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´╗┐Title: Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) - Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Author: Aquinas, Thomas, Saint, 1225?-1274
Language: English
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Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

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supplementation by David McClamrock



SUMMA THEOLOGICA

PART II-II ("Secunda Secundae")

Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
________________________

DEDICATION

To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
________________________

NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION

K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library . I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:

> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]

> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."

This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):

* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.

* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.

* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.

* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.

* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.

* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.

* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.

* Titles of questions are in all caps.

Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).

________________________

CONTENTS

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-189)

Question

1.   Of Faith
2.   Of the Act of Faith
3.   Of the Outward Act of Faith
4.   Of the Virtue Itself of Faith
5.   Of Those Who Have Faith
6.   Of the Cause of Faith
7.   Of the Effects of Faith
8.   Of the Gift of Understanding
9.   Of the Gift of Knowledge
10.  Of Unbelief in General
11.  Of Heresy
12.  Of Apostasy
13.  Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General
14.  Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost
15.  Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding
16.  Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding
17.  Of Hope, Considered in Itself
18.  Of the Subject of Hope
19.  Of the Gift of Fear
20.  Of Despair
21.  Of Presumption
22.  Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear
23.  Of Charity, Considered in Itself
24.  Of the Subject of Charity
25.  Of the Object of Charity
26.  Of the Order of Charity
27.  Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is to Love
28.  Of Joy
29.  Of Peace
30.  Of Mercy
31.  Of Beneficence
32.  Of Almsdeeds
33.  Of Fraternal Correction
34.  Of Hatred
35.  Of Sloth
36.  Of Envy
37.  Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace
38.  Of Contention
39.  Of Schism
40.  Of War
41.  Of Strife
42.  Of Sedition
43.  Of Scandal
44.  Of the Precepts of Charity
45.  Of the Gift of Wisdom
46.  Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom

TREATISE ON PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE

47.  Of Prudence Considered in Itself
48.  Of the Parts of Prudence
49.  Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence
50.  Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence
51.  Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence
52.  Of the Gift of Counsel
53.  Of Imprudence
54.  Of Negligence
55.  Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance
56.  Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence
57.  Of Right
58.  Of Justice
59.  Of Injustice
60.  Of Judgment
61.  Of the Parts of Justice
62.  Of Restitution
63.  Of Respect of Persons
64.  Of Murder
65.  Of Injuries Committed on the Person
66.  Of Theft and Robbery
67.  Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging
68.  Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation
69.  Of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant
70.  Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness
71.  Of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Counsel
72.  Of Reviling
73.  Of Backbiting
74.  Of Tale-Bearing
75.  Of Derision
76.  Of Cursing
77.  Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling
78.  Of the Sin of Usury
79.  Of the Quasi-integral Parts of Justice
80.  Of the Potential Parts of Justice
81.  Of Religion
82.  Of Devotion
83.  Of Prayer
84.  Of Adoration
85.  Of Sacrifice
86.  Of Oblations and First-fruits
87.  Of Tithes
88.  Of Vows
89.  Of Oaths
90.  Of the Taking of God's Name by Way of Adjuration
91.  Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by
       Means of Praise
92.  Of Superstition
93.  Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God
94.  Of Idolatry
95.  Of Superstition in Divinations
96.  Of Superstition in Observances
97.  Of the Temptation of God
98.  Of Perjury
99.  Of Sacrilege
100. On Simony
101. Of Piety
102. Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts
103. Of Dulia
104. Of Obedience
105. Of Disobedience
106. Of Thankfulness or Gratitude
107. Of Ingratitude
108. Of Vengeance
109. Of Truth
110. Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying
111. Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy
112. Of Boasting
113. Of Irony
114. Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability
115. Of Flattery
116. Of Quarreling
117. Of Liberality
118. Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place,
     of Covetousness
119. Of Prodigality
120. Of "Epikeia" or Equity
121. Of Piety
122. Of the Precepts of Justice

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE

123. Of Fortitude
124. Of Martyrdom
125. Of Fear
126. Of Fearlessness
127. Of Daring
128. Of the Parts of Fortitude
129. Of Magnanimity
130. Of Presumption
131. Of Ambition
132. Of Vainglory
133. Of Pusillanimity
134. Of Magnificence
135. Of Meanness
136. Of Patience
137. Of Perseverance
138. Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance
139. Of the Gift of Fortitude
140. Of the Precepts of Fortitude
141. Of Temperance
142. Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance
143. Of the Parts of Temperance, in General
144. Of Shamefacedness
145. Of Honesty
146. Of Abstinence
147. Of Fasting
148. Of Gluttony
149. Of Sobriety
150. Of Drunkenness
151. Of Chastity
152. Of Virginity
153. Of Lust
154. Of the Parts of Lust
155. Of Continence
156. Of Incontinence
157. Of Clemency and Meekness
158. Of Anger
159. Of Cruelty
160. Of Modesty
161. Of Humility
162. Of Pride
163. Of the First Man's Sin
164. Of the Punishments of the First Man's Sin
165. Of Our First Parents' Temptation
166. Of Studiousness
167. Of Curiosity
168. Of Modesty as Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body
169. Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel
170. Of the Precepts of Temperance

TREATISE ON ACTS WHICH PERTAIN ESPECIALLY TO CERTAIN MEN

171. Of Prophecy
172. Of the Cause of Prophecy
173. Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed
174. Of the Division of Prophecy
175. Of Rapture
176. Of the Grace of Tongues
177. Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words
178. Of the Grace of Miracles
179. Of the Division of Life into Active and Contemplative
180. Of the Contemplative Life
181. Of the Active Life
182. Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life
183. Of Man's Various Duties and States in General
184. Of the State of Perfection in General
185. Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State
186. Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists
187. Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious
188. Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life
189. Of the Entrance into Religious Life
_______________________

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
["II-II," "Secunda Secundae"]
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ. 1-46)
_______________________

QUESTION 1

OF FAITH (In Ten Articles)

Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.

The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of
the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the
opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.

About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act;
(3) the habit of faith.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex,
i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?

(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?

(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?

(5) Whether it can be anything known?

(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a
certain number of articles?

(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?

(8) Of the number of articles;

(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;

(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]

Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is
proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the
Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but
also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of
the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of
faith is not only the First Truth.

Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they
are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only
the First Truth, but also created truth.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the
sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith
is not only the First Truth.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is
about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.

_I answer that,_ The object of every cognitive habit includes two
things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material
object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is
the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the
conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of
the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the
conclusions are known.

Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the
object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of
which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it
is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the
Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which
faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things,
which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as
bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain
effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards
the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the
object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing
comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of
the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation
to health.

Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under
faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much
as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all
things contained in Holy Writ.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so
that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further
on (Q. 25, A. 1).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]

Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a
Proposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.

Obj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol.
Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is
not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . .
almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known."
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.

_On the contrary,_ Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now
the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science
and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise
about propositions; so that its object is something complex.

_I answer that,_ The thing known is in the knower according to the
mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to
know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part
(Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known
by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the
other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity,
things that are complex in themselves.

Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we
have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this
respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a
proposition.

Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount
of truth.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part
of the thing believed.

Reply Obj. 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in
so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as
in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have
knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First
Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He
is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way
of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]

Whether Anything False Can Come Under Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as
being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false
can be the object of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might
see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham,
God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed
that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have
been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.

Obj. 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ,
and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of
the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to
preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.

Obj. 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly
consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but
only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.

_On the contrary,_ No virtue that perfects the intellect is related
to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that
perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, AA. 2, 5).
Therefore nothing false can come under it.

_I answer that,_ Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save
through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A. 1)
that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so
that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under
the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of
the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what
one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas
hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between
them fails.

Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would
be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.

In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself
was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in
God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as
explained in the First Part (Q. 14, AA. 13, 15): and it is thus that
it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it
cannot be false.

Reply Obj. 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe
in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time,
wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human
conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion
through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false
opinion to be the outcome of faith.

Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and
such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ
is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not
follow that anything false comes under faith.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]

Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something
seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast
seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith
regard the same object.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.

Obj. 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore
faith is of things seen.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not."

_I answer that,_ Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which
is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known
either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held
by the habit of understanding), or through something else already
known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of
science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through
being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but
through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side
rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear
of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be
certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.

Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St.
Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to
be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."

Reply Obj. 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered
in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and
believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that
is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are
seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the
evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to
be believed.

Reply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For
just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming
to a right faith, and not to assent to others.

Reply Obj. 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but
not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]

Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration]?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is
ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not
in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of
such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it
ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an
object of science.

Obj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
things can be an object of science.

Obj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces
science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Obj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster.
i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a
thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of
perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of
perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of
perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an
object of science.

_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and
therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must
needs be, in a fashion, seen.

Now as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same
thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however,
that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is
believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now
through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which
vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see.
In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or
scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer,
is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it
by demonstration.

Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not
about the same things.

Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of
faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad
2, 3).

Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that
are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not
impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of
faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from
self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology
is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by
demonstration must know them first of all by faith.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as
we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for
one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the
same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like
manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and,
by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man,
about the same object, and in the same respect, science is
incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.
Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object
simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be
deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to
opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise.
Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of
faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why
science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same
respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]

Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain
Articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in
Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their
multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems
superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely,
and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal
aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above
(A. 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be
distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice
should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.

Obj. 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre,
Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God,
exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since,
as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against
his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be
divided into articles.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.

_I answer that,_ the word "article" is apparently derived from the
Greek; for the Greek _arthron_ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea]
which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of
distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit
together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the
Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to
words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric,
articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says
(Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced
singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look,
have struck terror into your foes."

Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct
articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together.
Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as
stated above (A. 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special
reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters
are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to
distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in
seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again
from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct
from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was
buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is
not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one
article.

Reply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith
consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb.
11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows
that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly
to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God
[*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of
God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and
these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain
things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their
own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for
instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at
the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy
Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the
Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
articles.

Reply Obj. 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken
in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there
is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth:
and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered
from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of
faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view
there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.

Reply Obj. 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle
declares (Heb. 11:6).
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.
11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the
same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all
times, the same things are to be believed.

Obj. 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as
stated in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be
no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of
faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time
went on.

Obj. 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion
no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with
perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the
faith, knew it most perfectly.

Obj. 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Deut. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to
thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the
mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as
they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves
also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems
that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the
knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the
nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they
receive the mysteries of salvation."

_I answer that,_ The articles of faith stand in the same relation to
the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based
on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order,
so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same
thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the
articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of
faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation
of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe
that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the
existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God
eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His
providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this
way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are
contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes
belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.

Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went
on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was
contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who
preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles
believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some
were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who
lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am
the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am
the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and
My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100):
"I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph.
3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known,
as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."

Reply Obj. 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for
from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time,
the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not
having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the
further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore
those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge
of the good things to be hoped for.

Reply Obj. 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the
part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that
takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the
learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does
not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for
he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the
disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this
way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on.
Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament
to childhood.

Reply Obj. 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can
take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active
cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature
makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not
brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is
the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while
man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action.
Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from
imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after
the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith,
nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for
the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of
faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith,
so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the
people, either openly or in figures.

Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by
Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more
perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his
youth.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8]

Whether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A. 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention
should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.

Obj. 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father
and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about
the Person of the Father.

Obj. 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of
the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.

Obj. 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should
have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems
that there is not a sufficient number of articles.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 6), to faith those things in
themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life,
and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the
sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3):
"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God,
and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first
distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of
the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human
nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and
thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers
to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the
creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace,
in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man
are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of
glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us
concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus
there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.

In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.

Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity
into one article.

Reply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching
over things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 8). Now in beings
having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His
providence over them.

Reply Obj. 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not
a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of
view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one
article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each
Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen
to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish
three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the
omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son
to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for
an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point.
In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the
Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way
Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life
everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one
article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from
another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as
each one separately presents a special difficulty.

Reply Obj. 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to
sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons
of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its
consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which
is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which
is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the
Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other
is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it
is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which
are ascribed to God's almighty power.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a
Symbol?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made,
since it is written (Deut. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that
I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it
was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy
Writ had once been published.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it
is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.

Obj. 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the
symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed
in the words: "I believe in one God."

Obj. 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above (A. 8). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says:
"We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God."
Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems
unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."

Obj. 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith.
Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly.
Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be
sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of
faith in a symbol.

_On the contrary,_ The universal Church cannot err, since she is
governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was
Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the
Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the
symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church.
Therefore it contains nothing defective.

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to
God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the
truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for
the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more
easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth
through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of
maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek _symballein_] takes its
name.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes
obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy
Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by
all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have
no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was
necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of
Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no
addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.

Reply Obj. 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of
simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave
rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise
differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of
heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains
implicitly.

Reply Obj. 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the
person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by
faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is
the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only
outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
should endeavor to acquire it.

Reply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among
heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the
Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the
Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one;
rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).

Reply Obj. 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must
be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy
Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in
the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in
keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.]
observes.

Reply Obj. 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of
the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it
is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10]

Whether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of
Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as
stated above (A. 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth
of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as
stated above (A. 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more
and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the
symbol.

Obj. 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under
pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under
pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of
the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined
by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and
this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as
the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated
in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
edition of the symbol.

Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung
in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of
the symbol.

_On the contrary,_ The symbol was drawn up by a general council. Now
such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can.
4, 5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff
to draw up a symbol.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 1), a new edition of the
symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may
arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to
that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally,
so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs
to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more
important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are
referred," as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence
our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32):
"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou,
being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is
that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to
1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question
of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole
Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision.
Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other
matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general
council and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the
teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic
teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction,
it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly
against the errors which arose.

Reply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not
take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new
edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the
same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken
into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more
fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through
some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign
Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its
decision confirmed.

Reply Obj. 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under
the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine,
as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly
the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. Since
it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule
of faith.
_______________________

QUESTION 2

OF THE ACT OF FAITH
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act;
(2) the external act.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?

(2) In how many ways is it expressed?

(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything
above natural reason?

(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are
attainable by natural reason?

(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?

(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?

(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for
salvation?

(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?

(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?

(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether to Believe Is to Think with Assent?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with
assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a
research, for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to
"coagitare," i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv) that faith is "an assent without research." Therefore
thinking has no place in the act of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
further on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with
faith.

Obj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A.
1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.

_On the contrary,_ This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine
(De Praedest. Sanct. ii).

_I answer that,_ "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now
the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to
think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the
intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which
precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that
comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the
Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form
therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be
understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is
nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way
thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet
deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.
Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of
deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to
the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for
an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
cogitative power.

Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the
first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely
what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with
assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be
understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the
nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the
intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking,
as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or
understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts
of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or
incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some
slight motive, as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet
with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to
believe," cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has
something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge
does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with
doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to
think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from
all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the
false.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which
demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things
have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.

Reply Obj. 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one
object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken
here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the
will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]

Whether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God,
Believing in a God and Believing in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not
be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.

Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species
of that act.

_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.).

_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation
of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.

If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One
of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.)
nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point
of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as
stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to
whatever he believes.

Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the
aspect of an end.

Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but
one and the same act having different relations to the object of
faith.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as
we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things
defectively is not to know them at all."

Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the
intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the
Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems
unnecessary for salvation.

Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?"
Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith,
since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our
judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such
matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God."

_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we
find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower
nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement,
while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the
earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round
the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their
proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the
movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.
Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to
God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only
to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness
either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and
in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational
nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and
being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.

Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not
only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that
which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine
goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's
ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which
vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to
John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned
cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed
all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his
nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order
that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the
Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a
learner to believe."

Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes
the master who is teaching him.

Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature,
natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this
way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are
in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.

Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things
of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God
from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things
are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved
by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that
can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object
of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as
stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be
known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there
is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the
others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is
not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.

_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may
arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the
science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God,
is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it
presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late
in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second
reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general.
For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either
through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations,
and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom
would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine
things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The
third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very
deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that
philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into
human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among
themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge
of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine
matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them,
as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.

Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind
for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved
by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.

Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and
about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can
be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are
of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]

Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
(Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe
anything explicitly.

Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we
by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and
it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:
'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything
explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God
proposes to be believed.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according
to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the
virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according
to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
believing anything explicitly.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to
fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5)
depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things
may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is
the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is
accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it
belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the
dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself,
for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be
armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to
the object of fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of
a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate
in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the
fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should
terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary
relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in
certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the
direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the
Blessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and
secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy
Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son
of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,
but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he
is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine
Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly,
when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of
faith.

Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's
power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound
to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully
given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a
punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine
states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct.
viii.]).

Reply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things
which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God
and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity
which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking,
in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority,
suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and
direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6]

Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have
explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary
for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is
necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is
not bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in
reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are
bound to believe everything explicitly.

Obj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but
only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith
of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the
learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have
explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
explicit faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were
ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory
expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified
by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who
are denoted by the oxen.

_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of
Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now
Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are
over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius
explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding
of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those
who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the
lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of
higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to
believe them more explicitly.

Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally
necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree,
whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly
more things than others are.

Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about
subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been
corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple
people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free
from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.

Reply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the
learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine
teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the
Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned
stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones,
who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold
obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the
universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32):
"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should
Believe Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation
of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are
ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine
revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above
(A. 6; I, Q. 111, A. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the
mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is
this king of glory?" and (Isa. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from
Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation.

Obj. 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the
teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Matt. 11:11) that
"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater
than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the
mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Matt. 11:3):
"Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore
even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.

Obj. 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the
ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith
in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that
it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly
in the mystery of Christ.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc):
"Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is
delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except
by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of
faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man
obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and
Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written
(Acts 4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men,
whereby we must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for
all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of
times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of
sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as
it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was
intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection,
since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however,
seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the
fact that he said (Gen. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father
and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says
(Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the
Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about
this sacrament.

But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before
and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the
learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those
sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so
to speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to
Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound
to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards
those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly
proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of
which we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in
reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to
believe them more or less explicitly according to each one's state
and office.

Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely
hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19),
yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ
revealed them to them.

Reply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist
inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly
professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
that this is the Son of God" (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art
Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus
saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be
believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had
already said (John 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who
taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling
His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as
may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with
Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in
ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own
Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's
Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
according to Zech. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament
hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no
water"; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its
fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.

It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the
latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing
to the signs of His works.

Reply Obj. 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as
is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know
that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about
Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we
read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine
Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a
man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ
shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the
lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf.
Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without
receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a
Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they
did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine
providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in
whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of
the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who
teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the
Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to
believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):
"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to
them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the
Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the
Trinity.

Obj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): "Father, I have
manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract.
cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the
name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In
that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is
not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in
Judea'; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He
takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name
of His, which hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of
Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the
Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

Obj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God
is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly
happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in
God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not
necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

_On the contrary,_ In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is
written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image
and likeness" (Gen. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was
necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of
Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the
world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was
conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the
mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but
implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was
it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace
had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of
the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed
on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19:
"Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of
the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all
times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and
for all people.

Reply Obj. 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden
in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it
was shown to the world.

Reply Obj. 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now
through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of
Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it
cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the
mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9]

Whether to Believe Is Meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For
the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114,
A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,
just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by
our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known
[*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not
meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is
not meritorious.

Obj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a
sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any
merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to
believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing,
this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is
hasty to give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he
gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means
meritorious.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by
faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they
did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our
actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will
moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from
the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the
act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine
truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that
it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently
the act of faith can be meritorious.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of
merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the
disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that
the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor
can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after
the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle
of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial
form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without
charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity,
the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of
nature, and a natural act of the free-will.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the
scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because
the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,
wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual
consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his
free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred
to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our
neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things
are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of
faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no
firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect
act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does
not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the
actual consideration.

Reply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for
he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by
miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine
invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose
the merit.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10]

Whether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of
Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe
lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)
that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If,
therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human
reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of
believing.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens
the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to
diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential
to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5).
Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen.
Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the
merit of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a
man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to
the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of
what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the
believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance,
when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,
unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason
diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues,
a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less
praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral
virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account
of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account
of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly,
human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when
a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he
thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support
thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of
faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a
consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words
of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We
now believe, not for thy saying" (John 4:42).

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no
will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.

Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of
the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not
cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing
that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do
not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand,
though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith
[*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which
are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.],
but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith,
since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not
diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to
believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
is not diminished.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist
in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit
of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm
in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not
renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
_______________________

QUESTION 3

OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?

(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]

Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith.
For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act
of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph.
6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence,
to make known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to
fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from
doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that
confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or
constancy.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's
faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works,
for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity."
But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore
neither is confession an act of faith.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and
the work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a
work proper to faith."

_I answer that,_ Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to
whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh,
and consequently it is an act of abstinence.

Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according
to 2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe,
and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended
to signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought
of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the
outward confession of them.

Reply Obj. 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures.
One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act
of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above.
Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an
act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.

Reply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an
indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz.
fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but
an indirect cause so to speak.

Reply Obj. 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding,
but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession
as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can
be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of
faith is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others,
is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32):
"Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church
of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among
unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation."

_I answer that,_ Things that are necessary for salvation come under
the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is
something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept.
Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an
affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as
stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 5, ad 3; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 2) do
not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind
as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect
of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of
virtue.

Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of
due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him:
for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to
remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without
faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from
the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is
necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must
be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to
God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.

Reply Obj. 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every
one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check
the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty
of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.

Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the
faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Matt. 7:6): "Give not that which is
holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest
turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to
the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the
disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it
is written (Matt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord
that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He
answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
_______________________

QUESTION 4

OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the
cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is faith?

(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?

(3) Whether its form is charity?

(4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith
are one identically?

(5) Whether faith is a virtue?

(6) Whether it is one virtue?

(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;

(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the
intellectual virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the
Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That
Appear Not?"

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not."
For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it
is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
Therefore it is not a substance.

Obj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things
to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope,
since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A.
3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing
to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Obj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."

Obj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which
it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is
already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices.

_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith
can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles
of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object
of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 2), has one same
thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be
in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q. 1,
AA. 1, 4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under
the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the
act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to
the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because
to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II, Q. 67, A.
4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when
the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first
beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident
principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these
principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of
which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith
is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the
reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is
brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all
things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through
seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made
evident when we were speaking of happiness (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8; I-II,
Q. 4, A. 3).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words,
"evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for
the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere
to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the
non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another
reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the
believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it
sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to
the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the
mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect
assent to what is non-apparent."

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish
it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that
appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the
object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the
substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of
faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the
beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of
this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in
Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we
believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others
say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things
which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount
to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear
not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid
foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing
forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to
be hoped for."

Reply Obj. 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus
condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus
contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by
the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of
those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we
shall prove further on (Q. 18, A. 1). For this reason the definition
of faith includes the object of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
the absent and the unseen.

Reply Obj. 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing,
make[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]

Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the
intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith
resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct
from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas
"faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is
it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true,
contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith
is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore
faith does not reside in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect.
Therefore faith is likewise.

_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be
perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch
as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will
and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be
perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be
perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the
intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the
reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty,
in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is
immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act
is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently
faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside
in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is
described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but
also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of
the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed
in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a
habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as
"the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima
iii, 10).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is the Form of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith.
For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two
things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of
the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of
a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
charity is not the form of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in
one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the
intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of
believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For
obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather
than charity, is the form of faith.

_On the contrary,_ Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (I-II, Q.
1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), voluntary acts take their species from
their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things.
Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to
which that act is directed, both because it takes its species
therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond
proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said
(A. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will,
i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of
faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.
Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act
of faith is perfected and formed by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens
the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by
different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain
order, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2)
when we were treating of human acts in general.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is
not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it
quickens the act of faith, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other
virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as
we shall show further on (Q. 23, A. 8), and consequently charity is
spoken of as the form of faith.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become
living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10,
"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be
done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living
faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done
away, so that they are not one identical habit.

Obj. 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.

Obj. 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a
believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
faith in him.

Obj. 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same
faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith
which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and
living.

_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this question.
For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting
that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and
that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal
sin.

Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless
faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit
of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable
that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person
having living faith.

We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated
by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in
respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
lifeless faith are not distinct habits.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect
things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the
perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes
a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.

Reply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to
be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said
above (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always
working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up
the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith
in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter
by creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one
who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin
does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a
previous mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith
without charity, and at another time, with charity.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]

Whether Faith Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue
is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject
good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is
directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue.
Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the
acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as
stated above (A. 4). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is
not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
faith a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces
(1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore
faith is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice
is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is
justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As shown above, it is by human virtue that human
acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle
of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living
faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to
the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that
this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should
infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is
that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on
account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be
found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence
of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since
nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Q. 1, A.
3): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that
the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living
faith is a virtue.

On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though
the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the
intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as
if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the
rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q.
65, A. 1), because the act of temperance requires both an act of
reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of
faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it
is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good
in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it
has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is formed by charity.

Reply Obj. 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on
human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity,
from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like
faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are
speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of
this kind can be a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically,
as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as
perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith,
being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue,
for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must,
therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain
excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according
to a gloss, or the "word of faith."

Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss
on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are
enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6]

Whether Faith Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith
is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge
are numbered among God's gifts according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and
knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
14, 15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about
some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but
divided into several parts.

Obj. 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q.
3, A. 1). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all:
since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
to come, as appears from Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive."
Therefore faith is not one.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one
accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."

_I answer that,_ If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in
two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one
faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by
adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith.
Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is
differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is
evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from
the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its
subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it
is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various
subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed,
then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one
same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in
believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to
one.

Reply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do
not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something
eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence
there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is
different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.

Reply Obj. 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from
any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we
have mentioned above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4; I-II, Q. 107, A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]

Whether Faith Is the First of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Luke 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that
fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that
which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope
"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further
on (Q. 17, A. 1). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (A. 2) that the intellect of the
believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of
faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the
first virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as
a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it
is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the
first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.

Obj. 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.
Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by
charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

_I answer that,_ One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by
its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature,
precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in
matters of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3; I-II, Q. 34,
A. 4, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last
end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the
will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far
as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is
present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by
faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith,
because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly
bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards
Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For
an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove
obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that
hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to
submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some
other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be
presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot
hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible,
since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (I-II, Q.
40, A. 1). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to
persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this
sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the
inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it
is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;
since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 2); and thus it is requisite for
faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the
commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special
virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his
superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby
man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.

Reply Obj. 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come
first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building:
since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts
adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is
charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity
which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity
cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity
precedes faith.

Reply Obj. 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not
an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes
faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless
the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]

Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual
Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than
science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to
certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also
wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the
believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about
matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the
intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
science and understanding are more certain than faith.

Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more
perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than
faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another
version [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you
shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it
seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word
of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science
[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q.
57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual
virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly,
for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first
way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First,
on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain
cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than
those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason.
Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and
thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more
certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of
faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged
simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a
disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more
certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e.
for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this
present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which
they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.

Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith,
but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith
with our intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what
he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge
of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far
as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they
are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
_______________________

QUESTION 5

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their
original state?

(2) Whether the demons have faith?

(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in
others?

(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1]

Whether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original
State?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the
angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor
says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or
things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation."
Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either
confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to
contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the
state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for
Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state
man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing,
but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by
faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation."
Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original
state.

Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,
according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either
in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore
there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
state.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . .
cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in
their original state; for then they could not hear anything from
another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man
or in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of
approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.

_I answer that,_ Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of
Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that
appear not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith
we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in
Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes
faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith.
Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of
which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith.
Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and
man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in
His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not
such as to exclude faith.

It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.
And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as
some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold
that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in
grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses
not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.

Since, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A.
1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we
must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of
hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet
consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7).
Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe
that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were,
namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a
creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we
assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former,
before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who
have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with
regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of
faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another,
even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2,
A. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels
before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest
knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we
cannot know except by believing them.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a
master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that
the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly
contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were
confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was
of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer
to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and
mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them
so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light
of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He
was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of
glory.

Reply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the
original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural
obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every
creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.

Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything
from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring
inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9:
"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2]

Whether in the Demons There Is Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For
Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the
believer's will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to
believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good,
as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons
there is no faith.

Obj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph.
2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift
of God." Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange
gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts
of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
after they sinned.

Obj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as
Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, "If I had
not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they
have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some
men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty
of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable.
Therefore in the demons there is no faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
believe and tremble."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the
believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because
he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident
principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent.
Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two
causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in
this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the
intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though
that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a
prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something,
and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the
intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly
that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself
foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence
of faith would not be removed.

Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons,
but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby
they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although
they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for
instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the
evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their
belief.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to
believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when
that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have,
is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through
their natural intellectual acumen.

Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident,
that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so
that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]

Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless
Faith in the Other Articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article
of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a
catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of
faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it
seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the
gift of lifeless faith.

Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may
possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions,
and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe
some articles of faith without believing the others.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of
faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a
man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can
believe some articles, and disbelieve others.

_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does
not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does
faith, after a man disbelieves one article.

 _I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a
heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.

The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which
proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the
habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by
faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but
merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to
the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to
whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by
the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he
chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church
as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident
that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is
not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but
if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article
has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in
accordance with his own will.

Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith,
about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful
does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order
to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds
the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their
respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without
another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without
knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the
articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First
Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the
Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever
abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either
to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept
without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect
obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one
commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend
in one point is become guilty of all."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]

Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man
than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its
object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith,
since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as
stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater
in one than in another.

Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme
cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme,
because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above
all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."

Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding
of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith
are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above
(Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in
equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree
by all the faithful.

_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find
more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little,
for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith,
why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): "O
woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one
than in another.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112,
A. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of
view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its
participation by the subject.

Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material
object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of
faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q.
1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among
believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4,
A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief
are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this
respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so
that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more
explicit.

If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of
its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the
act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as
stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man's faith
may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his
intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater
promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of
faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly
believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In
this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of
the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first
place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to
it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way
faith is greater in one than in another.

Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very
nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from
the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above
(I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails.

Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
_______________________

QUESTION 6

OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?

(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]

Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us,
and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which
science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused.
Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,
seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by
seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is
written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same
hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed,
and his whole house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is
through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired
by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to
Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired
by man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): "By grace you are
saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man
may glory . . . for it is the gift of God."

_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is
necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second
thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things
which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of
these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are
of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's
knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed
by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the
apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in
sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall
they preach, unless they be sent?"

As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement,
such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace
the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who
see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and
some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves
man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is
from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready
to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of
faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.
But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith,
is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some
supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God.
Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of
faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of
external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper
cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that
proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to
believe by words or deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the
believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in
order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as
stated above (Q. 2, A. 3).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]

Whether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.
For it is written (Deut. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now
lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of
God.

Obj. 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through
lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless (_informis_)
when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not
from God, as stated above (I-II, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
neither is lifeless faith from God.

Obj. 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is
written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the
sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry
at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now
faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God
the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But
this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone
is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which
lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith.
Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.

_I answer that,_ Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted
that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas
sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of
its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the
humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not
essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since,
therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign
the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows
that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the
cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential
to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness,
something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors:
though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which
is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
diaphanous body.

Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of
faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic
form, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless
faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this
is God, as stated above (A. 1). It follows, therefore, that
lifeless faith is a gift of God.

Reply Obj. 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with
the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a
perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's
species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 1,
ad 2; I-II, Q. 18, A. 5): for an act is said to be deformed through
being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of
the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of
a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He
is the cause of the act as such.

We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a
due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is
compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the
deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as
lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically,
though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in
sinners, are from God.

Reply Obj. 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is
healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous
unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing
from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that
a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to
desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the
instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is
granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the
gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given
to some without charity.
_______________________

QUESTION 7

OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]

Whether Fear Is an Effect of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For
an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it
is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him."
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now
fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2):
and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matt. 1:2. Therefore
fear is not an effect of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object
of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of
fear is an evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Again, acts
take their species from the object, according to what was stated
above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
believe and tremble."

_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 1). Now the principle of all appetitive
movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the
principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an
apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension
of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the
Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear
whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be
separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to
Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate
God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the
greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of
the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while
living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it
makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if
we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and
punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear
Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain
articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then
reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his
intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence
the text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."

Reply Obj. 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the
cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets
hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God
awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it
makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
sinners.

Reply Obj. 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good
which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes
also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to
submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will
suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of
fear.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]

Whether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For
purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying
the heart.

Obj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with
impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be
seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not
purify the heart.

Obj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way,
it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify
the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.
Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

_On the contrary,_ Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith."

_I answer that,_ A thing is impure through being mixed with baser
things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which
betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that
the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and
corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting
itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the
rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement,
namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first
beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God
must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first
beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected
through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly
purified thereby.

Reply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of
those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good
moves the appetite.

Reply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which
is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the
human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself,
through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible
objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible
with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov.
10:12).

Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity
of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect,
according to the present state of life.
_______________________

QUESTION 8

OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which
respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of
understanding there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?

(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
only speculative, or practical also?

(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
understanding?

(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?

(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other
gifts.

(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?

(8) Which of the fruits?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]

Whether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the
Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of
nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now
understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident
principles are known, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 6. Therefore it should
not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according
to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now
the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a
sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason),
as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge
which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather
than a gift of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."

_I answer that,_ Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference
between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned
with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge
penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the
intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 6.

Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the
truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is
enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is
perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and
vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all
these things.

Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things
as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the
understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things.
Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power;
wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man
needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so
as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this
supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of
understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only
certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man
is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3;
I-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for
which he requires the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something
previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the
light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore
this addition is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the
additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally,
what the natural light is in regard to those things which we know
from the first.

Reply Obj. 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
rather than after the will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15)
that "the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension
of him who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not
comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'],
or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith and
understanding are incompatible in the same subject.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding.
But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q. 1, A.
4; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding
in the same subject.

Obj. 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated
above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Much less, therefore, can understanding
and faith be in the same subject.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who
has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
thus it is written (Luke 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
understanding is compatible with faith.

_I answer that,_ We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on
the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.

On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain
things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery
to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son;
whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in
one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that
is contained in the Divine Scriptures.

On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the
essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in
itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the
state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the
direct object of faith: although certain other things that are
subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.

In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of
a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity
or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those
things which are the direct object of faith.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also
Practical?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with
which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural
reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was
made clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore
the gift of understanding is not practical.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding
to all that do it."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the gift of understanding is
not only about those things which come under faith first and
principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions
is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by
the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting
it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).

Reply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are
not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists
precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only
as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.

Reply Obj. 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the
eternal law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Now the eternal law
surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as
ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires
the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of
Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in
all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness
of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of
mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a
state of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,
faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith
Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of
understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not
necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in
a state of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base
and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the
gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state
of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: "He that
followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a
state of grace is without the gift of understanding.

_I answer that,_ In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs
be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
understood, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy
Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it
directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of
understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some
supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.

Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of
mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but
with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are
sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27:
"His unction teacheth you of all things."

Reply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the
things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate
from them.

Reply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift
of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order
that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes
with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
penetrate all things clearly.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not
Sanctifying Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found
also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in
expounding the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for
Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will
is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace,
the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is
no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be
prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matt. 7:22, where
those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not
prophesied in Thy name?']," are answered with the words: "I never knew
you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying
grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
of faith, according to Isa. 7:9, following another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand."
Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be without it.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 6:45): "Every one that hath
heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by
the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn
or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
without sanctifying grace.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) the gifts of
the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to
have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.

Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
sanctifying grace.

Reply Obj. 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
right estimate about the end.

Reply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a
kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed
to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with
regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the
gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but
understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard
the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between
understanding and faith.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first
principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.

Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.

_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they
must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction
is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated
together with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore
the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.

_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident,
since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while
the three belong to the appetitive power.

But the difference between this gift of understanding and the
remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also
belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William
of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of
understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in
that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of
understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs
from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge,
in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding
renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to
penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned
the number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4).

But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards
both matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For
all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which,
in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through
hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be
believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by
faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth,
secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and
furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as
it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above
(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3).

Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief,
two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated
or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,
when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are
proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind
unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a
fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore
folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright
about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind,
even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to
knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes,
viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby
man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles
of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than
faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the
things that are said.

Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,
but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7]

Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc.,
Responds to the Gift of Understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly
to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the
aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart
being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to
the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
hath not seen."

_I answer that,_ Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as
also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the
other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 69, AA. 2, 4), and each of these, in some way, responds
to the gift of understanding.

For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to
seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate
affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and
gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart
is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of
the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.

Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more
perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He
surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God
belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of
understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the
second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as
possessed by wayfarers.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 69, A. 2).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8]

Whether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of
Understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit
of faith, since it is written (Isa. 7:9) according to another reading
[*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not
understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you
shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of
understanding.

Obj. 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q. 4,
AA. 1, 7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite.
Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more
than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.

_On the contrary,_ The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says
that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen."
Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of
understanding.

_I answer that,_ The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, Q.
70, A. 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to
the other powers.

Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will.
In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to
the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while
the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
will.

Reply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue.
But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of
certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it
would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be
believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
of faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that
very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own
sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of
its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge,
which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one
corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.
The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive
faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which
the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the
intellective part.
_______________________

QUESTION 9

OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?

(2) Whether it is about Divine things?

(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?

(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]

Whether Knowledge Is a Gift?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the
gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge
implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces
knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
persons, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 4; I-II, Q. 68, A. 5). Now
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Therefore one gift suffices for
the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds
to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2). Therefore the
gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear
to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2), it
seems that knowledge is not a gift.

_On the contrary,_ Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isa.
11:2).

_I answer that,_ Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore,
does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature.
Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to
some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth:
first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure
judgment on it.

Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human
intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of
these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are
proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of
understanding, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 6): while the other is that
he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern
what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this
the gift of knowledge is required.

Reply Obj. 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms
a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his
reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative
reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of
truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was
stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7); wherefore God's knowledge is
not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which
that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it
is a participated likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief.
One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what
one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to
induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This
knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not
given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,
adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to
believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the
godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."

Reply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is
not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological
virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of God
. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge
of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of
human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."

_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from
its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the
order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the
second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed
through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first
cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed
through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short
of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most
perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of
convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given
the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which
fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper"
terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment
as stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows
the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of
all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who
knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the
knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge
of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name
denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment
which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take
knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom,
so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet
faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence
to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge,
but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of
union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of
wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit
regards formally the mean through which things are known, and
materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since
that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from
mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical
sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with
physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in _Phys._  ii, 2
that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God
through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which
it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered
among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we
make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned
about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is
practical.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if
it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this
authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a
speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not
speculative but practical.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
righteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge
can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To
him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a
sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
practical.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own
day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in
the mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds
of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 8), the gift of knowledge,
like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of
faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation,
in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First
Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done,
hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6:
"Faith . . . worketh by charity."

The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what
he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works,
since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of
faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so
far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet
not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (Q. 8, A. 5) about the gift
of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace:
and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that
they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters
of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never
to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of
holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . .
through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy
things."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]

Whether the Third Beatitude, "Blessed Are They That Mourn," etc.
Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even
as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.
Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter
is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and
the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude
does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now
there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with
the gift of knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation,
sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is
not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii,
9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv):
"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been
mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good."

_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God
is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned
to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of
those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they
deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing
their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a
right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of
which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through
the gift of knowledge.

Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in
so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of
knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past
errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right
judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason
sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the
resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life,
and is perfected in the life to come.

Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he
may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers:
it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the
beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is
not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are
about Divine things.
_______________________

QUESTION 10

OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL
(In Twelve Articles)

In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which
are contrary to knowledge and understanding.

As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general;
(2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?

(5) Of the species of unbelief;

(6) Of their comparison, one with another;

(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?

(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?

(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?

(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?

(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?

(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]

Whether Unbelief Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin
is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every
sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief,
for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says
(Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore
unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven
capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not
seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a
sin.

_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue,
and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of
pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because
he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of
opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the
faith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: "Who hath believed our
report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is
in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in
those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character,
not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine
things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like
unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot
be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of
unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) "If I had not come, and
spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds
(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they
believed not in Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it
is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,
unbelief is contrary to nature.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure
negation.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,
through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules
of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise
from vainglory."

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital
vices.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]

Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as
its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De
Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1).
Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching
of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief
is in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.
11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says
that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for
a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does
or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because
of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel,
since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin
of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and,
consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in
the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in
the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said
to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a
sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal
principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,
because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act
is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:
thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust,
wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now
dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the
intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent,
which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief
is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does
not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right
judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,
according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to
invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without
sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]

Whether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a
heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact
that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we
ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . . before was a
blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .
mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore
unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall
the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due
to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden
under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the
testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is
not the greatest of sins.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, "If I had not
come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract.
lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly
great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others
may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

_I answer that,_ Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Hence the more a
sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever
separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not
approach Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know
Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any
sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to
the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall
state further on (Q. 20, A. 3; Q. 34, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 39, A. 2, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus
from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic
not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more
grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and
conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be
aggravated.

Reply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter
respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this
ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a
man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of
unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider
the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery,
committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other
things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on
account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and
which he insults by committing sin.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]

Whether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of
unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an
unbeliever is a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.

Obj. 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of
all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in
unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of
theirs.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever
(Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not
every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are
good.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 2, 4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or
even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the
life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is
taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence
the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously."

Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can
direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not
an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God,
whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the
truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent
to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5]

Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not
several species of unbelief, according to the various points which
the unbeliever disbelieves.

Obj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in
an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of
our consideration.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species.
Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points
of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of
species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Several species of vice are opposed to each
virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are
opposed to it.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4; I-II, Q. 64, A.
1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are
opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with
regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way
there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to
a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and
another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of
vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the
corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In
this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g.
temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in
which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that
the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans
held evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison
to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in
number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the
faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted
before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or
heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been
accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of
the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the
unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these
three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to
the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

Reply Obj. 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two
ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case
the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin,
and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be
considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is
the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives
its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it
adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of
vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by
turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through
adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of
unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief
according to various points in which errors occur.

Reply Obj. 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things
in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things,
be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing
hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as
one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6]

Whether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver
according as it endangers the health of a more important member of
the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed
to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which
is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which
the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their
unbelief is the gravest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which
contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in
more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since
they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.

Obj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good
in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better
for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have
known it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of
justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing
it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), two things may be considered
in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this
point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more
grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised,
sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way
the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that
of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since,
however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which
they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of
the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens
do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point
of view of guilt; since, as stated above (A. 1) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the
mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (A. 1) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking
absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7]

Whether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend
not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.

Obj. 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if
anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which
have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have
been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter:
whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be
a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about
matters of faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul
increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that
"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."

_I answer that,_ In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about
the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as
though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would
sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other
hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to
confute errors, or for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear
the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their
presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction;
because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for
instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith
in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter,
as in those countries where there are no unbelievers. In the first
case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided
there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting
errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the
faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive,
while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of
faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory
says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to
error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might
have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is
dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of
simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that
they have never heard anything differing from what they believe.
Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to
say against the faith.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but
such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than
of sound speeches.

Reply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the
faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as
though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by
defending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always
to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith
which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you'; St. Thomas'
reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is
necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to
Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
convince the gainsayers."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8]

Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown,
asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he
answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the
wheat also together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom.
xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of
men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will
necessarily slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for
the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that
for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in
like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I
desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now
we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 19, AA. 9, 10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 14:23): "Go out into the
highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into
the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some
ought to be compelled to the faith.

_I answer that,_ Among unbelievers there are some who have never
received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are
by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may
believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they
should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so
that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their
evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this
reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not
indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if
they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still
leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent
them from hindering the faith of Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have
accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all
apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that
they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one
time, received.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid,
not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from
the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii)
of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to
union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with
arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law
was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has
broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's
words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from
those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root
the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep.
Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when this is not to be feared,
that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so
hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause
a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken."

Reply Obj. 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought
not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have
received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in
the same chapter.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a
vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter
of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received
it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled
to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep.
clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ
compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and
afterwards taught Him."

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve
to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war
which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church
gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the
sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations."
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything
that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without
any reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate
with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do
to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with
certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to
communicate with unbelievers.

Obj. 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 7:2, 3): "Thou shalt make no
league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make
marriages with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at
the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun
idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their
disciples, nor have any dealings with them."

_I answer that,_ Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can
be gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within?"

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the
faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of
excommunication on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and
time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that
their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of
the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled
by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so
the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If,
however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such
a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command
(Matt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and
cast it from thee."

With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition
gives this solution before the Reply Obj. 2] sense the reply is that
the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose
territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined
to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent
dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith:
hence the text goes on (Deut. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son
from following Me."
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10]

Whether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.

Obj. 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving
princes' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians
(4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of
Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever.
Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave
is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even
as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the
working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

_On the contrary,_ Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment
on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.

_I answer that,_ That this question may be considered in two ways.
First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the
faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This
ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and
endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their
superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of
great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they
see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to
go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether
forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have
authority over them in any capacity whatever.

Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.

Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief
deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted
into children of God.

This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in
slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought
for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he
should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church
harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to
the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular
princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in
favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the
above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her
members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so:
and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matt.
17:25, 26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because
"the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in
order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that
servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the
Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of
faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household,
that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed
Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and,
the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace
of Diocletian.

Reply Obj. 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole
lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas
the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works.
Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or
authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to
employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to
work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living
together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send
master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if
there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such
communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11]

Whether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do
them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it
is a sin to tolerate their rites.

Obj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.

Obj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the
rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist.
xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be
allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their
fathers have for ages observed them."

_I answer that,_ Human government is derived from the Divine
government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful
and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take
place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them,
greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly
in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly
tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain
greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If
you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust."
Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated,
either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of
some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their
rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we
hold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to
our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to
speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their
rites.

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12]

Whether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be
Baptized Against Their Parents' Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority
over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to
cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot
be severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath
joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is
broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15):
"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is
not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima,
and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is
unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator,
then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more,
therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents'
authority over their children: and consequently their children may be
baptized against their parents' will.

Obj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger
of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death.
Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death
and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and
other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be
left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen,
and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings
and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings
and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.
Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against
their parents' wishes.

Obj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his
soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore
it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents,
and consecrated to God in Baptism.

Obj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt
of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue
through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach,
according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the
sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if
Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they
accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.

_On the contrary,_ Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would
be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against
their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority
over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these
should not be baptized against their parents' will.

_I answer that,_ The custom of the Church has very great authority
and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very
doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church.
Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by
that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it
was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the
Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there
have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and
Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly
terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius,
who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if
it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat
this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against
their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom
observed hitherto.

There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of
reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be
persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly
embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.

The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child
is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct
from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is
like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason,
he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a
horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use
them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the
natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his
father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a
child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from
its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents'
wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its
free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after
itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then
it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace
the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even
against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of
reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that
they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given
to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the
salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use
of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the
use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes
to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child
has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.

Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against
the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the
judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from
the danger of everlasting death.

Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which
does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.

Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can
know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose
of the child in all matters relating to God.

Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,
threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching.
Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a
watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other
hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
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QUESTION 11

OF HERESY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?

(2) Of the matter about which it is;

(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?

(4) Whether converts should be received?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]

Whether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf.
Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are
manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby
a man makes choice of that school which he deems best." But choice is
an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that
he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which
belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De
Util. Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or
follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit,
especially that he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore
heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as
heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is
one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it
is a species of unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The word heresy as stated in the first objection
denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is
about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in
matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper
good, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the
chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are
secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.

Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.

Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
suggestions of his own mind.

Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.

Reply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will
regards faith, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end,
while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus
in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the
species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
in general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point
also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing
[*From the Greek _hairein_, to cut off], so does sect derive its name
from its being a cutting off (_secando_), as Isidore states (Etym.
viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each
belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act
itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason
of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way
it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in _Metaph._ iv; _Ed. Did._ iii, 5),
for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much
as its act is independent on a bodily organ.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]

Whether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters
of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians,
so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes
(Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters
of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though
they were its proper matter.

Obj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he
may not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies
spring up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying
elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and III, Q. 16, A. 8, but it is
not to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not
properly about the matter of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet
this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not
properly about the matter of faith.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ.
Dei xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which
are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth"
(Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its
proper matter.

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a
corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption
of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that
are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so
forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a
person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.

Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q.
32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way,
directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way,
indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which
leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be
heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were
about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense
than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning
of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by
the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as
stated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters
of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that
Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The
enemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so
that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us
mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius."

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated
in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means
should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek
the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when
they have found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a
choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly,
certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding
of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is
concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined
by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after
they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he
would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the
Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]:
"Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our
brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other
than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against
whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy
doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol
[*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most blessed
Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church.
If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we
beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of
Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment
of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself
is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]

Whether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated?

Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24, 25): "The servant of the Lord must not
wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics
are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . .
who are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that
heretics should be tolerated.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Matt. 13:30) to
suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the
world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:10, 11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that
he, that is such an one, is subverted."

_I answer that,_ With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On
their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt
the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which
supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other
evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority,
much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted
of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs:
after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for
his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating
him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him
to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by
death. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says:
"Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest
the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock,
burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as
that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by
its flame."

Reply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be
admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
from the words of the Apostle quoted above.

Reply Obj. 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the
faithful being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our
sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine
states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the
corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed.
Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel
them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate
them.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum),
"to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is
excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether
uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which
is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot
be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
(Q. 10, A. 8, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the
Church is God's sentence, according to Deut. 1:17: "You shall hear the
little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
person, because it is the judgment of God." Therefore even those who
are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
prostitution, should be received all the same.

Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Matt. 18:22) to forgive
his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man
should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to
be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back
into heresy.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers
who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore
heretics also should be received.

_On the contrary,_ The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal."
Therefore they should not be received by the Church.

_I answer that,_ In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good
to them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both
wish and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is
spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the
object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for
one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who
return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church
to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.

The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of
these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal
salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a
good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it,
both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and
because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one.
Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to
save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial
to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if
they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment,
others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is
written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is not speedily
pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without
any fear."

For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who
return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their
lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the
ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their
conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently
been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after
having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in
faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to
Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.

Reply Obj. 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for
she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are
not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the
way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence
of death.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and
spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied
to sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is
not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says
on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even
in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or
our neighbor's good demands.

Reply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the
faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

QUESTION 12

OF APOSTASY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]

Whether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to
unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not,
seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without
unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it
is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is
apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Ecclus.
10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Therefore apostasy
does not pertain to unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance,
or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov.
6:12-14): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh
with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the
foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil,
and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have
himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would
be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to
unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of
unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said
(Q. 10, A. 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:67): "Many of his disciples
went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously
(John 6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore
apostasy pertains to unbelief.

_I answer that,_ Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may
happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union
between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by
faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or
Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which
precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man
may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to
which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he
had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or
"Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his
mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize
in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.

But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to
unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy,
which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should
believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness
to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way
too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said
itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be
understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies
most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the
first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith
it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man
retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal
salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that
is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of
the soul, according to Rom. 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith."
Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's
every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of
justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all
his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands
revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of
movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is
that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith
even as he severed himself.

Reply Obj. 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by
the fact of its being the term _wherefrom_ or _whereto_ of movement:
on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the
terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term _whereto_ of the
movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not
to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had
known it, to turn back."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]

Whether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account
of Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance?

Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith,
that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine,
Super Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
their prince on account of his apostasy.

Obj. 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we
find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
from allegiance to their sovereign.

Obj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away
from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy
from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of
their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on
account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
apostatizing from the faith.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to
the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic
authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or
through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated
persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance
to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates
from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the
Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore
princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the
faith.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 10, A. 10), unbelief, in itself,
is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the
law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between
believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul
human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced
to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account
of other sins.

Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief
in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying
of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that
are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the
unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that
they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their
subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption
of the faith, since, as was stated above (A. 1, Obj. 2), "a man that
is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . .
soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith.
Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a
man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso
facto" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance
whereby they were bound to him.

Reply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted,
and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she
allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that
were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet
greater danger.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those
unbelievers who have never received the faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether,
as stated above (A. 1), which is not the case in any other sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 13

OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?

(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?

(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?

(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1]

Whether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or
insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God
rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from
you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the
saints." But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other
things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith.
Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of
blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed
of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and
the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so
that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His
creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not
opposed to confession of faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . .
before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it
ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains
to unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement
of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness.
Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does
not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is
His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting
God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine
goodness.

Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen
merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way
this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections,
even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him.
Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in
the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought
only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself
outwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the tongue. It is in this
sense that blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.

Reply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of
reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of
the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness
of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due
to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as
praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does
blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this
way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or
to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and
negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of
habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made
known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs
in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according
to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are
proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something
unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and
to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert
that God is the same as a creature.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.
Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col.
3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins":
and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy
is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts
of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of
them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:
hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the
deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 3,
10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the
reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth
the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment
is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a
mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin
is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual
life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever
things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their
genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity,
because, as stated above (A. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness,
which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal
sin, by reason of its genus.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all
the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those
mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned
afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more
grievous sins are included.

Reply Obj. 2: Since, as stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is contrary
to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the
prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy
God," etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he
who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even
more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur
unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing
to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen
through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into
words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of
those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so
called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words,
and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from
mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger,
kills one who is sitting beside him.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]

Whether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the
greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing
is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since
it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy,
which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more
grievous than that of blasphemy.

Obj. 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood,
and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer
goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more
grievous sin than blasphemy.

Obj. 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a
gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all."
Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.

_On the contrary,_ On Isa. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss
says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the
confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief:
while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added
thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love
and confession add to the praise of faith.

Therefore, since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3), unbelief is the
greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy
also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as
unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the
objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin
committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a
sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in
respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for
murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God.
Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the
evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above
(I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do
harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously
that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to
punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away
from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The
reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false
about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a
falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as
it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.

Reply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that
aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the
most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]

Whether the Damned Blaspheme?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because
some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the
fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these
punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more
are they restrained from blaspheming.

Obj. 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most
demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting
or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in
what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it
clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor
sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be
damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore,
will they blaspheme in the life to come.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched
with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power
over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who
are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will
nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them
thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and
consequently it will also be in their future state.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), detestation of the Divine
goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in
hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's
justice, since they love the things for which they are punished,
would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments
inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins
which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because
they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the
Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and
it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God
with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.

Reply Obj. 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy
through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas,
in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they
are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,
wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious.
In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is
part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned,
evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.

Reply Obj. 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that
detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in
this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
_______________________

QUESTION 14

OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same
as the sin committed through certain malice?

(2) Of the species of this sin;

(3) Whether it can be forgiven?

(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
before committing other sins?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]

Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin
Committed Through Certain Malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not
the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin
against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matt.
12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of
blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through
certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the
same as the sin committed through certain malice.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is
condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed
through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is
condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Matt. 12:32).
Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin
committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites
differ, are themselves different.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic
sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed
through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition
or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at
all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the
sin committed through certain malice.

_On the contrary,_ The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin
against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for
its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore
it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same
as the sin against the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ Three meanings have been given to the sin against
the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super
Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc.
xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in
Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to
utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we
understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each
Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one
of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man
(Matt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human
nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did
others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the
dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own
Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full,
according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11:19) that
He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans":
but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they
ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the
power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.

Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy
or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely,
a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not
confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in
thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word,
in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because
it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the
Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor
did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against
the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence,
but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to
sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to
understand Mark 3:29, 30, where after Our Lord had said: "But he that
shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds,
"because they said: He hath an unclean spirit."

But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of
blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that
good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the
Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins
through weakness, it is a sin "against the Father"; that when he sins
through ignorance, it is a sin "against the Son"; and that when he
sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil,
as explained above (I-II, Q. 78, AA. 1, 3), it is a sin "against the
Holy Ghost."

Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very
inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this
way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy
Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that
which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or
removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption,
and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ. 20, 21). Now all these
things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy
Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin
against the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a
protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son
of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of
God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense,
the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed
through ignorance, or through weakness.

Reply Obj. 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it
results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a
general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a
special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the
character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin
against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to
the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not
a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of
any kind of sin.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the
Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence,
obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual
good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny
God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man
rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each
of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the
Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not
diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith
whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed
that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not
be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17).
Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a
brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather
than against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to
refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev.
10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the
Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems
that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently
enumerated.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii)
says that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without
merits presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and
(Enchiridion lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is
guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm.
lxxi) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with
the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book
De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man
who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the
truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the
Church is taught," and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy
Ghost.

_I answer that,_ The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
distinguished in respect of the removal or contempt of those things
whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These
things are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of
His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine
judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered
from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the
consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,
which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the
consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is
removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can
obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.

God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a
brother's spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of
his brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the
world.

On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the
sin he has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as
denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken
above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of
sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing
is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin,
according to Rom. 6:21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those
things, of which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is
wont to prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is
removed by "obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging
to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): "There is none that
doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the
first; and, "They are all turned to their own course, as a horse
rushing to the battle," as regards the second.

Reply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in
disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.

Reply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of
past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects
by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be
considered in sin, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the
gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.

Reply Obj. 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned
repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a
brother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are
united together.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3]

Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible
to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost
can be forgiven.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being
healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful
physician," as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy
diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.
Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,
since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job
4:18, 19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall
they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man
can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin
against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world, nor in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot
submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon."

_I answer that,_ According to the various interpretations of the sin
against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost
we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since
in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man
perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since
it was not remitted by repentance in this life.

According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man
before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account
of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence,
they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against
His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy
Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore,
according to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews
are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in
the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the
present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the
pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their
forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the
shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience,
because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the
flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing
to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of
Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying
(Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out
of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal
punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about three
and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with
punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day
of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."

Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although
God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy
Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far
as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of
sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing
to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so
to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.

Reply Obj. 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering
God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of
sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*_Filios
diffidentiae,_ which the Douay version renders "children of
unbelief."].

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the question on the part of
God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain
subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as
it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself
this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against
the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For
the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from
imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to
Prov. 4:18: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards
and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect
is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21).
Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it
seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser
sins.

Obj. 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through
certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has
sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6, 9) that
"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once
do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems
that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after
other sins.

Obj. 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same
object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore
the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes
other sins.

_On the contrary,_ "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to
make a poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is
possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts
him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that
against the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in one way, to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin
through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place:
first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly
speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to
commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede
so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin
through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things
whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to
sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 1); and this also,
for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov.
18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins,
contemneth."

Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to
sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his
free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or
again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly
attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that
the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen
says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not think that anyone who stands on
the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can
only happen by degrees and bit by bit."

The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.

If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does
not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy
Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.

Reply Obj. 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most
part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good
or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater
(good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a
man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus,
although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil
actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed
through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a
habit.

Reply Obj. 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De
Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear
that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we
take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is
possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either
of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 15

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and
understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which
is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins
(I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and
dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding;
and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?

(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of
mind?

(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]

Whether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin.
Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.
Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John
9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore
blindness of mind is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind
is a punishment as appears from Isa. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this
people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it
not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De
Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as
Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent
truth," and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is
delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind
is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of
mind among the vices arising from lust.

_I answer that,_ Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of
the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a
threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,
since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never
forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from
exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers
which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance
in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the First Part (Q.
84, AA. 7, 8).

Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a
punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a
punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their
own malice blinded them."

A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
through which a man understands other things; to which principle a
man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens
in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is
deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle,
according to Ps. 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do
well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about
things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from
considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of
concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun."
In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which
arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness
which is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all;
and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a
man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]

Whether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind?

Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin
from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now
dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory
(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding
denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same
as blindness of mind.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
describes it as "dulness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as
a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind.
Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

Obj. 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the
fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A. 1),
while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is
not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin,
which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he
reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.

_On the contrary,_ Different causes produce different effects. Now
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these
others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.

_I answer that,_ Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be
sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through
being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of
metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its
object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to
perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence
in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can
perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent,
while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being
unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or
of great power.

Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, even as the
senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of
knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does
not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but
through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a
thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its
effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in
connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a
property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing
itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details:
whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his
understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a
thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is
unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the
nature of that thing.

Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes
a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual
goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the
knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of
understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending
them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This
dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that
is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to
his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful
consideration of spiritual things.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]

Whether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the
Flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of
sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i,
4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst
wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might
reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now
men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness
of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.

Obj. 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects
in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal
sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not
act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the
flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.

Obj. 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them
than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than
carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of
sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.

_I answer that,_ The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in
an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's
intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it
be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all
things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to
be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power
over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that
pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4, 5) that we all do best
that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do
them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.

Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with
pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most
impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices
cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so
that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things
is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as
sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore
lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely
the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible
things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and
chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual
operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on
account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and
understanding in every book, and wisdom."

Reply Obj. 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at
times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on
account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit
superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the
body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently
withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can
know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by
altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid
manner.

Reply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are
further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's
attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's
contemplation all the more.
_______________________

QUESTION 16

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and
under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts concerning faith;

(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have
been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due
and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should
believe, according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to
please God." Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith
to be given.

Obj. 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
reality in the figure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 107, A. 3). Now the
New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John
14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems
that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law
also.

Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same
as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and (Deut. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to
hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them
away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have
been given in the Old Law also.

Obj. 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
(Q. 3, A. 1). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession
and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27)
that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the
meaning of the paschal observance, and (Deut. 13:9) they were
commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

Obj. 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in
the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (John 15:25) that it was written
in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is
found written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye
that fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have
contained precepts of faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law
of works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the
Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.

_I answer that,_ A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone
who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the
primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6:
"He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2)
that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the
words, "I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of
Egypt," and, likewise (Deut. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the
Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one," precede the recording of the
precepts.

Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 7), it follows that,
if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
(John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received
many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of
faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing
their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the
Old Law.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual
life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.

Reply Obj. 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,
namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."

Reply Obj. 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt
virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 4, ad 3; I-II, Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1, A. 7, ad 3).
Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts
had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those
particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.

Reply Obj. 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law
could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of
faith, rather than to faith itself.

Reply Obj. 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby
we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord,"
which is not possible without faith. The words which follow--"believe
Him"--must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly
to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore
the passage concludes--"and your reward shall not be made void."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2]

Whether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were
Fittingly Set Down in the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge
and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For
knowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition
precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to
knowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law
referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are
those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and
understanding should have been given a place among the precepts of
the decalogue.

Obj. 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
precepts about teaching--both affirmative precepts as, for example,
(Deut. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"--and prohibitive
precepts, as, for instance, (Deut. 4:2), "You shall not add to the
word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it."
Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some
precepts directing him to learn.

Obj. 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a
priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law
at his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge,
I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood
to Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law
(Deut. 17:18, 19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded
the priests to learn the Law.

Obj. 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Deut. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore
the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly
set down in the Law.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "That, hearing all
these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."

_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in relation to
knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly,
the use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of
knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and
both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Deut. 6:6): "These
words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers
to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to
what is said, while the words that follow--"and thou shalt tell them
to thy children"--refer to teaching.

The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.

Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this,
the text continues--"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand,
and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt
write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the
continual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it
is impossible for us to forget those things which are continually
attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those
things we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are
ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for
instance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Deut.
4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them
not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."

We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
apostles.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Deut. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know
and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid
precepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which
take the first place.

Reply Obj. 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were
not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law,
and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand
learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the
precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the
priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence
it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
priests about things pertaining to the law of God.

Reply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
meditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he
should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not
that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but
that we should regulate all our actions according to it.
_______________________

QUESTION 17

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself;
(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether hope is a virtue?

(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?

(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?

(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?

(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?

(7) Of its relation to faith;

(8) Of its relation to charity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,
like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the
Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an
imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the
virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work
good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it
must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and
ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say
that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its
proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human
acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:
wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God
Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For,
as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating
of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in
two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything
as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope
attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right
reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill
use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus
is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we
speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show
further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace
and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of
hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our
merits, but from grace alone.

Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that
which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in
so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help
he leans.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses
every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the
soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human
soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered
into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object
of hope.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written
(Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He
will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and
spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's
Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal
happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of
hope.

Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope
"which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil,"
i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of
a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
happiness.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing
less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things
to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper
and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its
nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the
Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within
the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to
speak.

Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith
regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are
referred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although,
as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things
besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such
things in reference to its principal object.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]

Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect
it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will
be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's
eternal happiness.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.
But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore
we can hope for another's eternal happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it
is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we
should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
also hope for another's eternal salvation.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."

_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous
and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous
good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which
pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with
another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as
for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the
same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his
neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes
for himself and for another.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints'
prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not
to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in
him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in
any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."

_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7),
regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the
help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes
to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which
one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance
as the first cause leading to happiness.

Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any
creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards
happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as
being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped
to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way
that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain
things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be
trusted to give help.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]

Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For
a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has
for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to
obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith
and charity, which are theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,
divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in
as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one
that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it
is evident that hope is a theological virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it
in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,
as stated above (A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and
these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to
follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a
theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by
another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not
proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to
follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with
regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus
faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the
First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on
the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for
instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has
no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is
impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to
obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or
despairs of things of which he is capable.

Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.

Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (A. 1).
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]

Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession
of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life
of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to
hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from
faith.

Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly
to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.

_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now
hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having God
for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in
two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else
is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for
His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.

On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from
God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells
us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence
we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to
the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different
aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object
suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54,
A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).
Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]

Whether Hope Precedes Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss
on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the
entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is
by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.

Obj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac,"
i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.

_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the
object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In
order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of
hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in
one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine
assistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these
are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able
to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine
assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh
to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.

Reply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope
we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called
the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established
and perfected in faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition
of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not
apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Precedes Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose
says on Luke 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard
seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But
faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,"
i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes
charity.

_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and
of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect:
the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which
the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first
order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that
hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7)
in the treatise on the passions.

Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person
some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect
love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but
that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he
desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to
God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since
he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.

Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as
a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for
his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so
too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made
more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this
sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so
that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from
some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every
kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living
hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a
friend.

Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
_______________________

QUESTION 18

OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether it is in the blessed?

(3) Whether it is in the damned?

(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not
of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will
but in the irascible.

Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.
Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the
most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the
same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.

_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as
regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue
having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the
memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty,
it follows that it is in the will as its subject.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by
their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into
irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called
the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements
which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in
the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.
2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the
principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.
Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and
not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible:
whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,
or rather superintelligible.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to
one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required
in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of
hoping.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no
reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First
Part (Q. 85, A. 4).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]

Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words
of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.

Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness,
not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of
others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be
hope in them.

Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory
of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints
in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can
be hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth,
why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God.
Therefore hope has no place in them.

_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6;
I-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as
being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 2).

Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope
except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when
happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with
the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in
heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He
was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the
glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the
virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the
body but the enjoyment of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life,
because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of
God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.
Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness
(for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual
possession thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same
hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.
But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their
own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not
by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he
that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.

Reply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its
object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists
in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover,
although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison
with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the
soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as
compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the
glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is in the Damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared
for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to
Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that
the damned have hope.

Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope.
But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to
James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.

Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit
that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall
to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.

_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12,
"Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and
grief, according to Isa. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for
joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall
howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the damned.

_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that
what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that
which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their
confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no
foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true
happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for
ever, else the will would not rest.

In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly
penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible
if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation.
Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should
know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain
happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not
that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident
that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither
can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is
no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand,
hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory,
because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible
thing.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the
devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it
be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby
he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before
(Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth":
this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about
things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.

Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of
a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not
to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in
hope.

Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain
that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A.
5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.

Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail.
Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.

_On the contrary,_ "Hope is the certain expectation of future
happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be
gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."

_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways,
essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the
cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to
its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works
with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves
everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral
virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much
as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason:
and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing
in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received,
but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not
grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has
faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.

Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is
due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places
its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
_______________________

QUESTION 19

OF THE GIFT OF FEAR
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is to be feared?

(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;

(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

(4) Whether servile fear is good?

(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?

(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?

(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?

(11) Whether it remains in heaven?

(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether God Can Be Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object
of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).
But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore
God cannot be feared.

Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be
feared.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear
Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where
is My fear?"

_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the
future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is
someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes
for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very
evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the
evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness
itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear
in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either
from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be
separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being
the evil which a man shuns.

Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of
which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which
He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to
fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.

Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but
from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked
with works and words have called it to them."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and
Worldly Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.
4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the
aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of
wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,
is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in
comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be
that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be
distinguished from all these other fears.

Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial
and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
them.

Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire
for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore
"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes
us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of
fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,
it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to
whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the
passion of fear.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while
moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now
natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
numbered among these kinds of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes
our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these,
since it does not include charity in its definition.

Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different
ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man
away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten:
whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are
drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile
fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it
secondarily.

Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God
through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]

Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge
of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded
man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have
praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil,
since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby
the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear
is not always evil.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but
what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1;
I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species
from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement
is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement
is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were
to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account
of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the
world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is
born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine
states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises
from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear
is always evil.

Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so
far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one
may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."

Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to
withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to
Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath
upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is
part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his
own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds,
which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse
than to suffer any punishment whatever.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether Servile Fear Is Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done." Therefore servile fear is not good.

Obj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear
grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why
did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man
dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.

Obj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore
servile fear is not evil.

_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from
love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so
that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil
simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it
contrary to charity belongs to its very species.

This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary,
is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is
feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid
of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is
the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who
does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not
justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride,
but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the
sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors
from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished
by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to
receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the
same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says
that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.
54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.

Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are
not the same substantially but differ specifically.

Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the
object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God
in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This
cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it."

Obj. 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,
by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where the
Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.

Obj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine
testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the
contempt of self builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that
servile fear is driven out when charity comes.

_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost
dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity
comes.

_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is
fear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the
fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as
self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own
good and that he fear to be deprived of it.

Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In
one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the
love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when
a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way,
it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as
when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet
not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have
another special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity
which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.

Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it
is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that
is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in
opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear
of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when,
to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from
God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not
place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil
as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent
with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is
dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence
fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the
substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love
can remain with charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile:
and such is the sense of the two other objections.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a
part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while
wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the
Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is
prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to
its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of
an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that
art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.

Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall
state further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way,
and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is
ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according
to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through
grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being
cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as
directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human
law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii,
14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists
in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in
this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as
regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom
begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet
servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile
fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in
so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is
thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27,
"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or
filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of
wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law
belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of
all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that
in all things he will be ruled by God.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of
wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that
is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of
wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning
of faith is to be fast joined to it."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]

Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially
from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear
is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of
God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct
from filial fear.

Obj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object
of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be
the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.

Obj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial
fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.

_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the
substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect
of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In
prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ
substantially from filial fear.

_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
(_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in
some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way,
initial.

It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning
of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial
fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of
charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to
filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and
imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.
Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it
here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.

Reply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear,
which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the
thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper
object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it:
for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18.

Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear,
not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is
a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in
_Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being,
while it differs altogether from non-being.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]

Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore
fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for
its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue,
being connected with the same matter, as it were.

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed
as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to
pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since
they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.
ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good,
while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not
be said that fear is a gift.

_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven
gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3).

_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"--for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt.
10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas
the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as
they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A.
5).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it
was stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of
a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the
movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what
filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid
separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it
were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and
the last place, in the descending order.

Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since
thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by
God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

Reply Obj. 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil
shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), God cannot be an
object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the
other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in
God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does
not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity
which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is,
because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by
reason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4);
for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes,
wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride
of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God,
and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts
off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy
against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]

Whether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases?

Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases."

Obj. 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 8).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.

Obj. 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation.
Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear
decreases when the love of charity increases.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the
fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love
God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."

_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA. 2, 4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.

Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as
an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one
loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated
from him.

On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains
as to its substance, as stated above (A. 6). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks
less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly,
because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the
reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by
another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated
from him.

Reply Obj. 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but
submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in
a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11]

Whether Fear Remains in Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For
it is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without
fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who
already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is
about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above
(AA. 2, 5; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in
heaven.

Obj. 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to
1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

Obj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord
is holy, enduring for ever and ever."

_I answer that,_ Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no
means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security
which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 5, A. 4).

But with regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object
of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of
avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for
little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its
staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its
order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be
under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for
a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too
is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, but presumptuously
revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a
rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the
natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it
becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore
the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God,
and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will
be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as
of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words
of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His
beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him
without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it
should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,"
because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and
incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this
sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question
doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and
ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is
afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which
we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because
chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we
avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and
possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no
kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for
ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be
everlasting."

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear
that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.

Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are
both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"--that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God
(since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not
follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in
perfect subjection to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of
happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear
implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely
distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence
fear will not be cast out altogether.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12]

Whether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift
of Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the
beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the
beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (A. 7): whereas
poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to
Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and
give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to
the gift of fear.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh
with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to
restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude
of poverty.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope,
as stated above (A. 9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children
of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to
Rom. 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of
God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear,
rather than poverty of spirit.

Obj. 4: Further, it was stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2) that the
fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit."

_I answer that,_ Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear.
Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and
submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to
the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God,
it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in
another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with
perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some
trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name
of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he
does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external
goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from
poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding
of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's
interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of
worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will,
through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the
expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matt. 5:3.

Reply Obj. 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the
beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent
with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (AA. 7, 10).

Reply Obj. 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in
another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject
to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless,
pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous
character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning,
consequently.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.

Reply Obj. 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
_______________________

QUESTION 20

OF DESPAIR
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether despair is a sin?

(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]

Whether Despair Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from
the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But
despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not
a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt.
7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God,
or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair
is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be
a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the
Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a
sin but also the origin of other sins.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2)
affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and
avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect
correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good
in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a
false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of
the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind,
and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the
death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live"
[*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that
he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a
false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that
He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore,
just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true
opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of
despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is
vicious and sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion
from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not
always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to
a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God,
must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways:
first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act
proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18, 19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and
in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus
sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to
Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they
may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may
lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good
things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.

Reply Obj. 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of
the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed
to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even
so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that
which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due
to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair
of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so
long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a
man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his
faith be removed.

Obj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to
the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: "My iniquity
is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever
despairs, is an unbeliever.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned
heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon
for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.

_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which
precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not
everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.

_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to
the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the
appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the
appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in
themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while
having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as
to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal
opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to
have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is
impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that
there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a
movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state,
there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
can be other mortal sins, without belief.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause
is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy
is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]

Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2).
But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the
foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the
greatest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
sin than despair.

Obj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
sins.

_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous,
according to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very
grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer.
15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.:
"Why is my wound," etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological
virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since
the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its
very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among
mortal sins.

Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the
theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and
unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in
respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief
is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of
God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself;
whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of
God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are
against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him,
according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly
speaking it is a more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to
hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.

If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point
of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from
evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is
given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good
works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being
weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,"
says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it
loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and,
what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum.
Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair
is to fall into hell."

[And from this the response to the objections is evident.]
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]

Whether Despair Arises from Sloth?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.
Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now
despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.

Obj. 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises
from despair, and not vice versa.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the
contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration
of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De
Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than
that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof
could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite
Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the
neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among
the effects of sloth.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1),
the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by
oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness
may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not
deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it
impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact
that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of
no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected
with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold
the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a
distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous
goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good
impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his
being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his
affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any
good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in
this way despair is born of sloth.

Now this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible,
because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise
from lust, for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as
hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope:
and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into
despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be
swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is
good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not
naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it
follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the
contrary despair is born of sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises
from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he
considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a
man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his
thoughts away from sadness.
_______________________

QUESTION 21

OF PRESUMPTION
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?

(2) Whether presumption is a sin?

(3) To what is it opposed?

(4) From what vice does it arise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the
lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it
too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more
grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power
of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous.
Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the
Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.

Obj. 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy
Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which
sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby
man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he
presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption
which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.

Obj. 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a
mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from
turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.

_On the contrary,_ Just as, through despair, a man despises the
Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he
despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice
is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in
aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion
to Him.

_I answer that,_ Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible
to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power
of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption
owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on
his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though
it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according
to Judith 6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This
presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to
the mean in this kind of hope.

But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there
may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends
to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of
God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to
obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This
presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to
wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of
the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3) a sin
which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence
presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more
grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,
since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is
a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate
one's own.

Reply Obj. 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on
God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately.
For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure
it through others, even though we cannot.

Reply Obj. 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both
conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an
inordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable
good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is
unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2]

Whether Presumption Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin
is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption
some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a
poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy."
Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot
be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are
infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he
sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
Ghost.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 20, A. 1) with regard to
despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false
intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an
appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it
is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it
is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not
turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness
to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to
those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the
movement of presumption is conformed.

Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair,
since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God
to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes
God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the
right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be
measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
immensity of the goodness of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though
man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God
something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little
in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above
(A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and
through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does
not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of
obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from
sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,
because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear
than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written
(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:
'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a
help to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up
of the succours from thought.']." Therefore presumption is opposed to
fear rather than to hope.

Obj. 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas
fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary
to fear rather than to hope.

Obj. 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it
does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope.
Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that
presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

_On the contrary,_ When two vices are opposed to one another they are
contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of
despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every
virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as
temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,
alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning
is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says
(Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of
the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with
insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from
God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a
kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes
an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed
when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to
different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly
opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the
same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and
properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in
this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

Reply Obj. 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one
another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a
movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or
inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than
to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific
difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is
opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the
movement of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic
contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety.
Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas
it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by
excluding its ordinateness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]

Whether Presumption Arises from Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from
vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine
mercy. Now mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_)
which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from
vainglory.

Obj. 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair
arises from sorrow, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 4, ad 2). Since
therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to
arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which
give the most absorbing pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some
impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to
ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible.
Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from
vainglory.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption
of novelties is a daughter of vainglory."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), presumption is twofold; one
whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something
beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like
presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great
desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and
especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory
states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of
vainglory.

The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise
directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to
esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory,
however much he might be a sinner.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 22

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under
which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts relating to hope;

(2) The precepts relating to fear.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]

Whether There Should Be a Precept of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating
to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by
one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is
sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good.
Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to
do this.

Obj. 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the
chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief
of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope,
faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are
those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were
given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it
is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should
contain no precept of hope.

Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a
prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be
found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it
seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on John 15:12, "This is My
commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.):
"How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to
hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given
about hope.

_I answer that,_ Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some
belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law.
The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible:
such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of
hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he
believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission,
while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the
precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are
those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already
subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these
precepts were set forth from the very outset under the form of a
command.

Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the
form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it
would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of
faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder,
as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the
first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a
promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that
very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in
the Law are incitements to hope.

Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise
man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and
much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after
the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many
inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not
merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps.
61:9: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the
people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is
proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural
good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly
by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there
was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those
things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the
moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially
since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the
first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept
of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to
induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the
case of the first and fourth commandments.

Reply Obj. 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a
duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what
he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must
avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to
parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by
the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents.
And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he
had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively,
so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have
been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things
which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of
wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under
a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in
the Law.

Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love
is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of
love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the
precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.

Obj. 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the
Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems
that neither should any precept of fear have been given.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now, Israel,
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the
Lord thy God?" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do.
Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.

_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man
is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so
too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is
servile.

And just as according to what has been said (A. 1), in the
promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of
hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was
there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which
regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat
of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the
decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts
of the Law.

Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to
strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching
about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they
in the matter of fear.

On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort
of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of
all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of
filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because
each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to
which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage
quoted in the argument _On the contrary,_ man is required "to have
fear, to walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."

Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it
were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just
as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like
general principles of the whole Law.

Reply Obj. 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works
that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of
charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the
same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just
as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first
principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from
them proximately or remotely.

Reply Obj. 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption,
even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 3).
_______________________

QUESTION 23

OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;
(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be
fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its
acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.

The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,
considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation
to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is friendship?

(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is one virtue?

(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?

(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1]

Whether Charity Is Friendship?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For
nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's
friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is
of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay:
'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is
not friendship.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love
(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies,
according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is
not friendship.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there
are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the
delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the
friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his
letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the
Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn
together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,
not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the
study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the
virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship
based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).
Therefore charity is not friendship.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call
you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by
reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not
every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is
together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to
wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,
but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a
horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of
concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship
for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain
mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and
friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of
communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of
friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which
it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called
unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this
communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is
the friendship of man for God.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in
respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to
this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God
or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his
mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and
both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of
life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in
heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when
"His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc.
22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected
in heaven.

Reply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in
respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to
one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another,
as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he
loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected
with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for
their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate
us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to
our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom
the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

Reply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is
directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for
his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not
virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on
the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for
God's sake.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in
the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his
neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love.
Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he
says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was
said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in
the soul, but is God Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the
soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy
life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God
quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity,
according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to
life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.

Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the
contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed
it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings
the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not
something created in the soul.

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By
charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God
for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in
the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.
17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something
created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the
mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we
love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from
the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous
acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,
for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and
this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,
detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a
way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle
of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive
power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose
principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1):
so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which
involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an
act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will
in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an
instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,
nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again
the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has
been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is
the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy
Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should
be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the
principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to
their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is
inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He
"ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the
act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so
that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power,
inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect
than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it
be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue,
since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity
has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.
Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of
charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the
natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and
causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is
wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with
the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God
(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation
of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a
share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love
our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of
speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines
Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to
some an occasion of error.

Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by
charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the
life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is
immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form
depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore
it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an
infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,
this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of
charity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity
is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered
among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,
is charity a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is
not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is
a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us
to God, for by it we love Him."

_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated
by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
human reason and God.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of
virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows
that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites
us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that
friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or
with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about
works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect
from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another
person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship
considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of
a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).
Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of
itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and
virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit,
as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident
from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous,
as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore
friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather
than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it
is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the
goodness of God.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to
rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love
is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.
And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean
that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of
excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.

Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider
its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has
its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident
which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its
subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation
of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For
Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that
"virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in
the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be
a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed
it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all
your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now
Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love"
is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general
prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what
is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues,
viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special
virtue.

_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as
shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper
object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so
that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special
kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of
happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of
charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
Therefore charity is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue,
not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue
depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In
this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues,
as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on
prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last
end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other
ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of
horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object
the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows
that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding
them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command,
because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end,
according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits
are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one
another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit,
even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which
God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by
reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But
the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,
3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into
a number of various species.

_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the
object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of
the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore
charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine
goodness.

_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of
friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship
are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end,
and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely
friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous;
secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which
friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship
between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow
travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter
on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the
Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).

Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also
one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not
divided into several species.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were
equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of
charity for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore
charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely
God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give
glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with
love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary
and result from the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has
various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]

Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of
the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as
it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will,
since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the
intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less
excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is
beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according
to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to
be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
than charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of
these is charity."

_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which
is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human
acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3),
namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby,
even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological
virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their
object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual
virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that
among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to
that which attains God most.

Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues,
just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent
than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it
appoints the mean in human operations or passions.

Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the
thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the
will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of
the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of
the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is
the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the
soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves,
because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container
(De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul,
are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are
beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to
the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8):
whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God,
ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more
excellent than faith.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by
his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not
prove.

Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but
charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance
therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous,
as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of
arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7]

Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore
true virtue is possible without charity.

Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body
to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet
true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.

_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is
ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good
may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it
can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while
the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away
from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this
way no true virtue is possible without charity.

If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good
is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as
Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser,
whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through
fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he
curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,
whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he
goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,
45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a
true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final
and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one
is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is
always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.

There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as
stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is
possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not
perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable
principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or
chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by
charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation
to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,
as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as
charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since
then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way
the form of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making.
Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide
with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the
mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that
charity is the form of the virtues.

_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from
the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is
the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the
form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently,
in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs
give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has
been said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives
the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this
sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are
called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as
being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of
efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
aforesaid manner.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far
as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom,
and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character
of a material cause.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because
it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is
one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last
end.
_______________________

QUESTION 24

OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?

(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
gifts?

(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?

(5) Whether it increases by addition?

(6) Whether it increases by every act?

(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?

(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?

(9) Of the various degrees of charity;

(10) Whether charity can diminish?

(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?

(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is the Subject of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.
Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the
principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that
charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the
will.

_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also
the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its
subject.

_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2),
the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective
which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in
different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good
apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite
or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it
can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not
a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect
alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the
intellective appetite, i.e. the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of
the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2):
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good
which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the
will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not
by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and
transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The
charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not
in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its
rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship
of the will to the reason.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not
in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose.
For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of
the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the
last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in
the free-will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Caused in Us by Infusion?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
good," which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
infusion.

Obj. 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love
it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do
we need one in order to love God.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and
an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts.
Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
infusion.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God
is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), charity is a
friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect
does not transcend its cause.

Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the
participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Q.
23, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is
founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
fellowship, so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to
us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible
things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He
is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in
this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards
visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all
things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our
hearts.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a
pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must
be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things.
Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to
receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to
charity," and of a gloss on Matt. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
charity."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is Infused According to the Capacity of Our Natural
Gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matt. 25:15) that
"He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A.
7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
of his natural virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous
gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
to the capacity of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the
same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matt.
22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently
applies to man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth
where He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the
same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity,
but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.

_I answer that,_ The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause
of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater
effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature,
as stated above (A. 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on
the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy
Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the
Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according
to the measure of the giving of Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts
to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of
the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who
hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in
light."

Reply Obj. 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter.
In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for
grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6).
Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good
in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and
consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became
better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is
a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily
borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater
natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the
comparison fails.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Can Increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest
charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore
charity does not increase.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no
increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
Therefore charity cannot increase.

Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever
there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of
essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection."

_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the
affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and
this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to
God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that
it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the
way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he
says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
act.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its
essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its
subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to
act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to
produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases
essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject,
as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in
its subject.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Increases by Addition?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For
just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity
results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that
"increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the
increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by
addition.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 John 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in
a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.

Obj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the
causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the growth
of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity,
He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore
also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was
not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater
results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved
in _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does
not increase by addition.

_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so
that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless
capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is
added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose
the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.

Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric.
Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while
numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a
habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it
did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one
who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored
hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest
charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the
addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as
though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically
from that to which it is added.

It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place
by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
have held to be the case.

Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of
charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of
increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a
form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently,
since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a
form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject,
and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case
if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with
its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not
by charity being added to charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity,
it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this
way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in
animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is
distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it
has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of
intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to
rarefaction, as is proved in _Phys._ iv, 9. In like manner science,
as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it
increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an
accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its
subject, and in this way it increases in a man who knows the same
scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same
way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it
has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it
follows that it increases solely by being intensified.

Reply Obj. 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
forth the light of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state
of _having_ charity from the state of _not having it,_ so that
something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to _more having_ from
_less having,_ so that there is need, not for anything to be there
that was not there before, but for something to be more there that
previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by
the soul.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE

Whether Charity Increases Through Every Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act
of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less.
But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more
than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection
of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered
by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of
charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue.
Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase
of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.]
says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no
man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore
whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God.
Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ The effect does not surpass the power of its
cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or
slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity,
rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.

_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like
the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is
not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so
much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part
of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space
of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing
any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which
it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In
like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of
charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity,
in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again
according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out
into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity,
and then his charity increases actually.

Reply Obj. 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which,
however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
strive for that increase.

Reply Obj. 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each
act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
stone.

Reply Obj. 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual
increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 7]

Whether Charity Increases Indefinitely?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase
indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as
stated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, 9. But the increase of charity is a
movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity
does not increase indefinitely.

Obj. 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But
the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.

Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But
this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need
for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since
rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As,
therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the
charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow
that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is
absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I
had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if
I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if
he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.'
For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his
destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more
and more.

_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in
three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed
measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to
go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made,
another form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds
of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that
whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part
of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of
the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which
is not capable of ulterior perfection.

Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of
man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity
itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In
like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is
possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject,
no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity
increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a
further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to
fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.

Reply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is
not in this, but in a future life.

Reply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by
charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor.
6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of
receiving a further increase.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the
same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds:
thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity
of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which
follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
Hence the argument does not prove.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this
life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all
others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not
as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore
charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever
kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect,
cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world,
wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all
sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
(A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case
of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two
ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to
the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is
perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is
as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He
is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since
all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can
be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He
loves Himself.

On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he
loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a
man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this
life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is
impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love
towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give
his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except
in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the
perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not
common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his
whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring
anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common
to all who have charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which
the way leads."

Reply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
heaven.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply,
wherefore it can always increase.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9]

Whether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees,
Beginning,  Progress, and Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
Therefore it is not right to put only one.

Obj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to
be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
progressing and as beginning.

Obj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may
be, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to
increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
are unsuitably assigned to charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to
beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to
those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is
perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three
degrees of charity.

_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered
in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it
has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or
pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak
of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which
we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to
use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty
when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he
arrives at perfection.

In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished
according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the
increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy
himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences,
which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in
whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the
second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and
this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to
strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit
is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to
the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."

In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is
withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and
thirdly, rest in this term.

Reply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in
the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even
as every division of continuous things is included in these
three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher
states (De Coelo i, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may
progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins
which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they
come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection
with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the
other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who
built up Jerusalem.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is
not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards
union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek
this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the
beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing
in virtue.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10]

Whether Charity Can Decrease?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries
by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease
are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4),
it seems that it can also decrease.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." From this
it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity
quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides
God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes
the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man
turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity
in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity
into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less
charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in
preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares
himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.

_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire,
according to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are
fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts.
Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot
descend, i.e. decrease.

_I answer that,_ The quantity which charity has in comparison with
its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase,
as stated above (A. 4, ad 2).

Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53,
A. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship
(Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call
upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friendship."
Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause,
and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts
cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases
altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the
result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (A.
2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for
this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation
involves a sin.

The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by
way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.

It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But
mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but
destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way
of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against
charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.

In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial
sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love
for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act
as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people
sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to
their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false
opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the
certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit
diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he
does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not
turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he
that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does
not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the
last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption
may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are
venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of
charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject
stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal
relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument
does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in
creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,
as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e.
less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing
charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must
understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that
which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually
though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,
which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot
diminish charity, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore
that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on
the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11]

Whether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It?

Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is
born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of
God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be
not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a
letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true."
[*The quotation is from _De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam
comitem,_ vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly
known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was
no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot
lose it.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great
things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.

Obj. 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some
motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
cannot be lost.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat
against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."

_I answer that,_ The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown
above (A. 2; QQ. 23, 24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in
three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul
to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin
through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He
wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true
at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain
man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose
charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings
of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,"
as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De
Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin
at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good,
as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which
is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of
form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view
of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be
in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not
entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the
forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such
things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the
potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not
completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be
lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a
celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,
so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,
is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the
blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational
mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is
possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the
wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because
the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is
not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is
lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs
to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste
judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human
mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual
disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as
a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is
inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity
cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God
is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity
of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence,
which is the essence of goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the
power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills
to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

Reply Obj. 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no
true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the
changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity
included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose,
which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great
things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for
sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 12]

Whether Charity Is Lost Through One Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one
mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has
mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that
he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so
gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing
charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (lx) addresses
Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an
averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De
Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter
was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying
Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a
habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now,
seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
above (A. 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal
good.

Obj. 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end.
Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin
has been committed.

_On the contrary,_ By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal
death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the
other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it
is written (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My
Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in
which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John
17:3: "This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true
God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy,
at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it
is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore
charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
very nature is capable of destroying charity.

If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of
its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin,
for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the
endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of
its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is
not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends
on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the
infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion
of light in the air, as stated above (A. 10, Obj. 3). Consequently,
just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle
placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once
to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the
outpouring of charity by God into the soul.

Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of
charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to
God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it
follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal
sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is
enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's
absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place
but by aversion of the will."

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way,
that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so
far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3).
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin
if he commits it.

Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we
may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied
and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin
through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by
actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity,
through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against
charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered
it.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to
the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only
such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.

Reply Obj. 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope
do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated
above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even
as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Q. 23, A.
8).
_______________________

QUESTION 25

OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will
be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The
order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there
are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we
love our neighbor also?

(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?

(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?

(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?

(5) Whether one's own body?

(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?

(7) Whether sinners love themselves?

(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?

(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?

(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?

(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord
thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now
the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.
10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as
_latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
_dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
from that with which we love our neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2.
Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we
have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q.
54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the
same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its
object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity
that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the
object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is
specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and
whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.

Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in
two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as
when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of
God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising
the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for
its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God,
as neither is such like love.

Reply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the
honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition
of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on
account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so
long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is
distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which
is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according
to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular
honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he
loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in
the two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them
includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor.
Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness,
as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot participate in
happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an
accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
essential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore
charity need not be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves
his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love
our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also
is loved out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature
of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason
of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is
a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore
from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.

Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two
ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved
out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all
those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and
to the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we
love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and
our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life,
whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which
we desire for all whom we love out of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those
with whom we are friends.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He
loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should
love irrational creatures out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends
to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance
of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they
bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore
charity extends also to irrational creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes
and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that
walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to
irrational creatures.

_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and
our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational
life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.
1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our
friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which
we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational
creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of
these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have
an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is
towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we
cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not
competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to
the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of
its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such
like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship
is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to
friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human
life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational
creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third
reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship
of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot
attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an
irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far,
to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's
use; thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does:
and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have
a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison
fails.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself
out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that
there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has
charity towards himself.

Obj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love
and equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards
himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23,
A. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.

Obj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy,
since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man
deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim.
3:1, 2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we
must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself,
but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas
a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with
which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if
we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do
unto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ ix, 4, 8, that "the origin
of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to
ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something
greater than science, namely understanding.

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man
himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he
loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also
himself out of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far
as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they
humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational
nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to
the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through
charity that a man loves himself.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Body Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out
of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be
with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in
the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards
those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love
us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23, 26) that
there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among
them he reckons our own body.

_I answer that,_ Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of
sin and its punishment.

Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for
the removal of such things.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his
body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would
not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape
from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from
the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to
hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of
this death."

Reply Obj. 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing
and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are
able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine
states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a
fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of
charity.

Reply Obj. 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for
another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 6]

Whether We Ought to Love Sinners Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust."
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated
rather than loved, out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou
shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out
of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and
wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the
same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor
to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore
sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to _Ethic._ viii. But we ought not to associate with
sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them."
Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that
"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that
we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not
cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought
to love sinners out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his
nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God,
he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity
is based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought
to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle
to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to
hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his
being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of
charity, for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object
of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is
perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them
with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent
to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to
charity.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our
friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than
money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great
wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them
friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws
command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is
greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending
their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of
hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of
which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.
Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he
be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not
converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the
sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.

Reply Obj. 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy
Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction,
not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that
is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of
wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to
Ps. 57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,"
since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the
destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them,
but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is
just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is
referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself,
to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man
may live.

Reply Obj. 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what
they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is
written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt
not to be turned to them."

Reply Obj. 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on
account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.
But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is
no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matt.
9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards
fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out
from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by
consenting to sin.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 7]

Whether Sinners Love Themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that
which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love
of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners
most of all love themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping
with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance,
the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love
themselves.

Obj. 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore
many sinners love themselves.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul."

_I answer that,_ Love of self is common to all, in one way; in
another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to
the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he
thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways:
first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all
think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and
body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love
themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some
predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the
state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In
this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the
reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive
and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the
Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2
Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the
inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way
they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the
wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward
man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not
themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what
they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and
therefore truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to
be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he
does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in
almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to
the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its
integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods,
indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in
entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts
in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,
all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no
clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.

On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for
him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in
their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever
they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor
do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of
conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set
before thy face."

In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves,
as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not
love themselves thus.

Reply Obj. 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that
which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God,"
as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire
external goods as to despise spiritual goods.

Reply Obj. 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by
wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as
they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but
apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love
our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its
application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us
our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,
because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins."
Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.

Obj. 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now
everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary,
as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not
make us love our enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's
friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): "Thou
lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee."
Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 4:44): "Love your enemies."

_I answer that,_ Love of one's enemies may be understood in three
ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is
perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that
which is evil in another.

Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we
should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,
we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor
in general.

Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially
directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of
love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely,
because it does not require that we should have a special movement of
love to every individual man, since this would be impossible.
Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being
prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies
individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should
actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being
necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For
since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the
more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love
towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we
would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This
is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the
First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.

Reply Obj. 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now
our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself
should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They
are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness:
and it is as such that we are bound to love them.

Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does
not do this, as stated above.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation That We Should Show Our Enemies
the Signs and Effects of Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his
enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18):
"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."
Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects
of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such
signs and effects of love.

Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt. 5:44): "Love
your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity
demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we
should "do good to them."

Obj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of
charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),
that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great
things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence
charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But
charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he
be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and
effects of love towards our enemies.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate
you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to
do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not
require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

_I answer that,_ The effects and signs of charity are the result of
inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely
necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly
love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8).

We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and
signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to
our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or
for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole
community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should
show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we
did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to
what is written (Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of
the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of
love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not
necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and
signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for
instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according
to Prov. 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he
thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such
like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby
we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but
also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to
perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on
account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to
love us on account of our kindliness.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 10]

Whether We Ought to Love the Angels Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels
out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity
is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of
the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are
created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of
our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.
Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the
angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.
But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3).
Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship
with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our
companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give
them the friendship of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the
name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those
who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our
neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many
merciful favors."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of
charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in
which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt.
22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of
God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of
charity extends also to the angels.

Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a
common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.

Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate
genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers
of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of
our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist
in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive
nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in
this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1).
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 11]

Whether We Are Bound to Love the Demons Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of
charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their
fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in
our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and
understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the
matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves
the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also
out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
passage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful
to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love
the demons out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 28:18): "Your league with
death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not
stand." Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through
charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who
live in hell and compass death.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound,
out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name
of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore
demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying
stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called
demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in
accordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may
be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as
the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have
the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential
part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's
friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the
good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those
spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in
opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His
justice.

Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be
enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures
out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory
to God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way
too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as
much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts,
unto God's glory.

Reply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not
impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;
consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the
fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of
nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.

Reply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility
of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in
hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.

Reply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to
their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this
leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their
perverse intention to our profit.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 12]

Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of
Charity, Viz. God, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor,
our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.
lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of
oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is
not distinct from the love of God.

Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.
But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since
then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from
the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man
loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with
which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not
rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There
are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God,
"another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely
our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friendship of
charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this
fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which
happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes
of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which
happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to
be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various
things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since
the relation between the human lover and God is different from his
relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of
love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other,
so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

Reply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be
capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable
mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves
himself in one way, and his own body in another.

Reply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to
his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore,
on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him;
and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.
_______________________

QUESTION 26

OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY
(In Thirteen Articles)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an order in charity?

(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?

(3) Whether more than himself?

(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?

(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one
who is more closely united to him?

(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
one who is united to him by other ties?

(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
father?

(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?

(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?

(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
whom we are kind to?

(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Order in Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For
charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so
is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,
therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,
not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be
ascribed to charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the
terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle.
Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or
after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also
order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25,
A. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of
happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is
based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved
out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of
that love, which is God.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last
end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q.
23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of
appetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A.
1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First
Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order
in reference to the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation
depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,
charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the
soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things
themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is
more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and
to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in
this way that order is stated to be in charity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than
our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not
his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?"
Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more
lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._
ix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is
less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:
"Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his
neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of
charity, more than he loves God.

Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according
to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in
Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be
loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love
God more than our neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to
be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's
sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke
14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be
My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more
than our neighbor.

_I answer that,_ Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject
in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that
friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler
of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends;
hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now
the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness,
which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it
flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of
charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our
neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness
from Him.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being
the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since
each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a
thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way
that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were
lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we
are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more
visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with
it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.
For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first
lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those
things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves
not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor
is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our
love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the
likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we
share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we
become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we
ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in
all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in
anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally
with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by
participation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to
love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)
that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly
relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.
Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his
friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more
than God.

Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.
Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself
which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the
reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves
himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
love God more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.
But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this
is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not
bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of
Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take
offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a
thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God
more than himself.

_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
God above all things and more than himself, but also every single
creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by
a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones
do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each
part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own
particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the
principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive
to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues
whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own
property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much
more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which
is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common
good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the
universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share
of that happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations
towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of
friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as
becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to
itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of
God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of
friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the
Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying
Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His
Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to
love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of
charity is God, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now
sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are
ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid
injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his
neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss
for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of
charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its
own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.
Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his
neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it
seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love
for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of
charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature
and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason
of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated
above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of
charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated
above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on
which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity,
loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid
good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that
good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain
union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union,
the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more
potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with
him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love
himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to
give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of
happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from
its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that
has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way
on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God,
yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man
is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his
neighbor more than himself.

Reply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's
sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his
spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue,
which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought
not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from
sin, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying,
"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the
private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the
individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is
more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as
stated above (A. 3).
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his
neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his
neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more
than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's
body more than his own.

Obj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his
neighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to
his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more
than our neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake
of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own
body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect,
according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a
man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound,
out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we
ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."

_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has
more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above
(A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of
happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater
reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of
overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore,
as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more
than our own body.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing
seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that
we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to
his soul, which is his predominant part.

Reply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our
neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as
regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more
closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

Reply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care
of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps
in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a
man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a
case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own
accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection
of charity.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6]

Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor
more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One
ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to
all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time
or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely
united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than
another.

Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and
the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God,
as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to
love all our neighbors equally.

Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
neighbors equally.

_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate
to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.
Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain
neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment
(Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him
die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for
some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our
neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the
outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who
are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and
not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement
that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the
inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is
becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination
also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be
proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly,
so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards
those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought
to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1),
wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that
principle.

Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of
the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally
out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,
namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not
to love all equally.

Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As
regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because
we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not
to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some
more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter
inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
beneficence.

Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some
are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we
ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to
Him.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the
part of the good which we wish our friends.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]

Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are
More Closely United Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better
more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is
in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for
some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black
mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for
some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and
hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful
for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who
are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God
loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought
to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to
him.

Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most
which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by
natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by
nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship
of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has
more to do with better men than with those who are more closely
united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men
more than those who are more closely connected with us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of
charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity
regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.

_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object
and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while,
from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus
movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the
intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved
and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from
its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.

Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.
Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his
relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater
good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity
wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it
has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it
belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in
accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.
And this regards the species of love; for there are different species
of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom
we love.

On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to
the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more
closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he
wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater
good he wishes for them.

Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors
are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which
cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.
But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come
and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10,
11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man
who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so
reach a higher degree of happiness.

Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we
love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love
them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us
we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are
connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to
the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which
every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to
its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that
charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art
which is about the end commands the art which is about the means.
Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or
connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any
like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded
by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we
love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their
kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and
God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according
to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."

Reply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making
man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is
His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to
us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the
goodness of the will.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the
object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is
that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8]

Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties
of Blood?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who
are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written
(Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than
a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv
7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to
the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that
as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract
the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we
ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties
of blood.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we
ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.

Obj. 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom.
in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than
our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than
his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
all.

_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a
special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12).
Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us
by ties of blood.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to
love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different
persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is
more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of
which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should
compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that
friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by
natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic
fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side
on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to
nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning
relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and
on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people
such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the
principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a
wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our
parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."

The same applies to other kinds of friendship.

If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.

Reply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates
through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the
love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for
instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more
stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
the providing of necessaries.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom
he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom
he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer
rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not
simply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on
fellowship in battle.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9]

Whether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than
His Father?

Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to
whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good
to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.
12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but
the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his
children more than his parents.

Obj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more
than his parents.

Obj. 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
ought to love our children more than our parents.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We
ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and
lastly those of our household."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of
love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the
object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to
God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love
his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his
father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good
and more like God.

Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the
love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for
himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is
their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to
their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them
to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because
parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at
once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of
time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to
Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be
like to him."

Reply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect
and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and
care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in
honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
care.

Reply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children
more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we
consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his
father more.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves
us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to
the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to
be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless
in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received
to provide for his parents before all.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives
his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more
from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to
love her more than him.

Obj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
knows more surely than the father who are her children."

Obj. 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father
in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a
man ought to love his mother more than his father.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to
love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions
the mother afterwards.

_I answer that,_ In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether
the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as
mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference
in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed,
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen,
Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked
children."

Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
father is to be loved more.

Reply Obj. 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though
this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the
matter of the body to receive that form.

Reply Obj. 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
through being begotten of them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 11]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Wife More Than His Father and Mother?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more
than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another
unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gen. 2:24) that "a
man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore
a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should
"love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than
his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his
parents.

Obj. 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons
for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of
a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12)
that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure,
and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a
man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his
parents.

_On the contrary,_ According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their
wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less
than his neighbor, as stated above (A. 5): and among his neighbors he
should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
more than his wife.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the degrees of love may be
taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
his principles and considered as a more exalted good.

But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more,
because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to
Matt. 19:6: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh."
Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents
with greater reverence.

Reply Obj. 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and
mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to
succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
connection and co-habitation.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought
to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
him.

Reply Obj. 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his
father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are
more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the
latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.

As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12]

Whether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has
Benefited?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor
more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.
iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love
him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses
to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore
we ought to love our benefactors above all.

Obj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man
or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a
more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those
to whom we are kind.

Obj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and
then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that
"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather
than vice versa."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle
of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by
four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the
handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He
was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own
work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and
the reason is that we love _to be_ and _to live,_ and these are made
manifest in our _action._ Secondly, because we all naturally love
that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor
has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the
recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his
virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful
good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's
virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more
enduring,--for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of
calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it
present--and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods
than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it
the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more
difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of
things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what
comes easy to us.

Reply Obj. 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the
recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
through another.

Reply Obj. 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more
of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.

Reply Obj. 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents
love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow
that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our
benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents,
from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we
have bestowed lesser benefits.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 13]

Whether the Order of Charity Endures in Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure
in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect
charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods
less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will
love those who are better more than either himself or those who are
connected with him.

Obj. 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now
each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's
will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in
heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he
loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with
him, more than one who is.

Obj. 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for
then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so
that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is
not connected with him, more than one who is.

_On the contrary,_ Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory.
Now the order of charity given above (AA. 2, 3, 4) is derived from
nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.

_I answer that,_ The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above (AA. 7, 9), the degrees of
love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the
perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the
blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to
Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of
merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible
for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man,
whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits
determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more
than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of
love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (AA.
7, 9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed
by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind
to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in
the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and
even work for that end according to his capacity.

As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be
nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will
no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein
each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him
rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their
distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of
charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he
is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of
charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in
several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of
virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet
all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken
from nighness to God.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are
connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect
of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.

Reply Obj. 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love,
for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's
reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should
love himself more than all else after God.
_______________________

QUESTION 27

OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?

(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?

(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?

(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?

(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?

(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?

(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy?

(8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]

Whether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those
who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more
loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to
be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is
better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in
keeping with charity.

Obj. 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so."
Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.
Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you
love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather
than in loving.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that
friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity
is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than
in being loved.

_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the
person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent
to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as
another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is
clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for
that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more
competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of
something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the
fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved,
indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly,
because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love
than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love
them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not
to be loved."

Reply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable;
but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more,
however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does
not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much
as he ought to be loved.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to
be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is
bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in
him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good
alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored,
for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is
in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek
to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good
of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
loved.

Reply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be
loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
leading a man to love.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]

Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As
Goodwill?

Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is
goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should
wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and
to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the
fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,
that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain
to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill
is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
charity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.

_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs
from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive
appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For
the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every
passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of
love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration
of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the
difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says
(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire,
that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the
sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again
such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill
sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a
boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love,
which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill,
because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover
and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards
him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby
we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union
of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an
act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds
union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)
that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not
describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.

Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the
good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.

Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.

Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1,
and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary
on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.
ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear
shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems
that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some
evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.

_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to
enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be
enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved
for Himself.

_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of
causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal,
efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to
be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According
to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for
another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for
instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man
for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good
and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love
certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such
a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the
genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that
which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors
received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend,
we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.
Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for
anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything
else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor
does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very
substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other
good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else,
but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can
be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain
things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by
Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the
punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.

Reply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what
it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for
its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.

Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them,
but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for
thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is
indeed the Saviour of the world."

Reply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]

Whether God Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in
this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since
"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12).
Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But
man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isa.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now
sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is
less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.

_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said
to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor.
13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage
(1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God
immediately.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the
act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the
knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in
respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power
follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things
are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term
of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves
God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand,
with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God
through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by
way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
I, Q. 12, A. 12).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is
known through another thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know
Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not
rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love
begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular
movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to
God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to
creatures.

Reply Obj. 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is
removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5]

Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2]

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.

Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God,
because "God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God
cannot be loved wholly.

Obj. 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved
wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly
loved by a creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between
lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the
question may be understood in three ways, first so that the
qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God
is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.

Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the
lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought
to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love
of God, according to Deut. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with thy whole heart."

Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to
the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the
thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in
proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His
goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely,
because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is
finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]

Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in
loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and
order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love
of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above
all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a
mode of the love of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would
be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were
one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure
which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of
the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the
cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."

_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above
(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which
determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing
measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure
essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and
modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is
found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.
Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the
thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure,
whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be
taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).
Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their
mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is
endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus
the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect
as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not
give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so
that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be
immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of
God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little,
but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where
the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we
love God the better our love is.

Reply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of
that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of
our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to
love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
which is proper to the measure.

Reply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to
reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the
Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore
it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity
between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the
interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's
ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior
acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both
according to charity and according to reason.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?

Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving
of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves,
to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to
be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it
is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.

_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it
is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love
a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy
who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend
than to love one's enemy.

_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked
which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's
enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the
reason for which we love him.

In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so
that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of
love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its
opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.

In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than
one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible
to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the
only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose
that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it
throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is
proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the
things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so
much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable
matter.

Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near
than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor
those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in
this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more
ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict
sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's
sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this
would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that
we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is
meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.

The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said
in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the
reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part
of those who are loved.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love
God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem
to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love
of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it
is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

Obj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious
to love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now God is our chief
friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it
seems less meritorious to love God.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous
and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and
good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's
neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor
than to love God.

_On the contrary,_ That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by
reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God
is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.

_I answer that,_ This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love
of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its
own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom
the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to
him that loves God (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved
of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on
the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the
other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while
love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the
comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our
neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this
commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his
brother" (1 John 4:21).

Reply Obj. 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire
this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in
a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state
of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.

We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For
he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which
pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in
his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.

Reply Obj. 3: The _good_ has, more than the _difficult,_ to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
_______________________

QUESTION 28

OF JOY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the effects which result from the principal act
of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the
exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered:
(1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?

(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?

(3) Whether this joy can be full?

(4) Whether it is a virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 1]

Whether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But
God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in
this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent
from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us
rather than joy.

Obj. 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matt. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above (Q. 17, A. 6). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom.
12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17:
"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and
joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but
in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the
presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing
loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in
the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of
his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from
love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the
loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or
afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is
unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that
He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent
effect, according to 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy, which is
about God, is caused by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He
is present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle
goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight."
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.

Reply Obj. 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those
things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the
same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about
God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.

Reply Obj. 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us.
The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly:
while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward
to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether
perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's
charity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]

Whether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible
with an Admixture of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,
6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without
charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and
to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom.
Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16:
"Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity
is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity;
and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself.
This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even
as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of
evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord
always."

The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves
for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either
in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.

Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some
evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign
good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he
is hindered from participating in the Divine good.

Reply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa.
59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from
participating in the Divine good.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a
fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for
the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a
participation of the Divine good.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 3]

Whether the Spiritual Joy Which Proceeds from Charity, Can Be Filled?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it
is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is
greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a
creature.

Obj. 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature
is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:11): "That
My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."

_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first,
on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as
much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy
alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is
condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any
creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be
understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared
to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1,
2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when
there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains
nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the
movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains
possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown
above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has
been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there
will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he
had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5:
"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at
rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the
joy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since
they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant
by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet,
since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it
follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on
the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter
into the joy of thy Lord."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to
the thing in which we rejoice.

Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the
term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term,
some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy
will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully
set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account
of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect
of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There
is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as
we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you
may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which
is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,
nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is
evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is
an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an
inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same
habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of
which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not
proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,
hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that
preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the
virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions
(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the
appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the
same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,
and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but
from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct
from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it
is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate
self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of
the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was
necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,
because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On
the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely
charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated
above (here and A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is
accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love
any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
_______________________

QUESTION 29

OF PEACE (Four Articles)

We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?

(2) Whether all things desire peace?

(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?

(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]

Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well
ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than
that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that
peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the
same as concord.

Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves
identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace,
viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the
God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as
concord.

_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.
But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace
is not the same as concord.

_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.
Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace,
wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to
the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to
diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the
diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends
sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite,
according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit."
Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to
diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same
time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the
appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,
because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he
wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for
him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other
hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord
denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace
denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even
in one man.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is
between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered,
through one man agreeing with another in respect of something
befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not
of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear
of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace,
because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is
disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises
that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in
all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.

Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with
another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.

Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]

Whether All Things Desire Peace?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the
same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.

Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain
peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.
10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.

Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign
good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it
is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command
(Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).

_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain
thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in
consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining
it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that
whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,
to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."

Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or
rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence
Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of
connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites
proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural
appetites.

Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing
but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated
above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter
to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to
break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as
the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good
apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can
be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so
as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many
defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.
Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace
of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore
it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of
ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."

Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true
good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is
a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the
rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in
thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this
world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God,
yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the
peace.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens
sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of
their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from
one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the
effect of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different
things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17:
"And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the
effect of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
that love Thy Law."

_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A.
1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to
one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being
united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's
will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of
friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4),
and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same
things" (Sallust, Catilin.)

Reply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making
him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not
cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good.
Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely
apparentapparent.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not
agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and
especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if
there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to
some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such
a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks
that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight
matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect
peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire
fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether Peace Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you"
(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is
meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
peace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which
are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.
But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts
all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not
two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction:
and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God
and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of
charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is
placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of
its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in
respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect
of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
_______________________

QUESTION 30

OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity
or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand
either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for
the virtue.]
(In Four Articles)

We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?

(2) To whom does it belong to pity?

(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?

Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1,
ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now
fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not
excite mercy.

Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for
pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive
of mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is
a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is
the motive of mercy.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a
man's compassionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness.
Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to
beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for,
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has
whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other
hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he
wishes not.

Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural
appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a
man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a
thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat
what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.

Accordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to
_misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's
natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the
contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether
corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more
provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice,
wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our
pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns
out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet
greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil
befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one
who suffers undeservedly."

Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in
this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having
something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it
may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we
pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in
Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but
compassionate," and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus
"seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were
distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."

Reply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is
directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered
to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus.
30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3,
ad 1].

Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in
ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to
us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents,
we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in
which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."

Reply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the
recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are
present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so
far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies
are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a
defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.

Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in
whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in
a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason
for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Obj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not
a defect in the person who pities.

_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the
reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to
sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2).
Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as
stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
one's own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks
upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his
own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt
himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with
one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the
Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep."

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to
them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may
happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who
consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and
timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem
themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no
danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering
in the same way.

Reply Obj. 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as
He loves us as belonging to Him.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear
to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this
applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent
on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of
others.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through
having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are
incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the
human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think
that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the
same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not
compassionate but disdainful."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled"
(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called
a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of
Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of
doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the
mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way."
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore
mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they
result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now
mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we
weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.
Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is
not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object,
neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to
justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of
the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in
praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at
once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when
he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful
than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now
this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive
appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,
in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective
appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.
This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in
accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of
the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the
reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is
safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."
And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the
soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59,
AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying
to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it
impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,
considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one
another on the part of their respective estimation of another's
evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it
esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well
with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from
the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking,
however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state
further on (Q. 36, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which
is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other
virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,
namely the misery of the person pitied.

Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue
having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called
nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet.
ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but
as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet
nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in
which case they assume the character of a virtue.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.
For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is
preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.
12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is
the greatest virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is profitable
to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of
life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life
embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is
contained in mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"
according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man
like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for
being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since
of God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all
His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as
your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of
virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye
on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds
(Col. 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not
the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In
itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to
mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others
in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence
mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His
omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth
Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,
surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone
above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to
supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy
is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The
throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV,
Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity
which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies
the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to
our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all
others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply
the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

Reply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not
for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in
order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,
whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to
Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being,
according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for
by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."

Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in
mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,
whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy
for our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the
bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as
regards similarity of works.
_______________________

QUESTION 31

OF BENEFICENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity,
(1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence,
(3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more
closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]

Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.
For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But
this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
liberality and not of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or
as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this
respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is
either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an
act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of
friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to
one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to
others.

_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if
possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of
an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore
beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or
charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the
superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to
honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to
bestow good things on us.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence
belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract
from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend
something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove
the perfection of his friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to All?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.
For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to
do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good, and
receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need
not do good to all.

Obj. 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to
do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding
communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of
charity, we ought not to do good to all.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have
time, let us work good to all men."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an
effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the
inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,
because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior
in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since
the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to
all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of
virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to
every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be
bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds
us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind
to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a
good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to
all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as
for the faithful.

Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his
nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the
maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
would be to do evil rather than good.

Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal
are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from
doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor
lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in
danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like
distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
United to Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Luke
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely
united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather
who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to
those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest
a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.

Obj. 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very
great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.

Obj. 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who
have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our
benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.

Obj. 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
children, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 9). Yet a man ought to be more
beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay
up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not
bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to
us.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since
one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by
reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance
are more closely united to us."

_I answer that,_ Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which
is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as
Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is
an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters,
and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various
ways according to these various connections, because we ought in
preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the
matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with
us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of
time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought,
for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than
one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our
friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they
may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity
but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather
to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be
understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those
rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be
more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to
help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want
as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a
prudent man.

Reply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good
of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to
endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as
a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country
as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which
should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as
belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may
have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he
has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in
deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he
owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance
the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take
another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,
again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress:
in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be
weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would
take into consideration, because, on account of the different
particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is
impossible to lay down a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral
equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor
confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his
parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give
the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the
other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other
circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In
other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit
received; and here again no general rule can laid down.

Reply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love
tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to
honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it
would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,
to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the
obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have
received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Beneficence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For
precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men
virtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt.
4:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed
to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our
neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
beneficence is a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas
there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the
various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue
from charity.

_On the contrary,_ The internal and the external act do not require
different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as
external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of
goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from
charity, so neither is beneficence.

_I answer that,_ Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect
of good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a
distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of
virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of
habits, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we
consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to
love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to
be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under
certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
various kinds of benefits.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
_______________________

QUESTION 32

OF ALMSDEEDS
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

(2) Of the different kinds of alms;

(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?

(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?

(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?

(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?

(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?

(8) Who can give alms?

(9) To whom should we give alms?

(10) How should alms be given?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of
justice and not of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an
act of charity, but of religion.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for
a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: "He that hath the
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall
put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"

_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards
the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion
and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in
Greek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even
as the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity,
as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that
almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having
the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of
reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak
of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of
justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.
with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be
without the virtue.

Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue
being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it
to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far
as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a
sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
them more than one ought.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]

Whether the Different Kinds of Almsdeeds Are Suitably Enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds,
namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe
the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the
captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the
following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe,
harbor or bury."

Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the
ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to
reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who
trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in
the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon,
forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and
instruction.

And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead
man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have
spoken truly when He said (Matt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who
kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The
quotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in
enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the
dead (Matt. 25:35, 36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), the purpose of giving alms
is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human
life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man
needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs
riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.

Obj. 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect.
But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who
is ignorant of what he knows himself.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that
hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him
that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful
bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share
his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an
opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned
for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with
him the cause of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are
suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have
abundance or insufficiency.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably
taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect
the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others
affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal
need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs
during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things
needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some
accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal
or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid
food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have _to feed the hungry;_
while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in
respect of this we have _to give drink to the thirsty._ The common
need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of
clothing, and as to this we have _to clothe the naked:_ while the
other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have _to
harbor the harborless._ Again if the need be special, it is either
the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have _to
visit the sick,_ or it results from an external cause, and then we
have _to ransom the captive._ After this life we give _burial to the
dead._

In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
_prayer,_ whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by _instructing,_
and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by
_counselling._ Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the
appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by
_comforting._ Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate
act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First,
in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his
inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of _reproof._
Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be
committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by _pardoning the
injury,_ while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is
not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii,
15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on
account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with
him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied
by _bearing with him,_    especially with regard to those who sin out
of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to
bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their
being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly
actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them,
according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens."

Reply Obj. 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body
could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do";
and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with
the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly
necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done
with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose
respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a
man's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness
which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that
some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who
buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).

Reply Obj. 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and
lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to
support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like
manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the
purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason
for special mention of this particular need.

Reply Obj. 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the
act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to
the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil
of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov.
27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses
of an enemy."

Reply Obj. 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is
about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]

Whether Corporal Alms Are of More Account Than Spiritual Alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account
than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to
one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised
because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is
relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit
which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of
more account.

Obj. 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the
kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Luke 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are
rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again." Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom": and he who teaches another, makes progress in
knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore
corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

Obj. 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7):
"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now
a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a
spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than
spiritual almsdeeds.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on
the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Matt. 5:42): "You
should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when
you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of
justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what
is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks
unjustly." Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual
almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.

_I answer that,_ There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds.
First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the
first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more
excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal
gift, according to Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake
not My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the
spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in
looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his
body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to
love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our
neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than
corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case,
when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a
man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the
Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is
better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.

Reply Obj. 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want,
other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and
is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.

Reply Obj. 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if
it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not
detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the
less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it is with
spiritual almsdeeds.

Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not
detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.

Reply Obj. 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the
will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it
rests when it is inordinate.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]

Whether Corporal Almsdeeds Have a Spiritual Effect?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a
spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual
goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no
spiritual effect.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one
ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.

Obj. 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If
therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all."
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man
. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."

_I answer that,_ Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have
merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's
corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their
cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God
and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual
fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy
brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most
High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold."

Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have
a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the
above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the
poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their
substance.

Reply Obj. 2: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual
thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things
infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]

Whether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of
precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now
almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my
counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem
thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.

Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is
his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter
of precept.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave
an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can
always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in
some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be
needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it
seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Obj. 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

_On the contrary,_ No man is punished eternally for omitting to do
what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matt. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.

_I answer that,_ As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,
whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a
matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that
not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his
well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor
in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's
well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done
by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that
all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is
necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right
reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into
consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on
the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted
that he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: "That
which remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference
not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the
individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in
which case we have the expression "necessary to the person" [*The
official necessities of a person in position] taking the word
"person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of
all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge,
and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus
nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the
upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.

On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in
need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it
is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we
are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who
could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases
the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou
hast not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon _Pasce,_ dist.
lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are
bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose
need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good,
is a matter of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's
Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did
not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter
of precept.

Reply Obj. 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to
the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone
but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have
over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give
alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise--on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge
with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly
occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow,
which Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. 6:34), but he should judge
what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably
and generally occur.

Reply Obj. 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the
precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that
thou mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*_Pietas,_ whence our English
word "Piety." Cf. also inf. Q. 101, A. 2.]
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]

Whether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of
what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only
as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our
interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of
charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the
order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than
his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of
what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders
his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of what
he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the
care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that
gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but
also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he
needs.

_I answer that,_ A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because
without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to
give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance,
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had
merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others
under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of
others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to
him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen,
supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a
great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would
be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life and the lives of those
who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the
common good is to be preferred to one's own.

Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not
an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's
property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one
might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the
decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is
good to give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not
of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent
that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping
with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man
ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to
the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life,
for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his
possessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by
transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he
deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life,
can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer
extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme
indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common
weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.

The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]

Whether One May Give Alms Out of Ill-gotten Goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.

Obj. 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden
(Deut. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God:
"Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house
of . . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are
ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take
such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give."
And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby
the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is
lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods.

Obj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon _Pasce_ dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not
to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from
interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the
Body of Christ."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the
first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from
whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained
possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of
such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.

Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene
the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not
to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar
cases of illegal giving and receiving.

Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case
of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the
Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in
taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in
alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's
property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are
fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be
amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in
_De Quaest. Ev._ ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for
those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or,
according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, "Make unto
yourselves friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws
our affections by the various allurements of wealth." Or, because
"among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one
who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing
about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all
riches are styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality,"
because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in
need, and another in affluence.

Reply Obj. 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of
the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made
therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through
reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of
the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary
to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play,
and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to
restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms.
Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against
the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits.
Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are
subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude,
it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make
restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom
prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in
which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not
deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has
won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case
he ought to give it away in alms.

Reply Obj. 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme
necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's
goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is
willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take
something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in
need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the
owner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme
necessity.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]

Whether One Who Is Under Another's Power Can Give Alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to
whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to
give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as
Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index
to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim.
4:8: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things':
The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty
by all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.

Obj. 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gen. 3:16). But
a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is
related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*_Sponsus._ The matrimonial institutions of the
Romans were so entirely different from ours that _sponsus_ is no
longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."]
Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under
another's power.

Obj. 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give
alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they
are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily
use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to
profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can
give alms.

Obj. 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according
to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now
they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and
this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them.
Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.

_On the contrary,_ Alms should not be given out of another's
property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his
own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who
are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of
another's property. Therefore those who are under another's power
cannot give alms.

_I answer that,_ Anyone who is under another's power must, as such,
be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the
natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to
its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is
subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the
superior's permission.

Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in
so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by
his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monastery, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor
does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated
in _De Eccles. Dogm._ lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's
property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give
all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to
be needy with Christ."

Reply Obj. 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which
is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property
be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give
alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's permission:
yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she
impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without
the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of
necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet
in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.

Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any
particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to
the Fourth Objection is clear.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 9]

Whether One Ought to Give Alms to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
United to Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do
good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens
sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and
ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to
others.

Obj. 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal
reward in return, according to Matt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth
in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly
by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9:
"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall
fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings," which passage
Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who
succor them in their needs?" Therefore alms should be given to the
more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to
us.

Obj. 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it
falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of
those who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter
we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of
connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one
who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful
to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to
us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no
special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very
urgent need.

Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal
reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect
an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of
charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in
preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be
in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own
family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly,
almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the
recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that
Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does
not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when
he gives to others.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 10]

Whether Alms Should Be Given in Abundance?

Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in
abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most
closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a
way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says
(De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to
others.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result
if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much,
give abundantly."

_I answer that,_ Alms may be considered abundant in relation either
to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when
that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give
thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Luke 21:3, 4) commended the
widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had."
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A. 9).

On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to
give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor.
13:3): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which
words a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving
alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit
many."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding
the needs of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the
part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who
slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household
cares might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).

Reply Obj. 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on
account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more
daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose
says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should
take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the
shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has
fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own."

With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer
to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the
same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give
in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes
them so to give that they lack not for themselves."
_______________________

QUESTION 33

OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?

(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?

(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?

(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?

(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?

(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 1]

Whether Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of
zeal for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity.
Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
justice.

Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition.
Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for
a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now
it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2:
"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with
him, is not an act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed.
But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.

_I answer that,_ The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which
should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be
considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner,
secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or
scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the
justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.

Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's
good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of
which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external
loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of
virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of
external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity
rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an
external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a
remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others,
and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of
justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice
between one man and another.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an
act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
on (Q. 58, A. 5), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 John
3:4), through being contrary to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence
regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel
and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we
perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some
virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly
to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which
virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence,
which executes and directs the action.

Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with
the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a
sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his
goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do
better.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 2]

Whether Fraternal Correction Is a Matter of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter
of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according
to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed
be he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." Now it is
written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not
a matter of precept.

Obj. 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.

Obj. 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are
found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those of high
position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,
not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not
a matter of precept.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man
owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he
must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek
him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go
seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct
them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great
number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice,
and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to
reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal
correction is not a matter of precept.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not
be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.

_I answer that,_ Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now
sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter
how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature
they are connected with an evil end, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6:
wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the
other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing
the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be
virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be
done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end
depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these
circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in
this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be
omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of
virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the
circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy
the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good
of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not
contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean
virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed
to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so
far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct
our erring brother at all places and times.

Reply Obj. 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we
ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 5, ad 4), all the precepts
about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept
about the honor due to parents.

Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.

First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct
someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains
from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable
time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may
become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others
who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and
virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be
counselled by charity."

Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous
pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by
such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity."
This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might
probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so,
through fear or covetousness.

Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw
him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to
correct wrongdoers.

Reply Obj. 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and
certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find
him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek
him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that
has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound
to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance.
For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns
us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by
being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting
what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others,
which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor
seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave
their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]

Whether Fraternal Correction Belongs Only to Prelates?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.

Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now
corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction
belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters,
i.e. to prelates.

Obj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his
rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is
moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which
follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct
inferiors.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam
Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be
most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may
either correct their sinful ways, or, if they be incorrigible, cut
them off from the Church."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), correction is twofold. One
is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an
erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction
belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.

But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing
the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,
but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,
desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of
punishments.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is
common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal
favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought
he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the
like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore
Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction
concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal
assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with
a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing,
is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually
on one another, through being in some respect higher than one
another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in
potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can
correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter
wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Correct His Prelate?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his
prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch
the mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the
mount, dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the
Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark
signify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by
their subjects.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the face,"
adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his
prelate, he ought not to correct him.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not
to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks
better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than
of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only
to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position
among you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction
is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.

_I answer that,_ A subject is not competent to administer to his
prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the
coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is
an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of
any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be
something in that person which requires correction.

Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever
is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision
extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since,
however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances,
it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do
so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with
gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An
ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore
Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for
rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of
the church.

Reply Obj. 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate
inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he
speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of
those who touched the mount and the ark.

Reply Obj. 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of
fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter
then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of
the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)
tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy
ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be
observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's
subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of
scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.
2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they
should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not
disdain to be reproved by their subjects."

Reply Obj. 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's
prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no
presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in
this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that
when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that
he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to
one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in
greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 5]

Whether a Sinner Ought to Reprove a Wrongdoer?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a
wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having
committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to
forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has
committed a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than
corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have
no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a
man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to
reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:
therefore the former is also.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is
subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
written (Rom. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer
belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right
judgment. Now sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2), does not
destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of
all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find
fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin
proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons.
First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke
another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a
lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says
on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?" etc. (Matt. 7:3): "He is
speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal
sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren."

Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matt. 7:4, "How
sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom.
xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
thus: "That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that
you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your
own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to
hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by
men for your knowledge."

Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself
above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as
though he himself were a just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty
of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke
is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should
think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must
remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that
we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we
should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our
reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we
find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but
groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows from
this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not
sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although
thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his
brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 6]

Whether One Ought to Forbear from Correcting Someone, Through Fear
Lest He Become Worse?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from
correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is
weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O
Lord, for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must
not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or
contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of
madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter
how badly he takes it.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be
foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of
precept, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that it should not be
foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do
evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should
not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good
thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person
corrected become worse.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner
lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest
the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in
mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore
one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may
make a man worse.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) the correction of the
wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed
to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be
omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is
unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to
cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,
the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of
justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an
example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence
of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his
friends.

The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.
Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take
the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should
be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the
requirements of the end.

Reply Obj. 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is
unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with
the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power,
but not with simple fraternal correction.

Reply Obj. 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far
as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as
it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a
hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through
it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter of precept.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is directed to an end, becomes good through
being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction
hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer
good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted
lest evil should befall.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 7]

Whether the Precept of Fraternal Correction Demands That a Private
Admonition Should Precede Denunciation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction
does not demand that a private admonition should precede
denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow
the example of God, according to Eph. 5:1, 2: "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes
punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret.
Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to
precede denunciation.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the
commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find
that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous
admonition in private. Thus we read (Gen. 37:2) that "Joseph accused
his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9)
that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly
"by fraud kept back the price of the land," without beforehand
admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished
Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not
require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the
Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else
need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound
by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The
effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound
himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same
punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.]
Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret
admonition should precede public denunciation.

Obj. 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed
by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now
it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one
for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it
seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.

Obj. 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does
not require secret admonition before public denunciation.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the
words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Matt. 18:15): "Aiming
at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from
shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to
make a better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept
of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the
order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.

_I answer that,_ With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know
of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should
be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Tim. 5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may
have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).

On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Matt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against
thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others,
he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further
distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor
either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots
secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic
secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins
thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also
against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at
once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you
were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by
admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins
which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against,
either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he
alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to
succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body
restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a
limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least
indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so
too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so
amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.

For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not
only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he
lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are
restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man
finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome
says on Matt. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke
him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become
shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning
brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the
dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad
pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for
holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done
anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it
believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public
others are incited to sin likewise.

Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his
good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden
sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the
judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job
33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth
upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching
instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a
man from the things he is doing."

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were
public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did
not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin
of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused
"his brethren."

Reply Obj. 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those
words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin
against thee alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are
about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore
they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or
denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to
injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's
precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.

Reply Obj. 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine
precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then
men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything
that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood
supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction,
whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some
particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue
a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord,
both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be
obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God
alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of
hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through
certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a
prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or
ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 8]

Whether Before the Public Denunciation Witnesses Ought to Be Brought
Forward?

Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not
to be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray
his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De
Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known
a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one
ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.

Obj. 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man
brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
brother.

Obj. 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it
to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 18:16): "Take with thee one
or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc.

_I answer that,_ The right way to go from one extreme to another is
to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning
of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects
another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end
to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church.
Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be
placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin
be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance,
and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction
to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly,
and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin
be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the
matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several
by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our
Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his
Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause
a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise
that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue
to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with
any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must
take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call
witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would
not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become
worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from
correcting him, as stated above (A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin:
yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence
the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First,
to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly,
to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (loc.
cit.): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has
done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known
to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the
prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
holding the position of judge.
_______________________

QUESTION 34

OF HATRED
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which
is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy
of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
correction.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?

(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?

(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?

(5) Whether it is a capital sin?

(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Possible for Anyone to Hate God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object
of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself.
Therefore He is hated by none.

Obj. 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is
written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6.
Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.

Obj. 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore
none can hate Him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (John 15:24): "But now they
have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 29, A. 1), hatred is a
movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion
save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in
two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence;
secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God
. . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made" (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which
no man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is
impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.

Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be
contrary to the human will, since _to be, to live, to understand,_
which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore
again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the
Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are
contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment,
and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are
repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration
of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they
look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence,
which is the very essence of goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended
as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among
which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.

Reply Obj. 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the
source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be
like God, Who is Being itself.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether Hatred of God Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of
God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2).
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an
unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away
from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows
Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the
sin of hatred against God.

Obj. 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those
of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is
punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to
the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God
is man's worst sin.

_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God,
as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.

Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the
hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly.
For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it
directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is
directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for
instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in
so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which
aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself,
always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore
hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing
not to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things,
even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin
deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin
against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost
denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the
kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found
in every kind of that sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary:
wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it
becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith;
and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of
God is a greater sin than unbelief.

Reply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the
author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the
Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God
commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other
hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those
punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most
grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes
it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked
to hate justice than not to have done it."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]

Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not
always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according
to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor
perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come
to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My
disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it
is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written
(Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible
to hate certain people without committing a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that . . . hateth
his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin.
Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.

_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q.
29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of
that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not
in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in
respect of sin and lack of justice.

Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our
love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in
him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his
evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it
simply, is always sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our
parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them
in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection
of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his
nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which
they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should
love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]

Whether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our
Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.

Obj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give
our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love.
Therefore hatred is the worst.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a
man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.

Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, "He that
shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments
of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count
for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be
disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou
shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in
their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an
internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's
brother is a less grievous sin than murder.

_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned
against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than
external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder
of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the
root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be
inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be
sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or
out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's
outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his
inward hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5]

Whether Hatred Is a Capital Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred
is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief
of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.

Obj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of
our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.

Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more
than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be
reckoned a capital sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among
the seven capital sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all
in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is
first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first
and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good,
and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be
first among the vices, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason
that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of
such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]

Whether Hatred Arises from Envy?

Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy
is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow,
for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor
is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26,
A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of
God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy
those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to
be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred
does not arise from envy.

Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows
into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a
man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which
is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally
avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so
does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love
whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it
assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever
displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the
aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's
good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so
that "out of envy cometh hatred."

Reply Obj. 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement,
love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has
obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure
in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure
causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.

Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the
object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore
love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place
in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above (A. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in
so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in
various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger
and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks
upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
_______________________

QUESTION 35

OF SLOTH
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sloth is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]

Whether Sloth Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a
kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as
we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caenobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at
regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly,
no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De
Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at
being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries
and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we
dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth
is not a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2:
"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De
Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is
not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance."
Therefore sloth is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now
such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down
thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not
grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind,
that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence
sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on
Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good."

Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is,
in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow
also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so
oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the
Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed
up with overmuch sorrow."

Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow
for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in
point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an
evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said
above (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are
blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as
they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may
either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal
sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows
that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to
commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may
become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring
at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose
one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by
sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and
to be parched by the sun's heat.

Reply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from
being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such
like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we
reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the
goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have
received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.

Reply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin
should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin,
as in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more
we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us,
and forthwith sloth dies away.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]

Whether Sloth Is a Special Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite
spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of
continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then
sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems
that sloth is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to
joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.

Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now
nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this
be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual
goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of
weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to
be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing
but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to
carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not
a special vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from
the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.

_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.

Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is
proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which
consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to
have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In
like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual
good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special
vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which
charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]

Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth
seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the
precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous
than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed
from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But
sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a
most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is
not always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the
world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow
"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.
Therefore it is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the
effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which
by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity
is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow
about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore
sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be
observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their
genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their
perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of
reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human
acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a
mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to
the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the
imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the
concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial
sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal
sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality
alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and
then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,
which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine
good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In
this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the
Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
about the Divine good is contrary thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual
good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to
adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of
sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy
men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]

Whether Sloth Should Be Accounted a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 5). Now sloth does not move one to
action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
should not be accounted a capital sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to
sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness
in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful
things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For
"spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as
stated above (Q. 34, A. 6); "malice" is a genus which contains all
vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful
things is to be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the
commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness"
and "despair" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly
accounted a capital sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is
sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth:
and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite,
faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from
sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of
the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity,
curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has
wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.

_On the contrary,_ The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that
sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
sorrow, as stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 85, A. 8), it is fittingly
reckoned a capital sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing
things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such
as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For
since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) "no man can
be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that
man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other
things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in
spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of
sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant
objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause
sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of
sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of
"despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the
end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the
effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common
righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the
commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow
is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is
called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods
themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is
properly called "malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal
objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after
unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the
objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not
denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
applies to the others.

Reply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given
by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
above (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of
any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on
account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to
sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine
good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth
and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for
"bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an
effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to
"sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them
altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence.
All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to
the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to
wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing
after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness
of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is
called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity";
and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called
"restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of
his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to
another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote
changeableness of purpose.
_______________________

QUESTION 36

OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) What is envy?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]

Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,
in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.
47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are
envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects
have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of
goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of
envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who
have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we
possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a
species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."

_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it
may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and
in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in
two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far
as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man
grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some
harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as
the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).

Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in
so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:
and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for
sorrow to be about good, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it
diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man
is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed
from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors
to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner
whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far
removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who
are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is
against our will that these should be in better repute than we are,
and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes
pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.

Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he
is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in
such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to
him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."

Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had
them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;
and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above
all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
others have acquired goods.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]

Whether Envy Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and
be nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to
commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes
praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall
bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me
up." Therefore envy is not always a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a
kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's
good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man
grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm
either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,
as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being
lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his
glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we
believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we
dread lest many suffer unjustly."

Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,
but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about
temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may
grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good
is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by
virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher
states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The
nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to
signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying
that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he
considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem
great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to
the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are
unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either
for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such
goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are
prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in
Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor
envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps
had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw
the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion
of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we
grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this
is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.

Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to
strive to progress with those who are better than we are.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in
the first sense given above.

Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]

Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can
be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and
known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and
looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a
passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy
is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore
envy is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For
the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to
the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul
derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that
we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now
the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is
evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1),
in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are
venial sins.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of
the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a
mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is
contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]

Whether Envy Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
"those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is
not a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the
other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind
under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the
soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild
outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says
(Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom
of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this
wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane
of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a
capital sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned
by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred,
tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and
grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and
grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from
what has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be
assigned as daughters of envy.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who
states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters
thereto.

_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good,
so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated
above (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that
it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of
avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is
accounted a capital vice for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices
are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.
For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting
the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power
of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire
that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not
exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of
several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly
arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either
by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is
the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he
is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as
quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil,
death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).

There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a
sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our
neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,
because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who
is glorified in His works.

Reply Obj. 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for
the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by
way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of
term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's
reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have
_tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle
consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is
either able to do so, and then we have _joy at another's misfortune,_
or he is unable, and then we have _grief at another's prosperity._
The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes
love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6).
Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy,
when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as
it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter
of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper
notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at
another's misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a
result thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy,
gives rise to joy in his evil.
_______________________

QUESTION 37

OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall
consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is
on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz.
schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether discord is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]

Whether Discord Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to
disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this
does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our
neighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself.
But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is
written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were
Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men
brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope
and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had
so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the
Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a
holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is
written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and
Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord
is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned
among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said
afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain
the kingdom of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from
the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above
(Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity
directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the
Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord
is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.

But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in
two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts
and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's
intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor,
when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and
his neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal
sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity,
although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by
reason of their being imperfect acts.

The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the
intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's
honor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing
good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case
accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor.
Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be
accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by
undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1,
3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of
wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes
the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which
the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both
parties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his
own.

Reply Obj. 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of
another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to
God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to
its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a
will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right
rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is
opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.
Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from
charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov.
6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh
His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him
that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a
discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is
destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for
sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because
Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): "I came not to send
peace, but the sword."

Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental
and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought
one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was
owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things
necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine
providence, on account of the good which would ensue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]

Whether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of
vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord
is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A
passionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter
of vainglory.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, "As yet
the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs,
charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills.
Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from
vainglory.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be
a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on
Matt. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made
desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so
discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should
itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of
vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

_I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so
far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the
other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will
holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers
what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this
inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord,
whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that
of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.

Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists
in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from
anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord
consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from
pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
_wherefrom,_ i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
the term _whither,_ i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and
in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment
the term _whither_ is more important than the term _wherefrom_
(because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is
accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may
arise from both for different reasons, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while
discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united a
force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills,
and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as
though it were a capital vice.
_______________________

QUESTION 38

OF CONTENTION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]

Whether Contention Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
found in them, according to Luke 22:24: "And there was also a strife
amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17):
"Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil.
1:18): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore
contention is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts
or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good
intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to
Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?"
And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him
(Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me,
as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal
sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is against the precept of the Apostle who says
(2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20)
contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated
there (Gal. 5:21) "they who do such things shall not obtain the
kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God
and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a
mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore
just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention
signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts
various contrary things in a speech, this is called _contentio,_
which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren.
iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from
contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning,
and a most bitter end."

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with
regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must
consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be
blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to
the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in
keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would
be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that
"contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"--or
whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute,
in which case it is blameworthy.

Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the
truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose
[*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a
disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however,
contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper
measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a
disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be
a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as
to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim.
2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to
the subverting of the hearers."

Reply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with
the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for
what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought
not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were
not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and
for this reason Our Lord checked them.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to
be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith,
but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that
they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
Christ would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of
good results.

Reply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in
contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in
a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in
respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job
had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
inordinate in mind or in speech.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]

Whether Contention Is a Daughter of Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.

Obj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice.
But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.

Obj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter
of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth
up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore
contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 2), discord is a daughter
of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his
own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper
to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people
are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts,
so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words.
Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the
same reason as discord.

Reply Obj. 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as
a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with
whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
clings to his own opinion, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud
voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the
chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.

Reply Obj. 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods
even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does
so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why
the _per se_ and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not
result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of
pride.
_______________________

QUESTION 39

OF SCHISM
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first
place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether schism is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?

(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;

(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]

Whether Schism Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.),
"denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to
Isa. 59: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore
schism is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the
Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin
is a schism.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith.
If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not
to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon.
ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a
"schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same
worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the
community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that
of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin.

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its
name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to
unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and
essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical
order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental.
Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and
that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental.
Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the
reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity
which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one
person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole
Church in unity of spirit.

Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully
and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church;
for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the
Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural
body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of
the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection
or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the
subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head,
according to Col. 2:18, 19: "Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and
not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands,
being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the
increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent
in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are
those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold
communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his
supremacy.

Reply Obj. 1: The division between man and God that results from sin
is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a
result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
not schism properly so called.

Reply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church,
and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do
this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.

Reply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those
things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy
is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed
to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and
charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although
whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This
is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians
[*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism
and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs
a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is
the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which
things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned
aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy.
Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it
is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between
schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some
heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for
separating from the Church."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]

Whether Schism Is a Graver Sin Than Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut.
25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28)
that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them
down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into
hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God."
Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from
the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore
the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
opposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism
is a graver sin than unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ That which results from an addition to something
else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy
results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt
doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad
3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to
its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity
derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is
taken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q.
73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is,
in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.

Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God
Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith
is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which
is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore
it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous
than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular
schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either
because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of
greater danger, or for some similar reason.

Reply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law
which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God
was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among
them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those
who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well
known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it
behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a
miraculous and unwonted manner.

We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city,
and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised
therein of old']." Now sometimes a more severe punishment is
inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2,
ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away
from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more
severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes,
they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that
of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the
good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank
in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed,
is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object
and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is
our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor,
are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is
less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these
sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of
God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins
committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem
to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of
the multitude.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]

Whether Schismatics Have Any Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
return after being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they
retain their Orders.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as
he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very
great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church,
have a spiritual power.

Obj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to
the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the
Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders
should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church,
provided they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would
not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics.
Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.

_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu.
1, can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church,
and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power
or honor."

_I answer that,_ Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated,
is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently
such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has
received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall
into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he
come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however,
the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it
is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical
order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so
that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this
power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts
only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not
precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers
the sacrament.

On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is
conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not
adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in
heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor
excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and
if they do, it is invalid.

Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second
power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to
the essence of the power, but to its lawful use.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished with
Excommunication?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5)
that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems
that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.

Obj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not
brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now
schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold
communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be
excommunicated.

Obj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the
same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice"
[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the
sin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5 [*Gratianus, Decretum, P. II,
causa XXIII, qu. 5, can. 44, Quali nos (RP I, 943)], where it is
stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who
are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must
be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be
punished with excommunication.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents
of these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and
touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins."

_I answer that,_ According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man
sinneth, by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is
tormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a
twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the
members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for
schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse
submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are
unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is
just that they should be compelled by the secular power.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic,
save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit
this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may
receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.

Reply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby
a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance.

Reply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and
therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man,
another is added: just as physicians employ several bod[il]y
medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs
the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment
suffices, another should not be employed.
_______________________

QUESTION 40

OF WAR
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?

(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?

(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?

(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who
wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to
Matt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword."
Therefore all wars are unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin.
But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt.
5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath."
Therefore war is always sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as
is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial.
Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the
centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion
forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the
Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms,
and to give up soldiering altogether. _On the contrary,_ they were
told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay'
[*Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he
did not forbid soldiering."

_I answer that,_ In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private
individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his
rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the
business of a private individual to summon together the people, which
has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is
committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to
watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject
to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the
sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,
when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle
(Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's
minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so
too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in
defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said
to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and
deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive
to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel
war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are
attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of
some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super
Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges
wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to
make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore
what it has seized unjustly."

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those
wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty,
but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and
of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by
the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra
Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst
for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of
revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are
rightly condemned in war."

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take
the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority."
On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private
person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public
person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak,
of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by
another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those
who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword,
yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they
repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply Obj. 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so
that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from
resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly
severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will.
For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good
for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the
happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil
will, like an internal enemy."

Reply Obj. 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are
not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came
not to send upon earth" (Matt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them
to the prosperity of peace."

Reply Obj. 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all
forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference
incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as
they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon
the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and
was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf
hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it
is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As
untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said
that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather
together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it
is lawful for bishops to fight.

Obj. 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does
a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according
to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not
only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his
country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly
reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

_On the contrary,_ It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Matt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard
[Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in John 18:11]."
Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

_I answer that,_ Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a
number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i,
1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another,
that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore
those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy
themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human
laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to
engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that
they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine
things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong
to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises
are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so
too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a
soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second
reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are
directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ
is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as
you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the
death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for
them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should
be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed
what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been
decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become
irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully
do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is
altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to
the shedding of blood.

Reply Obj. 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are
salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate,
the sentence of excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their
superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight
justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual
helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were
commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this
purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the
front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up
arms themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 23, A. 4, ad 2) every power, art or
virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to
the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as
having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are
deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel
other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up
arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is
unbecoming their personality.

Reply Obj. 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who
have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q., 40, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Lay Ambushes in War?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in
war. For it is written (Deut. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after
that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of
deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to
lay ambushes even in a just war.

Obj. 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states
(Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with
one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems
that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions
to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on
war by laying ambushes.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the
authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the
city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).

_I answer that,_ The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive
the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two
ways. First, through being told something false, or through the
breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to
deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war
and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as
Ambrose states (De Officiis i).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do
not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always
bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have
to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it,
according to Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs."
Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the
enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn
is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's
knowledge, as stated in the Book on _Strategy_ [*Stratagematum i, 1]
by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush
which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have
an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide
anything from him.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful to Fight on Holy Days?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of
unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58:3) because
on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
unlawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm.
But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
avoiding temporal harm.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."

_I answer that,_ The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body.
Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): "Are you
angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?"
Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days.
Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal
(whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both
temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an
individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common
weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days,
provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt
God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain
from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight
on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 41

OF STRIFE
(In Two Articles)
[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]

We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether strife is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]

Whether Strife Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For
strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that
the word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu]
of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he
delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not
always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.

Obj. 2: Further, it is related (Gen. 26:21) that the servants of
Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise."
Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled
publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin.
Therefore strife is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes
are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.

_I answer that,_ While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it
takes place between private persons, being declared not by public
authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is
always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks
another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts
harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who
defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a
venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his
intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole
intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend
himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say
properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand,
his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a
sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance
obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending
himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with
the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on
him.

Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there
are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express
the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always
ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to
contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the
passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes
others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."

Reply Obj. 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac
quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with
them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore
the calumny [*Cf. Gen. 26:20].

Reply Obj. 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by
authority of the governing power, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1);
whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred.
For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it
is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
themselves inordinately.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether Strife Is a Daughter of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger.
For it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are
they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?"
But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth and
puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently
the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
is not a daughter of anger.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.

Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a
daughter of vainglory, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). Therefore
strife is also.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives
rise to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A
passionate man stirreth up strifes."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), strife denotes an antagonism
extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there
are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way
it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in
this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands
his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly
to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him
to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what
he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
passion of anger (I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly
speaking, strife arises from anger.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), all the
irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so
that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
concupiscence as from its first root.

Reply Obj. 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of
anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of
quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
quarrel and strife.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 48, A. 3) hinders the
judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence
they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason
that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.

Reply Obj. 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not
the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is
beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
reason given above.

Reply Obj. 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts
of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e.,
intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that
strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
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QUESTION 42

OF SEDITION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]

Whether Sedition Is a Special Sin Distinct from Other Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin
distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets
discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no
other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems
that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

Obj. 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
takes its name from scission, as stated above (Q. 39, A. 1).
Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that
of schism.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins,
is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a
special sin, distinct from other sins.

_On the contrary,_ Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other
sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

_I answer that,_ Sedition is a special sin, having something in
common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has
something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain
antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because
war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas
sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the
preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says
that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number
of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly,
they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against
external foes, being as it were between one people and another,
whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few
people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its
proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as
when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part.
Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,
namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.

Reply Obj. 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition,
and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a
seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one
another inordinately.

Reply Obj. 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First,
because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude,
viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the
temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or
kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.

Reply Obj. 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord,
since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between
the parts of a multitude.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]

Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
gloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin,
indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q. 40, A.
1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A.
1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some
dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to
retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore
there can be sedition without mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary
to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the
word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly
of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and
for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which
sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it
follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common
good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its
gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it
assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the
common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves
seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because
he defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common
good, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the
common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:
and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity
of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

Reply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is
directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather
that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition
among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for
this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler,
and to the injury of the multitude.
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QUESTION 43

OF SCANDAL
(In Eight Articles)

It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice,
those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal
seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here
consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is scandal?

(2) Whether scandal is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a special sin?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?

(6) Whether they can give scandal?

(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?

(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 1]

Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly
Said or Done That Occasions Spiritual Downfall?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (A. 2).
Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a
"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the
definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
"desire."

Obj. 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that
every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion."

Obj. 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's
spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.
Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's
spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems
unreasonable.

Obj. 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with
offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good
not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy
brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the
aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, "Dost thou know
that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we
read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by
deed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"

_I answer that,_ As Jerome observes the Greek _skandalon_ may be
rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For
when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it
may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such
an obstacle is a _skandalon_.

In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so
far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example,
moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.

Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."

Reply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart,
wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle
conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the
head of scandal.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something
else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of
rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man
were to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this
is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention,
yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all
appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore
fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to
comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an
appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A.
1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall,
which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or
deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that
downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but
an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental
cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not
make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental
to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is
mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).

Reply Obj. 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's
sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man
either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature
as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly
commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In
this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an
occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called
"active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of
another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does
what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one,
through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy
of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not,
so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's
downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according
to Rom. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me
all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without
"active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own
part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes
therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together
with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being
induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive
scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to
sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive
without active scandal, as we have already said.

Reply Obj. 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]

Whether Scandal Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt. 18:7): "It must
needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because
"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). But scandal
may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter
(Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore
scandal is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall,
can be without sin.

_On the contrary,_ Scandal is "something less rightly said or done."
Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is
always with sin.

_I answer that,_ As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two
kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal
in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual
downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person
scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he
succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.

Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the
person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when
a person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active
scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either
what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it
should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which
binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare;
so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.

Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are
to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional
necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever
God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part
(Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2).

Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).

Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails
to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man
partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs
injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he
does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that
scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of
living.

Reply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance:
for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of
dutifulness towards Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back
somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial
sin.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 3]

Whether Scandal Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to
every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and
consequently, scandal is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of
injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
_Ethic._ v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from
other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which
specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its
being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin
being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal
is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it.
But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is
written (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be
grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity." Therefore
scandal is a special sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active
and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed,
does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply
a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.

On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is
beside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his
inordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall,
but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active
scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by
that which is accidental.

Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word
or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind
of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because
moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder
are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention
of doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a
special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to
his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction,
whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.

Reply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may
derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins,
as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin
in itself, but has an appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin
from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end,
as stated above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 4]

Whether Scandal Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every
sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q.
24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). But scandal is contrary to charity, as
stated above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of
eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Matt. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this
passage, "it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a
fault, than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a
sin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound
the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus
against the brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin
against Christ." Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It may be a venial sin to lead a person into
venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal
may be a venial sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), scandal denotes a stumbling
whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently
passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a
stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed
by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word
or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling
results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to
commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed.

Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin;
for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either
commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself,
but has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a
mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because
he has such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he
declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he
wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a
person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him
into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he
intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into
venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to
lead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.

And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 5]

Whether Passive Scandal May Happen Even to the Perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to
the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to
Peter (Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore
can other perfect men suffer scandal.

Obj. 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We
would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore passive scandal
may be found in perfect men.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome, in commenting on Matt. 18:6, "He that
shall scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is
the little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take
scandal."

_I answer that,_ Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person
who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man
can be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The
elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is
unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so
only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16:
"Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Wherefore, however
much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or
deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness,
according to Ps. 124:1: "They that trust in the Lord shall be as
Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in
Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God
perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: "Much peace have they
that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block
(_scandalum_)."

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), in this passage, scandal
is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our
Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was
endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.

Reply Obj. 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will,
according to Rom. 8:38, 39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be
able to separate us from the love of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the
weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal
in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there
can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 6]

Whether Active Scandal Can Be Found in the Perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are
scandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according
to Matt. 15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard
this word, were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found
in the perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the
gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles
to live as do the Jews?" Therefore active scandal can be in the
perfect.

Obj. 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial
sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
perfect men.

_On the contrary,_ Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.

_I answer that,_ Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a
man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they
are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only
would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of
wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words
or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in
human weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not
fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only
a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that
anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal;
yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very
person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii)
and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing
from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because
he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been
converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action
was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for
scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was
no active scandal in Peter.

Reply Obj. 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If,
however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or
deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to
give scandal.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 7]

Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone
on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
teaches that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of
schism is feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since
it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone
on account of scandal.

Obj. 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet
one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you."
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it
is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De
Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on
account of scandal.

Obj. 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc.
xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the
observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such
things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works
should be omitted on account of scandal.

Obj. 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since
any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one
ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing
one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would
prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is
bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can
without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a
venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
to avoid scandal.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people
are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of
scandal, than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong,
above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to
be foregone on account of scandal.

_I answer that,_ Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply
to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from
sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to
love his own spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one
ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order
to avoid giving scandal.

Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from
such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man
wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This
is the "scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Matt. 15:14) that we ought to treat
such like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from
weakness or ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In
order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be
either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done
without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained
the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter
has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it
would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to
avoid such like scandal.

Reply Obj. 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal
properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the
nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident
that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and
more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will
no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to
bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be
contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be
considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
he whose duty it is to teach should not teach what is contrary to the
truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the
requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he
to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal
that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the
spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2), and so the same
is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall
speak further on (ad 4).

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 1), fraternal correction
aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned
among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is
not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected.
And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no
spiritual good is foregone.

Reply Obj. 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither
the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted
in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This
may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels,
and of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either
in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual
matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise
from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the
need on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to
these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in
order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it
ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be
a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some
circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were
it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when
it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause,
it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive
a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it
disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 8]

Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we
love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to
avoid scandalizing our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A. 7, Obj. 4],
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can
be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we
ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much
more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account
of scandal.

Obj. 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering
temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have
recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written
(Matt. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take
away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do
you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems
that we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.

Obj. 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we
to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

_On the contrary,_ Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the
restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took
scandal from his doing so.

_I answer that,_ A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for
either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of
them for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to
prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such
persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case
the care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of
necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore,
even as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not
to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards
those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on
account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are
not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have
them in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in
the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through
the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,
A. 7, it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such
temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other
means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as to injure
neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou
refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou
wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that
asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This
is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal
goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for
this would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give
wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the
plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were
in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as
equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our
property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose
themselves."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other
people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to
forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
scandalize my brother."

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)
this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But
sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same
applies to the saying of the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an
error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
is not customary to pay them.
_______________________

QUESTION 44

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?

(2) Whether there should be one or two?

(3) Whether two suffice?

(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?

(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?

(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?

(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";

(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]

Whether Any Precept Should Be Given About Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
is the form of the virtues as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8), while the
precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the
Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2;
Q. 100, A. 9). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity,
they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of
the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts
should be given about charity.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever God requires of us is included in a
precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to
Deut. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the
love of charity, which is the love of God.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, A. 1), a
precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a
matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is
due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something
else. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake,
because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that
which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else:
thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should
heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should
give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life
is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity,
while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to
this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5):
"The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good
conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose
acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of
the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that
regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good
conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the
having of a right faith--such are those