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Title: Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers - An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Author: Anonymous
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers - An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918" ***
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TACTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INFANTRY OFFICERS***
Transcriber's note:
There is no author cited on the book's title page; however,
the book's spine shows "A Field Officer"
Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed
in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page
breaks occurred in the original book. For its Index, a page
number has been placed only at the start of that section.
Footnotes have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the
end of their respective chapters. The book's Index has a
number of references to footnotes, e.g. the "(_note_)" entry
under "Boer War." In such cases, check the referenced page
to see which footnote(s) are relevant.
LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE
A TACTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INFANTRY OFFICERS
An examination of the Principles which underlie the Art of
Warfare, with illustrations of the Principles by examples
taken from Military History, from the _Battle of
Thermopylae_ B.C. 480, to the _Battle of the Sambre_
November 1-11, 1918
London
William Clowes and Sons, Ltd.
94 Jermyn Street, S.W.1
1922
First printed March, 1922
{vii}
PREFACE
The Lectures in this volume are based upon the official Text-books
issued by the Imperial General Staff and upon the works of recognised
authorities on the Art of Warfare.
The aim of the Author is to examine the Principles which underlie the
Art of Warfare, and to provide illustrations from Military History of
the _successes_ which have attended knowledge and intelligent
application of Text-book Principles, and of the _disasters_ which have
accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the
Text-books. The "dry bones" of the official publications are clothed
with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of
Military History, and the Lectures may thus, it is hoped, be of
assistance to Infantry Officers, either in the course of their own
studies, or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of
others may be based.
The scope of the work may be gathered from the Table of Contents and
from the Index, and it will be seen that the general Principles
underlying the Art of Warfare are included in the scheme, while
advantage has been taken of the revision of the official Text-books to
incorporate in the Lectures the lessons gained from the experience of
leaders in the Great War.
Upwards of 230 citations are made of "Battle incidents," and, as an
example of the Author's methods, attention may perhaps be directed to
the reinforcement of the Text-book Principle of co-operation and mutual
support by the citation of an instance, on the grand {viii} scale, by
Army Corps (during the _First Battle of the Marne_), and on the minor
scale, by tanks, bombers, aircraft, and riflemen (during the _First
Battle of the Somme_); to the successful application of established
Principles by the Advanced Guard Commander at _Nachod_, and to the
neglect of those Principles by "Jeb" Stuart at _Evelington Heights_,
and by the Prussian Advanced Guard Commanders in 1870; and to the value
of Musketry Training by instancing the successes achieved at the
_Heights of Abraham_, at _Bunker Hill_, _Coruña_, and at
_Fredericksburg_, which were repeated during the _Retreat from Mons_
and at the _Second Battle of the Somme_.
While every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation, and
to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of Principles, the
Author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him (at the
address of the Publishers) any inaccuracies or omissions which may come
under their notice.
LONDON,
March, 1922.
{ix}
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGES
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF BATTLES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv-xvii
PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE LECTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
THE ART OF WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Principles of War--Popular fallacies--Authorities quoted in
support of Fixed Principles (Gen. B. Taylor, C. S. Army; Marshal
Foch; Marshal Haig)--Necessity for Study (Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley;
Marshal French; Marshal Foch; Napoleon)--"Common Sense"
(Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis; General
Grant)--"Higher Ranks" Fallacy (Col. Henderson; Gen. Sir
E. B. Hamley)--Necessity for Study proved (Col. Henderson).
STRATEGY AND TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Definitions--Theatre of Operations the Kingdom of Strategy;
Field of Battle the Province of Tactics--Tactics subservient to
Strategy (Lord Roberts's Advance; First Battle of Somme;
First Battle of Cambrai; Gen. Lew Wallace at the Monocacy;
Marshal Grouchy at Wavre)--Moral--Idiosyncracies of leaders
(Napoleon at Austerlitz; Wellington at Sauroren; Lee and
Jackson _versus_ Abraham Lincoln)--National Moral (Foch,
quoted)--Discipline and Mobility (Battle of Hastings)--Marching
Power (Stonewall Jackson)--Time--Weather--Health--Human
Nature (Fabius and Roman people; McClellan and his Government;
Thomas at Nashville; Roberts in South Africa)--The
Spirit of France ("Nous sommes trahis" of 1870 and cheers of
the poilus in 1917)--Great Britain--America--Lord Roberts's
previous warning ("Germany strikes when Germany's hour has
struck")--Col. Henderson on moral of British and American
troops--"The Contemptible Little Army"--The New Armies
(Tribute from Marshal Haig endorsed by Marshal Foch)--Changes
in Methods of Warfare--Value of official Text-books.
THE BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-32
The Battle is the "only argument" of War--Characteristics of
the Battle (Issue uncertain; Human factor; Value of Reserves;
Superiority at point of Attack)--Lee's "partial attacks" at
Malvern Hill of no avail--Phases of the Battle--Information
and the Initiative (Salamanca; First Battle of the Marne;
Battle of Baccarat)--Development of the Battle (Surprise;
"Like a bolt from the blue" as at Chancellorsville or First
Battle of Cambrai; Marshal Foch on value of Surprise)--The
Decisive Blow--Arbela.
{x}
HOW BATTLES ARE INFLUENCED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-44
Commander's influence by his Orders and by his employment of
Reserves--Subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the
higher command"--The "fog of battle"--Information--Co-operation
(on grand scale at First Battle of the Marne; on minor
scale at Gneudecourt)--Fire Tactics--Value of withholding
fire (Heights of Abraham; Bunker Hill; Fredericksburg; Retreat
from Mons)--Enfilade and Reverse Fire (The Bluff in Ypres
Salient)--Movement--Advancing under Fire--Withdrawing
under Fire in "Delaying Action"--Holding on (Untimely surrender
at Soissons; Stubborn defence at First and Second Battles
of Ypres; Trônes Wood; Bourlon Village; Polygon Wood;
Givenchy)--Covering Fire--Fire and Movement inseparably
associated.
TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-50
Three distinct systems--The Defensive Battle seldom effects
positive results (Gettysburg; Fredericksburg)--The Offensive
Battle (Marlborough; Frederick the Great; Napoleon;
Wellington; Grant; Franco-Prussian War; Battle of Blenheim
described)--The Defensive-Offensive Battle (Marengo; Austerlitz;
Dresden; Vittoria; Orthez; Toulouse; Waterloo; Final Battles
of the Great War; Battle of Waterloo described)--Opportunities
for "restoring" the battle (Antietam)--Chancellorsville
a great Defensive-Offensive Battle--Passing from the "guard"
to the "thrust" (Second Battle of the Marne).
THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-69
Culminating point of all manoeuvres--Quick decision required
or "Position Warfare" will supervene--Second Battle of the
Somme--Methods of Attack--Two plans--Decisive blow on
pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by
fighting--Strength of the Attack--Disposition of the
Troops--Forward Body, Supports and Local Reserves--General
Reserve--The Commander's Plans--The Position of Assembly
(Banks's single column defeated by Forrest in Red River
Valley)--The Attacking Force (St. Privat; Plevna)--The Decisive
Attack--Advantages and Disadvantages of Frontal and Flank
Attacks--Decisive Attack must be followed up (Gettysburg;
Chattanooga)--Detailing the Units--Artillery in Attack
(Verneville; Colenso; mobility and protection of modern
Artillery)--Cavalry in Attack (Appomattox and Paardeberg;
Ramadie; Bagdadieh; Gaines's Mill; Gettysburg; First Battle
of Cambrai; Battle of Amiens; Second Battle of Le Cateau;
Archangel Front; Battle of the Sambre)--Royal Engineers--Medical
Arrangements--Supply--Commander's Position--Battle
Reports--Reorganisation and Pursuit ("Success must be followed
up until the enemy's power is ruined.")
FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-75
The Platoon (Square and Diamond Formations; Ground Scouts;
Flank Scouts; Behind a Barrage)--The Platoon Commander
("Appreciating the situation")--The Company--The Company
Commander--The Battalion--The Battalion Commander (Personal
examples; Monchy le Preux; Battle of Cambrai; Second
Battle of the Somme).
{xi}
DEFENSIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76-97
Counter-attack the soul of Defence--Reasons for adopting
defensive attitude (Chancellorsville)--Defensive-Offensive
Battles (Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo)--Obligatory
Defensive--(Nachod; Thermopylae; Horatius Codes; Second Battle
of the Somme; Rorke's Drift; Le Quesnoy)--Voluntary occupation
for future use (Salamanca; Soissons; Hal and Tubize)--Delaying
Action--The Offensive Spirit--Defence in Modern
Warfare--Inventions have strengthened the Defence (Quotations
from Marshals Foch and French and from "F. S. R.")--Position
Warfare and its characteristics--Entrenchments (Torres
Vedras)--Defensive Systems--Choosing a position (Framework of
artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts
manned by Infantry)--The Outpost Zone--The Battle Position--The
"Semi-Permanent" System--Pill-boxes and Concrete Forts--Common
characteristics of Defensive Action--The Active Defence--Position
must suit plans--Must not be too extensive or
too narrow (Condé-Mons-Binche Line; Retreat from Mons;
Ypres)--Field of Fire--Flanks--Cover--Artillery
positions--Depth--Lateral Communications--Lines of
Withdrawal--Changes of Base (Retreat from Mons; Seven Days'
Battle; Campaign in the Wilderness)--Luring victorious enemy
away from battlefield (Grouchy at Wavre)--Line for Decisive
Counter-Attack (Ramillies; Belgians behind River Gette)--Dividing
the Troops--Troops to hold the Position--Rôle of Local Reserves
(Talavera; Fredericksburg)--General Reserve for Decisive
Counter-Attack (Spottsylvania)--Artillery positions--Division
into Sectors--Position of General Reserve (Second Battle of the
Somme)--Position and Action of the Cavalry (Roliça,
Chancellorsville; Gettysburg; Sadowa; Rezonville; Balaclava;
First Battle of Le Cateau; Retreat from Mons; Cugny; No German
Cavalry available in Second Battle of the Somme to counteract
defensive action of British squadrons)--Rallying
Place--Reorganisation and Pursuit after Decisive Counter-attack.
PROTECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98-101
Marshal Foch on "Surprise"--Detachments provided to protect
Main Body--Close connection between Protection and
Reconnaissance--Radius of Reconnoitre increased by
Aircraft--Position Warfare (Air Photographs; Observation
Posts; Patrols; Raiding Parties; Entrenchments; Box
Respirators; Camouflage)--Manoeuvre Warfare (Protection from
Aircraft; Advanced Guard; Flank Guard; Rear Guard; Outposts).
THE ADVANCED GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102-113
"I never expected it" a disgraceful admission--Every moving
force requires a Guard--Strength (Numbers employed depend
upon size of force protected and tactical situation; Strategical
Advanced Guard enables Tactical Advanced Guard to be
reduced)--Distance--In Advances (Dash and resolution
required but interests of Main Body paramount)--In
Retreats--Training must be realistic--Tactical Principles
(Vanguard for Reconnaissance; Main Guard for Resistance;
Communication essential; Error at Sulphur Springs; Success at
Fredericksburg and First Battle of the Marne; False tactics of
Prussian Advanced Guards in 1870-1871; Excellent work at
Nachod)--Advanced Guard Problems (seven examples, including
"Jeb" Stuart at Evelington Heights).
{xii}
FLANK ATTACKS AND FLANK GUARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114-118
Vulnerability of Flanks and necessity for Guards--Who
furnishes them--Tactics similar to those prescribed for
Advanced Guards--Lines of Communications--Convoys--Raids on the
Lines of Communications (Gen. Turner Ashby; "Jeb" Stuart;
Stonewall Jackson's skill; Col. Madritov's Raid; Sannah's
Post; Ramdam).
THE REAR GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119-128
Nature of Rear Guard work--Strength--Composition--
Distribution--Distance--Tactical Principles (Rear Party watches;
Main Guard fights for Time; Sannah's Post)--Training--Eye
for Ground (Napoleon; Gen. R. E. Lee)--Examples of Rear
Guard Work (First Battle of Le Cateau and the Retreat from
Mons; Second Battle of the Somme; Les Boeufs; Le Quesnoy;
Roliça; Coruña; Value of Musketry; Bristow Station; J. V.
Moreau).
OUTPOSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129-140
Outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security
by Observation and Resistance--Strength--Observation (Aircraft;
Mobile Patrols; Outpost Companies)--Resistance (Infantry,
Artillery, and Machine guns; Sentry Groups, Piquets,
Supports, and Reserves)--Distance (Effective fire of various arms
the controlling factor)--Outpost Commander--Information and
Orders--The Outpost Line of Resistance--The Outpost Company
(Piquets, Supports, Detached Posts, Reserves; the Piquet
Commander; Patrols; Sentry Groups)--Day and Night
Work--Disasters through neglect of Tactical Principles (Chateau
of Chambord; Tweefontein)--Battle Outposts (Broenbeek;
Fredericksburg).
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141-143
Reconnaissance for Attack--Intelligence Officers--Reconnaissance
by Raids--Position Warfare--Reconnaissance for Defence--Position
Warfare.
NIGHT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144-154
Reason for Operations by Night (Secrecy; Frederick the Great's
Coat)--Night Marches (Direction; Protection; Secrecy;
Connection)--"Rules of Thumb"--Night Advances (Surprise;
Direction; Position of Deployment; Connection)--Night
Assaults (First Battle of the Somme; Serre Hill; Vimy Ridge;
Messines-Wytschaete; Villers Brétonneux; Morlancourt;
Spottsylvania)--Limitations of Night Assaults--Smoke and its
advantages and disadvantages--Successful and unsuccessful Night
Assaults (Rappahannock Station--Peiwar Kotal--Tel-el-Kebir;
Stormberg; Magersfontein)--Position of Deployment--Distinguishing
Badges, etc.--Watchword--Precautions against
Checks--Secrecy--"Rules of Thumb."
{xiii}
FIGHTING IN CLOSE COUNTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155-163
Restrictions on view and on movement--Advantages for Attack
against Defence--Savage Warfare (Isandhlwana; Rorke's Drift;
Tofrik; Toski; Teutoberger Wald)--Civilised Warfare (Villages
and Woods attract troops; Gravelotte; Spicheren; Worth; the
Wilderness; Sedan; Defence of Bazeilles; Noisseville)--Attack
on Woods (Tanks; Gauche; Villers Guislain; Messines)--Advancing
from captured position--Defence of Woods--Fighting
patrols--Attack on Villages (Tanks; Light Mortars)--Defence
of Villages (Delaying Action; Providing a "funnel").
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIOUS ARMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164-177
Close combination of all arms required--Infantry (Extent and
limitations of mobility; the decisive arm in battle; the Rifle
and Bayonet; the Lewis gun; Ranges of rifles and machine
guns; Grenades; Hand Grenades; Rifle Grenades; Light
Mortars; Machine guns)--Mounted Troops (Cavalry; Mounted
Rifles; Cyclists)--Artillery--Light Artillery (Pack Guns; Pack
Howitzers; Horse Artillery: Field Guns; Field Howitzers)--Light
Guns against Aircraft and Tanks--Medium Artillery--(Medium
Guns; Medium Howitzers)--Heavy Artillery (Heavy Guns;
Heavy Howitzers)--Super-Heavy Artillery (Super-Heavy
Guns; Super-Heavy Howitzers)--Table of Artillery Ranges--Mortars
and Light Mortars--Royal Engineers--Tanks--Aircraft
(Aeroplanes; Kite Balloons)--Gas--Smoke.
OPERATION ORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178-179
Orders should be written when possible--Should be "fool
proof"--Ambiguity to be avoided--The enemy are . . . My
intention is . . . You will--Initiative not to be hampered.
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181-189
{xv}
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF BATTLES
PAGES
Defence of Sublician Bridge (Legendary) 77
Pass of Thermopylae (B.C. 480) 77
Battle of Arbela (B.C. 331) 32
------ Cannae (B.C. 216) 14
Defeat of Varus by Arminius (A.D. 9) 156-157
Battle of Stamford Bridge (Sept. 25, 1066) 12
------ Hastings (Oct. 14, 1066) 11-12
------ Blenheim (Aug. 2, 1704) 46-47
------ Ramillies (May 23, 1706) 46, 91
------ Malplaquet (Sept. 11, 1709) 46
------ Leuthen (Dec. 5, 1757) 46
Heights of Abraham (Sept. 13, 1759) 38
Battle of Bunker Hill (June 17, 1775) 38
------ Ettlingen (July 9-10, 1796) 128
------ Marengo (June 14, 1800) 47, 76
------ Hohenlinden (Dec. 3, 1800) 128
------ Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805) 9-10, 47, 76,
125
------ Jena (Oct. 14, 1806) 125
------ Roliça (Aug. 17, 1808) 95, 127
------ Coruña (Jan. 16, 1809) 127-128
------ Talavera (July 27-28, 1809) 92
Lines of Torres Vedras (Oct.-Nov. 1810) 82-83
Battle of Salamanca (July 22, 1812) 27, 78
------ Vittoria (June 21, 1813) 47
------ Sauroren (July 28, 1813) 10
------ Dresden (Aug. 26-27, 1813) 47, 89
------ Orthez (Feb. 27, 1814) 47
Defence of Soissons (March 3, 1814) 41, 78
Battle of Toulouse (April 10, 1814) 47
----- Quatre Bras (June 16, 1815) 48
------ Ligny (June 16, 1815) 8, 47, 90-91
------ Waterloo (June 18, 1815) 8, 47-48, 76,
79
------ Wavre (June 18-19, 1815) 8, 91
------ Balaclava (Oct. 26, 1854) 96
Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1862) 3, 4, 12, 117
Battle of McDowell (May 8, 1862) 12
------ Cross Keys (June 6, 1862) 117
Seven Days' Battle (June-July, 1862) 14, 90
Battle of Gaines's Mill (June 27, 1862) 14, 65
------ Malvern Hill (July 1-3, 1862) 15, 25-26, 65,
112, 117
{xvi}
Battle of Evelington Heights (July 3, 1862) 112-113
------ Bull Run (2) (Aug. 28, 1862) 12
------ Antietam (Sept. 17, 1862) 14, 15, 48
------ Fredericksburg (Nov. 15, 1862) 14, 22, 38, 46,
92, 108,
139-140
------ Chancellorsville (May 2-3, 1863) 12, 30, 48, 76,
95, 117
------ Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) 15, 45, 61,
95-96, 117
------ Sulphur Springs (Oct. 12, 1863) 108
------ Bristow Station (Oct. 14, 1863) 128
------ Rappahannock Station (Nov. 7, 1863) 151
------ Chattanooga (Nov. 25, 1863) 61-62
------ Pleasant Hill (April, 1864) 59
------ The Wilderness (May 12, 1864) 90, 93, 97, 117,
125-126,
149-150, 158
------ Monocacy (July 8, 1864) 7
------ Nashville (Dec. 15-16, 1864) 15
------ Appomattox (April 9, 1865) 15, 64
------ Nachod (June 27, 1866) 18, 77, 110
------ Sadowa (July 3, 1866) 96
------ Spicheren (Aug. 6, 1870) 108-109, 158
------ Worth (Aug. 6, 1870) 109, 158, 159
------ Colombey (Aug. 14, 1870) 109-110
------ Rezonville (Aug. 16, 1870) 96
------ Gravelotte (Aug. 18, 1870) 158
------ Verneville (Aug. 18, 1870) 63
------ St. Privat (Aug. 18, 1870) 60
------ Noisseville (Aug. 31, 1870) 159
------ Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870) 16, 159
------ Metz (Oct. 27, 1870) 16
------ Chambord (Dec. 9, 1870) 138
------ Plevna (Dec. 10, 1877) 60
------ Peiwar Kotal (Dec. 2, 1878) 151
------ Isandhlwana (Jan. 22, 1879) 78, 156
------ Rorke's Drift (Jan. 22, 1879) 77-78, 156
------ Tel-el-Kebir (Sept. 13, 1882) 153-154
------ Tofrik (March 22, 1885) 156
------ Toski (Aug. 3, 1889) 156
------ Adowa (Feb. 26, 1896) 22
------ Stormberg (Dec. 10, 1899) 152
------ Magersfontein (Dec. 10-11, 1899) 152
------ Colenso (Dec. 15, 1899) 63
------ Ramdam (Feb. 13, 1900) 118
------ Paardeberg (Feb. 27, 1900) 16, 64
------ Sannah's Post (March 31, 1900) 118, 124
------ Tweefontein (Dec. 24, 1901) 138
------ The Yalu (May 1, 1904) 117-118
The Great War
Battle of Le Gateau (Aug. 1914) 126
------ River Gette (Aug. 1914) 91
Condé-Mons-Binche (Aug. 22-23, 1914) 87
Battle of Charleroi (Aug. 23, 1914) 88
------ Baccarat (Aug. 25, 1914) 28
Retreat from Mons (Aug. 1914) 19, 38, 87-88,
90, 96, 127,
165
{xvii}
First Battle of the Marne (Sept. 1914) 27-29, 36-37,
52, 108
First Battle of Ypres (Oct. 20-Nov. 20, 1914) 19, 20, 41-42,
88
Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-May 18, 1915) 20, 42, 176
Defence of Verdun (Feb.-Aug. 1916) 7, 16
Battle of Ypres Salient (March 2, 1916) 39
First Battle of the Somme (July 1-Nov. 18, 1916) 7, 13, 22, 37,
42, 53, 148,
171, 175,
176-177
Battle of Serre Hill (Feb. 10-11, 1917) 148-149
------ Messines (June 7, 1917) 20, 149, 160
Chemin des Dames (April-July, 1917) 16
Battle of Vimy (April 9, 1917) 149
------ Arras (April 9-June 7, 1917) 170
Monchy le Preux (April 14, 1917) 75
Third Battle of Ypres (Sept. 26, 1917) 42-43, 139
Battle of Broenbeek (Oct. 9, 1917) 139
First Battle of Cambrai (Nov. 20, 1917) 7, 30, 42,
66, 75, 160
The Piave Line (Italy) (Nov. 25, 1917) 7
Second Battle of the Somme (March 21-April 11, 1918) 20, 34, 43,
52-53, 56,
66, 75, 77,
78, 95, 96,
126-127, 174
Battle of Villers-Brétonneux (April 24-25, 1918) 149
------ Morlancourt (June 10, 1918) 149
Second Battle of the Marne (July 18, 1918) 49
Battle of Amiens (Aug. 8-13, 1918) 21, 66
------ Bapaume (Aug. 21-Sept. 1, 1918) 21
------ Havrincourt and Epehy (Sept. 12-18, 1918) 21
Second Battle of Cambrai (Sept. 27-Oct. 5, 1918) 21, 170
Battle of Flanders (Sept. 28-Oct. 14, 1918) 21
Second Battle of Le Cateau (Oct. 6-12, 1918) 21, 66, 96
Battle of the Selle (Oct. 17-25, 1918) 21
------ Sambre (Nov. 1-11, 1918) 21, 65, 67
Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1918) 65, 169
Mesopotamia
Battle of Ramadie (Sept. 27-29, 1917) 64
------ Bagdadieh (March 26, 1918) 64-65
North Russia
Archangel Province (Aug.-Sept. 1918) 66-67
{xix}
PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE LECTURES
"Field Service Regulations," Parts I. and II.
"Infantry Training," Parts I. and II.
CLERY, Major-General Sir C. F., K.C.B.:
"Minor Tactics."
CREASY, Sir Edward:
"Fifteen Decisive Battles at the World."
FOCH, Maréchal Ferdinand:
"Principles of War."
FRENCH OF YPRES, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P.:
"1914."
GRANT, General Ulysses S., United States Army:
"Memoirs."
HAIG OF BEMERSYDE, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T.:
"Sir D. Haig's Dispatches."
HAKING, Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B., G.B.E.:
"Staff Bides, etc."
HAMLEY, General Sir E. B., K.C.B.:
"Operations of War."
HENDERSON, Colonel G. F. R., C.B.:
"Stonewall Jackson."
"The Science of War."
NAPIER, Sir William Francis Patrick, K.C.B.;
"History of the Peninsular War."
"OLE LUK-OIE." _See_ SWINTON.
SWINTON, Major-General E. D., C.B.:
"The Green Curve."
TAYLOR, General R., Confederate States Army:
"Destruction and Reconstruction."
{1}
LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE
THE ART OF WARFARE
"The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its
principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."--MARSHAL FOCH.
The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed
principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his
goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and
there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these
pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out,
that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap
and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the
alluring trap that Warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a
third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the
General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the
Subaltern Officer.
KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.--With regard to the first of these
difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of
Warfare may be consulted. "The cardinal principles on which the art of
war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of
morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the
genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed"
(General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). "Although the manifold inventions of
modern times have given to warfare {2} a wider scope and fresh
materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it
applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more
delicate" (Marshal Foch). "This war has given us no new principles;
but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid
improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense
numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast
quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous
expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor
transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity
concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and
services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new
devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already
working" (Marshal Haig).
The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but
their successful application on the field of battle requires that they
should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The
mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by
the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General
Sir E. B. Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and
thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of
troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War
into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to
speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to
think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must
present itself to the mind as perfectly _obvious_" (Marshal French).
The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest
victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "Generally
speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect.
It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in
order to make war or even to understand {3} war. No study is possible
on the battlefield; one does there simply what one _can_ in order to
apply what one knows. In order to _do_ even a little one has to know a
great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes
itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed
principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called
extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all"
(Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way
to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the
great captains."
THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.--The fallacy that warfare is "merely a
matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson,
in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865,
when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in
Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a
professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have
possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and
yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were
frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like
hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this
well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous.
"Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from
assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation
whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall
Jackson").
In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in
the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker,
commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed
to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission
was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to
keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.
{4}
THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.--The same writer has also protested
vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field
is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a
detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being
has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is
constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and
success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend
upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of
War"). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations
of War Explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond
the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however
small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of
the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience,
seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with
marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in
every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements
of Jackson's forces in the _Shenandoah Valley Campaign_ of 1862 were
almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently
impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of
Jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of
Stonewall's couriers approached him. "I was always expecting him to
order me to assault the North Pole! But, if he _had_ ordered, we
should have done it!"
THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.--It is not pretended by any sane writer that
study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally
recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the
knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the
field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or
confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute
by nature. But "the quick, {5} the resolute, the daring, deciding and
acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to
decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art
they are called upon to practise" ("The Science of War"). Theory,
applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious
sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the
advice, or to take warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of
Wellington, of Foch, and of many of the most famous generals of
history. "A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's
warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's
communications his first objective; and if Wellington's tactical
methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if
he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . The
same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a
small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with
courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon
or an army corps" ("The Science of War").
{6}
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
DEFINITIONS.--Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by
non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the
soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined
it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered.
The theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of
Tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it
so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of
operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to
striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy,
and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_
combinations. "Strategy must ever be striving for Tactical success;
Tactics must ever keep in mind the Strategical situation and must
constantly aim at creating fresh Strategical opportunities. Tactics
without Strategy resembles a man without legs; Strategy without Tactics
is like a man without arms" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out
the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to
beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the
direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest
way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. No Strategy can
henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring Tactical results,
victory by fighting" (Marshal Foch).
Local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are
felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. Lord Roberts's advance on
Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on
Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles
apart. _The {7} First Battle of the Somme_ (July 1, 1916) not only
relieved the pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces
which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the
East. General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917)
was followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November
30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20 to
25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the
Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable
that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was
suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our
Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches).
A tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. In
June, 1864, General Hunter was operating with a Federal army in the
Shenandoah Valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall
back. In so doing he uncovered the National Capital, and General Early
was sent by the Confederate Commander-in-Chief to capture Washington.
General Grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the
dispatch of troops, and to further this end, General Lew Wallace,[1] on
his own initiative, confronted Early's corps at the _Monocacy_ on July
8, 1864. He met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed Early's
corps until the troops sent by Grant were in position. "If Early had
been but one day _earlier_ he might have entered the capital before the
arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. General Wallace contributed
on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater
benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an
equal force to render by means of a victory" (Grant's "Memoirs"). A
tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if
it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. On the
morning of June 18, 1815, Marshal Grouchy was in {8} pursuit of the
Prussians whom Napoleon had defeated on June 16 at Ligny. Although
urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at Waterloo), Grouchy
pushed on eastwards, where he found Thielmann's Prussian Corps of
16,000 men holding the passage across the Dyle at Wavre. The _Battle
of Wavre_ was begun at 4 p.m. on June 18, and by 11 a.m. on the next
day Grouchy was victorious. But his victory was barren. His tactical
achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own
force to considerable danger. As he sat down to pen a vainglorious
dispatch to the Emperor, he received the news that Napoleon was a
fugitive and the Imperial Army defeated and scattered. Grouchy's
feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted Blücher to join forces with
Wellington. To the Emperor's dismay it was the Prussians who came from
the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "C'est les Prussiens qui
viennent!"
MORAL.--It is seen that Strategy may be defined as the art of
concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at
the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main
armies; while Tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and
handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy
when encountered. But although Strategy may be considered as the art
of bringing an opponent to battle, and Tactics as the art of defeating
him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many
considerations which influence a commander in the field.
The art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from
the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what
locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated.
From information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed
be determined; but "in war (said Napoleon) moral force is to the
physical (that is, to numbers and {9} armament) as three to one," and
upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been
expressed. "To understand war you must go beyond its instruments and
materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously
analysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs,
their passions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. That
is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a
reasonable study of the art of war" (Marshal Foch). And while dealing
with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing
leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the
nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human
intelligences rather than between masses of men. "There have been
soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("The Science of
War"). "It was not the Roman legions which conquered Gaul, it was
Caesar. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the
Inn, it was Turenne" (Napoleon). A commander must, therefore, take
into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and
the means at the disposal of his adversary. He must project his mind
to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place
must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will
act under the given circumstances.
History supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[2]
Napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the Russian left wing against
his right at _Austerlitz_, Dec. 2, 1805, because he knew the
temperament of the Tsar Alexander. At Austerlitz, the most brilliant
of all his battles, Napoleon had 70,000 troops and was confronted by
80,000 Austrians and Russians drawn up on the Heights of Pratzen. His
plan was to draw the weight of the Russian attack against his
right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and {10}
self-confident Tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to
Napoleon"--and then to launch a superior attack against the Heights,
which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and
finally to hurl his General Reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the
Russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. When
the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right
was engaged, Napoleon launched Murat, Bernadotte, and Soult against the
allied centre; when Soult was master of the village and the knoll, and
as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the
reverse slopes of the Pratzen Ridge, the French centre wheeled round to
the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the Russians, who
were still heavily engaged in their original attack. These operations
were completely successful and over 40,000 of the opposing armies were
accounted for. Wellington defeated Soult at Sauroren in the Pyrenees
(July 28, 1813) by taking advantage of a minor incident. He had ridden
forward to see the disposition of the French forces, and as his men
cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said, "Soult
is a very cautious commander. He will delay his attack to find out
what those cheers mean; that will give time for the Sixth Division to
arrive and I shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he
had predicted. Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson frequently played
upon the nervousness of President Lincoln for the safety of Washington,
and by threatening to cross the Potomac induced him to withdraw troops
that were advancing against Richmond.
NATIONAL MORAL.--The moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must
also be taken into consideration. "The common theory that, in order to
win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better bases,
more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. For it leaves out of
account the most important part of the {11} problem, that which
animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and
physical qualities" (Marshal Foch).
DISCIPLINE AND MORALITY.--The discipline, courage, and endurance of the
troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting, are at least
of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "If their
discipline and leading be defective, Providence seldom sides with the
big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy
auxiliaries" ("The Science of War"). "An army which cannot march well
is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. A general whose strategy is
based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the
breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of
disaster. It is therefore necessary that the question of marching
should be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by
regimental officers and men. It is on the latter that the hardships
and exertions fall, and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by
teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move
faster and further than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred
by an army which allows itself to be out-marched. . . . Superior
mobility alone enabled Frederick the Great to move 'like a panther
round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank. The
discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of
combination" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "Nothing compensates for
absence of discipline; and the constant watchfulness that is necessary
in war, even when danger seems remote, can only be secured by
discipline, which makes of duty a habit" (General R. Taylor, C.S.
Army). At the _Battle of Hastings_ (Oct. 14, 1066) lack of discipline
and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the English nation and
brought about the Norman Conquest. Harold, the English king, had
defeated the forces of Harold Hadraade, {12} King of Norway, at
Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire (Sept. 25, 1066). Four days later, Duke
William of Normandy landed in Pevensey Bay, with 60,000 horse and foot.
Harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and
marching. After halting six days in London to collect reinforcements,
the English force entrenched itself on the hill of Sautlache and
awaited attack. The Normans were unable to penetrate the abattis, but
they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the English
race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat. Harold's undisciplined
auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were obeyed by the
"regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the palisades in
pursuit of the fleeing Normans, who suddenly turned about and
penetrated the English lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries.
Had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as the
"regulars" there had been no Norman Conquest.
With regard to marching, General T. J. Jackson once observed, in reply
to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one
man in marching than five in fighting." Acting on this principle he
invariably surprised his enemy, the most notable instances being his
surprise of Milroy at McDowell, of Banks and Fremont in the Valley, of
McClellan's right at Gaines's Mill, of Pope at the Second Manassas, and
his last and greatest of Hooker at Chancellorsville.
TIME.--Time is often a supreme factor in warfare, and the superior
mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical
advantage. Reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated
at the right spot at the right moment, and steamships, railways, and
mechanical transport thus play an important part in war. The mobility
of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle, and campaigns have
been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms.
{13}
WEATHER.--The weather is an important factor in war, and its influence
appears to have increased in modern times. Mists and fogs militate
against observation by aircraft, and poor visibility interferes with
the work of artillery. Roads are broken up by the weight of modern
traffic, and in a shelled area the craters become impassable after a
few days rain, making the supply of food, stores and ammunition a
serious problem. Such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack,
as the ground of the encounter consists principally of hastily dug
trenches which become running streams of mud; and they assist the
defence, as the pursuit is delayed, while the ground behind the
defending force is less liable to be churned up by shell fire. The bad
weather of September, 1916, caused a delay in the Allied advance
against Sailly-Saillesel and Le Transloy and made it necessary to
abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have
brought it within the grasp of the commanders. As the season advanced
and the bad weather continued the plans of the Allies had to be
reduced, and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some
indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather
permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended.
HEALTH.--"Wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral
of the opposing forces. Moral depends to a very large extent upon the
feeding and general well-being of the troops. Badly supplied troops
will invariably be low in moral, and an army ravaged by disease ceases
to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the fighting forces
are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that
with the rearward services rests victory or defeat" (Marshal Haig).
HUMAN NATURE.--Human nature is affected by discipline, fear, hunger,
confidence in or distrust of leaders, and by a variety of other
influences, and human {14} nature is more important than armament and
numbers. "No great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which
the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting" (General
Sir E. B. Hamley), and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its
leaders is also a factor of supreme importance. Time occupied in
preparation for battle, or in manoeuvring for the "weather gauge," is
seldom wasted; but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive
yielding to popular clamour. Against the strategical and tactical
genius of Hannibal, Quintus Fabius Maximus invoked the aid of time to
afford him opportunities to strike. His "Fabian Tactics" have become
proverbial, and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet
"Cunctator," which the epigram[3] of Ennius has immortalised in his
honour. Popular clamour led to a division of authority with Varro, and
to the disaster of _Cannae_ (B.C. 216). General G. B. McClellan was
recalled from the Army of the Potomac on account of his failure to
convert the drawn battle of the _Antietam_ (Sept. 17, 1862) into a
victory, and the army was handed over to General Burnside, who suffered
defeat at _Fredericksburg_ (Dec. 13, 1862) with terrible slaughter.
"But the stout heart of the American nation quickly rallied, and
inspired by the loyal determination of Abraham Lincoln the United
States turned once more to their apparently hopeless task" (Colonel G.
F. R. Henderson). McClellan's forte was organisation, and although at
first slow in the field, he had assembled and trained a magnificent
fighting force, with which he was "feeling his way to victory." He
suffered defeat indeed at _Gaines's Mill_ (June 27, 1862), the first
act in the drama of the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_. Day
after day he fell back through swamp and forest, battling with Lee's
victorious troops. But there was no further disaster. Under the most
adverse and dispiriting circumstances the Army of the Potomac fairly
held their own until {15} they reached the impregnable position of
Malvern Hill. There McClellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy
slaughter the disjointed attacks of the Army of Northern Virginia. He
had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base,
unknown to the Confederate General Staff, from the York River to the
James. This proved his strategic power, as did the dispositions at
_Malvern Hill_ (July 1, 1862) his tactical ability, and his work was
accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the
opposition of the executive, and in face of the military genius of
Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson. At the Antietam he forced the
Confederates to give battle, and although tactically indecisive, the
engagement caused the withdrawal of Lee's army into Virginia.
McClellan's successors were far less competent, and the magnificent
Army of the Potomac met with frequent disasters, until it formed the
solid nucleus of the forces of General Meade, which inflicted upon Lee
his first defeat and saved the Union at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863),
and finally under Grant, in conjunction with the Armies of the West,
crushed the life out of the Confederacy at _Appomattox_.
General G. H. Thomas, in command of the U.S. Army of the Cumberland,
refused battle with the Confederates in Nashville until he had prepared
cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit. Constancy of
purpose was the salient feature of Thomas's military character. He
would not fight until he was ready. The civil authorities urgently
demanded that he should advance. So great was the tension that Grant
finally sent General J. A. Logan to supersede Thomas; but before Logan
arrived Thomas had won the _Battle of Nashville_ (Dec. 15-16, 1864),
the most crushing victory of the war.
Lord Roberts landed in Cape Town on Jan. 10, 1900, and popular
expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated
advance of French's cavalry and the Sixth and Ninth Infantry Divisions
{16} resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field
of battle, and in the surrender on the field of Cronje's force at
_Paardeberg_ (Feb. 27, 1900), on the anniversary of Majuba.
THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE.--In all calculations on which a declaration of
war is based the moral fibre of the actual and potential enemy nations
is fully considered. It is difficult to imagine that the Headquarters
Staff of the German and Austrian Armies failed to bring under review
the moral of the nations against whom their armies were to be launched
in July, 1914. The Spirit of France had shown no signs of
deterioration, but was to be quelled by a rapid advance through neutral
territories, to bring about a bewildered collapse, as in 1870, before
the Russian mobilisation was complete, and "Nous sommes trahis" was
again to be heard from the disheartened troops. But the calm
determination of the commander and his generals in the dark days of
August, 1914, prevented the bewildered collapse, and the _Defence of
Verdun_ from February to August, 1916, and the cheers of the _poilus_,
as they recaptured the _Chemin des Dames_ in April-July, 1917, replaced
the capitulation of Sedan and of Metz and the "Nous sommes trahis" of
1870.
GREAT BRITAIN.--Britain was not expected to take an active part in the
struggle, and if she did the affairs of Ireland, the Suffragette
movement, and the general decadence of the nation would prevent a
whole-hearted prosecution of the war. A small force only could be sent
to Europe; it would be swallowed up in the "bewildered collapse," and
no reinforcements could be spared. The extent of the miscalculation is
shown in Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on July 3,
1919, in which the Prime Minister stated that the British Empire had
put 7,700,000 men under arms, had raised 9,500,000,000 pounds in taxes
and loans, and had suffered upwards of 8,000,000 casualties on land and
{17} sea. It was also shown that during the last two years of the war
the British armies had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting on the
Western Front in France and at the same time had destroyed the armed
forces of the Turkish Empire in the East. The risk of compelling
Britain to take part was undertaken, and the first great strategical
blunder of the war was committed.
AMERICA.--In the third year of the War America had gradually been
brought into the arena, and a further miscalculation arrayed the
hundred millions of a free and united nation against the autocracies of
Central Europe.
LORD ROBERTS.--Other brains than German had considered the possibility
of an armed conflict in Europe. For many years Lord Roberts had
advocated universal military service in the United Kingdom, as a
procedure beneficial in itself, and imperative on account of the clear
intentions of the Headquarters Staff of the German Army. "Germany
strikes when Germany's hour has struck," was his warning note, and
although apparently unheeded by the nation, his warning was not without
effect upon the training of the Regular Army.
COLONEL HENDERSON.--Military writers in the United Kingdom had also
considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of
Germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed
under review. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in "The Science of War," had
even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of Britain and
the Overseas Dominions but those of the United States would take part,
and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the
Atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of
the War. Colonel Henderson found in the race something more than
toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "Tactical ability is the
birthright of {18} our race. . . . In a conflict on the vastest scale
(the American Civil War) the tactics of the American troops, at a very
early period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866. In
Strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments
and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the
field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. Nor were the
larger tactical manoeuvres even of 1870 an improvement on those of the
American campaigns. . . . But in 1878, Skobeleff, the first of
European generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the
American War 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the Turkish
redoubts he followed the plan of the American generals on both sides,
when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting
columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be
repulsed." After the Civil War, General Forrest, a cavalry leader of
the Confederate States Army, was asked to what he attributed his
success in so many actions. He replied: "Well, I reckon I got there
first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the
Art of War. "At Nachod, the Austrian commander had numbers on his
side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by
numbers that he was beaten" (Marshal Foch). With regard to the moral
of the race Colonel Henderson makes this emphatic statement: "In the
last nine months of the American Civil War, time and again, according
to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but
it declined to be anything of the sort. The losses show this. This
was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both
sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the Duke
of Wellington. Never to know when they were beaten was a
characteristic of both North and South."
THE CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY.--In place of the general decadence of the
British race, upon which the German Staff appear to have relied, this
characteristic {19} quality of endurance was exhibited by French's
"Contemptible Little Army" during the _Retreat from Mons_ in August,
1914, at the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October 20, 1914), and at the
_Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22, 1915). Of his "Contemptible Little
Army" Marshal French writes in his book, "1914": "The British Army had
indeed suffered severely, and had performed a herculean task in
reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its _moral_
had withstood the ordeal. I think the Germans were probably justified
in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the
nation from which we spring."
THE NEW ARMIES.--From 1915 to 1918 the New Armies, raised, equipped,
and trained during the War, and representing the Empire in arms,
displayed the same inherent quality, and disproved for ever the charge
of decadence that had been brought against the British race. "That
these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions,
and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years
had been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history
of our nation records no equal. . . . Troops from every part of the
British Isles and from every Dominion and quarter of the Empire,
whether Regulars, Territorials, or men of the New Armies, have borne a
share in the battle. . . . Among all the long roll of victories borne
on the colours of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of
the endurance and resolution of our Infantry. They have shown
themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and of the
proud records of former wars" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 23,
1916).
"Our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are
capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under
conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the
greatest endurance, determination, and heroism to {20} overcome" (Sir
D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25, 1917). "It is no disparagement of the
gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn
struggle for the line of hills which stretches from Wytschaete to
Passchendaele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden
of our Empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in
October and November of 1914, made Ypres take rank for ever amongst the
most glorious of British battles" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25,
1917). "The British infantryman has always had the reputation of
fighting his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the
history of our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose,
has won victory from a numerically superior foe. Thrown once more upon
the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control, but which
will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full measure the
traditional qualities of his race" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, July 20,
1918). "Throughout this long period of incessant fighting against
greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the British
forces engaged was magnificent. What they achieved is best described
in the words of the French General (Maistre) under whose orders they
came, who wrote of them: 'They have enabled us to establish a barrier
against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves.
Cela aucun des témoins français ne l'oubliera'" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatch, December 21, 1918).
After four years of fighting, at the close of a defensive campaign of
the utmost severity, protracted by the efforts of the enemy from March
21-July 17, 1918, the New Armies passed from the guard to the thrust.
They were everywhere victorious, and in nine pitched battles they
captured upwards of 175,000 prisoners and 2,600 guns.
"In order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during
this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and importance
of the main events--
{21}
"_Battle of Amiens_ (Aug. 8-13) in which the IV. Army took 22,000
prisoners and more than 400 guns.
"_Battle of Bapaume_ (Aug. 21-Sept. 1) III. Army and Left Wing of IV.
Army: 34,000 prisoners, 270 guns.
"_Battle of the Scarpe_ (Aug. 26-Sept. 3) I. Army: 16,000 prisoners,
200 guns.
"_Battle of Haerincourt and Epéhy_ (Sept. 12-18) IV. and III. Armies:
12,000 prisoners, 100 guns.
"_Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line_ (Sept. 27-Oct. 5) IV.,
III., and I. Armies. Ended in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line and
in the capture of 35,000 prisoners and 380 guns.
"_Battle of Flanders_ (Sept. 28-Oct. 14) II. Army: 5,000 prisoners, 100
guns.
"_Battle of Le Cateau_ (Oct. 6-12) IV., III., and I. Armies: 12,000
prisoners, 250 guns.
"_Battle of the Selle_ (Oct. 17-25) IV. and III. Armies: 20,000
prisoners, 475 guns.
"_Battle of the Sambre_ (Nov. 1-11) IV., III., and I. Armies: 19,000
prisoners, 450 guns."
(Marshal Foch.)
CHANGES IN METHOD.--The principles which underlie the Art of War would
thus appear to be based on constant factors, but the methods of their
application are susceptible to change, for in their application the
principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions.
Gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour; the
bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike; the rifle outranged
the musket; the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively
increased the rate of fire; smokeless powder rendered a firing line
almost invisible; the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet
increased the danger-zone in an advance; the increased power, mobility,
and accuracy of the field gun[4] rendered certain {22} formations
obsolete in the attack; the general advance in the rate and accuracy of
fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery made attack on a strongly
organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of
the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence, or when an
overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and
smothers the enemy's resistance. The advent of a third service, by the
addition of the Air to the Sea and Land Services, increased the
facilities for reconnaissance[5] and added to the difficulties of
concealing movement during the hours of daylight. These and similar
influences have brought about changes in certain respects, amongst
which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments,
and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the
case, or modified to suit the new requirements.[6]
But no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the
infantryman. "Despite the enormous development of mechanical invention
in every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always
held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure
to-day as in any period of history. The infantryman remains the
backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. At no time has
the reputation of the British infantryman been higher, or his
achievement more worthy of his renown. . . . Immense as the
influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves
decide a campaign. Their true _rôle_ is that of assisting the
infantryman. . . . They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and
bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won" (Sir D.
Haig's Dispatches).
{23}
THE TEXT-BOOKS.--Changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to
time in circulars issued by the General Staff, to be embodied
eventually in the official text-books. These text-books ("Infantry
Training" and "Field Service Regulations") are the foundation upon
which the study of Infantry Tactics should be based, and of these books
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson has left behind him the following opinion:
"That portion of our own text-books which refers to Infantry in Attack
and Defence is merely the essence of Tactics. There is no single
sentence that is not of primary importance, no single principle laid
down that can be violated with impunity, no single instruction that
should not be practised over and over again." After four years of
warfare, in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been
put to the most searching of all tests (_i.e._ practical application in
War), the General Staff of the Army was able to preface a list of its
recent publications with the following exhortation: "It must be
remembered that the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations
and in Infantry Training are still the basis of all sound knowledge."
At the close of the final victorious campaign, Marshal Haig emphasised
the truth of this claim: "The longer the war lasted the more
emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and
training were based on correct principles. The danger of altering them
too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the
risk of adjusting them too little. . . . The experience gained in this
war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other
campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics
which have characterised the fighting. There was required also the
sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our Training Manuals and
Staff Colleges."
[1] Author of "Ben Hur."
[2] For an example in military fiction, see _The Second Degree_ in "The
Green Curve."
[3] "Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem."
[4] The term "field gun" was limited to the 18-pounder until the _Boer
War_, when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery. In the Great War,
mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the
largest calibre. Quick-firing field guns were first used by the
Abyssinians against the Italians at the Battle of Adowa (February 29,
1896).
[5] Reconnoitring balloons were first used by the Army of the Potomac
at the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 12, 1862). Aeroplanes were
used in warfare for the first time in 1911, during the Italo-Turkish
campaign in Tripoli, North Africa.
[6] Heavily armoured cars, known as "Tanks," were introduced during the
First Battle of the Somme, September 15, 1916.
{24}
THE BATTLE
"Theoretically, a well conducted battle is a decisive attack
successfully carried out."--MARSHAL FOCH.
"The Art of War, in order to arrive at its aim (which is to impose its
will upon the enemy), knows but one means, the destruction of the
adversary's organised forces. So we arrive at the battle, the only
argument of war, the only proper end that may be given to strategical
operations, and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish
the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive. The results of a
defensive battle are exclusively negative; it may check the enemy in
his march; it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim; but it
never leads to his destruction, and so is powerless to achieve the
wished-for victory. Therefore, every defensive battle must terminate
with an offensive action or there will be no result" (Marshal Foch).
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLE.--No two battles are precisely similar,
but there are certain characteristics common to every battle.
In the first place, the issue is almost always uncertain, for events
which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the
wisest plans. The best chances, therefore, are on the side of the
commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object,
who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity, and executes them with
the greatest ability. Decisive success has followed the combinations
of great commanders, and in the long run victory pays homage to
knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war. {25}
In the second place, the human factor always plays its part in battle.
Troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden
disaster, and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if
their flank is gained.
In the third place, a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown
into action at the right moment against greater numbers, if the latter
are exhausted by fighting, may achieve a success out of all proportion
to their numbers. For this reason a prudent commander will endeavour
to retain under his control some portion of his reserves, to be thrown
in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power.
To be superior at the point of attack is the Art of Warfare in a
nutshell, and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position
must be properly synchronised to be effective. The unbeaten enemy will
otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened
points. The attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal
or fails to reach the point mainly threatened.
McClellan's position with the Army of the Potomac on _Malvern Hill_
(July 1, 1862) was a desperate position to attack in front, but it
could have been turned on the right. The hill dominated the ground to
the north, and also the road on which Lee's Army of Northern Virginia
was approaching, and was crowned with numerous heavy guns, against
which Lee's artillery was powerless. It was Lee's intention to open
with an attack by a division, supported by two brigades, on the right
of the position, and when this force was at grips with the Army of the
Potomac, to assault the centre with a bayonet charge. About 5 p.m. the
sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position, and
mistaking this for the signal, General D. H. Hill launched the attack
on the centre. The first line of defence was carried, but the Northern
Army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line, and reinforcements
quickly {26} beat off the attack with heavy loss. After this attack
had failed, Magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on
the right flank was delivered with similar results. Both attacks were
carried out with superb courage, but partial blows of this nature are
without the first elements of success, and McClellan's movements were
not again molested.
PHASES OF THE BATTLE.--There are three principal phases of every
battle. Information must be obtained by observation and by fighting;
advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the
blow or blows will be most effective; success obtained by fighting must
be developed until the enemy is annihilated.
_Information and the Initiative_.--Much work requires to be done in the
air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face.
Aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast
tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain
whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are
being concentrated by the enemy. From information so obtained the
Headquarters Staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of
the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have
been perceived by the enemy. After the enemy is encountered this
information is at the service of the Commander of the troops, but it
will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. On each side
the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose
his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative
is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary,
instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to
his own purposes. Each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of
manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval
commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter.
The initiative won by the Strategy of one commander {27} is sometimes
wrested from him by the Tactics of his adversary. This was exemplified
at the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22, 1812). Wellington, the
generalissimo of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw
behind the River Tormes to the stronghold Ciudad Rodrigo, and had
dispatched his train to that centre. The French Commander (Marmont),
in his eagerness to intercept Wellington's line of retreat, moved part
of his force to the Heights of Miranda, thus threatening Wellington's
right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached
force and his main army. Wellington noted the fresh disposition of
Marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "That will do!"
he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him
by Marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against
the detached body (which was defeated before Marmont could send
assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army,
which was forced to leave the field. Wellington afterwards declared,
"I never saw an army receive such a beating." If the Spanish General
in alliance with Wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit
instructions, evacuated the Castle of Alba de Tormes (which commanded
the fords over which the French retreated), "not one-third of Marmont's
army would have escaped" (Napier).
As at Salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by
the Strategy of Marmont was wrested from him by the Tactics of
Wellington, so at the final phase of the _First Battle of the Marne_
(September, 1914), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
an inexhaustible supply of troops. To obtain a quick decision the
Germans went to every length. Of the main routes for the invasion of
France chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories
of Luxemburg and Belgium, and only one through France, and their
advance there broke {28} down, almost at the first, at the only point
where it was legitimately conducted, for the German armies failed to
pierce the French Front at the Gap of Charmes (Vosges), and their
defeat at the _Battle of Baccarat_ (August 25, 1914) led to the
decisive defeat at the First Battle of the Marne. They then abandoned,
for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and
retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the Aisne, relied upon
methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and
upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of
close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege
warfare, which endured until the collapse of Russia in 1917 freed for
an offensive movement on the requisite scale in 1918 upwards of
1,500,000 men. At the _First Battle of the Marne_, the five German
armies, which were following up the Franco-British left and centre,
were extended from Amiens to Verdun, but on September 8, 1914, the
German I. Army (General von Kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of
the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the German
forces. To the north-west of Paris a new French Army, collected from
the Metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been
assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and
intelligence of the Military Governor of Paris (General Gallieni); and
to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to
regain touch with the other German armies, one of which (under the
Crown Prince) was unsuccessfully engaged in battle, General von Kluck
adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march, across the
front of the Franco-British left wing. Upon receiving intelligence of
this manoeuvre from the Air Service in Paris, General Joffre, seeing
the opportunity of gaining the initiative, ordered an advance to the
attack on September 6, and the First Battle of the Marne, which
resulted from this order, changed the character of the fighting on the
{29} Western Front. The decisive blow was strategical rather than
tactical. It was delivered on a battlefield of 6,000 square miles, and
involved, throughout that area, a struggle of six great armies,
numbering in all 700,000 troops, against a similar number of armies of
at least equal strength. No counter-attack on such a scale had
previously been delivered in any campaign, and the scarcely interrupted
advance of the German armies received a permanent check, while the
strategic aim of the German Staff, namely, the speedy annihilation in
the field of the Franco-British armies, had to be definitely abandoned.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLE.--The "atmosphere" of battle is thus depicted
in "The Science of War": "When two armies are face to face and one is
superior in numbers to the other, the commander of the smaller army is
confronted by two problems. If the superior army is not yet
concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot
readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. If the
superior army is already concentrated, its commander may be induced, by
one means or another, to make detachments, and thus to be weak
everywhere. The first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre,
surprise marches, secrecy, feints to bewilder the adversary in his
concentration, and action on unexpected lines. The second, by skilful
threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will
detach forces; by concealment of his dispositions; and by drawing the
adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be
employed." "The power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of
the greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all
the great strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those
to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to
outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected. To what
Federal soldier did it occur on the {30} morning of _Chancellorsville_
(May 2-8, 1863) that Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would
detach Stonewall Jackson with more than half his own force of 43,000 to
attack his adversary in the rear" ("The Science of War"). Surprise was
the chief cause of success in the _First Battle of Cambrai_ (November
20, 1917) when General Sir Julian Byng launched the III. Army at dawn
against the highly organised defensive position known as the
"Hindenburg Line." The wire entanglements in front of this position
were exceptionally deep, and had not been broken by gun-fire. Behind
them the Germans were resting in apparent security and such information
as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not
corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which
was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in
force. The advance was preceded by battalions of Tanks, with Infantry
in close support, and was followed by Cavalry, to round up fugitives
and disorganise reinforcements. The artillery had previously been
strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines, to
prevent the Germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up
their formations. Aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the
battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action.
An advance was made into the strongest part of the German defensive
system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles, and secured
upwards of 11,000 prisoners, 150 guns, and considerable quantities of
stores and materials, and although after-events neutralised the initial
successes, the advance of November 20, 1917, will ever remain an
example of the value of surprise in war. "Surprise strikes with terror
even those who are by far the stronger. A new weapon of war may ensure
it, or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's, or a
concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not
ready instantaneously to parry the blow. But if the methods {31} be
various, the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the
enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected
and incontestably powerful means, the sentiment of impotence, the
conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say, that he is
conquered. And this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be
directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. For an army is an animate
and organised being, a collection of organs, of which the loss even of
a single one leads to death" (Marshal Foch). At almost any period of
the battle, and in almost every phase of fighting, surprise can be
brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine
gun or other form of fire. "A sudden effective fire will have a
particularly demoralising effect on the enemy; it is often
advantageous, therefore, to seek for surprise effects of this sort by
temporarily withholding fire" ("Infantry Training, 1921").
THE DECISIVE BLOW.--The preparatory action and the development usually
take the form of a converging movement of separated forces, so timed as
to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously, in order to
threaten the enemy's line of communications, for the line of supply is
as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a
human being. "Perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a
commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications. He
sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish
them" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). The decisive blow will be delivered
by the General Reserve, which will be secretly concentrated and
launched as secretly as possible; and the commander of the whole force
will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can
be kept in hand for this decisive blow, on a part of the enemy's front
if sufficient penetration has been effected, or on a flank. The point
chosen becomes the vital {32} point, and success there means success at
all points. Once routed, the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and
prevented from regaining order and moral.
A battle was fought in the year B.C. 331, nearly 2,300 years ago, at
Arbela,[1] in Mesopotamia, the Eastern theatre of operations in the
Great War of 1914-18, and it deserves study to show the eternal nature
of the main principles which underlie the Art of War. Alexander the
Great invaded the territories of Darius, King of the Medes and
Persians, with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main
armies in a decisive battle. The Macedonian forces were preceded by an
Advanced Guard of Cavalry, and from information obtained by the
Vanguard, Alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the
Persian forces. By a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company
with his Corps Commanders, Alexander was able to forestall a projected
movement, and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that
his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed
with spears, which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry, he
found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground, which afforded no
protection to either of his flanks. After advancing in these two lines
Alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx, or wedge-shaped figure,
and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings
asunder. In spite of local reverses in parts of the field, the depth
and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces:
the survivors were captured or dispersed, and the victory was complete.
[1] The site of this battle was probably Gaugamela, about 60 miles from
the present Arbil, which is 40 miles from Mosul, on the Baghdad road.
{33}
HOW BATTLES ARE INFLUENCED
Once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends
upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear, upon the
co-operation of his subordinate commanders, and upon the moral and
training of the troops engaged.
THE COMMANDER'S INFLUENCE is shown, first in his orders for the
operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces
retained in his hand for the decisive blow. Personal control, by the
commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but
should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of
his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions
and must be trusted to carry them into execution. Other, and more
important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is
essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from
his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his
subordinates to deal with. "A sound system of command is based upon
three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders
from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the
situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than
mechanical obedience" ("The Science of War"). A campaign resolves
itself into a struggle between human intelligences. Each commander
will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal
weapon is his General Reserve. If he can exhaust the reserve power of
his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to
victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile
reserves by causing {34} them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance
of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. During the campaign on
the Western Front in 1918 the Allies were able to conserve their
strength throughout the attacks from March 21 to July 15, and when they
passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack
from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension
would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would
cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal.
"The subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at
their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must,
above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use
best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only
judge. . . . The Commander-in-Chief cannot take the place of his
subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. In order to think
straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see
through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they
actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (Marshal Foch).
Students of military history will remember that the Prussian
Commander-in-Chief and his Chief Staff Officer, during the highly
successful campaign of 1870-71, did not come within sound of the guns
until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate
commanders. Outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests
and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[1]
and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. News of
the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the
accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses
and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part
of his reserves as reinforcements, {35} if he must, or to husband them
with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes
for him to launch them for the final blow.
INFORMATION.--In order that the commander's influence may be exerted to
the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should
reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without
delay. Subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders
of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the
battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur.
Runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order,
are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. Higher
units than battalions can usually depend on the Signal Service for
intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and
mounted orderlies must be available for their use. This ensures
co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. Information
received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and
orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to
commanders of all units affected.
CO-OPERATION.--"Co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy
matter to bring about. There are, however, three means of overcoming
the difficulty: constant communication between the units; thorough
reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made;
clear and well-considered orders" ("The Science of War"). Each
commander who issues orders for Attack or Defence should assemble his
subordinate commanders, if possible in view of the ground over which
the troops are to operate, explain his orders, and satisfy himself that
each subordinate understands his respective task. "Combination depends
on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the
commander through all grades down to the {36} corporal's squad; on the
intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the
commander's plans; on the discipline which ensures intelligent
obedience to the directing will; and on the mobility which gives rapid
effect to that will, and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting
opportunities. Every fresh development in the means of transmitting
orders and information rapidly, permits of an extension of the
commander's influence, and makes more perfect combination possible and
over wider areas" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). Even when, and
particularly when, forces are engaged in battle, reconnaissance must be
carried on and information gained must be communicated at once. It
will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack,
or decisive counter-stroke, will be found only after long and severe
fighting. Systematic arrangements for obtaining, sifting, and
transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the
highest importance. Information must be gained not only by troops and
aircraft actually engaged, but by supports and reserves, who will often
be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops. In such cases,
more than in any other, information must be communicated at once. By
intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with
one another, can anticipate situations as they develop, and decide at
the time what steps will be necessary to meet them. A general
reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by
observers in aircraft and in observation balloons. In addition, local
reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an
opening that might otherwise be lost, and may warn a commander of an
intended movement against him, which might otherwise develop into a
disagreeable surprise.
Co-operation and Mutual Support were developed in their highest form by
the Allied Corps Commanders in the _First Battle of the Marne_
(August-September, 1914). {37} In this campaign close on 1,500,000
troops were engaged on both sides, and the Corps Commanders,
particularly those of the French VI. Army (Manoury), III. Army
(Sarrail), and the Military Governor of Paris (Gallieni), were
continuously in touch with one another, and frequently rendered
assistance, unasked, by fire and by movement. Co-operation of a novel
kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the First Battle of the
Somme. An attack was launched on _Gueudecourt_ (September 26, 1916) by
the 21st Division, and a protecting trench was captured as a
preliminary to the larger movement. A tank, followed up by infantry
bombers, proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine
guns, while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its Lewis guns.
The survivors in the trench surrendered, and the garrison was collected
by supporting infantry, who advanced in response to signals from the
aeroplane.
FIRE TACTICS.--It has already been noted that the battle is the only
argument of war; it is also the final test of training, and on the
battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that
devoted to _musketry_. The fire tactics of an army, its combination of
fire and movement, the direction and control by the leaders and the
fire discipline of the rank and file, make for success or failure on
the field of battle. The fire must be directed by the fire unit
commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately
defined; it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander, who must be
able to recognise the objectives indicated, to regulate the rate of
fire, and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply. Fire
discipline must be maintained, so that there is the strictest
compliance with verbal orders and signals, and application on the
battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period. The
time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the
fire-unit commander, but, generally speaking, fire should be opened by
an {38} attacking force only when a further advance without opening
fire is impossible; and even in defence, when access to the ammunition
reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack, withholding fire
until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening
at a longer range. The tactical value of a withering fire at close
range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved
in battle. On the _Heights of Abraham_ (September 13, 1759) General
Wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited Montcalm's attack. Not a
shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within
forty paces, and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken
foe swept the French helplessly before it. At the _Battle of Bunker
Hill_ (June 17, 1775) the American colonists inflicted a loss of 46 per
cent. on the assaulting British force, by reserving their fire "until
the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified." At
the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) General Meagher's
Irish Brigade of the U.S. Army of the Potomac assaulted Marye's Hill,
1,200 strong. The defending Confederates reserved their fire until the
assailants were 100 yards from their position and drove them off with a
loss of 937 out of the 1,200. In August, 1914, the British Regular
Army, during the _Retreat from Mons_, reserved their fire until the
Germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory,
and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded.
Throughout the Great War, troops fully trained in the British system of
musketry and using the short magazine Lee Enfield rifle, proved beyond
dispute the values of the system and of the weapon. In a review of the
methods adopted to check the great German offensive in the spring of
1918, a circular issued by the General Staff states: "Rapid rifle fire
was the decisive factor in these operations. The men had confidence in
their rifles and knew how to use them."
Superiority of fire can only be gained by the close {39} co-operation
of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle, and unless
infantry co-operate, the artillery is not likely to produce any
decisive effect. Long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary
to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking
infantry. Enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily
brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective
range and in the rate of fire. Supports and local reserves will
usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing
fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding
up a movement by frontal fire. During the counter-attack for the
recapture of _The Bluff_, in the Ypres Salient (March 2, 1916) by
troops of the 3rd and 17th Divisions, the right and centre gained their
objectives. The left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to
reach the German trenches, but those who had penetrated to the German
line on the right realised the situation and brought a Lewis gun to
bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his
trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal.
MOVEMENT.--The influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire,
as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full
effects of fire; while it is often possible to move one unit only in
conjunction with the fire of another. It can also be used to relieve
one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving
another unit against the enemy. A steady and rapid advance of troops
has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency
in the fire-fight can be secured, and also of reducing the losses of
the advancing force, for if the troops remained stationary in the open
under heavy fire, at a known range, the losses would clearly be greater
than if they advanced, and would be suffered without gaining ground
towards the objective, while the closer the {40} assaulting line gets
to the objective, and the steadier its advance, the less confidence
will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance, and the fewer
casualties will be suffered in consequence. No "sealed pattern" is
laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire, but
certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books. Where
security is the first need, as in the case of protecting forces
(advanced, flank, or rear guards), movement should be effected by
bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from
supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration,
security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective.
Against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation
recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a
narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged
on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each
is different. Troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid
casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way
rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a
position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy.
Against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or
into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is
preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it
is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control.
In retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in
maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by
supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. The enemy is
generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against
retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire.
Retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate
bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in
their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected.
{41} Such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics,
but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the
withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held
against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault,
for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. It is
often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular
point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's
grit in holding on at all costs. In the campaign of 1814,
Brigadier-General Moreau was sent to the _Fortress of Soissons_, with
instructions to hold the town. His garrison consisted of about 1,200
all arms, with 20 guns. At 10.30 a.m. on March 2, the fortress was
bombarded by Winzingerode's Russians and Bülow's Prussians, and at 8
p.m. an assault was delivered. This was easily repulsed and a
counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines. The
bombardment was resumed until 10 p.m., when the garrison had a total
loss of 23 killed and 123 wounded. During the night the besiegers sent
a flag of truce to Moreau, and on March 3 that general capitulated with
all the honours of war "in order to preserve 1,000 fighting men for the
Emperor." His action cost Napoleon his throne, for had Moreau held out
the Emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe, Blücher (who
escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed, _viâ_ the bridge at
Soissons), and the campaign would have been at an end. If Moreau had
exhausted all the means of defence, as the regulations of war ordain,
he could certainly have held out for another 48 hours, and as heavy
firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him
that help was at hand. At the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October
20-November 20, 1914) the Regular Army of the United Kingdom, at the
outset, was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line, that in
many parts there was but one rifle for 17 yards of front, and there
were neither local nor general reserves. The {42} assaulting German
forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns
and artillery in overpowering strength. The British artillery was not
only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that Marshal French
was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds. But the line was
held, and a counter-attack, headed by the 2nd Battalion of the
Worcestershire Regiment, on October 31, with the bayonet, restored the
line at _Gheluvelt_, at the most critical moment of the battle, and the
Germans did not get through the defences. This stubborn resistance
threw the Germans behind their entrenchments, and the "Advance to
Calais" was stemmed by French's "Contemptible Little Army." At the
_Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22-May 18, 1915) surprise in the time
and nature of the attack, by the secret concentration of forces and the
introduction of poison gas, gained an initial advantage for the Germans
and left the British flank uncovered. A Canadian division
counter-attacked on the German flank, and by May 18 the Allies had
regained many of the captured positions. During the First Battle of
the Somme troops of the Royal West Kent and the Queen's Regiments
effected a lodgment in _Trônes Wood_ (July 14, 1916). They maintained
their position all night in the northern corner of the wood, although
completely surrounded by the enemy, and assisted in the final capture
and clearance of the wood at 8 a.m. the next day. Similar instances
occurred in _Bourlon Village_ (November 25-27, 1917) when parties of
the 13th East Surrey Regiment held out in the south-east corner of the
village, during a German counter-attack, and maintained their position
until touch was re-established with them 48 hours later; and in a group
of fortified farms south of _Polygon Wood_ (September 26, 1917) during
the Third Battle of Ypres, when two companies of the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders held out all night, although isolated from the
rest of the 33rd and 39th Divisions, until a renewed attack {43}
cleared the district of hostile forces. On April 9, 1918, during the
Germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing Allies'
lines, the ruins of _Givenchy_ were held by the 55th West Lancashire
(Territorial) Division, and the right edge of the neck through which
von Arnim and von Quast hoped to extend, in order to widen the wedge
into the Valley of the Lys, was firmly held, while the left edge (the
Messines Ridge) was recaptured by a counter-attack by the 9th Division.
The centre of the line was also stoutly held by the Guards' and other
divisions, many of which had suffered heavy losses in the V. Army
during the German attack in the last week of March. After 21 days of
the most stubborn fighting (March 21-April 11, 1918) of which the
_Attack on the Lys_ had formed part, Marshal Sir D. Haig issued an
order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all
costs. "Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no
retirement. . . . The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind
depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical
moment. . . . Victory will belong to the side which holds out
longest." Sir D. Haig's after-order, on April 23, 1918 (St. George's
Day), awarded special praise to the troops under his command. The
number of divisions employed by the Germans from March 21 to April 23,
1918, against the British alone was 102 (approximately 1,500,000
troops), and many of them were thrown in twice or three times. "In
resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has
enabled the enemy to direct against the British Army, all ranks, arms,
and services have behaved with a gallantry, courage, and resolution for
which no praise can be too high" (Haig's Dispatch).
COVERING FIRE.--The energetic and determined support of the infantry by
fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course
of the battle. In the attack, machine-gun platoons, Lewis gun
sections, {44} or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire, must
take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is
chiefly checking the advance. Machine-gun platoons are sometimes
brigaded, and at others left to battalion commanders, and their action
after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon
their tactical distribution at the time. Infantry platoons detailed to
give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire
ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops, unless definite
orders to the contrary have been received.
FIRE AND MOVEMENT.--It is thus seen that Fire and Movement are
inseparably associated, and judiciously employed in combination they
enable infantry to achieve its object in battle, to bring such a
superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters
possible, so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be
overwhelmed by a bayonet assault; and to prepare by similar means for
further advances, until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely
routed.
[1] In fiction, this point (that the generalissimo must not allow his
sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses) is
clearly brought out in _The Point of View_, a story in "The Green
Curve" by Ole-Luk-Oie (General Swinton).
{45}
TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION
A battle must practically always be of the nature of Attack and
Defence, but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing
forces may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack
by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the
adversary on the defensive, while an assailant may fight a delaying
action in one part of the field, although in another part his action
may be essentially offensive. There are three distinct systems of
Battle Action: the entirely defensive; the entirely offensive; and the
combined, or defensive-offensive system.
THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE has seldom effected positive results, except,
perhaps, at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863), where Meade permitted Lee to
break his forces against a strong position, with the result that the
Army of Northern Virginia had to withdraw, and the invasion of the
North came to an end. It must, however, be borne in mind that General
Lee was badly served by his subordinate, and General Meade's success
was largely due to this factor. On the second day of Gettysburg (July
2, 1863), General J. B. Hood's 1st Division of General J. Longstreet's
I. Army Corps was deploying round the left of the Federal Army south of
the Round Tops. He saw a chance to strike and requested permission
from Longstreet. Hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable
chance of decisive victory with the troops available. Longstreet, in
obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit,
refused to sanction Hood's advance. Longstreet's failure to seize a
fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the Confederate cause.
{46}
Burnside was defeated at _Fredericksburg_ (December 10-16, 1862) by
purely defensive tactics, but Lee had intended to follow up his victory
by a decisive counter-blow, which Burnside escaped by extricating the
Army of the Potomac before the blow fell. Success, even to the limited
degree achieved by Meade or Lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely
defensive tactics. "There is no such thing as an 'impregnable
position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is
bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (Marshal Foch).
THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Entirely Offensive system has been employed
by many of the greatest commanders, including Marlborough at _Blenheim_
(August 2, 1704), _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), and _Malplaquet_
(September 11, 1709); Frederick the Great, notably at _Leuthen_
(December 5, 1757); Napoleon, Wellington, and Grant, as also by the
Prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of 1866
and 1870-71. The disadvantage of the system is that lack of success
may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of
the whole army.
At the _Battle of Blenheim_ (August 2, 1704), Marlborough, "the
greatest captain of his age," had concentrated his forces with those of
Prince Eugene of Savoy the previous day and commanded an army of 56,000
men with 52 guns. He was confronted by the joint armies of Marshal
Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria, amounting to 60,000 men with 61
guns. It was necessary for Marlborough to attack before Villeroy
joined the enemy, or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity
presented itself. The right flank of his opponents rested on high
hills, which were protected by detached posts, and the left flank on
the Danube, while opposite the centre was the marshy valley of the
River Nebel, with several branches running through the swampy ground.
Marlborough decided that a battle {47} was absolutely necessary and he
attacked the next day. Like Hannibal, he relied principally on his
cavalry for achieving his decisive success, and this predilection was
known to the opposing commanders. He attacked the enemy's right and
left wings, and when heavily engaged with varying fortunes launched his
decisive attack against the centre, where the difficulties of the
ground caused it to be least expected. Marlborough lost 5,000 killed
and 8,000 wounded. The vanquished armies were almost destroyed, at
least 40,000 being accounted for, with 12,000 killed, 14,000 wounded
and missing, and 14,000 prisoners.
THE DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Defensive-Offensive system
consists in taking up a position which the enemy must attack, and in
delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the adversary has exhausted
his strength. This system has been employed in almost every campaign.
By such means Napoleon achieved his classic victories of _Marengo_
(June 14, 1800), _Austerlitz_ (December 2, 1805), and _Dresden_ (August
27, 1813); and Wellington his Peninsular victories at _Vittoria_ (June
21, 1813), _Orthez_ (February 27, 1814), and _Toulouse_ (April 10,
1814), in addition to his final triumph at _Waterloo_ (June 18, 1815);
and it was the method adopted by Marshal Foch in the decisive campaign
of 1918, which endured from March until the Armistice in November.
At the _Battle of Waterloo_ (June 18, 1815), the decisive
counter-stroke was delivered, in accordance with Wellington's
pre-arranged plan, by a force coming from a distance to the scene of
action. On the morning of June 17, when Wellington resolved to make a
stand at Waterloo, he was aware that the Prussians, who were mostly
young troops, had been beaten at Ligny; that Napoleon had, before that
battle, over 120,000 men, and that he himself had, all told, 68,000, of
whom 31,000, including the King's German Legion, were {48} British.
Yet he withdrew from Quatre Bras with the full determination of
standing at Waterloo and of fighting Napoleon's army, if Marshal
Blücher would come to his assistance with one Army Corps. Napoleon
attacked on June 18 with 72,000 men and 246 guns, against Wellington's
68,000 men with 156 guns, at 11 a.m., but he was unable to shift the
line or break through the squares. At 4.30 p.m. one of Blücher's corps
was delivering the promised counter-attack against Napoleon's line of
communications. Soon after 9 p.m. Wellington and Blücher met at La
Belle Alliance, Napoleon's headquarters before the battle, and the
pursuit was in full swing.
Opportunities for restoring the battle and for turning impending defeat
into a crushing victory are frequently offered during an engagement.
General Lee's thin lines at _Antietam_ or _Sharpsburg_ (September 17,
1862), slowly fed by men jaded by heavy marching, were sorely pressed,
but there was a lull in the Federal attack when Hooker's advance was
checked. Had General McClellan at that moment thrown in "his last man
and his last horse" in a vigorous reinforcing attack, _Antietam_ would
not have been a drawn battle, and Lee would not have retired at his
leisure into Virginia. Lee's great victory at _Chancellorsville_ (May
2-3, 1863), although marred by the accident which deprived him of
Stonewall Jackson, was a striking instance of the success of the
Defensive-Offensive system at the hands of a great commander, who
defeated 90,000 troops with less than half that number, by a containing
defence with 13,000 men and a decisive counter-stroke with the
remainder.
But while this combined system is regarded by most authorities as the
best, when circumstances warrant its adoption, it is the highest test
of generalship to seize the right moment to pass from the guard to the
thrust. This is the problem which confronted Marshal Foch, the
generalissimo of the Allied Forces, during the great {49} German
offensive movement on the Western Front in 1918. The defensive _rôle_
endured from March 21 until July 17, 1918, and although many local
counter-attacks were made along the whole battle front, the Allies did
not pass from the guard to the thrust until the decisive counter-stroke
was commenced in the _Second Battle of the Marne_ (July 18, 1918) on a
front of 27 miles from Fontenoy to Belleau, which drove the Germans
back across the Marne on July 20.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE (July 18, 1918).--The great German
offensive of March-June, 1918, was renewed on July 15, when the
artillery preparation opened shortly after midnight and troops were
poured across the Marne in small boats and over pontoon bridges. The
attack was not unexpected. Adequate reserves were ready and in place,
and a heavy counter-bombardment on the German troops in their positions
of assembly, close to their front-line trenches, caused heavy
casualties. The Germans succeeded in penetrating the French and
American positions in parts of the 50-mile front to a maximum depth of
4 miles south-west of Reims, but on the Plains of Champagne little
progress was made and the attack lost its momentum. During the attack
of March 21, 1918, the advance was not held up until it was within
striking distance of its ultimate objective, and the offensive on the
Aisne in May, 1918, secured an advance of 12 miles. Captured documents
showed that the attack of July east of Reims was intended to reach the
Marne at Eperney and Chalons, an advance of 21 miles. A feature of the
earlier days of the battle was a spirited counter-attack near Fossoy
(on the extreme left of the German forces) by a division of the
American Army which thrust the Germans behind their first line and
captured upwards of 1,000 prisoners, the ground regained in the river
bend being consolidated and held by the American division. The battle
continued for three days before the German {50} attack was brought to a
standstill, and at 4.80 a.m. on July 18 a counter-attack by the French,
American, and Italian forces changed the whole aspect of the campaign,
and led to the final triumph of the Allies and to the downfall of the
Central Powers.
{51}
THE ATTACK
"Surprise is at all times the assailant's strongest weapon."--"Field
Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920).
The aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to
seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces. The Attack is the
culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end, and every commander
will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected assault on
a part of the enemy's defences.
The achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has
assembled a sufficient force for his purpose, and has obtained, by
reconnaissance and by fighting, information as to the vulnerability of
the hostile position. The commander will then endeavour to break the
enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans; to retain
a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the
enemy a moment's breathing space; to drive a wedge into the heart of
his disordered masses, forcing his wings asunder; and to pursue and
annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy.
"Unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern
campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile, chiefly owing to
the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. The
armies will then be distributed in great depth, and the attackers are
faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only, but
a series of positions, extending back to a depth of several miles"
("Infantry Training, 1921").
Penetration, followed by the sundering of the Franco-British Armies,
was clearly the intention of the German {52} High Command in the
_Second Battle of the Somme_, which opened on March 21, 1918. The
German Armies had entrenched themselves after the First Battle of the
Marne (September, 1914), and for 43 months had been confronted by the
Allied Nations of Britain, France, and Belgium, reinforced at the close
by Portuguese troops and by the National Army of the United States.
Within the investing lines of the Western Front the German Armies were
besieged, the barrier reaching from the Belgian coast to the frontier
of Switzerland, while the armies of Austria-Hungary were similarly
penned in by the army of Italy, from Switzerland to the Adriatic. The
internal collapse of Russia, in 1917, enabled von Hindenburg to assume
the offensive, with upwards of 1,500,000 men released from the Eastern
Front, and part of this reserve power was projected, with the
Austro-Hungarian Armies, in a fierce attack on the Italian lines. The
success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were
dispatched from other parts of the Allied lines, and a diversion in the
region of Cambrai by the British III. Army, under Sir Julian Byng
(November 20, 1917), prevented the dispatch of further German reserve
power to the Italian Front, and necessitated a counter-thrust in
France. The battlefields of France again resumed their importance as
the vital point in the theatre of operations, and in the spring of
1918, profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the West,
Ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a 50-mile
front. The attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment, and
culminated in a desperate thrust against the British Armies north and
south of the River Somme, the points of penetration aimed at being the
British right, where it was linked up with the French on the River
Oise, in the neighbourhood of La Fère, and the British line of
communications in the neighbourhood of Amiens. The whole British line
opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the
Franco-British {53} advance on the Somme in July, 1916, was recaptured
by the German Armies. But this was not a battle for towns or
territory, as the German hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge
between the British and French Armies, to roll up the British flank
northwards to the sea-coast and the French flank southwards to Paris,
and to capture the main line of communication between these Northern
and Southern Armies. By skilful reinforcement of threatened points,
Marshal Haig frustrated the primary object of the attack, and by the
aid of the French Armies the whole line fell back, disputing the ground
with the utmost resolution, and maintaining the line without losing
touch between the south and north. The German wedge was thrust in, but
every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was
frustrated by the Allies. During the battle the French and British
Armies became intermingled, and to preserve unity of control a
Generalissimo was appointed in the person of General Foch, who had
commanded the French IX. Army at the First Battle of the Marne in
September, 1914, and the French Armies of the Somme during the advance
in July, 1916. General Pershing, commanding the Army of the United
States, gave a free hand to the Generalissimo to incorporate American
troops wherever they might be needed in the field, and Marshal Haig and
General Retain remained in command of the British and French Armies.
METHODS OF ATTACK.--The object of every attack is to break down the
enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete
his overthrow by assault, by the delivery of a decisive blow with as
large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected
point or portion of the enemy's position. The term "Decisive Attack"
does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive, but
rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure
relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him
is first obtained.
{54}
TWO PLANS OF ATTACK.--There are two plans of attack. In the first, the
direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined
beforehand; an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this
purpose, and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to
attack another portion of the enemy's position, to keep his attention
there, to pin his troops in position, to prevent him sending
reinforcements to the part mainly threatened, and ultimately to drive
home with the successful assault of the main attack. The rest of the
force is small and is retained in General Reserve to meet emergencies.
In the second plan, a general action is developed by a part of the
attacking force and the remainder is retained in General Reserve, to be
thrown in when the opportunity arrives, at the right time and in the
right place. In this case, the "remainder" is not less than half the
available force.
The first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force
has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position, when
he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate
strength of the forces arrayed against him. It must also be possible,
without undue risk, to divide the attacking force into parties of such
strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail, and it
is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a
small General Reserve to restore the battle. The second plan can be
adopted when information is incomplete, and owing to the strong force
retained by the commander in General Reserve, the situation can be
exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk.
STRENGTH OF THE ATTACK.--It must always be remembered that a commander
can never be too strong when making an attack, for he can never be
perfectly sure of what force he may encounter, or at what moment the
adversary may make a counter-attack. An attack {55} on an enemy
presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is
made, for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the
right place at the right time, and for an attack to have a reasonable
hope of success the attackers, at the point where the penetration takes
place, must be superior.
DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.--Each phase of the Attack will normally
require three separate bodies of troops for its execution: a _Forward
Body_ to seek out for, and when located attack, the enemy along the
whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to
wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions
of the defence; _Supports_ to penetrate the weak portions of the
defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions
of the defence which are holding up the Attack; with Local Reserves for
dealing with local counter-attacks; and a _General Reserve_ by means of
which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure.
THE FORWARD BODY, THE SUPPORTS, AND THE LOCAL RESERVES.--The paramount
duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward,
and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the
enemy, he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbour also, for, as a
rule, the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance.
But an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire, and
by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared
positions. The tactics to be pursued under these circumstances are
thus outlined in "Infantry Training, 1921": "When forward troops are
held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep
him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a
vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers. It
will be the duty of the Supports to turn the flank of, and enfilade,
that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing {56}
the Forward Body. To achieve this, Supports may have to quit their
direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit,
which is able to advance. It must constantly be borne in mind that
pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places
where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up, never
by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have
been unable to advance. There must be no slackening of pressure,
meanwhile, by the forward troops who are temporarily held up, or the
defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks
which are being directed against them." The Local Reserves are for
local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by
the Local Reserves of the enemy. In modern campaigns this work is
effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns
distributed in depth, and the mobile Local Reserves may thus consist of
smaller units detached for the purpose by the Forward Body or by the
Supports. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the
_Attacks on the Somme and the Lys_ were constantly held up by the
vigour and tenacity of the Franco-British defence, and to meet the
necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the
German General Staff: "If the assaulting troops are held up by
machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire,
while Supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the
flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the
Attack. Meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible
for the Attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar
support, and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by
means of smoke."
THE GENERAL RESERVE.--In a modern campaign against civilised troops it
will seldom, or never, happen that the efforts of the Forward Body,
Supports, and Local Reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent
him from regaining cohesion and fighting power. Even if {57} every
part of the position against which an assault is delivered is captured
and held, the enemy will not, by that means alone, cease to exist as a
fighting force, and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of
order and moral the work of the Attacking Force will be of little
avail. The destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the
ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander. He will,
therefore, accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of
the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during
the successful operations of his Attacking Force. It may, however,
happen that the efforts of the Attacking Force are generally
unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper
hand. By means of the General Reserve the commander exploits the
success or retrieves the failure of the Attacking Force. The commander
will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive
system against which he can direct his decisive attack. This point
cannot, as a rule, be determined until it has been revealed by the
successes of the Forward Body and the Supports, and when it has been
selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible
strength. While, therefore, the Forward Body, Supports, and Local
Reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them, a
commander will generally retain about half his available force for the
delivery of the Decisive Attack, and when this decisive blow has been
delivered the Reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy
until such time as other Infantry, or Cavalry, or Tanks, have caught up
and passed them. If the attacking troops fail to obtain their
objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving
exhausted troops and of dealing with the "decisive counter-attack" of
the enemy.
THE COMMANDER'S PLANS.--Once troops are committed to the assault the
commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose. His control
is exercised in {58} the correct interpretation or adaptation of his
original plan by his subordinate commanders. Before launching his
troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from
information received, the commander will assemble his subordinates and
the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that
his plans may be explained. This conference should be held at such a
time as will enable his subordinates to explain their _rôle_ to the
sub-unit commanders. Wherever possible the conference should be
preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the
attack is to be made, otherwise a map of the district concerned must be
substituted for the actual view.
The commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the
campaign at the time of the decision to attack. In the opening stages
of a campaign in a thickly populated country, and generally throughout
a campaign in less settled districts, a war of manoeuvre will lead to
the "Encounter Battle," and the objective to be aimed at will be
limited only by the power of endurance of his troops, the weather
conditions, and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with
ammunition and food. Under other conditions, the objective will be
subject to further limitations, as the defensive position will be
organised in great depth, and while effective penetration will thus be
more difficult to achieve it must, of necessity, be accompanied by
widening in proportion to its depth in order that space for manoeuvre
and facility for communication may be secured. The Infantry Attack
will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle, but the
greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited
will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater
difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit.
THE POSITION OF ASSEMBLY.--A column in march formation will very rarely
move to its attack position, or "jumping-off place," from column of
route except {59} where there are concealed lines of approach to the
spot. A Position of Assembly will therefore be assigned, and this will
be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the
issue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the
filling of water bottles. As a general rule, it is left to the
battalion commander to select Positions of Assembly for each of his
companies. When large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to
immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot
be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at
the right moment. In April, 1864, General Banks, with 25,000 U.S.
troops, moved from Grand Ecore to _Pleasant Hill_ in the Red River
Valley. Although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main
road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. As he came
into action with General Forrest, of the Confederate Army, the head of
his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces
inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter.
Had General Banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available
for his use, the Confederates on the spot would have been quickly
overpowered.
THE ATTACKING FORCE.--The commander must decide against which portion
or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance,
his Fire Attack shall be developed. As the object of this movement is
to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance
generally, and particularly at the point where the Decisive Attack is
to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is
clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one
or both flanks should be threatened if possible. But whenever a Fire
Attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the
enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once
begun. One {60} to three rifles per yard of the objective to be
assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the Forward
Body, Supports, and Local Reserves. At _St. Privat_ (August 18, 1870)
a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of
the French chassepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could
make no effective reply. The lines pressed on, but were ultimately
brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could
have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was
holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in
position, and would thus have carried the Forward Body to the assault.
Equally unsuccessful was Osman Pasha's attempt to break through the
investing lines at _Plevna_ (December 10, 1877). With 15,000 troops he
pierced the Russian lines, and another resolute effort would have
carried the sortie through the investing forces. But the 15,000
Supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were
blocked with fugitives and wagons.
THE DECISIVE ATTACK.--The commander must also decide the point and
direction of the Decisive Attack. This will be made on a part of the
front or on a flank, and it may be predetermined in accordance with
information concerning the hostile dispositions, or it may have to be
ascertained by further fighting. The advantages of a _Frontal Attack_
are that, if successful, the enemy's force is broken in two parts, the
separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and
overwhelmed in detail, and a decisive victory is thus obtained. The
disadvantages are that the force assaulting a part of the enemy's front
draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line, and
unless the Fire Attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be
held up, while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to
advance and to envelop the assailants. The advantages of a _Flank
Attack_ are that {61} the enemy's line of retreat is threatened, and
only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the assailant.
The disadvantages of a Flank Attack are that the enveloping troops have
to face a similar danger on their own outer flank, for upon this point
the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke, and for
this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by
strong reserves. The flank chosen for attack will be that which
affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting
artillery, which gives the best line of advance for the infantry, and
where success will have the most decisive results, the last depending
mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is
threatened. Where the various requisites are in conflict, the flank
affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the
artillery will be chosen. Nothing destroys the moral of men in action
so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this
method good infantry will seldom be beaten.
A decisive attack, to be completely successful, must be followed up by
fresh troops before the assaulting waves have been checked. Lee had
crossed the Potomac and desired "to defeat the last army of the
Federals in the east and drive the Northern Government from
Washington." The battle of _Gettysburg_ lasted three days (July 1-3,
1863). On the first, the army of Northern Virginia was uniformly
successful; on the second, the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro; on
the third, Lee decided to make a Napoleonic decisive attack with half
his available troops against Meade's centre. But the spirited attack
of the first 15,000, after penetrating the line, was checked, and the
remaining 15,000 did not arrive in support, so that the attack died
down, was repulsed, and withdrew in disorder.
At _Chattanooga_ (November 25, 1868) Grant's decisive attack was
successful, although delivered against a part of the position which
appeared to be impregnable, on account of the strength of the attack,
through {62} distribution in depth; 25,000 men were hurled against the
entrenchments in three lines, and the support of the third line carried
the waves of the attack through the defences.
DETAILING THE UNITS.--The commander will detail the units for carrying
out the Fire Attack, which will generally require one to three rifles
per yard of the objective. This force will be placed under a definite
commander, who will distribute it into a Forward Body to develop the
attack in the firing line; Supports, to enable the Forward Body to
assault the position; and Local Reserves to maintain or restore the
advantages gained, their main function being to repel counter-attacks
by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit.
The commander will also detail the units for carrying out the Decisive
Attack, which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion
of the position against which it is projected. This force, under a
definite commander, is distributed for the attack in depth, so that the
strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition.
The force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops,
to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place. It also
remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check,
or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is
desired to break off the engagement.
THE ARTILLERY.--The position of the artillery will be settled in
consultation with the artillery commander, the decision resting on the
objects in view, which are, to assist the infantry in its advance by
keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial
stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage
concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and
after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward
to repel {63} counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and
to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy. When the attack
is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have
been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of
an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack
advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is
launched. It will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns,
unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides
such protection. At the _Battle of Verneville_ (August 18, 1870) the
9th Prussian Corps Artillery had been pushed forward against the French
position at Armandvillers-Folie. The fire of the French infantry
caused a loss of 13 officers and 187 other ranks, and one battery was
disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. There was no infantry escort
to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. At the _Battle of
Colenso_ (December 15, 1899) two batteries of field artillery advanced
into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance
unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the Tugela River.
Frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade
fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part
of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all
ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in Boer hands. Infantry
regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with
the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in
order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets
of secondary importance. All reserves, whether they have been
specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord
make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition.
One of the outstanding lessons of the War of 1914-1918 is the
possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the
infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction
and to the security against {64} counter-attack provided by the deadly
fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort, and of
the Lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves.
THE CAVALRY.--The opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend
upon the character of the defensive operations. Against a highly
organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted
troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre. Before the
attack during an "Encounter Battle" the cavalry will have been out on
reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they
may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action, and by local
counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry
disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed
to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful assault the
Pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the
enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements,
to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications.
Generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a
flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force.
"Cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of
all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at
_Appomattox_ or _Paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of
Grand Tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to
attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (Henderson). In the
Mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of General Sir S. Maude's
forces on September 27-29, 1917, against the Turkish forces assembling
near _Ramadie_, 65 miles north-west of Baghdad, was converted into the
surrender of the Turkish commander and about 4,000 all arms by the
enveloping tactics of the Anglo-Indian Cavalry Division. A similar
manoeuvre on March 26, 1918, by the cavalry of the Mesopotamian Field
Force (commanded at that time by General Sir W. R. Marshall, {65} who
succeeded after General Maude's death from cholera), resulted in the
surrender of over 5,000 Turks, including a divisional commander, 22
miles north-west of Hit. The prisoners were fugitives from the battle
of _Baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications.
"On the morning of the Armistice (November 11, 1918) two British
Cavalry Divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before
orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 miles in
front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the
advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's
disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches). The absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often
decided the issue of a campaign. After the action of _Gaines's Mill_
(June 27, 1862) General J. E. B. Stuart was dispatched by Lee with the
Confederate cavalry on a false scent to White House, south of the York
River, to which base Lee believed McClellan to be retreating. But
McClellan had shifted his base to Harrison's Landing, on the James
River, and the Confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the Army
of the Potomac until July 3, two days after the failure of Lee's attack
on Malvern Hill. Had Stuart been available with his cavalry throughout
that critical period McClellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy
prey to the Confederate horsemen, and the roads through the forests and
swamps to Malvern Hill could have been blocked. Absence of cavalry
before the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863) hampered the
Confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with
unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before
them. General Stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding
expedition. After the victorious attack of General Early's division a
handful of General Buford's U.S. cavalry enabled the defeated 1st Corps
of Meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. A
thousand {66} Confederate sabres would have brushed Buford aside, and
July 1 would have been disastrous to the National cause.
During the German offensive of March-July, 1918, "even two or three
well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the
French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to
have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches). During the _Battle of Cambrai_ (November 20, 1917) a
squadron of the Fort Garry Horse crossed the Scheldt Canal, and after
capturing a German battery and dispersing a large body of infantry,
maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when
it withdrew to the British lines with its prisoners. During the
_Battle of Amiens_ (August 8-18, 1918) the cavalry were concentrated
behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first
day of the battle they advanced 23 miles from their position of
assembly. Throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and
valuable service. During the Second _Battle of Le Cateau_ (October
6-12, 1918) cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his
retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the
railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire
from Cattigny Wood and Clary "a dashing charge by the Fort Garry Horse
gained a footing in Cattigny Wood and assisted our infantry to press
forward. Further east, Dragoon Guards and Canadian Cavalry were
instrumental in the capture of Hennechy, Reumont, and Troisvilles" (Sir
D. Haig's Dispatches). In the early stages of the campaign in _North
Russia_ (August-September, 1918) a handful of cavalry on either bank of
the North Dwina River could have kept the Bolshevik forces constantly
on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of
their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing
infantry was unable to accomplish. A few squadrons of cavalry could
have dispersed the whole {67} Bolshevik force in the Archangel
Province. Tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit, as artillery,
the only effective enemy of the tank, is unlikely to remain in action
with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy; and a new terror has
been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled, man-carrying
Aircraft, armed with machine guns and bombs, and possibly even with
light quick-firing artillery. During the final stages of the
victorious _Allied Advance_ in November, 1918, the retreating German
Armies were continuously harassed from the air. "Throughout the day
(November 5, 1918) the roads, packed with the enemy's troops and
transport, afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full
advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather.
Over 30 guns, which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced
the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of the 25th Division
in the field near Le Presau" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.--The position and employment of the Royal
Engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the
Attack, and as the main function of this corps in the Attack is the
removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance, and the strengthening
of the position when captured, the Royal Engineers will probably remain
with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted.
MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.--The position of hospitals and clearing stations
will be settled in consultation with the S.M.O. Aid posts and advanced
dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in
connection with the medical officer of the units concerned.
SUPPLY.--The position of the Train, with its reserve supplies of
ammunition and of food for men and horses, will depend upon facilities
for communication with the attacking force and upon security against
artillery fire {68} or surprise attack from the air or land. The
position will probably be well in rear, and at the junction of roads
leading forward to the attacking troops. Rations will be brought up to
units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other
units concerned.
THE COMMANDER'S POSITION.--The position of the commander who issues the
orders for the Attack must be fixed, and must be made known to
subordinate commanders, as it will be the place to which reports will
be sent. In the case of a small force the commander will generally
stay with the General Reserve; if the force is fairly large, and
composed of all arms, he will probably be on the main artillery
position; but in the case of a large force he should be well out of
reach of the distraction of local incidents. If the commander of a
large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior
officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent
communications to him in his changed position. In the case of a small
force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave
a runner in the position stated as his headquarters, in order that
messages may reach him without delay.
BATTLE REPORTS.--The successful exploitation of success depends largely
on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all
parts of the battlefield. Reports are required from all who have
information to impart and they should be made out on previously
prepared message cards, stating the exact position of the sender at the
time of the report; the progress made by the unit under the command of
the sender, or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been
observed; the degree of the enemy's resistance; enemy movements; and
the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted
in carrying out such plans.
{69}
REORGANISATION AND PURSUIT.--Once a successful assault has been
delivered, subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of
their commands, and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire,
while local reserves follow up and secure the position against
counter-attack. Superior commanders must take steps to organise the
pursuit, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and to complete his
overthrow. No victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to
retire unmolested from the field of battle, and given time to recover
order and moral. "Never let up in a pursuit while your troops have
strength to follow" was a favourite maxim of Stonewall Jackson. The
pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft,
cavalry, and tanks, and the limits to which the infantry will carry the
pursuit will be fixed by the commander, who will bear in mind the
principle that "Success must be followed up until the enemy's power is
ruined" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). If the fruits
of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the
enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat. A few hours' delay
gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rearguard, and
to gain several miles on his rearward march. In modern warfare motor
transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the
mobility of cavalry, if arrangements for embussing them have previously
been made, and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond
the reach of pursuit.
{70}
FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK
"Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive
victory be won."--MARSHAL HAIG.
The formations in which Infantry move to the Attack must be such as
will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of Fire and
Movement. For this purpose, the forward troops must be furnished with
supports belonging to the same unit as themselves, in order that a
connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole.
THE PLATOON.--The smallest unit which can be divided into independent
bodies, each capable of Fire and Movement, is the platoon, the four
sections of which can pin the enemy to his position by fire and can
manoeuvre round his flanks. The normal distribution of the platoon for
the Attack is either the Square or the Diamond Formation. In the
_Square Formation_, two sections are forward covering the frontage
allotted to the platoon, and the remaining two sections are in support,
in such formation as may keep them in readiness for instant manoeuvre
with due regard to the avoidance of unnecessary loss. In the _Diamond
Formation_, one section leads to reconnoitre and to pin down the enemy,
while the remaining three sections are held in readiness to manoeuvre
for the decisive attack at the point in the enemy's defence which
offers the best prospect of success. The Diamond Formation is that
best suited to an Attack in an Encounter Battle, when the nature of the
enemy's dispositions are imperfectly known. It possesses the great
advantage of preserving {71} the power of manoeuvre for three-quarters
of the platoon until the action of the leading section has developed
the situation.
In each case (except when the Attack is launched against a highly
organised defensive position), the forward sections will be preceded by
_Ground Scouts_, to find the most covered line of advance and the best
fire positions, and to guard against ambush. These Ground Scouts
advance until checked, when they remain in observation until joined by
the leading sections. During the early stages of the Attack in an
Encounter Battle _Flank Scouts_ may be required until such time as the
deployment of the platoon renders them unnecessary.
Against a highly organised defensive system platoons may not be able to
advance to the Attack without a barrage, and it is essential that all
movements should conform exactly to the timing of the barrage and that
the troops should keep under the back edge of the shrapnel curtain, so
as to deliver their assault before the enemy has time to bring rifles
and machine guns into play. Under such circumstances, Ground scouts
must be dispensed with. Such a position will not be attacked without
careful previous reconnaissance and the lines of advance will have been
chosen beforehand. The Square Formation will be that usually adopted
for attacks on highly organised defensive positions, with the two rifle
sections forward and the two Lewis-gun sections in support. The
Lewis-gun sections are thus able to protect the flanks of the rifle
sections, and to deal with isolated enemy machine guns, or concealed
bodies of riflemen, which might come into action with reverse or
enfilade fire after the forward sections have passed over the occupied
ground.
THE PLATOON COMMANDER.--The platoon commander must explain the
situation to his subordinates and point out the line of advance. He
should usually move with the forward sections during the preparatory
{72} phase of an Attack, and when the forward sections have been
committed to the Attack he should assume control of the supporting
sections and move with them. If his platoon is in support, he will
thus be with the forward sections before the platoon is involved in the
fight. The success of Infantry in the Attack depends not only on dash,
control, and leading, but upon the intelligent co-operation of support
commanders, who must keep themselves acquainted with the course of the
battle by intelligent observation and will thus possess an
"appreciation of the situation" before involving their men in action,
and can direct the supports to the right spot at the right time, to
influence the battle by fire and by movement, without hesitation or
delay.
THE COMPANY.--The normal distribution of the company, when acting with
other companies of the battalion, is two platoons forward and two in
support. To meet the expectation of a stubborn resistance, or to cover
an unusually extensive frontage, three platoons may be forward, with
one in support; and where information as to the enemy's dispositions is
lacking, but strong opposition is unlikely, one platoon may be forward
with three in support, thus enabling the company commander to use any
or all the supports to influence the attack on obtaining information as
to the point in the enemy's position which offers the best prospect of
success. When the frontage allotted to a company is above the normal,
the leading platoons should not endeavour to cover the whole front, but
gaps should be left between them; otherwise the men will be so widely
extended as to deprive the leaders of the power of control.
When a company is acting independently, the normal formation will be
two platoons forward, with one in support, and one in reserve.
THE COMPANY COMMANDER.--The company commander will allot the tasks and
the frontages of his {73} platoons and give orders as to their
distribution, and must state where he will be himself during the
Attack. His position will be determined by the necessity of keeping
informed throughout the Attack of the situation and of the progress of
his platoons, and he is responsible that all essential information on
these points is passed back to the battalion commander. He must also
keep in touch with companies on his flanks, sending out patrols for
this purpose, if necessary; and must use every opportunity afforded by
the fire or smoke provided by other units or arms to get forward or
round the enemy's flanks. He will use his supporting platoons to push
through where the resistance is weak in order to turn the flank of
those portions of the enemy which are holding up the advance. As soon
as this temporary phase has been brought to a successful conclusion the
company commander must reorganise his platoons and secure their advance
on the objective. When the objective has been gained the position must
be consolidated and patrols sent out to prevent surprise.
THE BATTALION.--The distribution of the battalion depends entirely upon
the nature of the task allotted to it. Where the enemy's dispositions
are known and considerable resistance is anticipated in the earlier
stages of the Attack, the battalion will normally be distributed with
two companies forward, one in support and one in reserve. The forward
body should thus be strong enough to develop the Attack to such a point
that a decisive blow can be delivered by the supports against the main
resistance, and the reserve company is in hand for the completing
stages of the action or for stabilising the local battle. Where the
enemy's dispositions and the degree of resistance are still the subject
of conjecture, one company only may be forward, with two in support, so
that the main strength of the battalion will not be committed to any
definite _rôle_ before it is needed and before the situation of the
enemy is discovered.
{74}
THE BATTALION COMMANDER.--"The powers of personal control of a
battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited, and success
will depend, in a great measure, on the clearness of the orders which
commit his leading companies to the Attack" ("Infantry Training,
1921"). The battalion commander should be supplied with any details
concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops. He must understand
his objective, the limits of his frontage, and the extent of help which
he will receive from the other arms. In addition to such information
as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions,
particularly with regard to wire (or other obstacles) and machine guns,
he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies, the
best lines of approach to the objective, the most covered line of
advance for his supports and reserves, and the best position for his
own headquarters during each stage of the Attack. In his orders for
the Attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and
dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms; he will
allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not
brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he
will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the
advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the
necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for
the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during,
and after the Attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be
sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the
collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the
supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. The quartermaster
will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle.
Before issuing to the Attack a proportion of officers and other ranks
will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the
engagement is over.
{75}
The position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to
keeping in touch with the progress of the Attack in all its stages and
of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. Personal control is
difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but
opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion
commanders in the Great War, and seized with a success which
transformed a check into a victory. In 1916 a battalion commander of
the Coldstream Guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and
resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of
the Attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then
reached its objective. On April 14, 1917, the commander of a battalion
of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment witnessed the launching of a local
counter-attack by the Germans on the village of _Monchy-le-Preux_, and
by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters,
staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the 88th
Brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. On November 30,
1917, during the German counter-attack from Fontaine Notre Dame to
Tadpole Copse, in the Northern Sector of the _Cambrai_ zone, the
Germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap
between the 1/6th and 1/15th London Regiments. Local counter-attacks
led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including
the personnel of their respective headquarters, once more restored the
situation. In March, 1918, during the most critical period of the
German thrust at Amiens, a battalion commander of the Border Regiment
again and again, on horseback and on foot, personally restored the
situation.
{76}
DEFENSIVE ACTION
"The soul of the Defence is the Counter-Attack."--MARSHAL FOCH.
Defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field, or it
may be imposed upon him by the enemy, and a commander may rely upon
fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy, or he may employ
manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision.
A commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified
position, garrisoned by a portion only of his force, while he detaches
another (and probably greater) portion to attack the enemy from an
unexpected quarter. An outstanding example of this form of action is
exhibited in the _Battle of Chancellorsville_ (May 2-3, 1863), where
Lee kept at bay Hooker's army of 90,000 with one-third of his force and
detached Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men to attack the Federal rear.
Action of this kind is peculiarly effective, but it requires a secrecy
which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil, and if the
manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in
disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops.
A different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the
Defensive-Offensive battle, with examples of which the history of
Warfare is amply supplied--Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo being
typical battles of this nature. In this form of defensive action a
commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position, and after
exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault, the
commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms {77} the
exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all
the means at his disposal.
A position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity, sometimes
merely as a matter of tactical prudence. At _Nachod_ (June 27, 1866)
the Prussian Advanced Guard hurriedly established a defensive position
and kept at bay the whole Austrian Army, while the Prussian Army
emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array.
The _Pass of Thermopylae_ was occupied in B.C. 480 by 1,400 Greeks
under Leonidas, King of Sparta, to withstand the Persian hosts of
Xerxes, and although the Greek force was destroyed by an attack from
the rear (through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the
Persian service), the resistance offered to the "invincible" Persians
emboldened the Greeks in their future encounters, and led to the
ultimate defeat of the invaders. According to the legendary history of
Rome, Horatius Cocles and two companions defended the _Sublician
Bridge_ over the Tiber against Lars Porsena and the whole army of the
Etruscans. This legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the
_Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918). "The bridges across the
Crozat and Somme Canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with
entire success, it being probable that certain of them were still
practicable for infantry. Instances of great bravery occurred in the
destruction of these bridges. In one case, when the electrical
connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer
responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the
instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. By extraordinary good
fortune he was not killed" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). At _Rorke's
Drift_ (January 22, 1879) a force of 80 other ranks of the 24th
Regiment, under Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead, with about 40 hospital
cases, drove off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus, part of
Cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison {78}
at _Isandhlwana_ earlier the same day. An astounding feat of arms was
performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the
British Army in face of the overwhelming German attack at the _Second
Battle of the Somme_. A detachment of about 100 officers and men of
the 61st Brigade, 20th Division, was detailed to cover the withdrawal
of their division at _Le Quesnoy_ (March 27,1918). Under the command
of their Brigade-Major (Captain E. P. Combe, M.C.) the detachment
successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until 6 p.m.,
when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having accomplished
their task.
There are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or
potential tactical purpose. Before the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22,
1812) a Spanish force had been detached by Wellington to cover a ford
of the River Tormes by occupying the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the
force was withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge, and Marmont's
defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of
Valladolid. In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon placed a garrison of
1,200 in the _Fortress of Soissons_, but on March 3,1814, the garrison
capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the
regulations of War ordain, and the bridge at Soissons enabled Blücher
and Bülow to unite their forces across the River Aisne. In the
Waterloo campaign, Wellington stationed 17,000 men at _Hal_ and
_Tubize_, 8 miles from his right on the field of battle at Waterloo, to
repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his
centre was broken, and with 67,000 men took up a position astride the
Nivelle-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels roads which met at Mont St.
Jean. He was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern
criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces. It
is, however, permissible to suggest that the security of his right
flank, and the possession of a rallying point, inspired him with the
confidence which enabled him to {79} withstand the sustained attacks of
Napoleon until the arrival of Blücher's corps permitted him to
overwhelm his adversary.
A further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of
extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series
before the actual assault of the enemy, resistance being combined with
manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding
up his pursuit. Delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in
rearguard fighting, when the object to be gained is time rather than
position, and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local
counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments. But the guiding
principle in all defensive operations, including delaying action, must
be that "when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre, the passive occupation
of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always
involves the risk of crushing defeat" ("Field Service Regulations,"
vol. ii. (1920)).
THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT.--Although there are many forms of defensive
action the soul of the Defence in every case is a vigorous offensive
spirit. In the Active Defence, the Decisive Counter-Attack, ending in
the overthrow of the enemy, is the manoeuvre originally in view when
the defensive _rôle_ is adopted. In the Passive Defence against
superior numbers. Local Counter-Attacks end with the recapture of a
tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault, and in the
Delaying Action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached
force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders,
without undue risk, to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body.
Whatever the tactical situation, it is by the vigour of the offensive
spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined
enemy.
MODERN WARFARE.--In modern warfare the defensive position plays a part
of increasing importance, owing {80} to the great power conferred on
the defence by modern armaments. "Machine guns and barbed wire permit
the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be
disputed. In particular, they have given to a trench, or to a natural
obstacle, a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner
unsuspected before this war; they permit the prompt consolidation of a
large system that is easy to hold" (Marshal Foch). "The modern rifle
and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the Defence as
against the Attack. It has thus become a practical operation to place
the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting
line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but
also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got
away no longer exists" (Marshal French). It is thus possible to hold
the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a
minimum of exposure to loss, the extra strength of the position
counterbalancing the reduction in numbers, but a preference for
defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission
that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the
time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed. "It is of
paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations
where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be
allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is
possible. Position warfare can never of itself achieve victory"
("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). However strong
entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies,
nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and
well-armed enemy. It is scarcely even probable that an army behind
entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its
assailants as will enable the initiative, or liberty of manoeuvre, to
be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated. The
operations on both sides {81} are in the nature of a siege, and however
prolonged the siege, the advantage will be gained in the long run by
superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the
ground. In addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand
offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive
action in Position Warfare and the defence in a War of Manoeuvre. The
first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed, as
the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea
to sea, or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory.
Mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important
sphere, until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to
retreat, and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are
meanwhile confined to the infantry, and will be due to irregularities
in the alignment of the strong points, upon which enfilade fire may be
brought to bear. The second point of difference is the abundance of
time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing
elaborate systems of attack and defence, and for obtaining detailed
plans of the hostile works, through continuous reconnaissance by the
Air Service. In most countries there must be, of necessity, a
prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a Position War, owing
to the severity of winter conditions, or to the occurrence of the rainy
season, and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate
the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand
offensive. But this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather
than in fact, for no defensive system is ever perfect, no strong point
but needs further consolidation, new trenches are constantly
constructed or improved, and fresh areas are covered with wire
entanglements. Guns of all calibres, underground mines and light
mortars are ever at work, demolishing, wounding, and killing, while
lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all
times. On a smaller scale, snipers on both sides have a daily bag, and
{82} observers are ever at their posts noting every change, however
insignificant, and every new piece of work; "listening posts" are
detecting hostile plans, while patrols are collecting information and
raiding parties are reconnoitring, destroying defences, and inflicting
losses, it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in
greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out.
ENTRENCHMENTS.--Entrenchments have been employed in the defence from
the earliest times. The Roman walls in Britain, the Great Wall of
China, the earthworks in the Russian War of 1854-1855, in the American
Civil War of 1861-1864, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, and the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are notable examples. But in no war
previous to that of 1914-1918 have they played so important a part.
One of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were
those constructed in 1810 by Colonel R. Fletcher, of the Royal
Engineers, at _Torres Vedras_. These fortifications extended for 50
miles and contained 126 closed works, mounting 247 guns, and behind
these lines Wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the
retreat of Masséna enabled him to resume the initiative. In front of
these lines everything that could support the French armies had been
removed; behind them Wellington's forces were well provided in every
respect. On October 10, 1810, Masséna was confronted by the
entrenchments, the existence of which had been kept a profound secret,
while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault.
Before the end of October a Portuguese spy wrote to Wellington: "Heaven
forgive me if I wrong the French in believing they have eaten my cat"
(Napier). During the night of November 14-15, Masséna broke up his
camp and withdrew. But it was not the lines of Torres Vedras which won
back the Peninsula. Spain and Portugal were saved by the bold march
northwards {83} to Vittoria. "In six weeks Wellington marched, with
100,000 men, 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive
battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran French
troops from Spain" (Napier).
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.--"Whether it is the intention of the commander to
resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the
defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period, the
principles on which the construction of all defences should be
undertaken are the same. All defensive systems should be planned from
the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the
requirements of a prolonged defence. The ground must be thoroughly
reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of
tactical posts and defended localities. These posts should be
self-supporting, but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually
support each other by fire. The gaps between the posts must be covered
by the fire of the garrison of the posts, and machine guns may also be
sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks"
("Infantry Training, 1921"). This principle must govern the choice of
the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position
for defence, and troops detailed for the defence of an area must
continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such
time as the offensive is resumed.
CHOOSING A POSITION.--The framework of the modern defence consists of
artillery and machine guns; into this framework are fitted the defence
posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry, who are
responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting
the greatest possible loss on the enemy. A commander will require a
position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the
attackers penetrate the defences, and depth will thus be essential. He
will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front
being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the {84} enemy's forces
while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered; and in a War
of Manoeuvre he will require facilities for the Decisive Counter-Attack.
The depth of the position will develop automatically in a War of
Position, but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble
in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to
troops when withdrawn from the front line. The width of the position
will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force, the
guiding principle being to keep about half the force in General
Reserve; if, therefore, the remainder of the force is insufficient for
the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the
tactical requirements of the Active Defence. In Position Warfare,
however, a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the
limits that are practicable in the Active Defence, and the numbers
available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the
attack by means of obstacles, the removal of which is prevented by
machine-gun and rifle fire.
THE OUTPOST ZONE.--For the Active Defence of a position the defensive
system will consist of an Outpost Zone and a Battle Position. The
Outpost Zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant
watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack, watch
being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the Line of
Observation, supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive
posts, while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained,
mutually supporting defence posts on the Outpost Line of Resistance.
THE BATTLE POSITION.--The Battle Position will be established in the
area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break
the enemy's attack. It therefore forms the keystone of the whole
defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity
for defensive action. "In principle, in order to protect {85} the
battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment, it
should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars" ("Field
Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
THE SEMI-PERMANENT SYSTEM.--When a campaign is prolonged in any area
without decisive results a War of Position may be developed by one or
both of the combatants. In such cases the Outpost Zone is developed
into an intricate trench system, with protective avenues leading from
front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from
artillery fire. The Battle Position will probably coincide with the
Outpost Zone, the trenches being used for the purposes of observation
until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault.
In parts of the line on the Western Front of the Great War, "Pill-box"
forts, constructed of concrete, took the place of continuous lines of
trenches. These machine-gun forts were garrisoned, according to size,
by groups from 5 to 50 strong, and were echeloned in plan, to sweep all
approaches, and together to command with their mutually supporting fire
the whole area over which they were spread, the intervening ground
being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into
places where flanking fire may be poured into them. The advantages of
the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are
principally defensive. Fewer men are required for them than for the
trench systems, and there is less liability of loss from artillery
fire. But there are certain grave disadvantages. Well-directed
artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes, and a
direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of
action, thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the
whole scheme depends. Supports and reserves are necessarily far in
rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful
attacks, while a defensive scheme {86} composed entirely on the
pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than
entrenchments, there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior
to the attack.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.--Whatever the system of defence or phase of
warfare, every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with
neighbouring units. He must always be ready to assist a neighbouring
commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack; or to
throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being
captured by the enemy. Each post, occupied for the Defence (except in
Delaying Actions, where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled
resistance), forms a self-contained centre of resistance, capable of
all-round fire, and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area
allotted to it to the last man and the last round.
THE ACTIVE DEFENCE.--The Active Defence may be considered according to
the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the
position. It may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the
enemy must attack, and in the hope of delivering during that attack a
crushing and decisive counter-blow; or it may have been chosen of
necessity, to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the
encounter, with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke
when the opportunity arrives.
There is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander,
as in the first case a General Reserve is specially detailed for the
counter-stroke; and in the second, the position will be held with as
few troops as the tactical situation permits, in order to provide as
large a General Reserve as possible for the Grand Offensive. A
commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a
defensive position:--
(i) _The position must suit the plan of operations_; it must be "in the
enemy's way," and this the commander must be able to judge from the
map. It is {87} to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not
always essential to get astride his lines of advance, as a position on
parallel lines, threatening his flank and rear, cannot be ignored by
the enemy, unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to
mask the defender's position, while he proceeds to his objective with
his main army. "It was a mistake to assume that in order to cover
Turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town; the
armies united at Dego would have covered Turin, because they would have
stood on the flank of the road leading to that town" (Napoleon).
(ii) _The position must not be too extensive_ for the troops at the
disposal of the commander, and this will be governed by the extent of
the line to be actually held. It will consist of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points, which can be held as "pivots on which to
hinge the defence of the position," and the object must be to obtain
the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can
advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire. A rough-and-ready
rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be
supplied by the "troops to hold the position" (which should not exceed
one-half the available force) then the position is too extensive and
should be narrowed. On the other hand, too narrow a front may enable
the enemy to develop, early in the engagement, strong flank attacks,
which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the
assumption of the offensive. The _Condé-Mons-Binche_ line held on
August 22-23, 1914, by Sir J. French's army (I. Corps, General Sir D.
Haig; II. Corps, General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien) had a total width of
25 miles, and the troops at disposal, including General Sir E. H. H.
Allenby's Cavalry Division, consisted of about 75,000 all arms. The
frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of
one rifle per yard, and a position in rear had also been selected,
between Jerlain and Maubeuge, with a frontage of 15 miles. The
_Retreat from Mons_ was {88} due not to the excessive width of
frontage, but to the success of the German attack on the French V.
Corps at Charleroi (August 23, 1914), which left the right flank of the
British Army "in the air," while two German Corps were working round
the left flank. The British III. Corps (General Sir W. P. Pulteney)
did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing. At the _First
Battle of Ypres_ (October 31, 1914) many parts of the line were held
with one rifle for 17 yards, and there were no Supports or Local or
General Reserves. Yet the line was not only maintained but a
counter-attack at Gheluvelt thrust the attacking Germans behind their
entrenchments.
(iii) _There must be a clear field of fire_ to prevent the enemy
approaching unmolested within effective range, and particularly within
close range, from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an
ascendency in the fire-fight.
(iv) _The flanks must be secure_, or at least as strong as possible. A
flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure, and
a flank extending to the sea, or to the boundary of a neutral State. A
flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means
of distant observation may be called strong. It is a great advantage
if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make
his main attack on the other, as this will enable the defender to
forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his
General Reserve to meet and overwhelm it.
(v) _There should be facilities for cover_ on the position and
concealed avenues of approach from the rear. A crest affords cover on
the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment, while time enables
artificial means to be adopted. Tactical cover can be provided by
cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle,
and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to
lure the enemy on {89} to a false position. They can also induce
premature deployments by the enemy, and movements across the front of
the real position.
(vi) _There should be good artillery positions_ to provide effective
fire on all hostile avenues of approach, and counter-battery work on
hostile artillery positions. There should also be firm ground and good
roads for the movement of guns, and an absence of landmarks for the
enemy to range on. Guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all
modern battles, their disposition being settled in conference with the
artillery commander. A battery of field artillery requires 100 yards
frontage for its six guns, and there is usually an interval of 25 yards
between batteries.
(vii) _There must be depth_ to allow for the disposal and movement of
the Supports and Reserves, and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward
defences, or to issue to the counter-attack.
(viii) _There must be good lateral and frontal communication_ in order
that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced. A position
astride an unfordable stream, or high ridge or deep ravine should
therefore be avoided. At the _Battle of Dresden_ (August 26, 1813) the
Allies were encamped on the left bank of the Elbe. Their forces were
posted on the heights, but the position was cut transversely by a deep
ravine, so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right.
This vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of
Napoleon, who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and
routed it completely, with the capture of 10,000 prisoners, before any
assistance could arrive. The task of creating lateral communications,
if none exist, is of the utmost importance, as they enable a commander
to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre, to meet the
enemy with superior forces at the desired point.
(ix) _There should be good lines of withdrawal_, and these should be
horizontal, or only slightly oblique, to {90} the main position, and
not parallel with the general alignment. This is a point of the first
importance, for if the Lines of Communication lead straight to the rear
a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected
positions and towards its base, if it can keep the line intact and
prevent its flanks being turned. A wide base, with alternative lines
of approach, is of the greatest value, and when there is undue risk of
the Lines of Communication to a base being intercepted, an alternative
base, with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank, is an
acceptable safeguard, as the defence can be protracted while the
withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base. Such a change of
base was effected by Marshal French during the _Retreat from Mons_, and
amongst many historical examples may be quoted General McClellan's
transfer of the _Army of the Potomac_ from the York to the James River
in July, 1862, during the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_.
General Grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the
_Campaign in the Wilderness_ (May, 1864), from Washington to Orange and
Alexandria Railroad, then to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock, then
to Port Royal, further east on that river, then to White House on the
Pamunkey (a branch of the York River), and finally to the James River.
"His army was always well supplied, even his enormous numbers of
wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to
Washington, without any difficulty, and he had no obstacles whatever to
fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the
supply of ammunition" (Henderson). In withdrawing a defeated wing it
may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from
the field of battle, and to cause the pursuer, uncertain as to the
direction of the retreat, to make detachments which can be overthrown
by sudden counter-attacks, or to lure a pursuer from the field where
their presence is required, as Grouchy was lured after Napoleon's
defeat of the Prussians at Ligny {91} (June 16, 1815). The object of
Napoleon's attack on the Allies was the separation of Wellington's
Anglo-Belgian force from the Prussian Army under Blücher, and after the
defeat of the latter at Ligny the Emperor directed Marshal Grouchy to
pursue the Prussians and to drive them eastwards. Grouchy conducted a
leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the Prussian
Army (_The Battle of Wavre_, June 18-19, 1815), while the main body of
the Prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of Napoleon
at Waterloo.
(x) _There should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for
the Decisive Counter-Attack_. In order, therefore, to overthrow the
enemy, a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature
which neither side can cross. At _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), one wing
of the enemy was posted behind a marsh, where it was both unassailable
and unable to attack. Marlborough, therefore, ignored that wing
entirely, and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing, won
easily a decisive victory. The only occasions when an impassable
feature is welcome are in the Passive Defence of a small force against
overwhelming odds (as was seen in August, 1914, when the Belgians
occupied a position behind the _River Gette_), and in the Delaying
Action of a Rear-guard fighting for time for the Main Body to get away.
In such cases a Decisive Counter-Attack is not contemplated.
OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.--The framework of the _defence_ is
provided by artillery and machine-gun fire; the backbone of the
_offence_ is the infantry. The Commander will _divide the troops_ into
(a) _Troops to hold the position_, and (b) _General Reserve_, the
golden rule being to make (a) as small as the tactical situation
permits in order that (b) may be as large as possible, and its work
absolutely decisive. Under no circumstances {92} should the General
Reserve be much below half the available force.
Of these two portions, the _Troops to hold the position_ consist of
infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong
points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to
cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy
can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points.
This line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in
the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local
reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks
on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened
points by relieving the pressure on the front line. Their work
completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve,
and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control,
or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the
attacking force. At _Talavera_ (July 27, 1809) a portion of the
British force followed up the repulsed French columns too far, and
being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy
and retired in disorder to the position. At the battle of
_Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) two brigades emerged from the
Confederate position and drove Meade's division of the Army of the
Potomac out of their lines. But they rushed on with reckless
impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. Local
counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders,
exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus
prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local
reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the
flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined
counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.
_The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack_ and is held
for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force,
in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main
attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only
when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the
decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute
counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success.
But the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to
the General Reserve alone_. Commanders of sections of the defence who
are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the
decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have
been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for
the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This
opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it.
Every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the
opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "To
initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for
preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure,
with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
That the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the
battle of _Spottsylvania_ (May 12, 1864). General Hancock's Corps
(from Grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of Lee's
entrenchments in the Wilderness of Virginia; 20,000 men had assaulted
and captured the Salient, taking 4,000 prisoners; they then pressed
forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into
the Confederate position. "But Lee, recognising the weakness of the
Salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed
about half a mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were
suddenly brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had
intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could
neither make their orders {94} heard nor form their men for another
rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tremendous counter-attack.
Every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the
vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these 20,000 men were
driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the
Confederates recaptured their first position" (Henderson).
_He will select positions for the Artillery_, in consultation with the
commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of
approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy
early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to
combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to
support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by
counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the Decisive
Counter-Attack. The increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre
owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the
protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close
behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture.
_He will divide the position into sectors_, each garrisoned by a
distinct unit, under a definite commander. The mutually supporting
tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.)
will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite
subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control
the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the
units in times of need. The units from which such groups are formed
will usually be complete sections.
_He will decide the position of the General Reserve_. This will be the
locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if
it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the
enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the
General Reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main {95} attack
while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. As
surprise is essential to success, the position of the General Reserve
should be concealed as long as possible. The position of the General
Reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. At
the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918) the intentions of the
German commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "As
by this time (_i.e._ the evening of March 21) it had become clear that
practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed
to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting
reserves from other parts of the British front were put into immediate
execution. By drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front
not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight
divisions before the end of the month" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
_He must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the
Cavalry. Before defensive action in a War of Manoeuvre the cavalry
have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have
endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. During the
battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will
protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted
fire action. After the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in
pursuit. In case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious
advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the
withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. A
position near a flank will usually be occupied.
There have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that
has been worsted. After the _Combat of Roliça_ (August 17, 1808)
General Delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his
movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. At _Chancellorsville_
(May 3, 1863), and on the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863), a
handful of United States {96} cavalry held up the pursuit and staved
off disaster. At _Königgratz_ (_Sadowa_), (July 3, 1866), the charges
of the Austrian cavalry drove back the Prussian Horse and enabled
Benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. At _Rezonville_
(August 16, 1870) von Bredow's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge
the French batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some
breathing time for the hard-pressed Prussian infantry. The charge was
successful and the time was gained, but as at _Balaclava_ (October 26,
1854) there were few survivors from "Von Bredow's Todtenritt" (death
ride). After the battle of _Le Cateau_ (August 26, 1918) and during
the _Retreat from Mons_, the British cavalry, under General Allenby,
effectively held off the enemy and enabled the British troops to move
unmolested. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918
the withdrawal of the troops at _Cugny_ (March 24, 1918) was made
possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the 16th
Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking over 100
prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. During the retreat
in that area units of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions proved so
effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed
during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of
cavalry. "Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled
and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from
breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded
ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . .
The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of
the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or
three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven
between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have
failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D.
Haig's Dispatches).
{97}
_He must select a rallying place_ in rear of the main position from
which to recapture the front line, as General Lee recovered the
"Salient" in the Wilderness of Virginia.
_He must arrange for the reorganisation_ of his victorious forces and
for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy.
{98}
PROTECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE
"Surprise consists in the hard fact that the enemy suddenly appears in
considerable numbers without his presence having been known to be so
near for want of information; and without it being possible to assemble
against him for want of protection."--MARSHAL FOCH.
Every commander of a force, however large or small, is responsible for
the protection of his command against surprise, and a force can only be
regarded as secure from surprise when protection is furnished in every
direction from which interference is possible. Detachments are
therefore provided by every commander, their duty being to warn him if
hostile forces are discovered in the vicinity of such forces, and to
gain time, at all risks and at any sacrifice, for the commander of the
troops they protect to carry out his plans unimpeded by the enemy. "A
mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude,
it will often be better performed by an offensive" (Marshal Foch).
There is the closest connection between Reconnaissance and Protection.
It is only by finding out the location, strength and movements of the
enemy that a commander can decide how best to protect his troops, and
the forces he employs to protect his troops against surprise will very
largely prevent the enemy finding out his own strength and
dispositions. Detailed and timely information about the enemy and the
theatre of operations is a necessary factor in War and the value of the
information depends on whether it can reach the authorities in time to
be of use.
Facilities for reconnaissance have been enormously increased by the
introduction of man-carrying, self-propelled Aircraft. Before their
introduction reconnaissance {99} at a distance from the forward troops
was limited by the speed and endurance of the cavalryman's horse, and
by the skill of the cavalry scout in penetrating the preventive screen
of hostile cavalry, and in escaping the net spread out to catch him on
the return journey. His radius of operations was comparatively small,
that of the aërial observer is practically unlimited, as his machine
will carry him over the hostile area, and unless he is driven down by
opposing aircraft, or crippled by defensive fire from the ground, he
returns in a comparatively short space of time to his base, with his
budget of news, and may bring with him a series of photographs.
POSITION WARFARE.--When opposing forces are entrenched at no great
distance from one another, photographs taken from the air lead to the
discovery of new works from which the intentions of the enemy can be
predicted. On the Western Front in the Great War, photographs taken
from the air revealed the construction in the German training area of
actual sectors of British trenches in facsimile, thus indicating the
rehearsal of an attack on a definite part of the line. Hostile
aircraft are prevented from carrying out similar observational
journeys, the resistance of defending squadrons is overcome, and
whenever a favourable target is presented, casualties are caused by
bullets and bombs. Observers report all suspicious movements and
changes in trench construction, and from photographs taken at daily
intervals maps of hostile trenches are constructed and revised.
Infantry patrols and raiding parties are sent out by night and by day,
and information is gleaned from the uniforms and badges of captured
prisoners as to the distribution of hostile troops, while changes in
the plan of trenches, in the siting of wire entanglements, or in the
emplacements of guns and mortars are duly noted. In addition, troops
in observation posts, in or ahead of the front line, in favourable and
unsuspected {100} localities, are constantly observing the enemy, and
sentries over all posts containing troops are ready at all times of the
day and night to alarm the local garrisons. Resistance is afforded by
a series of mutually supporting strong points, sufficiently garrisoned
by troops who guard against surprise and hold their ground against
attack. Entrenchments, with dug-outs and shelters, provide protection
from fire, and barbed wire entanglements prevent unbroken rushes by the
enemy, and entice him into openings that are swept by rifle and
machine-gun fire. Box respirators and other appliances nullify the
effects of gas, and camouflage disguises the position of trenches,
troops, guns, and dumps, and so screens them from observation and
direct bombardment, while it provides unsuspected means of observing
the enemy's movements.
MANOEUVRE WARFARE.--In a War of Manoeuvre the steps taken to obtain
security against surprise vary with the situation of the troops.
Hostile aircraft flying high from the ground are dealt with by
counter-attack by armed aeroplanes, but as aërial fighting requires
space for manoeuvre hostile machines flying within 3,000 feet of the
ground must be dealt with by machine gun, Lewis gun, or concentrated
rifle fire, except in cases where it is essential to conceal from the
enemy that a certain position or locality is occupied, and where the
troops are so well hidden as to escape detection unless they open fire.
Movement is easily detected by low-flying aeroplanes, and in fair
weather troops can be recognised as hostile or friendly by an observer
at 500 feet, while movements of formed bodies on a road are visible at
5,000 feet. Troops remaining stationary in shaded places may easily
escape observation, and if small bodies in irregular formation lie face
downwards they are difficult to detect, even in the open. When a force
is in movement, detachments move with it to afford protection in every
direction from which interference {101} is possible; and when a force
is at rest, detachments with similar duties secure it from disturbance
and keep off attack until it can be met or developed without
disadvantage. These phases are dealt with under the headings of "THE
ADVANCED GUARD," "FLANK ATTACKS AND FLANK GUARDS," "THE REAR GUARD,"
and "OUTPOSTS."
{102}
THE ADVANCED GUARD
"Fabius, the saviour of Rome, used to say that a commander could not
make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead, 'I never expected it.'
It is, in truth, a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge.
Imagine everything, expect everything."--SENECA, "_De Ira._"
Every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments, the force
detached to precede the advance being known as an Advanced Guard, and
when a body of troops so protected halts, the responsibility for
protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been
protecting the march until they are relieved, the commander of the
Advanced Guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or
moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical
advantage.
STRENGTH.--The strength of this Guard depends on the proximity of the
enemy, but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight
opposition, so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be
delayed by small hostile forces, and to resist the enemy, when
encountered in strength, for such time as will enable the force it is
covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack. No general rule as
to the numerical strength of an Advanced Guard can be given, as the
number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical
situation and the country through which the protected force is passing.
It should, however, whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or
formation under its own commander, and it is found in practice that an
Advanced Guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a
quarter of the whole {103} force. When a large force is advancing in
several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a "Strategical
Advanced Guard," which protects the front and flanks of all the
columns. The "Tactical Advanced Guard" provided by each column may
then be reduced in strength.
DISTANCE.--The distance at which it moves ahead of the force it is
covering depends upon the nature of the country through which the force
is moving, upon the strength of the Main Body, and upon the tactical
situation, but it must always be sufficient to enable the Main Body to
deploy, to get into battle formation--unmolested by the enemy's
artillery, if required to do so. It is clear, therefore, that the
larger the Main Body the greater the distance must be, as more time
will be required for deployment. The Advanced Guard of a Brigade of
infantry, with artillery, would move at a distance of 1 to 2 miles
between the Main Guard and the Main Body, with the mounted patrols of
the Vanguard 4 to 5 miles ahead of the Main Body. These mounted
patrols would discover the presence of an enemy, and with the supports
of the Vanguard would feel for his strength and ascertain his
dispositions. The Main Guard would either assist in brushing him away
or would resist, in the best available position, any attempts to attack
the Main Body while the latter formed up for battle.
IN ADVANCES.--Infantry forming part of an Advanced Guard to a force
advancing must always act with dash and resolution, but their action
must always be regulated by the one motive of complying with the
intentions of the commander of the force they are covering. Any action
contemplated by the Advanced Guard commander must therefore be
considered from the point of view of its effects upon the plans of the
commander of the main body, but if these plans are not known, the
guiding principle will be _to regulate his action solely in the
interests {104} of the force he is covering_, and by driving in the
advanced troops of the enemy he will obtain information which will
assist his superior in coming to a decision, without interfering with
his liberty of action, whereas hesitation and delay may give the
initiative to the enemy. For this reason, a wide turning movement by
the Advanced Guard troops is seldom possible, as time is thereby lost
and the front of the Main Body is uncovered. "The ruling factor should
be the discovery of some tactical locality held by the enemy, the
capture of which will compel his whole line to fall back. If this
point can be discovered the whole energies of the Advanced Guard should
be directed against it alone, and elsewhere a defensive attitude should
be adopted, to avoid surprise of or interference with the Main Body"
(General R. C. B. Haking).
It must always be assumed that the enemy will have taken all the
necessary steps to protect himself and to hamper reconnaissance by an
adversary. If, therefore, hostile troops are known to be in a certain
locality, opposition must be expected before that locality is reached,
and study of the map should enable the Advanced Guard commander to
determine the approximate neighbourhood in which opposition may be
expected.
IN RETREATS.--While it is clear that a force advancing towards the
enemy must always be preceded by an Advanced Guard it must not be
forgotten that a force withdrawing from the enemy must also be so
protected, even when it is moving in or towards friendly territory.
Such a force will not only prevent the Main Body being surprised by an
energetic enemy, pursuing swiftly and getting round to attack where he
is least expected, but will also prevent the Main Body being delayed by
obstacles, and can delay the pursuit by preparing bridges, etc., for
demolition, which can be completed by the Rear Guard when the Main Body
has passed over {105} them. It can also reconnoitre the route to be
followed, so that the Main Body can proceed without delay.
TRAINING.--In formulating any scheme for the exercise of troops in
Advanced Guard work all officers and other ranks should be made to
understand the nature of the scheme, and should be informed (a) whether
the force is advancing or retreating, whether it is moving before or
after action with the enemy, and whether it is in a friendly or a
hostile country; (b) what is known of the enemy; (c) the direction and
objective of the march; (d) the general intentions of the commander of
the Main Body; and (e) the general instructions issued to the commander
of the Advanced Guard. "Unless such exercises are carried out in a
practical manner, young officers and inexperienced N.C.O.'s will get
the impression that an Advanced Guard consists merely of a procession
of small bodies of infantry, strung out at fixed intervals on a single
road. It is of the highest importance that the training should be
carried out on the lines that would be adopted in action" (G.H.Q.
Circular).
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.--"Speed of advance is the first consideration when
not in contact with the enemy. Hence an Advanced Guard will move on a
narrow front along roads and other channels of communication, with such
distances between advanced and supporting bodies as to avoid
possibility of surprise. When in contact with, or in the vicinity of,
the enemy, security and speed of advance are equal considerations.
Hence the Advanced Guard should move by bounds on a broad fighting
front across country" ("Infantry Training, 1921").
Before an Advanced Guard commander moves off in compliance with his
instructions he will take certain steps in accordance with these
tactical principles. He will divide his troops into two portions,
known as the _Vanguard_ and the _Main Guard_, and as the duties of the
{106} Vanguard are reconnaissance in general, as well as the protection
in particular of the Main Guard, it will contain a large proportion of
mobile troops, with infantry for assault and resistance, and engineers
for clearing the way through or over obstacles. Aircraft, in advance
of the Vanguard, not only increase the area under search and expedite
the discovery of the enemy, but prevent surprise and assist the
Advanced Guard as a whole by close co-operation in feeling for and
fighting the enemy when encountered. "In order to reconnoitre one must
compel the enemy to show himself wherever he may be. To this end he
has to be attacked until the extent of his position has been clearly
defined. But the attack is made with the intention not to bring on an
action. The skirmishing lines will advance, but they must be able to
disengage themselves at a given moment. Pressure is exercised from a
distance without allowing the forces exerting that pressure to become
tied up" (Marshal Foch). The duty of the Main Guard is Resistance,
that is to say, fighting. It will therefore consist mainly of
infantry, with artillery and machine guns, and the troops will move in
the order in which they will come into action. The Vanguard will be
preceded by scouts, special attention being paid to roads and tracks
parallel with the advance. This screen is followed by the remainder of
the Vanguard, in collected formation, until it is in contact with or in
the vicinity of the enemy, with protection at all times against local
surprise. The Main Guard follows, in touch with the Vanguard, and with
local protection. Both portions have definite commanders, and the
commander of the whole Advanced Guard will probably move with the
supports of the Vanguard. The commander will also determine the
_relative distances_ between the Vanguard and the Main Guard, these
being regulated by the strength of the Advanced Guard, and being based
upon the necessity of one part supporting the other. The distance of
the {107} Advanced Guard ahead of the Main Body may have been mentioned
in the operation orders, but if it is left to the discretion of the
Advanced Guard commander he will be guided solely by the interests of
the force he is covering, and his decision will be influenced by the
nature of the country (whether it is open, or intersected by woods,
hedges, sunken roads, etc., which make observation even by aircraft a
matter of great difficulty) and by the tactical situation, such
distance being chosen as will suit these conditions, while admitting
the fulfilment of the objects in view, viz.:--to obtain information
concerning the enemy and to prevent hostile reconnaissance; to prevent
surprise and delay; and to enable the Main Body to deploy into battle
formation without interruption by the enemy's fire.
It is also the duty of the commander to ensure _communication_ between
the various parts of the Advanced Guard and between that force and the
Main Body, by arranging for mounted orderlies and cyclists, signallers
and connecting files, in addition to the contact patrols furnished by
the Air Service, and to such telegraphic and telephonic communication
as can be provided in the field by the Signals. This is of the first
importance, as the action of the commanders of the Advanced Guard and
of the Main Body will depend on information received, and not only must
information be gained by every available means, but it must also be
communicated without delay to all concerned while it is fresh and
before it becomes stale. It must also be remembered that negative
information (_e.g._ that such and such a village has been thoroughly
searched and no trace of the enemy found) is at least of equal value to
positive information. The repetition or confirmation of information
already sent are also of importance, as it is clearly of value to a
commander to know positively that the enemy is still absent, or still
present, at a certain time in a certain locality. In the American
Civil War, during an encounter battle between {108} advanced troops,
the commander of the cavalry of the United States Army held up the
Confederate advanced troops. A sharp fight took place at _Sulphur
Springs_ (October 12, 1863) and the United States cavalry commander
became so absorbed in the battle that he failed to send information to
headquarters, and General Meade did not learn that he was in contact
with the Army of Northern Virginia until late in the afternoon. In the
campaign of _Fredericksburg_, General R. E. Lee, with the Army of
Northern Virginia, was confronted by General Burnside, with the Army of
the Potomac. On November 15, 1862, a patrol of Confederate cavalry
discovered Burnside's troops moving eastwards, and another patrol
brought news the same day that gunboats and transports had entered
Acguia Creek on the Potomac. These two pieces of information,
collected at points 40 miles distant from one another, gave Lee an
insight into his opponent's design. Information gained by aircraft on
September 4 and 5, 1914, and communicated immediately to General
Joffre, led to the discovery of the flank march across the
Franco-British front by the German I. Army, and to the decisive
counter-attack at the _First Battle of the Marne_ (September 6, 1914).
The Advanced Guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously
engaged, and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with
the known intentions of the commander of the Main Body. The tendency
to independent action of this kind, which militates against the success
of the best laid plans, was very observable in the early battles of the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Actions were hastily entered on by
Advanced Guards, maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival
of reinforcements, and finally concluded with barren results and losses
in excess of those inflicted. At the _Battle of Spicheren_ (August 6,
1870) the Advanced Guard of the 14th Prussian Division commenced the
battle, which had to {109} be sustained for three hours by 11
battalions against 39. During the next three hours 8 more battalions
arrived, and at the conclusion of the battle only 27 battalions and 10
batteries in all had come into action against a whole French Corps, and
there were two French Corps within reach of the one engaged. Had these
"marched to the sound of the cannon," as Napoleon would have marched,
the 14th Prussian Division would have been unable to extricate itself
without complete disaster. At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870)
the Prussian Crown Prince had expressed his intention not to engage the
French on that day. Yet the Advanced Guard of the V. Corps brought on
a battle into which the Bavarian Corps was perforce drawn. The Crown
Prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced
troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had
to be sent into action. Although tactically successful the battle was
out of accord with the settled plans of the Commander-in-Chief. In the
same way the Advanced Guard of the VII. Prussian Corps, contrary to the
letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the I. Army,
precipitated an action at _Colombey_ (August 14, 1870). Other troops
were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the I. Army was
engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had
expressly forbidden. The battle had no tactical or strategical
results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "Precipitate
action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most
advantageous manner. For when a small force is engaged against a
larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them
up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is
thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively
where an effective blow may be struck. Thus the direction of the fight
is surrendered to the enemy, as at Spicheren and Colombey. The French
positions were so strong that the German {110} reinforcements as they
arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and
the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical.
At Colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along
the front of the French position, where the Prussians made little
impression, while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on
the French" (Clery). It is thus seen that the commander of the
Advanced Guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his
instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the
force he is covering. But his action in _protecting_ the Main Body is
unfettered by any considerations of prudence, and must ever be vigorous
and resolute, any risks being taken that ensure the safety of the Main
Body. On the morning of the _Battle of Nachod_ (June 27, 1866) the
Advanced Guard of General Steinmetz's V. Corps (of the Army of the
Crown Prince of Prussia) was in bivouacs on a plateau, after emerging
from a long and narrow defile through which the Main Body must march to
the open country beyond. About 8 a.m. the cavalry of the Vanguard was
checked by the advanced troops of the VI. Austrian Corps. It was
imperative that the Prussian Advanced Guard should hold the plateau
until the Main Body had extricated itself from the defile. By the
rapid and accurate fire of the infantry and horse artillery, and the
co-operation of the cavalry against the Austrian squadrons, the thin
line was maintained for more than three hours. Less than 7 battalions
of infantry, with 13 squadrons of cavalry and 3 batteries of light
artillery, kept in check 21 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 4 batteries.
Had the Advanced Guard suffered itself to be driven back on the Main
Body in the defile a disaster could scarcely have been avoided, and
owing to the steadfast endurance of the Advanced Guard the Main Body
was able to drive the Austrian Corps from the field.
ADVANCED GUARD PROBLEMS.--The Advanced Guard commander must be able to
appreciate without delay {111} the situation which confronts his force,
and to solve the problem before him with regard solely to the interests
of the force he is covering.
(a) If the Vanguard is held up by the enemy who is ascertained to be
inferior in strength to the Advanced Guard, the commander will transmit
information to the Main Body and will attack vigorously to disperse the
enemy, in order that the movements of the Main Body may not be delayed.
A fire attack would be organised on the front of the enemy, supported
by close-range artillery fire, and a turning movement with Lewis guns
and rifles on one or both flanks. If the enemy held to a covered
position they could be ejected by rifle bombers or light mortars from a
flank, while artillery and machine guns prevented aimed fire at the
attacking force.
(b) If fire is opened on the Vanguard and definite information as to
the strength and dispositions of the enemy cannot be ascertained, such
information as had been gained would be transmitted and a bold
procedure would be adopted in order that the information might be
supplemented as quickly as possible. The commander would reinforce his
Vanguard with infantry from the Main Guard, and should be able to force
the enemy to disclose his position and strength, but unless ordered to
do so would take care not to become so involved in action that the Main
Body would be compelled to come up and extricate them.
(c) If the enemy is encountered when the Advanced Guard commander knows
that it is the intention of his superior to deliver an attack the
information would be transmitted with an outline of the steps taken in
seizing and securing all tactical points that will be of service to the
Main Body. The Advanced Guard would work on a wider front than would
otherwise be used by a force of that strength, and the artillery would
be posted with a view to its position being adopted as the main
artillery position.
{112}
(d) If, under similar circumstances, the intention not to be drawn into
a decisive engagement is known by the Advanced Guard commander he would
limit his activities to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and
numbers, and while hampering the enemy and preventing him from finding
out particulars concerning the Main Body, he must take care not to
become involved in a general engagement.
(e) A case may easily occur in which vigorous action is demanded,
whether the commander of the Main Body intends to attack at once or to
defer an engagement. Such a situation would arise if the Vanguard
discovered the approach of the enemy towards a ridge or other position
of tactical advantage, and if the Advanced Guard commander could, by a
rapid advance, forestall the enemy in the occupation of such a
position, his failure to do so, or hesitation in waiting for explicit
orders to do so, would be a grave neglect of duty.
(f) In the American Civil War a tactical blunder of another kind, due
to the impetuosity of the commander of the Independent Cavalry of the
Army of Northern Virginia, prevented the Southern commander from
obtaining a great strategical advantage over the Army of the Potomac.
The latter force had been withdrawn by General McClellan, after the
Seven Days' Battle around Richmond, to a secure position at Malvern
Hill, where the assaults of the Army of Northern Virginia were beaten
back with heavy losses. McClellan continued the withdrawal and had
reached Harrison's Landing on the James River. The Independent Cavalry
of the Southern Army had previously been dispatched on a false scent,
but at 9 a.m. on July 3 touch was regained with the Northern forces,
which were sighted from _Evelington Heights_ (July 3, 1862), a
commanding ridge within two miles of the bivouacs of the Army of the
Potomac, which was resting in apparent security, with inadequate
precautions against surprise. General J. E. B. Stuart, the Confederate
cavalry commander, {113} reached Evelington Heights with 1,200 sabres
and carbines and one light howitzer, and the whole Army of the Potomac,
90,000 all arms, was in bivouacs in full view from the Heights, and it
was clear that his presence was not suspected. The nearest column of
the force he was covering was six miles away, and there remained about
ten hours of daylight. It is easy to see, after the event, that this
was a case where "Silence is golden." Stuart should have sent the
information to Lee and to every column commander, urging them to press
on at all speed, while he occupied the Heights with his dismounted men
with the determination to hold his position with fire action, if
discovered, until the arrival of one or more columns of the Army of
Northern Virginia. But he failed to appreciate the situation, and
forgetting the larger question, he seized the opportunity to spread
panic in the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, and opened fire with his
one light howitzer. The Northerners recovered from the panic caused by
this unexpected attack, when it was realised that only one gun was in
action against them, and attacked and captured the Heights, and were
strongly entrenched there before the nearest Confederate column arrived.
(g) Among the examples of Advanced Guard work in Marshal Foch's
"Principles of War" is a problem for a battalion as the Advanced Guard
of a Brigade. "What is the problem the battalion commander has to
solve? It consists in preparing for the brigade to go into action
against an enemy who may debouch from Bettwiller. What does the
brigade require for such an action? It requires the _space_ necessary
for the full employment of its forces, and the _time_ necessary for
their arrival and deployment. In order to achieve that double task the
battalion commander orders his troops to occupy _the whole space
necessary_, and places them in points where they may hold on for the
_necessary time_."
{114}
FLANK ATTACKS AND FLANK GUARDS
"A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's warfare
would hardly fail to make his enemy's communications his first
objective."---Col. G. F. R. HENDERSON.
The Flanks are the most vulnerable points of an army, for an attack
upon these points subjects the defenders to enfilade fire, and is
delivered by troops arrayed in attack formation against an enemy that
is not in a position to repel the attack. The consequences of a
successful Flank Attack are so far-reaching that every effort will be
made by a commander to bring about such a consummation in order that he
may sever his adversary's communications, bring him to the end of his
resources, and deprive him of the means of replenishing them.
If, therefore, there is any possibility of a column on the march being
attacked in flank a force must be detached to protect that flank, and
if both flanks are exposed to attack both must be similarly protected.
The flank is the most vulnerable part of a moving column, and an attack
driven home upon that part has every prospect of success, for it will
be delivered by a force that is distributed in depth against a force
that is protracted in width after changing front to meet the attack,
and the absence of depth in the defending force will deprive the
defence of the principal source of strength in resisting attack.
An independent column is liable to attack on either of its flanks,
unless the nature of the country through which it is passing provides
security for one or the other in the form of an impenetrable feature
(such as a wide, {115} trackless marsh), or an impassable barrier (such
as a neutral frontier). The outer columns of a force moving on
parallel routes will have an exposed flank, while their inner flank is
protected by maintaining touch with the neighbouring column.
Flank Guards may be furnished by the Main Body, or by the Advanced
Guard, and this point will be made clear in the orders for the
operations. Their composition, strength, and distribution, and the
interval at which they move on the flank of the Main Body, are similar
to those of an Advanced Guard, while their action under all
circumstances is governed by the same tactical considerations, the
principle underlying every action of a Flank Guard commander being
compliance with the known intentions of the commander of the Main Body,
and the sacrifice of the interests of the Flank Guard to preserve the
interests of the Main Body. The same duties of reconnaissance and
protection have also to be carried out, and communication with the Main
Body has to be maintained. For the purposes of reconnaissance and
communication Aircraft are even more effective than in Advanced Guard
work, while observation patrols supplement and confirm the reports of
aërial observers. The work of protection varies with the nature of the
country through which the Guard and the Main Body are moving at the
particular time. In open country the Flank Guard may be keeping pace
with the Main Body at a regularly maintained interval, and on parallel
lines. In close country, and in hilly or mountainous districts, it may
be necessary to occupy a successive series of tactical positions on the
exposed flank, any of which can be reinforced and held at need to
safeguard the passage of the Main Body. In order that the whole column
may be protected, from the head of the Main Body to the train in rear,
unbroken touch must be maintained both with the Advanced and the Rear
Guard, and incursions between these forces and itself must be prevented
by the Flank Guard.
{116}
In addition to the protection of a column on the march, Flank Guard
work is of the highest importance on the Lines of Communications and in
the protection of Convoys. On the _Lines of Communications_ raids from
the air or land may always be expected in Manoeuvre Warfare, and one
flank is usually more vulnerable than the other. A _Convoy_, when
parked, is liable to attack from any quarter; and when on the march it
may be assailed from any direction, especially when the adversary can
detach mounted troops, or infantry rendered mobile by motor transport,
or raiding bodies carried in Aircraft. Frequently, however, one flank
only of the Lines of Communications is vulnerable owing to the
geographical or tactical situation, and the work of protecting traffic
or Convoys on the Lines of Communications is Flank Guard work, with due
precautions against surprise from all quarters, the Main Guard
remaining with the Convoy and securing its safe arrival at its
destination, rather than seeking an encounter with the enemy. The most
efficient way to protect a Convoy is to piquet the road daily with
troops sent out from posts on the line; but when it is necessary to
send a Convoy by a route which cannot be protected in this way a
special escort must be provided. The commander of an escort will not
engage the enemy if his task can be accomplished without fighting. If
fighting is inevitable the enemy should be engaged as far from the
Convoy as possible, and it will not be halted and parked, except as a
last resort. In the case of mechanical transport the whole of the
escort will be carried in motor vehicles, and except where parallel
roads are in existence, little can be done to secure flank protection
while on the move. A portion of such escort will move with the Convoy
and a portion will be sent ahead to secure any bridges or defiles which
have to be passed, the outlet of any defile being secured before the
Convoy is permitted to enter the defile. In the case of a horsed
Convoy the escort will usually consist of infantry, with a proportion
{117} of mobile troops. Small Advanced and Rear Guards will be
detailed and sufficient men will be posted along the column to ensure
order and easy communication. The remainder of the escort will usually
move on that flank from which attack is most likely.
The far-ranging raid on the Lines of Communications was a notable
feature of the American Civil War. It was freely employed on both
sides and was often harmful to the object of the attack and usually
profitable to the raiders, especially to those of the South, by reason
of the replenishment of stores. General Turner Ashby, the dashing
cavalry leader in the Shenandoah Valley, was a constant source of
terror to the Northern Generals, and his death while protecting the
movements to _Cross Keys_ (June 6, 1862) was a terrible blow to
Stonewall Jackson, who employed his mounted troops with more skill than
any other commander, Confederate or Federal. General R. E. Lee
possessed a great cavalry leader in J. E. B. Stuart, "but cool-headed
as he was, Lee appears to have been fascinated by the idea of throwing
a great body of horsemen across his enemy's communications, spreading
terror among his supply trains, cutting his telegraphs and destroying
his magazines. Yet in hardly a single instance did such expeditions
inflict more than temporary discomfort on the enemy; and the
Confederate Armies were led more than once into false manoeuvres for
want of the information which only the cavalry could supply. Lee at
_Malvern Hill_ and _Gettysburg_, and, on the side of the North, Hooker
at _Chancellorsville_, and Grant at _Spottsylvania_, owed defeat in
great measure to the absence of their mounted troops on raiding
excursions. In the Valley, on the contrary, success was made possible
because Jackson kept his cavalry to its legitimate duty" (Henderson
"Stonewall Jackson"). In the Russo-Japanese War a column of 500
Cossacks, under Colonel Madritov, made a bold raid on the
communications of the Japanese I. Army in the last days of April, 1904.
The raid involved a {118} ride of 240 miles and was carried out in
entire ignorance of the imminent attack upon General Zasulich's force
by the Japanese I. Army at the _Battle of the Yalu_ (May 1, 1904). On
arrival at his objective Colonel Madritov found nothing to attack, as
the base of the Japanese I. Army had been shifted from the Korean
frontier to a shorter sea base at the Yalu mouth. On his return he
found his General in disordered flight, and had his small force been
available at the Battle of the Yalu it could have protected the retreat
to Hamatan and Feng-hwang-cheng. Raids and attacks outside the centre
of operations, however daring, have no permanent value.
In the South African War a disaster to a Convoy at _Sannah's Post_, or
_Koorn Spruit_ (March 31, 1900), was caused by the absence of
precautions in front of a retreating force, the wagons being permitted
to enter a defile (the Spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was
held by the Boers) before the exit had been secured. Earlier in the
same campaign a Convoy of 800 wagons was lost at _Ramdam_ (February 13,
1900). An ambushed force of Boers killed all the transport animals and
the wagons were abandoned. No escort had been provided for the Convoy,
which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance.
Throughout the South African War the activities of De Wet emphasised
the vulnerability of the Lines of Communications.
Where the tactical situation permits, arrangements should be made to
protect the Lines of Communications by offensive action. An engagement
may be invited in a suitable position, the protecting troops holding
the raiders with a Delaying Action while reinforcements are summoned to
converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and
exterminating the raiders.
{119}
THE REAR GUARD
A Rear Guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the
stragglers, to keep off marauders, and to prevent surprise by an
energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the
rear of the advancing column.
But its most important work is the protection of a retreating force,
and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise
of the enemy and the spirit and determination of the force that is
being pursued. Generally speaking, Rear Guard fighting against an
unexhausted enemy is the most difficult and most dangerous of all
military enterprises. When a Rear Guard halts to fight it is being
separated every minute from the Main Body, which is moving away from
it, while every minute brings reinforcements to the enemy. The work
requires great tactical skill, as it is the duty of the commander to
delay pursuit by occupying positions from which he withdraws at the
last moment, without becoming involved in a general engagement, from
the meshes of which it may be necessary for the Main Body to return and
extricate him. The work also requires great moral courage, as it is
the duty of the commander to risk the loss of his force if by so doing
he is adopting the only means of saving the Main Body.
STRENGTH.--The strength of the Rear Guard will depend upon the energy,
strength, and closeness of the pursuit, the condition of the Main Body
(and whether it is withdrawing voluntarily or upon compulsion after an
unsuccessful engagement) and upon the nature of the country, but it
will generally amount to not less than {120} one-fifth or more than
one-third of the whole force, and will be selected, as a rule, from
those who have been least severely engaged.
COMPOSITION.--Its composition depends upon the work to be performed,
and this calls for detachments of all arms of the land service, in
addition to _Aircraft_, which can prevent surprise by reconnaissance
over the hostile area and can harass the pursuing columns by day and by
night by fire-action with Lewis guns and bombs. _Mounted troops_ are
required to extend the area watched and to prolong the resistance by
reason of their superior mobility, in addition to their counter-action
as cavalry. _Artillery_ are required to open long-range fire on the
enemy's columns and so to cause delay by deployment; and to concentrate
upon them while in, or emerging from, a defile. _Infantry_ and
_Machine-gun Platoons_ are required for prolonged fire-fights and local
counter-attacks, during which sudden bursts of machine and Lewis-gun
fire will do the greatest execution. _Engineers_ provide sappers for
the creation of obstacles and traps, and for the demolition of bridges
and viaducts. _Mechanical Transport_ may be required to add to the
mobility of the infantry. The _Medical Service_ is called upon to
provide attention and ambulances for the wounded and for the sick and
worn-out troops.
DISTRIBUTION.--The Rear Guard is divided into two parts--the Rear Party
and the Main Guard. The _Rear Party_ consists, like the Vanguard of
the Advanced Guard, of patrols and supports; the rest of the force
forms the _Main Guard_, and marches in the order in which the troops
are required, viz.: Artillery (with escort), Mounted Troops (if any
remain over from the Rear Party), Infantry, Medical Services and
Ambulances, and the Sappers of the Royal Engineers. The guns can thus
open fire whenever required, and the sappers, who are furthest away
from the pursuit, will have the longer time to prepare obstacles and
demolitions, the {121} latter being completed by the Rear Party.
Communication must always be secured and maintained between the Rear
Party and the Main Guard, and between the Rear Guard and the Main Body.
DISTANCE.--The distance at which the Rear Guard works is governed by
the duty it has to perform, viz.: to permit the withdrawal of the Main
Body to be carried out without interruption by the enemy, and to effect
this it will usually be necessary for the Machine Gun and Infantry
Platoons of the Main Guard to keep within effective range of positions
from which hostile artillery might molest the Main Body. The commander
will probably remain with this part of his force, as its work is of the
highest importance; in any case his position must be made known and
there should be definite commanders of the Rear Party and the Main
Guard. But while the distance separating the Rear Guard from the Main
Body must be sufficient, it must not be too great, or the enemy may
penetrate between it and the Main Body, and not only will the Rear
Guard be cut off and liable to destruction but it will cease to protect
the Main Body.
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.--The tactical work of a Rear Guard is carried out
according to the following principles:--
_The Rear Party watches_, and it must watch _all_ the roads and tracks
by which the pursuing force can advance, and is responsible that the
enemy does not get round the flanks (which may or may not be specially
protected by Flank Guards). Reconnaissance by Aircraft for the
discovery of intended outflanking movements is probably of greater
value in Rear Guard work than in any other military action. The Rear
Party also resists the hostile advanced troops as long as possible,
withdrawing before it is outflanked. "An outflanking manoeuvre is
specially convenient when attacking a Rear Guard, for the latter cannot
fulfil its mission once it has been turned" (Marshal Foch).
{122}
_The Main Guard fights for time_. If the withdrawal is more or less
unmolested, or if such pursuit as is offered can be dealt with by the
Rear Party, the Main Guard can continue its march, taking care not to
close in on the Main Body; and while falling back it can demolish
bridges, create obstacles, prepare ambushes, and so on, employing all
devices (within the laws of war) for delaying the enemy. When hotly
pursued it must gain time at all costs for the army it is covering, and
must not allow itself to be driven back on to the Main Body; or it will
hamper that force and cease to protect it. Time can be gained by
compelling the enemy to halt to reconnoitre a position, by making him
deploy into attack formation, and by making him go out of his way in
order to envelop a flank. But before an attack reaches a position in
such strength as to ensure success, and before the enveloping force can
achieve its object, sub-divisions of the Main Guard will withdraw in
succession under covering fire from those still in the line, which also
withdraw in their turn under covering fire from the sub-divisions in
their new positions, to tactical points further back, from which again
they cover the withdrawal of the forces which had protected their own
movement.
Certain points must be noted about the positions chosen for these
successive fire-fights, and the choice of the positions is so difficult
that an experienced staff officer should be specially detailed for the
work, Positions chosen must be in the enemy's way and the lines of
withdrawal to them must not converge; they must be easy to defend and
difficult to attack; the flanks must be secure from direct attack and
effective enfilade fire, necessitating a wide detour (and consequent
gain of time from the enemy) before they can be threatened; long-range
artillery fire on the lines of approach should be possible in order to
delay and break up the enemy's advance; and each position chosen for
the next line of resistance should be unseen by the {123} pursuing
enemy, and sufficiently far away from the line last occupied to induce
him to resume his march formation. This will necessitate a repetition
on the part of the enemy of all the stages of the attack--the discovery
and the report on the position, the decision to attack, and the
deployment into attack formation. It will often be of advantage for a
Rear Guard to take up a delaying position one or two hours before dark,
as the enemy will then have to attack with darkness approaching and may
wish to defer the attack until daylight, thus gaining several hours for
the protected force.
"The first position taken up by a Rear Guard after an unsuccessful
fight must be held longer, as a rule, than the subsequent positions,
because when once the defeated army has got well away along the roads
and has regained some semblance of organisation, the march continues
without interruption unless some obstacle has to be crossed" (General
Haking, "Staff Rides"). It can also be noted that as it is seldom the
intention of the Rear Guard commander to deliver a decisive
counter-attack, he can detail a very large proportion of his force to
hold the successive positions, with local reserves, for purely local
counter-attacks; and for the same reason, an obstacle in front of his
position (which would make that position unsuitable for the Active
Defence, as it would prevent the advance of the General Reserve to the
decisive counter-attack) is most welcome in the Delaying Action of a
Rear Guard fighting for time for its Main Body.
When at length a line of resistance is evacuated, the heavy artillery
will be withdrawn first to move to a distant fire position, then the
slow moving infantry and the light artillery (under the protective fire
of the aircraft and mobile troops), and last the cavalry and other
mobile troops, who by reason of their superior mobility, can hang on to
the last and can protect the flanks of the Rear Guard as they fall
back, before {124} resuming their work as a Rear Party, observing and
resisting the advanced troops of the pursuing force.
During a close pursuit the Rear Guard commander will be called upon to
exercise all his faculties and to exert all his tactical ability in
handling his command. One of the most anxious times before him will be
when the Main Body is passing through a defile, as such a passage will
not only delay its march but will make its columns particularly
vulnerable and helpless. In the case of defiles Napoleon's maxim must
be borne in mind: "It is contrary to the principles of war to let one's
parks and heavy artillery enter a defile if the other end is not held
also." At _Sannah's Post_ (March 31, 1900) the train was permitted to
enter a defile caused by the banks of the Koorn River without the
previous occupation of that defile, and all the wagons were captured.
This not only emphasises the necessity for an Advanced Guard in
retreat, but points to the need of tactical knowledge on the part of
the Rear Guard commander, especially in mountainous country or in
terrain cut up by woods and marshes, where the train is liable to cause
delays, as the withdrawing force is compelled to march in a long drawn
column. Extra time must be gained by the Main Guard to enable the Main
Body to emerge from the defile. The Rear Guard commander must
therefore adapt his plans to suit the country through which the Main
Body has to pass, as well as the country in which he will himself fight
Delaying Actions. A good map and ability to use it, and close
co-operation with the Main Body, must be determining factors for
success or failure.
TRAINING.--When troops are being exercised in Rear Guard work
opportunities should be taken to explain the difficulties of choosing
suitable positions, of withdrawing from them when involved in battle,
of the paramount necessity for mutual support, and of accepting {125}
any risk that may be required to safeguard the Main Body. Stress
should be laid upon the importance of Fire Tactics (the judicious
combination of Fire and Movement), the greatest of all factors in a
successful Rear Guard battle, and upon the ability to read and
understand a map, an essential qualification in all movements of troops
and indispensable in Rear Guard fighting. From the map a platoon
commander must be able to predict the probable line of the enemy's
advance against the line of resistance as well as the best route to be
taken when, at length, he withdraws his platoon to another fire
position in rear; while he must be prepared to throw his platoon in
local counter-attack on the flank or rear of an assaulting party that
has become detached from its supports and therefore affords a fleeting
opportunity for a local fighting success, and a rapid advance for this
purpose along a route unseen to the foe, a speedy reorganisation after
victory, and a rapid withdrawal to the point of issue, or to a line in
rear, can best be achieved by use of the map and reconnaissance of the
ground of the encounter.
EYE FOR GROUND.--One of the secrets of Napoleon's extraordinary
successes was his "eye for ground." "It was not until I went to Jena
and Austerlitz that I really grasped what an important part an eye for
ground like Napoleon's, or blindness as to ground like his opponent's
at both those battles, may play in Grand Tactics, that is, the art of
generalship" (Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, "The Science of War"). The
same was true of General R. E. Lee, particularly in the Wilderness
Campaign, when it was not only the entrenchments but the natural
features of the ground on which he relied in his defensive tactics.
"His eye for ground must have been extraordinary. The campaign was
fought over a very large area, an area of very close country, with few
marked natural features; and yet in the midst of woods, jungles, and
streams, with very little time at his disposal, he always seems to have
selected positions than which none could have been stronger" (Colonel
G. F. R. Henderson, "The Science of War").
EXAMPLES OF REAR GUARD WORK.--During the Retreat from Mons the Rear
Guard of the II. Corps of the British Expeditionary Force delayed the
pursuit by the daring and devotion of its cavalry and artillery, and by
subordinating its plans to the interests of the Main Body enabled the
Corps Commander (General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien) not only to throw off
the pursuit but to effect a junction with the other wing of the British
Army. The retreat took place after the First _Battle of Le Cateau_
(August 26, 1914), and during the period of the retreat the insecurity
of the British Army through the breakdown of a co-operating force
rendered it liable to disaster. But the moral of Marshal French and
his commanders, the stubborn fighting instincts of the British race,
and the excellence of the musketry training of the Regular Army in
times of peace, prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. The care
taken in training the troops in Fire Tactics, and particularly in
reloading with "eyes on the mark and butts to the shoulder," was most
abundantly justified. The accuracy and volume of the rifle fire
deceived the enemy as to the nature of the troops employed against
them, and the dismounted troops and infantry with their rifles were
reported as "battalions of machine gunners."
During the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March, 1918), the British III,
and V. Armies fought a series of Rear Guard battles, and the enemy's
advance was made at a very heavy cost. "Units retreated stubbornly
from one position to another as they found them turned and threatened
with isolation; but at many points fierce engagements were fought, and
whenever the enemy attempted a frontal attack he was beaten off with
loss" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). The machine gun proved its
effectiveness again and again during the British {127} withdrawal, and
twelve machine guns of the 63rd Division, posted in _Les Boeufs_ (March
24, 1918), held up the enemy's advance from Morval at a critical
period, and enabled the division to reach the position assigned to it.
The losses inflicted on the enemy by machine-gun and rifle and
Lewis-gun bullets were so heavy that by March 25 Von Below's XVII. Army
was described in German dispatches as "quite exhausted." During the
same battle a detachment of about 100 officers and other ranks, under
the command of the Brigade-Major of the 61st Brigade, held the enemy at
bay from early morning until 6 p.m. at _Le Quesnoy_ (March 27, 1918)
and enabled the 20th Division to retire to its destined position.
At the _Combat of Roliça_ (August 17, 1808) the French General
Delaborde was outnumbered by the Anglo-Portuguese forces under Sir A.
Wellesley, and being driven from his first and second positions he
withdrew to the mountains. During his retreat "he brought every arm
into action at the proper time . . . and retreated by alternative
masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry
. . . and he fell back, disputing the ground, to Quinta de Bugagliera"
(Napier).
In December, 1808, and January, 1809, General Sir John Moore withdrew
to Coruña before the armies of Napoleon (and when the Emperor returned
to Madrid, before those of Marshal Soult). "He conducted his long and
arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude" (Napier),
and it is interesting to note that as in the Retreat from Mons in 1914
and at the Second Battle of the Somme in 1918, so in the rear-guard
actions which preceded the embarkation of Sir John Moore's Army, the
musketry of the British troops was the deciding factor: "the English
muskets were all new, the ammunition fresh; and whether from the
peculiar construction of the muskets, the physical strength and
coolness of the men, or all combined, {128} the English fire is the
most destructive known" (Napier).
At _Bristow Station_ (October 14, 1863) during General Meade's campaign
in Northern Virginia (after his defeat of General Lee at Gettysburg,
July 1-3, 1863), a surprise attack by Stuart's cavalry and infantry
from General Rode's Division caused the withdrawal of the Federal
troops. General Warren covered the retirement and eventually withdrew
his own forces unmolested after beating off several attacks with
close-range musket fire.
Jean Victor Moreau, one of the greatest generals of the French
Republic, became a general of division at the age of 33, and by his
skill in extricating his forces from apparently certain disaster
established in retreat a far greater reputation for generalship than
his brilliant victories secured for him. In the spring of 1796 he
defeated Latour at _Rastatt_ and the Archduke Charles at _Ettlingen_,
and drove the Austrians back to the Danube, but owing to the defeat and
retreat of Jourdan he was compelled to regain the Rhine in a desperate
and apparently hopeless effort. Yet he not only preserved his army
intact but brought with him over 5,000 prisoners. In 1798 he again
saved his army from destruction when hard pressed by the Russians and
Austrians in Italy. Retreat was by no means his only or favourite
manoeuvre, as he subsequently gained victory after victory over the
Austrians in the campaign of 1800, drove them back behind the River
Inn, and won the decisive victory of _Hohenlinden_ (December 3, 1800),
where the Austrians and their Bavarian allies lost 17,000 men and 74
guns against a total loss of 5,000 on the side of the French.
{129}
OUTPOSTS
Opposing forces come into conflict through the encounter of the
Advanced Guards of moving columns; through the approach of a pursuing
force to the Rear Guard of a retreating enemy; through the attack of a
moving force on an enemy in position; and through the renewal of an
engagement which has died down between opposing forces.
Every commander will endeavour to prevent interference with his plans
and future movements, and while striving to surprise and outwit the
enemy he will exert every endeavour to prevent the application of this
vital principle by the enemy. The commander of a force that is at rest
will require security for that force in order that its rest may be
undisturbed, and he will require the security to be assured in order
that his plans for the overthrow of the enemy may be developed. He
will, therefore, detach a portion of his force to ensure this security
by observation, to prevent the secret occupation of localities the
hostile possession of which will interfere with his plans; and by
resistance to hostile movements he will secure the rest of the Main
Body.
The force detailed to protect troops at rest is known as Outposts, and
their duty is to preserve the security of the Main Body. Outposts
protect the Main Body from surprise by Observation, and if attacked
they gain time by Resistance until the commander of the Main Body can
put his plans into execution by the occupation of the position in which
he intends to receive attack. Observation is carried out by Aircraft,
by Patrols (mobile troops by day and infantry by night), and by
Sentries; Resistance is provided by Sentry Groups and by troops {130}
in defensive positions, called the Piquets, which have other troops as
Supports. In certain cases a Local Reserve and a General Reserve are
also provided.
STRENGTH.--Work in the Outpost Line is most exhausting. Not a man or a
horse should be employed there if their services can be dispensed with,
and although the number of troops allotted for the work depends almost
entirely upon the nature of the country and the tactical situation, it
is laid down in the text-books that if an unnecessarily large
proportion of the whole force is so employed the force will suffer in
efficiency. It can also be seen that although the work is of the first
importance and fraught with the greatest difficulties, it is clearly
possible for a comparatively small body of troops to carry it out.
Observation requires intelligence and vigilance rather than numbers;
Resistance can be provided by the Delaying Action on a wide front of
small numbers of skilled troops with the relative advantage conferred
upon them in defence by machine guns and small arms, and with the
assurance of support from their Main Body close at hand.
OBSERVATION.--A force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when
every body of the enemy within striking distance is so closely watched
that it can make no movement by night or day without its becoming known
immediately to the observers of the Outposts. By day the Outpost
commander will carry out Reconnaissance some distance ahead of his
position by means of Aircraft and Patrols of mounted troops and
cyclists, while the commander of each Outpost company keeps the
approaches to the position under observation by sentries, so posted as
to see and hear unobserved by a hostile force. By night, the Aircraft
and mounted troops are unable to render much assistance as moving
patrols, and the work of Reconnaissance and Observation falls upon the
platoons of the Outpost companies.
{131}
RESISTANCE.--For the purposes of Resistance the Outpost commander will
rely upon his infantry and upon such artillery and machine guns as may
be allotted to him, and if the area he is occupying is that in which
the commander of the Main Body will meet attack the Outposts will be
provided with a greater proportion of artillery and machine guns.
Resistance is offered by the entrenchment of each Sentry Group in an
all-round post, and depth and elasticity are given to the defence by
the establishment of entrenched Piquets in selected, mutually
supporting positions commanding with their fire every avenue of
approach, covering the flanks of neighbouring Piquets, and so arranged
in plan as to bring converging fire upon the enemy as he advances to
the attack. These Piquet positions will be strengthened, when
required, by the Supports, who will either assist in manning the
defences of the Piquets or will occupy similarly prepared defensive
posts on the flank. Local Reserves may sometimes be required for local
counter-attacks, and in certain cases a General Reserve is provided.
The degree of Resistance to be offered by the Sentry Groups depends on
the tactical situation and will be specified by the Outpost commander.
In certain cases the Sentry Groups are permitted in face of a heavy
attack to fall back to the Piquets, but if they do so they must be
warned of the danger of arriving headlong on the Piquet only just ahead
of the enemy. In consequence of this danger such retirements are
rarely permissible at night. The Piquets are generally posted on the
Outpost Line of Resistance, in which case they hold their positions to
the last man and the last round, until further orders are received from
the commander of the force protected.
DISTANCE.--The distance of the Outpost position from the troops
protected is regulated by the time the latter will require to prepare
for action and by the importance of preventing the enemy's field
artillery from {132} approaching within effective range of the ground
on which these troops will deploy if attacked. Heavy guns and mortars,
although motor traction gives them great mobility, are unlikely to
accompany the enemy's Advanced Guard, and preparation to withstand or
prevent their fire will not usually be required from Outpost troops.
The effective range of shrapnel is 5,500 yards, the limit of the
effective range of machine guns is 2,000 yards, and of Lewis guns and
rifles the effective limit is 1,400 yards. The position on which the
Main Body will deploy will thus be protected from the shrapnel of field
artillery, if the possible fire-positions of that arm are brought under
effective fire from machine guns 3,500 yards from the Position of
Deployment, with Lewis guns and rifles about 500 yards further forward.
On the other hand, especially in the case of small forces (against
which artillery will not be likely to be sent), the distance must not
be such as would permit of the Outposts being cut off, or as would
necessitate the employment of an undue proportion of men on Outpost
duty.
THE OUTPOST COMMANDER.--Before halting, a commander should first decide
on his dispositions in case of attack, and then arrange the quartering
of his command and the general position of the Outposts. In the case
of a small independent force the commander of the force will usually
himself detail the whole of the Outpost troops, and will either retain
the command in his own hand or appoint an officer to command them, In
such a case the disposition of the troops will probably be that of a
perimeter camp, preparation being made against attack from all
directions. In the case of large bodies Outpost troops will usually
consist of all arms, and a definite commander will always be appointed.
This commander will, when necessary, divide the Outpost line into
sectors, delegating responsibility for the holding of each sector to
the commander of a subordinate unit or formation, and defining the
limits {133} of sectors by distinctive features such as trees,
cottages, or streams. The tops of hills or the bottoms of valleys are
not suitable as tactical boundaries, and roads should be inclusive to
one or other sector, for a road used as a boundary may be neglected by
one of the commands it divides under the impression that it is the duty
of the other command to patrol it.
INFORMATION AND ORDERS.--The Outpost commander must have definite
information on the following points:--
I. What is known of the enemy and information concerning friendly
bodies of troops working against the enemy.
II. The intentions of the commander of the force he is protecting,
where the Main Body will rest and the period it will stay there, and
whether it is intended to engage the enemy if he advances, and if so on
what position.
III. The general line of the Outposts, the troops at disposal for the
work, and whether there are other troops on the left and right.
IV. The hour at which the Outposts are to be relieved and the place to
which reports are to be sent.
After receiving the above information he will give such orders as are
immediately necessary for protection against surprise. He will then
allot the task of Observation to his mobile troops and will decide on a
Line of Resistance for the Outpost troops. He will co-ordinate his
arrangements with those of neighbouring Outpost commanders and will
ensure that no ground on his flanks remains unwatched.
The Outpost commander will then issue orders to his subordinate
commanders on the following points:--
(1) Information concerning the enemy and his own troops so far as they
affect the Outposts.
(2) The general line to be occupied and his frontage and limits of each
subordinate commander.
(3) The distribution of the mobile troops, artillery, and machine guns.
{134}
(4) Instructions as to the degree of resistance to be offered and the
general line of the Outpost Line of Resistance.
(5) Special arrangements by night.
(6) Regulations as to smoking, fires, and cooking.
(7) The hour at which the Outposts will be relieved.
(8) The place to which reports are to be sent.
(9) Instructions as to the accommodation of the Reserves (if any are
provided) and whether the Supports (and Reserves, if any) may take off
accoutrements, etc.
When he receives information that the Outposts are in position, he will
transmit the information to the commander who appointed him.
THE OUTPOST LINE OF RESISTANCE.--Retirements under fire to a supporting
line are dangerous, especially at night. As a general rule, therefore,
the Piquets should be posted on the Outpost Line of Resistance.
Co-operation, intercommunication, and the exercise of command will be
facilitated by placing the Piquets along well-defined natural features,
or in the vicinity of roads. But the tactical situation may demand
that the line adopted should afford facilities for a most stubborn
resistance as well as facilities for observation, and the former
necessity will far outweigh the latter.
If the force is likely to remain halted for several days, especially if
the operations are likely to lapse into Position Warfare, commanding
ground is of great value to the artillery, and the Outpost Line of
Resistance will probably develop into the Outpost zone of a defensive
position. On the other hand, if halted for only one night, artillery
will not be largely employed, and commanding ground is not essential.
THE OUTPOST COMPANY.--The Outpost Company is the Outpost infantry unit,
the company commander providing Piquets, Supports, and Detached Posts
as required. Upon receiving his orders the commander will move his
command, with due precautions against {135} surprise, to the allotted
ground where the men will be halted under cover. Before proceeding to
the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the Outpost
company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his
operations, and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until
his Piquets have entrenched themselves. By the map he can decide the
number of Piquets he will require, in accordance with the number of
roads to be watched, the facilities for resistance, and the
requirements for patrolling. The extent of frontage allotted to an
Outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach (roads
and tracks, and open, unfenced country) to be watched, and under
ordinary circumstances a frontage up to 1,500 or 2,000 yards may be
allotted to a company with 4 platoons at fighting strength. Each
Piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good
defensive position. The Support (or Supports, if more than one is
detailed for the company frontage) should also be composed of a
complete unit, and should generally be posted 400 to 800 yards in rear
of the Piquets, with good lines of approach to each. _Detached Posts_
may be required, to watch an extreme flank, or to occupy a position in
front of the Sentry line, where the enemy might otherwise collect
unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance. A
further use is to deal with traffic through the line, where a main road
has no Piquet upon it. The Outpost company commander must inform his
Piquet commander, and his immediate superior, of his position, as all
reports received by the Piquets require to be sent to him, and his
superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all
times. The first duty of a Piquet commander (who is almost invariably
a Platoon commander) is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and
by all available means, and to prepare a range card, so that the enemy
may not approach without heavy loss; and if the Piquet has a Support
ordered to reinforce it in case {136} of attack, the entrenchments must
be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops (including the
Sentry Groups thrown out, if these have been ordered to withdraw to the
Piquet in case of a heavy attack). The commander must impress on all
men of his Piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of
their surroundings while daylight lasts, so that they may the more
easily find their way about by night. On his way to the position the
Piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch
and where sentries will need to be posted, and he will provide from his
platoon, patrols and sentries (with the necessary reliefs for the
patrols), will detail the various duties, and will make the necessary
sanitary arrangements. His sentries should be posted as expeditiously
as possible, and his patrols sent out at once. The number of patrols
to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country, and as each
patrol requires two reliefs, their number should not be greater than
circumstances demand. The duties of infantry patrols are to search the
ground and buildings, etc., for about 2,000 yards in front of the
sentry line, to find out whether the enemy is there or not, and if the
enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report
frequently. The number of Sentry Groups depends upon the nature of the
country and the height of the line of observation, but between them the
groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their
Piquet (up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring
Piquets). A Sentry Group consists of 6 men under a N.C.O. (2 on duty
and 4 off), and groups are usually posted not more than 400 yards from
their Piquet, and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw. If
invisible from their Piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the
Piquet commander. Sentry Groups required for night dispositions only
will not be posted until after dark. In order to prevent the men of
the Piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the N.C.O. and {137}
men of each relief must be made to bivouac together, apart from other
reliefs and from the remainder of the Piquet. A sentry will always be
posted over the Piquet, to watch the Sentry Groups and connecting
sentries, and ready to alarm the Piquet at any moment of need. Patrols
consist as a rule of a complete unit of 3 to 8 men under a N.C.O., and
should be formed of men trained as scouts, although it will sometimes
be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose, owing to the
vigilance of the enemy. Standing patrols may also have to be
furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at
night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the Piquet line,
at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. The
Piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour
before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are
invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement
by the enemy. Outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the
force is doubled at the hour of danger. All troops in the Outpost Line
must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the Piquet or
Support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden
attack. A detachment of Royal Engineers will usually be available to
superintend the consolidation of the main position.
DAY AND NIGHT WORK.--By day, the work of an Outpost Line will consist
in Reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the Aircraft and
mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine
guns, hold the Line of Resistance. By night, the mounted troops will
be withdrawn, except such "Cossack Posts" (standing patrols of mounted
troops) and "Vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed
necessary to leave established in front of the line, while Aircraft
will have much difficulty in discerning movement. The whole work of
observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be
in their day {138} position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of
a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train
their rifles.
Neglect of the Principles of War is almost inevitably followed by
disaster, and Protection is the first of the Tactical Principles.
During the later stages of the Franco-Prussian War a French force of
the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _Chateau of Chambord_
(December 9, 1870), which stands in a large park, near Blois. No
outpost precautions were taken, and the Chateau was captured by two
companies of Prussian infantry. The minor disasters suffered by
British arms in the South African War were almost entirely due to
neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. In spite
of the established superiority of the Boers in mobility and vigilance
the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently
neglected. At _Tweefontein_ (December 24, 1901) a force of Yeomanry
was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of Boers, and
heavy losses were suffered. The mystic atmosphere of Christmas Eve was
insufficient protection against the militancy of Christian De Wet.
BATTLE OUTPOSTS.--When a battle dies down at night, or when the forces
are in close proximity and a battle is imminent, the whole of the
troops must be kept in readiness for instant action. Protection by
Outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only
be provided by patrols, who keep touch with the enemy without causing
unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters, and by
sentries over the Forward Troops, which take the place of the Piquets.
The troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets
and bayonets. Unless otherwise ordered, the patrols should refrain
altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations
to secret observation of the enemy.
It is, however, essential that touch with the enemy {139} should be
maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are
usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when
hostile troops are within striking distance. In the American Civil
War, by losing touch with the Northern Army, the Southern Army
permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled.
During the Third Battle of Ypres (July 31-November 6, 1917) the Allies
renewed the attack on a six-mile front from Zonnebeke to Langemarck
(the junction of the Franco-British Armies in Flanders). This action,
known as the _Battle of Broenbeck_, or _Brombeek_ (October 9, 1917),
was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the 1st
Battalion Royal Newfoundland Regiment through the correct employment of
Battle Outposts. Germans massing for the counter-attack in Taube Farm
were pinned by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the
supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another
attacking force was destroyed by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it
was launched. A defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and
from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. The
casualties of the Newfoundlanders throughout this battle were 50
killed, 14 missing, and 132 wounded out of a total strength of 500 all
ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded 800.
After the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) the Army of
the Potomac under Gen. Burnside eluded the vigilance of Gen. R. E. Lee,
who had defeated it on December 13, 1862. Burnside withdrew (December
15, 1862) across the Potomac to Stafford Heights with the whole of his
army, under cover of a heavy storm. If special orders had been given
by the Outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if
scouts had been instructed to penetrate the Federal lines from time to
time at all risks, Burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage
while on the move and should have been driven into the Potomac. {140}
During the battle itself a Confederate Brigade was surprised in its own
front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out
in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with
which touch was not maintained. At all times of action with enemy
forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close
observation, or surprise may lead to disaster.
{141}
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE
Reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under "Influences on
the Battle" and in other lectures, and owing to the close connection
between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance
in general have been noted in dealing with Protection. It has also
been seen that observation by Aircraft, Patrols, and Sentries is
essential to Protection both in Position Warfare and the War of
Manoeuvre, and that Reconnaissance is the essence of Protection. There
remain, however, two forms of Reconnaissance that have not yet been
considered, namely: the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to
attacking it, and the Reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a
view to occupying it for defence.
RECONNAISSANCE FOR ATTACK.--The first of these is the constant duty of
all commanders in the line during Position Warfare, and it is carried
out by Patrols and Raiding Parties, who provide information which
supplements the photographs and reports of the Air Service, and enables
a commander to arrive at a decision. In a War of Manoeuvre
reconnaissance by the Air Service is equally important, and it is
supplemented by the work of the Patrols of the Advanced Guard, but
principally by that of specially selected Intelligence Officers,
working in conjunction with, or independent of, the Vanguard. Such
officers would be in possession of information which it might not be
possible to reveal to the commander of the Patrols of the Vanguard, and
their special training would give an added value to their report. The
chief {142} points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position
are:--
I. The extent of the position occupied.
II. Weak points of the position.
III. Points, the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or
reverse fire, and would thus render the rest of the position
untenable.
IV. Best line of attack.
V. Supporting positions, for covering, converging, enfilade,
and traversing fire.
It should be possible to gather this information without alarming the
enemy, or giving notice of impending attack.
Information on further points can be gained by fighting, and
_Reconnaissance by Raids_ is a common feature of Position Warfare. By
such means additional information can be gained, as to:--
VI. Names of regiments holding the position, judged from
identity discs, badges, buttons, etc.
VII. Whether preparations are being made for an attack
(discoverable by ear as well as eye), or bombardment, etc.
(from examination of shell dumps, etc.).
VIII. Position of machine guns (Pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc.
IX. Condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements.
X. Effects of recent bombardments.
XI. Moral of the enemy.
RECONNAISSANCE FOR OCCUPATION.--In the Reconnaissance of a Position
with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the
points to be noted are:--
I. The best line for the establishment of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry.
{143}
II. The best means of protecting the flanks.
III. The best position for the artillery and machine guns.
IV. The tactical key to the position.
V. The line from which attack may be expected.
VI. The best line for the counter-attack.
VII. The positions for the supports and reserves.
and, additionally, in the case of a War of Manoeuvre:--
VIII. The best position for the cavalry.
IX. Alternative positions in rear from which, after
reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best
line of withdrawal to them.
Additional information would be required in Position Warfare as to the
best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position,
and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against
attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.).
{144}
NIGHT OPERATIONS
There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in
certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement,
and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air
Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements
being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except
marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the
main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps
must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to
prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of
subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those
officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the
position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is
absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive
spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of
intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is
reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn
it!"
NIGHT MARCHES.--Night Marches are the movement of columns in march
formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day;
but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit,
deceive, and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by
outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a
locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which
appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. {145} Forces may
also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is
imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. Long marches of
this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are
made with such an object in view, the "March" may be said to terminate
when the Position of Assembly is reached, and from that point to become
an "Advance" or an "Assault." There are certain essentials to success:--
I. _Direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. The
route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the
Advanced Guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the
route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should
be secured. Across open country a general direction can be maintained by
means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (See
Chapter VIII., "Manual of Map Reading.")
II. _Protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by Advanced,
Flank, and Rear Guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of
mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service.
The Advanced Guard will be small, and will usually consist of Patrols
within 100 yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the
rest of the Advanced Guard in collective formation. The Rear Guard will
also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. Flanks will
usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted
by the Advanced Guard, and withdrawn by the Rear Guard.
III. _Secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as
possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. The march
{146} itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of
any kind. Care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses
likely to neigh must be left with the train. In the case of a march to
elude the enemy, Outposts will remain in position until daylight and will
be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and
bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning.
IV. _Connection_.--Every commander must have and must maintain a fixed
place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each
unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such
commanders at all times. Units must be closed up, and the usual
distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained
between units and their sub-divisions. The pace should be uniform, but
not more than 2 miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including
halts. The time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting,
and units must regain any distance lost before halting. After crossing
or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then
be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should
be detailed to superintend these matters. In addition to these general
principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb"
with all concerned:--
An officer must march in rear of each unit.
All ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack.
Fire will not be opened without orders.
Magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber.
There must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights.
{147}
When halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the
ranks.
NIGHT ADVANCES.--Night advances are the movement of deployed troops to
gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an
assault at dawn. They may take place as a preliminary to an engagement,
or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. In
the first case they are usually the sequel to a Night March, and in
either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. Surprise
is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of
gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an
engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a War of
Manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of Position Warfare.
In any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a
counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the
ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must
be carried by the troops. Successive advances of this nature may enable
the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such
advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended
meanwhile against counter-attacks. Unless troops are already deployed
for the advance, a Position of Assembly will need to be selected, with a
further Position of Deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide.
The deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow
frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of
the leading columns into the Forward Troops of the Attack may take place
without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. On reaching the
objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each
unit would entrench itself on the new position. As it is essential for
success that _direction_ should be maintained and _connection_ preserved,
the ground over which the advance is to be made must be {148} examined
beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes
or any available device. Care must also be taken in consolidating the
position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the
enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire.
Night Assaults.--Night Assaults are delivered by troops already deployed
into attack formation. It is an established tactical principle that
"when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is
probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from
a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of
a night assault." These conditions are frequently so unfavourable in
Position Warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to
the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are
made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of
daylight. During the _Battle of the Somme_ (July 1-17, 1916) a night
advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about 4 miles. The
troops moved out in the early hours of July 14, for a distance of about
1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some 300 to 500
yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong
patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid
out on the ground earlier in the night of July 13-14. The whole movement
was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The
assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m., when there was just sufficient light
to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the
whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery
barrage. They swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and
consolidated their position in the defences beyond.
On the night of February 10-11, 1917, the 32nd Division attacked and
captured 1,500 yards of trench {149} line at the foot of the _Serre
Hill_. The division formed up after dark and the attack began at 8.30
p.m., the objective was captured, and at 5 a.m. a determined
counter-attack was repulsed. The capture of the _Vimy Ridge_ by Canadian
troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on April 9,
1917: and the British victory of Messines (June 7, 1917) to an assault
launched at 3.10 a.m. In the latter case the Wytschaete-Messines
position, "one of the Germans' most important strongholds on the Western
Front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate
system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt
over a mile in depth, and the Germans had omitted no precautions to make
the position impregnable" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). Nineteen deep
mines under this position were fired at 3.10 a.m., and this was the
signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried
out under intense artillery protecting fire. By nightfall of June 7 the
whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over
7,000 prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the II. Army,
under General Sir H. C. O. Plumer. During the German offensive in 1918 a
counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the
village of _Villers Brétonneux_. The attack was launched at 10 p.m. on
the night of April 24-25. By daybreak the village was surrounded, and by
the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of 1,000 prisoners.
Among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the
Allies in July, 1918, was a highly successful night attack by the 2nd
Australian Division, on a front of about 2 miles, south of _Morlancourt_
(June 10, 1918). At 4.35 a.m. on May 12, 1864, one of General Ulysses
Grant's Corps, under General Hancock, assaulted "the Salient," part of
General Robert Lee's entrenchments in The Wilderness of Virginia
(_Spottsylvania_). 20,000 men were assembled and a night advance was
made, {150} directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night,
with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. The assault was
ordered for 4 a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until 4.35 a.m.
When the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in
making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with
the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. The assault
resulted in the capture of 4,000 prisoners and inflicted losses with the
bayonet of over 2,000, with a total loss to the assailants of about
2,000. This manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole
corps to a Position of Assembly within 1,200 yards of the hostile
outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of 20,000
troops. The captured salient was afterwards retaken by the Confederates
by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear
of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see _Battle of
Spottsylvania_).
Owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the
attacking movement, Night Assaults do not now carry the same comparative
advantages over Daylight Attacks as was the case before the introduction
of _Smoke_. Hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited
objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special
tactical localities. But by employing Smoke only two elements of
Surprise can be achieved. The _direction_ and _weight_ of the blow are
concealed, but the appearance of Smoke will warn the enemy to expect an
attack, and the _time_ of the blow is thus revealed. Smoke will probably
be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an
ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be
undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and
Outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated
force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a
similar nature, in order to gain advantages {151} for further operations
in daylight. When more important assaults are made, a larger force than
a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a
series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a
wide front. A Night Assault was delivered by two Federal brigades on the
Confederate bridgehead at _Rappahannock Station_ (November 7, 1863). One
of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the
Confederate position and cut off the retreat. Upwards of 1,500 of the
defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the
bridgehead. In the Second Afghan War, General Sir F. Roberts marched up
to the high passes leading out of the Kurram into the interior of
Afghanistan, with a column of 3,200 all ranks and 13 guns. He was
opposed by the Amir's force of about 18,000 men with 11 guns at _Peiwar
Kotal_ (December 2, 1878). Sir F. Roberts detached the greater part of
his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the Afghan position and
attacked at daylight. The Night March and subsequent attack were
completely successful. The enemy was defeated with great loss and all
his guns captured, the British losses being 20 killed and 78 wounded.
_Tel-el-Kebir_ was an example of a Night March in battle formation of a
force of 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns, to attack an
entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and
to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a
prolonged fire action. It resulted in a victory which decided the
Egyptian campaign, and added the Nile Valley to the British Empire. Sir
Garnet Wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with
its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the
troops reaching a position, varying from 300 to 900 yards distance from
the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the
march. The Egyptian Army, under Arabi Pasha, fought steadily, and again
and again renewed the fight, after falling back {152} within their
entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position
captured. The British loss was only 459 all ranks, and the Egyptians
lost upwards of 2,500 killed and wounded, the remaining 23,000 being
dispersed or captured. A daylight advance and assault of so strong a
position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a
cost to the attacking troops. In the South African War there were two
examples of the unsuccessful Night Attack. Major-General Gatacre essayed
a Night March followed by a Night Attack upon the Boers' position at
_Stormberg_ (December 10, 1899), but he was misled by his guides in
unknown ground and was himself surprised by the Boers and forced to
retire with a loss of over 700 officers and other ranks. On the
following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position
between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road. In a Night Attack
on _Magersfontein Hill_ (December 11, 1899) the Highland Brigade came
under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its Brigadier
(A. G. Wauchope) and 750 officers and other ranks. In the later stages
of the South African War, however, Night Marches followed by Raids were
employed with marked success, particularly in the Eastern Transvaal in
November and December, 1901.
Except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be
necessary to choose Positions of Assembly and of Deployment, and to
precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead
and on the flanks, within 100 yards of the following troops. On arrival
at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of
the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for
the various units. A scout from each Forward Platoon can thus mark the
inner flank on which his Platoon will rest, and the direction of the
whole line will be assured.
The troops will usually advance, during the earlier {153} stages, in
shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may
maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached.
Owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and
the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no
greater rate than 1 mile an hour can be counted on. When several
objectives are in view a corresponding series of Positions of Assembly
and Deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various
advancing forces do not converge.
Owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will
usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be
adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should
wear easily distinguishable badges. If hostile patrols are encountered
it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who
is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be
similarly treated.
The risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be
provided against, and Engineers or Pioneer Infantry should be present for
removing such obstacles. If fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that
all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at
all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a
reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will
increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost
certainly end in disaster.
In order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will
usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action
is required, until the Position of Assembly is reached; but before the
troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the
objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation
to be adopted at the Position of Deployment. In addition to this
information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles
involved, {154} there are certain axioms which must become "rules of
thumb" with all ranks:--
Fire must not be opened without orders.
Magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber.
Until daylight the bayonet only to be used.
Absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is
given.
No smoking; no lights.
If obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until
they are removed.
If hostile fire is opened, all ranks must press on at once with the
utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet.
{155}
FIGHTING IN CLOSE COUNTRY
Close country has a marked influence on Tactics owing to the
restrictions it imposes on view and on movement. Forest, jungle, and
bush, mountains and ravines, rivers and streams are natural obstacles,
while cultivation adds woods and plantations, fences and hedges, high
growing crops, farm houses, villages and towns, with sunken roads below
the surface of the adjoining land, and civilisation brings in its train
a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges, and the
natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased. The
obstruction to movement is more or less constant, except in
"continental" climates, where frost and snow render movement possible
in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes, and over roads and tracks
which are scarcely practicable in the summer season. The obstruction
to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the
leaves have fallen.
When the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are
weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in
favour of the Attack over the Defence.
An Attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the
action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective,
while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables
the Attacking force to surprise the Defence as to the direction and
weight of the blow to be delivered. Troops fighting in close country
are often unable to see what is going on around them, and the "sense of
security" is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully
assailed without warning. This favours the {156} Attack more than the
Defence, as the counter-attack, which is the soul of all defensive
operations, requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective.
SAVAGE WARFARE.--In Savage Warfare the inherent difficulties of
fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of
numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical
courage of the savages. Discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and
judgment in the application of the Principles of War, are required to
overcome these added difficulties. A vigorous offensive, Strategical
as well as Tactical, is _always_ the best method of conducting
operations in Savage Warfare, and for the purpose of Protection
vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other
form of warfare. At _Isandhlwana_ (January 22, 1879) the British camp
at the foot of Isandhlwana Hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a Zulu
Army, 10,000 strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and
yet in the evening of the same day 120 all ranks (40 sick being
included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus
at _Rorke's Drift_. In the operations after the fall of Khartoum a
desert column under Major-General Sir J. McNeill was surprised in dense
bush while constructing a zeriba at _Tofrik_ (March 22, 1885), but
after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the Mahdist Arabs were driven off
with more than 1,000 killed. In the operations in Upper Egypt against
the invading Mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led
to the _Battle of Toski_ (August 3, 1889) and resulted in the defeat
and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the
Anglo-Egyptian force under General Sir F. W. Grenfell. At the
beginning of the Christian Era three well-disciplined Roman legions
were decoyed into the fastnesses of the _Teutoberger Wald_ (A.D. 9) and
there attacked and annihilated by the Cherusci, a Saxon tribe, under
their king Arminius, and this defeat of Quintilius Varus is included by
Sir Edward Creasey among the {157} "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the
World." Fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes
is frequently the task of British troops in East and West Africa, while
the Indian Frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions
against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. In "Field
Service Regulations" (Part II.), 1921, the peculiarities of various
savage races by whom the Outposts of the British Empire are liable to
be assailed are carefully noted.
IN CIVILIZED WARFARE.--The military history of Europe and America
abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. In all ages
woods and villages play an important part in war. They form natural
magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. The fact of their
being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as
objectives in the Attack or as boundaries in the Defence, and in all
operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of
cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. Their situation is
also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are
frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive
scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main
position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be
guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. In
Position Warfare the wood and the village are of the highest
importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near
the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be
occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points. The names of woods, large and small, and
of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in
reports on the fighting on the Western Front in the Great War as the
scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there
are 67 references to copses, woods, and forests in Marshal Haig's
Dispatches. It {158} appears, however, to be generally admitted that
close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour
Delaying Action rather than a protracted Defence, and in Position
Warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the Attack on account
of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of
movement.
There are many instances of successful Delaying Action in woods and
villages. Some of the characteristics of such fighting were
exemplified in the Franco-Prussian War. At the _Battle of Gravelotte_
(August 18, 1870) the Bois de Vaux, on the left of the French position,
induced Marshal Bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it
appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning
movement on the _other_ flank. During an attack through the Bois de
Vaux a Prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all
cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. At the earlier
_Battle of Spicheren_ (August 6, 1870), however, two battalions
maintained their order and cohesion in Pfaffen Wood, and by moving
through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. A
tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified
at the same battle. Other Prussian troops had captured Gifert Wood and
the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position
through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood.
At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870) two French battalions held up
the attack of 18,000 Prussians for over an hour in the Niederwald,
although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching
from a captured wood was then experienced by the Prussians, as the
farther edge was kept under heavy fire by French troops in the
neighbouring Elsasshausen Copse. A decisive counter-attack cannot
usually be organised in such warfare, although Lee managed to employ
17,000 troops for that purpose with complete success at the _Battle of
the Wilderness_ (May 5-6, 1864). Local {159} counter-attacks, however,
are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the
Niederwald, at the _Battle of Worth_, several spirited counter-attacks
were made by the 96th French Regiment.
Villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure
in all battles as local centres of resistance. One of the most
spirited defences of a village took place at the _Battle of Sedan_
(September 1, 1870) when a heroic struggle was maintained by French
marine infantry in the village of _Bazeilles_, and after the white flag
had been hoisted over the Fortress of Sedan the fight was stubbornly
maintained at the village of Balan, the second line of defence of the
Bazeilles position. Visitors to the battlefield of Sedan are shown a
little inn with the title, _A La Dernière Cartouche_, in commemoration
of the struggle. A highly successful Night Attack was made by the
French on the village of _Noisseville_ (August 31, 1870), the normal
difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise
and the darkness.
THE ATTACK ON WOODS.--The opening stages of the attack on a wood
resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer
fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field
of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak
points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under
these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending
troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is
necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while
advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close
range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops
in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine
guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support,
the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160}
stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the
flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards,
while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements
reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During
the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917)
_Tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and
were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _Gauche Wood_,
acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th
Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they
reached the outskirts of _Villers Guislain_ they were forced to
withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to
the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the _Battle of Messines_
(June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance
by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally
speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the
many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is
limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of
approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood
"reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the
flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on
account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept,
to avoid loss of direction. In the _advance from the captured
position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have
established a fire position within close range it may only be possible
to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or
neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear
edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from
both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against
the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in
the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct
assault, or if {161} it can be got under control and the advance is to
be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood
(care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy
before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood.
DEFENCE OF A WOOD.--The outer edge of a wood is particularly
vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for
purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while
the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to
enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and Lewis guns being
particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and
strengthened emplacements. The perimeter should be divided into
sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. Lines
of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral
communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished
marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be
saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. The second
line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from
which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and Lewis guns,
and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to
counter-attack. If the wood is too far from the Outpost Zone of the
defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to
neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed
avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a
fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer
heavy loss or annihilation. In most cases, an attacking force will be
harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by
_fighting patrols_, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with
entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to
collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns.
{162}
THE ATTACK ON VILLAGES.--There are three phases in the attack on a
village as in the attack on a wood. In the fight for the outer edge,
the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both
flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover
of fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.
The second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the
village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and
dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. All captured
points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be
prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Troops must be trained to enter
buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads,
close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult
without undue exposure. Light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be
fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street
barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and
machine guns and Lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting
or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from
a commanding position at the end of a street. _The Tank_ is at its
best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any
street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but
it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as
a principal.
In the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the
supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the
capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as
essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the
struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be
expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. In issuing
from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions
in rear can be brought under control will also be required.
{163}
DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE.--It is difficult to avoid the inclusion of
villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded
for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the
Delaying Action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged
defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local
effect of a bursting shell is also increased.
There are certain principles common to all defensive action in village
fighting:--
(1) The garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a
definite commander.
(2) The forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the
village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to
artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing
itself in the forward buildings. In the case of a small village it
will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding
the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel"
thus provided.
(3) Supports and Reserves must be centralised in order that they may be
readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which
means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy.
(4) Houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while
house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the
defenders' power of manoeuvre.
(5) The interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of
machine guns and Lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the
inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for
determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets,
owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment.
(6) The natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting
require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the
part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for
collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be
made known to all ranks in the defending force.
{164}
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIOUS ARMS
"The full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act
in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of
each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms. Each has
its special characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the
co-operation of the others" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii.
(1921)).
"An intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first
essential of successful co-operation."--MARSHAL HAIG.
INFANTRY
"Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The speed with which infantry can
advance, and the distance which can be covered in one day, are the only
limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry. In the Great
War these limits were largely removed by the use of Mechanical
Transport, and this means of transportation will be used increasingly
in Modern Warfare, in order to bring fresh troops into or near the
scene of action, or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from
the battlefield. Against these natural limits to mobility are the
compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over
almost any ground by day or by night, and the rapidity with which
trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover.
The main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him
by killing or capture, and it is this power to close with the enemy
which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle.
THE RIFLE AND BAYONET.--The rifle is the principal infantry weapon, and
the British "Short-magazine {165} Lee-Enfield" rifle is the best rifle
in action. A trained rifleman can fire 15 aimed shots in a minute,
reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark. With the
bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for
delivering or repelling an assault, and in Night Assaults infantry
depend entirely upon the bayonet.
THE ENTRENCHING TOOL, carried by all other ranks, is an invaluable
adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet. In a War of Manoeuvre,
when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the
field of battle, by night as well as by day, the value of the
Entrenching Tool can scarcely be exaggerated. In Position Warfare, and
in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a War of
Manoeuvre, heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for
the consolidation of the defences, but for the rapid construction of
temporary defences by day or by night the Entrenching Tool alone has
been proved to be highly effective. When troops are "digging
themselves in" at night with this weapon care must be taken that some
system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the
right direction. By the extension of the men of an infantry section at
arm's length facing the enemy, and by moving the two men on each flank
two paces outwards, and the two centre men two paces backwards, and
then causing the section to dig "on the line of their toes," there will
result (even on the darkest night) a short fire trench with a central
traverse. This sectional trench can be connected at the first
opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended.
During the _Retreat from Mons_ (August-September, 1914) the
"Contemptible Little Army," under Marshal French, frequently obtained,
by means of the Entrenching Tool alone, shelter from bullets, and a
system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing Germans hundreds of
lives and materially delayed their movements.
{166}
THE LEWIS GUN.--The Lewis gun is an automatic rifle, firing the same
ammunition as the S.-M.-L.-E. rifle, and two Lewis-gun sections are
included in each infantry platoon. The rate of fire is increased by
the automatic action of the gun, the maximum rate permitting a drum of
47 rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds, while one or two rounds
only may be fired if so required. The mobility of the Lewis-gun
sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon.
RANGES OF RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS
_Close_ range. Up to 800 yards.
_Effective_ range. Over 800 yards up to 2,000 yards.
_Long_ range. Over 2,000 yards up to 2,900 yards.
GRENADES.--Hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle
and bayonet and the Lewis gun. Their principal use is in clearing
fortified posts, especially in Position Warfare. The _hand grenade_,
or bomb thrown by hand, is limited in range by the skill and strength
of the thrower, and 30 to 40 yards may be regarded as the maximum
distance. The _rifle grenade_ is effective up to about 400 yards, and
is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover.
In the latter case, a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or
howitzers.
LIGHT MORTARS.--The _Light Mortar Section_ is an integral part of every
infantry battalion, and although sometimes brigaded for special
purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions. A
section of 2 light mortars, firing 11-lb. bombs, consists of 1 officer
and 20 other ranks, and requires 2 horses and 1 G.S. limbered wagon.
Owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind, and
can search, high cover, while the mortars themselves are not very
conspicuous objects and can be {167} readily moved for short distances,
while they "come into action" in 30 seconds. The comparatively slow
flight of the bombs, however, enables the enemy to discover the
location of the mortars, and necessitates the use of expedients to
avoid counter-artillery fire. A maximum rate of 30 to 40 rounds a
minute can be maintained for two or three minutes, if ammunition is
available, and at an angle of 45 degrees a range of 700 yards can be
obtained.
MACHINE GUNS.--"The principal characteristic of the machine gun is its
power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be
sustained almost indefinitely, subject to limitations of ammunition
supply. The ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its
fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect"
("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The _Machine-gun
Platoon_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, but in Attack
machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing
overhead or other covering fire, while in Defence they form, with the
artillery, the framework into which the defensive dispositions are
fitted, and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a
commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely
defensive _rôle_. The ranges are those given above for rifles and
Lewis guns, and the rate of fire is about 20 times that of a rifle,
while 1,500 to 2,000 rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of
need.
MOUNTED TROOPS
CAVALRY.--The principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility.
This enables it to attack unexpectedly; to defend with determination
while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than
infantry; to gain information and to afford protection at a
considerable distance from the force protected; and to confirm {168}
and exploit the success obtained in battle. "Cavalry is capable, if
required, of undertaking most operations for which infantry would
usually be employed, but the demands made by the care of horses reduce
the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action; and it
therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations"
("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The cavalry arms are
the lance and sword for mounted action; horse artillery usually work
with cavalry, and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action
are the rifle, the machine gun, and the Hotchkiss rifle. Examples of
the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the
"Lectures."
MOUNTED RIFLES.--The characteristics and methods of employment of
mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry, with the exception that
they are not equipped for mounted action. Mounted rifles, like
cavalry, enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner
that is most bewildering to infantry, and attempts by infantry to
outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated
by the mobility of the defending force, as was exemplified in the South
African War of 1899-1902.
CYCLISTS.--Under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater
mobility than cavalry, and they can develop greater fire-power, as no
horse-holders are required. They are, however, dependent upon roads,
they are vulnerable on the move, they cannot fight without dismounting,
and they must return to their bicycles after action; whereas cavalry
horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot.
ARTILLERY
"The _rôle_ of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down
opposition, and to afford all possible {169} support to the infantry,
with whom the eventual decision rests" ("Field Service Regulations,"
vol. ii. (1921)).
All classes of artillery are included in modern military operations.
Motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the
battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from
battle, while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and
small arms fire, combined with the increase in mobility afforded by
motor traction, enables all but super-heavy artillery (which require a
railway mounting) to be placed close behind the infantry in Attack and
Defence. It is, however, obvious that the closest support can be given
by the guns that are weakest in shell-power, on account of the
superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns.
In Modern Warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is
carried out, of necessity, in the hours of darkness, owing to the
frequency of movement by night to avoid aërial observation, and to the
consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such
movements. The artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved
with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft.
The growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual
changes in the methods of warfare, its numbers and power increasing out
of all proportion to the experience of previous wars. "The 486 pieces
of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in August,
1914, were represented at the date of the Armistice by 6,437 guns and
howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre"
(Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). "From the commencement of our offensive in
August, 1918, to the conclusion of the Armistice some 700,000 tons of
artillery ammunition were expended by the British Armies on the Western
Front. For the fortnight from August 21 to September 3, our daily
average expenditure exceeded {170} 11,000 tons, while for the three
days of the crucial battle on September 27, 28, and 29 (_Second Battle
of Cambrai_) nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were fired by our
artillery" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
In the Table of Artillery Ranges on p. 173, the effective ranges of
light artillery firing H.E. shell are based on the use of No. 106 fuse.
"The invention of a new fuse known as '106,' which was first used at
the _Battle of Arras_ (April 9-June 7, 1917), enabled wire
entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our
methods of attacking organised positions. By bursting the shell the
instant it touched the ground, and before it had become buried, the
destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became
possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and
ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in
operations" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
Artillery is classed under the designations Light, Medium, Heavy, and
Super-Heavy.
LIGHT GUNS.--_Pack Guns_, with a calibre of 2.75 inches, are weakest in
shell-power, but they possess a mobility greater than any other
artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable
obstacles to wheeled traffic. _Pack Howitzers_, with a calibre of 3.7
inches, are particularly valuable in close country, the high angle of
descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover.
_Horse Artillery Guns_, firing a 13-pound shell, are the most mobile of
all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops.
All ranks of the Royal Horse Artillery are mounted, and its mobility is
scarcely less than that of cavalry. _Field Guns_, with a calibre of 3
inches, firing an 18-pound shell, are the principal artillery weapon of
a field army. Although inferior in mobility to Pack or Horse
Artillery, they have greater shell-power and afford the principal
support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy. Their
power to inflict casualties {171} by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes
them specially suitable in the defence, and the accuracy of modern
weapons enables them to co-operate in the Attack with covering fire,
under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the
assault. In addition to their normal functions, and to their
employment in counter-battery work, they can be employed in the
reduction of defences by bombardment with High Explosive shells, in
neutralising an area by the use of gas shells, or in providing
artificial cover by the production of _Smoke_. _Field Howitzers_, with
a calibre of 4.5 inches, have increased offensive power and practically
the same mobility as field guns.
Light guns are the principal weapons for protection against _Aircraft_
and for defence against _Tanks_. The Tank is powerless against
artillery, and its most effective enemy is light artillery. During the
_First Battle of the Somme_ a new terror was added to the British
attack by the introduction of the Tank, which surmounted inequalities
in the ground, crushed the wire defences, and crossed the trenches.
Although accompanied by infantry, it was regarded as an all-conquering
and decisive factor. At one period of the battle, however, a number of
Tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun, manned and fired
with the greatest gallantry by a single German artillery officer, who
fired point-blank at each Tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise.
Infantry were in close support, and a single Lewis-gun section could
have prevented the use of the field gun.
MEDIUM GUNS.--Medium guns, firing a 60-pound shell, are principally
employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of
18-pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force. _Medium
Howitzers_ occupy the same relative position, their offensive power
being greater than that of the Field Howitzer.
{172}
HEAVY GUNS.--Heavy guns of 6-inch calibre, firing a shell of 100
pounds, are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium
guns, and with greater effect. _Heavy Howitzers_, of 8-inch or
9.2-inch calibre, are principally employed against covered batteries
and strong defences, or for destroying wire entanglements with
instantaneous fuses.
SUPER-HEAVY GUNS.--Super-heavy guns of a calibre of 9.2 inches and
upwards are usually carried on railway mountings, and while they
possess a high muzzle velocity, considerable shell-power, and a high
degree of mobility (which enables them to come into action in any part
of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid), their arc of
fire is very restricted and their "life" is short. _Super-Heavy
Howitzers_, of 12-inch or 18-inch calibre, possess similar advantages
and disadvantages to super-heavy guns. Their normal use is the
destruction of permanent defences, the breaking down of bridges, etc.
The 12-inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is
highly effective in counter-battery work.
The table on p. 173 is based upon particulars given on p. 26 of "Field
Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921).
ROYAL ENGINEERS
"All arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of
defence. It is the duty of the Royal Engineers to assist them by
engineer reconnaissances, plans, advice, technical supervision,
provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special
technical skill. . . . Although trained as fighting troops, engineers
should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource;
casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace, and they may become
needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an
important bearing on the operations" ("Field Service Regulations," vol.
ii. (1921)).
{173}
TABLE OF ARTILLERY RANGES
Weapon Effective Range (Yds.)
_Light Artillery_ H.E. Shell Shrapnel
Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 4,000
Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900
Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 5,000
Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 5,500
Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000
_Medium Artillery_
Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 --
Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000
_Heavy Artillery_
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300 --
" " (9.2 in) 13,000
_Super-Heavy Artillery_
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 --
" " (12 in.) 28,200 --
" " (14 in.) 35,600 --
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000
Weapon Maximum Range (Yds.)
_Light Artillery_ H.E. Shell Shrapnel
Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 5,500
Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900
Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 6,400
Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 6,500
Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000
_Medium Artillery_
Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 15,300
Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000
_Heavy Artillery_
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300
" " (9.2 in) 13,000
_Super-Heavy Artillery_
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 24,500
" " (12 in.) 28,200 26,100
" " (14 in.) 35,600 --
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000
The maximum range of _Medium Mortars_ is 1,500 yards;
of _Light Mortars_ 700 yards.
{174}
CAREY'S FORCE.--During the _Second Battle of the Somme_ "a mixed force,
including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies,
army troops companies, field survey companies, and Canadian and
American Engineers, had been got together and organised by Major-Gen.
P. G. Grant, the Chief Engineer to the V. Army. On March 26 these were
posted by General Grant, in accordance with orders given by the V. Army
commander, on the line of the old Amiens defences between Mezières,
Marcelcave, and Hamel. Subsequently, as General Grant could ill be
spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of
his force to Major-Gen. G. G. S. Carey. Except for General Carey's
force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions,
which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the
battle. . . . On March 28 our line from Marcelcave to the Somme was
manned by Carey's Force, with the 1st Cavalry Division in close
support. . . . On March 29 the greater part of the British front south
of the Somme was held by Carey's Force, assisted by the 1st Cavalry
Division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had
not yet been found possible to withdraw. In rear of these troops, a
few of the divisions of the V. Army were given a brief opportunity to
reassemble" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
TANKS
Tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery, machine guns,
and rifles, and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they
can also destroy obstacles, weapons, and personnel. Their garrisons
are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets,
but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire. Their
mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol
carried and by the physical endurance of the crew, but except over deep
cuttings, {175} broad streams, swamps, very heavily shelled ground,
rocky and mountainous country, or in thick woods they can move without
difficulty. "The power of delivering successful surprise attacks
against almost any type of defences is one of the most important
advantages of the use of Tanks in large numbers" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).
During the _First Battle of the Somme_ (September 1-November 18, 1916)
"Our new heavily armoured cars, known as 'Tanks,' now brought into
action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the infantry,
and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help
in breaking down their resistance. . . . These cars proved of great
value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them
performed many deeds of remarkable valour" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
AIRCRAFT
Two classes of Aircraft are used in the field. Aeroplanes, which are
self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action; and Kite
Balloons, which, in favourable weather, can be towed by a lorry and can
be moved frequently without loss of efficiency.
AEROPLANES are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and
inter-communication, and not only obtain, and return to their base
with, information of the highest value, but facilitate personal
reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers.
Their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral
effect of their offensive action is of the highest value. Although
aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units
are moved too frequently. The action of aircraft in various phases of
fighting is dealt with throughout the Lectures.
KITE BALLOONS carry two observers, who can remain in telephonic
communication with the ground up to a {176} height of 5,000 feet.
Inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed
of 8 miles an hour while at a height of about 500 feet. Their extreme
vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle
front.
GAS
"The advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for
consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins.
Once authorised, however, and assuming that weather conditions are
favourable, gas may be expected to play a part in every action. . . .
The different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon
which can be used by all arms, thus _Artillery_ deal with gas shells,
_Infantry_ with light mortar gas bombs, _Aircraft_ with aërial gas
bombs, and _Engineers_ with all methods of use that call for special
manipulation" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).
Gas was introduced by the Germans during the _Second Battle of Ypres_
(April 22-May 18, 1915), and the numerous experiments and trials
necessary before gas can be used, and the great preparations which have
to be made for its manufacture, show that its employment was not the
result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately.
During the _First Battle of the Somme_ (September 1-November 18, 1916)
"the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of
offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops
from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same
instruments of destruction. . . . Since we have been compelled, in
self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to
record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our
own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our
gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us {177} have
proved thoroughly effective" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
SMOKE
Smoke can be discharged from _Artillery_ shells, Artillery or
_infantry_ mortar bombs, Infantry rifle grenades, smoke candles,
_Aircraft_ bombs, _Engineers'_ stationary generators, or the exhaust
pipe of _Tanks_. It is used to conceal movement for the purposes of
surprise or for reducing casualties, and can be so employed as to
impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the
natural visibility; but while the weight and direction of an intended
blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time
of its delivery. It is possible, however, to mystify, as well as to
surprise, the enemy by the use of smoke, and its strategical and
tactical value will ensure its adoption in Modern Warfare. In the
closing battles of the Great War "the use of smoke shells for covering
the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was
introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect" (Sir D.
Haig's Dispatches).
{178}
OPERATION ORDERS
Combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some
kind or other, and orders for operations should always be committed to
paper when circumstances permit. The object of an operation order is
to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of
the commander, and with full co-operation between all units.
Operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required
from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks, and the rules
for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books,
for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue
them.
The general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they
should be "fool proof," and it has been remarked that the writer of
orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to
misunderstand them. They must, therefore, be void of all ambiguity,
and while containing every essential piece of information, and omitting
everything that is clearly known already to the recipients, they should
be confined to facts, and conjecture should be avoided.
"An operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to
know and nothing more. It should tell him nothing which he can and
should arrange for himself, and, especially in the case of large
forces, will only enter into details when details are absolutely
necessary. Any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance
anything which he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should
be better able to decide on the spot, is likely to cramp his initiative
in dealing with unforeseen developments, and will be avoided. In {179}
particular, such expressions as 'Will await further orders' should be
avoided" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).
Apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in
block type, including a reference to the map used, dating and signing
the orders, numbering the copies, and stating the time and method of
issue, etc., the general tenour of all operation orders will always be:
_The enemy are. . . . My intention is. . . . You will. . . ._ In
other words, all that is known about the enemy, and of our own troops,
that is essential for the purposes of the order, should be revealed;
then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders; then
the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient. But
the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent
possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal
characteristics. "It is essential that subordinates should not only be
able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief
orders or instructions, but should also be able to take upon
themselves, whenever necessary, the responsibility of departing from,
or of varying, the orders they may have received" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).
{181}
INDEX
Active defence, the, 86-91
Adowa, battle of, (_note_) 22
Advanced guard, the, 102-113
distance, 103
information, 107-108
in advances, 103
in retreats, 104-105, 124
main guard, 105-106
Nachod, 77
night, 145
problems, 110-113
strategical, 103
strength of, 102-103
tactical, 103
tactics of, 103-104, 105-113
training, 105
vanguard, 105-106
Advances, night, 147-148
Advancing under fire, 39-44
Aërial observation, (_note_) 22, 98-99
photographs, 99
Aircraft, characteristics of, 169, 171, 175-176
advanced guard, 107
communication by, 37, 107, 115
flank guard, 115
gas, 176
outposts, 129-130, 137
position warfare, 81-82
protection by, 81, 98-99
protection from, 100
pursuit by, 67, 69
rear guard, 20, 120
reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 30, 36, 98-99, 100, 141
smoke, 177
Alexander the Great, 32
Allenby, General Viscount, G.C.B., 87, 96
America and the Great War, 17
American attack at Fossoy, 49
American Civil War, 3, 82
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Amiens, battle of, 21, 52, 66
Antietam, battle of, 14, 15, 48
Appomattox, battle of, 15, 64
"Appreciation of the Situation," 72
Arabi Pasha, 151
Arbela, battle of, 32
Archangel Province, 66-67
Archduke Charles, 128
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 42-43
Armandvillers-Folie, 63
Armies, the new, 19-22
Arminius, victory of, 156-157
Armistice Day, 1918, 65
Army, Contemptible Little, 18-19
of North Virginia, 25, 65-66
of the Cumberland, 15
of the Potomac, 3, 14-15, 25
Arras, battle of, 170
Art of warfare, 1-5
Artillery, characteristics of, 168-173
barrage, 71
development of, 21-22
effective range, 132
escorts, 63-64
gas shells, 176
growth of, 169-170
heavy, 172, 173
in attack, 62-64,
in defence, 83, 89
in retreat, 120, 123
light, 170-171
medium, 171
mobility of, 63-64
outpost, 131, 134
pack, 170
positions, 94
ranges, 173
smoke shells, 177
super-heavy, 172, 173
Ashby, Gen. Turner, C.S.A., 117
Assaults by night, 148-154
Assembly, position of, 58-59, 147
Attack, the, 51-75
aircraft in, 67
artillery in, 62-64
battalion in, 73-75
cavalry, 64-67
close country, 155-156
company in, 72-73
co-operation, 25-26, 35-37, 39
decisive, 56-57, 60-62
disposition of troops, 55
engineers, 67
fire, 62
flank, 61
formation for, 70-75
forward body, 55-56
frontal, 60-61
general reserve, 56-57
holding, 12, 30, 48, 59, 62, 76, 95, 117
local reserve, 55-56
medical arrangements, 67
methods of, 53
opening fire, 37-38
platoon in, 70-72
reconnaissance for, 141-142
smoke, 177
strength of, 54-55
supply, 67-68
supports, 55-56
two plans of, 54
villages, 162
woods, 159-161
Attacking force, the, 59-60
Austerlitz, battle of, 9-10, 47, 76
Australians at Morlancourt, 149
Avenues, communicating, 143
Baccarat, battle of, 28
Bagdadieh, battle of, 64-65
Balaclava Charge, 96
Balloons, observation by, 22, 175-176
Banks, Gen., U.S.A., 59
Bapaume, battle of, 21
Barrage, the, 71
Base, the, 90, 118
Battalion in attack, 73-75
Battle, the, 24-50
characteristics of, 24-26
decisive blow, 31-32
development of the, 29-31
influences on the, 33-44
information, 26-28
initiative, 26-28
outposts, 138-140
phases of the, 26-29
position, the, 84-85
reports, 68
the defensive, 45-46
the defensive-offensive, 47-49
the encounter, 58
the offensive, 46-47
types of, 45-50
Bavaria, Elector of, 46
Bayonet, the, 164-165
in night operations, 154
Bazaine, Maréchal, 158
Bazeilles, defence of, 159
Benedek, Marshal, 96
Bernadotte, Marshal, 10
Blenheim, battle of, 46-47
Blücher, Marshal, 8, 41, 48, 78
Bluff, the (Ypres), 39
Boer War, (_note_) 21
Bois de Vaux, 158
Bombs, light mortar, 166-167
(_See also_ Grenades.)
Border Regiment, 75
Bourlon Village, 42
Bristow Station, 128
British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17
moral, 16-22
Broenbeek, 139
Bromhead, Lieut., 77
Bülow, General von, 78
Bunker Hill, battle of, 38
Burnside, Gen., U.S.A., 14, 46, 108, 139-140
Byng of Vimy, Gen. Lord, G.C.B., 7, 52
Cambrai, first battle of, 7, 30-31, 52, 66, 75, 160
second battle of, 21, 170
Camouflage, 100
Canadian cavalry, 66
engineers, 174
infantry at Vimy, 149
Canadians at Ypres, 42
Cannae, battle of, 14
Carey, Maj.-Gen. G. G. S., C.B., 174
Carey's force, 174
Cattigny Wood, 66
Cavalry, characteristics of, 167-168
cossack posts, 137
in attack, 64-67
in defence, 95-96
in pursuit, 64-65, 69
in retreat, 95-96, 120, 123-124
Mesopotamian campaign, 64-65
outposts, 137
protection by, 98-99, 110
raids by, 117-118
reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 32, 65-66, 106, 112-113
vedettes, 137
Cetewayo, 77-78
Chambord, Chateau de, 138
Chancellorsville, battle of, 12, 30, 48, 76, 95, 117
Changes in warfare, 21-23
Characteristics of the various arms, 164-177
Chard, Lieut., 77
Charleroi, battle of, 88
Chattanooga, battle of, 61-62
Chemin des Dames, 16
Civilised warfare, 157-158
Clery, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. F.
(_quoted_): advanced guard tactics, 109-110
Close country, fighting in, 155-163
Coldstream Guards, 75
Colenso, battle of, 63
Colombey, battle of, 109
Combe, Capt. E. P., M.C., 78
Commander, battalion, 74-75
company, 72-73
outpost company, 134-137
piquet, 135-136
platoon, 71-72, 135-136
Commander's influence, 33-35
orders, 178-179
plans, 57-58
position, 68
"Common Sense" fallacy, 1, 3
Communication, 31, 35, 107-108
Communications, lateral, 89
lines of, 116-118
Company in attack, 72-73
outpost, 134-137
Condé-Mons-Binche line, 87
Connection by night, 146
"Contemptible Little Army," the, 18-19, 165
Convoys, 116-118
Co-operation, 35-37, 164
Coruña, 127-128
Cossack posts, 137
Counter attack, 123
decisive, 79, 84, 92-94
local, 56, 75, 79, 161, 163
Cover, 88-89, 155
Covering fire, 43-44
Cronje, Gen. (Paardeberg), 16
Cross Keys, battle of, 117
Crown Prince of Prussia (1870), 109
(1914), 28
Crozat Canal, 77
Cugny, 96
Cumberland, army of the, 15
Cyclists, characteristics of, 168
Davis, Jefferson, 3
Day outposts, 137-138
Daylight and night attacks, 148
Decisive attack, the, 31-32, 60-62
counter attack, 79, 84, 92-94
Defence in close country, 155-156
of villages, 163
of woods, 161
Defensive action, 76-97, 163
battle, 45-46
flank, 86
system, 83
Defensive-offensive battle, 47-49
Defiles, 124
Definitions, 6-8
Delaborde, Général, 95, 127
Delaying action, 118, 121-128, 158-159
Deployment, position of, 147-148
Depth of a position, 89
Detached posts, 134, 135
De Wet, 118, 138
Diamond formation, 70
Direction by night, 145
Discipline, value of, 11-12
Dresden, battle of, 47, 89
Early, General., C.S. Army, 7
East Surrey Regiment, 42
Embussing point, 69
Encounter battle, 58, 64
Engineers, Royal, characteristics, 172
gas, 176
smoke, 177
Entrenching tool, 165
Entrenchments, 82-83, 100, 135
Epehy, battle of, 21
Ettlingen, battle of, 128
Eugène of Savoy, 46
Evelington Heights, 112-113
Fabius Maximus, 14, 102
Fallacies exposed, 1-5
Fanny's Farm, 160
Field artillery, characteristics of, 170-171
of battle, 6-7
of fire, 88
Fighting in close country, 155-163
Fire attack, 59-60
and movement, 44
covering, 43-44
opening, 31, 37-38, 146, 154
overhead, 44
tactics, 37-39
Flame projectors, 176
Flanders, battle of, 21
Flank attacks, 61, 114-118
guard tactics, 115
guards, 114-118, 145
scouts, 71
Flanks in defence, 86
security of, 88
Fletcher, Col. Sir R., Bart., 82
Foch, Maréchal, 47, 48-50, 53
(_quoted_):--
advanced guard tactics, 106, 113
art of war, 1
British victories in 1918, 20-21
defence in modern warfare, 80
definitions, 6
fully equipped mind, 2-3
human factor in war, 10-11
moral, 9
Nachod, 18
outflanking a rear guard, 121
principles of war, 1-2
protection by attack, 98
soul of the defence, 76
subordinate commanders, 34
surprise, 30-31, 98
well conducted battle, 24
Fog of battle, 34
Fontenoy-Belleau attack, 49
Formations for the attack, 70-75
Forrest, General, C. S. Army, 18, 59
Fort Garry Horse, 66
Forward body, the, 55-56
Fossoy, American attack at, 49
France, spirit of, 16
Franco-Prussian War, 84, 158-159
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Frederick the Great, 11, 46, 144
Fredericksburg, battle of, 14, 22, 38, 46, 92, 108, 139
French of Ypres, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P., 15-16, 87-88, 90, 126, 165
(_quoted_):--
"Contemptible Little Army," 19
defence in modern warfare, 80
necessity for study, 2
Frontage of outpost company, 135
Frontal attack, 60-61
Gaines's Mill, battle of, 14, 65
Gallieni, Général, 28, 37
Gas, 42, 81, 100, 176-177
Gatacre, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F., K.C.B., 152
Gaugamela, (note) 32
General reserve, in attack, 33-34
in defence, 91-92, 94-95
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd-, O.M.
(_quoted_): British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17
Gette River, 91
Gettysburg, battle of, 15, 45, 61, 65-66, 95-96, 117, 128
Gheluvelt, 42, 88
Gifert Wood, 158
Givenchy, 43
Grant, Maj.-Gen. P. G., C.B., 174
Grant, General U. S., U.S.A., 3, 7, 15, 46, 60-62, 90, 117, 149-150
Gravelotte, battle of, 158
"Green Curve," the, 9, 34
Grenades, hand and rifle, 166
Grenfell, Gen. Sir F. W., K.C.B., 156
Grouchy, Maréchal, 7-8, 90-91
Ground, eye for, 125-126
scouts, 71
Guards' division, 43, 75, 160
Gueudecourt, 37
Haerincourt and Epehy, battle of, 21
Haig of Bemersyde, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T., 53
(_quoted_):--
artillery, 169-170
canal bridges, 77
Carey's force, 174
cavalry in defence, 96
cavalry in the war, 66-67
fuse No. 106, 170
gas, 176-177
hang on! 43
health and moral, 13
infantry the backbone, 22
New Armies, 19-22
"Other Man's Job," 164
principles of war, 2
rearward services, 13
reserves in 1918, 95
rifle and bayonet, 70
smoke, 177
surprise, 7
tanks, 175
Haking, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. C. B., G.B.E. (_quoted_):--
advanced guards, 104
rear guards, 123
Hal and Tubize, 78
Hamley, Gen. Sir E. B., K.C.B. (_quoted_):--
communications, 31
co-operation, 35-36
courage, 14
definitions, 6
"Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4
mobility, 11
study required, 2
Hancock, Gen., U.S.A., 93
Hand grenades, 166
Hannibal, 47
Harold II., king, 11-12
Harrison's Landing, 65
Hastings, battle of, 11-12
Health and moral, 13
Heavy artillery, 172, 173
Heights of Abraham, 38
Henderson, Col. G. F. R., C.B. (_quoted_):--
Abraham Lincoln, 14
atmosphere of battle, 29-30
British and American troops, 17-18
cavalry, 64
"Common Sense" fallacy, 3
co-operation, 35-37
discipline, 11
eye for ground, 125-126
flank attacks, 114
Grant's bases, 90
soldiers' battles, 9
sound system of command, 33
Spottsylvania, 93-94
study necessary, 4-5
value of text-books, 23
Hennechy, 66
"Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4
Hill, Gen. D. H., C.S. Army, 25-26
Hindenburg, Marshal von, 52
Hindenburg Line, battle of the, 21, 30
Hohenlinden, battle of, 128
Hood, Gen. J. B., C.S. Army, 45
Hooker, Gen., U.S.A., 3, 48, 76, 117
Horatius Cocles, 77
Horse artillery, characteristics of, 168, 170
Hotchkiss rifles, 168
Howitzers, 170, 171, 172, 173
Human nature in war, 13-16
Hunter, Gen., U.S.A., 7
Infantry, characteristics of, 164-167
Information in battle, 26-28, 35, 107-108
Initiative, the, 26-28, 178-179
Intelligence officers, 141-142
Isandhlwana, 77-78, 156
Italo-Turkish campaign, (_note_) 22
Jackson, Gen. T. J., C.S. Army, ("Stonewall" Jackson), 4, 10,
12, 69, 76, 117
Joffre, Maréchal, 28, 108
Jourdan, Maréchal, 128
Kimberley, relief of, 6
Kite balloons, 175-176
Königgratz, battle of, 96
Koorn Spruit, 118, 124
Ladysmith, relief of, 6
La Fère, 52
Lancashire territorials, 43
Le Cateau, first battle of, 96, 126
second battle of, 21, 66
Lee, General R. E., C.S. Army, 10, 45, 46, 48, 61, 65, 76,
93-94, 97, 108, 113, 117, 125-126, 128, 139-140, 149-150
Leonidas, 77
Le Quesnoy, 78
Les Boeufs, 126-127
Leuthen, battle of, 46
Lewis guns, characteristics of, 166
Liberty of manoeuvre, 26-28, 39, 43-44, 71, 126-127, 132, 139
Light Mortars, 166-167, 173
Ligny, battle of, 8, 47, 90-91
Lincoln, Abraham, 3, 10, 14
Lines of communications, 116-118
of observation, 130, 133
of resistance, 84, 134
Local reserves, attack, 55-56
defence, 92, 95
outposts, 130, 134
rear guards, 125
Logan, Gen. J. A., U.S.A., 15
London Regiment, 75
Longstreet, Gen. J., C.S. Army, 45
Losses reduced by movement, 39-40
Ludendorff, 52
Lys, attack on the, 43, 56
McClellan, Gen. J. B., U.S.A., 14-15, 25-26, 48, 65, 90, 112
Machine guns, characteristics of, 167
in attack, 43-44, 56
in close country, 159-160
in defence, 55-56, 83
in outposts, 131, 134
in retreats, 126-127
range of, 132
McNeill, Maj.-Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 156
Madritov, Colonel, 117-118
Magersfontein, battle of, 152
Mahdist Arabs, 156
Main guard (advanced guard), 105
(rear guard), 120-121
Maistre, General (_quoted_):--
British valour, 20
Malplaquet, battle of, 46
Malvern Hill, battle of, 15, 25-26, 65, 112-113, 117
Manassas, battles of, 12
Manoeuvre, liberty of, 25-28
Manoury, Général, 37
Map reading, 124, 135, 136
Marches, night, 144-147
Marching power of troops, 11-12
Marengo, battle of, 47, 76
Marlborough, Duke of, 46-47, 91
Marmont, Maréchal, 27, 78
Marne, first battle of the, 27-29, 36-37, 52, 53, 108
second battle of the, 49-50
Marshall, Gen. Sir W. R., K.C.B., 64-65
Marye's Hill, 38
Masséna, Maréchal, 82
Maude, Gen. Sir S., K.C.B., 64
McDowell, battle of, 12
Meade, Gen., U.S.A., 15, 45, 46, 61, 92, 128
Meagher's Irish brigade, 38
Mechanical transport, 21-22, 69, 164
Medical arrangements (attack), 67
Mesopotamia, 32, 64-65
Message cards, 68
Messines, battle of, 149, 160
Methods of attack, 53
Methuen, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 152
Mobility, value of, 11-12, 168
Monchy-le-Preux, 75
Monocacy, battle of, 7
Mons, retreat from, 19, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165
Moore, Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 127-128
Moral, 8-22
Moreau, Brig.-Gen., 41
Général J. V., 128
Morlancourt, 149
Mortars, 85, 159, 166-167, 173
Mounted troops, characteristics of, 167-168
Movement and fire, 39-44
in close country, 155
Murat, Maréchal, 10
Musketry, 37-39, 126-128
Nachod, battle of, 77, 110
Napier, Sir W. F. P. (_quoted_):--
rear guards, 127-128
Torres Vedras, 82-83
Napoleon, Emperor, 5, 8, 9-10, 46, 47, 89, 91, 109, 125, 127
(_quoted_):--
Caesar and Turenne, 9
C'est les Prussiens, 8
moral force, 8-9
read and re-read, 3
to cover Turin, 87
Nashville, battle of, 15
National moral, 10-11
New Armies, the, 19-22
Newfoundland Regiment, the Royal, 75, 139
Niederwald, 158-159
Night advances, 147-148
assaults, 148-154
entrenching, 165
marches, 144-147
operations, 144-154
outposts, 137-138
Nile valley, 151
Noisseville, 159
Norman conquest, 11-12
Observation, line of, 84, 130
posts, 99
Obstacles, 80
Offensive battle, the, 46-47
spirit, 79
Operation orders, 178-179
Orders, 178-179
Orthez, battle of, 47
Osman Pasha, 60
Outpost zone, the, 84, 134
Outposts, 129-140
aircraft, 137
artillery, 131
battle outposts, 138-140
cavalry, 130, 137
commander, 132-134
company, 134-137
day, 137-138
distance, 131
frontage, 135
information, 133-134
line of observation, 84, 130
line of resistance, 84, 134
machine guns, 131, 132
night, 137-138
observation by, 84, 130
orders, 133-134
outpost company, 134-137
outpost zone, 134
patrols, 130, 137-138
piquets, 131
position warfare, 134, 138
reconnaissance by, 130
reserves, 131
resistance by, 84, 131
sentry groups, 136-137
strength, 130
withdrawal of, 146
Paardeberg, battle of, 16, 64
Pack artillery, characteristics of, 170, 173
Passive defence, 79
Patrols, fighting, 161
from outposts, 130, 137-138
raiding, 99
Peiwar Kotal, battle of, 151
Penetration by attack, 51-52
Pétain, Maréchal, 53
Pfaffen Wood, 158
Phalanx, the, 32
Photographs, aërial, 99
Piave line, the, 7
Pill-box forts, 85-86
Pioneer infantry, 153
Piquets, 131
Platoon in attack, 70-72
in defence, 131
Pleasant Hill, 59
Plevna, battle of, 60
Plumer, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 149
Polygon Wood, 42-43
Position, choice of a, 83-84
defensive, 86-91
warfare, 79-82, 99-100, 134, 138, 141-142, 165, 166
Potomac, Army of the, 14-15, 25-26, 45, 46
Principles of warfare, 1-5
Protection and reconnaissance, 98-101
by night, 145
Pulteney, Gen. Sir W. P., K.C.B., 88
Pursuit, 64, 69
Quatre Bras, battle of, 48
Quebec, 38
Queen's Regiment, 42
Raids, 82, 141, 142
Rallying place, 97
Ramadie, battle of, 64
Ramdam, 118
Ramillies, battle of, 46, 91
Range cards, 135
Ranges of artillery, 173
of small arms, 166
of mortars, 173
Rappahannock Station, 161
Rastatt, 128
Rear guard, 119-128
aircraft, 120
artillery, 120
cavalry, 120
composition, 120
distance, 121
distribution, 120-121
examples, 126-128
infantry, 120
main guard, 120-121
machine guns, 120
mechanical transport, 120
medical arrangements, 120
night, 145
positions, 121-124
rear party, 120-121
Royal Engineers, 120
strength, 119-120
tactics, 79, 119, 121-128
training, 124-125
Reconnaissance and protection, 98-101, 175
by raids, 142
during battle, 36
for attack, 141-142
for defence, 142-143
intelligence officers, 141-142
tactical, 141-143
Reorganisation after attack, 97
and pursuit, 69
Report centres, 163
Reports, battle, 68
on positions, 141-143
Reserve, general, in attack, 56-57
in defence, 94-95
outposts, 131
local, 55-56, 92, 95, 125, 130, 134
Resistance, line of, 84, 134
Retiring under fire, 40-41
Retreat from Mons, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165
lines of, 89-90
tactics in, 104-105
Reumont, 66
Rezonville, 96
Rifle, the British, 38, 164-165
Rifle grenade, the, 166
Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, K.G., 15-16, 151 (_quoted_):--
"Germany Strikes," 17
Roliça, combat at, 95, 127
Roman walls, 82
Rorke's Drift, 77-78, 156
Royal Engineers, characteristics of, 172, 174
defence, 172
Horse Artillery, 170
in attack, 67, 153
outposts, 137
retreats, 120
West Kent Regiment, 42
Runners, 35
Russia, collapse of, 52
North (Campaign), 66-67
Russian War of 1854-1855, 82
Russo-Japanese War, 82, 117-118
Russo-Turkish War, 18, 82
Sadowa, battle of, 96
St. Privat, battle of, 60
Salamanca, battle of, 27, 78
Salient, the (1864), 97, 149
(Ypres), 39
Sambre, battle of the, 21
Sannah's Post, 118, 124
Sarrail, Général, 37
Sauroren, battle of, 10
Savage warfare, 156-157
Scarpe, battle of the, 21
Scouts (platoon), 71
Secrecy, 25, 29-31, 51, 102, 144, 145-146, 153-154
Sectors of defence, 94
Sedan, battle of, 159
Selle, battle of the, 21
Semi-permanent defences, 85-86
Seneca _quoted_: (Surprise), 102
Sentry groups, 131, 136-137
Serre Hill, 148-149
Seven Days' Battle, the, 14, 90
Sharpsburg, battle of, 14, 15, 48
Shenandoah Valley campaign, 4, 7, 12, 117
Signals, 35, 107
"Silence is golden," 113
Skobeleff, General Michael Dimitrievitch, 18
Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H. L., G.C.B., 87, 126
Smoke, 56, 150-151, 171, 177
Snipers, 81
Soissons, Fortress of, 41, 78
Soldiers' battles, 9
Somme, first battle of the, 7, 13, 37, 42-43, 148, 171, 176-177
second battle of the, 33-34, 43, 51-52, 56, 66, 77, 78, 126-127, 174
Soult, Maréchal, 10, 127
South African War, 6-7.
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Spicheren, battle of, 108-109, 158
Spottsylvania, battle of, 93-94, 117, 149-150
Square formation in attack, 70
Stafford Heights, 139
Stamford Bridge, battle of, 12
Stormberg, 152
Strategical advanced guard, 103
Strategy defined, 6, 8
and tactics, 6-23
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., C.S. Army ("Jeb" Stuart), 65, 112-113,
117, 128.
Study, necessity for, 1-3, 4-5
Sublician Bridge, 77
Sulphur Springs, 108
Super-heavy artillery, 172, 173
Supply, 13, 67
Supports in attack, 55-56, 169
in close country, 159
defence, 92
outposts, 134-137
Surprise, value of, 25, 29-31, 51, 175
fire, 31, 38
historical examples, 12, 30, 63, 77-78, 118, 124, 138
Tactical advanced guard, 103
reconnaissance, 140-143
Tactics and strategy, 6-23
definition of, 6, 8
subservient to strategy, 6-8
Tadpole Copse, 75
Talavera, battle of, 92
Tallard, Maréchal, 46
Tanks, characteristics of, 171, 174-175
in close country, 22, 160, 162, 177
Taube Farm, 139
Taylor, Gen. R., C.S. Army (_quoted_):--
cardinal principles, 1
discipline, 11
Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 151-152
Territorial troops, 19, 43
Teutoberger Wald, 156-157
Text-books, value of, 23
Theatre of operations, 6-7
Thermopylae, battle of, 77
Thielmann's Corps (Wavre), 8
Thomas, Gen. G. H., U.S.A., 15
Time, value of, 12
Tofrik, battle of, 156
Torres Vedras, lines of, 82-83
Toski, battle of, 156
Toulouse, battle of, 47
Trench warfare, 81-82
Trenches, fire, 165
Troisvilles, 66
Trônes Wood, 42
Tubize and Hal, 78
Tweefontein, 138
Types of battle action, 45-50
Valley campaign, the, 4, 7, 12, 117
Vanguard, the, 105-106
Varus, defeat of, 156-157
Vedettes, 137
Verdun, defence of, 16
Verneville, battle of, 63
View, in close country, 155
Village fighting, 157-159, 162-163
Balan, 159
Bazeilles, 159
Bourlon, 42
Givenchy, 43
Noisseville, 159
Villers-Guislain, 160
Villers-Brétonneux, 149
Villages, attack on, 162
defence of, 163
Vimy Ridge, 149
Visibility from air, 100
Vittoria, battle of, 47, 83
von Below, General, 127
von Bredow's "Todtenritt," 96
von Kluck, General, 28
Wallace, Gen. Lew, U.S.A., 7
Warfare, art of, 1-5
savage, 156-157
Warren, Gen., U.S.A., 128
Watchword at night, 153
Waterloo, battle of, 8, 47-48, 76, 78-79, 90-91
Wauchope, Brig-Gen. A. G., 152
Wavre, battle of, 8, 91
Weather, 13
Wellington, Field-Marshal Duke of, K.G., 5, 10, 46, 47, 78-79,
82-83, 127
Wilderness, battle of the, 93-94, 117, 149-150, 158
William the Conqueror, 12
Wire, 80
Wolfe, Gen. James, 38
Wolseley, Field-Marshal Viscount, K.P., 151-152
Wood fighting, 155-161
Bois de Vaux, 158
Elsasshausen Copse, 158
Gauche, 160
Gifert, 158
Niederwald, 158-159
Pfaffen, 158
Polygon, 42-43
Tadpole Copse, 75
Trônes, 42
Woods, attack on, 159-161
defence of, 161
Worcestershire Regiment, 42
Worth, battle of, 109, 158-159
Wytschaete Ridge, 20, 149
Yalu, battle of the, 118
Ypres, first battle of, 19, 20, 41-42, 88
second battle of, 19, 20, 42, 176
third battle of, 39, 139
Zero hour, 74
Zulu War, 77-78
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers - An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918" ***
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