to Blair, July 26, 1863, Ibid., 948] and moved to Honey
Springs two days later [same to same, July 29, 1863, Ibid.,
950-951]. On August 7, his camp was at Soda Springs, whither he had
gone "for convenience of water and grass" [same to same, August 7,
1863, Ibid., 956].]

[Footnote 822:--Ibid., 951.]

support.[823] Bankhead had not the slightest idea of doing anything
that would put Texas in jeopardy. In northern Texas sympathy for the
Federal cause, or "rottenness" as the Confederates described it, was
rife.[824] It would be suicidal to take the home force too far away.
Moreover, it was Bankhead's firm conviction that Steele would never be
able to maintain himself so near to Fort Gibson, so he would continue
where he was and decide what to do when time for real action
came.[825] It would be hazarding a good deal to amalgamate his
command,[826] half of which would soon be well disciplined, with
Steele's, which, in some of its parts, was known not to be.

As a matter of fact, Steele's command was worse than undisciplined. It
was permeated through and through with defection in its most virulent
form, a predicament not wholly unforeseen. The Choctaws had pretty
well dispersed, the Creeks were sullen, and Cabell's brigade of
Arkansans was actually disintegrating. The prospect of fighting
indefinitely in the Indian country had no attractions for men who were
not in the Confederate service for pure love of the cause. Day by day
desertions[827] took place until the number became alarming and, what
was worse, in some cases, the officers were in collusion with the
men in delinquency. Cabell himself was not above suspicion.[828] To
prevent the spread of

[Footnote 823: By August third, Bankhead had not been heard from at
all [Steele to Blair, August 3, 1863, _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 953]. The following communications throw some light
upon Bankhead's movements [Ibid., 948, 956, 963].]

[Footnote 824: Crosby to G.M. Bryan, August 30, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 825: Bankhead to E.P. Turner, August 13, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 826: Bankhead to Boggs, August 10, 1863, Ibid., 966.]

[Footnote 827: There is an abundance of material in the _Confederate
Records_ on the subject of desertions in the West. Note
particularly pp. 167, 168, 173-174, 192-193, 198, 204-205 of chap.
2, no. 268. Note, also, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii,

[Footnote 828: Duval to Cabell, August 17, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii 969-970.]

contagion among the Indians, his troops were moved to more and more
isolated camps[829] across the Canadian[830] and, finally, back in the
direction of Fort Smith. Ostensibly they were moved to the Arkansas
line to protect Fort Smith; for Steele knew well that his present hold
upon that place was of the frailest. It might be threatened at any
moment from the direction of Cassville and Morgan had been instructed,
in the event of an attack in prospect, to cross the boundary line and
proceed along the Boggy road towards Riddle's station.[831] Steele was
evidently not going to make any desperate effort to hold the place
that for so long had been the seat of the Confederate control over the
Southern Indians.

All this time, General Blunt had been patrolling the Arkansas for some
thirty miles or so of its course[832] and had been thoroughly
well aware of the assembling of Steele's forces, likewise of the
disaffection of the Indians, with which, by the way, he had had quite
a little to do. Not knowing exactly what Steele's intentions might be
but surmising that he was meditating an attack, he resolved to assume
the offensive himself.[833] The full significance of his resolution
can be fully appreciated only by the noting of the fact that,
subsequent to the Battle of Honey Springs, he had been instructed by
General Schofield, his superior officer, not only not to advance
but to fall back. To obey the order was inconceivable and Blunt had
deliberately disobeyed it.[834] It was now his determination to do
more. Fortunately, Schofield had recently changed his mind; for word

[Footnote 829: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 202.]

[Footnote 830: Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 957.]

[Footnote 831: Steele to Morgan, August, 1863, Ibid., 951;
August 8, 1863, Ibid., 957.]

[Footnote 832: Steele to Blair, August 7, 1863, Ibid., 956.]

[Footnote 833: Blunt to Schofield, July 30, 1863, Ibid., 411.]

[Footnote 834: Blunt to Lincoln, September 24, 1863, Ibid.,
vol. liii, supplement, 572.]

come to him that Congress had decided to relieve Kansas of her Indian
encumbrance by compassing the removal of all her tribes, indigenous
and immigrant, to Indian Territory. It mattered not that the former
had a title to their present holdings by ancient occupation and long
continued possession and the latter a title in perpetuity, guaranteed
by the treaty-making power under the United States constitution. All
the tribes were to be ousted from the soil of the state that had been
saved to freedom; but it would be first necessary to secure the Indian
Territory and the men of the Kansas tribes were to be organized as
soldiers to secure it. It is difficult to imagine a more ironical
proceeding. The Indians were to be induced to fight for the recovery
of a section of the country that would make possible their own
banishment. Blunt strenuously objected, not because he was averse
to ridding Kansas of the Indians, but because he had no faith in an
Indian soldiery. Said he,

    There are several reasons why I do not think such a policy
    practicable or advisable. It would take several months under the
    most favorable circumstances to organize and put into the field
    the Indians referred to, even were they ready and willing to
    enlist, of which fact I am not advised, but presume they would be
    very slow to enlist; besides my experience thus far with Indian
    soldiers has convinced me that they are of little service to the
    Government compared with other soldiers. The Cherokees, who are
    far superior in every respect to the Kansas Indians, did very good
    service while they had a specific object in view--the possession
    and occupation of their own country; having accomplished that,
    they have become greatly demoralized and nearly worthless as
    troops. I would earnestly recommend that (as the best policy
    the Government can pursue with these Indian regiments) they be
    mustered out of service some time during the coming winter, and
    put to work raising their subsistence, with a few white troops
    stationed among them for their protection.

    I would not exchange one regiment of negro troops for ten
    regiments of Indians, and they can be obtained in abundance
    whenever Texas is reached.

    In ten days from this date, if I have the success I expect, the
    Indian Territory south of the Arkansas River will be in our
    possession ...[835]

Blunt's mind was made up. He was determined to go forward with the
force he already had. Ill-health[836] retarded his movements a trifle;
but on the twenty-second of August, two days after the massacre by
guerrillas had occurred at Lawrence, he crossed the Arkansas. He was
at length accepting General Steele's challenge but poor Steele was
quite unprepared for a duel of any sort. If Blunt distrusted the
Indians, how very much more did he and with greater reason! With
insufficient guns and ammunition, with no troops, white or red, upon
whom he could confidently rely, and with no certainty of help from
any quarter, he was compelled to adopt a Fabian policy, and he moved
slowly backward, inviting yet never stopping to accept a full and
regular engagement. Out of the Creek country he went and into the
Choctaw.[837] At Perryville, on the road[838] to

[Footnote 835: Blunt to Schofield, August 22, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 465.]

[Footnote 836:--Ibid., 466. There seems to have been a good
deal of sickness at Fort Gibson and some mortality, of which
report was duly made to Steele [Ibid., 956; _Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 192-193].]

[Footnote 837: Steele had crossed the line between the Creeks and
Choctaws, however, before Blunt crossed the Arkansas. On August
sixteenth, he had his camp on Longtown Creek and was sending a
detachment out as far south as within about ten miles of Boggy Depot
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 968]. A few days
later, he made his camp on Brooken Creek, a little to the eastward
[Ibid., 972]. By that time, Steele was evidently quite
reconciled to the thought that Fort Smith might at any moment be
attacked and, perhaps, in such force that it would be needless to
attempt to defend it. Cabell was to move to a safe distance, in the
neighborhood of Scullyville, from whence, should there be reasonable
prospect of success, he might send out reënforcements. In the event of
almost certain failure, he was to draw off betimes in the direction of
Riddle's station, where flour was stored [Ibid.,].]

[Footnote 838: On the subject of roads and highways in Indian
Territory, see Ibid., (cont.)]

Texas, his men did have a small skirmish with Blunt's and at both
Perryville and North Fork, Blunt destroyed some of his stores.[839]
At North Fork, Steele had established a general hospital, which now
passed from his control.

Following the unsuccessful skirmish at Perryville, the evening of
August 25, Steele was "pushed rapidly down the country,"[840] so
observed the wary Bankhead to whom fresh orders to assist Steele had
been communicated.[841] Boggy Depot to the Texan commander seemed the
proper place to defend[842] and near there he now waited; but Steele
on East Boggy, full sixty miles from Red River and from comparative
safety, begged him to come forward to Middle Boggy, a battle was
surely impending.[843] No battle occurred, notwithstanding; for Blunt
had given up the pursuit. He had come to know that not all of Steele's
command was ahead of him,[844] that McIntosh with the Creeks had gone
west within the Creek country, the Creeks having refused to leave
it,[845] and that Cabell had gone east,

[Footnote 838: (cont.) vol. xxxiv, part ii, 859; vol. xii, part ii,
997; Sheridan, _Memoirs_, vol. ii, 340.]

[Footnote 839: Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i. 597-598; Steele to Snead, September 8,
1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 223.]

[Footnote 840: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 983.]

[Footnote 841: W.T. Carrington to Bankhead, August 22, 1863,
Ibid., 975.]

[Footnote 842: Bankhead to Turner, August 23, 1863, Ibid., 977.
Near Boggy Depot, "the Fort Gibson and Fort Smith roads" forked. At
Boggy Depot, moreover, were "all the stores of the Indian Department."
With Boggy Depot in the hands of the enemy, Bankhead's whole front
would be uncovered [Bankhead to Turner August 20, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 843: Duval to Bankhead and other commanders, August 27,
1863, Ibid., 981.]

[Footnote 844: Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 1863, Ibid., part
i, 597. He thought, however, that Stand Watie was with Steele but he
was not. He was absent on a scout [Steele to Boggs, August 30, 1863,
Ibid., part ii, 984].]

[Footnote 845: Steele to Snead, September 11, 1863, Ibid., part
ii, 1012.]

towards Fort Smith.[846] It was Fort Smith that now engaged Blunt's
attention and thither he directed his steps, Colonel W.F. Cloud[847]
of the Second Kansas Cavalry, who, acting under orders from General
McNeil,[848] had coöperated with him at Perryville, being sent on in
advance. Fort Smith surrendered with ease, not a blow being struck in
her defence;[849] but there was Cabell yet to be dealt with.

Steele's conduct, his adoption of the Fabian policy, severely
criticized in some quarters, in Indian Territory, in Arkansas, in
Texas, had yet been condoned and, indeed, approved[850] by General
Kirby Smith, the

[Footnote 846: Cabell's brigade, as already indicated, had had to be
sent back "to avoid the contagion of demoralization." [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 983; Steele to Snead, September 11,
1863, Ibid., 1012].]

[Footnote 847: Cloud had arrived at Fort Gibson, August 21 [Cloud to
McNeil, August 22, 1863, Ibid., 466].]

[Footnote 848: John McNeil was commanding the District of Southwestern
Missouri. The orders originated with Schofield [Ibid., part i,

[Footnote 849: Cabell had taken a position on the Poteau. Steele had
been much averse to his running the risk of having himself shut up in
Fort Smith [Steele to Cabell, September 1, 1863, Ibid., part
ii, 987].]

[Footnote 850: "The general commanding is satisfied that the Fabian
policy is the true one to adopt when not well satisfied that
circumstances warrant a different course..." [G.M. Bryan to Steele,
September 8, 1863, Ibid., 999]. Smith believed in "abandoning
a part to save the whole" [Letter to General R. Taylor, September 3,
1863, Ibid., 989]; but President Davis and men of the states
interested had impressed it upon him that that would never do. It must
have been with some idea of justifying Steele's procedure in mind that
Smith wrote to Stand Watie, September 8th [Ibid., 999-1000].
Watie had lodged a complaint with him, August 9th, against the
Confederate subordination of the Indian interests. To that Smith
replied in words that must have made a powerful appeal to the Cherokee
chief, who had already, in fact on the selfsame day that he wrote to
Smith, made an equally powerful one to his own tribe and to other
tribes. Watie's appeal will be taken up later, the noble sounding part
of Smith's may as well find a place for quotation here.

"I know that your people have cause for complaint. Their sufferings
and the apparent ill-faith of our Government would naturally produce
dissatisfaction. That your patriotic band of followers deserve the
thanks of our Government I know. They have won the respect and esteem
of our people (cont.)]

person most competent to judge fairly; because he possessed a full
comprehension of the situation in Steele's command. Smith knew and
others might have known that the situation had been largely created by
envy, hatred, and malice, by corruption in high places, by peculation
in low, by desertions in white regiments and by defection in Indian.

The Confederate government was not unaware of the increasing
dissatisfaction among its Indian allies. It had innumerable sources of
information, the chief of which and, perhaps, not the most reliable or
the least factional, were the tribal delegates[851] in Congress. Late

[Footnote 850: (cont.) by their steadfast loyalty and heroic bravery.
Tell them to remain true; encourage them in their despondency; bid
them struggle on through the dark gloom which now envelops our
affairs, and bid them remember the insurmountable difficulties with
which our Government has been surrounded; that she has never been
untrue to her engagements, though some of her agents may have been
remiss and even criminally negligent. Our cause is the same--a just
and holy one; we must stand and struggle on together, till that just
and good Providence, who always supports the right, crowns our efforts
with success. I can make you no definite promises. I have your
interest at heart, and will endeavor faithfully and honestly to
support you in your efforts and in those of your people to redeem
their homes from an oppressor's rule...

"What might have been done and has not is with the past; it is
needless to comment upon it, and I can only assure you that I feel the
importance of your country to our cause..."

That Smith was no more sincere than other white men had been, when
addressing Indians, goes almost without saying. It was necessary to
pacify Stand Watie and promises would no longer suffice. Candor was a
better means to the end sought. Had Smith only not so very recently
had his interview with the governors of the southwestern states, his
tone might not have been so conciliatory. In anticipation of that
interview and in advance of it, for it might come too late, some
Arkansans, with R.W. Johnson among them, had impressed it upon
Governor Flanagin that both Arkansas and Indian Territory were
necessary to the Confederacy. In their communication, appeared these
fatal admissions, fatal to any claim of disinterestedness:

"Negro slavery exists in the Indian Territory, and is profitable
and desirable there, affording a practical issue of the right of
expansion, for which the war began..." [July 25, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 945].]

[Footnote 851: Only two of the tribes, entitled to a delegate in the
Confederate Congress, seem to have availed themselves of the privilege
in 1863, the (cont.)]

in May, Commissioner Scott[852] set out upon a tour of inspection,
similar to the one he had made during the days of the Pike regime. On
his way through Arkansas, he stopped at Little Rock to consult with
General Holmes and to get his bearings before venturing again among
the tribes; but Holmes was ill, too ill to attend to business,[853]
and no interview with him was likely to be deemed advisable for some
time to come. Scott had, therefore, to resume his journey without
instructions or advice from the district commander, not regrettable
from some points of view since it enabled

[Footnote 851: (cont.) Cherokee and the Choctaw, which may account
for the persistence with which, in one form or another, a measure for
filling vacancies in the Indian representation came up for discussion
or for reference [See _Journal_, vols. iii, vi]. It became law in
January, 1864 [Ibid., vol. iii, 521]. A companion measure, for
the regulation of Indian elections, had a like bearing. It became law
earlier, in May, 1863 [Ibid., 420, vi, 459]. In the _Official
Records_, fourth ser. vol. in, 1189, _footnote o_, the
statement is made that the name of Elias C. Boudinot appeared first on
the roll, January 8, 1864; but it must be erroneous, since Boudinot,
as the delegate from the Cherokee Nation, was very active in Congress
all through the year 1863. His colleague from the Choctaw Nation
was Robert M. Jones. On December 10, when Indian affairs had become
exceedingly critical, Representative Hanly moved that one of the
Indian delegates should be requested to attend the sessions of the
Committee on Indian Affairs (_Journal_, vol. vi, 520). This
proposition eventually developed into something very much more

"_Resolved_, First, That each Delegate from the several Indian
nations with whom treaties have been made and concluded by the
Confederate States of America shall have and be entitled to a seat
upon the floor of this House, may propose and introduce measures being
for the benefit of his particular nation, and be heard in respect
and regard thereto, or other matters in which his nation may be
particularly interested.

"Second. That, furthermore, it shall be the duty of the Speaker of
this House to appoint one Delegate from one of the Indian nations upon
the Committee on Indian Affairs, and the Delegate so appointed shall
have and possess all the rights and privileges of other members of
such committee, except the right to vote on questions pending before
such committee"--_Journal_, vol. vi, 529. The Speaker appointed
Boudinot to the position thus created.]

[Footnote 852: In February, upon the nomination of President Davis and
the recommendation of Secretary Seddon, Scott had been appointed to
the position of full commissioner [Ibid., vol. iii, 69].]

[Footnote 853: During the illness of Holmes, which was protracted,
Price commanded in the District of Arkansas.]

him to approach his difficult and delicate task with an open mind and
with no preconceived notions derived from Holmes's prejudices.

Scott entered the Indian Territory in July and was at once beset
with complaints and solicitations, individual and tribal. On his own
account, he made not a few discoveries. On the eighth of August he
reported[854] to Holmes upon things that have already been considered
here, defective powder, deficient artillery, and the like; but not a
word did he say about the Cooper[855] and Boudinot intrigues. It
was too early to commit himself on matters so personal and yet so
fundamental. The Indians were not so reticent. The evil influence
that Cooper had over them, due largely to the fact that he professed
himself to be interested in Indian Territory to the exclusion of
all other parts of the country, was beginning to find expression in
various communications to President Davis and others in authority.
Just how far Stand Watie was privy to Cooper's schemes and in sympathy
with them, it is impossible to say. Boudinot was Cooper's able
coadjutor, fellow conspirator, while Boudinot and Watie were relatives
and friends.

Watie's energies, especially his intellectual, were apparently being
exerted in directions far removed from the realm of selfish and petty
intrigue. He was a man of vision, of deep penetration likewise, and he
was a patriot. Personal ambition was not his besetting sin. If he
had only had real military ability and the qualities that make for
discipline and for genuine leadership

[Footnote 854: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1097.]

[Footnote 855: On August 14, Cooper complained to Smith that Steele
had been given the place that rightfully should have been his
[Ibid., 987]. Smith looked into the matter and made his reply,
strictly non-partisan, September 1st [Ibid., 1037]. The
authorities at Richmond declared against Cooper's claims and
pretensions, yet, in no wise, did he abandon them.]

among men, he might have accomplished great things for Indian
Territory and for the Confederacy. Almost simultaneously with the
forwarding of Scott's first report to Holmes, he personally made
reports[856] and issued appeals,[857] some of which, because of their
grasp, because of their earnestness, and because of their spirit of
noble self-reliance, call for very special mention. Watie's purpose in
making and in issuing them was evidently nothing more and nothing less
than to dispel despondency and to arouse to action.

Watie's appeal may have had the effect designed but it was an effect
doomed to be counteracted almost at once. Blunt's offensive had more
of menace to the Creeks and their southern neighbors than had Steele's
defensive of hope. The amnesty to deserters,[858] that issued under
authority from Richmond on the twenty-sixth of August, even though
conditional upon a return to duty, was a confession of weakness and
it availed little when the Choctaws protested against the failure to
supply them with arms and ammunition, proper in quality and quantity,
for Smith to tell them that such things, intended to meet
treaty requirements but diverted, had been lost in the fall of
Vicksburg.[859] Had not white men been always singularly adept at
making excuses for breaking their promises to red?

In September, when everything seemed very dark for the Confederacy on
the southwestern front, desperate efforts were made to rally anew the

[Footnote 856: Watie's report to Scott, August 8, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1104-1105] was full of very just
criticism, but not at all factional.]

[Footnote 857: The appeal to the Creeks, through their governor, is to
be found in _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1105-1106,
and that to the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Ibid., 1106-1107.]

[Footnote 858:--Ibid., 980.]

[Footnote 859: Smith to Principal Chief, Choctaw Nation, August 13,
1863, Ibid., 967; Bryan to Hon. R.M. Jones, September 19, 1863,
Ibid., 1021.]

Proposals[860] from Blunt were known to have reached both the Creeks
and the Choctaws and were being considered, by the one, more or less
secretly and, by the other, in open council. Israel G. Vore,[861]
who had become the agent of the Creeks and whose influence was
considerable, was called upon to neutralize the Federal advances. In a
more official way, Commissioner Scott worked with the Choctaws, among
whom there was still a strong element loyal to the Confederacy, loyal
enough, at all events, to recruit for a new regiment to fight in its

Nothing was more likely to bring reassurance to the Indians than
military activity; but military activity of any account was obviously
out of the question unless some combination of commands could be
devised, such a combination, for example, as Magruder had in mind when
he proposed that the forces of Steele, Cooper, Bankhead, and Cabell
should coöperate to recover Forts Smith and Gibson, something more
easily said than done. It was no sooner said than brigade transfers
rendered it quite impracticable, Cabell and Bankhead both being needed
to give support to Price. In charge now of the Northern Sub-district
of Texas was Henry E. McCulloch. From him Steele felt he had a right
to expect coöperation, since their commands were

[Footnote 860: Steele to Snead, September 11, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1013; Bankhead to Steele, September
15, 1863, Ibid., 1016.]

[Footnote 861: In the spring of 1863, Vore was engaged in disbursing
funds, more particularly, in paying the Indian troops [Steele to
Anderson, April 17, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no.
270, pp. 197-198]. In November, 1862, the Creeks had requested that
Vore be made their agent and the appointment was conferred upon him
the following May [Scott to Seddon, December 12, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1095]. The Creeks were inclined to
be displeased at the delay, especially as they later had no reason
to regret their choice [Moty Kanard to Davis, August 17, 1863.
Ibid., 1107]. It was Cooper, apparently, who suggested sending
up Vore to have him work upon the Creeks [Ibid., 1000].]

territorially in conjunction, and to consult with him he journeyed to

Viewed in the light of subsequent events, the journey was productive
of more evil than good. With Steele absent, the command in Indian
Territory devolved upon Cooper[863] and Cooper employed the occasion
to ingratiate himself with the Indians, to increase his influence with
them, and to undermine the man who he still insisted had supplanted
him. When Steele returned from Texas he noticed very evident signs of
insubordination. There were times when he found it almost impossible
to locate Cooper within the limits of the command or to keep in touch
with him. Cooper was displaying great activity, was making plans
to recover Fort Smith, and conducting himself generally in a very
independent way. October had, however, brought a change in the status
of Fort Smith; for General Smith had completely detached the commands
of Indian Territory and Arkansas from each other.[864] It was not to
Holmes that Steele reported thenceforth but to Smith direct. Taken in
connection with the need that soon arose, on account of the chaos in
northern Texas, for McCulloch[865] to become absorbed in home affairs,

[Footnote 862 His destination was apparently to be Shreveport, the
department headquarters [Crosby to Bankhead, September 23, 1863.
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268. p. 251].]

[Footnote 863: Cooper's headquarters, in the interval, were to be at
Fort Washita [Ibid.,], where a company of Bass's regiment had
been placed in garrison [Duval to Cooper, July 15, 1863, Ibid.,
p. 145].]

[Footnote 864: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1045.]

[Footnote 865: McCulloch was being greatly embarrassed by the rapid
spread of unionist sentiment and by desertions from his army. The
expedient of furloughing was restarted to. To his credit, be it said,
that no embarrassments, no dawning of the idea that he was fighting
in a failing cause, could make him forget the ordinary dictates of
humanity. His scornful repudiation of Quantrill and his methods was
characteristic of the man. For that repudiation, see, particularly,
McCulloch to Turner, October 22, 1863, Ibid., vol. xxvi. part
ii, 348.]

separation from Arkansas left Indian Territory stranded.

Fort Smith, moreover, was about to become Blunt's headquarters and it
was while he was engaged in transferring his effects from Fort Scott
to that place that the massacre of Baxter Springs occurred, Blunt
arriving upon the scene too late to prevent the murderous surprise
having its full effect. The Baxter Springs massacre was another
guerrilla outrage, perpetrated by Quantrill and his band[866] who,
their bloody work accomplished at the Federal outpost, passed on down
through the Cherokee Nation, killing outright whatever Indians or
negroes they fell in with. It was their boast that they never burdened
themselves with prisoners. The gang crossed the Arkansas about
eighteen miles above Fort Gibson[867] and arrived at Cooper's camp on
the Canadian, October twelfth.[868]

Scarcely had Blunt established his headquarters at Fort Smith,
when political influences long hostile to him, Schofield at their
head,[869] had accumulated force

[Footnote 866: Quantrill's bold dash from the Missouri to the Canadian
had been projected in a spirit of bravado, deviltry, and downright
savagery, and had undoubtedly been incited by the execution of Ewing's
notorious order, _Number Eleven_ [_Official Records_,
vol. xxii, part ii, 473]. That order, as modified by Schofield, had
authorized the depopulating of those counties of Missouri, Jackson,
Cass, Bates, and a part of Vernon, where the guerrillas were believed
to have their chief recruiting stations and where secessionist feeling
had always been dominant. It was at once retaliatory and precautionary
and on a par with the instructions for the removal of the Acadians on
the eve of the breaking out of the French and Indian War. The
banished Missourians have, however, as yet found no Longfellow
to sentimentalize over them or to idealize, in a story of
_Evangeline_, their misfortunes and their character. History has
been spared the consequent and inevitable distortion.]

[Footnote 867: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 224.]

[Footnote 868: Quantrill to Price, October 13, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 700-701.]

[Footnote 869: In the matter of domestic politics in Kansas,
particularly as they were shaped by the excitement over the guerrilla
outrages, Schofield belonged to the party of _Moderates_, "Paw
Paws" as its members were called in derision, (cont.)]

sufficient to effect his removal. He was relieved, under Schofield's
orders of October 19, and Brigadier-general John McNeil then assumed
command of the District of the Frontier.[870] Colonel Phillips
continued in charge at Fort Gibson,[871] his presence being somewhat
of a reassurance to the Cherokees, who, appreciating Blunt's energetic
administration, regretted his recall.[872]

Had the Federal Cherokees been authoritatively apprised of the real
situation in the Indian Territory farther south, they need never have
been anxious as to the safety of Fort Gibson. Steele's situation was
peculiarly complex. As private personage and as commander he elicits
commiseration. Small and incapable was his force,[873] intriguing and
intractable were his

[Footnote 869: (cont.) and Blunt, like Lane, Wilder, and others, to
that of the _Extremists_, or _Radicals_. Of the Extremists
the "Red Legs" were the active wing, those who indulged in retaliatory
and provocative outrages. Schofield's animosity against Blunt, to
some extent richly deserved, amounted almost to a persecution. He
instituted an investigation of the District of the Frontier and it was
upon the basis of the findings of the committee of investigation that
he ordered Blunt's retirement [Schofield to Townsend, October 3, 1863,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 595-597; Blunt to Curtis,
November 30, 1864, Ibid., vol. xli, part iv, 727-729]. For
evidence of continued animosity see the correspondence of Champion
Vaughan, Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 738, 742.]

[Footnote 870: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 666.]

[Footnote 871: For the condition and movements of the Indian
Brigade from November 20, 1863, to December 20, 1863, see _Daily
Conservative_, January 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 872: The resolutions, commendatory of his work, to which
Blunt refers in his letter to Curtis of November 30, were passed by
the Cherokee National Council, October 20, 1863. The text of them
is to be found, as also Chief Christie's letter of transmittal, in
_Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 790-791.]

[Footnote 873: Steele reported that on October first he had
"Seminoles, 106; Chickasaws, 208; Creeks, 305; Choctaws, 1,024;
Choctaw militia, 200, and whites, 999" [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 34]. Concerning the condition of his entire command,
the best understanding can be obtained from the inspection report of
Smith's assistant inspector-general, W.C. Schaumburg, [Ibid.,
part ii, 1049-1053], October 26, 1863. Schaumburg exhibits conditions
as simply deplorable, Indians poorly mounted, ignorant of drill,
destitute of suitable (cont.)]

subordinates. Of the white force Magruder[874] was doing his utmost to
deprive him, and of the Indian Steele found it next to impossible to
keep account. Insignificant as it was, it was yet scattered here,
there, and everywhere,[875] Cooper conniving at its desultory
dispersion. Instead of strengthening his superior's hands, Cooper was,
in fact, steadily weakening them and all for his own advancement. He
disparaged Steele's work, discredited it with the Indians,[876] and,
whenever possible, allowed a false construction to be put upon his
acts. In connection with the movements of the white troops, is a
case in point to be found. Rumor had it that Bankhead's brigade, now
Gano's,[877] was to be called away for coast defence. Cooper knew
perfectly well that such was not Steele's intention and yet he

[Footnote 873: (cont.) arms; posts dilapidated; and prominent
tribesmen, like Colonel Tandy Walker, indulging in petty graft,
drawing government rations for members of their families and for their
negro slaves. McCulloch was also of the opinion that conditions in
Indian Territory were pretty bad [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 1065], and that the red men were absolutely unreliable
[Ibid., vol. xxvi, part ii, 378].]

[Footnote 874: For Magruder's insolent and overbearing attitude
towards Steele, see his correspondence in Ibid., part ii.
Magruder wanted Indian Territory attached to the District of Texas [p.
295] and was much disgusted that Gano's brigade was beyond his reach;
inasmuch as Smith himself had placed it in Indian Territory and Steele
could retain it there if he so pleased [pp. 349, 369, 371].]

[Footnote 875: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1063,
1065, 1076, 1109.]

[Footnote 876: Cooper's influence was greatest with the Choctaws and
Chickasaws. The Choctaw wavering of which there were numerous signs
[Ibid., 1019, 1024], the disposition of the Choctaw Council
towards neutrality [Ibid., 1042, 1046], which Scott was called
upon to check [Ibid., 1030-1031], and the Choctaw complaint
about the absence or inadequacy of arms [Ibid., 1021] were all
made the most of, in order to accentuate Steele's incapacity for
his task. October 7, the Chickasaw Legislature petitioned for
the elevation of Cooper to the full command in Indian Territory
[Ibid., 1123-1124]. It was, of course, a covert attack upon

[Footnote 877: Dissatisfaction with Bankhead on the part of his men
had been the chief cause of the transfer to Richard M. Gano. Steele
had a good deal of trouble with Gano's brigade as also with Bass's
regiment [See _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, nos. 267, 268].]

the Indians to believe that it was; in order that they might with
impunity charge Steele with having violated their treaty pledges.[878]
To nothing did they hold so rigidly as to the promise that white
troops were always to support Indian.

In the role of Indian superintendent ex officio, Steele had no fewer
difficulties and perplexities than in that of military chief. The
feeding of indigents was a problem not easily solved, if solvable.
In the absence of legislative provision, Hindman had instituted the
questionable practice of furnishing relief to civilians at the cost of
the army commissary and no other course had ever been deemed expedient
by his successors. In July, 1863, Steele had ordered[879] practically
all distribution agencies to be abolished, his reason being that only
refugees,[880] Indians out of their own country, ought, in the
season of ripened and ripening crops, to need subsistence and such
subsistence, being limited in amount and derived altogether from
the army supply, could be most economically handled by the regular
commissaries. As winter approached and the necessity for feeding on a
large scale became again pronounced,

[Footnote 878: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1063-1064,

[Footnote 879: "I am instructed by the Gen. Com'dg to direct that
you issue an order abolishing all agencies in the Indian country for
feeding 'Indigents.'

"It is thought that the crops now coming in will be sufficient to
support these people without any further drain upon Govt supplies.

"What little issues are absolutely necessary will be made by
post commissaries."--DUVAL to Lee, July 1, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 119.]

[Footnote 880: "I beg leave to recommend to your favorable
consideration the accompanying letter from the Hon. E.C. Boudinot. The
necessity of feeding not only the refugees, but to some extent during
the winter the other Indians, has been recognized by all commanders,
the drouth of last year having cut the crops very short. As the crops
are now maturing I have in a great measure discontinued the issue
except to refugee Cherokees and Osages, both of whom are out of their
own country ..."--STEELE to Smith, July 13, 1863, Ibid., pp.

he was disposed to keep the whole matter still under army regulations
so as to "avoid increasing competition."[881] The army exchequer could
be subsequently reimbursed when specific appropriations for Indians
should be made. Supplies of clothing had naturally to be otherwise
provided for and for those he contracted[882] in northern Texas.
Steele's whole policy with regard to the indigents was subjected to
the severest criticism;[883] for it was based upon the idea that to be
forewarned is to be forearmed. Disappointed speculators and grafters
were chief among his critics and, in spite of all his precautions,
they outwitted him. Peculation appeared on every hand, white sharpers
abounded, and Indians, relatively affluent, subsisted at government

Another source of embarrassment was developed by the application of
war measures, primarily intended for the states only, to the Indian
country. Indian property was impressed[884] as occasion arose. Very

[Footnote 881: Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, pp. 179-180.]

[Footnote 882: Steele to Bryan, November 9, 1863, _Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The Reserve Indians had
all along been fed by contract [Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863,
Ibid., no. 268, pp. 179-180]. In the fall, Steele renewed the
contract with Johnson and Grimes [Steele to S.A. Roberts, November 15,
1863, Ibid., no. 267, p. 37] and detailed men from his command,
from Martin's regiment, to assist in its execution [Steele to
McCulloch, November 22, 1863, Ibid., p. 41].]

[Footnote 883: The Creeks were particularly dissatisfied. They claimed
that food and raiment had been promised them, but the source of the
promises Steele was powerless to determine [Steele to Vore, November
20, 1863, Ibid., p. 39]. Indian soldiers on leave seemed to
expect their usual allowances and Cooper, although disclaiming that
he had any desire to "pander to the prejudices" of the natives, was
always to be found on their side in any contention with Steele. To all
appearances, the Indians had Cooper's support, in demanding all the
privileges and profits of regular troops and "all the latitude
of irregular, or partisan" [Steele to Cooper, November 24, 1863,
Ibid., pp. 44-45].]

[Footnote 884: Concerning the request of Steele that cotton and teams
be ordered exempt from impressment, see Steele to Bryan, November
9, 1863. _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The
Choctaws had considerable cotton and the question was what was to be
done with it in case of an advance of (cont.)]

frequently was this the case in the matter of transportation
facilities, in that also of negro labor. It was Steele's opinion that
the impressment law and the grain tithe law were not operative as
against the Indians[885] but his necessities forced the practice,
and execution by the army, under his orders, only intensified Indian
opposition to him.

Indian opposition to Steele in tangible form took two directions,
one of which, the advancement of Douglas H. Cooper, has already been
frequently referred to. The other was the advancement of Stand Watie.
During the summer, Stand Watie, as chief of the Confederate Cherokees,
had authorized the formation of a Cherokee brigade,[886] the object
being, the dislodgment of the Federals from Fort Gibson and their
consequent retirement from the Cherokee country. The brigade had not
materialized; but all Stand Watie's subsequent efforts were directed
towards the accomplishment of its patriotic object. Love of country
best explains his whole military endeavor. The enemy in the Cherokee
country he harassed, the enemy elsewhere, he left for others to deal
with. Generally speaking, in consequence, the autumn months of 1863
found Watie hovering around the Arkansas, the Cherokees and their
neighbors with him, while Cooper, almost equally particularistic
because the Choctaws and Chickasaws were his main support, concerned
himself with plans for the recovery of Fort Smith.

[Footnote 884: (cont.) the enemy. Was it to be burnt and the owners
were they to be indemnified [Steele to Anderson, December 9, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, p. 68]? Steele peremptorily forbade
confiscation of Indian property and discouraged any interference "with
the duties of agents, or with the National Council or government of
the tribes" [Steele to Captain J.L. Randolph, enrolling officer, July
7, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 132].]

[Footnote 885: Crosby to A.S. Cabell, October 6, 1863, Ibid.,
no. 267, p. 2.]

[Footnote 886: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1103.]

The fervid patriotism of one leader and the overweening personal
ambition of the other divided the Indians, then, into two camps and it
was but natural that the idea should soon evolve that Indian interests
could be best subserved by the formation of two distinct
Indian brigades. To this idea General Smith, when appealed to,
subscribed;[887] but General Steele was dubious about the propriety of
putting Stand Watie in charge of one of the brigades. "He appears to
exercise," said Steele, "no restraint over his men in keeping them
together, and his requisitions upon the depots seem to be made with
utter disregard of the numbers present or even on his rolls."[888]
General Smith conceived it would be possible, by organizing the
Indians into their own brigades and satisfying them that way, to draw
off the white contingent and make of it a separate brigade, still
operating, however, within the Indian country. To Cooper, the thought
of a separate white brigade was most unwelcome. The Indians could be
an effective force only in close conjunction with white troops. The
separation of whites and Indians would inevitably mean, although not
at present intended, the isolation of the latter and, perhaps, their
ultimate abandonment.

The various proposals and counter-proposals all converged in an
opposition to Steele. His presence in the Indian country seemed to
block the advancement of everybody. Cooper resented his authority
over himself and Stand Watie interpreted his waiting policy as due to
inertness and ineptitude. So small a hold did the Federals really have
on the Indian country that if Steele would only exert himself it could
easily be

[Footnote 887: _Official Records_, vol. 22, part ii, 1055-1056.]

[Footnote 888:--Ibid., 1065.]

broken. But Steele was neither aggressive nor venturesome. His task
was truly beyond him. Discouraged, he asked to be relieved and he
was relieved, Brigadier-general Samuel B. Maxey being chosen as his
successor.[889] Again Cooper had been passed over, notwithstanding
that his Indian friends had done everything they could for him. They
had made allegations against Steele; in order that a major-generalship
might be secured for Cooper and brigadier-generalships for some of
themselves.[890] Boudinot was believed by Steele to be at the bottom
of the whole scheme; but it had been in process of concoction for a
long time and Steele had few friends. General Smith was the stanchest
of that few and even Holmes[891] was not among them.

Obviously, with things in such a chaotic state, military operations
in the Indian country, during the autumn and early winter were almost
negligible.[892] Steele expected that the Federals would attempt a
drive from Fort Smith to the Red River and he collected what forces he
could for that contingency. Little reliance was to be placed upon the
Cherokees since they were intent upon recovering Fort Gibson; but the
Choctaws through whose country the hostile force would proceed, were
the drive made, aroused themselves as in the first days of the war.
They recruited their regiments anew

[Footnote 889: Special Orders, no. 214, December 11, 1863, _Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1094.]

[Footnote 890: Steele to S. Cooper, December 19, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 891: Boudinot to Davis, December 21, 1863, Ibid.,

[Footnote 892: Steele contended that between the very natural fear
that the Indians entertained that the white troops were going to be
withdrawn from their country and Magruder's determination to get those
same white troops, it was impossible to make any move upon military
principles [Steele to Anderson, November 9, 1863, Ibid.,
1064-1065]. Steele refused to recognize Magruder's right to interfere
with his command [Steele to Cooper, November 8, 1863, Ibid.,

and they organized a militia; but the drive was never made.[893]

The only military activity anywhere was in the Cherokee country and it
was almost too insignificant for mention. Towards the end of November,
the Federal force there was greatly reduced in numbers, the white and
negro contingents being called away to Fort Smith.[894] The Indian
Home Guards under Phillips were alone in occupation. With a detachment
of the Third Indian, Watie had one lone skirmish, although about one
half of Phillips's brigade was out scouting. The skirmish occurred
on Barren Fork, a tributary of the Illinois, on the eighteenth of
December.[895] Late in November, Watie had planned a daring cavalry
raid into the Neosho Valley.[896] The skirmish on Barren Fork arrested
him in his course somewhat; but, as the Federals, satisfied with a
rather petty success, did not pursue him, he went on and succeeded in
entering southwest Missouri. The raid did little damage and was only
another of the disjointed individual undertakings that Steele deplored
but that the Confederates were being more and more compelled to make.

[Footnote 893: Steele to Gov. Samuel Garland, Nov. 30, 1863,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1082. Col. McCurtain
of the Choctaw militia reported to Cooper that he expected to have
fifteen hundred Choctaws assembled by December first [Steele to Cano,
December 2, 1863, Ibid., 1085]. The Second Choctaw regiment
continued scattered and out of ammunition [Steele to Cooper, December
22, 1863, Ibid., 1109]. The Seminole battalion was ordered to
report to Bourland for frontier defence [Duval to Cooper, December 20,
1863, Ibid., 1102].]

[Footnote 894: Britton, _Civil War on the Borde_, vol. ii, 236.]

[Footnote 895: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 781-782.]

[Footnote 896:--Ibid., part ii, 722, 746, 752.]


The assignment of General Maxey to the command of Indian Territory
invigorated Confederate administration north of the Red River, the
only part of the country in undisputed occupancy. Close upon the
assumption of his new duties, came a project[897] for sweeping
reforms, involving army reorganization, camps of instruction for the
Indian soldiery, a more general enlistment, virtually conscription, of
Indians--this upon the theory that "Whosoever is not for us is against
us"--the selection of more competent and reliable staff officers, and
the adoption of such a plan of offensive operations as would mean the
retaking of Forts Smith and Gibson.[898] To Maxey, thoroughly familiar
with the geography of the region, the surrender of those two places
appeared as a gross error in military technique; for the Arkansas
River was a natural line of defence, the Red was not. "If the Indian
Territory gives way," argued he, "the granary of the Trans-Mississippi
Department, the breadstuffs, and beef of this and the Arkansas army
are gone, the left flank of Holmes' army is turned, and with it not
only the meat and bread, but the salt and iron of what is left of the
Trans-Mississippi Department."[899]

[Footnote 897: Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 856-858.]

[Footnote 898: To this list might be added the proper fitting out of
the troops, which was one of the first things that Maxey called to
Smith's attention [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1112-1113].]

[Footnote 899: This idea met with Smith's full approval [Ibid.,
vol. xxxiv, part ii, 918].]

Army reorganization was an immense proposition and was bound to be a
difficult undertaking under the most favorable of auspices, yet it
stood as fundamental to everything else. Upon what lines ought it to
proceed? One possibility was, the formation of the two brigades, with
Stand Watie and Cooper individually in command, which had already been
suggested to General Smith and favored by him; but which had recently
been found incompatible with his latest recommendation that all the
Indian troops should be commanded, _in toto_, by Cooper.[900] One
feature of great importance in its favor it had in that it did not
ostensibly run counter to the Indian understanding of their treaties
that white troops should be always associated with Indian in the
guaranteed protection of the Indian country, which was all very well
but scarcely enough to balance an insuperable objection, which Cooper,
when consulted, pointed out.[901] The Indians had a strong aversion
to any military consolidation that involved the elimination of their
separate tribal characters. They had allied themselves with the
Confederacy as nations and as nations they wished to fight. Moreover,
due regard ought always to be given, argued Cooper, to their tribal
prejudices, their preferences, call them what one will, and to their
historical neighborhood alliances. Choctaws and Chickasaws might well
stay together and Creeks and Seminoles; but woe betide the contrivance
that should attempt the amalgamation of Choctaws and Cherokees.

[Footnote 900: This is given upon the authority of Maxey [_Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 857]. It seems slightly at variance
with Smith's own official statements. Smith would appear to have
entertained a deep distrust of Cooper, whose promotion he did not
regard as either "wise or necessary" [Ibid., vol. xxii, part
ii, 1102].]

[Footnote 901: Cooper to T.M. Scott, January, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
xxxiv, part ii, 859-862].]


It seems a little strange that the Indians should so emphasize their
national individualism at this particular time, inasmuch as six of
them, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and Caddo,
professing to be still in strict alliance with the Southern States,
had formed an Indian confederacy, had collectively re-asserted their
allegiance, pledged their continued support, and made reciprocal
demands. All these things they had done in a joint, or general,
council, which had been held at Armstrong Academy the previous
November. Resolutions of the council, embodying the collective pledges
and demands, were even at this very moment under consideration by
President Davis and were having not a little to do with his attitude
toward the whole Maxey programme.

In the matter of army reorganization, Smith was prepared to concede
to Maxey a large discretion.[902] The brigading that would most
comfortably fit in with the nationalistic feelings of the Indians and,
at the same time, accord, in spirit, with treaty obligations and also
make it possible for Cooper to have a supreme command of the Indian
forces in the field was that which Cooper himself advocated, the same
that Boudinot took occasion, at this juncture, to urge upon President
Davis.[903] It was a plan for three distinct Indian brigades, a
Cherokee, a Creek-Seminole, and a Choctaw-Chickasaw. Maxey thought "it
would be a fine recruiting order,"[904] yet, notwithstanding, he gave

[Footnote 902: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 917.]

[Footnote 903: Boudinot to Davis, January 4, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
liii, supplement, 920-921]. Boudinot also suggested other things, some
good, some bad. He suggested, for instance, that Indian Territory be
attached to Missouri and Price put in command. Seddon doubted if Price
would care for the place [Ibid., 921].]

[Footnote 904:--Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 858.]

preference for the two brigade plan.[905] The promotion of Cooper,
implicit in the three brigade plan, was not at all pleasing to General
Smith; for he thought of it as reflecting upon Steele, whom he loyally
described as having "labored conscientiously and faithfully in
the discharge of his duties."[906] With Steele removed from the
scene[907]--and he was soon removed for he had been retained in the
Indian country only that Maxey might have for a brief season the
benefit of his experience[908]--the case was altered and Boudinot
again pressed his point,[909] obtaining, finally, the assurance of
the War Department that so soon as the number of Indian regiments
justified the organization of three brigades they should be

The formation of brigades was only one of the Indian demands that had
emanated from the general council. Another was, the establishment of
Indian Territory as a military department, an arrangement altogether
inadvisable and for better reasons than the one reason that Davis
offered when he addressed the united nations through their principal
chiefs on the twenty-second of February.[911] Davis's reason was that

[Footnote 905: Maxey to Smith, January 15, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 875.]

[Footnote 906:--Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1101-1102.]

[Footnote 907:--Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 845, 848.]

[Footnote 908: So Smith explained [Ibid., 845], when Steele
objected to staying in the Indian Territory in a subordinate capacity
[Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1108]. Steele was transferred to
the District of Texas [Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 961]. The
withdrawal of Steele left Cooper the ranking officer and the person on
whom such a command, if created, would fall [Ibid., vol. liii,
supplement, 968-969].]

[Footnote 909: Boudinot to Davis, February 11, 1864, Ibid.,

[Footnote 910: Seddon to Davis, February 22, 1864, Ibid.,

[Footnote 911: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Confederacy_, vol. i, 477-479; _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv,
part iii, 824-825. Davis addressed the chiefs and not the delegation
that had brought the resolutions [Ibid., vol. liii, supplement,
1030-1031]. John Jumper, Seminole principal chief, was a member of the

as a separate department Indian Territory could not count upon the
protection of the forces belonging to the Trans-Mississippi Department
that was assured to her while she remained one of its integral parts.
A distinct military district she should certainly be.

When Davis wrote, the ambition of Cooper had, in a measure, been
satisfied; for he had been put in command of all "the Indian troops in
the Trans-Mississippi Department on the borders of Arkansas."[912] It
was by no means all he wanted or all that he felt himself entitled to
and he soon let it be known that such was the state of affairs. He
tried to presume upon the fact that his commission as superintendent
of Indian affairs had issued from the government, although never
actually delivered to him, and, in virtue of it, he was in military
command.[913] The quietus came from General Smith, who informed Cooper
that his new command and he himself were under Maxey.[914]

It was hoped that prospective Indian brigades would be a powerful
incentive to Indian enlistment and so they proved. Moreover, much
was expected in that direction from the reassembling of the general
council at Armstrong Academy, and much had to be; for the times were
critical. Maxey's position was not likely to be a sinecure. As a
friend wrote him,

    Northern Texas and the Indian Department have been neglected
    so long that they have become the most difficult and the most
    responsible commands in the Trans-Mississippi Department. I
    tremble for you. A great name is in store for you or you fall into
    the rank of failures; the latter may be your

[Footnote 912: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 848;
Special Orders of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 1864,
_Confederate Records_, no. 7, p. 15.]

[Footnote 913: Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 1007.]

[Footnote 914:--Ibid., 1008.]

    fate, and might be the fate of any man, even after an entire and
    perfect devotion of all one's time and talent, for want of
    the proper means. In military matters these things are never
    considered. Success is the only criterion--a good rule, upon the
    whole, though in many instances it works great injustice. Good
    and deserving men fall, and accidental heroes rise in the scale,
    kicking their less fortunate brothers from the platform.[915]

With a view to strengthening the Indian alliance and accomplishing
all that was necessary to make it effective, Commissioner Scott was
ordered by Seddon to attend the meeting of the general council.[916]
Unfortunately, he did not arrive at Armstrong Academy in time, most
unfortunately, in fact, since he was expected to bring funds with
him and funds were sadly needed. Maxey attended and delivered an
address[917] that rallied the Indians in spite of themselves. In
council meeting they had many things to consider, whether or no they
should insist upon confining their operations henceforth to their own
country. Some were for making a raid into Kansas, some for forming an
alliance with the Indians of the Plains,[918] who, during this year
of 1864, were to prove a veritable thorn in the flesh to Kansas and
Colorado.[919] As regarded some of the work of the general council,
Samuel Garland, the principal chief of the Choctaws, proved a huge
stumbling block,

[Footnote 915: S.A. Roberts to Maxey, February 1, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 936-937.]

[Footnote 916: Seddon to Scott, January 6, 1864, Ibid.,

[Footnote 917: Moty Kanard, late principal chief of the Creek
Nation, spoke of it as a _noble_ address and begged for a copy
[Ibid., 960].]

[Footnote 918: Vore to Maxey, January 29, 1864, Ibid., 928;
Maxey to Anderson, February 9, 1864, Ibid., 958; same to same,
February 7, 1864, Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 963-966.]

[Footnote 919: Inasmuch as the alliance with the Indians of the Plains
was never fully consummated and inasmuch as these Indians harassed and
devastated the frontier states for reasons quite foreign to the causes
of the Civil War, the subject of their depredations and outrages is
not considered as within the scope of the present volume.]

and Cooper was forced, so he said, to "put the members of the grand
council to work on" him.[920] It was Cooper's wish, evidently, that
the council would "insist under the Indian compact that all Choctaw
troops shall be put at once in the field as regular Confederate troops
for the redemption and defense of the whole Indian Territory." The
obstinacy of the Choctaw principal chief had to be overcome in order
"to bring out the Third Choctaw Regiment speedily and on the proper
basis." In general, the council reiterated its recommendations of
November previous and so Boudinot informed President Davis,[921] it
being with him the opportunity he coveted of urging, as already noted,
the promotion of Cooper to a major-generalship.

In January and so anterior to most of the foregoing incidents, the
shaking of the political dice in Washington, D.C., had brought again
into existence the old Department of Kansas, Curtis in command.[922]
Its limits were peculiar for they included Indian Territory[923] and
the military post of Fort Smith as well as Kansas and the territories
of Nebraska and Colorado. The status of Fort Smith was a question for
the future to decide; but, in the meantime, it was to be a bone of
contention between Curtis and his colleague, Frederick Steele, in
command of the sister Department of

[Footnote 920: Cooper to Maxey, February, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 959. The report reached Phillips
that the Choctaws wanted a confederacy quite independent of the
southern [Ibid., part i, 107].]

[Footnote 921: Although Davis's address of February 22 could well,
in point of chronology, have been an answer to the applications and
recommendations of the second session of the general council, it
has been dealt with in connection with those of the first session,
notwithstanding that Boudinot made his appeal less than a fortnight
before Davis wrote. In his address, Davis specifically mentioned the
work of the first session and made no reference whatsoever to that of
the second.]

[Footnote 922: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 10.]

[Footnote 923: Ewing wanted the command of Indian Territory,
Ibid., 89.]

Arkansas; for Steele had control over all Federal forces within the
political and geographical boundaries of the state that gave the name
to his department except the Fort Smith garrison.[924] The termination
of Schofield's career in Missouri[925] was another result of political
dice-throwing, so also was the call for Blunt to repair to the
national capital for a conference.[926]

But politics had nothing whatever to do with an event more notable
still. With the first of February began one of the most remarkable
expeditions that had yet been undertaken in the Indian country. It
was an expedition conducted by Colonel William A. Phillips and it was
remarkable because, while it professed to have for its object the
cleaning out of Indian Territory,[927] its incidents were as much
diplomatic and pacific as military. Its course was only feebly
obstructed and might have been extended into northern Texas had
Moonlight of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry chosen to coöperate.[928]
As it was, the course was southward almost to Fort Washita.
Phillips carried with him copies of President Lincoln's Amnesty
Proclamation[929] and he distributed them freely. His interpretation
of the proclamation was his own and perhaps not strictly warranted by
the phraseology but justice and generosity debarred his seeing why
magnanimity and forgiveness should not be extended betimes to the poor
deluded red man as much as to the deliberately rebellious white. To
various prominent chiefs

[Footnote 924: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 167,

[Footnote 925:--Ibid., 188.]

[Footnote 926: Lane, Wilder, and Dole, requested that Blunt be
summoned to Washington [Ibid., 52].]

[Footnote 927: See Phillips's address to his soldiers, January 30,
1864, Ibid., 190.]

[Footnote 928: Phillips to Curtis, February 16, 1864, Ibid.,
part i, 106-108.]

[Footnote 929: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Presidents_, vol. vi, 213-215.]

of secessionist persuasion he sent messages of encouragement and
good-will.[930] More sanguine than circumstances really justified, he
returned to report that, for some of the tribes at least, the war was
virtually over.[931] What his peace mission may have accomplished, the
future would reveal; but there was no doubting what his raid had done.
It had produced consternation among the weaker elements. The Creeks,
the Seminoles, and the Chickasaws had widely dispersed, some into the
fastnesses of the mountains. Only the Choctaws continued obdurate
and defiant. It was strange that Phillips should have arrived at
conclusions so sweeping; for his course[932] had led him within
hearing range of the general council in session at Armstrong Academy
and there the division of sentiment was not so much along tribal lines
as along individual. Strong personalities triumphed; for, as Maxey so
truly divined, the Indian nations were after all aristocracies. The
minority really ruled. At Armstrong Academy, in spite of tendencies
toward an isolation that, in effect, would have been neutrality and,
on the part of a few, toward a definite retracing of steps, the
southern Indians renewed their pledges of loyalty to the Confederacy.
Phillips's olive branch was in their hands and they threw it aside.
Months before they might have been secured for the North but not now.
For them the hour of wavering was past. Maxey's vigor was stimulating.

[Footnote 930: To Governor Colbert of the Chickasaw Nation
[_Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part i, 109-110], to the Council
of the Choctaw Nation [Ibid., 110], to John Jumper of the
Seminole Nation [Ibid., 111], to McIntosh, possibly D.N.
[Ibid., part ii, 997]. For Maxey's comments upon Phillips and
his letters, see Maxey to Smith, February 26, 1864, Ibid.,

[Footnote 931: Phillips to Curtis, February 24, 1864, Ibid.,
part i, 108-109.]

[Footnote 932: For the itinerary of the course, see Ibid.,

The explanation of Phillips's whole proceeding during the month of
February is to be found in his genuine friendship for the Indian,
which eventually profited him much, it is true, but, from this time
henceforth, was lifelong. He stood in somewhat of a contrast to Blunt,
whom General Steele thought unprincipled[933] and who in Southern
parlance was "an old land speculator,"[934] and to Curtis, who was
soon to show himself, as far as the Indians were concerned, in his
true colors. While Phillips was absent from Fort Gibson, Curtis
arrived there. He was making a reconnoissance of his command and, as
he passed over one reservation after another, he doubtless coveted the
Indian land for white settlement and justified to himself a scheme
of forfeiture as a way of penalizing the red men for their
defection.[935] Phillips was not encouraged to repeat his peace

Blunt's journey to Washington had results, complimentary and
gratifying to his vanity because publicly vindicatory. On the
twenty-seventh of February he was restored to his old command or, to
be exact, ordered "to resume command of so much of the District of the
Frontier as is included within the boundaries of the Department of
Kansas."[936] His headquarters were at Fort Smith and immediately
began the controversy between him and Thayer, although scornfully
unacknowledged by Thayer, as to the status of Fort Smith. Thayer
refused to admit that there could be any issue[937] between them for
the law in the case was clear. What Blunt and Curtis really wanted was
to get hold of the

[Footnote 933: F. Steele to S. Breck, March 27, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 751.]

[Footnote 934: T.M. Scott to Maxey, April 12, 1864, Ibid., part
iii, 762.]

[Footnote 935: This matter is very much generalized here for the
reason that it properly belongs in the volume on reconstruction that
is yet to come.]

[Footnote 936: February 23, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv,
part ii, 408.]

[Footnote 937: John M. Thayer to Charles A. Dana, March 15, 1864,
Ibid., 617.]

western counties of Arkansas[938] so as to round out the Department of
Kansas. To them it was absurd that Fort Smith should be within their
jurisdiction and its environs within Steele and Thayer's. The upshot
of the quarrel was, the reorganization of the frontier departments on
the seventeenth of April which gave Fort Smith and Indian Territory to
the Department of Arkansas[939] and sent Blunt back to Leavenworth.
His removal from Fort Smith, especially as Curtis had intended, had
no change in department limits been made, to transfer Blunt's
headquarters to Fort Gibson,[940] was an immense relief to Phillips.
Blunt and Phillips had long since ceased to have harmonious views with
respect to Indian Territory. During his short term of power, Blunt had
managed so to deplete Phillips's forces that two of the three Indian
regiments were practically all that now remained to him since one, the
Second Indian Home Guards, had been permanently stationed at Mackey's
Salt Works on the plea that its colonel, John Ritchie, was Phillips's
ranking officer and it was not expedient that he and Phillips "should
operate together."[941] Blunt had detached also a part of the Third
Indian and had placed it at Scullyville as an outpost to Fort Smith.
There were to be no more advances southward for Phillips.[942] Instead
of making them he was to occupy himself with the completion of the
fortifications at Fort Gibson.[943]

[Footnote 938: Thayer to Grant, March 11, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 566.]

[Footnote 939:--Ibid., part iii, 192, 196.]

[Footnote 940:--Ibid., part ii, 651. Blunt would have preferred
Scullyville [Ibid., part iii, 13].]

[Footnote 941: Blunt to Curtis, March 30, 1864, Ibid., part ii,

[Footnote 942: Blunt to Phillips, April 3, 1864, Ibid., part
iii, 32; Phillips to Curtis, April 5, 1864, Ibid., 52-53.]

[Footnote 943: Curtis had ordered the completion of the fortifications
which might be taken to imply that he too was not favoring a forward

Among the southern Indians, Maxey's reconstruction policy was all this
time having its effect. It was revitalizing the Indian alliance with
the Confederacy, but army conditions were yet a long way from being
satisfactory. In March Price relieved Holmes in command of the
District of Arkansas.[944] A vigorous campaign was in prospect and
Price asked for all the help the department commander could afford
him. The District of Indian Territory had forces and of all the
disposable Price asked the loan. Maxey, unlike his predecessors, was
more than willing to coöperate but one difficulty, which he would fain
have ignored himself--for he was not an Albert Pike--he was compelled
to report. The Indians had to be free, absolutely free, to go or to
stay.[945] The choice of coöperating was theirs but theirs also the
power to refuse to coöperate, if they so desired, and no questions
asked. The day had passed when Arkansans or Texans could decide the
matter arbitrarily. Watie was expected to prefer to continue the
irregular warfare that he and Adair, his colonel of scouts, had so
successfully been waging for a goodly time now. Formerly, they
had waged it to Steele's great annoyance;[946] but Maxey felt no
repugnance to the services of Quantrill, so, of course, had nothing to
say in disparagement of the work of Watie. It was the kind of work, he
frankly admitted he thought the Indians best adapted to. The Choctaws
under Tandy Walker were found quite willing to cross the line and
they did excellent service in the Camden campaign, which, both in the
cannonade near Prairie d'Ane on the thirteenth of April and in the
Battle of Poison Spring on the

[Footnote 944: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 1034,

[Footnote 945: Maxey to Smith, April 3, 1864, Ibid., part iii,

[Footnote 946: For Steele's opposition to Adair's predatory movements,
see _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, nos. 267, 268.]

eighteenth of April, offered a thorough test of what Indians could do
when well disciplined, well officered, and well considered. The Indian
reinforcement of Marmaduke was ungrudgingly given and ungrudgingly
commended.[947] The Camden campaign was short and, when about over,
Maxey was released from duty with Price's army. His own district
demanded attention[948] and the Indians recrossed the line.

Price's call for help had come before Maxey had taken more than the
most preliminary of steps towards the reorganization of his forces and
not much was he able to do until near the end of June. Two brigades
had been formed without difficulty and Cooper had secured his
division; but after that had come protracted delay. The nature of the
delay made it a not altogether bad thing since the days that passed
were days of stirring events. In the case of Stand Watie's First
Brigade no less than of Tandy Walker's Second were the events
distinguished by measurable success. The Indians were generally
in high good humor; for even small successes, when coupled with
appreciation of effort expended, will produce that. One adventure of
Watie's, most timely and a little out of the ordinary, had been very
exhilarating. It was the seizure of a supply boat on the Arkansas at
Pheasant Bluff, not far from the mouth of the Canadian up which the
boat was towed until its commissary stores had been extracted. The
boat was the Williams, bound for Fort Gibson.[949]

[Footnote 947: Williamson to Maxey, April 28, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part i, 845.]

[Footnote 948: It had not been Smith's intention that he should go
out of his own district, where his services were indispensable, until
Price's need should be found to be really urgent [Boggs to Maxey,
April 12, 1864, Ibid., part iii, 760-761].]

[Footnote 949: --Ibid., part i, 1011-1013; part iv, 686-687.]

It was under the inspiration of such recent victories that the
southern Indians took up for consideration the matter of reënlistment,
the expiration "of the present term of service" being near at hand.
Parts of the Second Brigade took action first and, on the twenty-third
of June, the First Choctaw Regiment unanimously reenlisted for the
war. Cooper was present at the meeting "by previous request."[950]
Resolutions[951] were drawn up and adopted that reflected the new
enthusiasm. Other Choctaw regiments were to be prevailed upon to
follow suit and the leading men of the tribe, inclusive of Chief
Garland who was not present, were to be informed that the First
Choctaw demanded of them, in their legislative and administrative
capacities "such co-operation as will force all able-bodied free
citizens of the Choctaw Nation, between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five years, and fitted for military service, to at once join the
army and aid in the common defense of the Choctaw Nation, and give
such other coöperation to the Confederate military authorities as will
effectually relieve our country from Federal rule and ruin."

The First Brigade was not behindhand except in point of time by a few
days. All Cherokee military units were summoned to Watie's camp
on Limestone Prairie.[952] The assemblage began its work on the
twenty-seventh of June, made it short and decisive and indicated it in
a single resolution:

    Whereas, the final issue of the present struggle between the North
    and South involves the destiny of the Indian Territory alike with
    that of the Confederate States: Therefore,

    _Resolved_, That we, the Cherokee Troops, C.S. Army, do

[Footnote 950: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part iv, 694.]

[Footnote 951: --Ibid., 695.]

[Footnote 952: Stand Watie to Cooper, June 27, 1864, Ibid.,
part i, 1013.]

    unanimously re-enlist as soldiers for the war, be it long or

No action was taken on the policy of conscription; but, in July, the
Cherokee National Council met and, to it, Chief Watie proposed the
enactment of a conscription law.[954]

As a corollary to reorganization, the three brigade plan was now put
tentatively into operation. It was, in truth, "a fine recruiting
order," and Commissioner Scott, when making his annual rounds in
August, was able to report to Secretary Seddon,

    It is proposed to organize them into three brigades, to be called
    the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek Brigades; the Cherokee Brigade,
    composed of Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Osages, has already been
    organized; the Creek Brigade, composed of Creeks and Seminoles, is
    about being so, and the Choctaws anticipate no difficulty in
    being able to raise the number of men required to complete the
    organization of the Choctaw Brigade.[955]

Behind all this virility was General Maxey. Without him, it is safe to
say, the war for the Indians would have ended in the preceding winter.
In military achievements, others might equal or excel him but in
rulings[956] that endeared him to the Indians and in

[Footnote 953: _Official Records_, vol. xli, part ii, 1013.]

[Footnote 954: --Ibid., 1046-1047. The general council of the
confederated tribes had recommended an increase in the armed force of
Indian Territory and that it was felt could best be obtained, in these
days of wavering faith, only by conscription. The general council
was expected to meet again, July 20, at Chouteau's Trading House
[Ibid., 1047]. In October, the Chickasaws resorted to
conscription. For the text of the conscription act, see Ibid.,
vol. liii, supplement, 1024-1025.]

[Footnote 955:--Ibid., vol. xli, part ii, 1078. For additional
facts concerning the progress of reorganization, see Portlock to
Marston, August 5, 1864, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 259,
p. 37; Portlock to Captain E. Walworth, August 27, 1864, Ibid.,
pp. 42-43.]

[Footnote 956: The most significant of Maxey's rulings was that on
official precedence. His position was that no race or color line
should be drawn in determining (cont.)]

propaganda work he had no peer. At Fort Towson, his headquarters,
he had set up a printing press, from which issued many and many a
document, the purpose of each and every one the same. The following
quotation from one of Maxey's letters illustrates the purpose and, at
the same time, exhibits the methods and the temper of the man behind
it. The matter he was discussing when writing was the Camden campaign,
in connection with which, he said,

    ... In the address of General Smith the soldiers of Arkansas,
    Missouri, Texas, and Louisiana are specially named. The soldiers
    from this Territory bore an humbler part in the campaign, and
    although they did not do a great deal, yet a fair share of the
    killed, wounded, captured, and captured property and cannon can be
    credited to them. I had a number of General Smith's address struck
    off for circulation here, and knowing the omission would be
    noticed and felt, I inserted after Louisiana, "and of the
    Indian Territory," which I hope will not meet General Smith's

    I would suggest that want of transportation in this Territory will
    cripple movements very much....

    During my absence General Cooper urged General McCulloch to help
    him in this particular; General M. replies he can do "absolutely
    nothing." I am not disposed to complain about anything, but I do
    think this thing ought to be understood and regulated. Supplies
    of breadstuffs and forage, as well as clothing, sugar, etc., all
    having to be drawn from beyond the limits of this Territory, a
    more than ordinary supply of transportation is necessary. To that
    for the troops must be added that made necessary by the destitute
    thrown on the hands of the Government and who must be taken care
    of. I do not expect General Smith to investigate and study the

[Footnote 956: (cont.) the relative rank of officers [Maxey to Cooper,
June 29, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part iv, 698-699]
and he held that Confederate law recognized no distinction between
Indian and white officers of the same rank. Charles de Morse, a Texan,
with whom General Steele had had several differences, took great
exception to Maxey's decision. Race prejudice was strong in him. Had
there been many like him, the Indians, with any sense of dignity,
could never have continued long identified with the Confederate cause.
For De Morse's letter of protest, see Ibid., 699-700.]

    characteristics of command here so closely as I have. He hasn't
    the time, nor is it necessary. In my opinion no effort should be
    spared to hold this country. Its loss would work a more permanent
    injury than the loss of any State in the Confederacy. States can
    be recovered--the Indian Territory, once gone, never. Whites, when
    exiled by a cruel foe, find friends amongst their race; Indians
    have nowhere to go. Let the enemy once occupy the country to Red
    River and the Indians give way to despair. I doubt whether many of
    the highest officials in our Government have ever closely studied
    this subject. It is the great barrier to the empire State of the
    South from her foe now and in peace. Let Federalism reach the Red
    River, the effects will not stop there. The doctrine of _uti
    possidetis_ may yet play an important part.

    I believe from what I have heard that Mr. Davis has a fair
    knowledge of this subject, and I think from conversations with
    General Smith he has, but his whole time being occupied with his
    immense department--an empire--I trust he will pardon me when I
    say that no effort of commissaries, quartermasters, or anybody
    else should be spared to hold this country, and I only regret that
    it has not fallen into abler hands than mine....[957]

Military reorganization[958] for the Indian troops had, in reality,
come too late. Confederate warfare all along the frontier, in the
summer and autumn of 1864, was little more than a series of raids,
of which Price's Missouri was the greatest. For raiding, the best of
organization was never needed. Watie, Shelby, Price were all men of
the same stamp. Watie was the greatest of Indian raiders and his mere
name became almost as much of a terror as Quantrill's with which it
was frequently found associated, rightly or wrongly. Around Fort Smith
in July and farther north in August the Indian raided to good effect.
Usually, when he raided in the upper part of his own country, Federal

[Footnote 957: Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, _Official Records_,
vol. xxxiv, part iii, 820.]

[Footnote 958: For progress reached in reorganization by October,
see orders issued by direction of Maxey, Ibid., vol. liii,
supplement, 1023.]

supply trains were his objective, but not always. The refugees were
coming back from Kansas and their new home beginnings were mercilessly
preyed upon by their Confederate fellow tribesmen, who felt for the
owners a vindictive hatred that knew no relenting.

Watie's last great raid was another Cabin Creek affair that reversed
the failure of two years before. It occurred in September and was
undertaken by Watie and Gano together, the former waiving rank in
favor of the latter for the time being.[959] A brilliant thing, it
was, so Maxey, and Smith's adjutant after him, reported.[960] The
booty taken was great in amount and as much as possible of it utilized
on the spot. Maxey regretted that the Choctaws were not on hand
also to be fitted out with much-needed clothing.[961] It was in
contemplation that Watie should make a raid into Kansas to serve as
a diversion, while Price was raiding Missouri.[962] The Kansans had
probably much to be thankful for that circumstances hindered his
penetrating far, since, at Cabin Creek, some of his men, becoming
intoxicated, committed horrible excesses and "slaughtered

Had the force at Fort Gibson been at all adequate to the needs of the
country it was supposed to defend, such raids as Watie's would have
been an utter impossibility. Thanks to Federal indifference and
mismanagement, however, the safety of Indian Territory was

[Footnote 959: Cooper to T.M. Scott, October 1, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xli, part i, 783; Watie to T.B. Heiston, October 3,
1864, Ibid., 785.]

[Footnote 960:--Ibid., 793, 794. Cooper described it "as
brilliant as any one of the war" [Ibid., 783] and Maxey
confessed that he had long thought that movements of the raiding kind
were the most valuable for his district [Ibid., 777].]

[Footnote 961: Maxey to Boggs, October 9, 1864, Ibid., part
iii, 990.]

[Footnote 962: Cooper to Bell, October 6, 1864, Ibid.,

[Footnote 963: Curtis Johnson to W.H. Morris, September 20, 1864
[Ibid., part i, 774].]

of less consequence now than it had been before. The incorporation
with the Department of Arkansas and the consequent separation from
that of Kansas had been anything but a wise move. The relations of the
Indian country with the state in which its exiles had found refuge
were necessarily of the closest and particularly so at this time when
their return from exile was under way and almost over. For reasons
not exactly creditable to the government, when all was known, Colonel
Phillips had been removed from command at Fort Gibson. At the time of
Watie's raid, Colonel C.W. Adams was the incumbent of the post; but,
following it, came Colonel S.H. Wattles[964] and things went rapidly
from bad to worse. The grossest corruption prevailed and, in the
midst of plenty, there was positive want. Throughout the winter,
cattle-driving was indulged in, army men, government agents, and
civilians all participating. It was only the ex-refugee that faced
starvation. All other folk grew rich. Exploitation had succeeded
neglect and Indian Territory presented the spectacle of one of the
greatest scandals of the time; but its full story is not for recital

Great as Maxey's services to Indian Territory had been and yet were,
he was not without his traducers and Cooper was chief among them, his

[Footnote 964: _Official Records_, vol. xli, part iii, 301.
Wattles was not at Fort Gibson a month before he was told to be
prepared to move even his Indian Brigade to Fort Smith [Ibid.,
part iv, 130]. The necessity for executing the order never arose,
although all the winter there was talk off and on of abandoning Fort
Gibson entirely, sometimes also there was talk of abandoning Fort
Smith. So weak had the two places been for a long time that Cooper
insisted there was no good reason why the Confederates should not
attempt to seize them. It is interesting that Thayer notified Wattles
to be prepared to move just when there was the greatest prospect of a
Confederate Indian raid into Kansas.]

ambition being still unsatisfied. In November, at a meeting of the
general council for the confederated tribes, Maxey spoke[965] in his
own defence and spoke eloquently; for his cause was righteous. General
Smith was his friend[966] in the sense that he had been Steele's;
but there soon came a time when even the department commander was
powerless to defend him further. Early in 1865, Cooper journeyed to
Richmond.[967] What he did there can be inferred from the fact that
orders were soon issued for him to relieve Maxey.[968] He assumed
command of the district he had so long coveted and had sacrificed
honor to get, March first,[969] General Smith disapproving of the
whole procedure. "The change," said he, "has not the concurrence of my
judgment, and I believe will not result beneficially."[970]

But Smith was mistaken in his prognostications. The change was not
just but it did work beneficially. Cooper knew how to manage the
Indians, none better, and the time was fast approaching when they
would need managing, if ever. As the absolute certainty of Confederate
defeat gradually dawned upon them, they became almost desperate.
They had to be handled very carefully lest they break out beyond all

[Footnote 965: _Official Records_, vol. xli, part iv, 1035-1037;
vol. liii, supplement, 1027.]

[Footnote 966: In July, 1864, orders issued from Richmond for the
retirement of Maxey and the elevation of Cooper [Ibid., part
ii, 1019]; but Smith held them in abeyance [Ibid., part
iii, 971]; for he believed that Maxey's "removal, besides being an
injustice to him, would be a misfortune to the department." The
suppression of the orders failed to meet the approval of the
authorities at Richmond and some time subsequent to the first of
October Smith was informed that the orders were "imperative and must
be carried into effect" [Ibid.,].]

[Footnote 967: _Official Records_, vol. xlviii, part i, 1382.]

[Footnote 968:--Ibid., 1403.]

[Footnote 969:--Ibid., 1408.]

[Footnote 970:--Ibid.]

[Footnote 971: The evidence for this is chiefly in Cooper's own letter
book. One published letter is especially valuable in this connection.
It is from Cooper (cont.)]

Phillips was again in charge of their northern compatriots[972] and,
at Fort Gibson, he, too, was handling Indians carefully. It was in a
final desperate sort of a way that a league with the Indians of the
Plains was again considered advisable and held for debate at the
coming meeting of the general council. To effect it, when decided
upon, the services of Albert Pike were solicited.[973] No other could
be trusted as he. Apparently he never served or agreed to serve[974]
and no alliance was needed; for the war was at an end. On the
twenty-sixth of May, General E. Kirby Smith entered into a convention
with Major-general E.R.S. Canby, commanding the Military Division
of West Mississippi, by which he agreed to surrender the
Trans-Mississippi Department and everything appertaining to it.[975]
The Indians had made an alliance with the Southern Confederacy in
vain. The promises of Pike, of Cooper, and of many another government
agent had all come to naught.

[Footnote 971: (cont.) confidentially to Anderson, May 15, 1865.
_Official Records_, vol. xlviii, part ii, 1306.]

[Footnote 972: For Phillips's own account of his reinstallment,
see his letter to Herron, January 16, 1865, Ibid., part i,

[Footnote 973: Smith to Pike, April 8, 1864, Ibid., part ii,
1266-1269. It was necessary to have someone else beside Throckmorton,
who was a Texan, serve; because the Indians of the Plains had a deep
distrust of Texas and of all Texans [Smith to Cooper, April 8, 1864,
Ibid., 1270-1271; and Smith to Throckmorton, April 8, 1864,
Ibid., 1271-1272].]

[Footnote 974: Smith issued him a commission however. See
Ibid., 1266.]

[Footnote 975:--Ibid., 604-606.]


  December 30, 1862.

SIR: My letters, in respectful terms, addressed to your Adjutant
General, when I re-assumed command of the Indian Country, late in
October, have not been fortunate enough to be honored with a reply.
This will reach you through another medium, and so that others besides
yourself shall know its contents. I am no longer an officer under
you, but a private citizen, and _free_, so far as any citizen of
Arkansas can call himself free while he lives in this State; and
I will see whether you are as impervious to _all_ other
considerations, as you are to all sense of courtesy and justice.

You were sent out to Arkansas with certain _positive_ orders,
which you were _immediately_ to enforce. You _knew_
that "Gen Hindman never was the commanding General of the Trans.
Mississippi Department," and was not sent there by the War Department;
and that, _therefore_ and _of course_, all his orders were
illegal, for want of power. You _knew_ that he never had any
right to interfere with my command in the Department of Indian
Territory, to take away my troops and ordnance, or to send me
_any_ orders whatever; and that _therefore_ I was
_wholly_ in the right, in all my controversy with him. You
_knew_, also, that in stripping the Indian Country of troops,
artillery, arms and ammunition, he had been guilty of multiplied
outrages, contrary to the will and policy of the President, forbidden
by the Secretary of War for the future, and hostile to the interests
of the Confederacy.

I had been advised by the Secretary of War, on the 14th of July,
before _you_ were unfortunately thought of [in] connection with
the Trans. Mississippi Department, that Gen. Magruder was assigned to
the command of it; and that although I would be under his command,
it was not doubted that my relations with him would be pleasant and
harmonious, and that I would have such latitude in command of the
Indian country, as might be necessary for me to

[Footnote 976: Scottish Rite Temple, Pike _Papers_.]

act to the best advantage in its defence. And by the same letter I was
advised, that it was regretted I had met with so many embarrassments
in procuring supplies; and that an order had been issued from the
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, to prevent the pursuing of
such courses as I had complained of, in the seizure of what I had
procured; and the Secretary said it was to be hoped that neither I nor
any other officer would hereafter have cause to complain of supplies
being diverted from their legitimate destination. And that Gen.
Magruder might fully understand my position, &c., a copy of my letter
of 8th June, to General Hindman, stating in detail the plundering
process to which the Indian Service had before then been subjected,
was furnished to the former officer. Three several copies of this
letter were sent me, that it might be certain to reach me.

I do not repeat the substance of that letter, for _your_ benefit.
You have known it, no doubt, ever since you left Richmond. You told me
in August, that the War Department was fully informed in regard to the
matters between myself and Generals Van Dorn and Hindman. You spoke
it in the way of a taunt, and as if the Department justified them
and condemned me. You _meant_ me so to understand it. You are a
_very_ ingenious person; inasmuch as you _knew_ the exact
contrary to be true. When I afterwards received the Secretary's
letter, I remembered your remark, and did not doubt, and do not now
doubt, that when you were substituted for Gen. Magruder, you received
the same instructions that had been given _him_ and were yourself
furnished with a copy of the same letter, for the same purpose.

At all events, you were sent out to put an end to his outrages, and to
avert, if you could, the mischiefs about to spring from them. But when
you reached Little Rock, you found him there, and you found that the
troops, artillery, ammunition and stores that had reached and were on
their way there from the Indian Country, under his unrighteous orders,
_and which it was your duty to restore to me_, were too valuable
to be parted with, if that could be in any way avoided. Probably you
foresaw that you might, by and by need to seize money and supplies
procured by me. Twenty-six pieces of artillery, a supply of fixed
ammunition and other trifles, on hand, with $1,350,000 in money, and
over 6,000 suits of clothing in prospect, were the bait Hindman had to
tempt you withal; and for it you

sold your soul, as Faust sold his to Mephistopheles. Your Lieutenant
became your master; you found it convenient to believe his version
of every thing, and to justify him in every thing, and you ended in
making all his devilments your own, and adopting the whole infernal
spawn and brood, with additions of your own to the family.

You told me in August, that you had been prepared to judge me
favorably, until you read my address to the Indians on resigning my
command, but after that, you could not judge me fairly. I did not in
the least doubt the _fact_; but I did _not_ believe the
_reason_. What, moreover, had _you_ to _judge_ in
regard to _me_? You were not sent to _judge_ any body.
Hindman was the criminal you _were_ to operate upon.

And, if you were sent, or had otherwise any right, to judge _me_,
you administered the sort of justice that is in vogue in hell. Before
you _saw me, you heard him_. You adopted all his views, and never
asked me a question in regard to our controversy, or as to my own
action, or the condition of things in the Indian Country. I had been
infamously and assiduously slandered, from the moment when I began to
resist his illegal, impolitic and outrageous attempts to deprive the
Indian Department of every thing, to make it a mere appanage of, and
appendix to, North-Western Arkansas, to take the Indians again out
of their own country, and to compel me to unite in that insane and
miserable "expedition into Missouri," which was projected and planned
by Folly, mis-managed and misconducted by Imbecility and ended, as I
knew it would, in disaster and disgrace. Lies of all varieties were
ingeniously and laboriously invented at and about Head Quarters, and
despatches, by special and _fit_ agents, to be industriously
circulated throughout the Indian Country and Texas, as well as
Arkansas. The Indians were told that I had carried away into Texas the
gold and silver belonging to _them_; while the Texans were made
to believe that I was paying _their_ moneys to the Indians. It
was reported, in Bonham, Texas, by officers sent from Hindman's Head
Quarters, that I was defaulter to the amount of $125,000 and at last
there crawled out from the sewer under the throne, and sneaked about
the Indian Country and Texas, the damnable lie, that an Indian had
been taken, bearing letters from me to the Northern Indians, or, to
the enemy in Kansas; or, as another version had it, from Gen. James H.
Lane to me; and

three months ago it was whispered about that I was a member of the
secret disloyal organization in Northern Texas. Such lies could have
been counted by scores. Most of them are dead and rotten; but some
still live, by means of assiduous nursing. And all these lies, and
more either you or Hindman sent to the President at Richmond.

I say, sir, you never _inquired_ into _any_ thing. You
never wished to _hear_ any thing, whatever from _me_. You
disobeyed the orders with which you were sent as a public curse and
calamity into Arkansas, as if the State were not already sufficiently
infested by Hindman. Is it true that he has lately, upon his single
order, and without the ceremony of even a _mock_ trial, caused
three men "suspected of disloyalty" to be shot; and that, two of them
being proven to him to be true Southern men, he sent a reprieve,
which, either setting out too late, or lagging on the way, reached the
scene of murder after their blood had bathed the desecrated soil of
Arkansas? It has come to me so, from officers direct from Fort Smith.
At any rate, he has put to death nine or ten persons, without any
legal trial. Who is _he_, that he should do these things in this
nineteenth century? And who are _you_, sir, that you should
suffer, and by suffering, _approve_ and adopt them? How many
_more_ murders will suffice to awaken public vengeance?

Was the Star Chamber any worse than Hindman's Military Commissions,
that are ordered to preserve no records? Were the _Lettres de
Cachet_ of Louis XV, any greater outrage on the personal liberty of
_French subjects_, than Hindman's arrests and committal to the
Penitentiary of _suspected_ persons? Was Tristan l'Hermite any
more the minister of tyranny, than his Provost Marshals? or Caligula,
Caesar Borgia or Colonel Kirke any more cruel and remorseless than he,
that you have sustained all his acts, and made all his atrocities your
own? Take care, sir! You are not so high, that you may not be reached
by the arm of justice. The President is above you both, and God is
above him, and _sometimes_ interferes in human affairs.

Unless the late Secretary of War, through the President, sent an
official falsehood to the Congress of the Confederate States, you
were sent to Arkansas with _positive_ and _unconditional_
instructions, that, if Gen. Hindman _had_ declared Martial Law in
Arkansas, and adopted oppressive police regulations under it, _you
should rescind the_

_declarations of Martial Law, and the Regulations adopted to carry
it into effect_. You have not done so. You have not only _not_
rescinded _any_ thing; but you have, by a General Order, long
ago, continued in force all orders of General Hindman, not specially
revoked by you. That order could have no retroactive effect, to make
_his_ orders _to have been valid_ in the _past_. It
could only put them in force for the _future_; and you thereby
made them _your_ orders, as fully as if you had re-issued them.
In so doing, you became the enemy of your country, if not of the Human
race, and outlawed yourself.

You have _yourself_ established a tariff of prices exclusively on
articles produced by the farmers, including the sweet potatoes raised
by old women and superannuated negroes. You leave the Jews and
extortioners, some of the former of whom go about in uniforms,
claiming to be _officers_ and your agents to charge these same
venders of produce, whatever infamous prices they please for wares
they need to purchase with the pittances received according to your
scale of prices, for the vegetables that supply your and other tables.

You pretend, I learn, that the President gave you discretionary power,
in regard to Martial Law, and the Regulations in question. I do not
believe it; for, if he did, then he and the Secretary intentionally
deceived Congress by the equivalent of a lie. Do you pretend that the
President paltered with Congress in a double sense? I put you face
to face. Is it _your_ act, in _defiance_ of orders, that
continues Martial Law in force in Arkansas, stifles freedom of speech,
muzzles the Press, tramples on all the rights at once of the People of
that State, and makes the State itself only a congregation of Helots,
incompetent to be represented in Congress? Is it merely a contest
between you and Phelps, _which_ of the two shall be Military
Governor? If it _is_ your act, then justice ought at once to be
done upon you, lest the President, winking at the outrage, and not
stripping from your back your uniform of Lieutenant General, should
deserve to be impeached, as your accomplice.

Or, do you dare assert that it is _his_ act, because he gave you
discretionary power on the subject, after informing Congress that
Hindman never was Commanding General of the Department, and that you
had been ordered to rescind his declaration of Martial Law,--nay,
after publicly proclaiming that _no_ General had any power to
declare Martial Law? All the Confederacy thanked and applauded

him for so striking at the root of an immense outrage and abuse and
an unexpected public course; but if he has authorized or sanctions
_your_ course, he is unworthy longer to be President. If he has
not, you have defied his orders and justified men in judging yourself
authorized and him guilty; and so you are unworthy longer to be

When I saw you in August, you were greatly exercised on the subject of
my printed address to the Indians, publication of which in Little Rock
you had suppressed, _as if it could do any harm in Arkansas_. You
suppressed it, because it exposed those whose acts were losing the
Indian Country. You wanted to keep what had been taken from _me_,
and to escape damnation for the probable _consequences_ of the
acts, the _profit_ of which you were reluctant to part with. I do
not wonder the letter troubled you; for it told _the truth_, and
condemned and denounced in advance _more_ unjustifiable courses
of conduct that you were about to pursue.

You pretended that it had produced a great "ferment" among the
Indians; and that even many of the Chickasaws had in consequence
of it, left the service. It had produced _no_ ferment, and
_none_ of the Chickasaws had left us. On the contrary, the
Indians were quieted by it, the Creeks re-organized, in numbers, two
regiments, and the Chickasaws five companies. That was its purpose,
and such was its effect.

But to _you_, its enormity consisted in its exposure of the
conduct of two Major Generals. I told the Indians _plainly_, that
it was not _my_ fault or the fault of the Government, but of
these two Generals, that moneys, clothing, arms and ammunition,
procured for them, had not reached them; that troops raised for
service among them had never entered their country; and that, finally,
troops, artillery and ammunition were carried out of it. This
censure of my _superiors_, in vindication of the President and
Government, shocked your tender sensibilities. You were ready to
follow in their footsteps, and already _had_ the plunder; and you
told me that "the act of the officer was the act of the Government."
Did you really _mean_, that the Indians should have been led or
left to suppose that these acts were the acts of the Government?
That would have been _almost_ as great an infamy, as it was to
_take_ the supplies, and so give them cause and reason to believe
the robbery the act of the Government, _and thus excite them to
revolt_. Moreover, when I told you that the act of

the officer was _not_, in the case in question, the act of the
Government; that, if I had permitted the Indians to suppose so,
they would long have left us; and that, to quiet them, I had been
compelled, for three months and more than a hundred times, to explain
to them what had become of their supplies, and how and by whom
they have been seized, you admitted that "that was right for local
explanation." As there could be no objection to telling all, what I
had often told part, that _they_ might tell the rest; and as it
was no more a crime to _print_ than to _say_ it; I have
the right to believe and I _do_ believe that your _real_
objection to its publication was that it exposed _to our own people
the actual_ conduct of other Generals, and the _intended_
conduct of yourself. Have _you_ left the Indians to believe that
the late seizure and appropriation, by _yourself_, of their
clothing and moneys, is the act of the Government? If you have, you
ought to be shot as a Traitor, for provoking them to revolt, and
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

But you told me, that when you first read my letter, you held up your
hands, and exclaimed, "What! is the man a Traitor?" And you said that
not one of my friends in Little Rock, and I had, you said, a great
many, pretended to justify the letter. You have never found a friend
of mine, or an indifferent person, silly enough to think, like you,
that it savored of treason. It is only rarely one meets a man so
scantily furnished with sense as to misunderstand and pervert what is
written in plain English. I was vindicating myself, and still more
the Government, and persuading the Indians to remain loyal,
notwithstanding the wrongs they had endured. I, too, was an officer;
and _my_ acts _had_ been the acts of the Government.
_My_ promises to them were _its_ promises. The procuring of
supplies by _me_, was _its_ act; and when, reaching or not
reaching the frontier, the supplies were like the unlucky traveler,
who journeyed from Jerusalem to Jericho, _then_ the Government
_ceased_ to act, and unlicensed outrage took its place. And,
further, _my_ act was the act of the Government, when I told the
Indians _why_ they had not received their supplies and money, and
vindicated that Government at the expense of those who were guilty of
the act; and who having done it and reaped the profit, should not be
heard to object that all the world should know what they did, nor be
allowed to escape the responsibility of _all_ the consequences.

If to tell the Indians that other Generals had wrongfully stopped

their supplies, in any degree _resembled_ Treason, that could
only be so, because it _was_ treason to _do_ the act. It
cannot be wrong to make known what it was right and proper to do. The
truth is, that the acts done were outrages, which it was desirable for
the doers to conceal from the Indians. I refused to become a party to
those outrages, by concealing them. I would not agree in advance to
be _silent_, when _you_ should repeat and improve on those
outrages, and consummate what had been so felicitously begun.

I do not doubt that there are assassins wearing uniforms, who are
knaves enough to _pretend_ to read my letter as you do, and to
see in it the desire of a disappointed man to be revenged, even by the
ruin of his country. Power always has its pimps and catamites. These
would no doubt gladly have made my letter the means of murdering me
by that devilish engine of Military despotism, a Military commission,
that is _ordered_ to preserve no records. You, I think really
look upon it with alarm. It is, no doubt, _very_ desirable to
_you_, that the blame of losing the Indian Country, which, if not
already a fact accomplished, is a fact inevitable, should be made to
fall upon me. You, as the pliant and useful implement of Gen. Hindman,
are the cause of this loss; and you know I can prove it. You and he
have left nothing _undone_, that _could_ be done, to lose
it. And you may rest assured, that whether I live or die, you shall
not escape one jot or tittle of the deep damnation to which you are
richly entitled for causing a loss so irretrievable, so astounding, so
unnecessary and so _fatal_, and one which it will be impossible
to excuse as owing to ignorance and stupidity. No degree of
_these_ misfortunes, can be pleaded in bar of judgment.
_You_ will have _forced_ the Indians to go to the North for
protection. _You_ will have _given away_ their country to
the enemy. _You_ will have turned their arms against us. You will
have done this by disobeying the orders of your Government, continuing
the courses it condemned, and to put an end to which it sent you out
here; by falsifying its pledges and promises, taking for others' uses
the moneys which it sent out to pay the Indians, robbing them of the
clothing sent by it to cover their nakedness, and thus thrusting aside
all the considerations of common honesty, of justice, of humanity, and
even of policy, expediency and common sense.

When Mr. C.B. Johnson agreed, in September to loan your Quartermaster
at Little Rock, $350,000 of the money he was

conveying to Major Quesenbury, the Quartermaster of the Department of
Indian Territory, _you promised_ him that it should be repaid to
Major Quesenbury as soon as you should receive funds, and before he
would have disposed of the remaining million. _You got the money by
means of that promise; and you did not keep the promise_. On the
contrary, by an order that reached Fort Smith three hours before Mr.
Johnson did, you compelled Major Quesenbury, the moment he received
the money, to turn every dollar of it, over to a _Commissary_ at
Fort Smith; _and it was used to supply the needs of Gen. Hindman's
troops_; when the Seminoles, fourteen months in the service have
never been paid a dollar; and the Chickasaw and Choctaw Battalion, and
Chilly McIntosh's Creeks, each corps a year and more in the service,
have received only $45,000 each, and no clothing. Was this violation
of your promise, the act of the Government?

To replace the clothing I had procured for the Indians in December,
1861, and which, with near 1,000 tents, fell into the hands of the
troops of Generals Price and Van Dorn, I sent an agent, in June, to
Richmond, who went to Georgia, and there procured some 6,500 suits,
with about 3,000 shirts and 3,000 pairs of drawers, and some two or
three hundred tents. These supplies were at Monroe early in September;
and the Indians were informed that they and the moneys had been
procured and were on the way. The good news went all over their
country, as if on the wings of the wind; and universal content and
rejoicing were the consequences.

The clothing reached Fort Smith; and its issue to Gen. Hindman's
people commenced immediately. I sent a Quartermaster for it and he was
retained there. If _any_ of it has ever reached the Indians, it
has been only recently, and but a small portion of it.

You pretend to believe that the Indians were in a "ferment" and
discontented; and you took this very opportune occasion to stop all
the moneys due their troops and for debts in their country and take
and appropriate to the use of other troops the clothing promised
to and procured for _them_. The clothing and the money were
_theirs_; and you were in possession of an order from the
War Department, forbidding you to divert any supplies from their
legitimate destination; an order which was issued, _as you knew_,
in consequence of _my_ complaints, and to prevent moneys and
supplies for the _Indians_ being stopped: _and yet you stopped

You borrow part of the money, and then seize the rest, like a
_genteel_ highwayman, who first borrows all he can of a traveler,
on promise of punctual re-payment; and then claps a pistol to his
head, and orders him to "stand and deliver" the rest. And you did even
more than this.

For you promised the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, when he
was at Little Rock, about the 1st of October, on his way to the Indian
Country, to give the Indians assurances of the good faith of the
Government--_you promised him_, I say, _that the clothing in
question should go to the Indians_. He told the Chickasaws and
Seminoles, at least, of this promise. You broke it. You did _not_
send them the clothing. You placed the Commissioner and the Government
in an admirable attitude before the Indians; and the consequence has
been, I understand, the disbanding of the Chickasaws, and the failure
of the Seminole troops to re-organize. The consequence will be far
more serious yet. Indians cannot be deceived, and promises made them
shamelessly broken, with impunity.

While _you_ were thus stopping their clothing, and robbing the
half-naked Indians to clothe other troops, the Federals were sending
home the Choctaws whom they had taken prisoners, after clothing
them comfortably and putting money in their pockets. No one need be
astonished, when _all_ the Indians shall have turned their arms
against us.

Why did you and Gen. Hindman not procure by your own exertions what
you need for your troops? He reached Little Rock on the 31st of May.
You came here in August. I sent my agents to Richmond, for money and
clothing, in June and July. I never asked either of _you_ for
_any_ thing. I could procure for _my_ command all I wanted.
You and he were Major Generals; I, only a Brigadier; and Brigadiers
are plenty as blackberries in season. It is to be supposed that if I
could procure money, clothing and supplies for _Indians_, you and
he could do so for white troops. Both of you come blundering out
to Arkansas with nothing, and supply yourselves with what _I_
procure. Some officers would be ashamed _so_ to supply
deficiencies caused by their own want of foresight, energy or sense.

_You_ do not even know you need an Engineer, until one of mine
comes by, with $20,000 in his hands for Engineer Service in the

Indian Territory, some of which belongs to _me_ for advances
made, and with stationery and instruments procured by _me_, for
_my_ Department, in Richmond, a year ago; and _then_ you
find out that there are such things as Engineers, and that you need
one; and you seize on Engineer, money, and stationery. You even take,
notwithstanding Paragraph VI, of General Orders No. 50, the stationery
procured by me for the Adjutant General's Office of my Department, by
purchase in Richmond in December, 1861; for the want of which I had
been compelled to permit my own private stock to be used for months.

I no longer wonder that you do these things. When you told me that you
could not judge me fairly, because I told the Indians that others had
done them injustice, you confessed much more than you intended. It
was a pregnant sentence you uttered. By it you judged and convicted
yourself, and pronounced _your own sentence_, when you uttered

The Federal authorities were proposing to the Indians _at the very
time when you stopped their clothing and money_, that, if they
would return to the old Union, they should not be asked to take up
arms, their annuities should be paid them in money, the negroes taken
from them be restored, all losses and damage sustained by them be paid
for, and they be allowed to retain, as so much clear profit, what had
been paid them by the Confederate States. It was a liberal offer and
a great temptation, to come at the moment when you and Hindman were
felicitously completing your operations, and when there were no
breadstuffs in their country, and they and their women and children
were starving and half-naked. You chose an admirable opportunity to
rob, to disappoint, to outrage and exasperate them, and make your own
Government fraudulent and contemptible in their eyes. If any human
action _can_ deserve it, the hounds of hell ought to hunt your
soul and Hindman's for it through all eternity.

Instead of co-operating with the Federal authorities, and doing all
that he and you _could_ do to induce the Indians to listen to
and accept their propositions, _he_ had better have expelled the
enemy from Arkansas or "have perished in the attempt;" and you
had better have marched on Helena, before its fortifications were
finished, and purged the eastern part of the State of the enemy's
presence. If you had succeeded as admirably in that, as you have in

the Indian Country, you would have merited the eternal gratitude of
Arkansas, instead of its execrations; and the laurel, instead of a
halter. I said that you and your Lieutenant had left _nothing_
undone. I repeat it. Take another _small_ example. Until I left
the command, at the end of July, the Indian troops had regularly had
their half rations of coffee. As soon as I was got rid of, an order
from Gen. Hindman took all the remaining coffee, some 3,000 lbs.,
to Fort Smith. Even in this small matter, he could not forego an
opportunity of injuring and disappointing them.

You asked me, in August, what was the need of any white troops at all,
in the Indian Country; and you said that the few mounted troops, I
had, if kept in the Northern part of the Cherokee Country, would have
been enough to repel any Federal force that ever would have entered
it. As you and Hindman never allowed any ammunition procured by me, to
reach the Indian Country, if you could prevent it, whether I obtained
it at Richmond or Corinth, or in Texas, and as you approve of his
course in taking out of that country all that was to be found in it, I
am entitled to suppose that you regarded ammunition for the Indians
as little necessary, as troops to protect them in conformity to the
pledge of honor of the Government. One thing, however, is to be said
to the credit of your next in command. When he has ordered anything
to be seized, he has never denied having done so, or tried to cast
responsibility on an inferior. After you had written to me that you
had ordered Col. Darnell to seize, at Dallas, Texas, ammunition
furnished by me, you denied to him, I understand, that you had given
the order. Is it so? and _did_ he refuse to trust the order in
your hands, or even to let you see it, but would show it to Gen.

Probably you know by this time, if you are capable of learning
_any_ thing, whether any white troops are needed in the Indian
Country. The brilliant result of Gen. Hindman's profound calculations
and masterly strategy, and of his long-contemplated invasion of
Missouri, is before the country; and the disgraceful rout at Fort
Wayne, with the manoeuvres and results on the Arkansas, are pregnant
commentaries on the abuse lavished on me, for not taking "the line of
the Arkansas," or making Head Quarters on Spring River, with a force
too small to effect any thing any where.

I have not spoken of your Martial Law and Provost Marshals

in the Indian Country, and your seizure of salt-works there, or, in
detail, of your seizure of ammunition procured by me in Texas, and on
its way to the Indian troops, of the withdrawal of all white troops
and artillery from their country, of the retention for other troops
of the mountain howitzers procured by me for Col. Waitie, and the
ammunition sent me, for them and for small arms, from Richmond. This
letter is but a part of the indictment I will prefer bye and bye, when
the laws are no longer silent, and the constitution and even public
opinion no longer lie paralyzed under the brutal heel of
Military Power; and when the results of your _im_policy and
_mis_management shall have been fully developed.

But I have a word or two to say as to myself. From the time when I
entered the Indian Country, in May, 1861, to make Treaties, until the
beginning of June, 1862, when Gen. Hindman, in the plentitude of his
self-conceit and folly, assumed absolute control of the Military and
other affairs of the Department of Indian Territory, and commenced
plundering it of troops, artillery and ammunition, dictating Military
operations, and making the Indian country an appanage of Northwestern
Arkansas, there was profound peace throughout its whole extent. Even
with the wild Camanches and Kiowas, I had secured friendly relations.
An unarmed man could travel in safety and alone, from Kansas to Red
River, and from the Arkansas line to the Wichita Mountains. The Texan
frontier had not been as perfectly undisturbed for years. We had
fifty-five hundred Indians in service, under arms, and they were as
loyal as our own people, little as had been done by any one save
myself to keep them so, and much as had been done by others to
alienate them. They referred all their difficulties to me for
decision, and looked to me alone to see justice done them and the
faith of Treaties preserved.

Most of the time without moneys (those sent out to that Department
generally failing to reach it) I had managed to keep the white and
Indian troops better fed than any other portion of the troops of
the Confederacy any where. I had 26 pieces of artillery, two of the
batteries as perfectly equipped and well manned as any, any where. I
had on hand and on the way, an ample supply of ammunition, after
being once plundered. While in command, _I had procured, first and
last_, 36,000 pounds of rifle and cannon powder. If you would like
to know, sir, how I effected this, in the face

of all manner of discouragements and difficulties, it is no secret. My
disbursing officers can tell you who supplied them with funds for many
weeks, and whose means purchased horses for the artillery. Ask the
Chickasaws and Seminoles who purchased the only shoes they had
received--four hundred pairs, at five dollars each, procured and paid
for by _me_, in Bonham, and which I sent up to them after I was
taken "in personal custody" in November.

_You_ dare pretend, sir, that _I_ might be disloyal, or
even in thought couple the word Treason with _my_ name. What
_peculiar_ merit is it in _you_ to serve on our side in this
war? You were bred a soldier, and your only chance for distinction
lay in obtaining promotion in the army, and in the army of the
Confederacy. You _were_ Major, or something of the sort, in the
old army, and you _are_ a Lieutenant General. Your reward I
think, for what you have done or not done, is sufficient.

I was a private citizen, over fifty years of age, and neither needing
nor desiring military rank or civil honors. I accepted the office of
Commissioner, at the President's _solicitation_. I took that of
Brigadier General, with all the odium that I knew would follow it, and
fall on me as the Leader of a force of Indians, knowing there would be
little glory to be reaped, and wanting no promotion, simply and solely
to see _my_ pledges to the Indians carried out, to keep them
loyal to us, to save their country to the Confederacy, and to preserve
the Western frontier of Arkansas and the Northern frontier of Texas
from devastation and desolation.

What has been my _reward_? All my efforts have been rendered
nugatory, and my attempts even to _collect_ and _form_ an
army frustrated, by the continual plundering of my supplies and means
by other Generals, and your and their deliberate efforts to disgust
and alienate the Indians. Once before this, an armed force was sent to
arrest me. You all disobeyed the President's orders, and treated me as
a criminal for endeavoring to have them carried out. The whole
country swarms with slanders against me; and at last, because I felt
constrained reluctantly to re-assume command, after learning that the
President would not accept my resignation, I am taken from Tishomingo
to Washington, a prisoner, under an armed guard, it having been deemed
necessary, for the sake of effect, to send two hundred and fifty men
into the Indian Country to arrest me. _The Senatorial election was
at hand_.

I had, unaided and alone, _secured_ to the Confederacy a
magnificent country, equal in extent, fertility, beauty and resources
to any of our States--nay, superior to any. I had secured the means,
in men and arms, of keeping it. I knew how only it could be defended.
I asked no aid of any of you. I only asked to be let alone. Verily, I
have my reward also, as Hastings had his, for winning India for the
British Empire.

It is _your_ day _now_. You sit above the laws and domineer
over the constitution. "Order reigns in Warsaw." But bye and bye,
there will be a _just_ jury empannelled, who will hear _all_
the testimony and decide impartially--no less a jury than the People
of the Confederate States; and for their verdict as to myself, I and
my children will be content to wait; as also for the sure and stern
sentence and universal malediction, that will fall like a great wave
of God's just anger on you and the murderous miscreant by whose malign
promptings you are making yourself accursed.

Whether I am respectfully yours, you will be able to determine from
the contents of this letter.

ALBERT PIKE, _Citizen of Arkansas_.
THEOPHILUS H. HOLMES, Major General &c.



ABEL, ANNIE HELOISE, editor. The official correspondence of James S.
Calhoun (Washington, D.C., 1915).


BISHOP, ALBERT WEBB. Loyalty on the frontier, or sketches of union men
of the southwest (St. Louis, 1863).

embracing much of the territory included in the old St. Louis
Superintendency, was established in 1851 under an act of congress,
approved February 27 of that year.[977] Its headquarters were at St.
Louis from the date of its founding to 1859,[978] at St. Joseph
from that time to July, 1865,[979] at Atchison, from July, 1865 to
1869,[980] and at Lawrence, from 1869 to 1878.

In February of 1878, J.H. Hammond, who was then in charge of the
superintendency, reported upon its records to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.[981] He spoke of the existence of "eight cases
containing _Books, Records, Papers_," and he enclosed with
his report schedules of the contents of certain boxes labelled
A,B,C,D,E,F,H,L. Of Box A, the schedule appertaining gave this
information: "Old Records, Files, Memoranda, etc., Miscellaneous
Papers accumulated prior to 1869, when Enoch Hoag became
Sup'tCent.Sup'tcy." More particularly, Box A contained "One Bundle Old
Treaties of various years, three (bundles) of Agency Accounts," and,
for the period of 1830-1833, it contained "One Bundle Ancient Maps,"
and one of "Old Bills and Papers."

The collection as a whole, undoubtedly sent into the United States
Indian Office as Hammond reported upon it, has long since been
irretrievably broken up and its parts distributed. Knowing this the

[Footnote 977: 9 _United States Statutes at Large_, p. 586, sec.
2; Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 44, p. 259.]

[Footnote 978: Greenwood to Robinson, November 21, 1859, Ibid.,
no. 62, p. 272.]

[Footnote 979: Dole to Murphy, June 23, 1865, Ibid., no. 77, p.

[Footnote 980: Parker to Hoag, May 26, 1869, Ibid., no. 90, p.

[Footnote 981: Dr. William Nicholson, who succeeded Enoch Hoag as
superintendent, was ordered to deliver the records to Hammond [Hoyt
to Nicholson, telegram, January 15, 1878, Office of Indian Affairs,
_Correspondence of the Civilization Division_]. Hammond forwarded
the records to Washington, D.C., February 11, 1878.]

investigator is fain to deplore the advent of "efficiency" methods
into the government service. Such efficiency, when interpreted by the
ordinary clerk, has ever meant confusion where once was order and a
dislocation that can never be made good. From the break-up, in the
instance under consideration, the following books have been recovered:

  Letter Book, July 25, 1853 to May 10, 1861.
        "      November 1, 1859 to February 5, 1863.
        "      February, 1863.
        "      "Letters to Commissioner of Indian Affairs," May 23, 1855
               to October 31, 1859.
        "      "Letters to Commissioner," "Records," February 14, 1863
               to June 6, 1868.
        "      "District of Nebraska, Letters to Commissioner," June 6,
               1868 to April 10, 1871.
        "      April 12, 1871 to February 21, 1874.
        "      "Letters to Commissioner," February 21, 1874 to October
               22, 1875.
        "      "Letters to Commissioner," October 25, 1875 to January
               31, 1876.
        "      "Letters to Agents," October 4, 1858 to December 12, 1867.
        "      "Letters Sent to Agents, District of Nebraska," December
               12, 1867 to August 22, 1871.

Account Book of Central Superintendency, being Abstract of
Disbursements, 1853 to 1865.


These papers, miscellaneous in character and now located in the
Archives Division of the Adjutant General's Office of the United
States War Department, seem to have belonged personally to President
Davis or to have been retained by him. Among them is Albert Pike's
Report of the Indian negotiations conducted by him in 1861.

---- Journal of the Congress, 1861-1865.

United States Senate _Executive Documents_, 58th congress, second
session, no. 234.

Private Laws of the Confederate States of America, First Congress
(Richmond, 1862).

Private Laws of the Confederate States of America, Second Congress
(Richmond, 1864).

Provisional and Permanent Constitutions of the Confederate States and
Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the Provisional Congress
(Richmond, 1861).

Public Laws of the Confederate States of America, 1863-1864 (Richmond,

Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, First
Congress, edited by J.M. Matthews (Richmond, 1862).

Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate
States of America from February 8, 1861 to February 18, 1862, together
with the Constitution for the Provisional Government and the Permanent
Constitution of the Confederate States, and the

Treaties Concluded by the Confederate States with the Indian Tribes,
edited by J.M. Matthews (Richmond, 1864).

Statutes at Large of the Confederate States, commencing First Session
of the First Congress and including First Session of the Second
Congress, edited by J.M. Matthews (Richmond, 1864).

Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Second
Congress (Richmond, 1864).

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. Papers of the Adjutant and Inspector
General's Office.

Special Orders (Richmond, 1862).

General Orders, January, 1862 to December, 1863 (Columbia, 1863).

General Orders for 1863 (Richmond, 1864).

Special Orders (Richmond, 1864).

General Orders, January 1, to June 30, 1864, compiled by R.C.
Gilchrist (Columbia, 1864).

---- "Pickett Papers."

State papers of the Southern Confederacy now lodged in the Library
of Congress. Had Pike continued to prosecute his mission under the
auspices of the State Department, these papers would undoubtedly have
contained much of value for the present work, but as it is they yield
only an occasional document and that of very incidental importance.
The papers used were found in packages 81, 86, 88, 93, 95, 106, 107,
109, 113, 118. The "Pickett Papers" were originally in the hands of
Secretary Benjamin. After coming into the possession of the United
States government, they were at first confided to the care of the
Treasury Department and were handed over later, by direction of the
president, to the Library of Congress. The fact of their being in the
charge of the Treasury Department explains the circumstance of its
possession of the original treaty made by Pike with the Comanches, and
the fact that that manuscript turned up long after the main body of
"Pickett Papers" had been transferred to the Congressional Library
suggests the possibility that detached Confederate records may yet
repose in the recesses of the Treasury archives. Between the dates of
their consignment and their transfer, they must have become to some
degree disintegrated. The War Department borrowed some of the Pickett
Papers for inclusion in the _Official Records of the War of the

---- Records, or Archives.

Among these, which are to-day in the War Department in charge of the
Chief Clerk of the Adjutant-general's Office, are the following:

Chap. 2, no. 258, Letter Book, Brig. Gen. D.H. Cooper, C.S.A., Ex
officio Indian Agent, etc., May 10-27, 1865 (File Mark, W. 236).

It is a mere fragment. Its wrapper bears the following endorsement:
War Department, Archive Office, Chap. 2, No. 258.

Chap. 2, no. 270, Letter Book, Col. and Brig. Gen. Win. Steele's

The contents are,

a. A few letters dealing with Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, March to
July, 1862, pp. 7-22. These letters emanated from the

authority of William Steele, Colonel of the Seventh Regiment of Texas
Mounted Volunteers.

b. Letters dealing with matters in the Department of Indian Territory,
January 8, 1863 to May 18, 1863, pp. 27-254. Pages 1-6, 23-26, and 47
and 48 are missing.

The list of the whole, as given, is,

Letters Sent--Col. and Brig. Gen. Wm. Steele's command--Mch. 7, 1862
to May 18, 1863, viz.,

1. 7th Regt Texas M. Vols. Mch. 7 to June 20/62

2. Dept. New Mexico, June 24/62

3. Forces of Arizona, July 12, 1862.

4. Dept of Indian Territory, Jan. 8-12, 1863

5. 1st Div. 1st. Corps Trans-Miss. Dept., Jan. 13-20, 1863.

6. Dept. of Indian Territory, Jan. 21 to May 18, 1863.

Chap. 2, no. 268, Letters Sent, Department of Indian Territory, from
May 19, 1863 to September 27, 1863.

This is another William Steele letter book, but is not quite complete.
In point of time covered, it succeeds no. 270 and is itself succeeded
by no. 267.

Chap. 2, no. 267, Letters Sent, September 28, 1863 to June 17, 1864.

Pages 3 to 6, inclusive, are missing and there are no letters after
page 119.

Chap. 2, no. 259, Inspector General's Letters and Reports, from April
23, 1864, to May 15, 1865.

The cover has this as title: Letter Book A: Insp't Gen'l's
Office--Dis't of Indian Ter'y From April 23rd, 1864 to May 15, 1865.
On the inside of the front cover, appears this in pencil: "Received
from Gen'l M.J. Wright, Oct. 16/79." Some pages at the beginning of
the book have been cut out. Between pages 145 and 196, are reports,
variously signed, some by E.E. Portlock, some by N.W. Battle, and some
by James Patteson.

Chap. 2, no. 260, District of the Indian Territory, Inspector
General's Letter Book, April 23, 1864 to January 7, 1865.

"Received from Gen'l M.J. Wright, Oct. 16/79." From a comparison of
nos. 259 and 260, it is seen that no. 259 is a rough letter and report
book and that no. 260 is a finished product. The 1864 material in no.
259 is duplicated by that in no. 260.

Chap. 7, no. 36. Indian Treaties.

Chap. 7, no. 48. Regulations adopted by the War Department, on the
15th of April 1862, for carrying into effect the Acts of Congress of
the Confederate States, Relating to Indian Affairs, etc. (Richmond,

On page 1, is to be found, "Regulations for Carrying into effect, the
Act of Congress of the Confederate States, approved May 21, 1861,
entitled An Act for the protection of certain Indian Tribes, and of
other Acts relating to Indian Affairs."

FORT SMITH PAPERS. See Abel, _The American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, p. 361.

GREELEY, HORACE. The American conflict (Hartford, 1864-1867), 2 vols.

INDIAN BRIGADE, Inspection Reports of, for 1864 and 1865. These were
loaned for perusal by Luke F. Parsons, who was brigade inspector under
Colonel William A. Phillips.

KAPPLER, CHARLES J., compiler and editor. Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties. United States Senate Documents, 58th congress, second
session, no. 319, 2 vols. Supplementary volume, United States Senate
Documents, 62nd congress, second session, no. 719.

LEEPER PAPERS. See Abel, _The American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist_, pp. 360, 362.

LINCOLN, ABRAHAM. Complete Works, edited by John G. Nicolay and John
Hay (New York, 1890), 10 vols.

MCPHERSON, EDWARD. Political History of the United States of America
during the Great Rebellion (Washington, D.C., 1864).

MISSIONARY HERALD, containing the proceeding of the American Board for
Foreign Missions (Boston), vols. 56, 57, 60.

MOORE, FRANK, editor. Rebellion Record: Diary of American Events (New
York, 1868), 11 vols. and a supplementary volume for 1861-1864.

PHILLIPS, WILLIAM ADDISON. Conquest of Kansas by Missouri and her
allies (Boston, 1856).

"PIKE PAPERS." On subjects other than Indian, extant manuscripts
written and received by Albert Pike are exceedingly numerous. One
collection of his personal papers is in the possession of Mr. Fred
Allsopp of Little Rock; but the largest proportion of those of more
general interest, as also of more special, is in the Scottish Rite
Temple, Washington, D.C., under the care of Mr. W.L. Boyden. Three
things only deserve particular mention; viz.,

a. Autobiography of General Albert Pike. A bound typewritten
manuscript, "from stenographic notes, furnished by himself."

b. Confederate States, a/c's with. These papers are in a small
file-box and are chiefly receipts from John Crawford, Matthew Leefer,
Douglas H. Cooper, John Jumper, and

others for money advanced to them and vouchers for purchases made by
Pike. There are three personal letters in the box: D.H. Cooper to
Pike, July 28, 1873; William Quesenbury to Pike, August 10, 1873;
William Quesenbury to Pike, August 11, 1873. All three letters have
to do with a certain $5000 seemingly unaccounted for, a subject in
controversy between Pike and Cooper, reflecting upon the latter's
integrity. One of the papers is an itemized account of the money Pike
expended for the Indians, money "placed in his hands to be disbursed
among the Indian Tribes under Treaty stipulations in January, A.D.
1862." It contains an enclosure, the receipt signed by Edward Cross,
depositary, showing that Pike restored to the Confederate Treasury the
unexpended balance, $19,263 10/100 specie, $49,980 55/100, treasury
notes. The receipt is dated Little Rock, March 13, 1863.

c. Choctaw Case. Two packages of papers come under this heading. One
is of manuscript matter mainly, the other of printed matter solely.
In the latter is the _Memorial of P.P. Pitchlynn_, House
Miscellaneous Documents, no. 89, 43d congress, first session, and on
it Pike has inscribed, "Written by me, Albert Pike."

RICHARDSON, JAMES D., editor. Compilation of the messages and
papers of the Confederacy, including the diplomatic correspondence
(Nashville, 1905), 2 vols.

---- Compilation of the messages and papers of the presidents,
1789-1897 (Washington, 1896-1899), 10 vols.

United States of America. Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
_Reports_, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865.

---- Congressional Globe, 37th and 38th congresses, 1861-1865.

---- Department of the Interior, Files.

The files run in two distinct series. One series has its material
arranged in boxes, the other, in bundles. The former comprises letters
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs only, and has been examined to
the extent here given,

  No. 9, January 1, 1861 to December 1, 1861.
   "  10, December 1, 1861 to November 1, 1862.
   "  11, November 1, 1862 to July 1, 1863.
   "  12, July 1, 1863 to June 15, 1864.
   "  13, June 15, 1864 to April 1, 1865.

The latter were difficult of discovery. After an exhausting search,
however, they were located on a top-most shelf, under the roof, in
the file-room off from the gallery in the Patent Office building.
The bundles are small and each is bandaged as were the Indian Office
files, originally. The bandage, or wrapper, is labelled according to
the contents. For example, one bundle is labelled, "No. 1, 1849-1864,
War;" another, "No. 24, 1852-1868, Exec." In the first are letters
from the War Department, in the second, from the White House. Some of
the letters are from a

given department by reference only. A great number of the bundles have
nothing but a number to distinguish them,

  No. 53, January to June, 1865.
  "   54, July to August, 1865.
  "   55, September to December, 1865.
  "   56, January to December, 1866.

United States of America. Department of the Interior, Letter Books,
"Records of Letters Sent."

  No. 3, July 22, 1857 to January 3, 1862.
  "   4, January 3, 1862 to June 30, 1864.
  "   5. July 1, 1864 to December 12, 1865.
  "   6, December 14, 1865 to September 22, 1865.

---- Department of the Interior, Letter Press Books, "Letters, Indian

  No. 3, August 20, 1858 to March 5, 1862.
  "   4, March 5, 1862 to July 1, 1863.
  "   5. July 1, 1863 to June 22, 1864.
  "   6, June 22, 1864 to April 11, 1865.

Department of the Interior, Register Books, "Register of Letters
Received," Corresponding to the two series of files, are two series
of registers. One series is a register of letters received from the
Indian Office and each volume is labelled "Commissioner of Indian
Affairs." The particular volume used for the present work covers the
period from December 5, 1860 to January 6, 1866. It will be found
cited as "D," that being a designation given to it by Mr. Rapp, the
person at present in charge of the records. The second series is a
register of letters received from persons other than the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs. Each volume is labelled, "Indians."

  "Indians," No. 3, January 8, 1856 to October 27, 1861.
             ''  4, January 2, 1862 to December 27, 1865.

---- Office of Indian Affairs, Consolidated Files. During the last few
years and since the time when most of this investigation was made, the
various files of the Indian Office have been consolidated and, in many
cases, hopelessly muddled. It has been thought best to refer in the
text, wherever possible, to the old separate files, inasmuch as all
letter books and registers were kept with the separate filing in view.

---- Office of Indian Affairs,

General Files.

Central Superintendency, boxes 1860-1862, 1863-1868; Southern
Superintendency, boxes 1859-1862, 1863-1864, 1865, 1866; Cherokee,
1859-1865, 1865-1867, 1867-1869, 1869-1870; Chickasaw, 1854-1868;
Choctaw, 1859-1866; Creek, 1860-1869; Delaware, 1855-1861, 1862-1866;
Kansas, 1855-1862, 1863-1868; Kickapoo, 1855-1865; Kiowa, 1864-1868;
Miscellaneous, 1858-1863, 1864-1867, 1868-1869; Osage River,
1855-1862, 1863-1867;

Otoe, 1856-1862, 1863-1869; Ottawa, 1863-1872; Pottawatomie,
1855-1861, 1862-1865; Sac and Fox, 1862-1866; Seminole, 1858-1869;
Wichita, 1860-1861, 1862-1871.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Office of Indian Affairs, Irregularly-Shaped

This was a collection made for the convenience of the Indian Office.

The name itself is a sufficient explanation.

---- Office of Indian Affairs, John Ross Papers.

These were evidently part of the evidence furnished at the Fort Smith
Council, 1865.

---- Office of Indian Affairs, Land Files.

Central Superintendency, box 10, 1852-1869; Southern Superintendency,
1855-1870; Cherokee, box 21, 1850-1869; Choctaw, box 38, 1846-1873;
Creek, box 45, 1846-1873; Dead Letters, box 51; Freedmen in Indian
Territory, 2 boxes; Indian Talks, Councils, &c., box 3, 1856-1864, box
4, 1865-1866; Kansas, box 80, 1863-1865; Kickapoo, box 86, 1857-1868;
Miscellaneous, box 103, 1860-1870; Neosho, box 117, 1833-1865; New
York, box 130, 1860-1874; Osage, box 143, 1831-1873; Osage River, box
146, 1860-1866; Shawnee, box 190, 1860-1865; Special Cases, box 111,
"Invasion of Indian Territory by White Settlers;" Treaties, box 2,
1853-1863, box 3, 1864-1866.

---- Office of Indian Affairs, Special Files.

  No. 87, "Claims of Loyal Seminoles."
  " 106, "Claims of Delawares for Depredations, 1863."
  " 134, "Claims of Choctaws and Chickasaws."
  " 142,   "     "     "     "     "
  " 201, "Southern Refugees."
  " 284, "Claims of Creeks."

Kansas, box 78, 1860-1861, box 79, 1862; Otoe, box 153, 1856-1876;
Ottawa, box 155, 1863-1873; Pawnee, box 156, 1859-1877; Pottawatomie,
box 163, 1855-1865; Sac and Fox, box 177, 1860-1864, box 178,
1865-1868; Shawnee Deeds and Papers, box 195; Subsistence Indian
Prisoners, one box; Wyandott, box 242, 1836-1863, and many other
file boxes, with dates of the period under investigation, have been
examined but have yielded practically nothing of interest for the

Special Cases are quite distinct from Special Files. There are in all
two hundred three of the former and three hundred three of the latter.
There is in the Indian Office a small manuscript index to the Special
Cases and a folio index to the Special Files.

---- Office of Indian Affairs. Letter Books (letters sent). See Abel,
_The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, pp.

---- Office of Indian Affairs. Letters Registered (abstract of letters
received), ibid., p. 364.

---- Office of Indian Affairs, Miscellaneous Records, vol. viii,
April, 1852 to July, 1861; vol. ix, July, 1861 to January 22, 1887.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Office of Indian Affairs. Parker Letter
Book. Letters to E.S. Parker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and
others, 1869 to 1870.

---- Office of Indian Affairs. _Report Books_, Reports of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior. See
Abel, _The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, p.

UNITED STATES SENATE, Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, 37th congress, third session, no. 108 (1863), 3 vols.; 38th
congress, second session, no. 142 (1865), 3 vols. and Supplemental
Report (1866), 2 vols.

---- Committee Reports, no. 278, 36th congress, first session, being
testimony before a Select Committee of the Senate, appointed to
inquire into the Harper's Ferry affair.


Aside from the _Confederate Records_, which are not regular War
Department files, papers have been examined there for the Civil War
period, although not by any means exhaustively. Enough were examined,
however, to show reason for disparaging somewhat the work of the
editors of the _Official Records_. Apparently, the editors, half
of them northern sympathizers and half of them southern, proceeded
upon a principle of selection that necessitated exchanging courtesies
of omission.

WAR OF THE REBELLION. Compilation of the official records of the Union
and Confederate armies (Washington), 129 serial volumes and an index

The volumes used extensively in the present work were, _first
series_, volumes iii, viii, xiii, xxii, parts 1 and 2, xxvi, part
2, xxxiv, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, xli, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, xlviii,
parts 1 and 2, liii, supplement; _fourth series_, volume iii.


ABEL, ANNIE HELOISE. American Indian as slaveholder and secessionist
(Cleveland, 1915).

---- History of events resulting in Indian consolidation west of the

American Historical Association _Report_, 1906, 233-450.

---- Indian reservations in Kansas and the extinguishment of their

Kansas Historical Society _Collections_, vol. viii, 72-109.

ANDERSON, MRS. MABEL WASHBOURNE. Life of General Stand Watie (Pryor,
Oklahoma, 1915), pamphlet.

BADEAU, ADAM. Military history of U.S. Grant (New York, 1868), 3 vols.

BARTLES, WILLIAM LEWIS. Massacre of Confederates by Osage Indians in

Kansas Historical Society _Collections_, vol. iii, 62-66.

Biographical Congressional Directory, 1774-1903.

House Documents, 57th congress, second session, no. 458 (Washington,
D.C., 1903).

BLACKMAR, FRANK W. Life of Charles Robinson (Topeka, 1902).

BLAINE, JAMES G. Twenty years of Congress, 1860-1880 (Norwich,
Connecticut, 1884-1886), 2 vols.

(Durham, North Carolina, 1913).

BORLAND, WILLIAM P. General Jo. O. Shelby.

Missouri _Historical Review_, vol. vii, 10-19.

BOUTWELL, GEORGE SEWALL. Reminiscences of sixty years in public
affairs (New York, 1902), 2 vols.

BOYDEN, WILLIAM L. The character of Albert Pike as gleaned from his

_New Age Magazine_, March 1915, pp. 108-111.

BRADFORD, GAMALIEL. Confederate portraits.

"Judah P. Benjamin," _Atlantic Monthly_, June, 1913; "Alexander
H. Stephens," Ibid., July, 1913; "Robert Toombs," Ibid.,
August, 1913.

BRITTON, WILEY. Memoirs of the rebellion on the border, 1863 (Chicago,

---- The Civil War on the border (New York, 1899), 2 vols.

BROTHERHEAD, WILLIAM. General Frémont and the injustice done him.

Yale University Library of American Pamphlets, vol. 22.

CAPERS, HENRY D. The life and times of C.G. Memminger (Richmond,

CARR, LUCIEN. Missouri: a bone of contention, American Commonwealth
series (Boston, 1896).

CHADWICK, ADMIRAL FRENCH ENSOR. Causes of the Civil War, American
Nation series (New York, 1907), vol. xix.

CLAYTON, POWELL. The aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas (New York,

CONNELLEY, WILLIAM E. James Henry Lane: the grim chieftain of Kansas
(Topeka, 1899).

---- Quantrill and the border wars (Cedar Rapids, 1910).

CORDLEY, RICHARD. Pioneer days in Kansas (Boston, 1903).

COX, JACOB DOLSON. Military reminiscences of the Civil War (New York,
1900), 2 vols.

CRAWFORD, SAMUEL J. Kansas in the sixties (Chicago, 1911).

CURRY, J.L.M. Civil history of the government of the Confederate
States with some personal reminiscences (Richmond, 1901).

DANA, C.A. Recollections of the Civil War (New York, 1898).

DAVIS, JEFFERSON. Rise and fall of the Confederate government (New
York, 1881), 2 vols.

DAVIS, JOHN P. Union Pacific Railway (Chicago, 1894).

DAWSON, CAPTAIN F.W. Reminiscences of Confederate service, 1861-1865
(Charleston, 1882).

DRAPER, J.W. History of the American Civil War (New York, 1867-1870),
3 vols.

DYER, FREDERICK H., compiler. Compendium of the war of the rebellion
(Des Moines, 1908).

EATON, RACHEL CAROLINE. John Ross and the Cherokee Indians (Menasha,
Wisconsin, 1914).

EDWARDS, JOHN NEWMAN. Shelby and his men (Cincinnati, 1867).

---- Noted guerrillas, or the warfare of the border (Chicago, 1877).

EGGLESTON, GEORGE CARY. History of the Confederate war: its causes and
conduct (New York, 1910), 2 vols.

EVANS, GENERAL CLEMENT A., editor. Confederate military history
(Atlanta, 1899), 10 vols.

FISHER, SYDNEY G. Suspension of habaes corpus during the war of the
rebellion. _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. iii, 454-488.

FISKE, JOHN. Mississippi Valley in the Civil War (Boston, 1900).

FITE, EMERSON DAVID. Social and industrial conditions in the North
during the Civil War (New York, 1910).

FORMBY, JOHN. American Civil War (New York, 1910).

FORNEY, J.W. Anecdotes of public men (New York, 1873-1881), 2 vols.

FOULKE, WILLIAM DUDLEY. Oliver P. Morton, life and important speeches
(Indianapolis, 1899), 2 vols.

GORDON, GENERAL JOHN B. Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York,

GORHAM, GEORGE C. Life and public services of Edwin M. Stanton (New
York, 1899), 2 vols.

GRANT, ULYSSES SIMPSON. Personal memoirs (New York, 1895), 2 vols.,
new edition, revised.

GREENE, FRANCIS VINTON. Mississippi, Campaigns of the Civil War series
(New York, 1882).

GROVER, CAPTAIN GEORGE S. Shelby raid, 1863. Missouri _Historical
Review_, vol. vi, 107-126.

---- The Price campaign of 1864.

Missouri _Historical Review_, vol. vi, 167-181.

HALLUM, JOHN. Biographical and pictorial history of Arkansas (Albany,

HODGE, DAVID M. Argument before the Committee of Indian Affairs of the
United States Senate, March 10, 1880, in support of Senate Bill, no.
1145, providing for the payment of awards' made to the Creek Indians
who enlisted in the Federal army, loyal refugees, and freedmen
(Washington, D.C., 1880), pamphlet.

---- Is-ha-he-char, and Co-we Harjo. To the Committee on Indian

Affairs of the House of Representatives of the 51st congress in the
matter of the claims of the loyal Creeks for losses sustained during
the late rebellion (Washington, D.C.), pamphlet.

HOSMER, JAMES KENDALL. Appeal to arms, American Nation series (New
York, 1907), vol. xx.

---- Outcome of the Civil War, American Nation series (New York,
1907), vol. xxi.

HOUCK, LOUIS. History of Missouri (Chicago, 1908), 3 vols.

HULL, AUGUSTUS LONGSTREET. Campaigns of the Confederate army (Atlanta,

HUMPHREY, SETHK. The Indian dispossessed (Boston, 1906), revised

HUNTER, MOSES H., editor. Report of the military services of General
David Hunter, U.S.A., during the war of the rebellion. (New York,
1873), second edition.

JOHNSON, ROBERT UNDERWOOD and Clarence Clough Buel, editors. Battles
and leaders of the Civil War (New York, 1887), 4 vols.

JOHNSTON, GENERAL JOSEPH E. Narrative of military operations during
the late war (New York, 1874).

Johnston (New York, 1878).

LEWIS, WARNER. Civil War reminiscences. Missouri _Historical
Review_, vol. ii, 221-232.

LIVERMORE, WILLIAM ROSCOE. The story of the Civil War (New York,
1913), part iii, books 1 and 2.

LOVE, WILLIAM DELOSS. Wisconsin in the war of the rebellion (Chicago,

LOWMAN, HOVEY E. Narrative of the Lawrence massacre [Lawrence, 1864],

LUBBOCK, F.R. Six decades in Texas, or memoirs, edited by C. W. Raines
(Austin, 1890).

MCCLURE, A.K. Abraham Lincoln and men of war times (Philadelphia,
1892), fourth edition.

MCDOUGAL, JUDGE H.C. A decade of Missouri politics, 1860 to 1870, from
a Republican Viewpoint. Missouri _Historical Review_, vol. iii,

MCKIM, RANDOLPH H. Numerical strength of the Confederate army (New
York, 1912).

MCLAUGHLIN, JAMES. My friend, the Indian (Boston, 1910).

MANNING, EDWIN C. Biographical, historical, and miscellaneous
selections (Cedar Rapids, 1911).

MARTIN, GEORGE W. First two years of Kansas (Topeka, 1907), pamphlet.

MERRIAM, G.S. Life and times of Samuel Bowles (New York, 1885).

NOBLE, JOHN W. Battle of Pea Ridge, or Elk Horn tavern (St. Louis,
1892). War papers and personal recollections, 1861-1865, published by
the Commandery of the State of Missouri.

PELZER, LOUIS. Marches of the dragoons in the Mississippi Valley (Iowa
City, 1917).

PHILLIPS, JUDGE JOHN F. Hamilton Rowan Gamble and the provisional
government of Missouri. Missouri _Historical Review_, vol. v,

PHISTERER, FREDERICK, compiler. Statistical record of the armies of
the United States (New York, 1890).

PUMPELLY, RAPHAEL. Across America and Asia (New York, 1870), third
edition, revised.

REAGAN, JOHN H. Memoirs with special reference to secession and the
Civil War, edited by W.F. McCaleb (New York, 1906).

REYNOLDS, JOHN HUGH. Makers of Arkansas, Stories of the States series
(New York, 1905).

---- Presidential reconstruction in Arkansas.

Arkansas Historical Association _Publications_, vol. i, 352-361.

RHODES, JAMES FORD. History of the United States from the compromise
of 1850 (New York, 1893-1906), 7 vols.

RIDDLE, ALBERT GALLATIN. Recollections of war times (New York, 1895).

ROBINSON, CHARLES. Kansas conflict (Lawrence, 1898). Roman, Alfred.
Military operations of General Beauregard (New York, 1884), 2 vols.

ROPES, JOHN C. Story of the Civil War (New York, 1895-1905), parts 1
and 2.

ROSENGARTEN, JOSEPH GEORGE. The German soldier in the wars of the
United States (Philadelphia, 1886).

ROSS, MRS.W.P. Life and times of William P. Ross (Fort Smith, 1893).

SCHOFIELD, JOHN MCALLISTER. Forty-six years in the army (New York,

SCHURZ, CARL. Reminiscences (New York, 1909), 3 vols.

SHEA, JOHN C. Reminiscences of Quantrill's raid upon the city of
Lawrence, Kansas (Kansas City, Mo., 1879), pamphlet.

SHERIDAN, PHILIP H. Personal memoirs (New York, 1888), 2 vols.

SHERMAN, GENERAL WILLIAM T. Home letters, edited by M.A. DeWolfe Howe
(New York, 1909).

---- Memoirs (New York, 1875), 2 vols.

SHINN, JOSEPH H. History of education in Arkansas (Washington, D.C.,

United States Bureau of Education, _Publications_.

SHOEMAKER, FLOYD C. Story of the Civil War in northeast Missouri

Missouri _Historical Review_, vol. vii, 63-75, 113-131.

SMITH, GUSTAVUS W. Confederate war papers (New York, 1884), second

SMITH, WILLIAM HENRY. Political history of slavery (New York, 1903), 2

SNEAD, THOMAS L. Fight for Missouri (New York, 1886).

SPEER, JOHN. Life of Gen. James H. Lane, "the liberator of Kansas."
(Garden City, Kansas, 1896).

SPRING, LEVERETT. Career of a Kansas politician (James H. Lane).

_American Historical Review_, vol. iv, 80-104.

---- Kansas: the prelude to the war for the union, American
Commonwealth series (Boston, 1892).

STANTON, R.L. Church and the rebellion (New York, 1864).

STEARNS, FRANK PRESTON. Life and public services of George Luther
Stearns (Philadelphia, 1907).

STEPHENS, ALEXANDER H. Constitutional view of the late war between the
states (Philadelphia, 1870), 2 vols.

STOREY, MOORFIELD. Charles Sumner, American Statesmen series (Boston,

SUMNER, CHARLES. Works (Boston, 1874-1883), 15 vols.

TENNEY, WILLIAM J. Military and naval history of the rebellion in the
United States (New York, 1866).

THAYER, WILLIAM ROSCOE. Life and letters of John Hay (Boston, 1915), 2

THORNDIKE, RACHAEL SHERMAN, editor. Sherman letters (New York, 1894).

TODD, ALBERT. Campaigns of the rebellion (Manhattan, Kansas, 1884).

VAN DEVENTER, HORACE. Albert Pike (Knoxville, 1909).

VIOLETTE, E.M. Battle of Kirksville, August 6, 1862. Missouri
_Historical Review_, vol. v, 94-112.

VICTOR, ORVILLE J., editor. Incidents and anecdotes of the war (New
York, 1862).

VILLARD, HENRY. Memoirs (Boston, 1904), 2 vols.

VILLARD, OSWALD GARRISON. John Brown, 1800-1859 (Boston, 1910).

WHITFORD, WILLIAM CLARKE. Colorado volunteers in the Civil War
(Denver, 1906).

WIGHT, S.A. General Jo. O. Shelby. Missouri _Historical Review_,
vol. vii, 146-148.

WILDER, DANIEL W. Annals of Kansas (Topeka, 1875).

WILLIAMS, CHARLES R. Rutherford Birchard Hayes (Boston, 1914), 2 vols.

WILLIAMS, R.H. With the border ruffians: memoirs of the far west,
1852-1868, edited by E.W. Williams (London, 1908).

WILSON, CALVIN D. Negroes who owned slaves (_Popular Science
Monthly_, vol. lxxxi, no. 5, 483-494).

WILSON, HILL P. John Brown: soldier of fortune (Lawrence, 1913).

WOODBURN, JAMES ALBERT. Life of Thaddeus Stevens (Indianapolis, 1913).

WRIGHT, MARCUS J. General officers of the Confederate army (New York,


Abbott, James B: 204, _footnote_, 236, _footnote_

Abel, Annie Heloise: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 14, 57,
75, 85, 172, 183, 190, 226, 241, 260

Absentee Shawnees: 205, _footnote_

Acadians: removal of, 304, _footnote_

Adair, W. P: 268, _footnote_, 277, _footnote_, 326 and

Adams, C. W: 333

Ah-pi-noh-to-me: 108, _footnote_

Aldrich, Cyrus: 225, _footnote_, 229, _footnote_

Alexander, A. M: 267, _footnote_

Allen's Battery: 146

Allen County (Kans.): 82, _footnote_

Aluktustenuke: 94, _footnote_, 108, _footnote_

Amnesty Proclamation: 322

Anderson, Mrs. Mabel Washbourne: work cited in _footnotes_ on
pages 127, 130, 138, 194, 197, 271, 272, 288

Anderson, S. S: 265, _footnote_

Arapahoes: 274, _footnote_

Arizona Territory: 61-62

Arkadelphia (Ark.): 261

Arkansans: circulate malicious stories about Pike, 160,
_footnote_; lawless, 264; unable to decide arbitrarily about
Indian movements, 326

Arkansas: regards McCulloch as defender, 15; Van Dora's requisition
for troops, 25; Federals occupy northern, 34; Pike to call for aid,
36; attack from direction of, expected, 48; left in miserable plight
by Van Dorn, 128; army men exploited Pike's command, 150; R.W. Johnson
serves as delegate from, 175; R.W. Johnson becomes senator from in the
First Congress, 176; Thomas B. Hanly, representative from, introduces
bill for establishment of Indian superintendency, 176; disagreeable
experiences of Indians in, 177; Pike recommends separation of Indian
Territory from both Texas and, 179; unsafe to leave interests of
Indian Territory subordinated to those of, 246; political squabbles
in, 249, _footnote_; Indian Home Guards not intended for use in,
259; privilege of writ of _habeas corpus_ suspended, 269; Blunt
and Curtis want possession of western counties, 325

Arkansas and Red River Superintendency: 181; territorial limits, 177;
officials, 177-178; restrictions upon Indians and white men, 178;
Pike recommends organization, 179; Cooper seeks appointment as
superintendent, 179

Arkansas Military Board: 15, 16

Arkansas Post (Ark.): loss of, 270

Arkansas River: mentioned, 165, 192, 194, 216, 268, _footnote_,
272, _footnote_, 295; Pike's headquarters near junction with
Verdigris, 22; Pike to call troops to prevent descent, 36; Indian
refugees reach, 85; Indians flee across, 135; Campbell to examine
alleged position of enemy south, 136; Federals in possession of
country north of, 198; Stand Watie and Cooper pushed below, 220;
Phillips to hold line of, 251; Schofield desires control of entire
length of course, 260; Blunt patrolling, 293; Stand Watie to move
down, to vicinity of Fort Smith,

271, _footnote_; Osages, Pottawatomies, Cheyennes, and others to
gather on, 274-275, _footnote_; natural line of defence, 315;
seizure of supply boat on, 327

Arkansas State Convention: 16

Arkansas Volunteers: 60, _footnote_

Armstrong Academy (Okla.): meeting of Indian General Council at, 317;
unfortunate delay of Scott in reaching, 320; Southern Indians renew
pledge of loyalty to Confederate States at, 323

Army of Frontier: under Blunt, 196; regiments of Indian Home Guards
part of, 196; encamps on old battlefield of Pea Ridge, 197; gradual
retrogression into Missouri, 219, _footnote_; District of Kansas
to be separated from, 248

Atchison and Pike's Peak Railway Company: 230

Atrocities: Pike charged with giving countenance to, 30-31, 31,
_footnote_; degree of Pike's responsibility for, 32; repudiated
by Cherokee National Council, 32-33; become subject of correspondence
between opposing generals, 33; charged against Indians at Battle
of Wilson's Creek, 34, _footnote_; forbidden by Van Dorn, 36;
guerrilla, 44; influenced Halleck regarding use of Indian soldiers,
102; at Battle of Newtonia, 195; Blunts army accused of, 248,
_footnote_; Stand Watie's men commit, 332

Badeau, Adam: work cited, 96, _footnote_

Baldwin, A.H: 235, _footnote_

Bankhead, S.P: given command of Northern Sub-District of Texas,
286; Steele applies for assistance, 290; fails to appear, 291;
dissatisfaction with, 306, _footnote_

Barren Fork (Okla.): skirmish on, 312

Bartles, W.L: 237, _footnote_

Bass's Texas Cavalry: 276, _footnote_, 303, _footnote_, 306,

Bassett, Owen A: 123, _footnote_

Bates County (Mo.): 58, 304, _footnote_

Baxter Springs (Kans.): location, 121, 125, _footnote_; Weer
leaves Salomon and Doubleday at, 121; Indian encampment at, 125, 129;
negro regiment sent to, 259, 284; commissary train expected, 291;
massacre at, 304

Bayou Bernard: 163-164

Beauregard, Pierre G.T: devises plans for bringing Van Dorn east, 14,
_footnote_, 34; Hindman takes command under order of, 127, 186,
_footnote_, 190

Belmont (Kansas.): 274, _footnote_

Benge, Pickens: 132

Benjamin, Judah P: 22, 23, _footnote_, 24, _footnote_, 175,

Bennett, Joseph: 269, _footnote_

Bentonville (Ark.): 29, 216

Big Bend of Arkansas: 73, _footnote_, 274, _footnote_

Big Blue Reserve: 235, _footnote_

Big Hill Camp: 237, _footnote_

Big Mountain: 148, _footnote_

Billy Bowlegs: 68, _footnote_, 108, _footnote_, 228,

Biographical Congressional Directory: work cited, 59, _footnote_,
70, _footnote_

Bishop, Albert Webb: work cited, 219, _footnote_

Black Beaver Road: 67, _footnote_

Black Bob: 235, _footnote_, 236, _footnote_

Black Bob's Band: 204; to be distinguished from Absentee Shawnees,
204-205, _footnote_; lands raided by guerrillas, 205

Black Dog: 263, _footnote_

Blair, Francis P: 49

Blair, W.B: 290, _footnote_

Bleecker, Anthony: 41, _footnote_

Blue River (Okla.): 110

Blunt, James G: learns of designs of Drew's Cherokees, 33; avenges
burning of Humboldt, 53; succeeds Denver at Fort Scott, 98; in command
of reëstablished Department of Kansas, 106; reverses policy of Halleck
and Sturgis, 106-107 and _footnote_; promotion objected to, 107,
_footnote_; ideas on necessary equipment of Indian soldiers, 109;
Weer reports on subject of Cherokee relations, 136; forbids Weer to
make incursion into adjoining states, 139; orders white troops to
support Indian Brigade, 192-193; in charge of Army of Frontier, 196;
plans Second Indian Expedition, 196 and _footnotes_; promises to
return refugees to homes, 196, _footnote_, 203; opinion touching
profiteering, 208, 210-211; issue between, and Coffin, 210-211 and
_footnote_; promises return home to refugee Cherokees, 213;
vigorous policy, 218; achievements discounted by Schofield, 248, 249;
accusation of brutal murders and atrocities, 248, _footnote_;
makes headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, 249; wishes Phillips to
advance, 254, 257; advancement of Schofield obnoxious to, 260;
undertakes to go to Fort Gibson, 261, 286; in command of District of
Frontier, 286; victorious at Honey Springs, 288-289; decides to assume
offensive, 293; no faith in Indian soldiery, 294; transfers effects
from Fort Scott to Fort Smith, 304; relieved by McNeil, 305; summoned
to Washington for conference, 322 and _footnote_; restored to
command, 324; controversy with Thayer, 324

Bob Deer: 68, _footnote_

Boggs, W.R: 286, _footnote_

Boggy Depot (Okla.): 162, 284, 295, _footnote_, 296 and

Bogy, Lewis V: 235, _footnote_

Bonham (Texas): 302-303

Border Warfare: 16-17, 44

Boston Mountains: McCulloch and Price retreating towards, 26,
_footnote_; to push Confederate line northward of, 192

Boudinot, Elias C: Cherokee delegate in Confederate Congress, 180;
submits proposals to Cherokees, 279; active in Congress, 299,
_footnote_; coadjutor of Cooper and relative of Stand Watie, 300;
Steele forwards letter from, 307, _footnote_; Steele believes,
responsible for opposition, 311; urges plan of brigading upon
Davis, 317; suggests attaching Indian Territory to Missouri, 317,
_footnote_, 318, 321, _footnote_; reports to Davis, 321

Bourland, James: 312, _footnote_

Bowman, Charles S: 108

Branch, H.B: 48, _footnote_, 51, _footnote_, 74,
_footnote_, 116; charges against, 234, _footnote_

Breck, S: 324, _footnote_

Britton, Wiley: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 20, 22, 30,
35, 50, 51, 52, 55, 113, 118, 126, 131, 132, 146, 194, 196, 197, 198,
216, 218, 237, 249, 250, 257, 260, 271, 273

Brooken Creek (Okla.): 295, _footnote_

Brooks, William: 46, _footnote_, 47, _footnote_

Brown, E.B: 119, _footnote_, 127

Brown, John: 42, _footnote_

Browne, William M: 172, _footnote_

Bryan, G.M: 292, _footnote_

Buchanan, James: 41, 70, _footnote_

Buffalo Hump: 65, _footnote_

Burbank, Robert: 77, _footnote_

Bureau of Indian Affairs: created in Confederate War Dept, 172 and

Burlington (Kans.): 80

Burns, Robert: 26

Bushwhackers: 125, 236, _footnote_, 239, _footnote_, 260,
266, _footnote_

Buster, M.W: 194, _footnote_

Cabell, A.S: 270, _footnote_

Cabell, W.L: 277, _footnote_, 284 and _footnote_, 287, 289,
292, 297

Cabin Creek (Okla.): 131, 283-286 and _footnote_, 332

Caddoes: reported loyal to U.S., 66, _footnote_; in First
Indian Expedition, 115, _footnote_; encamped at Big Bend, 274,

Calhoun, James S: 260, _footnote_

Camden Campaign (Ark.): 326-327

Cameron, Simon: 56, 60, _footnote_, 72

Camp Bowen: 219, _footnote_

Camp Imochiah: 288, _footnote_

Camp McIntosh: 112, 153

Camp Quapaw: 146

Camp Radziwintski (Radziminski?): 153

Camp Ross, 255

Camp Stephens: 32, 35

Campbell, A.B: 81

Campbell, W.T: sent to reconnoitre, 136; halts at Fort Gibson, 136

Canadian River: 129, 162, 164, 293, 327

Canby, E.R.S: 335

Cane Hill (Ark.): 28, _footnote_, 218

Cantonment Davis (Okla.): established as Pike's headquarters, 22;
Indians gather at, 27; Cooper at, 169; Cooper's force flee to, 198

Carey's Ferry (Okla.): 192

Carey's Ford (Okla.): 126

Carney, Thomas: 211, _footnote_; named as suitable commissioner,
233, _footnote_

Carr, Eugene A: 30, _footnote_

Carriage Point: 111, _footnote_

Carrington, W.T: 296, _footnote_

Carruth, E.H: teacher among Indians, 59, 64, _footnote_; furthers
plan for inter-tribal council, 69; suspected of stirring up Indian
refugees against Coffin, 87-88 and _footnote_; refugee Creeks
want as agent, 89; satisfied with appointment to Wichita Agency, 89;
sent on mission, 122 and _footnote_, 133; in Cherokee Nation,
195, _footnote_; disapproves of attempting return of refugees,
209; Martin and, arrange for inter-tribal council, 273-275,

Carter, J.C: 208, _footnote_

Cass County (Mo.): 304, _footnote_

Cassville (Mo.): 293

Century Company's War Book: work cited, 13, _footnote_

Central Superintendent: 116-117

Chapman, J.B: 222 and _footnote_, 229, _footnote_

Chap-Pia-Ke: 69, _footnote_

Charles Johnnycake: 64, _footnote_

Chatterton, Charles W: 214, _footnote_

Cherokee Brigade: 309

Cherokee country: 193, 194

Cherokee Delegate: 111, _footnote_, 180

Cherokee Expedition: 73, _footnote_

Cherokee Nation: 47, _footnote_, 74, _footnote_, 111,
_footnote_; Clarkson to take command of all forces within, 130;
future attitude under consideration, 133; Weer suggests resumption of
allegiance to U.S., 134; Weer proposes abolition of slavery by vote,
134, _footnote_; intention to remain true to Confederacy, 135;
cattle plentiful, 145; Hindman designs to stop operations of wandering
mercantile companies, 156; maintenance of order necessary, 192;
archives and treasury seized, 193; Carruth and Martin in, 195,
_footnote_; Delaware District of, 197; deplorable condition
of country, 217; Boudinot, delegate in Congress from, 299,
_footnote_; Quantrill and his band pass into, 304

Cherokee National Council: ratifies treaty with Confederacy, 28,
_footnote_; opposed to atrocities, 32-33; resolutions against
atrocities, 33; assemblies, 255-256, legislative work, 256-257;
Federal victory at

Webber's Falls prevents convening, 271 and _footnote_; passage
of bill relative to feeding destitute Indians, 277, _footnote_;
adopts resolutions commendatory of Blunt's work, 305, _footnote_;
Stand Watie proposes enactment of conscription law, 329

Cherokee Neutral Lands (Kans.): 47, _footnote_, 53, 121, 125,
_footnote_; refugee Cherokees collect on, 213; refugees refuse
to vacate, 214; Pomeroy advocates confiscation of, 224; John Ross
and associates ready to consider retrocession of, 231-232 and

Cherokee Strip (Kans.): 79

Cherokee Treaty with Confederacy: ratified by National Council, 28,
_footnote_; Indians stipulated to fight in own fashion, 32

Cherokees: unwilling to have Indian Territory occupied by Confederate
troops, 15; civil war impending, 29; disturbances stirred up by bad
white men, 47, _footnote_, 48; effect of Federal defeat at
Wilson's Creek, 49; attitude towards secession, 63, _footnote_;
in First Indian Expedition, 115, _footnote_; driven from country,
116; flee across Arkansas River, 135; exasperated by Pike's retirement
to confines of Indian Territory, 159; outlawed, participate in Wichita
Agency tragedy, 183; demoralizing effect of Ross's departure, 193;
secessionist, call convention, 193; should be protected against
plundering, 195, _footnote_; refugee, on Drywood Creek, 209,
_footnote_, 213; repudiate alliance with Confederacy, 232;
approached by Steele through medium of necessities, 276; charge
Confederacy with bad faith, 279-281; asked to give military land
grants to white men in return for protection, 279-281; Blunt thinks
superior to Kansas tribes, 294; intent upon recovery of Fort Gibson,
311; troops pass resolution of reënlistment for war, 328-329

Chicago Tribune: 75, _footnote_

Chickasaw Battalion: 152, 155; Tonkawas to furnish guides for, 184,

Chickasaw Home Guards: 184, _footnote_

Chickasaw Legislature: 306, _footnote_, 329, _footnote_

Chickasaw Nation: Pike arrested at Tishomingo, 200; funds drawn upon
for support of John Ross and others, 215, _footnote_; Phillips
communicates with governor, 323, _footnote_

Chickasaws: discord within ranks, 29; attitude towards secession,
63, _footnote_; delegation of, and Creeks, and Kininola,
65, _footnote_; plundered by Osages and Comanches, 207,
_footnote_; refugee, given temporary home, 213; dissatisfied with
Cooper, 265, _footnote_; disperse, 323

Chiekies: 66, _footnote_

Chillicothe Band of Shawnees: 236, _footnote_

Chilton, W.P: 173, _footnote_

Chipman, N.P: 207, _footnote_

Chippewas: 212

Choctaw and Chickasaw Battalion: 25, 32

Choctaw Battalion: 152, 155

Choctaw Council: considers Blunt's proposals, 302; disposition towards
neutrality, 306, _footnote_; Phillips sends communication to,
323, _footnote_

Choctaw Militia: 311-312, 312, _footnote_

Choctaw Nation: Pike withdraws into, 110; Robert M. Jones, delegate
from, in Congress, 299, _footnote_; proposed conscription within,

Choctaws: discord bred by unscrupulous merchants, 29; attitude

towards secession, 63, _footnote_; refugee, given temporary home,
213; waver in allegiance to South, 220; sounded by Phillips, 254;
little recruiting possible while Fort Smith is in Confederate hands,
258-259; Steele entrusts recruiting to Tandy Walker, 265; no tribe so
completely secessionist as, 290; protest against failure to supply
with arms and ammunition, 301; proposals from Blunt known to have
reached, 302; cotton, 308-309, _footnote_; bestir themselves
as in first days of war, 311; principal chief opposes projects of
Armstrong Academy council, 321; want confederacy separate and distinct
from Southern, 321, _footnote_; do excellent service in Camden
campaign, 326

Choo-Loo-Foe-Lop-Hah Choe: talk, 68, _footnote_; signature, 69,

Chouteau's Trading House: 329, _footnote_

Christie: 305, _footnote_

Chustenahlah (Okla.): 79

Cincinnati (Ark.): 28, 35

Cincinnati Gazette: 58, _footnote_, 88, _footnote_

Clarimore: 238, _footnote_

Clark, Charles T: 82, _footnote_

Clark, George W: 158 and _footnote_

Clark, Sidney: 104, _footnote_

Clarke, G.W: 22

Clarkson, J.J: assigned to supreme command in northern part of Indian
Territory, 129-130; applies for permission to intercept trains on
Santa Fé road, 129, _footnote_; at Locust Grove, 131; surprised
in camp, 131, _footnote_; made prisoner, 132; Pike's reference
to, 158; placed in Cherokee country, 159, _footnote_

Clarksville (Ark.): 287-288, _footnote_

Clay, Clement C: 176, _footnote_

Cloud, William F: 193, 297

Cochrane, John: 56-57

Coffee, J.T: 113 and _footnote_, 125

Coffin, O.S: letter, 82 and _footnote_

Coffin, S.D: 208

Coffin, William G: testifies to disturbances among Osages, 46,
_footnote_; pays visit to ruins of Humboldt, 54, _footnote_;
plans for inter-tribal council, 69; orders countermanded for
enlistment of Indians, 77; learns of refugees in Kansas, 80; compelled
by settlers to seek new abiding-place for refugees, 86; refugees lodge
complaint against, 87 and _footnote_; military enrollment of
Indians conducted under authority of Interior Department, 105 and
_footnote_; applies for new instructions regarding First Indian
Expedition, 105; dispute with Elder, 116-117, 207, _footnote_;
anxious to have Osage offer accepted by refugee Creeks, 207-208,
_footnote_; disapproves of Blunt's plan for early return of
refugees, 209; issue between Blunt and, 210-211; contract with
Stettaner Bros. approved by Dole, 211, _footnote_; urges removal
of refugees to Sac and Fox Agency, 212; visits refugee Cherokees on
Neutral Lands, 213; details Harlan and Proctor to care for refugee
Cherokees at Neosho, 214; drafts Osage treaty of cession, 229;
suggests location for Indian colonization, 233; would reward Osage
massacrers, 238, _footnote_; prevails upon Jim Ned to stop
jayhawking, 274, _footnote_

Colbert, Holmes: 207, _footnote_

Colbert, Winchester: 184, _footnote_

Coleman, Isaac: 209

Collamore, George W: career, 87, _footnote_; investigation into
condition of refugees, 87, _footnote_

Colorado Territory: likely to be menaced by Southern Indians, 61;
conditions in, 61, _footnote_; recruiting officers massacred by

238, _footnote_; political squabbles in, 249, _footnote_;
harassed by Indians of Plains, 320; made part of restored Department
of Kansas, 321

Comanches: Pike's negotiation with, 63, _footnote_, 65,
_footnote_, 173, _footnote_; peaceable and quiet, 112; this
side of Staked Plains friendly, 153; Osages and, plunder Chickasaws,
207, _footnote_; reported encamped at Big Bend, 274,

Confederates: disposition to over-estimate size of enemy, 30,
_footnote_; defeat at Pea Ridge decisive, 34; should concentrate
on saving country east of Mississippi, 34; retreat from Pea Ridge, 35;
possible to fraternize with Federals, 44; victorious at Drywood
Creek, 51-52; in vicinity of Neosho, 127; no forces at hand to resist
invasion of Indian Territory, 147; defeat at Locust Grove counted
against Pike, 161; Cherokee country abandoned to, 193; in possession
as far north as Moravian Mission, 194; victory at Newtonia, 194-195
and _footnotes_; ill-success on Cowskin River and at Shirley's
Ford, 197; flee to Cantonment Davis, 198; officers massacred by
Osages, 237-238, _footnote_; grants to Indian Territory, 250;
foraging and scouting occupy, 253; distributing relief to indigents,

Congress, Confederate: authorizes Partisan Rangers, 112; Arkansas
delegates testify to Van Dorn's aversion for Indians, 148,
_footnote_; act of regulating intercourse with Indians, 169; act
for establishing Arkansas and Red River Superintendency, 177-178;
concedes rights and privileges to Indian delegates, 299,

Congress, United States: 71, 76, _footnote_, 86 and
_footnote_, 99; circumstances of refugees well-aired in, 209;
gives president discretionary power for relief of refugees, 209;
Osages memorialize for civil government, 229 and _footnote_; act
authorizing negotiations with Indian tribes, 231; decides to relieve
Kansas of Indian encumbrance, 294

Connelley, William E: work cited, 42 and _footnotes_ on pages 51,
101, 205, 239

Conway, Martin F: 72, _footnote_, 88, _footnote_, 107,

Cooley, D.N: 205, _footnote_

Cooper, Douglas H: colonel of First Regiment Choctaw and Chickasaw
Mounted Rifles, 25; communicates with Pike, 29, _footnote_;
objects to keeping Indians at home, 31, _footnote_; arrives at
Camp Stephens, 32, 35; protects baggage train on way to Elm Springs,
35; recommends Indians as guerrillas, 112; ordered to repair to
country north of Canadian River, 129, 154; orders Indian leaders to
report at Fort Davis, 137; regiment goes out of service, 153; views
on employment of Indians, 159 and _footnote_; Pike to hand over
command to, 162; transmits Pike's circular, 167, 169; orders arrest
of Pike, 169; calls for troops from all Indian nations, 174,
_footnote_; seeks to become superintendent of Indian affairs,
179; appointment withheld because of inebriety, 181; to attempt to
reënter southwest Missouri, 194; after Battle of Newtonia obliged to
fall back into Arkansas, 197; under orders from Rains, plans invasion
of Kansas, 197; defeated in Battle of Fort Wayne, 197-198; in
disgrace, 198; Steele preferred to, 246; not ranking officer of
Steele, 247, _footnote_, 300, _footnote_; force poorly
equipped, 248, _footnote_;

apparently bent upon annoying Steele, 265; can get plenty of beef,
272; influences to advance, at expense of Steele, 278, 306 and
_footnote_; orders Stand Watie to take position at Cabin Creek,
284-285; ammunition worthless at Honey Springs, 288; Boudinot
and, intrigue together, 300; headquarters at Fort Washita, 303,
_footnote_; manifests great activity in own interests, 303;
Quantrill and band reach camp of, 304; plans recovery of Fort Smith,
309; opposed to idea of separating white auxiliary from Indian forces,
310; raises objection to two brigade idea, 316; Boudinot and, advise
formation of three distinct Indian brigades, 317; placed in command
of all Indian troops in Trans-Mississippi Department on borders of
Arkansas, 319; declared subordinate to Maxey, 319; begins work of
undermining Maxey, 333-334

Cooper, S: 29, _footnote_, 128, _footnote_

Corwin, David B: 144

Corwin, Robert S: 231, _footnote_

Cottonwood River (Kans.): 85, _footnote_

Cowskin Prairie (Mo. and Okla.): Stand Watie's engagement at, 113;
encampment on, 119, 120, _footnote_; affair at, erroneously
reported as Federal victory, 119, _footnote_; Round Grove on,
126; scouts called in at, 138

Cowskin River: 197

Crawford, John: 48, 214, _footnote_

Crawford, Samuel J: work cited, 101, _footnote_, 194, footnote,
197, _footnote_; at Battle of Fort Wayne, 197

Crawford Seminary: 46, 50

Creek and Seminole Battalion: 25

Creek Nation: 62, _footnote_, 111, _footnote_; Clarkson to
take command of all forces within, 130; Pike negotiates treaty with,
173, _footnote_

Creeks: delegation of, and Chickasaws and Kininola seek help at Leroy,
65, _footnote_; desert Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, 76, _footnote_;
constitute main body of refugees in Kansas, 81; compose First Regiment
Indian Home Guards, 114 and _footnote_; company authorized by
Pike, 173, _footnote_; refugee, offered home by Osages, 207 and
_footnote_; refugee, given temporary home by Sacs and Foxes of
Mississippi, 213; unionist element attempts tribal re-organization,
228; views regarding accommodation of other Indians upon lands, 233;
Senate ratifies treaty with, 234; reject treaty, 235; Phillips sounds,
254; Phillips learns that defection has begun, 256; refuse to
charge, 272; nature and extent of disaffection among, 272-273 and
_footnote_; address Davis, 278; bad conduct complained of by
Steele, 285, _footnote_; inevitable effect of Battle of Honey
Springs upon, 290; Blunt's offensive and Steele's defensive, 301;
proposals of Blunt known to have reached, 302; disperse among
fastnesses of mountains, 323

Cross Timber Hollow (Ark.): 30, _footnote_

Currier, C.F: 67, _footnote_

Curtis, Samuel R: in charge of Southwestern District of Missouri,
26-27; estimate of number of troops contributed by Pike, 30,
_footnote_; instructed to report on Confederate use of Indians,
33, _footnote_; victory at Pea Ridge complete, 34; surmise with
respect to movements of Stand Watie and others, 120, _footnote_;
resents insinuations against military capacity of Blunt and Herron,
249; Lane opposed to Gamble, Schofield, and, 249, _footnote_;
regrets sacrifice of red men

in white man's quarrel, 250; calls for Phillips to return, 259;
succeeded by Schofield, 260; in command of restored Department of
Kansas, 321; arrives at Fort Gibson, 324

Cutler, George A: council held at Leroy by, 62, _footnote_; at
Fort Leavenworth, 74, _footnote_; ordered by Lane to transfer
council to Fort Scott, 74, _footnote_; reports Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la
in distress, 76, _footnote_; refugees complain of treatment,
87; approves of early return of refugees, 209; calls Creek chiefs to
consider draft of treaty, 233

Dana, Charles A: 126, _footnote_, 324, _footnote_

Danley, C.C: 15

Davis, Jefferson: work cited, 14, _footnote_; urged to send
second general officer out, 15-16; McCulloch's sacrifice of
Confederate interests in Missouri reported to, 18; unfavorable to
Price and to his method of fighting, 18-19; report of Pike submitted
to, 21; Cooper, in name of, orders Ross to issue proclamation calling
for fighting men, 137; correspondence with Pike, 167-168; recommends
creation of bureau of Indian affairs, 172; appoints Pike diplomatic
agent to Indian tribes, 173, _footnote_; signs bill for
establishment of southern superintendency, 176; Pike makes important
suggestions to, 179; offers explanation for non-payment of Indian
moneys, 179, _footnote_; inconsistentcy of, 187; refusal to
accept Pike's resignation, 190; orders adjutant-general to accept
Pike's resignation, 200; lack of candor in explaining matters to
Holmes, 269; Creeks address, 278; replies to protest from Flanagin,
287, _footnote_; opposed to surrendering part to save whole, 297,
_footnote_; considers resolutions of Armstrong Academy
council, 317; addresses Indians through principal chiefs, 318 and
_footnote_; objects making Indian Territory separate department,
318-319; knowledge of economic and strategic importance of Indian
Territory, 331

Davis, John S: 80, _footnote_

Davis, William P: 80, _footnote_

Dawson, C.L: 150, _footnote_, 152, 153, 154, _footnote_

Deitzler, George W: 97, _footnote_

Delahay, M.W: 222, _footnote_

Delaware Reservation (Kans.): location, 206; store of Carney and Co.
on, 211, _footnote_

Delawares: interview of Dole with, 77, _footnote_; in First
Indian Expedition, 113, _footnote_, 115, _footnote_; from
Cherokee country made refugees, 116, 206; wandering, implicated in
tragedy at Wichita Agency, 183; eager to enlist, 207; request
removal of Agent Johnson and Carney and Co. from reservation, 211,
_footnote_; wild, involved in serious trouble with Osages, 274,

Democratic Party: 47, _footnote_

De Morse, Charles: 266, _footnote_, 330, _footnote_

Denver, James W: career, 70; popular rejoicing over prospect of
recall, 72, _footnote_; learns of presence of refugees in Kansas,
80; assigned by Halleck to command of District of Kansas, 97; Lane
and Pomeroy protest against appointment, 97; later movements, 98
and _footnote_; coöperates with Steele and Coffin to advance
preparations for First Indian Expedition, 102; removal from District
of Kansas inaugurated "Sturgis' military despotism," 104

Department no. 2: 19

Department of Arkansas: 322

Department of Indian Territory: Pike in command, 20; relation to
other military units, 21; Pike deplores absorption of, 151; Pike's
appointment displeasing to Elias Rector, 181, _footnote_; created
at suggestion from Pike, 189

Department of Kansas: Hunter in command, 27, 61, 70; consolidated with
Department of Missouri, 96; reëstablished, 106 and _footnote_;
Blunt assigned to command, 106, 118; restored, Curtis in command, 321

Department of Mississippi: 96, 105

Department of Missouri: Halleck in command, 27, 61; consolidated with
Department of Kansas, 96

Department of Mountain: 96

Department of Potomac: 96

Department of West: 27, 61

De Smet, Father: 234

De Soto (Kans.): 236, _footnote_

Dickey, M.C: 226 and _footnote_

District of Arkansas: Hindman in command, 192; Price in command during
illness of Holmes, 299, _footnote_; Price succeeds Holmes, 326

District of Frontier: Blunt in command, 286; McNeil relieves Blunt,
305; Schofield institutes investigation, 305, _footnote_

District of Kansas: Denver assigned to command of, 97; Sturgis
assigned to, 98; checks progress of First Indian Expedition, 105;
Schofield advises complete separation from Army of Frontier, 248;
re-constituted with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, 249

District of Texas: 306, _footnote_, 318, _footnote_

Dole, R.W: 74, _footnote_, 114, _footnote_

Dole, William P: 53, _footnote_, 54, _footnote_; absent on
mission to West, 60; submits new evidence of serious state of affairs
among Indians, 61; authority of U.S. over Indians to be maintained,
61; Lane's plans appeal to, 72-73; disappointed over Stanton's
reversal of policy for use of Indian troops, 76; countermands orders
for enlistment of Indians, 77; warned that army supplies to refugees
to be discontinued, 83; Coffin and Ritchie apply for new instructions
regarding First Indian Expedition, 105-106; reports adversely upon
subject of Lane's motion, 223; motives considered, 225; submits
views on Pomeroy's project for concentration of tribes, 230,
_footnote_; undertakes mission to West, 234; treaties made by,
234 _et seq_.; detained by Delawares and by Quantrill's raid
upon Lawrence, 238-239 and _footnote_; negotiates with Osages at
Leroy, 239 and _footnote_; treaties impeachable, 241

Dorn, Andrew J: mentioned, 263, _footnote_, 264, _footnote_;
avowed secessionist, 47, _footnote_

Doubleday, Charles: 114, _footnote_; colonel of Second Ohio
Cavalry, 118; Weer to supersede, 119; proposes to attempt to reach
Fort Gibson, 119; desirous of checking Stand Watie, 119; indecisive
engagement on Cowskin Prairie, 119 and _footnote_; ordered not to
go into Indian Territory, 120; left at Baxter Springs by Weer, 121

Downing, Lewis: 231, _footnote_, 255, 256

Drew, John: dispersion of regiment, 24, 132; movements of men at Pea
Ridge, 32; finds refuge at Camp Stephens, 35; authorized to furlough
men, 111, _footnote_; regiment stationed in vicinity of Park
Hill, 111, _footnote_; desires

Clarkson placed in Cherokee country, 159, _footnote_

Drywood Creek (Kans.): Federal defeat at, 51 and _footnote_;
Price breaks camp at, 52, _footnote_; fugitive Indians on,
195, _footnote_, 209, _footnote_; Cherokee camp raided by
guerrillas, 213-214

Du Bose, J.J: 288, _footnote_

Duval, B.G: 266, _footnote_

Dwight's Mission: 217

East Boggy (Okla.): 296

Eaton, Rachel Caroline: work cited, 257, _footnote_

Echo Harjo: 278, _footnote_

Edgar County (Ill.): 84, _footnote_

Edwards, John Newman: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 14, 151,
194, 198

Elder, Peter P: 48, _footnote_, 204; makes Fort Scott
headquarters of Neosho Agency, 50; disputes with Coffin, 116-117,
207, _footnote_; prevails upon Ottawas to extend hospitality to
refugees, 213, _footnote_; suspicious of Coffin, 229

Elk Creek (Okla.): Kiowas select home on, 153; Cooper encamps on, 287,

Elkhorn Tavern (Ark.): 30 and _footnote_

Ellithorpe, A.C: 105, _footnote_, 115, _footnote_, 131,
_footnote_; with detachment at Vann's Ford, 144; disapproves
of attempting to return refugees at early date, 209-211
and _footnote_; complains of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, 219,
_footnote_; opinion about Indian Home Guards, 251

Elm Springs (Ark.): 35

El Paso (Tex.): 48

Emancipation Proclamation: Frémont's, 57; Lincoln's, 234

Evansville (Ark.): 28

Ewing, Thomas: 304, _footnote_, 321, _footnote_

"Extremists": 305, _footnote_

Fairhaven (Mass.): 31, _footnote_

Fall River (Kans.): 79, 81, 82, _footnote_, 84-85, 273,

False Wichita (Washita) River (Okla.): 153

Farnsworth, H.W: 205, _footnote_, 236, _footnote_

Fayetteville (Ark.): 28, _footnote_, 256; battle of, 218,

Federals: early encounter with, anticipated by Van Dorn, 20; expulsion
from Missouri planned by Van Dorn, 26; drive back Confederates under
McCulloch and Price, 26; disposition to over-estimate number of enemy,
30, _footnote_; attempt to recover battery seized by Indians
at Leetown, 31; in occupation of northern Arkansas, 34; defeat
at Wilson's Creek, 49; defeat at Drywood Creek, 51-52 and
_footnote_; showing unwonted vigor on northeastern border of
Cherokee country, 112, _footnote_; flight, 113, _footnote_;
Stand Watie on watch for, 130; defeat in Battle of Newtonia, 194-195
and _footnotes_; direct efforts towards arresting Hindman's
progress, 218; grants to Indian Territory, 250; foraging and scouting,
253; in possession of Fort Smith, 290; Steele places drive from Fort
Smith to Red River, 311; fail to pursue Stand Watie, 312

First Choctaw Regiment: under Col. Sampson Folsom, 152; ordered to
Fort Gibson, 155; men unanimously reënlist for duration of war, 328;
demands, 328

First Creek Regiment: commanded by D.N. McIntosh, 25; men gather at
Cantonment Davis, 27; two hundred men gather at Camp Stephens, 32;
about to make extended scout westward, 112; under orders to advance up
Verdigris toward Santa Fé road, 152

First Indian Brigade: 327

First Indian Expedition: had beginnings in Lane's project, 41; revival
of interest in, 99; Denver, Steele, and Coffin coöperate to advance,
102; arms go forward to Leroy and Humboldt, 102; time propitious for,
103; policy of Sturgis not yet revealed, 103-104; Steele, Denver, and
Wright in dark regarding, 103, _footnote_; Steele issues order
against enlistment of Indians, 105; vigor restored by re-establishment
of Department of Kansas, 106; orders for resuming enlistment
of Indians, 106-107; organization proceeding apace, 113 and
_footnote_; outfit of Indians decidedly inferior, 117; Weer
appointed to command of, 117 and _footnote_; Doubleday proposed
for command of, 118; existence ignored by Missourians, 119,
_footnote_; destruction planned by Stand Watie and others, 120
and _footnote_; Weer attempts to expedite movement, 121; special
agents accompany, 121-122 and _footnote_; component parts encamp
at Baxter Springs, 125; First Brigade put under Salomon, 125; Second
Brigade put under Judson, 125; advance enters Indian Territory
unmolested, 126; forward march and route, 126; Hindman proposes to
check progress, 129; march, 130; delicate position with respect to
U.S. Indian policy, 134; troubles begin, 138; supplies insufficient,
138; in original form brought to abrupt end, 143; Pike's depreciatory
opinion, 164 and _footnote_; Osages join conditionally, 207 and
_footnote_; Gillpatrick serves ends of diplomacy between John
Ross and, 271

First Kansas: 97, _footnote_

First Missouri Cavalry: 113

First Regiment Cherokee Mounted Rifles: commanded by John Drew, 25;
joins Pike at Smith's Mill, 28; movements and conduct at Pea Ridge,
32; iniquitous designs, 33; stationed in vicinity of Park Hill, 111,
_footnote_; defection after defeat at Locust Grove, 132

First Regiment Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles: commanded by
Cooper, 25; gathers at Camp Stephens, 32; goes out of service, 153;
two companies post themselves in upper part of Indian Territory, 155;
eight companies encamp near Fort McCulloch, 155; fights valiantly at
Battle of Newtonia, 194

Flanagin, Harris: 270, _footnote_, 287, _footnote_

Folsom, Sampson: 152, 155

Folsom, Simpson N: 152

Foreman, John A: 144, 284, 285

Formby, John: work cited, 19, _footnote_

Fort Arbuckle (Okla.): 15, 60, _footnote_, 184 and

Fort Blunt (Okla.): 260

Fort Cobb (Okla.): 15, 60, _footnote_, 112, 153, 275,
_footnote_; about to be abandoned by Texan volunteers, 173,
_footnote_; McKuska appointed to take charge of remaining
property, 174, _footnote_

Fort Davis (Okla.): Campbell discovers strong Confederate force at,
136; Cooper orders Indians to report at, 137; many of buildings
destroyed by order of Phillips, 220 and _footnote_, 254

Fort Gibson (Okla.): Pike's headquarters not far from, 22; Choctaw
troops guard road by Perryville towards, 112; Hindman orders Pike to
establish headquarters at, 128, _footnote_; Campbell halts
at, 136; Weer inclined to wander from straight road to, 139;
newly-fortified, given name of Fort Blunt, 260; Blunt undertakes to go

261; Cooper learns of approach of train of supplies for, 272,
_footnote_; Creeks obliged to stay at, 273, _footnote_;
Phillips despatches Foreman to reënforce Williams, 284; Steele's
equipment inadequate to taking of Fort Gibson, 286, 290-291; Phillips
continues in charge at, 305; Cherokees intent upon recovery, 311;
Phillips to complete fortifications at, 325; rapid changing of
commands at, 333, 335

Fort Larned (Kans.): 112, 152

Fort Leavenworth (Kans.): 73, _footnote_, 123, _footnote_;
protected, 45; Prince in charge at, 55; troops ordered to, 60,
_footnote_; Hunter stationed at, 69, _footnote_; arms for
Indian Expedition to be delivered at, 100

Fort Lincoln (Kans.): 52

Fort McCulloch (Okla.): constructed under Pike's direction, 110; Pike
to advance from, 119, _footnote_; Pike's force at, not to be
despised, 128; Cherokees exasperated by Pike's continued stay at, 159;
Pike departs from, 162

Fort Roe (Kans.): 80, 85

Fort Scott (Kans.): 213, 214; Lane at, 45, 51; chief Federal
stronghold in middle Southwest, 46; temporary headquarters for Neosho
Agency, 50; abandoned by Lane in anticipation of attack by Price, 52;
Indian council transferred to, 74, _footnote_; Blunt succeeds
Denver at, 98; tri-weekly post between St. Joseph and, 116; supply
train from, waited for, 126; Indians mustered in at, 132; Weer
cautioned against allowing communication to be cut off, 138-139;
Phillips's communication with, threatened, 272; Steele plans to take,

Fort Smith (Ark.): Drew's Cherokees marching from, to Fayetteville,
28, _footnote_; troops ordered withdrawn from, 60,
_footnote_; Choctaw troops watch road to, 112; indignation in,
against Pike, 158; martial law instituted in, 162, _footnote_;
attempt to make permanent headquarters for Arkansas and Red River
Superintendency, 176-177; plans to push Confederate line northward of,
192; conditions in and around, 247, 269, _footnote_; Phillips
despairs of Choctaw recruiting while in Confederate hands, 258-259;
Steele takes command at, 261; door of Choctaw country, 290; becomes
Blunt's headquarters, 304; Steele expects Federals to attempt a drive
from, to Red River, 311; included within restored Department of
Kansas, 321; dispute over jurisdiction of, 324; included within
re-organized Department of Arkansas, 325; Indian raids around, 331

Fort Smith _Papers_: work cited, 150, _footnote_

Fort Towson (Okla.): 330

Fort Washita (Okla.): 15, 60, _footnote_, 303, _footnote_

Fort Wayne (Okla.): in Delaware District of Cherokee Nation, 197;
battle of, October 22, 1862, 197, 211, 216, 249

Fort Wise (Colo.): 152

Foster, R.D: 47, _footnote_

Foster, Robert: 47, _footnote_

Foulke, William Dudley: work cited, 43, _footnote_

Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry: 322

Fourteenth Missouri State Militia: 113

Fourth Kansas Volunteers: 117, _footnote_

Franklin County (Kans.): 50, _footnote_

Frémont, John C: removal of, 13; sends out emergency call for men, 48;
failure to support Lyon, 49; no coördination of parts of army

of, 56; emancipation proclamation, 57; put in charge of Department of
Mountain, 96

Frontier Guards: 45, _footnote_

Fuller, Perry: 88 and _footnote_, 211, _footnote_, 212, 233

Furnas, Robert W: 105, _footnote_; letter to Dole, 107-108;
becomes ranking officer in field, 143; made commander of Indian
Brigade, 144

Gamble, Hamilton R: 119, _footnote_, 249, _footnote_, 260

Gano, Richard M: 306, _footnote_, 332

Gano's Brigade: 306, _footnote_

Garland, A.H: 148, _footnote_, 270, _footnote_

Garland, Samuel: 312, _footnote_, 321

Gillpatrick, Doctor: sent under flag of truce to Ross, 135; bearer of
verbal instructions, 193, 217, _footnote_; death, 271

Granby (Mo.): lead mines, 20; abandoned, 20, _footnote_; plan for
recovery, 194

Grand Falls: 47, _footnote_

Grand River (Okla.): 284; Cowskin Prairie on, 119; Second Indian Home
Guards to examine country, 126; Salomon places Indians as corps of
observation on, 142, 144;

Grand Saline (Okla.): 112, 131, _footnote_, 139

Grayson County (Texas): 190

Great Father: 46, _footnote_, 240-241, _footnote_, 272-273,

Greene, Francis Vinton: work cited, 14, _footnote_

Greenleaf Prairie (Okla.): 272

Greeno, H.S: 136, 137

Greenwood, A.B: 222, _footnote_

Guerrillas: Indian approved by Pike, 22 and _footnote_, 112; not
present in Sherman's march, 44; Halleck interested in suppression of,
101; operations checked by Hindman in Indian Territory, 194; Quantrill
and, raid Black Bob lands and Olathe, 205; policy of Confederate
government towards, 205, _footnote_; attacks disturb Shawnees,
236, _footnote_; raid Cherokee refugee camp on Drywood Creek,
213-214; everywhere on Indian frontier, 260; perpetrate Baxter
Springs Massacre, 304; are recruiting stations in certain counties of
Missouri, 304, _footnote_

Hadley, Jeremiah: 236, _footnote_

Halleck, Henry W: in command of Department of Missouri, 27; plans for
Denver, 71; disparaging remarks, 75, _footnote_; probable reason
for objecting to use of Indians in war, 75, _footnote_; in
charge of Department of Mississippi, 96; Lincoln's estimate of, 96;
instructed regarding First Indian Expedition, 100; opposed to arming
Indians, 101; interested in suppression of jayhawkers and guerrillas,
101; well rid of Kansas, 106, _footnote_; disregard of orders
respecting Indian Expedition, 109; calls for men, 259

Hallum, John: work cited, 149, _footnote_

Halpine, Charles G: 96

Hanly, Thomas B: 176

Hardin, Captain: 276, _footnote_

Harlan, David M: 232, _footnote_

Harlan, James: 214 and _footnote_

Harper's Ferry Investigating Committee: 226-227

Harrell, J.M: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 23, 149, 188,
190, 194, 249, 251, 284, 289

Harris, Cyrus: 63, _footnote_

Harris, John: 207, _footnote_

Harris, J.D: 152

Harrison, J.E: 267, _footnote_

Harrison, LaRue: 259

Harrisonville (Mo.): 55

Hart's Company: 266, _footnote_

Hart's Spies: 153

Hay, John: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 41, 45, 96

Hébert, Louis: 34

Helena (Ark.): 283

Henning, B.S: 207, _footnote_

Herndon, W.H: 214, _footnote_

Herron, Francis J: 249, 260

Heth, Henry: 19

Hindman, Thomas C: 119, _footnote_; appointment, 127,
_footnote_; assumes command of Trans-Mississippi District, 128,
186; disparagement of Pike's command, 128, _footnote_; orders
Pike's white auxiliary to move to Little Rock, 147; begins controversy
with Pike, 156; starts new attack upon Pike, 161; justification for
treatment of Pike, 162; impossible to be reconciled to Pike, 163;
withdraws approval of Pike's resignation, 169; placed in charge of
District of Arkansas, 192; appears in Tahlequah, 193; summoned by
Holmes, 194; instructed to let Pike go free, 200; resorts to save
expense, 247; recall demanded by Arkansas delegation, 270; associates
appraised by, 270, _footnote_; asks for assignment to Indian
Territory, 270, _footnote_; feeds indigents at cost of army
commissary, 307

Hitchcock, E.A: 98, _footnote_

Ho-go-bo-foh-yah: 82

Holmes, Theophilus H: 127, _footnote_, 166, _footnote_;
appointed to command of Trans-Mississippi Department, 187; develops
prejudice against Pike, 188; grants Pike leave of absence, 190; real
reasons for unfriendliness to Pike, 198-199; orders arrest of Pike,
199; forced to concede Indian claim to some consideration, 200;
command placed under supervision of Kirby Smith, 269; relations with
Hindman, 269; displacement demanded by Arkansas delegation, 270; Price
commands in District of Arkansas during illness, 299, _footnote_;
not friend of Steele, 311

Honey Springs (Ark.): 288

Horse Creek (Mo.): 145

Horton, Albert W: 230, _footnote_

Hoseca X Maria: 65, _footnote_

Hubbard, David: 172, _footnote_

Hudson's Crossing (Okla.): 126, 143

Humboldt (Kans.): 69, 79; proposed headquarters of Neosho Agency, 52;
sacked and burnt by marauders, 53; Coffin's account of burning of, 54,
_footnote_; Kansas Seventh ordered to give relief to refugees,
82, _footnote_; Kansas Tenth at, 82, _footnote_; Jennison
with First Kansas Cavalry at, 99, _footnote_

Hunter, David: falls back upon Sedalia and Rolla, 13, 26; in command
of Department of Kansas, 27, 65-66; Lane places men at disposal, 41,
_footnote_; guards White House, 45, _footnote_; appointment
distasteful to Lane, 66-69; stationed at Fort Leavenworth, 69,
_footnote_; orders relief of refugees, 73, _footnote_;
issues passes to Indian delegation, 73, _footnote_; interviewed
at Planter's House in St. Louis, 74, _footnote_; friction between
Lane and, 74-76; suggests mustering in of Kansas Indians,
74-75, _footnote_; Halleck's strictures upon command, 75,
_footnote_; sends relief to refugees, 81; warns that army
supplies to refugees must cease, 83; relieved from command, 96;
troubles mostly due to local politics, 97

Hutchinson, C.C: 55, _footnote_, 212, 213, _footnote_

Illinois Creek: battle of, 218, _footnote_

Illinois River: 28, 312

Indian Alliance with Confederacy: conditioned by stress of

circumstances, 134; Creeks and Choctaws disgusted with, 254; Cherokee
National Council revokes, 256; Indians fear mistake, 273-274; effect
of Battle of Honey Springs upon, 290; strengthened by formation of
Indian league, 317; revitalized by Maxey's reforms, 326

Indian Confederacy: formed by Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, Seminoles
and Caddoes, 317; Choctaws want separate from Southern, 321,

Indian Brigade: formed, 144; scouting of component parts of, 145-146;
white troops ordered to support of, 192-193; Phillips given command,
249; integral parts, 249, 250, _footnote_; assigned service, 250;
regarded by Phillips as in sad state, 251

Indian Delegation: 62, _footnote_, 73, _footnote_, 74,
_footnote_; Dole interviewed in Leavenworth, 94; Osage wants
conference with Great Father, 240, _footnote_; Creek, confers
with Steele, 262, _footnote_; Davis disregards, 318 and

Indian Home Guards: _Fifth Regiment_, 219 and _footnote_;
_First Regiment_, Furnas, colonel commanding, 107, 143; muster
roll, 108-109, _footnote_; composed of Creeks and Seminoles,
114; ordered to take position in vicinity of Vann's Ford, 144;
demoralization, 145; component part of Phillips's Indian Brigade, 249;
composed mainly of Creeks, 251; fought dismounted at Honey Springs,
288; _Fourth Regiment_, 219 and _footnote_; _Second
Regiment_, 125; _Third Regiment_, formation, 132; Phillips
commissioned colonel of, 132; detachment at Fort Gibson, 144;
engagement, 163-164, 194, 197; component part of Phillips's Indian
Brigade, 249; largely Cherokee in composition, 252; innovations
introduced into, 252; part placed at Scullyville, 325

Indian Protectorate: 175

Indian Indigents: 247, 262, 307-308 and _footnote_

Indian Refugees: Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and his men, 79; numbers justified
use of Indian soldiery, 79; numbers exaggerated, 81, 209 and
_footnote_; destitution, 81; Dr. Campbell ministers to needs,
81-82; Seventh Kansas gives relief, 82, _footnote_; Coffin
describes pitiable state, 82 and _footnote_; Snow furnishes
details of destitution of Seminole, 83, _footnote_; army supplies
to be discontinued, 83; Kile made special distributing agent, 84;
much-diseased, 85; hominy, chief food, 85, _footnote_; Neosho
Valley selected as suitable place for, 86; complain of treatment,
87; Collamore and Jones investigate condition, 87, _footnote_;
unwilling to remove to Sac and Fox reservation, 88 and
_footnote_; Creek request appointment of Carruth as agent,
89; manifest confidence in Lane's power, 94; unassuaged grief, 95;
subsistence becomes matter of serious moment, 99; Congress applies
Indian annuity money to support of, 99; want to assist in recovery of
Indian Territory, 99; to furnish troops for First Indian Expedition,
100; Halleck opposed to arming of, 101; Blunt advises early return to
own country, 136; numbers increase as result of Salomon's retrograde
movement, 146, _footnote_, 203; Blunt promises to restore to
homes, 196, 203; of Neosho Agency, 204-207 and _footnotes_; Creek
offered home by Osages, 207 and _footnote_; conditions among,
208; Cherokee on Drywood Creek, 209; distributed over Sac and Fox

212-213; collect on Neutral Lands, 213 and _footnote_; camp of
Cherokee raided by guerrillas, 213-214; Harland and Proctor to look
out for, at Neosho, 214; claim of Sacs and Foxes against Creek, 235,
_footnote_; Phillips's reasons for returning to homes, 258; at
Neosho returned to homes, 273 and _footnote_; cattle stolen, 274,
_footnote_; on return journey preyed upon by compatriots, 332

Indian Representation in Confederate Congress: 180, 279, 298-299,

Indian Soldiers (Confederate): as Home Guard, 23-24; as possible
guerrillas to prey upon Kansas, 23 and _footnote_; as corps of
observation, 25; refuse to move until paid, 27; conduct at Battle of
Pea Ridge, 30-33; not included in Van Dorn's scheme of things, 35; Van
Dorn orders return to own country, 35; order to cut off supplies from
Missouri and Kansas, 35-36; may be rewarded by Pike, 36; Pike's report
on activity, 112; Hindman's appraisement, 128, _footnote_; stigma
attaching to use, 148, _footnote_; organized in military way for
own protection, 159; do scouting, 163; Smith to raise and command
certain, 173, _footnote_; Pike to receive five companies from
Seminoles, 173, _footnote_; Leeper to enlist from Reserve tribes,
173-174, _footnote_; Cooper calls from all Indian nations, 174,
_footnote_; as Home Guard, 189; privations and desertions, 200;
threw away guns at Battle of Honey Springs, 288; recruiting, 317, 319;
results under best conditions, 326-327; consider reënlistment, 328;
recognition of services, 330

Indian Soldiers (Federal): feasibility of, 50, 57; Frémont and
Robinson not in favor of, 57; Hunter suggests making, out of Kansas
tribes, 74-75, _footnote_; Stanton refuses to employ, 76 and
_footnote_; use justified, 79; economy, 99; to form larger part
of First Indian Expedition, 100; Halleck opposed to, 101, 102;
Dole instructs officers to report at Fort Leavenworth, 102,
_footnote_; necessary equipment, 109; final preparations, 121;
appearance, 123 and _footnote_; excellent for scouting, 125; at
Locust Grove, 131, _footnote_; accused of outrages committed by
white men, 135, _footnote_; do scouting, 163; tribute of praise
for, 195, _footnote_; made part of Army of Frontier, 196;
diverted to service in Missouri, 196; desertions, 203 and
_footnote_; do well at Cane Hill and Prairie Grove, 218-219;
disposed to take leave of absence, 252; to help secure Indian
Territory, 294; negro regiment compared with Indian, 295

Indian Springs (Ga.): treaty, 255, _footnote_

Indian Territory: McCulloch expected to secure, 15; included within
Trans-Mississippi District, 20; troops of, 25; Pike to endeavour to
maintain, 36; attack, from, expected, 48; Frémont calls for aid, 48;
situation delicate, 59-60; left destitute of protection, 60; Hunter's
suggestion, 75, _footnote_; first refugees from, 79; "home," 93;
early return promised, 94; expeditions to recover, projected, 95 and
_footnote_; refugees want to recover, 99; Stand Watie returns
into, 113; Carruth and Martin to take note of conditions in, 122 and
_footnote_; Pike's force for defence of, exclusively, 129; Indian
Brigade holding its own there, 146; Pike's Indian force ordered to

border, 148; Pike attempts justification of retirement to southern
part, 151; Pike declares Indian officers peers of white, 158-159;
defence regarded by Pike as chief duty, 159; strategic importance not
unappreciated by Confederate government, 171; attached for judicial
purposes to western district of Arkansas, 177; Confederate government
fails to carry out promise, 177, _footnote_; Pike advises
complete separation of, 179; Scott to investigate conditions in, 181;
Pike returns to, 190; included within District of Arkansas, 192;
guerrilla warfare in, suppressed, 194; Federals in undisputed
possession of, 198; Holmes exploiting, 199; Indian alliance valuable,
201; Absentee Shawnees expelled from, 205, _footnote_; Blunt
advises speedy return of refugees, 209; Confederates plan recovery,
218; Lane introduces resolution for adding, to Kansas, 223; Dole
objects to regular territorial form of government in, 223; Kansas
tribes willing to exchange lands for homes in, 227; project for
concentration of tribes in, 230, _footnote_; negotiations for
removal of Kansas tribes to, 231; depletion of resources, 245, 247;
organized as separate military command, 245 and _footnote_;
troops to be all unmounted, 247; advertised as lost to Confederate
cause, 250; conception of responsibility to, 253; Phillips's plans
for recovery not at present practicable, 257; strategic importance
unappreciated by Halleck and Curtis, 259; Curtis to take consequences
of giving up 259; privilege of writ of _habeas corpus_ suspended
in, 269; Hindman asks for assignment to, 270, _footnote_; is mere
buffer, 276; Cooper poses as friend of, 278, 300; Creeks complaint to
Davis, 279; Confederate operations confined to attacks upon supply
trains, 283; removal of all Kansas Indians to, 294; roads and
highways in, 295-296, _footnote_; necessary to Confederacy, 298,
_footnote_; Scott enters, 300; command devolved upon Cooper, 303;
made distinct from Arkansas, 303; Magruder wants attached to District
of Texas, 306, _footnote_; war measures applied to, 308-309;
Maxey in command of, 311; Indian Home Guards only Federal forces
in, 312; granary of Trans-Mississippi Department, 315; Boudinot's
suggestions regarding, 317, _footnote_; council requests be made
separate department, 318; Davis objects, 318-319; included within
restored Department of Kansas, 321; Phillips starts upon expedition
through, 322; Price asks for loan of troops from, 326; strategic
importance of, 331; scandalous performances in, 333

Indian Trust Funds: 173-174

Indians of Plains: regarding alliance with, 320, 335; harass Kansas
and Colorado, 320 and _footnote_, 335

Interior Department: 73, _footnote_, 105 and _footnote_;
profiteering among employees, 208; Lane and Wilder make request, 230,

Inter-tribal Council: at Leroy, 62-69, _footnotes_; Lane's plans
for at headquarters, 69; Leroy selected as the place for, 69;
sessions of, 69-70; Hunter's plans for, at Fort Leavenworth, 70,
74, _footnote_; Lane orders transfer to Fort Scott, 74,
_footnote_; at Belmont, 237, _footnote_; at Armstrong
Academy, 317, 320, 323

Iola (Kans.): 88, _footnote_; Doubleday concentrates near, 120,
_footnote_; Osages advance as far as, 207 _footnote_

Ionies: 274, _footnote_

Iowas: 77, _footnote_

Ironeyes: 115, _footnote_

Iroquois: 79

Jackson, Claiborne: 16, 17, 50, _footnote_

Jackson County (Mo.): 304, _footnote_

Jacksonport (Ark.): 25

Jan-neh: 109, _footnote_

Jayhawkers: 41, _footnote_, 97, 101, 251, 266, 268,
_footnote_, 269, 273, _footnote_

Jayhawking Expedition: 73, _footnote_ 274, _footnote_

Jennison, C.R: 50, _footnote_, 52, _footnote_ 99,
_footnote_, 104, _footnote_

Jewell, Lewis R: 131

Jim Ned: 274, _footnote_

Jim Pockmark: 65, _footnote_

John Jumper: in command of Creek and Seminole Battalion, 25; on side
of Confederacy, 62, _footnote_; ordered to take Fort Larned, 112;
Seminole Battalion in motion toward Salt Plains, 152; honour conferred
upon, by Provisional Congress, 174, _footnote_; renegade members
from Seminole Battalion of, involved in tragedy at Wichita Agency,
183; loyal to Pike, 200; member of delegation to Davis, 318,
_footnote_; Phillips sends communication to, 323, _footnote_

John Ross _Papers_: work cited, 28, _footnote_

Johnson and Grimes: 308, _footnote_

Johnson, F: 207 and _footnote_, 211

Johnson, Robert W: 24, _footnote_, 25, _footnote_, 175, 176

Johnson County (Kans.): 204, 235, _footnote_

Johnston, Albert Sidney: 14, _footnote_, 19 and _footnote_,

Joint Committee on Conduct of War: 33, 33, _footnote_

Jones, Evan: 64, _footnote_, 73, _footnote_; investigates
conditions among refugees, 87, _footnote_; accompanies Weer, 121;
entrusted with confidential message to John Ross, 121-122; pleads for
justice to Indians, 225 and _footnote_; offers to negotiate about
Neutral Lands, 231

Jones, J.T: 213, _footnote_

Jones, Robert M: 180 and _footnote_

Jon-neh: 108, _footnote_

Jordan, A.M: 214, _footnote_

Jordan, Thomas: 128, _footnote_

Journal of the Confederate Congress: work cited in _footnotes_ on
pages 172, 173, 174, 175, 278

Judson, William R: 134; in charge of Second Brigade of First Indian
Expedition, 125

Kansans: fighting methods, 17, 44; implacable and dreaded foes of
Missouri, 18; fears attack from direction of Indian Territory, 48;
profiteering among, 208; covet Indian lands, 221, 224

Kansas: Indians on predatory expeditions into, 23; Indians to form
battalion, 23, _footnote_; Indians to cut off supplies from,
35-36; bill for admission signed by Buchanan, 41; exposed to danger,
45; troops called to Missouri, 48; Price has no immediate intention of
invading, 52; Indian enlistment, 57; likely to be menaced by Southern
Indians, 61; Territory, 70; refugees afflicted sorely, 93; desire to
recover Indian Territory, 95; Halpine makes derogatory remarks about,
96; not desired in Halleck's command, 96, _footnote_; revolution
to have been expected, 104, _footnote_; Pike's Indians to
repel invasion of Indian Territory from, 148; Pike tries to prevent
cattle-driving to, 173, _footnote_; failure of corn crop in
southern part, 209; people want refugees removed from southern, 212;

plundering in, 218; resolution for extending southern boundary,
223; proposition to confederate tribes of Nebraska and of, 227;
negotiations begun to relieve, of Indian encumbrance, 228; project
to concentrate tribes of, in Indian Territory, 230, _footnote_;
negotiations with tribes of, 231; political squabbles, 249,
_footnote_; Wells's command on western frontier, 267,
_footnote_; stolen property brought into, 273, _footnote_;
Steele plans to invade, 286; advisability of making raid considered,
320; Stand Watie contemplates an invasion, 332 Kansas Brigade: _See
Lane's Kansas Brigade_ Kansas Legislature: 42, 71, _footnote_,
225 Kansas Militia: 50, _footnote_ Kansas River: 206 Kansas
Seventh: 82, _footnote_ Kansas-Nebraska Bill: 17, 44 Kansas
Tenth: 82, _footnote_ Kaws: 226, 236 and _footnote_ Kaw
Agency (Kans.): 55, 205 Kechees (Keeches?): 115, _footnote_
Ke-Had-A-Wah: 65, _footnote_ Keith, O.B: 230 Ketchum, W. Scott:
119, _footnote_ Kickapoos: reported almost unanimously loyal
to U.S, 66, _footnote_; in First Indian Expedition, 115,
_footnote_; implicated in tragedy at Wichita Agency, 183;
fraudulent negotiation with, 230 and _footnote_; confer with
Carruth, 274, _footnote_ Kile, William: special agent
to refugees, 84; refuses appointment as quartermaster, 115,
_footnote_; misunderstanding with Ritchie, 115, _footnote_;
estrangement between Coffin and, 208 and _footnote_; resignation,
208, _footnote_; advises speedy return of refugees, 209
Killebrew, James: 50, _footnote_ King, John: 269, _footnote_
Kininola: 65, _footnote_ Kiowas: 112; select home on Elk Creek,
153; friendly, 153, _footnote_; confer with Carruth, 274,
_footnote_ Knights of Golden Circle: 111, _footnote_

Lane, H.S: 146, _footnote_ Lane, James Henry: character, 41, 56;
enthusiasm, 41, 49; influence with Lincoln, 41-42; elected senator
from Kansas, 42; accepts colonelcy and begins recruiting, 43; not to
be taken as type, 45; redoubles efforts for organizing brigade, 49;
empowered to recruit, 50; conceives idea of utilizing Indians, 50, 57;
abandons Fort Scott, 52; throws up breastworks at Fort Lincoln, 52;
proceeds to seek revenge in spite of Robinson's opposition, 55; burns
Osceola, 55; attitude towards slavery, 56; suggests re-organization
of military districts on frontier, 58; disconcerted by appointment of
Hunter, 66-69; plans for inter-tribal council, 69; Denver had measured
swords with, 70; control over Federal patronage in Kansas, 71;
nominated brigadier-general, 71; friction between Hunter and, 74-76;
instructed by anti-Coffin conspirators, 88, _footnote_; protests
to Lincoln against appointment of Denver, 97; succeeds in preventing
appointment of Denver, 98; responsible for Blunt's promotion, 107,
_footnote_; Phillips appointed on staff, 126, _footnote_;
endorses request of Agent Johnson, 207, _footnote_; introduces
resolution for extending southern boundary of Kansas, 223; denounces
Stevens as defaulter, 226, _footnote_; opposed to Gamble,
Schofield, and Curtis, 249, _footnote_; belongs to party of

_Extremists_, 305, _footnote_; requests that Blunt be
summoned to Washington for conference, 322, _footnote_

Lane, W.P: 266, _footnote_

Lane's Kansas Brigade: 41, 43, 49, 51, 58, 59, 71; relation to
Hunter's command, 72 and _footnote_; marauding committed, 75,
_footnote_; prospective Indian element dispensed with, 77

Lawler, J.J: 204, _footnote_

Lawrence (Kans.): 62, _footnote_, 73, _footnote_;
Quantrill's raid upon, 238, _footnote_; Dole detained by raid
upon, 239

Lawrenceburg (Ind.): 43, _footnote_

Lawrence _Republican_: 58, _footnote_

Leased District (Okla.): 181-182, 198

Leavenworth _Daily Conservative_: 58, _footnote_

Lee, Robert E: 186, _footnote_, 187

Lee, R.W: 307, _footnote_

Leeper, Matthew: authorized to enlist men, 173, _footnote_;
departs for Texas, 183; murder, 183

Leetown (Ark.): 30, 31

Leroy (Kans.): 86, 229, 239 and _footnote_; arrangements for
keeping cattle, 54, _footnote_; Lane builds stockades, 55;
council held by Cutler at, 62, _footnote_; substituted for
Humboldt as place for council, 69; sessions of council, 69-70; Indian
Brigade left, for Humboldt, 115, _footnote_; Weer returns to,
121; some Quapaws at, 204, _footnote_; Osages at, 207; Blunt
thinks refugees not properly cared for, 215; Dole negotiates with
Osages at, 239 and _footnote_

Lexington (Mo.): 52, _footnote_, 55

Limestone Gap: 111, _footnote_

Limestone Prairie: 328

Lincoln, Abraham: 71, 72 and _footnote_, 211, _footnote_;
suggests Hunter's falling back, 13; calls for volunteers, 41;
approached by Phelps and Blair, 49; popularity asserted, 54,
_footnote_; fears Frémont's supineness, 56; Lane urged to seek
interview with, 58; appointment of Cameron mistake, 60; attention
solicited by Dole, 61; sickness in family, 76, _footnote_;
refugees appeal to, 87 and _footnote_; estimate of Halleck, 96;
protests to, against appointment of Denver, 97; wires Halleck to defer
assignment of Denver, 97-98; responsible for Blunt's promotion,
107, _footnote_; Ross to intercede with, 192, _footnote_;
inquires into practicability of occupying Cherokee country, 216;
selects Schofield to succeed Curtis, 260; Amnesty Proclamation
distributed among Indians, 322

Lindsay's Prairie: 216

Linn County (Kans.): 101, _footnote_

Lipans: 274, _footnote_

Little Arkansas River: 275, _footnote_

Little Bear: 240, _footnote_

Little Bear Band of Osages: 238, _footnote_

Little Blue River (Okla.): 151, _footnote_

Little Boggy (Okla.): 112

Little Osage River: 45, 52

Little Rock (Ark.): 36, 63, _footnote_, 190; Van Dorn assumes
command at, 25; Hindman assumes command at, 128; Hindman orders Pike
to move part of forces to, 147; Scott endeavours to interview Holmes
in, 299

Livermore, William Roscoe: work cited in _footnotes_ on 260, 269,

Locust Grove (Okla.): skirmish at, 33, 131-132; Clarkson's commissary
captured at, 138; defeat of Confederates at, counted heavily against
Pike, 161

Lo-ka-la-chi-ha-go: 109, _footnote_

Lo-ga-po-koh: 109, _footnote_

Long Tiger: 103, _footnote_

Longtown Creek (Okla.): 295, _footnote_

Louisiana: portion included within Trans-Mississippi District,
20; requisition upon, for troops, 25; portion included within
Trans-Mississippi Department, 192 and _footnote_; western,
detached from Trans-Mississippi Department, 246

Love, William DeLoss: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 118, 138

Lower Creeks: 62, _footnote_

Lyon, Nathaniel: work to be repeated, 14; insight into Indian
character, 48; death, 49

McClellan, George B: 13, 75, _footnote_, 96

McClish, Fraser: 62, _footnote_

McCulloch, Ben: refuses to coöperate with Price, 14, 56; takes
position in Arkansas, 15; relations with leading Confederates
in Arkansas and Missouri, 16; little in common with Price, 17;
indifference towards Missouri, 18; proceeds to Richmond to discuss
matters in controversy, 19; driven back into northwestern Arkansas,
26; death, 31, 34; had approved of using Indians against Kansas,
31, _footnote_; commission from, found on John Matthews, 54,
_footnote_; had diverted Pike's supplies, 147-148

McCulloch, Henry E: in command of Northern Sub-district of Texas, 302;
opinion of conditions in Indian Territory, 306, _footnote_

McCurtain, J: 312, _footnote_

McDaniel, James: 231, _footnote_

McDonald, Hugh: 173, _footnote_

McGee's Residence: 47, _footnote_

McIntosh, Chilly: 25, 62, _footnote_, 152

McIntosh, D.N: colonel in command of First Creek Regiment, 25; arrives
at Camp Stephens, 32; under orders to advance up Verdigris toward
Santa Fé road, 152; conduct as commander, 285, _footnote_;
commanded First and Second Creek at Honey Springs, 288

McIntosh, James: 29, _footnote_; death, 31, 34; defeated
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la in Battle of Chustenahlah, 79

McIntosh, Unee: 62, _footnote_

McIntosh, William: 255, _footnote_

Mackey's Salt Works (Okla.): 325

McNeil, John: 297 and _footnote_, 305

Magazine Mountains: 266, _footnote_

Magruder, John Bankhead: to command Trans-Mississippi Department,
186; delay, 186, _footnote_; appointment, rescinded, 187; orders
Bankhead to Steele's assistance, 291-292; proposes consolidation of
commands for recovery of Forts Smith and Gibson, 302; tries to deprive
Steele of white force, 306, 311, _footnote_; wants Indian
Territory attached to Texas, 306, _footnote_

Manypenny, George W: 221

Marmaduke, John S: 251, 327

Marston, B.W: 329, _footnote_

Marque and Reprisal Law: 21

Martial Law: 162 and _footnote_

Martin, George W: work cited, 59, _footnote_

Martin, H.W: entrusted with mission by Coffin, 122 and
_footnote_, 133; opinion regarding refugees, 209, 217-218;
arrangements for inter-tribal council, 273, _footnote_

Martin's Regiment: 308, _footnote_

Marysville (Okla.): 112

Matthews, John: incensing Osages and Cherokees against U.S.
government, 47, _footnote_; death, 53 and _footnote_; had
commission from McCuIloch, 54, _footnote_

Maxey, Samuel B: assigned to command of Indian Territory, 311; project
for sweeping reforms, 315 and _footnote_; delivers address at
Armstrong Academy council, 320

and _footnote_; thinks Indians best adapted for irregular
warfare, 326; coöperates with Price willingly, 326-327; rulings,
329-330, _footnote_; sets up printing-press for propaganda work,
330; speaks in own defense, 334; superseded by Cooper, 334

Maysville (Ark.): 131, 197

Maremec River (Mo.): 27

Methodist Episcopal Church South: 236, _footnote_

Mexican War: 70; Roane's conduct in, criticised by Pike, 149

Mexico: Lane in, 42, _footnote_; teams hauling cotton to, 266,

Miamies: 77, _footnote_

Mico Hatki: 62, _footnote_, 64, _footnote_, 108,
_footnote_, 234

Middle Boggy (Okla.): 152, 296

Miles, W. Porcher: 278, _footnote_

Mills, James K.: 113

Mississippi River: 14, _footnote_, 26, _footnote_, 34, 268,

Missouri: 17, 173, _footnote_; decisive result of Battle of
Pea Ridge, 13; expected Confederacy to force situation for her, 18;
requisition upon, for troops, 25; relief planned by Van Dorn, 26, 34;
Indians to cut off supplies from, 35; fight for, on border, 43-44;
troops from Kansas called to, 48; Denver served in, 70; activity
of secessionists, 110; Payton, senator from, 176, _footnote_;
Hindman and others plan to reënter southwest, 194, 218; Delaware
Reservation not far distant from, 206; Martin refuses to consider
refugees living upon impoverished people of, 217-218; political
squabbles in, 249, _footnote_; Watie succeeds in entering
southwestern, 312; Boudinot suggests arrangements for, 317,

Missouri Commandery: work cited, 148, _footnote_

Missouri River: 53

Missouri State Guard: 17, 158

Missouri State Guards: Eighth Division, 130, _footnote_

Missourians: customary fighting methods during period of border
warfare, 17, 44; refugee, in Lane's Kansas Brigade, 51; inroads
resented by various tribes, 77, _footnote_; intent upon ignoring
First Indian Expedition, 119, _footnote_; battalion of, at Locust
Grove, 131

Mitchell, Robert B: appointment by Robinson, 46, _footnote_;
raises volunteers to go against Indians, 46, _footnote_; needed
by Halleck, 101 and _footnote_

Mix, Charles E: 52, _footnote_, 60, 208, _footnote_

"Moderates": 304, _footnote_

Mograin, Charles: 207, _footnote_, 241, _footnote_

Moneka: 46, _footnote_

Montgomery, James: 15 and _footnote_, 45, 53, _footnote_

Moonlight, Thomas: 322

Moore, Charles: 206, _footnote_

Moore, Frank: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 83, 84, 135,
184, 257, 287

Moore, Thomas O: 192, _footnote_

Moravian Mission: 194

Morgan, A.S: 291, _footnote_, 293

Morton, Oliver P: 43 and _footnote_

Moty Kennard: _footnotes_ on pages 62, 65, 262, 278, 302, 320

Mundy Durant: 235, _footnote_

Munsees: 212

Muskogee (Okla.): 288

Murrow, J.S: 162, _footnote_

Napier's _Peninsular War_: Pike's study of, 163

Nebraska Territory: 227, 231

Neosho (Mo.): defeat of Federals at, 113; Ratliff despatched to,
127; Cherokee refugees removed from Drywood Creek to, 214, 217, 218;
refugees at, 257, _footnote_, 273 and _footnote_

Neosho Agency: headquarters, 46, 50, 52; tribes included within, 48;
in great confusion, 115-116; changes in location of, 116-117

Neosho Falls (Kans.): 213

Neosho Valley: suitable place for refugees, 86; refugees object to
leaving, 88; Steele plans to replenish resources from, 286; Stand
Watie makes daring cavalry raid into, 312

New Albany: 80, _footnote_

New England Relief Society: 87, _footnote_

New Mexico: 61, 113, 152, 238, _footnote_

Newton, Robert C: 266, _footnote_

Newton County (Mo.): 47, _footnote_

Newtonia (Mo.): battle of, 194-195 and _footnotes_

New York Indian Lands: 79; intruded upon by white squatters, 80, 85;
refugees upon, 79, 85; controversy over, 85, _footnote_; Dole
makes treaty concerning, 235-236

New York _Tribune_: 31, _footnote_, 126, _footnote_,

Nicolay, John G: 42, _footnote_

Nineteenth Regiment of Arkansas Volunteers: 150, _footnote_

Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry: 119, _footnote_; Frederick
Salomon, colonel, 118; part attached to First Brigade of First Indian
Expedition, 126

North, The: 42, _footnote_, 171, 245; indifference towards West,
43; reconstruction measures in favor of, 228; Indian Territory came
too late into reckonings of, 250

North Fork of the Canadian (Okla.): 173, _footnote_

North Fork Village (Okla.): 173, _footnote_

Northern Sub-District of Texas: 286, 302

Ock-tah-har-sas Harjo: 228, _footnote_; elected principal chief
by refugee Creeks, 89; addresses "Our Father," 233

Office of Indian Affairs: prompt action needed, 47, _footnote_;
approval sought, 52; appeal to War Department for restoration of
military force in Indian Territory, 60; Carruth, special agent of,
accompanies First Indian Expedition, 122 and _footnote_;
agents ignored by military men of First Indian Expedition, 133 and
_footnote_; profiteering among employees, 208; Wattles sent out
by, 226; not yet prepared to treat with John Ross for retrocession of
Neutral Lands, 231

Oh-Chen-Yah-Hoe-Lah: 69, _footnote_

Oke-Tah-hah-shah-haw Choe: talk, 66, _footnote_

Olathe (Kans.): 205

Old George: 203

Oldham, Williamson S: 157 and _footnote_, 176, _footnote_

Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la: 24, 63, _footnote_, 73, _footnote_,
76 and _footnote_, 79; defeated by McIntosh in Battle of
Chustenahlah, 79; lodges complaint against Coffin, 87; friends oppose
election of Ock-tah-har-sas Harjo as principal chief, 89; interviews
Lane, 94; Coffin talks with, on subject of Indian Expedition, 102-103,
_footnote_; wants "wagons that shoot," 117; Creeks under, offered
home by Osages, 207 and _footnote_, 229; Ellithorpe complains of,
219, _footnote_; death, 234

Osage County (Kans.): 80

Osage Nation: 47, _footnote_

Osage Reservation (Kans.): exposed condition of, 55; refugees cross,
79; intruders upon, 222 and _footnote_; owners unwilling to cede
part of, 229-230

Osage River: 27

Osages: 252; bad white men interfering with, 46; disturbances

among, 46, _footnote_, 47, _footnote_; Mitchell schemes to
negotiate treaty with, 47, _footnote_; offer assistance to
U.S., 49; John Matthews, trader among, 53, _footnote_; loyalty
asserted, 54, _footnote_; Coffin to coöperate with Elder in
negotiating with, 87-88, _footnote_; attempt to persuade
enlistment for First Indian Expedition, 115, 207; approached for
cession of lands, 116, 222; abandon Confederate cause, 121;
Weer promotes enlistment of, 121; service rendered by, 207,
_footnote_; offer home to Creeks, 207 and _footnote_, 229,
237-238; memorialize Congress, 229; disgusted with Coffin's draft
of treaty of cession, 229; Dole makes treaty with, 235, 239 and
_footnote_; massacre of Confederate officers, 237-238,
_footnote_; council of Great and Little, 237, _footnote_;
unfair advantage taken by representatives of U.S. government, 238;
terms of Dole's treaty with, 239, _footnote_; makes propositions
to Dole, 240-241, _footnote_; Dorn reported to have funds for,
264, _footnote_; Jim Ned's band involved in serious difficulties
with, 274, _footnote_; invited to inter-tribal council, 274-275,

Osceola (Mo.): Lane burns, 55

Ottawas: included within Sac and Fox Agency, 212; receive refugees
upon certain conditions, 212-213; extend further hospitality to
refugees, 213, _footnote_

Pagy, A.T: 65, _footnote_

Park Hill (Okla.): Pike tarries at, 28; Drew's regiment stationed near
in, _footnote_; Greene sent with detachment to Tahlequah and,
136; Blunt's expeditionary force reaches, 193; Phillips has camp at,

Parke County (Ind.): 80, _footnote_

Parks, R.C: 113, _footnote_

Parks, Thomas J: 248, _footnote_

Parsons, Luke F: 285

Partisan Rangers: authorized by Confederate government, 112; W.P.
Lane's company of Texas, 266, _footnote_

Paschal Fish: 205, _footnote_, 236, _footnote_

Pascofa: 62, _footnote_

Patton, James: 47, _footnote_

Pawnee Fork: 112

"Paw Paws": 304, _footnote_

Payton, R.L.Y: 176, _footnote_

Pea-o-pop-i-cult: 65, _footnote_

Pearce, N. Bart: 16, 22, 156, 158

Pea Ridge (Ark.): 13, 29, 34, 36, 197

Pegg, Thomas: 256

Pelzer, Louis: work cited, 260, _footnote_

Peorias: 77, _footnote_

Perryville (Okla.): 112, 295-296

Pheasant Bluff (Okla.): 271, 327

Phelps, John S: 49, 199-200

Phil David: 68, _footnote_

Phillips, James A: 126, _footnote_

Phillips, William A: 126, 321; _footnote_; biographical sketch,
126, _footnote_; commissioned colonel of Third Indian, 132;
forces engage with those of Stand Watie, 163-164; Indians under,
fought well in Battle of Newtonia, 194, 195, _footnote_;
reconnoissances, 218; orders buildings at Fort Davis destroyed, 220,
_footnote_; given command of Indian Brigade by Blunt,
249; reports Indian Brigade in sad state, 251; large view of
responsibilities to Indian Territory, 253; makes overtures to Indians,
254; expostulates against delay in attempting recovery of Indian
Territory, 257; reasons for returning refugees, 258; moves over
border, 258; communication with Fort Scott threatened, 272; continues
in charge at Fort Gibson, 305; Indian Home

Guards under, only Federal troops left in Indian Territory, 312;
undertakes extended expedition through Indian Territory, 322; gives
own interpretation to Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation, 322-323;
differences between Blunt and, 325; removed from command at Fort
Gibson, 333; restored to command, 335

Phisterer, Frederick: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 30, 288

Piankeshaws: 77, _footnote_

Pickett Papers: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 171, 172, 175

Pike, Albert: 128; assigned to command of Department of Indian
Territory, 20; report submitted to Davis, 21; report to be found
in U.S. War Department, 21, _footnote_; makes headquarters at
Cantonment Davis, 22; anxious to save Indian Territory for South,
22-23; ordered to join Van Dorn with Indians, 27; becomes ranking
officer in field, 31; criticism in New York _Tribune_, 31,
_footnote_; authorizes Indian fighting at Pea Ridge, 32; rejoins
army at Cincinnati, 35; receives orders from Maury, 36; talk with
Comanches, 65, _footnote_; negotiations with Upper Creeks, 66,
_footnote_; negotiations with Seminoles, 68, _footnote_;
intrenches himself at Fort McCulloch, 110; report on Indian military
activity, 112; ordered to send more important of forces to Little
Rock, 147; protests against orders of May 31 and June 17, 154-156;
objects to appointment of Pearce, 156; reports grievances to Randolph,
156; Cherokees exasperated by stay at Fort McCulloch, 159; letter
to Stand Watie, 159, _footnote_; John Ross complains of, 160;
prepares resignation, 161; indites conciliatory letter to Hindman,
162-163; student of art of war, 163; publishes circular address to
Southern Indians, 165; effect of circular, 166 and _footnote_;
correspondence with Davis, 167-168; arrested by Cooper, 169; entered
upon diplomatic career as agent of Confederate State Department,
171-172 and _footnote_; exceeded instructions in assuming
financial obligations, 174, _footnote_; considers remuneration,
175, _footnote_; makes important recommendations to Davis, 179;
applies to Holmes for leave of absence, 190; resignation, 191 and
_footnote_; reënters Indian Territory, 198; rumors of conspiracy
with unionists in Texas, 199; arrested, 200; sums up grievances in
letter to Holmes, 201, Appendix; Kirby Smith attempts to reëmploy for
service among Indians of Plains, 201, 335; Steele takes umbrage at
published statement, 286, _footnote_

"Pins": 193, 268, _footnote_

Planter's House: 74, _footnote_, 94, _footnote_

Pocahontas (Ark.): 25

Poison Spring (Ark.): battle of, 326-327

Pomeroy, Samuel C: 41, _footnote_; elected senator from Kansas,
42; John Brown's opinion of, 42, _footnote_; endorses principle
underlying Frémont's emancipation proclamation, 56-57 instructed
by anti-Coffin conspirators, 88, _footnote_; protests against
appointment of Denver, 97; succeeds in preventing appointment
of Denver, 98; responsibility for Blunt's promotion, 107,
_footnote_; advocates confiscation of Cherokee Neutral Lands,
224; recommends concentration of tribes of West in Indian
Territory, 230, _footnote_; in company of Dole at Leroy, 239,

Pontiac: 31, _footnote_

Portlock, E.E: 329, _footnote_

Poteau River (Okla.): 297, _footnote_

Pottawatomies: 234 and _footnote_, 274-275, _footnote_

Prairie Creek (Ark.): 216

Prairie d'Ane (Ark.): 326

Prairie Grove (Ark.): battle of, 218 and _footnote_, 249

Prairie Springs: 279

Price, Sterling: 16, 17, 26, 29, 52, 55, 56, 127, _footnote_,
185, 317, _footnote_; tries to induce Quantrill and his men to
enter regular service, 205, _footnote_; Hindman's opinion
of, 270, _footnote_; commands in District of Arkansas, 299,
_footnote_, 326

Prince, William E: 55, 58

Proctor, A.G: 214, 234, _footnote_

Provisional Congress: refuses to confirm nomination of Heth, 19;
calls for information on McCulloch-Price controversy, 19; established
precedents of good faith in Indian relations, 172; resolution
authorizing Davis to send a commissioner to Indian nations, 172,
_footnote_, 173, _footnote_; work of, 173-175 and
_footnotes_; confers honour upon John Jumper, 174,
_footnote_; considerations of committees regarding Indian
superintendency, 175, 176

Pryor, Nathaniel: 145, _footnote_

Pryor Creek (Okla.): 142, 145

Quantrill, W.C: 45; guerrillas raid Black Bob Lands and Olathe, 205;
raid upon Lawrence, 238, _footnote_, 239; work scorned and
repudiated by McCulloch, 303, _footnote_; perpetrates Baxter
Springs massacre, 304; movements, 304 and _footnote_; Maxey feels
no repugnance for services of, 326

Quapaw Agency: 53, _footnote_

Quapaw Nation: 46, 50, _footnote_

Quapaws: 48, in First Indian Expedition, 115, _footnote_; driven
into exile, 116 and _footnote_; become refugees or are drawn into
ranks of Federal army, 204; some, not _bona fide_ refugees, 204,
_footnote_; no longer in Second Regiment of Indian Home Guards,

Quapaw Strip (Kans.): 126

Quesenbury, William: 158, 248, _footnote_

Rabb's Battery: 114, _footnote_

"Radicals": 305, _footnote_

Rains, James S: 125; makes Tahlequah headquarters of Eighth Division
Missouri State Guard, 130, _footnote_; to attempt to reënter
southwest Missouri, 194; Cooper acts under orders from, 197; in
disgrace, 198

Randolph, J.L: 267, _footnote_, 309, _footnote_

Randolph, George W: Pike makes complaint against Hindman, 156-158;
sympathy for Pike, 168; desires to terminate Magruder's delay, 186;
suggests that Price serve as second in command under Magruder, 186,
_footnote_; reassures Pike, 187, 189; instructions to Holmes, 189

Ratliff, Robert W: 121, _footnote_, 127

Rector, Elias: 175, 181, _footnote_

Rector, H.M: 185, _footnote_

"Red Legs": 305, _footnote_

Red River: 20, 36, 248, 311, 315

Reserve Indians: 112; Pike negotiates successfully with, 173,
_footnote_; volunteers authorized, 173-174, _footnote_;
disorders among, 182; uprising against and murder of Leeper undertaken
by, 182-183; Tonkawas almost exterminated by, 184; companies organized
among, 266, _footnote_; fed by contract, 308, _footnote_

Reynolds, Thomas C: 287, _footnote_

Richardson, James D; work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 21, 172,
278, 322

Richardson, John M: 113

Riddle's Station (Okla.): 276, _footnote_ 293, 295,

Ritchie, John: applies to Dole for new instructions, 106; appraisement
of, 106, _footnote_; dilatory in movements, 114, _footnote_;
disagreement with Kile, 115, _footnote_; slow in putting in
appearance at Humboldt, 115; commands Second Regiment Indian Home
Guards, 115; conducts prisoners to Fort Leavenworth, 144; allows
men to run amuck at Shirley's Ford, 197; dismissal from service
recommended, 197; Phillip's ranking officer, 325

Roane, J.S: Arkansas left in care of, 128, 149; asks forces of Pike,
149; conduct in Mexican War criticised by Pike, 149, _footnote_;
fights duel with Pike, 149, _footnote_; character, 199; arrests
Pike, 200

Roberts, S.A: 308, _footnote_, 320, _footnote_

Robertson, W.S: 225 and _footnote_

Robinson, Charles: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 15, 70,
97, 98, 226; appointment of Mitchell, 46, _footnote_; opposed
to Lane's plans for revenge, 55; approves of principle underlying
Frémont's proclamation, 56-57; opposed to enlistment of Indians, 57;
seeks aid of Prince, 58; responsible for Stanton's contesting of
Lane's seat, 59, _footnote_; Lane has no intention of obliging,
71, _footnote_; commissions for First Indian Expedition pouring
in, 123, _footnote_; calls for volunteers against guerrillas,
205, _footnote_; relations with Stevens, 226, _footnote_

Robinson, William: 62, _footnote_

Rocky Creek (Clear Creek): 184, _footnote_

Rolla (Mo.): 13, 26

Roman, Alfred: work cited, 14, _footnote_, 34, _footnote_

Roman Catholic Mission: 87, _footnote_, 121, 241, _footnote_

Rosengarten, Joseph George: work cited, 118, _footnote_

Ross, John: attitude of faction of, towards proposed Confederate
military occupation of Indian Territory, 15; communicates with Pike
on movements of Cherokee troops, 28, _footnote_; opposed to
secession, 63, _footnote_; reported to have host ready to
do service for U.S., 66, _footnote_; loyal to U.S., 74,
_footnote_; communication from Weer, 134 and _footnote_,
135; reply to Weer, 135-136; submits documents justifying his own
and tribal actions, 136; receives peremptory order from Cooper, 137;
arrested by Greeno, 137; suspected of collusion with captor, 137-138,
192; addresses himself to Hindman against Pike, 160; on mission to
Washington, 192 and _footnote_; formally deposed by convention
called by secessionist Cherokees, 193; receives monetary assistance,
214 and _footnote_; makes personal appeal to Lincoln to enable
refugees to be returned to homes, 215-216; and associates ready to
negotiate for retrocession of Neutral Lands, 231; Gillpatrick medium
of diplomatic intercourse between, and First Indian Expedition, 271

Ross, Mrs. W.P: work cited, 111, _footnote_

Ross, W.W: 234, _footnote_

Round Grove (Okla.): 126

Russell, O.F: 152-153

Sac and Fox Agency (Kans.): 54, _footnote_, 114, _footnote_;
suggested removal of refugees to, 212; tribes included within, 212;
Osages repair to, to confer with Dole, 238 and _footnote_

Sacs and Foxes of Mississippi: encounter refugees from Indian

Territory, 80; offer home to refugees, 86; reservation, 87; receive
Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, 213; scheme of building houses for,
226 and _footnote_; Dole makes treaty with, 235; claim against
Creek refugees, 235, _footnote_; some Sacs confer with Carruth,
274, _footnote_; invited to inter-tribal council, 274-275.

St. Francis River: 20

St. Joe (St. Joseph): 74, _footnote_, 116, 230

St Louis _Republican_: 75, _footnote_

Salomon, Frederick: colonel of Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry,
118; in command at Fort Scott, 118; left in command at Baxter Springs
by Weer, 121; in charge of First Brigade, First Indian Expedition,
125; instructions to, with respect to Indian policy of U.S.
government, 134; deplorable equipment of troops, 138; arrests Weer,
139; gives reasons arrest, 140-142; retrograde movement of, 142, 143,
147, 203; establishes himself at Camp Quapaw, 146; ordered by Blunt to
send troops to support of Indian Brigade, 192-193

Salt Plains: 152, 153

Sam Checote: 62, _footnote_

Santa Fé Trail: to intercept trains on, 129, _footnote_, 267,
_footnote_; Creek regiment to advance toward, 152

Scales, J.A: 268, _footnote_, 277, _footnote_

Schaumburg, W.C: 305, _footnote_

Schoenmaker, John: 241, _footnote_

Schofield, John M: 106, _footnote_, 119, _footnote_, 196,
248, 249 and _footnote_, 260, 261, 293, 304 and _footnote_

Schurz, Carl: 41 and _footnote_, 42, _footnote_

Scott, S.S: acting commissioner of Indian affairs, 172,
_footnote_; remarks of, 177, _footnote_; to investigate
conditions in Indian Territory, 181; hurries to Leased District,
184; asks Governor Colbert to harbor fugitive Tonkawas, 184,
_footnote_; sets out upon tour of inspection, 299; made full
commissioner, 299, _footnote_; reports to Holmes concerning
neglect of Indian Territory, 300; reports to Seddon prospects for
three Indian brigades, 329

Scott, T.M: 316, _footnote_

Scott, W.H: 287, _footnote_

Scott, Winfield S: 48, 56, 69, _footnote_

Scott County (Ark.): 20

Scullyville (Okla.): 155, 325, and _footnote_

Second Brigade, First Indian Expedition: put under Judson, 125

Second Choctaw Regiment: 312, _footnote_

Second Indian Brigade: 327

Second Indian Expedition: Carruth and Martin act in anticipation of,
133, _footnote_; Blunt making plans for, 196 and _footnote_,
208, _footnote_; Blunt discovers that Indians stipulate care of
families during absence, 215

Second Indiana Battery: 118, 125

Second Ohio Cavalry: 118, 119, _footnote_, 125-126

Second Regiment Cherokee Mounted Rifles: commanded by Stand Watie, 25;
joins Pike at Cincinnati, 28; takes position to observe enemy, 32;
guiltless of atrocities committed at Pea Ridge, 32; makes way to Camp
Stephens, 35; detail sent with ammunition to main army, 35; scouting
along northern line of Cherokee country, 112; desertions from, 145

Second Regiment Indian Home Guards: miscellaneous in composition, 114
and _footnote_; men not yet mustered in, 121; fills up after
defeat of Confederates at Locust Grove, 132; Corwin takes

command of, 144; engagement at Shirley's Ford, 197; component part of
Phillips's Indian Brigade, 249; Cherokee in composition, 252; fought
dismounted at Honey Springs, 288; stationed at Mackey's Salt Works,

Sedalia (Mo.): 13

Seddon, James A: 270, _footnote_, 299, _footnote_, 317,
_footnote_; instructs Scott to attend meeting of council at
Armstrong Academy, 320; Scott reports prospects of forming three
Indian brigades, 329

Seminole Battalion: 152, 312, _footnote_

Seminole Nation: 130

Seminoles (Confederate): Murrow, agent, 162, _footnote_; Pike
negotiates treaty with, 173, _footnote_; agree to furnish five
companies of mounted volunteers, 173, _footnote_; Creeks and,
want separate military department made of Indian Territory, 278-279;
disperse, 323

Seminoles (Federal or Unionist): Carruth teacher among, 59;
destitution of refugee, 83, _footnote_; in First Regiment Indian
Home Guards, 114 and _footnote_; attempt tribal reörganization,

Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Confederate): Johnson's bill, 176;
members, 176, _footnote_

Senecas: 48, 204 and _footnote_

Seneca-Shawnees: refugees, 116, 204; object to Wyandot treaty, 237,

Shawnee Agency (Kans.): 236, _footnote_

Shawnee Reserve (Kans.): 205 and _footnote_

Shawnees: 48; loyal to U.S., 66, _footnote_; in First Indian
Expedition, 113, _footnote_; from Cherokee country made refugees,
116; implicated in tragedy at Wichita Agency, 183; Neosho Agency
Indians seek refuge among, 204; are depredated upon, 204, 205,
_footnote_; Dole makes treaty with, 235

Shelby, Jo: 45, 194, 200

Sheridan, Philip H: work cited, 296, _footnote_

Sherman (Tex.): 190

Sherman, William T: 44

Shians (Cheyennes): 274, _footnote_

Shirley's Ford (Mo.): 197

Shoal Creek (Mo.): 118, 120, _footnote_

Shoe-Nock-Me-Koe: 68, _footnote_

Shreveport (La.): 303, _footnote_

Sigel, Franz: 29

Simms, W.E: 176, _footnote_

Sixth Kansas Cavalry: 249

Slavery: 298, _footnote_

Smith, James M.C: 173, _footnote_

Smith, Caleb P: 60, _footnote_, 61, 99; authorizes expenditure of
funds for relief of refugees, 83

Smith, John: 62, _footnote_

Smith, E. Kirby: 317; seeks to reëmploy Pike for service among
Indians, 201, 335 and _footnote_; assigned to command, 269;
approves Steele's adoption of Fabian policy, 297; reply to Stand
Watie, 297-298, _footnote_; detaches command of Indian Territory
from that of Arkansas, 303; subscribes to idea of forming two Indian
brigades, 310; is stanchest of Steele's friends, 311; opposed to three
brigade plan and to promotion of Cooper implicit in it, 318; commends
work of Steele, 318; address emended by Maxey, 330; friend of
Maxey, 334; holds in abeyance orders for retirement of Maxey, 334,
_footnote_; enters into convention with Canby, 335

Smith's Mill: 28

Snead, Thomas L: work cited, 15, _footnote_, 296, _footnote_

Snow, George C: 80, _footnote_, 83, _footnote_

Soda Springs (Okla.): 291, _footnote_

South, The: indifference towards West, 43; love of home state, great
bulwark of, 187-188; Choctaws reported as wavering in allegiance to,
220; Indian Territory as separate military entity comes too late into
reckonings, 250

Southern Confederacy: decisive results of battle of Pea Ridge, 13;
expected by Missouri to force situation for her, 18; relation of
Indian Territory determined by treaties of alliance, 21; Pike's great
purpose to save Indian Territory for, 22-23; Weer suggests that
Cherokee Nation dissolve its alliance with, 134; management of Indian
affairs of, 149-150, 171; view of obligations towards Indians,
174, _footnote_; policy with respect to guerrillas, 205,
_footnote_; Wyandots refuse to throw in lot with, 206; Kansas
politicians want to punish Indians for going over to, 224; Cherokees
repudiate alliance with, 232; Indians losing faith in, 273-274;
charged with bad faith by Cherokees, 279-281; Indian devotion to,
re-asserted, 317; Indians pledge anew loyalty to, 323

Southern Expedition: 73 and _footnote_

Southern Indian Regiments: 24-25

Southern Superintendency (Confederate): establishment delayed by
prolongation of Pike's mission, 175; bill for establishment of, 176

Southern Superintendency (Federal): 117, _footnote_

Southwest, The: 46, 70

Southwestern District of Missouri: 26-27

Southwestern Division of District of Missouri: 127

Spavinaw Creek (Okla.): 130, 138

Spavinaw Hills (Okla.): 127

Spears, John: 279

Speer, John: 43, _footnote_

Speight, J.W: brigade of, 246, _footnote_, 267, _footnote_

Springfield (Mo.): 26, 51

Spring, Leverett: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 15, 52, 97

Spring River: 119, 126; Shirley's Ford on, 197

Staked Plains: 153

Stand Watie: 159, _footnote_; colonel of Second Regiment Cherokee
Mounted Rifles, 25; men in poor trim and undisciplined, 28; men take
position as corps of observation, 32; makes way to Camp Stephens, 35;
scouting, 112, 127; engagements, 112, 113, 119 and _footnote_;
encampment on Cowskin Prairie, 119; home of, 127; successful
skirmishing commented upon, 152; elected Principal Chief, 193;
Phillips compels, to re-cross Arkansas, 218; in command of First
Cherokee Regiment, 262, _footnote_; Steele's great reliance upon,
270; cavalry raids, 272, 312; forced to retire from Cabin Creek, 285;
commanded First and Second Cherokee at Honey Springs, 288; complaints
to Kirby Smith, 297, _footnote_; related to Boudinot, 300; makes
reports and appeals, 301; proposed advancement, 309; authorizes
formation of Cherokee Brigade, 309; Steele's appraisement of, 310;
skirmish at Barren Fork, 312; has command of First Indian Brigade,
327; all Cherokee military units summoned to camp on Limestone
Prairie, 328; name becomes source of terror, 331; last great raid of,

Stanton, Edwin M: 75, _footnote_, 76; refuses to countenance
use of Indians as soldiers, 76 and _footnote_; efficient
administration of, 96; deprecates interference in military affairs in
Kansas, 98 and _footnote_

Stanton, Frederick P: 59, 72, _footnote_

State Department (Confederate): 171, 172, _footnote_

State Rights: 18

Statutes at Large of Provisional Government: work cited, 174,

Stearns, Frank Preston: work cited, in _footnotes_ on pages 42,

Steele, Frederick: in command of Department of Arkansas, 322; argues
over military status of Fort Smith, 321-322

Steele, James: special agent, 100; infers Halleck unfavorable to
Indian expedition, 101; presents credentials at arsenal at Fort
Leavenworth, 101; Sac and Fox chiefs willing to abide by decision,
235, _footnote_

Steele, William: 247; to report to Holmes for duty, 245,
_footnote_; preferred to Cooper, 246; sends most of troops in
direction of Red River, 248; takes large view of responsibilities
to Indian Territory, 253; difficulties and embarrassments, 261-269;
appeal for loyalty to Confederate cause, 267-268, _footnote; ex
officio_ superintendent of Indian affairs, 275-276; regards Indian
Territory as buffer, 276; influences to undermine, 278; makes stand in
Creek country, 291; opposition to, 310; command in bad condition, 292;
crosses from Creek into Choctaw country, 295; journeys to Bonham
to consult with McCulloch, 302-303; command detached from that of
Arkansas, 303; size of force, 305, _footnote_; work discredited
and disparaged by Cooper, 306; policy and practice in matter of
feeding indigents and refugees, 307 and _footnote_; relieved of
command of Indian Territory, 311; Kirby Smith commends work, 318

Stettaner Bros: 211, _footnote_

Stevens, Robert S: 211, _footnote_, 212, 226 and _footnote_

Stevens, Thaddeus: 57, 60, _footnote_

Stidham, George W: 62, _footnote_, 173, _footnote_

Stockton's Hall: 58 and _footnote_

Sturgis, S.D: Lane ordered to coöperate with, 56; placed in command
of District of Kansas, 98; policy with respect to First Indian
Expedition, 103-104; opposed to idea of Indian expedition, 104;
military despotism, 104; forbids enlistment of Indians, 105; refusal
to reinstate Weer, 117, _footnote_

Sugar Creek (Ark.): 30, _footnote_

Sumner, E.V: 260, _footnote_

Susquehanna River: 232

Tahlequah (Okla.): 132, 136; Rains makes headquarters, 130,
_footnote_; Hindman places white cavalry at, 192; Blunt's
expeditionary force seizes archives and treasury of Cherokee Nation,
193; Hindman appears in, 193; steamer, 263, _footnote_

Talliaferro (Taliaferro?), T.D: 267, _footnote_

Tandy Walker: supporter of Cooper, 265; recruits among Choctaws, 265;
appointment, 265, _footnote_; asks for establishment of Indian
Territory as separate military department, 279; commanded Regiment
of Choctaws and Chickasaws at Honey Springs, 288; indulging in petty
graft, 306, _footnote_; service of Choctaws under, in Camden
campaign, 326; has command of Second Indian Brigade, 327

Tawa Kuwus: 274, _footnote_

Taylor, N.G: 207, _footnote_

Taylor, R: 297, _footnote_

Taylor, Samuel M: 279

Tecumseh: 73, _footnote_

Te-Nah: 65, _footnote_

Tenth Kansas Infantry: 117, 118

Texans: assist Indians at Leetown

engagement, 31; away fighting "the cold weather people," 65,
_footnote_; circulate malicious stories about Pike, 160,
_footnote_; disposition towards self-sacrifice, 268; not possible
to deal with Indians arbitrarily, 326

Texas: 179; requisition upon, for troops, 25; Pike to call for troops
from, 36; way to, likely to be blocked by Southern Indians, 61; Pike
wants to be near, 151; anti-Pike reports spreading through, 169; road
from Missouri to, 173, _footnote_; Oldham, senator from,
176, _footnote_; rumors current that Pike is conspiring with
unionists, in, 199; detached from Trans-Mississippi Department,
245-246; cotton speculation alluring men with ready money,
248, _footnote_; public feeling towards deserters, 266,
_footnote_; great commissary depot west of Mississippi, 268,
_footnote_; Bankhead becomes alarmed for safety of, 287, 292;
virtual chaos in, 303; Steele contracts for clothing in northern, 308

Thayer, John M: 324 and _footnote_

Thayer, William Roscoe: work cited in _footnotes_ on pages 41,
45, 96

Third Choctaw Regiment: 321

Thomas, L: 74-75, _footnote_, 100, 109, _footnote_

Throckmorton, James W: 335, _footnote_

Thurston's House: 54, _footnote_

Timiny Barnet: 62, _footnote_

Tishomingo (Okla.): 200

Toe-Lad-Ke: talk, 67, _footnote_; signature, 69, _footnote_

Tonkawas: negotiations with Pike, 182; about one-half of, butchered,
184; surviving, flee to Fort Arbuckle, 184 and _footnote_

Toombs, Robert: 171, _footnote_, 173, _footnote_

Totten, James: 197

Trans-Mississippi Department: 128, _footnote_, 149, 168, 186,
187, 192, 245-246, 269, 270 and _footnote_, 315, 318-319

Trans-Mississippi District of Department no. 2: 14, 19, 20, 25, 127,
_footnote_, 128, _footnote_, 190, 191

Treaties of Alliance: 21, 23 and _footnote_, 173 and

Trench, E.B: 215, _footnote_

Turner, E.P: 292, _footnote_

Turner, John W: 83 and _footnote_

Tus-te-nu-ke-ema-ela: 108, _footnote_

Tus-te-nuk-ke: 108, _footnote_

Upper Creeks: 62, _footnote_

Usher, John P: 231, 239, _footnote_

Van Buren (Ark.): 162, _footnote_, 177

Van Dorn, Earl: 14, _footnote_, 20, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36;
appointment, 19; failure to credit Indians in report, 31 and
_footnote_, 148; orders Indians to harass enemy on border of
own country, 35-36, 110; telegraphic request to Davis, 127,
_footnote_, 186; diverts and appropriates Pike's supplies,
147-148 and _footnote_; hopes Price will be successor, 185

Vann's Ford: 144

Vaughan, Champion: 305, _footnote_

Vaughn, Richard C: 218, _footnote_

Verdigris River: 76, 79, 80, 85, 142, 144, 145, 210-211,
_footnote_, 273, _footnote_; tributary of Arkansas, 22

Verdigris Valley: 79, 85

Vernon County (Mo.): 304, _footnote_

Vicksburg (Miss.): 188, _footnote_, 259, 260, 283, 301,

Villard, Henry: work cited, 45, _footnote_

Villard, Oswald Garrison: work cited, 226, _footnote_

Vore, Israel G: 302 and _footnote_

Wakoes (Wacoes): 66, _footnote_; sent out as runners, 274,

Walker, L.P: 172, _footnote_

Walnut Creek (Kans.): 79, 85, 152, 205, _footnote_

Walnut Grove: 35

Walworth, E: 329, _footnote_

War Department (Confederate): 127, 172 and _footnote_, 186, 318

War Department (Federal): 60 and _footnote_, 73, _footnote_,
76, 99, 100

Warren (Tex.): 190

Warrensburg (Mo.): 58

Washington (George): 65, _footnote_

Washington Territory: 232

Wattles, Augustus: 46, _footnote_, 54, _footnote_, 57,

Wattles, Stephen H: 131, _footnote_, 333 and _footnote_

Weas: 77, _footnote_

Webber's Falls (Okla.): 216, 255, 260, 271, 276, 287, _footnote_

Weed, Thurlow: work cited, 60, _footnote_

Weer, William: 117 and _footnote_, 119, 120, 121, 130, 133;
ideas on Indian relations with U.S. government, 133, _footnote_;
communication with Ross, 134; proposes Cherokee Nation abolish
slavery by vote, 134, _footnote_; sends out two detachments to
reconnoitre, 136; joins Campbell at Fort Gibson, 136-137; faults and
failures, 139, 140-142; arrested by Salomon, 139; Ritchie's men run
amuck and attack their comrades in brigade of, 197

Welch, O.G: 29

Wells, J.W: 267, _footnote_

West, The: indifference towards, 43; character of war in, 44;
character of leaders, 45; criticism of Confederate management of
Indian affairs in, 149-150; establishment of Indian superintendency
left unsettled by Provisional Government, 174-175; Price submits plan
of operations for, 186, _footnote_; circumstances and
conditions concerning migrations of eastern tribes, 227; project for
concentrating tribes in Indian Territory, 230, _footnote_; keep
too many men needlessly in, 259; desertions, 292 and _footnote_

Western Military District: 43, 47, _footnote_

West's Battery: 267, _footnote_

Whistler, W: 69, _footnote_

White, George E: 157, _footnote_

White Auxiliary (Confederate): urged by Pike, 24 and _footnote_;
ordered to Little Rock, 129, 147; Kirby Smith thinks possible to
separate from Indian troops, 310

White Auxiliary (Federal): Dole's recommendation regarding, 99;
Stanton's instructions regarding, 100; not heard from, 102; orders
for, 109 and _footnote_; Indians ask for evidence of
existence, 118; composition, 118; comparison with Indians, 123 and
_footnote_; brigaded with Indian Home Guards, 125; retrograde
movement, 143, 203; Blunt orders Salomon to send to support of Indian
Brigade, 192-193, 203

White Chief: 68, _footnote_

White Cloud: 77, _footnote_

White Hair: 207, _footnote_, 238, _footnote_; principal
chief of Osages, 240, _footnote_

Whitney, H.C: 50, _footnote_, 52, _footnote_, 54,

Wichita Agency: 64, _footnote_; tragedy, 183-184; Belmont,
temporary, 274, _footnote_

Wichita Mountains: 153

Wigfall, Louis T: 264, _footnote_, 277, _footnote_

Wilder, A. Carter: 230, _footnote_, 322, _footnote_

Wilder, D.W: 58, _footnote_, 305, _footnote_

Willamette River: 232

Williams, James M: 284, 285

Williams, the: 327

Williamson, George: 327

Wilson, Hill P: work cited, 226, _footnote_

Wilson's Creek (Mo.): battle of, 34, _footnote_, 49

Wolcott, Edward: 83, _footnote_

Wolf Creek (Ark.): 135, 136, 145, 164

Wood, W.D: 218, _footnote_

Woodburn, James Albert: work cited, 57, _footnote_, 60,

Woodruff's Battery: 147, 150, 154

Wright, Marcus J: work cited, 19, _footnote_, 187,

Wyandot City (Kans.): 204, _footnote_

Wyandots: robbed by secessionist Indians, 206 and _footnote_;
escape into Kansas, 206; want to render military service, 206,
_footnote_; Dole's abortive treaty with, 236-237, _footnote_

*** End of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War" ***

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