Title: A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1
Author: Dasgupta, Surendranath, 1887-1952
Language: English
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nikhilam anujachittaM jñânasûtrair naverya@h
 sajabhiva kusumânâM kâlandhhrair vidhatte/
 sa laghum api mamaitaM prAchyavijñânatantuM
upah@rtamatibhaktyâ modatâM mai g@rhîtvâ//

May He, who links the minds of all people,
through the apertures of time, with new threads
of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased
to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered,
though it be small, with the greatest devotion.



A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY


SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA



VOLUME I

First Edition: Cambridge, 1922



DEDICATION

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly
dedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages
of India, who, for the first time in history, formulated
the true principles of freedom and devoted themselves
to the holy quest of truth and the final assessment
and discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of
man through their concrete lives, critical thought,
dominant will and self-denial.



NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF
TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT
AND PÂLI WORDS


The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way
as in Italian, except that the sound of _a_ approaches
that of _o_ in _bond_ or _u_ in _but_, and _â_ that of _a_ as in _army_.
The consonants are as in English, except _c_, _ch_ in church;
_@t_, _@d_, _@n_ are cerebrals, to which English _t_, _d_, _n_ almost
correspond; _t_, _d_, _n_ are pure dentals; _kh_, _gh_, _ch_, _jh_,
_@th_, _@dh_, _th_, _dh_, _ph_, _bh_ are the simple sounds plus an
aspiration; _ñ_ is the French _gn_; _@r_ is usually pronounced
as _ri_, and _s'_, _@s_ as _sh_.



PREFACE

The old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided
developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and
science so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important
achievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal
of all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated
the point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex
growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced.

It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent
kingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch
that the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of
spiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were
regarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the
political changes through which India passed.

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who
occupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled
the minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes
or the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order
which never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after
a passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it
is mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and
civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other
countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who
wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture
that they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical
thought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in
India has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of
opinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract.
It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples
should become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics
of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its
special features.

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of India

viii

that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past
thoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in
modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms
to the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and
solutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our
own times may throw light on the course of the process of the future
reconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features
of Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full
significance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as
the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern
philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of
re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been
undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few
exceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of
these scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and
history than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in
the way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and
translations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the
presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical
literature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to
those who are not familiar with the texts themselves.

A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the
chief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study
of a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested
in philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination
or time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time
interested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books
_The Study of Patanjali_ and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian
Systems of Thought_ I have attempted to interpret the Sämkhya and Yoga
systems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view
of their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with
the important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks
to show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard
to the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to
the original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pâli
technical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

ix

for further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed
essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual
course of the thoughts.

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the
different topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern
work of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large
number of works on each system and these have been knit together and
given a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people
unacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I
considered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts
in order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what
might appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the
thoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange
them in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly
faithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very
few places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of
English philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those
were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term.
In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made
dangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is
difficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire
some sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to
take those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with
such meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which
they are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I
hope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for
unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But
I may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places
where condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also
sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without
its dark and uncomfortable corners.

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brâhma@nic stage, my
treatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the
evolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the
later Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.

x


More is found in the Brâhmanas, but I do not think it worth while to
elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt
with the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject have
already been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details
will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant
current flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currents
of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems
in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It
will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of
an inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive
character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha
in the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required
in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of
theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early
Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to
decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic;
and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in
very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also
have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right
or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering
into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the
systems are different in some cases from those offered by some European
scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are
acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may
be in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of
Logic (Navya-Nyâya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the
contributions of this school consist in the invention of technical
expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude
and absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these
are almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however
incorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view
I could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not
be very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the
different Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but
consists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in
the writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

xi

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a
difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that
a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the
opinions of modern writers have been incorporated.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness
to the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar,
Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the
publication of both volumes of the present work.

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for
the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes.
Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300,000, of which those
devoted to education come to about £200,000. But the man himself is far
above the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy
and friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable
Bodhisattva--one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many
other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the
encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and
researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are
too deep for utterance.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge
University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the
proofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in
many places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the
transliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the
whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me
with his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition
of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its
treatment to repeated discussions with him.

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N.K. Siddhanta,
M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie
for the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My
obligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press
for the honour they have done me in publishing this work.

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my
book and who may be impressed with its inevitable

xii

shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

  Pramâ@nasiddhântaviruddham atra
  Yatkiñciduktam matimândyado@sât
  Mâtsaryyam utsâryya tadâryyacittâ@h
  Prasâdam âdhâya vis'odhayantu. [Footnote ref 1]


S.D.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

_February_, 1922.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill
feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through
the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and
misstatements.]


CONTENTS


CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY.....................................................1

CHAPTER II

THE VEDAS, BRÂHMA@NAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Vedas and their antiquity.................................10
 2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind......................10
 3 Classification of the Vedic literature........................11
 4 The Sa@mhitâs.................................................12
 5 The Brâhma@nas................................................13
 6 The Âra@nyakas................................................14
 7 The @Rg-Veda, its civilization................................14
 8 The Vedic gods................................................16
 9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism........................17
10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajâpati, Vis'vakarma.....19
11 Brahma........................................................20
12 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma............21
13 Cosmogony--Mythological and Philosophical.....................23
14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Âtman............................25
15 Conclusion....................................................26

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)

 1 The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature...............28
 2 The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence..........30
 3 Brâhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads...........................31
 4 The meaning of the word Upani@sad.............................38
 5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads..............38
 6 Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times..................39
 7 The Upani@sads and their interpretations......................41
 8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures........42
 9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method..............44
10 The Âtman doctrine............................................45
11 Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads............................48
12 The World.....................................................51
13 The World-Soul................................................52
14 The Theory of Causation.......................................52
15 Doctrine of Transmigration....................................53
16 Emancipation..................................................58

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?......62
2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature...........................65
3 The Indian systems of Philosophy...............................67
4 Some fundamental points of agreement...........................71
 1 _The Karma theory_.........................................71
 2 _The Doctrine of Mukti_....................................74
 3 _The Doctrine of Soul_.....................................75
5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic
 Faith in the end...............................................75
6 Unity in Indian Sâdhana (philosophical, religious and ethical
 endeavours)....................................................77

xiv


CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY


 1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha.................78
 2 Buddha: his Life...............................................81
 3 Early Buddhist Literature......................................82
 4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism............84
 5 The Khandhas...................................................93
 6 Avijjâ and Âsava...............................................99
 7 Sîla and Samâdhi..............................................100
 8 Kamma.........................................................106
 9 Upani@sads and Buddhism.......................................109
10 The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism.............................112
11 Mahâyânism....................................................125
12 The Tathatâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.)...............129
13 The Mâdhyamika or the Sûnyavâda school--Nihilism..............138
14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.145
15 Sautrântika theory of Perception..............................151
16 Sautrântika theory of Inference...............................155
17 The Doctrine of Momentariness.................................158
18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal
 Efficiency (Arthakriyâkâritva)..................................163
19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems
 diverged........................................................164
20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought.............166


CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Origin of Jainism.........................................169
 2 Two Sects of Jainism..........................................170
 3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains...............171
 4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains.....................172
 5 Life of Mahâvîra..............................................173
 6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.......................173
 7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekântavâda).............175
 8 The Doctrine of Nâyas.........................................176
 9 The Doctrine of Syâdvâda......................................179
10 Knowledge, its value for us...................................181
11 Theory of Perception..........................................183
12 Non-Perceptual knowledge......................................185
13 Knowledge as Revelation.......................................186
14 The Jîvas.....................................................188
15 Karma Theory..................................................190
16 Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ.....................................192
17 Pudgala.......................................................195
18 Dharma, Adharma, Âkâs'a.......................................197
19 Kâla and Samaya...............................................198
20 Jaina Cosmography.............................................199
21 Jaina Yoga....................................................199
22 Jaina Atheism.................................................203
23 Mok@sa (emancipation).........................................207

xv


CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PÂTAÑJALA SÂ@MKHYA (YOGA)

 1 A Review......................................................208
 2 The Germs of Sâ@mkhya in the Upani@sads.......................211
 3 Sâ@mkhya and Yoga Literature..................................212
 4 An Early School of Sâ@mkhya...................................213
 5 Sâ@mkhya kârikâ, Sâ@mkhya sûtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and Vijñâna
 Bhiksu..........................................................222
 6 Yoga and Patañjali............................................226
 7 The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa..........238
 8 Thought and Matter............................................241
 9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances.............................242
10 The Gunas.....................................................243
11 Prak@@rti and its evolution...................................245
12 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.......247
13 Mahat and Ahamkâra............................................248
14 The Tanmâtras and the Paramâñus...............................251
15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy.............254
16 Change as the formation of new collocations...................255
17 Causation as Satkâryavâda (the theory that the effect
 potentially exists before it is generated by the movement
 of the cause)...................................................257
18 Sâ@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism..............................258
19 Buddhi and Purusa.............................................259
20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.......261
21 Sorrow and its Dissolution....................................264
22 Citta.........................................................268
23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).......................270
24 The Yoga Meditation...........................................271


CHAPTER VIII

THE NYÂYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the Nyâya standpoint...274
2 Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras...................................276
3 Does Vais'e@sika represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ?..........280
4 Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras...........................285
5 Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras.................................294
6 Philosophy of Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras..............301
7 The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature...........................305
8 The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy..........310
9 The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya, Vis'e@sa,
 Samavâya........................................................313
10 The Theory of Causation.......................................319
11 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).................323
12 Proof of the Existence of Is'vara.............................325
13 The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Physics.................................326
14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâ@na)............................330
15 The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya...................................332
16 Perception (Pratyak@sa).......................................333
17 Inference.....................................................343
18 Upamâna and S'abda............................................354
19 Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.................................355
20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for
 the seeker of Salvation.........................................360
21 The Doctrine of Soul..........................................362
22 Îs'vara and Salvation.........................................363

xvi


CHAPTER IX

MÎMÂ@MSÂ PHILOSOPHY


1 A Comparative Review...........................................367
2 The Mîmâ@msâ Literature........................................369
3 The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the
 Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ..........................372
4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception........................375
5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception.......................378
6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of
 Perception......................................................379
7 The Nature of Knowledge........................................382
8 The Psychology of Illusion.....................................384
9 Inference......................................................387
10 Upamâna, Arthâpatti...........................................391
11 S'abda-pramâ@na...............................................394
12 The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi)..................397
13 Self, Salvation, and God......................................399
14 Mîmâ@msâ as Philosophy and Mimâ@msâ as Ritualism..............403



CHAPTER X

THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA


1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than
 the Dialectic of Controversy....................................406
2 The philosophical situation: a Review..........................408
3 Vedânta Literature.............................................418
4 Vedânta in Gau@dapâda..........................................420
5 Vedânta and Sa@nkara (788-820 A.D.)............................429
6 The main idea of the Vedânta philosophy........................439
7 In what sense is the world-appearance false?...................443
8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena..................445
9 The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience)...........................452
10 Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference................454
11 Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra and Anta@hkara@na.......457
12 Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta dialectic.......................461
13 The Theory of Causation.......................................465
14 Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference....................470
15 Âtman, Jîva, Is'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda....474
16 Vedânta theory of Illusion....................................485
17 Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation.......................489
18 Vedânta and other Indian systems..............................492

INDEX............................................................495

1



CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTORY

The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are
but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate
that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body
of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who
are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and
are not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought
to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does
not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and
private individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of
philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pâli have been published, as well as
translations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little
systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their
value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of
Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated.
Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical
terms are so different from those of European thought, that they can
hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult
for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical
thought in its true bearing from translations. Pâli is a much easier
language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pâli is helpful in
understanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its
semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult
language. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary
Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse
parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily
understand the Vedas. the Upani@sads, the Purânas, the Law Books and
the literary works, and is also well acquainted with European
philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand
even small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the
dialectical Vedânta. This is due to two reasons, the use of
technical terms and of great condensation in expression, and
the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

2

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous
manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninth
century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise
expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a result
of that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. These
terms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader
who wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in
olden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do
so with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself
had got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to
popularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the
chosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become
fit students (_adhikârî_) of philosophy, under the direction of a
teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote
their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the
rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy
were allowed to study it.

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes
the same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in
different systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical
term with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary
will enlighten him much about the matter [Footnote ref 1]. He will have
to pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the
doctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions
of similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very
puzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to
know all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and
so it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and
refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions.
There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some
of the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, and the _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ of
Haribhadra with the commentary of Gu@naratna; but the former is very
sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding
of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the
systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical
philosophical terms called Nyâyakos'a has been prepared by M.M.
Bhîmâcârya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.]

3

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible.
Gu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned,
and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems,
and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it
seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines
or discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any
of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book
which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and
psychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for
a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature,
even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical
terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian
philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical
terms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their
modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The
technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are
of inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite
meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting
or misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think
well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered
philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation.
The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher
cannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly
formed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days
of Buddhist philosophy in the Pâli literature, this difficulty is greatly
felt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and
their repetition in different places in more or less different senses
heighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be
conveyed.

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be
written? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose
beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have
any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor
Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his _History of Philosophy_
[Footnote ref 1], "A universal history of philosophy would include
the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: New York, 1914, p. 3.]

4

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a
few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the
mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus,
Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical
doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot
through with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to
the study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the
ancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests."
There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and
untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters.
It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views,
for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If
they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately
about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have
to go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of
the chapters.

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt
to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given
from two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian
philosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the
systems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials
directly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared
by specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some
truth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems
the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more
or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of
twenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly
be made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own
undertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the
original texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those
sources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited
and I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most
important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems
and diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many
interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused
in a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness.
There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

5

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the
present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the
present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more
competent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called
impossible on account of its imperfections.

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and
accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible
to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially
valid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first
sight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very
obscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates
and to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers.
As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their
mutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The
special nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth
chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous
course of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not
possible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at
a particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a
later time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state,
but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to
the original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history
has in Western countries often brought forth the development of more
coherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types
remained the same, their development through history made them more and
more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent
in the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through
the criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side
the parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more
differentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development
has been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have
been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be
made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made
in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I
have never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest
should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

6

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be
a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little
chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming
a general notion about the growth and development of the different
systems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the
development of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe,
definite chronological knowledge would be considered much more
indispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is
indispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which
succeeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when
we are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with
regard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin
has rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as
best I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier
stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of
these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable,
yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the
whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates
of the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately,
as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the
same thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system,
and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more
determinate forms.

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of
hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in
some of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000
B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term.
It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical
questions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms
of poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the
Brâhmaf@nas and the Âra@nyakas written mostly in prose, which followed
the Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to
establish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which
indulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This
latter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might
appear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what
little of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying
to express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

7

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose
and verse called the Upani@sads, which contain various sorts of
philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some
pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but
utterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real
and indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with
them. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this
literature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began
with the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe
that Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of
its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D.
The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to
be sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina
philosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier
days, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it
does not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with
other systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai@s@nava
thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu
writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and
Gu@naratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The
non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain
extent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is
difficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there
have been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds,
Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less
differing from one another as Buddhist thought did.

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy
and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox
Hindu thought are the Sâ@mkhya, the Yoga, the Nyâya, the Vais'e@sika,
the Mimâ@msâ (generally known as Pûrva Mimâ@msâ), and the Vedânta (known
also as Uttara Mimâ@msâ). Of these what is differently known as Sâ@mkhya
and Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vais'e@sika and
the Nyâya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times
the similarity of the former with Mimâ@msâ was greater than that
with Nyâya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the
same systems. Nyâya and Vais'e@sika have therefore been treated

8

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began
to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably
had their early beginnings at the time of the Upani@sads. But at
that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems
of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were
associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works
treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most
important early works is the _Bhagavadgâtâ_. This book is rightly
regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is
written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical
problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which
gives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upani@sads
than to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth
century onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic
ideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious
creeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and
pluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different
schools of Vai@s@nava philosophy. Most of the Vai@s@nava thinkers wished
to show that their systems were taught in the Upani@sads, and thus
wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote
commentaries on the _Brahmasûtra_, the classical exposition of the
philosophy of the Upani@sads. In addition to the works of these Vai@s@nava
thinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a
more eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old
as the Upani@sads. They are known as the S'aiva and Tantra thought, and are
dealt with in the second volume of this work.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought
can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is
extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the
systems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have
been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far
they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during
the earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are
traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop
side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they
were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of
Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

9

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of
any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new
problems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently
with its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the
philosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus
though it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of
Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Mîmâ@msâ were prior to Buddhism yet they have been
treated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these
systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the
Vais'e@sika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been
treated later, partly on account of its association with Nyâya, and
partly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much
later date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of
old philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have
been of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems
and their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be
satisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn
my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the
literature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study
of any particular system of thought.

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources
as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar
modes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to
the adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian
ideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the
modern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed.
This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes
of rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian
thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present
attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might
say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are
essentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main
difference is often the difference of the point of view from which the
same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries.
My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical
development will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second
volume of the present work.

10



CHAPTER II


THE VEDAS, BRÂHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

The Vedas and their antiquity.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the
earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed
difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came
into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them
can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date to
be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bâl Ga@ngâdhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The
ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary,
religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from
mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus
generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was
therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the
sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the
"seers" (_mantradra@s@tâ_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some
time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to
look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had,
theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed
to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of
each creation.


The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing
prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins,
who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their
preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through
the course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations
at all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes
in the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such
was the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as
the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at
all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus
at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old

11

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day
are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses
two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an
ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of
image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular
obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites.
Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes,
but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies.
Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money
for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals.
Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas
base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority.
Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas,
but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others
and maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone
was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their
views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious
customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be
but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to
be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in
the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal
transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority
from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to
say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the
past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all
literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may
say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox
Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the
Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.


Classification of the Vedic literature.

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study
of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused
when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and
subjects having the same generic name "Veda" or "S'ruti" (from
_s'ru_ to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

12

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending
over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature
represents the total achievements of the Indian people in different
directions for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a
diversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from
the points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out
four different types, namely the Sa@mhitâ or collection of verses (_sam_
together, _hita_ put), Brâhma@nas, Âra@nyakas ("forest treatises")
and the Upani@sads. All these literatures, both prose and verse,
were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought
almost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by
heart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and
were hence called _s'ruti_ (literally anything heard)[Footnote ref 1].


The Sa@mhitâs.

There are four collections or Sa@mhitâs, namely @Rg-Veda, Sâma-Veda,
Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the @Rg-Veda is probably the
earliest. The Sâma-Veda has practically no independent value, for
it consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the
@Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and
may thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains
in addition to the verses taken from the @Rg-Veda many original prose
formulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sâma-Veda is solely with
reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents
of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were
actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore
called the Veda of Yajus--sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted
with the arrangement in the @Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses are
generally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them.
Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the
Fire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth
collection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form
considerably later than the @Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor
Macdonell says, "It is not only entirely different from the _Rigveda_
but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the
_Rigveda_ deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pâ@nini, III. iii. 94.]

13

comparatively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the _Atharva-Veda_
is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon
world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower
grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These
two, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most
important of the four Vedas [Footnote ref 1]."


The Brâhma@nas. [Footnote ref 2]

After the Sa@mhitâs there grew up the theological treatises called the
Brâhma@nas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They
are written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the
different rituals to those who are not already familiar with them.
"They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, "the spirit of an age in
which all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice,
describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its
origin and significance." These works are full of dogmatic assertions,
fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the
field of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably
never so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed.
But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation
to generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus
there came about the necessity of the distribution of the different
sacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We may
assume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming
established, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious
minds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking
was thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result
was the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: A.A. Macdonell's _History of Sanskrit Literature_, p. 31.]

[Footnote 2: Weber (_Hist. Ind. Lit_., p. 11, note) says that the word
Brâhma@na signifies "that which relates to prayer _brahman_." Max Muller
(_S.B.E._, I.p. lxvi) says that Brâhma@na meant "originally the sayings
of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more
special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p. xxii)
says that the Brhâma@nas were so called "probably either because
they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman)
generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative
utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial
lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests." But
in view of the fact that the Brâhma@nas were also supposed to be as
much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view
is the correct one.]

14

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now
generally believed that the close of the Brâhma@na period was not later
than 500 B.C.


The Âra@nyakas.

As a further development of the Brâhma@nas however we get the Âra@nyakas
or forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who
had retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate
sacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could
not be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols
were supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant
the sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find
that amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas
began to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of
truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an
illustration from the beginning of the B@rhadâra@nyaka we find that
instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (_as'vamedha_)
there are directions for meditating upon the dawn (_U@sas_) as the head
of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and
so on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation
or meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials
of sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable
of bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of
Vedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic
meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus
we find that the Âra@nyaka age was a period during which free thinking
tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered
it for a long time. It was thus that the Âra@nyakas could pave the way
for the Upani@sads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the
Vedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upani@sads the source
of all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.


The @Rg-Veda, its civilization.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a
single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They
were composed probably at different periods by different sages,
and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

15

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed
down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions
that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the
collection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was
probably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms
to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect
the civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity
before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long
vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is
genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive
society which produced it--the oldest book of the Aryan race.
The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the
cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe,
and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals.
"The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread,
of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many
sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots,
is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and
family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important
part than eating [Footnote ref 1]." The wood-worker built war-chariots
and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups.
Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The
women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing;
they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men
and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a
tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families
forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of
the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases
electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the
will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and
law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, "the hymns
strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people
were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the
world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the
realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious,
was punished and the sin expiated."[Footnote ref 2] Thus it is only right
and proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 18.]

16

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans
more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and
dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular
ones. Thus Kaegi says, "The whole significance of the Rigveda
in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly
been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents
to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest
beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its
relation to man [Footnote ref 1]."


The Vedic Gods.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda were almost all composed in
praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary
importance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally
in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god.
The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse
powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have
therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the
Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the
Purâ@nas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the
thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods
associated with them are also similar in character. The same
epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few
specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later
mythological compositions of the Purâ@nas the gods lost their
character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual
personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow
like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted
with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the
characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers
of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as
Kaegi has it, as one that "lies concealed in the softer wood, as
in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early
morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness.
The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests
pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing
like a horse--he whom men love to see increasing like their own
prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 26.]

17

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he
presents to all sides his front.

   "All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light,
   His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance,
   The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream,
   So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease."

[Footnote ref 1] R.V.I. 143. 3.

They would describe the wind (Vâta) and adore him and say

   "In what place was he born, and from whence comes he?
   The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring,
   The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure:
   His rushing sound we hear--what his appearance, no one."

[Footnote ref 2] R.V.X. 168. 3, 4.

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth
here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven
beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and
imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a
few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some
dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the
terrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.


Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer
to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent
reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple
primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe
their origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in
a polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance
or shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not.
The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon
excited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck
with wonder that "the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance
or the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic
sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

   "Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
   That downward turned he falls not downward?
   The guide of his ascending path,--who saw it?"

[Footnote Ref 1] R.V. IV. 13. 5.

The sages wonder how "the sparkling waters of all rivers flow
into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 35.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_, p. 38.]

18

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and
fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to
accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude
of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They
hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed
them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or
aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion
or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the
time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has called
Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turn
standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of
as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special
concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they
ascribe the most power in the matter,--to whose department if I
may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind
of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything
that can be said of a divine being;--he is the highest, the only
god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however,
no offence or depreciation of any other god [Footnote ref 1]." "Against
this theory it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his _Vedic
Mythology_ [Footnote ref 2], "that Vedic deities are not represented as
'independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into
more frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even
the mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus
Varu@na and Sûrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varu@na and
the As'vins submit to the power of Vi@s@nu (I. 156)....Even when a
god is spoken of as unique or chief (_eka_), as is natural enough in
laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic
force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context
or even by the same verse [Footnote Ref 3]. "Henotheism is therefore an
appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance
produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism,
by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the
constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest
or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness
and to ignore other gods, and by the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 27.]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid._ p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other
references to Henotheism.]

[Footnote 3: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 16, 17.]

19

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35)
each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine [Footnote ref 1]."
But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration
of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this
stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic,
but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it
was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them.
The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a
monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different
deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side
was a tendency towards polytheism.

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajâpati, Vis'vakarma.

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and
highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme
Lord of all beings (Prajâpati), not by a process of conscious
generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind,
able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and
physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived.
Thus the epithet Prajâpati or the Lord of beings, which
was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized
as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said
in R.V.x. 121 [Footnote Ref 2]:

  In the beginning rose Hira@nyagarbha,
  Born as the only lord of all existence.
  This earth he settled firm and heaven established:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding
  All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;
  Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who by his might alone became the monarch
  Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
  Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
  The ocean and the distant stream exhibit;
  Whose arms extended are these spreading regions:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
  Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;
  Who measured out the air's extended spaces:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17.]

[Footnote 2: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.]

20

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vis'vakarma
(All-creator) [Footnote ref 1]. He is said to be father and procreator of
all beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters.
It is to him that the sage says,

  Who is our father, our creator, maker,
  Who every place doth know and every creature,
  By whom alone to gods their names were given,
  To him all other creatures go to ask him [Footnote ref 2]
                                          R.V.x.82.3.


Brahma.

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory
for the Vedânta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in
the @Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The
meanings that Sâya@na the celebrated commentator of the Vedas
gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (_a_) food, food offering,
(_b_) the chant of the sâma-singer, (_c_) magical formula or text,
(_d_) duly completed ceremonies, (_e_) the chant and sacrificial gift
together, (_f_) the recitation of the hot@r priest, (_g_) great. Roth
says that it also means "the devotion which manifests itself as
longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the
gods." But it is only in the S'atapatha Brâhma@na that the conception
of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the
supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods.
Thus the S'atapatha says, "Verily in the beginning this (universe)
was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having
created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this
(terrestrial) world, Vâyu the air, and Sûrya the sky.... Then the
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up
to the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again
into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these
two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and
that again which has no name and which one knows by its form,
'this is (of a certain) form,' that is form: as far as there are Form
and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed
are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows
these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force [Footnote
ref 3]. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the
Universe and is identified with Prajâpati, Puru@sa and Prâ@na

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's _Sanskrit
Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.]

[Footnote 2: Kaegi's translation.]

[Footnote 3: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Brâhmana _S.B.E._
vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.]

21

(the vital air [Footnote ref 1]). In another place Brahman is described as
being the Svayambhû (self-born) performing austerities, who offered
his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self,
and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over
all creatures [Footnote ref 2]. The conception of the supreme man (Puru@sa)
in the @Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the
world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining
three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the
present, past and future [Footnote ref 3].


Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic
tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices.
On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually
growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth
contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant
position, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics
of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the
desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not
dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian
or Vai@s@nava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived
as Haug notes "to be a kind of machinery in which every
piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the
performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring
of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils
employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw
contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole
sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed.
Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results
might follow. Thus when Tva@s@t@r performed a sacrifice for the
production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy
Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object
was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if
the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest
detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition
of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not
by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice.
The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain
mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S.B.E._ XLIII. pp.59,60,400 and XLIV. p.409.]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid_., XLIV, p. 418.]

[Footnote 3: R.V.x.90, Puru@sa Sûkta.]

22

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of
a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed
to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of
the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed
by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says "as an invisible thing at
all times and is like the latent power of electricity in an
electrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable
apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is not offered
to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare
on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by
the sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated
and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though
in each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings,
the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice
or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it.
Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even
to the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank
by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only
kind of duty, and it was also called _karma_ or _kriyâ_ (action) and
the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good
or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of
sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or
gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others)
were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that
the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature
under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the
use of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This word
was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "'order'
in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious
world as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]" and its unalterable law of
producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it
is here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises
such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present
day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic
hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex
system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course
towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate
reality of the universe.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]

23


Cosmogony--Mythological and philosophical.

The cosmogony of the @Rg-Veda may be looked at from two
aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological
aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says,
"The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production,
the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other
represents it as the result of natural generation [Footnote ref. 1]."
Thus in the @Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, "what was
the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven
and earth [Footnote ref. 2]?" The answer given to this question in
Taittirîya-Brâhma@na is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from
which the heaven and earth were made [Footnote ref 3]." Heaven and Earth
are sometimes described as having been supported with posts [Footnote
ref 4]. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and
parentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dak@sa.

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn
[Footnote ref 5] attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already
noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever
has been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become
diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and
all beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere;
from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from
his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which
the Sun is called the soul (_âtman_) of all that is movable and
all that is immovable [Footnote ref 6]. There are also statements to the
effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the
sages [Footnote ref 7]. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the
supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hira@nyagarbha [Footnote
ref 8]). In some passages it is said "Brahma@naspati blew forth these
births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent
sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the
existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions
sprang, thereafter, from Uttânapada [Footnote ref 9]." The most remarkable
and sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.x. 81. 4.]

[Footnote 3: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.]

[Footnote 4: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11; also R.V. II. 15 and IV.
56.]

[Footnote 5: R.V.x. 90.]

[Footnote 6: R.V.I. 115.]

[Footnote 7: R.V.I. 164. 46.]

[Footnote 8: R.V.X. 121.]

[Footnote 9: Muir's translation of R.V.x. 72; Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
v.p. 48.]

24

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world
are found is the 129th hymn of R.V.x.

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being.
   The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it.
   What covered all? and where? by what protected?
   Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;
   Of day and night there was yet no distinction.
   Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported,
   Other than It was none, nor aught above It.

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden;
   The universe was undistinguished water.
   That which in void and emptiness lay hidden
   Alone by power of fervor was developed.

4. Then for the first time there arose desire,
   Which was the primal germ of mind, within it.
   And sages, searching in their heart, discovered
   In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.

6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely
   From what and how this universe has risen?
   And whether not till after it the gods lived?
   Who then can know from what it has arisen?

7. The source from which this universe has risen,
   And whether it was made, or uncreated,
   He only knows, who from the highest heaven
   Rules, the all-seeing lord--or does not He know [Footnote ref 1]?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the
S'atapatha Brâhma@na (x. 5. 3.I) which says that "in the beginning
this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent;
in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did
not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been
declared by the Rishi (@Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither
the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither
existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to
become manifest,--more defined, more substantial: it sought after
a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency [Footnote
ref 2]." In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of
the universe were comprehended within the god Skambha [Footnote ref 3].

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang
forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 90. R.V.x. 129.]

[Footnote 2: See Eggeling's translation of _S'.B., S.B.E._ vol. XLIII. pp.
374, 375.]

[Footnote 3: _A.V._ x. 7. 10.]

25

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which
could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the
mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being;
and which could think that it was the primal One which by its
inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first
manifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang
forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the
Brâhma@nas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally
requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the
starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined
with the theory of creation, so that Prajâpati is sometimes
spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said
to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.


Eschatology; the Doctrine of Âtman.

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could
be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could
exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the
doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the S'atapatha
Brâhma@na it is said that those who do not perform rites with
correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death
again. In a hymn of the @Rg-Veda (X. 58) the soul (_manas_) of a man
apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the
trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there
is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the
highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance
of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath
where the evil-doers are punished. In the S'atapatha
Brâhma@na we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the
evil-doers, but let the good go by [Footnote ref 1]; it is also said
there that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance,
and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad.
It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to
the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he
performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of
the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys
or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world
according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the
moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S.B._ I. 9.3, and also Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_,
pp. 166, 167.]

26

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good
works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection
of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad
works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or
order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with
the conception of @rta, and the unalterable law which produces
the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the
doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the
@Rg-Veda are _manas_, _âtman_ and _asu_. The word _âtman_ however
which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used
to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought
and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as
dwelling in the heart[Footnote ref 1]. It is however difficult to
understand how âtman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man
going out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence
or reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one
passage in the @Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and
deeper passes from the vital breath (_asu_) to the blood, and thence
to âtman as the inmost self of the world; "Who has seen how
the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was
born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital
breath, the blood, the Self (_âtman_) of the world? Who went to
ask him that knows it [Footnote ref 2]?" In Taittîrya Âra@nyaka I. 23,
however, it is said that Prajâpati after having created his self (as
the world) with his own self entered into it. In Taittîrya Brâhma@na
the âtman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows
him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the
pre-Upani@sad Vedic literature âtman probably was first used to
denote "vital breath" in man, then the self of the world, and then
the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces
of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent
supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which
makes a man sinless and pure.


Conclusion.

Looking at the advancement of thought in the @Rg-Veda we
find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which
not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.i. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Âtman in
_Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_.

27

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having
emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as
one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as
being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother
of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express
doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation--"Who
knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly
the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable
nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their
effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities
as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the
tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple
character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some
quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable
from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another
world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the
soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be reborn
on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may
be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of
transmigration. The self (_âtman_) is spoken of in one place as the
essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brâhma@nas
and the Âra@nyakas we see that âtman has begun to mean the
supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus
approached the great Âtman doctrine of the Upani@sads.



CHAPTER III


THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS [Footnote ref 1]. (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)

The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature.

Though it is generally held that the Upani@sads are usually
attached as appendices to the Âra@nyakas which are again attached
to the Brâhma@nas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as
separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases
that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brâhma@na
are introduced into the Âra@nyakas and the Âra@nyaka materials
are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upani@sad teaching.
This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by
the "Nir@naya-Sâgara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Ísâ, 2 Kena,
3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 Mâ@n@dukya, 7 Taittirîya, 7 Aitareya,
9 Chândogya, 10 B@rhadâra@nyaka, 11 S'vetâs'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki,
13 Maitreyî, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jâbâla, 16 Brahmabindu, 17 Ha@msa,
18 Âru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nârâya@na, 21 Nârâya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa,
23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtanâda, 25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikhâ,
27 Maitrâya@nî, 28 B@rhajjâbâla, 29 N@rsi@mhapûrvatâpinî,
30 N@rsi@mhottaratâpinî, 31 Kâlâgnirudra, 32 Subâla, 33 K@surikâ,
34 Yantrikâ, 35 Sarvasâra, 36 Nirâlamba, 37 S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajrasûcikâ,
39 Tejobindu, 40 Nâdabindu, 41 Dhyânabindu, 42 Brahmavidyâ, 43 Yogatattva,
44 Atmabodha, 45 Nâradaparivrâjaka, 46 Tris'ikhibrâhma@na, 47 Sîtâ,
48 Yogacû@dama@ni, 49 Nirvâna, 50 Ma@ndalabrâhma@na, 51 Dak@si@nâmûrtti,
52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripâdvibhûtimahânârya@na, 55 Advayatâraka,
56 Ramarahasya, 57 Râmapûrvatâpinî, 58 Râmottaratâpinî, 59 Vâsudeva,
60 Mudgala, 61 Sâ@n@dilya, 62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mahâ, 65 S'ârîraka,
66 Yogas'ikhâ, 67 Turiyâtîta, 68 Sa@mnyâsa, 69 Paramaha@msaparivrâjaka,
70 Ak@samâlâ, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekâk@sara, 73 Annapûrnâ, 74 Sûrya, 75 Aksi,
76 Adhyâtma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 Sâvitrî, 79 Âtman, 80 Pâ'supatabrahma,
81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhûta, 83 Tripurârâpini, 84 Devî, 85 Tripurâ,
86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bhâvanâ, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali,
90 Bhasmajâbâla, 91 Rudrâk@sajâbâla, 92 Ga@napati, 93 Jâbâladars'ana,
94 Tâiasâra, 95 Mahâvakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Prâ@nâgnihotra,
98 Gopâlapûrvatâpinî, 99 Gopâlottaratâpinî, 100 K@r@s@na, 101 Yâjñavalkya,
102 Varâha, 103 S'âthyâyanîya, 104 Hayagrîva, 105 Dattâtreya, 106 Garu@da,
107 Kalisantara@na, 108 Jâbâli, 109 Saubhâgyalak@smî, 110 Sarasvatîrahasya,
111 Bahvrca, 112 Muktika.

The collection of Upani@sads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother,
contained 50 Upani@sads. The Muktika Upani@sad gives a list of 108
Upani@sads. With the exception of the first 13 Upani@sads most of them are
of more or less later date. The Upani@sads dealt with in this chapter are
the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the
purport of these, there are others which deal with the S'aiva, S'âkta,
the Yoga and the Vai@s@nava doctrines. These will be referred to in
connection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The
later Upani@sads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this
chapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upani@sads were
composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.]

29

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts
of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter.
Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be
found in this, that the Brâhma@nas were intended for the householders,
the Âra@nyakas for those who in their old age withdrew
into the solitude of the forests and the Upani@sads for those who
renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.
Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the
ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani@sads as being
of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature
as dictating the path of knowledge (_jñâna-mârga_) as opposed
to the path of works (_karma-mârga_) which forms the content
of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the
orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the
Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain
actions (_vidhi_) or prohibitions against committing certain others
(_ni@sedha_). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted
that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to
praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the
commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue
why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no
reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails
to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that
the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions
to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs
therefore to that of the Karma-mârga or the performance of Vedic
duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upani@sads however do not require
the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth
and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man.
Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong
controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedânta
(_Upani@sads_) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy
to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle
that the Upani@sads should not be regarded as an exception, but
that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be
held out as commending the performance of duties; but the
former dissociate the Upani@sads from the rest of the Vedic literature
and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to
any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which
reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.

30

S'a@nkara the most eminent exponent of the Upani@sads holds that
they are meant for such superior men who are already above
worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties
have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be
such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an
ascetic, for him the Upani@sads have been revealed for his ultimate
emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the
Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer
care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final
emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the
Upani@sads [Footnote ref 1].

The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.

The Upani@sads are also known by another name Vedânta, as
they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (_veda-anta_,
end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upani@sads,
the Vedânta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student
knows that in language the Upani@sads approach the classical
Sanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination
of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they
thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their
Vedic names which they took from the name of the different
schools or branches (_s'âkhâ_) among which the Vedas were studied
[Footnote ref 2]. Thus the Upani@sads attached to the Brâhma@nas
of the Aitareya and Kau@sîtaki schools are called respectively
Aitareya and Kau@sîtaki Upani@sads. Those of the Tâ@n@dins and
Talavakâras of the Sâma-veda are called the Chândogya and Talavakâra
(or Kena) Upani@sads. Those of the Taittirïya school of the Yajurveda

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This is what is called the difference of fitness
(_adhikâribheda_). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to
hear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sads
have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.]

[Footnote 2: When the Sa@mhitâ texts had become substantially fixed,
they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and
transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the
practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the
matter of prose compositions, the Brâhma@nas. These however were
gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the
special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited.
Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of
the texts of the Brâhma@nas even of the same Veda among different people.
These different schools were known by the name of particular S'âkhâs
(e.g. Aitareya, Kau@sîtaki) with which the Brâhma@nas were associated
or named. According to the divergence of the Brâhma@nas of the different
S'âkhâs there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the
Upani@sads associated with them.]

31

form the Taittirîya and Mahânâraya@na, of the Ka@tha school
the Kâ@thaka, of the Maitrâya@nî school the Maitrâya@nî. The
B@rhadâra@nyaka Upani@sad forms part of the S'atapatha Brâhma@na
of the Vâjasaneyi schools. The Îs'â Upani@sad also belongs to the
latter school. But the school to which the S'vetâs'vatara belongs
cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption
with regard to these Upani@sads is that they represent the
enlightened views of the particular schools among which they
flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number
of Upani@sads of a comparatively later age were attached to the
Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the
Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which
they dealt [Footnote ref 1].

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the
frequent episodes in the Upani@sads in which the Brahmins are
described as having gone to the K@sattriyas for the highest knowledge
of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the
Upani@sad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the
Brâhma@nas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical
speculations amongst the people in Pâli works, it may be
inferred that among the K@sattriyas in general there existed earnest
philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted
an important influence in the formation of the Upani@sad doctrines.
There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the
Upani@sads are found directly incorporated with the Brâhma@nas
it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas
alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either
set the Upani@sad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance
to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved
their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.


Brâhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads.

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brâhmanic to the
Upani@sad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the
history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic
hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were
developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of
the Upani@sads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, Âtman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc.
There were however some exceptions such as the Mâ@n@dûkya, Jâbâla,
Pai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc.]

32

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis'vakarman or
Hira@nyagarbha into the âtman and the Brahman of the Upani@sads
seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing
to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the âtman
doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout
the earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis'vakarman,
Hira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such a
nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sad
ideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubt
occurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the association
that come along with it are widely different from that of the
puru@sa of the Puru@sasûkta of the @Rg-Veda.

When the @Rg-Veda describes Vis'vakarman it describes him
as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events,
to whom they pray for worldly benefits. "What was the position, which
and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis'vakarman
produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The
one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every
side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth,
shapes them with his arms and with his wings....Do thou, Vis'vakarman,
grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest,
and the lowest, and the middle...may a generous son remain here
to us [Footnote ref 2]"; again in R.V.X. 82 we find "Vis'vakarman is
wise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of
intuition....He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows
all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names,
to him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3]."
Again about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R.V.I. 121, "Hira@nyagarbha arose
in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He
established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our
oblation?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the
earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who
produced the great and brilliant waters!--to what god, etc.? Prajâpati,
no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we
obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we
become masters of riches [Footnote ref 4]." Speaking of the puru@sa the
@Rg-Veda


__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17.
Hira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the
first created being. The phrase Sarvâhammânî Hira@nyagarbha which
Deussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word
Brahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]

[Footnote 2: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p, 7.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 16, 17.]

33

says "Purusha has a thousand heads...a thousand eyes, and a thousand
feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it]
by a space of ten fingers....He formed those aerial creatures, and
the animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1]," etc. Even that
famous hymn (R.V.x. 129) which begins with "There was then neither
being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above" ends with saying
"From whence this creation came into being, whether it was
created or not--he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably
knows or does not know."

In the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed,
and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside
but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position
of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed
theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality
and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation
here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are
offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true
self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of
philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest.
This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does
not carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophical
discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter
of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has
been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the
apparently meaningless speculations of the Brâhma@nas this doctrine
could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable
to be believed.

On the strength of the stories of Bâlâki Ga'rgya and Ajâtas'atru
(B@rh. II. i), S'vetaketu and Pravâha@na Jaibali (Châ. V. 3 and B@rh.
VI. 2) and Âru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Châ. V. 11) Garbe thinks
"that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the
doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence
on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin
in the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]" and that "it took
its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3]." This
if true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads away
from the influence of the Veda, Brâhma@nas and the Âra@nyakas. But do
the facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe
himself

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]

[Footnote 2: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 68.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.

34

self has produced. In the story of Bâlâki Gârgya and Ajâtas'atru
(B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, Bâlâki Gârgya is a boastful man
who wants to teach the K@sattriya Ajâtas'atru the true Brahman,
but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this
Ajâtas'atru replies (following Garbe's own translation) "it is
contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction
from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to
him [Footnote ref l]." Does this not imply that in the natural order of
things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the
K@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a
K@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning
of the conversation, Ajâtas'atru had promised to pay Bâlâki one
thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people
used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. The
second story of S'vetaketu and Pravâha@na Jaibali seems to be fairly
conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines,
the way of the gods (_devayâna_) and the way of the fathers
(_pit@ryâna_) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is without
any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge
of Brahman as the true self.

The third story of Âru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Châ. V. 11)
is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to
know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddâlaka
Âru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied
them to the K@sattriya king As'vapati Kaikeya who was studying
the subject. But As'vapati ends the conversation by giving them
certain instructions about the fire doctrine (_vaisvânara agni_) and
the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the
true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are
only the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructing
the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were
discussing and instructing the âtman knowledge. I am thus led
to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the
Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been
too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have
been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references
given by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 74.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yâjñavalkya
speaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidyâ_.]

35

just examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, that
the K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in the
religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirers
were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman
or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and
birth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence for
thinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyas
or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the
Brâhma@nas and the Âra@nyakas which were the productions of
the Brahmins.

The change of the Brâhma@na into the Âra@nyaka thought is
signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to
their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded
as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we
find in the B@rhadâra@nyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice
the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated
upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the
eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul,
and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good
can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is
most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is
the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere
animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place
of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material
substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals
lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side
by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the
Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic
meditations were taking the place of gross matter and
action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only
chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from
the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but
even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that
the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive
of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing
value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances
and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth
[Footnote ref 3].

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Winternitz's _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I.
pp. 197 ff.]

[Footnote 2: The story of Maitryî and Yâjñavalikya (B@rh. II. 4)
and that of Satyakâma son of Jabâlâ and his teacher (Châ. IV. 4).]

[Footnote 3: Châ. V. II.]

36

The Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya
Âra@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prâ@na [Footnote
ref 1], the Udgîtha of the Sâmaveda was identified with Om, Prâ@na,
sun and eye; in Chândogya II. the Sâman was identified with Om, rain,
water, seasons, Prâ@na, etc., in Chândogya III. 16-17 man was
identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation;
laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras;
and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with
sacrificial fees (_dak@si@nâ_). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic
Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision
of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the
Âra@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things
which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of
instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure
identity. Thus in Ait. Âra@n. II. 1. 3 we find "Then comes the origin
of food. The seed of Prajâpati are the gods. The seed of the gods
is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The
seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of
creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed
of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done
is this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2]."

The word Brahman according to Sâya@na meant mantras
(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great.
Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new,
"as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from
the fathers." It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forth
at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma
juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite,
endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its
guardian (R.V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22.
9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the
conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can
be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as
the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of
the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I am
disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the
meaning as we find it in many passages in the Âra@nyakas and the
Upani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ait. Âra@n. II 1-3.]

[Footnote 2: Keith's _Translation of Aitareya Âranyaka_.]

[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, _E.R.E._.]

37

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is
rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by
meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still
remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages
of the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon this
great force "Brahman" as being identified with diverse symbols,
natural objects, parts and functions of the body.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its
actual performance in the external world to certain forms of
meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories
of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions
was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing
could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations
of the Pañcâgnividyâ are so much referred to in the Upani@sads
as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that
the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations.
When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is
really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they
thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the
gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a
man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for
the gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1].

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of
the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vâyu (wind) to
blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman
that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The
whole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic power
of sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was being
abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power.
There are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after the
nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only
imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power
of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with
bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical
representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea
that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found
inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of
the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman
originated.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]

38


The meaning of the word Upani@sad.

The word Upani@sad is derived from the root _sad_ with the prefix
_ni_ (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the
act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to
him. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, "The history
and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that
Upani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting
of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher
[Footnote ref 1]." Deussen points out that the word means "secret" or
"secret instruction," and this is borne out by many of the passages of
the Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used
in this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find that
great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication
of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a
student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires
proves himself deserving to hear them. S'ankara however, the
great Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word from
the root _sad_ to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it
destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the
right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the
word Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems that
Deussen's meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3].


The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.

The oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these we
have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in
classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad the
more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads have
an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to
Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart.
We can read and read them over again without getting tired.
The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm
apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word
Upani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret
doctrine or instruction"; the Upani@sad teachings were also intended
to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of
high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Max Muller's _Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E._ vol.
I.p. lxxxi.]

[Footnote 2: _S. B.E._ vol. I, p lxxxi.]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]

39

emancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression,
when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and
attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we
find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been
adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of composition
had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sads
were compiled by 500 B C., they continued to be written even so
late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The
earliest and most important are probably those that have been
commented upon by S'ankara namely B@rhadâra@nyaka, Chândogya,
Aitareya, Taittiriya, Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mundaka and
Mândûkya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connection
that the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regard
to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of
them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of
the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon
the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S'iva, of Visnu and
the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be
respectively called the Yoga, S'aiva, Visnu and S'ârîra Upani@sads.
These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.


Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.

How the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is an
interesting story Dâra Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor
Shah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmir
in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who
undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775
Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, received
a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the
French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shujâ-uddaulah.
Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802.
This translation though largely unintelligible was read by
Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer
himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kausîtaki is also one of the earliest.
Max Müller and Schroeder think that Maitrây@anî also belongs to the
earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later
production. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In
the first period he includes B@rhadâra@nyaka, Chândogya, Taittirîya,
Aitareya, Kausîtaki and Kena. In that second he includes Kâ@thaka, Ís'â,
S'vetâs'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahânârâyana, and in the third period he
includes Pras'na, Maitrâya@nî and Mân@dûkya. The rest of the Upani@sads
he includes in the fourth period.]

40

writes in the preface to his _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_
[Footnote ref 1], "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker
of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to
us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which
this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe
that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less
deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and
assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best
of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express
the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected
aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as
a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though
the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads
is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display
its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every
sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole
is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial
and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace
of my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]" Through
Schopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention in
Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study
of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as
well.

The study of the Upani@sads has however gained a great
impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who
not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and
published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma
Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were
derived directly from the Upani@sads.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]

[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada
(­_S.B.E._ I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should
have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that
he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the
pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought
to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate
reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could
say in their favour."]

41


The Upani@sads and their interpretations.

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it may
be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse
and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the
Upani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past
times. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concluding
portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the
Vedânta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that
the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the
Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively
subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its
judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the
apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge
of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having
been once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only to
unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers
of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it
presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths
are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in
those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue
and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no
finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as
much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience
at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious
that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be
should have any right to say anything regarding the highest
truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons
that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary
for him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that they
supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus
it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their
principal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show that
they alone represented the true Vedânta doctrines. Any one
who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any
particular school might say that in following that school he was
following the Vedânta.

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is
absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of
diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads

42

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each
interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own
doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried
to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the
various systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the
interpretation offered by S'a@nkara very largely represents the view
of the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, though
there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other
systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedânta
is generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara and
S'a@nkara's system of thought is called the Vedânta system, though
there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing
the true Vedânta doctrines.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter
of the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute
claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not as
a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of
thought--the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were
still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S'a@nkara,
or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of
by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a
modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients
that all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take the
texts independently and separately and determine their meanings,
though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they
appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of
the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thus
find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.


The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sads
is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable
reality which is identical with that which underlies
the essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy in
Parmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the
same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the
reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.

43

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations
or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes.
There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there
is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual
reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm
of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness
in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature
of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhitâ
there were people who had risen to the conception of a single
creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajâpati,
Vis'vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But this
divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the
nature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objects
of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various
psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render
satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages
in the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there was
a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the
universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with
any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity
at all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest and
the results that were achieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not
yet gone out of the Âra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (_pratîka_)
forms of worship. _Prâ@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the most
essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are
related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the
eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This
recognition of the superiority of prâ@na brings us to the meditations
on prâ@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results.
So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting
characters of omnipresence and eternality _âkâs'a_ (space) is
meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Âditya (sun)
are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the
visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vâyu,
or the sun and the immaterial representation as âkâs'a, manas or
prâ@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes
for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest
after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

44

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic
associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice
yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of
Brahman.

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the
history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to
identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon,
lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of
these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is
indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are
tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original
as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how
toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations
could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to
undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of
Brahman.


Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the
discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic
worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity.
The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship
deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the
idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman.
They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many
symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They
did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a
dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls
which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this
was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be
satisfied with anything short of the highest.

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a
positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman,
they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not
point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance
to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not
like aught that we find in experience. Yâjñavalkya said "He
the âtman is not this, nor this (_neti neti_). He is inconceivable,
for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed,
untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

45

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1]." He is
_asat_, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be
understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is
being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by
him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever
we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the
unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible,
invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal,
without beginning or end, greater than the great (_mahat_), the fixed.
He who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2]."
Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms
their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet
the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no
characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial
to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He
is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which
rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical
universe. When Bâhva was questioned by Va@skali, he expounded
the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence--"Teach
me," said Va@skali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman."
Bâhva however remained silent. But when the question was put
forth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed but
you do not understand; the Âtman is silence [Footnote ref 3]." The way
to indicate it is thus by _neti neti_, it is not this, it is not this.
We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited
by conceptual thought.


The Âtman doctrine.

The sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involved
in the equation Âtman=Brahman. We have already seen that the
word Âtman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand
the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital
breath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the word
Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word
Âtman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all
misinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as an
adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced;
it is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword.]

[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15.]

[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on _Brahmasûtra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen,
_Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156.]

46

Upani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one
and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self
of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses.
Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical
parts of man) he is called _annamaya_. But behind the sheath of
this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath
which is called the self as vital breath (_prâ@namaya âtman_).
Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called
the _manomaya âtman_. This again contains within it the self
"consisting of consciousness" called the _vijñânamaya âtman_. But
behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the
_ânandamaya âtman_). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture;
for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could
live, who could breathe if this space (_âkâs'a_) was not bliss? For
it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible,
Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he
really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference,
between himself and this Âtman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1]."

Again in another place we find that Prajâpati said: "The self
(_âtman_) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and
grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations
are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired;
he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnote
ref 2]." The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and
Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self
from Prajâpati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look
into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could
find. They answered: "We see, this our whole self, even to the
hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that
is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went
away pleased, but Prajâpati thought, "There they go away,
without having discovered, without having realized the self."
Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the
self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and
pestered with doubts and came back to Prajâpati and said, "just
as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed
when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the
body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when
the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in
one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]

[Footnote 2: Châ. VIII. 7. 1.]

47

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory."
Prajâpati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and
said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this
is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed
but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came
back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind
when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is
so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by
its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it
suffered and as if it wept--in this I see no good." Prajâpati gave a
still higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in total
contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the
deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was
again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the
self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does
he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost.
I see no good in this." And now Prajâpati after having given a
course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as
the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and
having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this
was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking,
ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the
full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the
deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected
by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot
get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not
touch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1]."

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable
essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change.
This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure
subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is
the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all
knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows
but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump
of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through
entirely of savour; as in truth this Âtman has no inner or outer,
but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is
not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman
is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who
has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Châ. VIII. 7-12.]

48

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it
and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest _par
excellence_, our inmost Âtman. All limitation is fraught with pain;
it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man
receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe,
who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (_âkâs'a_)? It is he
who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless
support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable
one, then has he attained peace.


Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads.

There is the âtman not in man alone but in all objects of the
universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this âtman.
There is nothing outside the âtman, and therefore there is no
plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay
is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of
black iron is known, so when this âtman the Brahman is known
everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence
of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature
of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But
we must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so
much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers
who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not
notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and
nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity
attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all
Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it
return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered
into it as its inner controller (_antaryâmin_). Here is thus a glaring
dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller,
though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that
these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known
everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made
for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as
S'a@nkara the great professor of Vedânta does by explaining away
the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the
real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that
the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in
the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

49

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all,
wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and
unaffected [Footnote ref 1]." He is below, above, in the back, in front,
in the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2]." These
rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return
back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know
that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the
Being do not know that they have come from the Being...That which
is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self
thou art O S'vetaketu [Footnote ref 3]." "Brahman," as Deussen points out,
"was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe
as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the
universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was
represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman."
Thus it is said in Mund. I.I. 7:

  As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),
  As the plants shoot forth on the earth,
  As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,
  So from the imperishable all that is here.
  As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,
  In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,
  So, my dear sir, from the imperishable
  Living beings of many kinds go forth,
  And again return into him [Footnote ref 4].

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest
teaching of the Upani@sads is "That art thou."

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner
controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as
the âtman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the
result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a
theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing
aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it
is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and
earth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguished
again in the famous verse of S'vetâs'vatara [Footnote ref 6]:

  Two bright-feathered bosom friends
  Flit around one and the same tree;
  One of them tastes the sweet berries,
  The other without eating merely gazes down.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Châ. III. 14. 4.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]

[Footnote 3: Châ. VI. 10.]

[Footnote 4: Deussen's translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p.
164.]

[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]

[Footnote 6: S'vetâs'vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. i, 1, also Deussen's
translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 177.]

50

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional
use of the word _Îs'a_ or _Îs'âna_, there seems to be no doubt
that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement
of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted
position of the âtman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in
Kau@sîtaki Upani@sad 3. 9, "He is not great by good deeds nor low
by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he
wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants
to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the
master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (_âtman_)."
Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are
again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once
immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that
eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose
branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it
and no one can transcend it. This is that, "...from its fear the fire
burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vâyu and Death
the fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1]."

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the
conception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the main
currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has
found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the
Âtman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this
everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is
to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that
identifies the universe with the Âtman or Brahman. The third
current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord
controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the
melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked
out, that the later exponents of Vedânta, S'a@nkara, Râmânuja,
and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to
develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it
is that the doctrine of Mâyâ which is slightly hinted at once in
B@rhadâra@nyaka and thrice in S'vetâs'vatara, becomes the foundation
of S'a@nkara's philosophy of the Vedânta in which Brahman
alone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2].

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]

51


The World.

We have already seen that the universe has come out of
Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back
to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as
represented to experience could not be denied. S'a@nkara held
that the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accorded
a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely
relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon
as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however
remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not
probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to
the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the
highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior
world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this
reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only
reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding
that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it
is maintained in him and it will return back to him.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the
organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants,
animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many
created fire (_tejas_), water (_ap_) and earth (_k@siti_). Then the
self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their
combination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So all
other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding
of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold
division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later
distinction (especially in the Sâ@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimal
substances (_tanmâtra_) and gross elements, and the theory that each
gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And
in Pras'na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their
subtler natures, e.g. earth (_p@rthivî_), and the subtler state of earth
(_p@rthivîmâtra_). In the Taittirîya, II. 1, however, ether (_âkâs'a_)
is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements,
air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding
directly from the one which directly preceded it.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Châ. VI.11.]

[Footnote 2: _ibid._ VI.2,3,4.]

52


The World-Soul.

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the
soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V.X. 121. I,
where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation
from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred
to in the S'vetâs'vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange
that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads.
In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical
character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier
products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance
from the point of view of the development of the theory of
Brahman or Âtman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the
Puru@sa, nor the Vis'vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played an
important part in the earlier development of the Upani@sads
leads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directly
developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Veda
speculations. The passages in S'vetâs'vatara clearly show how from
the supreme eminence that he had in R.V.X. 121, Hira@nyagarbha
had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen
in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbha
doctrine of the Upani@sads says that the "entire objective universe is
possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This
subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in
all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For
the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues
to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal
knowing subject also (_hira@nyagarbha_) by whom it is sustained.
Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly
not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore
from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it
has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1]." This
however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbha
doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance
in the Upani@sads.



The Theory of Causation.

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the
Upani@sads. S'a@nkara, the later exponent of Vedânta philosophy,
always tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201.]

53

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in
reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did
on the strength of a series of examples in the Chândogya
Upani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is
spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot,
the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many
diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the
pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of
name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which
in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot,
plate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable
Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer
change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only
an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman,
the real _par excellence_.

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded
as having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfect
manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks
upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the
cause itself through the action and combination of the elements
of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have
been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination
of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real
change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we
shall see hereafter) the Pari@nâma theory of causation advocated
by the Sâ@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1].


Doctrine of Transmigration.

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body
they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath
to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts
of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in
the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our
own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the
human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration
had but little developed at the time.

In the Upani@sads however we find a clear development in
the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one
the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Châ. VI. 2-4.]

54

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine
of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the
idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that
those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the
digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers
(_pit@ryâna_), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke,
then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches
the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his
good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke,
mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation
of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is
born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense
in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnote
ref 1].

The other way is the way of gods (_devayâna_), meant for those
who cultivate faith and asceticism (_tapas_). These souls at death
enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright
half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into
Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of
the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions
of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright
and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of
lights'" (_jyoti@sâ@m jyoti@h_) [Footnote ref 2].

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine
of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of
his deeds (_karma_) by passing through the other worlds and without
reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods,
the _Yânas_. Thus Yâjñavalkya says, "when the soul becomes
weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with
which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses
go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and
centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye
turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become
one (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses)
become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become
one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with
him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he
does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not
think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the
senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Châ. V. 10.]

[Footnote 2: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335.]

55

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out.
When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any
other part of the body, the vital function (_prâ@na_) follows and all
the senses follow the vital function (_prâ@na_) in coming out. He
is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes
out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (_prajñâ_)
accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade
of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so
this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a
separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a
small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul
after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a
newer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods,
of Prajâpati or Brahma or of any other being....As he acts and
behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds,
virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full
of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as
the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being
attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he
was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the
end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this
world for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those who
have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has
freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in
himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains
Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are
in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and
attains Brahma here" (B@rh. IV. iv. 1-7).

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the
self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer
frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present
life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all
senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge,
work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the
body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer
body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which
thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories.
Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference
here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other
worlds.]

56

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of
the essence of the five elements (which would make up the
physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires,
of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of
the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma,
of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this
(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (B@rh. IV. iv. 5).
The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral
and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which
compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes
follows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills
and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts
the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and
its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral
and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of
the physical world on the other.

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse
psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements
holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The
root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition
of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and
act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing
acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing
karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the
fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But
there is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ryâna
theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part
in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in
this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the
self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no
rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of
this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth
and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between
desires and rebirth--for it is said that whatever a man desires he
wills, and whatever he wills he acts.

Thus it is said in another place "he who knowingly desires is
born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose
desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his
desires vanish here" (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires
is effected by the right knowledge of the self. "He who knows

57

his self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desire
will he trouble the body,...even being here if we know it, well if
we do not, what a great destruction" (B@rh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). "In
former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what
shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (B@rh. IV.
iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which
we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought
can be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is worked
out on the principle of desire (_kâma_) and karma only serves as
the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by
the person.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently
with the idea that desires (_kâma_) led to rebirth, we find that
in some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a
woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of
man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth
elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is
said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is
but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of
his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put
in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes
part of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore
does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within
herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be
protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth)
but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he
is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that
the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This
is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative
for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after
realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going
away he is born again that is his third birth" (Aitareya, II. 1-4)
[Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to
the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kâma, whatever
was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the
desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh.
IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any
other desire.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See also Kau@sîtaki, II. 15.]

58


Emancipation.

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection
is that of emancipation (_mukti_). Already we know that the
doctrine of Devayâna held that those who were faithful and performed
asceticism (_tapas_) went by the way of the gods through
successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth.
This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (_pit@ryâna_)
where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and
then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful
and perform _s'raddhâ_ had a distinctly different type of goal from
those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general
altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development
in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means
in the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attains
when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The
ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are
ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all
passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes
Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.

  He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,
  For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
  For him all doubts are solved,
  And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1].

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions
and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is
ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is
false. We "do not know" but are "pure knowledge" ourselves.
We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do
not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not
a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but
it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always
emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and
seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because
we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the
true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is
emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only
so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural
and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature
and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352.]

59

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in
our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing
necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore
the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge,
all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha
Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas,
the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice.
Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with
him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget
his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the
second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be
made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said,
"There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death
of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know
instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was
inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand
it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not
compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it
inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy
to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like
thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, "Choose sons
and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of
cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide
expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest.
Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth
and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make
thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult
to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure;
those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments;
the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give
them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death."
Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and
they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the
dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could
obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as
long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said."
Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is
he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses
the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire,
hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

60

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good),
are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals.
Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless
youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast
asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness
is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what
is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him
whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee
O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to
Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains
whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die;
he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is
not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle,
greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere.
Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among
fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot
be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It
can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals
its own nature [Footnote ref 1]." So long as the Self identifies itself
with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the
fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the
highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle
of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have
desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth
of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome
of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents
of the gross body (_annamaya ko@sa_), the vital functions (_prâ@namaya
ko@sa_) of life, the will and desire (_manomaya_) and the
thoughts and ideas (_vijñânamaya_), and so long as he keeps himself
in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences
in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences
are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers
pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from
these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he
is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement.
What this state is cannot be explained by the use of
concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is
not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some
parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]

61

whatever one knows as this and this (_neti neti_). In this infinite
and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no _meum_ and
_tuum_. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence
will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put
in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately
but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so,
Maitreyî, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting
only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal
existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge"
(B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the
processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it
retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a
state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and
pure blessedness.

62



CHAPTER IV


GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY


In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy
in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have
been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came
one after another and offered their independent speculations
on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in
chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon
the influence of one school upon another or upon the general
change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy.
Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had
their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and
it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began,
or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many
divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these
were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed
or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant
half-sentences (_sûtras_) which did not elaborate the subject in
detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads
of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already
thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences
were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had
direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed
difficult to guess from the sûtras the extent of their significance,
or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were
originally intended by them. The sûtras of the Vedânta system,
known as the S'ârîraka-sûtras or Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na
for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise
to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one
of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high
esteem and respect in which these writers of the sûtras were held
by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

63

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of
the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of
the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of
these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since
the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or
other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought
up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence
of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school
to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of
free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish,
India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary
views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained
and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other
rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish
the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an
example, the Nyâya system of philosophy consisting of a number
of half-sentences or sûtras is attributed to Gautama, also called
Ak@sapâda. The earliest commentary on these sûtras, called the
_Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya_, was written by Vâtsyâyana. This work was
sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnâga, and to answer these
criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary
called the _Bhâ@syavâttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original
force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of
the school. At this Vâcaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called
_Vârttika-tâtparya@tîkâ_ on this second commentary, where he tried
to refute all objections against the Nyâya system made by other
rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary,
called _Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ_, had another commentary called
_Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ-paris'uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. This
commentary had another commentary called _Nyâya-nibandha-prakâs'a_
written by Varddhamâna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This
again had another commentary called _Varddha-mânendu_ upon it by
Padmanâbha Mis'ra, and this again had another named
_Nyâya-tâtparyama@n@dana_ by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of
Vâtsyâyana, Vâcaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great,
but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries
on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnâga after Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparyatîkâ_ (p. I) and not Dignnâga as it is generally spelt.]

64

original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of
India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the
_Brahma-sûtras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadgîtâ_.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents
and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared.
Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and
subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the
defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was
originally formulated in the sûtras had probably but few problems
to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of
other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems
in which the original views were more or less involved but to
which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to
make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and
stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully
against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system
in the sûtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if
we take it along with its developments down to the beginning
of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man
strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible
to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is
necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in
all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of
history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote
ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems
which had their importance only so long as they lived and were
then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each
system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents
through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this
growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system
is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth
it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose
selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest
one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be
carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments
given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations
of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]

65


Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated,
and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a
spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the
earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final
essence or truth was the âtman, that a search after it was our
highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we
can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything
else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we
want (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuing
in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha
who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated
sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be
traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably
going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference
to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there
were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than
those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records.
It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated
among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad
circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic
and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these
sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably
discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time
when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama
or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various
topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified
and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and
recorded it in sûtras. These sûtras were intended probably for
people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus
could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained
in the aphorisms. The sûtras thus contain sometimes
allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in
which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed
of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and
conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken
chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however
free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Brahmajâla-sutta, Dîgha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]

66

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary
views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult
to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools
often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems
unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent
of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with
the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to
offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize
them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications
generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any
serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers,
for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations
of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They
would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things
only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent.
It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system
by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately.
This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except
when there is a specially new development, the system is to be
interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators
treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival
systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always
written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to
be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever
he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections
put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects
of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It
is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections
and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his
destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are
referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the
views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different
from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity,
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems,
that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid
of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not
widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

67

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular
system are expressed in such close interconnection with
the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood
without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in
particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth
of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian
philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual
opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at
which they ceased to grow and came to a stop--a purpose for
which a work like the present one may only be regarded as
forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sûtras and their commentaries there are also independent
treatises on the systems in verse called _kârikâs_, which
try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct
manner; the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ may be mentioned as a work of this
kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations,
commentaries, or general observations on any system written in
verses called the vârttikas; the _S'lokavârttika_, of Kumarila or the
_Vârttika_ of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these
of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition
to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose
in which the writers either nominally followed some selected
sûtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class
the _Nyâyamañjarî_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example
and of the latter the _Pras'astapâda bhâ@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ of
Madhusûdana Sarasvatî or the _Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ_ of Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.
The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in
which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly
forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers
and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate
them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India
begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically
ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some
minor publications are seen to come out.


The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes,
namely, the _nâstika_ and the _âstika_. The nâstika (_na asti_ "it is
not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

68

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are
principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cârvâka.
The âstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sâ@mkhya,
Yoga, Vedânta, Mîmâ@msâ, Nyâya and Vais'e@sika, generally known
as the six systems (_@sa@ddars'ana_ [Footnote ref 1]).

The Sâ@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kâpila, but the
earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga
system is attributed to Patañjali and the original sûtras are called
the _Pâtañjala Yoga sûtras_. The general metaphysical position
of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and
the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this
that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_Îs'vara_) as distinct
from Âtman and lays much importance on certain mystical
practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement
of liberation, whereas the Sâ@mkhya denies the existence of
Îs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture
are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and
thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system
of Sâ@mkhya associated with Kâpila and the Yoga system
associated with Patañjali are but two divergent modifications of
an original Sâ@mkhya school, of which we now get only references
here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted
as two should more properly be looked upon as two different
schools of the same Sâ@mkhya system--one may be called the
Kâpila Sâ@mkhya and the other Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya.

The Pûrva Mîmâ@msâ (from the root _man_ to think--rational
conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy.
It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with
which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word "_dars'ana_" in the sense of true philosophic
knowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ of Ka@nâda
(IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas
(400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "_ditthi_" (Sanskrit--dr@sti
from the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra
(fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of
philosophy (_sarvadars'anavâcyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I.).
Ratnakîrtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the
same sense ("_Yadi nâma dars'ane dars'ane nânâprakâram sattvatak-@sanam
uktamasti._" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_, p.20).
Mâdhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy,
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word "_mata_" (opinion or view) was also
freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word
to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call
those who held heretical views "_tairthika._" The words "siddha,"
"_jñânin_," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are
used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]

69

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices,
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex
Vedic context. The Mîmâ@msâ formulated some principles according
to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul,
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary
discussions in the Mîmâ@msâ that it may be called a system of
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this
day. The sûtras of Mîmâ@msâ are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara
wrote a bhâ@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of
Mîmâ@msâ literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumârila Bha@t@ta
and his pupil Prabhâkara, who criticized the opinions of his master
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm,
and to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the views
of Kumârila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may not
be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts without
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated
by the Mîmâ@msâ.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila could not understand the
meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "_Atra tunoktam tatrâpinoktam iti
paunaraktam_" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of
two combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunâuktam_ (said by
the particle _tu_) and _tatrâpi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not
said also there) and _tatra apinâ uktam_ (said there by the particle
_api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not
spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled
Kumârila, when Prabhâkara taking the second meaning pointed out to him
that the meaning was "here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_
and so it is indicated twice." Kumârila was so pleased that he called
his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]

70


The _Vedânta sûtras_, also called Uttara Mîmâ@msâ, written by
Bâdarâya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-sûtras_, form the
original authoritative work of Vedânta. The word Vedânta means
"end of the Veda," i.e. the Upani@sads, and the _Vedânta sûtras_ are
so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general
views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or
adhyâyas and each adhyâya is divided into four pâdas or chapters.
The first four sûtras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hsûtrî_
are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth
and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth,
(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads.
The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to
justifying the position of the Vedânta against the attacks of the
rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in
dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are
devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual
Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus
limited to the first four sûtras and the first and second chapters
of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries
to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological
views of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-sûtra_
was probably written by Baudhâyana, which however is not
available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that
of the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-sûtras_
together with all the commentaries and other works that follow
his views are popularly known as Vedânta philosophy, though
this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhâdvaitavâda
school of Vedânta philosophy (i.e. the Vedânta philosophy
of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic
philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Râmâyatas,
etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma
sûtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as
Râmânuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rîka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have
written independent commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtra_ to show
that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of
the Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-sûtras_. These
differed largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations
of the same sûtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by
the name of Vedânta as these are also claimed to be the real
interpretations intended by the Vedânta (Upani@sads)

71

and the _Vedânta sûtras_. Of these the system of Râmânuja has
great philosophical importance.

The _Nyâya sûtras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapâda,
and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ attributed to Ka@nâda, called also Ulûka,
represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are
in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor
importance. So far as the sûtras are concerned the _Nyâya sûtras_
lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while
the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics.
In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies
of their own, which however may generally be looked upon
largely as modifications of the Sâ@mkhya and Vedânta systems,
though their own contributions are also noteworthy.


Some fundamental Points of Agreement.

I. _The Karma Theory._

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the
Cârvâka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental
points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India
were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the
human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in
abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of
the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the
postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found
to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be
their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general
postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summum
bonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in
thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them
at this stage.

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems
agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual
leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good
or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot
be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual
has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to
suffer them.

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent
at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

72

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest
error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical
virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately
or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the
Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain
mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects
without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible
agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed,
the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called
the _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _apûrva_ (new), that by it the desired
object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modus
operandi_ of the _apûrva_ is unknown. There is also the notion
prevalent in the Sa@mhitâs, as we have already noticed, that he
who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he
who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures.
These were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, the
inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements
which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well
established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said
that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad
births.

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma
doctrine as established in the âstika systems we find that it was
believed that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generally
required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the
merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate
and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in
his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely
wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The
nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of
pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for
him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined
for him by his action are such that they are possible to be
realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a
goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world
process, so there is no time at which any person first began his
actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past
lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of
life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever
he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,

73

the special instincts of that life (technically called _vâsanâ_) come
forth. In accordance with these vâsanâs the person passes through
the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by
his action. The length of life is also determined by the number
and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying
actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for
giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those
actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the
person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But
even such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through
the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds
of actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_),
white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) as
most of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as'uklâk@r@s@na_),
i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not
associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person
can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action
that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits.
He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which
have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true
knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed,
and as his acts are only of the as'uklâk@r@s@na type no fresh karma
for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all
karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech
and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced.
The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that
attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and
sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul
during the infinite number of past lives is technically called
_kârmas'arîra_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth
to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens
and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment
of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being
expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by
his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of
suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated
in the soul produces a kind of coloration called _les'yâ_, such as
white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The

74

idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably
suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from
passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct,
his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is
then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously
earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect
and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict
adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and
when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the
person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of
contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities
having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top
of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma
theory which however being intimately connected with their
metaphysics will be treated later on.


2. _The Doctrine of Mukti_.

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the
inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case
of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births
and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the
basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the
happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that
this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths,
this running on from beginningless time has somewhere
its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or
in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma
leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of
all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should
find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys,
neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied
by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and
believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they
generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could
be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all
action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the
connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous,
artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched
by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

75

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless
time that we connect it with these. The realization of this
transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless
cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did
not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final
realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate
dissolution called Nirvâ@na, the nature of which we shall discuss
later on.


3. _The Doctrine of Soul_.

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence
of a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jîva.
As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences
of view. Thus while the Nyâya calls it absolutely
qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity,
Sâ@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness,
the Vedânta says that it is that fundamental point of unity
implied in pure consciousness (_cit_), pure bliss (_ânanda_), and pure
being (_sat_). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied
in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not
form a real part of it. The _summum bonum_ of life is attained
when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self
is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous
connections with it are absolutely dissociated.


The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the
Optimistic Faith in the end.

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been
equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be
considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest
utterance in Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable
chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as
nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the
meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures
are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is
painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are
anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated
with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped
when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All
our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting.
Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

76

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable
appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as
painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness
to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin
is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of
disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot
be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes,
for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot
also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually
being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to
another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of
it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge
which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self
is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures,
that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment
of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through
the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion
towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech
from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self
shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived.
When this is once done the self can never again be associated
with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately
dissociated from _citta_ which contains within it the root of all
emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever
conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this
connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion
to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed
person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti
as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic
creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity
peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency
to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through
right performance and right understanding. It is only when a
man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for
aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which
all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only
shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as
sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from
all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation.
In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

77

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental
fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the
complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically
deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember
that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The
pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic
confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of
emancipation.


Unity in Indian Sâdhana (philosophical, religious
and ethical endeavours).

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon
the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed
for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled,
no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all
desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are
almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very
high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare
his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment
of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with
regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are
indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the
means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially
the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only
in later times that devotion (_bhakti_) is seen to occupy a more
prominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus
it was that though there were many differences among the various
systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and
the means fur the attainment of the goal (_sâdhana_) being fundamentally
the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sâdhana
of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been
universal in India and this uniformity of sâdhana has therefore
secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.

78



CHAPTER V


BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Many scholars are of opinion that the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga
represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also
suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them.
It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the
systematic Sâ@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had
decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known
to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the
Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of
the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is
therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different
systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It
seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism
first.


The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different
philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before
Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and
these have already been briefly described. But these were not the
only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse
atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the
world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought
that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these
had sprung forth by their own nature (_svabhâva_), others that
everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable
destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or
through matter combinations in general. References to diverse
kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no
detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad
type of materialists the two schools of Cârvâkas (Dhûrtta
and Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature,
though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly
be discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara, I. 2, _kâla@h svabhâbo niyatiryad@rcchâ
bhutâni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam._]

[Footnote 2: Lokâyata (literally, that which is found among people in
general) seems to have been the name by which all carvâka doctrines
were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokâyatas.]

79

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained
in the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The
Cârvâkas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any
other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life
and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter,
just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with
yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses
(_madas'akti_). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as
there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So
long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything
will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt
to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in
the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can
be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the
distribution of the middle term (_hetu_) has not depended upon
some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy
the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case
any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and
there is no certitude about it. They were called Cârvâka because
they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or
moral responsibility. The word comes from _carv_ to eat. The
Dhûrtta Cârvâkas held that there was nothing but the four
elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the
result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no
virtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas held that there was
a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with
the destruction of the body. The original work of the Cârvâkas
was written in sûtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna
quote two sûtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be
found in Jayanta's _Nyâyamañjarî_, Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_
and Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_. _Mahâbhârata_ gives
an account of a man called Cârvâka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cârvâka materialists we
are reminded of the Âjîvakas of which Makkhali Gosâla, probably
a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahâvîra and a contemporary
of Buddha and Mahâvîra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going
determinism denying the free will of man and his moral
responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of
Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate
or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

80

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's
own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends
on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy,
or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due
to fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught
that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no
other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any
former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that
we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to
an end at death [Footnote ref 2].

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the
sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any
person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad
teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and
being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do
not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the
real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions
that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes
into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some
unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably
come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in
the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of
traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue
of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they
gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational
basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These
were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the
nebulous Sâ@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain
sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting
a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which
thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity
to come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless,
was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new
speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of
interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse
of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the
direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sâmaññaphala-sutta_, _Dîgha_, II. 20. Hoernlé's article on
the Âjîvakas, E.R.E.]

[Footnote 2: _Sâmaññaphala-sutta_, II. 23.]

81

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that
was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into
account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha,
we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic
contribution to philosophy.


Buddha: his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C.
in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in
the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana,
a prince of the Sâkya clan, and his mother Queen Mahâmâyâ.
According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would
enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old
man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried
his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and
surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions,
issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four
things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and
realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to
forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to
immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great
Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled
on foot to Râjag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelâ, where in
company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of
extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length
that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless
and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great
struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by
the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course
of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter
the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in
travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to
all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha
realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered
into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained
nirvâna [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this
great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in
other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will
probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Mahâparinibbânasuttanta_, _Dîgha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]

82

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess
it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and
subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate
the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization
of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding
centuries.


Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pâli Scriptures contain three different collections:
the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the
discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally
to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a
scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious
history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates
for the collection or composition of the different parts of the
aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were
however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very
probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were
completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during
the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine
(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals
only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks.
The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that
of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma.
Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to _Atthasâlinî_, the commentary
on the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, says that the Abhidhamma is so called
(_abhi_ and _dhamma_) because it describes the same Dhammas as are
related in the suttas in a more intensified (_dhammâtireka_) and
specialized (_dhammavisesatthena_) manner. The Abhidhammas
do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but
they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found
in the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features
of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement
of the former leads one to attain meditation (_samâdhi_) whereas
the latter leads one to attain wisdom (_paññâsampadam_). The force
of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the
suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is
not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in
enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a
technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

85

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving
for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow.
The Abhidhamma known as the _Kathâvatthu_ differs from the
other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views
of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed
in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the
opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory
assumptions.

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikâyas.
These are (1) _Dîgha Nikâya_, called so on account of the length
of the suttas contained in it; (2) _Majjhima Nikâya_ (middling
Nikâya), called so on account of the middling extent of the
suttas contained in it; (3) _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (Nikâyas relating
to special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being
delivered owing to the meetings (_sa@myoga_) of special persons which
were the occasions for them; (4) _A@nguttara Nikâya_, so called because
in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion
increase by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) _Khuddaka Nikâya_ containing
_Khuddaka pâ@tha, Dhammapada, Udâna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipâta,
Vimâna-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathâ, Therîgathâ, Jâtaka, Niddesa,
Pa@tisambhidâmagga, Apadâna, Buddhava@msa, Caryâpi@taka._

The Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@thâna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhâtukathâ,
Puggalapaññatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka_ and _Kathâvatthu_.
There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts
of the above works known as atthakathâ. The work known as
_Milinda Pañha_ (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is
of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature
is generally now known as Sthaviravâda or Theravâda. On the
origin of the name Theravâda (the doctrine of the elders)
_Dîpava@msa_ says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council)
and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vâda [Footnote ref
2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pâli literature
developed much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the
writer of _Visuddhimagga_ (a compendium of theravâda doctrines)
and the commentator of _Dîghanikâya, Dhammasa@nga@ni_, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced
by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but
it does not appear that Pâli Buddhism had any share in it. I

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasâlini_, p. 25.]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Dîpava@msa_, p. 31.]

84

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could
be considered as being acquainted with Pâli.


The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally
in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (_gu@na_), (3) cause
(_hetu_) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (_nissatta nijjîva_ [Footnote
ref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important,
from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist
philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all
reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena
and these were called dhammas. The question arises that
if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the
phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing
away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find
out "What being what else is," "What happening what else
happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena
are happening in a series and we see that there being
certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening
of some events others also are produced. This is called
(_pa@ticca-samuppâda_) dependent origination. But it is difficult to
understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as
_Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started
before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition
are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away
and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape
from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay
and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay
and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought
deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay
and death can only occur when there is birth (_jâti_), so they depend

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could
take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the
_Sa@myutta Nikâya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not
represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the
twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and
as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter
into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew
my attention to this fact.]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâtinî_, p. 38. There are also other senses in which
the word is used, as _dhamma-desanâ_ where it means religious teaching.
The _La@nkâvatâra_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyapûrvakâ dharmmâ_, i.e.
Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]

85

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth
depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if
there were previous existence (_bhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does
this existence depend, or what being there is there _bhava_. Then it
occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there
were holding fast (_upâdâna_) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upâdâna
depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (_ta@nhâ_) on which upâdâna
depended. There can be upâdâna if there is desire (_tanhâ_) [Footnote ref
3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it
occurred to him that there must be feeling (_vedanâ_) in order that
there may be desire. But on what does vedanâ depend, or rather
what must be there, that there may be feeling (_vedanâ_)? To this
it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (_phassa_)
in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no
sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact
depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts,
there are the six fields of contact (_âyatana_) [Footnote ref 5]. But on
what do the six âyatanas depend? It occurred to him that
there must be the mind and body (_nâmarûpa_) in order that there
may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does
nâmarûpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness
(_viññâna_) there could be no nâmarûpa [Footnote ref 8].
But what being there would there

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakîrtti in his
_Mâdhyamîka v@rtti,_ p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed
which brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthâpayali
kâyena vâcâ manasâ ca_).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 385, upâdânantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakîrtti
in explaining upâdâna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast
to the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastuni
sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanâya vi@dhapanâya upâdânamupâdatte tatra
tatra prârthayate_). _Mâdhyamîka v@rtti_, p. 565.]

[Footnote 3: Candrakîrtti describes t@r@s@nâ as
_âsvadanâbhinandanâdhyavasânasthânâdâtmapriyarûpairviyogo mâ bhût,
nityamaparityâgo bhavediti, yeyam prârthanâ_--the desire that there
may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which
are dear to us. _Ibid._ 565.]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassâyatana and phassakâya. _M. N._ II. 261,
III. 280, etc. Candrakîrtti says that _@sa@dbhirâyatanadvârai@h
k@rtyaprak@riyâ@h pravarttante prajñâyante. tannâmarûpapratyaya@m
@sa@dâyatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`câyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akâyâ@h
pravarttante. M.V._ 565.]

[Footnote 5: Âyatana means the six senses together with their objects.
Âyatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@lâyatana means six senses
as six fields of operation. Candrakîrtti has _âyatanadvârai@h_.]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nâmarûpa
as mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly
correct. The four skandhas are called nâma in each birth. These together
with rûpa (matter) give us nâmarûpa (mind and body) which being developed
render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there
may be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govindânanda, the commentator on
S'a@nkara's bhâsya on the _Brahma sûtras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different
interpretation of Namarûpa which may probably refer to the Vijñanavada
view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think
the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras
of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first
vijñana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana,
and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama)
are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen
and blood called rûpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with
Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum
while rûpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijñaña
entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through
the association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274,
275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijñaña into the womb compare
_D N_ II. 63.]

86

be viññâna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there
might be viññâna there must be the conformations (_sa@nkhâra_) [Footnote
ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhâras? Here it occurred
to him that the sa@nkhâras can only be if there is ignorance
(_avijjâ_). If avijjâ could be stopped then the sa@nkhâras will be
stopped, and if the sa@nkhâras could be stopped viññâna could be
stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha
actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence
sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and
death (_jarâmarana_) could not have happened if there was no
birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the
difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word
here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce
proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical
method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different
senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather
elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning
which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. p. 87,
"_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises
the complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action.
Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used
in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhâta khandha
(viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhâta
khandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental
states in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty
_cittasamprayuktasa@mskâra_, it also counts thirteen
_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning
attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the
commentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. ii. 19), also interprets
the word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ as
attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]

[Footnote 2: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8.]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanâ
(lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness
and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at
the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All
these make up suffering and are the results of jâti (birth). _M. V._
(B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhâsya counted all the terms from
jarâ, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing
the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]

87

enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadâra@nyaka says that just
as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort
collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of
this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes
another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been
before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove
the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy
except the Cârvâkas believed in it and so little is known to us of
the Cârvâka sûtras that it is difficult to say what they did to
refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does
not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an
infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of
a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them
in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the
Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth
might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (_bhava_).
If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakîrtti takes
it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only
take place on account of the works of a previous existence which
determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note
"as a man does so will he be born" (_Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate_,
Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakîrtti's interpretation of "bhava"
as Karma (_punarbhavajanakam karma_) seems to me to suit
better than "existence." The word was probably used rather
loosely for _kammabhava_. The word bhava is not found in the
earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pâli scriptures for the
first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this
bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence
if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they
desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance
with desire is called upâdâna. In the Upani@sads we read,
"whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (_Yatkraturbhavati
tatkarmma kurute_, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to
the thing depends upon desire {_t@r@s@nâ_}, it is said that in order
that there may be upâdâna there must be tanhâ. In the Upani@sads
also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake
himself to" (_sa yathâkâmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati_). Neither
the word upâdâna nor t@rs@nâ (the Sanskrit word corresponding

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu
philosophical works such as the Nyâya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]

88

to ta@nhâ) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained
in them are similar to the words "_kratu_" and "_kâma_." Desire
(ta@nhâ) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact.
Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote
ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the
whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together)
called nâmarûpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads
but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and
names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable
reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Visuddhimagga_ says that by
"Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation
(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form"
the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote
ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical
changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So
form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like
the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and
effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or
collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just
as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound;
and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from
any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the
cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the
same way all the elements of being both those with form and
those without, come into existence after having previously been
non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]."
Nâmarûpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and
body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found
to operate in the six doors of sense (_sa@lâyatana_). If we take
nâmarûpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend
upon the viññâna (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared
in the _Milinda Pañha_ with a watchman at the middle of

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word âyatana is found in many places in the earlier
Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Châ. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9.
10, but @sa@dâyatana does not occur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakîrtti interprets nâma as _Vedanâdayo'
rûpi@nas'catvâra@h skandhâstatra tatra bhave nâmayantîli nâma. saha
rûpaskandhena ca nâma rûpam ceti nâmarûpamucyate._ The four skandhas
in each specific birth act as name. These together with rûpa make
nâmarûpa. _M. V._ 564.]

[Footnote 3: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 184.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 185, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 185-186, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

89

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref
1]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Atthasâlinî_ also says that consciousness means
that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics
we must say that it knows (_vijânana_), goes in advance (_pubba@ngama_),
connects (_sandhâna_), and stands on nâmarûpa (_nâmarûpapada@t@thânam_).
When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense
are discerned (_ârammana-vibhâvana@t@thâne_) and it goes first as the
precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only
by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of
(mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2].
Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the _Milinda Pañha_
we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states
of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between
the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears
as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it
is lost; but there are the four aggregates as nâmarûpa, it stands on
nâma and therefore it is said that it stands on nâmarûpa. He further
asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or
different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows
itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those
in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected
heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that
the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness
takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So
though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different
from them [Footnote ref 3].

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jâti (birth)
is the cause of decay and death, _jarâmara@na_, etc. Jâti is the
appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote
ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any
better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Pañha_
(628).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 112...]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 113, _Yathâ hi rûpâdîni upâdâya paññattâ
suriyâdayo na atthato rûpâdîhi aññe honti ten' eva yasmin samaye
suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejâ-sa@nkhâtam rûpa@m pîti eva@m
vuccamâne pi na rûpâdihi añño suriyo nâma atthi. Tathâ cittam
phassâdayo dhamme upâdâya paññapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi
aññam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva
tasmin samaye phassâdihi atthato aññad eva hotî ti_.]

[Footnote 4: "_Jâtirdehajanma pañcaskandhasamudâya@h,_" Govindânanda's
_Ratnaprabhâ_ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II. ii. 19.]

90

suggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnote
ref 1]. Upâdâna is an advanced t@r@s@nâ leading to positive clinging
[Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@nâ (desire) which again is
the result of vedanâ (pleasure and pain). But this vedanâ is of course
vedanâ with ignorance (_avidyâ_), for an Arhat may have also vedanâ
but as he has no avidyâ, the vedanâ cannot produce t@r@s@nâ in turn. On
its development it immediately passes into upâdâna. Vedanâ means
pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads
to t@r@s@nâ (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact
(_spars'a_). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rîlâbha distinguishes
three processes in the production of vedanâ. Thus first there is the
contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge
of the object, and then there is the vedanâ. Depending on _Majjhima
Nikâya_, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in
the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing,
so here also vedanâ takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they
are "produits par un même complexe de causes (_sâmagrî_) [Footnote
ref 3]."

Spars'a is produced by @sa@dâyatana, @sa@dâyatana by nâmarûpa,
and nâmarûpa by vijñâna, and is said to descend in the womb
of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nâmarûpa, out
of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijñâna in this connection probably means the principle or
germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the
five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the
past karmas (_sa@nkhâra_) of the dying man and of his past
consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last
thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabhâ_ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II.
ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit
and demerit (_dharmâdi_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's
_Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in
_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the
active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side).
And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "_kammabhava_"
or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his _Théoric des Douze Causes_,
p. 26, says that _S'âlistambhasûtra_ explains the word "upâdâna" as
"t@r@s@nâvaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@nâ and Candrakîrtti also gives the
same meaning, _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdânanda explains "upâdâna"
as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@nâ (desire), i.e. the active
tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upâdâna means "support" it would
denote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _upâdânam
pañcaskandhalak@sa@nam...pañcopâdânaskandhâkhyam upâdânam. M.V._ XXVII. 6.]

[Footnote 3: Poussin's _Théorie des Douze Causes_, p. 23.

91

birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijñâna produced in the
womb is determined by the past vijñâna of the previous existence is
according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image,
like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple,
like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress
of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life,
so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break,
but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being.
New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale
pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp
is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the
vijñâna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñânas enters
into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which
the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñâna thus forms
the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñâna that name
(_nâma_) and form (_rûpa_) become associated.

The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskâras and
the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (_nâmayati_)
the new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@mskâras [Footnote
ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and the
instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life
(_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just
at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that
they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered
the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus
avidyâ and sa@mskâra of the past life produce the vijñâna, nâmarupa,

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the
plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your
resolution, 'May I be a cakravarttî king in a next existence,'"
_Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]

[Footnote 2: "_sa cedânandavijñâna@m mâtu@hkuk@sim nâvakrâmeta, na tat
kalalam kalalatvâya sannivartteta_," _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka,
S'ârîra_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapîduka sattva" which
connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character
is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is
in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births;
character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental
qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the
combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]

[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from
_Dîgha_, II. 63, "si le vijñâna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel
la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindânanda on S'a@nkara's commentary
on the _Brahma-sûtras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness
(vijñâna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskâras of the previous
birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nâma) and from that
the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus
(_kalala-budbudâvasthâ_} is produced.]

92

@sa@dâyatana, spars'a, vedanâ, t@r@s@nâ, upâdâna and the bhava
(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava
produces the jâti and jarâmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain
extending in three sections over three lives are all but the
manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally
determine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_
says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite
term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences
of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the
mind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@nâ_), grasping
(_upâdâna_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accounted
for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping
and (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance
and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;
and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even
the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are
accounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up
the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhâra and
viññâna, 2. vedanâ and tanhâ, 3. bhava and jâti) and the four
groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the
Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant
group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref
2]."

These twelve interdependent links (_dvâdas'â@nga_) represent
the pa@ticcasamuppâda (_pratâtyasamutpâda_) doctrines (dependent
origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to
cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppâda or pratîtyasamutpâda has
been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref
4].

___________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pâli
texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilâsinî_ on _Mahânidâna
suttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance
and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death"
to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as
tri@kâ@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24.
Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sa
pratîtyasamutpâdo dvâdas'â@ngastrikâ@n@daka@h pûrvâparântayordve dve
madhye@s@tau_."]

[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of
_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]

[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list
given in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijjâ and sa@nkhâra
have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it
has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes
not beyond."]

[Footnote 4: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]

93

Samutpâda means appearance or arising (_prâdurbhdâva_) and pratîtya
means after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two we
find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending
on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and
paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in
the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also
used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjâ is the
paccaya of sa@nkhâra it is meant that avijjâ is the ground (_@thiti_)
of the origin of the sa@nkhâras, is the ground of their movement,
of the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), of
their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their
intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause
and of their function as the ground with reference to those which
are determined by them. Avijjâ in all these nine ways is
the ground of sa@nkhâra both in the past and also in the future,
though avijjâ itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote
ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot
think of anything else but succession, but when we take the
paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the
cause as ground. Thus when avijjâ is said to be the ground
of the sa@nkhâras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems
reasonable to think that the sa@nkhâras were in some sense
regarded as special manifestations of avijjâ [Footnote ref 2]. But as this
point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would
be unwise to proceed further with it.


The Khandhas.

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree
and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We
have seen that Buddha said that there was no âtman (soul). He said
that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul,
they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of
them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical
states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidâmagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima
Nikâya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhâra...avijjânidânâ avijjâsamudayâ avijjâjâtikâ
avijjâpabhavâ_.]

[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitâ (egoism), râga (attachment),
dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyâ we find also
that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth
of avidyâ (_pañcaparvî avidyâ_).]

[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chândogya, II. 23 (_trayo
dharmaskandhâ@h yajña@h adhyayanam dânam_) in the sense of branches
and in almost the same sense in Maitrî, VII. II.]

94

classes: (1) rûpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense
data, etc., (2) vedanâ (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent),
(3) saññâ (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhâra (synthetic
mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound
sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts),
(5) viññâna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].

All these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)
and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself,
for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rûpa in rûpakhandha
stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense
data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rûpa" is also used in the sense of pure
organic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_,
I.p. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86. Rûpaskandha according
to _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the five
sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense
perceptions _vijñapti_).

The elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by defining
rûpa as "_cattâro ca mahâbhûtâ catunnañca mahâbhntanam
upâdâya rûpam_" (the four mahâbhûtas or elements and that
proceeding from the grasping of that is called rûpa) [Footnote ref 3].
Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rûpa means the four mahâbhûtas
and those which arise depending (_nissâya_) on them as
a modification of them. In the rûpa the six senses including
their affections are also included. In explaining why the four
elements are called mahâbhûtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a
magician (_mâyâkâra_) makes the water which is not hard appear
as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;
just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself
appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves
blue make themselves appear as blue (_nîlam upâdâ rûpam_),
not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red
or white (odâtam upâdârûpam), so on account of their similarity
to the appearances created by the magician they are called
mahâbhûta [Footnote ref 4]."

In the _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ we find that the Buddha says, "O
Bhikkhus it is called rûpam because it manifests (_rûpyati_); how

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86, etc.]

[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]

[Footnote 4: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 299.]

95

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and
as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the
sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rûpa
[Footnote ref 1]."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above
for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand
what is meant by rûpa, I think we find that that which manifested
itself to the senses and organs was called rûpa. No distinction
seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells,
etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as
sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance
of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses
but the sense-data and the sensations were "rûpa." Under certain
conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism
did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and
mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that
such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads
nor in the Sâ@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic.
The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and
were therefore called rûpa; the forms of affection that appeared
were also called rûpa; many other mental states or features
which appeared with them were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 2]. The
âyatanas or the senses were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 3]. The
mahâbhûtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations,
and they together with all that appeared in association with them were
called rûpa and formed the rûpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials,
sense-data, senses and sensations).

In _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 101) it is said that "the four
mahâbhûtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication
of the rûpakkhandha (_rûpakkhandhassa paññâpanâya_). Contact
(sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of
feelings (_vedanâ_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya
for the communication of the saññâkkhandha; sense-contact is
also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the
sa@nkhârakkhandha. But nâmarûpa is the hetu and the paccaya for
the communication of the viññânakkhandha." Thus not only feelings
arise on account of the sense-contact but saññâ and sa@nkhâra
also arise therefrom. Saññâ is that where specific knowing or

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86.]

[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]

96

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive
knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on saññâ says: "In editing the
second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification
distinguishing between saññâ as cognitive assimilation on occasion
of sense, and saññâ as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of
naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition
(_patigha-saññâ_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on
occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the
impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might
say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or
name (_adhivachânâ-saññâ_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_
(mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who
is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through
his speech.' Thus there are two stages of saññâ-consciousness,
1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they
are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

About sa@nkhâra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 87) that it
is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is
that which conglomerated rûpa as rûpa, conglomerated saññâ
as saññâ, sa@nkhâra as sa@nkhâra and consciousness (_viññâna_)
as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises
the conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a
synthetic function which synthesises the passive rûpa, saññâ,
sa@nkhâra and viññâna elements. The fact that we hear of 52
sa@nkhâra states and also that the sa@nkhâra exercises its synthetic
activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show
that probably the word sa@nkhâra is used in two senses, as mental
states and as synthetic activity.

Viññâna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa,
as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage
at which the intellectual process started and also the final
resulting consciousness.

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology
says that "consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) with
its object (_âramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_saññâ_)
and volition (_cetanâ_) come in. This contact is like the pillars of
a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it
(_dabbasambhârasadisâ_). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]

97

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole
consciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comes
first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association
with feeling (_vedanâ_), conceiving (_saññâ_) or volition (_cetanâ_);
it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends
objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side
of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes
consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and
visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; or
it has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment,
owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object.
For it is said in the Commentary:--"contact in the four planes of
existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the
object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors.
For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the
characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.'
But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic
of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is
quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent
the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact.
And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or
two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would
represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision
contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the
function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the
union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its
effect is feeling (_vedanâ_); though it is generated by the objects
it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing
(_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste
of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only
partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching,
of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere
coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling
alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste
of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states
are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of
diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king,
breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup
and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

98

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of
various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord,
expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting
of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object
by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the
food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and
as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according
to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys
the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or
experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

The special feature of saññâ is said to be the recognizing
(_paccabhiññâ_) by means of a sign (_abhiññânena_). According to
another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion
of the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work of
volition (_cetanâ_) is said to be coordination or binding together
(_abhisandahana_). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes
a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said
'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking
fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his
strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out
the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers,
etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be
thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral
states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five
strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort
by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of
volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]."
It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhâra was
separately designated as cetanâ (volition).

"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to
all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself
that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the
fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the
pollen, so one could not say that the rûpa was 'I' or that the
vedanâ was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is
nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Atthasâlinî_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]

[Footnote 3: _Samyutta Nikâya_, III. 130.]

99


Avijjâ and Âsava.

As to the question how the avijjâ (ignorance) first started
there can be no answer, for we could never say that either
ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1].
Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes
in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we
can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements
which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by
certain others. This mutual determination can only take place
in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for
there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority
in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into
being of the âsavas or depravities that the avijjâ came into
being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (_âsava_)
the avijjâ was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These âsavas are classified in
the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ as kâmâsava, bhavâsava, di@t@thâsava and avijjâsava.
Kâmâsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst
after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavâsava means
desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thâsava
means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal
or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not
come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are
different; avijjâsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its
extinction and its means of extinction. _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ adds
four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of
anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior
and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3].
Kâmâsava and bhavâsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for
they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

[Footnote 2: _M. N._ I.p. 54. Childers translates "âsava" as "depravities"
and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "âsava" in Skr. means
"old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the
meaning that he gives to it is "_cira pârivâsika@t@thena_" (on account
of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the
eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra.
As those wines which are kept long are called "âsavas" so these are also
called âsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that
Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called âsava on account of their
producing sa@msâradukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthasâlinî_, p. 48.
Contrast it with Jaina âsrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it
difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have
translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]

[Footnote 3: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195.]

[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasâlinî_, p. 371.]

100


The di@t@thâsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical
views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines.
The kâmasâvas stand in the way of one's entering into
the way of Nirvâ@na (_anâgâmimagga_) and the bhavâsavas and
avijjâsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final
emancipation. When the _Majjhima Nikâya_ says that from the
rise of the âsavas avijjâ rises, it evidently counts avijjâ there as
in some sense separate from the other âsavas, such as those of
attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge
about sorrow.

The afflictions (_kilesas_) do not differ much from the âsavas
for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar
to us, such as covetousness (_lobha_), anger or hatred (_dosa_),
infatuation (_moha_), arrogance, pride or vanity (_mâna_), heresy
(_di@t@thi_), doubt or uncertainty (_vicikicchâ_), idleness (_thîna_),
boastfulness (_udhacca_), shamelessness (_ahirika_) and hardness of heart
_anottapa_); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the âsavas.
In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha,
dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are
associated with the vedanâkkhandha, saññâkkhandha, sa@nkhârakkhandha
and viññânakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds
of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].


Sîla and Samâdhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the
tangles of desire (_ta@nhâ ja@tâ_), and the only way by which these
may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (_sîla_),
concentration (_samâdhi_) and wisdom (_paññâ_). Sîla briefly means
the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (_sabbapâpassa
akara@nam_). With sîla therefore the first start has to be made,
for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires
and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances.
This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance
of the sîla would lead one to the first two successive
stages of sainthood, viz. the sotâpannabhâva (the stage in which
one is put in the right current) and the sakadâgâmibhâva (the
stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samâdhi
is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old
kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhâ or desire is removed and

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[Footnote 1: _Dhammasa@nga@ni,_ p. 180.]

101

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It
directly brings in paññâ (true wisdom) and by paññâ the saint
achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an
arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (_paññâ_) is right knowledge about the
four âriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause
of destruction.

Sîla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc.
by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions
maintains himself on the right path. Sîla thus means 1. right
volition (_cetanâ_), 2. the associated mental states (_cetasika_),
3. mental control (_sa@mvara_) and 4. the actual non-transgression
(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind
by the preceding three sîlas called avîtikkama. Sa@mvara is
spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara (the
control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the
control of mindfulness), 3. Ñânasa@mvara (the control of knowledge),
4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara
(the control of active self-restraint). Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara
means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means
the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good
associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when
looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness
(_sati_) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to
think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it
as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by
which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the
proper adherence to sîla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities
(_kamma_) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (_samâdhânam,
upadhâra@na@m, pati@t@thâ_) [Footnote ref 2].

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a
number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting,
dining, etc., which are called the dhûta@ngas or pure disciplinary
parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sîla and the dhûtangas help the
sage to adopt the course of samâdhi. Samâdhi as we have seen means
the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (_kusalacittekaggatâ
samâdhi@h_) together with its states upon one particular
object (_ekâramma@na_) so that they may completely cease to
shift and change (_sammâ ca avikkhipamânâ_) [Footnote ref 4].

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga Nidânâdikathâ_.]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga-sîlaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, II.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85.]

102


The man who has practised sîla must train his mind first
in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire
the chief concentration of meditation called jhâna (fixed and
steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind
for the acquirement of jhânasamâdhi eventually lead to it
and are called upacâra samâdhi (preliminary samâdhi) as distinguished
from the jhânasamâdhi called the appanâsamâdhi (achieved samâdhi)
[Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he
has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive
desires for eating and drinking (_âhâre pa@tikkûlasaññâ_) by
emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated
in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations
as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man
continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting
associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment
to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil,
only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows
will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the
idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements,
k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase
of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called
catudhâtuvavatthânabhâvanâ (the meditation of the body as being
made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to
habituate his mind to think again and again (_anussati_) about the
virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following
the Buddha), the gods and the law (_dhamma_) of the Buddha, about
the good effects of sîla, and the making of gifts (_câgânussati_),
about the nature of death (_mara@nânussati_) and about
the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction
of all phenomena (_upasamânussati_) [Footnote ref 4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow
what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the
interconnection of jhâna (Skr. _dhyâna_) with its accessory stages
called parikammas (_Visuddhimagga,_ pp. 85 f.).]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic
attitude, "_Imañ ca pana âhâre pa@tikulasaññâ@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no
rasata@nhâya cittam pa@tilîyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so,
kantâranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado âhâra@m âhâreti
yâvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthâya_," p. 347. The mind of him who
inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from
all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off
from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food
without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to
sustain himself in crossing a forest.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294.]

103


Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations
called the upacâra samâdhi we come to those other
sources of concentration and meditation called the appanâsamâdhi
which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samâdhi.
The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind
continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts
which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbâna. In the first part
of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and
notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and
think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are,
and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies
and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the
dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called
asubhakamma@t@thâna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our
bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the
body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter
into the first jhâna by leading his mind away from his body.
This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness
about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration
the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling
(_passâsa_) and the exhaling (_âssâsa_) of his breath, so that instead
of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be
aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to
mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his
mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole
process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course.
This is called the anapânasati or the mindfulness of inhalation
and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihâra, the fourfold meditation
of metta (universal friendship), karu@nâ (universal pity),
muditâ (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and
upekkhâ (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his
friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to
the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking
how he should himself like to root out all misery and become
happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully,
and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also
have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think
that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga,_ VI.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 239-266.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ pp. 266-292.]

104

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself
to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any
difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others.
He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any
time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on
him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling
his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He
should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by
anger, he would spoil all his sîla which he was so carefully practising.
If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury,
should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he
were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself
indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas
are momentary (_kha@nikattâ_); that there no longer existed the
khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction
of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was
injured was himself an indispensable element in the production
of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and
there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible
and of being angry with him. If even after thinking
in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by
indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through
his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man
by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not
to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to
free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself
in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called
the mettâ-bhâvana. In the meditation of universal pity (_karu@nâ_)
also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and
foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for
those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither
acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to
Nibbâna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote
ref 2].

We next come to the jhânas with the help of material things
as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of
concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour,
yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space
(_parîcchinnâkâsa_). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth
and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 314-315.]

105

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds
that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his
mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to
concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jhânam_)
the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding
it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse
relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive
meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in
which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms
but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without
any quivering. This state is called vicâra (steadily moving). The
first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's _Visuddhimagga_
to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas
the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the
least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with
a buoyant exaltation (_pîti_) and a steady inward bliss called sukha
[Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first
jhâna roots out five ties of avijjâ, kamacchando (dallying with
desires), vyâpâdo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor),
uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchâ (doubt).
The five elements of which this jhâna is constituted are vitakka,
vicâra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhâna he finds it defective
and wants to enter into the second meditation (_dutiyam jhânam_),
where there is neither any vitakka nor vicâra of the first jhâna,
but the mind is in one unruffled state (_ekodibhâvam_). It is a
much steadier state and does not possess the movement which
characterized the vitakka and the vicâra stages of the first jhâna
and is therefore a very placid state (_vitakka-vicârakkhobha-virahe@na
ativiya acalatâ suppasannatâ ca_). It is however associated
with pîti, sukha and ekaggatâ as the first jhâna was.

When the second jhâna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined
towards the enjoyment of the pîti of that stage and becomes
indifferent to them (_upekkhako_). A sage in this stage sees the
objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all
the âsavas of the sage become loosened (khî@nâsava). The
enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Where there is pîti there is sukha, but where there is sukha
there may not necessarily be pîti. _Vîsuddhimagga_, p. 145.]

106

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes
to turn back to the enjoyment of pîti again. The two characteristics
of this jhâna are sukha and ekaggatâ. It should however
be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here,
the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it
(_atimadhhurasukhe sukhapâramippatte pi tatiyajjhâne upekkhako,
na tattha sukhâbhisangena âka@d@dhiyati_) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth
ball (_pa@thavî_) is however still the object of the jhâna.

In the fourth or the last jhâna both the sukha (happiness) and
the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment
and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by
supreme and absolute indifference (_upekkhâ_) which was slowly
growing in all the various stages of the jhânas. The characteristics
of this jhâna are therefore upekkhâ and ekaggatâ. With the
mastery of this jhâna comes final perfection and total extinction
of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an
arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas,
no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and
sufferings--Nibbâna.


Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded
with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he
thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he
comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikâya
also we read how Pâyâsi was trying to give his reasons in support
of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there
beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or
result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his
arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell
us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that
if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed
in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at
the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions
we do not find at the time of the death of any person that
his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of
the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments
with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikâya_, I.p. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp.
167-168.]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 349; _D. N._ II. pp. 317
ff.]

107

Pâyâsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine
of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the
Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In
the _Milinda Pañha_, we find Nâgasena saying "it is through a
difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some
long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some
handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some
rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree,
some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in
the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the
Upani@sad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any
other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation.
But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise
without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then
inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted,
pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent
and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]."
Karma by itself without craving (_ta@nhâ_) is incapable of bearing good
or bad fruits. Thus we read in the _Mahâsatipa@t@thâna sutta_, "even
this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and
self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit,
the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed
life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote
ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible,
craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in
memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear,
that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it
dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual
gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes.
And this is the first ârya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter
cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving
it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."

When the desire or craving (_ta@nhâ_) has once ceased the
sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after
that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 216-217.]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 340.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 341.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 341.]

108

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma
finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all
ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there
is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the
effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as
Moggallâna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma
an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of
his desire [Footnote ref 1].

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and
mind (_kâyika_, _vâcika_ and _mânasika_). The root of this kamma
is however volition (_cetanâ_) and the states associated with it
[Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into
the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there
even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for
he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives
an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually
carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (_vâcika_)
and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether
carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (_mânasika_)
[Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of
all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case
of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into
four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity,
(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those
which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of
both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor
bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which
contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].

Final extinction of sorrow (_nibbâna_) takes place as the natural
result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have
tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and
various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée
Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has
sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation,
as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Kathâvatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp,
221 ff.]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 88.]

[Footnote 3: See _Atthasâlinî_, p. 90.]

[Footnote 4: See _Atthasâlinî_, p. 89.]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in the _E. R.E._ on
Nirvâ@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalms
of the early Buddhists_, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; _Dîgha_,
II. 15; _Udâna_, VIII.; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109.]

109

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna in _Pali Text Society Journal_,
1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become
identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space
(_âkâsa_) or consciousness (_viññâna_) attained to a state in which
they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having
really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of
Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit
of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task
to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there
is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that
it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly
experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive
or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not
exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to
think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (_s'âs'vata_) or not-existing
(_as'âs'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as not
existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any
one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive
and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation,
takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical.
It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for
we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to
give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as
illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nâgârjuna and Candrakîrtti
took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted
it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence.
Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence
or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There
is no difference between the worldly stage (_sa@msâra_) and Nibbâna,
for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during
the sa@msâra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbâna.


Upani@sads and Buddhism.

The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ânanda
(bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly
presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was
the self (_attâ_) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that
the self(_âtman_) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we
are allowed



__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]

110

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could
conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss,
because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed
been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he
who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the
reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is
eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal
was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the
Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that
which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self
[Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the
Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads
doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often
identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is
found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a
permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence
which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered
that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined
as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (_neti
neti_) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could
nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our
changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self
was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me
as my self [Footnote ref 3].

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental
experience as it were, for they said that it could not
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out
as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The
Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But
how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken
of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the
Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said
that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences
either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did
not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise
men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (_rûpa_)
or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikûya_, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]

[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chândogya, VIII. 7-12.]

[Footnote 3: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45.]

111

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or
experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of
experiences that he considered as the perception of the self
[Footnote ref 1].

The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge.
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow.
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates,
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance
about the means of bringing about this extinction represent
the fourfold ignorance (_avijjâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyâ, which
is equivalent to the Pâli word avijjâ, occurs in the Upani@sads also,
but there it means ignorance about the âtman doctrine, and it is
sometimes contrasted with vidyâ or true knowledge about the self
(_âtman_) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth
was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was
nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence
was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of
Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways
represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the
right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (_âriya
sacca_)--sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of
sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we
may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the _Visuddhimagga_ "inasmuch however
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming
into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,--...or
in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest--therefore is it
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with
a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Samyutta Nikâya_, II. 46.]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikâya_, I.p. 54.]

[Footnote 3: Châ. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where
vidyâ and avidyâ have been used in a different and rather obscure sense,
I's'â 9-11.]

[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nikâya_, III. 85.]

[Footnote 5 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

112


The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the
Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death.
Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst
the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about
his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined
upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesâli
decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas,
they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahâsa@ngha) and
came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus
came to be called as the Mahâsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to
Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahâsa@nghikas seceded in
400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise
first to the three schools Ekavyavahârikas, Lokottaravâdins, and
Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutîyas. In the course of the
next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the
Prajñaptivâdins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The
Theravâda or the Sthaviravâda school which had convened the
council of Vesâli developed during the second and first century B.C.
into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas,
Mahîs'âsakas, Kâs'yapîyas, Sa@nkrântikas (more well known as
Sautrântikas) and the Vâtsiputtrîyas which latter was again split up
into the Dharmottarîyas, Bhadrayânîyas, Sammitîyas and Channâgarikas.
The main branch of the Theravâda school was from
the second century downwards known as the Hetuvâdins or
Sarvâstivâdins [Footnote ref 2]. The _Mahâbodhiva@msa_ identifies the
Theravâda school with the Vibhajjavâdins. The commentator of the
_Kathâvatthu_ who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime
in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of
Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little.
Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The _Mahâva@msa_ differs from _Dîpava@msa_ in holding that
the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahâsa@nghikas, but it was
the Mahâsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded
independently of them. The _Mahâbodhiva@msa_, which according to
Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.--1000 A.D., follows the
Mahava@msa in holding the Mahâsa@nghikas to be the first seceders
and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of
Pâ@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kathâvatthu_ by
Mrs Rhys Davids.]

[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys
Davids's translation of _Kathâvatthu_, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]

113

certain schools, of the Mahâsa@nghikas, Lokottaravâdins,
Ekavyavahârikas, Kakkulikas, Prajñaptivâdins and Sarvâstivâdins, but
these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical
importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the
Mahâsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with
mind (_citta_) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the
Prajñaptivâdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was
no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man,
(3) that the Sarvâstivâdins believed that everything existed. From
the discussions found in the _Kathâvatthu_ also we may know the
views of some of the schools on some points which are not always
devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found
by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It
is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism
were not so many different systems but only differed from one
another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered
as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now
appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their
literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises.
These schools are however not very important for a history of later
Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any
of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism
with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct
contact, are the Sarvâstivâdins including the Sautrântikas and
the Vaibhâ@sikas, the Yogâcâra or the Vijñânavâdins and the
Mâdhyamikas or the S'ûnyavâdins. We do not know which of the
diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools,
the Sautrântika, Vaibhâ@sika, Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika
schools. But as these schools were most important in relation
to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought,
it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can
about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in
general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them
the Vijñânavâdins or the Yogâcâras and the S'ûnyavâdins,
they often refer to the Sarvûstivûdins by which they mean
both the Sautrûntikas and the Vaibhû@sikas, ignoring the difference
that exists between these two schools. It is well to
mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the
Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravûda doctrines

114

as expressed in the Pâli works. The Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas
have been more or less associated with each other. Thus
the _Abhidharmakos'as'âstra_ of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhâ@sika
was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrântika. The
difference between the Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas that
attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former
believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas
the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could
only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary
_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ says that the Vaibhâsika
was but another name of the Âryasammitîya school. According to
Gu@naratna the Vaibhâ@sikas held that things existed for four moments,
the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of
decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out
in Vastlbandhu's _Abhidharmakos'a_ that the Vaibhâ@sikas believed
these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination
with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent
manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation
of Yas'omitra on _Abhidharmakos'a kârikâ_, V. 25). The self called
pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was
formless and was produced along with its object by the very
same conditions (_arthasahabhâsî ekasamâgryadhînah_). The Sautrântikas
according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but
only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past,
the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, âkâs'a and pudgala
are but names (_sa@mjñâmâtram_), mere assertions (_pratijñâmâtram_),
mere limitations (_samv@rtamâtram_) and mere phenomena (_vyavahâramâtram_).
By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal
and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly
perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the
diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all
compounded things are momentary (_k@sa@nikâh sarvasa@mskârâh_).

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Mâdhavâcârya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II.
_S'âstradîpikâ_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalañanda's commentary
(on _Bhâmatî_) _Vedântakalpataru_, p 286. "_vaibhâ@sikasya bâhyo'rtha@h
pratyak@sa@h, sautrântikasya jñânagatâkâravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_." The
nature of the inference of the Sautrântikas is shown thus by
Amalânanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "_ye yasmin satyapi kâdâcitkâ@h te
tadatiriktâpek@sâ@h_" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain
unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other
things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)
_Vedântakalpataru_, p. 289.]

115

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is
intended to be signified by that word (_anyâpoha@h s'abdârtha@h_).
Salvation (_mok@sa_) comes as the result of the destruction of the
process of knowledge through continual meditation that there
is no soul [Footnote ref 1].

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavâdins, Sautrântikas
and the Vaibhâ@sikas or the Sarvâstivâdins appears to
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus _Abhidharmakos'a_ (v. 24...)
describes the Sarvâstivâdins as those who maintain the universal
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavâdins
are those "who maintain that the present elements and
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition,
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and
of those among the past that have already produced fruition."
There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrâta,
Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrâta maintained
that when an element enters different times, its existence
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes
though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its
past aspects without being severed from its future and present
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love
other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra
held that an entity is called present, past and future according
as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva
maintained the view that just as the same woman may
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the
preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvâstivâdins, for they
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhâ@sika finds them all
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrâta's

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, pp. 46-47.]

116

view is only a veiled Sâ@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is
a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence
of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would
suppose that all the three times were found together and included
in one of them. The Vaibhâ@sika finds himself in agreement
with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having
produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in
past times could not have produced its effects in the present
time. The Sautrântika however thought that the Vaibhâ@sika's
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence,
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference
appeared in it. The true view according to him was,
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity,
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to
exist. He objected to the Vaibhâ@sika view that the past is to
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing
about the present on the ground that in that case there should
be no difference between the past and the present, since both
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference
between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the
same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

117

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhâ@sika suggests, but
past passions leave residues which become the causes of new
passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of
the Vâtsiputtrîyas and the Sarvâstivâdins as represented by
Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of
the existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument of
Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though
it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining
cause of perception, no such cause can be found which
may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary.
If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and
must be something different from the elements or entities of a
personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging
being would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriyâkâritva_)
which alone determines or proves existence. The
soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a
mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are
only the elements of a personal life. But the Vâtsiputtrîya
school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the
same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is
separate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which has
a separate existence, though we could not say that it was
altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the
same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements
of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence
cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must
be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise
an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist.
To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a
person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken
continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which
simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the
name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned,
and is based on an analogy with their own experience,
but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving
from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished
translation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by
my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful
to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

118

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions
in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,'
'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions
in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta
cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place
in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments,
these former moments coming in close succession being called
Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty,
for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces
its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of
the remembered object under certain conditions of attention,
etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or
violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of
memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind
and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying
that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only
meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the
same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say
"this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this
object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two
moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is
the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be
known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this
name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating
such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such
an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away
having reached an age." Only so much description can be
understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the
individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of
sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the
former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual
is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere
thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be
grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect.
This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other
fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we
sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but
what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc.,
fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

119

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some
colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation
'individual' but a common name for the different elements
of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question
whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is
just because there did not exist any living being as "individual,"
as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living
being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would
have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was
also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional
name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitîyas known to us and that by
name only is the _Sammitîyas'âstra_ translated into Chinese between
350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however
probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The Vaibhâ@sikas are identified with the Sarvâstivâdins who
according to _Dîpava@msa_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu,
branched off from the Mahîs'âsakas, who in their turn had
separated from the Theravâda school.

From the _Kathâvatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthivâdins
believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment
was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual
process, (3) that consciousness or even samâdhi was nothing but

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of
_A@s@tamakos'asthânanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendix
to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky,
_Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the
points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitîyas in the _E. R.E._
He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyâkhyâ_ the Sammitîyas have
been identified with the Vâtsîputtrîyas and that many of its texts were
admitted by the Vaibhâ@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as
follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvâna can fall away; (2) there is
an intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarâbhava_; (3)
merit accrues not only by gift (_tyagânvaya_) but also by the fact of the
actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given
(_paribhogânvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a
declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5)
they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from
which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala
cannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it
transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden;
it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory
constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by
Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala
doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have
noticed above.]

120

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1].
The Sabbatthivâdins or Sarvâstivâdins have a vast Abhidharma literature
still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the
Abhidharma of the Theravâda school which we have already mentioned
[Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _Jñânaprasthâna S'âstra_ of
Kâtyâyanîputtra which passed by the name of _Mahâ Vibhâ@sâ_ from which
the Sabbatthivâdins who followed it are called Vaibhâ@sikas [Footnote ref
3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa.
2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'âriputtra. 3. _Dhâtukâya_ by Pûr@na.
4. _Prajñaptis'âstra_ by Maudgalyâyana. 5. _Vijñânakâya_ by Devak@sema.
6. _Sa@ngîtiparyyâya_ by Sâriputtra and _Prakara@napâda_ by Vasumitra.
Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhâ@sika [Footnote
ref 4] system in verses (_kârikâ_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_,
to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name
_Abhidharma Kos'abhâ@sya_ in which he pointed out some of the defects
of the Vaibhâ@sika school from the Sautrântika point of view [Footnote
ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and
later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrântika and called his
work _Abhidharmakos'a vyâkhyâ_; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu
wrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Nyâyânusâra_ (Chinese translations of which
are available) on strict Vaibhâ@sika lines. We hear also of other
Vaibhâ@sika writers such as Dharmatrâta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and
Bhadanta, the writer of _Sa@myuktâbhidharmas'âstra_ and _Mahâvibhâ@sâ_.
Di@nnâga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhâ@sika
or a Sautrântika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu,
wrote his famous work _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ in which he
established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vâtsyâyana
the celebrated commentator of the _Nyâya sûtras_; but we regret

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathâvatthu_, p. xix,
and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]

[Footnote 2: _Mahâvyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvâstivâda, viz.
Mûlasarvâstivâda and Âryyasarvâstivâda. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks
of Âryyamûlasarvâstivâda and Mûlasarvâstivâda. In his time he found
it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu
says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Paramârtha, in his life of Vasubandhu,
says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra,
who studied it there.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Kâtyâyanîputtra's work
was probably a compilation from other Vibhâ@sâs which existed before the
Chinese translations and Vibhâ@sâ texts dated 383 A.D.]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrântikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the
Vaibhâ@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines
as given in the Suttapi@taka.]

121

to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit,
nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into
any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at
Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivâdins
from the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mahâvibhâ@sâs'âstra_,
etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch,
which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivâdins admitted the five skandhas, twelve
âyatanas, eighteen dhâtus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of
pratisa@mkhyânirodha apratisa@mkhyânirodha and âkâs'a, and the
sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rûpa
(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)
[Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together
(sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the
rûpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite
things or collocations--_sambhûyakâri_). The rûpa dharmas are
eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14
cittaviprayukta sa@mskâra dharmas (non-mental composite things);
adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five
dharmas. Rûpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the
sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or
collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell,
taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum
is known as paramâ@nu, which is the minutest form of rûpa. It
cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is
indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible.
But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary
flash into being. The simple atoms are called _dravyaparamâ@nu_
and the compound ones _sa@mghâtaparamâ@nu_. In the words of
Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested
in their actions or functions. They are consequently more
energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded
as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramâ@nus combine
together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form
only that they become perceptible. The combination takes
place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta
University.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the
Sarvâstivâdins in his bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtras_ II. 2 notices some
of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]

122

others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection
with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities
of all the mahâbhûtas are inherent in the paramâ@nus. The special
characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth),
viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging
to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to
form each of the elements; the difference between the different
elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special
characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics
though present remained only in a potential form. The
mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of
earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of
things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth.
The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely,
(1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as
activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as _dh@rti_ or
attraction, _sa@mgraha_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and
_vyûhana_ or clustering and collecting). These combine together
naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction
between the Vaibhâ@sika Sarvâstivadins and other forms of Buddhism
is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded
as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary
only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly,
owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyâ is not
regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of
pratîtyasamutpâda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual,
but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and
represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyâ,
which through sa@mskâra, etc., produces nâmarûpa in the case of
a particular individual, is not his avidyâ in the present existence
but the avidyâ of his past existence bearing fruit in the present
life.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when
it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example,
clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the
name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The
Sarvâstivâdins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in
the case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumârajîva's Chinese version of
Âryyadeva's commentary on the _Mâdhyamika s'âstra_ (chapter XX. Kârikâ 9).]

123

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum
of "vijñâna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and
the aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver.
It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a
permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a
substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow,
red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of
appearance (_sa@msthâna_) of long, short, round, square, high, low,
straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_kâyendriya_) has for
its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness,
roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These
qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by
the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted
under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch
which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of
wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other
energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which
excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire
becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The
indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse
thought (_vijñâna_); each of the five senses is an agent without
which none of the five vijñânas would become capable of perceiving
an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely
material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal
sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal
senses consists of a combination of paramâ@nus, which are extremely
pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is
the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from
one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective
atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is
performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed
on our person which is designated as avijñapti rûpa. It is called
rûpa because it is a result or effect of rûpa-contact; it is called
avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy
is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is
the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma
done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered
as twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that as
activity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

124

that due to body-motion (_kâyika karma_) and speech (_vâcika
karma_). Both these may again be latent (_avijñapti_) and patent
(_vijñapti_), giving us the kâyika-vijnñpti karma, kâyikâvijñapti
karma, vâcika-vijñapti karma and vâcikâvijñapti karma. Avijñapti
rûpa and avijñapti karma are what we should call in modern
phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding
to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity
there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself
in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but
are similar to those which are known, they are called avijñapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it
wills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vijñâna
because it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be
of three kinds: (1) svabhâva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination),
(2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present,
past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination
referring only to the past). The senses only possess the
_svabhâva nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovijñâna.
Each of the vijñânas as associated with its specific sense discriminates
its particular object and perceives its general characteristics;
the six vijñânas combine to form what is known as the
Vijñânaskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). There
are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta
dharmas âkâs'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction,
establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance
(_nîrûpâkhya_, non-rûpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyâ
nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused
by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my
attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because
they are non-existent but because the conditions which would
have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta
dharma, pratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, is the final deliverance from
bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These
are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation
they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution.
The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right
views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood,
right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hînayâna
thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as
Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as
those preached by Nâgârjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit
and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]

125


Mahâyânism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahâyânism took
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahâsa@nghikas
separated themselves from the Theravâdins probably some time in
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be
labelled as Mahâyâna were gradually on the way to taking their
first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works
which are regarded as various Mahâyâna sûtras, some of which
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others
as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahâyânasûtras, also
called the Vaipulyasûtras, are generally all in the form of instructions
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravâda
school.

The word Hînayâna refers to the schools of Theravâda, and
as such it is contrasted with Mahâyâna. The words are generally
translated as small vehicle (_hîna_ = small, _yâna_ = vehicle) and great
vehicle (_mahâ_ = great, _yâna_ = vehicle). But this translation by
no means expresses what is meant by Mahâyâna and Hînayâna
[Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_ gives

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sûtras are found in
Candrakîrtti's commentary on the _Mâdhyamîka kârikâs_ of Nâgârjuna; some of
these are the following: _A@s@tasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ_ (translated into
Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ, Gaganagañja,
Samâdhisûtra, Tathâgataguhyasûtra, D@r@dhâdhyâs'ayasañcodanâsûtra,
Dhyâyitamu@s@tisûtra, Pitâputrasamâgamasûtra, Mahâyânasûtra,
Mâradamanasûtra, Ratnakû@tasûtra, Ratnacû@dâparip@rcchâsûtra,
Ratnameghasûtra, Ratnarâs`isûtra, Ratnâkarasûtra,
Râ@s@trapâlaparip@rcchâsûtra, La@nkâvatârasûtra, Lalitavistarasûtra,
Vajracchedikâsûtra, Vimalakîrttinirdes'asûtra, S'âlistambhasûtra,
Samâdhirajasutra, Sukhâvatîvyûha, Suvar@naprabhâsasûtra,
Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),
Amitâyurdhyânasûtra, Hastikâkhyasûtra, etc.]

[Footnote 2: The word Yâna is generally translated as vehicle, but a
consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to
suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle
(_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajñâpâramitâ_, pp. 24, 319;
_Samâdhirâjasûtra_, p. 1; _Karu@nâpu@ndarîka_, p. 67; _La@nkâvatârasûtra_,
pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yâna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read
of Devayâna and Pit@ryâna. There is no reason why this word should be
taken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkâvatâra_ of S'râvakayâna
(career of the S'râvakas or the Theravâdin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayâna
(the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha
yâna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayâna (one career), Devayâna (career of
the gods), Brahmayâna (career of becoming a Brahmâ), Tathâgatayâna
(career of a Tathâgata). In one place _Lankâvatâra_ says that ordinarily
distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career,
but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankâvatâra_, p. 68).]

126

us the reason why one school was called Hînayâna whereas the
other, which he professed, was called Mahâyâna. He says that,
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion,
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hînayâna
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahâ
(great) Yâna, and hence it is branded as Hîna (small, or low).
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction
between Hînayâna and Mahâyâna. The ultimate good of an
adherent of the Hînayâna is to attain his own nirvâ@na or salvation,
whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahâyâna
creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the
salvation of all beings. So the Hînayâna goal was lower, and in
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received,
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were
narrower than that of the Mahâyâna adherents. A Hînayâna man
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahâyâna adherent was
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain
salvation. So the Hînayana adherents required only a short period
of work and may from that point of view also be called _hîna,_ or
lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahâyânists
which distinguishes them from the Hînayânists from the
philosophical point of view. The Mahâyânists believed that all
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and
void at bottom, whereas the Hînayânists only believed in the
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than
that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nâgârjuna first
preached the doctrine of S'ûnyavâda (essencelessness or voidness
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahâyâna sûtras
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we
take some of those sûtras which were in all probability earlier than
Nâgârjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nâgârjuna expounded

127

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhûti saying to
the Buddha that vedanâ (feeling), samjñâ (concepts) and the
sa@mskâras (conformations) are all mâyâ (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All
the skandhas, dhätus (elements) and âyatanas are void and absolute
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void
is not different from the skandhas, dhâtus and âyatanas, and this
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge
(_prajñâpâramitâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in
reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal
(_s'âs'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'âs'vata_) but pure void. It should
be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness"
(_tathatâ_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_)
has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pâramitâ_), benevolence
(_dânapâramitâ_), the virtue of character (_s'îlapâramitâ_), the virtue
of forbearance (_k@sântipâramitâ_), the virtue of tenacity and strength
(_vîryyapâramitâ_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhyânapâramitâ_).
The saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he will
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvâ@na. In reality,
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation;
and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage.
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his
work on the strength of his pâramitâs, though in reality there
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who
is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajñapâramitâ is
the absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@h
sarvadharmâ@nâm sa prajñâpâramitâ ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4].

The Mahâyâna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that
of S'ûnyavâda or the Mâdhyamika doctrine and Vijñânavâda.
The difference between S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda (the theory
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But
while the S'ûnyavâdins were more busy in showing this
indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñânavâdins, tacitly accepting

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _A@s@tesâhasiihâprajñâpâramita_, p. 16.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]

128

the truth preached by the S'ûnyavâdins, interested themselves in
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_vâsanâ_).

As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher
of a new type of idealism (_vijñânavâda_) known as the Tathatâ
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in
As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpâdas'âstra_ as being made from
_La@nkâvatârasûtra_, we should think of the _La@nkâvatârasûtra_ as
being one of the early works of the Vijñânavâdins [Footnote ref 1].
The greatest later writer of the Vijñânavâda school was Asa@nga
(400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abhûmi sûtra,
Mahâyâna sûtra, Upades'a, Mahâyânasamparigraha s'âstra, Yogâcârabhûmi
s'âstra_ and _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_. None of these works excepting the
last one is available to readers who have no access to the
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are
in all probability lost. The Vijñânavâda school is known to
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogâcâra, and it does
not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yogâcârabhûmi
s'âstra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu,
a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramârtha (499-569) tells
us, at first a liberal Sarvâstivâdin, but was converted to Vijñânavâda,
late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvâstivâdins,
_Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vijñânavâda
[Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of
Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirvâ@na, Saddharmapu@n@darîka,
Prajñâpâramitâ, Vimalakîrtti_ and _S'rîmâlâsi@mhanâda_, and
compiled some Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Vijñânamâtrasiddhi,
Ratnatraya_, etc. The school of Vijñânavâda continued for at
least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the S'ûnyavâda formed the fundamental
principle of all schools of Mahâyâna. The most powerful
exponent of this doctrine was Nâgârjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nâgârjuna's
kârikâs (verses) were commented upon by Âryyadeva, a disciple
of his, Kumârajîva (383 A.D.). Buddhapâlita and Candrakîrtti
(550 A.D.). Âryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûshana thinks that _Lankâvatâna_ belongs to
about 300 A.D.]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu,"
_J.R.A.S_. 1905.]

129

least three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_
and _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called
_Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ Âryyadeva says that whatever depends
for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory;
all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions
and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded
as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent
on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man
should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal
appearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he says
that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection
of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself
colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination
(_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touch
of imagination (_kalpanâ_) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the S'ûnyavâdins could produce
any great writers after Candrakîrtti. References to S'ûnyavâda
show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers
until the time of the great Mîmâ@msâ authority Kumârila who
flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ûnyavâdins
were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.


The Tathataâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya
who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of
India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably
converted to Buddhism by Pâr@sva who was an important
person in the third Buddhist Council promoted,
according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere
and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Âryyadeva's _Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by
Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_
were published by Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda s'âstrî in the Bengal
Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an
English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of
_S'raddhotpâdas`âstra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which
appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence
to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]

[Footnote 3: Târanâtha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple
of Nâgârjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner,
pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote
the _Buddhacaritakâvya_, of great poetical excellence, and the
_Mahâla@mkâras'âstra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical
instrument called Râstavara that he might by that means convert the
people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious,
inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-âtmanness
of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]

130


He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished
--the aspect as thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_) and the aspect as the cycle
of birth and death (_sa@msâra_). The soul as bhûtatathatâ means
the oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadhâtu_). Its essential
nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_)
appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could
overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and
there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot
be adequately expressed in any form of language. They
possess absolute sameness (_samatâ_). They are subject neither to
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul"
--thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_). This "thatness" has no attribute and
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness."
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is
spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This
bhûtatathatâ is neither that which is existence, nor that which is
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence,
nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence;
it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended
by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call
it negation, "s'ûnyatâ," in this sense. The truth is that which

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vâsanâ
in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the
sense of vâsanâ is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works
as _La@nkâvatâra_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a
term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]

131

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'ûnyatâ_) is
also void (_s'ûnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negated
nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure
soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and
completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be
called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it,
because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory
(_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the
truth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (_sa@msâra_) comes forth from
the Tathâgata womb (_tathâgatagarbha_), the ultimate reality.
But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other.
Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus
when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation
it is called the all-conserving mind (_âlayavijñâna_).
It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment.
Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is
free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient
memory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all
(_dharmadhâtu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakâya of all
Tathâgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental
truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any
real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary
creation of the perceivers under the influence of the
delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidyâ_) prevails
there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of
sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which
they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested
of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation,
viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have
any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation
with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted
phenomenal experience as prajñâ (wisdom) and karma
(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand
that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma,
disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and
accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the _âlayavijñâna_)

132

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down
and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and
the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakâya will manifest
itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are
mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is
identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore
ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense
it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the
water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here
the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical
with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the
water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of
the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise
when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and
clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (_avidyâ_), the waves
of mentality (_vijñâna_) make their appearance. These three (i.e.
the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence,
and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is
annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the
essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the
enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity
or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in
the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they
neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear
nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both
affectional (_kles'âvara@na_) and intellectual (_jñeyâvara@na_), as well
as from the mind (i.e. _âlayavijñâna_) which implicates itself with
birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal,
calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms
and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form
of a tathâgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings
may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its
relation with enlightenment _a priori_." But enlightenment _a priori_
is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as
non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses
its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation
as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations
of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance
of the mind (_âlayavijñâna_), by the avidyâkarma (ignorant

133

action), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of an
ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world
which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned
by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena
arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation);
being affected by the external world the mind becomes
conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.
The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon
intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well
as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states.
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and
succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there
arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment
to names or ideas (_sa@mjñâ_), etc. By clinging the mind
hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things.
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). On
account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations
of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon
is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering
arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of
its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through
avidyâ.

The relation between this truth and avidyâ is in one sense
a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds
of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay
[Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (_anâsrava_) and ignorance
(_avidyâ_) and their various transient forms all come from one and the
same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all
eternity abiding in Nirvâ@na.

It is by the touch of ignorance (_avidyâ_) that this truth assumes
all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind (_âlayavijñâna_) ignorance manifests
itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that
which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and
that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (_manas_).
Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different
modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness
(_karmavijñâna_) in the sense that through the agency of
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare Chândogya, VI. 1. 4.]

134

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (_prav@rttiivijñâna_)
in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there
evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is
representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (_manas_}
represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror
reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the
representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance,
with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously
and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness,
in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled
as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the
sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness
of attention (_manaskâra_) it (_manas_) retains all experiences and
never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well
as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution,
painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present
or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously
recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things
to come. Therefore the three domains (_kâmaloka_, domain of
feeling--_rûpaloka_, domain of bodily existence--_arûpaloka_, domain
of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the
mind (i.e. _âlayavijñâna_ which is practically identical with
_bhûtatathatâ_). Since all things, owing the principle of their
existence to the mind (_âlayavijñâna_), are produced by sm@rti,
all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations
of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from
all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion
that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized
and established only through ignorance (_avidyâ_) and memory
(_sm@rti_), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They
arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When
the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but
when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.
By ego-consciousness (_manovijñâna_) we mean the ignorant mind
which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of
I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of
sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness,
because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the
prejudices (_âsrava_), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing
in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

135

oblivious of the principle of sameness (_samatâ_) that underlies all
things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no
sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the _raison d'étre_ of samsâra. When
this is annihilated the conditions--the external world--are also
annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also
annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation
of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled
sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing
the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyâ (ignorance),
karmavijñâna (activity-consciousness--the subjective mind),
vi@saya (external world--represented by the senses) and the tathatâ
(suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of
these elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean
that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no
odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet
acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance
with which they are perfumed. Suchness (_tathatâ_) is likewise
a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming
power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to
do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the
work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.
Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the _raison d'étre_ of
all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness
and produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance.
On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood.
On account of its being misunderstood an external world
of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming
power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced.
And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer
as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness
perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming
the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of
birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvâna. This
longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn
perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we
are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves
of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and
we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

136

but the illusory manifestations of the mind (_âlayavijñâna_) and
have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand
the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform
those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We
should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By
virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable
âsa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As
ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (_âlayavijñâna_) is no longer
disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no
longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world
is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition
of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all
annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvâ@na and that various
spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvâ@na
of the tathatâ philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatâ (suchness
or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance
which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession
of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it
that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do,
As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in
possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle
of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such
manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and
hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle
in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love
(_maitrî_) and compassion (_karu@nâ_) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas,
is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe
in nirvâ@na, to cultivate the root of merit (_kus'alamûla_), to habituate
oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence
of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving
instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced
to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and
enter into Nirvâ@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming
power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes
of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path
of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas
and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual)
benefits (_hitatâ_)" and "entering into the samâdhi of purity, they

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]

137

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating
insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness
(_samatâ_) of the universe (_sarvaloka_) and to see innumerable Buddhas
and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in
unison with suchness, as in the case of s'râvakas (theravâdin
monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only
continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state
of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness.
But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with
suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow
themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma.
The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from
all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one
at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma
(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption.
For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great
wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhâtu (universe),
the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its
own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the
pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called
the tathâgatagarbha or the dharmakâya. It may be objected that
since thatness or suchness has been described as being without
characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing
all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits,
it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all
objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being
of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization
or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their
(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are
free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment
there originates a subjective mind (_âlayavijñâna_) that becomes
conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or
avidyâ. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly
pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign
to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is
called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to
illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever,
though the stage of the perfuming of avidyâ comes to an end with
the Buddhas when they attain to nirvâ@na. All Buddhas while at

138

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (_mahâkaru@nâ_) for all
beings, practise all virtues (_pâramitâs_) and many other meritorious
deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a
universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless
numbers of _kalpas_, recognize truthfully and adequately the
principle of equality (_samatâ_)among people; and do not cling
to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is
meant by the activity of tathatâ. The main idea of this tathatâ
philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is
at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyâ veils
it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the
pure thatness also perfumes the avidyâ there is a striving for the
good as well. As the stage of avidyâ is passed its luminous
character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only
illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view
of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than
that of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nkâvatâra_. Considering the
fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early
life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in
this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably
with the Vedânta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nkâvatâra_
admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas
(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self
(_âtman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality
as the ultimate truth. Nâgârjuna's Mâdhyamika doctrines which
eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more
faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijñânavâda
creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkâvatâra [Footnote ref 1].


The Mâdhyamika or the S'ûntavâda school.--Nihilism.

Candrakîrtti, the commentator of Nâgârjuna's verses known as
"_Mâdhyamika kârikâ_," in explaining the doctrine of dependent
origination (_pratîtyasamutpâda_) as described by Nâgârjuna starts
with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word
pratîtyasamutpâda means the origination (_utpâda_) of the nonexistent
(_abhâva_) depending on (_pratîtya_) reasons and causes

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of
As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpâda S'âstra_, I had to depend entirely on
Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]

139

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratîtya
means each and every destructible individual and pratîtyasamutpâda
means the origination of each and every destructible individual.
But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does
not suit the context in which the Pâli Scriptures generally speak
of pratîtyasamutpâda (e.g. _cak@su@h pratîtya rûpâni ca utpadyante
cak@survijñânam_) for it does not mean the origination of each and
every destructible individual, but the originating of specific
individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in
connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example
if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept,
we see that there cannot be any contact between visual
knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be
intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we
interpret the maxim of pratîtyasamutpâda as this happening that
happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All
origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor
by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason.
For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself.
To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean
that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again
without any further qualification it is said that depending on
one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any
other thing could come into being--from light we could have darkness!
Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others,
it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them
together. A thing also could not originate without any cause,
for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore
to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this
so-called dependent origination (_pratîtyasamutpâda_) it was referred
to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and
senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is
not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance
(_avidyâ_). The only thing which is not lost (_amo@sadharma_) is
nirvâ@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena
(_sa@mskâra_) are false and are lost with their appearances
(_sarvasa@mskârâs'ca m@r@sâmo@sadharmâ@na@h_).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

140

are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no
good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the
case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion
should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the
nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence
of the people that things are true. Those who are really
wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly
they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with
the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus
there are neither works nor cycles of births (_sa@msâra_) and also he
does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of
any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakû@tasûtra that
howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness
(_citta_); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist,
and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and
as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which
has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction.
He who through his false knowledge (_viparyyâsa_) does not comprehend
the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be
real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (_sa@msâra_). Like all
illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm
of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true
according to the nihilists (_s'ûnyavâdins_), then their statement that
there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti
in replying to this says that with s'ûnyavâdins the truth is absolute
silence. When the S'ûnyavâdin sages argue, they only accept for
the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with
them in their own manner to help them to come to a right
comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite
of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances,
that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that
we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these
phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda is described as "this
being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be
indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have
no essence or true nature. Nihilism (_s'ûnyavâda_) also means just
this. The true meaning of pratîtyasamutpâda or s'ûnyavâda is
this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

141

appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither
produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They
are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (_s'ûnya_)
does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of
position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any
intrinsic nature of their own (_ni@hsvabhâvatvam_).

The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything
has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even
heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat
and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions,
and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the
nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the
true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on
anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed
out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it
exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot
affirm the essence of other things to it (_parabhâva_). If we
cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently
assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first
believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are
not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (_abhâva_),
but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot
speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process
going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of
change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we
can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things;
for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment
after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to
justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes
from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed
also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere,
and so a process (_sa@msâra_) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot
be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had
suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the
second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact
there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination
as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a
self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. pp. 93-100.]

142

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if
the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression,
for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character
and takes up another at the same identical moment which is
inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process,
and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what
is then the nirvâ@na which is described as the final extinction of
all afflictions (_kles'a_)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does
not agree to such a definition of nirvâ@na. Nirvâ@na on the Madhyamaka
theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that
which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased
or as anything which is produced (_aniruddham anntpannam_}. In
nirvâ@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease
to exist in nirvâ@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they
never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvâ@na cannot be any positive thing or
any sort of state of being (_bhâva_), for all positive states or things
are joint products of combined causes (_sa@msk@rta_) and are liable to
decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since
we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a
negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are
communicated as being in a state of change and process coming
one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth
can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be
produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be
determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvâ@na is merely the
cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (_prapañcaprav@rtti_). It
cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for
these conceptions belong to phenomena (_na câprav@rttimatram
bhâvâbhâveti parikalpitum pâryyate evam na bhâvâbhâvanirvâ@nam_,
M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known,
and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to
appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon,
a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any
bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like
the mirage, the dream, the mâyâ, and the magic without any real
nature (_ni@hsvabhâva_). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. pp.162 and 201.]

143

one is trying to win a real nirvâ@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false
egoism that is to be considered as avidyâ. When considered deeply it is
found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence.
Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (_avidyâ_), there
would have been no conformations (_sa@mskâras_), and if there were
no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so
on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the
sa@mskâras," and it can be said of the sa@mskâras "we are being
produced by the avidyâ." But there being avidyâ, there come the
sa@mskarâs and so on with other categories too. This character of
the pratîtyasamutpâda is known as the coming of the consequent
depending on an antecedent reason (_hetûpanibandha_).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence
on conglomeration or combination (_pratyayopanibandh_).
It is by the combination (_samavâya_) of the four elements, space
(_âkâs'a_) and consciousness (_vijñâna_) that a man is made. It is
due to earth (_p@rthivî_) that the body becomes solid, it is due to
water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is
digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due
to âkâs'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijñâna that
there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination
that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think
that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be
allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or
souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and
attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come
the sa@mskâras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness
(_râga, dve@sa, moha_); from these proceed the vijñâna and
the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name
and form (_nâmarûpa_), from these proceed the senses (_@sa@dayatana_),
from the coming together of those three comes contact (_spars'a_);
from that feelings, from that comes desire (_tr@s@nâ_) and so on.
These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence
or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2].
The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or
non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism
(_s'âs'vatavâda_) or nihilism (_ucchedavâda_), and it is for this reason

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: _Ibid._ pp. 209-211, quoted from _Sâlistambhasûtra_.
Vâcaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bhâmatî_ on
S'a@nkara's _Brahma-sûtra_.]

144

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (_madhyamaka_) [Footnote
ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth
(_samv@rtisatya_) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true
reality (_paramârthasatya_) in them or anything else. Morality
plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any
other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nâgârjuna's
_Suk@rllekha_ as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from
the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (_asâra_) give according to
the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there
is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (_s'îla_) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless,
for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of
the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality,
patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having
reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina
prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (_mâtsaryya_), deceit (_s'â@thya_), duplicity
(_mâyâ_), lust, indolence (_kausîdya_), pride (_mâna_), greed (_râga_),
hatred (_dve@sa_) and pride (_mada_) concerning family, figure, glory,
youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door
for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall
attain the degree of an anâgâmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her,
according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the
six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the
wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly
conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour,
blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend,
careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you
must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity,
joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you
(certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (_brahmavihâra_).

41. By the four dhyânas completely abandoning desire (_kâma_), reflection
(_vicâra_), joy (_prîti_), and happiness and pain (_sukha, du@hkha_) you
will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am
not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in
me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four
aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

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[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

145

nature (_prak@rti_), not from themselves (_svabhâvât_), nor from the Lord
(_îs'vara_), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from
ignorance (_avidyâ_) and desire (_t@r@s@nâ_).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (_s'îlabrataparâmars'a_),
wrong views (_mithyâd@r@s@ti_) and doubt (_vicikitsâ_) are the three
fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality,
the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one
rules (of the _prâtimok@sa_) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (_anitya_) without
substance (_anâtma_) without help (_as'ara@na_) without protector
(_anâtha_) and without abode (_asthâna_) thou O Lord of men must become
discontented with this worthless (_asâra_) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish
and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no
other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity
of the quieting and the subduing nirvâ@na not subject to age, death or
decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (_prajñâ_) there is also no contemplation
(_dhyana_), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but
know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a
grove.


Uncompromising Idealism or the School
of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñânavâda
or Yogâcâra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers
of Hindu thought as Kumârila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great
extent with the S'ûnyavâdins whom we have already described.
All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary
constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the
so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We
construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists
by itself (_nirmmitapratimohi_) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions
involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions
(_khyâti vijñâna_), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions
(_vastuprativikalpavijñâna_). The two functions however mutually
determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished
(_abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke_). These functions are set to work
on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent
in them in relation to the world of appearance
(_anâdikâla-prapañca-vâsanahetukañca_) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 _Ibid._ p. 44.]

146

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped
(_abhûta-parikalpa-vâsanâ-vaicitra-nirodha_)
[Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge
is without any essence or truth (_nihsvabhâva_) and is but a
creation of mâyâ, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which
may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the
mind (_svacitta_), which has been accustomed to create imaginary
appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement
these creations take place as subject and object has no
appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence
and extinction (_utpâdasthitibha@ngavarjjam_) and is called the
âlayavijñâna. The reason why this âlayavijñâna itself is said to be
without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this,
that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all
the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence
in the sense in which the term is used and we could not
affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing
external but of our own mind (_svacitta_), and there is also the
beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world
of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which
takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also
the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account
of these four reasons there are produced in the âlayavijñâna (mind)
the ripples of our sense experiences (_prav@rttivijñana_) as in a lake,
and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas
called _pañchavijñânakâya_ thus appear in a proper synthetic
form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either
identical or different from the âlayavijñâna just as the waves cannot
be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As
the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the âlayavijñâna
is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (_v@rtti_). As
citta it collects all movements (_karma_) within it, as manas it
synthesizes (_vidhîyate_) and as vijñâna it constructs the fivefold
perceptions (_vijñânân vijânâti d@rs'yam kalpate pañcabhi@h_) [Footnote
ref 2].

It is only due to mâyâ (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their
twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as
an appearance (_samv@rtisatyatâ_) whereas in the real aspect we could
never say whether they existed (_bhâva_) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Pañcâvatârasûtra_, p. 44.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., pp. 50-55.]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_, pp. 58-59.]

147


All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (_sadasanta@h
mâyopamâ@h_). When we look deeply into them we find that
there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even
all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the
ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which
the positive and negative are one and the same (_bhâvâbhâvasamânatâ_)
[Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no
name and no substance had been described in the La@nkâvatârasûtra
as thatness (_tathatâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in
another place in the _La@nkâvatâra_ as voidness (_s'ûnyatâ_) which is one
and has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place
it is also designated as tathâgatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified
ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic âtman or Brahman
like the tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatâra
that Râva@na asks the Buddha "How can you say that
your doctrine of tathâgatagarbha was not the same as the âtman
doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics
also consider the âtman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading
and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply
thus--"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those
heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction
of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance
in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that
I say that all things are in reality the tathâgatagarbha. This
should not be regarded as âtman. Just as a lump of clay is made
into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature
of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics
(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_) that is variously described as
the garbha or the nairâtmya (essencelessness). This explanation of
tathâgatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to
attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously
inclined to believe in the âtman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned,
the idealistic Buddhists (_vijñânavâdins_) agreed to the doctrine of
pratîtyasamutpâda with certain modifications. There was with
them an external pratîtyasamutpâda just as it appeared in the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_, p. 65.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p. 70.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 80-81.]

148

objective aspect and an internal pratîtyasamutpâda. The external
pratîtyasamutpâda (dependent origination) is represented in the
way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the
co-operation of diverse elements--the lump of clay, the potter,
the wheel, etc. The internal (_âdhyâtmika_) pratîtyasamutpâda
was represented by avidyâ, t@r@s@nâ, karma, the skandhas, and the
âyatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the
_pravichayabuddhi_ and the
_vikalpalak@sa@nagrahâbhinives'aprati@s@thapikâbuddhi_. The
pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either
of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other
(_ekatvânyaiva_); either both or not both (_ubhayânubhaya_), either
are or are not (_astinâsti_), either eternal or non-eternal (_nityânitya_).
But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second
category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it
constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by
its own constructive activity--_parikalpa_) in a logical order of diverse
relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who
knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there
is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only
in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of
smoothness (_sneha_) that constructs the water as an external substance;
it is the sense construction of activity or energy that
constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction
of movement that constructs the external substance of air.
In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the
real (_mithyâsatyâbhinives'a_) five skandhas appear. If these were
to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal
relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be
no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them
together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or
destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up
things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as
perceivers. It is simply a convention (_vyavahâra_) to speak of things
as known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere
speech-construction (_vâgvikalpa_) and unreal. In speech one could not
speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, p. 85.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p. 87, compare the term "vyavahârika" as
used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same
sense by S'a@nkara.]

149

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;
the real truth (_paramartha_) can never be referred to by such
speech-construction.

The nothingness (_s'ûnyata_) of things may be viewed from
seven aspects--(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence
have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot
be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms
of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference
to an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable
(_laksanas'ûnyata_); (2) that they have no positive essence
(_bhâvasvabhâvas'ûnyatâ_), since they spring up from a natural
non-existence (_svabhâvâbhâvotpatti_); (3) that they are of an unknown
type of non-existence (_apracaritas'ûnyatâ_), since all the skandhas
vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected
though non-existent (_pracaritas'ûnyatâ_), for their skandhas
have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but
yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none
of the things can be described as having any definite nature,
they are all undemonstrable by language (_nirabhilapyas'ûnyatâ_);
(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that
which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires
which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent
in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and
time in which they are not (_itaretaras'ûnyatâ_).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal
nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a mâyâ; the
two kinds of negation (_nirodha_) are âkâs'a (space) and nirvana;
things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only
imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of
this school, that the reality is called the tathâgatagarbha (the
womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal
appearances of the clusters (_skandhas_), elements (_dhâtus_), and
fields of sense operation (_âyatanas_) only serve to veil it with
impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a
universal soul as the reality. But the _La@nkâvatâra_ attempts to
explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to
the tathâgatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of
false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening
to the nairâtmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, p. 80.

150


The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold
knowledge of (1) _svacittad@rs'hyabhâvanâ_, (2)
_utpâdasthitibha@ngavivarjjanatâ_,
(3) _bâhyabhâvâbhâvopalak@sa@natâ_ and
(4) _svapratyâryyajñânâdhigamâbhinnalak@sa@natâ_. The first means
that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind.
The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination,
existence or destruction. The third means that one should
know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said
either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely
like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire
(_vâsanâ_) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us
to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the
nature of all things.

The four dhyânas spoken of in the _Lankâvatâra_ seem to be
different from those which have been described in connection with
the Theravâda Buddhism. These dhyânas are called (1) _bâlopacârika_,
(2) _arthapravichaya_, (3) _tathatâlambana_ and (4) _tathâgata_.
The first one is said to be that practised by the s'râvakas
and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the
doctrine that there is no soul (_pudgalanairâtmya_), and that everything
is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all
things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on
till all conceptual knowing ceases (_âsa@mjñânirodhât_); we have
what is called the vâlopacârika dhyâna (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is
full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the
comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics
may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that
appears. This is called the _arthapravicayadhyâna_, for the sage
concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out
(_pravichaya_) the nature of all things (_artha_).

The third dhyâna, that in which the mind realizes that the
thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances,
is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness
(_tathatâ_). This dhyâna is called _tathatâlambana_, because it has for
its object tathatâ or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyâna is that in which the lapse of
the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness
and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

151

and nirvâna is that in which all root desires (_vâsanâ_) manifesting
themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge
and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This
cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot
be called destruction, for only compounded things (_sa@msk@rta_)
suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or
destruction. This nirvâna is different from that of the s'râvakas
and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state
nirvâ@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics
of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to
things and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)
of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is
said that the world is mâyâ or illusion, what is meant to be
emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena
that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere
constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatâ or thatness
is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or
nature of the imagination (_vikalpa_) tainted with the associations
of beginningless root desires (_vâsanâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathatâ has
no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the
course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore
also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind
(_cittavimukta_), for here there is no construction of imagination
(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_) [Footnote ref 3].


Sautrântika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakîrtti's [Footnote ref 4]
(about 635 A.D.) _Nyâyabindu_, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological
work, describes right knowledge (_samyagjñâna_) as an
invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankâvatarasûtra_, p. 100.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 109.]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijñanavada school is collected mainly
from _Lankâvatârasûtra_, as no other authentic work of the Vijñânavâda
school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be
had in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka vârttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya,
II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mahâyânasûtralamkâra_ deals more with the duties
concerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysics
of the system.]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakîrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijñanavâda in his
_Santânântarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Nyâyabindu_ seems
rightly to have been considered by the author of _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippani_
(p. 19) as being written from the Sautrântika point of view.]

152

desires to have (_samyagjñânapûrvikâ sarvapuru@sârthasiddhi_) [Footnote
ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any
knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthâdhigati_).
The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual
presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it
(_arthâdhigamât samâpta@h pramâ@navyâpârah_). Thus there are
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:
(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections
and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation
is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly
through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed
in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived
at the moment of perception was not the same as that
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series
(_nîlâdau ya eva santâna@h paricchinno nilajñânena sa eva tena
prâpita@h tena nilajñânam pramâ@nam_) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent
of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of
_Nyâyaybindu_, Vinîtadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in
_Nyâyabindu@tîkâtippanî_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutikâ_ of Dharmmottara,
but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî_, p. 11.]

153

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise
of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences,
desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with
it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the
object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right
knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object.
Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the
object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it
is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in
connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (_pratyaks'a_) has been defined by Dharmakîrtti as
a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated
by any names or relations (_kalpanâ_) and which is not erroneous
(_kalpanâpo@dhamabhrântam_) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not
indeed represent the actual nature (_svarûpa_) of perception, but only
shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything
may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception
is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that
if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it,
he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him
by his perception (_tasmâdgrâhye arthe vasturûpe yadaviparyastam
tadabhrântamiha veditavyam_}. It is said that a right perception
could not be associated with names (_kalpanâ_ or _abhilâpa_). This
qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not
directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing
only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being
the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded
as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present
the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also
must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are
when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work
of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced
by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of
previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the _Pramânasamucaya_ (not
available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.) was "_Kalpanâpodham_."
According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa
jñâna_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses
that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate
knowledge (_savikalpa jñâna_), as formed by the conceptual activity of
the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before,
cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to
the senses.]

154

to the sense
(_pûrvad@r@s@tâparad@r@s@tañcârthamekîkurvadvijñânamasannihitavi@sayam
pûrvad@r@s@tasyâsannihitatvât_). In all illusory perceptions it is the
sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological
causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the
object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through
the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those
features which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity of
knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented
by it (_arthena saha yatsârûpyam sâd@rs'yamasya jñânasya tatpramâ@namiha_).
But the objection here is that if our percept is only
similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which
is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes
invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which
appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their
sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi sârûpyam
tasya vas'ât_) and our perception of the object becomes possible.
It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of
having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between
the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and
the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of
causation but of a determinant and a determinate
(_vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvena_). Thus it is the same cognition
which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object
of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the
percept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h kiñcidrûpam pramâ@nam kiñcitpramâ@naphalam
na virudhyate_). It is on account of this similarity
with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the
definite awareness (_vyavasthâpanaheturhi sârûpyam_), so that by
the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the
similarity of the sense-datum with the object {_pramâ@na_) we come
to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue"
(_pramâ@naphala_). If this sameness between the knowledge and its
object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from
the awareness (_sârûpyamanubhûtam vyavasthâpanahetu@h_). The
object generates an awareness similar to itself, and
it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization
of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting
the _Nyâyabindu, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî_ (St Petersburg,
1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception
are available to us. _Nyâyabindu_ is probably one of the earliest works in
which we hear of the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ (practical fulfilment
of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded
as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakîrtti's works and the profuse
references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word
_arthakriyâ_ is found in Candrakîrtti's commentary on Nâgârjuna and also
in such early works as _Lalitavistara_ (pointed out to me by Dr E.J.
Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no
philosophical significance there.]

155


Sautrântika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrântika doctrine of Buddhism as described
by Dharmakîrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the
only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to
us in Sanskrit, inference (_anumâna_) is divided into two classes,
called svârthânumâna (inferential knowledge attained by a person
arguing in his own mind or judgments), and parârthânumâna (inference
through the help of articulated propositions for convincing
others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the
validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of
the external world. Inference copied external realities as much
as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception
of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing
perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also,
so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the
external fact thus inferred (_sârûpyavas'âddhi tannîlapratîtirûpam
sidhyati_).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such
that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to
be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not
exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint
conditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) between
the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is
not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where
the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not
exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the
above case. This law (_niyama_) is essential for establishing the
unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This
unfailing natural connection (_svabhâvapratibandha_) is found in two types

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As the _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ of Diñnâga is not available in
Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except
what can be got from the _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_ of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: _tasmât niyamavatorevânvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h
yena pratibandho gamyeta sâdhanyasa sâdhyena. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, p. 24.]

156

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained
in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where
the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred
is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines
may come to think that pines are called trees because they are
tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small
pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness
forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being
a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the
species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could
infer the latter from the former but not _vice versa_; this is called
the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (_tâdâtmya_).
The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect
which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke
the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of
these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected
with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no
inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (_svabhâvapratibandha_),
be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the
genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is
the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhâvapratibandha
determines the inseparability of connection (avinâbhâvaniyama) and
the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but
directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection
[Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as parârthânumâna
agrees with svârthânumâna in all essential characteristics; the
main difference between the two is this, that in the case of
parârthânumâna, the inferential process has to be put verbally in
premisses.

Pandit Ratnâkarasânti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century
A.D., wrote a paper named _Antarvyâptisamarthana_ in which

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _na hi yo yatra svabhâvena na pratibaddha@h sa tam
apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratîti nâsti
tayoravyabhicâraniyama. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only
possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions,
viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thing
about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the
li@nga in those cases where the sâdhya oc probandum existed), and
(3) vipak@sâsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sâdhya
did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism,
e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike
a lake.]

157

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those
cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which
possess the sâdhya (probandum) but between that which has the
characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics
of the sâdhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance
is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen,
etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the
characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the
characteristic of the sâdhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature
of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvyâpti_),
whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing
possessing li@nga and that possessing sâdhya, is known as outer
concomitance (_bahirvyâpti_) and generally accepted by the Nyâya
school of thought. This antarvyâpti doctrine of concomitance is
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early
as the _Kathâvatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of
the _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses
such as the udâhara@na (_Yo yo aggimâ so so dhûmavâ_--whatever is
fiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhûmavâ_--this
hill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasmâdayam aggimâ_--therefore
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the
method of the arguments which are found in the _Kathâvatthu_ as
follows:

"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thâpanâ_).
Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is _C D_? (_pâpanâ_).
Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.
That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thâpanâ,
because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally
established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed
pâpanâ because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

158

is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the
opponent. Next:

  "If _D_ be derived of _C_.
  Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.
  But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.
  (therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is
  wrong."

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major
in the latter method we get

  "If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.
  But _A_ is _B_.
  Therefore _C_ is _D_.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished
[Footnote ref 1]."


The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of
all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the
method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyâpti_), and then by the
method of difference by proving that the production of effects
could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent
and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness
as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of
producing anything (_arthakriyâkâritva_). The form of the first
type of argument by anvayavyâpti may be given thus: "Whatever
exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example
the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing
are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot
be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an
existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain
effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these
are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing
no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible,
for those which are done now could not be done again in the
future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kathâvatthu_
(_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

159

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one
might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at
the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing
anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce
at one moment and does not produce at another, this
contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were
different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature
of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at
those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have
in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the
work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do
so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the
future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the
capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two
moments (_s'aktâs'aktasvabhavatayâ pratik@sa@nam bheda@h_). The
capacity of producing effects (_arthakriyâs'akti_), which is but the
other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness
(_k@sa@nikatvavyâpta_).

The Nyâya school of philosophy objects to this view and says
that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect
produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded
as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect
cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and
that another _ad infinitum_. Since there can be no being that has
not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can
demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible
to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects
as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were
momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe
the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be
any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this
Ratnakirtti replies that capacity (_saâmarthya_) cannot be denied,
for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation
of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in
absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under
certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the
concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions
there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This
knowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

160

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment,
and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) is
indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that
in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of
being;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and
even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce
effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that
the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing
the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l].
Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between
things only so long as their apparent forms are not different
(_atadrûpaparâv@rttayoreva sâdhyasâdhanayo@h pratyak@se@na
vyâptigraha@nât_). The vyâpti or concomitance of any two things
(e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not
on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness
is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other
collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect
(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakîrtti
replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the
effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special
effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both
the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot.
How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special
effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which
preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakîrtti wishes to
draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals
a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number
of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has
being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of
Ratnakîrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production
of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites
was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh
century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly
(_Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 22):

"_mûlak@satikarîmâhuranavasthâm hi dû@sa@nam.
mûlasiddhau tvarucyâpi nânavasthâ nivâryate._"

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive
at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence
vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress
though one may not be willing to have it.]

161

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute
the doctrines of Nyâya than an elaboration of the Buddhist
principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary
of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all
dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all
strictly momentary (_k@sa@nika_--i.e. existing only for one moment)
was not emphasized in early Pâli literature. As'vagho@sa in his
_S'raddhotpâdas'âstra_ speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki's
translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation
of the khandhas as kha@nika in his _Visuddhimagga._ But from the
seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together
with the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva received great attention at
the hands of the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas. All the
Nyâya and Vedânta literature of this period is full of refutations
and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account
available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of
Ratnakîrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in
favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it
may be found in any of the important Nyâya works of this period
such as _Nynyamanjari, Tâtparyya@tîkâ_ of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent.
With the development of this doctrine they gave great
emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and
the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is
momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived
from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied
the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as
self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies
manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones
appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker.
Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot
discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of
these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of
self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product
as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any
particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every
moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

162

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been
existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I
perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that
"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in
memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident
that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the
past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before
my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence
is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory
referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived
at the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not only
of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but
also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of
self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions
arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But
since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception
to another object of the present moment, identity cannot
be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects
of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet
things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.
Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we
have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old
hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave
the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that
though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to
these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment
and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce
the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been
persisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as the
flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as
if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so
all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects
around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are
being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the
objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those
of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things
have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijñânirâsa of the Buddhists, _Nyâyamañjarî_, V.S.
Series, pp. 449, etc.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also
_Nyâyamañjarî,_ V.S. edition, p. 450.]

163


The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine
of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyâkâritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from
the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse
characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a
conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect,
determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or
as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the
elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the
conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of
these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic,
the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or
being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or
the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in
Sanskrit is called _arthakriyâkâritva_ which literally translated
means--the power of performing actions and purposes of some
kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the
performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means
that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency).
That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_.
Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding
change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapañha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition,
pp. 24, 28 and _Nyâyamañjarî,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the
paper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnakîrtti in _Six Buddhist Nyâya
tracts_.]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyâkâritva" is different
from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrântika
theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both
in Ratnakîrtti as well as in Nyâya writers who referred to this doctrine.
With Vinîtadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "_arthakrîyâsiddhi_"
meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire
(_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m dârupâkâdi
tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of
man such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment).
With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later
_arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable
and desirable objects (_heyopâdeyârthavi@sayâ_). But with Ratnakîrtti
(950 A.D.) the word _arthakriyâkâritva_ has an entirely different sense.
It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as
such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence
_sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_ pp. 20, 21, that
though in different philosophies there are different definitions of
existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted
definition of existence as _arthakriyâkâritva_ (efficiency of causing any
action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakîrtti refer to the
Buddhist doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ they usually refer to this
doctrine in Ratnakîrtti's sense.]

164

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot
be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once
produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in
us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but
cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect
and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming
into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things
were permanent there would be no reason why they should be
performing different effects at different points of time. Any
difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself
or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting
that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place.
The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it
has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power
then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no
notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression
produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power
exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should
hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production
of impressions or effects there should be some other
permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed
even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power
of producing effects and define each unit of such power as
amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be
different units of power at different moments, there should also
be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as
momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.
This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of
momentariness shown by Ratnakîrtti.


Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy
without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems
which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical
circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of
cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and the
part (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to the
specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and
the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the


165

relation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktimân_). Thus
on the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone
was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent
illusions due to ignorance, Sâ@mkhya held that there was no
difference between cause and effect, except that the former was
only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain
changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is
the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects.
Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor
effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary
existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary
antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality
which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by
another and this determination is nothing more than "that
happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole,
Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According
to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the
individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and
thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists
hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone
which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there
is no such thing as fingerness (_a@ngulitva_) as the abstract universal
of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we
know that the Sautrântika Buddhists did not believe in the existence
of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a
substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation.
In the external world there are as many individual simple units
(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each
unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective
world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the
assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there
are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of
sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next
moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation
as that of inherence (_samavâya_) in which relation the attributes
are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no
separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation
of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

166

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the
power.


Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid
to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What
was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation
of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of _pa@ticcasamuppâda_
was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and
not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The
discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether
the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathâgata
existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early
Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sîla, samâdhi and paññâ
and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas
hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in
the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with
enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahâyâna
scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the
non-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached.
This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagârjuna,
Âryyadeva, Kumârajîva and Candrakîrtti, is more or less a corollary
from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not
say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a
Tathâgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was
no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only
legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to
think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These
appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from
their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality.
The Tathatâ doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated
between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all
dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the
background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called
tathatâ, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent
entity could exist. The Vijñânavâda doctrine which also
took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the
S'ûnyavâda doctrine and the Tathatâ doctrine; but when carefully
examined it seems to be nothing but S'ûnyavâda, with an attempt
at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

167

non-essential how did it originate? Vijñânavâda proposes to give an
answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind
generated by the beginningless vâsanâ (desire) of the mind. The
difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatâ doctrine that
there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas
appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijñânavâda
doctrine. The Vijñânavâdins could not admit the existence of such
a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not
properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was
some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of
heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the
doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality
assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijñânavâda
literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we
are not in a position to judge what answers Vijñânavâda could give
on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the
same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'ûnya (void), tathatâ,
(thatness) and the âlayavijñâna of Vijñânavâda is more or less
the same.

The Tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with
him. But the S'ûnyavâda and the Vijñânavâda doctrines which
originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably
till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'ûnyavâda
doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu
philosophy, after Kumârila and S'a@nkara. From the third or
the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of
systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu
logicians. Di@nnâga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably
started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines
of the great Hindu logician Vâtsyâyana, in his Pramâ@nasamuccaya.
In association with this logical activity we find the
activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvâstivâdins
(known also as Vaibhâ@sikas) and the Sautrântikas. Both the
Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas accepted the existence of the
external world, and they were generally in conflict with the
Hindu schools of thought Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and Sâ@mkhya which
also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu
(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school.
We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist
thinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

168

Dharmmakîrtti (writer of Nyâyabindu 635 A.D.), Vinîtadeva and
S'ântabhadra (commentators of Nyâyabindu), Dharmmottara
(commentator of Nyâyabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.),
Pa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratnâkara S'ânti, some of whose contributions
have been published in the _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, published
in Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhist
writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature
of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and
the doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriyâkâritva_) as demonstrating
the nature of existence. On the negative side they were
interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyâya and
Sâ@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation,
relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These
problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrântika and
non-Vaibhâ@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of
course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence
of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their
doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between
Hindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought
till the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by the
Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world.
For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the
Vedânta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanent
external world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of the
external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent
background in the Brahman, which was the only reality
behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrântikas
admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel
with Nyâya and Sâ@mkhya was with regard to their doctrine
of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the
different ontological problems were in accordance with their
doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not
hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this
time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of
Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyâya, the Vedânta of the school of
S'a@nkara and the Theistic Vedânta of Râmânuja, Madhva, etc.

169



CHAPTER VI


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY


The Origin of Jainism.

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical
notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders
of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance
in outward appearance, and some European scholars
who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples
of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot
of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina
literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it
has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong
and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist
works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their
old name Nigantha and their leader Nâtaputta Varddhamâna
Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of
the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahâvîra the same kings
as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahâvîra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike
Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder
of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed
afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tïrtha@nkara) of
Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pârs'va, the last Tîrtha@nkara but
one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahâvîra, while Pârs'va's
predecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before
Mahâvîra's Nirvâ@na. The story in _Uttarâdhyayanasûtra_ that a
disciple of Pârs'va met a disciple of Mahâvîra and brought about
the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahâvîra
seems to suggest that this Pârs'va was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion
is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one
of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable
Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tîrtha@nkara was
@R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamâna Mahâvîra. All

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

170

Tîrtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they
neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet
they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref
1].


Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetâmbaras (wearers of
white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally
agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets
peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as
the Tîrtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of
Mahâvîra was not removed from the womb of Devanandâ to that
of Tris'alâ as the S'vetâmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk
who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa,
fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras
deny the canonical works of the S'vetâmbaras and assert that
these had been lost immediately after Mahâvîra. The origin of
the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhûti (A.D. 83) by the
S'vetâmbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetâmbara church,
of which there had already been previous to that seven other
schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that
they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and
that under Bhadrabâhu, the eighth sage after Mahâvîra, the last
Tîrtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphâlakas with laxer
principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetâmbaras
(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times
from the S'vetâmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of
their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history,
though there is practically no difference about the main creed.
It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit
works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than
those of the S'vetâmbaras, if we except the canonical books of
the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed
in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from
one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called
_gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha,
which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459"
of J. Burgess, and Bûhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurâ,"
in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on
Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

171

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahâvîra
(_sthavirâvali, pa@t@tâvali, gurvâvali_) and also many legends about
them such as those in the _Kalpasûtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ of
Hemacandra, etc.


The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of
sacred books, the fourteen Pûrvas and the eleven A@ngas. The
Pûrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were
gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now
the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these
are _Âcâra, Sûtrak@rta, Sthâna, Samavâya Bhagavatî, Jñâtadharmakathâs,
Upâsakadas'âs, Antak@rtadas'âs Anuttaraupapâtikadas'âs,
Pras'navyâkara@na, Vipâka_. In addition to these there are the twelve
_Upâ@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakîr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six
_Chedasûtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nândî_ and _Anuyogadvâra_
and four _Mûlasûtras_ (_Uttarâdhyayana, Âvas'yaka,
Das'avaikâlika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however
assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the
present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The
original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamâgadhî,
but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best
to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prâkrit and that
of the later works Jaina Mahârâ@s@trî. A large literature of glosses
and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And
besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain
systematic expositions of their faith in Prâkrit and Sanskrit.
Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent
treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umâsvâti's
_Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important
later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are
_Vis'e@sâvas'yakabhâ@sya_, Jaina _Tarkavârttika_, with the commentary
of S'ântyâcâryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.),
_Syâdvâdamañjarî_ of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), _Nyâyâvatâra_ of
Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.), _Parîk@sâmukhasûtralaghuv@rtti_ of
Anantavîryya (1039 A.D.), _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Aupapâtika, Râjapras'nîya, Jîvâbhigama, Prajñâpanâ,
Jambudvîpaprajñapti, Candraprajñapti, Sûryaprajñapti, Nirayâvali,
Kalpâvata@msikâ, Pu@spikâ, Pu@spacûlikâ, V@r@s@nida@sâs_.]

[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstâra, Âturapratyâkhyâna, Bhaktâparijñâ,
Ta@ndulavaiyâlî, Ca@n@dâvîja, Devendrastava, Ga@nivîja, Mahâpratyâkhyâna,
Vîrastava_.]

[Footnote 3: _Nis'îtha, Mahânis'îtha, Vyavahâra, Das'as'rutaskandha,
B@rhatkalpa, Pañcakalpa_.]

172

(825 A.D.), _Yogas'âstra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and
_Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1086-1169 A.D.).
I am indebted for these dates to Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular
literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and
Prâkrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. _Samarâicca-kahâ,
Upamitabhavaprapañca-kathâ_ in Prâkrit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ of
Somadeva and Dhanapâla's _Tilakamañjarî_); Jaina Sanskrit poems
both in the Purâ@na and Kâvya style and hymns in Prâkrit and
Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina
dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works,
original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature
of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics,
poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic
deserve special notice [Footnote ref 1].


Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less
than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in
Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces,
Eastern Râjputâna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of
the S'vetâmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Râjputâna, but they
are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to
bare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl,
a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover
his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. The
outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The
Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms
of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_câmara_) [Footnote
ref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out.
The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is
regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks
are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend
the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating,
studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of
their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The
laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]

[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]

173

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in
the upâs'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist
vihâras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being,
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully
without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture,
etc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].


Life of Mahâvîra.

Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of
the Jñâta clan and a native of Vais'âli (modern Besarh, 27 miles
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhârtha and Trîs'alâ.
The S'vetâmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tîrtha@nkara
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandâ
was then transferred to the womb of Trîs'alâ. This story the
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents
were the worshippers of Pârs'va and gave him the name Varddhamâna
(Vîra or Mahâvîra). He married Yas'odâ and had a daughter
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission
of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained
omniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to
preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)
some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].


The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chândogya Upani@sad held
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent,
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvâsagadasâo_, Jacobi, _loc.
cit_., and Hoernlé's article on the Âjîvakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetâmbaras,
however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it
eighteen years later.]

174

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g.
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nâma-rûpa_) [Footnote ref
1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities,
have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere
phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived
and that there is no unchanging substance behind them.
What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we
perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities
we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads
regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent
and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance,
as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities
do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere,
for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither
be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the
momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of
quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and
possibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solution
to offer. They held that it was not true that substance
alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances.
Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that
there was no permanent substance but merely the change of
passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views
and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain
some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in
experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are
three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear
to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated;
(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities
of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not
changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump
has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is
permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have
been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in
it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form,
has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Chândogya, VI. 1.]

175

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold"
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed,
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then is
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit,
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent
(_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utpâda_) and loss of
some old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref.1]. The solution of Jainism is
thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on
grounds of common-sense experience.


The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekântavâda).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and
change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekântavâda or
what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism
of the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists.
The Jains regarded all things as _anekânta_ (_na-ekânta_), or in
other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely,
as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and
limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence
as a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocation
of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_âkâs'a_),
i.e. a gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term and
not in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is a
collocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space or
time (_kâla_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one
and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a
composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote: 1: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of
Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

176

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms
only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone.
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied
gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta.
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a
certain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite
number of qualities (_anantadharmâtmaka@m vastu_), each of which
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted
senses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation
riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing
in relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref
2].


The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open
to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics
of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when
we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic
qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or
characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.
211. etc., and also _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and _Vis'e@sâvalyaka bhâ@sya_,
pp. 895-923.]

177

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible
and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two
points of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryâyanaya_
[Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms,
and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important
for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya,
sa@mgraha-naya and vyavahâra-naya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say,
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy,
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view,
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their
most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically
called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the
Jains the Nyâya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience.

Sa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being."
This according to the Jains is the Vedânta way of looking at things.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Syâdvâdama@njarî_, pp. 171-173.]

178


The vyavahâra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical
experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics,
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience,
and none of these can be separated and held up as being
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the
Sâ@mkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryâya-naya called _@rjusûtra_ is the Buddhist
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration
of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at
any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations
of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as
the true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The
Jains hold that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Vedânta, the Sâ@mkhya,
and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize
experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards
the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error
(_nayâbhâsa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations
from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore
be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryâya-naya, which represent
grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya,
samabhirû@dha-naya_, and _evambhûla-naya_. See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka
bhâ@sya_, pp. 895-923.]

179

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable
from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syât_
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative,
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations
and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syâdvâda [Footnote ref 1].


The Doctrine of Syâdvâda.

The doctrine of Syâdvâda holds that since the most contrary
characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing,
affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded
as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syâdasti_ or
"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense;
all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense
(_syâdavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some
sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti_); all affirmations are true as well as
indefinite (_syâdasti câvaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as
well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite
in some sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti syâdavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may
say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to
say explicitly that "may be (syât) that the jug is," otherwise if
"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being,
it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a
cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined
by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute
existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the
form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of
existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence
in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence
"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the
cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the
negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic
(such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined
by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue,
golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka bhâ@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and
_Syâdvâdamañjarî_, pp. 170, etc.]

180

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those
constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined.
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the
rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view
the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked
at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being
(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may
say, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syâdasti_), may be it is a
negation of being (_syânnâsti_); or I may proceed in quite another
way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which
naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment
"the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not
there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug
is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us
in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may
be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two
aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is,"
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood
here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics
constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis
on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the
affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is
put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try
to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence
of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for
how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet
such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all
affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are
thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four
again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that
the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and
is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.
Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its
nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of
them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngî_
holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each
from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Syâdvâdamañjarî_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166,
etc.]

181

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional,
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or
senses (_upâdhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent
and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite,
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation,
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of
the naya doctrine with the syâdvâda doctrine is therefore this,
that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as
many alternatives as are indicated by syâdvâda. The validity of
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya,
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely
according to any particular naya without any reference to
other nayas as required by the syâdvâda doctrine the nayas are
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas
(_nayâbhâsa_) [Footnote ref 1].


Knowledge, its value for us.

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyâyabindu_
says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in
which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them
to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found
to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the
task of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjñâna_ or
_pramâ@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us
to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the
above view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syâdvâda and
saptabha@ngî probably occurs in Bhadrabâhu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary
_Sûtrak@rtânganiryukti_.

[Footnote 2: See _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra_ (Benares), p. 16; also
_Parîk@sâ-mukha-sûira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]

182

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The
validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directly
helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad
for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can
adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what
is good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that
lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence
of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an
object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection.
For we are not concerned with how a cognition is
produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes.
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain
conditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyatâ_) that we can
have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they
generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under
certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions
we do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the
special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible
does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such
a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but
little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the
acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by
knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well
as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to
suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of
external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate,
and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other
characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual
experience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@sâ_), and
that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity
of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa
jñâna_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand
reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives
a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of
their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our
immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra,_ p. 26.]

[Footnote 2: See _Parî@sa-mukha-sûtra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the
concluding v@rtti of ch. II.]

183

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to
us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us
the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the
attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if
knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been
impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that
it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for
serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted
it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents
things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a
badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion
consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake
where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is
no untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this,
that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a
snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing
is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake
was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore
consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True
knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful
representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be
contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association
with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and
distinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attained
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then
called non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]).


Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the
Jains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the external
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or
other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually
exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When
I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its
relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the
snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called
_satkhyâti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-vârttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti
by S'antyâcârya, Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra, ch. I.,
_Parîksâ-mukha-sûtra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]

184

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it
before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijñânavâdin
Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge
of external objects by perception is gained through the senses.
The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished
from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which
alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive
senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are
only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the
five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains
of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with
those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account
of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself
before. The process of external perception does not thus involve
the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise
of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with
the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch
with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge
which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is
associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example,
I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge
of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and
hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the
rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into
myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge
of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this
happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through
the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have
only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As
experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable
to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding
in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas
(mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the
hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve
its purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu âtmâ ca
indriyam...anupahatacak@surâdides'e@su eva âtmana@h
karmak@sayopas'amaslenâsthagitagavâk@satulyâni cak@surâdîni
upakara@nâni. Jaina-Vâttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places,
however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as
senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number
of senses they possess. (See _Pramâ@namîmâ@msâ._ See also
_Tattvârthâ-dhigamasûtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to
the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to
admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate
category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the
sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination;
for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that
the veil which as observing it is removed.]

185

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has
been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the
karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence
of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense
organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists
and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence
of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa
(determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct
revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials
were necessary for the development of determinate
perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who
regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of
indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception.
The determinate stage with them is the result of the application
of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence
does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].


Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the
latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function
in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction
they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.
Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory,
etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to
have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called
respectively _pratijñâ, hetu, drs@tânta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except
for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process
(_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]

186

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected
with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhâva_) or as invariable
antecedence (_kramabhâva_) will from the mere statement
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an
inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all
ignorance [Footnote ref 2].


Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyâpti_) some of the Jaina logicians
like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyâpti_ (between smoke and fire) to
bahirvyâptî (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).
They also divide inference into two classes, svârthânumâna for one's own
self and _parârthânumâna_ for convincing others. It may not be out of
place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabâhu
in his Das'avaikâlikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for
making an inference; (1) _Pratijñâ_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijñâvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because
those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious
to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only
persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_
(but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina
scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins),
(6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those
who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve
honour), (7) _D@r@s@ânta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as
they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects),
(8) _Âs'a@nkâ (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats,
for they cook for them), (9) _Âs'a@nkâprati@sedha_ (this cannot be,
for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be
said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian
Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually
adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these
are irrelevant. When Vâtsyâyana in his _Nyâyasûtrabhâ@sya_, I. 1. 32,
says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he
probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavârttika_, and _Parîk@sâmukhasûtrav@rtti_, and
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]

187

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding
experience. When we have a unit of experience we
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so,
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect
produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time,
and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience
shows that not all of an object is found to be changing
every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is
found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings
or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face
of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes
every moment and that new things are being renewed at each
succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and
unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the
conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence
associated with change--_paryâya_ (acquirement of new qualities
and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other
systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one
particular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh
experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths
indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and
limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of
_arthakriyâkâritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting
on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they
became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable
abstract speculations which went directly against experience.
Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor
the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which
reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies
at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself
as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my
own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

188

in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the
rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it.
The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective
collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness
that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment.
Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred
in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us
as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character
of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent
of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious
and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sâ@mkhya does. Nor
should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it
reveals, as the Sautrântikas think, for then by copying the materiality
of the object, knowledge would itself become material.
Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the
self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mîmâ@msâ view that the
validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself
_svata@hprâmâ@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically
the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence
(sa@mvâda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous
knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced
there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without
reference to objective facts (_prâmâ@nyamutpattau parata eva
jñaptau svakârye ca svata@h paratas'ca. abhyâsânabhyâsâpek@sayâ_) [Footnote
ref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But
that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis,
for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This
brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.


The Jîvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be
divided into the living (_jîva_) and the non-living (_ajîva_). The
principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most
erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property
of the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that
the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is
directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things
are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Vârttika,_ p. 60.]

189

a description. This is directly against the view of the great
Mîmâ@msa authority Prabhâkara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state
is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite
knowledge (_ananta-jñâna_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite
power (_ananta-vîrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily
however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jîva_)
all the other jîvas (_sa@msârin_) have all their purity and power
covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating
in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number.
They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable
space-points in our mundane world (_lokâkâs`a_), have a limited
size (_madhyama-parimâ@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_)
nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jîva_ is called
_Jivâstikâya_. The word _astikâya_ means anything that occupies
space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and
contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body
which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and
smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to
the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it
lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot,
wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel
it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained
as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines
the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The
Jains divide the jîvas according to the number of sense-organs
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess
only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that
of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste.
Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell.
The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in
addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all
the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely
men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these
an inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@nda,_ p. 33.]

[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jñâna_.
Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see
a cloth. Jñâna means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the
cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it
was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and
then jñâna. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all
things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]

190

called rational (_sa@mjñin_) while the lower animals have no reason
and are called _asamjnin_.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains
regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated
by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of
souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;
they live and die and are born again in another elementary body.
These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case
they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants.
Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other
plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all
the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common.
Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they
exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants
of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and
invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world.
The whole universe is full of minute beings called _nigodas_; they
are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters,
having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme
pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with
them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply
of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an
infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to
replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the
souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to
the present. Thus it is evident the sa@msâra will never be empty
of living beings. Those of the _nigodas_ who long for development
come out and continue their course of progress through successive
stages [Footnote ref 1].


Karma Theory.

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jîvas are
born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already
noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul
is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of
the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter.
Those which obscure right knowledge of details (_jñâna_) are
called _jñânâvara@nîya_, those which obscure right perception
(_dars'ana_) as in sleep are called _dars'anâvaranîya_, those which

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._, and
_Lokaprakâs'a_, VI. pp. 31 ff.]

191

obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and
pain are _vedanîya_, and those which obscure the right attitude of the
soul towards faith and right conduct _mohanîya_ [Footnote ref 1]. In
addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma
which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body
with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality,
caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the
soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good
action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called
(1) _âyu@ska karma_, (2) _nâma karma_, (3) _gotra karma_, (4) _antarâya
karma_. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually
producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first
instance is called _bhâva karma_, which transforms itself into _dravya
karma_ and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming
into contact with the passions (_ka@sâya_) of the soul. These act like
viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This
matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided
into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the
cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma
matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as
golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are
called the _les'yâs_. The feelings generated by the accumulation of
the karma-matter are called _bhâva-les'yâ_ and the actual coloration
of the soul by it is called _dravya-les'yâ_. According as any karma
matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it
gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge
that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc.,
is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which
the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind
of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge
of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our
knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that
kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All
knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from
within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be
generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.

____________________________________________________________________


[Footnote 1: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matijñâna_
(ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernatural
cognition), (4) _mana@hparyâya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-jñâna_
(omniscience).]

192


After the effect of a particular karma matter (_karma-varga@nâ_)
is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul.
This process of purging off the karmas is called _nirjarâ_. If no
new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging
off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as
it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma
matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and
binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to
continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth.
After the death of each individual his soul, together with
its karmic body (_kârma@nas'arîra_), goes in a few moments to the
place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding
or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its
proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the
_audayika_ state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented
from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and
this is said to be the _aupas'amika_ state of the soul. When karma
is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul
is said to be in the _k@sâyika_ state, and it is from this state that
Mok@sa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary
good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized,
and some active (_k@sâyopas'amika_) [Footnote ref 1].


Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all
the experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths
in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects.
The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter
(_karma-varga@nâ_}. The influx of these karma particles into the
soul is called âsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by
body, mind, and speech. The âsravas represent the channels or
modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the
channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains
distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The stages through which a developing soul passes are
technically called _gu@nasthânas_ which are fourteen in number. The
first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next
five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in
the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his
karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he
still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation
(see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse).]

193

enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds
of âsravas, bhâvâsrava and karmâsrava. Bhâvâsrava means the
thought activities of the soul through which or on account of
which the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra
says that bhâvâsrava is that kind of change in the soul (which
is the contrary to what can destroy the karmâsrava), by which
the karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmâsrava, however, means the
actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These
bhâvâsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion
(_mithyâtva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramâda_),
the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions
(_ka@sâyas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekânta_
(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed),
_viparîta_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_
(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit),
_sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajñâna_ (want of any
belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers).
Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msâ_), falsehood (_an@rta_),
stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have
things which one does not already possess (_parigrahâkâ@nk@sâ_).
Pramâda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation
(_vikathâ_), passions (_ka@sâya_), bad use of the five senses
(_indriya_), sleep (_nidrâ_), attachment (_râga_) [Footnote ref 3].

Coming to dravyâsrava we find that it means that actual influx
of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners
in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight
different kinds, namely jñânâvara@nîya, dars'anâvara@nîya, vedanîya,
mohanîya, âyu, nâma, gotra and antarâya. These actual
influxes take place only as a result of the bhâvâsrava or the reprehensible
thought activities, or changes (_pari@nâma_) of the soul.
The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas
is called bhâvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the
actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called
dravyabandha. It is on account of bhâvabandha that the actual
connection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4].
The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29.]

[Footnote 2: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, edited
by S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]

[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30.]

[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamânapurâ@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by
Ghoshal.]

194

of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with
oil. Thus Gunaratna says "The influx of karma means the
contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the
particular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of
dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of
the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes
so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked
at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a
material body during its sa@msâra stage [Footnote ref 1]." From one
point of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _pâpa_
(good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is of
four kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration of
bondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubhâga_) and extension (_prades'a_).
The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already
mentioned, namely the jñanavaraniya karma which obscures the
infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail,
dars'anâvara@nîya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge
of the soul, vedanîya karma which produces the feelings of
pleasure and pain in the soul, mohanîya karma, which so infatuates
souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from
what is wrong, âyu karma, which determines the tenure of any
particular life, nâma karma which gives them personalities, gotra
karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding
for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance
of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay
of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be
intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle
of division, anubhâga. Prades'a refers to the different parts of
the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The
duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due
to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the
different classification of karmas as jñânâvaranîya, etc., are due to
the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnote
ref 3].

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhâvâsrava and
dravyâsrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush,
by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the
actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are
respectively called bhâvasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33.]

[Footnote 4: _Varddhamâ@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_
S'I. 35.]

195


The bhâvasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness,
abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects
of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order
to avoid injury to insects (_îryâ_), gentle and holy talk (_bhâ@sa_),
receiving proper alms (_e@sa@nâ_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints of
body, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness,
humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint,
penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss,
and supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@sâ_ consisting of
meditation about the transient character of the world, about our
helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence,
about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the
difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness
of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx
of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those
karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter
and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining
true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles
of the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _parî@sahajaya_ consisting of the
conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and
of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _câritra_ or right
conduct.

Next to this we come to nirjarâ or the purging off of the
karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjarâ also is of two
kinds bhâvanirjarâ and dravyanirjarâ. Bhâvanirjarâ means that
change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are
destroyed. Dravyanirjarâ means the actual destruction of these
karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by
penances before their time of fruition, called savipâka and avipâka
nirjarâs respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@sa
or liberation is effected.


Pudgala.

The _ajîva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgalâstikâya, dharmastikâya,
adharmâstikâya, âkâs'âstikâya, kâla, pu@nya, pâpa_. The word _pudgala_
means matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astikâya_
in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the
Buddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]

196

which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two
states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such
as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things
are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The
smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_).
The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell,
and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the
different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination
of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement
and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic
space (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place by
simple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades'a_) whereas
in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive
force (_oja@hprades'a_) (_Prajñâpanopâ@ngasûtra_, pp. 10-12).
Two atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscous
and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or
dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that
there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded
the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These
compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce
the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to
constant change (_pari@nâma_) by which they lose some of their
old qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are four
elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these
are alike in character. The perception of grossness however
is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the
atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the
perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise
(as the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of
a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined
atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given
in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing
appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have
all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the
dars'anavara@nîya and jñânavara@nîya veil, there arises in the soul
the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness
(_samâna-rûpatâ_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of
atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow)
is technically called _tiryaksâmânya_. This sâmânya or generality
is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity

197

(as maintained by the Naiyâyikas) but represents only the accession
of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities
of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of
qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and
to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing
to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the
developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the
relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to
the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of
some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as
a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This
sameness of qualities in time is technically called _ûrdhvasâmânya_
[Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of
view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be
regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from
the point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal.


Dharma, Adharma, Âkâs'a.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is
absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of
Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell,
sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe
(_lokâkâs'a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astikâya_
is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying
circumstance or cause which makes motion possible,
like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition
or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent
or passive (_udâsîna_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_)
cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if
the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its
motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but
if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of
dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_)
in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the
liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there
because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2].
Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_, pp. 136-143;
_Jainatarkavârttika_, p. 106.]

[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]

198

helps jîvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance
could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if
there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two
categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on
account of their notion that the inner activity of the jîva or the
atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other
extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed
into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jîvas
were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be
found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which
was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required
for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent
in the region of the liberated souls.

The category of âkâs'a is that subtle entity which pervades
the mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region of
liberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all other
substances such as dharma, adharma, jîva, pudgala. It is not a
mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness,
but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate
it. On account of its pervasive character it is called
_âkâs'âstikâya_ [Footnote ref 1].


Kâla and Samaya.

Time (_kâla_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles
which never mix with one another, but which help the happening
of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change
of qualities of the atoms. Kâla does not bring about the changes
of qualities, in things, but just as âkas'a helps interpenetration
and dharma motion, so also kâla helps the action of the transformation
of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments,
hours, days, etc., is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of the
unchangeable kâla in so many forms. Kâla thus not only aids the
modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as
moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments,
hours, etc., are its paryâyas. The unit of samaya is the time
required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]

199


Jaina Cosmography.

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning
or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced
as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts,
_ûrdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and
_adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe
(_lokâkas'a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement
possible. Beyond the lokâkas'a there is no dharma and therefore
no movement, but only space (_âkas'a_). Surrounding this lokakâs'a
are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over
the ûrdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakâs'a and (there being
no dharma) remains motionless there.


Jaina Yoga.

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation).
This yoga consists of jñana (knowledge of reality as it is), s'raddhâ
(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from
doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@msâ_ (not
taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _sûn@rta_
(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_
(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya
(abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and
body), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnote
ref 1].

These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent
on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary
householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra,
that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should
follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from
a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so
forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra.
These are: _Îryyâ_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and
illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken
while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which
may be lying on the way), _bhasâ_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all
beings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner),
_dânasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions
when taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily
refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_
(to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold
all people to be the same in mind), _vâggupti_ (absolute silence), and
_kâyagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds
of caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]

200

honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon
the virtues of ahi@msâ, sûn@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the
root of all these is ahi@msâ. The virtues of sûn@rta, asteya and
brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries
of ahi@msâ. Ahi@msâ may thus be generalized as the fundamental
ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be
passed in accordance with the standard of ahi@msâ; sûn@rta, asteya
and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression
leads to hi@msâ (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice
of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this
is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling
for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues
according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called
mahâbrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a
householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere
cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahâbrata it would
be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts.
Ahi@msâ according to a householder, according to anubrata,
would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according
to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to
prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to
any living being in any way.

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all
of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@msâ. These
are (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted area
and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places),
(2) _bhogopabhogamâna_ (to desist from drinking liquors, taking
flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and
vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding
time and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of
(a) _apadhyâna_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries,
killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) _pâpopades'a_ (desisting from
advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing
of so many insects), (c) _hi@msopakâridâna_ (desisting from
giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead
to the injury of insects), (d) _pramâdacara@na_ (to desist
from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading
sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) _s'ik@sâpadabrata_
consisting of (a) _sâmayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beings
equally), (b) des'âvakâs'ikabrata (gradually to practise
the _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_

200

(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibhâgabrata (to
make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called
_aticâra_, should be carefully avoided.

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to
know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the
soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can
be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is
pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on
account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are
burnt (_dhyânâgnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. The
soul is itself the sa@msâra (the cycle of rebirths) when it is
overpowered by the four ka@sâyas (passions) and the senses. The four
ka@sâyas are _krodha_ (anger), _mâna_ (vanity and pride), _mâyâ_
(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed).
These ka@sâyas cannot be removed except by a control of the
senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind
(_mana@hs'uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one can
proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when
the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should
make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism
(_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment
and antipathy (_râgadvc@sa_) can be removed only by the
purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that
man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin
(sage) that he should be free from them and become independent
in the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon
all beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquest
over râga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictest
asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this
samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of
meditation (_bhâvanâ_):

We should think of the transitoriness (_anityatâ_) of all things,
that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day,
what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are
transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure,
wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles
in a whirlwind.

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will
by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of
misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in

201

whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we
find that it fails us. This is called as'ara@nabhâvanâ (the meditation
of helplessness).

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits
of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one
another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and
by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate
on these aspects is called ekatvabhâvanâ and anyatvabhâvanâ.

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh,
blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as'ucibhâvanâ
(meditation of the impurity of the body).

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal
friendship and compassion and the passions are removed,
then only will good {_s'ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contrary
I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil
will befall me, is called âsravabhâvanâ (meditation of the befalling
of evil). By the control of the âsrava (inrush of karma)
comes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the
destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nîrjarâ
(decay and destruction of karma matter).

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas
(virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_sûn@rta_), purity
(_s'auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_akiñcanatâ_),
asceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks'ânti_), mildness
(_mârdava_), sincerity (_@rjutâ_), and freedom or emancipation from
all sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of the
highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can
look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called
dharmasvâkhyâtatâbhâvanâ.

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also
of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the
diverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabhâvanâ_
and _bodhibhâvanâ_.

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man
becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings,
and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a
mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should
take to the performance of dhyâna or meditation by deep concentration.
The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyâna
are interdependent, so that without dhyâna there is no samatva

203

and without samatva there is no dhyâna. In order to make the
mind steady by dhyâna one should think of _maitrî_ (universal
friendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of
men), _karu@nâ_ (universal compassion) and _mâdhyastha_ (indifference
to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any
note of sinners). The Jaina dhyâna consists in concentrating
the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The
dhyâna however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to
making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed
towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the
final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete
course of moral discipline which leads to the purification
of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu
yoga of Patañjali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1].


Jaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2].

The Naiyâyikas assert that as the world is of the nature of
an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and
this agent is Îs'vara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What does
the Naiyâyika mean when he says that the world is of the nature
of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made
up of parts (_sâvayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a
non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as
having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vikâritvam_).
Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it
means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_sâmânya_)
existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence
destructible, but these the Naiyâyikas regard as being partless and
eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space"
(_âkâs'a_) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyâyika regards
it as eternal.

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a
thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one
could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the
elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Yogas'âstra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in
_Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874,
and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]

[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_.]

204

having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when
a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in
the hollow which he dug.

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could
suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require
another creator to create him and he another, and so on _ad
infinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to
change with reference to his creative activity.

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some
time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects."
But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things
contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then
that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and
thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these
are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue
of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo
changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a
whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the
cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is
argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human
causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human
beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly
an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings
but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because
water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in
inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.
If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the
inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce
such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing
old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced
by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which
we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects,
and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is
said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been
made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer
the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having
been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have
a vicious circle (_anyonyâs'raya_).

205


Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by
an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have
never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held
that we should consider the general condition of agency only,
namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that
this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind
of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such
as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that
these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it
is said that these are also made by God, then you have an
argument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter which
you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists.
Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in
that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the
world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does
he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible,
for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a
body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any
other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there
cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that
he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that
he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless
God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take
to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would
be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it
in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then
he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it
through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose
there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing
else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they
suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious
actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such
a blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took
to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things
without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain
people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism
on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took
place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of

206

admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came
into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help
of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create
this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists,
you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has
no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production
of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied
a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then
there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction.
Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one
unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character
of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which
knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not
aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is
omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any
knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any
perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot
have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition
of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this
also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions
also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain
all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of
karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods
too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be
quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of
a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and
wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can
co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if
there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate
that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think
his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever
way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it
is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense
with the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp.
115-124.]

207


Mok@sa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) is
the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the
state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is
also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantajñâna_) and infinite
perception (_anantadars'ana_). In the sa@msâra state on account
of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn
out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and
that time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s'ruta_),
supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hparyâya_).
In the state of release however there is omniscience
(_kevala-jñâna_) and all things are simultaneously known to the
perfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@msâra stage the soul always
acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though
remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage
the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus
it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance
as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change
meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the
karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways
yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action
(_anantavîrya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and
infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time
by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this
power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated.
If man had not this anantavîrya in him he might have been eternally
under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured
his bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of this
indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and
produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his
highest good.

208



CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PÂTAÑJALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1].


A Review.

The examination of the two ancient Nâstika schools of
Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince
us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in
circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain
practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the
wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some
of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nâstika schools
of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the
point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nâstika schools
appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial
disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with
the K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the
taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals
at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination
of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical
power of producing the desired effect--a shower of rain, the
birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices
were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as
for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas
were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate
a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a
certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses
in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired
by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define
truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic
culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with
which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth
of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published
by the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority.
The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]

209

objects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends upon
the test of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though
probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial
creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental
principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at
least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see
that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being
due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that
which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme
did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in
formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2].
Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of
knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what
is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an
account of things that on proceeding according to its directions
we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct
estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good
and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes
were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not
carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in
the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so
far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent
soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute
view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening
of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true
only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense,
which we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions,
which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the
assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new
qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this
common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary
experience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands for
finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but
absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mîmâ@msâ of
Kumârila and Prabhâkara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them
is determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior
to the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva._ But the later Buddhists sought
to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of
_arthakriyâkâritva_.]

210

would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but
untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such
a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer
cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement,
an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism
from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to
formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of
sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was
busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles
or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances
of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean
sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions
were here considered bad or good according as they brought
about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial
creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal
degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth
should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The
sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the
other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned
their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and
unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever
dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken,
was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for
the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial
creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed
only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of
karma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its
fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit
of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of
sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however,
karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were
taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or
absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no
narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness
or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not
sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions
performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth
or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads

211

which had anticipated the new systems in all these
directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew
their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the
Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own
rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were
thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas,
it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp
such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to
harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial
creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent
and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are
indeed fulfilled in the Sâ@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may
be discovered in the Upani@sads.


The Germs of Sâ@mkhya in the Upani@sads.

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number
of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the
infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing
forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the
earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice,
and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result
[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears
as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived
their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages
for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of
development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level
in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored,
and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the
only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the
monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was
another line of thought which was developing alongside of it,
which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made
up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara
and particularly in Maitrâya@nî from which it appears
that the Sâmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and
many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the
date of Maitrâya@nî has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This
has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]

212

found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion
of the Sâ@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is
not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave
some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga
philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all
the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it
unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the
doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of
relativism of the Jains.


Sâ@mkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sâ@mkhya and Yoga in
this section has been based on the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_, the _Sâ@mkhya
sûtras_, and the _Yoga sûtras_ of Patañjali with their commentaries
and sub-commentaries. The _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ (about
200 A.D.) was written by Îs'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sâ@mkhya
given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and
this has been treated separately. Vâcaspati Mis'ra (ninth century
A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudî_. But
before him Gaudapâda and Râjâ wrote commentaries on the
_Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ [Footnote ref 1]. Nârâyanatîrtha wrote his _Candrikâ_ on
Gaudapâda's commentary. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ which have been commented
on by Vijñâna Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabhâ@sya_) of the
sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author
after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the
fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the
_Sâ@mkhya sûtras_. Vijñâna Bhiksu wrote also another elementary
work on Sâ@mkhya known as _Sâ@mkhyasâra_. Another short work
of late origin is _Tattvasamâsa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two
other works on Sâm@khya, viz Sîmânanda's _Sâmkhyatattvavivecana_
and Bhâvâga@nes'a's _Sâ@mkhyatattvayâthârthyadîpana_ (both later
than Vijñânabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been
freely consulted. Patañjali's _Yoga sûtra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.)
was commented on by Vâysa (400 A.D.) and Vyâsa's bhâsya
commented on by Vâcaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'âradî_,
by Vijñâna Bhik@su _Yogavârttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century
_Bhojav@rtti_, and by Nâges'a (seventeenth century) _Châyâvyâkhyâ_.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I suppose that Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_ was the same
as _Râjavârttika_ quoted by Vâcaspati. Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_
has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 109. This book
is probably now lost.]

213

Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may
mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories
of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_
by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published
by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation
to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published,
and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication
with the Calcutta University.

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sâ@mkhya works,
viz. _Mâ@tharabhâ@sya_ and _Âtreyatantra_. Of these the second is
probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sâ@mkhya, for we know
that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it
was called Âtreyasa@mhitâ or Âtreyatantra. Nothing is known
of the Mâtharabhâsya [Footnote ref 1].


An Early School of Sâ@mkhya.

It is important for the history of Sâ@mkhya philosophy that
Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been
dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sâ@mkhya, should
be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.
According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhâtus_), viz. the
five elements such as âkâs'a, vâyu etc. and cetanâ, called also
puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to
be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five
conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold
prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkâra and the five elements)[Footnote ref
2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence
is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses
there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with
them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate
sensing (_ûha_) and conceiving (_vicâra_) before definite understanding
(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the
combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with
a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sâ@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following
three sections at the time of first reading.]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapâ@ni, the
commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested,
the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktañcodâsîna@m
puru@samavyaktatvasâdharmyât avyaktâyâm prak@rtâveva prak@sipya
avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nâti._ Harinâtha Vis'ârada's edition of
_Caraka, S'ârîra_, p. 4.]

214

of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with
a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance
of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmâtras at all [Footnote ref 1].
The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) or gross matter,
the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhûtas and prak@rti, mahat
and aha@mkâra taking place through rajas make up what we call
man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases.
All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance,
life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also
the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death,
bondage, or salvation. If the âtman were not regarded as cause,
all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one
others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _paramâtman_,
is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in
itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it
through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By
ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa
and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action,
cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects
are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but
all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which
is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the
avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category.
The vikâra or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra,
whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajña
(_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajñam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta
and cetanâ are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested
prak@rti or cetanâ is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is
derived the ego (_aha@mkâra_) and from the aha@mkâra the five
elements and the senses are produced, and when this production
is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time
of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return
back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the
time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_),
all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkâra,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter,
is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having
eight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhâtuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat,
aha@mkâra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming
part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyârthâ, the five sense objects
which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]

215

etc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of
dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and
tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer
this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in
association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself
takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish,
undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will
and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive,
yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are
associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains
are felt by the conglomeration (_râs'i_), and not by the âtman presiding
over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and
pain comes desire (_t@r@s@nâ_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and
from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete
cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association
of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the
manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when
there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns
that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves,
but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do
not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last
renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally
extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence
of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote
ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this
state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any
characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sâ@mkhyas as their
goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are
rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be
enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary
previous to Cakrapâ@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve
back into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth they
become manifest again. See Cakrapâ@ni on s'ârîra, I. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhûta, it is not in any
sense like the Brahman of Vedânta which is of the nature of pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like
absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_),
resembling Nâgârjuna's Nirvâ@na. Thus Caraka
writes:--_tasmi@ms'caramasannyâse samûlâh@hsarvavedanâ@h
asa@mjñâjñânavijñânâ niv@rtti@m yântyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m
brahmabhûto bhûtâtmâ nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhâvebhya@h cihna@m
yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidâ@m brahma taccâk@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka,
S'ârîra_ 1. 98-100.]

216

the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours
in the shape of association with good people, abandoning
of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed
attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)
thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and
this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self.
As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or
character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation
(_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sâ_).

The main features of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka
are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera
of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed
which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmâtras are
not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of
the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of
emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute
existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is
no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the
conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkâra etc.
6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).

This account of Sâ@mkhya agrees with the system of Sâ@mkhya
propounded by Pañcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of
Âsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the
Mahâbhârata XII. 219. Pañcas'ikha of course does not describe
the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what
little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sâ@mkhya
he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pañcas'ikha
speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all
Sâ@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa
(_purusâvasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination
of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases
with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a
discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as
the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility.
The same discussion occurs in Pañcas'ikha also, and the proofs

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:
(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,
(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to
remember.]

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty
in accepting Pañcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sâ@mkhya doctrine.
This may probably be due to the fact that the Sâ@mkhya doctrines sketched
in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]

217

for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again
Pañcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these
phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pañcas'ikha are the different
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose
themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any
characteristic)--a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sâ@mkhya.
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation
which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction
(_samyagbadha_).

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sâ@mkhya, the
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these
the doctrine of the Maulikya Sâ@mkhya is said to be that which
believed that there was a separate pradhâna for each âtman
(_maulikyasâ@mkhyâ hyâtmânamâtmânam prati p@rthak pradhânam
vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sâ@mkhya doctrine
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sâ@mkhya.

In _Mahâbhârata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sâ@mkhya are
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five
(the well-known orthodox Sâ@mkhya system) and those who
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a
supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the
form of Sâ@mkhya advocated in the _Mahâbhârata_. The schools of
Sâ@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of
Sâ@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

_________________________________________________________________


[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 99.]

218

other chapters of the _Mahâbhârata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self
apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon
day; it is said that as Râhu (the shadow on the sun during an
eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be
seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'arîri@na@h_) are spoken of as
manifesting from prak@rti.

We do not know anything about Âsuri the direct disciple
of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of
Sâ@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same
form in the _Mahâbhârata_ and has been attributed there to Pañcas'ikha
is probably the earliest form of Sâ@mkhya available to us
in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the
school of Maulikya Sâ@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka
(78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sâ@mkhya as described by Îs'varak@r@s@na
and referred to in other parts of _Mahâbhârata_ is a definite
proof that Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya is a later modification, which
was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as
an authoritative old Sâ@mkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavâsin altered
the Sâ@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks
that Vindhyavâsin was a title of Îs'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe
holds that the date of Îs'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a
very plausible view that Îs'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his kârikâs to
another work, which was probably written in a style different
from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Kârikâ_ seems to
be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Âsuri is quoted by Gu@naratna
(_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when
buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience.
It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu," _J.
R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be
extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Îs'varak@r@s@na and
Vindhyavâsin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_
pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavâsin (p. 104) in
anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Îs'varak@r@s@nâ. It
appears that Îs'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sâ@mkhya
kârikâ_ and another an independent work on Sâ@mkhya, a line from which,
quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

  "_Pratiniyatâdhyavasâya@h s'rotrâdisamuttha adhyak@sam_" (p. 108).

If Vâcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumâna in his
_Tattvakaumudî_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sâ@mkhya
kârikâ_ then Îs'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavâsin
whose views on anumâna as referred to in _S'lokavârttika,_ p. 393, are
altogether different. But Vâcaspati's own statement in the
_Tâtparyya@tîkâ_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not
faithful.]

219

_Mahâbhâsya_ of Patañjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1].
The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which
frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned
with the strictly technical part of Sâ@mkhya, and it is just possible
that the book from which Patañjali quoted the passage, and which
was probably paraphrased in the Âryâ metre by Îs'varak@r@s@na
was not a Sâ@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the
verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sâ@mkhya, yet
since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of
Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard
against certain objections against the Sâ@mkhya doctrine of
prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the
verse of a Sâ@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Îs'varak@r@s@na.

The earliest descriptions of a Sâ@mkhya which agrees with
Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya (but with an addition of Îs'vara) are to be
found in Patañjali's _Yoga sûtras_ and in the _Mahâbhârata;_ but we
are pretty certain that the Sâ@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched
here was known to Patañjali, for in _Yoga sûtra_ I. 19 a reference is
made to a view of Sâ@mkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sâ@mkhya
of Caraka and Pañcas'ikha is very important; for it shows a
transitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and
the orthodox Sâ@mkhya doctrine as represented by Îs'varak@r@s@na.
On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and
that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that
the puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyâya,
and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer
than the orthodox Sâ@mkhya.

We hear of a _Sa@s@titantras'âstra_ as being one of the oldest Sâ@mkhya
works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ as
containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote
ref 2]. A quotation from _Râjavârttika_ (a work about which there is no
definite information) in Vâcaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sâ@mkhya
kârika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra because
it dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference
from puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of
puru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Patañjali's Mahâbhâ@sya, IV. I. 3.
_Atisannikar@sâdativiprakar@sât mûrttyantaravyavadhânât
tamasâv@rtatvât indriyadaurvalyâdatipramâdât,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]

[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ,_ pp. 108, 110.]

220

the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_,
nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the
eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].

But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya
Sa@mhitâ_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sâ@mkhya
of the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ was of
a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pañcarâtra
Vai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ says that Kapila's
theory of Sâ@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijñâna Bhiksu, the
greatest expounder of Sâ@mkhya, says in many places of his work
_Vijñânâm@rta Bhâ@sya_ that Sâ@mkhya was originally theistic, and that
the atheistic Sâ@mkhya is only a _prau@dhivâda_ (an exaggerated
attempt to show that no supposition of Îs'vara is necessary to
explain the world process) though the _Mahâbhârata_ points out
that the difference between Sâ@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the
former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy
between the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original
_Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ was
subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is
corroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among
the important Sâ@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddhâra_

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs,
and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karikâ_ of Is'varakr@sna, but I
have omitted them in my account of Sâmkhya as these have little
philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five,
viz. avidyâ (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa
(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo,
moha, mahâmoha, tamisrâ_, and _andhatâmisra_. These are of nine kinds
of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti
will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary
to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's
life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time
(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhâgya_), and
the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of
causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of
protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things
earned by enjoyment (_parâpara_), increase of desires leading to greater
disappointments (_anuttamâmbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others
(_uttamâmbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations
with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The
siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of
scriptures (_târa_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutâra_),
(3) proper reasoning (_târatâra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas
with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field
(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice
(_sadâmudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and
modamâna lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a.
The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses
and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the
absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis
and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the
achievement of the Sâ@mkhya goal.]

221

(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the
earlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vâcaspati's time.

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya
Sa@mhitâ_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was
composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it
has to be assumed that Kapila's Sâ@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It
seems probable that his disciple Âsuri tried to popularise it. But it
seems that a great change occurred when Pañcas'ikha the disciple of
Âsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It
is said in _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ (70) that the literature was divided by
him into many parts (_tena bahudhâk@rtam tantram_). The exact
meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that
the original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises.
It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas
accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential
parts as the Sâ@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption
that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are
a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the
Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may
be ventured is that Pañcas'ikha probably modified Kapila's
work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this
supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of
Sâ@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but
which is kept in a modified form by the Pâtañjala school of Sâ@mkhya,
second an atheistic one as represented by Pañcas'ikha, and
a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sâ@mkhya system.
An important change in the Sâ@mkhya doctrine seems to have
been introduced by Vijñâna Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his
treatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this
interpretation of Sâ@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical
one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system
of the accepted Kapila and the Pâtañjala school of Sâ@mkhya. But
it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was
applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then
they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase
and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 109.]

[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam prâhah s'arîramth mânavâh sâ@mkhyam
sa@mkhyâtmakatvâcca kapilâdibhirucyate. Matsyapurâna_, IV. 28.]

222

totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation
of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijñâna Bhik@su
and the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga
philosophy compiled by Patañjali and commented on by Vyâsa,
Vâcaspati and Vijñ@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sâ@mkhya doctrine
as explained by Vâcaspati and Vijñana Bhik@su in most points I
have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pâtañjala schools
of Sâ@mkhya and have treated them together--a principle which
was followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_.

The other important Sâ@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapâda
are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanâtana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is
known about their historicity or doctrines.


Sâ@mkhya kârikâ, Sâ@mkhya sûtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and
Vijñâna Bhik@su.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation
of the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga system. The _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ is
the oldest Sâ@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by
later writers. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_ was not referred to by any
writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth
century A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who
made allusions to a number of Sâ@mkhya works, did not make any
reference to the _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_, and no other writer who is known
to have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any
reference to the _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_. The natural conclusion therefore
is that these sûtras were probably written some time after
the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to
prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is
said at the end of the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ of Îs'varak@r@s@na that the
kârikâs give an exposition of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine excluding
the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the
parables attached to the original Sâ@mkhya works--the
_@Sa@s@titantras'âstra_. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ contain refutations
of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable
that these were collected from some earlier Sâ@mkhya work which is
now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition
of the _@Sa@s@titantras'âstra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddhâra_ as mentioned by

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume
of the present work.]

223

Gû@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to
suppose that the Sâ@mkhya doctrine found in the sûtras differs in
any important way from the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as found in the
_Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_. The only point of importance is this, that the
_Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute
pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved
in the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of
the gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence,
they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form
the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some
sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in
the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_. This is, however, a case of omission and not
of difference. Vijñâna Bhik@su, the commentator of the _Sâ@mkhya
sûtra_, was more inclined to theistic Sâ@mkhya or Yoga than
to atheistic Sâ@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in
his _Sâmkhyapravacanabhâ@sya, Yogavârttika_, and _Vijñânâm@rtabhasya_
(an independent commentary on the Brahmasûtras of
Bâdarâyana on theistic Sâ@mkhya lines). Vijñâna Bhiksu's own
view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he
agreed more with the views of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine of the
Pura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said
to be merged in the end in Îs'vara, by whose will the creative
process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya.
He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the
_Sâ@mkhya sûtras_, but he remarked that these were used only with
a view to showing that the Sâ@mkhya system gave such a rational
explanation that even without the intervention of an Îs'vara it could
explain all facts. Vijñâna Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sâ@mkhya
differed on many points from those of Vâcaspati, and it is difficult
to say who is right. Vijñâna Bhik@su has this advantage that
he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points
on which Vâcaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the
nature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most
important thing in Sâ@mkhya. Vijñâna Bhik@su described the
gu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vâcaspati and
Gau@dapâda (the other commentator of the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_)
remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their
interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of
Vijñâna Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite
explanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely

224

came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation
of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any
other work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter
may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka
nor the _Mahâbhârata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. But
Bhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known
of the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early
documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su
in giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _Kârikâ_
speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as
being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and
causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vâcaspati
merely paraphrases this statement of the _Kârikâ_ but does not enter
into any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in well
with all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible
that this view might not have been known before, and when the
original Sâ@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness
as to the conception of the gu@nas.

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation
differs from that of Vâcaspati. The most important of these may
be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of
the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vâcaspati holds that there is
no contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that
a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by
virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed
into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection
that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the
experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection
in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience
(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any
actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space
and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific
kind of fitness (_yogyatâ_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi,
and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed
to a person. Vijñâna Bhik@su differs from Vâcaspati and says that
if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

225

reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time
of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all,
for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it,
and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in
the buddhi for ever. Vijñana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a
real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive
state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on
account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change
means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers
changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there
is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when
the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears
as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between
Vâcaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual
process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the
determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas,
whereas Vâcaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the
sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate
sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is
the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at
the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association
by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified
by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the
indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and
conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.
Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is
directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate
position to manas as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are
one or two passages in Vâcaspati's commentary on the _Sâ@mkhya
kârikâ_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mkâra_)
as producing the subjective series of the senses and the
objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will,
but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not
necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view
with regard to the evolution of the tanmâtras from the mahat;
for contrary to the view of _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and Vijñâna Bhik@su etc.
Vâcaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkâra and

226

from aha@mkâra the tanmâtras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijñâna Bhik@su however
holds that both the separation of aha@mkâra and the evolution of the
tanmâtras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more
reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some
other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between
Vâcaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical
importance.


Yoga and Patañjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such
as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection,
and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the
other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was
used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as
the S'atapatha Brâhmana and the B@rhadâra@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2].
The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature
[Footnote ref 3].

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the
@Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very
much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow
of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues
and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force
of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of
a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally
applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control
of the senses [Footnote ref 5].

In Pâ@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical
meaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samâdhau_" (_yuj_
in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ in
the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as
a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological
derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.
9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German
Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10;
Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brâh, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;
S'atap. Brâh. XI. 5. 8. 1.]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriyâ@ni hayânâhu@h vi@sayâte@sugocarân_.
The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.
Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriyâ@nyasya hayâ@h_ the conative senses are its
horses.]

[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from
_yuja samâdhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam,"
V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which
passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time
(Pâ@nini as Goldstûcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with
these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by
the name of Yoga.]

227


In the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, we find that the word yoga has been
used not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samâdhau_" but
also with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusion
to the readers of the _Bhagavadgîtâ._ "Yogin" in the sense
of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded
with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of
this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ tried to mark out a
middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction
on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action
of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently
from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the
best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet
abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kau@tilya in his _Arthas'âstra_ when enumerating the philosophic
sciences of study names Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokâyata. The
oldest Buddhist sûtras (e.g. the _Satipa@t@thâna sutta_) are fully
familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus
infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical
method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sâ@mkhya, as we find
it in the _Yoga sûtras_ of Patañjali, it is indeed difficult to come to
any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted
notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not
probably developed any systematic form of prâ@nâyâma (a system
of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we
come to Maitrâya@nî that we find that the Yoga method had attained
a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in
which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetâs'vatara and
the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three
Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga
methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to
the Sâ@mkhya tenets, though the Sâ@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not
appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of
the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the
Maitrâya@nî in the conversation between S'âkyâyana and B@rhad
ratha where we find that the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics was offered

228

in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the
Sâ@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently
systematized by Patañjali. Thus S'âkyâyana says: "Here some
say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief,
certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating
he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man
stand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness.
All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a
verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called
the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'â@n@dilya, Yogatattva,
Dhyânabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanâda, Varâha, Ma@n@dala
Brâhma@na, Nâdabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalû, shows that the Yoga
practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but
none of these show any predilection for the Sâ@mkhya. Thus the
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana, however, in his bhâ@sya on _Nyâya sûtra_, I. i 29,
distinguishes Sâ@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sâ@mkhya holds
that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any
change in the pure intelligence (_niratis'ayâ@h cetanâ@h_). All changes
are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects.
Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa.
Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma.
The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non
being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last
view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyâsabhâ@sya,_ It is
closer to Nyâya in its doctrines. If Vâtsyâyana's statement is correct,
it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in
creation was borrowed by Sâ@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the
same sûtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sâ@mkhya
and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika._" Curiously
enough Vâtsyâyana quotes a passage from _Vyâsabhâ@sya,_ III. 13, in his
bhâ@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]

229

S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;
they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which
was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through
constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also
associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The
Yogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the
Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Râjayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some
cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedântism
with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in
the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also
very great, but we have to leave out these from our present
consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as
they are not connected with our present endeavour.

Of the Pâtañjala school of Sâ@mkhya, which forms the subject of
the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patañjali was probably
the most notable person for he not only collected the different
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which
were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all
on the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which
they have been handed down to us. Vâcaspati and Vijñâna
Bhik@su, the two great commentators on the _Vyâsabhâ@sya_, agree
with us in holding that Patañjali was not the founder of Yoga,
but an editor. Analytic study of the sûtras brings the conviction
that the sûtras do not show any original attempt, but a
masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented
by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also
in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition
and classification shows that the materials were already in
existence and that Patañjali systematized them. There was
no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of
other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of
explaining the system. Patañjal is not even anxious to establish
the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts
as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists
occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are
described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated
from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigî@savya wrote "_Dhâranâs'âstra_" which
dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patañjali.
He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the
nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory
where concentration is to be made. See Vâcaspati's _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ or
Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya on _Nyâya sûtra_, III. ii. 43.]

230

criticized; the putting of an "_iti_" (the word to denote the conclusion
of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course
another "_iti_" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a
hand other than that of Patañjali who was anxious to supply
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last
chapter as compared with the style of the other three.

The sûtras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the
topics introduced are such that they could well have been
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sûtras,
whereas the average number of sûtras in other chapters is between
51 to 55.

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date
of this famous Yoga author Patañjali. Weber had tried to connect
him with Kâpya Pata@mchala of S'atapatha Brâhma@na [Footnote ref l]; in
Kâtyâyana's _Varttika_ we get the name Patañjali which is explained
by later commentators as _patanta@h añjalaya@h yasmai_ (for
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of
names. There is however another theory which identifies the
writer of the great commentary on Pâ@nini called the _Mahâbhâ@sya_
with the Patañjali of the _Yoga sûtra_. This theory has been
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of
some Indian commentators who identified the two Patañjalis.
Of these one is the writer of the _Patañjalicarita_ (Râmabhadra
Dîk@sîta) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth
century. The other is that cited in S'ivarâma's commentary on
_Vâsavadattâ_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century.
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhâr and Cakrapâ@nidatta,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]

231

the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh
century A.D. Thus Cakrapâ@ni says that he adores the Ahipati
(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech
and body by his _Pâtañjala mahâbhâ@sya_ and the revision of
_Caraka._ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of
that illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his
grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patañjala and by
producing a treatise on medicine called _Râjam@rgâ@nka_ has like the
lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech,
mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyâsa (which is considered
to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also
based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that
the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion
between the three Patañjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor,
and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as
_Pâtañjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in his
commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of
metals.

Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore
in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian
and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these
commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great
commentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta,
Vâmana, Jayâditya, Nâges'a, etc. are silent on this point.
This is indeed a point against the identification of the two
Patañjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later
age. And if other proofs are available which go against such
an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the
Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patañjali's grammatical work contains anything
which may lead us to think that he was not the same
person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the
philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patañjalis
differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that
dravya is described in _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ in one place as being the
unity of species and qualities (_sâmânyavis'e@sâtmaka_), whereas
the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also
specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on
either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally
antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

232

Vyâ@di and Vâjapyâyana (Vyâ@di holding that words denoted
qualities or dravya and Vâjapyâyana holding that words denoted
species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pâ@nini had these two different ideas in
"_jâtyâkhyâyâmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyâm_" and
"_sarûpânamekas'e@samekavibhaktau_," and Patañjali the writer of
the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show
that he opposes the view of _Vyâsabhâ@sya_, though we must remember
that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard
to the writer of the sûtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya
is spoken of in the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ as that object which is the
specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is
of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat
sâsnâlâ@ngulakakudakhuravi@sâ@nyartharûpam_," we are reminded of
its similarity with "_ayutasiddhâvayavabhedânugata@h samûha@h dravyam_"
(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the
_Vyâsabhâsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ I have
not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us
in holding that the two Patañjalis cannot be identified. There
are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even
in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians
that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable
for us to judge anything about the personal views
of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the
writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ knew most of the important points of
the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer
to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sâ@mkhya dictum of ex
nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the
idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of
change _vikâra_ as production of new qualities _gu@nântarâdhâna_
(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133).
We may add to it that the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ agrees with the Yoga
view as regards the Spho@tavâda, which is not held in common
by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this
external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin
their works in a similar manner (_atha yogânus'âsanam_ and
_athas'âbdânus'âsanam_)--"now begins the compilation of the
instructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sûtrâ_)--and "now begins the compilation
of the instructions of words" (_Mahâbhâ@sya_).

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Patañjali's _Mahâbhâ@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]

233

which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the
_Yoga sûtra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive,
as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patañjalis
cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the
Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed
Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which,
as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they
were written by Patañjali it cannot be inferred that because
Vâcaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijñâna-vâdi
type, we are to infer that the sûtras refer to Vasubandhu or
even to Nâgârjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sûtras
had been developing long before the time of Nâgârjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators
may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two
Patañjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative
critical study of the _Yoga sûtras_ and the text of the _Mahâbhâ@sya,_
which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga
sûtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patañjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patañjali the Yoga
editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing
the other work _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for
our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous
one and he translates it along with another book called _Sânka_
(Sâ@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the
form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that
this book was not the present _Yoga sûtra_ of Patañjali, though it
had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation
and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation.
The book was called by Alberuni _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, which is to
be translated as the book of Pâtañjala, because in another place,
speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when
translated stands as "the author of the book of Pâtanjal." It
had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes
many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It
treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in
the _Yoga sûtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist
reference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramâ@nakam tadâ kim syât_
(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyâsabhâ@sya, as Bhoja, who had
consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count
it as sûtra.]

234

far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by
Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change
from what we find in the _Yoga sûtra_. Following the idea of God
in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless
emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and
shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they
could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name
of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of
which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives
him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical
with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it
uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption
with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga sûtra._
The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the
eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation
on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation
corresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yoga
sûtra._ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation,
of which the first is the _abhyâsa_ (habit) of Patañjali, and the
object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second
stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek
his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga sûtra,_ I. 23 and
I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana
or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the
same as in the _Yoga sûtra,_ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated
state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being
one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvamûla
avâks'âkha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branches
below), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure
Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different
doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of
interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga sûtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sûtras_
speak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient,
and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the
obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice
are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of
concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object,
for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills
that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No
argument is given in the _Yoga sûtras_ of the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]

235

object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the
roots.

The difference of this system from that of the _Yoga sûtra_ is:
(1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance
that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption
in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and
the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the
Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any
connection with God as we find in the _Yoga sûtra_ has been lost
sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in
God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance
of Yoga as control of mental states (_citta@rttinirodha_) is lost
sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the
means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification
of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patañjali's _Yoga sûtra_ in
the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it
probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga
doctrine of the sûtras entered into a new channel in such a way
that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments
of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author
mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable
that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same
person who wrote _Pâtañjala tantra_, who has been quoted by
S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of
by Nâges'a as "_Carake_ Patañjali@h." We can also assume with some
degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that
Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with
the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâ@ni
by his line "_pâtañjalamahâbhâ@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_"
refers to this work which was called "Pâtañjala." The commentator
of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and
the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the
_Vyâsabhâ@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably
written at a time when the _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ was not written
or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâ@mkhya, gives
a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama,
but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of _Pâs'upatadars'ana_ in
_Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_.]

236

also described the book as being very famous at the time, and
Bhoja and Cakrapâ@ni also probably confused him with Patañjali
the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book
of Patañjali was probably written by some other Patañjali within
the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not
be improbable that when _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ quotes in III. 44 as "_iti_
Patañjali@h," he refers to this Patañjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâya@na
Upani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely prâ@nâyâma,
pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dhara@nâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1].
Comparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga sûtras_ we find
that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been
replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two
heresies given in the _Brahmajâla sutta_ we know that there were
people who either from meditation of three degrees or through
logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external
world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the
association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi
or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called
s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in
samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in
Maitrâya@nî Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine,
when the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being
grafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion
did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The
substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patañjali shows that
the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya.
The introduction of ahi@msâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness),
asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha
(want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment)
as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is
deemed impossible (for the first time in the sûtras), probably
marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the
Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî,
karu@nâ, muditâ, upek@sâ is also equally significant, as we do not
find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other
literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation.
Beginning from the _Âcârâ@ngasûtra, Uttarâdhyayanasûtra_,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _prâ@nâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dhara@nâ tarkah samâdhih
sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]

237

the _Sûtrak@rtâ@ngasûtra,_ etc., and passing through Umâsvati's
_Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'âstra_ we find that
the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the
basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the
opinion expressed in Alberuni's _Pâtanjal_ that these cannot give
salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from
the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its
thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection
with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the
same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely
suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the
path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics
of the sa@msâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination,
decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of
similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism.
Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should
not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'a@nkara, as it is an
avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion
nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the
range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance
of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sûtra
"_anityâs'ucidu@hkhânâtmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ_" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_).
"This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be
ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds
of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts
off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of
Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in
the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has
never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu
literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things
in this section is to show that the _Yoga sûtras_ proper (first three
chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of
Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between
the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Yoga sûtra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathâcikitsâs'âstra@m
caturvyûha@m rogo rogahetuh ârogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi
s'âstram caturvyûhameva; tadyathâ sa@msâra@h, sa@msârahetu@h mok@sa@h
mok@sopâya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msâro heya@h, pradhânapuru@sayo@h
sa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyâtyantikî niv@rttirhâna@m hanopâya@h
samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâ@sya_, II. 15]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1].]

238

a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another.
As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed
to think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yoga
sûtras_ must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there
is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the
grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may
take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].


The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa.

The Sâ@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles,
souls and _prak@rti_, the root principle of matter. Souls are
many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities.
They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a
smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are
not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But
the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it
and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the
mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are
many, and had it not been so (the Sâ@mkhya argues) with the
birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one
all would have died [Footnote ref 2].

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension,
and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly
grasp in order to understand the Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Unlike
the Jaina soul possessing _anantajñâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_,
and _anantavîryya_, the Sâ@mkhya soul is described as being
devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute
pure consciousness (_cit_). The Sâ@mkhya view differs from
the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to
be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_ânanda_) [Footnote ref
3]. Bliss with Sâ@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it
belongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul;
secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (_Jîva_) are

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour
of this identification seems to be that both the Patañjalis as against
the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _spho@ta_ which was
denied even by Sâ@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my _Study
of Patanjali_, Appendix I.]

[Footnote 2: _Kârikâ_, 18.]

[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradîpikâ,_ IV.]

239

but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the
Brahman, but according to Sâ@mkhya they are all real and many.

The most interesting feature of Sâ@mkhya as of Vedânta is
the analysis of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya holds that our knowledge
of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things
are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind,
the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in
some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature
like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go,
they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things,
and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material,
but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest.
These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious,
if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection
with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted
as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the
Upani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite
consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas,
and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not
detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle
which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which
illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes.
The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self"
but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other
things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The
Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and
every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the
veil. Sâ@mkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image
of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent
principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle
matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms
or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance,
and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed
in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves,
the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated.
So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic
of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would
be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumudî_ 5; _Yogavârttika_, IV. 22;
_Vijñânâm@rtabhâ@sya_, p. 74; _Yogavârttika_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_,
I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyâsabhâ@sya,_ I. 6, 7.]

240

so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the
same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens
these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious.
This principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot indeed be
separately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle in
all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference.
This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality,
no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes
place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it,
and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes
of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item
of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is
but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the
principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge
carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness,
it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness.
Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a
particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation
of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening,
pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is
concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind
knowledge-stuff.

The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent
parts, and had held that the coming together of these
brought about the conscious states. This coming together was
to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity
or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary
collocation. With Sã@mkhya however the self, the pure _cit_, is
neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent.
Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements
of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise
have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into
connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted
as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and
may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the
expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is important to note that Sâ@mkhya has two terms to denote
the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of
awareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the form
of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition
takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]

241

knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a
system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called
puru@sa. There is a separate puru@sa in Sâ@mkhya for each individual,
and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedânta
âtman however is different from the Sâ@mkhya puru@sa in this that
it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being,
and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory mâyâ it
appears as many.


Thought and Matter.

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are
made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter
are, why then should the puru@sa illuminate it and not external
material objects. The answer that Sâ@mkhya gives is that the
knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects
in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance
of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), which
resembles the light of puru@sa, and is thus fit for reflecting and
absorbing the light of the puru@sa. The two principal characteristics
of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it
has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed
by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has
again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able
to catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendent
principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic
of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to
both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is
at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity
of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the
intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the
gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that
thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of
thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour,
and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its
object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter
did not possess some of the essential substances of which the
copy was made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which is
so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination
in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some
such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in

242

thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have
movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images
do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent
and plastic element of thought (_sattva_) in association with
movement (_rajas_) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation
of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction
(_tamas_) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses
things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)
holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness,
and actual knowledge comes before our view as though
by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the
light of the puru@sa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its
stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture
or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates
that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests
itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both
thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a
plasticity of intelligence-stuff (_sattva_), energy-stuff (_rajas_), and
mass-stuff (_tamas_), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last
two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.


Feelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1].

Another question that arises in this connection is the position
of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sâmkhya
holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have
analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most
interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that
we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we
should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped
sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its
appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and
we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image.
Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of
knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down
the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of
matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling
which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale
of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there
comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Kârikâ_, 12, with Gau@dpâda and Nârâya@natîrtha.]

243

reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark
the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the
point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in
ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain
stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at
a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with
matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves,
the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross
matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in
taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross
matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed
to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember
the Sâ@mkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and
matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances
which are in essence but three types of feeling entities.
The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we
have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations
of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings
that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that
we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither
sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression
(_vi@sâda_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of
manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as
shining (_prakâs'a_), energy (_prav@rtti_), obstruction (_niyama_), there
are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as
the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross
matter and thought by their varying modifications.


The Gu@nas [Footnote ref 1].

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically
called _gu@na_ in Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Gu@na in Sanskrit has three
meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These
entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it
may be mentioned in this connection that in Sâ@mkhya philosophy
there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each
and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What
we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance
of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Yogavârttika_, II. 18; Bhâvâga@nes'a's
_Tattvayâthârthyadîpana_, pp. 1-3; _Vijñânâm@rtabhâ@sya_,
p. 100; _Tattvakaumudî_, 13; also Gau@dapâda and Nârâya@natîrtha, 13.]

244

signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; any
object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sâ@mkhya
holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality,
however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding
subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a
quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects
but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities
were thus called gu@nas probably to suggest that they are the
entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves
as gu@nas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be
called gu@nas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes
by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and
matter. These may also be called gu@nas as things of secondary
importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they
continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual
groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably
constant like the souls (_puru@sa_). Moreover the object of the
world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the puru@sas,
the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of
primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined
to justify the name gu@na as applied to these subtle entities, it
should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or
subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gu@nas are
infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics
as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types
called _sattva_ (intelligence-stuff), _rajas_ (energy-stuff) and _tamas_
(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in
certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the
_sattva-gu@nas_ and those which behave as units of activity are called
the _rajo-gu@nas_ and those which behave as factors of obstruction,
mass or materiality are called _tamo-gu@nas_. These subtle gu@na
substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number
of sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a
larger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and
sattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result
of this, different substances with different qualities come into being.
Though attached to one another when united in different proportions,
they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined
resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is
however

245

one and only one stage in which the gu@nas are not compounded
in varying proportions. In this state each of the gu@na
substances is opposed by each of the other gu@na substances, and
thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in
which none of the characters of the gu@nas manifest themselves.
This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics
that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It
is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which
is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium
of the gu@nas is called prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which
cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose,
but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the
earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications
take place.


Prak@rti and its Evolution.

Sâ@mkhya believes that before this world came into being there
was such a state of dissolution--a state in which the gu@na compounds
had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their
mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prak@rti. Then
later on disturbance arose in the prak@rti, and as a result of that a
process of unequal aggregation of the gu@nas in varying proportions
took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold.
Prak@rti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the
gu@nas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate,
differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gu@nas are
always uniting, separating, and uniting again [Footnote ref 2]. Varying
qualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one
another and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve
from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or
qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce
the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies
never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy
there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter,
resistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestation
to sattva. The particular gu@na which happens to be predominant
in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and
others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Yogavârttika,_ II. 19, and _Pravacanabhâ@sya,_ I. 61.]

[Footnote 2: _Kaumudî_ 13-16; _Tattvavais'âradî_ II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also
_Yogavârttika,_ IV. 13,14.]

246

effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy
latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a
moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is
partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of
the gu@nas in different proportions presuppose the state of prak@rti
as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to
conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are
exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass,
and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium
is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural
affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other
reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there
arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different
moments. When one gu@na is preponderant in any particular
collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series
beginning from the first disturbance of the prak@rti to the final
transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law
which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B.N.Seal [Footnote ref 1],
"the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated
(_vai@samya_) within the undifferentiated (_sâmyâvasthâ_) of the
determinate (_vies'a_) within the indeterminate (_avis'esa_) of the
coherent (_yutasiddha_) within the incoherent (_ayutasiddha_). The
order of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the
parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate,
less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated,
more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such
an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in
the shape of the evolving collocations of gu@na reals take place
within the body of the prak@rti. Prak@rti consisting of the infinite
reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not
mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or
that the totality of the gu@nas in the prak@rti has been unhinged
from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast
number of gu@nas constituting the worlds of thought and matter
has been upset. These gu@nas once thrown out of balance begin to
group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then
in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of
aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way
that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones,
so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_,
1915, p.7.]

247

For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this
second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the
reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first
stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the
second stage is made good by a refilling from the prak@rti. So also,
as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals
of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage
is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the
first stage from the prak@rti. Thus by a succession of refillings the
process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where
there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical
and physical changes of qualities in things which had already
evolved. Evolution (_tattvântarapari@nâma_) in Sâ@mkhya means the
development of categories of existence and not mere changes of
qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental).
Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent
category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated
and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus
it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation
of new stages as integrated in previous stages (_sa@ms@rstaviveka_).


Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.

But how or rather why prak@rti should be disturbed is the most
knotty point in Sâ@mkhya. It is postulated that the prak@rti or the
sum-total of the gu@nas is so connected with the puru@sas, and there
is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prak@rti,
that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake
of the diverse puru@sas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and
sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them
to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world
into the quiescent state (_pralaya_) of prak@rti takes place when the
karmas of all puru@sas collectively require that there should be
such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment
the gu@na compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backward
movement (_pratisañcara_) till everything is reduced, to the gu@nas in
their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition
brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a
mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense
activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of
new things and qualities (_visad@rs'a-pari@nâma_); this course of new

248

production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same
state (_sad@rs'a-pari@nâma_) of equilibrium, so that there is no change
or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension
of the teleology or purpose of the gu@nas, or an absolute break of
the course of gu@na evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it
has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated
karmas of puru@sas, and since there is still the activity of the
gu@nas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production,
is also a stage of the sa@msâra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation)
is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement
of the gu@nas ceases forever with reference to the liberated soul.
But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium?
The Sâ@mkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental
(non-mechanical) influence of the puru@sa [Footnote ref 1]. This
influence of the puru@sa again, if it means anything, means that there
is inherent in the gu@nas a teleology that all their movements or
modifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the
purposes of the puru@sas. Thus when the karmas of the puru@sas had demanded
that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period
there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose
of the prak@rti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable
world for the experiences of the puru@sas by which its quiescent
state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the
inherent teleology of the prak@rti, which demands that a state of
pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should
begin. Since there is a purpose in the gu@nas which brought
them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes
that it also may be broken up again when the purpose
so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prak@rti brought
about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative
work again, and it is this natural change in the prak@rti that may
be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental
influence of the puru@sas.


Mahat and Aha@mkâra.

The first evolute of the prak@rti is generated by a preponderance
of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state
from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a
state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the
disturbance of the equilibrium of prak@rti for new creation takes place by
the will of Îs'vara (God).]

249

within it the minds (_buddhi_) of all puru@sas which were lost in the
prak@rti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution
of prak@rti to serve the puru@sas is thus manifested by the separating
out of the old buddhis or minds (of the puru@sas) which hold within
themselves the old specific ignorance (_avidyâ_) inherent in them
with reference to each puru@sa with which any particular buddhi
is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This
state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi)
or all the puru@sas is therefore called _buddhitattva._ It is a state
which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals.
The individual buddhis of individual puru@sas are on one
hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated
with their specific puru@sas. When some buddhis once begin to
be separated from the prak@rti, other buddhi evolutions take
place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation
of buddhis is effected for the service of the puru@sas,
all the other direct transformations that take place from the
prak@rti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being
once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations
of prak@rti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance,
which thus have exactly the same composition as the
first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prak@rti becomes
buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded
as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it
all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of
which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of
view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising
all creation, and is thus called _mahat_ (the great one). It is called
_li@nga_ (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the
ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished
from the prak@rti which is called _ali@nga,_ i.e. of which no
li@nga or characterise may be affirmed.

This mahat-tatva being once produced, further modifications
begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of
undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance
and tama preponderance. This state when the mahat
is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of
tamas, rajas and sattva's called _aha@mkâra,_ and the above three
tendencies are respectiviy called _tâmasika aha@mkâra_ or _bhûtâdi_,
_râjasika_ or _taijasa aha@mâra,_ and _vaikârika aha@mkâra._ The râjasika
aha@mkâra cannot make a new preponderance by itself; it only

250

helps (_sahakâri_) the transformations of the sattva preponderance
and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former
preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more
and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember
that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva
preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on
the line of sattva development could only take place when the
buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first
development of the buddhi on this line is called _sâttvika_ or _vaikârika
aha@mkâra_. This aha@mkâra represents the development
in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine,"
and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi the
function of which is a mere understanding and general datun as
thisness.

The ego or aha@mkâra (_abhimâna-dravya_) is the specific expression
of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine.
The function of the ego is therefore called _abhimâna_ (self-assertion).
From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision,
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech,
handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative
sense; the _prâ@nas_ (bio-motor force) which help both conation and
cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual
aha@mkâras and senses are related to the individual buddhis
by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come
into being. Each buddhi with its own group of aka@mkâra (ego)
and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar
other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as
knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different
for each individual, but so far as a general mind (_kâra@na buddhi_)
apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of
all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi
is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated
ignorance (_avidyâ_). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aha@mkâra
and the senses are so related that though they are different
from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the
buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We
must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling,
for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to aha@mkâra, the deficiency
of buddhi is made good by prak@rti; again as aha@mkâra
partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency

251

is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the
change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good
and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state
and finally from prak@rti.


The Tanmâtras and the Paramâ@nus [Footnote ref 1].

The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped
by the liberated rajas of aha@mkâra, in order to make itself preponderant,
and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming
the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi,
is called _bhûtâdi._ From this bhûtâdi with the help of rajas are
generated the _tanmâtras,_ the immediately preceding causes of the
gross elements. The bhûtâdi thus represents only the intermediate
stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas
reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmâtras.
There has been some controversy between Sâ@mkhya and Yoga
as to whether the tanmâtras are generated from the mahat or from
aha@mkâra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that
evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing
differentiation in integration within the evolving whole.
Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation
which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as
bhûtâdi. Bhûtâdi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid
of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass.
The second stadium tanmâtra represents subtle matter, vibratory,
impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials"
arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units
in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution
of the original energy (_rajas_). The tanmâtras possess something
more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess
physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of
impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of
viscous and cohesive attraction [Footnote ref. 2].

In intimate relation with those physical characters they also
possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch,
colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the
translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely
indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given
in Ray's _Hindu Chemistry._ The credit of explaining Sâ@mkhya physics,
in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.]

[Footnote 2: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]

252

of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles
of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other
words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar
transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can
act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest
particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (_atîndriya_
but not _anudbhûta_) [Footnote ref 1].

Of the tanmatras the _s'abda_ or _âkâs'a tanmâtra_ (the sound-potential)
is first generated directly from the bhûtâdi. Next
comes the _spars'a_ or the _vâyu tanmâtra_ (touch-potential) which is
generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhûtâdi with the
âkâs'a tanmâtra. The _rûpa tanmâtra_ (colour-potential) is generated
similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhûtâdi; the
_rasa tanmâtra_ (taste-potential) or the _ap tunmâtra_ is also similarly
formed. This ap tanmâtra again by its union with a unit of tamas
from bhûtâdi produces the _gândha tanmâtra_ (smell-potential) or
the _k@siti tanmâtra_ [Footnote ref 2]. The difference of tanmâtras or
infra-atomic units and atoms (_paramâ@nu_) is this, that the tanmâtras
have only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be
grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence
as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses.
It is important in this connection to point out that the classification
of all gross objects as k@siti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is
not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view
of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be
brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a
particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are
said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be
grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of
these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or
tanmâtras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five
gross forms.

The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmâtras as
follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter
from bhûtâdi generates the âkâsa-atom. The touch-potentials combine
with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]

[Footnote 2: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmâtras and
atoms were explained in literatures other than Sâ@mkhya; for some account
of it see Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]

253

vâyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials
and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The
taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials
and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the
smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate
the earth-atom. The âkâs'a-atom possesses penetrability, the vâyu-atom
impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat
and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom
cohesive attraction. The âkâsa we have seen forms the transition
link from the bhûtâdi to the tanmâtra and from the tanmâtra to
the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at
this stage. Sâ@mkhya distinguishes between a kâra@na-âkâs'a and
kâryâkâs'a. The kâra@na-âkâs'a (non-atomic and all-pervasive)
is the formless tamas--the mass in prak@rti or bhûtâdi; it is
indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness
(_âvara@nâbhâva_) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is first
associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential;
the atomic âkâs'a is the result of the integration of the
original mass-units from bhûtâdi with this sound-potential (_s'abda
tanmâtra_). Such an âkâs'a-atom is called the kâryâkâs'a; it is
formed everywhere and held up in the original kâra@na âkâs'a as
the medium for the development of vâyu atoms. Being atomic
it occupies limited space.

The aha@mkâra and the five tanmâtras are technically called
_avis'e@sa_ or indeterminate, for further determinations or
differentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of
existence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called
_vis'e@sa,_ i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined
as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course
of evolution which started in the prak@rti reaches its furthest limit
in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms
on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having
atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due
to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction
of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are
not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by
them which was substantially different from the combined atoms.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal in describing this âkâs'a says "Âkâs'a
corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and
in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray's _History
of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 88.]

254

The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things
certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it
will be better to enquire about the principle of causation according
to which the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended
or interpreted.


Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy [Footnote ref 1].

The question is raised, how can the prak@rti supply the deficiencies
made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes
from them? When from mahat some tanmâtras have evolved, or
when from the tanmâtras some atoms have evolved, how can the
deficiency in mahat and the tanmâtras be made good by the
prak@rti?

Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations
that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk,
changes into curd, and so on? Sâ@mkhya says that "as the total
energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving,
cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same
ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes
in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes,
and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the
gu@nas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the
(material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production
or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the
unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (_udbhûta-v@rtti_)
in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary
to call forth the so-called material cause into activity [Footnote ref 2]."
The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure
of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the
sculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality
and the concomitant conditions (_sahakâri-s'akti_) or efficient cause
(_nimitta-kâra@na_, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical
help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition [Footnote ref
3]. The refilling from prak@rti thus means nothing more than this, that
by the inherent teleology of the prak@rti, the reals there are so
collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat
have been collocated to form the bhûtâdi or the tanmâtras.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and _Yogavârttika_, IV. 3; _Tattvavais'âradî_,
IV. 3.]

[Footnote 2: Ray, _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 72.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 73.]

255


Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of
transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of
material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the
sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the
sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens
is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs
the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of
energy together with a fresh collocation(_gu@nasannives'avis'e@sa_).
As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one
field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove
the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself
to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes
(such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any
collocation against its transformation into any other collocation,
the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding
manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the
energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a
state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this
barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a
corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for
the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed
from the prak@rti, guided by the constant will of Îs'vara, the reals
in equilibrium in the state of prak@rti leave their state of arrest
and evolve themselves into mahat, etc.


Change as the formation of new collocations.

It is easy to see from what we have already said that any
collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form,
unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the
present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous
instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation
of the five atoms of k@siti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The
difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its
collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms
is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation
has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that
collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that
these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other
infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier
is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the

256

formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers
could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing.
And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by
which they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of
any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the
line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped"
(_pari@nâmakramaniyama_) or in other words there are
some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the
evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those
lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows
in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of
countries (_des'âpabandha_); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy
season only, this is limitation of season or time (_kâlâpabandha_);
deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (_âkârâpabandha_);
curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes
(_nimittâpabandha_). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that
path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural
obstructions [Footnote ref 1].

Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least
to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and
changing places in any and every object. At each moment the
whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms
at any moment is different from what it was at the previous
moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived
as _dharmapari@nâma_ or changes of _dharma_ or quality; but perceived
or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This
change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by
virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new,
and these are respectively called the _lak@sa@napari@nâma_ and
_avasthâpari@nâma_. At every moment every object of the world is
undergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future,
as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state
we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent
again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential,
manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future,
present and past [Footnote ref 2].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvavais'âradî_ and _Yogavârttika,_ III. 14.]

[Footnote 2: It is well to note in this connection that Sâ@mkhya-yoga does
not admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind
grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind
(_buddhi-nirmâ@na_). The time required by an atom to move its own measure
of space is called a moment (_k@sa@na_) or one unit of time. Vijñâna
Bhik@su regards one unit movement of the gu@nas or reals as a moment. When
by true wisdom the gu@nas are perceived as they are both the illusory
notions of time and space vanish. _Vyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvavais'âradî_, and
_Yogavârttika_, III. 52 and III. 13.]

257


Causation as Satkâryavâda (the theory that the effect potentially
exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).

The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of
the Sâ@mkhya view of causation as _satkâryavâda_. Sâ@mkhya holds
that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent;
causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due
to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already
held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means
an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and
this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of
the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of
such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation--the
effect. This doctrine is called _satkâryavâda,_ i.e.
that the kârya or effect is _sat_ or existent even before the causal
operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in
the sesarnum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk, The
causal operation (_kârakaiyâpâra_) only renders that manifest
(_âvirbhûta_) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition
(_tirohita_) [Footnote ref 1].

The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Sâ@mkhya
did, but with them there was no background to the change;
every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was
past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There
were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and
qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance.
Sâ@mkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas,
but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions
of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals
change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable.
The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came
into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory
of causation and also on account of their doctrine of s'ûnya, they
were called _vainâs'ikas_ (nihilists) by the Vedântins. This doctrine
is therefore contrasted to Sâ@mkhya doctrine as _asatkâryavâda._

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvakaumudî,_ 9.]

258

The jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and
that from one point of view satkâryavâda is true and from another
asatkâryavâda. The Sâ@mkhya view that the cause is continually
transforming itself into its effects is technically called _pari@nâmavâda_
as against the Vedânta view called the _vivarttavâda_: that
cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but
illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form--mere
Maya [Footnote ref. 1].


Sâ@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.

Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite
number of reals produce all the world and its transformations;
whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of
cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which
prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the
first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prak@rti? Sâ@mkhya
denies the existence of Îs'vara (God) or any other exterior influence,
and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which
guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands
that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that
they may render some service to the souls either in the direction
of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a
tendency that prak@rti is disturbed, and the gu@nas develop on two
lines--on the mental plane, _citta_ or mind comprising the sense
faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is
in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one
hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the
buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective
things. It is this tendency to be of service to the puru@sas
(_puru@sârthatâ_) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains
all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and
finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain
liberation from the association of prak@rti and its gratuitous service,
which causes us all this trouble of sa@msâra.

Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Both the Vedânta and the Sâ@mkhya theories of causation are
sometimes loosely called _satkâryyavâda._ But correctly speaking as some
discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedânta theory of causation
should be called satkâra@navâda for according to it the _kâra@na_ (cause)
alone exists (_sat_) and all _kâryyas,_ (effects) are illusory appearances
of the kâra@na; but according to Sâ@mkhya the kâryya exists in
a potential state in the kâra@na and is hence always existing and real.]

259

prak@rti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe,
how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best
service to the puru@sas, how can it remove its own barriers and
lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prak@rti
equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the
evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to
their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones?
There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course
of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony
may be attained. This Being is Îs'vara. Îs'vara is a puru@sa who
had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His
body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by
ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent
wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of
the reals by which the evolution of the gu@nas may best serve the
double interest of the puru@sa's experience (_bhoga_) and liberation
(_apavarga_) should be removed. It is according to this permanent
will of Îs'vara that the proper barriers are removed and the
gu@nas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the
service of the best interests of the puru@sas. Îs'vara has not created
the prak@rti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prak@rti in its
quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order
by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order
of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Îs'vara
in Yoga and its denial by Sâ@mkhya marks the main theoretic
difference between the two according to which the Yoga and
Sâ@mkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara Sâ@mkhya (Sâ@mkhya with
Îs'vara) and Nirîs'vara Sâ@mkhya (Atheistic Sâ@mkhya) [Footnote ref 1].


Buddhi and Puru@sa.

The question again arises that though puru@sa is pure intelligence,
the gu@nas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how
can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover,
the puru@sa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of
impurity and what service or need can such a puru@sa have of
the gu@nas? This difficulty is anticipated by Sâ@mkhya, which has
already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of
the gu@nas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and
the intelligence of the puru@sa to a very high degree, so much so

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'âradî,_ IV. 3; _Yogavârttika,_ I. 24; and
_Pravavanabhâsya,_ V. 1-12.]

260

that it can reflect the intelligence of the puru@sa, and thus render
its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent.
Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional
operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the
buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue
of the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi, these appear as if
they are intelligent. The self (puru@sa) according to Sâ@mkhya-Yoga
is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its
existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and
grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly
noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through
beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing
states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes
are further so associated with the reflection of the puru@sa in the
buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the puru@sa.
This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the puru@sa
in the buddhi has such a special fitness (_yogyatâ_) that it is interpreted
as the experience of the puru@sa. This explanation of
Vâcaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijñâna Bhik@su.
Vijñâna Bhik@su says that the association of the buddhi with the
image of the puru@sa cannot give us the notion of a real person
who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore
that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puru@sa,
it is then superimposed upon the puru@sa, and we have the notion
of an abiding person who experiences [Footnote ref 1]. Whatever may be the
explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puru@sa
is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of _cit_ on
buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puru@sa cannot
realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own.
Buddhi resembles puru@sa in transparency, and the puru@sa fails to
differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as
a result of this non-distinction the puru@sa becomes bound down
to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the
buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction
of puru@sa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi
is what is meant by _avidyâ_ (non-knowledge) in Sâ@mkhya, and is
the root of all experience and all misery [Footnote ref 2].

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'âradî_ and _Yogavârttika_, I. 4.]

[Footnote 2: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with
Sâ@mkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things
(e.g. the snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it is
therefore called the _akhyâti_ (non-apprehension) theory of illusion
which must be distinguished from the _anyathâkhyâti_ (misapprehension)
theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending
one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). _Yogavârttika,_ I. 8.]

261


Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the
puru@sa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself
and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of
buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference
but positively false knowledge, that we take the puru@sa to be
that which it is not (_anyathâkhyâti_). It takes the changing,
impure, sorrowful, and objective prak@rti or buddhi to be the
changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks
buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and
capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidyâ of Yoga.
A buddhi associated with a puru@sa is dominated by such an
avidyâ, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated
with the same puru@sa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidyâ.
If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged
in the prak@rti, and the avidyâ also sleeps with it. When at the
beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated
with the puru@sas emerge, the old avidyâs also become manifest
by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the
puru@sas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus
proceeds the course of sa@msâra. When the avidyâ of a person
is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to
attach itself to the puru@sa and is forever dissociated from it, and
this is the state of mukti.


The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.

It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have
evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the puru@sa.
What is the process of this experience? Sâ@mkhya (as explained
by Vâcaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes
into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this
touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars
of the thing cannot be noticed. This is called _nirvikalpa
pratyak@sa_ (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by
the function of the _sa@mkalpa_ (synthesis) and _vikalpa_ (abstraction
or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in
all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates,
and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and

262

thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized
by the puru@sa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the
experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkâra,
and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other
times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijñâna Bhik@su
differs from this view of Vâcaspati, and denies the synthetic
activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi
directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses.
At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate,
but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate [Footnote ref 1].
It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced
to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt and imagination.

Buddhi, including ahamkâra and the senses, often called _citta_
in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame
of a lamp, it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure
sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content
to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi
and puru@sa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being
interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the
puru@sa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of
consciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour.
The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its
functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Sâ@mkhya
does not admit any separate prana vâyu (vital breath) to keep the
body living. What are called _vâyus_ (bio-motor force) in Vedânta
are but the different modes of operation of this category of
buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements
performs the life-functions and sense-functions of the body.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes
place through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc., are modified
by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are
however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme
of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external
objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they
are reflected, like trees in a lake

  "_tasmims'ca darpane sphâre samasta vastudrstayah
  imâstâh pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumâh_" _Yogavarttika_, I. 4.

The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by
the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the
external objects and assumes their forms: "_indriyânyeva pranâlikâ
cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadvârâ bâhyavastusûparaktasya
cittasyendryasahityenaivârthakarah parinâmo bhavati_" _Yogavârttika_, I.
VI. 7. Contrast _Tattvakaumudî_, 27 and 30.]

263


Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or
rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions
(_sa@mskâras_) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies
of all past lives (_vâsanâ_) [Footnote ref 1]. These sa@mskâras are revived
under suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births
in their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the
same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected
within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different
animal lives. It is knotted with these vâsanâs like a net. If a man
passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vâsanâs of a dog life, which
the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of
births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of
a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes
attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival
of the vâsanâ suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be
any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and
tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was
born as man.

The sa@mskâras represent the root impressions by which any
habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in
which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word sa@mskâra is used by Pâ@nini who probably preceded
Buddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguished
from generating a new quality (_Sata utkar@sâdhâna@m sa@mskâra@h_, Kâs'ila
on Pâ@nini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and
(3) adornment (Pâ@nini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the word
sa@nkhâra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing,
perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas
(collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkhâra stands for almost anything
of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many
diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of
aggregation (_samavâya_ of Pâ@nini) is prominent. The word _sa@mskaroti_
is used in Kau@sîtaki, II. 6, Chândogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and
B@rhadâra@nyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet
come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The
meaning of sa@mskâra in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means
the impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects
experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative
exist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be
reproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word vâsanâ (_Yoga sûtra_, IV. 24)
seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanis@sads do not mention it and
so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pâli pi@takas.
_Abhidhânappadîpikâ_ of Moggallâna mentions it, and it occurs in
the Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root "_vas_" to stay. It is
often loosely used in the sense of sa@mskâra, and in _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ they
are identified in IV. 9. But vâsanâ generally refers to the tendencies of
past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which
can find scope in this life. But sa@mskâras are the sub-conscious states
which are being constantly generated by experience. Vâsanâs are innate
sa@mskâras not acquired in this life. See _Vyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvâvais'âradî_
and _Yogavârttika_, II. 13.]

264

engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might
not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced
before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the
citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without
any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of
any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its
roots as already left in the citta in the form of sa@mskâras should
be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary
tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own
sa@mskâra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable
sa@mskâras.

Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (ce@s@tâ)
by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their
objects. There is also the reserved potent power (s'akti) of citta,
by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue
to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved
in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga
method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state
of mind to the exclusion of others.

Merit or demerit (_pu@nya, pâpa_) also is imbedded in the citta
as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and
giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.


Sorrow and its Dissolution [Footnote ref 1].

Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all
experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain
substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations,
all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree
of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure,
we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited
it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the
fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much
greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the
keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his
capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full
of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that
all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by
ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences
through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Tattavais'âradî and Yogavârttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumudî,
I.]

265

eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or
the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures
lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing
sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately;
he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the
pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according
to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve
the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also
some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded
as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures
that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow.
Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes,
what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is
uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to
philosophy to find out the means of doing it.

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical
enquiry of the Sâ@mkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1]. All experiences are
sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences
may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after
death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puru@sa
are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue.
Citta must be dissociated from puru@sa. Citta or buddhi, Sâ@mkhya
says, is associated with puru@sa because of the non-distinction
of itself from buddhi [Footnote ref 2]. It is necessary therefore that in
buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the
nature of puru@sa; when this true conception of puru@sa arises in
the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from
and quite unrelated to puru@sa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As
a result of that, buddhi turns its back on puru@sa and can no
longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected
with sorrow, and thus the puru@sa remains in its true
form. This according to Sâ@mkhya philosophy is alone adequate
to being about the liberation of the puru@sa. Prak@rti which was
leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils
its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the
cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow
{_du@hkhabahla@h sa@msârah heya@h_).]

[Footnote 2: The word _citta_ is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is
the repository of all sub-conscious states. Sâmkhyn generally uses, the
word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they
emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.]

266

puru@sa from prak@rti. This final purpose being attained the
prak@rti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom
this right knowledge was generated; for other puru@sas however
the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences
from one birth to another in an endless cycle.

Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient.
In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true
knowledge differentiating puru@sa and buddhi should arise, but it
is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all
its samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived
again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest
state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puru@sa. This is
the _kevala_ (oneness) state of existence after which (all sa@mskâras,
all avidyâ being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any
longer to hold on to the puru@sa, and like a stone hurled from a
mountain top, gravitates back into the prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. To
destroy the old sa@mskâras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a
graduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should
be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher
and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler
states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin
advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and
try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the
state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity.
At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puru@sa, and
final liberation takes place.

Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1) _s'ukla_ or
white (_pu@nya_, those that produce happiness), (2) _k@r@s@na_ or black
(_pâpa_, those that produce sorrow), (3) _s'ukla-k@r@s@na_ (_pu@nya-pâpa_,
most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious
as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many
insects), (4) _as'uklâk@r@s@na_ (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and
meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains).
All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the
world and avoid taking the lives of insects [Footnote ref 2]. All karmas

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Both Sâ@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a
_Kaivalya_ (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been
absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at
this state puru@sa remains for ever alone without any association
with buddhi, see _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_, 68 and _Yoga sûtras_, IV. 34.]

[Footnote 2: _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, IV. 7.]

267

proceed from the five-fold afflictions (_kles'as_), namely _avidyâ,
asmitâ, râga, dve@sa_ and _abhinives'a_.

We have already noticed what was meant by avidyâ. It consists
generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it
as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge
while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other
four forms of asmitâ, etc. Asmitâ means the thinking of worldly
objects and our experiences as really belonging to us--the
sense of "mine" or "I" to things that really are the qualities or
transformations of the gu@nas. Râga means the consequent attachment
to pleasures and things. Dve@sa means aversion or antipathy
to unpleasant things. Abhinives'a is the desire for life or love of
life--the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our
experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family
to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are
attached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any
mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our
life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all
proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidyâ, which consists
in the false identification of buddhi with puru@sa. These five,
avidyâ, asmitâ, râga, dve@sa and abhinives'a, permeate our buddhi,
and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together
with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as
a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth
to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them [Footnote ref 1]. The karma in
the aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of
it is called _karmâs'aya_. (the bed of karma for the puru@sa to lie in).
We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (_kles'a_) of
the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or
modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the
teleology of the prak@rti and the removal of obstacles in the course
of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of
Îs'vara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous
one pleasure.

The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate,
and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such
a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for
him according to the evolution of prak@rti as shall make it possible
for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, II. 3-9.]

268

present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth
(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (_âyu@s_) and the
painful or pleasurable experiences (_bhoga_) destined for that life.
Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce
their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has
done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which
he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which
he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain
in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first
and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good
actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions,
all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot
again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those
karmas which have already ripened. This is the _jîvanmukti_ stage,
when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering
mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already
ripened (_ti@s@thati sa@mskâravas'ât cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'arîra@h_).


Citta.

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature
in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patañjali in
his _Yoga sûtra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint or
steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may
be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against
a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct.
The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called
_k@sipta_ (wild) and of the latter type _pramû@dha_ (ignorant). There
is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which
concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining
steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to
another thing and so on. This is called the _vik@sipta_ (unsteady)
stage of mind (_cittabhûmi_). As distinguished from these there is
an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on
an object for a long time. This is the _ekâgra_ (one-pointed) stage.
There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes
are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti,
and is called the _nirodha_ (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of
Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.

The cittas have five processes (_v@rtti_), (1) _pramâ@na_ [Footnote ref 1]
(valid

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any
cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on
correspondence with external facts or objects (_svata@h prâmâ@nya@m
svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m_). The contribution of Sâ@mkhya to the doctrine
of inference is not definitely known. What little Vâcaspati says on the
subject has been borrowed from Vâtsyâyana such as the _pûrvavat, s'e@savat_
and _sâmânyatodr@s@ta_ types of inference, and these may better be
consulted in our chapter on Nyâya or in the Tâtparya@tîkâ_ of Vâcaspati.
Sâ@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the
ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds
of inference "_mâtrânimittasa@myogivirodhisahacâribhi@h.
Svasvâmibadhyaghâtâdyai@h sâ@mkhyânâ@m saptadhânumâ_" (_Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p.
109). Sâ@mkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I.I. V) is
"_sambandhâdekasmât pratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranumânam_."]

269

cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference
and scriptural testimony), (2) _viparyaya_ (false knowledge, illusion,
etc.), (3) _vikalpa_ (abstraction, construction and different kinds of
imagination), (4) _nidrâ_ (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which
tamas tends to predominate), (5) _sm@rti_ (memory).

These states of mind (_v@rtti_) comprise our inner experience.
When they lead us towards sâ@msara into the course of passions
and their satisfactions, they are said to be _kli@s@ta_ (afflicted or
leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they
are called _akli@s@ta_ (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards
sa@msara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of
mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states,
and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation)
must be regarded as good.

This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta,
that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes
towards bad (sâ@msara). It is like a river, as the _Vyâsabhâ@sya
says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the
good. The teleology of prak@rti requires that it should produce
in man the sâ@msara as well as the liberation tendency.

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts
and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts,
and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad
thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore
never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is
as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather
remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows
that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic
attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an
innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation
[Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction
of three kinds of sorrows, _âdhyâtmika_ (generated internally by the
illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind),
_âdhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by
other men, beasts, etc.) and _âdhidaivika_ (generated by the injuries
inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours
(_puru@sârtha_).]

270

is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but
still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible
tendency of the mind. Man has power (_s'akti_) stored up in his
citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may
gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the
other. He must succeed in this, since prak@rti wants liberation for
her final realization [Footnote ref 1].


Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on
the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation,
so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more
weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind
can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should
be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin
should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (_ahi@msâ_),
absolute and strict truthfulness (_satya_), non-stealing (_asteya_),
absolute sexual restraint (_brahmacarya_) and the acceptance of
nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (_aparigraha_).
These are collectively called _yama_. Again side by side with these
abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions
and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the
habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the
body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (_tapas_), the study
of philosophy (_svâdhyâya_) and meditation on Îs'vara
(_Îs'varapra@nidhâna_). These are collectively called _niyamas_.
To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as
_pratipak@sa-bhâvanâ, maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâ_ and _upek@sâ_.
Pratipak@sa-bhâvanâ means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish
motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought
(self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope.
Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations
with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere
abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should
habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with
our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrî means to think of
all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to
think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one
should practise karu@nâ or kindly feeling for sufferers, muditâ

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See my "_Yoga Psychology_," _Quest_, October, 1921.]

271

or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upek@sâ
or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others.
The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note
of the vices of vicious men.

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures
(_vairâgya_) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances
of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross
and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may
attain liberation by a constant practice (_abhyâsa_) attended with
faith, confidence (_s'raddhâ_), strength of purpose and execution
(_vîrya_) arid wisdom (_prajñâ_) attained at each advance.


The Yoga Meditation.

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being
ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such
a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (_âsana_) and fixes his mind
on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should
fix it on Îs'vara, for in that case Îs'vara being pleased removes
many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for
him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice,
and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration
(_samâdhi_) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying
concentration namely _vitarka, vicâra, ânanda_ and _asmitâ_. Of
these vitarka and vicâra have each two varieties, _savitarka, nirvitarka,
savicâra, nirvicâra_ [Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates on
objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka
stage; when on the five tanmâtras with a remembrance of their
qualities it is called savicâra, and when it is one with the tanmâtras
without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicâra.
Higher than these are the ânanda and the asmitâ states. In the
ânanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions
of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmitâ stage buddhi
concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications.
In all these stages there are objects on which the mind
consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the _samprajñâta_
(with knowledge of objects) types of samâdhi. Next to this comes
the last stage of samâdhi called the _asamprajñâta_ or nirodha
samâdhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vâcaspati, however, thinks that ânanda and asmitâ have also
two other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su.]

272

long in this stage the old potencies (sa@mskâras) or impressions
due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards
the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner
thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the
nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the
buddhi becomes as pure as the puru@sa, and after that the citta not
being able to bind the puru@sa any longer returns back to prak@rti.

In order to practise this concentration one has to see that
there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a
quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles
is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This
has to be stopped by the practice of _prâ@nâyâma_. Prâ@nâyâma
consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then
giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for
hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need
of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained
steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.

The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting
in a steady posture, holding the breath by prâ@nâyâma, excluding
all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (_dhâra@nâ_).
At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same
thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called
_dhyâna._ After sufficient practice in dhyâna the mind attains the
power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one
with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is
no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind
becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called
_samâdhi_ [Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages of
samâdhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samâdhi, he passes
on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards
he attains miraculous powers (_vibhûti_) and his faith and hope
in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them
many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even
though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax.
His wisdom (_prajñâ_) also increases at each step. Prajñâ knowledge
is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _samâdhi_ cannot properly be
translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It means that
peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes
one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing
states.]

273

certain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] prajñâ
has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the
tanmâtras, the gu@nas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their
subtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies
(_sa@mskâra_) of the prajñâ wisdom grow in strength the potencies of
ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain
always in his prajñâ wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajñâ that
it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to sa@msâra.
The final prajñâs which lead to liberation are of seven kinds,
namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and
misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and
roots of sa@msâra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more
of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of
direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge
in the shape of a discrimination of puru@sa from prak@rti has been
understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather
metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are
as follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and
emancipation (_bhoga_ and _apavarga_) has been realized. (6) The
strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gu@nas drives
them into prak@rti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops.
(7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gu@nas
become merged in the prak@rti and remain there for ever. The
puru@sa having passed beyond the bondage of the gu@nas shines
forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in
this Sâ@mkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prak@rti. It
is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sâ@mkhya tries to
achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected
discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the
_Kârikâ_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky),
extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ
(e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object
(e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by
walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight),
being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown
into a lake).]

[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet the
real nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What
appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic
(mâyâ):

  "_Gunânâ@m parama@m rûpam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati
  Yattu d@rs@tipatham prâptam tanmâyeva sutucchakam._"

  _Vyâsabhâ@sya_, IV. 13.

The real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only by _prajñâ._]

274



CHAPTER VIII

THE NYÂYA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY


Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the
Nyâya standpoint.

The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of
substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of
things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary;
each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to
another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation
representing milk generates the collocation of curd
it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming
the cause-collocation and the _modus operandi_ is unintelligible;
the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately
generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on
such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine
of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence
on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination
and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment.
The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the
result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is
against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific
elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are
the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the
whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness,
blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump
state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in
the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience.
Moreover there would be no difference between material (_upâdâna_,
e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_
and _sahakâri_, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in
forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and
there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental
causes, as such.

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is
brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

275

effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the
cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence
to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the
moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that
causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated
the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we
perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is
perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as
future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.

The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized
states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds
within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is
already existent even before the causal movement for the production
of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the
oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and
that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the
stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists
only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in
a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of
clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it
to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never
carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug.
What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was
in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest
or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state
of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state
of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is
meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of
which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does
not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump
of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it
can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the
potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the
effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said
that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya
that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also
against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and
attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again
Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

276

from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi
non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss
that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on
buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul
(_âtman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why
Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge,
feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in
order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double
reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where
is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again
and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become
bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by
the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as
Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa
ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure
(_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance
(_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what
impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances?
Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras,
is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor
by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders.
The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction
in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other
systems. (See _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)


Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras.

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are
to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars
trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use
in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between
the adherents of different schools of thought trying to
defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in
the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded
even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by
the name _vâkovâkya_. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba
who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the
word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya
derived

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1 _Âpastamba,_ trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and
Bodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the Bombay
Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]

277

from the root _nî_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentences
and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning
and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of
words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing
out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered
into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the
strength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the _vidyâ_ (sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî
(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge
by further scrutiny), _trayî_ (the three Vedas), _vârttâ_ (the sciences
of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and _da@n@danîti_ (polity), and the
enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata
and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that the _Nyâya sûtra_ was not in existence
in Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to
Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar
name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand
Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya
from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means
the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.
What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement in _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 1
is this that he points out that the science which was known in his
time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by
Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî,
but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories
such as _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt) etc., though these were already contained
within the first two terms _pramâ@na_ (means of cognition) and
_prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its
special and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthâna_) were treated,
Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (_adhyâtmavidyâ_)
like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining
the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon
by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his
_Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the
word Nyâya (_pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam_--to scrutinize an object by
means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word
ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception
and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as
this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa's _Kumârasambhava "Udghâto pra@navayâsâm
nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam_," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian Philosophy,"
Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]

278

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences
[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya
is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its
capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the
way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that
the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this
seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself
designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate
branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or
Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made
after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the
importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that
seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or
_adhyâtmavidyâ_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of
the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of
the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend
any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of
Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya
was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four
vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side
with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably
even in Kau@tilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches,
one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather
of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external,
and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added
to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might
not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda
S'âstrî in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_
1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the
_Nyâya sûtras_, one as _Nyâyasûci_ and the other as _Nyâyasûtroddhâra_,
it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to
the authenticity of many of the _Nyâya sûtras_. He further points
out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras
were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China
and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which
one is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan
vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs'ca
vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâya@h pravarttate_ (all those which
one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all
beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana,
and all these depend on Nyâya). _Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya_, I.i. 1.]

279

thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands
of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who
put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These
suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but
we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such
additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs
of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of
the date of the original part of the _Nyâya sûtras_ still more difficult,
for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and
Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Nyâya sûtras_ on the
basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except
on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later
than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mahâyâna sûtras_
written before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.

The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na in _J.R.A.S._ 1918 thinks
that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about
550 B.C. whereas the _Nyâya sûtras_ of Ak@sapâda were written
about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the
sense of logic in _Mahâbhârata_ I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be
regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any
reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment
of the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapâda was made
to fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapâda wrote his _Nyâya
sûtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which does
not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na
has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced
a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part
of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.)
and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the _Nyâya sûtras_ [Footnote ref
1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîk@sikî
in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say
that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth
century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think
that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time
in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâya@na's
sûtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyâya.
On this ground he thinks that _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were written before
Bâdarâyana's _Brahma-sûtras_, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were
written later. Candrakânta Tarkâla@mkâra also contends in his

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's _Pâ@nini_, p. 157.]

280

edition of Vais'e@sika that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were earlier than the
Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes
one of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, but the whole foundation of his medical
physics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The
_La@nkâvatâra sûtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier
than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing
that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].

It is certain that even the logical part of the present _Nyâya
sûtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which
the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_)
Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views
of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference,
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya
doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].


Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?

The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition
that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed
to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented
in the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras._ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable
way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes
a _Vais'e@sika sûtra._ An examination of Caraka's _Sûtrasthâna_ (I.35-38)
leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some
compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_
before him. _Caraka sûtra_ or _kârikâ_ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas
are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc.,
cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "_para_" (universality)
and end with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with the sense-qualities
(_sârthâ_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known
enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found
in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'ârîra_, 39.]

[Footnote 2: See the next section.]

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on the _Nyâya sûtras,_ I.i.32. This is
undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in
_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ as noted before.]

[Footnote 4: _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ IX. ii. 1-2,
4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]

281

heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_),
elasticity (_sa@mskâra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);
in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para"
(universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition)
comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in
prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list
and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's
sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the
Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and
compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.
_Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation
from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha
as being collected from "_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_"--(from
very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya
and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate
categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though
slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition
one finds in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ that sâmânya (generality) and
vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were
therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were
undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning
to be written on them.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist
doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is
no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the
argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an
object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There
is also no other reference to any other systems except to some
Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no
reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude
to the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which the
nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya
phraseology of "_pûrvavat_" and "_s'e@savat_" was not known. _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate
cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to
those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in _J.A.S.B._,
1908.]

[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces
unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and
vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]

[Footnote 3: _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]

282

systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient
view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of
the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these
sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability
are pre-Buddhistic.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ begins with the statement that its object
is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty
of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini
begins his _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ by defining "dharma". This at first
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description
of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].
The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma
and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions
and also the _ad@r@s@ta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows
that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a
good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption
of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]

[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalâpa
Vyâkara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories
by Ka@nâda in his _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, after having proposed to describe
the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while
intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).

"_Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya
sâgaragamanopamam_."]

[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam_ (I.i.3 and
X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskâra_ as meaning "The Veda being the
word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no
mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later
Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of
VI.ii.1.]

283

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but
is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these
cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on
the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance
of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards
magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies,
V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion
of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations
have taken place), and the original movement of the
mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement
of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the
assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the
movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in
_Upaskara_) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is
said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the
annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths
Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)
and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded
on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience
are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all
life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or
the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air,
death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena
by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2),
in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.
Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding
substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of
metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to
this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or
sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_),
fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house
of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_),
sacrifice (_yajña_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial
sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the
prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)
(VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure
food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary
being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food
leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how

284

feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta.
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing
the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference
to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ
writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their
views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points
in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity
of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief
in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according
to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject
of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned,
and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we
may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The
fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due
to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the
_Vais`e@sika sûtras._ It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the
Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with
Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never
written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in
the days of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras,_ the view was probably what is
represented in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras._ As there is no reference to
Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions
in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all
atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was
as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers.
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one
of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and
the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons
in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33
till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the
eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know
from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question
of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my
opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upaskâra_ (II. ii.
36 by adding an "_api_" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and
II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as
sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion
is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound
as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]

285

that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the
seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally
this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika
III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its
activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this
inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the
activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no
certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is
suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted
on the authority of the scriptures (_âgama_). To this the final
Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self
in our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend
on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus
the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional
proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. ii.
10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika
represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented
a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.


Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining
virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is
that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs'reyasa_)
are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the
Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and
salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that
salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special
excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of
substance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_sâmdânya_),
particularity (_vis'e@sa_), and inherence (_samavâyay_) [Footnote ref 1].
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and
mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure,
separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to
species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate
differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this
system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same
element has specific features of difference.]

[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_),
liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskâra_),
merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.
These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums.
It must be noted that "_gu@na_" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not
subtle reals or substances as in Sâ@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would
be akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]

286

downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal
movement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other
dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or
its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses
karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.
Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is
devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)
of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material
cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion
(_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be
produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect
of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce
karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced
by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many
contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the
cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].

In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nâda first says that
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that
genus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See
_Upaskara_ I.i. 22.]

[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the
movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]

[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different
from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action
which is the cause of rebirth.]

287

being (_bhâva_) indicates continuity only and is hence
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action
maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate
differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being
(_sattâ_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it
is different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them,
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something
is and must be regarded as a category existing as one
identical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal
nature as being it has no special characteristics in the
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of
thingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gu@natva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)
are also categories which are separate from universal being
(_bhâva_ or _sattâ_) for they also have no separate genus or species
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or
being was the same in all.

In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nâda deals with
substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire,
colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be
found in ether (_âkâs'a_). Liquidity is a special quality of water
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote
ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred
from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)
and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of
inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics
called _sâmânyato d@r@s@ta_. The name of air "_vâyu_" is derived
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us
has (_asmadvis'i@s@tânâ@m_) to be admitted for accounting for the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is
important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]

[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It
should be noted that the word "_adravyatvena_" in II. i. 13 has been
interpreted by me as "_adravyavattvena_."]

288

giving of names to things (_sa@mjñâkarma_). Because we find
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented
by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied
space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs'a
(ether). Âkâs'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this
substance is âkâs'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As
being is one so âkâs'a is one [Footnote ref 2].

In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nâda tries to
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because
the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered,
or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely
grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question
whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must
be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact
of the senses and their object inheres.

The knowledge of sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) is the reason by

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed from _Upaskâra_ in interpreting
"_sa@mjñâkarma_" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while
_Upaskâra_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upaskâra's interpretation
seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for
the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's
_Upaskâra._]

289

which we can infer the existence of something different from the
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The
types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of
some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the
existence of some things from the existence of others. In all
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to
be connected with each other (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_) [Footnote
ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have
_anapades'a_ (fallacious middle) and _sandigdha_ (doubtful middle);
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way
in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.
by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In
the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity
of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _sâmânyatod@r@s@ta_
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition
to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the
methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.
There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference
are only pointed out as the basis.]

[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nâda was probably not
aware of Gautama's terminology.]

290

then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences
as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.
When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered
eternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can
only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything
as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal
is ignorance (_avidyâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing
which is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_vâyu_) is not perceived to
have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not
the actuality of colour (_rûpasamskâra_--i.e. in air there is only
colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote
ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also
explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the
quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskâra_. I
think the three sûtras "_Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam,"
"vyavasthato nana,"_ and _"vastrasâmarthyat ca"_ originally meant that
the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also
because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures,
they are regarded as many.]

[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upaskâra,_
which regards this sûtra "_avidya_" to mean that we do not know of any
reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]

[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of
_udbhûtarûpavattva_ and _anudbhûtarûpavattva_. The word _samskâra_ in
Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection
(_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome
(_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upaskâra_ IV. i. 7.]

291

are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile
sense) [Footnote ref 1].

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one
of them acts as the central radicle (_upa@s@tambhaka_). Bodies are of
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise
produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and
also on account of the authority of the Vedas.

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed.
Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of
heaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed
motions (_nodanavis'e@sa_) which are generated by special kinds of
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown
cause (_adr@s@takâranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion by
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia
(_vegasamskâra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls
down through heaviness.

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the _Upaskâra_ of S'ankara
Mis'ra on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ of Ka@nâda. It must be noted here
that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental
relativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or
touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend
on the visual or the tactual sense.]

292

of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained
as being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@takâritam_) and no explanation
is given as to the nature of this unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_).
It is however said that with the absence of _ad@r@s@ta_ there is no contact
of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore
mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are
regarded as inactive.

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain
Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities
of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta,
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa
takes place as a result of the work of the soul.

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many
causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those
that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small
relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The
eternal size of _parima@n@dala_ (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a
and âtman are called _mahân_ or _paramamahân_ (the supremely
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size
(parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether
(âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed from the _Upaskâra_ in the interpretation of
this sûtra.]

293

neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekap@rthaktva_).
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist
independently (_yutasiddhyabhâvât_). In the eighth book it is said
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension
of qualities, action, generality, and particularity
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the
cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book
negation is described; non-existence (_asat_) is defined as that to
which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of
existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly
perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).

In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary
or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason).
The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or
"these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism
from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidyâ_) is
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation
due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite
of this is true knowledge (_vidyâ_). In the tenth it is said that
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ here explains that it is intended that the senses
are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the
sûtras.]

[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _prâgabhâva_
(negation before production), _dhvamsâbhâva_ (negation after destruction),
and _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), have
been described. The fourth one is _sâmânyâbhâva_ (general negation).]

294


A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact
is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of
fire is also a cause.

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the
Vedas direct them, they have validity.


Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].

The _Nyâya sûtras_ begin with an enumeration of the sixteen
subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (_pramâ@na_), object of right
knowledge (_prameya_), doubt (_sa@ms'aya_), purpose (_prayojana_),
illustrative instances (_d@r@s@tânta_), accepted conclusions (_siddhânta_),
premisses (_avayava_), argumentation (_tarka_), ascertainment (_nir@naya_),
debates (_vâda_), disputations (_jalpa_), destructive criticisms
(_vita@n@dâ_), fallacy (_hetvâbhâsa_), quibble (_chala_), refutations
(_jâti_), points of opponent's defeat (_nigrahasthâna_), and hold that
by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (_nihs'reyasa_), is
attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (_apavarga_)
is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge
(_mithyâjñâna_), defects (_do@sa_), endeavours (_prav@rtti_, birth
(_janma_), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said
to be of four kinds, perception (_pratyak@sa_), inference (_anumâna_),
analogy (_upamana_), and testimony (_s'abda_). Perception is defined
as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names
proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three
kinds, from cause to effect (_pûrvavat_), effect to cause (_s'e@savat_),
and inference from common characteristics (_sâmânyato d@r@s@ta_).
Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known
thing.

S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)
[Footnote ref 2].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Nyâya
sûtras_, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the
commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present
their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as
possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two
systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]

[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a
@r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]

295

Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced
and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge
are said to be self (_âtman_), body, senses, sense-objects,
understanding (_buddhi_), mind (_manas_}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths,
enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and
salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (_prayatna_), pleasure, pain, and
knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which
upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain
as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];
the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap,
tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are
the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the
objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot
occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (_manas_).
Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and
body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead
men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref
2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called _apavarga_ [Footnote ref 3].
Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting
opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That
for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work
is called _prayojana_.

Illustrative example (_d@r@s@tânta_) is that on which both the
common man and the expert (_parîk@saka_) hold the same opinion.
Established texts or conclusions (_siddhânta_) are of four kinds,
viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called
the _sarvatantrasiddhânta_; (2) those which are held by one school
or similar schools but opposed by others called the _pratitantrasiddhânta_;
(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally
follow called _adhikara@nasiddhânta_; (4) those of the opponent's views
which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute
the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and
bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (_abhyupagamasiddhânta_)
[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]

[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full
of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated
with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in
salvation, but only cessation from pain.]

[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]

296

(1) _pratijñâ_ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);
(2) _hetu_ (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the
strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples
or negative instances); (3) _udâhara@na_ (positive or negative
illustrative instances); (4) _upanaya_ (corroboration by the instance);
(5) _nigamana_ (to reach the conclusion which has been proved).
Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ,
the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which
have been enumerated in the first sûtra.

The second book deals with the refutations of objections
against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening
of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there
was always a difference between the two things regarding which
doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating
characteristics between the two things are not noted.
Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object
to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of
perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before
the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter,
and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they
could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two
happened together then there would be no notion of succession
in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were
no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of
knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous
existence of those different kinds of musical instruments,
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence
of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition
of other things may themselves be the objects of right

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham âtodyamanumîyate
sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyâtodye svanata@h
anumânam bhavatîti, vî@nâ vâdyate ve@nu@h pûryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na
âtodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam
pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya,_ II.
i. 15.]

297

knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.
The means of right knowledge (pramâ@na) do not require
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves
as well.

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact
of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we
perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception
of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].
Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this
the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular
effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular
cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of
time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time
did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible.
The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have
perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be
done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a
means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved.
The four pramâ@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later
interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine
of perception, but against the wording of the definition
of perception as given in the,_Nyâya sûtra_, II. i. 4.]

[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who
rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later
Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),
_Avayavinirâkara@na_ in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, may be referred
to.]

[Footnote 3: _Pûrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ
bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakâs@thâdivahanañcopalabhamâna@h pûr@natvena,
nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimâtre@na. V@atsyâyana
bhâ@sya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river
is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater
augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current
large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,
associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of
water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].

298

are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication),
aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood
in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is
also understood--if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere
we understand that the same contains eight gallons of
corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramâ@nas
for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti,
sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.

The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are
said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The
theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity
proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to
refer to class-notions (_jâti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specific
position of the limbs (_âk@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested.
Class (_jâti_} is defined as that which produces the notion
of sameness (_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_).

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of
the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united
together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover
if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness
belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,
for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different
senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which
works in both eyes.]

299

senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in
previous existences.

The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense
is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally
the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation
is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three,
fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye,
and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of
earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements
of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made
by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive
quality of earth, viz. smell.

Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction of _buddhi_ (cognition) and
_cit_ (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between
the _buddhi_ and _cit_. We do not find in our consciousness two
elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness,
but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya
epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in
cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition
of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external
objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation
that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external
world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may
lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of
crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at
different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be
said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to
in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.
In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no
coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the
senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga view
represented in _Âtreya-sa@mhitâ_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika
or constituted of the gross elements.]

300

the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The
contact of manas with soul (_âtman_) takes place within the body
and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge
belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for
even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions
destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.
Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of
these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).
Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again
if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be
borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of
another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given
as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign,
(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor
and the possessed or master and servant, or things which
are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of
husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition,
(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover
and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that
which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such
as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection,
(19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does
not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body
as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected by
the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman)
through the destruction of karma.

In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa
(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all
other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy).
As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by
destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the
process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the
production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for
man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.
A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all
things have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for then
no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted
on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâya sûtra_ III. ii. 44.]

301

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas)
that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to
other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are
merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are
then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like
the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.
Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means
sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented
by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for
pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless
sleep, so there is no affliction (_kles'a_) in the man who attains
apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all
efforts (_prav@rtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless
with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then
there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism
(_aha@mkâra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects
(_do@sa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about the
nature of atoms (_a@nus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussion
is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins
that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when
separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as
leading to right knowledge.

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition
is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations
(_nigrahasthâna_) and futilities (_jâti_).



Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras.

When we compare the _Nyâya sûtras_ with the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_
we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes
have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large
amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art
for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was
probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises
which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering
themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their
opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has
known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]

[Footnote 2: A reference to the _Suvar@naprabhâsa sûtra_ shows that the
Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving
their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to
the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would
help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information
and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]

302

we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to
disputations as found in the _Nyâya sûtra_ with those that are
found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There
are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the
_Nyâya sûtra_ and _Caraka-sa@mhitâ_ which have treated of these
matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.
d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely
the definitions given of those in the _Nyâya sûtras_. There are
others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc.,
where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are
some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. _prati@s@thâpanâ,
jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras'a@msâ, upalambha,
parihâra, abhyanujñâ_, etc.) which are not found in the
_Nyâya sûtra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities
(jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in
the _Nyâya sûtra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms which
are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. _aupamya_ in
_Caraka, upamâna_ in _Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti_ in _Nyâya sûtra_ and
_arthaprâpti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anything
about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the
treatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is much
simpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyâya sûtras_.
If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the
fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the
treatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyâya sûtras_. It seems therefore
in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Nyâya
sûtras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation
to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation
was earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyâya sûtras_ represents
a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had
necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied
in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have
been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing
through the _Nyâya sûtras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrines
which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the
Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka,
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division
of inference (_anumâna_) as _pûrvavat, s'e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta_.]

303

further allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ as we have already
seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed
with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the
_Nyâya sûtras_ is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the
self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda_)and the akhyâti
doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief
points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya,
are never alluded to in the _Nyâya sûtras_. The advocacy of Yoga
methods (_Nyâya sûtras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be
an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in
keeping with the general tendency of the _Nyâya sûtras_, and the
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya
Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional
knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the
self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived
under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The _Nyâya sûtras_
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika
does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three
classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no
definition. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti
(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sâdhya_ (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated
either in the _Nyâya sûtras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sika
sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance
between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_),

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]

304

but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of
the term _prasiddhipûrvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be more
loose than the term _vyâpti_ as we know it in the later Nyâya. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate
pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With _Nyâya sûtras_ s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and
Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three
kinds _@r@si, ârya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamâna which is
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even
referred to in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. The _Nyâya sûtras_ know of
other pramâ@nas, such as _arthâpatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but
include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The _Nyâya sûtras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as
non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks
are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though
there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception,
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyâya
sûtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma,
vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska
discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyâya sûtras_ take much pains to prove
the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have
been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this
question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas
the _Nyâya sûtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological
grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self
in the _Nyâya sûtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of
sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from
Nyâya and calls _arthâpatti arthaprâpti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's
commentary.]

[Footnote 3: The _Nyâya sûtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of
jâti as "_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_" (II. ii. 71).]

305

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact
of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ admit
the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of
atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The
Vai'se@sika calls salvation _ni@hs'reyasa_ or _mok@sa_ and the Nyâya
_apavarga_. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of
connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of
pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between
the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the
notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.
Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which
cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment
there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness,
then from a sense of relativeness--apek@sâbuddhi--notion
of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two
things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by
heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held)
was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref
2]. But as the _Nyâya sûtras_ are silent on these points, it is not
possible to say that such were really the differences between early
Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between
the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of
Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of
Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from
the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost
the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore
preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found
from the sixth century onwards.


The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though
there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from
_Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another
passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914,
to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element
of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the
Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found
in the Nyâya or the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, unless the cessation of pain
with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss
or happiness.]

[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana_.]

306

appears from the _Vâyu purâna_ that he was born in Prabhâsa near
Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of
Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity
of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas
(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and
then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining
the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but
is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote
ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_,
namely _Râva@na-bhâ@sya_ and _Bharâdvâja-v@rtti_, but these are now
probably lost. References to the former are found in
_Kira@nâvalîbhâskara_ of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabhâ_
2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely
_Vyomavatî_ by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, _Nyâyakandalî_ by S'ridhara,
_Kira@nâvalî_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _Lîlâvatî_ S'rîvatsâcârya.
In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara
Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapâda-bhâsya_,
namely _Bhâsyasûkti_ and _Ka@nâda-rahasya_. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425
A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ called the
_Upaskâra_. Of these _Nyâya-kandalî_ of S'rîdhara on account of its
simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably
the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a
native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's
name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he
wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes
at the end of his work.

The _Nyâya sûtra_ was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and
the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known
as the _Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya_. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a
bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and
calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories
(_Padârthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya,
gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ in order and without
raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on
them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and
dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms
contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of
pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat
occur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_
are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date
definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us
after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th
century A.D.]

307

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he
lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi
places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a
_Vârttika_ on Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views
and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga
(about 500 A.D.) in his _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_. Vâcaspatimis'ra
(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Nyâyavârttika_ of
Udyotakara called _Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ in order to make
clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ which was sinking
in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings
(_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote
a sub-commentary on the _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ called
_Tâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi_. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a
sub-commentary on that called the _Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a_. Padmanâbha
wrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddhamânendu_ and S'a@nkara
Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the
_Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha
wrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'vanâthav@rtti_,
on the _Nyâya sûtra_, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate
commentary on the _Nyâya sûtras_ known as _Nyâyasûtravivara@na_.
In addition to these works on the _Nyâya sûtras_ many other
independent works of great philosophical value have been written
on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval
times is the _Nyâyamañjari_ of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished
shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Nyâya
sûtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite
independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian
thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparya@tîkâ_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another
important work is Udayana's _Kusumâñjali_ in which he tries to
prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read
with its commentary _Prakâs'a_ by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its
sub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's
_Âtmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in
which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition
to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later
times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection
with the present work. _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ by Vis'vanâtha with
its commentaries _Muktâvalî, Dinakarî_ and _Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha_
with _Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with

308

the commentary _Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî_ of S'ivâditya,
_Târkikarak@sâ_ of Varadarâja with the commentary _Ni@ska@n@taka_
of Mallinâtha, _Nyâyasâra_ of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and
_Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî_ of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the
_Nyâyamanjarisara_ by Yâdavâcârya, and _Nyâyasiddhântadîpa_ of
S'a@sadhara with _Prabhâ_ by S'e@sânantâcârya.

The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya
began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about
1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the
Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of
the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his
discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention
in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and
commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna
portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent
treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars
of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home
of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni
(1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya
(1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries
on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been
very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the
most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series
of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject
[Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of
metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly
in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately
and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote
ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the
nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke
and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature
of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there
should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic
thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third
quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started
in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century
Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr
Cakravarttî's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some
of the dates mentioned in this section.]

[Footnote 2: _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunatha as well as his
_Padârthatattvanirûpa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions.]

309

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical
expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted
even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate
and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit
ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the
importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it
can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by
attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that
so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned,
though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account
of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently
worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account
of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic
_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's
_Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra_, _Nyâyâvatâra_ of Siddhasena Divâkara
(533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) _Parîk@sâmukha sûtra_, and
_Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and
_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.
_Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ and _Nyâyapraves'a_ of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.),
_Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ_ and _Nyâyabindu_ of Dharmakîrtti
(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most
interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].
The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and
Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on
Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the
present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the _Vâtsyâyana
bhâ@sya_ and the Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ no Hindu work on logic
of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the
science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and
the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya
that roused Udyotakara to write the _Vârttika_. The Buddhist and
the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics
as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we
come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of
importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely _Nyâyasâra_
of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na,
for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

310

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya
interest [Footnote ref 1].


The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness
took a common-sense view of things, and held that
things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange
themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues
to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by
the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce
an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or
through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence
is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver
did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.
Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding
environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general
characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things
are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and
on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but
accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bhûtas_), earth
(_k@siti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atoms
are eternal; the fifth substance (_âkâs'a_) is all pervasive and eternal.
It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading
and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests
sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows
itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves
to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf
man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear
on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense
organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence
of time (_kâla_) as extending from the past through the present to the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to
have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be
acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should
refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr.
Cakravarttî in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system.
Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded
since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some
minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those
of the other. The original character of the two systems has already
been treated.]

[Footnote 3: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 59-64.]

311

endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could
have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account
for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya
did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit
of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its
own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms
and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity
is a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the
order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But
kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by
itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself
as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present,
and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things
in its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The
astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets.
These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception
of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless
substance which appears as many in association with the changes
related to it [Footnote ref l].

The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance
by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the
right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is
also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight
directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth
substance is the soul _(âtman)_ which is all-pervading. There are
separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings
of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to _âtman_. Manas (mind) is
the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;
all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are
generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the
objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with
the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling,
or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have
a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience
is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not
simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 64-66, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp.
136-139. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ regarded time as the cause of things
which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayamañjarî_, p. 140.]

312

of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas
the other things such as quality (_gu@na_), action (_karma_), sameness
or generality (_sâmânya_), speciality or specific individuality
(_vis'e@sa_) and the relation of inherence (_samavâya_) cannot show
themselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus the
place of rest (_âs'rayâ_) on which all the others depend (_âs'@rta_).
Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original
entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1].
When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and
a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way
of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics
and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any
passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and
attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref
2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to
reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor
dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands
of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The
entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying
principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there
must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the
percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types
or categories (_padârtha_), and held that the notion of each type
was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in
number--dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red
book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which
rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the
book a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that which
has the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also gu@na and
karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the
same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with
Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Abhâva_ (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is
mentioned in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. Later Nyâya writers such as
Udayana include _abhâva_ as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a
contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not
counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva--"_abhâvasya
prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât_." _Nyâyakandalî_,
p. 6, and _Lak@sa@nâvalî_, p. 2.]

[Footnote 2: "_Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su
do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni
karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni
asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h
prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati
paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât._" _Ibid._ p. 7.]

313

whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name
of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l].
They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate
mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions
could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or
not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences
which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate
entities or categories.


The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya,
Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padârtha_) we have
already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to
the others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _rûpa_
(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone
and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue,
yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are
found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are
permanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat
is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that
heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the
old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour
is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general
name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rûpatva_
(colourness), and the rûpa gu@na (quality) is that on which
rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended
by the eye.

The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be
apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent
(_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@sâya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap
have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like
rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must
be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are
apprehended by the tongue.

The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be
apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo
vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâveka@h." See Pa@n@ditâs'oka's _Avayavinirâkarana,
Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_.

[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of words.]

314

or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence
of earth materials.

The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended
only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold,
hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and
vâyu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there
been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.

The sixth is sa@mkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging
to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three,
etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative
oscillatory state of the mind (_apek@sâbuddhi_); thus when there are
two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and
that is another jug. This is called apek@sâbuddhi; then in the
two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an
indeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in us
and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs.
The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a
similar manner [Footnote ref 1].

The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in
things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and
speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is
called _parima@n@dala parimâ@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate
the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;
when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is not
the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and
the _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_),
for then the size (_parimâ@na_) of it would have been still smaller
than the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the
measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the
small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but
then the number (sa@mkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as
bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)
measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka)
compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by
Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara
Mis'ra's _Upaskâra_, VII. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms
as eternal as in "paramâ@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The
parima@n@dala parimâ@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimâ@na. The
a@nuparimâ@na and the hrasvaparimâ@na represent the two dimensions of
the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference
to trya@nukas. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 133.]

315

(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_)
of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross
trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is
the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by
them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much
bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas
of mahat parimâ@na makes things of still more mahat parimâ@na.
The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat
but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâ@na has to be admitted
as coexisting with mahat parimâ@na but not identical, for
things not only appear as great but also as long (_dîrgha_). Here
we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation
of "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dîrgha_) parimâ@na, and hence
the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater
and longer than the individual atoms which composed them.
Now the hrasva parimâ@na of the dyads is not regarded as having
a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct
type of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation
of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,
grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the
hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva
parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of
the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the
trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if
the atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regarded
as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas,
then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic
than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should
not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced
by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be
regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign
to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the
cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness
and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to
generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.
But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to
be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are
not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued
that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the
measure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause

316

of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimâ@na, hrasva
parimâ@na, mahat parimâ@na, and dîrgha parimâ@na. The parimâ@na
of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive,
is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimâ@nas
of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded
as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimâ@nas as belonging to
non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of
things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things
appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is
perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation
such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by
virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is _vibhâga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na which
destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give
rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote
and near.

The other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness),
_du@hkha_ (sorrow), _icchâ_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and
_yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of
which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness)
belongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@mskâra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_
(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,
(2) _sthiti-sthâpaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing
tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhâvanâ_
is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by
which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].
_Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy
happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic
of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which
things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through
unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India),
repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the
sa@mskâra becomes particularly strong. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 167.
Ka@nâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a
special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskâra,
memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality
of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit
that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasâmarthyam_). Sacrifice etc.
cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate
the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action
is destroyed its power (_sâmarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be
admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct
which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions
of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddhâ_), non-injury, doing good to all
beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of
anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,
fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of
duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by
Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to
these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and
attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma
which brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga
account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 272-280).
See also Vallabha's _Nyâyalilâvatî_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

317

the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a
man to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of
things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and
arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with
their merits or demerits.

_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must
be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There
are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,
(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of
karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the
things to which they belong to move.

_Sâmânya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect
of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite
of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of
them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.
In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all
perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness,
which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na,
and karma. This sameness is called _sâmânya_ or _jâti_, and it is
regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or
karma. This highest genus _sattâ_ (being) is called _parajâti_ (highest
universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower
universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or
still more intermediate jâtis such as _gotvâjâti_ (the genus cow),
_nîlatvajâti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera
sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as
_pas'utva_ (animal jâti) and _gotva_ (the cow jâti); here however
gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti.
The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which
from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

318

This jâti or _sâmânya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate
independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and
karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent
reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow
was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception
of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this
is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who
should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent
reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns
on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika said that negation
of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived
as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained
by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has
thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as
sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that
object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even
with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the
latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single
sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees
with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the
existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.
The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated
souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing
running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the
sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have
known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action
of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If
there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish
jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the
action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should
require one common factor to hold them together, then these should
require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.
Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent
(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Sâmânya is
such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to
exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past
experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and
transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya
can be pointed out as being externally perceptible
--_Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ_--in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_. The Vedanta
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know
jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See _Vedântaparibhâsâ_,
_Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabhâ_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's
_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,
for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati
tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam_).]

319

is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the
yogins who can perceive them.

_Samavâya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation
by virtue of which two different things such as substance and
attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana
(cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified
that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.
This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why
substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance
and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they
are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place
between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected
and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put
my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances
and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by
virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya
however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and
gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as
one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a
separate and independent category. This is not regarded as
many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because
it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed
but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being
by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padârthas or independent
realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that
view of things which finds expression in our language, and which
we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of
samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance
and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sûtrabhâ@sya II. ii. 13_)
that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different
things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with
either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that
another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasthâ_).
Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to
remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of
_anavasthâ_--_prâmâ@nikî_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question
of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another
_aprâmâ@nikî anavasthâ_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of
anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

320

they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and sâmânya, Vis'e@sa they
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed
the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the
doctrine of _asatkâryavâda_. This is just the opposite of the
Sâ@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nâbhâvo
vidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never be
produced (_nâsato vidyate bhâvah_). The objection to this view is
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible
things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced
was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mîmâ@msâ that an unseen power resides in the
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for
there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental
operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained
by molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing
except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)
between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of
an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what
succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well
(_anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ_). Unconditionality
and invariability are indispensable for _kâryakâra@na-bhâva_ or
cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or
adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also
be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only
collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional
upon something else (_na svâtantrye@na_). The potter's stick is an
unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamuñjari_, p. 494.]

321

of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment
or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is
not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be
regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable
antecedents or what enters into the production of their
co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they
are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those
of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the
sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably
precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the
substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into
the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional
antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration
of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the
conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent
of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar),
the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the
potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be
unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally
all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with
or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded
as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly
remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to
complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral,
secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the
irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of
energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of
an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda
eva bhautiko vyâpâra@h karotyartha@h atîndriyastu vyâparo
nâsti._ Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically
reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious
causal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all
energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya--its
insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations
of the different causal conditions--that these operations are of
the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds
to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy,
i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely
repudiates the Sâ@mkhya conception of power or productive

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

322

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atîndriya_) and finds
nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements
of operative conditions (_kâra@na-sâmagrî_), and nothing
in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results
from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].
Certain general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time
(_kâla_), the will of Îs'vara, destiny (_ad@r@s@ta_) are regarded
as the common cause of all effects (_kâryatva-prayojaka_). Those are
called _sâdhâra@na-kâra@na_ (common cause) as distinguished from the
specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called
_sâdhâra@na kâra@na_. It may not be out of place here to notice that
Nyâya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanism
of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of
metaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which constitutes a
system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical
systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species,
is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained
only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in
presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from
a certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or identity of
essence [Footnote ref 2].

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the
_samavâyi-kâra@na_ of the jug. _Samavâya_ means as we have seen
an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kâra@na is called
_samavâyi_ when its materials are found inseparably connected
with the materials of the effect. Asamavâyi-kâra@na is that which
produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of
the samavâyi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of
the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the
colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay
in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This
colour of the clay is thus called the asamavâyi cause of the jug.
Any quality (_gu@na_) or movement which existing in the samavâya
cause in the samavâya relation determines the characteristics of
the effect is called the asamavâyi-kâra@na. The instrumental

___________________________________________________________________


[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the
Ancient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_ on Buddhism.
_Nyâyamañjarî Bhâ@sâ-pariccheda_, with _Muktâvalî_ and _Dinakarî_, and
_Tarkas@mgraha_. The doctrine of Anyathâsiddhi was systematically
developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]

323

_nimitta_ and accessory (_sahakâri_) causes are those which help the
material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel
and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakãri
causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent,
before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it
holds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in
the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the
black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an
extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay
jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the
colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important
exception is to be found in the case of the production of
the parimâ@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced
by the parimâ@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their
number as we have already seen.


Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems
except the Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika
view Îs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings
desires to bring about dissolution (_sa@mhâreccho bhavati_). Simultaneously
with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and
forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act
(_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further bodies, senses,
or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about
of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Îs'vara)
the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations
as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to
the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then
all vâyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated
with dharma, adharma and past impressions (_sa@mskâra_) remain
suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that
souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless,
non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected
with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of
manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sûtras of both the systems seem to be
silent on the matter.]

324

atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the
part of Îs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to
give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Îs'vara wishes to create and this desire
of Îs'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal
desire of Îs'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)
as accessory causes (_sahakâri_) helps the disintegration of atoms
and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process
of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.
When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called
ad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this
ad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.
At the time of creation action first begins in the vâyu atoms by
the kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls
with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact
with one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a
similar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vâyu originates.
After vâyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water
atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth
atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the
gross form, the god Brahmâ and all the worlds are created by
Îs'vara and Brahmâ is directed by Îs'vara to do the rest of the
work. Brahmâ thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of
the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Îs'vara brings
about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good
of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they
may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for
the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Îs'vara
arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of
pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in
our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes
or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyâya
books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmâ as deputy
for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma
according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and
creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of
men, or that it may be due to a mere play (_lîlâ_) of Îs'vara.
Îs'vara is one, for if there were many Îs'varas they might quarrel.
The will of Îs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 48-54.]

325

but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it
our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of
pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the
exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.
The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.
Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications
take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire
(_icchâ_) of Îs'vara may thus be compared with the _icchâ_ of Îs'vara
as we find it in the Yoga system.


Proof of the Existence of Îs'vara.

Sâ@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient
to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The
Mîmâ@msakas, the Cârvâkas, the Buddhists and the Jains all
deny the existence of Îs'vara (God). Nyâya believes that Îs'vara
has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing
atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If
this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement
must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose,
but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a
collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual
objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world
being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any
other effect. The objection made against this view is that such
effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents
as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers,
oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects
that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have
a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The
answer that Nyâya gives is that the concomitance between two
things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific
peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had
seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had
thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is
fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small
fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead
us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large
volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be
sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

326

Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects
are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably
and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore
being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Îs'vara has no visible
body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that
we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are
not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyâya
answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also
effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not
because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot
be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was
no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point
to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done
it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate
for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots
as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause.
This cause is Îs'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful.
At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our
father who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].


Tht Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Physics.

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms.
These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity
(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour,
taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of
heat. Âkâs'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being
only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel
wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination
is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot
exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric
air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (_dvya@nuka_). Two,
three, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser molecules
of trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the
generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed
out by Dr B.N. Seal in his _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, that
the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's
_Kusumâñjali_ with _Prakâs'a_ and _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha.]

[Footnote 2: _Kadâcit tribhirârabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadâcit
caturbhirârabhyate kadâcit pañcabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpanâ.
Nyâyakandalî_, p. 32.]

327

they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into
groups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition
of one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]." Of course the
atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It
must however be noted in this connection that behind this
physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, the
will of Îs'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony
with the principle of a "moral government of the universe,"
so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the
due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance
thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer
qualitative changes under the influence of heat (_pâkajotpatti_)"
The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into the
atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining
them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge
reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other
molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for
the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sika
holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then
change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination,
under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine
of _pîlupâka_ (heating of atoms). Nyâya on the other hand thinks
that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities,
but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the
influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyâya directly affects
the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without
effecting a change in the atoms. Nyâya holds that the
heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and
thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is
not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for
such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is
called the doctrine of _pi@tharapâka_ (heating of molecules). This
is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyâya
and Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2].

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamh@itâ_ I. 7.]

[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191,
_Nyâyamañjarî_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _Vârttika_. There is very little
indication in the Nyâya and _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ that they had any of
those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of
these matters in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ (VII. 1), the _Nyâya sûtras_ are
almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory
of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after
Vâtsyâyana.]

328

atoms of the same bhûta or of many bhûtas. According to the
Nyâya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same
bhûta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the
compound of the same bhûta are due only to diverse collocations
of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no
difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed,
since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact
of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and
heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes
etc. in the original bhûta atoms. The change of these physical
characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances
in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the
species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks
bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms
separate bodies with them.

Pras'astapâda (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in
the higher compounds of the same bhûta the transformation takes
place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound
molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound
and not in the original atoms of the bhûta entering into the composition
of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd,
the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined
as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the
milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the
original bhûta of which the milk is a modification. The change
as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule
has not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again in
the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in
the Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments
of other bhûtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth
atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal
heat and biomotor force vâyu to form the germ (_kalala_). But
when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the
blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of
the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically
determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm.
These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of
the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1].
This atomic contact is called _ârambhaka-sa@myoga_.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences,_ pp. 104-108, and
_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 33-34, "_S'arîrârambhe paramânava eva kâra@nam na
s'ukra-s'onitasannipâta@h kriyâvibhâgâdinyâyena tayorvinâs'e sati
utpannapâkajai@h paramâ@nubhirârambhât, na ca s'ukras'onitaparamâ@nûnâ@m
kas'cidvis'e@sa@h pârthivatvâvis'e@sât....Pitu@h s'ukra@m mâtuh s'onita@m
tayos sannipâtânantara@m ja@tharânalasambandhât s'ukra-s'onitârambhake@su
paramâ@nu@su pûrvarûpâdivinâs'e samâ@nagu@nântarotpattau
dvya@nukâdikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrântahkara@napraves'o...tatra
mâturâhâraraso mâtrayâ sa@mkrâmate, ad@r@s@tavas'âttatra
punarja@tharânalasambandhât kalalârambhakaparamâ@nu@su
kriyâvibhâgadinyâyena kalalas'arîre na@s@te samutpannapâkajai@h
kalalârambhakaparamâ@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'âd
upajâtakriyairâhâraparamâ@nitbhi@h saha sambhûya
s'arîrântaramârakkyate."_.]

329


In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is
another kind of contact called _upa@s@tambha_. Thus in the case of
such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms
cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by
the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the
infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar
qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds
are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vâyu atoms form the
inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g.
gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding
upa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)
are regarded as physical mixtures.

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the
stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are
differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of
contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical
action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what
transforms flavour or taste.

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely
small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally
with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through
the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as
when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency
light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with _parispanda_
of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_).
In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound
back--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the
atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform
the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine
them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable
velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical
combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyâya writer says that
pâka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that

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[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]

330

changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates
or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the
same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When
grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of
heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into
such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].

In the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika system all action of matter on matter
is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) is
distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sâ@mkhya
doctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence)
to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore
to be subject to vibratory motion.


The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâ@na).

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the
most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We
have already seen that Sâ@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing
that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the
object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was
then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa.
The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to
a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence
of the self.

Nyâya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage
of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably,
and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_sâmagrî_)
which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well
as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted
and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus
called pramâ@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge
[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyâyabodhinî_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2: "_Avyabhicârinîmasandigdhârthopalabdhi@m vidadhatî
bodhâbodhasvabhâvâ sâmagrî pramâ@nam._" _Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 12.
Udyotakara however defined "pramâ@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of
knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have
followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyâpâra or movement of
the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with
them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vâcaspati says: "_siddhamindriyâdi,
asiddhañca tatsannikar@sâdi vyâpârayannutpâdayan kara@na eva caritârtha@h
kar@na@m tvindriyâdi tatsannikar@sâdi vâ nânyatra caritarthamiti
sâk@sâdupalabdhâveva phale vyâprîyate._" _Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p. 15. Thus it
is the action of the senses as pramâ@na which is the direct cause of
the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken
place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as
causes in some sense. _"Pramât@rprameyayo@h. pramâne
caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.
Pramât@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetû kathañcit."
Ibid._ p. 16.]

331

the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only
their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for
sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal
collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of
course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated
from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the
preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate
cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions,
the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in
upamâna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage
of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,
capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for
the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements
all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce
further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations
that is called pramâ@na.

Nyâya argues that in the Sâ@mkhya view knowledge originates
by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular
state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does
not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains
within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept
(knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however,
neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as
it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental
contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance
or appearance or illusion, then the Sâ@mkhya has to admit
that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge
is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sâ@mkhyists have
precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine
that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the
knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the
rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither
is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the
knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is
evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

332

express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are
both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes
this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the
object. The doctrine of the Vijñâna vâdins, that it is knowledge
alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also
irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object
in such a manner that knowledge as object should require
the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we
might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also
require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on
_ad infinitum_. Again if pramâ@na be defined as _prâpa@na_ (capacity
of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being
momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot
be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called
pramâ@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of
knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like
any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same
way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes
intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent
element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production
on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena
are produced [Footnote ref 2].


The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya.

We know that the Carvâkas admitted perception (_pratyak@sa_)
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the
Vais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (_anumâna_);
Sâ@mkhya added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 12-26.]

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gañges'a,
a later naiyâyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of
our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with
the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to
successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure
that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be
successful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacintâma@ni_, K.
Tarkavâgîs'a's edition, _Prâmâ@nyavâda_.

"The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramâ@na. The view
that Vais'e@sika only admitted two pramâ@nas, perception and inference, is
traditionally accepted, _"pratyak@sameka@mcârvâkâ@h ka@nâdasugatau puna@h
anumânañca taccâpi,_ etc." Pras'astapâda divides all cognition (_buddhi_)
as _vidyâ_ (right knowledge) and _avidyâ_ (ignorance). Under _avidyâ_ he
counts _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or
error), _anadhyavasâya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who
had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it
may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidyâ_) is of four kinds,
perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages
(_âr@sa_). Interpreting the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.
i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy
character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in
themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the
trustworthy character of their author. _Arthâpatti_ (implication) and
_anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upamâna_
(analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as
faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

333

Nyâya adds a fourth, _upamâna_ (analogy). The principle on which
the four-fold division of pramâ@nas depends is that the causal
collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of
our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge
being different in each case, and the manner or conditions
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be
admitted that inference and s'abda are different pramâ@nas, though
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyâya
thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamâna
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production
of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different
pramâ@nas [Footnote ref 1].


Perception (Pratyak@sa).

The naiyâyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which
they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.
These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic
of that element of which they were composed. Thus the
ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of
âkâs'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The
eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects
by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.
The cognitive senses (_vâk, pâni, pâda, pâyu_, and _upastha_) recognized
in Sâ@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such
for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the
general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the
contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error
not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:

  _Sâmagrîbhedâi phalabhedâcca pramâ@nabheda@h
  Anye eva hi sâmagrîphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h
  Anye eva ca sâmagrîphale s'abdopamânayo@h.    Nyâyamañjari_, p. 33.]

334

as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just
at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate
[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,
the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be
counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-pramâ@na_).
That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact
of the senses with the object is said to be the product of
the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate
(_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception
is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of
perception in which it appears without any association with name.
Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage
is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics
and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete
experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their
characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no
association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the
names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate
perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time
of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known
to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should
be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that
product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results
from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with
the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is
held by the later naiyâyikas that we are not conscious of it
directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first
stage without which the determinate consciousness could not
arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage
in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the
other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.
The contact of the sense with the object is regarded
as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called
sa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing
(_sa@myukta-samavâya_) in which they inhere in samavâya (inseparable)
relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in
the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness
(rûpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavâya relation.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great reputation, describes
perception as immediate awareness (_pratyak@sasya sâk@sâtkâritvam
lak@sa@nam_).]

335

This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavâya,
for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour
is in samavâya relation, and in the specific colour there is the
colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavâya
relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavâya
by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory
sense is âkâs'a and the sound exists in âkâs'a in the samavâya
relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar
kind of contact called samaveta-samavâya. (5) The generic
character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived
by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavâya. (6) There is
another kind of contact by which negation (_abhâva_) is perceived,
namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so
called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is
qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in
this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug
is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along
with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen
that Nyâya admits not only the substances and qualities but all
kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly
apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika theory
of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the
contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception
of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its
usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception
and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and
the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact
between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge
is indeed _arthaprakâs'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called
perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its
production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with
which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with
the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not
only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with
the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.
The senses according to Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have
seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental
(_atîndriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory

336

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].
The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,
but is one which is similar to the effects produced by
the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When
I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch
not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the
universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also
with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The
result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _âlocanajñâna_
(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the
memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character
(_sukhasâdhanatvasm@rti_) and as a result of that I perceive the
orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref
2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable
object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception
through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant
cause (sahakâri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand
the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon
understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though
this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,
yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,
it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and
hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive
intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact
and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is
in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.
Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable
condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses
be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals
associated with them but also with negation. A perception is
erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does
not possess (_atasmi@mstaditi_) and right knowledge (_pramâ_) is that
which presents an object with a character which it really has

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:

  _Na khalvatîndriyâ s'aktirasmâbhirupagamyate
  yayâ saha na kâryyasya sambandhajñânasambhava@h.

  Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 2:

  _Sukhâdi manasâ buddhvâ kapitthâdi ca cak@su@sâ
  tasya karanatâ tatra manasaivâvagamyate...
  ...Sambandhagraha@nakâle yattatkapitthâdivi@sayamak@sajam
  jñânam tadupâdeyâdijñânaphalamiti bhâ@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam
  sukhasâdhanatvajñânamupâdeyajñânam.

  _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]

337

(_tadvati tatprakârakânubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of
perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object,
but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions
that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as
a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a
desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate
stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus
far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is
concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the
similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream
that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes
that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing
of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense
is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the
characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by
illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is
no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant
memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This
doctrine of illusion is known as _viparîtakhyâti_ or _anyathâkhyâti._ What
existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (_h@rdaye
parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhâsanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika
as interpreted by Pras'astapâda and S'rîdhara is in full agreement
with Nyâya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as Vais'e@sika
calls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the right
thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion
consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].

I have pointed out above that Nyâya divided perception into
two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)
according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vâcaspati
says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a
particular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or
_nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the
universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Nyâyavârttika_, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's
_Tattvacintâma@ni,_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]

[Footnote 2: "_Indriye@nâlocya marîcîn uccâvacamuccalato nirvikalpena
g@rhîtvâ pas'câttatropaghâtado@sât viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo
bhrânto jâyate tasmâdvijñânasya uvabhicâro nârthasya,_ Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparyatîkâ_," p. 87.]

[Footnote 3: _Nyâyamañjarî,_ p. 88.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 184.]

[Footnote 6: _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 177-181, "_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na
do@sasahakârinâ rajatasa@mskârasacivena sâd@rs'yamanurundhatâ
s'uktikâvi@sayo rajatâdhyavasâya@h k@rta@h._"]

338

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange."
The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with
the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage,
the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not
as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and
attribute (_jâtyâdisvarûpâvagâhi na tu jâtyâdînâ@m mitho
vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhâvâvagâhîti yâvat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks
that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated
with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in
perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do
not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary
persons, for the association of the names and relations could be
distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].
S'rîdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely
in agreement with the above view of Vâcaspati. Thus S'rîdhara says
that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived
but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory
of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification
such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the
universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not
consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this,"
which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].
Vâcaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others,
but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite
subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyâya
writers however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different
opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge
means the knowledge of mere predication without any association
with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.
But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa
stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual
cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tâtparya@tikâ_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91,
"_prathamamâlocito'rtha@h sâmânyavis'e@savân._"]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p.84, "_tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmara@nâya
pûrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyaya@h._"]

[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "_ata@h savikalpakamicchatâ
nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram g@rh@nâti bhedasyâpi
pratibhâsanât nâpi svalak@sa@namâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi sa@mvedanât
vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânya@m
vis'e@sañcobhayamapi g@rh@nâti yadi paramida@m sâmânyamayam vis'e@sa@h
ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât,
pi@ndântarânuv@rttigraha@nâddhi sâmânya@m vivicyate,
vyâv@rttigraha@nâdvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h._"]

339

not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible
to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a
quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate
(_vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajñânam prati hi vis'e@sa@natâvacchedakaprakâra@m
jñâna@m kâra@na@m_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge
such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must
be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the
indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected
with universality or any other relations (_jâtyâdiyojanârahita@m
vais'i@s@tyânavagâhi ni@sprakârakam nirvikalpaka@m_) [Footnote ref 2].
But this stage is never psychologically experienced (_atîndriya_)
and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic
conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate
with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî,
"the cognition which does not involve relationing
cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know
the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower,
the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of
jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the
predicative quality (_vis'e@sa@natâvacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'
which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the
knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative
quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge
of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at
which the universal or the pure predication should be known
and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though
not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably
necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an
universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be
related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'e@sika
admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which
the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary
particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals
and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the
perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced
by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception
consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), gu@na (quality),

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvacintâma@ni_ p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: _Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Bhâ@sâpariccheda kârikâ_, 58.]

340

kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref
1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are
not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication
of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the
false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the
quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a
thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The
same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different
from that which moves. But name is completely different
from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified,
and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it
was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are
altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now
as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference
of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists,
for we know that Nyâya and Vais'e@sika believe jâti, gu@na
and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating
of them of substance as different categories related to it
at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as
erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the
memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make
the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot
in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated
until the second stage through the joint action of memory
is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in
order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in
mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated
with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there
cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the
Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should
identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which
was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual
perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of
memory or past impressions (_sa@mskâra_) this can be considered
as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be
the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 93-100, "_Pañca caite kalpanâ bhavanti
jâtikalpanâ, gu@nakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti,
tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât
kalpanâ ucyante._" See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.
See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]

341

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an
effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an
object of past experience refers to a past time and place and
is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with
an object which is experienced at the present moment. It
has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory
for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception
which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see
that early Nyâya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception
as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and
differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with
the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual
development of perception as the progressive effects of causal
operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the
self and the object under the influence of various intellectual
(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes,
it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only
give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation
as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon
the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense
and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy
and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds
of contact of a transcendental nature called _sâmânyalak@sa@na,
jñânalak@sa@na_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact sâmânyalak@sa@na
is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a
particular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with all
the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding
universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and
through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated
with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all
smoke in general. Jñânalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which
we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving
by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of
sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only,
but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact
of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental
contact (_alaukika sannikar@sa_) by virtue of which this is rendered

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tâtparya@tîkâ_, pp. 88-95.]

342

possible is called jñânalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by
these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].

Pleasures and pains (_sukha_ and _du@hkha_) are held by Nyâya
to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets,
conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to
appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel
that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot
be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then
that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated
the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should
have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,
it is evident that there must be some differences between the
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case
was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha,
This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge.
Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated
by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes
in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most
distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive
the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Kârikâ_ 63 and 64. We must remember
that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the
_Nyâya sûtra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception
should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character
of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception
as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle
(_Tattvacintâma@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him
as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the
definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by
Udyotakara as mentioned above.]

343

and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna,
which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form
of perception called mânasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept
visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive
that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the
eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual
percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception
is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyak@sa however is
that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.
When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective
cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to
the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by
the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition
which had already been generated in the soul. This second
reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can
proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].


Inference.

Inference (_anumâna_) is the second means of proof (prâmâ@na)
and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has
been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a
thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated
with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember
that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire
in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically
called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been
made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term
"fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is
necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the pak@sa,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in
association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be
contrasted with the _triputîpratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabhâkara, which
holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously
in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a,
gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am
aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding
the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaha@m
jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sâbhâvât
kintvida@mvi@sayakajñânatvavis'i@s@tasya jñânasya vais'i@styamâtmani
bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâd@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m
bhâsitumarhati, pûrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaha@m
jânâmiti na vyavasâya@h kintu anuvyavasâyah." _Tattvacintâma@ni_, p. 795.]

344

and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the
sâdhya in it (sapak@sa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the
sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must
not be present in any such object as does not possess the
sâdhya (_vipak@sa-vyâv@rtti_ absent from vipak@sa or that which does
not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be
such that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyak@sa_) or
the testimony of the s'âstra (_abâdhita-vi@sayatva_). The liñga
should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way
could also be possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of any
one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu
as determining the inference, and thus would only make the
hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or
seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.
Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible
is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the
pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically
called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type,
technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case
that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being
created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {_vipak@sa_), namely
non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality
which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type,
technically called _anaikântika-hetu_, is found in the case that
sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being
an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is
present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well
as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the
sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the
sâdhya is not absolute (_anaikântika_). A fallacy of the fourth
type, technically called _kâlâtyayâpadi@s@ta_, may be found in the
example--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.
Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is
fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakara@nasama_, is to be
found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same
time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the
doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâ@msâ did. Eternality
of sound meant with Mîmâ@msâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal
indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under
certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of
movement of the vocal muscles.]

345

since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like
âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against
inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are
valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity
of nature in two relations, viz. _tâdâtmya_ (essential
identity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and
effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not
of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer
that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related
to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of
the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a
pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity
(_tâdâtmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of
succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable
association (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of
which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions
noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific
relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the
inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the
essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument
that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;
for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both
ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a
pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with
those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential
identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)
with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.
The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)
is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the
case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of
other types of inference, where the association as cause and
effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is
inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the
li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted
above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was
associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjari_ on anumâna.]

346

that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we
perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered
the concomitance (_vyâpti_) of smoke and fire which we had
observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,
which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we
concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the
li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its
concomitance with fire (_t@rtîya-li@nga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause
(_anumitikara@na_ or _anumâna_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The
concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyâpti._ When
this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with
those having fire, it is called _bahirvyâpti_; and when it refers to the
conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any
relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was
observed, it is called _antarvyâpti._ The Buddhists since they did
not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti
view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref
1].

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference
will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign
(_hetu_) with the signate (_sâdhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in
each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyâptigraha_)
had been correct, and the observation of concomitance
had been valid. The Mîmâ@msâ school held, as we shall see in
the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case
in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases
I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there
was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.
But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where
there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in
all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any
smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should
be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire
should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically
called _anvayavyâpti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyâpti._ But even this
is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a
hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have
been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but
it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyâptisamarthana,_ by Ratnâkaras'ânti in the _Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]

347

or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It
may be that one might never have observed smoke without an
antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even
that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in
a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass
produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained
the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately
followed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam
yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyâyamañjarî,_
p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of
concomitance (_vyâpti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But
of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the
above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu,
and there might be some other condition (_upâdhi_) associated
with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire
in green wood (_ârdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might
doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced
smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.
But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged
in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would
have to be dispensed with (_vyâghâta_). Thus such doubts as
lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or
unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we
had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The
Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method
of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (_vyâptigraha_),
but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance
always depended on a relation of cause and effect
or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the
relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of
genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was
quite a number of other types of inference which could not be
brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the
tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening
other things would happen could certainly exist, even
without the supposition of an identity of essence.

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often
have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ on anumâna and vyâptigraha.]

[Footnote 2: _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ on vyâptigraha, and _Tattvacintâma@ni_ of
Ga@nges'a on vyâptigraha.]

348

infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however
that though different causes are often found to produce
the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one
effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its
other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found
that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other
effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy
downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water
of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of
the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits
that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the
rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street
of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,
the special manner in which the water flows by small
rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was
due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we
see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform
and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists
assumed _a priori_ principles of causality or identity of essence.
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya
works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves
assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with
the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but
that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in
a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce
smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to
produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition
(_upâdhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on
account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and
so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in
the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so
in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the
validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that
there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned
the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide
experience (_bhûyodars'ana_).

Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that
(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of
the reason" described a valid reason (_li@nga_) as that which is connected
with the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists
wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

349

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya
qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and _vipak@sâsattva_ of
a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say
that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family
name of Ka@nâda) said. Ka@nâda says that we can infer a cause
from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one
thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition
or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We
can infer by a reason because it is duly associated
(_prasiddhipûrvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this
association was according to Ka@nâda can also be understood for
he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association,
the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred
or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful
existence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has
horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns.
Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for
there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though
a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The
first fallacy is a combination of pak@sâsattva and sapak@sâsattva,
for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no
horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva,
for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,
it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view
of Ka@nâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever
there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the
smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that
there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nâda's enumeration of types of
inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect
from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the
only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing
the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection
such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides
inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics
of one member of a class to another member of the same
class), and sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is
that where the previously known case and the inferred case is
exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point
out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of
flesh on its neck (_sâsnâ_), I can whenever I see the same hanging

350

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But
when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended
to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta.
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded
with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,
namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with
the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of
heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citârtha_)
is expressed in five premisses for convincing others
who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then
the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction
of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna
(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.
Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes
of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be
conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is
called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an
entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nâda
himself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@m
kâryyakâra@nasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati_). The five premisses which are
called in Nyâya _pratijñâ, hetu d@r@s@tânta, upanaya,_ and _nigamana_
are called in Vais'e@sika _pratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna_,
and _pratyâmnâya_. Ka@nâda however does not mention the name
of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ is
of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is
very similar to Nyâya d@r@s@tânta, but the last two are entirely
different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence
(e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of
an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has
no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).
He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

___________________________________________________________________

{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na says that "An example before the time of
Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the
understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has
smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable
to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that
is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection
between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because
it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_,
pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example
as "like a kitchen" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvâdanuya@h sthâlyâdivat_,
I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether
Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dig@nnâga or Dig@nnâga from Pras'astapâda
cannot be easily settled.]

351

(_nidars'anâbhâsa_). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist
of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of
the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so
different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable
to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional
Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely
indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being
pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyâya. There is
no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything
from Di@nnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,
for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations
are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nâda himself, and
Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the
question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved
that Di@nnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever
to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most
important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference
can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through
the memory of the connection between the middle and the major
previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it
is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the
connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded
as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to
inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is
_li@ngaparâmars'a_, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the
minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major,
for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection,
but the present perception of the middle associated with
the memory of the connection (_sm@rtyanug@rhîto li@ngaparâmars'o_).
But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.
Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have
no reference to this point The doctrine of _tâdâtmya_ and _tadutpatti_
was therefore in all probability a new contribution to
Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was
that the root principle of the connection between the middle and
the major was that the former was either identical in essence
with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a
mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya with _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 200-255.]

352

the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of
this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a
separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence
such that there being fire there is smoke and there being
no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with
perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the
smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless
it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated,
it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately
preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of
argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke
can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time
and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many
cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause
and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this
morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of
identity of essence (_tâdâtmya_ as in the case of the pine and the
tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be
inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described
in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are
naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when
such is the case, though we may not know any further about the
nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former
and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under
certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there
may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate
the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if
even after observing a large number of cases and careful search
such conditions (_upâdhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to take
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural
connection between the middle and the major. The later
Buddhists introduced the method of _Pañcakâra@nî_ in order to
determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions
determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the
effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate
succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Kâryyakâra@nubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât avinâbhâvaniyamo'
dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p. 105.]

353

immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method
cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause
and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect
relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better
to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect
relation [Footnote ref 1].

In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described,
namely pûrvavat, s'e@savat, and sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta. Pûrvavat is the
inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from
heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects,
e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta
refers to the inference in all cases other than those of
cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the
tamarind from its form and colour. _Nyâyamañjarî_ mentions
another form of anumâna, namely paris'e@samâna (_reductio ad
absurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)
of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already
definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any
other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to
anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of
these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely
that of the inference of the probandum (_sâdhya_) by virtue of the
unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called
the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya)
a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an
important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and
kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the
vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of
instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,
as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever
there is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire,
there is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one's
own self (_svârthânumâna_) or for the sake of convincing others
(_parârthânumâna_). In the latter case, when it was necessary that
an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,
live propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namely
pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâhara@na
(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),
upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâya@na's bhâsya, Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ and
_Tâtparyya@tîkâ,_ I.i. 5.]

354

fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which
could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case
"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge
(_ida@m, vâcyam prameyatvât_)." Now no such case is known which
is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any
case where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) and
no name (_vâcyatva_); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based
necessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatva
or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name.
The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances
in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the
inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing
the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from
other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident
that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the
concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There
is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our
inference--earth differs from other elements, since it has the
special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in
those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such
special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.


Upamâna and S'abda.

The third pramâ@na, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by
Vais'e@sika, is _upamâna_, and consists in associating a thing unknown
before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some
other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never
seen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--"what
is gavaya?" and the forester replies--"oh, you do not
know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the
forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to
be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.
This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its
similarity to a known thing is called _upamâna_. If some forester
had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him
that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have
known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would
have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is
said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association
of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

355

on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown
animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough
realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of
similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind.
Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the
association of the name in accordance with the perception of
similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is
called _upamâna_ [Footnote ref 1].

S'abda-pramâ@na or testimony is the right knowledge which
we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful
persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the
Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us
right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the
utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit
s'abda as a separate pramâ@na, but they sought to establish the
validity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)
on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible
person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly
corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sûtras, which tacitly admit the
validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this
was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.


Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.

The problem of negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) is of great interest
in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only
from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_ on upamâna. The oldest Nyâya view was that
the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association
of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself
"upamâna." When Pras'astapâda held that upamâna should be treated as a
case of testimony (_âptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation
in view. But Udyotakara and Vâcaspati hold that it was not by the
instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name
"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and
the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the
perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories
that lead us to this association called upamâna. What Vâtsyâya@na
meant is not very clear, but Di@nnâga supposes that according to
him the result of upamâna was the knowledge of similarity or the
knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vâcaspati of course holds that
he has correctly interpreted Vâtsyâya@na's intention. It is however
definite that upamâna means the associating of a name to a new object
(_samâkhyâsambandhapratipattirupamânârtha@h_, Vâtsyâya@na). Jayanta
points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly
leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of
the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently
it cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astapâda
and _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 220-22, Vâtsyâya@na, Udyotakara, Vâcaspati and
Jayanta on _Upamâna_.]

[Footnote 2: See Kumârila's treatment of abhâva in the _S'lokavârttika_,
pp. 473-492.]

356

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the
next chapter, hold that negation (_abhâva_) appears as an intuition
(_mânam_) with reference to the object negated where there are no
means of ordinary cognition (_pramâ@na_) leading to prove the existence
(_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion
"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no
contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when
we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence
of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and
the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see
neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged
that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say
the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even
then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact,
which is absent in the other case, we could never say
that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and
remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises
the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual
perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were
no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence
at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he
is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where
he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware
of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even
without perceiving the place and without any operation of the
memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of
there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,
for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,
and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could
be regarded as a reason (_li@nga_), for the non-perception of the jug
is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no
concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and
its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of
non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty
about the notion of non-existence (_abhâva_) which was sought
to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be
admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process
of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of
non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception
of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.

357

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the
ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug
arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and
there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground
should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of
the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due
to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug
is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle
that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact
with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or
non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even
without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance,
and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact.
It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required
in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation
or non-existence of other places which are far away from him.
To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary
that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a
thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only
be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as
well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension
of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to
be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence
but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived
before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence
(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) can thus, according
to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive
existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere
vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not,"
as position (_bhâva_) is what generates the cognition "it is."

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold
that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with
specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);
but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think
that negation could thus be associated with them in any
relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its
_pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for
when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there
is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the
relation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if

358

the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,
for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without
effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation
is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the
nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it
will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it
will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or
that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception,
e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception--there
is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi
(non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there is
no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--there
is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi
(non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here,
since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception
of contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here because
of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory
effects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)
virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessity
destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposition of effects--there is not here the causes
which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here,
because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--there
is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);
(11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--this
place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it
is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation,
but that does not prove that there is any reason for the
cognition of negation (_heturnâbhâvasamvida@h_). All that we can
say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use
(_yogyatâ_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ
is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage
as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.
Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of
negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions
which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive
perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 53-7.]

359

leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug
(_anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati_) [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive
existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we
have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said
that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception
of the ground without the jug. But is this being without
the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then
it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even
when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over
the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a
distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground
with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground,
without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter
much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation
is apprehended by perception as much as any positive
existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;
just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects
there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of
negation with space and time with which it appears associated is
the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality
(_vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na_). The relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is
the other is not. The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva
in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the
commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika
the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _prâgabhâva_ (the
negation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug
before it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@msâbhâva_ (the negation
following the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyâbhâva_ (mutual
negation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Nyâyamañjarî_,
pp. 48-63.]

[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the
sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign
of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the
non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its
non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for
he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses
(_bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual
sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the
preception of non-existence (_abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi
abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî_), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]

360

in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantâbhâva_ (a negation which
always exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in
other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].


The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices
for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere
of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence
of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do
not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are
_tarka_, _nir@naya_, _vâda_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@dâ_, _hetvâbhâsa_, _chala_,
_jâti_ and _nigrahasthâna_.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern
its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of
some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not
inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right
conclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specific
nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the
conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two
opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the
doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them
tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is
called a _vâda_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants
give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents.
A jalpa is called a _vita@n@dâ_ when it is only a destructive
criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without
seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas
are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Nyâya_
sûtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetvâbhâsas_) of the middle (hetu):
_savyabhicâra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_
(tautology), _sâddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kâlâtîta _(inopportune).
Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove
opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible
like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because
it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha
is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a
jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with
reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects,
and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]

361

where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form
(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of
eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires
to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,
but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);
kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not
tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that
sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the
drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and
the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour
is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was
already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the
case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the
stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.
The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes,
(1) sâdhâra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhâra@na or too restricted
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhârin or unsubsuming
(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of
knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion
may also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that in
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)
is of three kinds (i) _âs'rayâsiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in
the sky), (2) _svarûpâsiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is
visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyâpyatvâsiddha_ is that
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence
is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because
there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated
with smoke. The fallacy _bâdhita_ is that which pretends to prove
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot
because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the
fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyâya practice

362

Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnâga also
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the
fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the
purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory
conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna
means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is
conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to
emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_ that these
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding
onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge
of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as
being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].


The doctrine of Soul.

Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded
consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were
other Cârvâkas called Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas who admitted the
existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.
The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.
The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics
mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.
They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,
etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 586-659, and _Târkikarak@sâ_ of
Varadarâja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]

363

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self
is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our
self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâ@msâ, for Nyâya holds
that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may
be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or
I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot
be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we
cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the
inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to
which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced
as a result of collocations. Never has the production of
âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any
destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not
located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at
the same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with
the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though
âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are
seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation
of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested
or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness
as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different
facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than
the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and
pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures
and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be
due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed
in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world
must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as
the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.


Îs'vara and Salvation.

Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of
inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâ@mkhya and the Buddhists did
not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic
arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence
of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta type.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See
_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 432 ff.]

364


The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the
world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never
produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to
this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an
effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips
occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in
nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a
result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the
atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of
the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a
difference between the order and arrangement of human productions
(e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;
and therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatâ_)
of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was
produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and
arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator
or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the
concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"
in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with
specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case
may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar
other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same
kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard
the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider
the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.
So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and
arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and
thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be
different from the order and arrangement of things produced by
man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would
not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many
effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground
without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold,
for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created
by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has
a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in
its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order
and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an
effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.
Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

365

so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus
omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not
require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without
any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is
always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the
karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or
protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the
results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless
can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in
the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the
universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any
association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception
of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body,
so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of
our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements
are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].

The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian
philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that
the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of
sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarva@m
du@hkha@m vivekina@h_); the wise therefore is never attached to the
so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyâjñâna_)
which consists in thinking as my own self that which
is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;
when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and
as Nyâya says, of the proofs (_pramâ@na_), the objects of knowledge
(_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is
attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can
be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipak@sabhâvanâ_),
namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any
pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but
pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it
will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction
of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and
ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of
Patañjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote:1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 190-204,_ Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha
S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusumâñjalî_.]

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fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with
it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment,
actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the
production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of
sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all
its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains
in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'e@sika
is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a
state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in
its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness
in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute
happiness (_ânanda_), though really speaking the state of mukti
can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in
its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,
knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 499-533.]



CHAPTER IX

MÎMÂ@MSÂ PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]


A Comparative Review.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of
an original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the Sâm@khya). Space, time,
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are
substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in
substances. Knowledge (_jñâna_) which illuminates all things is
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other
physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and
the objects of sense, knowledge (_jñâna_) is produced. Soul with
Nyâya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as
without it the different entities being without any principle of
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.

Sâ@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,
qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist
between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

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[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mîmâ@msâ see Chapter IV.]

368

that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three
types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within
them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge,
willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly
and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations
did not bring about any new thing but brought about a
phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another
form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them
merely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. Sâ@mkhya holds
however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness
and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact
this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter
into conscious thought or experience of a person.

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and
separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly
be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has
been pointed out by the Nyâya school in a very strong and
emphatic manner. Even Sâ@mkhya did not try to prove that the
existence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in
experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the
existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of
a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states
of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle
towards virtue and emancipation. Sâ@mkhya had first supposed
knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and
then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as
puru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here
in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by
the inadequate analysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as being
non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyâya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self
on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality,
and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis
is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances
and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature
of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was
a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance
in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon
the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their
conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious

369

thought. Of course it is true that Sâ@mkhya had approached
nearer to this view than Nyâya, but it had separated
the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it
threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite
unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem
to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification
of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this
could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--a
transcendent illusion running on from beginningless
time. These difficulties occurred because Sâ@mkhya soared to a
region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common
sense experience. The Nyâya position is of course much worse
as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything,
but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could
not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on
a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common
sense experience that substances are different from qualities and
actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the
whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is,
to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary
that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought
to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and
an account of experience should be given according to its verdict.
No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores
the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is
a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction
is ushered in by the Mîmâ@msâ system. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
were written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bhâ@sya_) on it was
written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made
by Kumârila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarâcârya, and a disciple
of Kumârila, Prabhâkara.


The Mîmâ@msâ Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew
in India in the Brâhma@nas. This system once set up gradually
began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details
of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some
generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of
India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old
rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

370

had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions
and doubts became more common about the many
intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries
into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and
priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâ@msâ (lit. attempts
at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were
different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
(which are with us the foundations of Mîmâ@msâ) are only a comprehensive
and systematic compilation of one school is evident from
the references he gives to the views in different matters of other
preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not
available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has
written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it
may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so
masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other
attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work
of the Mîmâ@msâ system. Commentaries were written on it by
various persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in _Nyâyaratnâkara_
verse 10 of _S'lokavârttika_), Bhavadâsa {_Pratijñasûtra_ 63}, Hari and
Upavar@sa (mentioned in _S'âstradîpikâ_). It is probable that at least
some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary
known as the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_. It is difficult to say anything
about the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngânâtha
Jhâ would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current
verse which speaks of King Vikramâditya as being the son
of S'abarasvâmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhâ@sya of S'abara
is the basis of the later Mîmâ@msâ works. It was commented
upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vârttikakâra by
Prabhâkara and merely referred to as "yathâhu@h" (as they say)
by Kumârila. Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ says that Prabhâkara's commentary
_B@rhatî_ on the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_ was based upon the work
of this Vârttikakâra. This _B@rhatî_ of Prabhâkara had another
commentary on it--_@Rjuvimâlâ_ by S'alikanâtha Mis'ra, who also
wrote a compendium on the Prabhâkara interpretation of Mîmâ@msâ
called _Prakara@napañcikâ_. Tradition says that Prabhâkara
(often referred to as Nibandhakâra), whose views are
often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumârila. Kumârila
Bha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary
of S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

371

exposition of S'abara's bhâ@sya in three parts known as _S'lokavârttika_
(dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's
work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as
Tarkapâda), _Tantravârttika_ (dealing with the remaining three
chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and
_@Tup@tîkâ_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)
[Footnote ref 1]. Kumârila is referred to by his later followers
as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapâda, and Vârttikakâra. The next great Mîmâ@msâ
scholar and follower of Kumârila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of
_Vidhiviveka, Mîmâ@msânukrama@nî_ and the commentator of _Tantravârttika,_
who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Pârthasârathi
Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'âstradîpikâ,
Tantraratna,_ and _Nyâyaratnamâlâ_ following the footprints
of Kumârila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumârila,
the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Kâs'ikâ_ and Somes'vara
the author of _Nyâyasudhâ_ deserve special notice. Râmak@r@s@na
Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapâda_ of
_S'âstradîpikâ_ called the _Yuktisnehapûra@nî-siddhânta-candrikâ_ and
Somanâtha wrote his _Mayûkhamâlikâ_ on the remaining chapters
of _S'âstradîpikâ_. Other important current Mîmâ@msâ works which
deserve notice are such as _Nyâyamâlâvistara_ of Mâdhava, _Subodhinî,
Mîmâ@msâbâlaprakâs'a_ of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, _Nyâyaka@nikâ_ of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, _Mîmâ@msâparibhâ@sa_ by K@r@s@nayajvan,
_Mîmâ@msânyâyaprakâs'a_ by Anantadeva, Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's
_Bha@t@tacintâma@ni,_ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been
consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the
Mîmâ@msâ literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all
Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the
sm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals
of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained
by them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance,
proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even
under the British administration is explained according to the
Mîmâ@msâ maxims. Its relations to the Vedânta philosophy will
be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this
chapter. The views of the two schools of Mîmâ@msâ as propounded
by Prabhâkara and Kumârila on all the important topics have

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Mahâmahopadhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî says, in his
introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, that "Kumârila preceded
Sa@nkara by two generations."]

372

also been pointed out. Prabhâkara's views however could not
win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that
he was regarded by Kumârila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly
any new contribution has been made to the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy
after Kumârila and Prabhâkara. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ deal mostly
with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in
connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be
gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and
vague. Vârttikakâra's views also can only be gathered from the
references to them by Kumârila and Prabhâkara. What we know
of Mîmâ@msâ philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.
It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the
subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do
not know of any work on Mîmâ@msâ written in English except
the excellent one by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ on the Prabhâkara
Mîmâ@msâ to which I have frequently referred.


The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the
Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ.

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge
(_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure
of the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude
of truth. The Mîmâ@msâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge
excepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory is
valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither
depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other
knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity
of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.
It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge
is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this
knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive
anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this
visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is
true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert
Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended
that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial
rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's.
Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by
him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views
were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara
was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was
alive. But this has of course no historic value.]

373

it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and
how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In
other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee
that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively
as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not
have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue
is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot
be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain
that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but
there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object
from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively
valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify
its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge,
and following our perception of even a mirage we should
never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions,
and this proves that when we practically follow the
directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity,
which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception
with what we find later on in practical experience. Again,
every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations,
and as such depends upon them for its production, and
hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.
It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for
validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and
attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People
only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically
in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of
a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with
our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes
of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of
knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the
object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyâjñâna_
or _phalajñâna_) just as perception or knowledge represented
them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of
knowledge (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_), but validity is ascertained by
_sa@mvâda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote
ref l].

It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the
supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective
collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 160-173.]

374

only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this
theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be
experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;
we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain
objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the
objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that
the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis
which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme
prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a
phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we
say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external
collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted
by experience; knowledge only photographs the
objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that
knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is
only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation
to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is
not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and
interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in
things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What
we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the
agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective
facts never come to us directly, they are always taken
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed
different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this
is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is
what is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-prâmâ@ya_) of knowledge
in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced,
objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

375

of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well
(_svakâryakara@ne svata@h prâmâ@nya@m jñânasya_). Whenever there
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work
(_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness
of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper
of mind. This is what Mîmâ@msa means when it says that the
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other
data (_jñânasya prâ@mâ@nyam svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m parata@h_). Knowledge
attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory
experience (_bâdhakajñâna_) comes in or when our organs etc. are
known to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@sajñâna). It is from
these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when
we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them
not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of
knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not
be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find
any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All
knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently
by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory
is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon
a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and
cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.


The place of sense organs in perception.

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it
could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so,
the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in

376

face of the Nyâya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the
ground of diverse sense-contact the Mîmâ@msâ probably could not
afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore
accepted the Nyâya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge
with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of
svata@h-prâmâ@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious of
a conflict between these two different principles of the production
of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked
at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts
of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by
virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a
matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge
are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but
when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses
must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to
be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one
knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge
as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence
of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the
physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be
operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred
later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic
of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge
which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later
on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it.
Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects
may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the
rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us
as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.

Prabhâkara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of
the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are
phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always
in the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments;
the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus
be regarded as the material cause (_samavâyikâra@na_); but there
must be some such movements or other specific associations
(_asamavâyikâra@na_) which render the production of this or
that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist
either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the
colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which

377

is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which
form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself
(e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a
substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial
cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put
in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is
eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that
the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must
inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again
accepting the Nyâya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities
in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some
other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul
acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances.
Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in
other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are
three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and
space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them.
Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise
of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind
of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul.
This atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone by
itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid
of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot
lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence
it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized
by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will
need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic
quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous
characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know
that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must
be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light,
and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognition
of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly
organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the
âkâs'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of
touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these
organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have
to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the
sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas

378

with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The
objects of perception are of three kinds,(1) substances, (2) qualities,
(3) jâti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of
earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic
states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste,
smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction,
priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
effort [Footnote ref l].

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that
Kumârila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of the
senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that
the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or
activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things
without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might
be entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref
2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.


Indeterminate and determinate perception.

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first
stage is called _nirvikalpa_ (indeterminate) and the second _savikalpa_
(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception
at the first moment of the association of the senses and
their objects. Thus Kumârila says that the cognition that appears
first is a mere _âlocana_ or simple perception, called non-determinate
pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling
the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around
himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is
presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the
individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate
perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist
view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality
(_svalak@sa@na_} and regards it as being the only valid element in
perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's
_Prabhâkaramimâ@msâ_, pp. 35 etc.]

[Footnote 2: _S'lokavârttika_, see _Pratyak@sasûtra_, 40 etc., and
_Nyâyaratnâkara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection that
Sâ@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyâya that the senses actually went
out to meet the objects (_prâpyakâritva_) but held that there was
a special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which the
senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars.
It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature
of the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Pârthasârathi objects
to it as being almost a different category (_tattvântara_).]

379

impositions. But both Kumârila and Prabhâkara think that both
the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate
stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because
we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in
contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or
differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in
comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined
characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a
class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features
in common with some other things; so we see that as other things
are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept
at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an
individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the
characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived
at the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things are
not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and
hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first
stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions
brings the present perception in relation to past ones
and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It
is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate
and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case
memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory
in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of
memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the
determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet
since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not
enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as
a valid cognition. Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in
holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception
valid [Footnote ref 2].


Some Ontological Problems connected with the
Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class (_jâti_) of a percept in relation to
other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference
between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems
of jâti and avayavâvayavî (part and whole notion) were

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by
S'rîdhara.]

[Footnote 2: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_ and _S'âstradîpikâ_.]

380

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering
into discussion about jâti, Prabhâkara first introduced the
problem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayavî_ (whole). He argues as
an exponent of svata@h-prâmâ@nyavâda that the proof of the true
existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness,
and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness
must be admitted to have its existence established. Following
this canon Prabhâkara says that gross objects as a whole exist,
since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material
cause and their connection (_sa@myoga_) is the immaterial cause
(_asamavâyikâra@na_), and it is the latter which renders the whole
altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and
it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the
whole is perceived. Kumârila holds that it is due to the point of
view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate
whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical,
but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing
appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it
from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing
appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see _S'lokavârttika,
Vanavâda_) [Footnote ref 1].

Jâti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is
different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its
entirety in each individual constituting that jâti (_vyâs'ajyav@rtti_),

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Sâ@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity
of the universal and the particular (_sâmânyavis'esasamudâyo dravyam,
Vyâsabhâsya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is
different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.
Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts
exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which
they exist close together (_mrantarâ hi tadavayavâh_), and it is this
latter combination (_ayutasiddhâvayava_) which is called a dravya, but
here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the
parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space
between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as
Panditâs'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), it
is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole
occupying space (_paramânava eva hi pararûpades'aparihârenotpannâh
parasparasahitâ avabhâsamânâ desavitânavanto bhavanti_). The whole
is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinirâkarana, Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless
_(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an
object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the
parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid
reason against it:

   "_adustakaranodbhûtamanâvirbhûtabâdhakam
   asandigdañca vijñânam katham mithyeti kathyate._"

_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 550 ff.]

381

but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the
argument that jâti should be denied, because it involves the conception
of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The
class character or jâti exists because it is distinctly perceived by
us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal
in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even
when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual
of that class (e g. cow class) comes into being, a new
relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is
brought into relation with the class-character existing in other
individuals, for inherence (_samavâya_) according to Prabhâkara
is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced
and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is
non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyâya
holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of
things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the
class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual,
nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of
class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With
the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new
relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the
class-character or jâti has no separate existence apart from the
individuals as Nyâya supposes. Apprehension of jâti is essentially
the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to
other similar things of that class by the perception of the common
characteristics. But Prabhâkara would not admit the existence of
a highest genus sattâ (being) as acknowledged by Nyâya. He
argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because
we find that the individuals of a class possess some common
characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate
things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate
jâti as sattâ, as demanded by the naiyâyikas. That all things are
said to be _sat_ (existing) is more or less a word or a name without
the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience
always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we
can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or
being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When
we speak of a thing as _sat_, we do not mean that it is possessed
of any such class-characters as sattâ (being); what we mean
is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarûpasattâ.

382

Thus the Nyâya view of perception as taking only the
thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, (_sanmâtra-vi@sayam
pratyak@sa@m_) is made untenable by Prabhâkara, as according to
him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According
to Kumârila however jâti is not something different from the
individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived.
Kumârila's view of jâti is thus similar to that held by Sâ@mkhya,
namely that when we look at an individual from one point of
view (jâti as identical with the individual), it is the individual that
lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jâti becomes
latent, but when we look at it from another point of view
(the individual as identical with jâti) it is the jâti which presents
itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent.
The apprehension as jâti or as individual is thus only a matter
of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look
at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jâti, Kumârila
holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct
from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist,
but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves
(_S'lokavârttika, Pratyak@sasûtra_, 149, 150, _abhedât samavâyo'stu
svarûpam dharmadharmi@no@h_), Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara
that jâti is perceived by the senses (_tatraikabuddhinirgrâhyâ
jâtirindriyagocarâ_).

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of
Prabhâkara we find that the category of vis'e@sa admitted by the
Ka@nâda school is not accepted as a separate category by the
Mîmâ@msâ on the ground that the differentiation of eternal
things from one another, for which the category of vis'e@sa is
admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary
qualities of these things. The quality of p@rthaktva or specific
differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they
constitute, can very well serve the purposes of vis'e@sa.


The nature of knowledge.

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the
knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether
perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal
the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self
is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded
as perception from the point of view of self. The division

383

of the pramâ@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anumâna (inference),
etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with
reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within
the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining
or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have
knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the
remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (_sa@mvid_) that reveals
by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.
It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of
knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they
are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather
say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mîmâ@msâ
answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the
cognized were not different from one another, they could not
have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is
by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The
cognition (_sa@mvedana_) of a person simply means that such a
special kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in the
self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to
a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition
is that with reference to which the active operation of the
self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless,
for they have the cognitional character by which things are
illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than
this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are
believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal
to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to
objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions
were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency
(_ad@r@s@ta_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance
of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions
of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that
amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the
operation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordance
with his previous merit or demerit.

The Prabhâkara Mîmâ@msâ, in refuting the arguments of those
who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized
by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we
do not experience any such double cognition and also because it
would lead us to a _regressus ad infinitum,_ for if a second cognition

384

is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third
and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition,
then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown
to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and
reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the
illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this
self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred
and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the
presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be
apprehended by perception (_pratyak@sa_). Prabhâkara draws a
subtle distinction between perceptuality (_sa@mvedyatva_) and being
object of knowledge (_prameyatva_). A thing can only be apprehended
(_sa@mvedyate_) by perception, whereas inference can only
indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the
object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other
cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence
of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].

Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in holding that perception
is never the object of another perception and that it ends
in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he
says that every perception involves a relationship between the
perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as
the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.
This is indeed different from the Prabhâkara view, that
in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and
the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of
_tripu@tîpratyak@sa_) [Footnote ref 2].


The Psychology of Illusion.

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are
valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot
be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and
its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian
philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called
_satkhyâti_ which we have described before, and of the Vedântists,
which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three
different theories of illusion, viz. (1) _âtmakhyâti_, (2) _viparîtakhyâtî_
or _anyathâkhyâti_, and (3) _akhyâti_ of the Mîmâ@msâ school. The

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ,_ by Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ.]

[Footnote 2: _loc. cit._ pp. 26-28.]

385

viparîtâkhyâti or anyathâkhyâti theory of illusion is accepted by
the Nyâya, Vais'e@sika and the Yoga, the âkhyâti theory by
Mîmâ@msâ and Sâ@mkhya and the âtmakhyâti by the Buddhists.

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is
the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece
of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced
by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard
to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny
the existence of the external world and think that there are only
the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of
past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so
also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge
which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account
of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates
sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong
perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called
external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did
exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right
perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge
creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This
is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception.
Nyâya objects to the above view, and says that, if
knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon
itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception
ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver."
Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false
hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming
from outside and that the external as such does not exist.

The viparîtakhyâti or the anyathâkhyâti theory supposes that
the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we
do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished
from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the
conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere
is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In
illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is
not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it
is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before
that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as
silver. This school agrees with the akhyâti school that the fact

386

that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of
illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough
to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite
positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of
silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.

The âkhyâti theory of Mîmâ@msâ holds that since the special
peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous
to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as
the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized
at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the
features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver
fails to apprehend the difference between these two things,
and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain
weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the
common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended,
and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past
time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as
a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the
silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion
takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a
dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is
different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a
matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the
difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of
the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception
appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real
valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on
the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver
would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case
of a real perception. Kumârila agrees with this view as expounded
by Prabhâkara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as
valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any
real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that
does not matter, for it is admitted in Mîmâ@msâ that when later
experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate
the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its
production [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the Mîmâ@msâ had to
adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition
at the moment of its production is valid. The âkhyâti theory

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ, S'âstradîpikâ_, and _S'lokavârttika_,
sûtra 2.]

387

tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any
positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension
due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that
though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition,
is made up of two elements, the present perception and
memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually
present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of
any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition
is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also,
as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived
is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this
perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of
the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension
involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded
as self-valid as any other cognition.


Inference.

S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation
has been known to exist between two things, we can have the
idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind
of knowledge is called inference. Kumârila on the basis of this
tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice
that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire)
subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent
relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend
upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary
that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third
thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of
one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the
other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire),
though including all the cases of the existence of the other
(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter
(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether
it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of
the constellation of K@rttikâ with Rohi@nî, where, by the rise of the
former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of
identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or
a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and
a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of
cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming

388

one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the
one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the
existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all
such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending
beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called
_gamya_ or _vyâpaka_ and the other (e.g. smoke) _vyâpya_ or _gamaka_
and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill,
the pak@sa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be
inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the
gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is
fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case
of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent
relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a
third thing (e g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only
in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place
where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory
that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka
thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that
the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.
Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception
and not from any universal general proposition. Kumârila holds
that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major
and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of
fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was
known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor
of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated
and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new
knowledge (_des'akâlâdhikyâdyuktamag@rhîtagrâhitvam anumânasya,
Nyâyaratnâkara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough
that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance
failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances
in which the absence of the gamya or vyâpaka was marked by an

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumârila
was indebted to Di@nnâga for this; for Di@nnâga's main contention is that
"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is
the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us
no new knowledge see Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and
_Tâtparya@tikâ_, p. 120.]

389

absence of the gamaka or vyâpya, should also be noted, for a
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The
experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist
in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the
circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the
existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of
coexistence as well.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded
as self-valid. To this Kumârila's answer is that memory
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramâna, as it does
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence
of two things in another was known in a number of cases,
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya
in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit
statement of the process of inference for convincing others
(_pârârthânumâna_) both Kumârila and Prabhâkara hold that three
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three
premisses pratijñâ, hetu and d@rstânta may quite serve the purpose
of an anumâna.

There are two kinds of anumâna according to Kumârila
viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and sâmânyatod@r@s@tasambandha.
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Kumârila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance
(_vyâpti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the
positive ones.]

[Footnote 2: "_tasmâdanavagate'pi sarvatrânvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke
bahus'ah sâhityâvagamamâtrâdeva
vyabhicârâdars'anasanâthâdanumânotpattira@ngîkartavya@h._"
_Nyâyaratnâkara_, p. 288.]

390

relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and
fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where
the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete
things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement
and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is
change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the
change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held
that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals
[Footnote ref 1].

Prabhâkara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the
permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact
that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)
is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both
subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between
two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations
of time and place the things in which these two subsist
together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things
(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that
though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the
concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote
ref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that
the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the
presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any
smoke is seen. Prabhâkara counts separately the fallacies of the
minor (_pak@sâbhâsa_), of the enunciation (_pratijñâbhâsa_) and of
the example (_d@r@s@tântâbhâsa_) along with the fallacies of the middle
and this seems to indicate that the Mîmâ@msâ logic was not altogether
free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke
includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there
would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential
cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhâkara,
for he does not admit that a pramâ@na should necessarily bring
us any new knowledge, for pramâ@na is simply defined as "apprehension."
So though the inferential cognition always pertains to
things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramâ@na,
since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavârttika, Nyâyaratnâkara, S'âstradîpikâ,
Yuktisnehapûra@nî, Siddhântacandrikâ_ on anumâna.]

[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is
no condition (_upâdhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhâkara has
nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in
a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say
that it does not exist (_prayatnenânvi@syamâ@ne aupâdhikatvânavagamât_,
see _Prakara@napañcikâ_, p. 71).]

391


Upamâna, Arthâpatti.

Analogy (_upamâna_) is accepted by Mîmâ@msâ in a sense which
is different from that in which Nyâya took it. The man who
has seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox
(_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with
the _go,_ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is not
within the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya._ The
cognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go,_ as it follows
directly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the
_gavaya,_ is called upamâna (analogy). It is regarded as a separate
pramâ@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarity
existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is
not mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the
_gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen,
and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference
of Prabhâkara and Kumârila on this point is that while the
latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact
of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the
former regards it as a distinct category.

_Arthâpatti_ (implication) is a new pramâ@na which is admitted
by the Mîmâ@msâ. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta
is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile
these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being
in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside
the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta
outside the house is called _arthâpatti_ (presumption or
implication).

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthâpatti
cognition is a matter on which Prabhâkara and Kumârila
disagree. Prabhâkara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta
habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him
there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired
previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and
the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his
house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause
of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta,
and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain
somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication,
without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for

392

making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he
might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and
also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from
home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is
living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in
the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The
perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate
link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he
must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element
of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist
beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire
is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the
house leads to the presumption of an external existence only
when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt
and uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].

Kumârila however objects to this explanation of Prabhâkara,
and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful
by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt
may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is
dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life
of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition
of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed
when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not
follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is
living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his
absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very
fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of
doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure
of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about
the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or
by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside
the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot
be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty
of his life associated with the perception of his absence from the
house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence.
There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his
absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without
the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates
between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_, pp. 113-115.]

393

cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a
reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta
must be found outside the house.

Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted
as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there
is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke
in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes
irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance
of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption
that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if
the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known
otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance
was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the
inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot
be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered
any contradiction without the presumption of the universal
proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthâpatti
is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now
when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference
cannot be served by arthâpatti, the validity of inference
as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we
admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us
either by inference or by arthâpatti.

So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthâpatti, for
in inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and
later on from that the sâdhya (what is to be proved); both of
them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and
it is exactly this that distinguishes arthâpatti from anumâna.
For arthâpatti takes place where, without the presumption of
Devadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of
Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is
living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot
swallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external
existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot
be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by
presuming his existence outside the house. Arthâpatti is thus
the result of arthânupapatti or the contradiction of the present
perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.

It is by this arthâpattipramâ@na that we have to admit that
there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the

394

shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices
by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such
beneficent state of existence.


S'abda pramâ@na.

S'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by
most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the
Jaina, Buddhist, Cârvâka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on this
topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore
omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the
Nyâya, and the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority
of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and
they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied
it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition
that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the
Mîmâ@msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone,
and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.
Their authority was not derived from the authority of any
trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves.
Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with
us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old
days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for
Mîmâ@msâ, for the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ were written for the purpose
of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.
The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological
doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation
of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to
writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much
upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a
rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the
Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.
But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (_s'abda_)
as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with
Mîmâ@msâ as it is its very soul.

S'abda (word) as a pramâ@na means the knowledge that we
get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from
relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of
which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds,
viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.
The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not

395

uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in
itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us
before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;
but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the
relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged
means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abda
as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the
validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its
being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not
explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when
even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known,
we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any
sentence.

Prabhâkara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters,
or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent
letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are
thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which
serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The
reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be
found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the
denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception
of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but
leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions
of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings
about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing
about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing
a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted
that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the
purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate
potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is
the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhâkara and
Kumârila agree on this point.

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words
have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of
their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their
comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will
not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the
word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning,
but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning
and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to

396

understand the meaning of a word. Mîmâmsâ does not think
that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due
to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings
to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative
of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention
is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see
the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic
commandments, by the performance of which such results would
arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.
Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though
they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by
which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists
of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the
word. Nyâya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause
that produces the word while Mîmâm@sâ thinks that it only manifests
to the hearer the ever-existing word.

The process by which according to Prabhâkara the meanings
of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands
a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the
child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the
senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"
and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can
only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he
deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things
only as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvitâbhidhâna
vâda_), and no word can be comprehended as having any
denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine
holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally
related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence,
thus the word _gâm_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it is
intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine
genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of
action, viz. bringing in the sentence _gâm ânaya_--bring the cow.
Kumârila however thinks that words independently express
separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea (_abhihitânvayavâda_). Thus
in _gâm ânaya_, according to Kumârila, _gâm_ means the bovine
class in the accusative character and _ânaya_ independently means

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya God created all words and associated them
with their meanings.]

397

bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the
cow." But on the former theory the word _gâm_ means that it is
connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence
only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above
sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot
have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumârila
which is also the Nyâya theory is called abhihitânvayavâda [Footnote ref
1].

Lastly according to Prabhâkara it is only the Veda that can
be called s'abda-pramâ@na, and only those sentences of it which
contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way
with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is
only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the
speaker. But Kumârila considers the words of all trustworthy
persons as s'abda-pramâ@na.


The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).

In addition to the above pramâ@nas Kumârila admits a fifth
kind of pramâ@na, viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the
non-existence of a thing. Kumârila argues that the non-existence of
a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived
by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could
come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some
people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumâna.
They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object
there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision
of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy
to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want
of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions
are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How
can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?
It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramâ@na
namely anupalabdhi.

All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrûpa_) or in
a negative relation (_asadrûpa_), and it is only in the former case

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ_ by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ and S.N.
Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this
connection that Mîmâ@msâ did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound
which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of
letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was
manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the
syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this
word manifestation. See Vâcaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavârttika_
and _Prakara@napañcikâ_. For the doctrine of anvitâbhidhâna see
Sâhkanâtha's _Vâkyârthamât@rkâv@rttî_.]

398

that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the
latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be
had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we
designate as a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhâkara
holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the
perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need
of admitting a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. For what is
meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception
of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty
space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought
not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the
place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that
which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation
is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of
empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment
which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then
also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted,
which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or
negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain
the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best
be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge,
or in other words to substitute for the place of the external
absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the
thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends
in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted
either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation
or abhâva as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.
It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without
any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next
moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.
But this also means that the moment of the perception of the
ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or
its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission
of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can
there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant
that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified
by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of
the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of
the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.
The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes

399

meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not
specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the
ground. And this would require that we had already the notion
of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special
manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also
be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the
notion of negation immediately and not through other negations,
and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also
of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we
remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a
separate pramâ@na by which the absence or want of a sensible
object--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended.


Self, Salvation, God.

Mîmâ@msâ has to accept the existence of soul, for without it
who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would
be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing
sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is
thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the
sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many,
one in each body. Prabhâkara thinks that it is manifested to us in
all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence
of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so,
why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our
cognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?
Kumârila however differs from Prabhâkara about this analysis of
the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even
though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or
their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied
beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our
cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the
self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different
from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is
present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in
many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that
the self is different from the body is this, that movement or
willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to
the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be
found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some
other entity owing to the association with which the body appears

400

to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge,
feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived
by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc.,
are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation
that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart
themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body
is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and
this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the
vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that
if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a
mover? But Mîmâ@msâ does not admit that movement means
atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which
moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.
It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter
moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an
agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of
the body. The self must also be understood as being different
from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses
he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all
through.

The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhâkara
holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the
cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor
entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the
self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in
what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyâk@sa (perception
as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but
knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and
the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man
who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is
regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the
case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet
it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not
soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum,
and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable
from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is
cognized the self also is not cognized.

Kumârila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from
the body is perceived by a mental perception (_mânasa-pratyak@sa_
as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self
perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its

401

own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection
that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its
own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhâkara's
theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet
considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of
linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet
he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge,
for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though
at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it
does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but
reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which
is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt
known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self
does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects,
nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of
objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition
which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as
the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the
mind. This is indeed different from Prabhâkara's analysis, who
regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition,
both being the result of the illumination of knowledge.
Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara however in holding that soul
is not self-illuminating (_svayamprakâs'a_), for then even in deep
sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such
manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an
unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had
it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed
sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that
"I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover
the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found
when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without
knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not
atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head
as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of
the body which contracts and expands according to the body it
occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should
be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This
self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their
individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot
be explained [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavârttika_, âtmavâda _S'âstra-dîpikâ_, âtmavâda and
mok@savâda.]

402


Kumârila considered the self to be merely the potency of
knowledge (jñânas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were
generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self
itself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the
time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas
the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge
without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of
salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any
of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge,
willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss
or ânanda as Vedânta supposes; but these are generated in it by
its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested
of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the
energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation
is accepted in the main by Prabhâkara also.

Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers
the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them
and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from
the performance of kâmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for
the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees
himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing
the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyâ prayers etc., by the performance
of which there is no benefit but the non-performance
of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the
dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further
body or rebirth.

Mîmâ@msâ does not admit the existence of any God as the
creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is
made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the
universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created
it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the
action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither
is it necessary as Nyâya supposes that dharma and adharma
should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyâya
Mîmâ@msâ did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of
molecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy
(_s'akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual
movements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and
yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the
relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyâya strongly opposes this
doctrine of a non-sensible (atîndriya) energy and seeks to explain all
action by actual molecular motion.]

403

no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot
be any contact (_sa@myoga_) or inherence (_samavâya_) of dharma
and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot
have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like
the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the
world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the
beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be
actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself
require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,
no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been
running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti
or pralaya.


Mîmâ@msâ as philosophy and Mîmâ@msâ as ritualism.

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that
Mîmâ@msâ agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence
of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities,
rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti,
samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been
mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that
Kumârila was influenced by Sâ@mkhya thought rather than by
Nyâya. Sâ@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which
have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;
other systems have generally followed them or have differed from
them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and
Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in
general with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not
laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance
of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika about
the world was most suitable.

The main difference of Mîmâ@msâ with Nyâya consists of the
theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the
Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from
God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any
other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity
of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the
advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated
to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and
there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be
nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions

404

invalid. The other pramâ@nas such as perception, inference, etc.
were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us
how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing
thing which could be perceived by the other pramâ@nas, but
a thing which could only be produced by acting according to
the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma
and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâ@na of the Veda was our
only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a
knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them
it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable
Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution
which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be
acknowledged by the Mîmâ@msâ as it would have endangered the
eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on
that account.

The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhma@nas
(also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are
three classes of injunctions (1) apûrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and
(3) parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi is an order which enjoins
something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed
(we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the
sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that
where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways,
an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following
some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn
could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should
be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the
only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi
that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as
an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as
the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have
remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi.
In parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but
not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take
up the rein" (_imâm ag@rbhnâ@m ras'anâ@m_) which could be used in
a number of cases should not however be used at the time of
holding the reins of an ass.

There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic
sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively
they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be

405

taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences
can however yield meanings separately by themselves they
should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain
sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context
of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.

The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma.
The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities
or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the
deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered
that as dharma can only be acquired by following
the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as
giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas
which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming
part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive.
Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which
describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction
(called the _arthavâdas_) should be interpreted as forming part
of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even
those expressions which give reasons for the performance of
certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted
as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as
mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.

When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of
the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence
is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated
either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive
force called _apûrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of the
sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apûrva is like
a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the
desired results follow [Footnote ref 1].

It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works
of S'abara and Kumârila make an elaborate research into the
nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great
detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student
of philosophy.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ_ and Mâdhava's
_Nyâyamâlâvistara_.]

406



CHAPTER X

THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA


Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential
than the Dialectic of controversy.

_Pramâ@na_ in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement
by which knowledge is acquired, _pramâtâ_ means the subject or
the knower who cognizes, _pramâ_ the result of pramâ@na--right
knowledge, _prameya_ the object of knowledge, and _prâmâ@nya_ the
validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is
sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to
its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of
validity in the mind of the subject--the knower (that his perceptions
are true), which moves him to work in accordance with
his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the
attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things.
The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has
not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a
metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge
based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on
the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the
theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify
a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation
of experience which the others sometimes ignored or
sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different
schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one
another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently
very important in determining the prestige of any school
of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya
or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many
learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at
once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a
large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation
were often undertaken by great masters all over the country
for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools
and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore
not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical

407

mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to
inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of
some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal
victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the
debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced
Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude
of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these
debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by
exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close
dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent,
asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that
his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed
to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on
Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an
interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms
(to thwart opponents) sometimes called _vita@n@dâ_, before he can
come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence.
All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play
for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer
is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to
no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory
of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of
the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of
knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at
by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency
of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations
on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their
net contribution to philosophy. With Vedânta we come to an
end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here
to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the
point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the
position of the Vedânta of the S'a@nkara school in the field of
Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore
now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory
of knowledge (_pramâ@navâda_) reached by some of the main
schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by
the S'a@nkara Vedânta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt
to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.

408


The philosophical situation. A Review.

Before dealing with the Vedânta system it seems advisable
to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to
the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine
the position of the Vedânta as taught by S'a@nkara and
his school.

The Sautrântika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is
concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@sâdrtka_).
This however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagjñâna_)
which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said
to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.
So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned,
it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore
this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about
knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or
contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how
far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our
actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get
in our practical experience (_arthaprâdpakatva_). The perception is
right (_abhrânta_ non-illusory) when following its representation we
can get in the external world such things as were represented by
it (_sa@mvâdakatva_). That perception alone can be right which is
generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.
When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the
object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that
this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is
not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by
the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which
I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this
or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence
to objects perceived is called _kaipanâ_ or _abhilâpa_.
Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilâpa
association (_kalpanâpo@dha_), for though this is taken as a part of
our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and
hence its association with the object is an evident error. The
object as unassociated with name--the nirvikalpa--is thus what
is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijñâna or
thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also
determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an

409

object of knowledge (_grâhya_), and by the fact of the rise
of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing
realizable or attainable in the external world. The special
features of the object undefinable in themselves as being
what they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what is
actually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1].
The _pramâ@naphala_ (result of perception) is the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word
"svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakîrtti between ray esteemed friend Professor
Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakîrtti held
that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception
was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your
interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,--the object (or idea with Vijñânavâdin)
_from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated_,
this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and
future has been taken away, what remains? _The present_ and the present
is a _k@sa@na_ i.e. nothing.... The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtâna
or simply sa@mtâna and in every sa@mtâna there is a synthesis ekîbhâva
of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya =
kalpana = adhyavasâya)...There is in the perception of a jug _something_
(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the _idea_ of
a jug (which is always a sa@mtâna, always vikalpita), and if you take
the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:
k@sanasya jñânena prâpayitumas'akyatvât. This is absolutely the Kantian
teaching about _Synthesis of Apprehension_. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a
_transcendental_ source of knowledge, because practically speaking it
gives no knowledge at all. This _pramâ@na_ is _asatkalpa_. Kant says
that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa =
kalpanâpo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of
intellect (kalpanâ = buddhi = synthesis = ekîbhâva) they would be blind.
Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of
Dharmakîrtti. He is a Vijñânavâdî as I understand, because he maintains
the cognizability of ideas (vijñâna) alone, but the reality is an
incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bâhya, it is
artha, it is arthakriyâk@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for
which he sometimes is called Sautrântika and this school is sometimes
called Sautranta-vijñânavâda, as opposed to the Vijñânavâda of As'vagho@sa
and Âryâsanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as
it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramârthasat,
what would remain of Vijñânavâda? But there is the perception of the jug
as opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddhâ kalpanâ), an element of
reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense
knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element
of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakîrtti
has also _s'uddhâ kalpanâ_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ...And very
interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumâna, the first
moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtâna and the second from sa@mtâna to k@sa@na,
that is the reason that although bhrânta the anumâna is nevertheless
pramâ@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the
arthakriyâk@sa@na. It is bhrânta directly and pramâ@na indirectly;
pratyak@sa is pramâ@na directly and bhrânta (asatkalpa) indirectly... ."
So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are
concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes
the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is
blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative
element of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation
(_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor
Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)
and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing
only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving
affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process
occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative
element of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N.T., p. 20) but
this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative
process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot
express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other
ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form
a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its
own specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature?
Dharmakîrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means
those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when
the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasyârthasya
sannidhânâsannidhânâbkyâm jñânapratibhâsabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N.,
p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific
characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the
object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific
character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative
or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue"
(_nîlasarûpa@m pratyak@samanubhûyamâna@m nîlabodharûpamavasthâpyate ...
nîlasârûpyamasya pramâ@nam nîlavikalpanarûpa@m tvasya pramâ@naphalam_,
N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue
(_nîlanirbhâsa@m hi vijñânam_, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance
(_yatkiñcit arthasya sâk@sâtkârijñânam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N.T. 7) and
this is real (_paramârthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation is
different from the idea "this is blue" (_nîlabodha_, N.T. 22) which is
the result of the former (_pramâ@naphala_) through the association of
the affirmative process (_adhyavasâya_) and is regarded as invalid for
it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is
a _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means pure
sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object
and with Dharmakîrtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception
and vikalpapratyaya or pramânaphala is the idea or concept which follows
it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the
construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage
of the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasya
prâpayitumas'akyatvât_, N.T. 16). N.T. = _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_,
N = _Nyâyabindu (Peterson's edition).]

410

ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing
the means which being followed the thing can be got (_yena k@rtena
artha@h prâpito bhavati_). Pramâ@na then is the similarity of the
knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we
assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is
perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience.
Yet this later stage is pramâ@naphala and not pramâ@na which
consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations),
and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards
the perceived object. The pramâ@na therefore only refers
to the newly-acquired knowledge (_anadhigatâdhigant@r_) as this is
of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective
world. This account of perception leaves out the real
epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated
by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to
the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and
its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The
question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as
determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.

411


The Yogâcâras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from
the above-mentioned Sautrântika Buddhists, and say that since
we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone,
what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the
data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that
sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you
say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come
into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped
by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore
be the same as knowledge (_sahopalambhaniyamât abhedo
nîlataddhiyo@h_); for it is in and through knowledge that external
objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we
are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is
knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in
such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects.
We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external
objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question
why then if there are no external objects, there should be so
much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved
by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption,
the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the
infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining
our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in
the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments
by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine
the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge
alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of
knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire
(_vâsanâ_) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines
the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge,
pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity
as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms
in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a
blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously
interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though
the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as
the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person,
say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can
happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory
cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects

412

believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments,
whatever they may be, are destroyed the next
moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver
or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the
knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing
idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience,
interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower
and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the
flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive
objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought,
Nyâya, Sâ@mkhya, and the Mîmâ@msâ, accept the duality of soul
and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the
two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of
knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of
knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also
enquired after and considered important.

Pramâ@na is defined by Nyâya as the collocation of instruments
by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being.
The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge
consists partly of consciousness (_bodha_) and partly of material
factors (_bodhâbodhasvabhâva_). Thus in perception the
proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first
brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate
consciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later
on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact
etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug.
The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a
factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of
course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the
fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the
qualifying factor (_vis'e@sanajñâna_ as jugness) he could not have
comprehended the qualified object (_vis'i@s@tabuddhi_} the jug (i.e.
the object which possesses jugness). In inference (_anumâ@na_)
knowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upamâna the sight
of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case
of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramâ@na;
even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world,
right knowledge was called pramâ@na, because it was of the same
form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form
of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the

413

external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the
external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external
world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions
of the external world it is pramâ@na, and so far as it determines our
attitude towards the external world it is pramâ@naphala. The
question how knowledge is generated had little importance with
them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of
the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge
was called pramâ@na, because it was the means by which we
could form convictions (_adhyavasâya_) about the external world.
Nyâya sought to answer the question how knowledge was
generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not
a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but
thought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like other
gu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations
like any other happening in the material world. Pramâ@na
does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (_anadhigatâdhi-gant@r_)
as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were
collocations of pramâ@na, knowledge was produced, no matter
whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the
knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable
collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced
whenever the cause of it namely the pramâ@na collocation
is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class
(_sâmânya_), inherence (_samavâya_), etc., were considered as having
as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements.
The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus
conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the
colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of
indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with
the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate
consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than
the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain
collocation of things ended in a certain result (_phala_). Jñâna
(knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations
(_sâmagrî_) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul,
of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This
confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical
distinction between knowledge and an external event
of the objective world. Nyâya thus fails to explain the cause

414

of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective
world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities
which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded
as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly
but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jñâna, sukha
(pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence
as much as substances, but when any new substances were
produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It
is very probable that in Nyâya the cultivation of the art of inference
was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced
later by an application of the inferential method which gave
the introspective method but little scope for its application,
so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is
a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological
experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate
the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it
[Footnote ref 1].

Sâ@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and
material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the
copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from
the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent
sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external
objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects
makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances
though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were
made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the
form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably
thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances
of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element,
viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly
different from material combinations. This element of intelligence
is indeed different from the substances or content of
the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a
stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding,
bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in
accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This
light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in
consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the
fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this
element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_ on pramâ@na.]

415

relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up
into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point
of the Sâ@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance
of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of
knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (_puru@sa_)
when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape
of knowledge is thus the pramâ@na (instrument and process of
knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes
is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the
external objects (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_ and _svata@h-aprâmâ@nya_). The
pramâ@na however can lead to a pramâ or right knowledge only
when it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch
with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but
by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact.
It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion
the original prak@rti in Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same
transcendent touch (call it yogyatâ according to Vâcaspati or
samyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of
puru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into
consciousness. The Vijñânavâdin Buddhist did not make any
distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (_âkâra_)
and did not therefore agree that the âkâra of knowledge was
due to its copying the objects. Sâ@mkhya was however a realist
who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as
all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance
(_sattva_) which could assume the shape of the objects.
But Sâ@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not
think like Nyâya that the âkâra of knowledge was all that knowledge
had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element
which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With
Nyâya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and
the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like
a physical event. With Sâ@mkhya however so far as the content
and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was
indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element
of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent
affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of
consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.

The Mîmâ@msist Prabhâkara agreed with Nyâya in general
as regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact

416

induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a
unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower
and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations,
for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals
things--the direct apprehension that should be called the pramâ@na.
Pramâ@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramâ,
the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramâ@na may also indeed
mean the collocations so far as they induce the pramâ. For
pramâ or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists,
but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances.
The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific
attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective
world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge,
and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the
objective field (_sa@mvâdin_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate)
means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely
a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyâya
holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes
the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as
represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].

Prabhâkara rejected the Sâ@mkhya conception of a dual element
in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and
a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an
unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the
knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend
upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_)
external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension
(_anubhûti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world;
knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its
self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart
from its self-revealing character Prabhâkara did not enquire.

Kumârila declared that jñâna (knowledge) was a movement
brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing
consciousness (_jñâtatâ_) of objective things. Jñâna itself
cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement
necessary for producing the jñâtatâ or consciousness of things.
Movement with Kumârila was not a mere atomic vibration, but
was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the
first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next
moment, was called savikalpa.]

417

was sometimes the result. Jñâna was a movement and not the
result of causal operation as Nyâya supposed. Nyâya would
not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it
would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities,
such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment
of a physical movement. Kumârila accords the same
self-validity to knowledge that Prabhâkara gives. Later knowledge
by experience is not endowed with any special quality
which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the
previous movement. For what is called sa@mvâdi or later testimony
of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The
self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we
can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is
the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances
leading to cognition of things that is called jñâna [Footnote ref 2].
Here Kumârila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge
as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was
beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijñânavâda Buddhism, Sâ@mkhya,
and Mîmâ@msâ was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique
character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in
touch. But Vijñânavâda denied the external world, and thereby
did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya admitted
the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge
and pure intelligence; Prabhâkara ignored this difference,
and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge
was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and
the known, Kumârila however admitted a transcendent element
of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness,
but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question
remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of
knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects,
how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be
regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative,
either referring to one's being prompted to the objective
world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the
suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyaratnamâla_, svata@h-prâmâ@nya-nir@naya.]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyamañjari_ on Pramâ@na, _S'lokavârttika_ on
Pratyak@sa, and Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@tâcintama@ni_ on Pratyak@sa.]

418

uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether
any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge
and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded
as the real. But the question was not asked, whether
there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth,
the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This
philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the
Hindu mind.


Vedânta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-sûtras_
were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the
other Indian systems, even of the S'ûnyavâda Buddhism (of course
according to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have been
written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in
supposing that they were written some time in the second century
B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dapâda revived the monistic
teaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad in verse called _Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ_. His disciple Govinda
was the teacher of S'a@nkara (788--820 A.D.). S'a@nkara's commentary
on the _Brahma-sûtras_ is the root from which sprang
forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedântism of great
originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ânandagiri, a
disciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary called _Nyâyanir@naya_,
and Govindânanda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabhâ_.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote
another commentary on it called the _Bhâmati._ Amalânanda
(1247--1260 A.D.) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and Apyayadik@sita
(1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngarâjadhvarîndra of Kâñcî wrote his
_Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru._ Another disciple of S'a@nkara,
Padmapâda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it
known as _Pañcapâdikâ_. From the manner in which the book is
begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary
on the whole of S'a@nkara's bhâsya, but it ends abruptly at the
end of the fourth sûtra. Mâdhava (1350), in his _S'a@nkaravijaya,_
recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received
S'a@nkara's permission to write a vârttika on the bhâsya.
But other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara was
formerly a great Mîmâ@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'vara
after his conversion to Vedântism) he was not competent to write

419

a good _vârttika_ on the bhâ@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote
a treatise called _Nai@skarmyasiddhi._ Padmapâda wrote a @tîkâ
but this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once
seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapâda wrote it down.
Prakâs'âtman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapâda's _Pañcapâdikâ_
known as _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na. _Akha@n@dânanda wrote
his _Tattvadîpana,_ and the famous N@rsi@mhâs'rama Muni (1500)
wrote his _Vivara@nabhâvaprakâs'ikâ_ on it. Amalânanda and
Vidyasâgara also wrote commentaries on _Pañcapâdikâ,_ named
_Pañcapâdikâdarpa@na_ and _Pañcapâdikâ@tîkâ_ respectively, but
the _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na_ had by far the greatest reputation.
Vidyâra@nya who is generally identified by some with Mâdhava
(1350) wrote his famous work _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1],
elaborating the ideas of _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na_; Vidyâra@nya
wrote also another excellent work named _Jîvanmuktiviveka_ on
the Vedânta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.)
excellent work _Nai@skarmyasiddhi_ is probably the earliest independent
treatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in his
bhâ@sya. It has been commented upon by Jñânottama Mis'ra.
Vidyâra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known as
_Pañcadas'î,_ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in
verse on Vedânta. Another important work written in verse on
the main teachings of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya is _Sa@mk@sepas'arîraka_,
written by Sarvajñâtma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been
commented upon by Râmatîrtha. S'rîhar@sa (1190 A.D.) wrote
his _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya_, the most celebrated work on the
Vedânta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly
after S'rîhar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an
independent work on Vedânta dialectic known as _Tattvadîpikâ_
which has also a commentary called _Nayanaprasâdinî_ written
by Pratyagrûpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghunâtha also wrote
commentaries on _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya._ A work on Vedânta
epistemology and the principal topics of Vedânta of
great originality and merit known as _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ was
written by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra (about 155OA.D.). His son
Râmak@r@snâdhvarin wrote his _S'ikhâma@ni_ on it and Amaradâsa his
_Ma@niprabhâ._ The _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ with these two commentaries
forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental
principles of Vedânta. Another work of supreme importance

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mhâcârya's article in the _Indian Antiquary_,
1916.]

420

(though probably the last great work on Vedânta) is the
_Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî who followed Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.
This has three commentaries known as _Gau@dabrahmânandî_,
_Vi@t@thales'opadhyâyî_ and _Siddhivyâkhyâ_. Sadânanda
Vyâsa wrote also a summary of it known as _Advaitasiddhisiddhântasâra_.
Sadânanda wrote also an excellent elementary work
named _Vedântasâra_ which has also two commentaries _Subodhinî_
and _Vidvanmanorañjinî_. The _Advaitabrahmasiddhi_ of Sadânanda
Yati though much inferior to _Advaitasiddhi_ is important, as it
touches on many points of Vedânta interest which are not dealt
with in other Vedânta works. The _Nyâyamakaranda_ of Ânandabodha
Bha@t@târakâcâryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very
well, as also some other important points of Vedânta interest.
_Vedântasiddhântamuktâvalî_ of Prakâs'ânanda discusses many of
the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñâna and its relations
to cit, the doctrine of _d@r@stis@r@stivâda_, etc., with great clearness.
_Siddhântales'a by Apyayadîk@sita is very important as a summary
of the divergent views of different writers on many points of
interest. _Vedântatattvadîpikâ_ and _Siddhântatattva_ are also good
as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedânta system.
_Bhedadhikkâra_ of Nrsi@mhâs'rama Muni also is to be regarded as
an important work on the Vedânta dialectic.

The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedânta
works on which the present chapter has been based.



Vedânta in Gau@dapâda.

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of
the Vedânta thought as contained in the _Brahma-sûtras_ without
making any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any
other commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-sûtras_
were first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who
held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more
than a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sûtras_
who not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also
differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the
different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of
their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation
was the only one that was faithful to the sûtras and to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall
deal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the
_Brahma-sûtras_.]

421

the Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation
myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only
just one additional view. But however that may be, I am
myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the
_Brahma-sûtras_ were probably more faithful to the sûtras than the
interpretations of S'añkara.

The _S'rîmadbhagavadgîtâ_, which itself was a work of the
Ekânti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the _Brahma-sûtras_ as
having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1].
Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical
sûtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism
found in the _Brahma-sûtras_ are not with regard to the Vijñâna-vada
of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'ûnyavâda, but he regards
the composition of the _Brahma-sûtras_ to be later than Nâgârjuna.
I agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@shana in holding that
both the Yogâcâra system and the system of Nâgârjuna evolved
from the _Prajñâpâramitâ_ [Footnote ref 2]. Nâgârjuna's merit
consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support
of S'unyavâda; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavâda are
concerned I believe that the Tathatâ philosophy of As'vagho@sa
and the philosophy of the _Prajñâpâramitâ_ contained no less.
There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nâgârjuna were
better known to the Hindu writers than the _Mahâyâna sûtras_.
Even in such later times as that of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, we find
him quoting a passage of the _S'âlistambha sûtra_ to give an account
of the Buddhist doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda [Footnote ref 3].
We could interpret any reference to S'ûnyavâda as pointing to
Nâgârjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods
were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in
the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ to the _Brahma-sûtras_ clearly points out a date
prior to that of Nâgârjuna; though we may be slow to believe such
an early date as has been assigned to the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ by Telang,
yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back
as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part
of the second century B.C. The _Brahma-sûtras_ could thus be
placed slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadgîtâ_.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: "Brahmasûtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"
_Bhagavadgîtâ_. The proofs in support of the view that the
_Bhagavadgîtâ_ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd
volume of the present work in the section on _Bhagavadgîtâ_ and
its philosophy.]

[Footnote 2: _Indian Antiquary_, 1915.]

[Footnote 3: See Vâcaspati Mis'ra's _Bhâmatî_ on S'a@nkara's bhâsya on
_Brahma-sûtra_, II. ii.]

422

I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with
this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu
writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapâda or S'a@nkara,
and who interpreted the _Brahma-sûtras_ in accordance with those
monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists
had been writing commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtras_, goes to
show that the _Brahma-sûtras_ were originally regarded as an
authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that
the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, the canonical work of the Ekânti Vai@s@navas,
should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous
to Gau@dapâda who attempted to give an exposition of the
monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing
a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent
work as did Gau@dapâda. I am inclined to think therefore that
as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a
coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it
was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form
of dualism which was already developing in the later days of
the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such
Upani@sads as the S'vetâs'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya
was also the result of this dualistic development.

It seems that Bâdarâya@na, the writer of the _Brahma-sûtras_,
was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator
S'a@nkara. Gau@dapâda seems to be the most important
man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies
of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to
formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant
that no other kârikâs on the Upani@sads were interpreted,
except the _Mân@dûkyakârikâ_ by Gau@dapâda, who did not himself
make any reference to any other writer of the monistic
school, not even Bâdarâya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession
that the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered from
the Vedas by Gau@dapâda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary
on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, he says that "he adores by
falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his
adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made
dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all
people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great
churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart
of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal

423

gods [Footnote ref l]." It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkara
should credit Gau@dapâda and not Bâdarâya@na with recovering the
Upani@sad creed. Gau@dapâda was the teacher of Govinda, the
teacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkara
was a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by
his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control
and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapâda [Footnote ref 2]. There is
some dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed
by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider
it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to
teach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapâda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.

Gau@dapâda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist
teachers As'vagho@sa, Nâgârjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and
I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kârikâs for thinking
that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that
the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha.
Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kârikâs he
says that he adores that great man (_dvipadâm varam_) who by knowledge
as wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances
(_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 4]. He
then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des'ita_)
that the touch of untouch (_aspars'ayoga_--probably referring to
Nirvâ@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings,
and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor
found any contradiction in it (_avivâda@h aviruddhas'ca_).
Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents,
whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_jâta_)
is of non-existents (_abhûtasya_); there are others who quarrel
with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents
are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being
(_advayamajâtim_). He agrees with those who hold that there
is no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his
kârikâ he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was
no coming into being in any way (_sarvathâ Buddhairajâti@h paridîpita@h_).

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, Anandâs'rama
edition, p. 214.]

[Footnote 2: Anandâs'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's
kârikâ, p. 21.]

[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th
century, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he
did not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years.
_J.R.A.S._ 1916.]

[Footnote 4: Compare _Lankâvatâra_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_.]

[Footnote 5: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, IV. 2, 4.]

424


Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuvâdi_),
who since they found things and could deal with them and
were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of
origination (_jâti_). In IV. 90 he refers to _agrayâna_ which we
know to be a name of _Mahâyâna_. Again, in IV. 98 and 99
he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature.
These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leaders
know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances
(_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the kârikâs with an
adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref
1].

Gau@dapâda's work is divided into four chapters: (i) Âgama
(scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)
Alâtas'ânti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is
more in the way of explaining the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad by
virtue of which the entire work is known as _Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ_.
The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts
of Gau@dapâda's work, not particularly connected with the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad.

In the first chapter Gau@dapâda begins with the three apparent
manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the
external world while we are awake (_vis'va_ or _vais'vânara âtmâ_),
(2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa âtmâ_), (3) as the
experiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the _prâjña_ when there
is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure
bliss (_ânanda_). He who knows these three as one is never
attached to his experiences. Gau@dapâda then enumerates some
theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded
as a creation from the prâ@na (vital activity), others
consider creation as an expansion (_vibhûti_) of that cause
from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is
like dream (_svapna_) and magic (_mâyâ_); others, that creation
proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds
from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord
(_bhogârtham_) or for his play only (_kri@dârtham_), for such
is the nature (_svabhâva_) of the Lord, that he creates, but he
cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ IV. 100. In my translation I have not
followed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain
away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in
Gau@dapâda's kârikâ. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as
Gau@dapâda's kârikâs seemed to indicate. I have followed the
same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapâda's
philosophy below.]

425


Gau@dapâda does not indicate his preference one way or the
other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_),
unrelationable (_avyavahâryam_), ungraspable (_agrâhyam_), indefinable
(_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_),
the essence as oneness with the self (_ekâtmapratyayasâra_),
as the extinction of the appearance (_prapañcopas'ama_),
the quiescent (_s'ântam_), the good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_)
[Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapañca_) would have ceased
if it had existed, but all this duality is mere mâyâ (magic or illusion),
the one is the ultimately real (_paramârthata@h_). In the second chapter
Gau@dapâda says that what is meant by calling the world a
dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists
in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the
present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance
has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams
things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we
have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside,
but both of them are but illusory creations of the self.
What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the
moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to
have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived,
and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere
imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that
which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary
productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first
the imagination of a perceiver or soul (_jîva_) and then along with
it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external
world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake,
so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.
There is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho,
na cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is
striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination
finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna's first kârikâ the idea of
_prapañcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas'âs'vatam
anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam
prapañcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram_.
Compare also Nâgârjuna's Chapter on _Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ,
Pûrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapañcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit
kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhists
were the first to use the words _prapañcopas'aman s'ivam_.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna's k@arikâ, "anirodhamanutpâdam" in
_Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S._, p. 3.]

426

of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_)
is false; it is only the oneness (_advayatâ_) that is good. There
is no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nânedam
...na p@rthag nâp@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended
attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the
Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all
appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].

In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the
void(_âkâs'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth
and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but
howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from
âkâs'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams
(_svapna_) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed
upon the one (_advaita_) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot
therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All
birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition
of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream,
as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the
mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless
state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything
to be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop
all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any
birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken
the mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it
when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects
when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by
wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless
and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction;
when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect
Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into
being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajña_).

In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ânti, Gau@dapâda further

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare _Mâdhyamikakârikâ, _B.T.S._, p.3 _anekârtham
anânârtham_, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p.78,
_Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate
S'unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_;
also 8,46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm
svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h
bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti_.]

[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._ p. 196, _Âkâs'am
s'as'as'@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas'câbhivyajyante
tathâbhâvena kalpanâ_, with Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, III. 28, _Asato
mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya
vâpi jâyate_.]

427

describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas
(appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2].
Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which
reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who
regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form)
cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it
suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?
If it is said that things come into being from that which has no
production, there is no example with which such a case may be
illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that
which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a
right conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause and
effect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect there
is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect.
Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either
being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth,
neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature
(_svabhâvatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot
be said to have a production. All experience (_prajñapti_) is
dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there
would be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. When
we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be
dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of
reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_)
does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest
them, for since things do not exist they are not different from
their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular
case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while
they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in
present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with
objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.
Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are
ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are
really traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production
is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is
perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare
Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the
_S'ataka_.]

[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or
entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini,
"Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions
of the Vedas.]

428

production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it
could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and
an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like
a magical or illusory elephant (_mâyâhastî_) and exists only as far
as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus
the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one
knowledge (_vijñâna_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness
(_avastutva_), the cessation (s'ântam). As the movement of
burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the
movement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving
and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or
curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it
does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed
upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess
them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation
between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore
to be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing
(_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not
a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all
the appearances are neither things nor those which are not
things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind
(_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as
one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of
existence (_sa@msâra_), but when that notion ceases there is no
sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a
relative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing
permanent (_s'âs'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced,
hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances
(_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their
coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not
exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of
seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible.
As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all
appearances. That which appears as existing from an
imaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not
so in reality (_para-mârtha_), for the existence depending on
others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not
a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist
and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or
steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

429


It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the
Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna's kârikâs and
the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in _La@nkâvatâra_, that it is
needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the
Buddhist S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that
these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads.
It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long
as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and
for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took
the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he
wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations
of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth
that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested
that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable
vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the
Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the
Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads
guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda's views it was left
for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.


Vedânta and S´a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).

Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be
the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and
summarized in the _Brahma-sûtras_ of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads
form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is
therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the
Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished
from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the
Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the _Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of
Jaimini. Though these _Brahma-sûtras_ were differently interpreted
by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary
on them now available, written by S'a@nkarâcârya, have
attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and
deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the
illustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the
philosophy propounded by S´a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious
followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy
we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If
other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have
to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this

430

chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta
philosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's
work (the commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtra_ and the ten
Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as
found in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are
more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore
better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara,
but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare
that they are true to their master's philosophy.

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (_Jaimini
sûtra, Nyâya sûtra,_ etc.) are the only original treatises, and no
foundation other than these is available. In the case of the
Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and
the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a
systematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or
expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras
and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected
and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also
enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a
part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the
Hindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them
was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the
highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most
formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were
the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any
philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be
interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or
that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman
and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere
exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing
some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form.
S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found
in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared
by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could
not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest
and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise
could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da--the
(sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas--the purport of
the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended
for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

431

and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute
truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who
had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly
joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman
as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas
were intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not
begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and
psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show
by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference
to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they
were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he
understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that
the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour
of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and
apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the
texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the
Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas
about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the
Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order
to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it
was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that
his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to
criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to
be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the
Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and
wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the _Brahma-sûtras_
but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him
had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid
which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the
Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted
testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth.
His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great
detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted
either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that
all the realistic categories which Nyâya and other systems
had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also
supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedânta epistemology,
and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the mâyâ,
the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant
topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

432

had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed
fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that
philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken
as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our
faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of
logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting
the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many
lives of S'a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the
_S'a@nkaradigvijaya_, _S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilâsa_, _S'a@nkara-jaya_,
etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700
and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru
was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles
are related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the
incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and
became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in
a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over
to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs'rama. It is said that
he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra_ in his twelfth
year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads.
He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to
travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other
schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to
meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and
he advised him to meet Kumârila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana
and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then
travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere
he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth
acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of
India.

S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and
by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_
tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which
was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_
[Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-sûtras_,
there is ample evidence that he was contending against some
other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held
that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhâ@sya) on
the ten Upani@sads (Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mâ@n@dûkya,
Aitareya, Taittirîya, B@rhadâra@nyaka, and Chândogya), and on the
_Brahma-sûtra_.]

433

of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual
interpretations of the _Brahma-sûtras_ is proved by the fact that
S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions
were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring
according to Vâcaspati to the Mîmâ@msâ) and some of
us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sûtras and
the Upani@sads from the Vedânta point of view) think that the
soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed
to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity
of the self (_âtmaikatva_) that this S'ârîraka commentary of
mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Râmânuja, in the introductory
portion of his bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra,_ says that the views of
Bodhâyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-sûtra_
were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was
following this Bodhâyana bhâ@sya in writing his commentary. In
the _Vedârthasa@mgraha_ of Râmânuja mention is made of Bodhâyana,
Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhâruci as Vedântic authorities,
and Dravi@dâcâryya is referred to as the "bhâ@syakâra" commentator.
In Chândogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology
appeared to be different from the _Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkara
refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom
he calls "âcâryya" (_atrokta@h parihârah âcâryyaih_) and Ânandagiri
says that "âcâryya" there refers to Dravi@dâcâryya. This Dravi@dâcâryya
is known to us from Râmânuja's statement as being a
commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here
that he had written a commentary on the Chândogya Upani@sad.

A study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtras_ of
Bâdarâya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought
leaves us convinced that these sûtras were regarded by all as
condensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences
of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sûtras and
the Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them
in each particular case. The _Brahma-sûtra_ is divided into four
adhyâyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters
or pâdas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion
(_adhikara@na_) which are composed of a number of sûtras, which
raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and
uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtras_, I. iii. 19.]

434

a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these
sûtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the
second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the
Upani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist
Vedânta creed does not consist in proving the Vedânta to
be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but
in so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree
in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the
only truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer
some of the objections that may be made from the Sâ@mkhya
point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some
apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present
any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute
the Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhâgavata
and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and
his commentaries on the first four sûtras contain the main points
of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing
that the conclusion of the sûtras was always in strict agreement
with the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never
occupied the premier position; its value was considered only
secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding
of the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot
be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be
reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he
shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater.
So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic
and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found
in the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to
be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport
of the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus
bound to vindicate the position of the Vedânta as a thoroughly
rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on
its rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what
was true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's
interpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict
experience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that
his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience.
If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation
that was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent
contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,

435

he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing
a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the
whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and not
simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously
appear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong
to reason but to the scriptures.

He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason
it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which
identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the
senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification,
for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal
knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would
be no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophically
the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other
things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describe
the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate
truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be
taken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point being
granted, the next point is that our experience is always based
upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and
the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc.
upon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion.
All this had been said by Gau@dapâda. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dapâda's
conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive
proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the
refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he
thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his
idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. He
showed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This
being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must
be a mere magic show of illusion or mâyâ. S'a@nkara never tries
to prove that the world is mâyâ, but accepts it as indisputable.
For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion
is that all else is mere illusion or mâyâ. He had thus to
quarrel on one side with the Mîmâ@msâ realists and on the other
with the Sâ@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity
of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The
Mîmâ@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be
interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,

436

or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that
the Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted
as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of
actions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does not
therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman,
but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as
possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman
should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a
nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would
then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates.
S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was
that the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman.
No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required;
but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when
the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the
ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas,
the karmakâ@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relating
to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior
types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads,
the jñânakâ@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate
truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who
had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and
who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly
joy. Throughout his commentary on the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ S'a@nkara
tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions
of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices,
etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in
that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of
the Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural
duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all
desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions,
the field of karmamârga (the path of duties), and wanted
to know the truth alone, they entered the jñânamârga (the way
of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedânta
was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer
inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete
emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending
to study the Vedânta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is
eternal and what is transitory (_nityânityavastuviveka_), (2)
disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of

437

the after world (_ihâmutraphalabhogavirâga_), (3) attainment of
peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration
and faith (_s'amadamâdisâdhanasampat_) and desire for salvation
(_mumuk@sutva_). The person who had these qualifications should
study the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of the
truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained
emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone
was the reality and all else was mâyâ, all injunctions ceased to
have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (_karma_) and
the path of wisdom (_jñâna_) were intended for different classes of
persons or adhikârins. There could be no joint performance of
Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in
the Upani@sads (_jñâna-karma-samuccayâbhâva@h_). As against the
dualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured any
kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between
the Vedânta as expounded by Gau@dapâda and as explained by
S'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could to
dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition
of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct
interpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achieved
remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a
hidden Buddhist (_pracchanna Bauddha_), but his influence on
Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded
in later times as being almost a divine person or an
incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples,
and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding
generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a
much stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara's
philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedânta
thought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretations
are nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, but
the questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise have
been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one
could not treat Vedânta as a complete and coherent system of
metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections,
we may close this with a short description of some of the main
features of the Vedânta thought as explained by S'a@nkara.

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is "the cause from which
(proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world
which is extended in names and forms, which includes many

438

agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially
determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is
formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination
of the) mind [Footnote ref 1]." The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for the
existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The
world must have been produced as the modification of something,
but in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken of
as having been originated from something other than Brahman,
so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into
being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from
something else, for then we should have a _regressus ad infinitum_
(_anavasthâ_). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have
come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source
then from which this world has come into being is Brahman.
(3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (_sâk@si_) which
shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition
which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self,
and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it,
for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all
and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence,
pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of
us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are
identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that
we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely
without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our
true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual
self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth
is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure
blessedness, and pure being.

All creation is illusory mâyâ. But accepting it as mâyâ, it
may be conceived that God (Îs'vara) created the world as a mere
sport; from the true point of view there is no Îs'vara who creates
the world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all
exist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of
Îs'vara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In
reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory.
Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (upâdâna-kâra@na)
as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-kâra@na) of the world.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen's _System of
the Vedânta_.]

439

There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the
effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause--a mere illusion
of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and
call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted
that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations
as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and
form (_nâmarúpa_). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect
imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent
(_vyavahârika_) as mere objects of name and form (_nâmarûpa_), but
the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(_pâramârthika_)
[Footnote ref 1].


The main idea of the Vedânta philosophy.

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedãnta philosophy
as taught by the @S'a@kara school is this, that the ultimate
and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as
many in different individuals. The world also as apart from
us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth
to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical,
are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable
truth underlying them all is the self. While other
systems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far
they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude
in practical life towards them, Vedãnta sought to reach
beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final
and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm,
the subject and the object. The famous instruction of
@S'vetaketu, the most important Vedânta text (mahâvâkya) says,
"That art thou, O S'vetaketu." This comprehension of my self
as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this
knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances
will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged
of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this
truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for
salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor
instructs him, "That art thou." At once he becomes the truth
itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence;
all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the
_Brahma-sûtras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his
_System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any
long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from
the writings of his followers.]

440

many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the
vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines
forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed
that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all
world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests,
and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched
by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the
idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire
and attachment with the world and had known the nature of
his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his
own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all
his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued
as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality
with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true
knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which
the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly
joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly.
The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo
the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits
of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked
again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself
and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation)
meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis
and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded
as an unconscious one by Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and Mîma@msâ,
and as a state of pure intelligence by Sâ@mkhya and Yoga. But
with Vedânta the case is different, for it held that the world as
such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination
which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired.
As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the
Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as
a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections
of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance
of the world process does not represent the ultimate and
highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding
diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless
time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real
truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves
really are, but do not also know what the world about us is.
We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing

441

it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no
doubt true that these experiences show us an established order
having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth.
They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to
be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is
comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one
truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as
the absolute--the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance
as experienced by us is thus often likened to the
illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment
the perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick
it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but
as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of
conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded
by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion
of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes
so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was
acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also
vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false
knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again.
The Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here is
doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but
delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even
after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that
there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any
knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by
the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sâ@mkhya
puru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff
is dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the Mîmâ@msâ
and the Nyâya soul is also incapable of knowing the world
after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But
the Vedânta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know
the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception
of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the
person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion
cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to
us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and
indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do
not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know
that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this

442

world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link
is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or
manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell
the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory
perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true
knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads held
that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere,
and S'añkara explained it by adding that the "many" was merely
an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound
to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance
is mâyâ (illusion). This is what S'añkara emphasizes in expounding
his constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine.
The question is sometimes asked, how the mâyâ becomes associated
with Brahman. But Vedânta thinks this question illegitimate,
for this association did not begin in time either with
reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons.
In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion
does not affect the unchangeable truth. Mâyâ or illusion is no
real entity, it is only false knowledge (_avidyâ_) that makes the
appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found.
Mâyâ or avidyâ has an apparent existence only so long as it
lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is
not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance
has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has
existence so long as we are deluded by it (_prâtîtika-sattâ_).
Mâyâ therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical
division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded
middle. For the mâyâ can neither be said to be "is" nor
"is not" (_tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyâ_). It cannot be said that
such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and
illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are
perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent
existence than the fact of their perception. If it has
any creative function, that function is as illusive as its
own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts.
Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association
with mâyâ, for there can be no association of the real with the empty,
the mâyâ, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.

443


In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false--a mere product of mâyâ. The
falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved
in the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ "is"
nor _asat_ "is not." Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not"
is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "is
not," since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and
has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge
dawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in
the air" or a hare's horn is "is not," for these are called _tuccha_,
the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be
"is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of
ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is),
but since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). This
is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapañca_)
that it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Or
rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of
the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to
be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the
being, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it
will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist,
and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory
perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell,
we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of
illusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (this
is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and
will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of
silver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as
silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_),
the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when
the "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the
silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this"
before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once
directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never
existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no
separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity
of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that
the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved
refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

444

negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the
conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false
(for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different
from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this
reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the
world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself,
and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis,
that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation
also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only
thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The
peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it
appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though it
is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge
dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance
is an appearance which is different from what we
know as real (_sadvilak@sa@na_); for the real is known to us as
that which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will never
again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof.
A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted;
but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance
will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded
as real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the
world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities
such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth.
The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the
negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance
and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but
the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is
contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself
is also contradicted.

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous
(_svaprakâs'a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the
object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things,
ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called _d@rs'ya_ (objects of
consciousness), while it is the _dra@s@tâ_ (the pure consciousness
comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as
an expression of a mental state (_v@rtti_), it is said to have a form and
it becomes d@rs'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of
consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being
manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyâtvanirukti_.]

445

Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the
Upani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines
forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakâs'a
and dra@s@tâ. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any
form or mode. The notion of _d@rs'yatva_ (objectivity) carries with
it also the notion of _ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature as
non-consciousness (_ajñânatva_) and non-selfness (_anâtmatva_) which
consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness.
The relation of consciousness (_jñâna_) to its objects cannot be
regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall
see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between
knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the
conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in
which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence.
In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (_ânanda_) shines
forth, the ânanda is not an object or form of the illuminating
consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there
is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory
imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different
from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they
depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves
but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all
finite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the
abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever.
The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited
in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure
being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is,
the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the
individual appearances, there is no other class (_jâti_) such as
cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different
individual forms are illusorily imposed (_gha@tâdîkam sadarthekalpitam,
pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tîyamânatvât_). So
this world-appearance which is essentially different from the
Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it
is imposed, is false
(_upâdânani@s@thâiyaniâbhâvapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithyâtvasiddhi@h
--as Citsukha has it).


The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception
of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly
illusions is called _prâtibhâsika,_ as they are contradicted by other

446

later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never
contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavahârika_
(from _vyavahâra_, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our
practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the
Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance
runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated
experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true.
It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance
ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from
the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is
false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedânta it is
sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us,
we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedânta answers
that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor
can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge,
for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without
a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a
conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends
within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and
independence, which cannot be had directly from experience,
as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth.
Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true
reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of
consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its
manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the
world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not
be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all
experience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being that
is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor
merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the
being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events
and appearances (_ekenaiva sarvânugatena sarvatra satpratîti@h_).
Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being
(_sat_) as Nyâya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves
but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis
and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis
(_adhi@s@thâna_) on which the illusions appear. This being is not
different with different things but one in all appearances. Our
perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a
guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

447

could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures)
did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate
inference, but it can do so only when its own validity
has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.
But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance,
for our present perceptions cannot prove that these
will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are
also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance
cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted
by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception
in this case is contradicted by inference and we have
hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend
(_upajîvya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such
dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely
valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by
proper examination and enquiry (_parîk@sâ_), which may convince
us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal
testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and
realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved
beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.
But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with
any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never
be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedânta also
admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the
world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it
cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when
to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to
exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the
objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will
never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the
world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedânta inference
that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself
to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as
one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts
the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold
aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is
false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation
between the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness
(_d@rs'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

448

connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been
so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its
connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine
any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for
it can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavâya_);
and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no
other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness,
but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot
be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect
like the jñâtatâ of Mîmâ@msâ is produced upon the object, for such
an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can
objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)
associated with the object as Prabhakâra thinks, for there are
many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not
considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean
that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jñâna-kâra@na_)
involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference
to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects
of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is
not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?
Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own
forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though
this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of
inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does
not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever
way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately
and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also
seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting
between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be
admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all
nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness
yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted
even by Vedânta that this can only take place through specific
sense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but
if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place
even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold
external world without? The answer that the Vedânta gives to
such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has
not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

449

flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness;
so it is not possible that the external reality should have to
pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what
happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all
things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its
veil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or
state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates
everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination
of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous
if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the
reality is hidden by the veil of ajñâna (nescience). This veil is
removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a
mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing
shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory
impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively,
but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajñâna which is
removed by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as
the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The
action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the
mind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding
ajñâna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of
the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the
object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows
itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not
be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the
veil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows
the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself
is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but
ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell)
take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the
eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed
to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it
generated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the
wrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion
"this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver,
it is the _cit,_ consciousness or reality as underlying the object
represented to us by "this" or "_idam_" that is the basis (_adhi@s@thâna_)
of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or
non-cognition (_ajñâna_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas
the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

450

basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my
mental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the form
that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective
phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression
of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made
through the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould or
states. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge.
Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as
shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality,
but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms
when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed
by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification
(_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of
knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other
entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested
through the states. This Vedânta does not admit, for it holds
that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental
states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be
there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had
there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge,
the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to
be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality
untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are
material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous
consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms
in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations
(_upâdhi_). It manifests _ajñâna_ (nescience) and hence does not by
itself remove the ajñâna, except when it is reflected through any
specific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner
and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness
which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal
appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that
manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one
identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis
of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection
through the mental states or v@rttis.

The phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determined
in their various forms and manifestations but not as
to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of
any relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavâya (inherence)

451

between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the
truth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs'ya (perceived)
have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but
illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological
illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing
is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived
as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not
noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure
consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics
of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any
illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere
"this" can be. The answer of Vedânta is that when the Brahman
stands as the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_) of the world-appearance its
characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special
character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it
may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible
because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed
to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is,"
the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as
a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.
In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines
forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the
Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made
possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance
can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and
not illusory. But the Vedânta points out that even by illusory
perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory
perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake
could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams
may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical
functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions
imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient
to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced
in actual waking life account for the dream creations.
According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in
previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies
(_sa@mskâra_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of
world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot
affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

452

the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective
creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the
phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable
state of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@mskârasya
viyadâdyadhyâsajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratîtyabhâvepi tadadhyâsasya
pûrvam sattvât k@rtsnasyâpi vyavahârikapadârthasya
ajñâtasattvâbhyupagamât_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion
is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_)
and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but
no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.
To this Vedânta says that similarity is not an indispensable
factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a
white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye
through the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the production
of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions
or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be
done by _ad@r@s@ta_--the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.
In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of
this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no
other do@sa (defect) than the avidyâ (nescience) which constitutes
the appearance. Here avidyâ is the only do@sa and Brahman is the
only adhi@s@thâna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the
self-luminous as the adhi@s@thâna, the illusory creations could not
have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception
of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thâna.
Hence where the adhi@s@thâna is hidden by the veil of avidyâ, the
association with mental states becomes necessary for removing
the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thâna.
As soon as the adhi@s@thâna, the ground, the reality, the blissful
self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.
The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing
more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.


The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience).

Ajñâna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is
beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anâdibhâvarupatve
sati jñânanivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself
in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of
perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no
beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

453

is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive
(_bhâvarûpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation
(_abhâva_) too, for the positivity (_bhâvatva_) does not mean here the
opposite of abhâva (negation) but notes merely its difference from
abhâva (_abhâva-vilak@sa@natvamâtram vivak@sitam_). Ajñâna is not
a positive entity (_bhâva_) like any other positive entity, but it is
called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhâva_).
It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the
ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different
both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes
objected that ajñâna is a mere illusory imagination of the moment
caused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless
(_anâdi_); but Vedânta holds that the fact that it is an imagination
or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely
a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have
been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground
as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being
for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the
ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajñâna therefore being
ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajñâna is the
indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different
from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is
beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have
a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine
whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution
of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which
can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the
illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which
produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedântists
however define ajñâna as the substance constituting illusion, and
say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded
as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that
only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what
is necessary for the notion of a material cause (_upâdâna_) is this,
that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of
effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in
and through the effects which are produced in the time process.
Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajñâna which
also is unreal should be the cause of it.

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Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference.

Ajñâna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor
negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions
as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,"
or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly "I had
been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such
perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics,
and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.
It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not
the perception of the indefinite, the ajñâna, but merely the negation
of knowledge. To this Vedânta says that had it been the
perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have
been associated with the specific object to which it applied.
A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation
generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation
as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.
But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does
not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any
specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless
ignorance. Such an indefinite ajñâna is positive in the sense that
it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive
in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive,
for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself
in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation,
and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception
of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on
the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the
ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.
Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the
negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without
any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest
itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge
is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the
latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do
not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be
known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do
not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is
rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category
namely the indefinite, the ajñâna. It is our common experience

455

that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajñâna_) of a specific type
we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be
admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the
perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving
consciousness (_sâk@si_) is such that both the root ajñâna as well
as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented
in mental states (_v@rtti-jñâna_), are comprehended by it.
Of course when the v@rttijñâna about a thing as in ordinary
perceptions of objects comes in, the ajñâna with regard to it is
temporarily removed, for the v@rttijñâna is opposed to the ajñâna.
But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sâk@si-caitanya_)
is conceived it can comprehend both the ajñâna and the jñâna
(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show
themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or
as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all
positives either as indefinite ajñâna or as states of knowledge
or as specific kinds of ajñâna or ignorance, but it is unable to
comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhâva_) is not a perception,
but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when
I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness
with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a
negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from
the Nyâya point of view that since without the knowledge of a
qualification (_vis'e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis'i@s@ta_) cannot be
known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness
without the object being known first. To this Vedânta
replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known
before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as
well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not
out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity,
but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.
Even the naiyâyikas would agree that in the expression "there
is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted,
for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions
and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so
negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions
and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all
distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be
accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many
on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

456

content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to
object that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to the
perception of an indefinite ajñâna in consciousness. So also the
perception "I do not know what you say" is not the perception
of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know
first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is
impossible to say "I do not know what you say."

So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did not
know anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perception
of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that
during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the
awakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only an
inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and
active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity
had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of
knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no
invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of
the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately
preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state
of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is
by the impression (_sa@mskâra_) of the aforesaid mental state of
ajñâna that one remembers that state and says that "I did not
perceive anything so long." The indefinite (_ajñâna_) perceived in
consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere
negation of knowledge (_jñânâbhâva_) and the two are so connected
that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from
the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite
is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as
such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened
state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajñâna may also be inferred from the
manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness,
as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness
which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we
say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present
knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite
which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just
as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by
removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its
existence

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na, Tattvadîpana_, and
_Advaitasiddhi_.]

457

is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman
does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there
was no ajñâna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself
in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñâna there would
have been no illusion. It is the ajñâna that constitutes the substance
of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded
as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it
is unchangeable. This ajñâna is manifested by the perceiving
consciousness (_sâk@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. The
perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which
reflects itself in the states of avidyâ (ignorance).


Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra, and Anta@hkara@na.

This ajñâna rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit or
Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not
opposed to the ajñâna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed
to the ajñâna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the
mental states (_v@rtti_). The ajñâna thus rests on the pure cit and not
on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to
produce the notion of ego "_aham_" or the individual soul. Vâcaspati
Mis'ra however holds that the ajñâna does not rest on the pure cit
but on the jîva (individual soul). Mâdhava reconciles this view of
Vâcaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñâna may be
regarded as resting on the jîva or individual soul from this point of
view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jîva
(_Cinmâtrâs'ritam ajñânam jîvapak@sapâtitvât jîvâs'ritam ucyate_
Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems
however to indicate that the ajñâna is with reference to the perceiving
self in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this
is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of
the close association of ajñâna with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of
which are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha,
p. 48).

The ajñâna however does not only rest on the cit, but it has
the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are
with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is
thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñâna is noticed;
the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous
character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on
the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,

458

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit
seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does
not shine (_nâsti na prakâs'ate iti vyavahâra@h_) or rather there is no
appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is
hidden by the ajñâna means nothing more than this, that it is
such {_tadyogyatâ_) that the ajñâna can so relate itself with it that
it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other
states of ajñâna-consciousness in experience. Ajñâna is thus
considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It
is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel
it. The action of this ajñ@ana is thus on the light of the reality
which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved
by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not
only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness
but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;
so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our
pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit
is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the
essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there
is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal
experiences of pleasure. The ajñâna is one, but it seems to obstruct
the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it
may be said that the ajñâna has many states as constituting the
individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the
diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñâna
are technically called tulâjñâna or avasthâjñâna. Any state of
consciousness (v@rttijñâna) removes a manifestation of the ajñâna
as tulâjñâna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajñâna as obstructing the
pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated
in the notion of the ego or aha@mkâra. This notion of aha@mkâra
is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other
associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.;
it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed
in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand
limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of
the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set
of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of
impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations
held up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with

459

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken
as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion
of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns,
there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one,
so, here also when I say "I perceive", there are two distinct elements
of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused
into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality,
and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which
appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.
Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other
unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhâkara
sought to repudiate. Prabhâkara did not consider the self to be
self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought
(_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the
object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the
analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball
and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the
anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can
never say that these two are really different, and only have an
illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_)
is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and
like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the
fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedânta objects to this saying
that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to
discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If
knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as
well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge
are indeed one and the same. Kumârila thinks this thought
(_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyâya and Prabhâkara as a
quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other
movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a
substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of
a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything,
if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya the _âtman_ is conscious only through
association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).
Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable
collocations. Thus, _Nyâyamañjarî_ in refuting the doctrine of
self-luminosity {_svaprakâs'a_) says (p.432)

 _sacetanas'citâ yogâttadyogena vinâ ja@da@h
 nârthâvabhâsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nâma manma@he.]

460

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality
of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily
to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what
else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the
self, the âtman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any
of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.
The self is thus the same as vijñâna, the pure consciousness,
which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages,
waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkâra is absent during deep sleep.
It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept
happily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this,
that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkâra are
altogether submerged in the ajñâna, and there are only the
ajñâna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkâra as a state of
anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception
of the ajñâna in the sleep and originates the perception
"I did not know anything." This aha@mkâra which is a mode
(_v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyâ, and is
manifested as jñânas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyâs'akti
(power of work). This kriyâs'akti of the aha@mkâra is illusorily
imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to
be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkâra
itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of
the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkâra of a past period can
now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na,
aha@mkâra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of
the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its
capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of
knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When
the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is
called a jîva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñâna
is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But
it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support
it (_âs'raya_); its own nature as the ajñâna or indefinite is perceived
directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating
the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and
_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See _Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

461

these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself
through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in
the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through
these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkâra is a moment,
is itself a beginningless system of ajñâna-phenomena containing
within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as
merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the
jîva or individual soul began his career.


Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajñâna could be
experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there
are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous
Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter
has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by
which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all
the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is
different from the category of the positive and the negative, has
only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the
true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can
be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character
as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed
order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,
all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajñâna or mâyâ is indeed
hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all
these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is
said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence
beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle
and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything
else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly
appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only
seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except
pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.
It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the
objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and
false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must
show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All
categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to
be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before
us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

462

examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as
that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our
fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by
S'rîhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible
within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete
account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.
I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference
(_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya_. Four explanations are
possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be
perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience
(_svarûpa-bheda_) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference
between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other
(_anyonyâbhâva_), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâ@t@tas think; (3) difference
means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the
Vais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality
in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first
alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth
represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their
mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the
cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic
of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated
into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive
in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?
i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by
the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference
from something else, it is expected that something else such
as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also
be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if
the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated
together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction
becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what
we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from
something else, and if that thing from which the difference is
perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an
entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents
its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,
then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference
from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth
itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

463

the jug only indicates a term from which difference
is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,
for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent
of any association of its difference from other things,
and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If
it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation
to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference
from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty
comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the
cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of
the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would
also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but
identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character
of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other,
but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to
ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have
not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything
might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation
between these two, then that relation would require another
relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again
require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it
may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference
to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are
viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.
But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely
different from the perception of difference. It should also be
noted that the notion of difference is also different from the
notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say
that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say
that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear
as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.
The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things
for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different
from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is
the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the
difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and
not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This
shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the
thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

463

things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we
find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not
in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same
difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of
jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the
residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require
that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce
difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the
cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth
itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be
explained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhâva_) is explained
as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in
the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality
in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;
and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as
identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth
we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for
clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence
of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness
in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third
alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics
(_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the
vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence
as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if
the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless
vaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in the
negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences
they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics
as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of
things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the
other, then apart from the differences--the natural forms--the
things are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvarûpatâ_). If natural forms
(_svarûpa_) mean special natural forms (_svarûpa-vis'e@sa_) then as the
special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference,
the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones
would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there
is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain
differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as
to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones
or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it
exists or not, and so forth.

465


The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and
dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters
of _Kathâvatthu_. In the great _Mahâbha@sya_ on Pâ@nini by Patañjali
also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who
took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all
its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove
that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was
non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and
self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was
only the void (_s'ûnya_). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in
his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rîhar@sa
again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after
having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our
everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought
to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we
cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of
all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led
to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not
exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention
was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñâna
produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show
that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other
words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajñâna,
are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S'rîhar@sa
was followed by _Tattvadîpikâ_ of Citsukha, in which he generally
followed S'rîhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the
addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of
Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S'ûnyavâda in
annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other
Vijñânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character
of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous
ultimate reality.


The Theory of Causation.

The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing
phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the
root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.
The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused
by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents,
as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

466

and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered
insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedãnta had before
it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded
certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of
phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.
In fact the concept of causation and production had in it
something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry
after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and
primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the
present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of
the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect
was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the
ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If
apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation
of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably
present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs
forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before,
and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The
Nyãya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a
general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular
kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding
moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the
other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing
more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature
of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable
condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyãya,
is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived
as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these
again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time
and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually
dependent upon each other (_anyonyâs'raya_) neither of these can
be conceived independently. Another important condition is
invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable
antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as
an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's
house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it
means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect,
it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are
always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]

467

to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence
and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of
that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also
it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence
of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it
is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated
with its accessory factors, then also the question remains
the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.
Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a
plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which
happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot
also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular
cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that
from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special
kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and _Nyâyamañjarî_), for out of the
same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate,
etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then
the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does
it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On
the former supposition the scattered factors being always present
in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means
something else above the specific factors, then that something always
existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation
(_sâmagrî_) be defined as the last movement of the causes
immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the
relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.
Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces
the effect, the very conception of causation which was required
to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved
in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce
its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically
inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out
the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable
series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics
of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajñâna of mâyâ,
and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in
themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all
carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and
some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure
being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

468

which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The
true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through
all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon
it of ajñâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that
is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,
etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere
appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth
is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is
being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being
imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what
is called the _satkâryavâda_ or more properly the _satkâra@navâda_
of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,
and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this
much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being
which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the
being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called
the _vivarttavâda_ as distinguished from the _sâ@mkhyayogapari@nâmavâda_,
in which the effect is regarded as the real development
of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a
different kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but
when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called
_pari@nâma (kâra@nasvalak@sa@nânyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvilak@sa@no
vivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamattâko'nyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h
tadvi@samasattâka@h vivartta@h)_. Vedânta has as much to object
against the Nyâya as against the pari@nâma theory of causation
of the Sâ@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,
and actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the
light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate
things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality
however though phenomena are not identical with the cause,
they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam
vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kâryyam vivartta@h)_.

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the
world, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedânta in explaining
the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the
mâyâ, ajñâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes
on them both. Thus Sarvaj@nâtmamuni, the writer of
_Sa@nk@sepa-s'ârîraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman
should be regarded as the causal substance (_upâdâna_) of the
world-appearance, whereas Prakâs'âtman Akhan@dânanda, and

469

Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the
mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs'vara should be regarded
as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance
is an evolution or pari@nâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs'vara,
whereas Îs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others
however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor
of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity
in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance
may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the
mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the
avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter
(_upâdâna_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom
both Îs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better
rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in
association with his avidyâ or ajñâna. Others however hold that
since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being
and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to
be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal
matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in pari@nâma.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of
the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva.
Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which
the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold
world of appearance. Prakâs'ânanda holds however in his _Siddhânta
Muktâvalî_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected
even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal
matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the
phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the
product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna
(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences
of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect
the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is
the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only
a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ
was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and
wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying
it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began
to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadâra@nyaka,
Pras'na, and Svetâs'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It
is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

470

the word mâyâ occurs only once in the B@rhadâra@nyaka and once
only in the Pras'na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs
only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa
uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the _Lankâvatâra_
it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara the
word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle
of creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the
phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapâda the teacher
of S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help
of the mâyâ doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the
spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not
pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or
enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapâda asserts
clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that
the world does not exist in reality, that it is mâyâ, and not reality.
When the highest truth is realized mâyâ is not removed, for it is
not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own
airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapâda who compared
the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects
seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable
of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and
unreal. The âtman says Gau@dapâda is at once the cognizer and
the cognized, the world subsists in the âtman through mâyâ.
As âtman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily
follows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expounded
this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads
and the Brahma-sûtra, but he seems to me to have done little
more than making explicit the doctrine of mâyâ. Some of his
followers however examined and thought over the concept of
mâyâ and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable
thereby substantially contributing to the development of
the Vedânta philosophy.


Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].

Pramâ@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If
memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra and his son Râmak@r@s@na worked out a
complete scheme of the theory of Vedântic perception and inference.
This is in complete agreement with the general Vedânta metaphysics.
The early Vedântists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory
nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.
It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as
worked out by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra he was largely indebted to the Mîmâm@sâ
school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamâna s'abda and
anupalabdhi also Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra accepted the Mîmâm@sâ view. The
Vedantins, previous to Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra, had also tacitly followed
the Mîmâm@sâ in these matters.]

471

pramâ@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right
knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge
(_pramâ_) in Vedânta is the knowledge of an object which has not
been found contradicted (_abâdhitârthavi@sayajñânatva_). Except
when specially expressed otherwise, pramâ is generally considered
as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired
(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections
are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a
few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive
moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired
in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedânta
considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise,
any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as
remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive
one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a
series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge
of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge
of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental
state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as
having remained unchanged all through the series of moments.
There is of course this difference between the same percept of a
previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh
elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though
the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned
remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses
though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.
When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state
representing the book is not changed every second, and hence
there can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental
states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous
one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains
the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any
change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the
same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains
the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

472

addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the
external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the
absolute is realized.

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the
external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as
it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has
been transformed into a state (_v@rtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the
anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its
knowledge, the ignorance (_ajñâna_) with reference to that object is
removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness
(_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by
ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object
is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form
resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes
that by the action of ajñâna, pure consciousness or being
is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of
the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is
but the transformation of ignorance (ajñâna), the former cannot
manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance
they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The
diversified objects of the world are but transformations of
the principle of ajñâna which is neither real nor unreal. It
is the nature of ajñâna that it veils its own creations. Thus
on each of the objects created by the ajñâna by its creating
(_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (âvara@na) capacity.
But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na
through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into
the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil
on that particular ajñâna form--the object, and as the self-shining
cit is shining through the particular ajñâna state, we
have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is
in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the
ajñâna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls
and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedânta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The
same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called mânâs,
buddhi, aha@mkâra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called
mânâs, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As
presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkâra, and as
producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications
or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special
kind of modification of ajñâna as anta@hkara@na).]

473

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary
and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñâna forms
so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the
subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on
the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation
(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective
consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the
specific mental states
(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayâvacchinnacaitanyâbhinnatvam
tattadâkâravi@sayâvacchinnajñânasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam_).
This union in perception means that the objective has at that
moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of
the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na
is called jîvasâk@si.

Inference (_anumâna_), according to Vedânta, is made by our
notion of concomitance (_vyâptijñâna_) between two things, acting
through specific past impressions (_sa@mskâra_). Thus when I see
smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke
with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I
infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and
the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance
revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between
the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is
generated by the perception of two things together, when no
case of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicârâjñâna_)
regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether
subjective, the Vedântist does not emphasize the necessity
of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhûyodars'anam
sak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nâdara@nîya@h_). Vedânta is
not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of
concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the
concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory
instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedânta whether this
concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.
The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance
(_anvayavyâpti_) that the Vedânta allows. So the
Vedânta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyâya
supported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence
with agreement in absence), _kevalânvayi_ (by universal agreement
where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

474

_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedânta
advocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijña_ (the hill is fiery);
(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tânta_ (as in the
kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyâya maintained [Footnote
ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedânta as
being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the
one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,
we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam
sarvam mithyâ Brahmabhinnatvât yedevam tadevam yathâ s'uktirûpyam_).
First premiss (_pratijñâ_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second
premiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss
(_dr@s@tânta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote
ref 2].


Âtman, Jîva, Îs'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous
(_svayamprakâs'a). But what does this mean? Vedânta
defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but
is yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati
aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the
capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness
without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever
anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character
as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not
be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.
This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can
produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its
objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for
its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug,
the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness
to manifest it, then that might again require another, and
that another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavasthâ_). If consciousness
did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,
then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he
had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness
(_anubhûti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijñâ, hetu and udâharana, or
udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyâya, viz.
pratijña, hetu, udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]

[Footnote 2: Vedântic notions of the pramâna of upamana, arthapatti,
s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mîmâm@sâ view, do not
require to be treated here separately.]

475

of all our world experience. This goes directly against
the jñâtatâ theory of Kumârila that consciousness was not immediate
but was only inferable from the manifesting quality
(_jñâtatâ_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedânta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness
is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object
of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in
consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it
is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The
self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is
never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the
perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association
comprehended under the term aha@mkâra (ego). The real self is
identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.
This real self called the âtman is not the same as the jîva or
individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences
of worldly life. Îs'vara also must be distinguished from this
highest âtman or Brahman. We have already seen that many
Vedântists draw a distinction between mâyâ and avidyâ. Mâyâ
is that aspect of ajñâna by which only the best attributes
are projected, whereas avidyâ is that aspect by which impure
qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are
more of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter
veiling (_âvara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation
of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with mâyâ and
avidyâ (also called ajñâna) was believed respectively to explain the
phenomenal Îs'vara and the phenomenal jîva or individual. This
relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upâdhi or pratibimba,
and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is
like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,
though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes
the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The
sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the
impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may
be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of
water and yield different kinds of images possessing different
characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally
have all the appearance of reality. The other conception
of the relation is that when we speak of âkâs'a (space) in the jug
or of âkâs'a in the room. The âkâs'a in reality does not suffer

476

any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In
reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_)
within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited
by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the
âkâs'a limited within it will remain as separate from the âkâs'a
limited within the room.

Of the Vedântists who accept the reflection analogy the followers
of N@rsi@mhâs'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected
in the mâyâ, Îs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the
avidyâ the individual or jîva. Sarvajñâtmâ however does not
distinguish between the mâyâ and the avidyâ, and thinks that
when the cit is reflected in the avidyâ in its total aspect as cause,
we get Îs'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na--a product
of the avidyâ--we have jîva or individual soul.

Jîva or individual means the self in association with the ego
and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,
suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jîva also three
stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na
is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñâna and the
jîva in this state is called prâjña or ânandamaya. In the dream-state
the self is in association with a subtle body and is called
taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a
subtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure
state is called Brahman, when associated with mâyâ it is called
Îs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as
controlling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross
elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virâ@t
puru@sa.

The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of
as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and
the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and
when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâ@sika (illusory).

Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajñâna is one
there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara;
but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the
ajñâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is
Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajñâna gives
us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the anta@hkara@na
as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and
apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of

477

Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent
on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed
by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the
avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible
of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna)
by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond
it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity
of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are
not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining
or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the
Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a
phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more
powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of
us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and
both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some
Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and
that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his
imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will
continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his
experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary
individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary
salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of
the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva
and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the
doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some
Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance
has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person
creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective
datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception
of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a
rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and
agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen
the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and
there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory
perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no
corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must
be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds
that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

478

are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently
and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison
with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant
and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance.
According to the other view phenomena are not
objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that
the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the
perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion
occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist
before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,
and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore
called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda, i.e. the theory that the
subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there
are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.
In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of
the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with
which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective
phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajñâna,
but still these phenomena of the ajñâna are there as the common
ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective
epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda has no proper
epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined
by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications
of the avidyâ. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda theory approaches
nearest to the Vijñânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference
that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being
Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable
reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary
perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that
both are modifications of ajñâna. It is indeed difficult to
comprehend the nature of ajñâna, though its presence in consciousness
can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism
all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and
become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains
the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these
indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes
of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue
from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in
its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

479

that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms
and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,
incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under
certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,
and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a
positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only
the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms
and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a
cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being
apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that
is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have
being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing
the characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes of
ajñâna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our
experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to
conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajñâna.
Moreover such is the nature of ajñânas that they are knowable
only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous
Brahman or âtman. Being as such is the highest truth, the
Brahman. The ajñâna states are not non-being in the sense of
nothing of pure negation (_abhâva_), but in the sense that they are
not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,
the ajñâna, and this illumination means nothing more than a
false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajñâna
if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness,
and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and
mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these
cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone
that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajñâna
states in themselves as apart from the âtman we fail in a dilemma,
for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and
when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus
apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other
kind of its existence is known to us. If ajñâna had been a non-entity
altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive
entity then it would never cease to be; the ajñâna thus is a
mysterious category midway between being and non-being and
undefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is
called _tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvâcya_ or undefinable and undeterminable
either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

480

a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal
in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness
it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they
are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible
as to their real nature or mutual relation, and
comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness,
but apart from these no rational conception of them can be
formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajñâna
(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in
consciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâdins asserted
that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence
of avidyâ and that beyond that no objective common ground
could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of
Vedânta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining
our common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasathâ_) we may
think that we have an objective world before us as the common
field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and
operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be
interpreted in the light of the Vedânta metaphysics.

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the
âtman, the one highest reality, secondly as jîva or the âtman as
limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated
from the âtman, but âtman is regarded as identical with the psychosis
thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _jîvasâk@si_ or
perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jîva comprehends,
knows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis or
mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyâ manifestations,
just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of
avidyâ phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is not
only the avidyâ capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences,
but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of
past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The
anta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidyâ modes of it into
the jîvasâk@si (jîva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and
these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed
into experience. These avidyâ states of the anta@hkara@na
are called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the
v@rttiajñânas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed
upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness
and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

481

forms of ajñâna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only
so long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis of
anta@hkara@na, for the ajñâna can be destroyed by the cit only in the
form of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the ajñâna veils the cit
from manifestation. The removal of ajñâna-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na
or the manifestation of v@rtti-jñâna is nothing but this, that
the anta@hkara@na states of avidyâ are the only states of ajñâna
which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous âtman
(_adhyâsa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of the
avidyâ phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity
consists in this that avidyâ in this form cannot be superimposed
on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These
avidyâ phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in
all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond
consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyâ
phenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with the
avidyâ states and render themselves objects of consciousness or
have their veil of âvara@na removed. It is thus assumed that in
ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta@hkara@na
goes out of the man's body (_s'arîramadhyât_) and coming in
touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,
and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which
is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.
The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested
(though these were taking place on the background of
the same self-luminous Brahman or âtman as forms of the highest
truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajñâna phenomena
in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous.
It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena
that the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into corresponding
states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed
the anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states or
v@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the
v@rttis alone has the power of removing the ajñâna veiling the
cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,
or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of
appearance and due to avidyâ. And it is only from the point of
view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects
can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together
through the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects

482

translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajñâna
which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the
object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected
through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The
pratyak@sa-pramâ or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the
pure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical with
the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by
it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three
consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective
phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jîva
or pramâtâ, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rtti
of the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected.

Pramâ or right knowledge means in Vedânta the acquirement
of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by
experience (_abâdhita_). There is thus no absolute definition of
truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long
as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it
is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted
by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the
knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true
absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness
which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The
truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out
whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience
or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to
be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be
contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated
by a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as
pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated
the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In continuous
perception of anything for a certain time as an object
or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the
same way all the while so long as any other new form is not
taken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new
knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the
hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter
of inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the
fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

483

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as
inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired
perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is
odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal
wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it
to be odoriferous. Vedânta does not admit the existence of the
relation called _samavâya_ (inherence) or _jâti_ (class notion); and
so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the
other class called inference, and holds that both perception and
inference are but different modes of the transformations of the
anta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. The
perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is
in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of
the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in
the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective
cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that
through the v@rtti the same reality subsisting in the object and
the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred,
being away from contact with anta@hkara@na, has apparently
a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness.
Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing
the same identical reality in the object and the subject by
anta@hkara@na contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced
by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically
to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta
before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge
produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (_s'âbda_)
knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak@sa.
The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same
as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as
represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the
unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but
only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception
already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from
"this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa
knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness
when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the
knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for

484

though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet
from the point of view of intrinsic significance (_tâtparya_) one
identical reality only is indicated. Vedânta does not distinguish
nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'âbda
perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the
condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the
sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas
in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different
ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (_râjapuru@sa
âgacchatî_). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is
signified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnote
ref 1].

It is not out of place to mention in this connection that
Vedânta admits all the six pramâ@nas of Kumârila and considers
like Mîmâ@msâ that all knowledge is self-valid (_svat@ah-pramâ@na_).
But pramâ has not the same meaning in Vedânta
as in Mîmâ@msâ. There as we remember pramâ meant the
knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such
all knowledge was pramâ, until practical experience showed the
course of action in accordance with which it was found to be
contradicted. In Vedânta however there is no reference to action,
but pramâ means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition
of self-validity as given by Mîmâ@msâ Vedânta adds another
objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svata@h-prâmâ@nya
as is not vitiated by the presence of any do@sa (cause
of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedânta of course
does not think like Nyâya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence,
etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,
nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the
Mîmâ@msists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It
adopts a middle course and holds that absence of do@sa is a necessary
condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that
this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to
be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,
but Vedânta says that as it requires only a negative condition
for the absence of do@sa, the objection does not apply to it, and it
holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition
for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyâya,
then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.
But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ and _S'ikhâma@ni._]

485

attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedânta was bound to
follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the
pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else
for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal
forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance
would come to be valid; so it held that knowledge
could be regarded as valid only when there was no do@sa
present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge
was false and had no validity, because there was the
avidyâ-do@sa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was
valid in which there was no do@sa. Validity (prâmâ@nya) with
Mîmâ@msâ meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to
practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedânta it meant
correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of
do@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the
correctness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].


Vedânta Theory of Illusion.

We have already seen that the Mîmâ@msists had asserted that
all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathârthâ@h
sarve vivâdaspadîbhûtâ@h pratyayâ@h pratyayatvât_). Even
illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the
distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and
the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedânta objects to this,
and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which
is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is
said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.
non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),
then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,
and negation with Mîmâ@msâ is nothing but the bare presence of the
locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but
the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception
of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely
and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's
sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas
is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one
could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping
down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ, S'ikhâma@ni, Ma@niprabhâ_ and Citsukha
on svata@hprâma@nya.]

486

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical
movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect
perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated
and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver
appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the
movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For
the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us
to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus
I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite
this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as
if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mîma@msâ position
may be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vedânta thinks that the illusion
is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon
of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;
the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion
is generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the
phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas.
The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described
thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a
mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me
is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state
of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidyâ
(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence
of the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression of
silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the
appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver
appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state
generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two
transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal
illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness
(_sâk@sicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations,
one in the avidyâ states forming the illusory objective silver
phenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state.
But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,
their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have
one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of
illusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacanîya-khyâti_) illusory silver
is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver
occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedânta, namely the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha_ and _Nyâyamakaranda_ on
akhyâti refutation.]

487

_pâramârthika_ or absolute, _vyavahârika_ or practical ordinary
experience, and _prâtibhâsika,_ illusory. The first one represents
the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due
to do@sa. The difference between vyavahârika and prâtibhâsika
is that the do@sa of the vyavahârika perception is neither discovered
nor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of the
prâtibhâsika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such
as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of
our ordinary experience, and thus the prâtibhâsika experience
lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavahârika. But just
as the vyavahârika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications
of the ajñâna, as apart from our subjective experience and
even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is
also regarded as a modification of avidyâ, an undefinable creation
of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in the
case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver
is created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is
called the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacanîya_) silver of illusion.
Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same
but the avidyâ of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (_pari@nâma_)
on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.
The illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the point
of view of the cit and pari@nâma from the point of view of
avidyâ, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nâma is, that
in the former the transformations have a different reality from
the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),
while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality
as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same
stuff as the avidyâ whose transformations it is). But now a
difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to
a coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified
by do@sa and the object--cit as underlying the "this" before
me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the
experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that
"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place
in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of
the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion
"I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection
with a previous v@rtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing
of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

488

knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is"
according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams
also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception
of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are
generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are
imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded
merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the
form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not
that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses
are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,
but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,
time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that
since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to
last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought
to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking
stages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different
states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were
causing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation)
as distinguished from _bâdha_ (cessation). The illusory creation of
dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these
cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa of
sleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications in
accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is
called niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience
it, whereas bâdha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation
ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell
the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this
was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived
as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality
was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective
illusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is
transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon
it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds
of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable
silver (_anirvacanîya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attribution
of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory
silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion
that it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyathâkhyâti_
form of illusion as advocated by Nyâya. Vedânta admits that
when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present

489

before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other
by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion
is of the form of anyathâkhyâti; but if one of the things is not
present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not
of the anyathâkhyâti type, but of the anirvacanîyakhyâti type.
Vedânta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed
that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance
was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous
in all our experiences. The world appearance is an
illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it
is a misattribution (_anyathâkhyâti_) of the characteristic of the
Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which
manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,
just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of
silver its reality.



Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation.

Vedânta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the
study of Vedânta and is instructed by the preceptor--"Thou
art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge,
and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory.
The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedânta are (1)
that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper
accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of
the knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another,
he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such
as daily prayer, etc. called _nitya-karma_) and occasionally obligatory
duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son,
called _naimittika-karma_) and must have avoided all actions for
the fulfilment of selfish desires (_kâmya-karmas_, such as the
performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited
actions (e.g. murder, etc. _ni@siddha-karma_) in such a
way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no
karma is generated by the _nitya_ and _naimittika-karma_, and as
he has not performed the _kâmya_ and prohibited karmas, he has
acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified
his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of
fitting the mind for Vedânta instruction (called _sâdhana_) he
can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedânta instruction.
These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal

490

and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this
life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for
all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge,
(4) control over the senses by which these are restrained
from everything but that which aids the attainment of right
knowledge (_dama_), (a) having restrained them, the attainment
of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards
worldly enjoyments (_uparati_), (b) power of bearing extremes
of heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment
of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and
Upani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing
the above qualities should try to understand correctly
the true purport of the Upani@sads (called _s'rava@na_), and by
arguments in favour of the purport of the Upani@sads to
strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upani@sads (called
_manana_) and then by _nididhyâsana_ (meditation) which includes
all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth
as one. Vedânta therefore in ethics covers the ground of
Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding
the difference between puru@sa and prak@rti, with Vedânta
salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman
alone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. Mîmâ@msâ asserts
that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the
supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance
with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good
and the removal of evil. But Vedânta holds that though the
purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mîmâ@msâ has it, yet this
is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the
goal is clearly as the Upani@sads indicate it, namely the attainment
of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic
duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was
believed by many (e.g. Vâcaspati Mis'ra and his followers) that
due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a
great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others
believed (e.g. Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers) that it served to
bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors,
etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became
easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.
In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajñânas removed

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântasâra_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]

491

are only smaller states of ajñâna, whereas when the
Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajñâna as a whole is removed.
Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a
state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when
this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which
at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñâna
modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed,
only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its
own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece
of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn
the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge
would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and
at last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].

The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman
as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss
shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as
illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but
limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also
are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste
of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being
of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent
beings as the _sattâ_ (being as class notion) of the naiyâyika, but
the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness
and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (_sat_) is pure
bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyâ during
mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the
question, how the avidyâ came forth and stayed during the world-appearance.
It is best to remember that the category of the
indefinite avidyâ is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation
and destruction. Vedânta however believes that even when the
true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a
while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it.
Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like
an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer
acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe
karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and
there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of
perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of
beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any

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[Footnote 1:_Siddhântales'a_.]

492

of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any
knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is
called _jîvanmukta_, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all
world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone
in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the
stage [Footnote ref 1].



Vedânta and other Indian Systems.

Vedânta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyâya, and most of
its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it.
S'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and
inconsistencies in many of the Nyâya conceptions, such as the
theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavâya,
the conception of jâti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to
still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of
S'rîhar@sa, Citsukha, Madhusûdana, etc. It was opposed to Mîmâ@msâ so
far as this admitted the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreed
with it generally as regards the pramâ@nas of anumâna, upamiti,
arthâpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter
in Mîmâ@msâ with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting
power of knowledge. But it differed from Mîmâ@msâ
in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate
discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to
ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties
to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest
knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties
only so long as he was not fit for Vedânta instruction and
studies.

With Sâ@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedânta seems to
be very close. We have already seen that Vedânta had accepted
all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that
were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedânta
and Sâ@mkhya was this that Sâ@mkhya believed, that the stuff of
which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the
puru@sas. In later times Vedânta had compromised so far with
Sâ@mkhya that it also sometimes described mâyâ as being made
up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedânta also held that according
to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications

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[Footnote 1: See _Pañcadas'î_.]

[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyâya, _S'a@nkara-bhâ@sya_, II.
ii.]

493

of the mâyâ. Thus Îs'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure
sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in
Vedânta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sâ@mkhya
held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that mâyâ was
believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it
was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from
what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial
nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long
as it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable
as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation,
but even then it was believed to be a combination of
positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals
composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged
to it with which it could be defined. Mâyâ however was undemonstrable,
indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a
separate category of the indefinite. Sâ@mkhya believed in the
personal individuality of souls, while for Vedânta there was only
one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the mâyâ
transformations. There was an adhyâsa or illusion in Sâ@mkhya
as well as in Vedânta; but in the former the illusion was due
to a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or mere
misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedânta there
was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable
creation. Causation with Sâ@mkhya meant real transformation,
but with Vedânta all transformation was mere appearance.
Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to
see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems
during the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similar
ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested
themselves into the present divergences of the two systems.
Though S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the Sâ@mkhya
view could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly be
convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more
he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sâ@mkhya
thought had its origin in the Upani@sads. Sâ'a@nkara and his
followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from
the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'ûnya
of Nâgârjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between
pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of
S`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñânavâda Buddhism

494

can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth
in the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vijñâna Bhik@su and
others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to
think that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound of
Vijñânavâda and S'ûnyavâda Buddhism with the Upani@sad
notion of the permanence of self superadded.





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