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Title: Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars) - From the Complete American Edition
Author: Aquinas, Thomas, Saint, 1225?-1274
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars) - From the Complete American Edition" ***
supplementation by David McClamrock
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
THIRD PART
["III," "Tertia Pars"]
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
________________________
DEDICATION
To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
________________________
NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library . I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:
> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."
This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):
* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.
* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.
* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.
* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.
* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.
* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.
* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.
* Titles of questions are in all caps.
Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).
_______________________
CONTENTS
THIRD PART (QQ. 1-90)
Question
1. Of the Fitness of the Incarnation
2. Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate
3. Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the Person Assuming
4. Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature
5. Of the Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed
6. Of the Order of Assumption
7. Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual Man
8. Of the Grace of Christ as He Is the Head of the Church
9. Of Christ's Knowledge in General
10. Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul
11. Of the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused on the Soul of Christ
12. Of the Acquired or Empiric Knowledge of Christ's Soul
13. Of the Power of Christ's Soul
14. Of the Defects of Body Assumed by the Son of God
15. Of the Defects of Soul Assumed by Christ
16. Of Those Things Which Are Applicable to Christ in His Being
and Becoming
17. Of Christ's Unity of Being
18. Of Christ's Unity of Will
19. Of the Unity of Christ's Operation
20. Of Christ's Subjection to the Father
21. Of Christ's Prayer
22. Of the Priesthood of Christ
23. Of Adoption as Befitting to Christ
24. Of the Predestination of Christ
25. Of the Adoration of Christ
26. Of Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man
-- Editorial Note: St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception
27. Of the Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin
28. Of the Virginity of the Mother of God
29. Of the Espousals of the Mother of God
30. Of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin
31. Of the Matter From Which the Saviour's Body Was Conceived
32. Of the Active Principle in Christ's Conception
33. Of the Mode and Order of Christ's Conception
34. Of the Perfection of the Child Conceived
35. Of Christ's Nativity
36. Of the Manifestation of the Newly Born Christ
37. Of Christ's Circumcision, and of the Other Legal Observances
Accomplished in Regard to the Child Christ
38. Of the Baptism of John
39. Of the Baptizing of Christ
40. Of Christ's Manner of Life
41. Of Christ's Temptation
42. Of Christ's Doctrine
43. Of the Miracles Worked by Christ, in General
44. Of Christ's Miracles Considered Specifically
45. Of Christ's Transfiguration
46. The Passion of Christ
47. Of the Efficient Cause of Christ's Passion
48. Of the Efficiency of Christ's Passion
49. Of the Effects of Christ's Passion
50. Of the Death of Christ
51. Of Christ's Burial
52. Of Christ's Descent into Hell
53. Of Christ's Resurrection
54. Of the Quality of Christ Rising Again
55. Of the Manifestation of the Resurrection
56. Of the Causality of Christ's Resurrection
57. Of the Ascension of Christ
58. Of Christ's Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father
59. Of Christ's Judiciary Power
60. What Is a Sacrament?
61. Of the Necessity of the Sacraments
62. Of the Sacraments' Principal Effect, Which Is Grace
63. Of the Other Effect of the Sacraments, Which Is a Character
64. Of the Causes of the Sacraments
65. Of the Number of the Sacraments
66. Of the Sacrament of Baptism
67. Of the Ministers by Whom the Sacrament of Baptism Is Conferred
68. Of Those Who Receive Baptism
69. Of the Effects of Baptism
70. Of Circumcision
71. Of the Preparations That Accompany Baptism
72. Of the Sacrament of Confirmation
73. Of the Sacrament of the Eucharist
74. Of the Matter of This Sacrament
75. Of the Change of Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ
76. Of the Way in Which Christ Is in This Sacrament
77. Of the Accidents Which Remain in This Sacrament
78. Of the Form of This Sacrament
79. Of the Effects of This Sacrament
80. Of the Use or Receiving of This Sacrament in General
81. Of the Use Which Christ Made of This Sacrament at Its Institution
82. Of the Minister of This Sacrament
83. Of the Rite of This Sacrament
84. Of the Sacrament of Penance
85. Of Penance as a Virtue
86. Of the Effect of Penance, As Regards the Pardon of Mortal Sin
87. Of the Remission of Venial Sin
88. Of the Return of Sins Which Have Been Taken Away by Penance
89. Of the Recovery of Virtue by Means of Penance
90. Of the Parts of Penance, in General
________________________
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
THIRD PART
["III," "Tertia Pars"]
_______________________
PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His
people from their sins" (Matt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed
unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to
the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order
to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end
of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the
consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by
Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of
immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for
our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and
suffered by our Saviour--i.e. God incarnate.
_______________________
TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ. 1-59)
_______________________
QUESTION 1
OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION
(In Six Articles)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than
actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the
beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of
the world?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Fitting That God Should Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of
goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity.
But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was
most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not
fitting for God to become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are
infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were
"to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the
head of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are
infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most
composite--especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that
God should be united to human flesh.
Obj. 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil
is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who
is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting
that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Obj. 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the
greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom
rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things.
But God--Who takes care of the whole world--the whole universe of
things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He
should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in
comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and
that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the
government of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus
writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
_On the contrary,_ It would seem most fitting that by visible things
the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was
the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom.
1:20): "For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known
at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might
of God--"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant
to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men
forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge
for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is
nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."
_I answer that,_ To each thing, that is befitting which belongs to it
by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this
belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very
nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i).
Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it
belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others,
as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the
essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest
manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so
joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these
three--the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should
become incarnate.
Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed
through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had
been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the
creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should
not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be,
although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply Obj. 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting
to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was
above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason
of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's
salvation.
Reply Obj. 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever
differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is
ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and
incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own
goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's
justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by
withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of
the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to
assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "The
Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human
flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe.
This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal
things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the
greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor,
if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by
each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be
everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming
incarnate.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 2]
Whether It Was Necessary for the Restoration of the Human Race That
the Word of God Should Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the
reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become
incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said
(I, Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of
flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature.
He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Obj. 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had
fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should
satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for
God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is
more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of
sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act.
Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature
that the Word of God should become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's
salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father,
where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far
beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is
high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther
on: "Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence.
Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should
be made like unto us by assuming flesh.
_On the contrary,_ What frees the human race from perdition is
necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the
Incarnation is such; according to John 3:16: "God so loved the world
as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may
not perish, but may have life everlasting." Therefore it was
necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in
two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is
necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end
is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for
a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should
become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with
His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other
ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become
incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways were not
wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but
that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery."
Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good."
First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing
God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the
Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature,
established and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which
is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us
how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of
this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of
human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly
enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What
greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love
for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at
least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to
well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a
sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be
followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And
therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and
Whom man might follow, might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard
to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of
man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's
humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was
made man, that man might be made God."
So also was this useful for our _withdrawal from evil._ First,
because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor
to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one
person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man,
because they have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught
how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a
place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared
to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity
(xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of
the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former
worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's
presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no
merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17).
Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block
to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so
great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to
free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be
overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done
by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied
for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it
behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in
the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by
majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same
Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other--for
this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have
brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an
example."
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity,
without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways--first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of
human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any
person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done
to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against
God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty,
because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the
offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act
of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of
God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly--i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the
satisfaction of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in
consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is
increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 3]
Whether, If Man Had Not Sinned, God Would Have Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would
still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other
things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides
absolution from sin"; and these were discussed above (A. 2).
Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to
perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power
manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely
distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is
God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be
perfected, inasmuch as the last creature--viz. man--is united to the
first principle--viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God
would have become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace
by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is
the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld
from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had
not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Obj. 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of
Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power."
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God
should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Obj. 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the
first man, as is plain from Gen. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the
angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18).
Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become
incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2),
expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man is
come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had
not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Tim. 1:15,
"Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," a gloss says,
"There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save
sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need
of medicine."
_I answer that,_ There are different opinions about this question.
For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would
have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our
assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the
Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us.
Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first
man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in
accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was
ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed,
the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not
limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become
incarnate.
Reply Obj. 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had
not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine
wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness
of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But
because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it
was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things
should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, "And
the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had
blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the
vices of the flesh."
Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of
production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to
God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply Obj. 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature:
one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always
fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural
capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power,
which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of
pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this
is false, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 6). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater
after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater
good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded,
grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal
candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a
Redeemer!"
Reply Obj. 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future
things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be
brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply Obj. 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one
to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect
knows the cause.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 4]
Whether God Became Incarnate in Order to Take Away Actual Sin, Rather
Than to Take Away Original Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God
became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin;
for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says
(Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is
chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.
Obj. 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely
pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 87, A. 5). But Christ came
to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for
sins--and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Obj. 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3):
"This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as
though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of
himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved
me and delivered Himself for me.'" But our individual sins are actual
sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have
this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual
sins.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of
God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
_I answer that,_ It is certain that Christ came into this world not
only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to
posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added
to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men's fault,
inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19:
"The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than
the light"), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting
out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the
offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto
condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification."
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more
of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater
than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this
respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch
as "the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said _Ethic._ i, 2.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted
out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for
original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume
death and the like in Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The
Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world,
but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For
what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given
to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to
another than yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to account
Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them
not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to
wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one
person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one
as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of
charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by
each one.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 5]
Whether It Was Fitting That God Should Become Incarnate in the
Beginning of the Human Race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4, 5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding
charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins,
hath quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow
I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came into
this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had God
become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in
their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the human race.
Obj. 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work
of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to
have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the
Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John 1:14:
"The Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace
and truth." Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of
the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the
law": upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when
it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son." But God decreed
everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most
fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the human race.
_I answer that,_ Since the work of the Incarnation is principally
ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it
is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at
the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given
only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Matt. 9:12, 13): "They
that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . .
For I am not come to call the just, but sinners."
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might
be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
words in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that
the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For
first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of
his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when
he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of
the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that
having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and
beseech the aid of grace."
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 15:46, 47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that
which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first
man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a
gloss says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous
was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time,
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence
(Luke 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh,
shall He find think you, faith on earth?"
Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a
friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state
of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt
rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human
race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should
despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their
disease.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep.
cii), saying (Q. 2) that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have
His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who
would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was
not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear
themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal
presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same Augustine,
taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix),
says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would
not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears
witness that they would have done penance with great humility if
these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?" And he
adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says
(Rom. 9:16), 'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth,
but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those
who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst
them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them in His
predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly
believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth
with those who are condemned." [*The words in brackets are not in the
text of St. Augustine].
Reply Obj. 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and
nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same,
imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus
the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection
of human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with
God follows.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 6]
Whether the Incarnation Ought to Have Been Put Off Till the End of
the World?
Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.
91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"--i.e. "in the last days," as
a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time
of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on
it." Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the
end of the world.
Obj. 2: Further, as has been said (A. 5, ad 3), in the same subject,
perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is
most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest
perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in
Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore
the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
Obj. 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two.
But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient
for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for
Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation
ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the
years Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of the
Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been
put off till the end of the world.
_I answer that,_ As it was not fitting that God should become
incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting
that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And
this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature.
For, as it has been said (A. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes
imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way
imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect
from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time,
whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection,
perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the
Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is
raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming
that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human
race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection
of human nature, according to John 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all
received"; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have
been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory
to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate
will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said _Qq.
Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 83,_ "it is in the power of the Giver to have
pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by
the feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow
dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a
standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and
later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in
writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it
upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being
touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of
their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father." But if
this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge
and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been
swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine
power, which has saved men in several ways--not only by faith in some
future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply Obj. 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us
to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the
human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age--i.e.
the sixth age--on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came
in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together
in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account
of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine
says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that
the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth."
But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that
Christ came in the sixth age--i.e. in the old age--of the human race.
Reply Obj. 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as
merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says on John 3:11, "For God sent not His
Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two
comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second,
to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God."
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in
mercy till the end of the world.
_______________________
QUESTION 2
OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE
(In Twelve Articles)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 1]
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the
flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a
certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Obj. 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other
unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine
and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for
Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii,
act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen
says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as
appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
_On the contrary,_ It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten
Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without
change, without division, without separation--the distinction of
natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union
did not take place in the nature.
_I answer that,_ To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura."
Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of
this begetting; and because in living things the principle of
generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further
employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion
in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this
principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called
nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural
generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the
species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species
is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab.
Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,
"--i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now
speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is,"
or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union
of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made
of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which
remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form
is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition;
and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and
fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by
manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of
commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First,
because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial
form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the
Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be
disproved later on (A. 6). Secondly, because thereby we should not
have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several
things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature,
but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be
constituted in Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but
changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way
some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by
manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine
Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, Q. 9, AA. 1, 2),
hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it
cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same
species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from
any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature
neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there
can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of
them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon
of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the
human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone
would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal;
nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot
be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it
would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be
communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs.
Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in
the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity
varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply Obj. 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod
(i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ
results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or
substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be
anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results;
but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in
Person.
Reply Obj. 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature
and person--results in each individual--of nature inasmuch as the
soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from
matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the
Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, Q. 3,
A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there
is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply Obj. 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15, 17),
not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties
still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch
as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes
God.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 2]
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did
not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct
from His Nature, as we said (I, Q. 39, A. 1). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not
take place in the person.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours.
But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I, Q. 29, A.
3, ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality,
much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper
personality.
Obj. 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed
an individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not
exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ
has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place
in the person.
_On the contrary,_ We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act.
5): "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided
into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word
of God." Therefore the union took place in the person.
_I answer that,_ Person has a different meaning from "nature." For
nature, as has been said (A. 1), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature
(which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every
individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its
nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does
not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and
individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are
composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and
the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly
separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in
addition certain other things outside the notion of the species.
Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as
its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are
composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the
suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if
there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its
nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is
called "nature" as it is an essence, and a suppositum as it is
subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a
person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing
else than "an individual substance of rational nature," according to
Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in
person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human
nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united
to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away
with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as
the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to
His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person
of the Word, and not in the nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above,
inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something
subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that
the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives
therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human
nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the
nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a
thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and
perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature
of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that
in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in
Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the
species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in
man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the
species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form
which perfects.
Reply Obj. 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but _in atomo_"--that is, in an individual--as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates,
although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does
not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the
whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined
as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete
substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human
nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not
its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in
something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the
union took place in the person.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether the Union of the Word Incarnate Took Place in the Suppositum
or Hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did
not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing (_aliud_) by reason of the
Word and another thing (_aliud_) by reason of the man." And Pope Leo
says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious
with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries." But "one"
(_aliud_) and "the other" (_aliud_) differ in suppositum. Therefore
the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Obj. 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis
of the Word.
Obj. 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any
genus or species, as is plain from the First Part (Q. 3, A. 5). But
Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of
man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our
nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature
supersubstantially." Now nothing is contained under the human species
unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ
there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of
God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5): "In
our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis."
_I answer that,_ Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ,
held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another
of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in
the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous.
First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature,
viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a
person is an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it
is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper
hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this,
condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying:
"If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two
subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the
incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy
Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now
"subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to
hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly,
because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in
which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a
property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that
a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to
dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not
in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in
regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of
the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms:
"If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one
Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or
power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be
anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed
the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to
the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is
risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be
a suppositum, because he underlies (_supponitur_) whatever belongs to
man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any
hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows
that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the
Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was
buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council
of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to
two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and
apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or
by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the
man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if
they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father,
let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long
since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases,
or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the
hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is
said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh
in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both--to wit, God
and man--let him be anathema."
Reply Obj. 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
(_alterum_), so essential difference makes "another thing" (_aliud_).
Now it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental
difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in
created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie
different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that
the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence
just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not
signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental
forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another
thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but
diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to
Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and
another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing
and another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one
Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not
one thing and another."
Reply Obj. 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in
every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with
something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand
or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a
particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz.
the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with
which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply Obj. 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus
or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but
on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in
composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we
say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature
assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether After the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ Is
Composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not
composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or
hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (A. 2).
But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from
First Part (Q. 39, A. 1). Therefore since the Nature of the Word is
simple, as was shown above (I, Q. 3, A. 7), it is impossible that the
Person of Christ be composite.
Obj. 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine
Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part
implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible
that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Obj. 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be
homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures,
it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to
A. 2.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5), "In
the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis
composed from both."
_I answer that,_ The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in
two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple,
even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or
hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the
Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch
as one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: This composition of a person from natures is not
so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that
in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not verified in every composition, that
the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only
in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed
solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and
body, and neither of these is an animal.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether in Christ There Is Any Union of Soul and Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul
and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a
human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in
Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But
this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal.
Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the
hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to AA. 2, 3.
Obj. 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature
of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that
"we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ."
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose
of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the
Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
_On the contrary,_ The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated,
as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born
of a Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore
in Christ there was a union of soul and body.
_I answer that,_ Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7),
"being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to
the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form
does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the
act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which
nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the
soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it
destroys the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply Obj. 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight
with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz.
lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body
in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men
because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by
themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be
united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of
them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new
hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is
united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it
therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of
less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not
lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul
in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate
form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect
and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler
perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (A. 2, ad
2).
Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways:
First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He
would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said
that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists
conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would
not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke 24:39), "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can
it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all
the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed
all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in an
individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum
or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would
become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he
adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be
generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in
the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man."
Reply Obj. 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the
effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle
of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in
living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the
body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 6]
Whether the Human Nature Was United to the Word of God Accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the
Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son
of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is
accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit
be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality.
Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being
comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come
or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to
Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it
came to Him accidentally.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the
essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not
take place in the nature, as was said above (A. 1). Hence the human
nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Obj. 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human
nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the
instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature
was united to the Son of God accidentally.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates,
not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being.
If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say
Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or
quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the
Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since
Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some
to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?"
_I answer that,_ In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the
two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches
and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature
resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures
(which were distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the
distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second
was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated
the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be
distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were
mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God
dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of intention,"
inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will
of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said
the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, "by
greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God
was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the
Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names,
inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is
plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies,
through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in
Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that
a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his
conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion
set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of
keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not
united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and
were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons
might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the
Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A.
3). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind
that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity
of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds
"one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and
Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the
error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is
no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man
Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by
putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it
says something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that the soul and body
are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place
in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but
midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council
(Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may
be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of
Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came
together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by
mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining
division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God,
rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of
the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence."
Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions,
mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis
of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of
Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two
hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to
be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.
Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples
need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly
similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine
things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the
Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation,"
i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ
is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to
accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human
nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is
changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the
garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is
ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq.
83, qu. 73).
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being
comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the
soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed
unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the
soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is
other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of
God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person;
while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were
assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the
body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch
as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not
accidentally united to the Son of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance,
as is plain from _Metaph._ v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for
essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis--hence the
union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it
is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in
the nature.
Reply Obj. 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument
pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the
case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into
the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the
body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human
nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into
the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that
the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril
says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm
that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an
instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene
held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to
the unity of the hypostasis.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 7]
Whether the Union of the Divine Nature and the Human Is Anything
Created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human
natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in
God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for
God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the
union is not anything created.
Obj. 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end
of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is
terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be
judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which
is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Obj. 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on
account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing
created, but the Creator.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now
this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the
union is something created.
_I answer that,_ The union of which we are speaking is a relation
which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch
as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was
said above (I, Q. 13, A. 7), every relation which we consider between
God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but
only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change
in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking
is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the
human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must
say it is something created.
Reply Obj. 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of
thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the
creature is really united to God without any change in Him.
Reply Obj. 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion,
depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere
save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a
created being.
Reply Obj. 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the
union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it
does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because
that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its
relation.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 8]
Whether Union Is the Same As Assumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term
of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine
hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not
different.
Obj. 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing
seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what
is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and
passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming
and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is
one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation,
and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and
humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that
union is the same as assumption.
_On the contrary,_ The Divine Nature is said to be united, not
assumed.
_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 7), union implies a certain
relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come
together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are
brought about by some change; and change consists in action and
passion. Hence the _first_ and principal difference between
assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the
relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is
said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be
assumed. Now from this difference another _second_ difference arises,
for assumption implies _becoming,_ whereas union implies _having
become,_ and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but
the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is
taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis
when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of
God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature,
considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and
we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows
a _third_ difference, which is that a relation, especially one of
equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas
action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the
patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines
the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking
to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things.
Hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united
with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to
be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is
joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists
in human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the
term, but a different relation, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For
whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person
of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself;
and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the
united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is
said to be united, but not assumed.
Reply Obj. 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on
the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking
unto oneself (_ad se sumere_), whereas incarnation and humanation
(determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing
assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs
logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 9]
Whether the Union of the Two Natures in Christ Is the Greatest of All
Unions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in
Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls
short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by
participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are
some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself,
which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are
speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the
less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most
distant--namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are
infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.
Obj. 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of
soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature;
whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results
what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is
greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the
union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in
the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in
the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of
the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater
than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the
greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the
greatest unity.
_I answer that,_ Union implies the joining of several in some one
thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two
ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to
that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a
pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person,
in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no
pre-eminence in regard to the things united.
Reply Obj. 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than
numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a
Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received
into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having
in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it
is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity,
which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things
numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is
higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine
Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity
of the Divine Person, but is united to it.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the
Person in Whom the union takes place.
Reply Obj. 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the
unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the
Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.
And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests
upon what is untrue--namely, that the union of the Incarnation is
greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence--we must say
to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in
the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But
the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the
Father--namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I
say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is
not the same suppositum of Father and Son.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 10]
Whether the Union of the Incarnation Took Place by Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not
take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above
(I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). But the union of the human nature to the Divine
did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (A. 6). Therefore
it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by
grace.
Obj. 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written
(Col. 2:9): "In Christ [Vulg.: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness of the
Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not take
place by grace.
Obj. 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If,
therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem
that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same
grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith,
as this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became
Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by
grace.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 1), grace is
taken in two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing
something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands
in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to
God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human
nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the
saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode
belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as
to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the
perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit,
whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take
place by means of a habit.
And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God
gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or
acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace,
even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But
if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the
human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace,
inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits--but
not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the
union took place.
Reply Obj. 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of
the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature
is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but
is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the
Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of
it.
Reply Obj. 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e.
the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to
the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence
it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in
Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul,
but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in
Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the
sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place
(Col. 2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body
is Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch as the body is opposed to
the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in
Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three
dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other
creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly,
by personal union, which is proper to Christ.
Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of
the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in
subsistence or person.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 11]
Whether Any Merits Preceded the Union of the Incarnation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed
upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord,
be upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for
the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore
the Incarnation falls under merit.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it
cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which
they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says
(Moral. xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's
coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could
not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the
bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come
Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous
in their everlasting seat." Therefore it would seem that they merited
the Incarnation.
Obj. 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she merited
to bear the Lord of all" [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite,
Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation.
Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can
find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also
find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members."
But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not
by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His
mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits
preceded the generation of Christ.
_I answer that,_ With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the
above (A. 10) that no merits of His could have preceded the union.
For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that
afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become
the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning
of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He
had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke
1:35: "The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son
of God." And hence every operation of this man followed the union.
Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the
union.
Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this
union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are
properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and
consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the
Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the
union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul
in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly,
because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit
does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it
is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation
fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to
John 1:17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because
the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature,
and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man,
since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of
the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation
congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God
should harken to those who obeyed Him.
And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest.
Reply Obj. 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without
which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not
merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and
grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the
Incarnation is the principle of merit, because "of His fulness we all
have received" (John 1:16).
Reply Obj. 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the
Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the
grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and
holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 12]
Whether the Grace of Union Was Natural to the Man Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to
the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place
in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above (A. 2). Now a
thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought
rather to be called personal than natural.
Obj. 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous
things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things,
which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in
opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other.
Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But
the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine
Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it
natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would
belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore
it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the
assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to
that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him."
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature
designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing.
Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from
the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to
mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his
birth, according to Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath";
and Wis. 12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice
natural." Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or
habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of
the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if
coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine
Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to
Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the
beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine
Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature,
yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly
the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the
beginning of His nativity.
Reply Obj. 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the
same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from
merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the
Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.
Reply Obj. 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according
to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the
human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless,
it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the
_property_ of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy
Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it
is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the
Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs
to the whole Trinity--to wit, to be the active principle of this
grace.
_______________________
QUESTION 3
OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming,
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?
(2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?
(3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
(4) Whether one Person can assume without another?
(5) Whether each Person can assume?
(6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?
(7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?
(8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to
assume human nature than for another Divine Person?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Befitting for a Divine Person to Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine
Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies
something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is
perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and
consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does
not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created
nature.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in
some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated
to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a
person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I, Q. 29, A. 1).
Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e. to
take to Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant
that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the
effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a
Person to assume a nature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii): "This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the
nature, "of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten God
is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to
assume a nature.
_I answer that,_ In the word "assumption" are implied two things,
viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take
something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the
principle and the term. The principle--because it properly belongs to
a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine
action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as
was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the union took place in the Person,
and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is
most properly befitting to a Person.
Reply Obj. 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be
made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]:
"We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to
addition"; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to
God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man;
hence, not God but man is perfected.
Reply Obj. 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch
as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents
several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not
contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist
in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may
concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and
quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its
infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not
accidentally, but in subsistence.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1), the human nature
constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person
is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the
Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be
man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted
simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine
Nature, but to assume the human nature.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Befitting to the Divine Nature to Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine
Nature to assume. Because, as was said above (A. 1), to assume is to
take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human
nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said
above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine
Nature to assume human nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons.
If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it
consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father
assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.
Obj. 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not
a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the
agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii): "That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father"
(i.e. which is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took
our nature free of sin from His Mother."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), in the word assumption two
things are signified--to wit, the principle and the term of the
action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the
Divine Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its
power; but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the
Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is
considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said
to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a
nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also
said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it
assumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6): "Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the
Nature of God is incarnate."
Reply Obj. 1: "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same
suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from
the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took
human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to
Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of
the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum
of the Father and the Son is not one, and hence it cannot properly be
said that the Father assumes human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is
befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like.
But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as
was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.
Reply Obj. 3: As in God _what is_ and _whereby it is_ are the same,
so likewise in Him _what acts_ and _whereby it acts_ are the same,
since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine
Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether the Nature Abstracted from the Personality Can Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our
mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (A. 1) that it
belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what
belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other
is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without
color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally
abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.
Obj. 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said
above (A. 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only
in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the
Divine Nature cannot assume.
Obj. 3: Further, it has been said above (I, Q. 40, A. 3) that in the
Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the
one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is
abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.
_On the contrary,_ In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal
property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and
Procession, as was said above (I, Q. 30, A. 2). Now if we mentally
abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which
the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke 1:37): "No word
shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the
Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.
_I answer that,_ The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First,
to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the
intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for
all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as
regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they
are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the
same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as
knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding
manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our
intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the
like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding
Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if
we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the
Nature assuming.
Reply Obj. 1: Because in God _what is,_ and _whereby it is,_ are one,
if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract
is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be
something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an
intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on
account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we
mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in
our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in
this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its
subsistence or Personality.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons
are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our
thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the
assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in
the Person of the Word.
Reply Obj. 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said
that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of
the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can
think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However,
some of the things predicated of God can be understood without
others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether One Person Without Another Can Assume a Created Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created
nature without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are
inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the
three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation.
Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one
without belonging to another.
Obj. 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so
also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in
one of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But
the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption
is.
Obj. 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so
likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom.
14:3: "God hath taken him to Him." But this assumption pertains to
all the Persons; therefore the first also.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of
the Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to
which something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), assumption implies two
things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the
act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to
the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as
stated above (A. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the
assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the
nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to
belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to
be united to the one Person of the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion
would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term,
which is a Person.
Reply Obj. 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by
reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above
(AA. 1, 2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now "the
whole Divine Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is
incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to
the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as
Damascene explains there.
Reply Obj. 3: The assumption which takes place by the grace of
adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine
Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4:
"That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this
assumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle
and the term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is
common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term,
as was said above.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 5]
Whether Each of the Divine Persons Could Have Assumed Human Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have
assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this
assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But
it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should
be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the
Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have
assumed flesh.
Obj. 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into
possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: "For you
have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit
of adoption of sons." But sonship by adoption is a participated
likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor
the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew
He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His
Son." Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of
the Son could have become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the
temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not
belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said
above (I, Q. 32, A. 3; First Part, Q. 43, A. 4). Therefore at least
the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the
Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be
one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father
and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2, 4), assumption implies
two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the
assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the
term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly
in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to
all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now
whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can
terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in
rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them.
Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the
Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the
Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy
Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the
Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal
Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity.
Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy
Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine
Persons.
Reply Obj. 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural
sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father,
Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6:
"God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba,
Father." And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we
receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so
likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received
adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural
sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father
and Son.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal
birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of
God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He
is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for
the nature of mission.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether Several Divine Persons Can Assume One and the Same Individual
Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there
be only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one
person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be
destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three
Persons can take one human nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person,
as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one
human nature.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of God
the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of
the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to
assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of
each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely,
what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons.
Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would
be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God;
and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three
Persons should assume one human nature.
_On the contrary,_ The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But
the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they
can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human
nature be assumed by the three Persons.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 2, A. 5, ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude
another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same
Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole
reason of the deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep.
ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality
of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of
the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or
three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be
impossible for them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus
Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that
"several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of
Person."
Reply Obj. 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human
nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man,
because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say
the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so
it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human
nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human
nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons
were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying
that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one
people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God
and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one
spirit results," according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the
Lord is one spirit."
Reply Obj. 2: In this supposition the human nature would be assumed
to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each
Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with
each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Person by assumption.
Reply Obj. 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a
communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because
whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person
subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may
apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be
predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the
Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own
Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost
on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the
man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the
Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the
Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy
of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude
that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether One Divine Person Can Assume Two Human Natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two
human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the
Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine
Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).
Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures,
there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species;
which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one
species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.
Obj. 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the
Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have
one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several,
for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there
would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is
impossible.
Obj. 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine
Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part of
it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and
complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two
human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul
of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two
bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of
natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume
two human natures.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son
do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human
nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing
is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of
the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can
assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
_I answer that,_ What has power for one thing, and no more, has a
power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite,
nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said
that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to
assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the
Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human
nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this
is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any
creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine
Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union,
or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it
has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human
nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials by its
form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And
hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new
suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the
multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation
the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not
constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (A. 6). Hence there
can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of
the division of matter, without distinction of supposita.
Reply Obj. 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a
hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the
two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be
called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said
above (A. 6, ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we
must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which
is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge
of a word's signification or co-signification, we must consider the
things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is
never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a
man who has on two garments is not said to be "two persons clothed,"
but "one clothed with two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is
designated in the singular as "such by reason of the two qualities."
Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this
similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above (Q. 2,
A. 6, ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human
natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum,
one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one
people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on
account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine
Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said
to be one man, as stated (A. 6, ad 1), not from the unity of
suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common.
Reply Obj. 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same
relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related
first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity;
and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person,
inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed
that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in
human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His
manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by
the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal
union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in
the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the
Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not be
necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other, i.e.
all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 8]
Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than
any other Divine Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son
of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For
by the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge
of God, according to John 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this
came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth." But by the
Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back
from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very
Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as
Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said
(John 14:28): "The Father is greater than I." Now this error would
not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for
no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it
seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person
of the Son, should have become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as
it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15:
"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature." But the power of creation is
appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more
becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of
sins, according to Matt. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For
He shall save His people from their sins." Now the remission of sins
is attributed to the Holy Ghost according to John 20:22, 23: "Receive
ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven
them." Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than
the Person of the Son to become incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the
mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made
known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most
heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer." But power
and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24:
"Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore it was
fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ It was most fitting that the Person of the Son
should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as
are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is
the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures,
because the word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar
likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is
His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And
therefore as creatures are established in their proper species,
though movably, by the participation of this likeness, so by the
non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it
was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its
eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the
intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork,
restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a
particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept
of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom is derived. And
hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as
he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is
instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said
(Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom."
And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that
the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of such as are
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on
sons, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." Hence it was
fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same
chapter (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to
be made conformable to the image of His Son."
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of
the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence
it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led
back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst
for knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since
it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: "Or despisest
thou the riches of His goodness?" Hence, even if the Person of the
Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding
an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to restore
human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: The first creation of things was made by the power of
God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to
have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the
Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation
according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling
the world to Himself."
Reply Obj. 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to
the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy
Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man's
justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the
Holy Ghost is.
_______________________
QUESTION 4
OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of
God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a
threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature;
secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order
of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any
other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature
abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all
its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any
man begotten of the stock of Adam?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 1]
Whether Human Nature Was More Assumable by the Son of God Than Any
Other Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of
being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine
says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the
whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of
God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is
not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite.
Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any
other creature.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the
Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q. 3, A. 8). But
as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in
irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the
irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
Obj. 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.;
xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal
of resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man,
according to Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness."
Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the
nature of man.
Obj. 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the
more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole
universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human
nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed
than human nature.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with
human nature.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of
being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken
with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to
what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a
creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is
said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now
this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz.
according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its
dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual,
was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation,
viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need--because it
stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now
these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational
creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature
the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only
human nature was assumable.
Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their
proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their
first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not
that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the
proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be
not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God,
but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no
capability for this.
Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature,
forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through
its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace
regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the
creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which
such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For
what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as
a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is
much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more
perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by
operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the
union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in
personal being.
Reply Obj. 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are
perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation,
inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence
they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their
personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the
incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the
creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the
fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing
a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and
in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was
said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although
the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is
irremediable, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of
one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position
or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as
was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of
being assumed.
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed
human nature _in atomo,"_ i.e. in an individual. But an individual in
rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son
of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent
III [*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that
"the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would
seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii) that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is
taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion.
Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption;
rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (Q. 3, AA. 1,
2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been
corrupted--in which case it was useless; or it remains after the
union--and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the
other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Hence
it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
Reply Obj. 1: The Son of God assumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in
an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the
Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was
assumed.
Reply Obj. 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature
assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of
the human nature but through the addition of something which is above
human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
Reply Obj. 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of
anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have
been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine
Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in
this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed
the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the
human nature from having its personality.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 3]
Whether the Divine Person Assumed a Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For
it is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and
taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says
(De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore
things human."
Obj. 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son
of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
Obj. 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the
men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any
other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which
is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus
Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and
Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is
another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that
there be another besides Him."
_I answer that,_ As has been said above (A. 2), what is assumed is
not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption.
Now it was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2) that the individual to Whom the
human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is
the term of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human
nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 4, 11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature.
And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man,
granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one
suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that
there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly
and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the
first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was
assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A.
6).
Reply Obj. 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but
are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors;
so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was
assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this--that the Son
of God is man.
Reply Obj. 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete,
inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a
suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
Reply Obj. 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the
man whose nature He assumed.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 4]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed Human Nature Abstracted
from All Individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of
human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it
is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men,
especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals
withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to
have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
Obj. 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed
to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the
Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing (_per se_) man, which,
according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its
individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
Obj. 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (A.
3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said (A. 3). Therefore
the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the
Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought;
for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not
exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is
separated from individuals.
_I answer that,_ The nature of man or of any other sensible thing,
beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two
ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the
Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human
or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves
(Metaph. vii, 26, 27, 29, 51), because sensible matter belongs to the
specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition,
as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature
cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were
subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be
assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is
terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common
form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a
common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations,
according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the
contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God,
having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a
nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the
Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's
sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth,
and conversed with men."
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of
God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this
would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human
nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a
false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11).
Reply Obj. 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all,
not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the
nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause,
whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human
salvation.
Reply Obj. 2: Self-existing (_per se_) man is not to be found in
nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists
held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only
in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be
assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
Reply Obj. 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete,
as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless
it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an
individual.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 5]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed Human Nature in All
Individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by
itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature
belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that
human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its
supposita.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love;
hence it is written (John 3:16): "God so loved the world as to give
His only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our
friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to
assume several human natures, as was said above (Q. 3, A. 7), and
with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume human nature in all its supposita.
Obj. 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest
manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had
been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead
many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. 2:10).
Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its
supposita.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the
Son of God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He
assume all its hypostases."
_I answer that,_ It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by
the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of
supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been
taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the
assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (A. 3),
if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow
that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the
Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to
the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of
many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the
First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men
would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one
Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature,
so that on both sides unity might be found.
Reply Obj. 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself,
because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs
to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however,
that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential
principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would
belong to all its supposita.
Reply Obj. 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in
human nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God
commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were
sinners . . . Christ died for us," which would not have taken place
had He assumed human nature in all its supposita.
Reply Obj. 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful
workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence
it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 6]
Whether It Was Fitting for the Son of God to Assume Human Nature of
the Stock of Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God
to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says
(Heb. 7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high
priest . . . separated from sinners." But He would have been still
further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the
stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have
assumed human nature of the stock of Adam.
Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is
from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He
ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
Obj. 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as
a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of the
Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than
from the stock of Abraham, who was just.
_On the contrary,_ (Luke 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back
to Adam.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able
to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by
his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better
to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish
the enemy of the human race." And this for three reasons: First,
because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should
make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted
should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the
whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the
conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the
devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest,
since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was
raised to such might and glory.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards
sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He
came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to be made
like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in this
is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from
a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
Reply Obj. 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to
take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which
Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written
(Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need
cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover
is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself
unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human
nature in Adam himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated from
sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was
fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should
stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness
should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ
was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in
Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and
circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is
written (Gen. 17:11).
_______________________
QUESTION 5
OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of
flesh and blood?
(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?
(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a True Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the
likeness of men." But what is something in truth is not said to be in
the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true
body.
Obj. 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the
assumption lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God
to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by
the assumption God was not united to a body.
Obj. 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the
apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in
the imagination, as is plain from Isa. 60:1: "I saw the Lord
sitting," etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of
God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body
of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us,
He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was
not a phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.
_I answer that,_ As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was
not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His
body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the
essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body.
Therefore granted, as already proved (Q. 4, A. 1), that it was
fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must
consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken
from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body
was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of
those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in
very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow
that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect
must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from
the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have
anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our
Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24:37, 39), when the
disciples, "troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,"
and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch,
saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as
you see Me to have."
Reply Obj. 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature
in Christ--just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to
be like in species--and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of
this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient unto
death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.
Reply Obj. 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God
is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that
He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the
form of God." For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to
become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine
simplicity and purity--for this would be to assume a body to the
unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has
been stated above (Q. 2, A. 1): but, the natures remaining distinct,
He assumed a body to the unity of Person.
Reply Obj. 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as
regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For
if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness
but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26).
Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament
should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition
of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the
thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col.
2:17): "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is
Christ's."
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a Carnal or Earthly Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly,
but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first
man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."
But the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body,
as is plain from Gen. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was
of heaven as regards the body.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall
not [Vulg.: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of
God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in
Him, but rather a heavenly body.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of
all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ
to assume such a body.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord says (Luke 24:39): "A spirit hath not
flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not
of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior
elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a
carnal and earthly body.
_I answer that,_ By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ
was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a
heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature
of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an
imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have
been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a
heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it
requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be
placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher
(Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of
such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is
impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son
of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered
or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death.
Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since
the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and
earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a
heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: "The Son of
God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it
with Him from heaven."
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from
heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the
Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be
here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed nature, according to
John 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended
from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven."
Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of
the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was
formed by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine,
explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu.
4, work of an unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because
He was not conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the
same way (De Trin. x).
Reply Obj. 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of
flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in
Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment;
thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the
work of our redemption.
Reply Obj. 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised
a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General
Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St.
Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for
displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because
by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the
power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God,
did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most
precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 3]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul.
For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (John
1:14): "The Word was made flesh"--no mention being made of a soul.
Now it is not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to
flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have
assumed a soul.
Obj. 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken
it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would
seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, "with
Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether
superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But
"God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De
Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have
assumed a soul.
Obj. 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the
common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus
Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not
hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word
of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had
no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69, 55), it was first
of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of
God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took
the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that
there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul
and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot
hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the
authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul,
Matt. 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and John 10:18:
"I have power to lay down My soul [_animam meam:_ Douay: 'My life']."
But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken
metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of
the soul of God (Isa. 1:14): "My soul hateth your new moons and your
solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the
Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry.
Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept
and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if
these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the
Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined.
For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and
another that historical events were related in very truth by the
Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the
Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius
Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in
taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness,
and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable
to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He
reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He
cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of
these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call
Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God
of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two
reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no
place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the
cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful
transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment
of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one
who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you
look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than
the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its
intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that
Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most
loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was
better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He
protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against
the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man
receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent,
there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from
the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; _Metaph._ vii, 34).
Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is
taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made
man," as Isa. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of
the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh,
because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became
visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or
because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union
the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence,
wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist
mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it
is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was
reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the
Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.
Reply Obj. 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first
effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of
the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence
from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded
that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may
be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that
in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming
to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a
common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and
the humanity.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Human Mind or Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human
mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not
required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Hence, since in Christ there was
the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human
mind.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of
God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into
this world," as is written John 1:9, is compared to the mind as the
greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it
were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit
of a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the
Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.
Obj. 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is
called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing
carnal, either in its substance or in its act, for it is not the act
of a body, as is proved _De Anima_ iii, 6. Hence it would seem that
the Son of God did not assume a human mind.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
xiv): "Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has
true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His
flesh He says (Luke 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not
flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a
soul, saying (John 17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I
may take it again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying
(Matt. 11:29): 'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.'
And God says of Him by the prophet (Isa. 52:13): 'Behold my servant
shall understand.'"
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49, 50), "the
Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning
the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh
alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the
Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to
Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place." But this
position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First,
because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He
marveled (as is plain from Matt. 8:10). Now marveling cannot be
without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause,
i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause,
we seek to know it, as is said _Metaph._ i, 2. Secondly, it is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the
justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of
sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was
especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an
intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was
united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for
what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the
truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the
soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it
is not perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ
had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human
flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal
soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80)
that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God "took
an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is against
the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.
Reply Obj. 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not
required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is
the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing
is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by
the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected
by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected
in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human
mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of another
luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of
the body illuminated--at the presence of the sun the light of the
stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the
intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light
of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of
man is perfected rather than overshadowed.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of a
body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form
of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it
may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a
better disposed body should correspond to it.
_______________________
QUESTION 6
OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the
soul?
(2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?
(3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?
(4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to
being united to the soul?
(5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of
the parts?
(6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 1]
Whether the Son of God Assumed Flesh Through the Medium of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh
through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God
is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the
mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures
immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is
the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in
unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to
the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human
body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the
hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of
individuation, which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem
to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the
medium of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were
joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed
color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the
medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the
body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the
flesh, as will be shown (Q. 50, AA. 2, 3). Hence the Word was not
joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The
greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and
through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something
higher."
_I answer that,_ A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end.
Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now
there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in
the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the
order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to
Himself at the same time, as will appear (Q. 30, A. 3). An order of
nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards
rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God;
secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is
midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second
order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the
less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is
found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be
said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium
of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the
soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of
God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its
relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh.
For it was said above (Q. 4, A. 1) that human nature was assumable
before all others.
Reply Obj. 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures and
God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and
depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on
account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing
immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is
in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is
by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is
here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower
creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature
by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it
is united to flesh through the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted
simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to
it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even
as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human
nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more
exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human
nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence
the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the
aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the
other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on
another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as
a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter
has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her
beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet
when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So
likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with
flesh still endured.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul Through the Medium of the
Spirit or Mind?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium
between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence
but the soul itself, as was said above (I, Q. 77, A. 1, ad 1).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of
the spirit or mind.
Obj. 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more
assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the
soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not
assumable, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it seems that the
Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.
Obj. 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first
through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the
very essence, which naturally comes before its power--the mind.
Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The
invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit,
and a body by means of the soul."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the Son of God is said to
have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the
order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these
may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we
compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed
congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His
likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit,
according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So,
too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the
soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the
medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the
soul, God Himself being an intellect."
Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in
essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power;
and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.
Reply Obj. 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic
spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the
irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human
spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I, Q. 62, A. 8;
First Part, Q. 64, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the
intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of
the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower
powers, which are common to every soul.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 3]
Whether the Soul Was Assumed Before the Flesh by the Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before
the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the
medium of the soul, as was said above (A. 1). Now the medium is
reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul
before the body.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels,
according to Ps. 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the
angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I, Q. 46, A.
3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning).
But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 2, 3, 9), that "neither the soul nor the body of
Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word."
Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh,
which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that "of
His fulness we have all received" (John 1:16), i.e. all the faithful
of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this
could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of
grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of
the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since
the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union
with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We
saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father, full of grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that
from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the
Word of God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The
intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God,
and henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the
Virgin."
_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon i, 7, 8; ii, 8) maintained that
all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the
beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first
of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would
follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the
Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union
did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing
subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting
to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning,
and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin;
for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours,
which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies.
Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was
not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused
into it in the beginning than into other men."
Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (A. 1), the soul of Christ is said to
be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order
of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in
the order of time.
Reply Obj. 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul
excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of
power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the
angels in "fulness of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is
in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the
form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it
is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to
angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter.
Reply Obj. 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to
the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. 3:22) that "the
justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them
that believe in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already born;
so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since "having
the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is written (2
Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of
justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to
Rom. 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to
the purpose of the grace of God." Hence because this purpose is
eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the
faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and
truth.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 4]
Whether the Flesh of Christ Was Assumed by the Word Before Being
United to the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by
the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius]
says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt
that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin
without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh
of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to
the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the
completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ
was assumed before being united to the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the
body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being
than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted
above (A. 3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no
other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten
before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in
Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being
united to the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the
second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union
with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a
second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh
before it was to the soul.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the
same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a
rational and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with
the flesh did not precede the union with the soul.
_I answer that,_ The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account
of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form.
Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it,
because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time
it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same
instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is
that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human
flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore
since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is
against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body,
so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul,
since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.
Reply Obj. 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and
hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but
there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception
of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might,
disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.
Reply Obj. 2: The form actually gives the species; but the matter in
itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be
against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And
therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin,
inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's
flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the
nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ
is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin
of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh
before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of
creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in
time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it
has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has
from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as
united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from
its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the
Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the
rational nature.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 5]
Whether the Whole Human Nature Was Assumed Through the Medium of the
Parts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole
human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De
Agone Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth
assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body
through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man." But
the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He
assumed all, through the medium of the parts.
Obj. 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of
the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the
parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would
seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole.
Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.
Obj. 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the
union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are
presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the
parts.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our
Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are
immediately joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood." Now the
humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts.
Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the
whole.
_I answer that,_ When anything is said to be a medium in the
assumption of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time,
because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous.
For it has been shown (AA. 3, 4) that the soul and body were mutually
united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of
the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what
is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now
a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the
agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for these two causes
precede the thing. On the part of the agent--that is simply first,
which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively
first, with which his operation begins--and this because the
intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter--that
is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now
in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be
particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad
Volusianum cxxxvii), "in such things the whole reason of the deed is
the power of the doer." But it is manifest that, according to the
intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is
incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must
be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature,
through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on
account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed
a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except that
the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole
human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order
of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of
time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider
the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and
hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is
more perfect.
Reply Obj. 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is
terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction
of parts.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 6]
Whether the Human Nature Was Assumed Through the Medium of Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature
through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But
the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore
the union took place by grace.
Obj. 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its
perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was
fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God
assumed the soul through the medium of grace.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate
Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by
means of _breathing_ (_spiritus_). Therefore the Word of God is
united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of
grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor.
12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
_On the contrary,_ Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown
above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Now the union of the Word with human
nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was
shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed
by means of grace.
_I answer that,_ In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual
grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the
assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of
union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal
being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the
Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the
habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an
effect following the union, according to John 1:14: "We saw His glory
. . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace
and truth"--by which we are given to understand that because this Man
(as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is
full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of
God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by
grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause.
Reply Obj. 1: Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know
and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as
a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human
nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not
on any habit, but on the nature itself.
Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the substantial perfection of the body;
grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot
ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the
soul ordains the body.
Reply Obj. 3: Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing
(_spiritus_), not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For
from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which
the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds
the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown (Q.
32, A. 1). But it does not follow from this that the grace of the
Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.
_______________________
QUESTION 7
OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN
(In Thirteen Articles)
We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God
in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what
belongs to defect.
Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The
grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power.
With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as
He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the
Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken (Q. 2).
Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?
(2) Whether in Christ there were virtues?
(3) Whether He had faith?
(4) Whether He had hope?
(5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts?
(6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?
(7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces?
(8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy?
(9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him?
(10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ?
(11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite?
(12) Whether it could have been increased?
(13) How this grace stood towards the union?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 1]
Whether in the Soul of Christ There Was Any Habitual Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul
assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead
by the rational creature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "By Whom He hath
given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be
made partakers of the Divine Nature." Now Christ is God not by
participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in
Him.
Obj. 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well,
according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "I have labored more abundantly than all
they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me"; and in order that he
may reach eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God
(is) life everlasting." Now the inheritance of everlasting life was
due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God;
and by the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made,
He had the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature
needed no further grace beyond union with the Word.
Obj. 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit
for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal
agent. Now the human nature in Christ was "as the instrument of the
Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there
was no need of habitual grace in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him"--which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by
habitual grace, as was said above (I, Q. 8, A. 3; Q. 43, AA. 3, 6).
Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ.
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ
for three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with
the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing
cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of
grace is from God, according to Ps. 83:12: "The Lord will give grace
and glory." And hence it was most fitting that His soul should
receive the influx of Divine grace. Secondly, on account of the
dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to
God by knowledge and love, to which it is necessary for human nature
to be raised by grace. Thirdly, on account of the relation of Christ
to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the "Mediator of God and
men," as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it behooved Him to have
grace which would overflow upon others, according to John 1:16: "And
of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace."
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet
because together with unity of person there remains distinction of
natures, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the soul of Christ is not
essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by
participation, which is by grace.
Reply Obj. 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is
due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through
the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same whereby
the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of
this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behooved
it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could not be
without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He had
the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And
because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the
Divine operation, as will be shown (Q. 19, A. 1), it was necessary
for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be
perfect in Him.
Reply Obj. 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the
Godhead--not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but
is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul,
which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action
demanded that he should have habitual grace.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 2]
Whether in Christ There Were Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For
Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every
good act, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for
thee." Therefore there were no virtues in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue
is contrasted with a "certain heroic or godlike habit" which is
attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ.
Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, as was said above (I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2), all the
virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to
have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and
magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned,
according to Matt. 8:20: "The Son of man hath not where to lay His
head." Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from
which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues.
_On the contrary,_ on Ps. 1:2, "But His will is in the law of the
Lord," a gloss says: "This refers to Christ, Who is full of all
good." But a good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ
was full of all virtue.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), as grace
regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power.
Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its
essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a
principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the
grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in
consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul
for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to
beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself--as to
make him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others through the
medium of the virtues which proceed from grace.
Reply Obj. 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from
virtue commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is
disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is
not hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had
them most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus
gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of "virtue of the
purified soul" (cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5).
Reply Obj. 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in
regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the
extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done.
But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them
aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all
riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence;
although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became
Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to
Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (John 13:21), "That which
thou dost do quickly," the disciples understood our Lord to have
ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil
desires whatever, as will be shown (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2); yet He was
not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more
perfect in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man differs from the
continent in this--that the temperate has not the evil desires which
the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the
Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all
virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something
less than virtue.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 3]
Whether in Christ There Was Faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith
is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g. temperance and
liberality. Now these were in Christ, as stated above (A. 2). Much
more, therefore, was there faith in Him.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not
Himself, according to Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But
of Christ it is said (Heb. 12:2) that He is "the author and finisher
of our faith." Therefore there was faith in Him before all others.
Obj. 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the blessed.
But in the blessed there is faith; for on Rom. 1:17, "the justice of
God is revealed therein from faith to faith," a gloss says: "From the
faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight." Therefore
it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies
nothing imperfect.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the evidence
of things that appear not." But there was nothing that did not appear
to Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (John 21:17): "Thou
knowest all things." Therefore there was no faith in Christ.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (II-II, Q. 1, A. 4), the object of
faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every
other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny
that the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of
faith. Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God's
Essence fully, as will be made clear (Q. 34, A. 1). Hence there could
be no faith in Him.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing
that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a
certain defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in
Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral
virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with
regard to their matter.
Reply Obj. 2: The merit of faith consists in this--that man through
obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rom.
1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name." Now
Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8:
"Becoming obedient unto death." And hence He taught nothing
pertaining to merit which He did not fulfil more perfectly Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that
"whereby such things as are not seen are believed." But faith in
things seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain
similitude with regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7. Art. 4]
Whether in Christ There Was Hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is
said in the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): "In Thee, O Lord, have I
hoped." But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God.
Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was
shown above (II-II, Q. 17, A. 5, ad 3). But Christ awaited something
pertaining to bliss, viz. the glorifying of His body. Therefore it
seems there was hope in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his
perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something still to
come pertaining to Christ's perfection, according to Eph. 4:12: "For
the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the
building up [Douay: 'edifying'] of the body of Christ." Hence it
seems that it befitted Christ to have hope.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for?" Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen,
so also is hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above
(A. 1): neither, consequently, was there hope.
_I answer that,_ As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to
what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects
what as yet one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a
theological virtue, does not regard everything unseen, but only God;
so likewise hope, as a theological virtue, has God Himself for its
object, the fruition of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of
hope; yet, in consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may expect
the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the virtue of
faith believes God not only in Divine things, but even in whatsoever
is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of His conception Christ
had the Divine fruition fully, as will be shown (Q. 34, A. 4), and
hence he had not the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as
regards such things as He did not yet possess, although He had not
faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew all things
fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless He
did not as yet fully possess all that pertained to His perfection,
viz. immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for.
Reply Obj. 1: This is said of Christ with reference to hope, not as a
theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other things
not yet possessed, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as
being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by a certain
outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above (I-II, Q. 4, A.
6). Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of
the body but the soul's bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition.
Reply Obj. 3: The building up of the church by the conversion of the
faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby He is
perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His
perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by him
who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in
Christ, because of the aforesaid reason.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 5]
Whether in Christ There Were the Gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as
is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what
is perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since
the virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in
Him.
Obj. 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to
belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to
receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give
gifts according to Ps. 67:19. "Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.:
'Thou hast received gifts in men']." Therefore it was not becoming
that Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the
contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and
counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the
contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 4:1): "Seven women shall take
hold of one man": on which a gloss says: "That is, the seven gifts of
the Holy Ghost shall take hold of Christ."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts,
properly, are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch as
these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost,
according to Luke 4:1: "And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost,
returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert."
Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent
degree.
Reply Obj. 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be
helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect,
needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect
the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter
how perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect
the soul's powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of
the Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and
receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the Holy
Ghost never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine
nature He proceedeth."
Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge, but
also earthly knowledge, as will be said (Q. 15, A. 10). And yet even
in heaven the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain
manner, as was said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6).
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 6]
Whether in Christ There Was the Gift of Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of
fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object
of hope is goodness, and of fear, evil, as was said above (I-II, Q.
40, A. 1; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). But in Christ there was not the virtue
of hope, as was said above (A. 4). Hence, likewise, there was not the
gift of fear in Him.
Obj. 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated
from God, which pertains to _chaste_ fear--or to be punished by Him,
which pertains to _servile_ fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract.
ix). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor
being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible
for Him to sin, as will be said (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2). Now fear is not of
the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 4:18) that "perfect charity
casteth out fear." But in Christ there was most perfect charity,
according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all
knowledge." Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:3): "And He shall be filled
with the spirit of the fear of the Lord."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1), fear regards
two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is
that by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king
inasmuch as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can
hurt would not be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might,
to which resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily
repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared
except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in
Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil
of separation from God by fault, nor as it regards the evil of
punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine
pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy
Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is
said (Heb. 5:7) that in all things "he was heard for his reverence."
For Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller
sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him
the fulness of the fear of the Lord.
Reply Obj. 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness
properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains
to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said _Ethic._ ii,
6. And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil
which fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness,
viz. of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. On the other hand,
hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the
good itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ,
Who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not
attribute the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards
the evil object.
Reply Obj. 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which
principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in
Christ.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 7]
Whether the Gratuitous Graces Were in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in
Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not
pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its
fulness, according to John 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." But the
gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed
distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1
Cor. 12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces." Therefore it would
seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be
gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that
He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be
mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to
gratuitous graces: since He is "the power of God and the wisdom of
God," as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for
Christ to have the gratuitous graces.
Obj. 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the
faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use
is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: "Wisdom
that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in
them both?" Now we do not read that Christ made use of these
gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues.
Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that "as
in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 3, AA. 1, 4), the
gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and
spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means
of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be
useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual
doctrine and faith, according to Heb. 2:3, 4: "Which having begun to
be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him,
God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders." Hence it is
clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ,
as in the first and chief teacher of the faith.
Reply Obj. 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts
both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained
to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of
miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the
fulness, since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had
the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who
are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive
power in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that
act. And hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in
Christ.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of
God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it
does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower
of grace; but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace.
Reply Obj. 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles,
because they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to
preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself
says (Matt. 15:24): "I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of
the house of Israel"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): "I say that
Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision." And hence it was not
necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of
all languages not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts,
of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be
shown (Q. 10, A. 2). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed, just
as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there
is no occasion.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 8]
Whether in Christ There Was the Gift of Prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of
prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect
knowledge, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet
of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him
in a dream." But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more
than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that "plainly and not by riddles
and figures doth he see God" (Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to
admit prophecy in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope
with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not
present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of
far-off things. But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope,
as was said above (AA. 3, 4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be
admitted in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence
Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above
(II-II, Q. 174, A. 4) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an
angel in the desert. But Christ was "made lower than the angels," not
as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings
of His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was
not a prophet.
_On the contrary,_ It is written of Him (Deut. 18:15): "Thy God will
raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren," and He
says of Himself (Matt. 13:57; John 4:44): "A prophet is not without
honor, save in his own country."
_I answer that,_ A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of
far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are
far from men's senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now
we must bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing
and announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And
this is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in
France were to know and announce to others living in France what
things were transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus
told Giezi (4 Kings 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his
chariot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to announce
what things were there, it would not be prophetical. And the same
appears in regard to time. For it was prophetical of Isaias to
announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would rebuild the temple
of God, as is clear from Isa. 44:28. But it was not prophetical of
Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or
angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our
knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch
our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch
as He was not merely a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer." Hence it was
prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge
of other "wayfarers": and for this reason He is called a prophet.
Reply Obj. 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge,
viz. by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the
comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine things in
dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by
riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Deut. 24:10:
"And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ had full and
unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the
imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which Divine things
could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a "comprehensor," but a
"wayfarer."
Reply Obj. 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who
believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by
the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the
sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this
state of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the
perfection of Christ's beatitude; but prophecy is not.
Reply Obj. 3: Angels, being "comprehensors," are above prophets, who
are merely "wayfarers"; but not above Christ, Who was both a
"comprehensor" and a "wayfarer."
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 9]
Whether in Christ There Was the Fulness of Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness
of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above (I-II,
Q. 110, A. 4). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for
there was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above (AA. 3,
4). Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.
Obj. 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above (I-II, Q. 111,
A. 2), grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now operating
grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no
place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ
there was not the fulness of grace.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 1:17): "Every best gift and
every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of
lights." But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully.
Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the
fulness of the gifts of grace.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.:
'His glory'] full of grace and truth."
_I answer that,_ To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now
totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards
their _intensive_ quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has
whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in
him; secondly, _as regards power_; for instance, if anyone be said to
have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of
life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants
have not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fulness of grace.
First, since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect
way it can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of
Christ's soul to the cause of grace. For it was said above (A. 1)
that the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it
receives. And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united
to God than all other rational creatures, receives the greatest
outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation to the effect. For
the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured
out from it upon others. And hence it behooved Him to have the
greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other hot
things, is of all things the hottest.
Likewise, as regards the _virtue_ of grace, He had grace fully, since
He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this,
because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in
the genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first
principle of a genus universally extends itself to all the effects of
that genus; thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause
of generation, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things
that come under generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen
in Christ inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace,
which are the virtues, gifts, and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain
defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is
of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was
not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there
should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever
perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in
fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the
subject's defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat.
Reply Obj. 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify;
but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the
part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of
Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered
just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it
was until then sinful, or even not just.
Reply Obj. 3: The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of
Christ according to the capacity of the creature and not by
comparison with the infinite fulness of the Divine goodness.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 10]
Whether the Fulness of Grace Is Proper to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to
Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be
full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the
Blessed Virgin (Luke 1:28): "Hail, full of grace"; and again it is
written (Acts 6:8): "Stephen, full of grace and fortitude." Therefore
the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ
does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be
communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph.
3:19): "That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God."
Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be proportioned
to the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the
comprehensor there will be a certain fulness, since "in our heavenly
country with its fulness of all good, although some things are
bestowed in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly,"
as is clear from Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.).
Therefore in the state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is
possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is not proper
to Christ. On the contrary, The fulness of grace is attributed to
Christ inasmuch as He is the only-begotten of the Father, according
to John 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were . . . the
Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." But to be the
Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is
proper to Him to be full of grace and truth.
_I answer that,_ The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways:
First, on the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the
one who has grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to
be the fulness of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to
essence and power, inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest
possible excellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its
effects. And this fulness of grace is proper to Christ. But on the
part of the subject there is said to be the fulness of grace when
anyone fully possesses grace according to his condition--whether as
regards intensity, by reason of grace being intense in him, to the
limit assigned by God, according to Eph. 4:1: "But to every one of us
is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ"--or
"as regards power," by reason of a man having the help of grace for
all that belongs to his office or state, as the Apostle says (Eph.
3:8): "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . .
to enlighten all men." And this fulness of grace is not proper to
Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on
the part of grace itself--since she had not grace in its greatest
possible excellence--nor for all the effects of grace; but she is
said to be full of grace in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch as
she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her,
i.e. to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said
to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit
minister and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And
the same must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater
than another, according as one is divinely pre-ordained to a higher
or lower state.
Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness
which has reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is
divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to
which all the saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which
pertains to the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain
fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have grace
enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God.
And this is the fulness of grace which the Apostle desires for the
faithful to whom he writes.
Reply Obj. 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.:
vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts
corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the
saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven
and on earth, which are not possessed by all.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 11]
Whether the Grace of Christ Is Infinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's grace is infinite. For
everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is
immeasurable; since it is written (John 3:34): "For God doth not give
the Spirit by measure to His Son [*'To His Son' is lacking in the
Vulgate], namely Christ." Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.
Obj. 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which
can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ's
grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole
human race; for He is the propitiation for our sins . . . and for
those of the whole world, as is said (1 John 2:2). Therefore the
grace of Christ is infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the
quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ
is finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent
as to reach to an equality with Christ's grace, against what is
written (Job 28:17): "Gold nor crystal cannot equal it," as Gregory
expounds it (Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.
_On the contrary,_ Grace is something created in the soul. But every
created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered
all things in measure and number and weight." Therefore the grace of
Christ is not infinite.
_I answer that,_ As was made clear above (Q. 2, A. 10), a twofold
grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of
union, which, as was said (Q. 6, A. 6), is for Him to be personally
united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the
human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the
Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be
taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must be a
finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject, and
Christ's soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being
of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject.
Secondly it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus
the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited,
i.e. it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what
pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed
measure; seeing that "according to the purpose" of God to Whom it
pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a
universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to
Eph. 1:5, 6, "He hath graced us in His beloved Son"; thus we might
say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but
in the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature
of light.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the Father "doth not give the
Spirit by measure," it may be expounded of the gift which God the
Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which
is an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: "So that
the Son may be as great as the Father is." Or again, it may be
referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to
the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss
says on this text: "As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it
is united thus full and perfect to human nature." Thirdly, it may be
referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends
to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (Tract.
xiv in Joan.) says: "The division of the gifts is a measurement. For
to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another
the word of knowledge." But Christ the giver does not receive by
measure.
Reply Obj. 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both
because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity
[*Perhaps we should read 'infinity'--Ed.] of the Divine Person, to
Whom Christ's soul is united.
Reply Obj. 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the
greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of
any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a
universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it
increases, can never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man,
no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 12]
Whether the Grace of Christ Could Increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase.
For to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of
Christ was finite. Therefore it could increase.
Obj. 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased,
according to 2 Cor. 9:8: "And God is able to make all grace abound in
you." But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits.
Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 2:52) that the child "Jesus
advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men." Therefore the
grace of Christ could increase.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.:
'His glory'] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full
of grace and truth." But nothing can be or can be thought greater
than that anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore
no greater grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ
was full.
_I answer that,_ For a form to be incapable of increase happens in
two ways: First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of
the form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject
reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its
own manner, e.g. if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it
has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of
air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the
heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of
increase is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection
which this form can have by nature, e.g. if we say the heat of fire
cannot be increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of
heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of
grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom,
according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered all things in number,
weight and measure." And it is with reference to its end that a
measure is set to every form, as there is no greater gravity than
that of the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the
earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature
with God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of
the rational creature with God than that which is in the Person. And
hence the grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence
it is clear that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part
of grace. But neither can it be increased on the part of the subject,
since Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the first
instant of His conception. Hence there could have been no increase of
grace in Him, as there could be none in the rest of the blessed,
whose grace could not increase, seeing that they have reached their
last end. But as regards men who are wholly wayfarers, their grace
can be increased not merely on the part of the form, since they have
not attained the highest degree of grace, but also on the part of the
subject, since they have not yet attained their end.
Reply Obj. 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition can be
made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of
finite quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of
natural quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to
which a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are
determined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that "there
is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and
increase." And hence to the quantity of the whole there can be no
addition. And still more must we suppose a term in the forms
themselves, beyond which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary
that addition should be capable of being made to Christ's grace,
although it is finite in its essence.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the Divine power can make something greater
and better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not make
it to be ordained to anything greater than the personal union with
the Only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the
purpose of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient.
Reply Obj. 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two ways.
First inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased;
and in this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the
effects, i.e. inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in
this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since
in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself
true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man.
_______________________
THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 7, Art. 13]
Whether the Habitual Grace of Christ Followed After the Union?
Objection 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow
after the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace
seems to be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Every man becomes a Christian from the
beginning of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His
beginning became Christ"; and of these two the first pertains to
habitual grace and the second to the grace of union. Therefore it
would seem that habitual grace did not follow upon the union.
Obj. 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at
least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in
human nature for the personal union. Therefore it seems that the
habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union.
Obj. 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace
is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper
to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union.
Therefore it does not follow it.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 42:1): "Behold my servant, I
will uphold Him . . . "and farther on: "I have given My Spirit upon
Him"; and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it
remains that the assumption of human nature to the unity of the
Person preceded the habitual grace of Christ.
_I answer that,_ The union of the human nature with the Divine
Person, which, as we have said above (Q. 2, A. 10; Q. 6, A. 6), is
the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in
order of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple
reason: First, with reference to the order of the principles of both.
For the principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming
human nature, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He
assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is
given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent
inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the
Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy
Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to
which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of
nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy
Ghost takes place. Secondly, the reason of this order may be taken
from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man
by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence
of the sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. 43:2): "The glory of the God
of Israel came in by the way of the east . . . and the earth shone
with His majesty." But the presence of God in Christ is by the union
of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of
Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun.
Thirdly, the reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace,
since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the
suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in consequence,
grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis which operates.
Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature before the
union, as is clear from Q. 4, A. 2. Therefore the grace of union
precedes, in thought, habitual grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of
God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be
made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since
both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.
Reply Obj. 2: As disposition in the order of generation precedes the
perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually
perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has
already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of
fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire.
Now the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word
from the beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not
understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a
natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Grace
is in a manner natural to the Man Christ."
Reply Obj. 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of the
same genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to
prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union
is not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera
even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent
this proper from being before the common since it does not result
from something being added to the common, but is rather the principle
and source of that which is common.
_______________________
QUESTION 8
OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church;
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?
(2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as
regards their souls?
(3) Whether He is the Head of all men?
(4) Whether He is the Head of the angels?
(5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as
His habitual grace as an individual man?
(6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ?
(7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
(8) Whether Antichrist can be called the head of all the wicked?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Is the Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man
to be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to
the members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are
not imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De
Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), "not even Christ, as man, but only as God,
bestows the Holy Ghost." Therefore it does not belong to Him as man
to be Head of the Church.
Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But
God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, "The
Head of Christ is God." Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member,
receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal
principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the
Church.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 1:22): "And He . . . hath made
Him head over all the Church."
_I answer that,_ As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from
its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members
has divers acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so
likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with
the human head, in which we may consider three things, viz. order,
perfection, and power: "Order," indeed; for the head is the first
part of man, beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that
every principle is usually called a head according to Ezech. 16:25:
"At every head of the way, thou hast set up a sign of thy
prostitution"--"Perfection," inasmuch as in the head dwell all the
senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members
there is only touch, and hence it is said (Isa. 9:15): "The aged and
honorable, he is the head"--"Power," because the power and movement
of the other members, together with the direction of them in their
acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power
there ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people,
according to 1 Kings 15:17: "When thou wast a little one in thy own
eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?" Now these
three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His
nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though not in
time, since all have received grace on account of His grace,
according to Rom. 8:29: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated
to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the
first-born amongst many brethren." Secondly, He had perfection as
regards the fulness of all graces, according to John 1:14, "We saw
Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] . . . full of grace and truth," as was shown
(Q. 7, A. 9). Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the
members of the Church, according to John 1:16: "Of His fulness we
have all received." And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly
called the Head of the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He
is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as
man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And
hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e.
by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But
Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost
authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost
instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. 3:5: "He . . .
who giveth to you the Spirit."
Reply Obj. 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in
all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity.
Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one human
body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an ordered
multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is
part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is head of the
domestic multitude has a head above him, i.e. the civil governor. And
hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ,
although Christ Himself is Head of the Church.
Reply Obj. 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other
exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And
hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly
quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in
His visible nature in which man is set over man.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Is the Head of Men As to Their Bodies or Only As to
Their Souls?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to
their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church
inasmuch as He bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on
the Church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and
movement. Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their
bodies.
Obj. 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ
was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was
the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear
from Matt. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as
was said above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the
Church as regards bodies.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 3:21): "Who will reform the
body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory."
_I answer that,_ The human body has a natural relation to the
rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the
soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other
properties which belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul
is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we
must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of _influence,_
inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is
united through the soul, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 1). Hence the
whole manhood of Christ, i.e. according to soul and body, influences
all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily
the body: First, inasmuch as the "members of the body are presented
as instruments of justice" in the soul that lives through Christ, as
the Apostle says (Rom. 6:13): secondly, inasmuch as the life of glory
flows from the soul on to the body, according to Rom. 8:11: "He that
raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies,
because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you."
Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body
first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was
said above.
Reply Obj. 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a rational
soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.
Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His body from other
men, yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body, according
to 1 Cor. 15:22: "And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall
be made alive."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Is the Head of All Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men.
For the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now
the unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of
Christ, as it is written (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the
Head of all men.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25, 27):
"Christ delivered Himself up for" the Church "that He might present
it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any
such thing." But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the
spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all
the faithful.
Obj. 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ
as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. 2:17). But the fathers
of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments,
according to Heb. 8:5: "Who serve unto the example and shadow of
heavenly things." Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and
therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): "Who is the Saviour
of all men, especially of the faithful," and (1 John 2:2): "He is the
propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those
of the whole world." Now to save men and to be a propitiation for
their sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of
all men.
_I answer that,_ This is the difference between the natural body of
man and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural
body are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all
together--neither as regards their natural being, since the body of
the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of
the world until its end--nor as regards their supernatural being,
since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are
without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it
already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body
not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality.
Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to
act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to
the triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the
charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come.
Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in
general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and
principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory;
secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity;
thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly,
of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not
yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine
predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in
potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men
existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on
their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of
Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the
Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is
rooted in two things--first and principally, in the power of Christ,
which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race;
secondly, in free-will.
Reply Obj. 2: To be "a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle" is
the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ.
Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which "if we say
we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," as is written (1 John 1:8).
Nevertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are
free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but
such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ
actually, but potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless
faith, which unites to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that
man partake of the life of grace. For, as is written (James 2:20):
"Faith without works is dead." Yet such as these receive from Christ
a certain vital act, i.e. to believe, as if a lifeless limb were
moved by a man to some extent.
Reply Obj. 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not
as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it
is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is
clear from the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the
ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to
Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him,
and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Is the Head of the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the
angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man
is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since,
as is written (Heb. 2:16): "For nowhere doth He take hold of the
angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Therefore Christ
as man is not the head of the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church,
which is His Body, as is written (Eph. 1:23). But the angels do not
belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the
faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not "walk
by faith" but "by sight," otherwise they would be "absent from the
Lord," as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. 5:6, 7). Therefore Christ as man
is not head of the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that as
"the Word" which "was in the beginning with the Father" quickens
souls, so the "Word made flesh" quickens bodies, which angels lack.
But the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man
does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of
the angels.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), "Who is the head of
all Principality and Power," and the same reason holds good with the
other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1, ad 2), where there is one
body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained
to one end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically
called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are
ordained to one end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence
the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of
angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, since He is
nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, not only than man, but
even than angels; and of His influence not only men but even angels
partake, since it is written (Eph. 1:20-22): that God the Father set
"Him," namely Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places,
above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion and every
name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is
to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet." Therefore
Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read
(Matt. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
Reply Obj. 1: Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to
their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though
not in specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can be
said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short
as regards the body.
Reply Obj. 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the
faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors.
Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And
therefore He is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of
comprehensors, as having grace and glory most fully.
Reply Obj. 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect,
i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things
on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue
of the spiritual nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something not
only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on
account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e. by personal
union.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 5]
Whether the Grace of Christ, As Head of the Church, Is the Same As
His Habitual Grace, Inasmuch As He Is Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of
the Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For
the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): "If by the offense of one many died,
much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man,
Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the actual sin of Adam is
distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity.
Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from
His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to
others from Him.
Obj. 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal
grace of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the sanctification of
His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to another, viz. to
sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of Christ is
distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church.
Obj. 3: Further, as was said above (Q. 6, A. 6), in Christ we
distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital
grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace
of Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also
distinct from the capital grace.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:16): "Of His fulness we all
have received." Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him.
Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace.
Now He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in
Him in its perfection, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 9). Hence His
capital and personal grace are not distinct.
_I answer that,_ Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in
act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it
acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it
heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its
being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is
nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and
the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by
reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above (A. 1; Q. 7,
A. 9) grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way;
and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it
is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others--and this belongs
to the nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of
Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His grace, as He is
the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but there is a
distinction of reason between them.
Reply Obj. 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is
derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him
the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the
sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the
corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by
means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ
Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one
corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as in Adam we
distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.
Reply Obj. 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and the
cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the
personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the
reason of the justification of others, which pertains to capital
grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified
by this difference.
Reply Obj. 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but
the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal
being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence
of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal
grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it
brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union,
the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there
is a distinction of reason between them.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 6]
Whether It Is Proper to Christ to Be Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of
the Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): "When thou wast a
little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes
of Israel?" Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old
Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man
than Christ might be head of the Church.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His
bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others
also to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil
speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the
edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers."
Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be head of
the Church.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only
called "Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation." Now Christ did
not retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1
Pet. 5:4, "And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall
receive a never-fading crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation,
according to Apoc. 21:14: "And the wall of the city had twelve
foundations." Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of
Head for Himself alone.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the
Church is that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being
supplied with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of
God." But this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head
of the Church.
_I answer that,_ The head influences the other members in two ways.
First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and
sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by
a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses,
which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now
the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose
manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of
justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as
regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this
way others may be called heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1,
"Ye great men, heads of the people"; differently, however, from
Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to
the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are
called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of
their Churches. Or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is
the head of the whole Church, viz. during the time of his
Pontificate, and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as
they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the
Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are
called heads, as taking Christ's place, according to 2 Cor. 2:10,
"For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your
sakes I have done it in the person of Christ," and 2 Cor. 5:20, "For
Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by
us."
Reply Obj. 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in regard
to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his
kingdom.
Reply Obj. 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but
by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): "If the
rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except
that all these are members of one Shepherd?" So likewise others may
be called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the
one Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract.
xlvii), "He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us
calleth himself the Door. He kept this for Himself alone." And this
because by door is implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is
by the door that all enter the house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom
also we have access . . . into this grace, wherein we stand" (Rom.
5:2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may be implied not
merely the principal but also the secondary authority.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 7]
Whether the Devil Is the Head of All the Wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the
wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into
the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc.
But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which
proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be
called the head of the wicked.
Obj. 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin
is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did
not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin
of man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm.
lxxxii): "Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the
suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement
of our will." Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.
Obj. 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole
multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they
are united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers
defects, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot
be called the head of all the wicked.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17,
"Let the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of
every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i.e. the devil.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 6), the head not only
influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly,
directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone
is the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i.e. by interior
influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the
Church, as was stated (A. 6); or as regards exterior governance, and
thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him.
And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is
written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride." Now
it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end.
But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature
from God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from
obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of
an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty,
according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou
hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve.'" Hence,
inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under
the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called
their head.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the devil does not influence the rational mind
interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.
Reply Obj. 2: A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to
obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in
consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of
their own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose
standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them.
Therefore in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who "sinneth
from the beginning" (1 John 3:8), is held out to all to be followed,
and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will
without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the
wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wis. 2:24, 25: "By
the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they follow him
that are of his side."
Reply Obj. 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although they
differ by conversion to different changeable goods.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 8, Art. 8]
Whether Antichrist May Be Called the Head of All the Wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the
wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is
the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Antichrist is not
their head.
Obj. 2: Further, Antichrist is a member of the devil. Now the head is
distinguished from the members. Therefore Antichrist is not the head
of the wicked.
Obj. 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But
Antichrist has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him.
Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29,
"Ask any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking
of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to
Antichrist the head of all evil-doers."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), in the head are found
three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as
regards the order of the body, Antichrist is not said to be the head
of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil
preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from
the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by
exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not
beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness.
Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but
of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all
the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2
Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "As in
Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Antichrist the fulness
of all wickedness." Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the
devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of
God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more
copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the
wicked who have gone before are signs of Antichrist, according to 2
Thess. 2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh."
Reply Obj. 1: The devil and Antichrist are not two heads, but one;
since Antichrist is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of
the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4,
"Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all
the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of
pride will be in him." Now he is said to be in him not by personal
union, nor by indwelling, since "the Trinity alone dwells in the
mind" (as is said De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of
wickedness.
Reply Obj. 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of
the Church, as was said above (A. 1, ad 2), so likewise Antichrist is
a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.
Reply Obj. 3: Antichrist is said to be the head of all the wicked not
by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in
him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the
same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he
executes it.
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QUESTION 9
OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the
consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in
general; secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
(2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors
have?
(3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
(4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 9, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Had Any Knowledge Besides the Divine?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge
except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be
known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things.
Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.
Obj. 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all
created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God
is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in
Christ no other knowledge except the Divine.
Obj. 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took
place in the Person, as is clear from Q. 2, A. 2. Now, according to
some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the union," whereby
Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully
than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two
natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ,
but one only, pertaining to both natures.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the
sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created
knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was
created knowledge.
_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 5), the Son of God assumed an
entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not
only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved
Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account
of the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in
potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a
tablet on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon
through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as
is said _De Anima_ iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect
unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should
assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole
human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence
it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which
would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that
there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine
knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more
imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since
everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17,
Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had
not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge.
Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the
human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles;
since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human
intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took
the whole human nature, as stated above (Q. 5). And hence the Sixth
Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the
opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges
or wisdoms.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an
uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's
understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph.
xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of
Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there
had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have
known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose,
since everything is on account of its operation.
Reply Obj. 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order,
the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the
light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we
suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and
the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed
by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air
by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is
not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the
light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written
John 1:9.
Reply Obj. 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a
knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human
nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one
hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man,
and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above (Q. 3,
AA. 1, 6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any
knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and
knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 9, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Had the Knowledge Which the Blessed or Comprehensors
Have?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge
of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is
a participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy
light we shall see light." Now Christ had not a participated light,
but He had the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according
to Col. 2:9: "For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead
corporeally." Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the
blessed.
Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed,
according to John 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know
Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." But
this Man was blessed through being united to God in person, according
to Ps. 64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee."
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge--one by nature,
one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in
the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But
in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge,
i.e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the
knowledge of the blessed in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ The knowledge of the blessed consists in the
knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man,
according to John 8:55: "I do know Him, and do keep His word."
Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed.
_I answer that,_ What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is
in act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now
man is in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which
consists in the vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end;
since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge,
inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to
this end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Heb.
2:10: "For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are
all things, Who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the
author of their salvation by His passion." And hence it was necessary
that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God,
should belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought always
to be more efficacious than the effect.
Reply Obj. 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in
Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person
remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ,
which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from
the Divine Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby
it sees God in essence.
Reply Obj. 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated
beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated
beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature
of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in
the last end of human nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent
above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it
of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its
nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made
to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge
is in every way above the nature of the human soul.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 9, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Had an Imprinted or Infused Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another
infused knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other
knowledge compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to
perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of
perfect knowledge, as the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the
enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10, 12.
Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge, as
stated above (A. 2), it would seem that there could not be any other
imprinted knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative
syllogisms. Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need
of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer
necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to
beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its
term, it seems that since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not
necessary for Him to have any other knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible
forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible
forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once, one
more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the
soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the
other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid
all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all
intelligible things, and it is reduced to act by intelligible
species, which are its completive forms, as is plain from what is
said _De Anima_ iii, 32, 38. And hence we must admit in the soul of
Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted
upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him,
intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is
in potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things,
the Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind,
as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even
as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 24,
30), there is a double knowledge--one the morning knowledge, whereby
they know things in the Word; the other the evening knowledge,
whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species;
so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ,
there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word,
and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible
species proportioned to the human mind.
Reply Obj. 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to
manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have
reference to the unseen, as was said above (II-II, Q. 1, A. 4). But
cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific
cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply Obj. 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways:
first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to
receive the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not
cease, but remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused
by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired
by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still
remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following,
so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause,
since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to
understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms
proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge,
there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but
as strengthened by beatitude.
Reply Obj. 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a
similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the First Part
(Q. 12, A. 2); but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence
immediately, inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the
beatified mind as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the
Divine Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature
whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding form, there is
nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind, intelligible
species, proportioned to its nature.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 9, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Had Any Acquired Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters,
by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said
(John 7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know
letters, having never learned?" Therefore it seems that in Christ
there was no acquired knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the power
of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species
could accrue to His soul.
Obj. 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge, acquires
no new habit, through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two
forms of the same species would be in the same thing together); but
the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased.
Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does
not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived
by the senses.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was
the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He
suffered," i.e. "experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in
the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
_I answer that,_ As is plain from A. 1, nothing that God planted in
our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of
God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a
passive, but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that
in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an
active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing
in vain, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less
in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its
proper operation is useless, as is said in _De Coel._ ii, 17. Now the
proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible
species in act, by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said
(De Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect is that "whereby
everything is made actual." And thus it is necessary to say that in
Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive
intellect by the action of the active intellect--which means that
there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And
hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, A. 3; D,
xviii, A. 3), it must be said that in Christ there was acquired
knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as
regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For
such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge--by
discovery and by being taught--the way of discovery is the higher,
and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i,
4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is
good who obeys him that speaks aright." And hence it was more fitting
for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being
taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice."
Reply Obj. 2: The human mind has two relations--one to higher things,
and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active
intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of
Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness
was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved
it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply Obj. 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of
the human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind
cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a
different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not
from phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
_______________________
QUESTION 10
OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL
(In Four Articles)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since,
however, we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the First Part
(Q. 14), it now remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the
beatific knowledge; (2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired
knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the First Part (Q. 12) of
the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall
speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of
Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did
any other creature?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 10, Art. 1]
Whether the Soul of Christ Comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo
Bono i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed." Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy
Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity.
Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of
Christ comprehends the Divine Essence.
Obj. 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human
nature in Christ." Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature
seen by the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of
Christ comprehended the Divine Essence.
Obj. 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by
grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems
that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself." But the Divine Essence is
not finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely
exceeds it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
_I answer that,_ As is plain from Q. 2, AA. 1, 6, the union of the
two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the First Part (Q. 12, AA. 1, 4, 7), seeing that the
infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said
that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply Obj. 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in
the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by
reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of
creatures.
Reply Obj. 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the human
nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for although
it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of the
Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the
human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God
was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of
the world's government, neither did He narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body." So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i.e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 7).
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the
grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God
in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the
identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His
soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son
of Man is the Creator.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 10, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Knew All Things in the Word?
Obj. 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day
or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but
the Father." Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Obj. 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more
he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul
of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not
know all things in the Word.
Obj. 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the
uncreated, which is impossible.
_On the contrary,_ on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy
to receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the
knowledge of all things."
_I answer that,_ When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things
in the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly,
to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word.
For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so
many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no
beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to
itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent
belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has
been appointed Judge of all by God, "because He is the Son of Man,"
as is said John 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the
Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men,
of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (John 2:25),
"For He knew what was in man," can be understood not merely of the
Divine knowledge, but also of His soul's knowledge, which it had in
the Word. Secondly, "all things" may be taken widely, as extending
not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to
such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will
be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone,
and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For
this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to
comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence.
For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some,
however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of
the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word;
for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and,
consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply Obj. 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the
knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above (Q. 9, A. 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son,
Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But
this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said John 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made
by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked
by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on
the contrary, we read (Gen. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest
God," i.e. "Now I have made thee know." But the Father is said to
know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying
"but the Father," we are given to understand that the Son knows, not
merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as
Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ
as man to know how to judge--which is greater--much more is it given
to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however
(in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church,
which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be
understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply Obj. 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than
the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He
is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself
can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown
in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 9). Therefore the soul of Christ knows
all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but
not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple
intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the
soul of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on
the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the
knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ
which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as
regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God
infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of
cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect
infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ;
although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of
knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated
above.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 10, Art. 3]
Whether the Soul of Christ Can Know the Infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken." But it is impossible for the
definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would
mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible
that the soul of Christ knows the infinite.
Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the
knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its
capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ
cannot know the infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But
more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than
in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore
the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.
_On the contrary,_ The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it
can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 John 2:2:
"He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also
for those of the whole world." Therefore the soul of Christ knows the
infinite.
_I answer that,_ Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth
are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways:
First, simply, i.e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively,
i.e. whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said
_Metaph._ ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it
is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being
in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not
knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is
known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of
Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite
number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act at
any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption
will not last for ever: consequently there is a certain number not
only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things
capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other
mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the
Word, for it knows, as stated above (A. 2), all that is in the power
of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is
an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a
certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and not by a knowledge of
vision.
Reply Obj. 1: As we said in the First Part (Q. 8, A. 1), the infinite
is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have
the negatively infinite, i.e. a form or act not limited by being
received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is
most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is
not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God
is said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows,
yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards
matter, which is taken privatively, i.e. inasmuch as it has not the
form it ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in
quantity. Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it
is, as it were, matter with privation of form as is said _Phys._ iii,
65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite
is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known.
For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said _Phys._
iii, 62, 63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something
from it, i.e. taking part after part, there always remains something
to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect
immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be
received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but
finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the
intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ
knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by
discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e. in any
creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally
in the Word Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite
in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a
surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there
were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity,
i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite,
since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But
what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the
First Part (Q. 7, A. 2). Now the proper object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as is said _De Anima_ iii, 26, to which pertains
the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has
a finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is
simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A. 1). But the infinite
in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul
of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its
essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect
understands a universal--for example, the nature of a genus or
species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be
predicated of an infinite number.
Reply Obj. 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but one.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2, 3) that, since bodies have
dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies.
Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder
the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to
suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite
breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is
accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. iii, 37, 38); as the infinite is multiplied by different
subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in
such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that
particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing
is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is
nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one
of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts.
Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing
greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line
there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in
numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and
likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more
even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing
is greater than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the
infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that
order; yet we may suppose something greater outside that order. In
this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of
the creature, and yet there are more in the power of God than in the
potentiality of the creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows
infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God
knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 10, Art. 4]
Whether the Soul of Christ Sees the Word or the Divine Essence More
Clearly Than Does Any Other Creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection
of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we
have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that
which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed
see the Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in
the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not
see the Word more perfectly than any other creature.
Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power
of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of
Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see
the Word more perfectly than the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than
does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate
degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner
in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert
that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more
perfectly than does every other creature.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20, 21) that God set
Christ "on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all
principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is
named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come." But
in that heavenly glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does
he know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly
than does any other creature.
_I answer that,_ The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all
the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon
them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5:
"The Word of God on high is the fountain of Wisdom." Now the soul of
Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely
joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more
fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself
than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest
of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of
God; hence it is written (John 1:14): "And we saw His glory, the
glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father," "full" not only
of "grace" but also of "truth."
Reply Obj. 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing
known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends
on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees
a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in
this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant
light, knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other
blessed, although all see the Divine Essence in itself.
Reply Obj. 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural
power of any creature, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4).
And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in
which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the
angelic nature is placed before the human.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 7, A. 12), there cannot be a
greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with
the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine
vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and
more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.
_______________________
QUESTION 11
OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul
of Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
(3) Whether this knowledge was collative?
(4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;
(5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?
(6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 1]
Whether by This Imprinted or Infused Knowledge Christ Knew All Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know
all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the
perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the
human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply,
but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to
act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are
knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did
not know what exceeded the natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to
sight, as is said _De Anima_ iii, 18, 31, 39. But it does not pertain
to the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without
color. Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human
intellect to know things of which there are no phantasms, such as
separate substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for
the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this
knowledge He did not know separate substances.
Obj. 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the
intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this
knowledge the soul of Christ did not know singulars.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2) that "the Spirit of
wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him
[*Vulg.: 'The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of
wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of
knowledge . . . '; cf. Ecclus. 15:5," under which are included all
that may be known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to
wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the
knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge (_scientia_), the knowledge
of all practical things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this
knowledge Christ had the knowledge of all things.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 9, A. 1), it was fitting that
the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its
powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human
soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in
comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the
first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a
natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the
obediential power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul
were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence,
by it the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force
of a man's active intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human
sciences; secondly, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made
known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of
wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost;
since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely
than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by this
knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above (Q. 10).
Reply Obj. 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an
intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the
active intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since it is
somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand
without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after
the state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure,
to know separate substances by itself, as was said in the First Part
(Q. 89, AA. 1, 2), and this is especially clear as regards the souls
of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a
wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate
substances in the same way that a separated soul could.
Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection
of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in
practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of
singulars, in which operations exist, as is said _Ethic._ vi, 7.
Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past things,
knowledge of present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully
says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of
prudence by the gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular
things--present, past, and future.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Could Use This Knowledge by Turning to Phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not
understand by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because,
as is stated _De Anima_ iii, 18, 31, 39, phantasms are compared to
man's intellective soul as colors to sight. But Christ's power of
seeing could not become actual save by turning to colors. Therefore
His intellective soul could understand nothing except by turning to
phantasms.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours.
otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what
the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of
men." But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms.
Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.
Obj. 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect.
Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to
phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the
soul of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting.
Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by
turning to phantasms.
_On the contrary,_ The soul of Christ knew certain things which could
not be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it
could understand without turning to phantasms.
_I answer that,_ In the state before His Passion Christ was at the
same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly
shown (Q. 15, A. 10). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer
on the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a
comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the
condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise
subject to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it.
Hence after the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the
body. But the soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms,
because it is fettered by the body and in a measure subject to and
dependent upon it. And hence the blessed both before and after the
resurrection can understand without turning to phantasms. And this
must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities
of a comprehensor.
Reply Obj. 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is not with
regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the power of
seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective power is
not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it
apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the
present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both
powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of
both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different
states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never
but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows
nothing without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect
can know without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same nature as
our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in fact,
but only in hope, i.e. the state of comprehension.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand without
turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to
phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as the
senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but
for the need of animal life.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 3]
Whether This Knowledge Is Collative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this
knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 14): "We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ." Now these
things are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply
comparison and discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no
collative or discursive knowledge in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in
order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew
everything, as was said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence there was no
discursive or collative knowledge in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of
comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Matt.
22:30. Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the
angels, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no
discursive or collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Christ had a rational soul, as was shown (Q. 5, A.
4). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in
comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there
was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.
_I answer that,_ Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two
ways. First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us,
who proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from
causes to effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in
Christ's soul was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge
which we are now considering was divinely infused, and not acquired
by a process of reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called
discursive or collative in use; as at times those who know, reason
from cause to effect, not in order to learn anew, but wishing to use
the knowledge they have. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's
soul could be collative or discursive; since it could conclude one
thing from another, as it pleased, as in Matt. 17:24, 25, when our
Lord asked Peter: "Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute,
of their own children, or of strangers?" On Peter replying: "Of
strangers," He concluded: "Then the children are free."
Reply Obj. 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is with
doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such
counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from
Christ.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison, as
used to acquire knowledge.
Reply Obj. 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the gifts of
graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence
to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the
blessed, but not to angels.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 4]
Whether in Christ This Knowledge Was Greater Than the Knowledge of
the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in
Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the
thing perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below
the angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking
of is imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that
this knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature
is perfected.
Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure
comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the
knowledge of the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it is.
But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge
of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and
turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the
knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ's soul.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus,
Who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of
death, crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that
Christ is said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the
suffering of death. And hence, not in knowledge.
_I answer that,_ The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be
looked at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the
inflowing cause; secondly, as regards what it has from the subject
receiving it. Now with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted
upon the soul of Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the
angels, both in the number of things known and in the certainty of
the knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on the
soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light which pertains
to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge
imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the angelic knowledge,
in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human soul, i.e. by
turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion.
And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 5]
Whether This Knowledge Was Habitual?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual
knowledge. For it has been said (Q. 9, A. 1) that the highest
perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of
an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially
or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to
know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual
knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now,
since Christ knew all things, as was said (Q. 10, A. 2), He could not
have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another,
since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore
the habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to
Him--which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a
habitual knowledge of what He knew.
Obj. 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower.
But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore,
in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it
would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of
Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.
_On the contrary,_ The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about
was univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same
species as ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit.
Therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), the mode of the knowledge
impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it.
For the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient.
Now the connatural mode of the human soul is that it should
understand sometimes actually, and sometimes potentially. But the
medium between a pure power and a completed act is a habit: and
extremes and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it
is the connatural mode of the human soul to receive knowledge as a
habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge imprinted on the soul
of Christ was habitual, for He could use it when He pleased.
Reply Obj. 1: In Christ's soul there was a twofold knowledge--each
most perfect of its kind: the first exceeding the mode of human
nature, as by it He saw the Essence of God, and other things in It,
and this was the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge
habitual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this way.
But the second knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to
human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He knew things by species divinely
imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now
this knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus
of human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be always in act.
Reply Obj. 2: Habits are reduced to act by the command of the will,
since a habit is that "with which we act when we wish." Now the will
is indeterminate in regard to infinite things. Yet it is not useless,
even when it does not actually tend to all; provided it actually
tends to everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is a
habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act;
provided that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to
act according as the matter in hand and the time require.
Reply Obj. 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First,
simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and
goodness, is a good and a being; secondly, being and goodness are
taken relatively, and in this way an accident is a being and a good,
not that it has being and goodness, but that its subject is a being
and a good. And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better or more
excellent than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole
goodness of habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the
subject.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 6]
Whether This Knowledge Was Distinguished by Divers Habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only
one habit of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more
united it is; hence the higher angels understand by the more
universal forms, as was said in the First Part (Q. 55, A. 3). Now
Christ's knowledge was most perfect. Therefore it was most one.
Therefore it was not distinguished by several habits.
Obj. 2: Further, our faith is derived from Christ's knowledge; hence
it is written (Heb. 12:2): "Looking on Jesus the author and finisher
of faith." But there is only one habit of faith about all things
believed, as was said in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 4, A. 6). Much
more, therefore, was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is distinguished by the divers formalities
of knowable things. But the soul of Christ knew everything under one
formality, i.e. by a divinely infused light. Therefore in Christ
there was only one habit of knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Zech. 3:9) that on "one" stone,
i.e. Christ, "there are seven eyes." Now by the eye is understood
knowledge. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several
habits of knowledge.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 5), the knowledge imprinted
on Christ's soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is
connatural to a human soul to receive species of a lesser
universality than the angels receive; so that it knows different
specific natures by different intelligible species. But it so happens
that we have different habits of knowledge, because there are
different classes of knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one
genus are known by one habit; thus it is said (Poster. i, 42) that
"one science is of one class of object." And hence the knowledge
imprinted on Christ's soul was distinguished by different habits.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said (A. 4), the knowledge of Christ's soul is
most perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with regard to what
is in it on the part of God's gift; but it is below the angelic
knowledge as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to
this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various habits,
inasmuch as it regards more particular species.
Reply Obj. 2: Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence Christ
is the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is simply
one.
Reply Obj. 3: The divinely infused light is the common formality for
understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of the active
intellect is with regard to what is naturally known. Hence, in the
soul of Christ there must be the proper species of singular things,
in order to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way there
must be divers habits of knowledge in Christ's soul, as stated above.
_______________________
QUESTION 12
OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ's
soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge?
(3) Whether He learned anything from man?
(4) Whether He received anything from angels?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 12, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Knew All Things by This Acquired or Empiric Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not know everything by
this knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But
Christ did not experience everything. Therefore He did not know
everything by this knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But not
all sensible things were subjected to Christ's bodily senses.
Therefore Christ did not know everything by this knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things
knowable. Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His
acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific
knowledge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all
things by this knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ Nothing imperfect was in Christ's soul. Now this
knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all
things by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be
made. Hence Christ knew all things by this knowledge.
_I answer that,_ Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul,
as we have said (Q. 9, A. 4), by reason of the active intellect, lest
its action, which is to make things actually intelligible, should be
wanting; even as imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in
Christ's soul for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the
passive intellect is that by which "all things are in potentiality,"
so the active intellect is that by which "all are in act," as is said
_De Anima_ iii, 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ knew by infused
knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in any way in
potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known
by the action of the active intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of things may be acquired not merely by
experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other things;
since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go on to
understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like from
like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not
experience all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what
He did experience.
Reply Obj. 2: Although all sensible things were not subjected to
Christ's bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to
His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the
most excellent force of His reason, in the manner described in the
previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend
their powers and the effects they have upon things here below, which
were not subjected to His senses; and for the same reason, from any
other things whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other
things.
Reply Obj. 3: By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all
things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's
active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the
essences of separate substances, nor past, present, or future
singulars, which, nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as
was said above (Q. 11).
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 12, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Advanced in Acquired or Empiric Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not advance in this
knowledge. For even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His
infused knowledge, so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is
plain from what has been said (A. 1). But He did not advance in these
knowledges. Therefore neither in this.
Obj. 2: Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the
perfect cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect
knowledge in Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this
knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 22): "Whoever say
that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving additional
sensations, do not venerate the union which is in hypostasis." But it
is impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to say
that His knowledge received increase.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 2:52): "Jesus advanced in
wisdom and age and grace with God and men"; and Ambrose says (De
Incar. Dom. vii) that "He advanced in human wisdom." Now human wisdom
is that which is acquired in a human manner, i.e. by the light of the
active intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge.
_I answer that,_ There is a twofold advancement in knowledge: one in
essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased; the other
in effect--e.g. if someone were with one and the same habit of
knowledge to prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and
afterwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second
way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as
in age, since as His age increased He wrought greater deeds, and
showed greater knowledge and grace.
But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of
infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had
perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His
beatific knowledge increase; while in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 15),
we have already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase.
Therefore, if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired
knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some
[*Blessed Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure], and
sometime appeared to me (Sent. iii, D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ
increased in essence, but merely by experience, i.e. by comparing the
infused intelligible species with phantasms. And in this way they
maintain that Christ's knowledge grew in experience, e.g. by
comparing the infused intelligible species with what He received
through the senses for the first time. But because it seems unfitting
that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ, and
because to extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural
action of man's active intellect, it seems becoming to place even
this action in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of
Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase by this
abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after
abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could
abstract others, and others again.
Reply Obj. 1: Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge
of Christ's soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power,
which could produce the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge
did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly.
But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the active
intellect which does not produce the whole at once, but successively;
and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the
beginning, but step by step, and after a time, i.e. in His perfect
age; and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that He
increased in "knowledge and age" together.
Reply Obj. 2: Even this knowledge was always perfect for the time
being, although it was not always perfect, simply and in comparison
to the nature; hence it could increase.
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Damascene regards those who say
absolutely that addition was made to Christ's knowledge, i.e. as
regards any knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused
knowledge which is caused in Christ's soul by union with the Word;
but it does not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the
natural agent.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 12, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Learned Anything from Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ learned something from man.
For it is written (Luke 2:46, 47) that, "They found Him in the temple
in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them
questions." But to ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner.
Therefore Christ learned something from man.
Obj. 2: Further, to acquire knowledge from a man's teaching seems
more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul
of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in
sensible things the intelligible species are only in potentiality.
Now Christ received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated
above (A. 2). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by
learning from men.
Obj. 3: Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know everything
from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above (A. 2). But
anyone hearing words which mean something, may learn something he
does not know. Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did
not know by this knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 45:4): "Behold, I have given
Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the
Gentiles." Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ
did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man.
_I answer that,_ In every genus that which is the first mover is not
moved according to the same species of movement; just as the first
alterative is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God
the Head of the Church--yea, of all men, as was said above (Q. 8, A.
3), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that
all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself
says (John 18:37): "For this was I born, and for this came I into the
world; that I should give testimony to the truth." And thus it did
not befit His dignity that He should be taught by any man.
Reply Obj. 1: As Origen says (Hom. xix in Luc.): "Our Lord asked
questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by
questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question
and the wise reply." Hence the Gospel goes on to say that "all that
heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers."
Reply Obj. 2: Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge
immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but
through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now
as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge; so
are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God "poured" wisdom "out upon all His
works." Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man,
so it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and
not by man's teaching.
Reply Obj. 3: Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age, as
stated above (A. 2). Now as a fitting age is required for a man to
acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by
being taught. But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and
hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until
such time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by
way of experience. Hence Gregory says (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii):
"In the twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth,
since in the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed
before the age of perfection."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 12, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Received Knowledge from the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the
angels. For it is written (Luke 22:43) that "there appeared to Him an
angel from heaven, strengthening Him." But we are strengthened by the
comforting words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3, 4: "Behold thou
hast taught many and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have
confirmed them that were staggering." Therefore Christ was taught by
angels.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "For I see that
even Jesus--the super-substantial substance of supercelestial
substances--when without change He took our substance upon Himself,
was subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by
the angels." Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to
the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men are taught by means of
angels.
Obj. 3: Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject to
the celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic minds.
Now Christ's body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly
bodies, for He felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and
other human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the
illuminations of supercelestial spirits.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the highest
angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work,
and of the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly."
Now to teach and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore
Christ did not receive knowledge from the angels.
_I answer that,_ Since the human soul is midway between spiritual
substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two
ways. First by knowledge received from sensible things; secondly, by
knowledge imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual
substances. Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected;
first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which there is
no need of angelic light, since the light of the active intellect
suffices; secondly, by the higher impression of infused knowledge,
which He received directly from God. For as His soul was united to
the Word above the common mode, in unity of person, so above the
common manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by the
Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of angels, who in their
beginning received the knowledge of things by the influence of the
Word, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Reply Obj. 1: This strengthening by the angel was for the purpose not
of instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human nature.
Hence Bede says (on Luke 22:43): "In testimony of both natures are
the angels said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened
Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; but having
become man, even as it was for our sake that He was sad, so was it
for our sake that He was strengthened," i.e. in order that our faith
in the Incarnation might be strengthened.
Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the angelic
instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what
happened at His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He
was a child. Hence in the same place he adds that "Jesus' withdrawal
to Egypt decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and
again His return to Judaea from Egypt."
Reply Obj. 3: The Son of God assumed a passible body (as will be said
hereafter (Q. 14, A. 1)) and a soul perfect in knowledge and grace (Q.
14, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4). Hence His body was rightly subject to the
impression of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to the
impression of heavenly spirits.
_______________________
QUESTION 13
OF THE POWER OF CHRIST'S SOUL
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the power of Christ's soul; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether He had omnipotence simply?
(2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures?
(3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body?
(4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own
will?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 13, Art. 1]
Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence.
For Ambrose [*Gloss, Ord.] says on Luke 1:32: "The power which the
Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time." Now
this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief
part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all
eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence
in time.
Obj. 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His
knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of
all that God knows, as was said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore He had
all power; and thus He was omnipotent.
Obj. 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge
is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical
knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and
thus it seems that He can do all things.
_On the contrary,_ What is proper to God cannot belong to any
creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex.
15:2, 3: "He is my God and I will glorify Him," and further on,
"Almighty is His name." Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a
creature, has not omnipotence.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1; Q. 10, A. 1) in the
mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that
there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still
retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing
follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is
either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the
constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of
matter and form.
And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the
Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very
uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom.
v), it has an active power over everything that can have the nature
of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing
has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature
extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of
Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence.
Reply Obj. 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence
in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which
union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be
omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as
neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because
there is one Person of God and man.
Reply Obj. 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not
in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of
the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the
agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or
form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower
to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason
seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness
obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from
another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence
there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all
things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God,
cannot do these things by the same similitudes.
It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in
the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner;
for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it
had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior
nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not
received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they
had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of
Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner
of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of
Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the
soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows
by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things
present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of
vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul
do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do all that
God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an
infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no
thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed,
although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power;
yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as
creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the
First Part (Q. 45). Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is
finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way;
yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of
omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create
itself.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge;
yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of
those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for
speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower
to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is
required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be
operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something
else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to
enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of
Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode
of God's creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode,
since it has no knowledge operative of creation.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 13, Art. 2]
Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence with Regard to the
Transmutation of Creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence
with regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says
(Matt. 28:18): "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth." Now
by the words "heaven and earth" are meant all creatures, as is plain
from Gen. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with
regard to the transmutation of creatures.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all
creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "even as the denser and lower
bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies;
so are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of
life by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful
rational spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit
of life." But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits,
enlightening them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it
seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the
transmutation of creatures.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ's soul had in its highest degree the "grace
of miracles" or works of might. But every transmutation of the
creature can belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly
bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius
proves (Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence
with regard to the transmutation of creatures.
_On the contrary,_ To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who
preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3:
"Upholding all things by the word of His power." Therefore God alone
has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.
Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul.
_I answer that,_ Two distinctions are here needed. Of these the first
is with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is
three-fold. The first is natural, being brought about by the proper
agent naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a
supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to
raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be
brought to nothing.
The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be
looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power
of nature or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word
of God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul
of Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of
grace, it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. to
rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of
grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short
of its perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if
we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word
united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the
miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation,
which is "to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth"
[*Eph. 1:10]. But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they
may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby
they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can
create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He
alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus
it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with
regard to the transmutation of creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): "Power is given
Him," i.e. to Christ as man, "Who a little while before was
crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again." But power
is said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was
brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (A. 1, ad
1). And although this was made known to the angels before the
Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all
men, as Remigius says (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, "things are said to
happen when they are made known" [*Hugh of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad
Philip.]. Hence after the Resurrection our Lord says "that all power
is given" to Him "in heaven and on earth."
Reply Obj. 2: Although every creature is transmutable by some other
creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be
enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be
made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some
transmutations can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that
can be made in creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the
instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since
some of these transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order
of nature nor in the order of grace.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said in the Second Part (Q. 178, A. 1, ad 1),
the grace of mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a
saint, so that these miracles are wrought not by his own, but by
Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most
excellently, i.e. not only that He might work miracles, but also that
He might communicate this grace to others. Hence it is written (Matt.
10:1) that, "having called His twelve disciples together, He gave
them power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all
manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 13, Art. 3]
Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence with Regard to His Own
Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with
regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,
23) that "all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to
hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die."
Now God is called omnipotent because "He hath done all things
whatsoever He would" (Ps. 113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ's
soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural operations of the
body.
Obj. 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in
Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing
could happen to the body against the will of the soul--and this on
account of the original justice which it had in the state of
innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with
regard to His body.
Obj. 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of
the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's
imagination, as was said in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 3). Now
the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the
imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was
omnipotent with regard to His own body.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 2:17) that "it behooved Him in
all things to be made like unto His brethren," and especially as
regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs
to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its
nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or
will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author
of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore
Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), Christ's soul may be viewed
in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way,
as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course
and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own
body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature,
has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's soul may
be viewed as an instrument united in person to God's Word; and thus
every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power.
Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed
to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is
attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ's soul.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Damascene refers to the Divine will of
Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide Orth.
xix, 14, 15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh
was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it.
Reply Obj. 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam had
in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of
changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from
any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had
wished. But since man has three states--viz. innocence, sin, and
glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension and
from the state of innocence, freedom from sin--so also from the state
of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of
this life, as will be said (Q. 14, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally
in some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on high,
since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion,
as is said _De Anima_ iii, 9, 10. So, too, as regards alteration in
heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul,
wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and
thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the
other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the
imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, however strong it
is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or foot, or such like.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 13, Art. 4]
Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence As Regards the Execution
of His Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not
omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. For it is
written (Mk. 7:24) that "entering into a house, He would that no man
should know it, and He could not be hid." Therefore He could not
carry out the purpose of His will in all things.
Obj. 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the
First Part (Q. 19, A. 12). But our Lord commanded certain things to
be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Matt.
9:30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been
opened, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread
His fame abroad in all that country." Therefore He could not carry
out the purpose of His will in everything.
Obj. 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do
himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished
to be done, for it is written (Luke 6:12): "He went out into a
mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of
God." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all
things.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77):
"It is impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled:
nor is it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to
pass."
_I answer that,_ Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what
was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was
capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His
wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to
His will. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the
Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such like
miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except
as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (A. 2).
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77):
"What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it
must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles,
to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been
invidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith.
Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to
be sought; and so it came to pass." Or it may be said that this will
of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it,
but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come
under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was
approved in the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act.
iv], we read: "When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be
hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will
which He deigned to assume in time?"
Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that
"Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an
example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their
miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their
example, they are made public against their will." And thus this
command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to John
8:50, "I seek not My own glory." Yet He wished absolutely, and
especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be
published for the good of others.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be
brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do
by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul
depended on God, "Who works in all [Vulg.: 'you'], both to will and to
accomplish" (Phil. 2:13).
_______________________
QUESTION 14
OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature;
and first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature
defects of body?
(2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these
defects?
(3) Whether He contracted these defects?
(4) Whether He assumed all these defects?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 14, Art. 1]
Whether the Son of God in Human Nature Ought to Have Assumed Defects
of Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have
assumed human nature with defects of body. For as His soul is
personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the
soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was
said above (Q. 7, A. 9; Q. 9, seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to
have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision
wherein the blessed see, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 2), and thus the
soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the
body is glorified; since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii),
"God made the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness of its
blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature" (i.e. the
body), "not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and
vision, but the fulness of health" (i.e. the vigor of
incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ was incorruptible and
without any defect.
Obj. 3: Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there was
no fault in Christ, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: "Who did no guile."
Therefore defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have
been in Him.
Obj. 4: Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his
proper end. But by such like bodily defects, the end of the
Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by
these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to
Isa. 53:2, 3: "[There was no sightliness] that we should be desirous
of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and
acquainted with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and
despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not." Secondly, because the
desire of the Fathers would not seem to be fulfilled, in whose person
it is written (Isa. 51:9): "Arise, arise, put on Thy strength, O Thou
Arm of the Lord." Thirdly, because it would seem more fitting for the
devil's power to be overcome and man's weakness healed, by strength
than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting
that the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or defects
of body.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 2:18): "For in that, wherein
He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them
also that are tempted." Now He came to succor us. Hence David said of
Him (Ps. 120:1): "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from
whence help shall come to me." Therefore it was fitting for the Son
of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to
suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succor to us.
_I answer that,_ It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of
God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially
for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the
sin of the human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came
into the world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on
himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily
defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the
punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam,
according to Rom. 5:12: "By one man sin entered into this world, and
by sin death." Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation
that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead,
according to Isa. 53:4, "Surely He hath borne our infirmities."
Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since
human nature is known to men only as it is subject to these defects,
if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He
would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but
imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil.
2:7: "He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being
made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." Hence,
Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as
related John 20:26. Thirdly, in order to show us an example of
patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and
defects. Hence it is said (Heb. 12:3) that He "endured such
opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied,
fainting in your minds."
Reply Obj. 1: The penalties one suffers for another's sin are the
matter, as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the
principle is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to
satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its
efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it
proceeded from charity, as will be explained (Supp., Q. 14, A. 2).
Hence, it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfect as regards the
habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of
satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter
of satisfaction should not be wanting.
Reply Obj. 2: From the natural relationship which is between the soul
and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet
this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His
Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in
the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what
belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
15) that, "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh
was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it."
Reply Obj. 3: Punishment always follows sin actual or original,
sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who
suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ,
according to Isa. 53:5: "He was wounded for our iniquities, He was
bruised for our sins."
Reply Obj. 4: The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but
greatly furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And
although these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His
Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom.
5:1, 2: "By Jesus Christ we have access to God." Moreover, the
ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but
spiritual strength, wherewith He vanquished the devil and healed
human weakness.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 14, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Was of Necessity Subject to These Defects?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject
to these defects. For it is written (Isa. 53:7): "He was offered
because it was His own will"; and the prophet is speaking of the
offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore
Christ was not of necessity subject to bodily defects.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20): "Nothing
obligatory is seen in Christ: all is voluntary." Now what is
voluntary is not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of
necessity in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful. But
no creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it
pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not
of necessity in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:3) that "God" sent "His
own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." Now it is a condition of
sinful flesh to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other
like passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was
in Christ's flesh.
_I answer that,_ Necessity is twofold. One is a necessity of
_constraint,_ brought about by an external agent; and this necessity
is contrary to both nature and will, since these flow from an
internal principle. The other is _natural_ necessity, resulting from
the natural principles--either the form (as it is necessary for fire
to heat), or the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of
contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which
results from the matter, Christ's body was subject to the necessity
of death and other like defects, since, as was said (A. 1, ad 2), "it
was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to
do and suffer what belonged to it." And this necessity results from
the principles of human nature, as was said above in this article.
But if we speak of necessity of constraint, as repugnant to the
bodily nature, thus again was Christ's body in its own natural
condition subject to necessity in regard to the nail that pierced and
the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such necessity is repugnant
to the will, it is clear that in Christ these defects were not of
necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the human will of
Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of
reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the will,
inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be "offered because it was His own
will," i.e. Divine will and deliberate human will; although death was
contrary to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 23, 24).
Reply Obj. 2: This is plain from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing was more powerful than Christ's soul,
absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more
powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for piercing.
And this I say, in so far as Christ's soul is considered in its own
proper nature and power.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 14, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Contracted These Defects?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For
we are said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth.
But Christ, together with human nature, derived His bodily defects
and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was
subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these
defects.
Obj. 2: Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is
derived together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these
penalties are caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore
Christ contracted them.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects, as
is written Heb. 2:17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore
it seems that Christ contracted these defects.
_On the contrary,_ These defects are contracted through sin,
according to Rom. 5:12: "By one man sin entered into this world and
by sin, death." Now sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did
not contract these defects.
_I answer that,_ In the verb "to contract" is understood the relation
of effect to cause, i.e. that is said to be contracted which is
derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death
and such like defects in human nature is sin, since "by sin death
entered into this world," according to Rom. 5:12. And hence they who
incur these defects, as due to sin, are properly said to contract
them. Now Christ had not these defects, as due to sin, since, as
Augustine [*Alcuin in the Gloss, Ord.], expounding John 3:31, "He that
cometh from above, is above all," says: "Christ came from above, i.e.
from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the
first man." For He received human nature without sin, in the purity
which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have
assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is clear that Christ
did not contract these defects as if taking them upon Himself as due
to sin, but by His own will.
Reply Obj. 1: The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin,
[*See introductory note to Q. 27] and therefore contracted these
defects. But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature
without sin, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without
its penalties. But He wished to bear its penalties in order to carry
out the work of our redemption, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore He
had these defects--not that He contracted them, but that He assumed
them.
Reply Obj. 2: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human
nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the material
principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of
contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice.
Hence the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby
original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without
sin, He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have
assumed them.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ was made like to other men in the quality and
not in the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did
not contract them.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 14, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Ought to Have Assumed All the Bodily Defects of Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the
bodily defects of men. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 18):
"What is unassumable is incurable." But Christ came to cure all our
defects. Therefore He ought to have assumed all our defects.
Obj. 2: Further it was said (A. 1), that in order to satisfy for us,
Christ ought to have had perfective habits of soul and defects of
body. Now as regards the soul, He assumed the fulness of all grace.
Therefore as regards the body, He ought to have assumed all defects.
Obj. 3: Further, amongst all bodily defects death holds the chief
place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to
have assumed other defects.
_On the contrary,_ Contraries cannot take place simultaneously in the
same. Now some infirmities are contrary to each other, being caused
by contrary principles. Hence it could not be that Christ assumed all
human infirmities.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), Christ assumed human
defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this
it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace
in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which
flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not
incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it
was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities.
For there are some defects that are incompatible with the perfection
of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a
difficulty in well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the
whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first
parent, but are caused in some men by certain particular causes, as
leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; and these defects are sometimes
brought about by the fault of the man, e.g. from inordinate eating;
sometimes by a defect in the formative power. Now neither of these
pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost,
Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He
Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life. But there are
some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason
of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the
like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i, 11; iii, 20) calls "natural and indetractible passions"
--natural, as following all human nature in common; indetractible, as
implying no defect of knowledge or grace.
Reply Obj. 1: All particular defects of men are caused by the
corruptibility and passibility of the body, some particular causes
being added; and hence, since Christ healed the passibility and
corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all
other defects.
Reply Obj. 2: The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to
Christ's soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the
Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of knowledge
and wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in
order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of
Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but
only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Death comes to all men from the sin of our first
parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death.
Hence there is no parity.
_______________________
QUESTION 15
OF THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST
(In Ten Articles)
We must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under
this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was sin in Christ?
(2) Whether there was the _fomes_ of sin in Him?
(3) Whether there was ignorance?
(4) Whether His soul was passible?
(5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain?
(6) Whether there was sorrow?
(7) Whether there was fear?
(8) Whether there was wonder?
(9) Whether there was anger?
(10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 1]
Whether There Was Sin in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is
written (Ps. 21:2): "O God, My God . . . why hast Thou forsaken Me?
Far from My salvation are the words of My sins." Now these words are
said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having
uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ
there were sins.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) that "in Adam all have
sinned"--namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ also
was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2:18) that "in that, wherein
He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them
also that are tempted." Now above all do we require His help against
sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 5:21) that "Him that knew no
sin" (i.e. Christ), "for us" God "hath made sin." But that really is,
which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ.
Obj. 5: Further, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi), "in the man
Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living." Now
man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of
repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to
have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a
pattern of repentance.
_On the contrary,_ He Himself says (John 8:46): "Which of you shall
convince Me of sin?"
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 14, A. 1), Christ assumed our
defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth
of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to
us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not
to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works
our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since,
as it is written (Ecclus. 34:23), "The Most High approveth not the
gifts of the wicked." Secondly, the truth of His human nature is not
proved by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God
is the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by
the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Thirdly,
because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is
opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of
sin--either original or actual--according to what is written (1 Pet.
2:22): "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth."
Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 25), things are
said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic
property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He
suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and
relative property, when things are said of Him in our person which
nowise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of
Tichonius which Augustine quotes in _De Doctr. Christ._ iii, 31, the
first regards "Our Lord and His Body," since "Christ and His Church
are taken as one person." And thus Christ, speaking in the person of
His members, says (Ps. 21:2): "The words of My sins"--not that there
were any sins in the Head.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20), Christ was in
Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in
Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as
he goes on to say: "As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an
invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the
visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the
virtue of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far
otherwise--from on high." Hence He was not in Adam according to
seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore
Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only
materially--and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as Adam received
his body materially from the slime of the earth--actively from God.
And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards
His matter.
Reply Obj. 3: In His temptation and passion Christ has succored us by
satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but hinders
it, as has been said. Hence, it behooved Him not to have sin, but to
be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would have
been due to Him for His own sin.
Reply Obj. 4: God "made Christ sin"--not, indeed, in such sort that
He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it is
written (Osee 4:8): "They shall eat the sins of My people"--they,
i.e. the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin.
And in that way it is written (Isa. 53:6) that "the Lord hath laid on
Him the iniquity of us all" (i.e. He gave Him up to be a victim for
the sins of all men); or "He made Him sin" (i.e. made Him to have
"the likeness of sinful flesh"), as is written (Rom. 8:3), and this
on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed.
Reply Obj. 5: A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by
having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence
Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore
the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 2]
Whether There Was the _Fomes_ of Sin in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was the _fomes_ of
sin. For the _fomes_ of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the
body spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of
original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were
subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and
mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the
_fomes_ of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19), "it was
by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to
suffer and do what belonged to it." But it is proper to the flesh to
lust after its pleasures. Now since the _fomes_ of sin is nothing
more than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rom. 7:8, it seems that
in Christ there was the _fomes_ of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, it is by reason of the _fomes_ of sin that "the
flesh lusteth against the spirit," as is written (Gal. 5:17). But the
spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned
according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy--to wit, the
concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he "is not
crowned except he strive lawfully." Now Christ had a most valiant and
conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc.
6:2: "There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that
He might conquer." Therefore it would especially seem that the
_fomes_ of sin ought to have been in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:20): "That which is
conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost drives out
sin and the inclination to sin, which is implied in the word _fomes._
Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the _fomes_ of sin.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 7, AA. 2, 9), Christ had grace
and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in
the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so
much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance
controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the
irascible appetite, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 56, A.
4). But there belongs to the very nature of the _fomes_ of sin an
inclination of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to reason.
And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues are in any
man, the weaker the _fomes_ of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in
Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the _fomes_ of sin
was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained
to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to
satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive
appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not
the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humors, nor those of the
vegetative soul, as is made plain _Ethic._ i, 13. And hence
perfection of virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does
not exclude passibility of body; yet it excludes the _fomes_ of sin,
the nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive
appetite to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it by the
concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is
a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of reason.
And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ's
flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that is
sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth.
iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there was
the _fomes_ of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable
things against the order of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some
extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed
to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength
the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting
against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit
reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no
internal assault on the part of the _fomes_ of sin, He sustained an
external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the
crown of victory by overcoming them.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 3]
Whether in Christ There Was Ignorance?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For
that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature,
although it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering
and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that "He assumed an ignorant
and enslaved nature." Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of
knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:21) "Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made
sin." Therefore there was ignorance in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Isa. 8:4): "For before the child know
to call his Father and his mother, the strength of Damascus . . .
shall be taken away." Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of
certain things.
_On the contrary,_ Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But
Christ came to take away our ignorance; for "He came to enlighten
them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death" (Luke 1:79).
Therefore there was no ignorance in Christ.
_I answer that,_ As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in
Christ, so too there was the fulness of all knowledge, as is plain
from what has been said above (Q. 7, A. 9; Q. 9). Now as the fulness
of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the _fomes_ of sin, so the
fulness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to
knowledge. Hence, even as the _fomes_ of sin was not in Christ,
neither was there ignorance in Him.
Reply Obj. 1: The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two ways.
First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it "ignorant
and enslaved"; hence he adds: "For man's nature is a slave of Him"
(i.e. God) "Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future things."
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its
union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fulness of
knowledge and grace, according to John 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and
truth"; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected
with ignorance.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did
not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition.
Reply Obj. 3: The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human
knowledge of Christ; thus he says: "Before the Child" (i.e. in His
human nature) "know to call His father" (i.e. Joseph, who was His
reputed father), "and His mother" (i.e. Mary), "the strength of
Damascus . . . shall be taken away." Nor are we to understand this as
if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but "before He
know" (i.e. before He is a man having human knowledge)--literally,
"the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken
away by the King of the Assyrians"--or spiritually, "before His birth
He will save His people solely by invocation," as a gloss expounds
it. Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this was
fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: "Before He
uttered human words in human flesh, He received the strength of
Damascus, i.e. the riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the
first place is given to gold). They themselves were the spoils of
Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this
people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the worship of
idols. Hence these were the first spoils which the child took from
the domination of idolatry." And in this way "before the child know"
may be taken to mean "before he show himself to know."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 4]
Whether Christ's Soul Was Passible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible.
For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since
"the agent is greater than the patient," as is clear from Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
Now no creature was stronger than Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's
soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was
not passible; for its capability of suffering would have been to no
purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything.
Obj. 2: Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says that the soul's
passions are ailments [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 2]. But Christ's soul had
no ailment; for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain from
Ps. 40:5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee." Therefore
in Christ's soul there were no passions.
Obj. 3: Further, the soul's passions would seem to be the same as the
_fomes_ of sin, hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:5) calls them the "passions
of sins." Now the _fomes_ of sin was not in Christ, as was said (A.
2). Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and
hence His soul was not passible.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 87:4) in the person of Christ:
"My soul is filled with evils"--not sins, indeed, but human evils,
i.e. "pains," as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was
passible.
_I answer that,_ A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways:
first with a bodily passion; secondly, with an animal passion. It
suffers with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul
is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being; and hence,
when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must
be disturbed, i.e. in the being which it has in the body. Therefore,
since Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Q.
14, A. 2), His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner.
But the soul suffers with an animal passion, in its
operations--either in such as are proper to the soul, or in such as
are of the soul more than of the body. And although the soul is said
to suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was said
in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; I-II, Q. 41, A. 1);
nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most
properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even
as all else pertaining to man's nature. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 9): "Our Lord having deigned to live in the form of a
servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to be
assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a true
body and a true human soul."
Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Christ otherwise
than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us
these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so
in Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions
in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all
movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of
the reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9), that "Christ
assumed these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing
dispensation, when He willed; even as He became man when He willed."
Thirdly, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at
times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the
reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements
that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the
sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what
was right. Hence Jerome says (on Matt. 26:37) that "Our Lord, in
order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sorrowful' in
very deed; yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is
by a propassion that He is said to have 'begun to grow sorrowful and
to be sad'"; so that it is a perfect "passion" when it dominates the
soul, i.e. the reason; and a "propassion" when it has its beginning
in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further.
Reply Obj. 1: The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions
from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His
own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions.
Reply Obj. 2: Tully is speaking there according to the opinions of
the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only to
the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is
manifest that passions like these were not in Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: The "passions of sins" are movements of the sensitive
appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these were not in Christ,
as neither was the _fomes_ of sin.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 5]
Whether There Was Sensible Pain in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in
Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): "Since with Christ to die was
life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the mystery of
His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him?" And further on
he says: "The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be
God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him,
and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these
wrought in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as
a dart piercing the water." Hence there was no true pain in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in
original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh
of Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the
Virgin's womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.
Obj. 3: Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things
dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up
more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in
the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence,
as was said above (Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore He could feel no pain.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 53:4): "Surely He hath borne
our infirmities and carried our sorrows."
_I answer that,_ As is plain from what has been said in the Second
Part (I-II, Q. 35, A. 7), for true bodily pain are required bodily
hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt,
since it was passible and mortal, as above stated (Q. 14, AA. 1, 2);
neither was the sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ's soul
possessed perfectly all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt
but that in Christ there was true pain.
Reply Obj. 1: In all these and similar words, Hilary does not intend
to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence
after the foregoing he adds: "Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or
wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to
prove the reality of the body, the body's customs were assumed, so
that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our
nature. Or when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body's
necessity, but to its custom." And he uses the word "necessity" in
reference to the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above
stated (Q. 14, AA. 1, 3), so that Christ's flesh is said not to have
lain under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there
was no sin in it. Hence he adds: "For He" (i.e. Christ) "had a
body--one proper to His origin, which did not exist through the
unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body
by the strength of His power." But as regards the proximate cause of
these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of
Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above
(Q. 14, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not merely
on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from the
necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ;
but only the necessity of natural principles.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2), by the power of
the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept in the
soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility and
mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight
of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the
sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 6]
Whether There Was Sorrow in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it
is written of Christ (Isa. 42:4): "He shall not be sad nor
troublesome."
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): "Whatever shall befall
the just man, it shall not make him sad." And the reason of this the
Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of his
goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods,
and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be subject to
fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune has given
him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: "This is the
name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one." Therefore
there was no sorrow in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13, 14) that all
sorrow is "evil, and to be shunned." But in Christ there was no evil
to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "Sorrow
regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But Christ suffered
nothing against His will, for it is written (Isa. 53:7): "He was
offered because it was His own will." Hence there was no sorrow in
Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful
even unto death." And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii.) that "as a man He
had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly,
since I preach the cross."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 5, ad 3), by Divine
dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as
not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out
sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive
appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or
object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the
sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive
of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the
reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q.
35, AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or
money. Now Christ's soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to
Himself, as His passion and death--or to others, as the sin of His
disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could
be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; otherwise,
indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated (A. 4), when we
were speaking of the passions of Christ's soul in general.
Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion; yet it
was inchoatively in Him as a "propassion." Hence it is written (Matt.
26:37): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad." For "it is one
thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome says,
on this text.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), "for the three
passions"--desire, joy, and fear--the Stoics held three _eupatheias_
i.e. good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire,
will--for joy, delight--for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow,
they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow
regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could
befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that
only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing
is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now
although what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is
man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in
man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to
the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And
hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the
sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this
sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand
that "whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him
sad," because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus
Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion.
Reply Obj. 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not
always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an
inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9):
"Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and
where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious
passions?"
Reply Obj. 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be
contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to
which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired,
but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and
passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although
they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption
of the human race.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 7]
Whether There Was Fear in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it
is written (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without
dread." But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in
Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "I ask those who think
thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by
expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to
the glory of martyrdom?" Therefore it is unreasonable that there
should be fear in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid.
Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He
endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there
was no fear in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus "began to fear and
to be heavy."
_I answer that,_ As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present
evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil.
Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain,
does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For
when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present,
and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be
considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite
naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and
by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow.
Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future
event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing
what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).
Reply Obj. 1: The just man is said to be "without dread," in so far
as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason
dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion.
Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus "began to fear and to be
heavy," with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Matt. 26:37).
Reply Obj. 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that
he excludes sorrow, i.e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet
to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear,
even as sorrow.
Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the
power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily
avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 8]
Whether There Was Wonder in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For
the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see
an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to
the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said (A.
3). Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "wonder
is fear springing from the imagination of something great"; and hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man does
not wonder." But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no
wonder in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ
could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at
nothing.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 8:10): "Jesus hearing this,"
i.e. the words of the centurion, "marveled."
_I answer that,_ Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted.
Now there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ's
Divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards
the human knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet
things could be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric
knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by
day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine
knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was
no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric
knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for
our instruction, i.e. in order to teach us to wonder at what He
Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says (Super Gen. Cont. Manich.
i, 8): "Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need
to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not
signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching."
Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things
might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion's faith as if it
was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with
respect to others.
Reply Obj. 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for with
respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to
His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 9]
Whether There Was Anger in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it
is written (James 1:20): "The anger of man worketh not the justice of
God." Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God,
since of Him it is written (1 Cor. 1:30): "For He [Vulg.: 'Who'] of
God is made unto us . . . justice." Therefore it seems that there was
no anger in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from
_Ethic._ iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no
anger in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger that comes
of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal
disturbs it." Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor
disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor
zealous anger.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 2:17) that the words of Ps.
58:10, "the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," were fulfilled in
Him.
_I answer that,_ As was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 46, A. 3,
ad 3, and II-II, Q. 158, A. 2, ad 3), anger is an effect of sorrow.
For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a
desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon
himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and
the desire of revenge. Now it was said (A. 6) that sorrow could be in
Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e.
when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way
anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful.
Sometimes, however, this desire is without sin--nay, is praiseworthy,
e.g. when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is
zealous anger. For Augustine says (on John 2:17) that "he is eaten up
by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to
be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs."
Such was the anger that was in Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in two
ways--sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and
in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are
attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must
understand that "the anger of man worketh not the justice of God."
Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument,
and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed
to anger but to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason
that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled
and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds
the mean in anger.
Reply Obj. 3: In us the natural order is that the soul's powers
mutually impede each other, i.e. if the operation of one power is
intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason
why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by
reason, dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ,
by control of the Divine power, "every faculty was allowed to do what
was proper to it," and one power was not impeded by another. Hence,
as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or
pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the
inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 10]
Whether Christ Was at Once a Wayfarer and a Comprehensor?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and
a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the
end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in
the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the
end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once
wayfarer and comprehensor.
Obj. 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not
pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dios. cxviii) that "upon the inferior nature, which is the body,
there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as
enjoy and understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of
incorruption." Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully
enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a
comprehensor.
Obj. 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose
bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although
their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers,
but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that
Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind
enjoyed God although His body was mortal.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a
stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?"
_I answer that,_ A man is called a wayfarer from tending to
beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude,
according to 1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend [Douay:
'obtain']"; and Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']". Now man's perfect beatitude consists
in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 4, A.
6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the
mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body "will
rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption," as is written 1
Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and
thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the
soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His
soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear
from the above (A. 4; Q. 14, AA. 1, 2). Hence He was at once
comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul,
and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to
beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude.
Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and
resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against
this under a different respect--as when a man is at once acquainted
with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what
he does not know.
Reply Obj. 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul
with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say,
instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister
"organically" to beatitude.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of
Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not
passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do
nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily
sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.
_______________________
QUESTION 16
OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND
BECOMING
(In Twelve Articles)
We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to
what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation to us.
Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first
is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the
second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this is true: "God is man"?
(2) Whether this is true: "Man is God"?
(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?
(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the
Son of God, and conversely?
(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the
Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature?
(6) Whether this is true: "The Son of God was made man"?
(7) Whether this is true: "Man became God"?
(8) Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?
(9) Whether this is true: "This man," pointing out Christ, "began to
be"? or "always was"?
(10) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a creature"?
(11) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is God"?
(12) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a hypostasis or person"?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 1]
Whether This Is True: "God Is Man"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God is man." For
every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this
proposition, "God is man," is on remote matter, since the forms
signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart.
Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would
seem to be false.
Obj. 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual
agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of
the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do
not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems
that the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying
that God is man.
Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, "as the soul and
the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ." But this is
false: "The soul is the body." Therefore this also is false: "God is
man."
Obj. 4: Further, it was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4) that
what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to
the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word "man" is
not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it
would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man;
and this is clearly false.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:6, 7): "Who being in the
form of God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant,
being made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man"; and
thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form
of God is God. Therefore God is man.
_I answer that,_ This proposition "God is man," is admitted by all
Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the
proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the
Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but
fictitious man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an
imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is
called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held
that Christ's body and soul were not united, could not say that God
is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the
parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above (Q. 2, A. 5; Q.
5, A. 1).
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny
the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God
and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by grace;
even as all other holy men are called gods--Christ being more
excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace.
And thus, when it is said that "God is man," God does not stand for
the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which
was disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 10, 11). But some admit this
proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that
Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth
of the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by
reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority,
or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to
be man--nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by
such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in
affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into
the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in
Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things
distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated
of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as
they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John
because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions
also were disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).
Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true
Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person,
but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is
true and proper, "God is man"--not only by the truth of its terms,
i.e. because Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the
predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete
may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word "man"
may stand for any individual man. And thus this word "God," from its
very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of
God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Now of every
suppositum of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word
signifying that nature in the concrete, as "man" may properly and
truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, since the Person of
the Son of God for Whom this word "God" stands, is a suppositum of
human nature this word man may be truly and properly predicated of
this word "God," as it stands for the Person of the Son of God.
Reply Obj. 1: When different forms cannot come together in one
suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the
subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two
forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote,
but natural or contingent, as when I say: "Something white is
musical." Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely
apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation
in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both]
essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in
contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God
accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its
hypostasis--not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word
"God," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of
human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are
distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of
another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being
distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For
the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in
suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.
Reply Obj. 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the abstract, even as
Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and
"carnal" or "corporeal," as, on the other hand, "God" and "man."
Hence in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract,
but only the concrete of the concrete.
Reply Obj. 4: This word "man" is predicated of God, because of the
union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not
follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God
from eternity.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 2]
Whether This Is True: "Man Is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Man is God." For God
is an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are
rebuked for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood
and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this
word "God" should be predicated of man.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be
predicated of the subject. But this is true: "God is the Father," or
"God is the Trinity." Therefore, if it is true that "Man is God," it
seems that this also is true: "Man is the Father," or "Man is the
Trinity." But these are false. Therefore the first is false.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): "There shall be no new
God in thee." But man is something new; for Christ was not always
man. Therefore this is false: "Man is God."
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom is Christ
according to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for
ever." Now Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is
true: "Man is God."
_I answer that,_ Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Divine and
human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and
proper: "Man is God," even as this: "God is man." For this word "man"
may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand
for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of
human nature. Now it is manifest that the word "God" is truly and
properly predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in
the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Hence it remains that this is true and
proper: "Man is God."
Reply Obj. 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones
and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there
was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the
Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum,
which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: This word "Father" is predicated of this word "God,"
inasmuch as this word "God" stands for the Person of the Father. And
in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because
the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And,
consequently, it is not necessary that this word "Father" be
predicated of this word "Man," of which the Word "God" is predicated,
inasmuch as "Man" stands for the Person of the Son.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something new,
yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And
because this word "God" is predicated of man not on account of the
human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow
that we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that
"Man" stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those
who assert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf. Q. 2, AA. 3,
6].
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Can Be Called a Lordly Man?*
[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why
we can say in Latin, e.g. _oratio dominica_ (the Lord's Prayer) or
_passio dominica_ (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as
_homo dominicus_ (a lordly man)].
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man.
For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled
to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is
speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.
Obj. 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His
Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is
said to be "humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth.
iii, 11), where he says that "being humanized manifests the
conjunction with man." Hence with like reason may it be said
denominatively that this man is lordly.
Obj. 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is "Divine"
derived from "Deus" [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls
Christ the "most Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ
be called a lordly man.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see
that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the
Lord Himself."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 3), when we say "the Man
Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person
of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both
natures. Now "God" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son
of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively,
since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we
say "lordly" denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly
be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if,
when we say "the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as
those who assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called
lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor,
as the Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is
not called "divine" by essence, but "deified"--not, indeed, by its
being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with
the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De
Fide Orth. iii, 11, 17).
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words (Retract.
i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he adds:
"Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man,
"I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be
said although it may be defended with some reason," i.e. because one
might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human
nature, which this word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the
suppositum.
Reply Obj. 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine
natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e. from eternity.
Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the
Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be "humanized"--not
that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the
converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature
assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a "deified" or
"lordly" man.
Reply Obj. 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of
things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say
that "the Divine Essence is God," by reason of identity; and that
"the Essence belongs to God," or is "Divine," on account of the
different way of signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word,"
though the Word is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we
say "the person of Plato," on account of its different mode of
signification. But "lordly" is not predicated of those of which
"lord" is predicated; for we are not wont to call a man who is a
lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, as
the "lordly will," or the "lordly hand," or the "lordly possession."
And hence the man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly;
yet His flesh can be called "lordly flesh" and His passion the
"lordly passion."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 4]
Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the
same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper
to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it
belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable.
Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.
Obj. 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.
Obj. 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it
does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is
said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."
_I answer that,_ On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide
words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained
to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as
pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man.
Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to
the Word, let him be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29].
But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they
predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord."
Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was
from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or
that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand
maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine
or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence
Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes
to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in
the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ
by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are
to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone--let
him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one
hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the
name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the
hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the
Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis
of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the
human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are
predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are
predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to
the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by
Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the
Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is
less than the Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The
prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point
of view of what is said."
Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the
same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being
predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are
predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply Obj. 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to
God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be
derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if
they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a
discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said:
"God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's
salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that
Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its
own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless
things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our
salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our
salvation was the occasion of harm to God?"
Reply Obj. 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its
suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 5]
Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of the
Divine Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can
be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is
predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature.
Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the
Divine Nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed Athanasius
and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate." Therefore it
would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature
may be said of the Divine Nature.
Obj. 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to
Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess
saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what
belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we
mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i.e. the
properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is
passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature.
Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the
Divine Nature.
_I answer that,_ What belongs to one cannot be said of another,
unless they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only
of man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human
natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is
the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated
of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words
stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words
we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature--whether
the word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the
word "Christ," by which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and
the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word
"God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word
"Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): "It is
of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; because since
the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is
altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of God by the
Godhead which He has with the Father."
Reply Obj. 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by
reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of
God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence
certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the
Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not
say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the First Part (Q.
39, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the
Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature
suffered.
Reply Obj. 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any
property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other
in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to
be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above (Q. 2, A.
1, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the
human nature--not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine
Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence,
whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be
uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature.
But the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the
human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise
be predicated of the Divine Nature.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 6]
Whether This Is True: "God Was Made Man"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God was made man."
For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made
simply. But this is false: "God was made simply." Therefore this is
false: "God was made man."
Obj. 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be
the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and
I change not." Hence this is false: "God was made man."
Obj. 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of
the Son of God. But this is false: "God was made the Person of the
Son of God." Therefore this is false: "God was made man."
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:14): "The Word was made
flesh": and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), "when he said,
'The Word was made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was
made man."
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be made that which begins to be
predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly
predicated of God, as stated above (A. 1), yet in such sort that it
pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of
His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, "God was made man";
though it is understood differently by some: even as this, "God is
man," as we said above (A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in
whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God
is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to
be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And
hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something is
newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated
of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated,
then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is
predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect
anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But
whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything
without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side
without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left
side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is
changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it
is thus we say of God: "Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast been'] our
refuge" (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason of the
union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated
of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature,
which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, "God
was made man," we understand no change on the part of God, but only
on the part of the human nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God,
but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is
false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is true:
"God was made man" by being united to human nature.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 7]
Whether This Is True: "Man Was Made God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God." For
it is written (Rom. 1:2, 3): "Which He had promised before by His
prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to
Him of the seed of David according to the flesh." Now Christ, as man,
is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was
made the Son of God.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was this
assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this
assumption this is true: "God was made man." Therefore, in like
manner, this is true: "Man was made God."
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God was
humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call
it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore
with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and
thus it is true that "Man was made God."
Obj. 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject
of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word
"man" signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to
which the making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is truer
than "God was made man."
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not
say that man was deified, but that God was humanized." Now to be made
God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made
God."
_I answer that,_ This proposition, Man was made God, may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the participle "made"
absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in
this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is
predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said (AA. 8, 9). And
in the same sense this is false: "God was made man." But it is not of
this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so
understood that the word "made" determines the composition, with this
meaning: "Man was made God, i.e. it was brought about that Man is
God." And in this sense both are true, viz. that "Man was made God"
and that "God was made Man." But this is not the proper sense of
these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that "man" has
not a personal but a simple supposition. For although "this man" was
not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of
God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always
God. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle "made" attaches
making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in
this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the
same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),
this proposition is false, because, when it is said, "Man was made
God," "man" has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not
verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now
the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be God" is verified, is
the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was
always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or
is made God, or that He was made God.
But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to
be God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a
certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of
affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal
reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God,
and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man.
Reply Obj. 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who" which
refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as
affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed
of David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God--and it is
in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken
as affecting the subject, with this meaning--that the "Son of God was
made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds
it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say
"the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of
God."
Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense
that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was
brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both
sayings are true as stated above.
The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is
the same as to be made God.
Reply Obj. 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e.
for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally,
i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was
made God," the being made is not attributed to the human nature but
to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity,
and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said
that "God was made Man," the making is taken to be terminated in the
human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: "God was made
Man," and this is false: "Man was made God"; even as if Socrates, who
was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would
be true: "This man was made white today," and this would be false;
"This white thing was made man today." Nevertheless, if on the part
of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in
the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the
making, e.g. if it were said that "human nature was made the Son of
God's."
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 8]
Whether This Is True: "Christ Is a Creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Christ is a creature."
For Pope Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ.]:
"A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a
creature." Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God
became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a
creature.
Obj. 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of
the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they
are signified, as stated above (A. 5). But it is the property of
human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine
Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He
is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.
Obj. 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather than
the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the
Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason
of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that
He is a creature.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Trin. i): "Was Christ made by a
word? Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: "No!" Hence he
adds: "How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a
composite Nature." Therefore it must not be granted that "Christ is a
creature."
_I answer that,_ As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words
spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very
words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their
error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and
less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His
Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a
"creature" or "less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz.
"in His human nature." But such things as could not be considered to
belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of
Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ
suffered, died and was buried: even as in corporeal and human beings,
things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the
part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of
the whole simply, i.e. without qualification, for we do not say that
the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but
we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only
belong to him as regards his hair.
Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors
use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term; we
should however take as understood the qualification, "as man."
Reply Obj. 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine
Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called created
and uncreated, passible and impassible." Nevertheless things of which
we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated
without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv,
5) that "the one hypostasis," i.e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its
Godhead and created in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not
say without qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible";
in order to avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a
true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification,
that Christ was incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead."
Reply Obj. 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin
applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case
of creation; and hence there is no parity.
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NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 9]
Whether This Man, i.e. Christ, Began to Be?
Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be.
For Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that "before the world was,
neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men--the Man Jesus
Christ." But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this
Man, i.e. Christ, began to be.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be
simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.
Obj. 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But
Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this
Man began to be.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday
and today: and the same for ever."
_I answer that,_ We must not say that "this Man"--pointing to
Christ--"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a
twofold reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the
judgment of the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is
one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according
to this, when we say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal
suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in
time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be."
Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature,
which is signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the
subject is not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is
taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A. 1,
ad 4). Secondly, because even if this proposition were true, it ought
not to be made use of without qualification; in order to avoid the
heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Person of the Son
of God is a creature, and less than the Father, so he maintained that
He began to be, saying "there was a time when He was not."
Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i.e. we must say
that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His
humanity."
Reply Obj. 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the lower
species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to be
white," that therefore "it began to be colored." And this because "to
begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow
if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto." Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this
does not follow: "Christ began to be Man--therefore He began to be."
Reply Obj. 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ, although it
signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies
the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence, since it
signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to
the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false:
"The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to be
Man."
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TENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 10]
Whether This Is True: "Christ As Man Is a Creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a
creature," or "began to be." For nothing in Christ is created except
the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human
nature." Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.
Obj. 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when
I say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated (AA. 8, 9) we must not absolutely grant that
"the Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as Man
is a creature."
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated
of him _per se_ and simply, for _per se_ is the same as "inasmuch as
itself," as is said _Metaph._ v, text. 23. But this is false: "Christ
as Man is per se and simply a creature." Hence this, too, is false;
"Christ as Man is a creature."
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But
this is false: "Christ as Man is Creator." Therefore this is true:
"Christ as Man is a creature."
_I answer that,_ When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be
added in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by
reason of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum,
since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and
uncreated, this will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if
it be added by reason of the human nature, it is true, since by
reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him
to be a creature, as was said (A. 8).
It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since
it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the
same to say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man." Hence
this is to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a
creature." But if something further be added whereby [the term
covered by the reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this
proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for instance were
one to say: "Christ as 'this' Man is a creature."
Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human
nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only of
abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is
a creature" and that "man is a creature."
Reply Obj. 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the
suppositum--and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature,
as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the
suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that
"this man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a
creature."
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human
nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every
such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a
creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human
nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated
being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He
is a creature simply.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 11]
Whether This Is True: "Christ As Man Is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is
God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of
union. Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Obj. 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to Isa.
43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake." But
Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Matt. 9:6: "But that you may
know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular
Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we signify
the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as
Man is God.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every
man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is
God--which is clearly false.
_I answer that,_ This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may
be taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this
way it is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human
nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature.
Secondly it may be taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this
way, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person
of the Son of God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is
true that Christ, as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term
placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the
suppositum, as stated above (A. 10), hence this is to be denied
rather than granted: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply Obj. 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves
towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing
because of its matter or subject--and to be in act belongs to it
because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that
it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union,
and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and
the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man
has the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply Obj. 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving
sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine
Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins
authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides
instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this
passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena
Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in
order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to
the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He
remained the Word of God."
Reply Obj. 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun
"this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this
Man, is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God."
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 12]
Whether This Is True: "Christ As Man Is a Hypostasis or Person"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or
person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the
likeness of men." But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man
is a person.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But
He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual
substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance
of rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore
Christ as Man is a person.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis
and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore
Christ as Man is a person.
_On the contrary,_ Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore
if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are
two persons--one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous,
as was said above (Q. 2, A. 6; Q. 4, A. 2).
_I answer that,_ As was said (AA. 10, 11), the term "Man" placed in
the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the
nature. Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is
taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man
is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else
than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to
the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so
understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person,
and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is
a person. Secondly it may be taken that in Christ a proper
personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to
the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person,
since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the Divine
Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as
everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper
to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is
not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is
not, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The "individual substance," which is included in the
definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of
itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be
called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless,
because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it
cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human
nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and
singular.
Reply Obj. 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of
itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the
sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny
all the other propositions.
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QUESTION 17
OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For,
in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and
plurality in detail: thus we concluded (Q. 9) that there is not only
one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (Q. 35,
A. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will;
(3) of operation.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is one or two?
(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 17, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Is One or Two?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the
form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet
both are Man by reason of the man assumed." Now "both" may only be
said when there are two. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are two.
Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchiridion
xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of a servant
. . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the
other as man." Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere man,
He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and
thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is
two.
Obj. 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and
something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three
Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are
two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature,
notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are
one, according to John 10:30: "I and the Father are one." Therefore,
notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the
duality of nature.
Obj. 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that
"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a
duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise
(_alterum_) so does substantial form make another thing (_aliud_) as
Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two substantial
natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "Whatever is,
inasmuch as it is, is one." But we confess that Christ is. Therefore
Christ is one.
_I answer that,_ Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the
abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person,
except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not
differ, as stated in the First Part (Q. 29, A. 4, ad 1). But in
Christ, since there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human,
one of them, viz. the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the
abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is
signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But
the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but
only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified by the suppositum. For
we cannot truly say that "Christ is human nature," because human
nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum. But we say that
Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having
the Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having
manhood is differently signified by the word "man" and by the word
"Jesus" or "Peter." For this word "man" implies one having manhood
indistinctly, even as the word "God" implies indistinctly one having
the Godhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus" implies one having
manhood distinctly, i.e. with its determinate individual properties,
as "Son of God" implies one having the Godhead under a determinate
personal property. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with
regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in
the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But
because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they
are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the
suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in
their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its
final completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ,
they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted
one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the
neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the
masculine signifies something formed and perfect. On the other hand,
the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ
is two not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since
we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear from
Q. 2, AA. 2, 3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely
in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if
"both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both;
but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two
supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete.
For I can say that "both, viz. God and Man, are God" on account of
God Who assumes; and "both, viz. God and Man," are Man on account of
the man assumed.
Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing and another,"
this saying is to be explained in this sense--"having this nature and
another." And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra
Felic. xi), where, after saying, "In the mediator of God and man, the
Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds: "I say
another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not
another thing by reason of the unity of person." Hence Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "If we must speak briefly, that
of which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible
is not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the
same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from
it; for both these are one."
Reply Obj. 3: This is false, "Christ is only man"; because it does
not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms
placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added
whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true
proposition--for instance, "Christ is only that which is man."
Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than
man," because "another thing," inasmuch as it refers to a diversity
of substance, properly refers to the suppositum, even as all relative
things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: "Therefore He
has another nature."
Reply Obj. 4: When it is said, "Christ is something that the Father
is"; "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated
even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said:
"Christ is something that is not the Father"; "something" signifies,
not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the
concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct
suppositum, i.e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the
individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one
thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the
human nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does
not reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of
the Father and Son.
Reply Obj. 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine Nature
is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence it
may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery
of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of
Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.
Reply Obj. 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in
the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is predicated
is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word "Christ."
Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not
duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.
Reply Obj. 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence
diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called "otherwise"
simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of substance. Now not
merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance,
as is said _Metaph._ v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not
suffice for anything to be called "another thing" simply, unless
there is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes
"another thing" relatively, i.e. in nature, if there is no diversity
of suppositum.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 17, Art. 2]
Whether There Is Only One Being in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one
being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that
whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows
the nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two
beings.
Obj. 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature
itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not
the Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not
only one being in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons,
yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in
Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore
in Christ there is not only one being.
Obj. 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body,
since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since
this is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides
the Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.
_On the contrary,_ Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it
is one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were
two beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not
one.
_I answer that,_ Because in Christ there are two natures and one
hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ
must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ
must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the
hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being--and to the
nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the
manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by
it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man.
Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which
does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis,
this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but
relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is
Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why
this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for
the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being
whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very
hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one
hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be
one being for one thing.
If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not
hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained,
it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ--one, inasmuch
as He is God--the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates
we place one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as
he is a man, since "being white" does not pertain to the personal
being of Socrates. But being possessed of a head, being corporeal,
being animated--all these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and
hence there arises from these only the one being of Socrates. And if
it so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted
there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who
was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but
only a relation to these, i.e. inasmuch as he would be said to be,
not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with
reference to what accrued to him afterwards. And thus, since the
human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or
personally as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 5, 6), and not accidentally,
it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new
personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal
being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to
subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which
has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is
consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being.
Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality
from the duality of the nature.
Reply Obj. 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the
Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature
is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said in the First Part (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 3; Q.
75, A. 5, ad 4), since the Divine Person is the same as the Nature,
there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being of
the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three
Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if
the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the
Nature.
Reply Obj. 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body, inasmuch as
it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the complement of
its nature and species. But if we consider the body perfected by the
soul, without the hypostasis having both--this whole, composed of
soul and body, as signified by the word "humanity," does not signify
_what is,_ but _whereby it is._ Hence being belongs to the subsisting
person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and of this
relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human nature
by informing the body.
_______________________
QUESTION 18
OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?
(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is
distinct from the will of reason?
(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?
(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?
(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine
will in the thing willed?
(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Two Wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills,
one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and
first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and
commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was
moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was
only one will, viz. the Divine.
Obj. 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by
the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to
the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for
natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of
necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will
in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect,"
i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will,
since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in
some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person.
But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ
there is only one will.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord says (Luke 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done."
And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7)
says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Luke
22:42 he says: "His will, He refers to the Man--the Father's, to the
Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead
eternal."
_I answer that,_ Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem
to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did
not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word
was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence
since "the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima
iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus
there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held
one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him.
Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one
of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on,
Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of
Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one
will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two
natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ's
human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it
was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of
Pope Agatho [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it
was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ,
in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of
old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the
Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two
natural wills in Him and two natural operations." And this much it
was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed
a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Q. 5; Q. 9, A. 1). Now
the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its
natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the First
Part (QQ. 79, 80). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a
human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of
human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains
to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said
in the First Part (Q. 19, A. 1). Hence it must be said that there are
two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at
the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ
there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the
good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh" in
them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For
although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it
can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 105,
A. 4). And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine
will according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I
have desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where
the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,'
what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that
His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's
will ought to be subject to God's will?"
Reply Obj. 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul
is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is
moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2, 4; _Ethic._ viii, 11). And hence it
was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument
of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily
follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power--which
is also called will--is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with
respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is
neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated
in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 10, AA. 1, 2) [*Cf. I, Q. 82, A. 2]. And
yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is
natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in
Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural
movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply Obj. 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a
determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing
of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature,
"to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed
considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the
human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in
a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the
bidding of the Divine will.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 2]
Whether in Christ There Was a Will of Sensuality Besides the Will of
Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of
sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the
sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts." Now
sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there
was no will of sensuality.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12, 13) the
sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing
serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal
without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i,
32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Obj. 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A. 1).
But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in
Christ there was only one human will.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will
which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow." From
this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human
will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in
the Second Part (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore,
seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will
of reason.
_I answer that,_ As was said (Q. 9, A. 1), the Son of God assumed
human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of
human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the
genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together
with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which
things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality.
Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual
appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality
or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is
said to be "rational by participation," as is clear from the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason,"
as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a
will by participation."
Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so
called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by
participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys
reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent--not as
regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as
regards the corruption of the _fomes,_ which was not in Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another, there
seems to be only one" (Aristotle, _Topic._ iii); thus a surface which
is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too,
because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes
of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in
Christ, even as there is but one human nature.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 3]
Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called
_thelesis_, and the rational will which is called _boulesis_. Now
Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of
human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Obj. 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.]
ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of
reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several
wills.
_On the contrary,_ In every order there is one first mover. But the
will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one
man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of
reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one
human will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the will is sometimes
taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is
taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two
species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For
the will, as was said in the I-II, Q. 8, AA. 2, 3, regards both the
end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For
towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is
good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain
relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else.
Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything
desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene
_thelesis_--i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as nature," is
different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is
desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and
this act of the will Damascene calls _boulesis_--i.e. counseling
will, and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts
does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common
ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we
are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one
human will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if we
are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a
will as nature, which is called _thelesis_, and a will as reason,
which is called _boulesis_.
Reply Obj. 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the
act, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers,
as was said in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from
the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's
evil, absolutely considered.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 4]
Whether There Was Free-will in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that _gnome_, i.e. opinion,
thinking or cogitation, and _proairesis_, i.e. choice, "cannot
possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with
propriety." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with
propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently
no free-will, of which choice is the act.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is
"a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not
appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning
such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of
everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will
in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was
determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q. 15,
AA. 1, 2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 7:15): "He shall eat butter
and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the
good," which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was
free-will in Christ.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 3), there was a twofold act of
the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in
itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His
will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to
another--which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this,
that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means.
And thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice
is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of
free-will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3). Hence, since
"will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and
consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the First
Part (Q. 83, A. 3; I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he
considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless
doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God
Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before
the foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet
doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We
may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage
quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only
as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose,
after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2, 3). Hence
if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding
doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain
that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when
it is in an ignorant nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not
determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as
to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 5]
Whether the Human Will of Christ Was Altogether Conformed to the
Divine Will in the Thing Willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will
anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the
person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have
desired it." Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the
other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing
but what was willed by His Divine will.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which,
indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according
to Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all
knowledge." Now charity makes men will what God wills; hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to
will and choose the same." Therefore the human will in Christ willed
nothing else than was willed by His Divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who
are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they
would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will,
for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ
wills nothing else than does the Divine will.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When
Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to
have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only
have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our
weakness into His Divine but into His human will."
_I answer that,_ As was said (AA. 2, 3), in Christ according to His
human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality,
which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether
considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason.
Now it was said above (Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2) that by
a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His
flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He
allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now
it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from
sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature
turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as
death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these
things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the
will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless,
the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the
will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death,
not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of
man's salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and
in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God
did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God,
which appears from what He says (Matt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should
be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by
another will.
Reply Obj. 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to
be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of
which does not extend to the will of God--nor by His will considered
as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in
relation to the Divine will.
Reply Obj. 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards
the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends
agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation
to the will of a friend.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch
as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence
things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite
could happen to Him in His passible flesh.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 6]
Whether There Was Contrariety of Wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in
Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as
contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in
His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He
wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence
Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against
Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this
chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again,
'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes two
wills--the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from
the passion--and His Divine will eager for the passion." Hence there
was contrariety of wills in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the
spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety
of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which
the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion,
according to Isa. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will,"
yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was
contrariety of wills in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 22:43) that "being in an agony,
He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle
[*Greek, _agonia_] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems
that there was contrariety of will in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third
Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two
natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but
following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving
against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will."
_I answer that,_ Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition
in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not
suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of
contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards
his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be
contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the
diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one
regards the doing of something with reference to some universal
reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with
reference to some particular reason, there is not complete
contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged
for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred
wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no
contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good
went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private
good--in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be
in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational
appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there
is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as
to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this
case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite
would reach the rational will.
And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there
was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the
natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which
the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the
passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the
human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the
sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could
nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor
the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural
will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand,
neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from
or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement
of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine
will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of
sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature.
Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or
contrariety of wills.
Reply Obj. 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else
than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose
permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper
movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15, 18, 19).
Reply Obj. 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded
by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in
Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.
Reply Obj. 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as
far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of
motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one
thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this
springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge
which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by
His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the
salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion.
Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive
part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23).
_______________________
QUESTION 19
OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the
Godhead and Manhood?
(2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human
nature?
(3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for
Himself?
(4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 19, Art. 1]
Whether in Christ There Is Only One Operation of the Godhead and
Manhood?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation
of the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii):
"The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the
supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and
having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine
operation." But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation,
which is written in Greek _theandrike_, i.e. God-manlike. Hence it
seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, there is but one operation of the principal and
instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument
of the Divine, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 8, A. 1, ad 1;
Q. 18, A. 1, ad 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human
natures in Christ are the same.
Obj. 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one
hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person
is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or
person, for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to
singulars. Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead
and the Manhood.
Obj. 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so also
does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is
only one operation of the Godhead and the (Q. 17, A. 2). Hence, on
account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.
Obj. [5]: Further, [where there is one thing] operated there is one
operation. But the same thing was operated by the Godhead and the
Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead.
Hence it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the
Godhead and the Manhood.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): "How can the same
operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as
the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different
substances?"
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 18, A. 1), the aforesaid
heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in
Christ. Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we
must bear in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained
agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is
moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the
actions and movements of the inferior principle are things operated
rather than operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is
properly the operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which
belongs to the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are
things operated by the man--one of which is operated by the soul
through the feet, the other through the hands. And because it is the
same soul that operates in both cases, there is only one indifferent
operation, on the part of the thing operating, which is the first
moving principle; but difference is found on the part of what is
operated. Now, as in a mere man the body is moved by the soul, and
the sensitive by the rational appetite, so in the Lord Jesus Christ
the human nature is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they said
that there is one indifferent operation on the part of the Godhead
operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as the Godhead of
Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word
of His power--and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in
body. Hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act.
10] quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who said: "What things
were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are
becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth
is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly limbs, wholly
unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to God. Yet one, i.e. the
Incarnate Word, wrought one and the other--neither was this from one
nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because
there are distinct things operated there are therefore two operating
natures and forms."
But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by another has a
twofold action--one which it has from its own form--the other, which
it has inasmuch as it is moved by another; thus the operation of an
axe of itself is to cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the
craftsman, its operation is to make benches. Hence the operation
which belongs to a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it
belong to the mover, except in so far as he makes use of this kind of
thing for his work: thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but
not of a smith, except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating
iron. But the operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by
another, is not distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to
make a bench is not the work of the axe independently of the workman.
Hence, wheresoever the mover and the moved have different forms or
operative faculties, there must the operation of the mover and the
proper operation of the moved be distinct; although the moved shares
in the operation of the mover, and the mover makes use of the
operation of the moved, and, consequently, each acts in communion
with the other.
Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power
whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has
its proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely.
Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the
human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same
way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as
an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And
this is what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. xxviii): "Both forms"
(i.e. both the Divine and the human nature in Christ) "do what is
proper to each in union with the other, i.e. the Word operates what
belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh."
But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in
Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had
not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of
the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the
Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the
Divine and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these
are impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is
supposed to be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the
natures is supposed. Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council
(Act. 18) condemned this opinion, and decreed as follows: "We confess
two natural, indivisible, unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable
operations in the same Lord Jesus Christ our true God"; i.e. the
Divine operation and the human operation.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i.e. a
God-manlike or Divino-human, operation not by any confusion of the
operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine
operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the
power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (Ad Caium
iv), "what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the
Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing
up the weight of bodily feet." Now it is clear that to be begotten
belongs to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in
Christ supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as
when He healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he
adds: "He performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not
as man does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God
and man."
Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine
and the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, Div.
Nom. ii: "Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the
Holy Ghost no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most
gracious and merciful will," i.e. inasmuch as the Father and the Holy
Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things.
And he adds: "He is truly the unchangeable God, and God's Word by the
sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for
us, He wrought." Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which
the Father and the Holy Ghost do not share, except by Their merciful
consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein
the Father and the Holy Ghost share.
Reply Obj. 2: The instrument is said to act through being moved by
the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper
operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence
the action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the
action of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation,
inasmuch as it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ's human
nature, as the instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the
operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of
Christ saves us and that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not
distinct; nevertheless, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is
a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the Divine, as
stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in
accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the
operation receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or
natures spring the divers species of operations, but from the unity
of hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of
the species: thus fire has two operations specifically different,
namely, to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and
heat, and yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one
and the same time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there
are necessarily two specifically different operations by reason of
His two natures; nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the
same time is numerically one, as one walking and one healing.
Reply Obj. 4: Being and operation belong to the person by reason of
the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to the very
constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of
a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the complete
and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person by
reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not
incompatible with personal unity.
Reply Obj. 5: The proper work of the Divine operation is different
from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a leper is
a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the proper
work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in one
work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 19, Art. 2]
Whether in Christ There Are Several Human Operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are several human
operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His
nutritive soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the
angels by His intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the
operations of a plant as plant and of an animal as animal are
different. Therefore Christ as man has several operations.
Obj. 2: Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their acts.
Now in Christ's soul there were divers powers and habits; therefore
also divers operations.
Obj. 3: Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their
operations. Now the human body has divers members of different form,
and consequently fitted to divers operations. Therefore in Christ
there are divers operations in the human nature.
_On the contrary,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15),
"operation is consequent upon the nature." But in Christ there is
only one human nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human
operation.
_I answer that,_ Since it is by his reason that man is what he is;
that operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason
through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any
operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will,
it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of
some part of human nature--sometimes by reason of the nature of
elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards--sometimes by reason of
the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to
grow--sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear,
to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these
operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive
soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are
somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear
from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring
from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are
not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor
simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it was
said (A. 1) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form, the
operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct;
but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent,
then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one.
And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and
of the vegetative soul are distinct from the will's operation, which
is properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul
inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by
reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the
same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we
consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the
will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship
to various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity
of things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of
the operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this
respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of
operations in Christ.
Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly
called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other
operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in
the Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which
was not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations
pertained in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will
"that His flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it," as stated
above (Q. 18, A. 5). Much more, therefore, is there one
operation in Christ, than in any other man whatsoever.
Reply Obj. 1: The operations of the sensitive and nutritive
parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these
operations were more human than in others.
Reply Obj. 2: Powers and habits are diversified by comparison
with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations
corresponds to the divers powers and habits, as likewise to the divers
objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations
from Christ's humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of
time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was
said above.
(St. Thomas gives no reply to Obj. 3; some codices add: Hence may be
gathered the reply to the third objection.)
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 19, Art. 3]
Whether the Human Action of Christ Could Be Meritorious to Him?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human action of Christ could not
be meritorious to Him. For before His death Christ was a comprehensor
even as He is now. But comprehensors do not merit: because the
charity of the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since
fruition depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle
of merit, since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ
before His passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now.
Obj. 2: Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because Christ
is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to Him,
which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from the
beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever has the principle does not properly merit
what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul,
whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was
brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not
overflow to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the
body.
Obj. 4: Further, the manifestation of Christ's excellence is a good,
not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is
promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be
manifested to them, according to John 14:21: "He that loveth Me,
shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him and will manifest
Myself to him." Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of
His greatness.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 2:8, 9): "Becoming
obedient unto death . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him."
Therefore by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited
something for Himself.
_I answer that,_ To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent
than to have it from another, for "what is of itself a cause is
always more excellent than what is a cause through another," as is
said _Phys._ viii, 5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that
of which it is to some extent the cause. But of whatever good we
possess the first cause by authority is God; and in this way no
creature has any good of itself, according to 1 Cor. 4:7: "What hast
thou that thou hast not received?" Nevertheless, in a secondary
manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, of having certain good
things, inasmuch as he cooperates with God in the matter, and thus
whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a manner, of
himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than without
merit.
Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ,
consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless
it be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ's
dignity and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence
He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul,
nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is not yet
possessed, it would be necessary that Christ should have been without
these at some time; and to be without them would have diminished
Christ's dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the
glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of
meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say
that Christ had, by merit, the glory of His body and whatever
pertained to His outward excellence, as His Ascension, veneration,
and the rest. And thus it is clear that He could merit for Himself.
Reply Obj. 1: Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to the
glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited by
charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the
same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a
comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was
at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above (Q. 15, A.
10). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in
the state of meriting.
Reply Obj. 2: Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of God, the
Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as to the
first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a
beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with
merit, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: It is by Divine appointment that there is an overflow
of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human merit; so
that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs in the
body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing to
the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the
glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. 8:11:
"He . . . shall quicken also our [Vulg.: 'your'] mortal bodies,
because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: 'you']." And thus
it could fall under Christ's merit.
Reply Obj. 4: The manifestation of Christ's excellence is His good as
regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others; although
in regard to the being which they have in themselves it chiefly
belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is referred
to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 19, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Could Merit for Others?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit for others.
For it is written (Ezech. 18:4): "The soul that sinneth, the same
shall die." Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the
same shall be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ
merited for others.
Obj. 2: Further, of the fulness of Christ's grace we all receive, as
is written John 1:16. Now other men having Christ's grace cannot
merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. 14:20) that if "Noe and
Daniel and Job be in the city [Vulg.: 'the midst thereof'] . . . they
shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver
their own souls by their justice." Hence Christ could not merit
anything for us.
Obj. 3: Further, the "reward" that we merit is due "according to
justice [Vulg.: 'debt'] and not according to grace," as is clear from
Rom. 4:4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that
our salvation is not by God's grace but by justice, and that He acts
unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ's merit
extends to all.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:18): "As by the offense of
one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one,
unto all men to justification of life." But Adam's demerits reached
to the condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit
of Christ reach others.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 5), grace was in
Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the
whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who
constitute one mystical person. And hence it is that Christ's merit
extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man
the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since
it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.
Reply Obj. 1: The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but the
sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the
whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So,
too, the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the
head of all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members.
Reply Obj. 2: Others receive of Christ's fulness not indeed the fount
of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be that
men merit for others, as Christ did.
Reply Obj. 3: As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal
generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by
spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are
incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, "As many of you as
have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ"; and it is by grace
that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus
man's salvation is from grace.
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QUESTION 20
OF CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to
the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His
relation to the Father, e.g. that He was subject to Him, that He
prayed to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are
predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's
relation to Him, e.g. that the Father adopted Him and that He
predestined Him.
Hence we must consider (1) Christ's subjection to the Father; (2) His
prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption--whether it is becoming to
Him; (5) His predestination.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father?
(2) Whether He is subject to Himself?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 20, Art. 1]
Whether We May Say That Christ Is Subject to the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was
subject to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a
creature, since, as is said in _De Eccles. Dogm._ iv, "in the Trinity
there is no dependence or subjection." But we cannot say simply that
Christ is a creature, as was stated above (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore we
cannot say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is
subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to
the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
21): "We must bear in mind that we may not call it" (i.e. Christ's
human nature) "a servant; for the words 'subservience' and
'domination' are not names of the nature, but of relations, as the
words 'paternity' and 'filiation.'" Hence Christ in His human nature
is not subject to God the Father.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): "And when all things
shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject
unto Him that put all things under Him." But, as is written (Heb.
2:8): "We see not as yet all things subject to Him." Hence He is not
yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says (John 14:28), "The Father is greater
than I"; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "It is not without
reason that the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the
Father and the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on
account of the form of God, and the second on account of the form of
a servant, without any confusion." Now the less is subject to the
greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the
Father.
_I answer that,_ Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is
proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a
threefold subjection to God. The first regards the degree of
goodness, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the very essence of
goodness as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created
nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so
to say, to the rays of this goodness. Secondly, human nature is
subject to God, as regards God's power, inasmuch as human nature,
even as every creature, is subject to the operation of the Divine
ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is especially subject to God through
its proper act, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His command.
This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first
(Matt. 19:17): "Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good,
God." And on this Jerome remarks: "He who had called Him a good
master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns
that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God." And
hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature,
did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because "in such
things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to
be good," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the
Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The
second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that
befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment;
hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ "is subject to the
ordinance of God the Father." And this is the subjection of
subservience, whereby "every creature serves God" (Judith 16:17),
being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: "The
creature serving Thee the Creator." And in this way the Son of God
(Phil. 2:7) is said to have taken "the form of a servant." The third
subjection He attributes to Himself, saying (John 8:29): "I do always
the things that please Him." And this is the subjection to the
Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that
he became "obedient" to the Father "unto death."
Reply Obj. 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature
simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be
added or not, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 8), so also we are to
understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His
human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is
better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of
Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.
Reply Obj. 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon
action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to be moved
by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature
as agent, but to the person, since "acts belong to supposita and to
singulars," according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Nevertheless
action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or
hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to
rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to
be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing
prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human
nature.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): "Christ will give
the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the faithful,
over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision," i.e. to see the
essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally
subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His members by
the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things will be
fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will
concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as
regards His power, according to Matt. 28:18: "All power is given to
Me in heaven and in earth."
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 20, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Is Subject to Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For
Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus (Part I,
ch. xxvi) received: "Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself.
It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this." And
Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): "The one Being,
Christ, cannot be the servant or master of Himself." Now Christ is
said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to
Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has a
relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that nothing is
like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the
servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, "as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so God
and man are one Christ," as Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man is
not said to be subject to himself or servant to himself or greater
than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore,
Christ is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is
subject to His Godhead.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Truth shows in
this way" (i.e. whereby the Father is greater than Christ in human
nature) "that the Son is less than Himself."
Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant was so
taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But
because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the
Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore
the Son is greater than Himself in human nature.
Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father,
according to John 20:17: "I ascend to My Father and to your Father to
My God and your God." Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the
servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the
Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant
and is subject to Himself.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1, ad 2), to be master or
servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a
nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of
Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ,
this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood
to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was
the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the man
serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the
condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus (Part
III, ch. i, anath. 6): "If anyone say that the Word begotten of God
the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does not rather confess
the same to be at once God and man as the Word made flesh, according
to the Scriptures, let him be anathema." And in this sense it is
denied by Cyril and Damascene (Obj. 1); and in the same sense must it
be denied that Christ is less than Himself or subject to Himself.
Secondly, it may be understood of the diversity of natures in the one
person or hypostasis. And thus we may say that in one of them, in
which He agrees with the Father, He presides and rules together with
the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He
is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine says that "the Son
is less than Himself."
Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name "Christ" is the
name of a Person, even as the name "Son," those things can be
predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him
by reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those
relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the
hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is
rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say
that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or
servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification, in
His human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head of
Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita, which is
required in order that anyone may be the master of another.
Reply Obj. 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the master and the
servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership and
subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of
Himself in different respects.
Reply Obj. 3: On account of the divers parts of man, one of which is
superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11)
that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the
irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man
may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His
different parts.
To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said.
For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to,
Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.
_______________________
QUESTION 21
OF CHRIST'S PRAYER
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider Christ's prayer; and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray?
(2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensuality?
(3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself or only for
others?
(4) Whether every prayer of His was heard?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 21, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Becoming of Christ to Pray?
Objection 1: It would seem unbecoming that Christ should pray. For,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "prayer is the asking for
becoming things from God." But since Christ could do all things, it
does not seem becoming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore
it does not seem fitting that Christ should pray.
Obj. 2: Further, we need not ask in prayer for what we know for
certain will happen; thus, we do not pray that the sun may rise
tomorrow. Nor is it fitting that anyone should ask in prayer for what
he knows will not happen. But Christ in all things knew what would
happen. Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in
prayer.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer
is the raising up of the mind to God." Now Christ's mind needed no
uplifting to God, since His mind was always united to God, not only
by the union of the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude.
Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should pray.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:12): "And it came to pass in
those days, that He went out into a mountain, and He passed the whole
night in the prayer of God."
_I answer that,_ As was said in the Second Part (Q. 83, AA. 1, 2),
prayer is the unfolding of our will to God, that He may fulfill it.
If, therefore, there had been but one will in Christ, viz. the
Divine, it would nowise belong to Him to pray, since the Divine will
of itself is effective of whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps.
134:6: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." But because the
Divine and the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the human will
of itself is not efficacious enough to do what it wishes, except by
Divine power, hence to pray belongs to Christ as man and as having a
human will.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ as God and not as man was able to carry out all
He wished, since as man He was not omnipotent, as stated above (Q.
13, A. 1). Nevertheless being both God and man, He wished to offer
prayers to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for our
instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be from the Father;
hence He says (John 11:42): "Because of the people who stand about I
have said it" (i.e. the words of the prayer) "that they may believe
that Thou hast sent Me." Hence Hilary says (De Trin. x): "He did not
need prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be
unknown." Secondly, to give us an example of prayer; hence Ambrose
says (on Luke 6:12): "Be not deceived, nor think that the Son of God
prays as a weakling, in order to beseech what He cannot effect. For
the Author of power, the Master of obedience persuades us to the
precepts of virtue by His example." Hence Augustine says (Tract. civ
in Joan.): "Our Lord in the form of a servant could have prayed in
silence, if need be, but He wished to show Himself a suppliant of the
Father, in such sort as to bear in mind that He was our Teacher."
Reply Obj. 2: Amongst the other things which He knew would happen, He
knew that some would be brought about by His prayer; and for these He
not unbecomingly besought God.
Reply Obj. 3: To rise is nothing more than to move towards what is
above. Now movement is taken in two ways, as is said _De Anima_ iii,
7; first, strictly, according as it implies the passing from
potentiality to act, inasmuch as it is the act of something
imperfect, and thus to rise pertains to what is potentially and not
actually above. Now in this sense, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 24), "the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to God,
since it was ever united to God both by personal being and by the
blessed vision." Secondly, movement signifies the act of something
perfect, i.e. something existing in act, as to understand and to feel
are called movements; and in this sense the mind of Christ was always
raised up to God, since He was always contemplating Him as existing
above Himself.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 21, Art. 2]
Whether It Pertains to Christ to Pray According to His Sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that it pertains to Christ to pray
according to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps. 83:3) in the
person of Christ: "My heart and My flesh have rejoiced in the Living
God." Now sensuality is called the appetite of the flesh. Hence
Christ's sensuality could ascend to the Living God by rejoicing; and
with equal reason by praying.
Obj. 2: Further, prayer would seem to pertain to that which desires
what is besought. Now Christ besought something that His sensuality
desired when He said (Matt. 26:39): "Let this chalice pass from Me."
Therefore Christ's sensuality prayed.
Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater thing to be united to God in person
than to mount to Him in prayer. But the sensuality was assumed by God
to the unity of Person, even as every other part of human nature.
Much more, therefore, could it mount to God by prayer.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:7) that the Son of God in
the nature that He assumed was "made in the likeness of men." But the
rest of men do not pray with their sensuality. Therefore, neither did
Christ pray according to His sensuality.
_I answer that,_ To pray according to sensuality may be understood in
two ways. First as if prayer itself were an act of the sensuality;
and in this sense Christ did not pray with His sensuality, since His
sensuality was of the same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now
in us the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because the
movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and,
consequently, it cannot mount to God, which is required for prayer;
secondly, because prayer implies a certain ordering inasmuch as we
desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is the work of
reason alone. Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in
the Second Part (II-II, Q. 83, A. 1).
Secondly, we may be said to pray according to the sensuality when our
prayer lays before God what is in our appetite of sensuality; and in
this sense Christ prayed with His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer
expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of
the sensuality--and this, that He might teach us three things. First,
to show that He had taken a true human nature, with all its natural
affections: secondly, to show that a man may wish with his natural
desire what God does not wish: thirdly, to show that man should
subject his own will to the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the
Enchiridion (Serm. 1 in Ps. 32): "Christ acting as a man, shows the
proper will of a man when He says 'Let this chalice pass from Me';
for this was the human will desiring something proper to itself and,
so to say, private. But because He wishes man to be righteous and to
be directed to God, He adds: 'Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou
wilt,' as if to say, 'See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire
something proper to thee, even though God wishes something else.'"
Reply Obj. 1: The flesh rejoices in the Living God, not by the act of
the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into
the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement of
the rational appetite.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the sensuality wished what the reason
besought, it did not belong to the sensuality to seek this by
praying, but to the reason, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The union in person is according to the personal being,
which pertains to every part of the human nature; but the uplifting
of prayer is by an act which pertains only to the reason, as stated
above. Hence there is no parity.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 21, Art. 3]
Whether It Was Fitting That Christ Should Pray for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should
pray for Himself. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): "Although His word of
beseeching did not benefit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of
our faith." Hence it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for
us.
Obj. 2: Further, no one prays save for what He wishes, because, as
was said (A. 1), prayer is an unfolding of our will to God that He
may fulfil it. Now Christ wished to suffer what He suffered. For
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi): "A man, though unwilling, is
often angry; though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps;
though unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He" (i.e. Christ) "did all
these things, because He wished." Therefore it was not fitting that
He should pray for Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Orat. Dom.): "The Doctor of Peace
and Master of Unity did not wish prayers to be offered individually
and privately, lest when we prayed we should pray for ourselves
alone." Now Christ did what He taught, according to Acts 1:1: "Jesus
began to do and to teach." Therefore Christ never prayed for Himself
alone.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord Himself said while praying (John 17:1):
"Glorify Thy Son."
_I answer that,_ Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. First, by
expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated above (A. 2); or
also of His simple will, considered as a nature; as when He prayed
that the chalice of His Passion might pass from Him (Matt. 26:39).
Secondly, by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is
considered as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His
Resurrection (John 17:1). And this is reasonable. For as we have said
above (A. 1, ad 1) Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to
give us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is
the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and
of all the good that He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in
His human nature He had already received certain gifts from His
Father. so there were other gifts which He had not yet received, but
which He expected to receive. And therefore, as He gave thanks to the
Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by
acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as we read (Matt. 26:27;
John 11:41): so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him
in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such
as the glory of His body, and the like. And in this He gave us an
example, that we should give thanks for benefits received, and ask in
prayer for those we have not as yet.
Reply Obj. 1: Hilary is speaking of vocal prayer, which was not
necessary to Him for His own sake, but only for ours. Whence he says
pointedly that "His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself." For
if "the Lord hears the desire of the poor," as is said in the Ps.
9:38, much more the mere will of Christ has the force of a prayer
with the Father: wherefore He said (John 11:42): "I know that Thou
hearest Me always, but because of the people who stand about have I
said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me."
Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished indeed to suffer what He suffered, at
that particular time: nevertheless He wished to obtain, after His
passion, the glory of His body, which as yet He had not. This glory
He expected to receive from His Father as the author thereof, and
therefore it was fitting that He should pray to Him for it.
Reply Obj. 3: This very glory which Christ, while praying, besought
for Himself, pertained to the salvation of others according to Rom.
4:25: "He rose again for our justification." Consequently the prayer
which He offered for Himself was also in a manner offered for others.
So also anyone that asks a boon of God that he may use it for the
good of others, prays not only for himself, but also for others.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 21, Art. 4]
Whether Christ's Prayer Was Always Heard?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's prayer was not always heard.
For He besought that the chalice of His passion might be taken from
Him, as we read (Matt. 26:39): and yet it was not taken from Him.
Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.
Obj. 2: Further, He prayed that the sin of those who crucified Him
might be forgiven, as is related (Luke 23:34). Yet not all were
pardoned this sin, since the Jews were punished on account thereof.
Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.
Obj. 3: Further, our Lord prayed for them "who would believe in Him
through the word" of the apostles, that they "might all be one in
Him," and that they might attain to being with Him (John 17:20, 21,
24). But not all attain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His
was heard.
Obj. 4: Further, it is said (Ps. 21:3) in the person of Christ: "I
shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear." Not every prayer of His,
therefore, was heard.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 5:7): "With a strong cry
and tears offering up prayers . . . He was heard for His reverence."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), prayer is a certain
manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is the request of
one who prays granted, when his will is fulfilled. Now absolutely
speaking the will of man is the will of reason; for we will
absolutely that which we will in accordance with reason's
deliberation. Whereas what we will in accordance with the movement of
sensuality, or even of the simple will, which is considered as nature
is willed not absolutely but conditionally (_secundum quid_)--that
is, provided no obstacle be discovered by reason's deliberation.
Wherefore such a will should rather be called a "velleity" than an
absolute will; because one would will (_vellet_) if there were no
obstacle.
But according to the will of reason, Christ willed nothing but what
He knew God to will. Wherefore every absolute will of Christ, even
human, was fulfilled, because it was in conformity with God; and
consequently His every prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also
is it that other men's prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is
in conformity with God, according to Rom. 8:27: "And He that
searcheth the hearts knoweth," that is, approves of, "what the Spirit
desireth," that is, what the Spirit makes the saints to desire:
"because He asketh for the saints according to God," that is, in
conformity with the Divine will.
Reply Obj. 1: This prayer for the passing of the chalice is variously
explained by the Saints. For Hilary (Super Matth. 31) says: "When He
asks that this may pass from Him, He does not pray that it may pass
by Him, but that others may share in that which passes on from Him to
them; So that the sense is: As I am partaking of the chalice of the
passion, so may others drink of it, with unfailing hope, with
unflinching anguish, without fear of death."
Or according to Jerome (on Matt. 26:39): "He says pointedly, 'This
chalice,' that is of the Jewish people, who cannot allege ignorance
as an excuse for putting Me to death, since they have the Law and the
Prophets, who foretold concerning Me."
Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (De Martyr. ad Origen 7):
"When He says 'Remove this chalice from Me,' He does not mean, 'Let
it not come to Me'; for if it come not, it cannot be removed. But, as
that which passes is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the
Saviour beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed."
Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He prayed thus "as
man," being reluctant to die according to His natural will.
Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to Hilary, that He
thus prayed that other martyrs might be imitators of His Passion, or
that He prayed that the fear of drinking His chalice might not
trouble Him, or that death might not withhold Him, His prayer was
entirely fulfilled. But if we understand that He prayed that He might
not drink the chalice of His passion and death; or that He might not
drink it at the hands of the Jews; what He besought was not indeed
fulfilled, because His reason which formed the petition did not
desire its fulfilment, but for our instruction, it was His will to
make known to us His natural will, and the movement of His
sensuality, which was His as man.
Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord did not pray for all those who crucified Him,
as neither did He for all those who would believe in Him; but for
those only who were predestinated to obtain eternal life through Him.
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also manifest.
Reply Obj. 4: When He says: "I shall cry and Thou wilt not hear," we
must take this as referring to the desire of sensuality, which
shunned death. But He is heard as to the desire of His reason, as
stated above.
_______________________
QUESTION 22
OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST
(In Six Articles)
We have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?
(2) Of the victim offered by this priest;
(3) Of the effect of this priesthood;
(4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to Himself, or only
to others?
(5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood;
(6) Whether He should be called "a priest according to the order of
Melchisedech"?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Fitting That Christ Should Be a Priest?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be a priest.
For a priest is less than an angel; whence it is written (Zech. 3:1):
"The Lord showed me the high-priest standing before the angel of the
Lord." But Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. 1:4:
"Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath inherited a
more excellent name than they." Therefore it is unfitting that Christ
should be a priest.
Obj. 2: Further, things which were in the Old Testament were figures
of Christ, according to Col. 2:17: "Which are a shadow of things to
come, but the body is Christ's." But Christ was not descended from
the priests of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:14): "It is
evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, in which tribe Moses spoke
nothing concerning priests." Therefore it is not fitting that Christ
should be a priest.
Obj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, which is a figure of Christ, the
lawgivers and the priests were distinct: wherefore the Lord said
to Moses the lawgiver (Ex. 28:1): "Take unto thee Aaron, thy
brother . . . that he [Vulg.: 'they'] may minister to Me in the
priest's office." But Christ is the giver of the New Law, according
to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My law in their bowels." Therefore it
is unfitting that Christ should be a priest.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 4:14): "We have [Vulg.:
'Having'] therefore a great high-priest that hath passed into the
heavens, Jesus, the Son of God."
_I answer that,_ The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator
between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine
things on the people, wherefore _sacerdos_ (priest) means a giver of
sacred things (_sacra dans_), according to Malachi 2:7: "They shall
seek the law at his," i.e. the priest's, "mouth"; and again,
forasmuch as he offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a
manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the
Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men is
ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may
offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Now this is most befitting
to Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2
Pet. 1:4: "By Whom" (i.e. Christ) "He hath given us most great and
precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the
Divine Nature." Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God,
according to Col. 1:19, 20: "In Him" (i.e. Christ) "it hath well
pleased (the Father) that all fulness should dwell, and through Him
to reconcile all things unto Himself." Therefore it is most fitting
that Christ should be a priest.
Reply Obj. 1: Hierarchical power appertains to the angels, inasmuch
as they also are between God and man, as Dionysius explains (Coel.
Hier. ix), so that the priest himself, as being between God and man,
is called an angel, according to Malachi 2:7: "He is the angel of the
Lord of hosts." Now Christ was greater than the angels, not only in
His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the fulness of grace
and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly power
in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were
ministers of His priesthood, according to Matt. 4:11: "Angels came
and ministered unto Him." But, in regard to His passibility, He "was
made a little lower than the angels," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:9):
and thus He was conformed to those wayfarers who are ordained to the
priesthood.
Reply Obj. 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "What
is like in every particular must be, of course, identical, and not a
copy." Since, therefore, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of
the priesthood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock of
the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that His
priesthood is not quite the same as theirs, but differs therefrom as
truth from figure.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 7, A. 7, ad 1), other
men have certain graces distributed among them: but Christ, as being
the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces. Wherefore, as to
others, one is a lawgiver, another is a priest, another is a king; but
all these concur in Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is
written (Isa. 33:22): "The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our
law-giver, the Lord is our King: He will" come and "save us."
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Was Himself Both Priest and Victim?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ Himself was not both priest
and victim. For it is the duty of the priest to slay the victim. But
Christ did not kill Himself. Therefore He was not both priest and
victim.
Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ has a greater similarity to
the Jewish priesthood, instituted by God, than to the priesthood of
the Gentiles, by which the demons were worshiped. Now in the old Law
man was never offered up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much to
be reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, according to Ps.
105:38: "They shed innocent blood; the blood of their sons and of
their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan."
Therefore in Christ's priesthood the Man Christ should not have been
the victim.
Obj. 3: Further, every victim, through being offered to God, is
consecrated to God. But the humanity of Christ was from the beginning
consecrated and united to God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly
that Christ as man was a victim.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): "Christ hath loved
us, and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a victim
[Douay: 'sacrifice'] to God for an odor of sweetness."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "Every visible
sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible
sacrifice." Now the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers
his spirit to God, according to Ps. 50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit." Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to
raise man's spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice.
Now man is required to offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for
the remission of sin, by which he is turned away from God. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 5:1) that it appertains to the priest "to offer
gifts and sacrifices for sins." Secondly, that man may be preserved
in a state of grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and
salvation consist. Wherefore under the old Law the sacrifice of
peace-offerings was offered up for the salvation of the offerers, as
is prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. Thirdly, in order
that the spirit of man be perfectly united to God: which will be most
perfectly realized in glory. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust
was offered, so called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we
read in the first chapter of Leviticus.
Now these effects were conferred on us by the humanity of Christ.
For, in the first place, our sins were blotted out, according to Rom.
4:25: "Who was delivered up for our sins." Secondly, through Him we
received the grace of salvation, according to Heb. 5:9: "He became to
all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." Thirdly, through
Him we have acquired the perfection of glory, according to Heb.
10:19: "We have [Vulg.: 'Having'] a confidence in the entering into
the Holies" (i.e. the heavenly glory) "through His Blood." Therefore
Christ Himself, as man, was not only priest, but also a perfect
victim, being at the same time victim for sin, victim for a
peace-offering, and a holocaust.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ did not slay Himself, but of His own free-will
He exposed Himself to death, according to Isa. 53:7: "He was offered
because it was His own will." Thus He is said to have offered Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to a
twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this
respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not
accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great
crime: a similitude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of
the Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Secondly, the
slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the
Sufferer, Who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He
is a victim, and in this He differs from the sacrifices of the
Gentiles.
(The reply to the third objection is wanting in the original
manuscripts, but it may be gathered from the above.--Ed.)
[*Some editions, however, give the following reply:
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that Christ's manhood was holy from its
beginning does not prevent that same manhood, when it was offered to
God in the Passion, being sanctified in a new way--namely, as a
victim actually offered then. For it acquired then the actual
holiness of a victim, from the charity which it had from the
beginning, and from the grace of union sanctifying it absolutely.]
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 3]
Whether the Effect of Christ's Priesthood Is the Expiation of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of Christ's priesthood is
not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to God alone to blot out
sins, according to Isa. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities
for My own sake." But Christ is priest, not as God, but as man.
Therefore the priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1-3) that the victims of
the Old Testament could not "make" (the comers thereunto) "perfect:
for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshipers
once cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; but in
them there is made a commemoration of sins every year." But in like
manner under the priesthood of Christ a commemoration of sins is made
in the words: "Forgive us our trespasses" (Matt. 6:12). Moreover, the
Sacrifice is offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we
say: "Give us this day our daily bread." Therefore sins are not
expiated by the priesthood of Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Law, a he-goat was
mostly offered for the sin of a prince, a she-goat for the sin of
some private individual, a calf for the sin of a priest, as we gather
from Lev. 4:3, 23, 28. But Christ is compared to none of these, but
to the lamb, according to Jer. 11:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is
carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that His priesthood does
not expiate sins.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 9:14): "The blood of
Christ, Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God,
shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living
God." But dead works denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ
has the power to cleanse from sins.
_I answer that,_ Two things are required for the perfect cleansing
from sins, corresponding to the two things comprised in sin--namely,
the stain of sin and the debt of punishment. The stain of sin is,
indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner's heart is turned
to God: whereas the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the
satisfaction that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ
produces both these effects. For by its virtue grace is given to us,
by which our hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. 3:24, 25:
"Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is
in Christ Jesus, Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through
faith in His blood." Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as
"He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows" (Isa. 53:4).
Wherefore it is clear that the priesthood of Christ has full power to
expiate sins.
Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man,
yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore in the
Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. i, anath. 10] we read: "If anyone
say that the very Word of God did not become our High-Priest and
Apostle, when He became flesh and a man like us, but altogether
another one, the man born of a woman, let him be anathema." Hence in
so far as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that
sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. For this
reason Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 14): "So that, since four things
are to be observed in every sacrifice--to whom it is offered, by whom
it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered; the same one
true Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was
one with Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom
He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself, and was Himself
that which He offered."
Reply Obj. 2: Sins are commemorated in the New Law, not on account of
the inefficacy of the priesthood of Christ, as though sins were not
sufficiently expiated by Him: but in regard to those who either are
not willing to be participators in His sacrifice, such as
unbelievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or who,
after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it by whatsoever
kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church
is not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a
commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. De. x, 20):
"Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the
sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the
Church."
Reply Obj. 3: As Origen says (Sup. Joan. i, 29), though various
animals were offered up under the Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice,
which was offered up morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from
Num. 38:3, 4. By which it was signified that the offering up of the
true lamb, i.e. Christ, was the culminating sacrifice of all. Hence
(John 1:29) it is said: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who
taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 4]
Whether the Effect of the Priesthood of Christ Pertained Not Only to
Others, but Also to Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of the priesthood of
Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself. For it
belongs to the priest's office to pray for the people, according to 2
Macc. 1:23: "The priests made prayer while the sacrifice was
consuming." Now Christ prayed not only for others, but also for
Himself, as we have said above (Q. 21, A. 3), and as expressly stated
(Heb. 5:7): "In the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears He
offered [Vulg.: 'offering'] up prayers and supplications to Him that
was able to save Him from death." Therefore the priesthood of Christ
had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, in His passion Christ offered Himself as a
sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, not only for others, but
also for Himself, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4). Therefore the
priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in
Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the
priesthood of Christ. But the priest of the Old Law offered sacrifice
not only for others, but also for himself: for it is written (Lev.
16:17) that "the high-priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for
himself and his house, and for the whole congregation of Israel."
Therefore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely in
others, but also in Himself.
_On the contrary,_ We read in the acts of the Council of Ephesus
[*Part III, ch. i, anath. 10]: "If anyone say that Christ offered
sacrifice for Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew
not sin needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema." But the priest's
office consists principally in offering sacrifice. Therefore the
priesthood of Christ had no effect in Himself.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a priest is set between God
and man. Now he needs someone between himself and God, who of himself
cannot approach to God; and such a one is subject to the priesthood
by sharing in the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of Christ;
for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:25): "Coming of Himself to God, always
living to make intercession for us [Vulg.: 'He is able to save for
ever them that come to God by Him; always living,' etc.]." And
therefore it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the
effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others. For
the influence of the first agent in every genus is such that it
receives nothing in that genus: thus the sun gives but does not
receive light; fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ is
the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old
Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His
person, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For what I have pardoned, if I
have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person
of Christ." Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should receive
the effect of His priesthood.
Reply Obj. 1: Although prayer is befitting to priests, it is not
their proper office, for it is befitting to everyone to pray both for
himself and for others, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one
another that you may be saved." And so we may say that the prayer by
which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His priesthood.
But this answer seems to be precluded by the Apostle, who, after
saying (Heb. 5:6), "Thou art a priest for ever according to the order
of Melchisedech," adds, "Who in the days of His flesh offering up
payers," etc., as quoted above (Obj. 1): so that it seems that the
prayer which Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. We must
therefore say that other priests partake in the effect of their
priesthood, not as priests, but as sinners, as we shall state farther
on (ad 3). But Christ had, simply speaking, no sin; though He had the
"likeness of sin in the flesh [Vulg.: 'sinful flesh']," as is
written Rom. 8:3. And, consequently, we must not say simply that He
partook of the effect of His priesthood but with this qualification--
in regard to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds
pointedly, "that was able to save Him from death."
Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in the offering of a
sacrifice by any priest--namely, the sacrifice itself which is
offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of
priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But
Christ obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the
sacrifice, which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very
devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the passion.
Reply Obj. 3: A figure cannot equal the reality, wherefore the
figural priest of the Old Law could not attain to such perfection as
not to need a sacrifice of satisfaction. But Christ did not stand in
need of this. Consequently, there is no comparison between the two;
and this is what the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28): "The Law maketh men
priests, who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was
since the Law, the Son Who is perfected for evermore."
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 5]
Whether the Priesthood of Christ Endures for Ever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priesthood of Christ does not
endure for ever. For as stated above (A. 4, ad 1, 3) those alone need
the effect of the priesthood who have the weakness of sin, which can
be expiated by the priest's sacrifice. But this will not be for ever.
For in the Saints there will be no weakness, according to Isa. 60:21:
"Thy people shall be all just": while no expiation will be possible
for the weakness of sin, since "there is no redemption in hell"
(Office of the Dead, Resp. vii). Therefore the priesthood of Christ
endures not for ever.
Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most of
all in His passion and death, when "by His own blood He entered into
the Holies" (Heb. 9:12). But the passion and death of Christ will not
endure for ever, as stated Rom. 6:9: "Christ rising again from the
dead, dieth now no more." Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not
endure for ever.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But at
one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay
dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for
ever."
_I answer that,_ In the priestly office, we may consider two things:
first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of
the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice
is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the
sacrifice which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in
eternal good, which we obtain through His death, according to Heb.
9:11: "Christ is [Vulg.: 'being come'] a high-priest of the good
things to come"; for which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to
be eternal. Now this consummation of Christ's sacrifice was
foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a
year, entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood of a he-goat and
a calf, as laid down, Lev. 16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat
and calf not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like manner
Christ entered into the Holy of Holies--that is, into heaven--and
prepared the way for us, that we might enter by the virtue of His
blood, which He shed for us on earth.
Reply Obj. 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any
further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated,
they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their
glory depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath
enlightened it"--that is, the city of the Saints--"and the Lamb is
the lamp thereof."
Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ's passion and death are not to be
repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it
is written (Heb. 10:14), "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever
them that are sanctified."
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.
As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in
that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the
Holies, with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But
the figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not
an everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed
every year.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 22, Art. 6]
Whether the Priesthood of Christ Was According to the Order of
Melchisedech?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's priesthood was not according
to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the
entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is
principal is not secondary in regard to others, but others are
secondary in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a
priest according to the order of Melchisedech.
Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to
Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the
Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly
they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the Second
Part (II-II, Q. 2, A. 7). Therefore the priesthood of Christ should
be denominated after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the
order of Melchisedech, which was before the Law.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2, 3): "That is 'king of
peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having
neither beginning of days nor ending of life": which can be referred
only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a
priest according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else,
but according to His own order.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for
ever according to the order of Melchisedech."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 3) the priesthood of the
Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately
representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both
because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because
it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence
of Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in
whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the
priesthood of Christ is said to be "according to the order of
Melchisedech," on account of the excellence of the true priesthood
over the figural priesthood of the Law.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of
Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest,
but because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the
Levitical priesthood.
Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in Christ's priesthood:
namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking thereof. As
to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly
foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shedding
of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which there was
no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of this
sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ's
priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists, then
the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of
Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as Augustine
says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) ecclesiastical unity, which is
established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ [*Cf. Q.
79, A. 1]. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ
is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.
Reply Obj. 3: Melchisedech is described as "without father, without
mother, without genealogy," and as "having neither beginning of days
nor ending of life," not as though he had not these things, but
because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy
Scripture. And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same
passage, he is "likened unto the Son of God," Who had no earthly
father, no heavenly mother, and no genealogy, according to Isa. 53:8:
"Who shall declare His generation?" and Who in His Godhead has
neither beginning nor end of days.
_______________________
QUESTION 23
OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST
(In Four Articles)
We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
(2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone?
(3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God?
(4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 23, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Fitting That God Should Adopt Sons?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should
adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger
as his son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the
Creator of all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.
Obj. 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default of
natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in
the First Part (Q. 27, A. 2). Therefore it is unfitting that God
should adopt.
Obj. 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may
succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem
possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die.
Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 1:5) that "He hath
predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God." But the
predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt
some as His sons.
_I answer that,_ A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of
goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely
good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of
good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are
made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this
consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy
and rich in Himself--that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a
man's inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch
as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude,
He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption,
forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts
worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make
him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one
who is already worthy.
Reply Obj. 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in
respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as
to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.
Reply Obj. 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so God, Who
works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His
perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness
is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the
work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to
men, according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made
conformable to the image of His Son."
Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the same
time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material
inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all
receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety
without detriment to the ever-living Father.
Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us
by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on
Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also."
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 23, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Fitting That the Whole Trinity Should Adopt?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should
adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But
among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be
applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can
adopt.
Obj. 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:29: "That He might be the first-born among many
brethren." Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore
our Lord says (John 20:17): "I ascend to My Father and to your
Father." Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4, 5, 6): "God sent His
Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because
you are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your
hearts, crying: 'Abba' (Father)." Therefore it belongs to Him to
adopt, Who has the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the
Father alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.
_On the contrary,_ It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can
call Father; whence it is written (Rom. 8:15): "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' (Father)." But
when we say to God, "Our Father," we address the whole Trinity: as is
the case with the other names which are said of God in respect of
creatures, as stated in the First Part (Q. 33, A. 3, Obj. 1; cf. Q.
45, A. 6). Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole Trinity.
_I answer that,_ There is this difference between an adopted son of
God and the natural Son of God, that the latter is "begotten not
made"; whereas the former is made, according to John 1:12: "He gave
them power to be made the sons of God." Yet sometimes the adopted son
is said to be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which
is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): "Of
His own will hath He begotten us by the word of truth." Now although,
in God, to beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce
any effect in creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of
the oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there
must needs be one power and one operation: whence our Lord says (John
5:19): "What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth
in like manner." Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt
men as sons of God.
Reply Obj. 1: All human individuals are not of one individual nature,
so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all, as is
the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is
possible.
Reply Obj. 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as
having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in
one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says,
separately, "My Father," and "Your Father" (John 20:17). For He is
Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him:
whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to
Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of
the whole Trinity, as we are.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), adoptive sonship is a
certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place
in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man
is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light
of grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption,
though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as
its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as
imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 23, Art. 3]
Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Be Adopted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational
nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the
rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father
even of the irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is
father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?" Therefore it is
not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Obj. 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God.
But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the
Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day
when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord." Therefore it is
not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all that
have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be
adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not
proper to human nature.
_On the contrary,_ Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated
Rom. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational
nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), the sonship of
adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God
proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in
oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something
may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not
on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already
built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form,
but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is
not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way
every creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through
the Word. Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as
to its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge
which is begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in
the mind of the master. In this way the rational creature, even in
its nature, is likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is
likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the
Father, which is by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord
prays (John 17:21, 22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also
are one." And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who
are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore
clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not
indeed to all, but only to those who have charity; which is "poured
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason
(Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons."
Reply Obj. 1: God is called the Father of the irrational creature,
not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason of
creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of likeness.
Reply Obj. 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not
that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to
receive the adoption of sons.
Reply Obj. 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but
from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 23, Art. 4]
Whether Christ As Man Is the Adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity
of power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'--'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted."
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by the
same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian." But other men are Christians by the grace of
adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently
He would seem to be an adopted son.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater
dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much
more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son." But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 John 5:20: "That
we may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ." Therefore Christ, as
Man, is not an adopted Son.
_I answer that,_ Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or
person, not to the nature; whence in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3) we
have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ
there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it
belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (A. 1, ad
2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of
natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it
has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can
nowise be called an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or
two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the
adopted Son of God.
Reply Obj. 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so
neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that "carnal
humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is
used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son.
Reply Obj. 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the
principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son;
whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual
grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted
son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ,
according to John 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the
Only-begotten of the Father; full of grace and truth."
Reply Obj. 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject
to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this
cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
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QUESTION 24
OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST
(In Four Articles)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 24, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Befitting That Christ Should Be Predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be
the adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated
us unto the adoption of children." But it is not befitting to Christ
to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Obj. 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false--"The human nature is Son of God." In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by
grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of
grace, as stated in the First Part, Q. 23, AA. 2, 5. Therefore Christ
was not predestinated to be the Son of God.
Obj. 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so
also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son
of God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God."
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God."
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4):
"Who was predestinated the Son of God in power."
_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said in the First
Part (Q. 23, AA. 1, 2), predestination, in its proper sense, is a
certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are
to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and
that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace
of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity
pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something
would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that
the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the
eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ
was predestinated.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by
which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply Obj. 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. xv]
says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the
nature and not to the Person--that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a
person's nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because
to be predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which
belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly,
for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to
human nature; for this proposition is false: "The human nature is the
Son of God": unless one were to force from it such an exposition as:
"Who was predestinated the Son of God in power"--that is, "It was
predestinated that the Human nature should be united to the Son of
God in the Person."
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to
be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him,
considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him
according to the grace of union.
Reply Obj. 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be
the Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so
there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in
the participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of
God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way
of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place
when they are made known; so that the sense would be--"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God." But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly
said to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end
of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our
knowledge thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that
Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that
one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine
says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He
Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power."
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the
subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as
under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely
of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this
is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human
nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in
human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition--"Christ
was predestinated the Son of God"--is truer than this--"Christ was
made the Son of God."
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 24, Art. 2]
Whether This Proposition Is False: "Christ As Man Was Predestinated
to Be the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God." For at some time a man
is that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination
does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son
of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Obj. 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to
any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Obj. 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to take
place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God." Therefore
this proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be
man," is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the
Son of God."
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says:
"Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory
was predestinated."
_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in predestination. One
on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed
to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was
not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed on it was it
united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human
nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours
was predestinated to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a
position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher." Now that
is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of
human nature. Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was
predestinated the Son of God."
Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son
of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two ways to
the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes
under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense
would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be the
Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and
gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by
reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is
said to be predestinated as Man.
Reply Obj. 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human
nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing
may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human
nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination
refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Word of
God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner
that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of
Man, because He assumed Man to Himself; and the Son of God, because
it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature."
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God
was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was
predestinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was not
bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human
nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper
to say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God,"
than that, "Christ, as Son of God, was predestinated to be Man."
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 24, Art. 3]
Whether Christ's Predestination Is the Exemplar of Ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our
predestination is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is
not the exemplar of ours.
Obj. 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the exemplate.
But there was no need for God to be led from something else to
knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated." Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Obj. 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas
Christ was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom.
1:4). Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is
the most splendid light of predestination and grace." Now He is
called the light of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our
predestination is made manifest by His predestination and grace; and
this seems to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore
Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours.
_I answer that,_ Predestination may be considered in two ways. First,
on the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's
predestination cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the
same way and by the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to
which anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son
of God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which
is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written
(Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made
conformable to the image of His Son." Secondly, in respect of the
manner of obtaining this good--that is, by grace. This is most
manifest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any
antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of the fulness
of His grace we all have received, as it is written (John 1:16).
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply Obj. 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the exemplar in
all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 24, Art. 4]
Whether Christ's Predestination Is the Cause of Ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not
the cause of ours.
Obj. 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no
other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being
predestinated according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the cause of ours.
Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken
away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not taken
away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation
might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath
predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ."
_I answer that,_ if we consider predestination on the part of the
very act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both
Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its
term, thus Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it
should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination
covers not only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also
the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies Obj. 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply Obj. 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would
have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed the
Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be
the cause of our salvation.
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QUESTION 25
OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST
(In Six Articles)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to
us; and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him;
secondly, we must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one
and the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of _latria?_
(3) Whether the adoration of _latria_ is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether _latria_ is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 1]
Whether Christ's Humanity and Godhead Are to Be Adored with the Same
Adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written
(John 5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father."
But Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Obj. 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature
is distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above (Q. 19, A.
1), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Obj. 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word,
it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence
of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost
nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive
a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is
given to His Godhead.
_On the contrary,_ We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council
[*Second Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone
say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two
distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with
the one and the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed
down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema."
_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in a person to whom honor
is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its
entirety: for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man
himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a
man's hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being
honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honored in
them. In this way a man may be honored even in something external;
for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has
a certain excellence, for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q.
103, A. 1). If therefore in one man there are several causes of
honor, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to
him will be one in respect of the person honored, but several in
respect of the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored,
both on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given
one adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on
the part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there
are several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on
account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His
created knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils.
For it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part
I, ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be
adored besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct
persons; and does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single
adoration, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema."
Reply Obj. 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored, but
only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is the
reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply Obj. 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of honor.
And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not two
adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply Obj. 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word of
God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal
in him [*Cf. _Ethic._ ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a
Person of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to
Whom Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul
hereby diminished, but rather increased, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 2,
ad 2).
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 2]
Whether Christ's Humanity Should Be Adored with the Adoration of _Latria?_
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored
with the adoration of _latria._ For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore
His foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by
the Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes
spiritually of His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed
with the adoration called _latria,_ which is due to the Creator
alone." Now the flesh is part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's
humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of _latria._
Obj. 2: Further, the worship of _latria_ is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25).
But Christ's humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be
adored with the adoration of _latria._
Obj. 3: Further, the adoration of _latria_ is due to God in
recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Deut. 6:13: "Thou
shalt adore [Vulg.: 'fear'; cf. Matt. 4:10] the Lord thy God, and
shalt serve Him only." But Christ as man is less than the Father.
Therefore His humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of
_latria._
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "On account
of the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ
not for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto
in person." And on Ps. 98:5, "Adore His foot-stool," a gloss says:
"He who adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather
Him whose foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool."
But the incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of _latria._
Therefore also His body or His humanity.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) adoration is due to the
subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something
non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is
honored. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood
in two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and
thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the
incarnate Word of God: just as to adore a King's robe is nothing else
than to adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of
Christ's humanity is the adoration of _latria._ Secondly, the
adoration of Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its
being perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the
adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of _latria_ but
of _dulia._ So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with
_latria_ on account of His Divinity, and with _dulia_ on account of
His perfect humanity.
Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of _latria_ is due to God the
Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of _dulia_ on
account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore
on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped," a gloss says:
"Lord of all by power, to Whom _dulia_ is due: God of all by
creation, to Whom _latria_ is due."
Reply Obj. 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the flesh
of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could
happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man.
But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "If by a subtle
distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it
cannot be adored because it is a creature"--that is, with adoration
of _latria._ And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of
God, it should be adored with the adoration of _dulia_; not any kind
of _dulia,_ such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain
higher adoration, which is called _hyperdulia._
Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because
the adoration of _latria_ is not given to Christ's humanity in
respect of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is
united, by reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 3]
Whether the Image of Christ Should Be Adored with the Adoration of
_Latria_?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's image should not be adored
with the adoration of _latria._ For it is written (Ex. 20:4): "Thou
shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of
anything." But no adoration should be given against the commandment
of God. Therefore Christ's image should not be adored with the
adoration of _latria._
Obj. 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works of
the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are
reproached principally for that "they changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible
man," as is written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ's image is not to
be adored with the adoration of _latria._
Obj. 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of _latria_ is due by reason
of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of _latria_ is
not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on the
rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material image
which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.
Obj. 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the Divine
worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1 Cor.
11:23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the
Church, says: "I have received of the Lord that which also I
delivered unto you." But Scripture does not lay down anything
concerning the adoration of images. Therefore Christ's image is not
to be adored with the adoration of _latria._
_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) quotes Basil as
saying: "The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype," i.e.
the exemplar. But the exemplar itself--namely, Christ--is to be
adored with the adoration of _latria_; therefore also His image.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. i),
there is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed
towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the
image in so far as it is the image of something else. And between
these movements there is this difference; that the former, by which
one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from
the movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is
towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is
towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is
shown to Christ's image, as a thing--for instance, carved or painted
wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It
follow therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only
as it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to
Christ's image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is
adored with the adoration of _latria,_ it follows that His image
should be adored with the adoration of _latria._
Reply Obj. 1: This commandment does not forbid the making of any
graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of
adoration, wherefore it is added: "Thou shalt not adore them nor
serve them." And because, as stated above, the movement towards the
image is the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration
thereof is forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose
image it is. Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the
prohibition to adore those images which the Gentiles made for the
purpose of venerating their own gods, i.e. the demons, and so it is
premised: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me." But no
corporeal image could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is
incorporeal; because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16):
"It is the highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what
is Divine." But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can
be adored in His corporeal image.
Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common with
the "unfruitful works" of the Gentiles, but not with their useful
works. Now the adoration of images must be numbered among the
unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles
used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there
was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the
demons used to give in them, and on account of other such like
wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they
were images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in
these images they gave the veneration of _latria._ Whereas we give
the adoration of _latria_ to the image of Christ, Who is true God,
not for the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose
image it is, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its own
sake. Consequently, if the adoration of _latria_ were shown to the
rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion
of error--namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at
the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is.
This cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in
insensible material.
Reply Obj. 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the Holy
Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they
did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance
with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as
time went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:14): "Stand
fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by
word"--that is by word of mouth--"or by our epistle"--that is by word
put into writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ's
image. Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of
Christ, which is in Rome.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 4]
Whether Christ's Cross Should Be Worshipped with the Adoration of
_Latria_?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's cross should not be
worshiped with the adoration of _latria._ For no dutiful son honors
that which dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was
scourged, or the gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor
it. Now Christ underwent the most shameful death on the cross;
according to Wis. 2:20: "Let us condemn Him to a most shameful
death." Therefore we should not venerate the cross but rather we
should abhor it.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's humanity is worshiped with the adoration of
_latria,_ inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But
this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ's cross should not
be worshiped with the adoration of _latria._
Obj. 3: Further, as Christ's cross was the instrument of His passion
and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the nails,
the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of
_latria._ It seems, therefore, that Christ's cross should not be
worshiped with the adoration of _latria._
_On the contrary,_ We show the worship of _latria_ to that in which
we place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ's
cross, for the Church sings:
"Dear Cross, best hope o'er all beside,
That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
Give to the just increase of grace,
Give to each contrite sinner peace."
[*Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O.P.]
Therefore Christ's cross should be worshiped with the adoration of
_latria._
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), honor or reverence is due to
a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honor
or reverence is due save by reason of a rational nature. And this in
two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature:
secondly, inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In
the first way men are wont to venerate the king's image; in the
second way, his robe. And both are venerated by men with the same
veneration as they show to the king.
If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was
crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways--namely, in one
way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended
thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ,
and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it
is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of
_latria._ And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to
it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of
Christ's cross in any other material whatever--for instance, in stone
or wood, silver or gold--thus we venerate the cross merely as
Christ's image, which we worship with the adoration of _latria,_ as
stated above (A. 3).
Reply Obj. 1: If in Christ's cross we consider the point of view and
intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear as His
shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it will
appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over the
enemy, according to Col. 2:14, 15: "He hath taken the same out of the
way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities and
powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing
over them in Himself." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): "The
Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to
them that are saved--that is, to us--it is the power of God."
Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ's cross was not united to the Word of
God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way, viz. by
representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is
shown to it.
Reply Obj. 3: By reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we worship
not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): "The precious wood, as having
been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be
meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred
dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth." Yet
these very things do not represent Christ's image as the cross does,
which is called "the Sign of the Son of Man" that "will appear in
heaven," as it is written (Matt. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to
the women (Mk. 16:6): "You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was
crucified": he said not "pierced," but "crucified." For this reason
we worship the image of Christ's cross in any material, but not the
image of the nails or of any such thing.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 5]
Whether the Mother of God Should Be Worshipped with the Adoration of
_Latria_?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped
with the adoration of _latria._ For it seems that the same honor is
due to the king's mother as to the king: whence it is written (3
Kings 2:19) that "a throne was set for the king's mother, and she sat
on His right hand." Moreover, Augustine [*Sermon on the Assumption,
work of an anonymous author] says: "It is right that the throne of
God, the resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ,
should be there where He is Himself." But Christ is worshiped with
the adoration of _latria._ Therefore His Mother also should be.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "The honor of
the Mother reflects on the Son." But the Son is worshiped with the
adoration of _latria._ Therefore the Mother also.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ's Mother is more akin to Him than the cross.
But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of _latria._ Therefore
also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration.
_On the contrary,_ The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore
the worship of _latria_ is not due to her.
_I answer that,_ Since _latria_ is due to God alone, it is not due to
a creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For
though insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for
their own sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being
venerated for its own sake. Consequently the worship of _latria_ is
not due to any mere rational creature for its own sake. Since,
therefore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the
worship of _latria_ is not due to her, but only that of _dulia_: but
in a higher degree than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the
Mother of God. For this reason we say that not any kind of _dulia_ is
due to her, but _hyperdulia._
Reply Obj. 1: The honor due to the king's mother is not equal
to the honor which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by
reason of a certain excellence on her part. This is what is meant by
the authorities quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: The honor given to the Mother reflects on her
Son, because the Mother is to be honored for her Son's sake. But not
in the same way as honor given to an image reflects on its exemplar:
because the image itself, considered as a thing, is not to be
venerated in any way at all.
Reply Obj. 3: The cross, considered in itself, is not an
object of veneration, as stated above (AA. 4, 5). But the Blessed
Virgin is in herself an object of veneration. Hence there is no
comparison.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 25, Art. 6]
Whether Any Kind of Worship Is Due to the Relics of the Saints?
Objection 1: It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to
be worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the
occasion of error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to
savor of the error of the Gentiles, who gave honor to dead men.
Therefore the relics of the saints are not to be honored.
Obj. 2: Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible. But
the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to
venerate them.
Obj. 3: Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a living
body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it.
Therefore, after a saint's death, it seems that his body should not
be worshiped.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. xl): "We believe
that the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed
martyrs, as being the members of Christ, should be worshiped in all
sincerity": and further on: "If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he
is not accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and
Vigilantius."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a
father's coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more
cherished by his children, as love for one's parents is greater, in
no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more
intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong
to man's very nature." It is clear from this that he who has a
certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after
his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external
things, such as his clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that
we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of
Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors.
Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in
a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and
organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and operating in them, and are
destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the
Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by
working miracles at their presence.
Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words are
quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii) as
follows: "We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext
of religion; they worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of
dust in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen." To him Jerome
replies (Ep. ad Ripar. cix): "We do not adore, I will not say the
relics of the martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the
angels"--that is to say, with the worship of _latria._ "But we honor
the martyrs' relics, so that thereby we give honor to Him Whose
martyrs [*The original meaning of the word 'martyr,' i.e. the Greek
_martys_ is 'a witness'] they are: we honor the servants, that the
honor shown to them may reflect on their Master." Consequently, by
honoring the martyrs' relics we do not fall into the error of the
Gentiles, who gave the worship of _latria_ to dead men.
Reply Obj. 2: We worship that insensible body, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of the soul, which was once united thereto, and now
enjoys God; and for God's sake, whose ministers the saints were.
Reply Obj. 3: The dead body of a saint is not identical with that
which the saint had during life, on account of the difference of
form, viz. the soul: but it is the same by identity of matter, which
is destined to be reunited to its form.
_______________________
QUESTION 26
OF CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN
(In Two Articles)
We have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and
man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?
(2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 26, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Proper to Christ to Be the Mediator of God and Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the
Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be
mediators between God and man, according to Deut. 5:5: "I was the
mediator and stood between God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] and you at that
time." But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet.
Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and bad,
cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and man
is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It
is also fitting to the bad angels--that is, the demons: for they have
something in common with God--namely, _immortality;_ and something
they have in common with men--namely, _passibility of soul_ and
consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei ix, 13, 15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a
Mediator of God and man.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech one
of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy
Ghost, as it is written (Rom. 8:26), "asketh" God "for us with
unspeakable groanings." Therefore the Holy Ghost is a Mediator
between God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 2:5): "There is . . . one
Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus."
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to
join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes
are united in the mean (_medio_). Now to unite men to God
perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to
God, according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "God was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself." And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect
Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the
human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, "Mediator of God
and man, the man Christ Jesus," added: "Who gave Himself a redemption
for all."
However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators,
in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in
uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially.
Reply Obj. 1: The prophets and priests of the Old Law were called
mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially:
inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect
Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may
be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the
ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the
saving sacraments to men.
Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix,
13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. "For
since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality,
and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how
much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than
established between them?" Dionysius, however, says that they do
occupy a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are
established below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfill the
office of mediator, not indeed principally and perfectively, but
ministerially and dispositively: whence (Matt. 4:11) it is said that
"angels came and ministered unto Him"--namely, Christ. As to the
demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with God, and
unhappiness in common with men. "Hence for this purpose does the
immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder men
from passing to a happy immortality," and may allure them to an
unhappy immortality. Whence he is like "an evil mediator, who
separates friends" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xv].
But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with
men. Hence "for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled
the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make
immortal--which He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He
might confer beatitude on those who were deprived of it--for which
reason He never forsook us." Wherefore He is "the good Mediator, Who
reconciles enemies" (De Civ. Dei xv).
Reply Obj. 3: Since the Holy Ghost is in everything equal to
God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men:
but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet
is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above
(Q. 20, A. 1). Hence on Gal. 3:20, "Christ is a Mediator [Vulg.:
'Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one']," the gloss says: "Not
the Father nor the Holy Ghost." The Holy Ghost, however, is said "to
ask for us," because He makes us ask.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 26, Art. 2]
Whether Christ, as Man, Is the Mediator of God and Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator
of God and men. For Augustine says (Contra Felic. x): "One is the
Person of Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance;
lest, the office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son
either of God alone, or merely the Son of a man." But He is the Son
of God and man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man.
Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of
God and man.
Obj. 2: Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with the
Father and the Holy Ghost; so, as man, He has a common nature with
men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the
Father and the Holy Ghost, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for
on 1 Tim. 2:5, "Mediator of God and man," a gloss says: "As the Word,
He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God 'with God,'
and at the same time one God." Therefore neither, as man, can He be
called Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He reconciled
us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which separated us
from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as
God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): "Not because
He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely
immortal and supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He
is Mediator, as man."
_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in a mediator: first,
that he is a mean; secondly, that he unites others. Now it is of the
nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by
communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of
these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God,
He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and
power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Ghost anything
that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others
something belonging to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it
were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him
as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and
from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to
Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both
precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God
for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man.
Reply Obj. 1: If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we
consequently take from Him the singular fulness of grace, which
belongs to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written
(John 1:14). From which fulness it resulted that He was established
over all men, and approached nearer to God.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the Father.
But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as man,
He can be Mediator, but not as God.
Reply Obj. 3: Although it belongs to Christ as God to take away sin
authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him, as man, to satisfy for the
sin of the human race. And in this sense He is called the Mediator of
God and men.
_______________________
ST. THOMAS AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION (EDITORIAL NOTE)
The privilege of the Virgin-Mother of God and the supreme prerogative
of her Son may be seen from the following diagram:
THE LAW AND COURSE OF ORIGINAL SIN.
[The following content was presented in the form of a three-column
table in the original.]
[COLUMN 1] UNDER THE LAW.
All descendants from Adam.
Spring from Adam materially and seminally.
The body lies (not under the guilt, but) under the effects of
original sin.
The stricken body dispositively causes the soul to contract the guilt
of original sin.
The soul at the moment of union with the body contracts the stain.
All contract both debt and stain.
All need a Redeemer to destroy the stain contracted.
[COLUMN 2] PARTIALLY EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; PRIVILEGE OF IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION.
Spring from Adam materially and seminally.
The body lies (not under the guilt, but) under the effects of
original sin.
The stricken body would have dispositively caused the soul to
contract the guilt of original sin.
The soul at the moment of union with the body was prevented by the
infusion of grace from contracting the stain.
Mary contracted the debt, but not the stain.
Mary needed a Redeemer to prevent her from contracting the stain.
[COLUMN 3] WHOLLY EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION.
Springs from Adam materially, not seminally. (Q. 31, A. 1)
His body lay under neither guilt nor effects of original sin.
The body being entirely free, could not transmit the stain to His
soul.
No preventive grace needed.
Jesus Christ contracted neither debt nor stain.
Jesus Christ is not redeemed, but the Redeemer.
It will thus be seen how accurately St. Thomas speaks of the "flesh"
or body of our Blessed Lady. For it should be remembered that,
according to St. Thomas, the human body is animated in succession by
(1) a vegetative, (2) a sensitive, and (3) a rational soul. Hence his
assertion that "the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in
original sin" (Q. 14, A. 3, ad 1) means that the body of the Blessed
Virgin, being descended from Adam both materially and seminally,
contracted the bodily defects which are conveyed by seminal
generation, and are the results of the privation of original justice
(Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3). Before animation, therefore the body of the
Blessed Virgin would not be infected with the guilt of original sin,
because privation of grace can only be in that which is the subject
of grace, viz. the rational soul. Nevertheless, before animation the
body of the Blessed Virgin, being seminally descended from Adam, was
such that it would have been the means of transmitting the taint of
original sin to the rational soul at the very first instant of
animation, unless the grace of the Redeemer intervened and sanctified
her soul "in that self-same instant," thus redeeming her and
preventing her from contracting the guilt of original sin.
Why, then, does St. Thomas say that because the Blessed Virgin was
not sanctified before animation, therefore she could be sanctified
only after animation?
Such a conclusion would hold if it were a question of the order of
Nature: "a thing must be before it is such (_prius est esse quam esse
tale_)"; and therefore the soul must be, before it is sanctified. But
if St. Thomas held for a posteriority of time, no matter how short,
we ask how it was that he did not perceive the fallacy of the
argument, since it might be neither before nor after, but in the very
instant of, animation.
The question is answered thus: St. Thomas as a Doctor of the Church
and in matters which were not then _de fide,_ is a witness to the
expression of the faith of his time. Hence his line of argument
coincides with, because it follows, that of St. Bernard, Peter
Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure. It was
not likely that St. Thomas would differ from the great masters of his
time, who failed to understand that the grace of redemption might at
the same time be one of preservation and prevention. Nor is it likely
that St. Thomas had any reliable information about the movement* in
progress at that time towards a belief in the Immaculate Conception.
[*Principally in England, where, owing to the influence of St. Anselm
(1109), the doctrine was maintained by Eadmer (1137). Nicolas of St.
Albans (1175), Osbert of Clare (1170), Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of
Lincoln (1253), William of Ware (1300), who was the master of Duns
Scotus (1308)]. No doubt he knew something of it, but the names of its
promoters would have weighed little with him as against those of
Bernard, Albert, Peter, Alexander, and Bonaventure. And it must not be
forgotten that among those who upheld the doctrine of the Immaculate
Conception, not a few ascribed the privilege as being absolute and not
one of preservation and Redemption. Hence it is that St. Thomas
insists on two things: (1) that the Mother of God was redeemed, and
(2) that the grace of her sanctification was a grace of preservation.
And, be it remarked in conclusion, these two points, so much insisted
on by St. Thomas, are at the very basis of the Catholic doctrine of
the Immaculate Conception.
_______________________
QUESTION 27
OF THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN
(In Six Articles)
After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the
consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the
Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to
Him. This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider:
(1) Those things that relate to His coming into the world; (2) Those
things that relate to the course of His life in this world; (3) His
departure from this world; (4) Those things that concern His
exaltation after this life.
The first of these offers four points of consideration: (1) The
Conception of Christ; (2) His Birth; (3) His Circumcision; (4) His
Baptism. Concerning His Conception there are some points to be
considered: (1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; (2) as to the
mode of His Conception; (3) as to the perfection of the offspring
conceived.
On the part of the Mother four points offer themselves to our
consideration: (1) Her sanctification. (2) her virginity; (3) her
espousals; (4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, was sanctified before
her birth from the womb?
(2) Whether she was sanctified before animation?
(3) Whether in virtue of this sanctification the fomes of sin was
entirely taken away from her?
(4) Whether the result of this sanctification was that she never
sinned?
(5) Whether in virtue of this sanctification she received the fulness
of grace?
(6) Whether it was proper to her to be thus sanctified?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 1]
Whether the Blessed Virgin Was Sanctified Before Her Birth from the
Womb?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified
before her birth from the womb. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46):
"That was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural;
afterwards that which is spiritual." But by sanctifying grace man is
born spiritually into a son of God according to John 1:13: "(who) are
born of God." But birth from the womb is a natural birth. Therefore
the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): "The
sanctification, by which we become temples of God, is only of those
who are born again." But no one is born again, who was not born
previously. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before
her birth from the womb.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever is sanctified by grace is cleansed from sin,
both original and actual. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was
sanctified before her birth from the womb, it follows that she was
then cleansed from original sin. Now nothing but original sin could
hinder her from entering the heavenly kingdom. If therefore she had
died then, it seems that she would have entered the gates of heaven.
But this was not possible before the Passion of Christ, according to
the Apostle (Heb. 10:19): "We have [Vulg.: 'having'] therefore a
confidence in the entering into the Holies by His blood." It seems
therefore that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth
from the womb.
Obj. 4: Further, original sin is contracted through the origin, just
as actual sin is contracted through an act. But as long as one is in
the act of sinning, one cannot be cleansed from actual sin. Therefore
neither could the Blessed Virgin be cleansed from original sin as
long as she was in the act of origin, by existence in her mother's
womb.
_On the contrary,_ The Church celebrates the feast of our Lady's
Nativity. Now the Church does not celebrate feasts except of those
who are holy. Therefore even in her birth the Blessed Virgin was
holy. Therefore she was sanctified in the womb.
_I answer that,_ Nothing is handed down in the canonical Scriptures
concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Mary as to her being
sanctified in the womb; indeed, they do not even mention her birth.
But as Augustine, in his tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin,
argues with reason, since her body was assumed into heaven, and yet
Scripture does not relate this; so it may be reasonably argued that
she was sanctified in the womb. For it is reasonable to believe that
she, who brought forth "the Only-Begotten of the Father full of grace
and truth," received greater privileges of grace than all others:
hence we read (Luke 1:28) that the angel addressed her in the words:
"Hail full of grace!"
Moreover, it is to be observed that it was granted, by way of
privilege, to others, to be sanctified in the womb; for instance, to
Jeremias, to whom it was said (Jer. 1:5): "Before thou camest forth
out of the womb, I sanctified thee"; and again, to John the Baptist,
of whom it is written (Luke 1:15): "He shall be filled with the Holy
Ghost even from his mother's womb." It is therefore with reason that
we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been sanctified before her
birth from the womb.
Reply Obj. 1: Even in the Blessed Virgin, first was that which is
natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual: for she was first
conceived in the flesh, and afterwards sanctified in the spirit.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks according to the common law, by reason
of which no one is regenerated by the sacraments, save those who are
previously born. But God did not so limit His power to the law of the
sacraments, but that He can bestow His grace, by special privilege,
on some before they are born from the womb.
Reply Obj. 3: The Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb from
original sin, as to the personal stain; but she was not freed from
the guilt to which the whole nature is subject, so as to enter into
Paradise otherwise than through the Sacrifice of Christ; the same
also is to be said of the Holy Fathers who lived before Christ.
Reply Obj. 4: Original sin is transmitted through the origin,
inasmuch as through the origin the human nature is transmitted, and
original sin, properly speaking, affects the nature. And this takes
place when the offspring conceived is animated. Wherefore nothing
hinders the offspring conceived from being sanctified after
animation: for after this it remains in the mother's womb not for the
purpose of receiving human nature, but for a certain perfecting of
that which it has already received.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 2]
Whether the Blessed Virgin Was Sanctified Before Animation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified
before animation. Because, as we have stated (A. 1), more grace was
bestowed on the Virgin Mother of God than on any saint. Now it seems
to have been granted to some, to be sanctified before animation. For
it is written (Jer. 1:5): "Before I formed thee in the bowels of thy
mother, I knew thee": and the soul is not infused before the
formation of the body. Likewise Ambrose says of John the Baptist
(Comment. in Luc. i, 15): "As yet the spirit of life was not in him
and already he possessed the Spirit of grace." Much more therefore
could the Blessed Virgin be sanctified before animation.
Obj. 2: Further, as Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. xviii), "it was
fitting that this Virgin should shine with such a purity that under
God none greater can be imagined": wherefore it is written (Canticles
4:7): "Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in
thee." But the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater,
if she had never been stained by the contagion of original sin.
Therefore it was granted to her to be sanctified before her flesh was
animated.
Obj. 3: Further, as it has been stated above, no feast is celebrated
except of some saint. But some keep the feast of the Conception of
the Blessed Virgin. Therefore it seems that in her very Conception
she was holy; and hence that she was sanctified before animation.
Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy,
so are the branches." Now the root of the children is their parents.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin could be sanctified even in her parents,
before animation.
_On the contrary,_ The things of the Old Testament were figures of
the New, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All things happened to them in
figure." Now the sanctification of the tabernacle, of which it is
written (Ps. 45:5): "The most High hath sanctified His own
tabernacle," seems to signify the sanctification of the Mother of
God, who is called "God's Tabernacle," according to Ps. 18:6: "He
hath set His tabernacle in the sun." But of the tabernacle it is
written (Ex. 40:31, 32): "After all things were perfected, the cloud
covered the tabernacle of the testimony, and the glory of the Lord
filled it." Therefore also the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified
until after all in her was perfected, viz. her body and soul.
_I answer that,_ The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be
understood as having taken place before animation, for two reasons.
First, because the sanctification of which we are speaking, is
nothing but the cleansing from original sin: for sanctification is a
"perfect cleansing," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii). Now sin
cannot be taken away except by grace, the subject of which is the
rational creature alone. Therefore before the infusion of the
rational soul, the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified.
Secondly, because, since the rational creature alone can be the
subject of sin; before the infusion of the rational soul, the
offspring conceived is not liable to sin. And thus, in whatever
manner the Blessed Virgin would have been sanctified before
animation, she could never have incurred the stain of original sin:
and thus she would not have needed redemption and salvation which is
by Christ, of whom it is written (Matt. 1:21): "He shall save His
people from their sins." But this is unfitting, through implying that
Christ is not the "Saviour of all men," as He is called (1 Tim.
4:10). It remains, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified
after animation.
Reply Obj. 1: The Lord says that He "knew" Jeremias before he was
formed in the womb, by knowledge, that is to say, of predestination:
but He says that He "sanctified" him, not before formation, but
before he "came forth out of the womb," etc.
As to what Ambrose says, viz. that in John the Baptist there was not
the spirit of life when there was already the Spirit of grace, by
spirit of life we are not to understand the life-giving soul, but the
air which we breathe out (_respiratus_). Or it may be said that in
him as yet there was not the spirit of life, that is the soul, as to
its manifest and complete operations.
Reply Obj. 2: If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred
the stain of original sin, this would be derogatory to the dignity of
Christ, by reason of His being the universal Saviour of all.
Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Saviour of all,
needed not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the
highest place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way
whatever, but was holy in His very Conception, according to Luke
1:35: "The Holy which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son
of God." But the Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but
was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb. This is what
is signified (Job 3:9) where it is written of the night of original
sin: "Let it expect light," i.e. Christ, "and not see it"--(because
"no defiled thing cometh into her," as is written Wis. 7:25), "nor
the rising of the dawning of the day," that is of the Blessed Virgin,
who in her birth was immune from original sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the Church of Rome does not celebrate the
Conception of the Blessed Virgin, yet it tolerates the custom of
certain churches that do keep that feast, wherefore this is not to be
entirely reprobated. Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does
not give us to understand that she was holy in her conception. But
since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of her
Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, is kept on
the day of her conception.
Reply Obj. 4: Sanctification is twofold. One is that of the whole
nature: inasmuch as the whole human nature is freed from all
corruption of sin and punishment. This will take place at the
resurrection. The other is personal sanctification. This is not
transmitted to the children begotten of the flesh: because it does
not regard the flesh but the mind. Consequently, though the parents
of the Blessed Virgin were cleansed from original sin, nevertheless
she contracted original sin, since she was conceived by way of
fleshly concupiscence and the intercourse of man and woman: for
Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "All flesh born of carnal
intercourse is sinful."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 3]
Whether the Blessed Virgin Was Cleansed from the Infection of the
Fomes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not cleansed
from the infection of the fomes. For just as the fomes, consisting in
the rebellion of the lower powers against the reason, is a punishment
of original sin; so also are death and other corporeal penalties.
Therefore the fomes was not entirely removed from her.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 12:9): "Power is made perfect
in infirmity," which refers to the weakness of the fomes, by reason
of which he (the Apostle) felt the "sting of the flesh." But it was
not fitting that anything should be taken away from the Blessed
Virgin, pertaining to the perfection of virtue. Therefore it was
unfitting that the fomes should be entirely taken away from her.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the Holy
Ghost came upon" the Blessed Virgin, "purifying her," before she
conceived the Son of God. But this can only be understood of
purification from the fomes: for she committed no sin, as Augustine
says (De Nat. et Grat. xxvi). Therefore by the sanctification in the
womb she was not absolutely cleansed from the fomes.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Canticles 4:7): "Thou art all fair,
O my love, and there is not a spot in thee!" But the fomes implies a
blemish, at any rate in the flesh. Therefore the fomes was not in the
Blessed Virgin.
_I answer that,_ on this point there are various opinions. For some
have held that the fomes was entirely taken away in that
sanctification whereby the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb.
Others say that it remained as far as it causes a difficulty in doing
good, but was taken away as far as it causes a proneness to evil.
Others again, that it was taken away as to the personal corruption,
by which it makes us quick to do evil and slow to do good: but that
it remained as to the corruption of nature, inasmuch as it is the
cause of transmitting original sin to the offspring. Lastly, others
say that, in her first sanctification, the fomes remained
essentially, but was fettered; and that, when she conceived the Son
of God, it was entirely taken away. In order to understand the
question at issue, it must be observed that the fomes is nothing but
a certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive
appetite, for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion. Now sensual
concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it rebels
against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or hindering
from good. Consequently it is essential to the fomes to incline to
evil, or hinder from good. Wherefore to say that the fomes was in the
Blessed Virgin without an inclination to evil, is to combine two
contradictory statements.
In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say that the
fomes remained as to the corruption of nature, but not as to the
personal corruption. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup.
i.), it is lust that transmits original sin to the offspring. Now
lust implies inordinate concupiscence, not entirely subject to
reason: and therefore, if the fomes were entirely taken away as to
personal corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of
nature.
It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the fomes was
entirely taken away from her by her first sanctification or that it
was fettered. Now that the fomes was entirely taken away, might be
understood in this way, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on
the Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul's powers was
granted to her, that the lower powers were never moved without the
command of her reason: just as we have stated to have been the case
with Christ (Q. 15, A. 2), who certainly did not have the fomes of
sin; as also was the case with Adam, before he sinned, by reason of
original justice: so that, in this respect, the grace of
sanctification in the Virgin had the force of original justice. And
although this appears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother,
yet it is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose
power no one had been freed from the first sentence of condemnation.
And though, through faith in Christ, some were freed from that
condemnation, according to the spirit, before Christ's Incarnation,
yet it does not seem fitting that any one should be freed from that
condemnation, according to the flesh, except after His Incarnation,
for it was then that immunity from condemnation was first to appear.
Consequently, just as before the immortality of the flesh of Christ
rising again, none obtained immortality of the flesh, so it seems
unfitting to say that before Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His
Virgin Mother's or anyone else's flesh should be without the fomes,
which is called "the law of the flesh" or "of the members" (Rom.
7:23, 25).
Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the
womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes in its essence, but
that it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in
holy men, since she had not the use of reason from the very first
moment of her existence in her mother's womb, for this was the
singular privilege of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace
bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by
Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular
manner, from any inordinate movement. Afterwards, however, at the
conception of Christ's flesh, in which for the first time immunity
from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire
freedom from the fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother. This
indeed is signified (Ezech. 43:2): "Behold the glory of the God of
Israel came in by the way of the east," i.e. by the Blessed Virgin,
"and the earth," i.e. her flesh, "shone with His," i.e. Christ's,
"majesty."
Reply Obj. 1: Death and such like penalties do not of themselves
incline us to sin. Wherefore though Christ assumed them, He did not
assume the fomes. Consequently in order that the Blessed Virgin might
be conformed to her Son, from "whose fulness" her grace was derived,
the fomes was at first fettered and afterwards taken away: while she
was not freed from death and other such penalties.
Reply Obj. 2: The "infirmity" of the flesh, that pertains to the
fomes, is indeed to holy men an occasional cause of perfect virtue:
but not the "sine qua non" of perfection: and it is quite enough to
ascribe to the Blessed Virgin perfect virtue and abundant grace: nor
is there any need to attribute to her every occasional cause of
perfection.
Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Ghost effected a twofold purification
in the Blessed Virgin. The first was, as it were, preparatory to
Christ's conception: which did not cleanse her from the stain of sin
or fomes, but rather gave her mind a unity of purpose and disengaged
it from a multiplicity of things (Cf. Dionysius, Div. Nom. iv), since
even the angels are said to be purified, in whom there is no stain, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi). The second purification effected in
her by the Holy Ghost was by means of the conception of Christ which
was the operation of the Holy Ghost. And in respect of this, it may be
said that He purified her entirely from the fomes.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 4]
Whether by Being Sanctified in the Womb the Blessed Virgin Was
Preserved from All Actual Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that by being sanctified in the womb the
Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin. For, as we have
already stated (A. 3), after her first sanctification the fomes
remained in the Virgin. Now the motion of the fomes, even if it
precede the act of the reason, is a venial sin, albeit extremely
slight, as Augustine says in his work De Trinitate [*Cf. Sent. ii, D,
24]. Therefore there was some venial sin in the Blessed Virgin.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test. lxxiii on Luke
2:35: "Thy own soul a sword shall pierce") says that the Blessed
Virgin "was troubled with wondering doubt at the death of our Lord."
But doubt in matters of faith is a sin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin
was not preserved from all actual sin.
Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom (Hom. xlv in Matth.) expounding the text:
"Behold thy mother and thy brethren stand without, seeking thee,"
says: "It is clear that they did this from mere vain glory." Again,
on John 2:3: "They have no wine," the same Chrysostom says that "she
wished to do them a favor, and raise herself in their esteem, by
means of her Son: and perchance she succumbed to human frailty, just
as did His brethren when they said: 'Manifest Thyself to the world.'"
And a little further on he says: "For as yet she did not believe in
Him as she ought." Now it is quite clear that all this was sinful.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxxvi): "In the
matter of sin, it is my wish to exclude absolutely all questions
concerning the holy Virgin Mary, on account of the honor due to
Christ. For since she conceived and brought forth Him who most
certainly was guilty of no sin, we know that an abundance of grace
was given her that she might be in every way the conqueror of sin."
_I answer that,_ God so prepares and endows those, whom He chooses
for some particular office, that they are rendered capable of
fulfilling it, according to 2 Cor. 3:6: "(Who) hath made us fit
ministers of the New Testament." Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by
God to be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, by
His grace, made her worthy of that office, according to the words
spoken to her by the angel (Luke 1:30, 31): "Thou hast found grace
with God: behold thou shalt conceive," etc. But she would not have
been worthy to be the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned. First,
because the honor of the parents reflects on the child, according to
Prov. 17:6: "The glory of children are their fathers": and
consequently, on the other hand, the Mother's shame would have
reflected on her Son. Secondly, because of the singular affinity
between her and Christ, who took flesh from her: and it is written (
2 Cor. 6:15): "What concord hath Christ with Belial?" Thirdly,
because of the singular manner in which the Son of God, who is the
"Divine Wisdom" (1 Cor. 1:24) dwelt in her, not only in her soul but
in her womb. And it is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter
into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no
actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so that what is written (Cant
4:7) is fulfilled: "Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a
spot in thee," etc.
Reply Obj. 1: After her sanctification the fomes remained in the
Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest she should be surprised by some
sudden inordinate act, antecedent to the act of reason. And although
the grace of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it
did not suffice; for otherwise the result of her sanctification would
have been to render impossible in her any sensual movement not
preceded by an act of reason, and thus she would not have had the
fomes, which is contrary to what we have said above (A. 3). We must
therefore say that the above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was
perfected by divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion
to result from the fomes.
Reply Obj. 2: Origen (Hom. xvii in Luc.) and certain other doctors
expound these words of Simeon as referring to the sorrow which she
suffered at the time of our Lord's Passion. Ambrose (in Luc. 2:35)
says that the sword signifies "Mary's prudence which took note of the
heavenly mystery. For the word of God is living and effectual, and
more piercing than any two-edged sword" (Heb. 4:12).
Others again take the sword to signify doubt. But this is to be
understood of the doubt, not of unbelief, but of wonder and
discussion. Thus Basil says (Ep. ad Optim.) that "the Blessed Virgin
while standing by the cross, and observing every detail, after the
message of Gabriel, and the ineffable knowledge of the Divine
Conception, after that wondrous manifestation of miracles, was
troubled in mind": that is to say, on the one side seeing Him suffer
such humiliation, and on the other considering His marvelous works.
Reply Obj. 3: In those words Chrysostom goes too far. They may,
however, be explained as meaning that our Lord corrected in her, not
the inordinate motion of vain glory in regard to herself, but that
which might be in the thoughts of others.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 5]
Whether, by Her Sanctification in the Womb, the Blessed Virgin
Received the Fulness of Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that, by her sanctification in the womb,
the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness or perfection of
grace. For this seems to be Christ's privilege, according to John
1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as the Only-Begotten [Vulg.:
'as it were of the Only-Begotten'] full of grace and truth." But what
is proper to Christ ought not to be ascribed to some one else.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness of grace at
the time of her sanctification.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing remains to be added to that which is full
and perfect: for "the perfect is that which lacks nothing," as is
said _Phys._ iii. But the Blessed Virgin received additional grace
afterwards when she conceived Christ; for to her was it said (Luke
1:35): "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee: and again, when she was
assumed into glory." Therefore it seems that she did not receive the
fulness of grace at the time of her first sanctification.
Obj. 3: Further, "God does nothing useless," as is said _De Coelo et
Mundo_ i. But it would have been useless for her to have certain
graces, for she would never have put them to use: since we do not
read that she taught which is the act of wisdom; or that she worked
miracles, which is the act of one of the gratuitous graces. Therefore
she had not the fulness of grace.
_On the contrary,_ The angel said to her: "Hail, full of grace" (Luke
1:28); which words Jerome expounds as follows, in a sermon on the
Assumption (cf. Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): "Full indeed of grace: for
to others it is given in portions; whereas on Mary the fulness of
grace was showered all at once."
_I answer that,_ In every genus, the nearer a thing is to the
principle, the greater the part which it has in the effect of that
principle, whence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that angels, being
nearer to God, have a greater share than men, in the effects of the
Divine goodness. Now Christ is the principle of grace,
authoritatively as to His Godhead, instrumentally as to His humanity:
whence (John 1:17) it is written: "Grace and truth came by Jesus
Christ." But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His
humanity: because He received His human nature from her. Therefore it
was due to her to receive a greater fulness of grace than others.
Reply Obj. 1: God gives to each one according to the purpose for
which He has chosen him. And since Christ as man was predestinated
and chosen to be "predestinated the Son of God in power . . . of
sanctification" (Rom. 1:4), it was proper to Him to have such a
fulness of grace that it overflowed from Him into all, according to
John 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received." Whereas the Blessed
Virgin Mary received such a fulness of grace that she was nearest of
all to the Author of grace; so that she received within her Him Who
is full of all grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner,
dispensed grace to all.
Reply Obj. 2: In natural things at first there is perfection of
disposition, for instance when matter is perfectly disposed for the
form. Secondly, there is the perfection of the form; and this is the
more excellent, for the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is
more perfect than that which disposed to the form of fire. Thirdly,
there is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its
qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its own place.
In like manner there was a threefold perfection of grace in the
Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was
made worthy to be the mother of Christ: and this was the perfection
of her sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed
Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her
womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory.
That the second perfection excels the first, and the third the
second, appears (1) from the point of view of deliverance from evil.
For at first in her sanctification she was delivered from original
sin: afterwards, in the conception of the Son of God, she was
entirely cleansed from the fomes: lastly, in her glorification she
was also delivered from all affliction whatever. It appears (2) from
the point of view of ordering to good. For at first in her
sanctification she received grace inclining her to good: in the
conception of the Son of God she received consummate grace confirming
her in good; and in her glorification her grace was further
consummated so as to perfect her in the enjoyment of all good.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin received in a
high degree both the gift of wisdom and the grace of miracles and
even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive
them, as to put them and such like graces to every use, as did
Christ: but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life. For she
had the use of wisdom in contemplation, according to Luke 2:19: "But
Mary kept all these words, pondering them in her heart." But she had
not the use of wisdom as to teaching: since this befitted not the
female sex, according to 1 Tim. 2:12: "But I suffer not a woman to
teach." The use of miracles did not become her while she lived:
because at that time the Teaching of Christ was to be confirmed by
miracles, and therefore it was befitting that Christ alone, and His
disciples who were the bearers of His doctrine, should work miracles.
Hence of John the Baptist it is written (John 10:41) that he "did no
sign"; that is, in order that all might fix their attention on
Christ. As to the use of prophecy, it is clear that she had it, from
the canticle spoken by her: "My soul doth magnify the Lord" (Luke
1:46, etc.).
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 27, Art. 6]
Whether After Christ, It Was Proper to the Blessed Virgin to Be
Sanctified in the Womb?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was proper for the Blessed Virgin,
after Christ, to be sanctified in the womb. For it has been said (A.
4) that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb, in order that
she might be worthy to be the mother of God. But this is proper to
her. Therefore she alone was sanctified in the womb.
Obj. 2: Further, some men seem to have been more closely connected
with Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist, who are said to have
been sanctified in the womb. For Christ is specially called the Son
of David and of Abraham, by reason of the promise specially made to
them concerning Christ. Isaias also prophesied of Christ in the most
express terms. And the apostles were in converse with Christ Himself.
And yet these are not mentioned as having been sanctified in the
womb. Therefore it was not befitting that either Jeremias or John the
Baptist should be sanctified in the womb.
Obj. 3: Further, Job says of himself (Job 31:18): "From my infancy
mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from [my mother's]
womb." Nevertheless we do not for this reason say that he was
sanctified in the womb. Neither therefore are we bound to say that
Jeremias and John the Baptist were sanctified in the womb.
_On the contrary,_ It is written of Jeremias (Jer. 1:5): "Before thou
camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee." And of John the
Baptist it is written (Luke 1:15): "He shall be filled with the Holy
Ghost, even from his mother's womb."
_I answer that,_ Augustine (Ep. ad Dardan.) seems to speak dubiously
of their (Jeremias' and John the Baptist's) sanctification in the
womb. For the leaping of John in the womb "might," as he says,
"signify the great truth," viz. that the woman was the mother of God,
"which was to be made known to his elders, though as yet unknown to
the infant. Hence in the Gospel it is written, not that the infant in
her womb believed, but that it 'leaped': and our eyes are witness
that not only infants leap but also cattle. But this was unwonted
because it was in the womb. And therefore, just as other miracles are
wont to be done, this was done divinely, in the infant; not humanly
by the infant. Perhaps also in this child the use of reason and will
was so far accelerated that while yet in his mother's womb he was
able to acknowledge, believe, and consent, whereas in other children
we have to wait for these things till they grow older: this again I
count as a miraculous result of the divine power."
But since it is expressly said (of John) in the Gospel that "he shall
be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb"; and of
Jeremias, "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified
thee"; it seems that we must needs assert that they were sanctified
in the womb, although, while in the womb, they had not the use of
reason (which is the point discussed by Augustine); just as neither
do children enjoy the use of free will as soon as they are sanctified
by baptism.
Nor are we to believe that any others, not mentioned by Scripture,
were sanctified in the womb. For such privileges of grace, which are
bestowed on some, outside the common law, are ordered for the
salvation of others, according to 1 Cor. 12:7: "The manifestation of
the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," which would not result
from the sanctification of anyone unless it were made known to the
Church.
And although it is not possible to assign a reason for God's
judgments, for instance, why He bestows such a grace on one and not
on another, yet there seems to be a certain fittingness in both of
these being sanctified in the womb, by their foreshadowing the
sanctification which was to be effected through Christ. First, as to
His Passion, according to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify
the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate": which
Passion Jeremias foretold openly by words and by symbols, and most
clearly foreshadowed by his own sufferings. Secondly, as to His
Baptism (1 Cor. 6:11): "But you are washed, but you are sanctified";
to which Baptism John prepared men by his baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: The blessed Virgin, who was chosen by God to be His
Mother, received a fuller grace of sanctification than John the
Baptist and Jeremias, who were chosen to foreshadow in a special way
the sanctification effected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was
granted to the Blessed Virgin thenceforward never to sin either
mortally or venially: whereas to the others who were thus sanctified
it was granted thenceforward not to sin mortally, through the
protection of God's grace.
Reply Obj. 2: In other respects these saints might be more closely
united to Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist. But the latter
were most closely united to Him by clearly foreshadowing His
sanctification, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 3: The mercy of which Job speaks is not the infused
virtue; but a certain natural inclination to the act of that virtue.
_______________________
QUESTION 28
OF THE VIRGINITY OF THE MOTHER OF GOD
(In Four Articles)
We now have to consider the virginity of the Mother of God;
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether she was a virgin in conceiving?
(2) Whether she was a virgin in His Birth?
(3) Whether she remained a virgin after His Birth?
(4) Whether she took a vow of virginity?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 28, Art. 1]
Whether the Mother of God Was a Virgin in Conceiving Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God was not a virgin in
conceiving Christ. For no child having father and mother is conceived
by a virgin mother. But Christ is said to have had not only a mother,
but also a father, according to Luke 2:33: "His father and mother
were wondering at those things which were spoken concerning Him": and
further on (Luke 2:48) in the same chapter she says: "Behold I and
Thy father [Vulg.: 'Thy father and I'] have sought Thee sorrowing."
Therefore Christ was not conceived of a virgin mother.
Obj. 2: Further (Matt. 1) it is proved that Christ was the Son of
Abraham and David, through Joseph being descended from David. But
this proof would have availed nothing if Joseph were not the father
of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ's Mother conceived Him of
the seed of Joseph; and consequently that she was not a virgin in
conceiving Him.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4): "God sent His Son, made of
a woman." But according to the customary mode of speaking, the term
"woman" applies to one who is known of a man. Therefore Christ was
not conceived by a virgin mother.
Obj. 4: Further, things of the same species have the same mode of
generation: since generation is specified by its terminus just as are
other motions. But Christ belonged to the same species as other men,
according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the likeness of men, and in
habit found as a man." Since therefore other men are begotten of the
mingling of male and female, it seems that Christ was begotten in the
same manner; and that consequently He was not conceived of a virgin
mother.
Obj. 5: Further, every natural form has its determinate matter,
outside which it cannot be. But the matter of human form appears to
be the semen of male and female. If therefore Christ's body was not
conceived of the semen of male and female, it would not have been
truly a human body; which cannot be asserted. It seems therefore that
He was not conceived of a virgin mother.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 7:14): "Behold a virgin shall
conceive."
_I answer that,_ We must confess simply that the Mother of Christ was
a virgin in conceiving for to deny this belongs to the heresy of the
Ebionites and Cerinthus, who held Christ to be a mere man, and
maintained that He was born of both sexes.
It is fitting for four reasons that Christ should be born of a
virgin. First, in order to maintain the dignity or the Father Who
sent Him. For since Christ is the true and natural Son of God, it was
not fitting that He should have another father than God: lest the
dignity belonging to God be transferred to another.
Secondly, this was befitting to a property of the Son Himself, Who is
sent. For He is the Word of God: and the word is conceived without
any interior corruption: indeed, interior corruption is incompatible
with perfect conception of the word. Since therefore flesh was so
assumed by the Word of God, as to be the flesh of the Word of God, it
was fitting that it also should be conceived without corruption of
the mother.
Thirdly, this was befitting to the dignity of Christ's humanity in
which there could be no sin, since by it the sin of the world was
taken away, according to John 1:29: "Behold the Lamb of God" (i.e.
the Lamb without stain) "who taketh away the sin of the world." Now
it was not possible in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born
from sexual intercourse without incurring the infection of original
sin. Whence Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "In that union,"
viz. the marriage of Mary and Joseph, "the nuptial intercourse alone
was lacking: because in sinful flesh this could not be without
fleshly concupiscence which arises from sin, and without which He
wished to be conceived, Who was to be without sin."
Fourthly, on account of the very end of the Incarnation of Christ,
which was that men might be born again as sons of God, "not of the
will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1:13),
i.e. of the power of God, of which fact the very conception of Christ
was to appear as an exemplar. Whence Augustine says (De Sanct.
Virg.): "It behooved that our Head, by a notable miracle, should be
born, after the flesh, of a virgin, that He might thereby signify
that His members would be born, after the Spirit, of a virgin Church."
Reply Obj. 1: As Bede says on Luke 1:33: Joseph is called the father
of the Saviour, not that he really was His father, as the Photinians
pretended: but that he was considered by men to be so, for the
safeguarding of Mary's good name. Wherefore Luke adds (Luke 3:23):
"Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph."
Or, according to Augustine (De Cons. Evang. ii), Joseph is called the
father of Christ just as "he is called the husband of Mary, without
fleshly mingling, by the mere bond of marriage: being thereby united
to Him much more closely than if he were adopted from another family.
Consequently that Christ was not begotten of Joseph by fleshly union
is no reason why Joseph should not be called His father; since he
would be the father even of an adopted son not born of his wife."
Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:18: "Though Joseph was not
the father of our Lord and Saviour, the order of His genealogy is
traced down to Joseph"--first, because "the Scriptures are not wont
to trace the female line in genealogies": secondly, "Mary and Joseph
were of the same tribe"; wherefore by law he was bound to take her as
being of his kin. Likewise, as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i),
"it was befitting to trace the genealogy down to Joseph, lest in that
marriage any slight should be offered to the male sex, which is
indeed the stronger: for truth suffered nothing thereby, since both
Joseph and Mary were of the family of David."
Reply Obj. 3: As the gloss says on this passage, the word "_mulier_
is here used instead of _femina,_ according to the custom of the
Hebrew tongue: which applies the term signifying woman to those of
the female sex who are virgins."
Reply Obj. 4: This argument is true of those things which come into
existence by the way of nature: since nature, just as it is fixed to
one particular effect, so it is determinate to one mode of producing
that effect. But as the supernatural power of God extends to the
infinite: just as it is not determinate to one effect, so neither is
it determinate to one mode of producing any effect whatever.
Consequently, just as it was possible for the first man to be
produced, by the Divine power, "from the slime of the earth," so too
was it possible for Christ's body to be made, by Divine power, from a
virgin without the seed of the male.
Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, ii,
iv), in conception the seed of the male is not by way of matter, but
by way of agent: and the female alone supplies the matter. Wherefore
though the seed of the male was lacking in Christ's conception, it
does not follow that due matter was lacking.
But if the seed of the male were the matter of the fetus in animal
conception, it is nevertheless manifest that it is not a matter
remaining under one form, but subject to transformation. And though
the natural power cannot transmute other than determinate matter to a
determinate form; nevertheless the Divine power, which is infinite,
can transmute all matter to any form whatsoever. Consequently, just
as it transmuted the slime of the earth into Adam's body, so could it
transmute the matter supplied by His Mother into Christ's body, even
though it were not the sufficient matter for a natural conception.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 28, Art. 2]
Whether Christ's Mother Was a Virgin in His Birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Mother was not a virgin in
His Birth. For Ambrose says on Luke 2:23: "He who sanctified a
strange womb, for the birth of a prophet, He it is who opened His
Mother's womb, that He might go forth unspotted." But opening of the
womb excludes virginity. Therefore Christ's Mother was not a virgin
in His Birth.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing should have taken place in the mystery of
Christ, which would make His body to seem unreal. Now it seems to
pertain not to a true but to an unreal body, to be able to go through
a closed passage; since two bodies cannot be in one place at the same
time. It was therefore unfitting that Christ's body should come forth
from His Mother's closed womb: and consequently that she should
remain a virgin in giving birth to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, as Gregory says in the Homily for the octave of
Easter [*xxvi in Evang.], that by entering after His Resurrection
where the disciples were gathered, the doors being shut, our Lord
"showed that His body was the same in nature but differed in glory":
so that it seems that to go through a closed passage pertains to a
glorified body. But Christ's body was not glorified in its
conception, but was passible, having "the likeness of sinful flesh,"
as the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3). Therefore He did not come forth
through the closed womb of the Virgin.
_On the contrary,_ In a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. III,
Cap. ix) it is said: "After giving birth, nature knows not a virgin:
but grace enhances her fruitfulness, and effects her motherhood,
while in no way does it injure her virginity." Therefore Christ's
Mother was a virgin also in giving birth to Him.
_I answer that,_ Without any doubt whatever we must assert that the
Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His Birth: for the prophet says
not only: "Behold a virgin shall conceive," but adds: "and shall bear
a son." This indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because
this was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in
question, for He is the Word of God. For the word is not only
conceived in the mind without corruption, but also proceeds from the
mind without corruption. Wherefore in order to show that body to be
the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that it should be
born of a virgin incorrupt. Whence in the sermon of the Council of
Ephesus (quoted above) we read: "Whosoever brings forth mere flesh,
ceases to be a virgin. But since she gave birth to the Word made
flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so as to manifest His Word, by
which Word He thus manifested Himself: for neither does our word,
when brought forth, corrupt the mind; nor does God, the substantial
Word, deigning to be born, destroy virginity."
Secondly, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ's
Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He might take away
our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting that in His Birth He should
corrupt His Mother's virginity. Thus Augustine says in a sermon on
the Nativity of Our Lord: "It was not right that He who came to heal
corruption, should by His advent violate integrity."
Thirdly, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to honor our father
and mother should not in His Birth lessen the honor due to His Mother.
Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose says this in expounding the evangelist's
quotation from the Law: "Every male opening the womb shall be called
holy to the Lord." This, says Bede, "is said in regard to the wonted
manner of birth; not that we are to believe that our Lord in coming
forth violated the abode of her sacred womb, which His entrance
therein had hallowed." Wherefore the opening here spoken of does not
imply the unlocking of the enclosure of virginal purity; but the mere
coming forth of the infant from the maternal womb.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished so to show the reality of His body, as to
manifest His Godhead at the same time. For this reason He mingled
wondrous with lowly things. Wherefore, to show that His body was
real, He was born of a woman. But in order to manifest His Godhead,
He was born of a virgin, for "such a Birth befits a God," as Ambrose
says in the Christmas hymn.
Reply Obj. 3: Some have held that Christ, in His Birth, assumed the
gift of "subtlety," when He came forth from the closed womb of a
virgin; and that He assumed the gift of "agility" when with dry feet
He walked on the sea. But this is not consistent with what has been
decided above (Q. 14). For these gifts of a glorified body result
from an overflow of the soul's glory on to the body, as we shall
explain further on, in treating of glorified bodies (Suppl., Q. 82):
and it has been said above (Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 16, A. 1, ad 2)
that before His Passion Christ "allowed His flesh to do and to suffer
what was proper to it" (Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii): nor was there
such an overflow of glory from His soul on to His body.
We must therefore say that all these things took place miraculously
by Divine power. Whence Augustine says (Sup. Joan. Tract. 121): "To
the substance of a body in which was the Godhead closed doors were no
obstacle. For truly He had power to enter in by doors not open, in
Whose Birth His Mother's virginity remained inviolate." And Dionysius
says in an epistle (Ad Caium iv) that "Christ excelled man in doing
that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural
conception, of a virgin, and in the unstable waters bearing the
weight of earthly feet."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 28, Art. 3]
Whether Christ's Mother Remained a Virgin After His Birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Mother did not remain a
virgin after His Birth. For it is written (Matt. 1:18): "Before
Joseph and Mary came together, she was found with child of the Holy
Ghost." Now the Evangelist would not have said this--"before they
came together"--unless he were certain of their subsequent coming
together; for no one says of one who does not eventually dine "before
he dines" (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.). It seems, therefore, that the
Blessed Virgin subsequently had intercourse with Joseph; and
consequently that she did not remain a virgin after (Christ's) Birth.
Obj. 2: Further, in the same passage (Matt. 1:20) are related the
words of the angel to Joseph: "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy
wife." But marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore
it seems that this must have at some time taken place between Mary
and Joseph: and that, consequently she did not remain a virgin after
(Christ's) Birth.
Obj. 3: Further, again in the same passage a little further on (Matt.
1:24, 25) we read: "And" (Joseph) "took unto him his wife; and he
knew her not till she brought forth her first-born Son." Now this
conjunction "till" is wont to designate a fixed time, on the
completion of which that takes place which previously had not taken
place. And the verb "knew" refers here to knowledge by intercourse
(cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.); just as (Gen. 4:1) it is said that
"Adam knew his wife." Therefore it seems that after (Christ's) Birth,
the Blessed Virgin was known by Joseph; and, consequently, that she
did not remain a virgin after the Birth (of Christ).
Obj. 4: Further, "first-born" can only be said of one who has
brothers afterwards: wherefore (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He
also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son;
that He might be the first-born among many brethren." But the
evangelist calls Christ the first-born by His Mother. Therefore she
had other children after Christ. And therefore it seems that Christ's
Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth.
Obj. 5: Further, it is written (John 2:12): "After this He went down
to Capharnaum, He"--that is, Christ--"and His Mother and His
brethren." But brethren are those who are begotten of the same
parent. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin had other sons
after Christ.
Obj. 6: Further, it is written (Matt. 27:55, 56): "There were
there"--that is, by the cross of Christ--"many women afar off, who
had followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering unto Him; among whom was
Mary Magdalen, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the
mother of the sons of Zebedee." Now this Mary who is called "the
mother of James and Joseph" seems to have been also the Mother of
Christ; for it is written (John 19:25) that "there stood by the cross
of Jesus, Mary His Mother." Therefore it seems that Christ's Mother
did not remain a virgin after His Birth.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 44:2): "This gate shall be
shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it;
because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it." Expounding
these words, Augustine says in a sermon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): "What
means this closed gate in the House of the Lord, except that Mary is
to be ever inviolate? What does it mean that 'no man shall pass
through it,' save that Joseph shall not know her? And what is
this--'The Lord alone enters in and goeth out by it'--except that the
Holy Ghost shall impregnate her, and that the Lord of angels shall be
born of her? And what means this--'it shall be shut for
evermore'--but that Mary is a virgin before His Birth, a virgin in
His Birth, and a virgin after His Birth?"
_I answer that,_ Without any hesitation we must abhor the error of
Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ's Mother, after His Birth,
was carnally known by Joseph, and bore other children. For, in the
first place, this is derogatory to Christ's perfection: for as He is
in His Godhead the Only-Begotten of the Father, being thus His Son in
every respect perfect, so it was becoming that He should be the
Only-begotten son of His Mother, as being her perfect offspring.
Secondly, this error is an insult to the Holy Ghost, whose "shrine"
was the virginal womb [*"Sacrarium Spiritus Sancti" (Office of B. M.
V., Ant. ad Benedictus, T. P.)], wherein He had formed the flesh of
Christ: wherefore it was unbecoming that it should be desecrated by
intercourse with man.
Thirdly, this is derogatory to the dignity and holiness of God's
Mother: for thus she would seem to be most ungrateful, were she not
content with such a Son; and were she, of her own accord, by carnal
intercourse to forfeit that virginity which had been miraculously
preserved in her.
Fourthly, it would be tantamount to an imputation of extreme
presumption in Joseph, to assume that he attempted to violate her
whom by the angel's revelation he knew to have conceived by the Holy
Ghost.
We must therefore simply assert that the Mother of God, as she was a
virgin in conceiving Him and a virgin in giving Him birth, did she
remain a virgin ever afterwards.
Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says (Contra Helvid. i): "Although this
particle 'before' often indicates a subsequent event, yet we must
observe that it not infrequently points merely to some thing
previously in the mind: nor is there need that what was in the mind
take place eventually, since something may occur to prevent its
happening. Thus if a man say: 'Before I dined in the port, I set
sail,' we do not understand him to have dined in port after he set
sail: but that his mind was set on dining in port." In like manner
the evangelist says: "Before they came together" Mary "was found with
child, of the Holy Ghost," not that they came together afterwards:
but that, when it seemed that they would come together, this was
forestalled through her conceiving by the Holy Ghost, the result
being that afterwards they did not come together.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "The Mother
of God is called (Joseph's) wife from the first promise of her
espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal
intercourse." For, as Ambrose says on Luke 1:27: "The fact of her
marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to
witness to the reality of the union."
Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that this is not to be understood of
carnal knowledge, but of acquaintance. Thus Chrysostom says [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth., Hom. 1: among the spurious works ascribed to
Chrysostom] that "Joseph did not know her, until she gave birth,
being unaware of her dignity: but after she had given birth, then did
he know her. Because by reason of her child she surpassed the whole
world in beauty and dignity: since she alone in the narrow abode of
her womb received Him Whom the world cannot contain."
Others again refer this to knowledge by sight. For as, while Moses
was speaking with God, his face was so bright "that the children of
Israel could not steadfastly behold it"; so Mary, while being
"overshadowed" by the brightness of the "power of the Most High,"
could not be gazed on by Joseph, until she gave birth. But afterwards
she is acknowledged by Joseph, by looking on her face, not by lustful
contact.
Jerome, however, grants that this is to be understood of knowledge by
intercourse; but he observes that "before" or "until" has a twofold
sense in Scripture. For sometimes it indicates a fixed time, as Gal.
3:19: The law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed
should come, to whom He made the promise." On the other hand, it
sometimes indicates an indefinite time, as in Ps. 122:2: "Our eyes
are unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; from which it
is not to be gathered that our eyes are turned from God as soon as
His mercy has been obtained. In this sense those things are indicated
"of which we might doubt if they had not been written down: while
others are left out to be supplied by our understanding. Thus the
evangelist says that the Mother of God was not known by her husband
until she gave birth, that we may be given to understand that still
less did he know her afterwards" (Adversus Helvid. v).
Reply Obj. 4: The Scriptures are wont to designate as the first-born,
not only a child who is followed by others, but also the one that is
born first. "Otherwise, if a child were not first-born unless
followed by others, the first-fruits would not be due as long as
there was no further produce" [*Jerome, Adversus Helvid. x]: which is
clearly false, since according to the law the first-fruits had to be
redeemed within a month (Num. 18:16).
Reply Obj. 5: Some, as Jerome says on Matt. 12:49, 50, "suppose that
the brethren of the Lord were Joseph's sons by another wife. But we
understand the brethren of the Lord to be not sons of Joseph, but
cousins of the Saviour, the sons of Mary, His Mother's sister." For
"Scripture speaks of brethren in four senses; namely, those who are
united by being of the same parents, of the same nation, of the same
family, by common affection." Wherefore the brethren of the Lord are
so called, not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by
relationship, as being blood-relations of His. But Joseph, as Jerome
says (Contra Helvid. ix), is rather to be believed to have remained a
virgin, "since he is not said to have had another wife," and "a holy
man does not live otherwise than chastely."
Reply Obj. 6: Mary who is called "the mother of James and Joseph" is
not to be taken for the Mother of our Lord, who is not wont to be
named in the Gospels save under this designation of her dignity--"the
Mother of Jesus." This Mary is to be taken for the wife of Alphaeus,
whose son was James the less, known as the "brother of the Lord"
(Gal. 1:19).
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 28, Art. 4]
Whether the Mother of God Took a Vow of Virginity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God did not take a vow
of virginity. For it is written (Deut. 7:14): "No one shall be barren
among you of either sex." But sterility is a consequence of
virginity. Therefore the keeping of virginity was contrary to the
commandment of the Old Law. But before Christ was born the old law
was still in force. Therefore at that time the Blessed Virgin could
not lawfully take a vow of virginity.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): "Concerning virgins
I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel." But the
perfection of the counsels was to take its beginning from Christ, who
is the "end of the Law," as the Apostle says (Rom. 10:4). It was not
therefore becoming that the Virgin should take a vow of virginity.
Obj. 3: Further, the gloss of Jerome says on 1 Tim. 5:12, that "for
those who are vowed to virginity, it is reprehensible not only to
marry, but also to desire to be married." But the Mother of Christ
committed no sin for which she could be reprehended, as stated above
(Q. 27, A. 4). Since therefore she was "espoused," as related by Luke
1:27 it seems that she did not take a vow of virginity.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. iv): "Mary
answered the announcing angel: 'How shall this be done, because I
know not man?' She would not have said this unless she had already
vowed her virginity to God."
_I answer that,_ As we have stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 88,
A. 6), works of perfection are more praiseworthy when performed in
fulfilment of a vow. Now it is clear that for reasons already given
(AA. 1, 2, 3) virginity had a special place in the Mother of God. It
was therefore fitting that her virginity should be consecrated to God
by vow. Nevertheless because, while the Law was in force both men and
women were bound to attend to the duty of begetting, since the
worship of God was spread according to carnal origin, until Christ
was born of that people; the Mother of God is not believed to have
taken an absolute vow of virginity, before being espoused to Joseph,
although she desired to do so, yet yielding her own will to God's
judgment. Afterwards, however, having taken a husband, according as
the custom of the time required, together with him she took a vow of
virginity.
Reply Obj. 1: Because it seemed to be forbidden by the law not to
take the necessary steps for leaving a posterity on earth, therefore
the Mother of God did not vow virginity absolutely, but under the
condition that it were pleasing to God. When, however, she knew that
it was acceptable to God, she made the vow absolute, before the
angel's Annunciation.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the fulness of grace was in Christ perfectly,
yet some beginning of the fulness preceded in His Mother; so also the
observance of the counsels, which is an effect of God's grace, began
its perfection in Christ, but was begun after a fashion in His Virgin
Mother.
Reply Obj. 3: These words of the Apostle are to be understood of
those who vow chastity absolutely. Christ's Mother did not do this
until she was espoused to Joseph. After her espousals, however, by
their common consent she took a vow of virginity together with her
spouse.
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QUESTION 29
OF THE ESPOUSALS OF THE MOTHER OF GOD
(In Two Articles)
We now consider the espousals of God's Mother: concerning which two
points arise for inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?
(2) Whether there was true marriage between our Lord's Mother and
Joseph?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 29, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Should Have Been Born of an Espoused Virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born of
an espoused virgin. For espousals are ordered to carnal intercourse.
But our Lord's Mother never wished to have carnal intercourse with
her husband; because this would be derogatory to the virginity of her
mind. Therefore she should not have been espoused.
Obj. 2: Further, that Christ was born of a virgin was miraculous,
whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): "This same power of
God brought forth the infant's limbs out of the virginal womb of His
inviolate Mother, by which in the vigor of manhood He passed through
the closed doors. If we are told why this happened, it will cease to
be wonderful; if another instance be alleged, it will no longer be
unique." But miracles that are wrought in confirmation of the Faith
should be manifest. Since, therefore, by her Espousals this miracle
would be less evident, it seems that it was unfitting that Christ
should be born of an espoused virgin.
Obj. 3: Further, the martyr Ignatius, as Jerome says on Matt. 1:18,
gives as a reason of the espousals of the Mother of God, "that the
manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil, who would think
Him to be begotten not of a virgin but of a wife." But this seems
to be no reason at all. First, because by his natural cunning he
knows whatever takes place in bodies. Secondly, because later on
the demons, through many evident signs, knew Christ after a
fashion: whence it is written (Mk. 1:23, 24): "A man with an unclean
spirit . . . cried out, saying: What have we to do with Thee, Jesus
of Nazareth? Art Thou come to destroy us? I know . . . Thou art the
Holy one of God." Therefore it does not seem fitting that the Mother
of God should have been espoused.
Obj. 4: Further, Jerome gives as another reason, "lest the Mother of
God should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress." But this reason
seems to have no weight, for if she were not espoused, she could not
be condemned for adultery. Therefore it does not seem reasonable that
Christ should be born of an espoused virgin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:18): "When as His Mother
Mary was espoused to Joseph": and (Luke 1:26, 27): "The angel Gabriel
was sent . . . to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph."
_I answer that,_ It was fitting that Christ should be born of an
espoused virgin; first, for His own sake; secondly, for His Mother's
sake; thirdly, for our sake. For the sake of Christ Himself, for four
reasons. First, lest He should be rejected by unbelievers as
illegitimate: wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 1:26, 27: "How could we
blame Herod or the Jews if they seem to persecute one who was born of
adultery?"
Secondly, in order that in the customary way His genealogy might be
traced through the male line. Thus Ambrose says on Luke 3:23: "He Who
came into the world, according to the custom of the world had to be
enrolled. Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required,
because they represent the family in the senate and other courts. The
custom of the Scriptures, too, shows that the ancestry of the men is
always traced out."
Thirdly, for the safety of the new-born Child: lest the devil should
plot serious hurt against Him. Hence Ignatius says that she was
espoused "that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the
devil."
Fourthly, that He might be fostered by Joseph: who is therefore
called His "father," as bread-winner.
It was also fitting for the sake of the Virgin. First, because thus
she was rendered exempt from punishment; that is, "lest she should be
stoned by the Jews as an adulteress," as Jerome says.
Secondly, that thus she might be safeguarded from ill fame. Whence
Ambrose says on Luke 1:26, 27: "She was espoused lest she be wounded
by the ill-fame of violated virginity, in whom the pregnant womb
would betoken corruption."
Thirdly, that, as Jerome says, Joseph might administer to her wants.
This was fitting, again, for our sake. First, because Joseph is thus
a witness to Christ's being born of a virgin. Wherefore Ambrose says:
"Her husband is the more trustworthy witness of her purity, in that
he would deplore the dishonor, and avenge the disgrace, were it not
that he acknowledged the mystery."
Secondly, because thereby the very words of the Virgin are rendered
more credible by which she asserted her virginity. Thus Ambrose says:
"Belief in Mary's words is strengthened, the motive for a lie is
removed. If she had not been espoused when pregnant, she would seem
to have wished to hide her sin by a lie: being espoused, she had no
motive for lying, since a woman's pregnancy is the reward of marriage
and gives grace to the nuptial bond." These two reasons add strength
to our faith.
Thirdly, that all excuse be removed from those virgins who, through
want of caution, fall into dishonor. Hence Ambrose says: "It was not
becoming that virgins should expose themselves to evil report, and
cover themselves with the excuse that the Mother of the Lord had also
been oppressed by ill-fame."
Fourthly, because by this the universal Church is typified, which is
a virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, Christ, as Augustine says
(De Sanct. Virg. xii).
A fifth reason may be added: since the Mother of the Lord being both
espoused and a virgin, both virginity and wedlock are honored in her
person, in contradiction to those heretics who disparaged one or the
other.
Reply Obj. 1: We must believe that the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God,
desired, from an intimate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to be
espoused, being confident that by the help of God she would never
come to have carnal intercourse: yet she left this to God's
discretion. Wherefore she suffered nothing in detriment to her
virginity.
Reply Obj. 2: As Ambrose says on Luke 1:26: "Our Lord preferred that
men should doubt of His origin rather than of His Mother's purity.
For he knew the delicacy of virgin modesty, and how easily the fair
name of chastity is disparaged: nor did He choose that our faith in
His Birth should be strengthened in detriment to His Mother." We must
observe, however, that some miracles wrought by God are the direct
object of faith; such are the miracles of the virginal Birth, the
Resurrection of our Lord, and the Sacrament of the Altar. Wherefore
our Lord wished these to be more hidden, that belief in them might
have greater merit. Whereas other miracles are for the strengthening
of faith: and these it behooves to be manifest.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. iii), the devil can do many
things by his natural power which he is hindered by the Divine power
from doing. Thus it may be that by his natural power the devil could
know that the Mother of God knew not man, but was a virgin; yet was
prevented by God from knowing the manner of the Divine Birth. That
afterwards the devil after a fashion knew that He was the Son of God,
makes no difficulty: because then the time had already come for
Christ to make known His power against the devil, and to suffer
persecution aroused by him. But during His infancy it behooved the
malice of the devil to be withheld, lest he should persecute Him too
severely: for Christ did not wish to suffer such things then, nor to
make His power known, but to show Himself to be in all things like
other infants. Hence Pope Leo (Serm. in Epiph. iv) says that "the
Magi found the Child Jesus small in body, dependent on others, unable
to speak, and in no way differing from the generality of human
infants." Ambrose, however, expounding Luke 1:26, seems to understand
this of the devil's members. For, after giving the above
reason--namely, that the prince of the world might be deceived--he
continues thus: "Yet still more did He deceive the princes of the
world, since the evil disposition of the demons easily discovers even
hidden things: but those who spend their lives in worldly vanities
can have no acquaintance of Divine things."
Reply Obj. 4: The sentence of adulteresses according to the Law was
that they should be stoned, not only if they were already espoused or
married, but also if their maidenhood were still under the protection
of the paternal roof, until the day when they enter the married
state. Thus it is written (Deut. 22:20, 21): "If . . . virginity be
not found in the damsel . . . the men of the city shall stone her to
death, and she shall die; because she hath done a wicked thing in
Israel, to play the whore in her father's house."
It may also be said, according to some writers, that the Blessed
Virgin was of the family or kindred of Aaron, so that she was related
to Elizabeth, as we are told (Luke 1:36). Now a virgin of the
priestly tribe was condemned to death for whoredom; for we read (Lev.
21:9): "If the daughter of a priest be taken in whoredom, and
dishonor the name of her father, she shall be burnt with fire."
Lastly, some understand the passage of Jerome to refer to the
throwing of stones by ill-fame.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 29, Art. 2]
Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true marriage between
Mary and Joseph. For Jerome says against Helvidius that Joseph "was
Mary's guardian rather than her husband." But if this was a true
marriage, Joseph was truly her husband. Therefore there was no true
marriage between Mary and Joseph.
Obj. 2: Further, on Matt. 1:16: "Jacob begot Joseph the husband of
Mary," Jerome says: "When thou readest 'husband' suspect not a
marriage; but remember that Scripture is wont to speak of those who
are betrothed as husband and wife." But a true marriage is not
effected by the betrothal, but by the wedding. Therefore, there was
no true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 1:19): "Joseph, her husband,
being a just man, and not willing to take her away [*Douay: 'publicly
to expose her'], i.e. to take her to his home in order to cohabit with
her, was minded to put her away privately, i.e. to postpone the
wedding," as Remigius [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Matth.] expounds.
Therefore, it seems that, as the wedding was not yet solemnized,
there was no true marriage: especially since, after the marriage
contract, no one can lawfully put his wife away.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): "It cannot
be allowed that the evangelist thought that Joseph ought to sever his
union with Mary" (since he said that Joseph was Mary's husband) "on
the ground that in giving birth to Christ, she had not conceived of
him, but remained a virgin. For by this example the faithful are
taught that if after marriage they remain continent by mutual
consent, their union is still and is rightly called marriage, even
without intercourse of the sexes."
_I answer that,_ Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of
its attaining its perfection. Now perfection of anything is twofold;
first, and second. The first perfection of a thing consists in its
very form, from which it receives its species; while the second
perfection of a thing consists in its operation, by which in some way
a thing attains its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a
certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are
pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And
the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the
first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the
other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in
rearing their offspring.
Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the marriage of the
Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was absolutely true: because both
consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the
flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. For this
reason the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Matt.
1:20): "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife": on which words
Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "She is called his wife from
the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever
was to know by carnal intercourse."
But as to the second perfection which is attained by the marriage
act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are
begotten; thus this marriage was not consummated. Wherefore Ambrose
says on Luke 1:26, 27: "Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a
wife. The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss
of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union."
Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as to
upbringing of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i):
"All the nuptial blessings are fulfilled in the marriage of Christ's
parents, offspring, faith and sacrament. The offspring we know to
have been the Lord Jesus; faith, for there was no adultery:
sacrament, since there was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there
was none."
Reply Obj. 1: Jerome uses the term "husband" in reference to marriage
consummated.
Reply Obj. 2: By marriage Jerome means the nuptial intercourse.
Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i super Matth. [*Opus
Imperfectum, among the supposititious works ascribed to St.
Chrysostom]) the Blessed Virgin was so espoused to Joseph that she
dwelt in his home: "for just as she who conceives in her husband's
house is understood to have conceived of him, so she who conceives
elsewhere is suspect." Consequently sufficient precaution would not
have been taken to safeguard the fair fame of the Blessed Virgin, if
she had not the entry of her husband's house. Wherefore the words,
"not willing to take her away" are better rendered as meaning, "not
willing publicly to expose her," than understood of taking her to his
house. Hence the evangelist adds that "he was minded to put her away
privately." But although she had the entry of Joseph's house by
reason of her first promise of espousals, yet the time had not yet
come for the solemnizing of the wedding; for which reason they had
not yet consummated the marriage. Therefore, as Chrysostom says (Hom.
iv in Matth.): "The evangelist does not say, 'before she was taken to
the house of her husband,' because she was already in the house. For
it was the custom among the ancients for espoused maidens to enter
frequently the houses of them to whom they were betrothed." Therefore
the angel also said to Joseph: "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy
wife"; that is: "Fear not to solemnize your marriage with her."
Others, however, say that she was not yet admitted to his house, but
only betrothed to him. But the first is more in keeping with the
Gospel narrative.
_______________________
QUESTION 30
OF THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN
(In Four Articles)
We now have to consider the Blessed Virgin's Annunciation, concerning
which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was befitting that announcement should be made to her
of that which was to be begotten of her?
(2) By whom should this announcement be made?
(3) In what manner should this announcement be made?
(4) Of the order observed in the Annunciation.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 30, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Necessary to Announce to the Blessed Virgin That Which
Was to Be Done in Her?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unnecessary to announce to the
Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her. For there seems to
have been no need of the Annunciation except for the purpose of
receiving the Virgin's consent. But her consent seems to have been
unnecessary: because the Virginal Conception was foretold by a
prophecy of "predestination," which is "fulfilled without our
consent," as a gloss says on Matt. 1:22. There was no need,
therefore, for this Annunciation.
Obj. 2: Further, the Blessed Virgin believed in the Incarnation, for
to disbelieve therein excludes man from the way of salvation;
because, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22): "The justice of God (is) by
faith of Jesus Christ." But one needs no further instruction
concerning what one believes without doubt. Therefore the Blessed
Virgin had no need for the Incarnation of her Son to be announced to
her.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the Blessed Virgin conceived Christ in her
body, so every pious soul conceives Him spiritually. Thus the Apostle
says (Gal. 4:19): "My little children, of whom I am in labor again,
until Christ be formed in you." But to those who conceive Him
spiritually no announcement is made of this conception. Therefore
neither should it have been announced to the Blessed Virgin that she
was to conceive the Son of God in her womb.
_On the contrary,_ It is related (Luke 1:31) that the angel said to
her: "Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth
a son."
_I answer that,_ It was reasonable that it should be announced to the
Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order to
maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of God with the
Virgin--namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him,
before conceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta
Virgin. iii): "Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ,
than in conceiving the flesh of Christ"; and further on he adds: "Her
nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had she
not borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her
flesh."
Secondly, that she might be a more certain witness of this mystery,
being instructed therein by God.
Thirdly, that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience:
which she proved herself right ready to do, saying: "Behold the
handmaid of the Lord."
Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock
between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the
Annunciation the Virgin's consent was besought in lieu of that of the
entire human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of predestination is fulfilled without the
causality of our will; not without its consent.
Reply Obj. 2: The Blessed Virgin did indeed believe explicitly in the
future Incarnation; but, being humble, she did not think such high
things of herself. Consequently she required instruction in this
matter.
Reply Obj. 3: The spiritual conception of Christ through faith is
preceded by the preaching of the faith, for as much as "faith is by
hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Yet man does not know for certain thereby that
he has grace; but he does know that the faith, which he has received,
is true.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 30, Art. 2]
Whether the annunciation should have been made by an angel to the
Blessed Virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation should not have been
made by an angel to our Blessed Lady. For revelations to the highest
angels are made immediately by God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
vii). But the Mother of God is exalted above all the angels.
Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have
been announced to her by God immediately, and not by an angel.
Obj. 2: Further, if in this matter it behooved the common order to be
observed, by which Divine things are announced to men by angels; in
like manner Divine things are announced to a woman by a man:
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34, 35): "Let women keep
silence in the churches . . . but if they would learn anything, let
them ask their husbands at home." Therefore it seems that the mystery
of the Incarnation should have been announced to the Blessed Virgin
by some man: especially seeing that Joseph, her husband, was
instructed thereupon by an angel, as is related (Matt. 1:20, 21)
Obj. 3: Further, none can becomingly announce what he knows not. But
the highest angels did not fully know the mystery of the Incarnation:
wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the question, "Who is
this that cometh from Edom?" (Isa. 63:1) is to be understood as made
by them. Therefore it seems that the announcement of the Incarnation
could not be made becomingly by any angel.
Obj. 4: Further, greater things should be announced by messengers of
greater dignity. But the mystery of the Incarnation is the greatest
of all things announced by angels to men. It seems, therefore, if it
behooved to be announced by an angel at all, that this should have
been done by an angel of the highest order. But Gabriel is not of the
highest order, but of the order of archangels, which is the last but
one: wherefore the Church sings: "We know that the archangel Gabriel
brought thee a message from God" [*Feast of Purification B.V.M. ix
Resp. Brev. O.P.]. Therefore this announcement was not becomingly
made by the archangel Gabriel.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:26): "The angel Gabriel was
sent by God," etc.
_I answer that,_ It was fitting for the mystery of the Incarnation to
be announced to the Mother of God by an angel, for three reasons.
First, that in this also might be maintained the order established by
God, by which Divine things are brought to men by means of the
angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that "the angels
were the first to be taught the Divine mystery of the loving kindness
of Jesus: afterwards the grace of knowledge was imparted to us
through them. Thus, then, the most god-like Gabriel made known to
Zachary that a prophet son would be born to him; and, to Mary, how
the Divine mystery of the ineffable conception of God would be
realized in her."
Secondly, this was becoming to the restoration of human nature which
was to be effected by Christ. Wherefore Bede says in a homily (in
Annunt.): "It was an apt beginning of man's restoration that an angel
should be sent by God to the Virgin who was to be hallowed by the
Divine Birth: since the first cause of man's ruin was through the
serpent being sent by the devil to cajole the woman by the spirit of
pride."
Thirdly, because this was becoming to the virginity of the Mother of
God. Wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ascribed
to St. Jerome but not his work]: "It is well that an angel be sent to
the Virgin; because virginity is ever akin to the angelic nature.
Surely to live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is not an
earthly but a heavenly life."
Reply Obj. 1: The Mother of God was above the angels as regards the
dignity to which she was chosen by God. But as regards the present
state of life, she was beneath the angels. For even Christ Himself,
by reason of His passible life, "was made a little lower than the
angels," according to Heb. 2:9. But because Christ was both wayfarer
and comprehensor, He did not need to be instructed by angels, as
regards knowledge of Divine things. The Mother of God, however, was
not yet in the state of comprehension: and therefore she had to be
instructed by angels concerning the Divine Conception.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Assumption (De
Assump. B.V.M. [*Work of another author: among the works of St.
Augustine]) a true estimation of the Blessed Virgin excludes her from
certain general rules. For "neither did she 'multiply her
conceptions' nor was she 'under man's, i.e. her husband's,' power
(Gen. 3:16), who in her spotless womb conceived Christ of the Holy
Ghost." Therefore it was fitting that she should be informed of the
mystery of the Incarnation by means not of a man, but of an angel.
For this reason it was made known to her before Joseph: since the
message was brought to her before she conceived, but to Joseph after
she had conceived.
Reply Obj. 3: As may be gathered from the passage quoted from
Dionysius, the angels were acquainted with the mystery of the
Incarnation: and yet they put this question, being desirous that
Christ should give them more perfect knowledge of the details of this
mystery, which are incomprehensible to any created intellect. Thus
Maximus [*Maximus of Constantinople] says that "there can be no
question that the angels knew that the Incarnation was to take place.
But it was not given to them to trace the manner of our Lord's
conception, nor how it was that He remained whole in the Father,
whole throughout the universe, and was whole in the narrow abode of
the Virgin."
Reply Obj. 4: Some say that Gabriel was of the highest order; because
Gregory says (Hom. de Centum Ovibus [*34 in Evang.]): "It was right
that one of the highest angels should come, since his message was
most sublime." But this does nat imply that he was of the highest
order of all, but in regard to the angels: since he was an archangel.
Thus the Church calls him an archangel, and Gregory himself in a
homily (De Centum Ovibus 34) says that "those are called archangels
who announce sublime things." It is therefore sufficiently credible
that he was the highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory says (De
Centum Ovibus 34), this name agrees with his office: for "Gabriel
means 'Power of God.' This message therefore was fittingly brought by
the 'Power of God,' because the Lord of hosts and mighty in battle
was coming to overcome the powers of the air."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 30, Art. 3]
Whether the Angel of Annunciation Should Have Appeared to the Virgin
in a Bodily Vision?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel of the Annunciation should
not have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision. For "intellectual
vision is more excellent than bodily vision," as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii), and especially more becoming to an angel: since by
intellectual vision an angel is seen in his substance; whereas in a
bodily vision he is seen in the bodily shape which he assumes. Now
since it behooved a sublime messenger to come to announce the Divine
Conception, so, seemingly, he should have appeared in the most
excellent kind of vision. Therefore it seems that the angel of the
Annunciation appeared to the Virgin in an intellectual vision.
Obj. 2: Further, imaginary vision also seems to excel bodily vision:
just as the imagination is a higher power than the senses. But "the
angel . . . appeared to Joseph in his sleep" (Matt. 1:20), which was
clearly an imaginary vision. Therefore it seems that he should have
appeared to the Blessed Virgin also in an imaginary vision.
Obj. 3: Further, the bodily vision of a spiritual substance stupefies
the beholder; thus we sing of the Virgin herself: "And the Virgin
seeing the light was filled with fear" [*Feast of Annunciation,
B.V.M. ii Resp. Brev. O.P.]. But it was better that her mind should
be preserved from being thus troubled. Therefore it was not fitting
that this announcement should be made in a bodily vision.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine in a sermon (De Annunt. iii) pictures
the Blessed Virgin as speaking thus: "To me came the archangel
Gabriel with glowing countenance, gleaming robe, and wondrous step."
But these cannot pertain to other than bodily vision. Therefore the
angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed
Virgin.
_I answer that,_ The angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily
vision to the Blessed Virgin. And this indeed was fitting, first in
regard to that which was announced. For the angel came to announce
the Incarnation of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that,
in order to make this known, an invisible creature should assume a
form in which to appear visibly: forasmuch as all the apparitions of
the Old Testament are ordered to that apparition in which the Son of
God appeared in the flesh.
Secondly, it was fitting as regards the dignity of the Mother of God,
who was to receive the Son of God not only in her mind, but in her
bodily womb. Therefore it behooved not only her mind, but also her
bodily senses to be refreshed by the angelic vision.
Thirdly, it is in keeping with the certainty of that which was
announced. For we apprehend with greater certainty that which is
before our eyes, than what is in our imagination. Thus Chrysostom
says (Hom. iv in Matth.) that the angel "came to the Virgin not in
her sleep, but visibly. For since she was receiving from the angel a
message exceeding great, before such an event she needed a vision of
great solemnity."
Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual vision excels merely imaginary and merely
bodily vision. But Augustine himself says (De Annunt. iii) that
prophecy is more excellent if accompanied by intellectual and
imaginary vision, than if accompanied by only one of them. Now the
Blessed Virgin perceived not only the bodily vision, but also the
intellectual illumination. Wherefore this was a more excellent
vision. Yet it would have been more excellent if she had perceived
the angel himself in his substance by her intellectual vision. But it
was incompatible with her state of wayfarer that she should see an
angel in his essence.
Reply Obj. 2: The imagination is indeed a higher power than the
exterior sense: but because the senses are the principle of human
knowledge, the greatest certainty is in them, for the principles of
knowledge must needs always be most certain. Consequently Joseph, to
whom the angel appeared in his sleep, did not have so excellent a
vision as the Blessed Virgin.
Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says on Luke 1:11: "We are disturbed, and
lose our presence of mind, when we are confronted by the presence of
a superior power." And this happens not only in bodily, but also in
imaginary vision. Wherefore it is written (Gen. 15:12) that "when the
sun was setting, a deep sleep fell upon Abram, and a great and
darksome horror seized upon him." But by being thus disturbed man is
not harmed to such an extent that therefore he ought to forego the
vision of an angel. First because from the very fact that man is
raised above himself, in which matter his dignity is concerned, his
inferior powers are weakened; and from this results the aforesaid
disturbance: thus, also, when the natural heat is drawn within a
body, the exterior parts tremble. Secondly, because, as Origen says
(Hom. iv in Luc.): "The angel who appeared, knowing hers was a human
nature, first sought to remedy the disturbance of mind to which a man
is subject." Wherefore both to Zachary and to Mary, as soon as they
were disturbed, he said: "Fear not." For this reason, as we read in
the life of Anthony, "it is difficult to discern good from evil
spirits. For if joy succeed fear, we should know that the help is
from the Lord: because security of soul is a sign of present majesty.
But if the fear with which we are stricken persevere, it is an enemy
that we see."
Moreover it was becoming to virginal modesty that the Virgin should
be troubled. Because, as Ambrose says on Luke 1:20: "It is the part
of a virgin to be timid, to fear the advances of men, and to shrink
from men's addresses."
But others say that as the Blessed Virgin was accustomed to angelic
visions, she was not troubled at seeing this angel, but with wonder
at hearing what the angel said to her, for she did not think so
highly of herself. Wherefore the evangelist does not say that she
was troubled at seeing the angel, but "at his saying."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 30, Art. 4]
Whether the Annunciation Took Place in Becoming Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation did not take place
in becoming order. For the dignity of the Mother of God results from
the child she conceived. But the cause should be made known before
the effect. Therefore the angel should have announced to the Virgin
the conception of her child before acknowledging her dignity in
greeting her.
Obj. 2: Further, proof should be omitted in things which admit of no
doubt; and premised where doubt is possible. But the angel seems
first to have announced what the virgin might doubt, and which,
because of her doubt, would make her ask: "How shall this be done?"
and afterwards to have given the proof, alleging both the instance of
Elizabeth and the omnipotence of God. Therefore the Annunciation was
made by the angel in unbecoming order.
Obj. 3: Further, the greater cannot be adequately proved by the less.
But it was a greater wonder for a virgin than for an old woman to be
with child. Therefore the angel's proof was insufficient to
demonstrate the conception of a virgin from that of an old woman.
_On the contrary,_ it is written (Rom. 13:1): "Those that are of God,
are well ordered [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']." Now
the angel was "sent by God" to announce unto the Virgin, as is
related Luke 1:26. Therefore the Annunciation was made by the angel
in the most perfect order.
_I answer that,_ The Annunciation was made by the angel in a becoming
manner. For the angel had a threefold purpose in regard to the
Virgin. First, to draw her attention to the consideration of a matter
of such moment. This he did by greeting her by a new and unwonted
salutation. Wherefore Origen says, commenting on Luke (Hom. vi), that
if "she had known that similar words had been addressed to anyone
else, she, who had knowledge of the Law, would never have been
astonished at the seeming strangeness of the salutation." In which
salutation he began by asserting her worthiness of the conception, by
saying, "Full of grace"; then he announced the conception in the
words, "The Lord is with thee"; and then foretold the honor which
would result to her therefrom, by saying, "Blessed art thou among
women."
Secondly, he purposed to instruct her about the mystery of the
Incarnation, which was to be fulfilled in her. This he did by
foretelling the conception and birth, saying: "Behold, thou shalt
conceive in thy womb," etc.; and by declaring the dignity of the
child conceived, saying: "He shall be great"; and further, by making
known the mode of conception, when he said: "The Holy Ghost shall
come upon thee."
Thirdly, he purposed to lead her mind to consent. This he did by the
instance of Elizabeth, and by the argument from Divine omnipotence.
Reply Obj. 1: To a humble mind nothing is more astonishing than to
hear its own excellence. Now, wonder is most effective in drawing the
mind's attention. Therefore the angel, desirous of drawing the
Virgin's attention to the hearing of so great a mystery, began by
praising her.
Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose says explicitly on Luke 1:34, that the Blessed
Virgin did not doubt the angel's words. For he says: "Mary's answer
is more temperate than the words of the priest. She says: How shall
this be? He replies: Whereby shall I know this? He denies that he
believes, since he denies that he knows this. She does not doubt
fulfilment when she asks how it shall be done."
Augustine, however, seems to assert that she doubted. For he says (De
Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. li): "To Mary, in doubt about the
conception, the angel declares the possibility thereof." But such a
doubt is one of wonder rather than of unbelief. And so the angel
adduces a proof, not as a cure for unbelief, but in order to remove
her astonishment.
Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says (Hexaemeron v): "For this reason had
many barren women borne children, that the virginal birth might be
credible."
The conception of the sterile Elizabeth is therefore adduced, not
as a sufficient argument, but as a kind of figurative example:
consequently in support of this instance, the convincing argument
is added taken from the Divine omnipotence.
_______________________
QUESTION 31
OF THE MATTER FROM WHICH THE SAVIOUR'S BODY WAS CONCEIVED
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider the Saviour's conception. First, as to the
matter from which His body was conceived; secondly, as to the author
of His conception; thirdly, as to the manner and order of His
conception.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?
(2) Whether it was derived from David?
(3) Of the genealogy of Christ which is given in the Gospels;
(4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be born of a woman?
(5) Whether His body was formed from the purest blood of the Virgin?
(6) Whether the flesh of Christ was in the patriarchs as to something
signate?
(7) Whether the flesh of Christ in the patriarchs was subject to sin?
(8) Whether Christ paid tithes in the loins of Abraham?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 1]
Whether the Flesh of Christ Was Derived from Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was not derived from
Adam. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:47): "The first man was of the
earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly." Now, the
first man is Adam: and the second man is Christ. Therefore Christ is
not derived from Adam, but has an origin distinct from him.
Obj. 2: Further, the conception of Christ should have been most
miraculous. But it is a greater miracle to form man's body from the
slime of the earth, than from human matter derived from Adam. It
seems therefore unfitting that Christ should take flesh from Adam.
Therefore the body of Christ should not have been formed from the
mass of the human race derived from Adam, but of some other matter.
Obj. 3: Further, by "one man sin entered into this world," i.e. by
Adam, because in him all nations sinned originally, as is clear from
Rom. 5:12. But if Christ's body was derived from Adam, He would have
been in Adam originally when he sinned: therefore he would have
contracted original sin; which is unbecoming in His purity. Therefore
the body of Christ was not formed of matter derived from Adam.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 2:16): "Nowhere doth
He"--that is, the Son of God--"take hold of the angels: but of the
seed of Abraham He taketh hold." But the seed of Abraham was derived
from Adam. Therefore Christ's body was formed of matter derived from
Adam.
_I answer that,_ Christ assumed human nature in order to cleanse it
of corruption. But human nature did not need to be cleansed save in
as far as it was soiled in its tainted origin whereby it was
descended from Adam. Therefore it was becoming that He should assume
flesh of matter derived from Adam, that the nature itself might be
healed by the assumption.
Reply Obj. 1: The second man, i.e. Christ, is said to be of heaven,
not indeed as to the matter from which His body was formed, but
either as to the virtue whereby it was formed; or even as to His very
Godhead. But as to matter, Christ's body was earthly, as Adam's body
was.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 29, A. 1, ad 2) the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation is miraculous, not as ordained to strengthen
faith, but as an article of faith. And therefore in the mystery of
the Incarnation we do not seek that which is most miraculous, as in
those miracles that are wrought for the confirmation of faith, but
what is most becoming to Divine wisdom, and most expedient to the
salvation of man, since this is what we seek in all matters of faith.
It may also be said that in the mystery of the Incarnation the
miracle is not only in reference to the matter of the conception, but
rather in respect of the manner of the conception and birth; inasmuch
as a virgin conceived and gave birth to God.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 15, A. 1, ad 2), Christ's body was
in Adam in respect of a bodily substance--that is to say, that the
corporeal matter of Christ's body was derived from Adam: but it was
not there by reason of seminal virtue, because it was not conceived
from the seed of man. Thus it did not contract original sin, as
others who are descended from Adam by man's seed.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 2]
Whether Christ Took Flesh of the Seed of David?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not take flesh of the seed
of David. For Matthew, in tracing the genealogy of Christ, brings it
down to Joseph. But Joseph was not Christ's father, as shown above
(Q. 28, A. 1, ad 1, 2). Therefore it seems that Christ was not
descended from David.
Obj. 2: Further, Aaron was of the tribe of Levi, as related Ex. 6.
Now Mary the Mother of Christ is called the cousin of Elizabeth, who
was a daughter of Aaron, as is clear from Luke 1:5, 36. Therefore,
since David was of the tribe of Juda, as is shown Matt. 1, it seems
that Christ was not descended from David.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written of Jechonias (Jer. 22:30): "Write this
man barren . . . for there shall not be a man of his seed that shall
sit upon the throne of David." Whereas of Christ it is written (Isa.
9:7): "He shall sit upon the throne of David." Therefore Christ was
not of the seed of Jechonias: nor, consequently, of the family of
David, since Matthew traces the genealogy from David through
Jechonias.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:3): "Who was made to him of
the seed of David according to the flesh."
_I answer that,_ Christ is said to have been the son especially of
two of the patriarchs, Abraham and David, as is clear from Matt. 1:1.
There are many reasons for this. First to these especially was the
promise made concerning Christ. For it was said to Abraham (Gen.
22:18): "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed":
which words the Apostle expounds of Christ (Gal. 3:16): "To Abraham
were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his
seeds' as of many; but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which is
Christ." And to David it was said (Ps. 131:11): "Of the fruit of thy
womb I will set upon thy throne." Wherefore the Jewish people,
receiving Him with kingly honor, said (Matt. 21:9): "Hosanna to the
Son of David."
A second reason is because Christ was to be king, prophet, and
priest. Now Abraham was a priest; which is clear from the Lord saying
unto him (Gen. 15:9): "Take thee [Vulg.: 'Me'] a cow of three years
old," etc. He was also a prophet, according to Gen. 20:7: "He is a
prophet; and he shall pray for thee." Lastly David was both king and
prophet.
A third reason is because circumcision had its beginning in Abraham:
while in David God's election was most clearly made manifest,
according to 1 Kings 13:14: "The Lord hath sought Him a man according
to His own heart." And consequently Christ is called in a most
special way the Son of both, in order to show that He came for the
salvation both of the circumcised and of the elect among the Gentiles.
Reply Obj. 1: Faustus the Manichean argued thus, in the desire to
prove that Christ is not the Son of David, because He was not
conceived of Joseph, in whom Matthew's genealogy terminates.
Augustine answered this argument thus (Contra Faust. xxii): "Since
the same evangelist affirms that Joseph was Mary's husband and that
Christ's mother was a virgin, and that Christ was of the seed of
Abraham, what must we believe, but that Mary was not a stranger to
the family of David: and that it is not without reason that she was
called the wife of Joseph, by reason of the close alliance of their
hearts, although not mingled in the flesh; and that the genealogy is
traced down to Joseph rather than to her by reason of the dignity of
the husband? So therefore we believe that Mary was also of the family
of David: because we believe the Scriptures, which assert both that
Christ was of the seed of David according to the flesh, and that Mary
was His Mother, not by sexual intercourse but retaining her
virginity." For as Jerome says on Matt. 1:18: "Joseph and Mary were
of the same tribe: wherefore he was bound by law to marry her as she
was his kinswoman. Hence it was that they were enrolled together at
Bethlehem, as being descended from the same stock."
Reply Obj. 2: Gregory of Nazianzum answers this objection by saying
that it happened by God's will, that the royal family was united to
the priestly race, so that Christ, who is both king and priest,
should be born of both according to the flesh. Wherefore Aaron, who
was the first priest according to the Law, married a wife of the
tribe of Juda, Elizabeth, daughter of Aminadab. It is therefore
possible that Elizabeth's father married a wife of the family of
David, through whom the Blessed Virgin Mary, who was of the family of
David, would be a cousin of Elizabeth. Or conversely, and with
greater likelihood, that the Blessed Mary's father, who was of the
family of David, married a wife of the family of Aaron.
Again, it may be said with Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii) that if
Joachim, Mary's father, was of the family of Aaron (as the heretic
Faustus pretended to prove from certain apocryphal writings), then we
must believe that Joachim's mother, or else his wife, was of the
family of David, so long as we say that Mary was in some way
descended from David.
Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says on Luke 3:25, this prophetical passage
does not deny that a posterity will be born of the seed of Jechonias.
And so Christ is of his seed. Neither is the fact that Christ reigned
contrary to prophecy, for He did not reign with worldly honor; since
He declared: "My kingdom is not of this world."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 3]
Whether Christ's Genealogy Is Suitably Traced by the Evangelists?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's genealogy is not suitably
traced by the Evangelists. For it is written (Isa. 53:8): "Who shall
declare His generation?" Therefore Christ's genealogy should not have
been set down.
Obj. 2: Further, one man cannot possibly have two fathers. But
Matthew says that "Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary": whereas
Luke says that Joseph was the son of Heli. Therefore they contradict
one another.
Obj. 3: Further, there seem to be divergencies between them on
several points. For Matthew, at the commencement of his book,
beginning from Abraham and coming down to Joseph, enumerates
forty-two generations. Whereas Luke sets down Christ's genealogy
after His Baptism, and beginning from Christ traces the series of
generations back to God, counting in all seventy-seven generations,
the first and last included. It seems therefore that their accounts
of Christ's genealogy do not agree.
Obj. 4: Further, we read (4 Kings 8:24) that Joram begot Ochozias,
who was succeeded by his son Joas: who was succeeded by his son
Amasius: after whom reigned his son Azarias, called Ozias; who was
succeeded by his son Joathan. But Matthew says that Joram begot
Ozias. Therefore it seems that his account of Christ's genealogy is
unsuitable, since he omits three kings in the middle thereof.
Obj. 5: Further, all those who are mentioned in Christ's genealogy
had both a father and a mother, and many of them had brothers also.
Now in Christ's genealogy Matthew mentions only three
mothers--namely, Thamar, Ruth, and the wife of Urias. He also
mentions the brothers of Judas and Jechonias, and also Phares and
Zara. But Luke mentions none of these. Therefore the evangelists seem
to have described the genealogy of Christ in an unsuitable manner.
_On the contrary,_ The authority of Scripture suffices.
_I answer that,_ As is written (2 Tim. 3:16), "All Holy Scripture is
inspired of God [Vulg.: 'All scripture inspired of God is
profitable'], etc. Now what is done by God is done in perfect order,
according to Rom. 13:1: "Those that are of God are ordained [Vulg.:
'Those that are, are ordained of God']." Therefore Christ's genealogy
is set down by the evangelists in a suitable order.
Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Matt. 1, Isaias speaks of the
generation of Christ's Godhead. Whereas Matthew relates the
generation of Christ in His humanity; not indeed by explaining the
manner of the Incarnation, which is also unspeakable; but by
enumerating Christ's forefathers from whom He was descended according
to the flesh.
Reply Obj. 2: Various answers have been made by certain writers to
this objection which was raised by Julian the Apostate; for some, as
Gregory of Nazianzum, say that the people mentioned by the two
evangelists are the same, but under different names, as though they
each had two. But this will not stand: because Matthew mentions one
of David's sons--namely, Solomon; whereas Luke mentions
another--namely, Nathan, who according to the history of the kings (2
Kings 5:14) were clearly brothers.
Wherefore others said that Matthew gave the true genealogy of Christ:
while Luke gave the supposititious genealogy; hence he began: "Being
(as it was supposed) the son of Joseph." For among the Jews there
were some who believed that, on account of the crimes of the kings of
Juda, Christ would be born of the family of David, not through the
kings, but through some other line of private individuals.
Others again have supposed that Matthew gave the forefathers
according to the flesh: whereas Luke gave these according to the
spirit, that is, righteous men, who are called (Christ's) forefathers
by likeness of virtue.
But an answer is given in the Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. [*Part i, qu.
lvi; part 2, qu. vi] to the effect that we are not to understand that
Joseph is said by Luke to be the son of Heli: but that at the time of
Christ, Heli and Joseph were differently descended from David. Hence
Christ is said to have been supposed to be the son of Joseph, and
also to have been the son of Heli as though (the Evangelist) were to
say that Christ, from the fact that He was the son of Joseph, could
be called the son of Heli and of all those who were descended from
David; as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom" (viz. the Jews) "is
Christ according to the flesh."
Augustine again gives three solutions (De Qq. Evang. ii), saying:
"There are three motives by one or other of which the evangelist was
guided. For either one evangelist mentions Joseph's father of whom he
was begotten; whilst the other gives either his maternal grandfather
or some other of his later forefathers; or one was Joseph's natural
father: the other is father by adoption. Or, according to the Jewish
custom, one of those having died without children, a near relation of
his married his wife, the son born of the latter union being reckoned
as the son of the former": which is a kind of legal adoption, as
Augustine himself says (De Consensu Evang. ii, Cf. Retract. ii).
This last motive is the truest: Jerome also gives it commenting on
Matt. 1:16; and Eusebius of Caesarea in his Church history (I, vii),
says that it is given by Africanus the historian. For these writers
say that Mathan and Melchi, at different times, each begot a son of
one and the same wife, named Estha. For Mathan, who traced his
descent through Solomon, had married her first, and died, leaving one
son, whose name was Jacob: and after his death, as the law did not
forbid his widow to remarry, Melchi, who traced his descent through
Mathan, being of the same tribe though not of the same family as
Mathan, married his widow, who bore him a son, called Heli; so that
Jacob and Heli were uterine brothers born to different fathers. Now
one of these, Jacob, on his brother Heli dying without issue, married
the latter's widow, according to the prescription of the law, of whom
he had a son, Joseph, who by nature was his own son, but by law was
accounted the son of Heli. Wherefore Matthew says "Jacob begot
Joseph": whereas Luke, who was giving the legal genealogy, speaks of
no one as begetting.
And although Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) says that the Blessed
Virgin Mary was connected with Joseph in as far as Heli was accounted
as his father, for he says that she was descended from Melchi: yet
must we also believe that she was in some way descended from Solomon
through those patriarchs enumerated by Matthew, who is said to have
set down Christ's genealogy according to the flesh; and all the more
since Ambrose states that Christ was of the seed of Jechonias.
Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii) "Matthew
purposed to delineate the royal personality of Christ; Luke the
priestly personality: so that in Matthew's genealogy is signified the
assumption of our sins by our Lord Jesus Christ": inasmuch as by his
carnal origin "He assumed 'the likeness of sinful flesh.' But in
Luke's genealogy the washing away of our sins is signified," which is
effected by Christ's sacrifice. "For which reason Matthew traces the
generations downwards, Luke upwards." For the same reason too
"Matthew descends from David through Solomon, in whose mother David
sinned; whereas Luke ascends to David through Nathan, through whose
namesake, the prophet, God expiated his sin." And hence it is also
that, because "Matthew wished to signify that Christ had condescended
to our mortal nature, he set down the genealogy of Christ at the very
outset of his Gospel, beginning with Abraham and descending to Joseph
and the birth of Christ Himself. Luke, on the contrary, sets forth
Christ's genealogy not at the outset, but after Christ's Baptism, and
not in the descending but in the ascending order: as though giving
prominence to the office of the priest in expiating our sins, to
which John bore witness, saying: 'Behold Him who taketh away the sin
of the world.' And in the ascending order, he passes Abraham and
continues up to God, to whom we are reconciled by cleansing and
expiating. With reason too he follows the origin of adoption; because
by adoption we become children of God: whereas by carnal generation
the Son of God became the Son of Man. Moreover he shows sufficiently
that he does not say that Joseph was the son of Heli as though
begotten by him, but because he was adopted by him, since he says
that Adam was the son of God, inasmuch as he was created by God."
Again, the number forty pertains to the time of our present life:
because of the four parts of the world in which we pass this mortal
life under the rule of Christ. And forty is the product of four
multiplied by ten: while ten is the sum of the numbers from one to
four. The number ten may also refer to the decalogue; and the number
four to the present life; or again to the four Gospels, according to
which Christ reigns in us. And thus "Matthew, putting forward the
royal personality of Christ, enumerates forty persons not counting
Him" (cf. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. ii). But this is to be taken
on the supposition that it be the same Jechonias at the end of the
second, and at the commencement of the third series of fourteen, as
Augustine understands it. According to him this was done in order to
signify "that under Jechonias there was a certain defection to
strange nations during the Babylonian captivity; which also
foreshadowed the fact that Christ would pass from the Jews to the
Gentiles."
On the other hand, Jerome (on Matt. 1:12-15) says that there were two
Joachims--that is, Jechonias, father and son: both of whom are
mentioned in Christ's genealogy, so as to make clear the distinction
of the generations, which the evangelist divides into three series of
fourteen; which amounts in all to forty-two persons. Which number may
also be applied to the Holy Church: for it is the product of six,
which signifies the labor of the present life, and seven, which
signifies the rest of the life to come: for six times seven are
forty-two. The number fourteen, which is the sum of ten and four, can
also be given the same signification as that given to the number
forty, which is the product of the same numbers by multiplication.
But the number used by Luke in Christ's genealogy signifies the
generality of sins. "For the number ten is shown in the ten precepts
of the Law to be the number of righteousness. Now, to sin is to go
beyond the restriction of the Law. And eleven is the number beyond
ten." And seven signifies universality: because "universal time is
involved in seven days." Now seven times eleven are seventy-seven: so
that this number signifies the generality of sins which are taken
away by Christ.
Reply Obj. 4: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:8, 11: "Because Joram allied
himself with the family of the most wicked Jezabel, therefore his
memory is omitted down to the third generation, lest it should be
inserted among the holy predecessors of the Nativity." Hence as
Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperf. in Matth. Hom. i, falsely ascribed to
Chrysostom] says: "Just as great was the blessing conferred on Jehu,
who wrought vengeance on the house of Achab and Jezabel, so also
great was the curse on the house of Joram, through the wicked
daughter of Achab and Jezabel, so that until the fourth generation
his posterity is cut off from the number of kings, according to Ex.
20:5: I shall visit [Vulg.: 'Visiting'] the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children unto the third and fourth generations."
It must also be observed that there were other kings who sinned and
are mentioned in Christ's genealogy: but their impiety was not
continuous. For, as it is stated in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov.
Test. qu. lxxxv: "Solomon through his father's merits is included in
the series of kings; and Roboam . . . through the merits of Asa," who
was son of his (Roboam's) son, Abiam. "But the impiety of those three
[*i.e. Ochozias, Joas, and Amasias, of whom St. Augustine asks in
this question lxxxv, why they were omitted by St. Matthew] was
continuous."
Reply Obj. 5: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:3: "None of the holy women
are mentioned in the Saviour's genealogy, but only those whom
Scripture censures, so that He who came for the sake of sinners, by
being born of sinners, might blot out all sin." Thus Thamar is
mentioned, who is censured for her sin with her father-in-law; Rahab
who was a whore; Ruth who was a foreigner; and Bethsabee, the wife of
Urias, who was an adulteress. The last, however, is not mentioned by
name, but is designated through her husband; both on account of his
sin, for he was cognizant of the adultery and murder; and further in
order that, by mentioning the husband by name, David's sin might be
recalled. And because Luke purposes to delineate Christ as the
expiator of our sins, he makes no mention of these women. But he does
mention Juda's brethren, in order to show that they belong to God's
people: whereas Ismael, the brother of Isaac, and Esau, Jacob's
brother, were cut off from God's people, and for this reason are not
mentioned in Christ's genealogy. Another motive was to show the
emptiness of pride of birth: for many of Juda's brethren were born of
hand-maidens, and yet all were patriarchs and heads of tribes. Phares
and Zara are mentioned together, because, as Ambrose says on Luke
3:23, "they are the type of the twofold life of man: one, according
to the Law," signified by Zara; "the other by Faith," of which Phares
is the type. The brethren of Jechonias are included, because they all
reigned at various times: which was not the case with other kings:
or, again, because they were alike in wickedness and misfortune.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 4]
Whether the Matter of Christ's Body Should Have Been Taken from a
Woman?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of Christ's body should
not have been taken from a woman. For the male sex is more noble than
the female. But it was most suitable that Christ should assume that
which is perfect in human nature. Therefore it seems that He should
not have taken flesh from a woman but rather from man: just as Eve
was formed from the rib of a man.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever is conceived of a woman is shut up in her
womb. But it ill becomes God, Who fills heaven and earth, as is
written Jer. 23:24, to be shut up within the narrow limits of the
womb. Therefore it seems that He should not have been conceived of a
woman.
Obj. 3: Further, those who are conceived of a woman contract a
certain uncleanness: as it is written (Job 25:4): "Can man be
justified compared with God? Or he that is born of a woman appear
clean?" But it was unbecoming that any uncleanness should be in
Christ: for He is the Wisdom of God, of whom it is written (Wis.
7:25) that "no defiled thing cometh into her." Therefore it does not
seem right that He should have taken flesh from a woman.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 4:4): "God sent His Son, made
of a woman."
_I answer that,_ Although the Son of God could have taken flesh from
whatever matter He willed, it was nevertheless most becoming that He
should take flesh from a woman. First because in this way the entire
human nature was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
11): "It was suitable that man's liberation should be made manifest
in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the
nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming that the liberation of the
female sex should be manifested in that man being born of a woman."
Secondly, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "Thou shalt find in Christ
many things both natural, and supernatural. In accordance with nature
He was within the womb," viz. of a woman's body: "but it was above
nature that a virgin should conceive and give birth: that thou
mightest believe that He was God, who was renewing nature; and that
He was man who, according to nature, was being born of a man." And
Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): "If Almighty God had created
a man formed otherwise than in a mother's womb, and had suddenly
produced him to sight . . . would He not have strengthened an
erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He
had become a true man? And whilst He is doing all things wondrously,
would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy? But
now, He, the mediator between God and man, has so shown Himself,
that, uniting both natures in the unity of one Person, He has given a
dignity to ordinary by extraordinary things, and tempered the
extraordinary by the ordinary."
Thirdly, because in this fashion the begetting of man is accomplished
in every variety of manner. For the first man was made from the
"slime of the earth," without the concurrence of man or woman: Eve
was made of man but not of woman: and other men are made from both
man and woman. So that this fourth manner remained as it were proper
to Christ, that He should be made of a woman without the concurrence
of a man.
Reply Obj. 1: The male sex is more noble than the female, and for
this reason He took human nature in the male sex. But lest the female
sex should be despised, it was fitting that He should take flesh of a
woman. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "Men, despise not
yourselves: the Son of God became a man: despise not yourselves,
women; the Son of God was born of a woman."
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine thus (Contra Faust. xxiii) replies to
Faustus, who urged this objection; "By no means," says he, "does the
Catholic Faith, which believes that Christ the Son of God was born of
a virgin, according to the flesh, suppose that the same Son of God
was so shut up in His Mother's womb, as to cease to be elsewhere, as
though He no longer continued to govern heaven and earth, and as
though He had withdrawn Himself from the Father. But you, Manicheans,
being of a mind that admits of nought but material images, are
utterly unable to grasp these things." For, as he again says (Ep. ad
Volus. cxxxvii), "it belongs to the sense of man to form conceptions
only through tangible bodies, none of which can be entire everywhere,
because they must of necessity be diffused through their innumerable
parts in various places . . . Far otherwise is the nature of the soul
from that of the body: how much more the nature of God, the Creator
of soul and body! . . . He is able to be entire everywhere, and to be
contained in no place. He is able to come without moving from the
place where He was; and to go without leaving the spot whence He
came."
Reply Obj. 3: There is no uncleanness in the conception of man from a
woman, as far as this is the work of God: wherefore it is written
(Acts 10:15): "That which God hath cleansed do not thou call common,"
i.e. unclean. There is, however, a certain uncleanness therein,
resulting from sin, as far as lustful desire accompanies conception
by sexual union. But this was not the case with Christ, as shown
above (Q. 28, A. 1). But if there were any uncleanness therein, the
Word of God would not have been sullied thereby, for He is utterly
unchangeable. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v):
"God saith, the Creator of man: What is it that troubles thee in My
Birth? I was not conceived by lustful desire. I made Myself a mother
of whom to be born. If the sun's rays can dry up the filth in the
drain, and yet not be defiled: much more can the Splendor of eternal
light cleanse whatever It shines upon, but Itself cannot be sullied."
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 5]
Whether the Flesh of Christ Was Conceived of the Virgin's Purest
Blood?
Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was not conceived
of the Virgin's purest blood: For it is said in the collect (Feast of
the Annunciation) that God "willed that His Word should take flesh
from a Virgin." But flesh differs from blood. Therefore Christ's body
was not taken from the Virgin's blood.
Obj. 2: Further, as the woman was miraculously formed from the man,
so Christ's body was formed miraculously from the Virgin. But the
woman is not said to have been formed from the man's blood, but
rather from his flesh and bones, according to Gen. 2:23: "This now is
bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." It seems therefore that
neither should Christ's body have been formed from the Virgin's
blood, but from her flesh and bones.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ's body was of the same species as other men's
bodies. But other men's bodies are not formed from the purest blood
but from the semen and the menstrual blood. Therefore it seems that
neither was Christ's body conceived of the purest blood of the Virgin.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the Son
of God, from the Virgin's purest blood, formed Himself flesh,
animated with a rational soul."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), in Christ's conception His
being born of a woman was in accordance with the laws of nature, but
that He was born of a virgin was above the laws of nature. Now, such
is the law of nature that in the generation of an animal the female
supplies the matter, while the male is the active principle of
generation; as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i). But a
woman who conceives of a man is not a virgin. And consequently it
belongs to the supernatural mode of Christ's generation, that the
active principle of generation was the supernatural power of God: but
it belongs to the natural mode of His generation, that the matter
from which His body was conceived is similar to the matter which
other women supply for the conception of their offspring. Now, this
matter, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.), is the
woman's blood, not any of her blood, but brought to a more perfect
stage of secretion by the mother's generative power, so as to be apt
for conception. And therefore of such matter was Christ's body
conceived.
Reply Obj. 1: Since the Blessed Virgin was of the same nature as
other women, it follows that she had flesh and bones of the same
nature as theirs. Now, flesh and bones in other women are actual
parts of the body, the integrity of which results therefrom: and
consequently they cannot be taken from the body without its being
corrupted or diminished. But as Christ came to heal what was corrupt,
it was not fitting that He should bring corruption or diminution to
the integrity of His Mother. Therefore it was becoming that Christ's
body should be formed not from the flesh or bones of the Virgin, but
from her blood, which as yet is not actually a part, but is
potentially the whole, as stated in _De Gener. Animal._ i. Hence He
is said to have taken flesh from the Virgin, not that the matter from
which His body was formed was actual flesh, but blood, which is flesh
potentially.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), Adam,
through being established as a kind of principle of human nature, had
in his body a certain proportion of flesh and bone, which belonged to
him, not as an integral part of his personality, but in regard to his
state as a principle of human nature. And from this was the woman
formed, without detriment to the man. But in the Virgin's body there
was nothing of this sort, from which Christ's body could be formed
without detriment to His Mother's body.
Reply Obj. 3: Woman's semen is not apt for generation, but is
something imperfect in the seminal order, which, on account of the
imperfection of the female power, it has not been possible to bring
to complete seminal perfection. Consequently this semen is not the
necessary matter of conception; as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal. i): wherefore there was none such in Christ's conception: all
the more since, though it is imperfect in the seminal order, a
certain concupiscence accompanies its emission, as also that of the
male semen: whereas in that virginal conception there could be no
concupiscence. Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that
Christ's body was not conceived "seminally." But the menstrual blood,
the flow of which is subject to monthly periods, has a certain
natural impurity of corruption: like other superfluities, which
nature does not heed, and therefore expels. Of such menstrual blood
infected with corruption and repudiated by nature, the conception is
not formed; but from a certain secretion of the pure blood which by a
process of elimination is prepared for conception, being, as it were,
more pure and more perfect than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless,
it is tainted with the impurity of lust in the conception of other
men: inasmuch as by sexual intercourse this blood is drawn to a place
apt for conception. This, however, did not take place in Christ's
conception: because this blood was brought together in the Virgin's
womb and fashioned into a child by the operation of the Holy Ghost.
Therefore is Christ's body said to be "formed of the most chaste and
purest blood of the Virgin."
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 6]
Whether Christ's Body Was in Adam and the Other Patriarchs, As to
Something Signate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was in Adam and the
patriarchs as to something signate. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
x) that the flesh of Christ was in Adam and Abraham "by way of a
bodily substance." But bodily substance is something signate.
Therefore Christ's flesh was in Adam, Abraham, and the other
patriarchs, according to something signate.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Rom. 1:3) that Christ "was made . . . of
the seed of David according to the flesh." But the seed of David was
something signate in him. Therefore Christ was in David, according to
something signate, and for the same reason in the other patriarchs.
Obj. 3: Further, the human race is Christ's kindred, inasmuch as He
took flesh therefrom. But if that flesh were not something signate in
Adam, the human race, which is descended from Adam, would seem to
have no kindred with Christ: but rather with those other things from
which the matter of His flesh was taken. Therefore it seems that
Christ's flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs according to
something signate.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that in whatever
way Christ was in Adam and Abraham, other men were there also; but
not conversely. But other men were not in Adam and Abraham by way of
some signate matter, but only according to origin, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 119, A. 1, A. 2, ad 4). Therefore neither was Christ
in Adam and Abraham according to something signate; and, for the same
reason, neither was He in the other patriarchs.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5, ad 1), the matter of Christ's
body was not the flesh and bones of the Blessed Virgin, nor anything
that was actually a part of her body, but her blood which was her
flesh potentially. Now, whatever was in the Blessed Virgin, as
received from her parents, was actually a part of her body.
Consequently that which the Blessed Virgin received from her parents
was not the matter of Christ's body. Therefore we must say that
Christ's body was not in Adam and the other patriarchs according to
something signate, in the sense that some part of Adam's or of anyone
else's body could be singled out and designated as the very matter
from which Christ's body was to be formed: but it was there according
to origin, just as was the flesh of other men. For Christ's body is
related to Adam and the other patriarchs through the medium of His
Mother's body. Consequently Christ's body was in the patriarchs, in
no other way than was His Mother's body, which was not in the
patriarchs according to signate matter: as neither were the bodies of
other men, as stated in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 1, A. 2, ad 4).
Reply Obj. 1: The expression "Christ was in Adam according to bodily
substance," does not mean that Christ's body was a bodily substance
in Adam: but that the bodily substance of Christ's body, i.e. the
matter which He took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in its active
principle, but not as in its material principle: in other words, by
the generative power of Adam and his descendants down to the Blessed
Virgin, this matter was prepared for Christ's conception. But this
matter was not fashioned into Christ's body by the seminal power
derived from Adam. Therefore Christ is said to have been in Adam by
way of origin, according to bodily substance: but not according to
seminal virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ's body was not in Adam and the other
patriarchs, according to seminal virtue, yet the Blessed Virgin's
body was thus in them, through her being conceived from the seed of a
man. For this reason, through the medium of the Blessed Virgin,
Christ is said to be of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by
way of origin.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ and the human race are kindred, through the
likeness of species. Now, specific likeness results not from remote
but from proximate matter, and from the active principle which begets
its like in species. Thus, then, the kinship of Christ and the human
race is sufficiently preserved by His body being formed from the
Virgin's blood, derived in its origin from Adam and the other
patriarchs. Nor is this kinship affected by the matter whence this
blood is taken, as neither is it in the generation of other men, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 2, ad 3).
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 7]
Whether Christ's Flesh in the Patriarchs Was Infected by Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was not infected by
sin in the patriarchs. For it is written (Wis. 7:25) that "no defiled
thing cometh into" Divine Wisdom. But Christ is the Wisdom of God
according to 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore Christ's flesh was never defiled
by sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ
"assumed the first-fruits of our nature." But in the primitive state
human flesh was not infected by sin. Therefore Christ's flesh was not
infected either in Adam or in the other patriarchs.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that "human nature
ever had, together with the wound, the balm with which to heal it."
But that which is infected cannot heal a wound; rather does it need
to be healed itself. Therefore in human nature there was ever
something preserved from infection, from which afterwards Christ's
body was formed.
_On the contrary,_ Christ's body is not related to Adam and the other
patriarchs, save through the medium of the Blessed Virgin's body, of
whom He took flesh. But the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly
conceived in original sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 3, ad 1), and
thus, as far as it was in the patriarchs, it was subject to sin.
Therefore the flesh of Christ, as far as it was in the patriarchs,
was subject to sin.
_I answer that,_ When we say that Christ or His flesh was in Adam and
the other patriarchs, we compare Him, or His flesh, to Adam and the
other patriarchs. Now, it is manifest that the condition of the
patriarchs differed from that of Christ: for the patriarchs were
subject to sin, whereas Christ was absolutely free from sin.
Consequently a twofold error may occur on this point. First, by
attributing to Christ, or to His flesh, that condition which was in
the patriarchs; by saying, for instance, that Christ sinned in Adam,
since after some fashion He was in him. But this is false; because
Christ was not in Adam in such a way that Adam's sin belonged to
Christ: forasmuch as He is not descended from him according to the
law of concupiscence, or according to seminal virtue; as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3, A. 6, ad 1; Q. 15, A. 1, ad 2).
Secondly, error may occur by attributing the condition of Christ or
of His flesh to that which was actually in the patriarchs: by saying,
for instance, that, because Christ's flesh, as existing in Christ,
was not subject to sin, therefore in Adam also and in the patriarchs
there was some part of his body that was not subject to sin, and from
which afterwards Christ's body was formed; as some indeed held. For
this is quite impossible. First, because Christ's flesh was not in
Adam and in the other patriarchs, according to something signate,
distinguishable from the rest of his flesh, as pure from impure; as
already stated (A. 6). Secondly, because since human flesh is
infected by sin, through being conceived in lust, just as the entire
flesh of a man is conceived through lust, so also is it entirely
defiled by sin. Consequently we must say that the entire flesh of the
patriarchs was subjected to sin, nor was there anything in them that
was free from sin, and from which afterwards Christ's body could be
formed.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ did not assume the flesh of the human race
subject to sin, but cleansed from all infection of sin. Thus it is
that "no defiled thing cometh into the Wisdom of God."
Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said to have assumed the first-fruits of our
nature, as to the likeness of condition; forasmuch as He assumed
flesh not infected by sin, like unto the flesh of man before sin. But
this is not to be understood to imply a continuation of that
primitive purity, as though the flesh of innocent man was preserved
in its freedom from sin until the formation of Christ's body.
Reply Obj. 3: Before Christ, there was actually in human nature a
wound, i.e. the infection of original sin. But the balm to heal the
wound was not there actually, but only by a certain virtue of origin,
forasmuch as from those patriarchs the flesh of Christ was to be
propagated.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 31, Art. 8]
Whether Christ Paid Tithes in Abraham's Loins?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ "paid tithes" in Abraham's
loins. For the Apostle says (Heb. 7:6-9) that Levi, the
great-grandson of Abraham, "paid tithes in Abraham," because, when
the latter paid tithes to Melchisedech, "he was yet in his loins." In
like manner Christ was in Abraham's loins when the latter paid
tithes. Therefore Christ Himself also paid tithes in Abraham.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ is of the seed of Abraham according to the
flesh which He received from His Mother. But His Mother paid tithes
in Abraham. Therefore for a like reason did Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, "in Abraham tithe was levied on that which needed
healing," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x). But all flesh subject
to sin needed healing. Since therefore Christ's flesh was the subject
of sin, as stated above (A. 7), it seems that Christ's flesh paid
tithes in Abraham.
Obj. 4: Further, this does not seem to be at all derogatory to
Christ's dignity. For the fact that the father of a bishop pays
tithes to a priest does not hinder his son, the bishop, from being of
higher rank than an ordinary priest. Consequently, although we may
say that Christ paid tithes when Abraham paid them to Melchisedech,
it does not follow that Christ was not greater than Melchisedech.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that "Christ did
not pay tithes there," i.e. in Abraham, "for His flesh derived from
him, not the heat of the wound, but the matter of the antidote."
_I answer that,_ It behooves us to say that the sense of the passage
quoted from the Apostle is that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham.
For the Apostle proves that the priesthood according to the order of
Melchisedech is greater than the Levitical priesthood, from the fact
that Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech, while Levi, from whom the
legal priesthood was derived, was yet in his loins. Now, if Christ
had also paid tithes in Abraham, His priesthood would not have been
according to the order of Melchisedech, but of a lower order.
Consequently we must say that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham's
loins, as Levi did.
For since he who pays a tithe keeps nine parts to himself, and
surrenders the tenth to another, inasmuch as the number ten is the
sign of perfection, as being, in a sort, the terminus of all numbers
which mount from one to ten, it follows that he who pays a tithe
bears witness to his own imperfection and to the perfection of
another. Now, to sin is due the imperfection of the human race, which
needs to be perfected by Him who cleanses from sin. But to heal from
sin belongs to Christ alone, for He is the "Lamb that taketh away the
sin of the world" (John 1:29), whose figure was Melchisedech, as the
Apostle proves (Heb. 7). Therefore by giving tithes to Melchisedech,
Abraham foreshadowed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who
were to be his descendants in contracting original sin, needed that
healing which is through Christ. And Isaac, Jacob, and Levi, and all
the others were in Abraham in such a way so as to be descended from
him, not only as to bodily substance, but also as to seminal virtue,
by which original sin is transmitted. Consequently, they all paid
tithes in Abraham, i.e. foreshadowed as needing to be healed by
Christ. And Christ alone was in Abraham in such a manner as to
descend from him, not by seminal virtue, but according to bodily
substance. Therefore He was not in Abraham so as to need to be
healed, but rather "as the balm with which the wound was to be
healed." Therefore He did not pay tithes in Abraham's loins.
Thus the answer to the first objection is made manifest.
Reply Obj. 2: Because the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original
sin, she was in Abraham as needing to be healed. Therefore she paid
tithes in him, as descending from him according to seminal virtue.
But this is not true of Christ's body, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ's flesh is said to have been subject to sin,
according as it was in the patriarchs, by reason of the condition in
which it was in His forefathers, who paid the tithes: but not by
reason of its condition as actually in Christ, who did not pay the
tithes.
Reply Obj. 4: The levitical priesthood was handed down through carnal
origin: wherefore it was not less in Abraham than in Levi.
Consequently, since Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech as to one
greater than he, it follows that the priesthood of Melchisedech,
inasmuch as he was a figure of Christ, was greater than that of Levi.
But the priesthood of Christ does not result from carnal origin, but
from spiritual grace. Therefore it is possible that a father pay
tithes to a priest, as the less to the greater, and yet his son, if
he be a bishop, is greater than that priest, not through carnal
origin, but through the spiritual grace which he has received from
Christ.
_______________________
QUESTION 32
OF THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION
(In Four Articles)
We shall now consider the active principle in Christ's conception:
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Holy Ghost was the active principle of Christ's
conception?
(2) Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy
Ghost?
(3) Whether it can be said that the Holy Ghost is Christ's father
according to the flesh?
(4) Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ's
conception?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 32, Art. 1]
Whether the Accomplishment of Christ's Conception Should Be
Attributed to the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that the accomplishment of Christ's
conception should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost, because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i), "The works of the Trinity are
indivisible, just as the Essence of the Trinity is indivisible." But
the accomplishment of Christ's conception was the work of God.
Therefore it seems that it should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost
any more than to the Father or the Son.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): "When the fulness of
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman"; which words
Augustine expounds by saying (De Trin. iv): "Sent, in so far as made
of a woman." But the sending of the Son is especially attributed to
the Father, as stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 8). Therefore His
conception also, by reason of which He was "made of a woman," should
be attributed principally to the Father.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 9:1): "Wisdom hath built
herself a house." Now, Christ is Himself the Wisdom of God; according
to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God." And
the house of this Wisdom is Christ's body, which is also called His
temple, according to John 2:21: "But He spoke of the temple of His
body." Therefore it seems that the accomplishment of Christ's
conception should be attributed principally to the Son, and not,
therefore, to the Holy Ghost.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:35): "The Holy Ghost shall
come upon Thee."
_I answer that,_ The whole Trinity effected the conception of
Christ's body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the Holy Ghost,
for three reasons. First, because this is befitting to the cause of
the Incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Ghost is
the love of Father and Son, as stated in the First Part (Q. 37, A.
1). Now, that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin's
womb was due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said (John
3:16): "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son."
Secondly, this is befitting to the cause of the Incarnation, on the
part of the nature assumed. Because we are thus given to understand
that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of
Person, not by reason of its merits, but through grace alone; which
is attributed to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: "There are
diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Wherefore Augustine says
(Enchiridion xl): "The manner in which Christ was born of the Holy
Ghost . . . suggests to us the grace of God, whereby man, without any
merits going before, in the very beginning of his nature when he
began to exist was joined to God the Word, into so great unity of
Person, that He Himself should be the Son of God."
Thirdly, because this is befitting the term of the Incarnation. For
the term of the Incarnation was that that man, who was being
conceived, should be the Holy one and the Son of God. Now, both of
these are attributed to the Holy Ghost. For by Him men are made to be
sons of God, according to Gal. 4:6: "Because you are sons, God hath
sent the Spirit of His Son into your [Vulg.: 'our'] hearts, crying:
Abba, Father." Again, He is the "Spirit of sanctification," according
to Rom. 1:4. Therefore, just as other men are sanctified spiritually
by the Holy Ghost; so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ
conceived in sanctity by the Holy Ghost, so as to be the natural Son
of God. Hence, according to a gloss on Rom. 1:4, the words, "Who was
predestinated the Son of God, in power," are explained by what
immediately follows: "According to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e.
through being conceived of the Holy Ghost." And the Angel of the
Annunciation himself, after saying, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon
thee," draws the conclusion: "Therefore also the Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God."
Reply Obj. 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to the
whole Trinity; yet in some way it is attributed to each of the
Persons. For to the Father is attributed authority in regard to the
Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human
nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the
Son: but the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed to
the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son,
according to Gal. 4:6: "God sent the Spirit of His Son." For just as
the power of the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit
enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men,
so the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor.
1:24: "Christ, the Power of God," through the Holy Ghost formed the
body which He assumed. This is also shown by the words of the angel:
"The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee," as it were, in order to
prepare and fashion the matter of Christ's body; "and the Power of
the Most High," i.e. Christ, "shall overshadow thee--that is to say,
the incorporeal Light of the Godhead shall in thee take the corporeal
substance of human nature: for a shadow is formed by light and body,"
as Gregory says (Moral. xviii). The "Most High" is the Father, whose
Power is the Son.
Reply Obj. 2: The mission refers to the Person assuming, who is sent
by the Father; but the conception refers to the body assumed, which
is formed by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And therefore, though
mission and conception are in the same subject; since they differ in
our consideration of them, mission is attributed to the Father, but
the accomplishment of the conception to the Holy Ghost; whereas the
assumption of flesh is attributed to the Son.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 52):
"This may be understood in two ways. For, first, Christ's house is
the Church, which He built with His blood. Secondly, His body may be
called His house, just as it is called His temple . . . and what is
done by the Holy Ghost is done by the Son of God, because Theirs is
one Nature and one Will."
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 32, Art. 2]
Whether It Should Be Said That Christ Was Conceived of (_de_) the
Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should not say that Christ was
conceived of (_de_) the Holy Ghost. Because on Rom. 11:36: "For of
Him (_ex ipso_) and by Him, and in Him, are all things," the gloss of
Augustine says: "Notice that he does not say, 'of Him' (_de ipso_),
but 'of Him' (_ex ipso_). For of Him (_ex ipso_), are heaven and
earth, since He made them: but not of Him [de ipso, since they are
not made of His substance." But the Holy Ghost did not form Christ's
body of (_de_) His own substance. Therefore we should not say that
Christ was conceived of (_de_) the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 2: Further, the active principle of (_de_) which something is
conceived is as the seed in generation. But the Holy Ghost did not
take the place of seed in Christ's conception. For Jerome says
(Expos. Cathol. Fidei) [*Written by Pelagius]: "We do not say, as
some wicked wretches hold, that the Holy Ghost took the place of
seed: but we say that Christ's body was wrought," i.e. formed, "by
the power and might of the Creator." Therefore we should not say that
Christ's body was conceived of (_de_) the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 3: Further, no one thing is made of two, except they be in some
way mingled. But Christ's body was formed of (_de_) the Virgin Mary.
If therefore we say that Christ was conceived of (_de_) the Holy
Ghost, it seems that a mingling took place of the Holy Ghost with the
matter supplied by the Virgin: and this is clearly false. Therefore
we should not say that Christ was conceived of (_de_) the Holy Ghost.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:18): "Before they came
together, she was found with child, of (_de_) the Holy Ghost."
_I answer that,_ Conception is not attributed to Christ's body alone,
but also to Christ Himself by reason of His body. Now, in the Holy
Ghost we may observe a twofold habitude to Christ. For to the Son of
God Himself, who is said to have been conceived, He has a habitude of
consubstantiality: while to His body He has the habitude of efficient
cause. And this preposition of (_de_) signifies both habitudes: thus
we say that a certain man is "of (_de_) his father." And therefore we
can fittingly say that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost in such
a way that the efficiency of the Holy Ghost be referred to the body
assumed, and the consubstantiality to the Person assuming.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ's body, through not being consubstantial with
the Holy Ghost, cannot properly be said to be conceived "of" (_de_)
the Holy Ghost, but rather "from (_ex_) the Holy Ghost," as Ambrose
says (De Spir. Sanct. ii.): "What is from someone is either from his
substance or from his power: from his substance, as the Son who is
from the Father; from his power, as all things are from God, just as
Mary conceived from the Holy Ghost."
Reply Obj. 2: It seems that on this point there is a difference of
opinion between Jerome and certain other Doctors, who assert that the
Holy Ghost took the place of seed in this conception. For Chrysostom
says (Hom. i in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., among the supposititious
writings]): "When God's Only-Begotten was about to enter into the
Virgin, the Holy Ghost preceded Him; that by the previous entrance of
the Holy Ghost, Christ might be born unto sanctification according to
His body, the Godhead entering instead of the seed." And Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii): "God's wisdom and power overshadowed her,
like unto a Divine seed."
But these expressions are easily explained. Because Chrysostom and
Damascene compare the Holy Ghost, or also the Son, who is the Power
of the Most High, to seed, by reason of the active power therein;
while Jerome denies that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed,
considered as a corporeal substance which is transformed in
conception.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xl), Christ is said to
be conceived or born of the Holy Ghost in one sense; of the Virgin
Mary in another--of the Virgin Mary materially; of the Holy Ghost
efficiently. Therefore there was no mingling here.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 32, Art. 3]
Whether the Holy Ghost Should Be Called Christ's Father in Respect of
His Humanity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost should be called
Christ's father in respect of His humanity. Because, according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i): "The Father is the active
principle in generation, the Mother supplies the matter." But the
Blessed Virgin is called Christ's Mother, by reason of the matter
which she supplied in His conception. Therefore it seems that the
Holy Ghost can be called His father, through being the active
principle in His conception.
Obj. 2: Further, as the minds of other holy men are fashioned by the
Holy Ghost, so also was Christ's body fashioned by the Holy Ghost.
But other holy men, on account of the aforesaid fashioning, are
called the children of the whole Trinity, and consequently of the
Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ should be called the Son
of the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as His body was fashioned by the Holy
Ghost.
Obj. 3: Further, God is called our Father by reason of His having
made us, according to Deut. 32:6: "Is not He thy Father, that hath
possessed thee, and made thee and created thee?" But the Holy Ghost
made Christ's body, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore the Holy
Ghost should be called Christ's Father in respect of the body
fashioned by Him.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Christ was born
of the Holy Ghost not as a Son, and of the Virgin Mary as a Son."
_I answer that,_ The words "fatherhood," "motherhood," and "sonship,"
result from generation; yet not from any generation, but from that of
living things, especially animals. For we do not say that fire
generated is the son of the fire generating it, except, perhaps,
metaphorically; we speak thus only of animals in whom generation is
more perfect. Nevertheless, the word "son" is not applied to
everything generated in animals, but only to that which is generated
into likeness of the generator. Wherefore, as Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxix), we do not say that a hair which is generated in
a man is his son; nor do we say that a man who is born is the son of
the seed; for neither is the hair like the man nor is the man born
like the seed, but like the man who begot him. And if the likeness be
perfect, the sonship is perfect, whether in God or in man. But if the
likeness be imperfect, the sonship is imperfect. Thus in man there is
a certain imperfect likeness to God, both as regards his being
created to God's image and as regards His being created unto the
likeness of grace. Therefore in both ways man can be called His son,
both because he is created to His image and because he is likened to
Him by grace. Now, it must be observed that what is said in its
perfect sense of a thing should not be said thereof in its imperfect
sense: thus, because Socrates is said to be naturally a man, in the
proper sense of "man," never is he called man in the sense in which
the portrait of a man is called a man, although, perhaps, he may
resemble another man. Now, Christ is the Son of God in the perfect
sense of sonship. Wherefore, although in His human nature He was
created and justified, He ought not to be called the Son of God,
either in respect of His being created or of His being justified, but
only in respect of His eternal generation, by reason of which He is
the Son of the Father alone. Therefore nowise should Christ be called
the Son of the Holy Ghost, nor even of the whole Trinity.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ was conceived of the Virgin Mary, who supplied
the matter of His conception unto likeness of species. For this
reason He is called her Son. But as man He was conceived of the Holy
Ghost as the active principle of His conception, but not unto
likeness of species, as a man is born of his father. Therefore Christ
is not called the Son of the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 2: Men who are fashioned spiritually by the Holy Ghost
cannot be called sons of God in the perfect sense of sonship. And
therefore they are called sons of God in respect of imperfect
sonship, which is by reason of the likeness of grace, which flows
from the whole Trinity.
But with Christ it is different, as stated above.
The same reply avails for the Third Objection.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 32, Art. 4]
Whether the Blessed Virgin Cooperated Actively in the Conception of
Christ's Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cooperated
actively in the conception of Christ's body. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin, purifying
her, and bestowing on her the power to receive and to bring forth the
Word of God." But she had from nature the passive power of
generation, like any other woman. Therefore He bestowed on her an
active power of generation. And thus she cooperated actively in
Christ's conception.
Obj. 2: Further, all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, as
the Commentator says (De Anima ii). But the generative power, in both
man and woman, belongs to the vegetative soul. Therefore, both in man
and woman, it cooperates actively in the conception of the child.
Obj. 3: Further, in the conception of a child the woman supplies the
matter from which the child's body is naturally formed. But nature is
an intrinsic principle of movement. Therefore it seems that in the
very matter supplied by the Blessed Virgin there was an active
principle.
_On the contrary,_ The active principle in generation is called the
"seminal virtue." But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x), Christ's
body "was taken from the Virgin, only as to corporeal matter, by the
Divine power of conception and formation, but not by any human
seminal virtue." Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not cooperate
actively in, the conception of Christ's body.
_I answer that,_ Some say that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively
in Christ's conception, both by natural and by a supernatural power.
By natural power, because they hold that in all natural matter there
is an active principle; otherwise they believe that there would be no
such thing as natural transformation. But in this they are deceived.
Because a transformation is said to be natural by reason not only of
an active but also of a passive intrinsic principle: for the
Philosopher says expressly (Phys. viii) that in heavy and light
things there is a passive, and not an active, principle of natural
movement. Nor is it possible for matter to be active in its own
formation, since it is not in act. Nor, again, is it possible for
anything to put itself in motion except it be divided into two parts,
one being the mover, the other being moved: which happens in animate
things only, as is proved _Phys._ viii.
By a supernatural power, because they say that the mother requires
not only to supply the matter, which is the menstrual blood, but also
the semen, which, being mingled with that of the male, has an active
power in generation. And since in the Blessed Virgin there was no
resolution of semen, by reason of her inviolate virginity, they say
that the Holy Ghost supernaturally bestowed on her an active power in
the conception of Christ's body, which power other mothers have by
reason of the semen resolved. But this cannot stand, because, since
"each thing is on account of its operation" (De Coel. ii), nature
would not, for the purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the
male and female sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct
from that of the female. Now, in generation there are two distinct
operations--that of the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it
follows that the entire active operation is on the part of the male,
and the passive on the part of the female. For this reason in plants,
where both forces are mingled, there is no distinction of male and
female.
Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's Father, but His
Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active
power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be
His Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. Whence it would
follow that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We
must therefore say that in Christ's conception itself she did not
cooperate actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof.
Nevertheless, before the conception she cooperated actively in the
preparation of the matter so that it should be apt for the conception.
Reply Obj. 1: This conception had three privileges--namely, that it
was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only, but of
God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all three
were effected by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to the
first, that the Holy Ghost "came upon the Virgin, purifying
her"--that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As
to the second, he says: "And bestowing on her the power to receive,"
i.e. to conceive, "the Word of God." As to the third, he says: "And
to give birth" to Him, i.e. that she might, while remaining a virgin,
bring Him forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers
achieve this through the action of the male seed.
Reply Obj. 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect
compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the
inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher
art gives the form, as is stated _Phys._ ii, so also the generative
power of the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by
the active power of the male.
Reply Obj. 3: In order for a transformation to be natural, there is
no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a passive
principle, as stated above.
_______________________
QUESTION 33
OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST'S CONCEPTION
(In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ's conception,
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its
conception?
(2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception?
(3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its
conception?
(4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 33, Art. 1]
Whether Christ's Body Was Formed in the First Instant of Its
Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not formed in the
first instant of its conception. For it is written (John 2:20):
"Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building"; on which words
Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): "This number applies
manifestly to the perfection of our Lord's body." He says, further
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 56): "It is not without reason that the Temple,
which was a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in
building: so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so
many days was our Lord's body perfected." Therefore Christ's body was
not perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception.
Obj. 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the formation
of Christ's body in order that the purest blood of the Virgin's body
might be brought where generation might aptly take place. Now, no
body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken in
movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as
is proved _Phys._ vi. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an
instant.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ's body was formed of the purest blood of the
Virgin, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 5). But that matter could not be
in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter would
have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore the
last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first
instant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants there is
an interval of time. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an
instant, but during a space of time.
Obj. 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time for
its act, so also does the generative power: for both are natural
powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ's body took a
fixed time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written
(Luke 2:52) that He "advanced in wisdom and age." Therefore it seems
for the same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too,
belongs to the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a
fixed time, like the bodies of other men.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xviii): "As soon as the angel
announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the
womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh."
_I answer that,_ In the conception of Christ's body three points may
be considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of
generation; secondly, the formation of the body from that matter;
thirdly, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of
quantity. Of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is
a preamble; the third, a result of the conception.
Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be
contrary to the very nature of the local movement of any body
whatever, the parts of which come into a place successively. The
third also requires a succession of time: both because there is no
increase without local movement, and because increase is effected by
the power of the soul already informing the body, the operation of
which power is subject to time.
But the body's very formation, in which conception principally
consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the
infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ's
body was formed, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1). For the greater the
power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and,
consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter
instantaneously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Person
of the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that
He should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the
conception had been going on for any time before the perfect
formation of the body, the whole conception could not be attributed
to the Son of God, since it is not attributed to Him except by reason
of the assumption of that body. Therefore in the first instant in
which the various parts of the matter were united together in the
place of generation, Christ's body was both perfectly formed and
assumed. And thus is the Son of God said to have been conceived; nor
could it be said otherwise.
Reply Obj. 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to formation
alone of Christ's body, but to its formation, together with a fixed
development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the aforesaid
number are foreshadowed the number of months during which Christ was
in the Virgin's womb.
Reply Obj. 2: This local movement is not comprised within the
conception itself, but is a preamble thereto.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in which
that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period of
time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in
which Christ's body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of
the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the
place of generation.
Reply Obj. 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of that
which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is
caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but
of the father generating from seed, in which the formative power
derived from the father's soul has its operation. But Christ's body
was not formed by the seed of man, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 5, ad
3), but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the formation
thereof should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the
development of Christ's body was the effect of the augmentative power
in Christ's soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it
behooved His body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other
men, so as to prove the reality of His human nature.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 33, Art. 2]
Whether Christ's Body Was Animated in the First Instant of Its
Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not animated in the
first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian.):
"Christ's flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the
beginning of His animation different from that of other men." But the
soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their
conception. Therefore neither should Christ's soul have been infused
into His body in the first instant of its conception.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires
determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its
conception Christ's body was not of the same quantity as the bodies
of other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its
development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred
sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child
than others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine
says (De Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin's
womb for the space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to
what Pope Leo says (Serm. iv in Epiph.): "They found the child Jesus
nowise differing from the generality of infants." Therefore Christ's
body was not animated in the first instant of its conception.
Obj. 3: Further, whenever there is "before" and "after" there must be
several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.
ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be "before" and
"after": for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an
animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ
could not be effected in the first instant of His conception.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "At the very
instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it
was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul."
_I answer that,_ For the conception to be attributed to the very Son
of God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, "who was conceived
by the Holy Ghost," we must needs say that the body itself, in being
conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown
above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means
of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e. the intellect.
Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must
needs have been animated by the rational soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be
considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the
body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into
Christ's body was the same as in other men's bodies: for just as the
soul is infused into another man's body as soon as it is formed, so
was it with Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered merely
in regard to time. And thus, because Christ's body was perfectly
formed in a shorter space of time, so after a shorter space of time
was it animated.
Reply Obj. 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into which
it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude because
it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a body has
when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the
perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to
say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first
animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle
stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the
time when other men's bodies are animated; though it was less than
theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that
quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated
body; since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man's
body.
Reply Obj. 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the generation of
other men, because the body is successively formed and disposed for
the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it receives
an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly disposed, it
receives a perfect soul. But Christ's body, on account of the
infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed instantaneously.
Wherefore, at once and in the first instant it received a perfect
form, that is, the rational soul.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 33, Art. 3]
Whether Christ's Flesh Was First of All Conceived and Afterwards
Assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was first of all
conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be
assumed. But Christ's flesh began to exist when it was conceived.
Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it
was conceived.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by
means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the
term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the
conception. But at the term of the conception it was already
conceived. Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards
assumed.
Obj. 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect
precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the
Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ's body is something generated.
Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which
consisted in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of
its conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and
afterwards assumed.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii [*Written
by Fulgentius]): "Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that
Christ's flesh was not conceived in the Virgin's womb, before being
assumed by the Word."
_I answer that,_ As stated above, we may say properly that "God was
made man," but not that "man was made God": because God took to
Himself that which belongs to man--and that which belongs to man did
not pre-exist, as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the
Word. But if Christ's flesh had been conceived before being assumed
by the Word, it would have had at some time an hypostasis other than
that of the Word of God. And this is against the very nature of the
Incarnation, which we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God
was united to human nature and to all its parts in the unity of
hypostasis: nor was it becoming that the Word of God should, by
assuming human nature, destroy a pre-existing hypostasis of human
nature or of any part thereof. It is consequently contrary to faith
to assert that Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and
afterwards assumed by the Word of God.
Reply Obj. 1: If Christ's flesh had been formed or conceived, not
instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow:
either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was
conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the
conception was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that
flesh the beginning and the completion of its conception were in the
same instant. So that, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum
xviii] says: "We say that the very Word of God was conceived in
taking flesh, and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word
taking flesh."
From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the
same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and
animation were completed.
Reply Obj. 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be looked upon
as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and mounting up
to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus maintained.
Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of the perfect
Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our nature;
according to John 6:38: "I came down from heaven."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 33, Art. 4]
Whether Christ's Conception Was Natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's conception was natural. For
Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the
flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the
true and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.
Obj. 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous effect.
But Christ's conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, who is a
mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ. Therefore
it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.
Obj. 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough
that the passive principle be natural, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 4).
But in Christ's conception the passive principle on the part of His
Mother was natural, as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 4). Therefore
Christ's conception was natural.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.): "Christ
does in a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is
shown in the miraculous virginal conception."
_I answer that,_ As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "In this mystery
thou shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are
supernatural." For if we consider in this conception anything
connected with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother,
it was in all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part
of the active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since
judgment of a thing should be pronounced in respect of its form
rather than of its matter: and likewise in respect of its activity
rather than of its passiveness: therefore is it that Christ's
conception should be described simply as miraculous and supernatural,
although in a certain respect it was natural.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by reason of
His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of Man,
although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom
sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.
Reply Obj. 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, not
as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied the matter,
and because the conception took place in her womb.
Reply Obj. 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a
transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active
principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case
in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.
_______________________
QUESTION 34
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and
concerning this there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of
His conception?
(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?
(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?
(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 34, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Was Sanctified in the First Instant of His Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the
first instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46):
"That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural:
afterwards that which is spiritual." But sanctification by grace is
something spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of
sanctification, not at the very beginning of His conception, but
after a space of time.
Obj. 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin:
according to 1 Cor. 6:1: "And such some of you were," namely,
sinners, "but you are washed, but you are sanctified." But sin was
never in Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be
sanctified by grace.
Obj. 3: Further, as by the Word of God "all things were made," so
from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness,
according to Heb. 2:11: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are
sanctified are all of one." But "the Word of God, by whom all things
were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i).
Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made
holy.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:35): "The Holy which shall
be born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (John 10:36):
"Whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 7, AA. 9, 10, 12), the abundance
of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the
Word, according to John 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of
the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." For it has
been shown above (Q. 33, AA. 2, 3) that in the first instant of
conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word
of God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ
had the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage
refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But
the mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of
the fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the
promotion of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the
Godhead. Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of
spiritual life from the very beginning.
Reply Obj. 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now something is
made not only from its contrary, but also from that which is opposite
to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is made either
from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners are made
holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin. Whereas
Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus
sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner,
because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man,
not indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not
holy; but by negation--that is, when He was not man He had not human
sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man.
For this reason the angel said (Luke 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee." Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral.
xviii): "In order to show the distinction between His holiness and
ours, it is declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we
are made holy, yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition
of a corruptible nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born
holy who . . . was not conceived by the combining of carnal union."
Reply Obj. 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and the
whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the
same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God
the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an
instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of
Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above (Q. 7, A.
1, ad 3; Q. 8, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore Christ's humanity is both
sanctified and sanctifier.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 34, Art. 2]
Whether Christ As Man Had the Use of Free-will in the First Instant
of His Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation.
Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant
of His conception, as was made clear above (Q. 33, A. 2), it seems
impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.
Obj. 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But choice
presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been previously
the object of deliberation." Therefore it seems impossible that
Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant of
His conception.
Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and reason,"
as stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 2, Obj. 2): consequently the
use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect.
But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and
this cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs--a
condition which would seem impossible in the first instant of
Christ's conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have
the use of free-will at the first instant of His conception.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his book on the Trinity
(Gregory: Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb,
while retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a
perfect man." But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore
Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of His
conception.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), spiritual perfection was
becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He
attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit,
but in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that
operation is a "second act." We must, therefore, say that in the
first instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul
which can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will
and intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the
operation of the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much
more, indeed, than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to
will, and to feel, are not movements that may be described as "acts
of an imperfect being," which attains perfection successively, but
are "the acts of an already perfect being," as is said, _De Anima_
iii, text. 28. We must therefore say that Christ had the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception.
Reply Obj. 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in time;
but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins to
act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated,
begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not
terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the
action of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an
operation is the use of free-will, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended, there may
be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as soon as
this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen: and
consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying
grace, and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to
John 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." Wherefore, as being possessed
of certainty about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused
knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated
above (Q. 11, A. 2). Consequently His intellect and will could
act without any action of the senses.
Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, _De Gener. Animal._
ii, 3, 4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first
instant of His conception, through His body being already fashioned
and endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him
to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 34, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Could Merit in the First Instant of His Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first
instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation
to merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first
instant of his creation, as was shown in the First Part, Q. 63, A. 5.
Therefore neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of
its creation--that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.
Obj. 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his
conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his
natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is
natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the Second Part
(I-II, Q. 109, A. 5; Q. 114, A. 2). Therefore it seems that the use
of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His
conception, was not meritorious.
Obj. 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a
way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same
thing again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore,
Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows
that afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue.
Therefore Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test.
super Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to
the soul of Christ." But increase of merit would have been possible
had He not merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore
Christ merited in the first instant of His conception.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), Christ was sanctified by
grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is
twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their
own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of,
not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the
Church. The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter:
just as act is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself,
than that which is by another" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ viii]. Since,
therefore, the sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He
was so sanctified that He might sanctify others; consequently He was
sanctified by reason of His own movement of the free-will towards
God. Which movement, indeed, of the free-will is meritorious.
Consequently, Christ did merit in the first instant of His conception.
Reply Obj. 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good as to
evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas to
evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside
nature is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because
that which is beside nature is an exception to nature." Therefore the
free-will of a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the
first instant of its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided,
however, its nature be unimpaired.
Reply Obj. 2: That which man has at the first moment of his creation,
in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him; but nothing
hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at the
very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in the
first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could merit.
And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness, said
to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion xl).
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to someone
from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by
subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality,
which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not,
indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so
that it was due to Him from more causes than before.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 34, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Was a Perfect Comprehensor in the First Instant of His
Conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor
in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as
fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of
His conception, as stated above (A. 3). Since, therefore, the state
of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ was
not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.
Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Luke 24:26): "Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?" But
glory belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not
in the state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception,
when as yet He had not suffered.
Obj. 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to
God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always
in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they
had been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards.
Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the
first instant of His conception.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou
hast chosen, and taken to Thee"; which words, according to the gloss,
refer to Christ's human nature, which "was taken by the Word of God
unto the unity of Person." But human nature was taken by the Word of
God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first
instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of
beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.
_I answer that,_ As appears from what was said above (A. 3), it was
unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely
habitual grace without the act. Now, He received grace "not by
measure" (John 3:34), as stated above (Q. 7, A. 11). But the grace of
the "wayfarer," being short of that of the "comprehensor," is in less
measure than that of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that
in the first instant of His conception Christ received not only as
much grace as comprehensors have, but also greater than that which
they all have. And because that grace was not without its act, it
follows that He was a comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence
more clearly than other creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3), Christ did not merit the
glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have been a
comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came through His
Passion.
Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even in His
humanity, something more than other creatures--namely, that He was in
the state of beatitude from the very beginning.
_______________________
QUESTION 35
OF CHRIST'S NATIVITY
(In Eight Articles)
After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation
after birth.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?
(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed
to Christ?
(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His
temporal birth?
(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?
(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin
Mother in respect of two filiations?
(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;
(7) Of its place;
(8) Of the time of the Nativity.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 1]
Whether Nativity Regards the Nature Rather Than the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather
than the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum): "The eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born
of human nature, except in a true human nature." Consequently it
becomes the Divine Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the
human nature. Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature
itself.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), "nature"
is so denominated from "nativity." But things are denominated from
one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that
nativity regards the nature rather than the person.
Obj. 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to
exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His
nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the
nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity
regards the hypostasis, not the nature."
_I answer that,_ Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that
is born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly
speaking, is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is
to be generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is
a thing born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking,
belongs to that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is
said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or
hypostasis designates something as subsisting, nature designates
form, whereby something subsists. Consequently, nativity is
attributed to the person or hypostasis as to the proper subject of
being born, but not to the nature.
But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the
purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.
Reply Obj. 1: On account of the identity of nature and hypostasis in
God, nature is sometimes put instead of person or hypostasis. And in
this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was conceived and
born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and born in the
human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: No movement or change is denominated from the subject
moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the subject has
its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated from the
person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of nativity.
Reply Obj. 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to exist:
rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature. Because,
as stated above, nature designates that by which something is;
whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 2]
Whether a Temporal Nativity Should Be Attributed to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be
attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a
thing that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures
for it the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin.
xii]. But Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be
born in time.
Obj. 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born. But
the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore He
needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no
temporal birth.
Obj. 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person. But
in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is but
one nativity.
Obj. 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But
this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the
nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption;
since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the
use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose
running is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a
double nativity in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess
two nativities in Christ: one of the Father--eternal; and one which
occurred in these latter times for our sake."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), nature is compared to
nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is
diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the
Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold
nature: one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other
which He received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs
attribute to Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of
the Father from all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother
in time.
Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic, Felician,
and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us
suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a
universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to
all seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows
life that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches
the womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own
purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though
manifestly it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active
soul and passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And
so we confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as
though, before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then,
but in a way much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just
as the soul is held to be born together with the body: not as though
they both made one substance, but that from both, one person results.
Yet we do not say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be
thought that His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the
flesh of the Son of God to have been from eternity: lest it be
thought that He took, not a true human body, but some resemblance
thereof."
Reply Obj. 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus
solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes., p. 1, cap.
viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake,
of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is
foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all
eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to
exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human
nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason
do we say that He was born in the flesh."
Reply Obj. 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the nature
as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations to
be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of
their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity
were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by
way of a transformation or movement.
Reply Obj. 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in respect
of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who runs
at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is
born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time
differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a
measure of duration.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 3]
Whether the Blessed Virgin Can Be Called Christ's Mother in Respect
of His Temporal Nativity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called
Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated
above (Q. 32, A. 4), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate
actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But
this does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood
might be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems
that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed Virgin.
But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or
sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam.
Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed
Virgin.
Obj. 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of the
semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), "Christ's body was
formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy
Ghost." Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be
called the Mother of Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:18): "The generation of
Christ was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to
Joseph," etc.
_I answer that,_ The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature
the Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above (Q. 5, A. 2; Q. 31,
A. 5), Christ's body was not brought down from heaven, as the heretic
Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and
formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for
motherhood, as has been made clear above (Q. 31, A. 5; Q. 32, A. 4).
Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ's Mother.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 3), not every generation
implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the generation
of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are made from
some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does not
follow from this, but only in the generation of living things, which
is properly called nativity.
Reply Obj. 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "The temporal
nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a way,
natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse of
time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He was
begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and the Blessed Virgin,
above the law of conception." Thus, then, on the part of the mother,
this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of the
Holy Ghost it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the
true and natural Mother of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 31, A. 5, ad 3; Q. 32, A. 4), the
resolution of the woman's semen is not necessary for conception;
neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 4]
Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be
called the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not
make any assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read
nowhere in Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God,
but that she is the "mother of Christ" or of "the Child," as may be
seen from Matt. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed
Virgin is the Mother of God.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine
Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the
Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother
of God.
Obj. 3: Further, the word "God" is predicated in common of Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of
God it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin
should not be called Mother of God.
_On the contrary,_ In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council
of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: "If anyone confess not that
the Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin
is the Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God
made flesh, let him be anathema."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), every word that
signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of
that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in
the hypostasis, as above stated (Q. 2, A. 3), it is manifest that
this word "God" can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a
Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the
human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is
employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a
word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth
are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature
in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature
was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the
conception, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it follows that it can be
truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from
this is a woman called a man's mother, that she conceived him and
gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the
Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the
Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity
were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the
Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed
unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as
Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it
is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.
Reply Obj. 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is solved by
saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in Scripture
that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it
expressly said in Scripture that "Jesus Christ is true God," as may
be seen 1 John 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the "Mother of
Jesus Christ," which is clearly expressed Matt. 1:18. Therefore, from
the words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother
of God.
Again, it is written (Rom. 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews "according
to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." But He
is not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He
who is "above all things, God blessed for ever," is truly born of the
Blessed Virgin as of His Mother.
Reply Obj. 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in a
letter against Nestorius [*Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes., p. 1, cap. ii],
answers it thus: "Just as when a man's soul is born with its body,
they are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the
mother of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much.
Something like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For
the Word of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but
because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh
He was born of a woman." Consequently we must say that the Blessed
Virgin is called the Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother
of the Godhead, but because she is the mother, according to His human
nature, of the Person who has both the divine and the human nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the name "God" is common to the three Persons,
yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone, sometimes
only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as stated above
(Q. 16, A. 1; First Part, Q. 39, A. 4). So that when we say, "The
Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God," this word "God" stands only for
the incarnate Person of the Son.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 5]
Whether There Are Two Filiations in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ.
For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two
nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations.
Obj. 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the son
of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him:
because the very being of a relation consists _in being referred to
another;_ wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other
is destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the
Son of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing
eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His
Mother's Son by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her
Son at all, which is in contradiction to what has been said above
(AA. 3, 4), or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal
filiation. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.
Obj. 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the
other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from
the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species.
Therefore it seems impossible that one and the same relation be
referred to extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said
to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are
terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by
the same relation, be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother
Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.
_On the contrary,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things
pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things
that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the
Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was
said in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3; Q. 40, A. 2). Therefore there is
but one filiation in Christ.
_I answer that,_ opinions differ on this question. For some,
considering only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two
filiations in Christ, just as there are two nativities. _On the
contrary,_ others, considering only the subject of filiation, which
is the person or hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just
as there is but one hypostasis or person. Because the unity or
plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms,
but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in
respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself
two filiations--one in reference to his father, and another in
reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we
shall see that every man bears but one relation to both his father
and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man
is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but
one relation to both. The same is said of one master who teaches many
disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many
subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes
specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations
differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations
being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and
logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and
in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different
relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same
disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it
happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various
causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons
by several acts of generation. Wherefore the paternity cannot differ
specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same.
And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time
be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to
be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation.
But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural
generation and of another by adoption.
Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same
nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time:
indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to
this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and
the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is
neither the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or
hypostasis alone; and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or
person than the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ
but that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation
which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in
the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking,
as we have said in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 7). Therefore the
filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real
relation, but only a relation of reason.
Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we
consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that
there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if
we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal
suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a
real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to
His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to
Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the
real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although
lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through
the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is
really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her
motherhood to Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation
in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such filiation.
But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive
of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it
is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature,
just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human
nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as
in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is
said to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth
are the subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the
subject of filiation, because this relation regards directly the
person.
Reply Obj. 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal mother,
but together with this eternal filiation we understand a certain
temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which
relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother.
Reply Obj. 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said
_Metaph._ iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the
extremes of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other
there is not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the
Philosopher observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it
happens that on the part of one extreme there is one relation,
whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus in man on the
part of his parents there is a twofold relation, the one of
paternity, the other of motherhood, which are specifically diverse,
inasmuch as the father is the principle of generation in one way, and
the mother in another (whereas if many be the principle of one action
and in the same way--for instance, if many together draw a ship
along--there would be one and the same relation in all of them); but
on the part of the child there is but one filiation in reality,
though there be two in aspect, corresponding to the two relations in
the parents, as considered by the intellect. And thus in one way
there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in respect of
the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation in regard
to His temporal mother.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 6]
Whether Christ Was Born Without His Mother Suffering?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His
Mother suffering. For just as man's death was a result of the sin of
our first parents, according to Gen. 2:17: "In what day soever ye
shall eat, ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die";
so were the pains of childbirth, according to Gen. 3:16: "In sorrow
shalt thou bring forth children." But Christ was willing to undergo
death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His birth should
have been with pain.
Obj. 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But
Christ ended His life in pain, according to Isa. 53:4: "Surely . . .
He hath carried our sorrows." Therefore it seems that His nativity
was not without the pains of childbirth.
Obj. 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Saviour
[*Protevangelium Jacobi xix, xx] it is related that midwives were
present at Christ's birth; and they would be wanted by reason of the
mother's suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin
suffered pain in giving birth to her Child.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ.
[*Supposititious]), addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: "In
conceiving thou wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without
pain."
_I answer that,_ The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant
opening the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above (Q. 28,
A. 2, Replies to objections), that Christ came forth from the closed
womb of His Mother, and, consequently, without opening the passage.
Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there
any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein for that
God-Man "was born into the world," according to Isa. 35:1, 2: "Like
the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy
and praise."
Reply Obj. 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman follow from
the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gen. 3:16) after the words, "in
sorrow shalt thou bring forth children," the following are added: "and
thou shalt be under thy husband's power." But, as Augustine says
(Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg., [*Supposititious]), from this sentence we
must exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, "because she conceived
Christ without the defilement of sin, and without the stain of sexual
mingling, therefore did she bring Him forth without pain, without
violation of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity
of her maidenhood." Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through His
own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary
result of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death.
Reply Obj. 2: As "by His death" Christ "destroyed our death"
[*Preface of the Mass in Paschal-time], so by His pains He freed us
from our pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the
mother's pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone
for our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother to suffer
in giving birth.
Reply Obj. 3: We are told (Luke 2:7) that the Blessed Virgin
herself "wrapped up in swaddling clothes" the Child whom she had
brought forth, "and laid Him in a manger." Consequently the narrative
of this book, which is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says
(Adv. Helvid. iv): "No midwife was there, no officious women
interfered. She was both mother and midwife. 'With swaddling clothes,'
says he, 'she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.'" These
words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 7]
Whether Christ Should Have Been Born in Bethlehem?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in
Bethlehem. For it is written (Isa. 2:3): "The law shall come forth
from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem." But Christ is
truly the Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world
at Jerusalem.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Matt. 2:23) that it is written of Christ
that "He shall be called a Nazarene"; which is taken from Isa. 11:1:
"A flower shall rise up out of his root"; for "Nazareth" is
interpreted "a flower." But a man is named especially from the place
of his birth. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in
Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up.
Obj. 3: Further, for this was our Lord born into the world, that He
might make known the true faith, according to John 18:37: "For this
was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give
testimony to the truth." But this would have been easier if He had
been born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the world;
whence Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: "Your faith is spoken
of in the whole world." Therefore it seems that He should not have
been born in Bethlehem.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mic. 5:2): "And thou, Bethlehem,
Ephrata . . . out of thee shall He come forth unto Me, that is to be
the ruler in Israel."
_I answer that,_ Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two
reasons. First, because "He was made . . . of the seed of David
according to the flesh," as it is written (Rom. 1:3); to whom also
was a special promise made concerning Christ; according to 2 Kings
23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the
God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore He willed to be born at
Bethlehem, where David was born, in order that by the very birthplace
the promise made to David might be shown to be fulfilled. The
Evangelist points this out by saying: "Because He was of the house
and of the family of David." Secondly, because, as Gregory says (Hom.
viii in Evang.): "Bethlehem is interpreted 'the house of bread.' It
is Christ Himself who said, 'I am the living Bread which came down
from heaven.'"
Reply Obj. 1: As David was born in Bethlehem, so also did he choose
Jerusalem to set up his throne there, and to build there the Temple
of God, so that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a priestly
city. Now, Christ's priesthood and kingdom were "consummated"
principally in His Passion. Therefore it was becoming that He should
choose Bethlehem for His Birthplace and Jerusalem for the scene of
His Passion.
At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boasting of men who
take pride in being born in great cities, where also they desire
especially to receive honor. Christ, on the contrary, willed to be
born in a mean city, and to suffer reproach in a great city.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished "to flower" by His holy life, not in His
carnal birth. Therefore He wished to be fostered and brought up at
Nazareth. But He wished to be born at Bethlehem away from home;
because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human
nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a foreign
place--foreign not to His power, but to His Nature. And, again, as
Bede says on Luke 2:7: "In order that He who found no room at the inn
might prepare many mansions for us in His Father's house."
Reply Obj. 3: According to a sermon in the Council of Ephesus [*P.
iii, cap. ix]: "If He had chosen the great city of Rome, the change
in the world would be ascribed to the influence of her citizens. If
He had been the son of the Emperor, His benefits would have been
attributed to the latter's power. But that we might acknowledge the
work of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose a poor
mother and a birthplace poorer still."
"But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may
confound the strong" (1 Cor. 1:27). And therefore, in order the more
to show His power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself,
which was the head of the world, in sign of His complete victory,
in order that from that city the faith might spread throughout the
world; according to Isa. 26:5, 6: "The high city He shall lay
low . . . the feet of the poor," i.e. of Christ, "shall tread it
down; the steps of the needy," i.e. of the apostles Peter and Paul.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 35, Art. 8]
Whether Christ Was Born at a Fitting Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born at a fitting
time. Because Christ came in order to restore liberty to His own. But
He was born at a time of subjection--namely, when the whole world, as
it were, tributary to Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command as
Luke relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born at a
fitting time.
Obj. 2: Further, the promises concerning the coming of Christ
were not made to the Gentiles; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom
belong . . . the promises." But Christ was born during the reign of
a foreigner, as appears from Matt. 2:1: "When Jesus was born in the
days of King Herod." Therefore it seems that He was not born at a
fitting time.
Obj. 3: Further, the time of Christ's presence on earth is compared
to the day, because He is the "Light of the world"; wherefore He says
Himself (John 9:4): "I must work the works of Him that sent Me,
whilst it is day." But in summer the days are longer than in winter.
Therefore, since He was born in the depth of winter, eight days
before the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born at a
fitting time.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 4:4): "When the fulness of the
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law."
_I answer that,_ There is this difference between Christ and other
men, that, whereas they are born subject to the restrictions of time,
Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, chose a time in which to be
born, just as He chose a mother and a birthplace. And since "what is
of God is well ordered" and becomingly arranged, it follows that
Christ was born at a most fitting time.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ came in order to bring us back from a state of
bondage to a state of liberty. And therefore, as He took our mortal
nature in order to restore us to life, so, as Bede says (Super Luc.
ii, 4, 5), "He deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly
after His birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar's census, and thus
submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty."
Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived under one ruler,
peace abounded on the earth. Therefore it was a fitting time for the
birth of Christ, for "He is our peace, who hath made both one," as it
is written (Eph. 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Isa. 2:4: "If we
search the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout the
whole world there was discord until the twenty-eighth year of
Augustus Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all war ceased";
according to Isa. 2:4: "Nation shall not lift up sword against
nation."
Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world was
governed by one ruler, because "He came to gather His own [Vulg.:
'the children of God'] together in one" (John 11:52), that there
might be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16).
Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished to be born during the reign of a
foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob might be fulfilled (Gen.
49:10): "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler
from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent." Because, as
Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., falsely ascribed
to Chrysostom]), as long as the Jewish "people was governed by Jewish
kings, however wicked, prophets were sent for their healing. But now
that the Law of God is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is
born; because a grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skilful
physician."
Reply Obj. 3: As says the author of the book _De Qq. Nov. et Vet.
Test.,_ "Christ wished to be born, when the light of day begins to
increase in length," so as to show that He came in order that man
might come nearer to the Divine Light, according to Luke 1:79: "To
enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death."
In like manner He chose to be born in the rough winter season, that
He might begin from then to suffer in body for us.
_______________________
QUESTION 36
OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE NEWLY BORN CHRIST
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the manifestation of the newly born Christ:
concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's birth should have been made known to all?
(2) Whether it should have been made known to some?
(3) To whom should it have been made known?
(4) Whether He should have made Himself known, or should He rather
have been manifested by others?
(5) By what other means should it have been made known?
(6) Of the order of these manifestations;
(7) Of the star by means of which His birth was made known;
(8) of the adoration of the Magi, who were informed of Christ's
nativity by means of the star.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 1]
Whether Christ's Birth Should Have Been Made Known to All?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should have been made
known to all. Because fulfilment should correspond to promise. Now,
the promise of Christ's coming is thus expressed (Ps. 49:3): "God
shall come manifestly. But He came by His birth in the flesh."
Therefore it seems that His birth should have been made known to the
whole world.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ came into this
world to save sinners." But this is not effected save in as far as
the grace of Christ is made known to them; according to Titus 2:11,
12: "The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men,
instructing us, that denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we
should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world." Therefore
it seems that Christ's birth should have been made known to all.
Obj. 3: Further, God is most especially inclined to mercy; according
to Ps. 144:9: "His tender mercies are over all His works." But in His
second coming, when He will "judge justices" (Ps. 70:3), He will come
before the eyes of all; according to Matt. 24:27: "As lightning
cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall
also the coming of the Son of Man be." Much more, therefore, should
His first coming, when He was born into the world according to the
flesh, have been made known to all.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 45:15): "Thou art a hidden
God, the Holy [Vulg.: 'the God] of Israel, the Saviour." And, again
(Isa. 43:3): "His look was, as it were, hidden and despised."
_I answer that,_ It was unfitting that Christ's birth should be made
known to all men without distinction. First, because this would have
been a hindrance to the redemption of man, which was accomplished by
means of the Cross; for, as it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had
known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory."
Secondly, because this would have lessened the merit of faith, which
He came to offer men as the way to righteousness, according to Rom.
3:22: "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ." For if, when
Christ was born, His birth had been made known to all by evident
signs, the very nature of faith would have been destroyed, since it
is "the evidence of things that appear not," as stated, Heb. 11:1.
Thirdly, because thus the reality of His human nature would have come
into doubt. Whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "If He
had not passed through the different stages of age from babyhood to
youth, had neither eaten nor slept, would He not have strengthened an
erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He
had become true man? And while He is doing all things wondrously,
would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy?"
Reply Obj. 1: According to the gloss, the words quoted must be
understood of Christ's coming as judge.
Reply Obj. 2: All men were to be instructed unto salvation,
concerning the grace of God our Saviour, not at the very time of His
birth, but afterwards, in due time, after He had "wrought salvation
in the midst of the earth" (Ps. 73:12). Wherefore after His Passion
and Resurrection, He said to His disciples (Matt. 28:19):
"Going . . . teach ye all nations."
Reply Obj. 3: For judgment to be passed, the authority of the judge
needs to be known: and for this reason it behooves that the coming of
Christ unto judgment should be manifest. But His first coming was
unto the salvation of all, which is by faith that is of things not
seen. And therefore it was fitting that His first coming should be
hidden.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 2]
Whether Christ's Birth Should Have Been Made Known to Some?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should not have been
made known to anyone. For, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), it befitted
the salvation of mankind that Christ's first coming should be hidden.
But Christ came to save all; according to 1 Tim. 4:10: "Who is the
Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." Therefore Christ's
birth should not have been made known to anyone.
Obj. 2: Further, before Christ was born, His future birth was made
known to the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Therefore it was not
necessary that it should be made known to others after His birth.
Obj. 3: Further, no wise man makes known that from which arise
disturbance and harm to others. But, when Christ's birth was made
known, disturbance arose: for it is written (Matt. 2:3) that "King
Herod, hearing" of Christ's birth, "was troubled, and all Jerusalem
with him." Moreover, this brought harm to others; because it was the
occasion of Herod's killing "all the male children that were in
Bethlehem . . . from two years old and under." Therefore it seems
unfitting for Christ's birth to have been made known to anyone.
_On the contrary,_ Christ's birth would have been profitable to none
if it had been hidden from all. But it behooved Christ's birth to be
profitable: else He were born in vain. Therefore it seems that
Christ's birth should have been made known to some.
_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1) "what is of God is
well ordered." Now it belongs to the order of Divine wisdom that
God's gifts and the secrets of His wisdom are not bestowed on all
equally, but to some immediately, through whom they are made known to
others. Wherefore, with regard to the mystery of the Resurrection it
is written (Acts 10:40, 41): "God . . . gave" Christ rising again "to
be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses
pre-ordained by God." Consequently, that His birth might be
consistent with this, it should have been made known, not to all, but
to some, through whom it could be made known to others.
Reply Obj. 1: As it would have been prejudicial to the salvation of
mankind if God's birth had been made known to all men, so also would
it have been if none had been informed of it. Because in either case
faith is destroyed, whether a thing be perfectly manifest, or whether
it be entirely unknown, so that no one can hear it from another; for
"faith cometh by hearing" (Rom. 10:17).
Reply Obj. 2: Mary and Joseph needed to be instructed concerning
Christ's birth before He was born, because it devolved on them to
show reverence to the child conceived in the womb, and to serve Him
even before He was born. But their testimony, being of a domestic
character, would have aroused suspicion in regard to Christ's
greatness: and so it behooved it to be made known to others, whose
testimony could not be suspect.
Reply Obj. 3: The very disturbance that arose when it was known that
Christ was born was becoming to His birth. First, because thus the
heavenly dignity of Christ is made manifest. Wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. x in Evang.): "After the birth of the King of heaven, the
earthly king is troubled: doubtless because earthly grandeur is
covered with confusion when the heavenly majesty is revealed."
Secondly, thereby the judicial power of Christ was foreshadowed. Thus
Augustine says in a sermon (30 de Temp.) on the Epiphany: "What will
He be like in the judgment-seat; since from His cradle He struck
terror into the heart of a proud king?"
Thirdly, because thus the overthrow of the devil's kingdom was
foreshadowed. For, as Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(Serm. v [*Opus Imperfectum in Matth., Hom. ii, falsely ascribed to
St. John Chrysostom]): "Herod was not so much troubled in himself as
the devil in Herod. For Herod thought Him to be a man, but the devil
thought Him to be God. Each feared a successor to his kingdom: the
devil, a heavenly successor; Herod, an earthly successor." But their
fear was needless: since Christ had not come to set up an earthly
kingdom, as Pope Leo says, addressing himself to Herod: "Thy palace
cannot hold Christ: nor is the Lord of the world content with the
paltry power of thy scepter." That the Jews were troubled, who, on
the contrary, should have rejoiced, was either because, as Chrysostom
says, "wicked men could not rejoice at the coming of the Holy one,"
or because they wished to court favor with Herod, whom they feared;
for "the populace is inclined to favor too much those whose cruelty
it endures."
And that the children were slain by Herod was not harmful to them,
but profitable. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (66 de
Diversis): "It cannot be questioned that Christ, who came to set man
free, rewarded those who were slain for Him; since, while hanging on
the cross, He prayed for those who were putting Him to death."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 3]
Whether Those to Whom Christ's Birth Was Made Known Were Suitably
Chosen?
Objection 1: It would seem that those to whom Christ's birth was made
known were not suitably chosen. For our Lord (Matt. 10:5) commanded His
disciples, "Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles," so that He might
be made known to the Jews before the Gentiles. Therefore it seems that
much less should Christ's birth have been at once revealed to the
Gentiles who "came from the east," as stated Matt. 2:1.
Obj. 2: Further, the revelation of Divine truth should be made
especially to the friends of God, according to Job 37 [Vulg.: Job
36:33]: "He sheweth His friend concerning it." But the Magi seem to
be God's foes; for it is written (Lev. 19:31): "Go not aside after
wizards (_magi_), neither ask anything of soothsayers." Therefore
Christ's birth should not have been made known to the Magi.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ came in order to set free the whole world
from the power of the devil; whence it is written (Malachi 1:11):
"From the rising of the sun even to the going down, My name is great
among the Gentiles." Therefore He should have been made known, not
only to those who dwelt in the east, but also to some from all parts
of the world.
Obj. 4: Further, all the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of
Christ. But the sacraments of the Old Law were dispensed through the
ministry of the legal priesthood. Therefore it seems that Christ's
birth should have been made known rather to the priests in the Temple
than to the shepherds in the fields.
Obj. 5: Further, Christ was born of a Virgin-Mother, and was as yet a
little child. It was therefore more suitable that He should be made
known to youths and virgins than to old and married people or to
widows, such as Simeon and Anna.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 13:18): "I know whom I have
chosen." But what is done by God's wisdom is done becomingly.
Therefore those to whom Christ's birth was made known were suitably
chosen.
_I answer that,_ Salvation, which was to be accomplished by Christ,
concerns all sorts and conditions of men: because, as it is written
(Col. 3:11), in Christ "there is neither male nor female, [*These
words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] neither Gentile nor Jew . . .
bond nor free," and so forth. And in order that this might be
foreshadowed in Christ's birth, He was made known to men of all
conditions. Because, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(32 de Temp.), "the shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were
Gentiles. The former were nigh to Him, the latter far from Him. Both
hastened to Him together as to the cornerstone." There was also
another point of contrast: for the Magi were wise and powerful; the
shepherds simple and lowly. He was also made known to the righteous
as Simeon and Anna; and to sinners, as the Magi. He was made known
both to men, and to women--namely, to Anna--so as to show no
condition of men to be excluded from Christ's redemption.
Reply Obj. 1: That manifestation of Christ's birth was a kind of
foretaste of the full manifestation which was to come. And as in the
later manifestation the first announcement of the grace of Christ was
made by Him and His Apostles to the Jews and afterwards to the
Gentiles, so the first to come to Christ were the shepherds, who were
the first-fruits of the Jews, as being near to Him; and afterwards
came the Magi from afar, who were "the first-fruits of the Gentiles,"
as Augustine says (Serm. 30 de Temp. cc.).
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm. 30
de Temp.): "As unskilfulness predominates in the rustic manners of
the shepherd, so ungodliness abounds in the profane rites of the
Magi. Yet did this Corner-Stone draw both to Itself; inasmuch as He
came 'to choose the foolish things that He might confound the wise,'
and 'not to call the just, but sinners,'" so that "the proud might
not boast, nor the weak despair." Nevertheless, there are those who
say that these Magi were not wizards, but wise astronomers, who are
called Magi among the Persians or Chaldees.
Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. ii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperf., among the supposititious works of Chrysostom]: "The Magi
came from the east, because the first beginning of faith came from
the land where the day is born; since faith is the light of the
soul." Or, "because all who come to Christ come from Him and through
Him": whence it is written (Zech. 6:12): "Behold a Man, the Orient is
His name." Now, they are said to come from the east literally, either
because, as some say, they came from the farthest parts of the east,
or because they came from the neighboring parts of Judea that lie to
the east of the region inhabited by the Jews. Yet it is to be
believed that certain signs of Christ's birth appeared also in other
parts of the world: thus, at Rome the river flowed with oil
[*Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 185]; and in Spain three suns were
seen, which gradually merged into one [*Cf. Eusebius, Chronic. II,
Olymp. 184].
Reply Obj. 4: As Chrysostom observes (Theophylact., Enarr. in Luc.
ii, 8), the angel who announced Christ's birth did not go to
Jerusalem, nor did he seek the Scribes and Pharisees, for they were
corrupted, and full of ill-will. But the shepherds were
single-minded, and were like the patriarchs and Moses in their mode
of life.
Moreover, these shepherds were types of the Doctors of the Church, to
whom are revealed the mysteries of Christ that were hidden from the
Jews.
Reply Obj. 5: As Ambrose says (on Luke 2:25): "It was right that our
Lord's birth should be attested not only by the shepherds, but also
by people advanced in age and virtue": whose testimony is rendered
the more credible by reason of their righteousness.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Himself Should Have Made His Birth Known?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have Himself made His
birth known. For "a direct cause is always of greater power than an
indirect cause," as is stated _Phys._ viii. But Christ made His birth
known through others--for instance, to the shepherds through the
angels, and to the Magi through the star. Much more, therefore,
should He Himself have made His birth known.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 20:32): "Wisdom that is hid
and treasure that is not seen; what profit is there in them both?"
But Christ had, to perfection, the treasure of wisdom and grace from
the beginning of His conception. Therefore, unless He had made the
fulness of these gifts known by words and deeds, wisdom and grace
would have been given Him to no purpose. But this is unreasonable:
because "God and nature do nothing without a purpose" (De Coelo i).
Obj. 3: Further, we read in the book _De Infantia Salvatoris_ that in
His infancy Christ worked many miracles. It seems therefore that He
did Himself make His birth known.
_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv) that the Magi found
the "infant Jesus in no way different from the generality of human
infants." But other infants do not make themselves known. Therefore
it was not fitting that Christ should Himself make His birth known.
_I answer that,_ Christ's birth was ordered unto man's salvation,
which is by faith. But saving faith confesses Christ's Godhead and
humanity. It behooved, therefore, Christ's birth to be made known in
such a way that the proof of His Godhead should not be prejudicial to
faith in His human nature. But this took place while Christ presented
a likeness of human weakness, and yet, by means of God's creatures,
He showed the power of the Godhead in Himself. Therefore Christ made
His birth known, not by Himself, but by means of certain other
creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: By the way of generation and movement we must of
necessity come to the imperfect before the perfect. And therefore
Christ was made known first through other creatures, and afterwards
He Himself manifested Himself perfectly.
Reply Obj. 2: Although hidden wisdom is useless, yet there is no need
for a wise man to make himself known at all times, but at a suitable
time; for it is written (Ecclus. 20:6): "There is one that holdeth
his peace because he knoweth not what to say: and there is another
that holdeth his peace, knowing the proper time." Hence the wisdom
given to Christ was not useless, because at a suitable time He
manifested Himself. And the very fact that He was hidden at a
suitable time is a sign of wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3: The book _De Infantia Salvatoris_ is apocryphal.
Moreover, Chrysostom (Hom. xxi super Joan.) says that Christ worked
no miracles before changing the water into wine, according to John
2:11: "'This beginning of miracles did Jesus.' For if He had worked
miracles at an early age, there would have been no need for anyone
else to manifest Him to the Israelites; whereas John the Baptist says
(John 1:31): 'That He may be made manifest in Israel; therefore am I
come baptizing with water.' Moreover, it was fitting that He should
not begin to work miracles at an early age. For people would have
thought the Incarnation to be unreal, and, out of sheer spite, would
have crucified Him before the proper time."
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 5]
Whether Christ's Birth Should Have Been Manifested by Means of the
Angels and the Star?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should not have been
manifested by means of the angels. For angels are spiritual
substances, according to Ps. 103:4: "Who maketh His [Vulg.: 'makest
Thy'] angels, spirits." But Christ's birth was in the flesh, and not
in His spiritual substance. Therefore it should not have been
manifested by means of angels.
Obj. 2: Further, the righteous are more akin to the angels than to
any other, according to Ps. 33:8: "The angel of the Lord shall encamp
round about them that fear Him, and shall deliver them." But Christ's
birth was not announced to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna,
through the angels. Therefore neither should it have been announced
to the shepherds by means of the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems that neither ought it to have been
announced to the Magi by means of the star. For this seems to favor
the error of those who think that man's birth is influenced by the
stars. But occasions of sin should be taken away from man. Therefore
it was not fitting that Christ's birth should be announced by a star.
Obj. 4: Further, a sign should be certain, in order that something be
made known thereby. But a star does not seem to be a certain sign of
Christ's birth. Therefore Christ's birth was not suitably announced
by a star.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 32:4): "The works of God are
perfect." But this manifestation is the work of God. Therefore it was
accomplished by means of suitable signs.
_I answer that,_ As knowledge is imparted through a syllogism from
something which we know better, so knowledge given by signs must be
conveyed through things which are familiar to those to whom the
knowledge is imparted. Now, it is clear that the righteous have,
through the spirit of prophecy, a certain familiarity with the
interior instinct of the Holy Ghost, and are wont to be taught
thereby, without the guidance of sensible signs. Whereas others,
occupied with material things, are led through the domain of the
senses to that of the intellect. The Jews, however, were accustomed
to receive Divine answers through the angels; through whom they also
received the Law, according to Acts 7:53: "You [Vulg.: 'who'] . . .
have received the Law by the disposition of angels." And the
Gentiles, especially astrologers, were wont to observe the course of
the stars. And therefore Christ's birth was made known to the
righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, by the interior instinct of the Holy
Ghost, according to Luke 2:26: "He had received an answer from the
Holy Ghost that he should not see death before he had seen the Christ
of the Lord." But to the shepherds and Magi, as being occupied with
material things, Christ's birth was made known by means of visible
apparitions. And since this birth was not only earthly, but also, in
a way, heavenly, to both (shepherds and Magi) it is revealed through
heavenly signs: for, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(cciv): "The angels inhabit, and the stars adorn, the heavens: by
both, therefore, do the 'heavens show forth the glory of God.'"
Moreover, it was not without reason that Christ's birth was made
known, by means of angels, to the shepherds, who, being Jews, were
accustomed to frequent apparitions of the angels: whereas it was
revealed by means of a star to the Magi, who were wont to consider
the heavenly bodies. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.):
"Our Lord deigned to call them through things to which they were
accustomed." There is also another reason. For, as Gregory says (Hom.
x in Evang.): "To the Jews, as rational beings, it was fitting that a
rational animal [*Cf. I, Q. 51, A. 1, ad 2]," viz. an angel, "should
preach. Whereas the Gentiles, who were unable to come to the
knowledge of God through the reason, were led to God, not by words,
but by signs. And as our Lord, when He was able to speak, was
announced by heralds who spoke, so before He could speak He was
manifested by speechless elements." Again, there is yet another
reason. For, as Augustine [*Pope Leo] says in a sermon on the
Epiphany: "To Abraham was promised an innumerable progeny, begotten,
not of carnal propagation, but of the fruitfulness of faith. For this
reason it is compared to the multitude of stars; that a heavenly
progeny might be hoped for." Wherefore the Gentiles, "who are thus
designated by the stars, are by the rising of a new star stimulated"
to seek Christ, through whom they are made the seed of Abraham.
Reply Obj. 1: That which of itself is hidden needs to be manifested,
but not that which in itself is manifest. Now, the flesh of Him who
was born was manifest, whereas the Godhead was hidden. And therefore
it was fitting that this birth should be made known by angels, who
are the ministers of God. Wherefore also a certain "brightness" (Luke
2:9) accompanied the angelic apparition, to indicate that He who was
just born was the "Brightness of" the Father's "glory."
Reply Obj. 2: The righteous did not need the visible apparition of
the angel; on account of their perfection the interior instinct of
the Holy Ghost was enough for them.
Reply Obj. 3: The star which manifested Christ's birth removed all
occasion of error. For, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): "No
astrologer has ever so far connected the stars with man's fate at the
time of his birth as to assert that one of the stars, at the birth of
any man, left its orbit and made its way to him who was just born":
as happened in the case of the star which made known the birth of
Christ. Consequently this does not corroborate the error of those who
"think there is a connection between man's birth and the course of
the stars, for they do not hold that the course of the stars can be
changed at a man's birth."
In the same sense Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): "It is not an
astronomer's business to know from the stars those who are born, but
to tell the future from the hour of a man's birth: whereas the Magi
did not know the time of the birth, so as to conclude therefrom some
knowledge of the future; rather was it the other way about."
Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom relates (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, according
to some apocryphal books, a certain tribe in the far east near the
ocean was in the possession of a document written by Seth, referring
to this star and to the presents to be offered: which tribe watched
attentively for the rising of this star, twelve men being appointed
to take observations, who at stated times repaired to the summit of a
mountain with faithful assiduity: whence they subsequently perceived
the star containing the figure of a small child, and above it the
form of a cross.
Or we may say, as may be read in the book _De Qq. Vet. et Nov.
Test.,_ qu. lxiii, that "these Magi followed the tradition of
Balaam," who said, "'A star shall rise out of Jacob.' Wherefore
observing this star to be a stranger to the system of this world,
they gathered that it was the one foretold by Balaam to indicate the
King of the Jews."
Or again, it may be said with Augustine, in a sermon on the Epiphany
(ccclxxiv), that "the Magi had received a revelation through the
angels" that the star was a sign of the birth of Christ: and he
thinks it probable that these were "good angels; since in adoring
Christ they were seeking for salvation."
Or with Pope Leo, in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxiv), that "besides
the outward form which aroused the attention of their corporeal eyes,
a more brilliant ray enlightened their minds with the light of faith."
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 6]
Whether Christ's Birth Was Made Known in a Becoming Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth was made known in an
unbecoming order. For Christ's birth should have been made known to
them first who were nearest to Christ, and who longed for Him most;
according to Wis. 6:14: "She preventeth them that covet her, so that
she first showeth herself unto them." But the righteous were nearest
to Christ by faith, and longed most for His coming; whence it is
written (Luke 2:25) of Simeon that "he was just and devout, waiting
for the consolation of Israel." Therefore Christ's birth should have
been made known to Simeon before the shepherds and Magi.
Obj. 2: Further, the Magi were the "first-fruits of the Gentiles,"
who were to believe in Christ. But first the "fulness of the Gentiles
. . . come in" unto faith, and afterwards "all Israel" shall "be
saved," as is written (Rom. 11:25). Therefore Christ's birth should
have been made known to the Magi before the shepherds.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 2:16) that "Herod killed all
the male children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the borders
thereof, from two years old and under, according to the time which he
had diligently inquired from the wise men": so that it seems that the
Magi were two years in coming to Christ after His birth. It was
therefore unbecoming that Christ should be made known to the Gentiles
so long after His birth.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 2:21): "He changes time and
ages." Consequently the time of the manifestation of Christ's birth
seems to have been arranged in a suitable order.
_I answer that,_ Christ's birth was first made known to the shepherds
on the very day that He was born. For, as it is written (Luke 2:8,
15, 16): "There were in the same country shepherds watching, and
keeping the night-watches over their flock . . . And it came to pass,
after the angels departed from them into heaven they [Vulg.: 'the
shepherds'] said one to another: Let us go over to Bethlehem . . .
and they came with haste." Second in order were the Magi, who came to
Christ on the thirteenth day after His birth, on which day is kept
the feast of the Epiphany. For if they had come after a year, or even
two years, they would not have found Him in Bethlehem, since it is
written (Luke 2:39) that "after they had performed all things
according to the law of the Lord"--that is to say, after they had
offered up the Child Jesus in the Temple--"they returned into
Galilee, to their city"--namely, "Nazareth." In the third place, it
was made known in the Temple to the righteous on the fortieth day
after His birth, as related by Luke (2:22).
The reason of this order is that the shepherds represent the apostles
and other believers of the Jews, to whom the faith of Christ was made
known first; among whom there were "not many mighty, not many noble,"
as we read 1 Cor. 1:26. Secondly, the faith of Christ came to the
"fulness of the Gentiles"; and this is foreshadowed in the Magi.
Thirdly it came to the fulness of the Jews, which is foreshadowed in
the righteous. Wherefore also Christ was manifested to them in the
Jewish Temple.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 9:30, 31): "Israel, by
following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of
justice": but the Gentiles, "who followed not after justice,"
forestalled the generality of the Jews in the justice which is of
faith. As a figure of this, Simeon, "who was waiting for the
consolation of Israel," was the last to know Christ born: and he was
preceded by the Magi and the shepherds, who did not await the coming
of Christ with such longing.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the "fulness of the Gentiles came in" unto
faith before the fulness of the Jews, yet the first-fruits of the
Jews preceded the first-fruits of the Gentiles in faith. For this
reason the birth of Christ was made known to the shepherds before the
Magi.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions about the apparition of the star
seen by the Magi. For Chrysostom (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf. in
Matth., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), and Augustine in a sermon
on the Epiphany (cxxxi, cxxxii), say that the star was seen by the
Magi during the two years that preceded the birth of Christ: and
then, having first considered the matter and prepared themselves for
the journey, they came from the farthest east to Christ, arriving on
the thirteenth day after His birth. Wherefore Herod, immediately
after the departure of the Magi, "perceiving that He was deluded by
them," commanded the male children to be killed "from two years old
and under," being doubtful lest Christ were already born when the
star appeared, according as he had heard from the Magi.
But others say that the star first appeared when Christ was born, and
that the Magi set off as soon as they saw the star, and accomplished
a journey of very great length in thirteen days, owing partly to the
Divine assistance, and partly to the fleetness of the dromedaries.
And I say this on the supposition that they came from the far east.
But others, again, say that they came from a neighboring country,
whence also was Balaam, to whose teaching they were heirs; and they
are said to have come from the east, because their country was to the
east of the country of the Jews. In this case Herod killed the babes,
not as soon as the Magi departed, but two years after: and that
either because he is said to have gone to Rome in the meanwhile on
account of an accusation brought against him, or because he was
troubled at some imminent peril, and for the time being desisted from
his anxiety to slay the child, or because he may have thought that
the Magi, "being deceived by the illusory appearance of the star, and
not finding the child, as they had expected to, were ashamed to
return to him": as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii). And the
reason why he killed not only those who were two years old, but also
the younger children, would be, as Augustine says in a sermon on the
Innocents, because he feared lest a child whom the stars obey, might
make himself appear older or younger.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 7]
Whether the Star Which Appeared to the Magi Belonged to the Heavenly
System?
Objection 1: It would seem that the star which appeared to the Magi
belonged to the heavenly system. For Augustine says in a sermon on
the Epiphany (cxxii): "While God yet clings to the breast, and
suffers Himself to be wrapped in humble swaddling clothes, suddenly a
new star shines forth in the heavens." Therefore the star which
appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cci):
"Christ was made known to the shepherds by angels, to the Magi by a
star. A heavenly tongue speaks to both, because the tongue of the
prophets spoke no longer." But the angels who appeared to the
shepherds were really angels from heaven. Therefore also the star
which appeared to the Magi was really a star from the heavens.
Obj. 3: Further, stars which are not in the heavens but in the air
are called comets, which do not appear at the birth of kings, but
rather are signs of their approaching death. But this star was a sign
of the King's birth: wherefore the Magi said (Matt. 2:2): "Where is
He that is born King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the
east." Therefore it seems that it was a star from the heavens.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): "It was not one
of those stars which since the beginning of the creation observe the
course appointed to them by the Creator; but this star was a stranger
to the heavens, and made its appearance at the strange sight of a
virgin in childbirth."
_I answer that,_ As Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.), it is clear,
for many reasons, that the star which appeared to the Magi did not
belong to the heavenly system. First, because no other star
approaches from the same quarter as this star, whose course was from
north to south, these being the relative positions of Persia, whence
the Magi came, and Judea. Secondly, from the time [at which it was
seen]. For it appeared not only at night, but also at midday: and no
star can do this, not even the moon. Thirdly, because it was visible
at one time and hidden at another. For when they entered Jerusalem it
hid itself: then, when they had left Herod, it showed itself again.
Fourthly, because its movement was not continuous, but when the Magi
had to continue their journey the star moved on; when they had to
stop the star stood still; as happened to the pillar of a cloud in
the desert. Fifthly, because it indicated the virginal Birth, not by
remaining aloft, but by coming down below. For it is written (Matt.
2:9) that "the star which they had seen in the east went before them,
until it came and stood over where the child was." Whence it is
evident that the words of the Magi, "We have seen His star in the
east," are to be taken as meaning, not that when they were in the
east the star appeared over the country of Judea, but that when they
saw the star it was in the east, and that it preceded them into Judea
(although this is considered doubtful by some). But it could not have
indicated the house distinctly, unless it were near the earth. And,
as he [Chrysostom] observes, this does not seem fitting to a star,
but "of some power endowed with reason." Consequently "it seems that
this was some invisible force made visible under the form of a star."
Wherefore some say that, as the Holy Ghost, after our Lord's Baptism,
came down on Him under the form of a dove, so did He appear to the
Magi under the form of a star. While others say that the angel who,
under a human form, appeared to the shepherds, under the form of a
star, appeared to the Magi. But it seems more probable that it was a
newly created star, not in the heavens, but in the air near the
earth, and that its movement varied according to God's will.
Wherefore Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxi): "A star
of unusual brightness appeared to the three Magi in the east, which,
through being more brilliant and more beautiful than the other stars,
drew men's gaze and attention: so that they understood at once that
such an unwonted event could not be devoid of purpose."
Reply Obj. 1: In Holy Scripture the air is sometimes called the
heavens--for instance, "The birds of the heavens [Douay: 'air'] and
the fishes of the sea."
Reply Obj. 2: The angels of heaven, by reason of their very office,
come down to us, being "sent to minister." But the stars of heaven do
not change their position. Wherefore there is no comparison.
Reply Obj. 3: As the star did not follow the course of the heavenly
stars, so neither did it follow the course of the comets, which
neither appear during the daytime nor vary their customary course.
Nevertheless in its signification it has something in common with the
comets. Because the heavenly kingdom of Christ "shall break in
pieces, and shall consume all the kingdoms" of the earth, "and itself
shall stand for ever" (Dan. 2:44).
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 36, Art. 8]
Whether It Was Becoming That the Magi Should Come to Adore Christ and
Pay Homage to Him?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming that the Magi
should come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him. For reverence is
due to a king from his subjects. But the Magi did not belong to the
kingdom of the Jews. Therefore, since they knew by seeing the star
that He that was born was the "King of the Jews," it seems unbecoming
that they should come to adore Him.
Obj. 2: Further, it seems absurd during the reign of one king to
proclaim a stranger. But in Judea Herod was reigning. Therefore it
was foolish of the Magi to proclaim the birth of a king.
Obj. 3: Further, a heavenly sign is more certain than a human sign.
But the Magi had come to Judea from the east, under the guidance of a
heavenly sign. Therefore it was foolish of them to seek human
guidance besides that of the star, saying: "Where is He that is born
King of the Jews?"
Obj. 4: Further, the offering of gifts and the homage of adoration
are not due save to kings already reigning. But the Magi did not find
Christ resplendent with kingly grandeur. Therefore it was unbecoming
for them to offer Him gifts and homage.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 60:3): "[The Gentiles] shall
walk in the light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising." But
those who walk in the Divine light do not err. Therefore the Magi
were right in offering homage to Christ.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 1), the Magi are the
"first-fruits of the Gentiles" that believed in Christ; because their
faith was a presage of the faith and devotion of the nations who were
to come to Christ from afar. And therefore, as the devotion and faith
of the nations is without any error through the inspiration of the
Holy Ghost, so also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the
Holy Ghost, did wisely in paying homage to Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.):
"Though many kings of the Jews had been born and died, none of them
did the Magi seek to adore. And so they who came from a distant
foreign land to a kingdom that was entirely strange to them, had no
idea of showing such great homage to such a king as the Jews were
wont to have. But they had learnt that such a King was born that by
adoring Him they might be sure of obtaining from Him the salvation
which is of God."
Reply Obj. 2: By proclaiming [Christ King] the Magi foreshadowed the
constancy of the Gentiles in confessing Christ even until death.
Whence Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, while they thought
of the King who was to come, the Magi feared not the king who was
actually present. They had not yet seen Christ, and they were already
prepared to die for Him.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.):
"The star which led the Magi to the place where the Divine Infant was
with His Virgin-Mother could bring them to the town of Bethlehem, in
which Christ was born. Yet it hid itself until the Jews also bore
testimony of the city in which Christ was to be born: so that, being
encouraged by a twofold witness," as Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv),
"they might seek with more ardent faith Him, whom both the brightness
of the star and the authority of prophecy revealed." Thus they
"proclaim" that Christ is born, and "inquire where; they believe and
ask, as it were, betokening those who walk by faith and desire to
see," as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxcix). But the
Jews, by indicating to them the place of Christ's birth, "are like
the carpenters who built the Ark of Noe, who provided others with the
means of escape, and themselves perished in the flood. Those who
asked, heard and went their way: the teachers spoke and stayed where
they were; like the milestones that point out the way but walk not"
(Augustine, Serm. cclxxiii). It was also by God's will that, when
they no longer saw the star, the Magi, by human instinct, went to
Jerusalem, to seek in the royal city the new-born King, in order that
Christ's birth might be publicly proclaimed first in Jerusalem,
according to Isa. 2:3: "The Law shall come forth from Sion, and the
Word of the Lord from Jerusalem"; and also "in order that by the zeal
of the Magi who came from afar, the indolence of the Jews who lived
near at hand, might be proved worthy of condemnation" (Remig., Hom.
in Matth. ii, 1).
Reply Obj. 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*From the
supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): "If the Magi had come in search of
an earthly King, they would have been disconcerted at finding that
they had taken the trouble to come such a long way for nothing.
Consequently they would have neither adored nor offered gifts. But
since they sought a heavenly King, though they found in Him no signs
of royal pre-eminence, yet, content with the testimony of the star
alone, they adored: for they saw a man, and they acknowledged a God."
Moreover, they offer gifts in keeping with Christ's greatness: "gold,
as to the great King; they offer up incense as to God, because it is
used in the Divine Sacrifice; and myrrh, which is used in embalming
the bodies of the dead, is offered as to Him who is to die for the
salvation of all" (Gregory, Hom. x in Evang.). And hereby, as Gregory
says (Hom. x in Evang.), we are taught to offer gold, "which
signifies wisdom, to the new-born King, by the luster of our wisdom
in His sight." We offer God incense, "which signifies fervor in
prayer, if our constant prayers mount up to God with an odor of
sweetness"; and we offer myrrh, "which signifies mortification of the
flesh, if we mortify the ill-deeds of the flesh by refraining from
them."
_______________________
QUESTION 37
OF CHRIST'S CIRCUMCISION, AND OF THE OTHER LEGAL OBSERVANCES
ACCOMPLISHED IN REGARD TO THE CHILD CHRIST
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider Christ's circumcision. And since the
circumcision is a kind of profession of observing the Law, according
to Gal. 5:3: "I testify . . . to every man circumcising himself that
he is a debtor to do the whole Law," we shall have at the same time
to inquire about the other legal observances accomplished in regard
to the Child Christ. Therefore there are four points of inquiry:
(1) His circumcision;
(2) The imposition of His name;
(3) His presentation;
(4) His Mother's purification.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 37, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Should Have Been Circumcised?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been
circumcised. For on the advent of the reality, the figure ceases. But
circumcision was prescribed to Abraham as a sign of the covenant
concerning his posterity, as may be seen from Gen. 17. Now this
covenant was fulfilled in Christ's birth. Therefore circumcision
should have ceased at once.
Obj. 2: Further, "every action of Christ is a lesson to us" [*Innoc.
III, Serm. xxii de Temp.]; wherefore it is written (John 3:15): "I
have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do
also." But we ought not to be circumcised; according to Gal. 5:2: "If
you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore it
seems that neither should Christ have been circumcised.
Obj. 3: Further, circumcision was prescribed as a remedy of original
sin. But Christ did not contract original sin, as stated above (Q.
14, A. 3; Q. 15, A. 1). Therefore Christ should not have been
circumcised.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 2:21): "After eight days were
accomplished, that the child should be circumcised."
_I answer that,_ For several reasons Christ ought to have been
circumcised. First, in order to prove the reality of His human
nature, in contradiction to the Manicheans, who said that He had an
imaginary body: and in contradiction to Apollinarius, who said that
Christ's body was consubstantial with His Godhead; and in
contradiction to Valentine, who said that Christ brought His body
from heaven. Secondly, in order to show His approval of circumcision,
which God had instituted of old. Thirdly, in order to prove that He
was descended from Abraham, who had received the commandment of
circumcision as a sign of his faith in Him. Fourthly, in order to
take away from the Jews an excuse for not receiving Him, if He were
uncircumcised. Fifthly, "in order by His example to exhort us to be
obedient" [*Bede, Hom. x in Evang.]. Wherefore He was circumcised on
the eighth day according to the prescription of the Law (Lev. 12:3).
Sixthly, "that He who had come in the likeness of sinful flesh might
not reject the remedy whereby sinful flesh was wont to be healed."
Seventhly, that by taking on Himself the burden of the Law, He might
set others free therefrom, according to Gal. 4:4, 5: "God sent His
Son . . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were
under the Law."
Reply Obj. 1: Circumcision by the removal of the piece of skin in the
member of generation, signified "the passing away of the old
generation" [*Athanasius, De Sabb. et Circumcis.]: from the
decrepitude of which we are freed by Christ's Passion. Consequently
this figure was not completely fulfilled in Christ's birth, but in
His Passion, until which time the circumcision retained its virtue
and status. Therefore it behooved Christ to be circumcised as a son
of Abraham before His Passion.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ submitted to circumcision while it was yet of
obligation. And thus His action in this should be imitated by us, in
fulfilling those things which are of obligation in our own time.
Because "there is a time and opportunity for every business" (Eccl
8:6).
Moreover, according to Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.), "as we died when He
died, and rose again when Christ rose from the dead, so were we
circumcised spiritually through Christ: wherefore we need no carnal
circumcision." And this is what the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "In
whom," [i.e. Christ] "you are circumcised with circumcision not made
by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the
circumcision of" our Lord Jesus "Christ."
Reply Obj. 3: As Christ voluntarily took upon Himself our
death, which is the effect of sin, whereas He had no sin Himself, in
order to deliver us from death, and to make us to die spiritually unto
sin, so also He took upon Himself circumcision, which was a remedy
against original sin, whereas He contracted no original sin, in order
to deliver us from the yoke of the Law, and to accomplish a spiritual
circumcision in us--in order, that is to say, that, by taking upon
Himself the shadow, He might accomplish the reality.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 37, Art. 2]
Whether His Name Was Suitably Given to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that an unsuitable name was given to
Christ. For the Gospel reality should correspond to the prophetic
foretelling. But the prophets foretold another name for Christ: for
it is written (Isa. 7:14): "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a
son, and His name shall be called Emmanuel"; and (Isa. 8:3): "Call
His name, Hasten to take away the spoils; Make haste to take away the
prey"; and (Isa. 9:6): "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor
God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of
Peace"; and (Zech. 6:12): "Behold a Man, the Orient is His name."
Thus it was unsuitable that His name should be called Jesus.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Isa. 62:2): "Thou shalt be called by
a new name, which the mouth of the Lord hath named [Vulg.: 'shall
name']." But the name Jesus is not a new name, but was given to
several in the Old Testament: as may be seen in the genealogy of
Christ (Luke 3:29), "Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for His
name to be called Jesus."
Obj. 3: Further, the name Jesus signifies "salvation"; as is clear
from Matt. 1:21: "She shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call
His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins." But
salvation through Christ was accomplished not only in the
circumcision, but also in uncircumcision, as is declared by the
Apostle (Rom. 4:11, 12). Therefore this name was not suitably given
to Christ at His circumcision.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, in which it is written
(Luke 2:21): "After eight days were accomplished, that the child
should be circumcised, His name was called Jesus."
_I answer that,_ A name should answer to the nature of a thing. This
is clear in the names of genera and species, as stated _Metaph._ iv:
"Since a name is but an expression of the definition" which
designates a thing's proper nature.
Now, the names of individual men are always taken from some property
of the men to whom they are given. Either in regard to time; thus men
are named after the Saints on whose feasts they are born: or in
respect of some blood relation; thus a son is named after his father
or some other relation; and thus the kinsfolk of John the Baptist
wished to call him "by his father's name Zachary," not by the name
John, because "there" was "none of" his "kindred that" was "called by
this name," as related Luke 1:59-61. Or, again, from some occurrence;
thus Joseph "called the name of" the "first-born Manasses, saying:
God hath made me to forget all my labors" (Gen. 41:51). Or, again,
from some quality of the person who receives the name; thus it is
written (Gen. 25:25) that "he that came forth first was red and hairy
like a skin; and his name was called Esau," which is interpreted
"red."
But names given to men by God always signify some gratuitous gift
bestowed on them by Him; thus it was said to Abraham (Gen. 17:5):
"Thou shalt be called Abraham; because I have made thee a father of
many nations": and it was said to Peter (Matt. 16:18): "Thou art
Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church." Since, therefore,
this prerogative of grace was bestowed on the Man Christ that through
Him all men might be saved, therefore He was becomingly named Jesus,
i.e. Saviour: the angel having foretold this name not only to His
Mother, but also to Joseph, who was to be his foster-father.
Reply Obj. 1: All these names in some way mean the same as Jesus,
which means "salvation." For the name "Emmanuel, which being
interpreted is 'God with us,'" designates the cause of salvation,
which is the union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of
the Son of God, the result of which union was that "God is with us."
When it was said, "Call his name, Hasten to take away," etc., these
words indicate from what He saved us, viz. from the devil, whose
spoils He took away, according to Col. 2:15: "Despoiling the
principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently."
When it was said, "His name shall be called Wonderful," etc., the way
and term of our salvation are pointed out: inasmuch as "by the
wonderful counsel and might of the Godhead we are brought to the
inheritance of the life to come," in which the children of God will
enjoy "perfect peace" under "God their Prince."
When it was said, "Behold a Man, the Orient is His name," reference
is made to the same, as in the first, viz. to the mystery of the
Incarnation, by reason of which "to the righteous a light is risen up
in darkness" (Ps. 111:4).
Reply Obj. 2: The name Jesus could be suitable for some other reason
to those who lived before Christ--for instance, because they were
saviours in a particular and temporal sense. But in the sense of
spiritual and universal salvation, this name is proper to Christ, and
thus it is called a "new" name.
Reply Obj. 3: As is related Gen. 17, Abraham received from God and at
the same time both his name and the commandment of circumcision. For
this reason it was customary among the Jews to name children on the
very day of circumcision, as though before being circumcised they had
not as yet perfect existence: just as now also children receive their
names in Baptism. Wherefore on Prov. 4:3, "I was my father's son,
tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother," the gloss
says: "Why does Solomon call himself an only son in the sight of his
mother, when Scripture testifies that he had an elder brother of the
same mother, unless it be that the latter died unnamed soon after
birth?" Therefore it was that Christ received His name at the time of
His circumcision.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 37, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Was Becomingly Presented in the Temple?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was unbecomingly presented in
the Temple. For it is written (Ex. 13:2): "Sanctify unto Me every
first-born that openeth the womb among the children of Israel." But
Christ came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; and thus He did
not open His Mother's womb. Therefore Christ was not bound by this
law to be presented in the Temple.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is always in one's presence cannot be
presented to one. But Christ's humanity was always in God's presence
in the highest degree, as being always united to Him in unity of
person. Therefore there was no need for Him to be presented to the
Lord.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is the principal victim, to whom all the
victims of the old Law are referred, as the figure to the reality.
But a victim should not be offered up for a victim. Therefore it was
not fitting that another victim should be offered up for Christ.
Obj. 4: Further, among the legal victims the principal was the lamb,
which was a "continual sacrifice" [Vulg.: 'holocaust'], as is stated
Num. 28:6: for which reason Christ is also called "the Lamb--Behold
the Lamb of God" (John 1: 29). It was therefore more fitting that a
lamb should be offered for Christ than "a pair of turtle doves or two
young pigeons."
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture which relates this as
having taken place (Luke 2:22).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), Christ wished to be "made
under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law"
(Gal. 4:4, 5), and that the "justification of the Law might be"
spiritually "fulfilled" in His members. Now, the Law contained a
twofold precept touching the children born. One was a general precept
which affected all--namely, that "when the days of the mother's
purification were expired," a sacrifice was to be offered either "for
a son or for a daughter," as laid down Lev. 12:6. And this sacrifice
was for the expiation of the sin in which the child was conceived and
born; and also for a certain consecration of the child, because it
was then presented in the Temple for the first time. Wherefore one
offering was made as a holocaust and another for sin.
The other was a special precept in the law concerning the first-born
of "both man and beast": for the Lord claimed for Himself all the
first-born in Israel, because, in order to deliver the Israelites, He
"slew every first-born in the land of Egypt, both men and cattle"
(Ex. 12:12, 13, 29), the first-born of Israel being saved; which law
is set down Ex. 13. Here also was Christ foreshadowed, who is "the
First-born amongst many brethren" (Rom. 8:29).
Therefore, since Christ was born of a woman and was her first-born,
and since He wished to be "made under the Law," the Evangelist Luke
shows that both these precepts were fulfilled in His regard. First,
as to that which concerns the first-born, when he says (Luke 2:22,
23): "They carried Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord: as it
is written in the law of the Lord, 'Every male opening the womb shall
be called holy to the Lord.'" Secondly, as to the general precept
which concerned all, when he says (Luke 2:24): "And to offer a
sacrifice according as it is written in the law of the Lord, a pair
of turtle doves or two young pigeons."
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory of Nyssa says (De Occursu Dom.): "It seems
that this precept of the Law was fulfilled in God incarnate alone in
a special manner exclusively proper to Him. For He alone, whose
conception was ineffable, and whose birth was incomprehensible,
opened the virginal womb which had been closed to sexual union, in
such a way that after birth the seal of chastity remained inviolate."
Consequently the words "opening the womb" imply that nothing hitherto
had entered or gone forth therefrom. Again, for a special reason is
it written "'a male,' because He contracted nothing of the woman's
sin": and in a singular way "is He called 'holy,' because He felt no
contagion of earthly corruption, whose birth was wondrously
immaculate" (Ambrose, on Luke 2:23).
Reply Obj. 2: As the Son of God "became man, and was circumcised in
the flesh, not for His own sake, but that He might make us to be
God's through grace, and that we might be circumcised in the spirit;
so, again, for our sake He was presented to the Lord, that we may
learn to offer ourselves to God" [*Athanasius, on Luke 2:23]. And
this was done after His circumcision, in order to show that "no one
who is not circumcised from vice is worthy of Divine regard" [*Bede,
on Luke 2:23].
Reply Obj. 3: For this very reason He wished the legal victims to be
offered for Him who was the true Victim, in order that the figure
might be united to and confirmed by the reality, against those who
denied that in the Gospel Christ preached the God of the Law. "For we
must not think," says Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.) "that the good God
subjected His Son to the enemy's law, which He Himself had not given."
Reply Obj. 4: The law of Lev. 12:6, 8 "commanded those who could, to
offer, for a son or a daughter, a lamb and also a turtle dove or a
pigeon: but those who were unable to offer a lamb were commanded to
offer two turtle doves or two young pigeons" [*Bede, Hom. xv in
Purif.]. "And so the Lord, who, 'being rich, became poor for our
[Vulg.: 'your'] sakes, that through His poverty we [you] might be
rich," as is written 2 Cor. 8:9, "wished the poor man's victim to be
offered for Him" just as in His birth He was "wrapped in swaddling
clothes and laid in a manger" [*Bede on Luke 1]. Nevertheless, these
birds have a figurative sense. For the turtle dove, being a
loquacious bird, represents the preaching and confession of faith;
and because it is a chaste animal, it signifies chastity; and being a
solitary animal, it signifies contemplation. The pigeon is a gentle
and simple animal, and therefore signifies gentleness and simplicity.
It is also a gregarious animal; wherefore it signifies the active
life. Consequently this sacrifice signified the perfection of Christ
and His members. Again, "both these animals, by the plaintiveness of
their song, represented the mourning of the saints in this life: but
the turtle dove, being solitary, signifies the tears of prayer;
whereas the pigeon, being gregarious, signifies the public prayers of
the Church" [*Bede, Hom. xv in Purif.]. Lastly, two of each of these
animals are offered, to show that holiness should be not only in the
soul, but also in the body.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 37, Art. 4]
Whether It Was Fitting That the Mother of God Should Go to the Temple
to Be Purified?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for the Mother of
God to go to the Temple to be purified. For purification presupposes
uncleanness. But there was no uncleanness in the Blessed Virgin, as
stated above (QQ. 27, 28). Therefore she should not have gone to the
Temple to be purified.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 12:2-4): "If a woman, having
received seed, shall bear a man-child, she shall be unclean seven
days"; and consequently she is forbidden "to enter into the sanctuary
until the days of her purification be fulfilled." But the Blessed
Virgin brought forth a male child without receiving the seed of man.
Therefore she had no need to come to the Temple to be purified.
Obj. 3: Further, purification from uncleanness is accomplished by
grace alone. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace;
rather, indeed, did she have the very Author of grace with her.
Therefore it was not fitting that the Blessed Virgin should come to
the Temple to be purified.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, where it is stated
(Luke 2:22) that "the days of" Mary's "purification were accomplished
according to the law of Moses."
_I answer that,_ As the fulness of grace flowed from Christ on to His
Mother, so it was becoming that the mother should be like her Son in
humility: for "God giveth grace to the humble," as is written James
4:6. And therefore, just as Christ, though not subject to the Law,
wished, nevertheless, to submit to circumcision and the other burdens
of the Law, in order to give an example of humility and obedience;
and in order to show His approval of the Law; and, again, in order to
take away from the Jews an excuse for calumniating Him: for the same
reasons He wished His Mother also to fulfil the prescriptions of the
Law, to which, nevertheless, she was not subject.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the Blessed Virgin had no uncleanness, yet she
wished to fulfil the observance of purification, not because she
needed it, but on account of the precept of the Law. Thus the
Evangelist says pointedly that the days of her purification
"according to the Law" were accomplished; for she needed no
purification in herself.
Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have chosen his words in order to
exclude uncleanness from the Mother of God, who was with child
"without receiving seed." It is therefore clear that she was not
bound to fulfil that precept, but fulfilled the observance of
purification of her own accord, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The sacraments of the Law did not cleanse from the
uncleanness of sin which is accomplished by grace, but they
foreshadowed this purification: for they cleansed by a kind of carnal
purification, from the uncleanness of a certain irregularity, as
stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 102, A. 5; Q. 103, A. 2). But the
Blessed Virgin contracted neither uncleanness, and consequently did
not need to be purified.
_______________________
QUESTION 38
OF THE BAPTISM OF JOHN
(In Six Articles)
We now proceed to consider the baptism wherewith Christ was baptized.
And since Christ was baptized with the baptism of John, we shall
consider (1) the baptism of John in general; (2) the baptizing of
Christ. In regard to the former there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?
(2) Whether that baptism was from God?
(3) Whether it conferred grace?
(4) Whether others besides Christ should have received that baptism?
(5) Whether that baptism should have ceased when Christ was baptized?
(6) Whether those who received John's baptism had afterwards to
receive Christ's baptism?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Fitting That John Should Baptize?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that John should
baptize. For every sacramental rite belongs to some law. But John did
not introduce a new law. Therefore it was not fitting that he should
introduce the new rite of baptism.
Obj. 2: Further, John "was sent by God . . . for a witness" (John
1:6, 7) as a prophet; according to Luke 1:76: "Thou, child, shalt be
called the prophet of the Highest." But the prophets who lived before
Christ did not introduce any new rite, but persuaded men to observe
the rites of the Law. as is clearly stated Malachi 4:4: "Remember the
law of Moses My servant." Therefore neither should John have
introduced a new rite of baptism.
Obj. 3: Further, when there is too much of anything, nothing should
be added to it. But the Jews observed a superfluity of baptisms; for
it is written (Mk. 7:3, 4) that "the Pharisees and all the Jews eat
not without often washing their hands . . . and when they come from
the market, unless they be washed, they eat not; and many other
things there are that have been delivered to them to observe, the
washings of cups and of pots, and of brazen vessels, and of beds."
Therefore it was unfitting that John should baptize.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture (Matt. 3:5, 6), which,
after stating the holiness of John, adds many went out to him, "and
were baptized in the Jordan."
_I answer that,_ It was fitting for John to baptize, for four
reasons: first, it was necessary for Christ to be baptized by John,
in order that He might sanctify baptism; as Augustine observes, super
Joan. (Tract. xiii in Joan.).
Secondly, that Christ might be manifested. Whence John himself says
(John 1:31): "That He," i.e. Christ, "may be made manifest in Israel,
therefore am I come baptizing with water." For he announced Christ to
the crowds that gathered around him; which was thus done much more
easily than if he had gone in search of each individual, as
Chrysostom observes, commenting on St. John (Hom. x in Matth.).
Thirdly, that by his baptism he might accustom men to the baptism of
Christ; wherefore Gregory says in a homily (Hom. vii in Evang.) that
therefore did John baptize, "that, being consistent with his office
of precursor, as he had preceded our Lord in birth, so he might also
by baptizing precede Him who was about to baptize."
Fourthly, that by persuading men to do penance, he might prepare men
to receive worthily the baptism of Christ. Wherefore Bede [*Cf. Scot.
Erig. in Joan. iii, 24] says that "the baptism of John was as
profitable before the baptism of Christ, as instruction in the faith
profits the catechumens not yet baptized. For just as he preached
penance, and foretold the baptism of Christ, and drew men to the
knowledge of the Truth that hath appeared to the world, so do the
ministers of the Church, after instructing men, chide them for their
sins, and lastly promise them forgiveness in the baptism of Christ."
Reply Obj. 1: The baptism of John was not a sacrament properly so
called (_per se_), but a kind of sacramental, preparatory to the
baptism of Christ. Consequently, in a way, it belonged to the law of
Christ, but not to the law of Moses.
Reply Obj. 2: John was not only a prophet, but "more than a prophet,"
as stated Matt. 11:9: for he was the term of the Law and the
beginning of the Gospel. Therefore it was in his province to lead
men, both by word and deed, to the law of Christ rather than to the
observance of the Old Law.
Reply Obj. 3: Those baptisms of the Pharisees were vain, being
ordered merely unto carnal cleanliness. But the baptism of John was
ordered unto spiritual cleanliness, since it led men to do penance,
as stated above.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 2]
Whether the Baptism of John Was from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the baptism of John was not from God.
For nothing sacramental that is from God is named after a mere man:
thus the baptism of the New Law is not named after Peter or Paul, but
after Christ. But that baptism is named after John, according to
Matt. 21:25: "The baptism of John . . . was it from heaven or from
men?" Therefore the baptism of John was not from God.
Obj. 2: Further, every doctrine that proceeds from God anew is
confirmed by some signs: thus the Lord (Ex. 4) gave Moses the power
of working signs; and it is written (Heb. 2:3, 4) that our faith
"having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by
them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and
wonders." But it is written of John the Baptist (John 10:41) that
"John did no sign." Therefore it seems that the baptism wherewith he
baptized was not from God.
Obj. 3: Further, those sacraments which are instituted by God are
contained in certain precepts of Holy Scripture. But there is no
precept of Holy Writ commanding the baptism of John. Therefore it
seems that it was not from God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:33): "He who sent me to
baptize with water said to me: 'He upon whom thou shalt see the
Spirit,'" etc.
_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the baptism of
John--namely, the rite of baptism and the effect of baptism. The rite
of baptism was not from men, but from God, who by an interior
revelation of the Holy Ghost sent John to baptize. But the effect of
that baptism was from man, because it effected nothing that man could
not accomplish. Wherefore it was not from God alone, except in as far
as God works in man.
Reply Obj. 1: By the baptism of the New Law men are baptized inwardly
by the Holy Ghost, and this is accomplished by God alone. But by the
baptism of John the body alone was cleansed by the water. Wherefore
it is written (Matt. 3:11): "I baptize you in water; but . . . He
shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost." For this reason the baptism of
John was named after him, because it effected nothing that he did not
accomplish. But the baptism of the New Law is not named after the
minister thereof, because he does not accomplish its principal
effect, which is the inward cleansing.
Reply Obj. 2: The whole teaching and work of John was ordered unto
Christ, who, by many miracles confirmed both His own teaching and
that of John. But if John had worked signs, men would have paid equal
attention to John and to Christ. Wherefore, in order that men might
pay greater attention to Christ, it was not given to John to work a
sign. Yet when the Jews asked him why he baptized, he confirmed his
office by the authority of Scripture, saying: "I am the voice of one
crying in the wilderness," etc. as related, John 1:23 (cf. Isa.
40:3). Moreover, the very austerity of his life was a commendation of
his office, because, as Chrysostom says, commenting on Matthew (Hom.
x in Matth.), "it was wonderful to witness such endurance in a human
body."
Reply Obj. 3: The baptism of John was intended by God to last only
for a short time, for the reasons given above (A. 1). Therefore it
was not the subject of a general commandment set down in Sacred Writ,
but of a certain interior revelation of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 3]
Whether Grace Was Given in the Baptism of John?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace was given in the baptism of
John. For it is written (Mk. 1:4): "John was in the desert baptizing
and preaching the baptism of penance unto remission of sins." But
penance and remission of sins are the effect of grace. Therefore the
baptism of John conferred grace.
Obj. 2: Further, those who were about to be baptized by John
"confessed their sins," as related Matt. 3:6 and Mk. 1:5. But the
confession of sins is ordered to their remission, which is effected
by grace. Therefore grace was conferred in the baptism of John.
Obj. 3: Further, the baptism of John was more akin than circumcision
to the baptism of Christ. But original sin was remitted through
circumcision: because, as Bede says (Hom. x in Circumcis.), "under
the Law, circumcision brought the same saving aid to heal the wound
of original sin as baptism is wont to bring now that grace is
revealed." Much more, therefore, did the baptism of John effect the
remission of sins, which cannot be accomplished without grace.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 3:11): "I indeed baptize you
in water unto penance." Which words Gregory thus expounds in a
certain homily (Hom. vii in Evang.): "John baptized, not in the
Spirit, but in water: because he could not forgive sins." But grace
is given by the Holy Ghost, and by means thereof sins are taken away.
Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), the whole teaching and
work of John was in preparation for Christ: just as it is the duty of
the servant and of the under-craftsman to prepare the matter for the
form which is accomplished by the head-craftsman. Now grace was to be
conferred on men through Christ, according to John 1:17: "Grace and
truth came through Jesus Christ." Therefore the baptism of John did
not confer grace, but only prepared the way for grace; and this in
three ways: first, by John's teaching, which led men to faith in
Christ; secondly, by accustoming men to the rite of Christ's baptism;
thirdly, by penance, preparing men to receive the effect of Christ's
baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: In these words, as Bede says (on Mk. 1:4), a twofold
baptism of penance may be understood. One is that which John
conferred by baptizing, which is called "a baptism of penance," etc.,
by reason of its inducing men to do penance, and of its being a kind
of protestation by which men avowed their purpose of doing penance.
The other is the baptism of Christ, by which sins are remitted, and
which John could not give, but only preach, saying: "He will baptize
you in the Holy Ghost."
Or it may be said that he preached the "baptism of penance," i.e.
which induced men to do penance, which penance leads men on to "the
remission of sins."
Or again, it may be said with Jerome [*Another author on Mk. 1 (inter
op. Hier.)] that "by the baptism of Christ grace is given, by which
sins are remitted gratis; and that what is accomplished by the
bridegroom is begun by the bridesman," i.e. by John. Consequently it
is said that "he baptized and preached the baptism of penance unto
remission of sins," not as though he accomplished this himself, but
because he began it by preparing the way for it.
Reply Obj. 2: That confession of sins was not made unto the remission
of sins, to be realized immediately through the baptism of John, but
to be obtained through subsequent penance and through the baptism of
Christ, for which that penance was a preparation.
Reply Obj. 3: Circumcision was instituted as a remedy for original
sin. Whereas the baptism of John was not instituted for this purpose,
but was merely in preparation for the baptism of Christ, as stated
above; whereas the sacraments attain their effect through the force
of their institution.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 4]
Whether Christ Alone Should Have Been Baptized with the Baptism of
John?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ alone should have been
baptized with the baptism of John. For, as stated above (A. 1), "the
reason why John baptized was that Christ might receive baptism," as
Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii). But what is proper to
Christ should not be applicable to others. Therefore no others should
have received that baptism.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever is baptized either receives something from
the baptism or confers something on the baptism. But no one could
receive anything from the baptism of John, because thereby grace was
not conferred, as stated above (A. 3). On the other hand, no one
could confer anything on baptism save Christ, who "sanctified the
waters by the touch of His most pure flesh" [*Mag. Sent. iv, 3].
Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized with
the baptism of John.
Obj. 3: Further, if others were baptized with that baptism, this was
only in order that they might be prepared for the baptism of Christ:
and thus it would seem fitting that the baptism of John should be
conferred on all, old and young, Gentile and Jew, just as the baptism
of Christ. But we do not read that either children or Gentiles were
baptized by the latter; for it is written (Mk. 1:5) that "there went
out to him . . . all they of Jerusalem, and were baptized by him."
Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized by
John.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 3:21): "It came to pass, when
all the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized and
praying, heaven was opened."
_I answer that,_ For two reasons it behooved others besides Christ to
be baptized with the baptism of John. First, as Augustine says (Super
Joan., Tract. iv, v), "if Christ alone had been baptized with the
baptism of John, some would have said that John's baptism, with which
Christ was baptized, was more excellent than that of Christ, with
which others are baptized."
Secondly, because, as above stated, it behooved others to be prepared
by John's baptism for the baptism of Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: The baptism of John was instituted not only that Christ
might be baptized, but also for other reasons, as stated above (A.
1). And yet, even if it were instituted merely in order that Christ
might be baptized therewith, it was still necessary for others to
receive this baptism, in order to avoid the objection mentioned above.
Reply Obj. 2: Others who approached to be baptized by John could not,
indeed, confer anything on his baptism: yet neither did they receive
anything therefrom, save only the sign of penance.
Reply Obj. 3: This was the baptism of "penance," for which children
were not suited; wherefore they were not baptized therewith. But to
bring the nations into the way of salvation was reserved to Christ
alone, who is the "expectation of the nations," as we read Gen.
49:10. Indeed, Christ forbade the apostles to preach the Gospel to
the Gentiles before His Passion and Resurrection. Much less fitting,
therefore, was it for the Gentiles to be baptized by John.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 5]
Whether John's Baptism Should Have Ceased After Christ Was Baptized?
Objection 1: It would seem that John's baptism should have ceased
after Christ was baptized. For it is written (John 1:31): "That He
may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing in
water." But when Christ had been baptized, He was made sufficiently
manifest, both by the testimony of John and by the dove coming down
upon Him, and again by the voice of the Father bearing witness to
Him. Therefore it seems that John's baptism should not have endured
thereafter.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv): "Christ was
baptized, and John's baptism ceased to avail." Therefore it seems
that, after Christ's baptism, John should not have continued to
baptize.
Obj. 3: Further, John's baptism prepared the way for Christ's. But
Christ's baptism began as soon as He had been baptized; because "by
the touch of His most pure flesh He endowed the waters with a
regenerating virtue," as Bede asserts (Mag. Sent. iv, 3). Therefore
it seems that John's baptism ceased when Christ had been baptized.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:22, 23): "Jesus . . . came
into the land of Judea . . . and baptized: and John also was
baptizing." But Christ did not baptize before being baptized.
Therefore it seems that John continued to baptize after Christ had
been baptized.
_I answer that,_ It was not fitting for the baptism of John to cease
when Christ had been baptized. First, because, as Chrysostom says
(Hom. xxix in Joan.), "if John had ceased to baptize" when Christ had
been baptized, "men would think that he was moved by jealousy or
anger." Secondly, if he had ceased to baptize when Christ baptized,
"he would have given His disciples a motive for yet greater envy."
Thirdly, because, by continuing to baptize, "he sent his hearers to
Christ" (Hom. xxix in Joan.). Fourthly, because, as Bede [*Scot.
Erig. Comment. in Joan.] says, "there still remained a shadow of the
Old Law: nor should the forerunner withdraw until the truth be made
manifest."
Reply Obj. 1: When Christ was baptized, He was not as yet fully
manifested: consequently there was still need for John to continue
baptizing.
Reply Obj. 2: The baptism of John ceased after Christ had been
baptized, not immediately, but when the former was cast into prison.
Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.): "I consider that John's
death was allowed to take place, and that Christ's preaching began in
a great measure after John had died, so that the undivided allegiance
of the multitude was transferred to Christ, and there was no further
motive for the divergence of opinions concerning both of them."
Reply Obj. 3: John's baptism prepared the way not only for Christ to
be baptized, but also for others to approach to Christ's baptism: and
this did not take place as soon as Christ was baptized.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 38, Art. 6]
Whether Those Who Had Been Baptized with John's Baptism Had to Be
Baptized with the Baptism of Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who had been baptized with
John's baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. For
John was not less than the apostles, since of him is it written
(Matt. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of
women a greater than John the Baptist." But those who were baptized
by the apostles were not baptized again, but only received the
imposition of hands; for it is written (Acts 8:16, 17) that some were
"only baptized" by Philip "in the name of the Lord Jesus": then the
apostles--namely, Peter and John--"laid their hands upon them, and
they received the Holy Ghost." Therefore it seems that those who had
been baptized by John had not to be baptized with the baptism of
Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, the apostles were baptized with John's baptism,
since some of them were his disciples, as is clear from John 1:37.
But the apostles do not seem to have been baptized with the baptism
of Christ: for it is written (John 4:2) that "Jesus did not baptize,
but His disciples." Therefore it seems that those who had been
baptized with John's baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism
of Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, he who is baptized is less than he who baptizes. But
we are not told that John himself was baptized with the baptism of
Christ. Therefore much less did those who had been baptized by John
need to receive the baptism of Christ.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Acts 19:1-5) that "Paul . . . found
certain disciples; and he said to them: Have you received the Holy
Ghost since ye believed? But they said to him: We have not so much as
heard whether there be a Holy Ghost. And he said: In what then were
you baptized? Who said: In John's baptism." Wherefore "they were"
again "baptized in the name of our [Vulg.: 'the'] Lord Jesus Christ."
Hence it seems that they needed to be baptized again, because they
did not know of the Holy Ghost: as Jerome says on Joel 2:28 and in an
epistle (lxix De Viro unius uxoris), and likewise Ambrose (De Spiritu
Sancto). But some were baptized with John's baptism who had full
knowledge of the Trinity. Therefore these had no need to be baptized
again with Christ's baptism.
Obj. 5: Further, on Rom. 10:8, "This is the word of faith, which we
preach," the gloss of Augustine says: "Whence this virtue in the
water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart, save by the
efficacy of the word, not because it is uttered, but because it is
believed?" Whence it is clear that the virtue of baptism depends on
faith. But the form of John's baptism signified the faith in which we
are baptized; for Paul says (Acts 19:4): "John baptized the people
with the baptism of penance, saying: That they should believe in Him
who was to come after him--that is to say, in Jesus." Therefore it
seems that those who had been baptized with John's baptism had no
need to be baptized again with the baptism of Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): "Those who
were baptized with John's baptism needed to be baptized with the
baptism of our Lord."
_I answer that,_ According to the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D,
2), "those who had been baptized by John without knowing of the
existence of the Holy Ghost, and who based their hopes on his
baptism, were afterwards baptized with the baptism of Christ: but
those who did not base their hope on John's baptism, and who believed
in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were not baptized afterwards, but
received the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands made over them by
the apostles."
And this, indeed, is true as to the first part, and is confirmed by
many authorities. But as to the second part, the assertion is
altogether unreasonable. First, because John's baptism neither
conferred grace nor imprinted a character, but was merely "in water,"
as he says himself (Matt. 3:11). Wherefore the faith or hope which
the person baptized had in Christ could not supply this defect.
Secondly, because, when in a sacrament, that is omitted which belongs
of necessity to the sacrament, not only must the omission be
supplied, but the whole must be entirely renewed. Now, it belongs of
necessity to Christ's baptism that it be given not only in water, but
also in the Holy Ghost, according to John 3:5: "Unless a man be born
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of
God." Wherefore in the case of those who had been baptized with
John's baptism in water only, not merely had the omission to be
supplied by giving them the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands,
but they had to be baptized wholly anew "in water and the Holy Ghost."
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): "After John,
baptism was administered, and the reason why was because he gave not
Christ's baptism, but his own . . . That which Peter gave . . . and
if any were given by Judas, that was Christ's. And therefore if Judas
baptized anyone, yet were they not rebaptized . . . For the baptism
corresponds with him by whose authority it is given, not with him by
whose ministry it is given." For the same reason those who were
baptized by the deacon Philip, who gave the baptism of Christ, were
not baptized again, but received the imposition of hands by the
apostles, just as those who are baptized by priests are confirmed by
bishops.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says to Seleucianus (Ep. cclxv), "we deem
that Christ's disciples were baptized either with John's baptism, as
some maintain, or with Christ's baptism, which is more probable. For
He would not fail to administer baptism so as to have baptized
servants through whom He baptized others, since He did not fail in
His humble service to wash their feet."
Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the
supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): "Since, when John said, 'I ought to
be baptized by Thee,' Christ answered, 'Suffer it to be so now': it
follows that afterwards Christ did baptize John." Moreover, he
asserts that "this is distinctly set down in some of the apocryphal
books." At any rate, it is certain, as Jerome says on Matt. 3:13,
that, "as Christ was baptized in water by John, so had John to be
baptized in the Spirit by Christ."
Reply Obj. 4: The reason why these persons were baptized after being
baptized by John was not only because they knew not of the Holy
Ghost, but also because they had not received the baptism of Christ.
Reply Obj. 5: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), our sacraments
are signs of present grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law
were signs of future grace. Wherefore the very fact that John
baptized in the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not
give the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the New Law.
_______________________
QUESTION 39
OF THE BAPTIZING OF CHRIST
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, concerning which
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have been baptized?
(2) Whether He should have been baptized with the baptism of John?
(3) Of the time when He was baptized;
(4) Of the place;
(5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him;
(6) Of the apparition of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove;
(7) Whether that dove was a real animal?
(8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 39, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Fitting That Christ Should Be Baptized?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to be
baptized. For to be baptized is to be washed. But it was not fitting
for Christ to be washed, since there was no uncleanness in Him.
Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to be baptized.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ was circumcised in order to fulfil the law.
But baptism was not prescribed by the law. Therefore He should not
have been baptized.
Obj. 3: Further, the first mover in every genus is unmoved in regard
to that movement; thus the heaven, which is the first cause of
alteration, is unalterable. But Christ is the first principle of
baptism, according to John 1:33: "He upon whom thou shalt see the
Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth."
Therefore it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 3:13) that "Jesus cometh from
Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him."
_I answer that,_ It was fitting for Christ to be baptized. First,
because, as Ambrose says on Luke 3:21: "Our Lord was baptized because
He wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, that, being
purified by the flesh of Christ that knew no sin, they might have the
virtue of baptism"; and, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.),
"that He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who were to be
baptized afterwards." Secondly, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in
Matth.), "although Christ was not a sinner, yet did He take a sinful
nature and 'the likeness of sinful flesh.' Wherefore, though He
needed not baptism for His own sake, yet carnal nature in others had
need thereof." And, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix) "Christ
was baptized that He might plunge the old Adam entirely in the
water." Thirdly, He wished to be baptized, as Augustine says in a
sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxvi), "because He wished to do what He had
commanded all to do." And this is what He means by saying: "So it
becometh us to fulfil all justice" (Matt. 3:15). For, as Ambrose says
(on Luke 3:21), "this is justice, to do first thyself that which thou
wishest another to do, and so encourage others by thy example."
Reply Obj. 1: Christ was baptized, not that He might be cleansed, but
that He might cleanse, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: It was fitting that Christ should not only fulfil what
was prescribed by the Old Law, but also begin what appertained to the
New Law. Therefore He wished not only to be circumcised, but also to
be baptized.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ is the first principle of baptism's spiritual
effect. Unto this He was not baptized, but only in water.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 39, Art. 2]
Whether It Was Fitting for Christ to Be Baptized with John's Baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for Christ to be
baptized with John's baptism. For John's baptism was the "baptism of
penance." But penance is unbecoming to Christ, since He had no sin.
Therefore it seems that He should not have been baptized with John's
baptism.
Obj. 2: Further, John's baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. de Bapt.
Christi), "was a mean between the baptism of the Jews and that of
Christ." But "the mean savors of the nature of the extremes"
(Aristotle, De Partib. Animal.). Since, therefore, Christ was not
baptized with the Jewish baptism, nor yet with His own, on the same
grounds He should not have been baptized with the baptism of John.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is best in human things should be ascribed
to Christ. But John's baptism does not hold the first place among
baptisms. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized with
John's baptism.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 3:13) that "Jesus cometh to
the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii): "After
being baptized, the Lord baptized, not with that baptism wherewith He
was baptized." Wherefore, since He Himself baptized with His own
baptism, it follows that He was not baptized with His own, but with
John's baptism. And this was befitting: first, because John's baptism
was peculiar in this, that he baptized, not in the Spirit, but only
"in water"; while Christ did not need spiritual baptism, since He was
filled with the grace of the Holy Ghost from the beginning of His
conception, as we have made clear above (Q. 34, A. 1). And this is
the reason given by Chrysostom (Hom. de Bapt. Christi). Secondly, as
Bede says on Mk. 1:9, He was baptized with the baptism of John, that,
"by being thus baptized, He might show His approval of John's
baptism." Thirdly, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), "by going
to John to be baptized by him, He sanctified baptism."
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), Christ wished to be baptized in
order by His example to lead us to baptism. And so, in order that He
might lead us thereto more efficaciously, He wished to be baptized
with a baptism which He clearly needed not, that men who needed it
might approach unto it. Wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 3:21: "Let
none decline the laver of grace, since Christ did not refuse the
laver of penance."
Reply Obj. 2: The Jewish baptism prescribed by the law was merely
figurative, whereas John's baptism, in a measure, was real, inasmuch
as it induced men to refrain from sin; but Christ's baptism is
efficacious unto the remission of sin and the conferring of grace.
Now Christ needed neither the remission of sin, which was not in Him,
nor the bestowal of grace, with which He was filled. Moreover, since
He is "the Truth," it was not fitting that He should receive that
which was no more than a figure. Consequently it was more fitting
that He should receive the intermediate baptism than one of the
extremes.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is a spiritual remedy. Now, the more perfect a
thing is, the less remedy does it need. Consequently, from the very
fact that Christ is most perfect, it follows that it was fitting that
He should not receive the most perfect baptism: just as one who is
healthy does not need a strong medicine.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 39, Art. 3]
Whether Christ Was Baptized at a Fitting Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was baptized at an unfitting
time. For Christ was baptized in order that He might lead others to
baptism by His example. But it is commendable that the faithful of
Christ should be baptized, not merely before their thirtieth year,
but even in infancy. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have
been baptized at the age of thirty.
Obj. 2: Further, we do not read that Christ taught or worked miracles
before being baptized. But it would have been more profitable to the
world if He had taught for a longer time, beginning at the age of
twenty, or even before. Therefore it seems that Christ, who came for
man's profit, should have been baptized before His thirtieth year.
Obj. 3: Further, the sign of wisdom infused by God should have been
especially manifest in Christ. But in the case of Daniel this was
manifested at the time of his boyhood; according to Dan. 13:45: "The
Lord raised up the holy spirit of a young boy, whose name was
Daniel." Much more, therefore, should Christ have been baptized or
have taught in His boyhood.
Obj. 4: Further, John's baptism was ordered to that of Christ as to
its end. But "the end is first in intention and last in execution."
Therefore He should have been baptized by John either before all the
others, or after them.
_On the