Title: Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, - from Spanish and Portuguese Domination, Volume 1
Author: Dundonald, Thomas Cochrane, Earl of, 1775-1860
Language: English
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LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU AND BRAZIL, FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE
DOMINATION, VOLUME 1***


NARRATIVE OF SERVICES IN THE LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU, AND BRAZIL,
FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

by

THOMAS, EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, etc. etc.

VOL. I

London:
James Ridgway, No 169, Piccadilly

MDCCCLIX



TO THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G. ETC. ETC.


My Lord,

I am proud to have been honoured with your Lordship's permission to
dedicate to you the following narrative of historical events, respecting
which the public has not previously been placed in a position to form a
correct judgment. Your Lordship's generous acquiescence enables me to
discharge a double debt: First--of thanks to one whose high political
character this country will ever warmly cherish;--Secondly--of deep-felt
gratitude for the countenance and efficient aid experienced from your
Lordship at a period when party faction made me the object of bitter
resentment; the injustice of which could in no way be better
demonstrated, than by the fact that--in the midst of unmerited obloquy,
it was my high privilege to preserve your Lordship's friendship and
esteem.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obliged and faithful Servant,

DUNDONALD.



CONTENTS.


PREFACE

CHAPTER I.

Invitation to take command of Chilian Navy--Arrival at Valparaiso--First
expedition to Peru--Attack on Spanish shipping at Callao--Departure for
Huacho--Capture of Spanish convoys of money--Paita taken--Return to
Valparaiso to reorganise the squadron--Offer to give up my share of
prize money to the Republic--This offer declined by the Supreme
Director--Popular congratulations--Attempt on Lady Cochrane's life.

CHAPTER II.

Second expedition to Peru--Disappointment at not being provided with
troops--Failure of rockets--Departure for Arica--Capture of
Pisco--Capture of Spanish ships at Puna--Determine to make an attempt on
Valdivia--Arrival off that port, and capture of Spanish brig of war
_Potrillo_--Troops obtained from Conception--Flag-ship nearly
wrecked--Attack on forts, and conquest of Valdivia.

CHAPTER III.

Departure for Chiloe--Preparations of the enemy--Capture of Fort
Corona--Failure at Fort Aguy, and subsequent retreat--Return to
Valdivia--Capture of Osorio--Return to Valparaiso--Enthusiastic
reception--Chagrin of the ministry--Importance of conquest of Valdivia
in a political point of view--Promotion of officers under
arrest--Employment of Indians by the Spaniards--Career of
Benavides--Mutinous spirit of the seamen in consequence of their
captures being appropriated by Government--Resignation of my
commission--Refusal thereof--Renewed offer of an estate--This again
declined--Seamen obtain their wages--Private purchase of an
estate--Government gives notice of taking it--Appointment of flag
captain against my wishes--Annoyance given to me by Minister of
Marine--Renewed resignation of the command--Officers of the squadron
resign in a body--Government begs of me to retain the command--My
consent--General San Martin--The Senate--Zenteno--Corruption of parties
in the Administration.

CHAPTER IV.

Obstacles to equipping the squadron--Sailing of the liberating
expedition--Debarcation at Pisco--Long inaction of the army--General San
Martin removes to Ancon--Capture of the Esmeralda--Exchange of
prisoners--Acknowledgment of the service by General San Martin--Lady
Cochrane's visit to Mendoza.

CHAPTER V.

San Martin's violation, of truth--Removal of blockade--Spanish
depression--Troops dying of fever--San Martin's designs on
Guayaquil--Mutinous conduct of officers--Refusal to obey
orders--Deposition of Viceroy--San Martin gives me troops--Jealousy of
San Martin--Attack on Arica--Capture of Tacna--Capture of
Moquega--Refusal of more men--an armistice ratified--Distress of
Lima--Dissatisfaction of the army--Lady Cochrane in action--Devotion of
seamen.

CHAPTER VI.

Return to Callao--Lima abandoned--Hesitation of General San Martin to
occupy the City--Loss of the _San Martin_--Excesses of the
Spaniards--Proclamation of independence--San Martin assumes autocratic
power under the title of Protector--My remonstrance--His reply--Mutinous
state of the squadron from neglect.

CHAPTER VII.

Tampering with Chilian officers--The Archbishop of Lima--His
expulsion--Negociation for surrender of the Forts--This
counteracted--San Martin's bombastic Proclamations--His refusal to
encounter the enemy--The Spaniards relieve Callao--Delusive
proclamation--The unblushing falsehood--Spaniards carry off the
treasure--Discontent of the squadron.

CHAPTER VIII.

Prolonged destitution of squadron--The men mutiny in a body--The
seamen's letters--San Martin sends away the public treasure--My seizure
of it--Private property restored--San Martin's accusations against
me--The squadron paid wages--Attempt on the officers' fidelity--I am
asked to desert from Chili--Ordered to quit on refusal--Monteagudo's
letter--My reply--Justification of seizing the treasure--- No other
course possible.

CHAPTER IX.

Arrival at Guayaquil--Address to Guayaquilenos--Injurious
monopolies--Ministerial folly--Departure from Guayaquil--Arrival in
Mexico--Anchor at Acapulco--Mock Ambassadors--Plot against me--Return to
Guayaquil--Venganza taken possession of--Agreement with Junta--General
La Mar--Orders to withhold supplies--Abominable cruelty--Courtly
splendour--Destruction of a division of the Army--Dissatisfaction of
officers--Renewed overtures from San Martin--Their refusal by
me--Warning to the Chilian Government.

CHAPTER X.

Return to Valparaiso--Thanks of the Government--Reasons for
satisfaction--Illegitimate trade--Turned to good account--Denunciation
of Officers deserted--Investigation of accounts--San Martin's charges
against me--My refutation--Government refuses its publication--Cruelty
to Spanish prisoners--Retirement to Quintero--Political fruits of our
success--Destitute condition of squadron--Infamous attempt to promote
dissatisfaction therein--Object of this course--Steps taken to defeat
it--Disavowed by the Minister--Sympathy of officers--Attempt to get rid
of Gen. Freire--Its eventual result--Letter of the Captains.

CHAPTER XI.

Negociations with Bolivar--Exile of Monteagudo--Complaints of the
Limeños--Extravagance of the Government--Exculpation of San
Martin--Effects of popular dissension--Disagreement of Bolivar and San
Martin--Vote of Peruvian Congress--Extraordinary neglect of the Chilian
Squadron--San Martin's arrival at Valparaiso--I demand his
trial--Countenance of the Supreme Director--Squadron at length paid
wages--Revolt of Conception--General Freire apprises me of it--Freire
asks for my support--His letter not replied to--San Martin's influence.

CHAPTER XII.

The squadron taken from me--I accept invitation from Brazil--Letter to
the Supreme Director--San Martin quits Chili--His prudence--Opinion of
his Aide-de Camp--Ministerial neglect--Permission to quit Chili--Letter
to General Freire--For the first time made public--Letter to the
Captains and Officers--To the Chilian people--To the foreign
merchants--To the President of Peru--San Martin actuated by
revenge--This shewn from his letters.

CHAPTER XIII.

Freire marches on Valparaiso--Elected Supreme Director--He begs of me to
return--My reply--Subsequent letter to General Freire.

CHAPTER XIV.

Injustice to the squadron--Inconsistency of this--Estate taken from
me--My losses by litigation--Endeavours to enforce my claims--Petty
excuses for evading them--I am charged with expenses of the Army--And
with costs for making legal captures--My conduct approved at the time---
Ministerial approbation--Paltry compensation at length given--Ministerial
corruption--Proved by San Martin--Cause of official animosity to
me--Conclusion.

APPENDIX.



PREFACE.


The first of these volumes forms a history of the consolidation of
Chilian independence, and of the subsequent liberation of Peru--through
the instrumentality of the Chilian squadron under my command; a service
which called forth from the Governments and people of the liberated
states the warmest expressions of gratitude to the naval service
collectively, and to myself personally, as having planned and conducted
the operations whereby these results were attained.

It records also the strangely inconsistent fact that--beyond these marks
of national approbation--neither Chili nor Peru ever awarded to the
squadron or myself any more substantial reward--though, in a pecuniary
sense, deeply indebted to us; for, during the greater portion of the war
of independence, the subsistence of the crews, and the repairs and
equipment of the Chilian squadron were solely provided for by our own
exertions, without cost to the Government; since, in addition to the
capture of Spanish ships-of-war and merchant vessels--money, provisions,
and stores to a great extent fell into our hands; all of which--though
our own stipulated right--were voluntarily devoted to state exigencies,
in the full conviction that, at the expiration of the war, the value of
our sacrifices would, as a point of national honour, be returned to us
by Chili. As regards Peru, our still unpaid for captures of ships-of-war
formed her first naval force, for which the only requital has been, a
vote of her first National Assembly--almost its inaugural act--ascribing
to me the double praise of her liberation from the Spanish yoke, and of
her subsequent deliverance from an intolerable military tyranny.

The volume contains another point, which forms a yet stranger sequel to
my services on the Western shores of South America. After the expiration
of thirty years, Chili granted me the absurdly inadequate sum of £.6,000
_in full of all my claims!_ And this, with the knowledge that, after my
return to England I was involved in litigation on account of the legal
seizure of vessels under the orders of her former Government--by which
I was subjected to a loss, directly and indirectly, of _more than three
times the amount_. The Chilian portion of this history, therefore,
resolves itself into the fact, that not only did I reap no reward
whatever, for the liberation of Chili and Peru, but that the
independence of both countries was achieved _at a heavy pecuniary
sacrifice to myself!_ in compensation for which, as well as for my
recognised services--Chili has thought its national honour sufficiently
vindicated by allotting me _one-third of my losses only_, without other
compensation of any kind! I regret to add, that my necessities at the
time, arising for the most part from the pecuniary difficulties to which
I had been subjected on Chilian account, compelled me to accept the
amount tendered.

The second volume is of a character somewhat similar. It narrates the
circumstances under which--by promises the most inviting, and
stipulations the most binding--I was induced to accept the command, or
rather organization of the first Brazilian navy. It details the complete
expulsion of all Portuguese armaments, naval and military, from the
Eastern shores of the South American Continent, by the squadron alone,
wholly unaided by military co-operation; in the course of which arduous
service, ships of war, merchant vessels, and valuable property to the
extent of several millions of dollars were captured under the Imperial
order, and their value--in spite of previous stipulations--_refused to
the captors_, on the falsely assumed ground that the provinces liberated
were Brazilian--though a Brazilian military force had been recently
beaten in an attempt to expel the Portuguese--and though these provinces
were, at the period of my assuming the command, in the uninterrupted
occupation of the very Portuguese fleets and armies afterwards expelled,
it was falsely pretended that the property captured was not enemy's
property--though expressly described as such in numerous Imperial
decrees--and more especially by the instructions given to me by His
Imperial Majesty to seize or destroy it wherever found.

It was, in short, subsequently decided by a Court of Admiralty--for the
most part composed of Portuguese members, acting under the influence of
a Portuguese faction in the Administration--that neither myself nor the
squadron were entitled to the prizes made--though most inconsistently,
the same tribunal condemned the ships of war taken--as "_droits_" to the
crown--for which, compensation was awarded to the squadron by His
Imperial Majesty, but never paid by the ministers to whom the order was
directed.

Not to anticipate the contents of the volume devoted to Brazilian
affairs. It being found after the expulsion of the enemy, that the
stipulations made with myself were too binding to be easily set aside,
several futile attempts were made to evade them, but this being found
impossible, the unworthy expedient was resorted to of summarily
dismissing me from the service, after the establishment of peace with
Portugal--an event entirely consequent on my individual services. By
this expedient--of the rectitude or otherwise of which the reader will
be able to judge from the documentary evidence laid before him--I was
got rid of without compensation for my claims, which for thirty years
were altogether repudiated; but, at the expiration of that period, fully
recognised as _having been due from the beginning!_ The Brazilian
Government, however, satisfied its own sense of justice by awarding me
less than _one-half the simple interest of the amount stipulated in my
patents_; thus retaining the whole of the principal admitted to be due.

The preceding remarks form a _synopsis_ of my career on both sides of
the continent of South America; the narrative, where dispute might
arise, being carefully founded on, and in all cases accompanied by
documentary evidence, which admits neither dispute nor contradiction.

The trifling amount awarded by Chili, would probably not have been
granted at all, but for the earnest remonstrance of Lord Palmerston,
warmly seconded by the efforts of the Hon. Mr. Jerningham, British
Minister to the Chilian Republic, by whose joint exertions the
Government was induced to admit--that national honour was involved in
fulfilling national obligations; though an infinitesimal view of either
the one or the other was certainly taken when awarding me the
insignificant sum previously mentioned.

In Brazil the case was somewhat different. It is to His present Imperial
Majesty, Don Pedro II. that I owe any investigation of my claims, by the
appointment of a Commission (_Secçoes_), which reported that they ought
never to have been withheld, as being my stipulated right. But even the
limited amount awarded in consequence of this decision, was on the point
of being further diminished one half by its projected payment in a
depreciated currency--and, had it not been for the intervention of Lord
Clarendon, and of the Hon. Mr. Scarlett, British Minister at Rio de
Janeiro, of whose zealous exertions in my favour I cannot speak too
warmly--this further injustice would have been perpetrated without the
knowledge or sanction of His present Imperial Majesty.

It may be asked, why--with the clear documentary evidence in my
possession--and now adduced--I have for so many years endured an amount
of obloquy and injustice, which might at any time have been set aside by
its publication? The reply is obvious. The withholding of my claims by
the Governments of both sides the South American Continent, and the
ruinous expense to which I was put on account of Chili, entailed upon me
many years of pecuniary difficulty. To have told even the
truth--unbacked as I then was, by the British Government--would have
been to have all my claims set at defiance, so that compulsory
discretion was a sufficient reason for my silence. It was long before I
could induce a British Minister to satisfy himself of the rectitude of
my conduct--the soundness of my claims--or the dishonesty of those who,
believing me to be powerless, laughed at reiterated demands for my
stipulated rights. Yet more I have never sought from those to whom I
gave liberty and dominion.

There is, however, a reason for the present publication, of which I have
never lost sight. Amidst all the injustice which it has been my lot to
sustain, I have ever determined--for the sake of my family--to whom my
character is an heir-loom--that no obloquy shall follow me to the grave,
for none have I merited. On the day these volumes see the light, this
resolution will be partially fulfilled. On that day I shall have
completed the eighty-third year of a career strangely chequered, yet not
undistinguished; and, therefore, the opinions of either Chilians or
Brazilians are now of small moment to me in comparison with a reputation
which has been demmed worthy of belonging to history. None of the
present ruling powers in either Chili or Brazil can possibly be offended
with me for giving a guardedly temperate documentary narrative of what
must hereafter form the basis of their national annals. I do not for a
moment contemplate that men of enlightened views such as now direct the
affairs of both countries have either part or sympathy with
self-interested adventurers who in popular revolutions too often rise to
the surface, and for a time make confusion worse confounded; till
replaced--as a matter of course, no less than by necessity--by men of
greater grasp of mind and more exalted aspirations.

But this is as it maybe--my reputation as a British seaman is to me of
the highest moment, and it shall not be sullied after my death by the
aspersions of those who wilfully revenged the thwarting of their
anti-Imperial designs, by imputations which can alone enter into the
minds of men devoid of generous impulses and therefore incapable of
appreciating higher motives. I have not followed their example, but
where it is necessary to bring forward such persons--they will be viewed
through the medium of their own documents, which are incontestible and
irresistible, and which would as easily convict me of untruth as they
convict my maligners of practices unworthy the honour of a nation.

To my own countrymen these volumes can scarcely be matter of
indifference; though, perhaps, few reflect that the numerous fleets of
British merchantmen which now frequent both shores of South America, are
the consequence of the deliverance of these vast territories from an
exclusive colonial yoke. It is true that England had previously formed a
treaty with Portugal, permitting English vessels to trade to her South
American Colonies, but such was the influence of Portuguese merchants
with the local governments, that it was nearly inoperative; so that,
practically, the Portuguese were in the exclusive possession of that
commerce which my expulsion of the fleet and army of the mother country
unreservedly threw open to British enterprise. The same, even in a
higher degree, may be said with regard to Chili and Peru.

Yet, scarcely had my mission to Chili become known, than the influence
of Spain induced the British Ministry to pass a "Foreign Enlistment
Act," the penal clauses of which were evidently aimed at me, for
having entered into the service of unacknowledged governments without
permission--though I had shortly before been most unjustly driven from
the service of my native country.

In blind animosity towards me, my former English persecutors failed to
perceive the advantage to British commerce, of freeing both sides of
South America from lingering war and internal dissension. An amusing
instance of this occurred on my return to England. Having occasion to
wait upon the then Attorney-General relative to a patent which I had in
hand, he brusquely inquired "_whether I was not afraid to appear before
him?_" On my replying that "I was not aware of having reason to fear
appearing in the presence of any man," he told me the question had been
officially put to him, whether I could be punished under the "Foreign
Enlistment Act," for the part I had taken in the liberation of Chili,
Peru, and Brazil? To this I replied, that "if Government was indiscreet
enough further to persecute me for having thrown open to British
commerce the largest field for enterprise of modern times, they could
take what steps they chose, for that I, having accepted service in South
America before the passing of the Act, was not afraid of the
consequences of having infringed its provisions." It is almost needless
to say that no such prosecution was instituted, though the will was
good, despite the national benefits conferred.

I will not enter farther into the subject in a preface to volumes which
themselves form only a summary of events in which I was a principal
actor, but at the same time, one, which I hope will prove satisfactory
and decisive. It would have been easy to have dilated the narrative, but
my object is solely to leave behind me a faithful record of events which
must one day become history, and there is no history like documentary
history.

To those high personages who have advocated my cause with other nations,
the present volume will give satisfaction, as affording additional proof
that their advocacy rested upon no visionary basis. To the members of
the press, who have adopted the same views, this exposition will be
equally satisfactory. To all these I owe the thanks of recognising in
me, a love for that service, from which--for a time I was unjustly
expelled. It is my intention, if God spare my life, to add to these
Memoirs a narrative of my former experience in the British navy, and,
what may be of greater utility, an exposition of that which, from
jealousy and other causes no less unworthy, _I was not permitted to
effect_. To these I shall add a few remarks upon my connexion with the
liberation of Greece, developing some remarkable facts, which have as
yet escaped the notice of historians. These reminiscences of the past
will, at least, be instructive to future generations and if any remarks
of mine will conduce to the permanent greatness and security of my
country, I shall deem the residue of my life well spent in recording
them.

At my advanced age, such a task as that now partially executed, would,
perhaps, have presented insuperable difficulties, but for the assistance
rendered me by Mr. Earp, who, with great perseverance, has
unravelled--what, in the lapse of time, had become the almost
inextricable confusion of my papers. That, however, has, with his
assistance, been accomplished in such a way as to base upon original
documents every incident contained in the work--the more important of
these documents being adduced, so as to admit of neither doubt nor
question. The same course will be pursued in the forthcoming English
portion of my career, with a result, I trust, equally clear and
convincing.

DUNDONALD.



CHAPTER I.

INVITATION TO TAKE COMMAND OF CHILIAN NAVY--ARRIVAL AT VALPARAISO--FIRST
EXPEDITION TO PERU--ATTACK ON SPANISH SHIPPING AT CALLAO--DEPARTURE FOR
HUACHO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH CONVOYS OF MONEY--PAITA TAKEN--RETURN TO
VALPARAISO TO REORGANIZE THE SQUADRON--OFFER TO GIVE UP MY SHARE OF
PRIZEMONEY TO THE REPUBLIC--THIS OFFER DECLINED BY THE SUPREME
DIRECTOR--POPULAR CONGRATULATIONS--ATTEMPT ON LADY COCHRANE'S LIFE.


In the year 1817, Don Jose Alvarez, accredited agent of the government
of Chili--as yet unacknowledged by European powers--applied to me to
undertake the organization of a naval force in that country, capable of
contending against the Spaniards; who, notwithstanding the successful
revolt of the Chilenos by land, still maintained their predominance on
the waters of the Pacific.

Having at that time no professional employment, in consequence of my
unjust expulsion from the British naval service, by the machinations of
the powerful political party which I had offended--and finding that
Chili was making great efforts to create a navy, in furtherance of which
object a war steamer had been placed on the stocks in London--I accepted
the invitation, engaging to superintend her building and equipment, and
to take her to Valparaiso when completed.

Meanwhile, Alvarez received orders from his Government, that, if his
proposals had been accepted, no time must be lost in my departure, as
the position of Chili was critical, the Spaniards threatening Valparaiso
by sea, and being still in possession of the continent from Conception
to Chiloe, where they were organizing the savage Indian tribes to carry
desolation into the newly emancipated provinces. Reliable information
had also been received, that the Court of Madrid was making strenuous
efforts to recover its lost possessions by a powerful reinforcement to
its Pacific squadron, against which the Chileno ships of war, in their
present state, were not in a condition to contend.

Alvarez therefore begged me not to wait for the steamer, the completion
and equipment of which he would hasten, but at once to sail for Chili in
the _Rose_ merchantman, then on the eve of departure. Knowing that the
whole of Peru was in the hands of the Spaniards, and that they were also
in possession of Valdivia, the strongest fortified harbour to the
southward--from both of which there would be considerable difficulty in
dislodging them after the arrival of the anticipated reinforcements--I
embarked without delay; and on the 28th of November, 1818, landed at
Valparaiso, accompanied by Lady Cochrane and our two children.

Our reception, both from the authorities and the people, was
enthusiastic, the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, coming from the
seat of Government, Santiago, to welcome us. This excellent man was the
son of an Irish gentleman of distinction in the Spanish service, who had
occupied the important position of Viceroy of Peru. The son had,
however, joined the patriots, and whilst second in command had not long
before inflicted a signal defeat upon the Spaniards in the interior; in
reward for which service the gratitude of the nation had elevated him to
the Supreme Directorate.

A variety of _fêtes_ was given at Valparaiso in honour of our arrival,
these being prolonged for so many days as to amount to a waste of time.
The same scenes were, however, re-enacted at the distant capital,
whither the Supreme Director insisted on taking us, till I had to remind
His Excellency that our purpose was rather fighting than feasting.
Nevertheless, the reception we had met impressed me with so high a sense
of Chilian hospitality, that, heartbroken as I had been by the infamous
persecution which had driven me from the British navy, I decided upon
Chili as my future home; this decision, however, being only an
exemplification of the proverb _"L'homme propose--Dieu dispose."_

The Chilian squadron had just returned from a successful cruise, the
gallant Admiral Blanco Encalada, who commanded it, having captured a
noble Spanish 50-gun frigate, the _Maria Isabel_, in the bay of
Talcahuano.

The squadron consisted of the recently captured Spanish frigate, now
named the _O'Higgins_, in honour of the Supreme Director; the _San
Martin_, 56 guns, formerly the _Cumberland_ Indiaman, which had been
bought into the service; the _Lautaro_, 44 guns, also a purchased
Indiaman; the _Galvarino_, 18 guns, recently the British sloop of war
_Hecate_; the _Chacabuco_, 20 guns; and the _Aracauno_, 16 guns; a force
which, though deficient in organization and equipment, was very
creditable to the energy of a newly emancipated people.

A few days after my arrival a commission was issued, conferring upon me
the title of "Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral and Commander in Chief of
the Naval Forces of the Republic." Admiral Blanco, with patriotic
liberality, relinquishing his position in my favour, though, from his
recent achievement, justly entitled to retain it; paying me also the
additional compliment of personally announcing to the ships' companies
the change which had been effected.

My advent was regarded by the captains of the squadron with great
jealousy, the more so, as I had brought with me from England officers
upon whom I could place implicit reliance. It so happened that two of
the Chilian commanders, Captains Guise and Spry, had shortly before
arrived from England with the _Hecate_, which had been sold out of the
British navy, and bought by them on speculation. The Buenos Ayrean
Government having declined to purchase her, they had brought her on to
Chili, where the Government took her and received her former owners into
its service. These officers, together with Captain Worcester, a North
American, got up a cabal, the object of which was to bring about a
divided command between myself and Admiral Blanco, or, as they
expressed it--"two commodores and no Cochrane." Finding that Admiral
Blanco would not listen to this, they persuaded one or two of the
inferior ministers--whose jealousy it was not difficult to excite--that
it was dangerous and discreditable to a republican Government to allow a
nobleman and a foreigner to command its navy, and still more so, to
allow him to retain his title; the object being to place Admiral Blanco
in the chief command, with myself as his second--by which arrangement,
as he had not been accustomed to manage British seamen, they expected to
control him as they pleased. Admiral Blanco, however, insisted on
reversing our positions, offering his services as second in command, in
which arrangement I gladly acquiesced. This insignificant squabble would
not be worth narrating, but for its bearing on subsequent events; as
well as enabling me to confer a pleasing testimony to the patriotic
disinterestedness of Admiral Blanco, who is still one of the brightest
ornaments of the Republic which he so eminently aided to establish.

On the 22nd of December my flag was hoisted on board the _O'Higgins_,
after which the greatest despatch was used to get the squadron ready for
sea. Anxious to avoid delay, on the 16th of January I sailed with four
ships only, the _O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro,_ and _Chacabuco_;
leaving Admiral Blanco to follow with the _Gaharino, Aracauno,_ and
_Puyrredon_. A mutiny having broken out on board the _Chacabuco_, it
became necessary to enter Coquimbo, where the leading mutineers were
landed, tried, and punished.

I shall here narrate an incident which occurred on our departure. Lady
Cochrane, with her children, had returned from Santiago to Valparaiso,
to take leave of me on embarkation. She had just gone ashore, and the
last gun had been fired to summon all hands on board, when, hearing a
loud _hurrah_ near the house where she resided, she went to the window,
and saw our little boy--now Lord Cochrane, but then scarcely more than
five years old--mounted on the shoulders of my flag-lieutenant, waving
his tiny cap over the heads of the people, and crying out with all his
might, _"Viva la patria!"_ the mob being in a frenzied state of
excitement.

The child had slipped out of Lady Cochrane's house with the officer,
insisting on being carried to his father; with which request the
lieutenant, nothing loth, complied. To the horror of Lady Cochrane, she
saw her boy hurried down to the beach amidst the shouts of the
multitude, and, before she could interfere, placed in a boat and rowed
off to the flag-ship, which was at the time under weigh, so that he
could not be sent ashore again; there being no alternative but to take
him with us, though without clothes--which were afterwards made for him
by the sailors--and with no other attendance save that which their rough
but kindly natures could administer.

On our way along the coast we received information that the _Antonio_
was about to sail from Callao for Cadiz, with a considerable amount of
treasure, so that, in the hope of intercepting her, we cruized just out
of sight of the port till the 21st of February. As she did not make her
appearance, preparations were made to put in execution a plan which had
been formed to attack the Spanish shipping during the Carnival, when, in
the height of that festival, less vigilance than ordinary might
reasonably be expected. We had previously ascertained that the naval
force in the harbour consisted of the frigates _Esmeralda_ and
_Venganza_, a corvette, three brigs of war, a schooner, twenty-eight
gun-boats, and six heavily-armed merchantmen; the whole being moored
close in under the batteries, which mounted upwards of 160 guns, whilst
the aggregate force of the shipping was 350 guns, as appeared from an
official account of their armament.

A direct attack with our small force seemed, therefore, a thing not at
present to be attempted; but in its place I had formed the design to cut
out the frigates during the carnival, which terminated on the 23rd.
Knowing that two North American ships of war were daily expected at
Callao, it was arranged to take in the _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under
American colours, leaving the _San Martin_ out of sight behind San
Lorenzo, and if the _ruse_ were successful, to make a feint of sending a
boat ashore with despatches, and in the meantime suddenly to dash at the
frigates, and cut them out. Unfortunately, one of those thick fogs, so
common on the Peruvian coast, arose, in which the _Lautaro_ parted
company, and did not rejoin the flag-ship for four days afterwards,
when the carnival being at an end, our plan was rendered abortive.

The fog, which in the climate of Peru often continues for a considerable
length of time, lasted till the 29th, when hearing heavy firing, and
imagining that one of the ships was engaged with the enemy, I stood with
the flag-ship into the bay; the other ships, imagining the same thing,
also steered in the direction of the firing, when the fog clearing for a
moment, we discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us;
which, when taken possession of by the flag-ship, proved to be a Spanish
gun-boat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on being made
prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute in honour of the
Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of inspection to the
batteries and shipping, and was then on board the brig of war _Pezuela_,
which we saw crowding sail in the direction of the batteries.

The fog again coming on, suggested to me the possibility of a direct
attack, which, if not altogether successful, would give the Spaniards
such an idea of our determination of purpose, as would inspire them with
respect for the Chilian squadron, and might induce their ships to
refrain from the protection of their commerce; in which case a blockade
would prevent the necessity of separating our small force in chase of
them, should they evince a desire of getting to sea.

Accordingly, still maintaining our disguise under American colours, the
_O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_ stood towards the batteries, narrowly escaping
going ashore in the fog. The Viceroy having no doubt witnessed the
capture of the gun-boat, had, however, provided for our reception, the
garrison being at their guns, and the crews of the ships of war at their
quarters. Notwithstanding the great odds, I determined to persist in an
attack, as our withdrawing without firing a shot, would produce an
effect upon the minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended;
having sufficient experience in war to know that moral effect, even if
the result of a degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the
place of superior force.

The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and
the _Lautaro_ alongside the Spanish frigates, as at first intended, but
anchored with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping, which was
arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear rank being judiciously
disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the front line. A
dead calm succeeding, we were for two hours exposed to a heavy fire from
the batteries, in addition to that from the two frigates, the brigs
_Pezuela_ and _Maypeu_, and seven or eight gun-boats; nevertheless, the
northern angle of one of the principal forts was silenced by our fire.

A breeze springing up, we weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front
of the batteries, and returning their fire; when Captain Guise, who
commanded the _Lautaro_, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off,
and never again came within range. As from want of wind, or doubt of the
result, neither the _San Martin_ nor _Chacabuco_ had ever got within
fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone to continue the action; but as
this, from want of co-operation on the part of the other ships, was
useless, I was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attack, and
withdrew to the island of San Lorenzo, about three miles distant from
the forts; the Spaniards, though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive
of their gun-boats, not venturing to follow us.

The annexed was the Spanish naval force present: _Frigates_.--Esmeralda,
44 guns; Venganza, 42 guns; Sebastiana, 28 guns.

_Brigs_.--Maypeu, 18 guns; Pezuela, 22 guns; Potrilla, 18 guns; and one,
name unknown, 18 guns.

_Schooner_, name unknown, one long 24, and 20 culverins.

_Armed Merchantmen_.--Resolution, 36 guns; Cleopatra, 28 guns; La Focha,
20 guns; Guarmey, 18 guns; Fernando, 26 guns; San Antonio, 18 guns.

Total, fourteen vessels, of which ten were ready for sea; and
twenty-seven gun-boats.

In this action my little boy had a narrow escape. As the story has been
told by several Chilian writers somewhat incorrectly, I will
recapitulate the circumstances.

When the firing commenced, I had placed the boy in my after-cabin,
locking the door upon him; but not liking the restriction, he contrived
to get through the quarter gallery window, and joined me on deck,
refusing to go down again. As I could not attend to him, he was
permitted to remain, and, in a miniature midshipman's uniform, which the
seamen had made for him, was busying himself in handing powder to the
gunners.

Whilst thus employed, a round shot took off the head of a marine close
to him, scattering the unlucky man's brains in his face. Instantly
recovering his self-possession, to my great relief, for believing him
killed, I was spell-bound with agony, he ran up to me exclaiming, "I am
not hurt, papa: the shot did not touch me; Jack says, the ball is not
made that can kill mamma's boy." I ordered him to be carried below; but,
resisting with all his might, he was permitted to remain on deck during
the action.

Our loss in this affair was trifling, considering that we were under the
fire of more than two hundred guns; but the ships were so placed that
the enemy's frigates lay between us and the fortress, so that the shot
of the latter only told upon our rigging, which was considerably
damaged.

The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined that
all the Chilian vessels were engaged, and were not a little surprised,
as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the quondam _Maria
Isabella_, was their only opponent. So much were they dispirited by this
discovery, that as soon as possible after the close of the contest,
their ships of war were dismantled, the top masts and spars being formed
into a double boom across the anchorage so as to prevent approach. The
Spaniards were also previously unaware of my being in command of the
Chilian squadron, but on becoming acquainted with this fact, bestowed
upon me the not very complimentary title of "El Diablo," by which I was
afterwards known amongst them. The title might have been rendered more
appropriate, had my efforts been better seconded by the other vessels.

On the following day, having repaired damages, the flag-ship and
_Lautaro_ again went in and commenced a destructive fire upon the
Spanish gun-boats, the neutral vessels in the harbour removing out of
the line of shot. As the gun-boats withdrew to a position closer under
the batteries, where we could make little impression upon them without
getting severely punished by the fire of the fortress, we contented
ourselves with the demonstration made.

On the 2nd of March, I despatched Capt. Foster with the gun-boat
captured from the Spaniards, and the launches of the _O'Higgins_ and
_Lautaro_--to take possession of the island of San Lorenzo, when an
unworthy instance of Spanish cruelty presented itself in the spectacle
of thirty-seven Chilian soldiers taken prisoners eight years before. The
unhappy men had ever since been forced to work in chains under the
supervision of a military guard--now prisoners in turn; their sleeping
place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they
were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar. The joy of the poor
fellows at their deliverance, after all hope had fled, can scarcely be
conceived.

From the liberated patriots and the Spanish prisoners, I learned that in
Lima there were a number of Chilian officers and seamen taken on board
the _Maypeu_, whose condition was even more deplorable than their own,
the fetters on their legs having worn their ancles to the bone, whilst
their commander, by a refinement of cruelty, had for more than a year
been lying under sentence of death as a rebel. Upon this, I sent a flag
of truce to the viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, requesting him to
permit the prisoners to return to their families, in exchange for the
Spanish prisoners on board the squadron, and others in Chili--where
there were great numbers, who were comparatively well treated. The
Viceroy denied the charge of ill-treatment--asserted his right, if he
thought proper, to regard his prisoners as pirates; retorting that after
the battle of Maypeu, General San Martin had treated the Spanish
Commissioner as a spy, and had repeatedly threatened him with death. The
exchange of prisoners was uncourteously refused, the Viceroy concluding
his reply with an expression of surprise that a British nobleman should
command the maritime forces of a Government "unacknowledged by all the
Powers of the globe." To this latter observation, I considered it
incumbent upon me to reply that "a British nobleman was a free man, and
therefore had a right to adopt any country which was endeavouring to
re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity; and that I had hence
adopted the cause of Chili, with the same freedom of judgment that I had
previously exercised when refusing the offer of an Admiral's rank in
Spain, made to me not long before, by the Spanish Ambassador in London;"
this offer having been made by the Duke de San Carlos, in the name of
Ferdinand the Seventh.

Our means being clearly inadequate to any decisive attack on the Spanish
ships of war, I resolved to try the effect of an explosion vessel, and
accordingly established a laboratory on the island of San Lorenzo, under
the superintendence of Major Miller, the Commandant of Marines. Whilst
engaged in this duty, that able and gallant officer was so severely
burned by an accidental explosion, as to render his further services on
this occasion unavailable.

On the 22nd of March--our preparations being completed--we again stood
towards the batteries, the flag-ship going close in under the combined
fire of the forts and shipping, in order to divert the attention of the
enemy from the explosion vessel, which was set adrift in the direction
of the frigates, but, unfortunately, when within musket shot of them,
she was struck by a round shot and foundered, causing complete failure
in our object. The _San Martin_ and the _Lautaro_ keeping far astern,
there was no alternative but to withdraw from further attack, leaving
the explosion vessel to her fate.

As other attempts, with our want of means, would answer no better
purpose than useless demonstration, and as the ships were now destitute
of water and provisions, we were obliged to fall back upon Huacho,
leaving the _Chacabuco_ to watch the movements of the enemy.

The inhabitants of Huacho, who were well disposed to co-operate in any
effort for the emancipation of Peru, afforded us every assistance in
provisioning and watering the ships, for which the commandant, Cevallos,
shot two influential persons who had been foremost in aiding us, and
severely punished others; at the same time seizing our water casks, and
sending me an insolent letter of defiance, on which a party of seamen
and marines was landed and put the garrison to flight; the officer
commanding the party however withdrew from pursuit at hearing salutes
fired on the arrival of Admiral Blanco with the _Galvarino_ and
_Puyrredon_, mistaking this for an engagement with a newly-arrived
enemy. The whole of the Government property found in the Spanish
custom-house was captured.

The people of Huacho having volunteered information that a quantity of
specie belonging to the Philippine Company had been placed for safety on
board a vessel in the river Barrança, she was forthwith overhauled, and
the treasure transferred to the flag-ship.

Leaving Admiral Blanco at Huacho with the _San Martin_ and _Puyrredon_,
on the 4th of April we sailed for Supe, with the _O'Higgins_ and
_Galvarino_, having previously ascertained that a sum of money destined
for the payment of Spanish troops was on its way from Lima to Guambucho;
on the following day a party of marines being landed at Patavilca,
captured the treasure, amounting to 70,000 dollars, together with a
quantity of military stores. On the 7th, having received further
information that the Philippine Company had placed other treasure on
board the French brig, _Gazelle_, at Guambucho, we sailed for that
place, and, on the 10th, the seamen of the _O'Higgins_ examined her, and
brought off an additional sum of 60,000 dollars.

The secret of our obtaining possession of these and other convoys of
Spanish money along the coast, was, that I paid the inhabitants highly
for information relative to their transmission, and was thus enabled to
seize the treasure even in the interior of the country. As the Chilian
Ministry subsequently refused to allow me "secret service money," these,
disbursements were actually made at my own expense.

It was also my object to make friends of the Peruvian people, by
adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that
none but Spanish property should be taken, whilst their own was in all
cases respected. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal
dissatisfaction with Spanish colonial rule speedily became changed into
an earnest desire to be freed from it. Had it not been for this good
understanding with the inhabitants, I should scarcely have ventured to
detach marines and seamen for operations at a distance into the country,
as was subsequently the case; the people giving me the most reliable
information of every movement of the enemy.

On the 13th, we arrived at Paita, where the Spaniards had established a
garrison. A party of marines and seamen was again landed, on which the
enemy fled from the fort, and a quantity of brass ordnance, spirits, and
military stores, was captured.

Contrary to strict orders, some marines stole a number of valuable
church ornaments, but on the complaint of the authorities I caused them
to be restored, punishing the offenders, and at the same time presenting
the priests with a thousand dollars to repair the damage done in their
churches; this act, though far from conciliating the priests--who
dreaded Chilian success--adding greatly to our popularity amongst the
inhabitants, which was my object in bestowing the amount. Our thus
refraining from plunder was almost beyond the comprehension of a people
who had bitter experience of Spanish rapacity, whilst the undisciplined
Chilenos, who formed the greater portion of the squadron, as little
comprehended why their plundering propensities should be restrained.

On the 5th of May, I proceeded with the flag-ship alone to reconnoitre
Callao, having learned that the _Chacabuco_ and _Puyrredon_ had been
chased off the port by the Spanish frigates. Finding that these were
again moored under shelter of the batteries, we returned to Supe,
convinced that our previous visit to Callao had proved sufficient to
deter them from putting to sea for the protection of their own coasts;
this, indeed, forming my chief reason for having persisted in attacks
which, with our small force, could answer no other purpose; but this
alone was an advantage gained, as it enabled us to communicate freely
with the inhabitants on the coast, and to ascertain their sentiments,
which--from our forbearance, no less than command of the sea--were
almost uniformly in favour of co-operation with Chili for their
emancipation.

Both at Lima and on the coast, the best effect was produced by the
circulation of the following proclamation:--

   "Compatriots! The repeated echoes of liberty in South America
   have been heard with pleasure in every part of enlightened Europe,
   more especially in Great Britain, where I, unable to resist the
   desire of joining in such a cause, determined to take part in it.
   The Republic of Chili has confided to me the command of her naval
   forces. To these must the dominion of the Pacific be consigned.
   By their co-operation must your chains be broken. Doubt not but
   that the day is at hand on which, with the annihilation of despotism
   and your now degraded condition, you will rise to the rank of a free
   nation, to which your geographical position and the course of events
   naturally call you."

   "But it is your duty to co-operate in preparing for this success,
   and to remove obstacles, under the assurance that you will receive
   the most efficacious assistance from the government of Chili, and
   your true friend,             COCHRANE."

This proclamation was accompanied by another from the Chilian
government, declaratory of the sincerity of its intentions, so that
these combined caused us to be everywhere received as liberators.

On the 8th, we returned to Supe, and having learned that a Spanish force
was in the vicinity, a detachment of marines and seamen was, after dark,
pushed through a heavy surf, and landed, in the hope of taking them by
surprise. But the enemy was on the alert, and on the following morning
our little party fell into an ambuscade, which would have proved
serious, had not Major Miller, who commanded the marines, promptly
formed his men, who, attacking in turn, soon put the enemy to flight at
the point of the bayonet, capturing their colours, and the greater
portion of their arms. On the 13th, a detachment of Spanish troops
arrived from Lima under Major Camba, who, notwithstanding his
superiority of numbers, did not venture to attack our small party, which
withdrew to the ships with a number of cattle taken from the Spaniards;
Camba writing to the Viceroy so effective a description of his having
"driven the enemy into the sea," that he was immediately promoted.

Not to enter into further details of our visits to other parts of the
coast, where similar captures of provisions and military stores, &c.
were effected--it being my practice to compel the Spaniards to supply
all the wants of the squadron, nothing being ever taken from the natives
without payment,--I resolved--as our means were clearly incommensurate
with our main object--to return to Valparaiso, for the purpose of
organizing a more effective force, and on the 16th of June reached that
port, where we found Admiral Blanco with the _San Martin_ and
_Chacabuco_, he having been obliged to raise the blockade of Callao for
want of provisions; a step with which the Government was highly
displeased, though with more reason to blame its own negligence or want
of foresight in not providing them. Admiral Blanco was nevertheless put
under arrest, but a court of inquiry being held, he was honourably
acquitted.

The objects of the first expedition had been fully accomplished, viz. to
reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should
be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the
inclinations of the Peruvians with regard to their desire for
emancipation--a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged
to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties, so
long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the
accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of
the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their
military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no
inconsiderable amount of treasure.

It had, however, become evident to me that the passive system of defence
which the Spaniards adopted in Callao, would render it a difficult
matter to get at them without more effective means than the guns of the
ships, which were greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy's
fortress and shipping combined, whilst their experience in the use of
artillery was greater than that of our crews. The Supreme Director
having paid a visit to the squadron--on the 21st of June I addressed to
him a letter, stating my apprehension that the finances of the
Government might be limited, and that I would gladly give up to the
exigencies of the Republic the whole of my share of prize-money taken
during our recent cruize, provided it were applied to the manufacture of
rockets. This offer was declined, with a compliment from the Supreme
Director, on the advantage already gained, by compelling the Spaniards
ignominiously to shut "themselves up in their port, in spite of their
numerical superiority."

Complimentary addresses from the Chilian people were also presented to
me in profusion, and a public panegyric was pronounced at the National
Institute of the capital, upon the service rendered; but as this was
only a recapitulation of what has been already narrated--conveyed in
flowery rhetorical phrases--in the use of which the Occidentals are
almost as expert, and often as exaggerated, as are the Orientals--I
shall refrain from giving it. Suffice it to say, that the people were
not a little delighted with the plain facts, that whereas only a few
months before theirs had been the blockaded port, they were now able to
beard the enemy in his stronghold, till then believed--both by
Spaniards and Chilians--to be inviolable; and that, with only four ships
on our part, the Spanish Viceroy had been shut up in his capital, and
his convoys, both by sea and land, intercepted, whilst his ships of war
did not venture to emerge from their shelter under the batteries of
Callao.

The manufacture of rockets was now carried on in earnest, under the
superintendence of Mr. Goldsack, an eminent engineer, who had been
engaged in England for the purpose. From a mistaken notion of parsimony,
the labour of constructing and filling them was allotted to a number of
Spanish prisoners, with what result will appear in the sequel.

In these and other preparations two months were consumed, in the course
of which another vessel--an American built corvette--was added to the
squadron, and named by the Supreme Director the _Independencia_.

During my absence Lady Cochrane chiefly resided at Valparaiso, where
she diligently employed herself in promoting objects essential to the
welfare of the squadron; after a time removing to a delightful country
house at Quillota, where her life was endangered by a ruffian in the
interest of the Spanish faction.

This man, having gained admission to her private apartment, threatened
her with instant death if she would not divulge the secret orders which
had been given to me. On her declaring firmly that she would not divulge
anything, a struggle took place for a paper which she picked off a
table; and before her attendants could come to her assistance she
received a severe cut from a stiletto. The assassin was seized,
condemned, and ordered for execution, without the last offices of the
Catholic religion.

In the dead of the night preceding the day fixed for his execution, Lady
Cochrane was awoke by loud lamentations beneath her window. On sending
to ascertain the cause, the wretched wife of the criminal was found
imploring her Ladyship's intercession that her husband should not be
deprived of the benefits of confession and absolution. Forgiving the
atrocity of the act, Lady Cochrane, on the following morning used all
her influence with the authorities, not for this alone, but to save the
man's life, and at length wrung from them a reluctant consent to commute
his punishment to banishment for life.



CHAPTER II.

SECOND EXPEDITION TO PERU--DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT BEING PROVIDED WITH
TROOPS--FAILURE OF ROCKETS--DEPARTURE FOR ARICA--CAPTURE OF
PISCO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH SHIPS AT PUNA--DETERMINE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON
VALDIVIA--ARRIVAL OFF THAT PORT, AND CAPTURE OF SPANISH BRIG OF WAR
POTRILLO--TROOPS OBTAINED FROM CONCEPTION--FLAG-SHIP NEARLY
WRECKED--ATTACK ON FORTS, AND CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA.


On the 12th of September, 1819, I again sailed for the Peruvian coast,
with Admiral Blanco as second in command. The squadron consisted of the
_O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro, Independencia_, and _Puyrredon_, the
_Galvarino_ and _Araucano_ not being in readiness. Two vessels
accompanied the squadron, to be afterwards fitted up as fire-ships.

The Government was exceedingly anxious that some decisive blow should be
at once struck. With the exception of the rockets, the squadron was in
little better condition than before, a loan having failed, whilst 4,000
dollars only were subscribed by the merchants. The crews for the most
part consisted of _cholos_, or native peasants, whom it was difficult to
shape into good seamen, though they fought gallantly when well led. The
officers were nearly all English or North American, this being a
redeeming feature, but very few of them possessed the tact to bring up
the men to anything like a seaman-like standard; a by no means easy
task however, as a considerable portion of those embarked did duty both
as marines and seamen.

I begged of the Government to supply me with 1,000 troops, asserting
that even with that number of men it would be possible to take the
castles of Callao, and destroy the whole of the Spanish shipping in the
harbour. I was assured that this force had been provided, and was in
readiness to embark at Coquimbo, where, on my arrival on the 16th, in
place of 1,000 troops I found only 90!--and these in so ragged a
condition, that a subscription of 400 dollars was raised by the
inhabitants, and given to Major Miller to buy clothing for them.

I was so much annoyed at this, as to be on the point of returning to
Valparaiso to throw up my commission; but, reflecting that the squadron
was in possession of rockets, and that the Government might even yet
forward a military force, I made up my mind to proceed, and on the 29th
the squadron again came to an anchor in Callao roads.

The two following days were occupied in making rocket rafts, and in
getting ready life-preservers for the men, in case of their falling from
the rafts. On the 1st of October the _Galvarino, Puyrredon_, and
_Araucano_, stood into the bay to reconnoitre, and sustained a heavy
fire from the shore, upon which I ordered the _Independencia_ to their
aid; but that vessel was brought to an anchor when at the distance of
several miles from them. On the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Charles, a
most able and gallant officer, reconnoitred in a boat, and made trial
of some rockets, upon which he reported unfavourably.

In this affair the mast of the _Araucano_ was struck by a round shot,
and severely damaged--the circumstance being merely mentioned to shew
the state in which the squadron was equipped; the only means of
repairing the damage being by fishing the mast with an anchor-stock
taken from the _Lautaro_, whilst an axe had to be borrowed for the
purpose from the flag-ship!

On the 2nd, the _Araucano_ again went in, accompanied by a squadron of
boats under the command of Captain Guise, and fired several rockets, but
with no perceptible effect--the Spaniards having unrigged their ships;
the brig sustained considerable damage from the firing of the forts and
shipping.

After dark, an attack by rockets and shells was arranged, the
_Galvarino_ taking in tow a mortar raft, under the command of Major
Miller, and placing it, under a heavy fire, within half a mile of the
enemy's batteries. The _Puyrredon_ followed with another raft, carrying
the shells and magazine; the _Araucano_ took charge of a rocket-raft,
under Captain Hind, whilst the _Independencia_ towed in a second
rocket-raft, under Lieut-Colonel Charles, the rest of the squadron
remaining at anchor.

Great expectations were formed, as well by myself as the whole squadron,
as to the effect to be produced by these destructive missiles, but they
were doomed to disappointment, the rockets turning out utterly useless.
Some, in consequence of the badness of the solder used, bursting from
the expansive force of the charge before they left the raft, and setting
fire to others--Captain Hind's raft being blown up from this cause, thus
rendering it useless, besides severely burning him and thirteen men:
others took a wrong direction in consequence of the sticks not having
been formed of proper wood, whilst the greater portion would not ignite
at all from a cause which was only discovered when too late. It has been
stated in the last chapter that the filling of the tubes was, from
motives of parsimony, entrusted to Spanish prisoners, who, as was found
on examination, had embraced every opportunity of inserting handfulls of
sand, sawdust, and even manure, at intervals in the tubes, thus impeding
the progress of combustion, whilst in the majority of instances they had
so thoroughly mixed the neutralizing matter with the ingredients
supplied, that the charge would not ignite at all, the result being
complete failure in the object of the expedition. It was impossible to
blame the Spanish prisoners in the Chilian arsenal for their loyalty,
but to me their ingenuity was a bitter ground for disappointment, as
with useless rockets we were no better off than in the first expedition;
nor indeed so well off, for in the interval the Spaniards had so
strengthened their booms at the anchorage, as to render it impossible
for the ships to get at them--whilst, by constant practice, their fire
had acquired a precision which our crews could not equal.

The only damage effected was by Major Miller's mortar, the shells
sinking a gun-boat, and doing some execution in the forts and amongst
the shipping. As daylight appeared, I ordered the whole of the rafts to
be towed off, there being no further use in their remaining exposed to
the heavy fire of the batteries. As it was, our loss was trifling, only
about twenty being killed and wounded; but amongst these I had to regret
the death of a promising young officer, Lieut. Bealey, who was cut in
two by a round shot.

The failure of the rockets was very unfairly attributed by the Chilian
Government to Mr. Goldsack, whereas the fault lay in itself for having
neither supplied him with proper workmen nor materials. From the
scarcity and high, price of spelter, he had also been compelled to make
use of an inferior solder for the tubes, and thus the saving of a few
hundred dollars frustrated the success of a great object. The
consequence to poor Goldsack was utter ruin, though of his capability
there could be no question, he having for many years been one of the
principal assistants of Sir W. Congreve at Woolwich.

By the 5th, one of the explosion vessels was completed, and I resolved
to try her effect on the booms and shipping, for which purpose she was
placed in charge of Lieut. Morgell, who carried her in gallant style
towards the enemy's shipping, but the wind falling calm, she became a
target for their really excellent practice, and was in a short time
riddled through and through. As the Spaniards began to fire red-hot
shot, Lieut. Morgell was compelled to abandon her, first setting fire
to the train, then turning her adrift, thus causing her to explode,
though at a distance which did no damage to the enemy.

Whilst this was going on, a strange sail was reported off the bay, and
the _Araucano_ went in chase, Captain Crosbie returning the next morning
with the intelligence that she was a frigate. Upon this, the squadron
got under weigh, in pursuit, when she made all sail, and as I did not
deem it expedient to quit the bay of Callao, the chase was given up, and
we returned in the evening to our former anchorage. It was afterwards
learned that she was the _Prueba_, of 50 guns, just arrived from Cadiz;
whence she had convoyed another ship, with a cargo valued at half a
million of dollars; this ship contriving to slip into Callao during the
short absence of the squadron in pursuit of the frigate, so that we lost
both prizes.

It was useless to remain any longer at Callao, as my instructions
peremptorily commanded me not to approach with the ships within range of
the enemy's batteries, nor to make any attempt on their squadron, except
with the rockets and fire-ships. I was moreover ordered to return within
a given time to Valparaiso, these restrictions being insisted on by the
Minister of Marine, ostensibly from what he considered my temerity in
having attacked the forts and shipping at Callao on the first
expedition--but really, from his own narrow-minded jealousy, that I, a
foreigner, should effect anything which might give me undue prominence
in the estimation of the Chilian people.

I had, however, other reasons for quitting Callao. The newly-arrived
Spanish frigate _Prueba_, was at large, and as I had reason to believe,
was sheltering at Guayaquil, from which port I made up my mind to
dislodge her. The Government had not sent any of the promised supplies
for the squadron, which was running short of provisions, so that it was
necessary to resort to my former practice of compelling the Spaniards to
furnish them; whilst as no troops had been supplied, it was clear that
there had never been an intention of sending any; the assurance of the
Minister of Marine that they were waiting for me at Coquimbo being only
a _ruse_ on his part to get me to sea without a military force.

We now received intelligence that the _Prueba_ had been accompanied from
Spain by two line of battle ships, and that these were daily expected at
Arica, whither I proceeded in quest of them, but was disappointed in not
finding them. It was subsequently learned, that although they had sailed
from Cadiz, in company with the _Prueba_, they never reached the
Pacific, one of them, the _Europe_, being pronounced unseaworthy on
crossing the line; and the other, the _Elmo_, foundering on the passage
round Cape Horn!

On the 5th of November, three hundred and fifty troops--now brought by
the experience and zeal of Lieut.-Col. Charles into a tolerably
soldier-like condition--were distributed on board the _Lautaro,
Galvarino_, and the remaining fire-ship, and were despatched to Pisco,
under the command of Captain Guise, for supplies to be taken from the
Spaniards, the troops being under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Charles, and
the marines under the direction of Major Miller.

As it was not improbable that the expected Spanish ships would make for
Callao, whilst it was more than probable that the _Prueha_ would again
attempt to run in, I therefore proceeded towards that port, and on the
8th anchored at San Lorenzo, the United States frigate _Macedonia_ being
also at anchor there. The presence of the latter put the Spaniards on
their mettle, for shortly after our arrival, they made a show of sending
twenty-seven gun-boats to attack us, not however, venturing to get their
frigates under weigh. Preparations being made on our part to cut off the
gun-boats, they quickly retreated, to the no small amusement of the
North Americans, for whose edification the spectacle had been exhibited.

I was not mistaken in the expectation that the _Prueba_ might again
attempt to take shelter under the forts of Callao. On her appearance, we
immediately gave chase, but she once more escaped in the night. On my
return, I fell in with, and captured her boat, which had been sent
ashore with despatches to the Viceroy, and from the information gained
from the crew, I now felt certain that she would take refuge in
Guayaquil, whither I determined to follow her.

Before doing so in the narrative, the success of the expedition
despatched to Pisco must be mentioned. It was the intention of the
officers commanding to land in the night, and thus take the garrison by
surprise; but this plan was frustrated by the wind dying away, so that
the landing could not be effected till broad daylight, when the
garrison, supported by field artillery and cavalry, were prepared to
receive them. Nothing daunted, the patriot troops landed without firing
a shot, through the fire of the guns, whilst the Spanish infantry from
house tops, and the church tower, thinned their ranks at every step. At
length it came to the bayonet, for which the Spaniards did not wait, but
rushed into the square of the town, after having mortally wounded the
brave Col. Charles. Major Miller instantly followed, when their last
volley in the square, before flying in all directions, brought down him
also, with three bullets in his body, so that his life was despaired of.
The ships remained for four days, during which they obtained all they
wanted; but 200,000 gallons of spirits, placed on the beach for
shipment, was destroyed by order of Captain Guise, in consequence of his
not being able to control the men, who, from the facility of obtaining
liquor, were becoming unmanageable.

On the 16th, the _Galvarino_ and _Lautaro_ rejoined me at Santa, which
place had previously been taken possession of by the marines left on
board the flag-ship. On the 21st, I despatched the _San Martin,
Independencia,_ and _Araucano_ to Valparaiso, together with a transport
filled with sick--an epidemic of a destructive nature having broken out
on board the squadron. This disease, which carried off many men, had
been introduced on board by the Minister of Marine's army of ninety men,
shipped at Coquimbo.

I now proceeded in search of the _Prueba_, with the flag-ship,
_Lautaro, Galvarino_, and _Puyrredon_. On the 27th, we entered the river
Guayaquil, and leaving the _Lautaro_ and the brigs outside, the
flag-ship crowded all sail during the night--though without a
pilot--arriving next morning at the island of Puna, under which two
large vessels were anchored, and instantly attacked, when, after a brisk
fire of twenty minutes, they struck, proving to be the _Aguila_, of 20
guns, and _Vigonia_, of 16 guns, both laden with timber, destined for
Lima. The village of Puna was also taken possession of. On rejoining the
other vessels with the prizes, they were found ready to sail, imagining
from the firing that I had fallen in with the _Prueba_, and might
possibly get the worst of the contest.

The _Prueba_ was at Guayaquil as had been anticipated, but having been
lightened of her guns and stores she had been towed up the river, where,
from the shallowness of the water, it was impossible to get at her;
whilst, as she lay under the protection of the batteries, I did not deem
it practicable to cut her out with the boats.

A circumstance here occurred which would not be worth mentioning, did it
not bear upon future matters. Captains Guise and Spry--imagining that I
should now return to Valparaiso, and that the comparative failure of the
expedition would be attributed to me, instead of to the worthless
rockets, and to my instructions not to attempt anything beyond their
use--endeavoured to get up a mutiny, by circulating a report that I did
not intend to permit the ships left outside to share in the prizes, and
had indeed left them behind for this purpose; having also permitted my
officers to plunder the prizes _ad libitum_, before leaving the
river--further declaring, that I intended to claim a double share, from
having acted in the capacity of admiral and captain.

As there was not the slightest doubt of their having sedulously
circulated these reports, with the object of entering the port of
Valparaiso with the squadron in a discontented condition, I determined
to take serious notice of their conduct. On the necessary steps being
taken, they both pledged their honour that they had not made or even
heard of such a report!

But I had no intention to return to Valparaiso, and still less to make
officers so inimical to me acquainted with my future plans.

On the 13th of December, Major Miller was so far recovered as to be
removed on board the flag-ship, after which I despatched the _Lautaro_
to Valparaiso with the two prizes, first transferring to her armament
the beautiful brass guns taken in the _Vigonia_; leaving the _Galvarino_
and _Puyrredon_ to watch the movements of the Spanish frigate.

As the reader may suppose, I was greatly annoyed at having been foiled
at Callao, from causes altogether beyond my control, for the bad
rockets, and worse faith of the Minister of Marine in not supplying me
with the promised troops, were no faults of mine. My instructions, as
has been said, were carefully drawn up to prevent my doing anything
rash--as the first trip to Callao had been represented by certain
officers under my command, who had no great relish for fighting. At the
same time the Chilian people expected impossibilities; and I had, for
some time, been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should
gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one
ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and felt
quite sure of Major Miller's concurrence where there was any fighting to
be done, though a ball in the arm, another through the chest, passing
out at his back, and a left hand shattered for life, were not very
promising fighting incentives as far as physical force was concerned,
yet the moral courage of my gallant guest was untouched, and his
capacity to carry out my plans was greater than before, as being more
matured by sharp experience.

My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a _coup de main_
the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously
deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which
would ensue in Chili from our want of success before Callao. The
enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do
anything desperate, having resolved that, unless fully satisfied as to
its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often
imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness
without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation,
well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was
unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to
have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came
within the scope of my calculations.

The first step clearly was to reconnoitre the place, where the flag-ship
arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours, and made a
signal for a pilot, who--as the Spaniards mistook the _O'Higgins_ for
the long-expected _Prueba_--promptly came off, together with a
complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom were
made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was ordered to
take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the officer and
his men, knowing there was little chance of finding their way on shore
again, thought it most conducive to their interests to supply all the
information demanded, the result being increased confidence on my part
as to the possibility of a successful attack. Amongst other information
obtained was the expected arrival of the Spanish brig of war _Potrillo_,
with money on board for the payment of the garrison.

As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the
officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might
not altogether be pacific, this suspicion being confirmed by the
detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon us from
the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our reconnoissance
being now completed, withdrew beyond its reach. Having occupied two days
in reconnoitring--on the third the _Potrillo_ hove in sight; and being
also deceived by our Spanish colours was captured without a
shot--20,000 dollars and some important despatches being found on board.

As nothing could be done without troops, with which the Chilian
ministers had been careful not to supply me, I determined to sail to
Conception, where Governor Freire had a considerable force to keep in
check the savage tribes of Indians whom the Spaniards employed, under
the monster Benavides and his brother, to murder the defenceless
patriots. On the 22nd of January we anchored in Talcahuano bay, where we
found the Buenos Ayrean brig _Intrepido_ and the Chilian schooner
_Montezuma_.

Governor Freire received us with great hospitality; and after
explanation of my plans, placed two hundred and fifty men at my
disposal, under the command of a gallant Frenchman, Major Beauchef;
notwithstanding that Freire was on the eve of attacking Benavides, and
by thus weakening his division might incur the displeasure of the
Government. No time was lost in embarking the men in the three vessels,
the _Montezuma_ being taken into the service, and the Buenos Ayrean brig
volunteering to accompany us.

It was highly praiseworthy on the part of General Freire to place these
troops under my orders, inasmuch as they were destined for a service in
the praise of which, even if successful, he could not participate;
whilst, if unsuccessful, he would certainly have incurred great blame.
He knew, moreover, that the Ministry had refrained from supplying me
with regular troops; yet he not only generously contributed them, but
pledged himself not to communicate my plans to the Government; our
destination being even kept secret from the officers, who were told not
to encumber themselves with baggage, as we were only going to Tucapel,
in order to harass the enemy at Arauco, thus making it appear that we
were about to aid General Freire against Benavides, instead of his
aiding us to capture Valdivia.

But our difficulties, though we had obtained the troops, were not at an
end. The flag-ship had only two naval officers on board, one of these
being under arrest for disobedience of orders, whilst the other was
incapable of performing the duty of lieutenant; so that I had to act as
admiral, captain, and lieutenant, taking my turn in the watch--or rather
being constantly on the watch--as the only available officer was so
incompetent.

We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January, when I communicated my
intentions to the military officers, who displayed great eagerness in
the cause--alone questioning their success from motives of prudence. On
explaining to them that if unexpected projects are energetically put in
execution they almost invariably succeed, in spite of odds, they
willingly entered into my plans; and Major Miller's health being now
sufficiently re-established, his value as a commander was as great as
ever.

On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in a
dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate
duties, I had laid down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of the
lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also,
surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep.
Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders to be called
the moment a breeze sprang up, but these orders were neglected, and a
sudden wind taking the ship unawares, the midshipman, in attempting to
bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a rock, where she lay
beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel, and had the swell
increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.

We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being both
out of sight. The first impulse both of officers and crew was to abandon
the ship, but as we had six hundred men on board, whilst not more than a
hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this would have been but
a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that those who escaped
could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they would meet nothing but
torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians, I with some
difficulty got them to adopt the alternative of attempting to save the
ship.

The first sounding gave five feet water in the hold, and the pumps were
entirely out of order. Our carpenter, who was only one by name, was
incompetent to repair them; but having myself some skill in carpentry I
took off my coat, and by midnight got them into working order, the water
meanwhile gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in bailing
it out with buckets.

To our great delight the leak did not increase, upon which I got out
the stream anchor, and commenced heaving off the ship, the officers
clamouring first to ascertain the extent of the leak. This I expressly
forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men, whilst as we now
gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship would swim as far as
Valdivia, which was the chief point to be regarded, the capture of the
fortress being my object, after which the ship might be repaired at
leisure. As there was no lack of physical force on board, she was at
length floated; but the powder magazine having been under water, the
ammunition of every kind--except a little upon deck and in the cartouch
boxes of the troops--was rendered unserviceable; though about this I
cared little, as it involved the necessity of using the bayonet in our
anticipated attack, and to facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in
every case, evinced a rooted aversion.

Before making the land to the southward of Punta Galera, the troops in
the _O'Higgins_ as well as the marines, were, in a high sea, removed
into the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, to which I shifted my flag,
ordering the _O'Higgins_ to stand off and on out of sight of land, to
avoid creating suspicion. We then made for the harbour, intending to
land the same evening and take the Spaniards by surprise, but, as it
fell calm, this plan was frustrated.

The fortifications of Valdivia are placed on both sides of a channel
three quarters of a mile in width, and command the entrance, anchorage,
and river leading to the town, crossing their fire in all directions so
effectually, that with proper caution on the part of the garrison no
ship could enter without suffering severely, while she would be equally
exposed at anchor. The principal forts on the western shore are placed
in the following order:--El Ingles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo
Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the eastern side are Niebla, directly
opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst on the island of Manzanera is a
strong fort mounted with guns of large calibre, commanding the whole
range of the entrance channel. These forts, with a few others, amounted
in the whole to fifteen, and in the hands of a skilful garrison would
render the place almost impregnable, the shores on which they stand
being almost inaccesible by reason of the surf, with the exception of a
small landing place at the Aguada del Ingles.

It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention,
anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles, on the
afternoon of Feb. 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate
disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below; and
to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a story of
our having just arrived from Cadiz, and being in want of a pilot: upon
which they told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied, that our
boats had been washed away in the passage round Cape Horn. Not being
quite satisfied, they began to assemble troops at the landing-place,
firing alarm guns, and rapidly bringing up the garrisons of the western
forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.

Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the boats,
which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the vessels,
one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and the guns of
Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon us, the first
shots passing through the sides of the _Intrepido_, and killing two men,
so that it became necessary to land in spite of the swell. We had only
two launches and a gig, into which I entered to direct the operation,
Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushing off in the first launch,
under the fire of the party at the landing place, by which the coxswain
being wounded, the Major had to take the helm, and whilst doing this,
received a ball through his hat, grazing the crown of his head. Ordering
a few only of his party to fire, the whole leaped ashore at the landing
place, driving the Spaniards, before them at the point of the bayonet.
The second launch now pushed off from the Intrepido, and, in this way,
in less than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on
shore.

The most difficult task--the capture of the forts--was to come; the only
way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached being by a
precipitous path, along which the men could only pass in single file;
the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the enemy,
after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.

As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one of
the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack, expecting to
fall in with a body of the enemy outside the fort, but all having
re-entered, our men were unopposed.

This party having taken up its position, the main body moved forward,
cheering and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their
chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up an
incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the shouts,
but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark. Whilst the
patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young officer, Ensign
Vidal--who had previously distinguished himself at Santa--got under the
inland flank of the fort, and with a few men, contrived unperceived to
tear up some pallisades, by which a bridge was made across the ditch,
whereby he and his small party entered, and formed noiselessly under
cover of some branches of trees which overhung it, the garrison
directing their whole attention to the shouting patriots in an opposite
direction.

A volley from Vidal's party convinced the Spaniards that they had been
taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those who had
outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a like
panic a column of three hundred men, drawn up behind the fort. The
Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens, in their
efforts to gain the other forts, which were opened to receive them; the
patriots thus entering at the same time, and driving them from fort to
fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more, who had
abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort
Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number of the
enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the forest;
whilst upwards of a hundred, besides officers, fell into our hands, the
like number being found bayoneted on the following morning. Our loss was
seven men killed, and nineteen wounded.

The Spaniards had, no doubt, regarded their position as impregnable,
which, considering its difficulty of access and almost natural
impenetrability, it ought to have been, if properly defended. They had
only found out their error when too late, thus justifying my former
remark to the military officers, that an attack where least expected is
almost invariably crowned with success. Much less had the Spaniards
calculated on a night attack, the most favourable of all to the
attacking party, as necessitating unity of action--and the least
favourable of all to the party attacked, as inspiring doubt and panic,
almost certain to end in irresolution and defeat. The garrison consisted
of the Cantabria regiment of the line, numbering about eight hundred,
with whom was associated a militia of upwards of a thousand.

On the 5th, the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, which had been left at the
Aguada Inglesa, entered the harbour, being fired at in their passage by
Fort Niebla on the eastern shore. On their coming to an anchor at the
Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla,
Carbonero, and Piojo. The _O'Higgins_ now appearing in sight off the
mouth of the harbour, the Spaniards abandoned the forts on the eastern
side, no doubt judging that as the western forts had been captured
without the aid of the frigate, they had--now that she had arrived--no
chance of successfully defending them; the patriot troops were therefore
disembarked at Fort Niebla till the tide served to take them to the town
of Valdivia.

In crossing the harbour, the _Intrepido_, from want of precaution in
taking soundings, grounded on a bank in the channel, where, bilged by
the surf, she finally became a wreck. Nor was the _O'Higgins_ in a much
better condition, as, from the injury sustained at Quiriquina, it became
necessary to put her ashore on a mud bank, as the sole means of saving
her from going down in deep water, so that the only vessel left was the
little schooner _Montezuma_.

On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying garrison
up the river, when we received a flag of truce informing us that the
enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private houses and
magazines; and, together with the Governor, Colonel Montoya, had fled in
the direction of Chiloe. From the disorders which were committed by the
Spaniards, previous to their retreat, the town was in great
consternation, many of the inhabitants having also fled; a proclamation
issued by me, to the effect that no one should be molested in person or
property, had, however, the effect of inducing them to return; and an
additional order immediately to choose for themselves a Governor, at
once restored peace and tranquillity--the disposition of the people
being for the most part good, whilst any leaning which might have
existed in favour of Spanish rule was dissipated by the excesses which,
previous to their flight, the royalist troops had committed.

The fortifications were so numerous, that at first it was my intention
to destroy them and embark the artillery, as the Spaniards who had
escaped to Chiloe--where another Spanish regiment was stationed--might
return after my departure and recover them, the force which could be
spared to garrison them being insignificant when distributed amongst
fifteen forts. On further reflection, I could not make up my mind to
destroy fortresses, the erection of which had cost upwards of a million
of dollars, and which Chili would find it difficult to replace; and
therefore determined on leaving them intact, with their artillery and
ammunition, intending, before my return to Valparaiso, to render the
rout of the Spaniards who had escaped, yet more complete.

The booty which fell into our hands, exclusive of the value of the forts
and public buildings, was considerable, Valdivia being the chief
military depot in the southern part of the continent. Amongst the
military stores, were upwards of 1,000 cwt. of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon
shot, of which 2,500 were brass, 170,000 musket cartridges, a large
quantity of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were brass, and the
remainder iron; the ship _Dolores_, afterwards sold at Valparaiso for
20,000 dollars, with public stores, also sold for the like value; and
plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the churches of
Conception, valued at 16,000 dollars.

From correspondence found in the archives of Valdivia, it was clear that
Quintanilla, the Governor of Chiloe, had serious apprehensions of a
revolt at San Carlos, so that, in place of returning to Valparaiso, I
resolved to see what could be effected there. The loss of the
_Intrepido_ was a serious drawback to our means of transporting troops,
and the flag-ship would no longer float; as, however, we had possession
of the _Dolores_, it was resolved to crowd into her and the _Montezuma_
all the troops that could be spared, leaving Major Beauchef the whole of
those brought from Conception.

Meanwhile, I despatched a _piragua_ to Valparaiso with the intelligence
of our success; the unexpected news, as was afterwards learned, creating
such an amount of popular enthusiasm as had never before been witnessed
in Chili. The most amusing part of the affair was, that by the time my
despatches announcing our victory reached Vaparaiso, the other ships of
the squadron had also arrived, when Captain Guise and his officers had
attributed our rocket failure at Callao to my want of skill in their
use; the inference desired, being my want of capability to command a
squadron. Not a word of blame was then attributed to poor Goldsack, who
had superintended their manufacture, as indeed none was deserved, though
the blame afterwards attributed to him ended as before stated in his
ruin.

To this alleged want of professional skill on my part, Zenteno had
drawn up an elaborate accusation against me of disobedience to orders,
in not having returned, according to my instructions; the whole _clique_
felicitating themselves on my dismissal with disgrace. Even the people
did not know what judgment to form, as all materials for forming an
opinion were kept from them, whilst every pretence tending to my
discredit was carefully made known. On news of the victory, all this was
immediately hushed up--the ministers, to retrieve their own credit,
joined in the popular enthusiasm, which it would have been unavailing to
thwart--and poor Goldsack was overwhelmed with reproach for the failure
of his rockets, though the whole blame rested with the Government in
having employed Spanish prisoners as his workmen.



CHAPTER III.

DEPARTURE FOR CHILOE--PREPARATIONS OF THE ENEMY--CAPTURE OF FORT
CORONA--FAILURE AT FORT AGUY, AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--RETURN TO
VALDIVIA--CAPTURE OF OSORIO--RETURN TO VALPARAISO--ENTHUSIASTIC
RECEPTION--CHAGRIN OF THE MINISTRY--IMPORTANCE OF CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA
IN A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW--PROMOTION OF OFFICERS UNDER
ARREST--EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS BY THE SPANIARDS--CAREER OF
BENAVIDES--MUTINOUS SPIRIT OF THE SEAMEN IN CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR
CAPTURES BEING APPROPRIATED BY GOVERNMENT--RESIGNATION OF MY
COMMISSION--REFUSAL THEREOF--RENEWED OFFER OF AN ESTATE--THIS AGAIN
DECLINED--SEAMEN OBTAIN THEIR WAGES--PRIVATE PURCHASE OF AN
ESTATE--GOVERNMENT GIVES NOTICE OF TAKING IT--APPOINTMENT OF FLAG
CAPTAIN AGAINST MY WISHES--ANNOYANCE GIVEN TO ME BY MINISTER OF
MARINE--RENEWED RESIGNATION OF THE COMMAND--OFFICERS OF THE SQUADRON
RESIGN IN A BODY--GOVERNMENT BEGS OF ME TO RETAIN THE COMMAND--MY
CONSENT--GENERAL SAN MARTIN--THE SENATE--ZENTENO--CORRUPTION OF PARTIES
IN THE ADMINISTRATION.


Having provided for the safety of the city and province of Valdivia, by
establishing a provisional government, and left Major Beauchef with his
own troops to maintain order--on the 16th of February, I sailed with the
_Montezuma_ schooner, and our prize the _Dolores_, for the island of
Chiloe, taking with me two hundred men, under the command of Major
Miller, my object being to wrest Chiloe from Spain, as I had done
Valdivia. Unfortunately, the services of the flag-ship, the _O'Higgins_,
were not available, there being no way of rendering her seaworthy,
without tedious repairs, for which there was no time, as our success
depended on attacking Chiloe before the Governor had leisure to prepare
for defence. Neither of our vessels being armed for fighting, I
depended altogether upon Major Miller and our handful of soldiers to
oppose a thousand regular troops, besides a numerous militia; but having
been informed that the garrison was in a mutinous state, I calculated
that by judicious management, they might be induced to join the patriot
cause.

Unluckily, our design had got wind, and the Spanish Governor,
Quintanilla, a judicious officer, had managed to conciliate them. On
coming to an anchor on the 17th, at Huechucucay, we found a body of
infantry and cavalry, with a field-piece, ready to dispute our landing;
but drawing off their attention by a feigned attack upon a distant spot,
and thus dividing them into two parties, Major Miller got on shore, and
soon routed them, capturing their field-piece.

A night attack being decided upon, the troops, a hundred and seventy in
number, moved on under the direction of a guide, who, wilfully or
treacherously, misled them, the men thus wandering about in the dark
throughout the whole night. At dawn, they found their way to Fort
Corona, which, with a detached battery, was taken without loss. Halting
for a short time to refresh the men, Major Miller bravely, but too
precipitately, moved on Fort Aguy, in broad daylight; this fort being
the stronghold of the enemy, mounting twelve guns, with others flanking
the only accessible path by which entrance could be gained, and being
garrisoned by three companies of regulars, two companies of militia, and
a full proportion of artillerymen. The fort stood on a hill, washed on
one side by the sea, and having on the other an impenetrable forest, the
only access being by a narrow path, whilst the means of retreat for the
garrison was by the same path, so that the attack became for the latter
a matter of life and death, since, in case of defeat, there was no mode
of escape, as at Valdivia.

In spite of these odds, and the spectacle of two fanatical friars on the
ramparts, with lance in one hand, and crucifix in the other, urging on
the garrison to resist to the death the handful of aggressors--the
indomitable courage of Miller did not allow him to remain in the forts
he had already taken till nightfall, when he would have been
comparatively safe by attacking in the dark. Choosing out of his small
band a forlorn hope of sixty men, he perilled his own safety, upon which
so much depended, by leading them in person; every gun and musket of the
enemy being concentrated on a particular angle of the path which he must
needs pass. As the detachment reached the spot, a shower of grape and
musketry mowed down the whole, twenty out of the sixty being killed
outright, whilst nearly all the rest were mortally wounded. Seeing their
gallant Commander fall, the marines, who were waiting to follow, dashed
through the fire, and brought him off, with a grape-shot through his
thigh, and the bones of his right foot crushed by a round shot. Another
dash by the force which remained brought off the whole of the wounded,
though adding fearfully to their numbers. This having been accomplished,
Captain Erescano, who succeeded to the command, ordered a retreat; the
Spaniards, animated by success, and urged on by the friars, following
just within musket-shot, and making three separate attacks, which were
on each occasion repelled, though from the killed and wounded, the
pursuers were now fully six times their number. Nevertheless one-half of
the diminished band kept the enemy at bay, whilst the other half spiked
the guns, broke up the gun-carriages, and destroyed the military stores
in the forts captured in the morning, when they resumed their march to
the beach, followed by the Spaniards as before.

The marines who, with affectionate fidelity, had borne off Major Miller,
had been careful to protect him from fire, though two out of the three
who carried him were wounded in the act; and when, on arriving at the
beach, they were invited by him to enter the boat, one of them, a
gallant fellow named Roxas, of whom I had spoken highly in my despatches
from Valdivia, on account of his distinguished bravery, refused, saying,
"No, Sir, I was the first to land, and I mean to be the last to go on
board." He kept his word; for on his Commander being placed in safety,
he hastened back to the little band, now nearly cut up, and took his
share in the retreat, being the last to get into the boats. Such were
the Chilenos, of whom the mean jealousy of the Minister of Marine,
Zenteno, refused to allow me a thousand for operations at Callao--which
could have been conducted with ease, as Valdivia had been captured with
less than a third of that number.

Our force being now seriously diminished, and feeling convinced that
the fanatics of Chiloe were devoted to the cause of Spain, there was
nothing left but to return to Valdivia, where, finding that the
Spaniards who had been dispersed in the neighbourhood were committing
excesses, I despatched Major Beauchef with 100 men to Osorio to secure
that town, the relief being accepted with great joy even by the Indians,
of whom, wrote Major Beauchef to me, "I have embraced more than a
thousand Caciques and their followers. They have all offered their
services to fight in the patriotic cause; but as circumstances do not
require this, I have invited them to return to their own lands, and have
received their promises to be ready if the country should call for their
services." The Spaniards being driven from Osorio, the flag of Chili
was, on the 26th of February, hoisted on the castle by Major Beauchef,
who returned to Valdivia.

There being nothing further to require my presence, I placed the
_O'Higgins_ under the orders of my secretary, Mr. Bennet, to superintend
her repairs, and embarked in the _Montezuma_, for Valparaiso, taking
with me five Spanish officers who had been made prisoners, amongst whom
was Colonel Fausto De Hoyos, the Commandant of the Cantabria regiment.

On my departure, the Spaniards, elated by their success at Chiloe,
combined with those who had been driven from Valdivia, in an attempt to
recover their lost possessions, but Major Beauchef, having timely
intelligence of their intention, set out to meet them. A number of
volunteers having joined the patriot force, Major Beauchef on the 6th of
March encountered the enemy on the river Toro, and instantly attacked
them, when, in about an hour, the Spanish officers mounted their horses
and fled in a body, leaving the men to their fate. Nearly three hundred
of these immediately surrendered, and Major Beauchef--having captured
the whole of the arms and baggage--returned in triumph to Valdivia.

On the 27th of February, I arrived at Valparaiso, in the _Montezuma_,
amidst the most lively demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of the
populace, and warm expressions of gratitude from the Supreme Director.
But my reception by his ministers was wholly different. Zenteno, through
whose orders I had broken, declared, that the conquest of Valdivia "was
the act of a madman! that I deserved to have lost my life in the
attempt; and even now ought to lose my head for daring to attack such a
place without instructions, and for exposing the patriot troops to such
hazard;" afterwards setting on foot a series of intrigues, having for
their object the depreciation of the service which had been rendered, so
that I found myself exposed to the greatest possible vexation and
annoyance, with not the slightest indication of national acknowledgment
or reward to myself, officers, or men.

The chagrin of Zenteno and the bad passions of his adherents were
further enhanced by the congratulatory addresses which poured in on both
the Supreme Director and myself from all parts, the people declaring,
contrary to the assertions of Zenteno, that I had acted, not from any
feeling of personal vanity, but from a conviction of the national
utility of the act; and that by its accomplishment the valour of the
Chilenos had been so displayed as to shew that they had the utmost
confidence in their officers, and hence possessed the moral as well as
physical courage necessary for further achievements.

Notwithstanding the envious dissatisfaction of Zenteno, the government
was compelled, in deference to the popular voice, to award medals to the
captors, the decree for this stating that "the capture of Valdivia was
the happy result of the devising of an admirably arranged plan, and of
the most daring and valorous execution." The decree further conferred on
me an estate of 4,000 quadras from the confiscated lands of Conception,
which I refused, as no vote of thanks was given by the legislature; this
vote I finally obtained as an indemnification to myself for having
exceeded my orders; such being necessary after Zenteno's expressions of
ill-will towards me on account of breaking through instructions.

Situated as Chili then was, it is impossible to over-rate the importance
of this acquisition--the capture of a noble harbour protected by fifteen
forts, and the magazines with their vast amount of military stores,
being even secondary to the political advantages gained by the Republic.

The annexation of this province, at one blow conferred on Chili
complete independence, averting the contemplated necessity for fitting
out a powerful military expedition for the attainment of that object,
vitally essential to her very existence as an independent state;
because, so long as Valdivia remained in the hands of the Spaniards,
Chili was, in her moments of unguardedness or disunion, in constant
danger of losing the liberties she had, as yet, but partially acquired.

The resources of the province of Valdivia, together with those of
Conception, had contributed the means whereby the Spaniards maintained
their hold upon the Chilian territory. Not only were they deprived of
these resources--now added to those of Chili--but a great saving was
effected by exonerating the Republic from the necessity of maintaining a
military force in the southern provinces, as a check upon both Spaniards
and Indians, who, at the moment of our conquest of Valdivia, were being
let loose in all directions against the Chilian patriots.

Setting aside, therefore, the removal of danger, and the complete
establishment of independence, the money value alone of the conquest
was, to a Government of very limited means, of the first importance, as
doing away with the necessity of military expenditure, estimated by
competent judges at a million of dollars, merely to attempt the
accomplishment of an object, which, without any additional cost, I had
effected with a single ship, so unseaworthy that she had to be left
behind.

But the advantage of the conquest did not end here. Had it not been for
this capture, the Spanish power in Chili, aided by the Indians, would
have found it easy to maintain itself in such a country for a protracted
period, despite any military force Chili was in a condition to bring
against it; so that no effective co-operation with the people of Peru
could have been undertaken--as common prudence would have deterred them
from entering into distant revolutionary projects, so long as the
Spaniards were in possession of any part of the Chilian territory;
whilst the necessity of defending herself through a protracted civil
war, would have prevented Chili from aiding in the liberation of Peru,
which would thus have remained a permanent base of operations for the
Spaniards to annoy, if not again to recover, the Chilian provinces.

A further advantage was the successful negociation of a loan of one
million sterling in England, which was accomplished solely on account of
what had been achieved, every attempt at this having failed so long as
the Spaniards were in possession of the most important harbour and
fortress in the country, from which, as a basis, they might organize
future attempts to recover the revolted provinces.

Notwithstanding these advantages, not a penny in the shape of reward,
either for this or any previous service, was paid to myself, the
officers, or seamen, nevertheless the Government appropriated the money
arising from the sale of the _Dolores_, and the stores with which she
was loaded; neither was there any account taken of the value of the guns
and the enormous amount of ammunition left in the forts at Valdivia.
The men who performed this achievement were literally in rags, and
destitute of everything, no attempt being made by the department of
Marine to lessen their sufferings--for to this extent was their
condition reduced.

In place of reward, every encouragement was offered to the officers to
disobey my orders. Two of these I had marked for punishment, for
deliberate murder. Ensign Vidal having captured two Spanish officers in
Fort Ingles, they surrendered their swords, receiving the gallant
youth's pledge of safety; but Captain Erescano coming up, immediately
butchered them. Another case was even worse: Ensign Latapia, who had
been left in command of the castle of Corral, after my departure to
Chiloe, ordered two of his prisoners to be shot; and four officers would
have met the same fate, had not my secretary, Mr. Bennet, taken them on
board the _O'Higgins_. For this I placed Latapia under arrest, making
the necessary declarations for a court-martial, and conveyed him as a
prisoner to Valparaiso, where, in place of being punished, both he and
Erescano were promoted, and taken into the liberating army of General
San Martin.

I have spoken of the aid afforded to the Spaniards by the Indians. On
the 10th of March General Freire, afterwards Supreme Director, wrote me
a letter congratulatory of my success against Valdivia, which he
concluded by informing me that its capture had already caused the
Indians of Angol, and their Cacique, Benavente, to declare in favour of
Chili, and that he did not doubt but that this would shortly be followed
by a similar declaration on the part of the Indians throughout the
province; General Freire not being aware that I had already produced
this effect by distributing amongst them an immense quantity of trumpery
stores and gewgaws, accumulated by the Spaniards in the magazines at
Valdivia, for the purpose of rewarding murderous inroads into the
Chilian territory.

It will be interesting briefly to note the employment of Indians by the
Spaniards. Their agent, or leader, in this horrible warfare, was a
wretch named Benavides, who may fairly lay claim to the distinction of
being the most perfect monster who ever disgraced humanity. He had
originally been a common soldier in the Buenos Ayrean army, and,
together with his brother, had _carte blanche_ from the Spaniards to
commit the most fearful atrocities on the Chilian patriots, who could
not defend themselves against the stealthy cowardice of Indian warfare.
His invariable practice was, whenever a village or estate could be
surprised, to sew up the leading inhabitants as tightly as possible in
raw ox-hides stripped from their own cattle, when, being laid in the
burning sun, the contraction of the hides as they dried caused a slow
and lingering death of perfect agony, which it was the amusement of
himself and the savages whom he led to enjoy whilst smoking their
cigars. When any persons of influence fell into his hands, he cut out
their tongues, and otherwise horribly mutilated them--a bishop and
several other gentlemen surviving as witnesses of his atrocities.

Valdivia was this man's _point d'appui_, whence he drew his supplies,
and when we took the place a small vessel fell into our hands, laden
with arms and ammunition for his disposal amongst the Indians. She was
destined for Arauco, and had on board two Spanish officers and four
non-commissioned officers, sent for the purpose of rendering the Indians
still more formidable by indoctrinating them into European modes of
warfare.

The wretch Benavides was afterwards bought over by General San Martin,
and sent to Conception for the orders of General Freire, who told him to
his face that he would have nothing to do with such a monster; whereupon
Benavides left Conception, and commenced a desolating warfare upon the
inhabitants of the coast, even refining upon his former barbarities. The
country getting too hot for him, he again offered his services to the
Spaniards, and was on his way to Peru in a small vessel, when, being
compelled to go ashore for water, in the vicinity of Valparaiso, one of
his men betrayed him, and he was sent to Santiago, where he was hung.

The seamen were becoming mutinous, in consequence of neither receiving
pay nor prize-money, every promise given being broken, as well to them
as to myself. As they looked to me for the vindication of their rights,
and, indeed, had only been kept from open outbreak by my assurance that
they should be paid, I addressed a letter of expostulation to the
Supreme Director, recounting their services and the ill-merited
harshness to which they were exposed at the hands of his Ministers,
notwithstanding that since their return they had aided the Government in
the construction of wharves and other conveniences necessary for the
embarkation of troops and stores to Peru--a military expedition to that
country being now decided on.

The fact was, that the proceeds of the captures were appropriated by the
Government, which, to avoid repayment, declared that the conquest of
Valdivia was a _restoration!_ though the place had never been in
possession of Chili. On my refusing to allow the stores I had brought
from thence to be disembarked, unless as a compensation to the seamen,
it was alleged as a reason for the course pursued that even if Valdivia
had not belonged to the Republic, Chili did not make war on every
section of America. It was therefore put to my liberality and honourable
character whether I would not give up to the Government all that the
squadron had acquired?

These views were written by Monteagudo, afterwards the willing
instrument of General San Martin in Peru. I asked him, "Whether he
considered that which had been advanced as just, or according to law?"
The reply was, "_Certainly not, but I was ordered to write so!_" Finding
that I would surrender nothing, it was next debated in the Council
whether I ought not to be brought to a court martial for having delayed
and diverted the naval forces of Chili to the reduction of Valdivia,
without the orders of Government!

No doubt this course would have been decided on but from the unsettled
condition of the Republic and fear of the populace, who denounced the
views of the Ministry as heartily as they advocated my proceedings.

As nothing in the shape of justice could be obtained for the squadron,
on the 14th of May, I begged His Excellency the Supreme Director to
accept the resignation of my Commission, as, by retaining it, I should
only be instrumental in promoting the ruin which must follow the conduct
of his advisers; at the same time telling him I had not accepted it to
have my motives misconstrued, and my services degraded as they had been
on account of objects which I was unable to divine, unless, indeed, a
narrow-minded jealousy, such as that which designated the capture of
Valdivia, its "_restoration_," though it had never before passed from
under the dominion of the Spaniards.

This course had not been anticipated, though it was not adopted in any
spirit of intimidation, but from repugnance to the heartless ingratitude
with which important national services had been met. The Ministers were,
however, thus brought for a time to their senses, the justice of my
complaints being acknowledged, and every assurance given that for the
future the Government would observe good faith towards the squadron. An
estate, as has been said, had been offered to me as a reward for my
services, which was declined for reasons already adduced. The offer was
now renewed, but again declined, as nothing but promises were as yet
forthcoming to the service, and the only hold upon the seamen was my
personal influence with them, in consequence of my unyielding advocacy
of their rights--a hold which I was not likely to forego for a grant to
myself. In place, therefore, of accepting the estate, I returned the
document conveying the grant, with a request that it might be sold, and
the proceeds applied to the payment of the squadron; but the requisition
was not complied with.

Seeing that I was determined not to be trifled with, and shamed by my
offer of applying the estate to the payment of the men, General San
Martin, who was appointed to command the military portion of the
expedition to Peru, came to Valparaiso in June, and on the 13th of July,
the squadron was paid wages in part only, but as I insisted on the whole
being liquidated, this was done on the 16th; but without any portion of
their prize-money. My share alone of the value of captures made at and
previous to the capture of Valdivia was 67,000 dollars, and for this I
received the assurance of the Supreme Director that it should be paid to
me at the earliest possible moment; upon which I accepted the estate
which continued to be pressed upon me, the grant expressing the purpose
for which it was given, adding as a reason that "my name should never
cease from the land." This estate, situated at Rio Clara, was, after my
departure from Chili, forcibly resumed by the succeeding Government;
and the bailiff, whom I had placed upon it for the purpose of seeing how
it could be improved by culture and the introduction of valuable
European seeds, was forcibly expelled from its supervision.

On my first refusal to accept the estate--for the reason before
assigned--in order to convince the Chilians how great was my desire to
be enrolled amongst the number of their citizens, I purchased a hacienda
at Herradura, about eight miles from Valparaiso. The effect produced by
this upon the Ministry was almost ludicrous. It was gravely argued
amongst them as to what I, a foreigner, could intend by purchasing an
estate in Chili? The conclusion to which they came being, as I was
credibly informed, that as the whole population was with me, I must
intend, when opportunity served, to set myself up as the ruler of the
Republic, relying upon the people for support! Such was statesmanship at
that day in Chili.

It so happened, that soon after purchasing this property I pointed out
to the Government how much better the Bay of Herradura was calculated
for a naval arsenal, than the ill-protected Bay of Valparaiso; offering
at the same time to make them a gratuitous present of all the land
required for the establishment of a naval arsenal and marine depot. This
offer was, no doubt, construed into an act, on my part, to gain
additional popularity--though this, perhaps, would have been no easy
matter; and a notice was served upon me not to make any improvements, as
the Government intended to appropriate the estate--but would not
reimburse any outlay, though they would repay me the purchase money, and
also for any improvements that had already have been effected!

I instantly solicited an explanation of the Supreme Director, and
received an apology, attributing the whole affair to the officiousness
of the Attorney-General, who had founded his proceeding on an old
Spanish law; and there, for a time, the matter dropped, but for a time
only--viz. so long as the necessities of the state required my services.

A new source of annoyance now arose, in all kinds of attempts to lessen
my authority in the navy, but as I was always on the alert to maintain
my position, these resulted in nothing but defeat to their concoctors.
At length an overt act was committed in the appointment of Captain Spry
as my flag captain on board the _O'Higgins_, which had been repaired at
Valdivia, and was now come down to Valparaiso. An order to this effect
was sent to me, which I promptly refused to obey, adding that Captain
Spry should never tread my quarter-deck as flag captain, and that if my
privilege as an admiral were not admitted, the Government might consider
my command as at an end, for so long as I continued in command of the
squadron, I would not permit an executor of my orders to be forced upon
me. The point was immediately conceded, and Captain Crosbie was
appointed flag captain.

The nomination of Spry was, no doubt, meant to control my efforts in the
future expedition to Peru, the credit of which, if any, was to be
reserved for the army. As far as I knew anything of Captain Spry, I had
no personal objections to him, but, restricted as I had been by the
Minister of Marine Zenteno, I had great doubts as to the motives for
appointments of his making, being convinced that his principal aim was
to prevent me from doing anything beyond keeping the Spaniards in check,
an operation to which I was by no means inclined to accede, as had been
evinced by the recent conquest of Valdivia, in excess of his
instructions.

Encouraged by the annoyance given to me by the Minister of Marine and
his party, one or two of my captains thought themselves at liberty to
manifest a disregard to my authority, which, as their admiral, I did not
choose to tolerate. The most influential of these was Captain Guise,
who, having been guilty of several acts of direct disobedience and
neglect of duty, was, by my orders, put in arrest, pending a demand made
by me that the Government should institute a court martial for the
investigation of his conduct. This act greatly irritated Zenteno, who
desired to support him, and refused consent to the inquiry; thus
establishing a precedent for the captain of any ship to consider himself
independent of the admiral.

Such an act of folly in violation of the discipline of the navy, no less
than of personal insult to myself, determined me to have nothing more to
do with the Chilian administration, and on July 16th, I once more
transmitted to the Government my resignation, at the same time demanding
my passport to quit the country, notifying to the officers of the
squadron that on the receipt of the same I should cease to command. A
meeting was immediately held amongst them, and on the same day, I
received--not a valedictory address, as might have been expected--but
two letters, one signed by five captains, and the other by twenty-three
commissioned officers, containing resolutions of abandoning the service
also, at the same time handing in their commissions. To this proof of
attachment, I replied, by requesting that they would not sacrifice their
own positions on my account, and recommended them not to make their
resolutions public till they had further considered the matter, as it
might be seriously detrimental to the interests of the country.

The following letter was addressed to me on this occasion by the
officers of the squadron:--

   "On board the _Independencia_, July 18, 1820."

   My Lord,

   The general discontent and anxiety which your Lordship's
   resignation has occasioned amongst the officers and others of
   the squadron, afford a strong proof how much the ungrateful conduct
   of the Government is felt by those serving under your command.

   "The officers whose names are subscribed to the enclosed resolutions,
   disdaining longer to serve under a Government which can
   so soon have forgotten the important services rendered to the State,
   beg leave to put in your hands their commissions, and to request
   you will be kind enough to forward them to the Minister of Marine.
   At the same time that we are thus forced to withdraw ourselves from
   the service, our warmest wishes will be offered up for the prosperity
   and liberty of the country."

   "Signed by 23 Commissioned Officers."

The following resolutions accompanied this letter:--

"Resolved--1. That the honour, safety, and interest of the Chilian
navy entirely rest on the abilities and experience of the present
Commander-in-Chief."

"2. That, as the feelings of unbounded confidence and respect which we
entertain for him cannot be transferred to another, we have come to the
resolution of resigning our commissions, and of transmitting them to
Government, through the hands of our admiral."

"3. That our commissions shall be accompanied by a letter expressive of
our sentiments, signed by all whose commissions are enclosed."

"Signed by 23 Officers."

Pending the acceptance of my resignation by the Government, the
equipment of the squadron was carried on with the greatest alacrity, so
that there might be no ground for complaint that the termination of my
command had caused any remissness in our duties. I, however, withheld
the commissions which had been enclosed to me by the officers of the
squadron, lest the measure should excite popular dissatisfaction, and
thus cause a danger for which the Government was unprepared.

The only captains who did not sign the resolutions were Guise and Spry,
the former being in arrest, and the latter being offended with me on
account of my refusal to accept him as flag captain. There is no doubt
but that he immediately communicated to Zenteno the resolutions of the
officers, for on the 20th I received from him the following letter:--

   "Valparaiso, July 20th, 1820."

   "My Lord,"

   "At a moment when the services of the naval forces of
   the State are of the highest importance, and the personal services
   of your Lordship indispensable, the Supremacy, with the most
   profound sentiments of regret, has received your resignation, which,
   should it be admitted, would involve the future operations of the
   arms of liberty in the New World in certain ruin; and ultimately
   replace in Chili, your adopted home, that tyranny which, your
   Lordship abhors, and to the annihilation of which your heroism has
   so greatly contributed."

   "His Excellency the Supreme Director commands me to
   inform your Lordship that should you persist in resigning the command
   of the squadron which has been honoured by bearing your
   flag--the cause of terror and dismay to our enemies, and of glory to
   all true Americans; or should the Government unwisely admit it,
   this would indeed be a day of universal mourning in the New
   World. The Government, therefore, in the name of the nation
   returns you your commission, soliciting your re-acceptance of it, for
   the furtherance of that sacred cause to which your whole soul is
   devoted."

   "The Supremacy is convinced of the necessity which obliges
   your Lordship to adopt the measures which placed Captain Guise, of
   the _Lantaro_, in arrest, and of the justice of the charges exhibited
   against this officer; but being desirous of preventing any delay in
   the important services in which the ships of war are about to
   proceed, it is the request of His Excellency the Supreme Director
   that his trial be postponed to the first opportunity which does not
   interfere with the service of the squadron, so important at the
   present epoch."

   "(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO."

In addition to this communication from the Minister of Marine, I
received private letters from the Supreme Director and General San
Martin, begging me to continue in command of the naval forces, and
assuring me that there should be no further cause for complaint.

On receipt of these letters I withdrew my resignation, and returned to
the officers of the squadron their commissions, at the same time
setting Captain Guise at liberty, and reinstating him in the command of
his ship. I would not have done this but from a feeling of attachment to
the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, whose amiable disposition--too
easy to contend with the machinations of those around him,--- was a
sufficient assurance that he was neither an actor in, nor even privy to
the system of annoyance pursued towards me by a clique of whom Zenteno
was the agent. Like many other good commanders, O'Higgins did not
display that tact in the cabinet which had so signally served his
country in the field, in which,--though General San Martin, by his
unquestionable powers of turning the achievements of others to his own
account, contrived to gain the credit--the praise was really due to
General O'Higgins. The same easy disposition, after the elevation of the
latter to the Supreme Directorate, induced him to consent to the
establishment of a senatorial court of consultation, conceding to it
privileges altogether incompatible with his own supremacy; and it was
with this body that all the vexations directed against me originated--as
has been asserted by writers on Chili, at the instigation of General San
Martin; but having no documentary evidence to prove this, I shall not
take upon myself to assert the fact, notwithstanding that the subsequent
conduct of the General gave more than probability to the generally
received opinion.

There was, however, no doubt but that General San Martin had been privy
to much of the annoyance given to the squadron and myself, as, upon my
accusing him of this, he replied that he only "wanted to see how far the
Supreme Director would allow a party spirit to oppose the welfare of the
expedition;" adding, "Never mind, my lord, I am general of the army, and
you shall be admiral of the squadron." _"Bien, milord, yo soy General
del exercito, y V. sara Almirante de la esquadra."_ His allusion to the
complicity of the Supreme Director I knew to be false, as His Excellency
was anxious to do all in his power both for the squadron and his
country; had not the Senate, on which he had conferred such
extraordinary powers, thwarted all his endeavours.

General San Martin was, however, much surprised when I shewed him the
letters and returned commissions of the officers, he having no
conception of their determination not to serve under any command but my
own; this step on their part being fraught with the greatest danger to
the equipment of the contemplated expedition.

The Senate just noticed was an anomaly in state government. It consisted
of five members, whose functions were to remain only during the first
struggles of the country for independence; but this body had now assumed
a permanent right to dictatorial control, whilst there was no appeal
from their arbitrary conduct, except to themselves. They arrogated the
title of "Most Excellent," whilst the Supreme Director was simply "His
Excellency;" his position, though nominally head of the executive,
being really that of mouth-piece to the Senate, which, assuming all
power, deprived the Executive Government of its legitimate influence, so
that no armament could be equipped, no public work undertaken, no troops
raised, and no taxes levied, except by the consent of this irresponsible
body. For such a clique, the plain, simple good sense, and thorough good
feeling of the Supreme Director was no match; as, being himself above
meanness, he was led to rely on the honesty of others from the
uprightness of his own motives. Though in every way disposed to believe,
with Burke, that "what is morally wrong can never be politically right,"
he was led to believe that a crooked policy was a necessary evil of
Government; and as such a policy was adverse to his own nature, he was
the more easily induced to surrender its administration to others who
were free from his conscientious principles.

Of these the most unscrupulous was Zenteno, who, previous to the
revolution, had been an attorney at Conception, and was a _protégé_ of
General San Martin--carrying with him into State Administration the
practical cunning of his profession, with more than its usual proportion
of chicanery. As he was my bitter opponent, obstructing my plans for the
interests of Chili in every possible way, it might ill become me to
speak of him as I then felt, and to this day feel. I will therefore
adduce the opinion of Mrs. Graham, the first historian of the Republic,
as to the estimation in which he was generally held:--"Zenteno has read
more than usual among his countrymen, and thinks that little much. Like
San Martin, he dignifies scepticism in religion, laxity of morals, and
coldness of heart, if not cruelty, with the name of philosophy; and
while he could shew creditable sensibility for the fate of a worm, would
think the death or torture of a political opponent matter for
congratulation." I was his political opponent, as wishing to uphold the
authority of the Supreme Director, and hence, no doubt, his enmity to
me; his influence even extending so far as to prevent the Supreme
Director from visiting me whilst in Santiago, on the ground that such a
course on his part would be undignified!

At this distance of time--now that Chili is in possession of a
Government acting on more enlightened principles--there is no necessity
for withholding these remarks, without which the subsequent acts of the
Chilian Government towards me might be liable to misconstruction as to
my representations of them. So long as Chili was in a transition state
from a corrupt and selfish Government to one acting in accordance with
the true interests of the country, I forbore to make known these and
other circumstances, which, having now become matters of history, need
not any longer be withheld.

Writing in this spirit, I may mention a reason, notorious enough at the
time, why the squadron was not paid even its wages. The Government _had_
provided the means, but those to whom the distribution was entrusted
retained the money during their pleasure, employing it for their own
advantage in trading speculations or in usury, only applying it to a
legitimate purpose when further delay became dangerous to themselves.
One great cause of the hatred displayed towards me by these people, was
my incessant demands that the claims of the squadron should be satisfied
as regarded wages. As to prize-money, not a dollar was ever conceded by
the Government either to myself, officers, or men, so long as I remained
in Chili; but I had the satisfaction to see that the constant watch
which I kept on those financial disorders, was the means of ameliorating
the system, though with the additional dislike to myself of those whose
short-sighted policy I was thwarting, and whose avaricious speculations
were thus curtailed.

In spite of his enmity, the Minister of Marine had been officially
compelled to write me the following letter:--

   "My Lord,"

   "If victories over an enemy are to be estimated
   according to the resistance offered, or the national advantages
   obtained, the conquest of Valdivia is, in both senses, inestimable;
   encountering, as you did, the natural and artificial strength of that
   impregnable fortress which, till now, had obstinately defended itself
   by means of those combined advantages. The memory of that
   glorious day will occupy the first pages of Chilian history, and the
   name of Your Excellency will be transmitted from generation to
   generation by the gratitude of our descendants."

   "His Excellency the Supreme Director, highly gratified by that
   noble conquest, orders me to inform you (as I have now the
   satisfaction of doing), that he experiences, in his own name, and in
   that of the nation, the most heartfelt gratification at that signal
   achievement. The meritorious officers, Beauchef, Miller, Erescano,
   Carter, and Vidal, and all the other officers and soldiers who, in
   imitation of your Excellency, encountered such vast dangers, will be
   brought to the notice of Government, in order to receive a decorative
   medal, in gratitude for their gallantry, and in proof that Chili rewards
   the heroes who advocate her cause."

   Our national flag has been displayed amidst the most festive public
   demonstrations, above those of Valdivia and Cantabria, in proof of the
   subjection of our enemies.

   "I beg, with the greatest gratification, the honour to announce to you
   your letter of the 3rd instant, transmitting those of Major Beauchef and
   Major Miller."

  "God preserve your Excellency many years."

  (Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO.
  "The Vice-Admiral commanding the Chilian
   Squadron."

It is difficult to see how a man who could have written the above
letter, even officially, could have become my worst enemy; the reasons
for which will, however, develop themselves as we proceed.

As the estate which was conferred upon me at Rio Clara was afterwards
taken from me, without reason assigned, I will here give the letter
conveying it, as this will again have to be alluded to. The
attorney-like cunning of Zenteno prevented its conveyance by any more
formal document than the decree conferring it.

   "My Lord,"

   "A Decree of this date has been issued by His
   Excellency the Supreme Director, of which the annexed is a
   copy:--"

   "Desirous to expedite, without loss of time, the gift of 4000
   _quadras_ of land, which, by decree of the Senate, was assigned to the
   Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron, Vice-Admiral Lord Cochrane,
   as a demonstration of public appreciation for his distinguished
   services in the '_Restoration,_' of the important fortress of Valdivia;
   the said 4000 _quadras_ are assigned on the lands of Rio Clara, in
   the province of Conception, being part of the confiscated estate of
   Pablo Furtado, a fugitive Spaniard."

   "'The present deed shall serve as a sufficient title to the property in
   favour of the Vice-Admiral, being communicated to the Minister of
   Finance, in order to the accustomed formalities, to receive possession
   and enjoy the benefits.'"

  "I have the honour to communicate the above, by Supreme orders, for your
   information."

  "God preserve your Excellency many years."

  "(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO.
   Administration of Marine,
   Valparaiso, August SO, 1820.
   Published by order of His Excellency."

       *       *       *       *       *



CHAPTER IV.

OBSTACLES TO EQUIPPING THE SQUADRON--SAILING OF THE LIBERATING
EXPEDITION--DEBARCATION AT PISCO--LONG INACTION OF THE ARMY--GENERAL SAN
MARTIN REMOVES TO ANCON--CAPTURE OF THE ESMERALDA--EXCHANGE OF
PRISONERS--ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE SERVICE BY GENERAL SAN MARTIN--LADY
COCHRANE'S VISIT TO MENDOZA.


The difficulties which attended the equipment of the squadron and troops
destined for the liberation of Peru were very great, the Government
being without credit, whilst its treasury had been completely exhausted
by efforts to organise an army--a loan being impossible, and indeed
refused. By my influence with the British merchants, I managed to obtain
considerable quantities of naval and military stores, and in addition, a
contribution to a subscription which was set on foot, in place of a
forced loan, upon which the Government hesitated to venture.

The greatest difficulty was, however, with regard to the foreign seamen,
who, disgusted with the want of faith towards them, refused to re-enter
the service. The Government, upon this, requested me to resort to
impressment, which I declined, telling them, moreover, that the captain
of the British frigate then in port would not permit his countrymen to
be impressed. The alternative proposed was to use my influence with the
men, by issuing such a proclamation, dictated by myself, as would render
them dependent for their pay and prize-money upon General San Martin,
and on the success of the expedition; it being evident that they would
not place further confidence in the promises of the Government.

A joint proclamation was therefore issued by Gen. San Martin and myself,
my signature being added as a guarantee, whilst his bore the authority
of Commander-in-Chief. The following extract will shew the nature of
this proclamation:--

   "On my entry into Lima, I will punctually pay to all foreign
   seamen who shall voluntarily enlist into the Chilian service, the whole
   arrears of their pay, to which, I will also add to each individual,
   according to his rank, one year's pay over and above his arrears, as
   a premium or reward for his services, if he continue to fulfil his
   duty to the day of the surrender of that city, and its occupation by
   the liberating forces."

   (Signed) JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
   "COCHRANE."

This proclamation had the desired effect, and the crews of the ships
were immediately completed.

The Chilian force amounted to 4200 men, General San Martin, to the great
disappointment of General Freire, being nominated Captain-General--the
force under his command was designated the "liberating army" _(Exercito
Libertador)_. Whilst the expedition was in process of formation, the
Supreme Director had apprised the Peruvian people of its object, and
lest they should entertain any jealousy of its presence uninvited, had
declared his views in a general proclamation, from which the following
is an extract:--

   "Peruvians--Do not think we shall pretend to treat you as a
   conquered people? such a desire could have entered into the heads
   of none but those who are inimical to our common happiness. We
   only aspire to see you free and happy; _yourselves will frame your
   own government_, choosing that form which is most consistent with
   your customs, your situation, and your wishes. Consequently, _you
   will constitute a nation as free and independent as ourselves_."

This, and subsequent proclamations, will require to be borne in mind, as
the result by no means corresponded with the intentions of the Supreme
Director, whose honesty of purpose was afterwards set at nought by those
in whose estimation Peru was only a field for the furtherance of their
own ambition. The Chileno officers, both native and foreign, certainly
believed in the sincerity of their leaders, but were subsequently doomed
to be miserably disappointed as regarded the chief of them.

On the 21st of August, 1820, the squadron sailed amidst the enthusiastic
plaudits of the people, who felt proud that in so short a time the power
of Spain had not only been humbled, but that they were enabled to
despatch an army to liberate her principal remaining State.

On the 25th, the squadron hove to off Coquimbo, taking on board another
battalion of troops. On the 26th we again sailed, when General San
Martin made known to me his intention of proceeding with the main body
of the army to Truxillo, a place four degrees to leeward of Lima, where
the army could have gained no advantage, nor, indeed, have found
anything to do, except to remain there safe from any attack by the
Spaniards, who could not approach it by land, whilst the squadron could
protect it by sea.

By representing to General San Martin that this course would cause great
dissatisfaction amongst the Chileno officers and men, who expected to be
landed and led at once against Lima, for the immediate conquest of which
they were amply sufficient, he consented to give up his plan of
proceeding to Truxillo, but firmly refused to disembark his men in the
vicinity of Lima; for what reason I could not then divine. My own plan
was to land the force at Chilca, the nearest point to Callao, and
forthwith to obtain possession of the capital; an object by no means
difficult of execution, and certain of success.

Finding all argument unavailing, we sailed for Pisco, where the
expedition arrived on the 7th of September, and on the 8th, to my great
chagrin, the troops were disembarked, and for fifty days remained in
total inaction! with the exception of despatching Colonel Arenales into
the interior with a detachment, which, after defeating a body of
Spaniards, took up a position to the eastward of Lima.

Even on arriving at Pisco, General San Martin declined to enter the
town, though the Spanish forces consisted of less than three hundred
men. Landing the troops under Major-General Las Heras, he went down the
coast in the schooner _Montezuma_ the inhabitants meanwhile retiring
into the interior, taking with them their cattle, slaves, and even the
furniture of their houses. This excess of caution excited great
discontent in the army and the squadron, as contrasting strangely with
the previous capture of the place, in the preceding year, by
Lieut.-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, with their handful of men.

On the return of General San Martin, he professed to be greatly
chagrined at the departure of the inhabitants, and the consequent loss
of supplies. Instead of attributing this to his own tardy movements, he
declared his disbelief in the accounts he had received from Peru as to
the friendly disposition of the inhabitants, even throwing out doubts as
to the success of the expedition in consequence. It was of the first
importance to have taken the place immediately, and to have conciliated
the inhabitants, as the ships were scantily provisioned, and all but
destitute of other necessary supplies. A detailed account, however, of
the capture of the place was transmitted to Santiago, where it was duly
recorded in the official organ as the first feat of the great
expedition.

During these fifty days the squadron was also necessarily kept in
inaction, having achieved nothing beyond the capture of a few
merchantmen along the coast, and a fruitless chase of two Spanish
frigates, the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, which I did not follow up, as
involving risk to the transports during my absence.

This delay was productive of the worst disasters which could have
befallen the expedition. The people were eager to receive us, and not
calculating on such tardiness on the part of General Martin--were
everywhere declaring in our favour; but being unsupported, were fined,
imprisoned, and subjected to corporal punishment by the Viceroy.
Rendered cautious by this, they naturally distrusted the force idling
away its time at Pisco, manifesting reluctance to bring forward the
requisite supplies, upon which they were treated, by order of General
San Martin, with military rigour; being thus harassed, the Peruvians
began to look upon the Chilenos as oppressors in common with the
Spaniards, to the no small danger of losing every desire for national
independence.

Nevertheless, on reaching Pisco, Gen. San Martin had promulgated a
proclamation from the Supreme Director full of fervent appeals to God
and man as regarded the good intentions of the Chilian Government: the
following are extracts:--

   "Peruvians, here are the engagements under which Chili--before
   the Supreme Being--and calling all nations to witness as
   avengers of any violation of the compact, engages to aid you--setting
   death and toil at defiance. You shall be free and independent.
   You shall choose your own government and laws, by the
   spontaneous will of your representatives. No military or civil
   influence, direct or indirect, shall your brethren use to influence
   your social dispositions. You shall dismiss the armed force sent to
   your assistance the moment you judge proper, without regard to
   our opinion of your danger or security. Never shall any military
   division occupy the soil of a free people, unless called for by your
   lawful magistrate. Neither by ourselves, nor by our aid, shall
   party opinions which may have preceded your liberty be punished.
   Ready to overthrow any armed force which may resist your rights,
   we beseech you to forget all grievances antecedent to the day of
   your glory, so as to reserve the most severe justice to obstinacy
   and oppression."

Such, were the inducements held out to the Peruvian people, and such
was their first experience with regard to their liberators.

Yet even amidst inaction the fruits of demonstration early became
manifest, a vessel arriving on the 4th of October, from Guayaquil, with
the intelligence that on receiving news of the sailing of the
expedition, that province had declared itself independent. Upon the
arrival of this welcome news, I again begged of General San Martin to
reimbark the troops and move on Lima, and at length succeeded in
inducing him to make a move.

Previous to our departure, General San Martin issued the following
proclamation, here given to shew how promises solemnly entered into
could afterwards be broken.

   "Peruvians! I have paid the tribute which, as a public man, I
   owe to the opinion of others, and have shewn what is my object and
   mission towards you. I come to fulfil the expectations of all those
   who wish to belong to the country which gave them birth, and who
   desire to be governed by their own laws. On the day when Peru
   shall freely pronounce as to the form of her institutions, be they
   whatever they may, _my functions shall cease_, and I shall have the
   glory of announcing to the Government of Chili, of which I am a
   subject, that their heroic efforts have at last received the consolation
   of giving liberty to Peru, and peace to the neighbouring states."

The troops being reimbarked--on the 28th we sailed from Pisco, and on
the following day anchored before Callao. After having reconnoitred the
fortifications, I again urged on General San Martin an immediate
disembarcation of the force, but to this he once more strenuously
objected, to the great disappointment of the whole expedition;
insisting on going to Ancon, a place at some distance to the northward
of Callao. Having no control over the disposition of the troops, I was
obliged to submit; and on the 30th, detached the _San Martin,
Galvarino,_ and _Araucano_, to convoy the transports to Ancon, retaining
the _O'Higgins, Independencia_, and _Lautaro_, as if for the purpose of
blockade.

The fact was, that--annoyed in common with the whole expedition--at this
irresolution on the part of General San Martin, I determined that the
means of Chili, furnished with great difficulty, should not be wholly
wasted, without some attempt at accomplishing the objects of the
expedition; and accordingly formed a plan of attack with the three ships
which I had kept back--though being apprehensive that my design would be
opposed by General San Martin, I had not even mentioned to him my
intentions.

This design was to cut out the _Esmeralda_ frigate from under the
fortifications, and also to get possession of another ship, on board of
which we had learned that a million of dollars was embarked for flight,
if it became necessary; my opinion being that if such display of power
were manifested, the Spaniards would either surrender the capital or
abandon it.

The enterprise was hazardous, for since my former visit the enemy's
position had been much strengthened, no less than 300 pieces of
artillery being mounted on shore, whilst the _Esmeralda_ was crowded
with the best sailors and marines that could be procured, these sleeping
every night at quarters. She was, moreover, defended by a strong boom
with chain moorings, and by armed blockships; the whole being surrounded
by twenty-seven gun-boats; so that no ship could possibly get at her.

For three days we occupied ourselves in preparations, still keeping
secret the purpose for which they were intended. On the evening of 5th
of November, this was communicated to the ships by the following
proclamation:--

   "Marines and Seamen,"

   "This night we are going to give the enemy a mortal
   blow. Tomorrow you will present yourselves proudly before
   Callao, and all your comrades will envy your good fortune. One
   hour of courage and resolution is all that is required of you to
   triumph. Remember, that you have conquered in Valdivia, and be
   not afraid of those who have hitherto fled from you."

   "The value of all the vessels captured in Callao will be yours,
   and the same reward in money will be distributed amongst you as
   has been offered by the Spaniards in Lima to those who should
   capture any of the Chilian squadron. The moment of glory is
   approaching, and I hope that the Chilenos will fight as they have
   been accustomed to do, and that the English will act as they have
   ever done at home and abroad."

   "COCHRANE."

On issuing this proclamation, it was stated that I should lead the
attack in person, volunteers being requested to come forward, on which
the whole of the marines and seamen on board the three ships offered to
accompany me. As this could not be permitted, a hundred and sixty seamen
and eighty marines were selected, and after dark were placed in fourteen
boats alongside the flag-ship, each man armed with cutlass and pistol,
being, for distinction's sake, dressed in white, with a blue band on
the left arm. The Spaniards I expected would be off their guard, as, by
way of _ruse_, the other ships had been sent out of the bay under the
charge of Captain Foster, as though in pursuit of some vessels in the
offing--so that the Spaniards would consider themselves safe from attack
for that night.

At ten o'clock all was in readiness, the boats being formed in two
divisions, the first commanded by my flag-captain Crosbie, and the
second by Captain Guise,--my boat leading. The strictest silence, and
the exclusive use of cutlasses were enjoined; so that, as the oars were
muffled, and the night dark, the enemy had not the least suspicion of
the impending attack.

It was just upon midnight when we neared the small opening left in the
boom, our plan being well-nigh frustrated by the vigilance of a
guard-boat, upon which my launch had luckily stumbled. The challenge was
given, upon which, in an under-tone, I threatened the occupants of the
boat with instant death if they made the least alarm. No reply was made
to the threat, and in a few minutes our gallant fellows were alongside
the frigate in line, boarding at several points simultaneously.

The Spaniards were completely taken by surprise--the whole, with the
exception of the sentries, being asleep at their quarters--and great was
the havoc made amongst them by the Chileno cutlasses whilst they were
recovering themselves. Retreating to the forecastle, they there made a
gallant stand, and it was not until the third charge that the position
was carried. The fight was for a short time renewed on the
quarter-deck, where the Spanish marines fell to a man, the rest of the
enemy leaping overboard and into the hold to escape slaughter.

On boarding the ship by the main chains, I was knocked back by the butt
end of the sentry's musket, and falling on a thole pin of the boat, it
entered my back near the spine, inflicting a severe injury, which caused
me many years of subsequent suffering. Immediately regaining my footing,
I reascended the side, and when on deck, was shot through the thigh, but
binding a handkerchief tightly round the wound, managed, though with
great difficulty, to direct the contest to its close.

The whole affair, from beginning to end, occupied only a quarter of an
hour, our loss being eleven killed and thirty wounded, whilst that of
the Spaniards was a hundred and sixty, many of whom fell under the
cutlasses of the Chilenos before they could stand to their arms. Greater
bravery I never saw displayed than that of our gallant fellows. Before
boarding, the duties of all had been appointed, and a party was told off
to take possession of the tops. We had not been on deck a minute, when I
hailed the foretop, and was instantly answered by our own men, an
equally prompt answer being returned from the frigate's maintop. No
British man-of-war's crew could have excelled this minute attention to
orders.

The uproar speedily alarmed the garrison, who, hastening to their guns,
opened fire on their own frigate, thus paying us the compliment of
having taken it; though, even in this case, their own men must still
have been on board, so that firing on them was a wanton proceeding, as
several Spaniards were killed or wounded by the shot of the fortress,
and amongst the wounded was Captain Coig, the commander of the
_Esmeralda_--who, after he was made prisoner, received a severe
contusion by a shot from his own party.

The fire from the fortress was, however, neutralised by a successful
expedient. There were two foreign ships of war present during the
contest--the United States frigate _Macedonian_, and the British frigate
_Hyperion_; and these, as previously agreed on with the Spanish
authorities in case of a night attack--hoisted peculiar lights as
signals, to prevent being fired upon. This contingency being provided
for by us--as soon as the fortress commenced its fire on the
_Esmeralda_, we also ran up similar lights, so that the garrison became
puzzled which vessel to fire at; the intended mischief thus involving
the _Hyperion_ and _Macedonian_, which were several times struck, the
_Esmeralda_ being comparatively untouched. Upon this the neutral
frigates cut their cables and moved away; whilst Captain Guise, contrary
to my orders, cut the _Esmeralda_ cables also, so that there was nothing
to be done but to loose her top-sails and follow; the fortress then
ceasing its fire.

My orders were not to cut the cables of the, _Esmeralda_; but after
taking her to capture the _Maypu_, a brig of war previously taken from
Chili--and then to attack and cut adrift every ship near, there being
plenty of time before us; no doubt existing but that when the
_Esmeralda_ was taken, the Spaniards would desert the other ships as
fast as their boats would permit them, so that the whole might either
have been captured or burned. To this end all my previous plans had been
arranged; but on being placed _hors de combat_ by my wounds, Captain
Guise, on whom the command of the prize devolved, chose to interpose his
own judgment, and content himself with the _Esmeralda_ alone, cutting
her cables without my orders; the reason assigned being, that the
English had broken into her spirit-room and were getting drunk, whilst
the Chilenos were disorganized by plundering. It was a great mistake,
for if we could capture the _Esmeralda_, with her picked and
well-appointed crew, there would have been little or no difficulty in
cutting the other ships adrift in succession. It would only have been
the rout of Valdivia over again, chasing the enemy, without loss, from
ship after ship, instead of from fort to fort.

The following extract, from the order issued preparatory to the attack,
will clearly shew the plan frustrated by cutting the _Esmeralda_
adrift:--

   "On securing the frigate, the Chilian seamen and marines are
   not to give the Chilian cheer, but to deceive the enemy, and give
   time for completing the work: they are to cheer '_Viva el Rey_.'"

   "The two brigs of war are to be fired on by the musketry _from
   the Esmeralda_, and are to be taken possession of by Lieutenants
   Esmonde and Morgell, in the boats they command; which, being
   done, they are to cut adrift, run out, and anchor in the offing as
   quickly as possible. The boats of the _Independencia_ are to turn
   adrift all the outward Spanish merchant ships; and the boats of the
   _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under Lieutenants Bell and Robertson, are to
   set fire to one or more of the headmost hulks; but these are not to be
   cut adrift, so as to fall down upon the rest."

  (Signed) "COCHRANE."

By the cutting of the _Esmeralda's_ cables, not one of these objects was
effected. The captured frigate was ready for sea, with three months'
provisions on board, and with stores sufficient for two years. She was,
no doubt, if opportunity offered, intended to convoy the treasure-ship,
which, by the precipitancy of Captain Guise, we had missed; indeed the
Spanish Admiral being on board at the time, with his flag flying, was a
pretty clear proof that she was on the point of departure; instead of
which, the Admiral, his officers, and 200 seamen were made prisoners,
the remainder of the crew, originally 370 in number, being killed,
wounded, or drowned.

An incident occurred during the contest which, at this distance of time,
I shall not refrain from mentioning. His Britannic Majesty's ship
_Hyperion_ was so close to the _Esmeralda_, as to be a witness of the
whole proceeding. A midshipman was standing at the gangway looking on,
amongst others, when his truly English nature, unable to restrain itself
as our gallant fellows cleared the forecastle of the enemy, gave vent to
its expression by clapping his hands in approbation. It was afterwards
reported that he was immediately ordered below by his commander, Captain
Searle, who threatened to put him under arrest. Such was the feeling of
an English commander towards me. I should not have condescended to
notice this occurrence but for the bravado shown by the same officer on
a previous occasion, by casting loose his guns, with their tompions out,
when my flag-ship entered the roads; thereby either intimating that he
considered me a pirate, or that he would so treat me, if he had an
opportunity.

When approaching the _Esmeralda_, the British frigate also hailed each
boat separately, with the evident intention of alarming the enemy; which
would no doubt have been the case, had not the Spaniards been thrown off
their guard by the before-mentioned ruse of sending the ships out of the
bay.

Far different was the conduct of the commander of the United States
frigate _Macedonian_--whose sentinels did not hail the boats--the
officers in an under-tone wishing us success; and still more honourable
was the subsequent testimony of that talented officer, Captain Basil
Hall, who commanded His Britannic Majesty's ship _Conway_, then in the
Pacific. This testimony, though in some degree a recapitulation of the
events already related, but slightly inaccurate as regards the number of
men employed, I feel proud to adduce:--

   "While the liberating army, under General San Martin, was
   removing to Ancon, Lord Cochrane, with part of his squadron,
   anchored in the outer roads of Callao. The inner harbour was
   guarded by an extensive system of batteries, admirably constructed,
   and bearing the general name of the 'Castles of Callao.' The
   merchant ships, as well as the men of war, consisting of the
   _Esmeralda_, a large 40-gun frigate, and two sloops of war, were
   moored under the guns of the castle, within a semicircle of fourteen
   gun-boats, and a boom made of spars chained together."

   "Lord Cochrane, having previously reconnoitred these formidable defences
   in person, undertook, on the 5th of November, 1820, the desperate
   enterprise of cutting out the Spanish frigate, although she was known to
   be fully prepared for an attack. His Lordship proceeded in fourteen
   boats, containing 240 men--all volunteers from the different ships of
   the squadron--in two divisions, one under the orders of Captain Crosby,
   and the other under Captain Guise, both officers commanding the Chileno
   squadron."

  "At midnight, the boats having forced their way across the boom, Lord
  Cochrane, who was leading, rowed alongside the first gun-boat, and
  taking the officer by surprise, proposed to him, with a pistol at his
  head, the alternative of silence or death. No reply being made, the
  boats pushed on unobserved, and Lord Cochrane, mounting the
  _Esmeralda's_ side, was the first to give the alarm. The sentinel on the
  gangway levelled his piece and fired, but was instantly cut down by the
  coxwain, and his Lordship, though wounded in the thigh, at the same
  moment stepped on the deck, the frigate being boarded with no less
  gallantry on the opposite side by Captain Guise, who met Lord Cochrane
  midway on the quarter-deck, as also Captain Crosby, and the afterpart of
  the ship was soon carried, sword in hand. The Spaniards rallied on the
  forecastle, where they made a desperate resistance, till overpowered by
  a fresh party of seamen and marines, headed by Lord Cochrane. A gallant
  stand was again made on the main deck, but before one o'clock the ship
  was captured, her cables cut, and she was steered triumphantly out of
  the harbour."

  "This loss was a death-blow to the Spanish naval force in that quarter
  of the world; for, although there were still two Spanish frigates and
  some smaller vessels in the Pacific, they never afterwards ventured to
  shew themselves, but left Lord Cochrane undisputed master of the coast."

On the morning of the 6th a horrible massacre was committed on shore.
The market-boat of the United States frigate was, as usual, sent for
provisions, when the mob took it into their heads that the _Esmeralda_
could not have been cut out without the assistance of the _Macedonian_,
and, falling upon the boat's crew, murdered the whole of them.

The wounded amongst the _Esmeralda's_ crew were sent on shore under a
flag of truce, a letter from me to the Viceroy proposing an exchange of
prisoners being at the same time transmitted. The proposal was this time
civilly acceded to, and the whole were sent on shore; the Chilian
prisoners, who had long languished in the dungeons of the fortress,
being returned, and ordered to join the army of General San Martin.

On transmitting the intelligence of our success to General San Martin, I
received from him the following acknowledgment of the achievement:--


   _10th November, 1820._
   "My Lord,"


   "The importance of the service you have rendered to the
   country by the capture of the frigate _Esmeralda_, and the brilliant
   manner in which you conducted the gallant officers and seamen
   under your orders to accomplish that noble enterprise, on the night
   of the memorable 5th of November, have augmented the gratitude
   due to your former services by the Government, as well as that of
   all interested in the public cause, and in your fame."

   "All those who participated in the risks and glory of the deed,
   also deserve well of their countrymen, and I have the satisfaction to
   be the medium of transmitting the sentiments of admiration which
   such transcendent success has excited in the chiefs of the army
   under my command. Permit me to express them to you, in order
   that they may be communicated to the meritorious officers, seamen,
   and marines of the squadron, to whom will be religiously fulfilled
   _the promises you made_."

   "It is grievous that, connected with the memory of so glorious
   a deed, regret for those who shed their blood in its achievement
   should enter; but let us hope that such thoughts will be dissipated,
   by your adding further deeds of glory to the country, and to your
   name."

   "God preserve you many years."

   "JOSE DE SAN MARTIN."


San Martin's expression of religiously fulfilling the "promises I
made," is in allusion to the promise, signed by himself, which had been
exacted previous to the departure of the squadron from Valparaiso, that
the men should have a year's pay given to them. With the preceding
letter General San Martin voluntarily sent another promise to the
captors, of 50,000 dollars, to be paid on gaining possession of Lima.
Neither the one promise nor the other were ever fulfilled, nor did they
ever obtain any prize-money.

To the Administration in Chili General San Martin wrote as follows:--


   "Head Quarters, Supe, Dec. 1, 1820.
    Senor Minister,"


   "I have the honour of forwarding to you the despatches
   of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of the squadron,
   relative to the heroic capture of the frigate _Esmeralda_, by boarding
   her under the batteries of Callao."

   "It is impossible for me to eulogise in proper language the daring
   enterprise of the 5th of November, by which Lord Cochrane
   has decided the superiority of our naval forces--augmented the
   splendour and power of Chili--and secured the success of this
   campaign."

   "I doubt not that His Excellency the Supreme Director will
   render the justice due to the worthy chief, his officers, and other
   individuals who have had a share in that successful action."

   "I beg you will honour me by congratulating His Excellency on
   this important success, and principally on account of the influence
   it will have on the great object which occupies his attention."

   "JOSE DE SAN MARTIN."

   "To Don Jose Ignacio Zenteno,
   Minister of Marine."

Soon after my departure for Peru, Lady Cochrane undertook a journey
across the _Cordillera_, to Mendoza, the passes being, at that season,
often blocked up with snow. Having been entrusted with some despatches
of importance, she pushed on rapidly, and on the 12th of October arrived
at the celebrated _Ponte del Inca_, 15,000 feet above the level of the
sea. Here the snow had increased to such an extent as to render farther
progress impossible, and her ladyship was obliged to remain at a
_Casucha_, or strong house, built above the snow for the safety of
travellers; the intense cold arising from the rarity of the atmosphere,
and the absence of all comfort--there being no better couch than a dried
bullock's hide--producing a degree of suffering which few ladies would
be willing to encounter.

Whilst proceeding on her mule up a precipitous path in the vicinity, a
Royalist, who had intruded himself on the party, rode up in an opposite
direction and disputed the path with her, at a place where the slightest
false step would have precipitated her into the abyss below. One of her
attendants, a tried and devoted soldier, named Pedro Flores, seeing the
movement, and guessing the man's intention, galloped up to him at a
critical moment, striking him a violent blow across the face, and thus
arresting his murderous design. The ruffian finding himself vigorously
attacked, made off, without resenting the blow, and so, no doubt,
another premeditated attempt on Lady Cochrane's life was averted.



CHAPTER V.

SAN MARTIN'S VIOLATION OF TRUTH--REMOVAL OF BLOCKADE--SPANISH
DEPRESSION--TROOPS DYING OF FEVER--SAN MARTIN'S DESIGNS ON
GUAYAQUIL--MUTINOUS CONDUCT OF OFFICERS--REFUSAL TO OBEY
ORDERS--DEPOSITION OF VICEROY--SAN MARTIN GIVES ME TROOPS--JEALOUSY OF
SAN MARTIN--ATTACK ON ARICA--CAPTURE OF TACNA--CAPTURE OF
MOQUEGA--REFUSAL OF MORE MEN--AN ARMISTICE RATIFIED--DISTRESS OF
LIMA--DISSATISFACTION OF THE ARMY--LADY COCHRANE--GOES INTO THE
INTERIOR--DANGEROUS POSITION--LADY COCHRANE IN ACTION--DEVOTION OF
SEAMEN.


On the 8th of November I went to Ancon with our prize, this being hailed
with great enthusiasm by the army, which--now that the Spanish naval
force had received, what even the Spaniards themselves considered its
death blow--made certain that it would be at once led against Lima,
before the authorities recovered from their consternation. To their
mortification--no less than my own--General San Martin, in defiance of
all argument to the contrary, ordered the troops on board the
transports, having decided on _retreating to Huacho!_ whither the
_O'Higgins_ and _Esmeralda_, abandoning the blockade, had to convoy
them. In place of prompt action--or rather demonstration, for the
occupation of the city would have amounted to little more--he issued a
proclamation, promising, as before, the most perfect freedom to the
Peruvian people if they would join him:--

  "Spaniards, your destiny is in your own hands. I come not to declare
  war against the fortunes and persons of individuals. The enemy of the
  liberty and independence of America alone is the object of the vengeance
  of the arms of the PATRIA. I promise you in the most positive manner,
  that your property and persons shall be inviolable, and that you shall
  be treated as respectable citizens, if you co-operate in the great
  cause," &c. &c.

By the 12th the army was again disembarked, amidst evident
manifestations of dissatisfaction on the part of the officers, who were
naturally jealous of the achievements of the squadron, from being
themselves restrained from enterprise of any kind. To allay this feeling
General San Martin had recourse to an almost incredible violation of
truth, intended to impress upon the Chilian people, that the army, and
not the squadron, had captured the _Esmeralda!_--indeed stating as much
in words, and declaring that the whole affair was the result of his own
plans, to which I had agreed! though the truth is, that doubting his
confidants, I had concealed from him my intentions of making the attack.
The following is an extract from the bulletin issued to the army:--

   "Before the General-in-Chief left the Vice-Admiral of the
   Squadron, _they agreed on the execution of a memorable project,
   sufficient to astound intrepidity itself!_ and to make the history of
   the liberating expedition of Peru eternal!"

   "Those valiant soldiers who for a length of time have suffered
   with the most heroic constancy the severest oppression, and the
   most inhuman treatment in the dungeons of Casas-matas, have just
   arrived at our head-quarters. Flattering promises of liberty, and
   the threats of death, were not sufficient to destroy their loyalty to
   their country; they have waited with firmness the day on which
   their companions in arms should rescue them from their misery, and
   revenge the insults which, humanity has received in their persons.
   This glory was reserved _to the liberating army, whose efforts have
   snatched from the hands of tyranny these respectable victims._ Let
   this be published for the satisfaction of these individuals, _and that
   of the army, to whose arms they owe their liberty_."

It thus went forth to the people of Chili, that the army captured the
frigate, and subsequently released the prisoners, though not a man in
the whole force had the most distant idea that an attack was even
contemplated, much less could it have co-operated, seeing that it was
far away in cantonments! This bulletin excited the astonishment of the
troops; but as it contributed to their _amour propre_, by representing
to the Chilian people that the achievement which had been effected was
due to them, they accepted it; whilst I thought it beneath me to refute
a falsehood palpable to the whole expedition. It had, however, as
General San Martin no doubt calculated, the effect of allaying, for the
moment, a dissatisfaction which foreboded serious consequences.

On the 15th we again sailed from Huacho, to renew the blockade at
Callao, beyond which nothing could be done; though even this was of
importance, as cutting off supplies from the capital, the inhabitants of
which, in consequence of the privations they were subjected to, caused
great uneasiness to the Viceregal Government.

Several attempts were now made to entice the remaining Spanish naval
force from their shelter under the batteries, by placing the _Esmeralda_
apparently within reach, and the flag-ship herself in situations of some
danger. One day I carried her through an intricate strait called the
Boqueron, in which nothing beyond a fifty-ton schooner was ever seen.
The Spaniards, expecting every moment to see the ship strike, manned
their gun-boats, ready to attack as soon as she was aground, of which
there was little danger, for we had found, and buoyed off with small
bits of wood invisible to the enemy, a channel through which a vessel
could pass without much difficulty.

On the 2nd of December the _Esmeralda_, being in a more than usually
tempting position, the Spanish gun-boats ventured out in the hope of
recapturing her, and for an hour maintained a smart fire; but on seeing
the _O'Higgins_ manoeuvring to cut them off, they precipitately
retreated.

The preceeding successes caused great depression amongst the Spanish
troops, and on the following day the battalion of Numantia, numbering
650 disciplined men, deserted in a body, and joined the Chilian forces
at Chancay. On the 8th, forty Spanish officers followed their example;
and every day afterwards, officers, privates, and civilians of
respectability, joined the patriot army, which thus became considerably
reinforced; the defection of so large a portion of his troops being a
severe loss to the Viceroy.

On the 6th, Colonel Arenales, who, after his previous success, had
marched into the interior, defeated a division of the royalist army at
Pasco. On his proceeding to Huamanga, the authorities fled, and the
inhabitants declared themselves independent. Tarma was next abandoned,
and followed the same example, as did Huanuco, Cueñca, and Loxa;
whilst, on the news of the capture of the _Esmeralda_ arriving at
Truxillo, that important province also revolted, under the direction of
the Spanish governor, the Marquis of Torre Tagle.

Notwithstanding this succession of favourable events, General San Martin
still declined to march on Lima, remaining inactive at Haura, though the
unhealthy situation of the place was such, that nearly one-third of his
troops died of intermittent fever, during the many months they remained
there. In place of securing the capital, where the army would have now
been welcomed, he proposed to send half the army to Guayaquil, in order
to annex that province, this being the first manifestation on the part
of General San Martin to found a dominion of his own--for to nothing
less did he afterwards aspire, though the declared object of the
expedition was to enable the South Pacific provinces to emancipate
themselves from Spain, leaving them free to choose their own
governments, as had been repeatedly and solemnly declared, both by the
Chilian Government and himself.

Finding that I would not consent to avert the naval force from the
purposes to which it was destined, the project was abandoned; but the
troops which had advanced to Chancay were ordered to fall back on Haura,
this step being actually a further retreat as regarded the position of
the Spanish forces, which thus managed to check further desertion by
apprehending and shooting all who attempted it.

Still General San Martin was determined, if possible, to accomplish his
views on Guayaquil. Two deputies, Tomas Guido and Colonel Luzuriago,
were despatched with complimentary messages to Torre Tagle and others,
warning them against the designs of Bolivar, whose success in the north
led San Martin to fear that he might have designs on Peru. The deputies
were strictly enjoined to represent that if such were Bolivar's
intention, Guayaquil would only be regarded as a conquered province;
whilst, if the people of that place would adhere to him, he would, on
the fall of Lima, make it the _principal port of a great empire_, and
that the establishment of the docks and arsenals which _his navy_ would
require, would enrich the city beyond measure. They were at the same
time exhorted to form a militia, in order to keep out Bolivar.

By way of conciliating me, General San Martin proposed in a flattering
way to call the captured frigate the "_Cochrane_," as two vessels before
had been named the "_San Martin_," and "_O'Higgins_;" but to this I
demurred, as acquiescence in such a proceeding might in the estimation
of others have identified me with any course the general might be
inclined to pursue, and I had already formed my conjectures as to what
were evidently his future purposes. Finding me firm in declining the
proffered honour, he told me to give her what name I thought proper; but
this was also refused, when he said, "Let her be called the
'_Valdivia_,' in memory of your conquest of that place;" her name was
accordingly changed from the _Esmeralda_ to the _Valdivia_.

The command of the frigate had been given to Captain Guise; and after
her change of name, his officers wrote to him a letter deprecating the
name, and alleging, that as they had nothing to do with the conquest of
Valdivia, it ought to be withdrawn, and one more consonant with their
feelings substituted. This letter was followed by marked personal
disrespect towards myself, from the officers who had signed it, who made
it no secret that the name of Guise was the one sought to be
substituted.

As the conversations held by these officers with the rest of the
squadron were of such a derogatory nature as regarded my character and
authority, as might lead to serious disorganization, I brought the whole
of the officers who had signed the letter to a court-martial, two being
dismissed the service, the remainder being dismissed the ship, with a
recommendation to General San Martin for other appointments.

During the arrest of these officers, I had determined upon an attack
upon the fortifications of Callao, intending to carry them by a coup de
main, similar to that which had succeeded at Valdivia, and having, on
the 18th, taken soundings in the _Potrillo_, was convinced of the
feasibility of the plan.

On the 20th, this intention was notified by an order, stating that on
the following day I should make the attack with the boats of the
squadron and the _San_ _Martin_, the crew of which received the order
with loud cheers, volunteers for the boats eagerly pressing forward from
all quarters.

In place of preparing to second the operations, Captain Guise sent me a
note refusing to serve with any other but the officers under
arrest--stating that unless they were restored, he must resign his
command. My reply was that I would neither restore them nor accept his
resignation, without some better reason for it than the one alleged.
Captain Guise answered, that my refusal to restore his officers was a
sufficient reason for his resignation, whereupon I ordered him to weigh
anchor on a service of importance; the order being disobeyed on the
ground that he could no longer act, having given over the command of the
ship to Lieutenant Shepherd. Feeling that something like a mutiny was
being excited, and knowing that Guise and his colleague, Spry, were at
the bottom of the matter, I ordered the latter to proceed with the
_Galvarino_ to Chorillos, when he also requested leave to resign, as
"his friend Captain Guise had been compelled so to do, and he had
entered the Chilian navy conditionally to serve only with Captain Guise,
under whose patronage he had left England." Such was the state of mutiny
on board the _Galvarino_, that I deputed my flag-captain, Crosbie, to
restore order, when Spry affected to consider himself superseded, and
claimed exemption from martial law. I therefore tried him by
court-martial, and dismissed him from the ship.

The two officers now made their way to head-quarters, where General San
Martin immediately made Spry his naval _aide-de-camp_, thus promoting
him in the most public manner for disobedience to orders, and in
defiance of the sentence of the court-martial; this being pretty
conclusive proof that they had been acting under the instructions of
General San Martin himself, for what purpose will appear in the course
of the narrative. The course now pursued by General San Martin
sufficiently showed that the disturbance previously made at Valparaiso
emanated also from himself, and that in both cases the mutinous officers
felt quite secure in his protection; though I will do both the credit of
supposing them ignorant at the time of the treacherous purposes of which
they were afterwards the instruments.

Knowing that I should take their punishment into my own hands if they
returned to the squadron, General San Martin kept both about his own
person at head-quarters, where they remained.

So dissatisfied were the Spanish troops at Lima with the government of
their Viceroy, Pezuela, to whose want of military capacity they absurdly
attributed our successes, that they forcibly deposed him, after
compelling him to appoint General Lacerna as his successor. The deposed
Viceroy wishing to send his lady and family to Europe, applied to
General San Martin for a passport, to avoid capture by the Chilian
squadron. This was refused; but Lady Cochrane having arrived at Callao
in the British frigate _Andromache_, to take leave of me previous to
her departure for England, the Viceroy's lady, Donna Angela, begged of
her Ladyship to use her influence with the General to obtain leave for
her departure for Europe. Lady Cochrane immediately proceeded to Haura,
and effected the object; after which she remained for a month at
head-quarters, residing at the house of a Peruvian lady, Donna Josefa
Monteblanco.

A passage was also, by Lady Cochrane's influence, procured for the lady
in the _Andromache_, on board which ship Captain Sherriff politely
invited me to meet her. At this interview the ex-Vicequeen expressed her
surprise at finding me "a gentleman and _rational being_ and not the
_ferocious brute_ she had been taught to consider me!" A declaration,
which, from the unsophisticated manner in which it was made, caused no
small merriment in the party assembled.

As I was determined not to be idle, General San Martin was with some
difficulty prevailed upon to give me a division of 600 troops, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller. On the 13th of March we sailed for
Pisco, of which, on its previous abandonment by the army, after a
useless sojourn of fifty days, the enemy had again taken possession. On
the 20th it was retaken, when it was found that the Spaniards had
severely punished the alleged defection of the inhabitants for
contributing to the supplies of the patriot force during its stay. Not
imagining that we should return, the Spanish proprietors of estates had
brought back their cattle, of which we managed to seize some 500 head,
besides 300 horses for the use of the Chilian forces, the squadron thus
supplying their wants instead of remaining in total inaction.

Previous to going to Pisco, I had again urged on General San Martin to
advance on Lima, so convinced was I of the goodwill of the inhabitants.
On his refusal, I begged him to give me 2,000 men, with whom I offered
to take the capital, but this was also declined. I then offered to
undertake the capture of Lima with 1,000 men, but even this was refused,
and the detachment under Colonel Miller was only given to me to get rid
of my importunity. Of this detachment I however determined to make the
most before our return.

The only way of accounting for this indisposition on the part of General
San Martin to place an adequate military force at my disposal, was the
reason current amongst the officers of the army, who were all eager to
place themselves under my orders; viz. the violent jealousy which caused
him to look upon me as a rival, though without reason, as I should
certainly not have attempted to interfere with him in the government of
Peru when its reduction was complete. Suspicious himself he could not
trust me, employing every effort to lessen my reputation amongst his
officers, and endeavouring to the utmost to prevent the squadron from
gathering fresh laurels; even sacrificing his own reputation to this
insane jealousy, by preventing anything being done in which I could take
part.

On the 18th I shifted my flag into the _San Martin_, and leaving the
_O'Higgins_ and _Valdivia_ at Pisco to protect the troops, sailed for
Callao, where we arrived on the 2nd of April. On the 6th, we again
attacked the enemy's shipping under the batteries, and did them
considerable damage, but made no further attempt to gain possession of
them, as I had other aims in view. After this demonstration, the object
of which was to deter them from quitting their shelter, we returned to
Pisco.

General San Martin having now given me discretionary power to do what I
pleased with the few troops placed at my disposal, I determined on
attacking Arica, the southernmost port of Peru. Reimbarking the troops,
and abandoning Pisco, we sailed on the 21st, and on the 1st of May
arrived off Arica, to the Governor of which I sent a summons to
surrender, promising to respect persons and personal property. As this
was not complied with, an immediate bombardment took place, but without
any great effect, as, from the difficulties of the port, it was
impracticable to get sufficiently near to the fortifications.

After a careful survey, the _San Martin_ was on the 6th, hauled nearer
in shore, and some shells were thrown over the town by way of
intimidation. As this had not the desired effect, a portion of the
troops was landed at Sama, to the northward of the town, being followed
by Colonel Miller with the remainder, and Captain Wilkinson with the
marines of the _San Martin_; when the enemy fled, and the patriot flag
was hoisted on the batteries. We took here a considerable quantity of
stores, and four Spanish brigs, besides the guns of the fort and other
detached artillery. A quantity of European goods, belonging to the
Spaniards at Lima, was also seized and put on board the _San Martin_.

On the 14th Colonel Miller, with the troops and marines, advanced to
Tacna, and by my directions took possession of the town, which was
effected without opposition, two companies of infantry deserting the
royalist cause and joining his force. These I ordered to form the
nucleus of a new regiment, to be called the "Tacna Independents."

Learning that the Spanish General Ramirez had ordered three detachments
from Arequipa, Puno, and La Paz, to form a junction at Tacna, to execute
the usual Spanish order--to "drive the insurgents into the sea"--Miller
determined on attacking them separately. The Arequipa detachment, under
Colonel Hera, was fallen in with at Maribe, and immediately routed, the
result being that nearly the whole were killed or taken prisoners,
together with four hundred mules and their baggage. In this affair we
lost a valued officer, Mr. Welsh, an assistant surgeon, who had
volunteered to accompany the detachment. This gentleman was sincerely
mourned by all, and his early death was a great loss to the patriot
service.

This action was fought none too soon, for before it was over the other
detachments from Puno and La Plaz appeared in sight, so that the
patriots had to face a fresh enemy. With his usual promptness Miller
despatched Captain Hind, with a rocket party, to oppose their passage of
a river; when, finding that the Arequipa detachment had been cut up,
the royalists remounted their mules and decamped, in the direction of
Moquega.

On the 22nd Miller pursued the runaway royalists, and, on the 24th,
entered Moquega, by a forced march of nearly a hundred miles, where he
found the enemy, deserted by their colonel. Notwithstanding the fatigue
of the Chilenos, an instant attack was made, when the whole, with the
exception of about twenty killed, were made prisoners. The inhabitants
at once gave in their adherence to the cause of independence, their
Governor, Colonel Portocarrera, being the first to set the example.

On the 25th Colonel Miller learned that a Spanish force was passing
Torata, about fifteen miles distant, when, coming up with them on the
following day, they were all taken prisoners or dispersed, as were also
those who had fled from Arica, numbering four hundred men; so that in
less than a fortnight after landing at Arica, the patriot forces had
killed and made prisoners upwards of one thousand of the royalist army,
by a series of difficult forced marches, and amidst hunger and
privations of every kind, which were cheerfully borne by the Chilenos,
who were no less inspired by a love of country than with attachment to
their commander. The result was the complete submission of the Spaniards
from the sea to the Cordilleras, Arica forming the key to the whole
country.

Having ascertained that Colonel Miller was at Moquega, I took the _San
Martin_ to Ilo, from which anchorage the patriot force was supplied
with everything requisite. The sick were taken on board the brigs
captured at Arica, as were also the Spanish colonels, Sierra and Suares,
who had been taken prisoners, but whom I liberated on their _parole_,
not to serve again until regularly exchanged.

It has been said that, before sailing to Arica, I had procured from
General San Martin discretionary powers to do as I pleased with the
troops placed at my disposal. My object was believed to be to create a
diversion in favour of the general, but this was the least part of my
intention; for, as the army had remained inactive from its first landing
in Peru--with the exception of the detachment under Colonel
Arenales,--no diversion would have been of much use. I wrote to the
Government at Santiago for 1,000 men, or, if these could not be sent,
for 500, and also for 1,000 stand of arms, of which there was abundance
in the arsenal to equip recruits, who would have been forthcoming; and
with these we could, with the greatest ease, have secured the whole of
the southern provinces of Peru, the people being warmly disposed in our
favour. I therefore told the Government that with such a force, we could
hold the whole of Lower Peru, and gain eventual possession of Upper
Peru. My request was refused, on the false ground that the Government
had no means to equip such an expedition, and thus the good will
manifested by the natives was thrown away.

In spite of this neglect, I determined to persevere, relying upon
sacrifices made by the Peruvians themselves in our favour. General
Ramirez was actively engaged in drawing men from distant garrisons to
act against our small force, which was suffering severely from ague.
Nevertheless, every effort was made again to advance into the
interior--a number of recruits from the adjacent provinces having been
enrolled--and everything promised a general revolt in favour of
independence, when the Governor of Arequipa communicated to us
intelligence that an armistice had been agreed upon for twenty days,
between General San Martin and the Viceroy Lacerna. This happening just
at the moment when hostilities could have been carried on with the
greatest effect, and we were preparing to attack Arequipa itself--was
annoying in the extreme; the more so, as the application had come from
the Viceroy, who, being the first to receive intelligence of our
success, had, no doubt, deceived General San Martin into the
arrangement, in order to check our operations in the South.

This armistice was ratified on the 23rd of May, and sent by express to
the Governor of Arequipa, the unusual haste proving the object of the
Viceroy in persuading General San Martin to its ratification. To have
regarded the armistice as a preliminary to the independence of Peru was
a great mistake on the part of General San Martin, as the Viceroy
Lacerna had no more power to acknowledge the absolute independence of
the Colonists, than had his predecessor; and therefore the object of the
armistice could have been none other than to put a stop to our progress,
thereby giving the Spanish generals time to collect their scattered
forces, without any corresponding advantage to the patriot cause.

Being thus reluctantly reduced to inaction, I dropped down to Mollendo,
where we found a neutral vessel taking in corn for supplying the city of
Lima, which city, from the vigilance of the squadron, was reduced to
great straits, as shewn in an address from the _Cabildo_ to the
Viceroy:--"The richest and most opulent of our provinces has succumbed
to the unopposable force of the enemy, and the remaining provinces are
threatened with the same fate; whilst this suffering capital of Lima is
undergoing the horrible effects of a rigorous blockade, hunger,
robberies, and death. Our soldiers pay no respect to the last remains of
our property, even our oxen, indispensable for the cultivation of the
land, being slain. If this plague continues, what will be our lot--our
miserable condition?" From this extract it is plain that Lima was on the
point of being starved out by the squadron, whilst the inhabitants
foresaw that, although the army of General San Martin was inactive, our
little band in the south would speedily overrun the provinces, which
were willing to second our efforts in favour of independence.

To return to the shipment of wheat for the relief of Lima. On
ascertaining the fact, I wrote to the Governor of Arequipa, expressing
my surprise that neutrals should be allowed to embark provisions during
an armistice; the reply being that the most positive orders should be
given to put a stop to it, upon which I retired from Mollendo, but
leaving an officer to keep watch, and finding that the embarkation was
persisted in, I returned and shipped all the wheat found on shore. The
consequence of this was that Colonel La Hera, with 1,000 royalists, took
possession of Moquega, on pretence that I had broken the armistice.

My private advices from head quarters informed me that the
dissatisfaction of the Chilian army was daily increasing, on account of
their continued inaction, and from jealousy at our success; knowing
also, that the capital of Peru was, from the straits to which it was
reduced, as well as from inclination, eager to receive them. General San
Martin nevertheless declined to take advantage of the circumstances in
his favour, till dissension began to assume the character of
insubordination. A daily toast at the tables of the officers was, to
those who fight for the liberties of Peru, not those who write. "_A los
que pelean por la libertad del Peru, no los que escriven_." General San
Martin, aware of the state of feeling in the army, went on board the
schooner _Montezuma_, for the re-establishment of his health.

I was further informed that the Viceroy was negociating with General San
Martin for the prolongation of the armistice to _sixteen months_, in
order to give time for communication with the Court of Madrid, to
ascertain whether the parent state would consent to the independence of
Peru! At the same time official information was forwarded to me that a
further prolongation of twelve days had been conceded.

Feeling certain that there was something wrong at head-quarters, I
determined to proceed to Callao for the purpose of learning the true
state of affairs, leaving Colonel Miller to return to Arica, and in case
of emergency, victualling and equipping the prizes, so as to be in
readiness, if necessary, for the reception of his troops.

During my absence Lady Cochrane sailed for England, partly for the sake
of her health, but more for the purpose of obtaining justice for me, for
in addition to the persecution which I had undergone, a "Foreign
Enlistment Bill" had been passed, the enactments of which were
especially aimed at my having engaged in a service which had for its
object the expulsion of Spain, then in alliance with England, from her
Colonies in the Pacific.

As an incident relating to her Ladyship has been mentioned in the
"Memoirs of General Miller," I may be pardoned for giving it as narrated
in that work.

   "On the 25th, six hundred infantry and sixty Cavalry, all picked
   men, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller,
   who received directions to embark on a secret service under the
   orders of Lord Cochrane, and proceeded to Huacho. On the day
   after his arrival there, and whilst he was inspecting the detachments
   in the Plaza, Lady Cochrane galloped on to the parade to speak to
   him. The sudden appearance of youth and beauty on a fiery
   horse, managed with skill and elegance, absolutely electrified
   the men, who had never before seen an English lady. '_Que
   hermosa! Que graciosa! Que linda! Que airosa! Es un angel del
   cielo_!' were exclamations which escaped from one end of the line
   to the other. Colonel Miller, not displeased at this involuntary
   homage to the beauty of his countrywoman, said to the men, 'This
   is our _generala_;' on which her Ladyship, turning to the line,
   bowed to the troops, who no longer confining their expressions of
   admiration to suppressed interjections, loud _vivas_ burst from officers
   and men, to which Lady Cochrane, smiling her acknowledgments, cantered
   off the ground like a fairy."

In the month of February, during my absence, Lady Cochrane, tired of the
crowded villages occupied by the liberating army, undertook a journey
into the interior, in the hope that change of air might prove
advantageous to our infant child, which was in a precarious state of
health. She performed the journey on horseback, under the intense heat
of a vertical sun, across a desert, impeded by the precipitous beds of
torrents which intersect the country in every direction. On her arrival
at Quilca, she was most hospitably received by the Marchioness de la
Pracer, who placed her palace and every luxury at Lady Cochrane's
disposal.

In the midst of the festivities which followed, her child was taken
dangerously ill, whilst no medical assistance of any kind was at hand.
On this she determined to return to the coast, and seek the aid of an
English or Spanish physician, but as the Royalist army was advancing
towards the direction necessary to be taken, this was judged
impracticable till they had passed.

Whilst her Ladyship was in this state of suspense, information was
received that the Royalists, having gained intelligence that she was at
Quilca, had determined to seize her and her infant that very evening,
and to detain them as hostages. This intelligence arrived just as a
large party was assembled in the ball-room, when, with a decision which
is one of her chief characteristics, Lady Cochrane ordered a
_palanquin_--presented to her by the Marquis of Torre Tagle--to be got
ready instantly, and placing the child and its nurse in it, she
despatched them under the protection of a guard. Leaving the ball-room
secretly, she changed her dress, immediately following on horseback with
relays of her best horses.

Travelling all night and the following day without intermission, the
party came to one of those swollen torrents which can only be crossed by
a frail bridge made of cane-rope, a proceeding of extreme danger to
those who are not well accustomed to the motion produced by its
elasticity. Whilst the party was debating as to how to get the palanquin
over, the sound of a Royalist bugle was heard close at hand. Lady
Cochrane sprang to the palanquin, and taking out her suffering infant,
rushed on to the bridge, but when near the centre, the vibration became
so great that she was compelled to lie down, pressing the child to her
bosom--being thus suspended over the foaming torrent beneath, whilst in
its state of vibration no one could venture on the bridge. In this
perilous situation, Pedro, the faithful soldier of whom mention has been
previously made, seeing the imminent danger of her Ladyship, begged of
her to lie still, and as the vibration ceased, crept on his hands and
knees towards her Ladyship, taking from her the child, and imploring her
to remain motionless, when he would bring her over in the same way; but
no sooner had he taken the child, than she followed, and happily
succeeded in crossing, when the ropes being cut, the torrent was
interposed between her and her pursuers.

All travellers agree in describing these torrent bridges as most
perilous. They are constructed of six elastic cane or hide ropes, four
of which, with some sticks laid across, form the floor, and two the
parapet. Only one person can pass at a time, and as the weight of the
passenger causes the bridge to belly downwards, he remains suspended as
it were in an elastic bag, from which it requires considerable skill to
extricate himself with safety. Mules and horses cannot go over at all,
but are hauled through the torrent with ropes.

Having reached the coast in safety, Lady Cochrane came down to me at
Callao. Whilst she was on board, I received private information that a
ship of war laden with treasure was about to make her escape in the
night. There was no time to be lost, as the enemy's vessel was such an
excellent sailer that, if once under weigh, beyond the reach of shot,
there was no chance of capturing her. I therefore determined to attack
her, so that Lady Cochrane had only escaped one peril ashore to be
exposed to another afloat. Having beat to quarters, we opened fire upon
the treasure-ship and other hostile vessels in the anchorage, the
batteries and gun-boats returning our fire, Lady Cochrane remaining on
deck during the conflict. Seeing a gunner hesitate to fire his gun,
close to which she was standing, and imagining that his hesitation from
her proximity might, if observed, expose him to punishment, she seized
the man's arm, and directing the match fired the gun. The effort was,
however, too much for her, as she immediately fainted, and was carried
below.

The treasure-vessel having been crippled, and the gun-boats beaten off,
we left off firing and returned to our former anchorage, Lady Cochrane
again coming on deck. As soon as the sails were furled, the men in the
tops, and the whole crew on deck, no doubt by preconcerted arrangement,
spontaneously burst forth with the inspiring strains of their national
anthem, some poet amongst them having extemporized an alteration of the
words into a prayer for the blessing of Divine providence on me and my
devoted wife; the effect of this unexpected mark of attachment from five
hundred manly voices being so overwhelming as to affect her Ladyship
more than had the din of cannon.



CHAPTER VI.

RETURN TO CALLAO--LIMA ABANDONED--HESITATION OF GEN. SAN MARTIN TO
OCCUPY THE CITY--LOSS OF THE SAN MARTIN--EXCESSES OF THE
SPANIARDS--PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE--SAN MARTIN ASSUMES AUTOCRATIC
POWER UNDER THE TITLE OF PROTECTOR--MY REMONSTRANCE--HIS REPLY--MUTINOUS
STATE OF THE SQUADRON FROM NEGLECT.


We arrived at Callao on the 2nd of July, when learning that Lima was no
longer tenable from want of provisions, and that an intention existed on
the part of the Viceroy to abandon it, I forebore to make any hostile
demonstration which might interfere with such decision, and withdrew to
a distance from the port, awaiting the result, which could not be far
distant, as the people had become clamorous, and all hope of assistance
from Spain was abandoned.

Having, however, learned, on the 5th of July, that an attempt was being
made by the Viceroy to obtain a still further prolongation of the
armistice, I again entered the bay with the _San Martin_--my former
flag-ship, the _O'Higgins_, being absent on the coast.

On the 6th the Viceroy abandoned the city, retaining, however, the
fortresses at Callao, the garrison of which was reinforced from the
troops which had evacuated Lima; a large quantity of warlike stores
being also deposited in the forts, thus securing greater efficiency
than before.

To the astonishment of the Peruvians and Chilenos, no movement was made
by the liberating army to take possession of the Capital; and as the
Spanish troops were withdrawn, whilst no government existed, serious
disorders were anticipated, so that the _Cabildo_ applied to Capt. Basil
Hall, then in command of the British ship of war _Conway_, for his
assistance to maintain tranquillity and protect public and private
property. Captain Hall immediately despatched a party of marines, who
contributed to maintain order.

General San Martin having been apprised by the Viceroy of his intention
to abandon the capital, had entered the harbour in the schooner
_Sacramento_, but nevertheless gave no orders for its occupation. On the
7th a detachment of cavalry, _without orders_, entered Lima, and those
on the 8th were followed by another detachment of infantry.

On working up to the port on the 8th, I was surprised to find General
San Martin still afloat in his schooner, though the liberating army was
now entering the city in a body, and the occupation was complete;
General San Martin remained on board till the evening of the 10th, when
he privately landed.

As the forts at Callao were still in the possession of the enemy, I made
preparations to attack them, and to destroy the shipping still sheltered
under them. Aware of my intentions, the garrison, on the 11th, sank the
_San Sebastian_, the only frigate left in the harbour, in order to
prevent her falling into our hands On the following day, the
_O'Higgins, Lautaro, Puyrredon_, and _Potrillo_ arrived, so that the
squadron was again complete.

It was mentioned in the last chapter that I had seized a considerable
quantity of wheat at Mollendo, on account of a breach of the armistice.
This was still on board, and the city being in a state of famine,
General San Martin directed that the wheat, of which there were upwards
of two thousand _fanegas_, should be landed at the Chorillos free of
duty. As the _San Martin_ was deeply laden, I objected to this from the
dangerous nature of the anchorage, but more especially, that the only
anchor on board was made from the remains of two broken anchors lashed
together; this objection was nevertheless overruled, and, as I had
anticipated, she went ashore at Chorillos, where, from the heavy swell
which set in, she became a total wreck.

On the 17th I received an invitation from the _Cabildo_ to visit the
city, and on landing, found that preparations had been made to give the
visit the character of a public entry, carriages being provided, with
deputations from the various corporations. Finding this to be the case,
I declined entering Lima in a manner so ostentatious, as General San
Martin had entered the city privately by night. I was, however,
compelled to hold a _levee_ at the palace, where the compliments of the
established authorities and principal inhabitants were tendered to me.
General San Martin declined to attend this complimentary manifestation,
remaining at La Legua, about halfway between Lima and Callao, where he
had established his head quarters; probably considering such honours out
of place towards one whom as Captain-General he might regard as a
subordinate, and the more so, as no such compliment had been offered to
himself.

On the following day, General San Martin directed a civic guard to be
organized in place of the Spanish guard which had evacuated the city,
the Marquis of Torre Tagle being appointed its commandant. At the same
time the General retained the whole of the liberating army, though had
even a portion of these followed the retreating Spaniards, the greater
part would have joined the patriot standard--it being afterwards
ascertained that Colonel Rodil who commanded them, had shot great
numbers in the attempt to desert; even the patriot guerilla parties,
unaided, had defeated those who were kept together; so that had a
division of the liberating army been sent to co-operate with the
guerillas, the entire Spanish force might have been annihilated, in
place of forming the _nucleus_--as they afterwards did--of a force
which, after my departure from Chili, threatened not only the
independence of Peru, but even that of the Chilian Republic itself.

Being thus unopposed, and the towns which had given in their adhesion to
the cause of independence being left defenceless--the retreating
Spaniards committed great excesses amongst the inhabitants of the
interior, who found themselves exposed to more than the rigours of
martial law, without the least attempt for their protection; though a
promise of this had formed one of the principal inducements for
throwing off their allegiance to the Viceroy, at whose mercy--or rather
want of it--they now found themselves exposed.

In place of protecting the Peruvians in the interior, a number of highly
inflated proclamations were issued, in which it was left to be inferred
that the city had been taken by hard fighting, though not a blow had
been struck, except by the detachment of Colonel Arenales and the
squadron, whose vigilance of blockade and previous actions had so
dispirited the enemy and reduced them to such straits, that abandonment
of the capital was inevitable. Nor was the large force present even
required to maintain Lima, the inhabitants having for a long period been
subjected to miseries which they had no disposition to re-encounter.

But General San Martin had other views in retaining the army than
protecting those who had confided in his promises; the military force
being required for very different purposes to that which had been set
forth in his proclamations and in those entrusted to him by the Chilian
government.

On the 24th I ordered Captain Crosbie to proceed to Callao in the boats,
and cut out as many of the enemy's vessels as he could bring away. The
service was gallantly performed, for on the following day he brought out
two large merchantmen, the _San Fernando_ and _Milagro_, and the sloop
of war _Resolucion_, together with several launches; burning moreover
two vessels within musket shot of the batteries.

On the 27th, the _Cabildo_ sent me an invitation to be present at the
public proclamation of the independence of Peru. As their letter fully
recognises the obligations of the Limeños to the services of the
squadron,--I shall transcribe it:--

   "Lima is about to solemnize the most august act which has been
   performed for three centuries, or since her foundation; this is the
   proclamation of her independence, and absolute exclusion from
   the Spanish government, as well as from that of any other foreign
   potentate, and this _Cabildo_--wishing the ceremony to be conducted
   with all possible decorum and solemnity, _considers it necessary that
   your Excellency, who has so gloriously co-operated in bringing about
   this highly desired object_, will deign to assist at the act with your
   illustrious officers, on Saturday, the 28th instant."

Imagining that myself and officers had been mainly instrumental in
establishing the independence of Peru--for I had in vain urged the
Captain-General to action, as far as the army was concerned, the
invitation was accepted, but judge of my surprise at the ceremony, when
medals were distributed, ascribing to General San Martin and the army
the whole credit of having accomplished that which the squadron had
achieved! The inscription on the medals was as follows.--"Lima secured
its independence on the 28th of July, 1821, under the protection of
_General San Martin and the liberating army_." The declaration of
independence was however complete, according to the promises and
intentions of the Chilian government. On hoisting the national flag,
General San Martin pronounced the following words:--"Peru is from this
moment free and independent, by the general vote of the people, and by
the justice of her cause, which God defend."

The inhabitants of Lima were in a state of great delight at this
termination of centuries of Spanish misrule, and that their independence
of action was fully recognized as had been stipulated by Chili. As a
mark of gratitude, a deputation from the _Cabildo_, on the next day
waited on General San Martin, offering him, in the name of the
inhabitants of the capital, the first presidency of their now
independent state. To the astonishment of the deputation they were
curtly told that their offer was altogether unnecessary, as he had
_already taken the command, and should keep it as long as he thought
proper, whilst he would allow no assemblies for the discussion of public
matters_. The first act of the freedom and independence so
ostentatiously proclaimed on the previous day, being the establishment
of a despotic government, in which the people had neither voice nor
share; and this by the General of a Republic which existed only by the
will of the people!

In this extraordinary assumption of power I had not been at all
consulted, probably because it was known that I would not countenance
anything but carrying out intact the intentions of the Supreme Director
of Chili as declared in his proclamations. It now became evident to me
that the army had been kept inert for the purpose of preserving it
entire to further the ambitious views of the General, and that with the
whole force now at Lima the inhabitants were completely at the mercy of
their pretended liberator, but in reality their conqueror.

As the existence of this self-constituted authority was no less at
variance with the institutions of the Chilian Republic than with its
solemn promises to the Limeños, I again shifted my flag on board the
_O'Higgins_, determined to adhere solely to the interests of Chili; but
not interfering in any way with General San Martin's proceedings till
they interfered with me in my capacity as Commander in Chief of the
Chilian navy.

On the 3rd of August, General San Martin issued a proclamation to the
same effect as his declaration to the now extinct _Cabildo_; setting
forth that although it was abundantly notorious that he aspired only to
retirement and tranquillity, nevertheless a moral responsibility
required him to unite all government in his own person, and he therefore
declared himself "Protector of Peru," with Don Juan Garcia del Rio, Don
Bernardo Monteagudo, and Don Hipolito Unanue, as his three ministers of
state.

Being at the time on board the flag-ship, I knew nothing of this
proclamation; but as the squadron had not been paid their twelve months'
wages, nor the 50,000 dollars promised by General San Martin, I went on
shore on the 4th of August, to make the demand on behalf of the
squadron, the seamen having served their time. Being ignorant of the
self-imposed title which General San Martin had assumed, I frankly
asked him to devise some means for defraying these payments.

I forbear personally to relate what passed at this interview; but as my
secretary was present, and on his return to England published an account
thereof, which is in every respect substantially true, I will give it in
his words:--


   "On the following morning, August 4th, Lord Cochrane, uninformed
   of the change which had taken place in the title of San
   Martin, visited the palace, and began to beg of the General in
   Chief to propose some means for the payment of the foreign seamen,
   who had served their time and fulfilled their contract. To this,
   San Martin answered, that 'he would never pay the Chilian
   squadron unless it was sold to Peru, and then the payment should
   be considered part of the purchase money!' To this Lord Cochrane
   replied, that 'by such a transaction the squadron of Chili
   would be transferred to Peru by merely paying what was due to the
   officers and crews for services done to that state.' San Martin knit
   his brows, and turning to his two ministers, Garcia and Monteagudo,
   ordered them to retire, to which his Lordship objected, stating that
   'as he was not master of the Spanish language, he wished them to
   remain as interpreters, fearful that some expression, not rightly
   understood, might be considered offensive.' San Martin now turned
   round to the Admiral, and said--'Are you aware, my Lord, that I
   am Protector of Peru?'--'No,'--said his Lordship, 'I ordered my
   secretaries to inform you of it,' returned San Martin. 'That is
   now unnecessary, for you have personally informed me,' said his
   Lordship; 'I hope that the friendship which has existed between
   San Martin and myself will continue to exist between the Protector
   of Peru and myself.' San Martin then--rubbing his hands--said,
   'I have only to say, that I am Protector of Peru!'"

   "The manner in which this last sentence was expressed, roused
   the Admiral, who, advancing, said--'Then it becomes me, as
   senior officer of Chili, and consequently the representative of the
   nation, to request the fulfilment of all the promises made to Chili
   and the squadron; but first--and principally--the squadron.' San Martin
   returned--'Chili! Chili! I will never pay a single _real_ to Chili! As
   to the squadron, you may take it where you please, and go where you
   choose; a couple of schooners are quite enough for me;' '_Chili! Chili,
   yo nunca pagare 'un real a Chili! y en quanto a la esquadra, puede V
   llevarla donde quiere, e irse quando guste, con un par de golestas me
   basta a mi_.'"

   "On hearing this, Garcia left the room, and Monteagudo walked to the
   balcony. San Martin paced the room for a short time and turning to his
   Lordship, said,--'Forget, my Lord, what is past.' The admiral
   replied--'I will, when I can,' and immediately left the palace."

   His Lordship was now undeceived by the man himself; the repeated reports
   he had heard of his past conduct crowded on his imagination, and knowing
   what might be attempted, from what had been already done, his Lordship
   agreed with me, that his life was not safe ashore. He therefore
   immediately took horse--rode to Boca Negra, and went on board his
   frigate[1].

[Footnote 1: "_Twenty Years Residence in South America_,"
by W.B. STEVENSON, Secretary to Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of Chili,
&c. &c. 1825.]

One thing has been omitted in the preceding narrative. General San
Martin, following me to the staircase, had the temerity to propose to me
to follow his example--viz. to break faith with Chilian Government to
which we had both sworn--to abandon the squadron to his interests--and
to accept the higher grade of "First Admiral of Peru." I need scarcely
say that a proposition so dishonourable was declined; when in a tone of
irritation he declared that "he would neither give the seamen their
arrears of pay, nor the gratuity he had promised."

On arriving at the flag-ship, I found the following official
communication, requesting me to fire a salute in honour of San Martin's
self-elevation to the protectorship:--

   Lima, 4th Aug. 1821.
   MY LORD,

   His Excellency the Protector of Peru commands
   me to transmit to you the annexed organic decree, announcing his
   exaltation to the Supreme Authority; in order that the squadron
   may be informed of this momentous event, and that the new
   Government may be acknowledged by the naval department under
   your command, belonging to the Republic of Chili.

   I hope, that duly estimating this high act, you will cause it to be
   celebrated with all the dignity which is compatible with the martial
   usage of the naval service.

   (Signed) MONTEAGUDO.
   Attested by the _Rubrica_ of the Protector.

Though this was a request to acknowledge General San Martin as invested
with the attributes of a Sovereign Prince, I complied with it in the
hope that quiet remonstrance might recal him to a sense of duty to the
Chilian Government, no less than to his own true interests. On the 7th
of August, I addressed to him the following letter:--


   Callao Roads, 7th Aug. 1821.
   MY DEAR GENERAL,

   I address you for the last time under your late designation,
   being aware that the liberty I may take as a friend might
   not be deemed decorous to you under the title of "Protector," for I
   shall not with a gentleman of your understanding take into account,
   as a motive for abstaining to speak truth, any chance of your
   resentment. Nay, were I certain that such would be the effect of this
   letter, I would nevertheless perform such an act of friendship, in
   repayment of the support you gave me at a time when the basest
   plots and plans were laid for my dismissal from the Chilian Service,
   for no other reason than that certain influential persons of shallow
   understanding and petty expedients hate those who despise mean
   acts accomplished by low cunning.

   Permit me, my dear General, to give you the experience of
   eleven years during which I sat in the first senate in the world,
   and to say what I anticipate on the one hand, and what I fear
   on the other, nay, what I foresee; for that which is to come, in
   regard to the acts of Governments and Nations, may as certainly
   be predicted from history, as the revolutions of the solar system.
   You have it in your power to be the Napoleon of South America,
   as you have it in your power to be one of the greatest men now
   acting on the theatre of the world; but you have also the power
   to choose your course, and if the first steps are false, the eminence
   on which you stand will, as though from the brink of a precipice,
   make your fall the more heavy and the more certain.

   The rocks on which the South American Government have
   split have hitherto been bad faith, and consequent temporary
   expedients. No man has yet arisen, save yourself, capable of
   soaring aloft, and with eagle eye embracing the expanse of the
   political horizon. But if in your flight, like Icarus, you trust to
   waxen wings, your descent may crush the rising liberties of Peru,
   and involve all South America in anarchy, civil war, and political
   despotism.

   The real strength of Government is public opinion. What
   would the world say, were the Protector of Peru, as his first act, to
   cancel the bonds of San Martin, even though gratitude may be a
   private and not a public virtue? What would they say, were the
   Protector to refuse to pay the expense of that expedition which
   placed him in his present elevated situation? What would they
   say, were it promulgated to the world that he intended not even to
   remunerate those employed in the navy which contributed to his
   success.

   What good can be arrived at by a crooked path that cannot be
   attained by a straight and open way? Who has advised a tortuous
   policy and the concealment of the real sentiments and intentions of
   Government? Has an intriguing spirit dictated the refusal of pay
   to the Chilian navy, whilst the army is doubly paid? Is it proposed
   thus to alienate the minds of the men from their present service, and
   by such policy to obtain them for the service of Peru? If so, the
   effect will, I predict, be the contrary, for they have looked, and do
   look, to Peru for their remuneration, and, if disappointed, they will
   feel accordingly.

   See to what a state the Senate had brought the beautiful and
   fertile province of Chili. Nay, had not their notorious want of
   faith deprived them, notwithstanding their mines, their confiscated
   and public lands, of the means possessed even by the Spanish
   Government, and of the credit necessary to procure a dollar in any
   foreign country, or even in their own? I say, therefore, my dear
   General, that whoever has advised you to commence your Protectorship
   with devices unworthy of San Martin, is either a thoughtless
   or a wicked man, whom you should for ever banish from your
   counsels.

   My dear General, look to the flattering addresses presented by
   the servile of all countries to the most base in power. Think not
   that it is to the person of San Martin that the public are attached.
   Believe not, that without a straight and dignified course you can
   obtain the admiration or love of mankind. So far yet you have
   succeeded, and, thank God, it is in your power to succeed yet
   farther. Flatterers are more dangerous than the most venomous
   serpents, and next to them are men of knowledge, if they have not
   the integrity or courage to oppose bad measures, when formally
   discussed, or even when casually spoken of.

   What political necessity existed for any temporary concealment
   of the sentiments of Government in regard to the fate of the
   Spaniards in Peru? Were not the army and the people ready to
   support your measures, and did not the latter call aloud for their
   expulsion? Believe me, my dear General, that after your
   declaration, even the seizing on Spanish property belonging to
   those who remain, is an act which ought not to be resorted to without
   crime on their part subsequently committed.

   In the feelings of my breast no man can deceive me. Of the sentiments
   of others, I judge by my own, and I tell you what they are
   as an honest man and a friend.

   I could say much to you, my dear General, on other subjects of
   little inferior importance, but as the foregoing are the only acts
   immediately contemplated of which I have acquired a knowledge,
   and which are, in their consequences, ruinous, I shall, at present,
   only add, that had kings and princes but one man in their
   dominions who would, on all occasions, utter the naked truth,
   multifarious errors would be avoided, and the mischief to mankind
   would be infinitely less.

   You will plainly perceive that I have no personal interests in
   these, or any other points, at variance with yours; but, on the
   contrary, if I were base and interested, I have now taken a decisive
   and irrevocable step to ruin my prospects; having no other security
   for such not being the consequence of my candour save my good
   opinion of your judgment and your heart.

   Believe me, under all circumstances, your attached friend,

   COCHRANE.

To this letter, on the 9th of August, General San Martin replied as
follows:--

   Lima, 9th August, 1821.

   My Lord,


   The best proof of friendship that can be given by
   you is the sincere announcement of your opinions as to the course
   I should follow in my new political character.

   Assuredly you have not erred, when, under the title of Protector,
   you do not anticipate any change in my personal character. Happily,
   the alteration is only in a name, which, in my opinion, was
   required for the benefit of the country; and if, in the character in
   which you have known me, you have met with _civility_ and frankness,
   it would be an injustice to deny me confidence, having always
   listened to you as an enlightened person, experienced in the world;
   especially as you do me justice in enabling me to make observations
   on the spirit of your last communication.

   I am aware that good faith in one who presides over a nation, is
   the vital spirit of its prosperity; and as, in this respect, a singular
   current of success has called me temporarily to the supreme magistracy
   of this country, I should renounce the advantages acquired
   and betray my principles, if vanity or servile acquiescence in bad
   advice were to induce me to deviate from the social interests of
   Peru, and so expose it to the evils which in such case you dread.

   I know, my Lord, that one cannot fly with waxen wings. I perceive
   the course I ought to pursue, and that, however great the
   advantages already gained, there are rocks which, _without the aid of
   prudence and good faith_, must be encountered.

   By good fortune, I have not forgotten the maxim of religiously
   adhering to the word of a gentleman, which, as General, has been
   the pivot on which my anticipations have rested.

   It now behoves me to explain my engagements towards the
   Chilian squadron, to which, it is very gratifying to declare that
   Peru, in part, owes its liberty; an acknowledgment which would
   have been made on the medals coined, if, in the hurry of business,
   _I had been able to give my attention to the subject of the inscription
   that was presented to me as a model!_ You yourself have heard me
   eulogise its merits and services.

   I have offered to the crews of the squadron of Chili twelve
   months' pay, as an acknowledgment of its services, and am employed
   in providing the means, and also in endeavouring to collect the
   reward of 50,000 dollars which _you_ offered to the seamen who should
   capture the _Esmeralda_, and I am not only disposed to pay these sums,
   but to recompense valour displayed in the cause of the country.

   But you know, my Lord, that the wages of the crews do not
   come under these circumstances, and that I--_never having engaged
   to pay the amount--am not obliged to do so!_ That debt is due from
   Chili, whose government engaged the seamen. Although it may
   be just, in the state of its finances, to indemnify Chili in some
   degree for the expeditionary expenses, that will be, for me, an
   agreeable consideration; but in no degree will I acknowledge a right
   to claim arrears of pay!

   If I could forget the services of the squadron, and the sacrifices
   of Chili, I should manifest ingratitude, which, neither as a public
   or private virtue will I ever forego; but it is as imprudent to lavish
   rewards, as to withhold them from the meritorious. I am engaged
   in finding means to realize measures as regards the squadron, which
   I intend to propose to the Supreme Government of Chili, and thus
   conciliate all interests.

   Your affectionate friend,
   JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
   To Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of Chili.

In this letter, San Martin attributes his usurpation to a "singular
current of success;" omitting to state that he neither achieved one
blow, nor devised one plan which led to it, whilst he had all along
offered it every obstruction in his power. He declares that the
arrogation of the fall of the Spaniards, attributed by the inscription
on the medal to the army and himself, was a mistake, brought about by
"his not being able, in the hurry of business, to give attention to the
model presented to him;" whereas the inscription was his own writing,
after days of deliberation and consultation with others, who advised him
not to mention the squadron in the inscription.

In this letter he repudiates all connection with Chili, though he had
sworn fidelity to the republic as its Captain General. He denies ever
having engaged to pay the squadron their wages, though on no other
condition had it put to sea from Valparaiso, and his own handwriting to
this specific promise was accepted as the inducement. Though himself an
officer of Chili, he treats Chili as a state with which he had nothing
to do, whose debts he declares that he will not pay, as he had
previously told me on the 4th of August; finally, he says that he will
propose to Chili to pay its own seamen! As to his promises to give the
men a twelvemonths' pay in acknowledgment of their services, this was
neither intended nor given; whilst, as to the 50,000 dollars promised to
the captors of the _Esmeralda_, which he is "endeavouring to collect,"
he had long before "collected" many times the amount from the old
Spaniards--who had offered a similar reward for the capture of any
vessels of the Chilian squadron--and kept it. Fortunately, his own
letters prove these matters, which otherwise I should have hesitated to
mention, unsupported by testimony so irrefutable.

General San Martin afterwards denied to the Chilian Government that he
refused, on the 4th of August, to pay the squadron. Here is the same
assertion, in his own handwriting, on the 9th! During the whole of this
time the squadron was in a state of literal destitution; even the
provisions necessary for its subsistence being withheld from it, though
the Protector had abundant means of supplying them; but his object was
to starve both officers and men into desertion--so as to accelerate the
dismemberment of the squadron which I would not give up to his ambitious
views.

The sound advice contained in my letter General San Martin never
forgave--and he afterwards fell exactly as I had predicted--there was no
merit in the prophecy, for similar causes lead to like effects. Adhering
to my own duty, I felt that I was free from his command, and determined
to follow no other course than to carry out, as far as lay in my power,
the pledge of the Chilian Government to the Peruvian people.

Concealing for the present his resentment, and reflecting that the forts
of Callao were still in the hands of the Spaniards, the Protector
endeavoured to explain away the disagreeable nature of our interview on
the 4th of August, by asserting, "that he only said, or meant to say,
that it might be interesting to Chili to _sell some of her vessels of
war to Peru_, because the latter wanted them for the protection of her
coasts;" adding, that "the Government of Chili would at all times devote
their squadron to the furtherance of the cause of Peru." He repeated,
that the arrears of pay to the squadron should be liquidated, as well as
the rewards which had been promised.

As none of these were forthcoming, the squadron began to shew symptoms
of mutiny at the conduct of the Protector. On the 11th of August I wrote
to him, apprising him of the increasing discontent of the seamen, again
requesting payment. On this a decree was issued, ordering one-fifth of
the customs receipts to be set aside for the joint pay of the army and
navy, but as the fortress and port of Callao were in the hands of the
Spaniards, these receipts were most insignificant, and the measure was
rightly regarded by the squadron as a subterfuge.

To this communication the Protector replied, on the 13th of August--at
the same time hinting that I might _reconsider_ my refusal to accept the
command of the contemplated Peruvian navy.

The subjoined is his letter:--

  Lima, 13th of August, 1821. MY LORD,

  In my official letter addressed to you on the disagreeable business of
  paying the squadron, which causes us so much uneasiness, I have told you
  that it is impossible to do as we wish. I have nothing to add, unless my
  previous declaration, that I shall never view with indifference any
  thing that interests you. I told you in Valparaiso, that "your lot
  should be equal to mine" and I believe myself to have proved that my
  intentions have not varied--nor can vary, because every day renders my
  actions more important.

  No, my Lord, I do not view with indifference anything which concerns
  you, and I shall be deeply grieved, if you do not wait till I can
  onvince you of the truth. If, however, in despite of all this, you
  determine on the course, which, at our interview a few days ago, you
  proposed to take, it will be for me a difficulty from which I cannot
  extricate myself, but I hope that--_conforming yourself to my
  wishes_--you will conclude the work begun, on which our common lot
  depends.

  Adieu, my Lord, I repeat that I am, with sincere esteem, your eternal
  friend,

  JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.

The assertion, that he could not satisfy the seamen, was a subterfuge;
he had abundance of money, derived from the wholesale spoliation of the
Spaniards, to which indefensible course I had alluded in my letter of
August 7th. He also hoped that "_conforming to his wishes_," I would
accept the appointment of "First Admiral;" the consequence of
which--together with the decree transferring the Chilian
officers--without their consent--to the service of Peru, would have been
to turn over to his Government the Chilian squadron.



CHAPTER VII.

TAMPERING WITH CHILIAN OFFICERS--THE ARCHBISHOP OF LIMA--HIS
EXPULSION--NEGOCIATION FOR SURRENDER OF THE FORTS--THIS
COUNTERACTED--SAN MARTIN'S BOMBASTIC PROCLAMATIONS--HIS REFUSAL TO
ENCOUNTER THE ENEMY--THE SPANIARDS RELIEVE CALLAO--DELUSIVE
PROCLAMATION--THE UNBLUSHING FALSEHOOD--SPANIARDS CARRY OFF THE
TREASURE--DISCONTENT OF THE SQUADRON.


Finding that I was indisposed to acknowledge his self-assumed authority,
and still less to contribute to measures which would, in effect, have
deprived Chili of the Navy, which by her patriotic sacrifices had been
created, the Protector issued a proclamation, again _promising_ the
payment of arrears to the seamen, and a pension for life to the
officers, _acknowledging them as officers of Peru_! No inference can be
drawn from this other than a direct intimation to the officers to desert
from the Chilian service.

The following are extracts from the proclamation, which was published in
a Gazette Extraordinary of August 17th, 1821:--

   "The Army and Squadron of Chili united, have, at last, completed
   the oath which they took, to liberate Peru, and have raised it to
   the rank which justice and the interests of the world demand.
   Their constancy and heroism will hand them down to posterity
   with gratitude. I should be deficient in my political duty, did
   I not manifest the appreciation due to their transcendent deeds,
   promoting the interests of both hemispheres."

   "1. The State of Peru acknowledges as a national debt the
   arrears of the Army and Squadron, as well as the promises made by
   me to both."

   "2. All the property of the State, and also twenty per cent, on
   the revenue, are pledged to the extinction of these debts."

   "3. All the officers of the Army and Squadron who sailed with
   the liberating expedition, and now remain in them, _are acknowledged
   as officers of Peru_."

   "4. Those comprehended in the preceding articles, and those
   employed in the said cause, shall receive, during the period of their
   lives, a pension of half their full pay, awarded on leaving Valparaiso,
   which pension shall be paid even in the case of their settling in a
   foreign country."

   "5. All shall receive a medal," &c, &c.

Not a penny of the arrears and the other emoluments promised, was,
however, paid to the squadron; nor was any intended to be paid, the
object being to get the officers quietly to transfer themselves from the
Chilian squadron to the service of the Protector, on the strength of the
promises made: and, in this, he was ably seconded by his instruments,
Guise and Spry, who, in defiance of their desertion, and the sentence of
court-martial on the latter, had been retained near his person for the
accomplishment of this object.

One of the most fearless opponents of the Protector was the Archbishop
of Lima, an excellent man, much beloved by the people--who made no
secret of his indignation at the usurpation which had taken place,
despite all the promises of Chili, declared "before God and man"--as
well as those of the Protector himself, to "leave the Peruvians free as
regarded their own choice of Government." As the honest prelate
denounced, in no measured terms, the despotism which had been
established in the place of the liberty guaranteed, it was determined
to get rid of him.

The first step was an order to the Archbishop, dated August 22, 1821, to
close all the houses of spiritual exercises. This was politely refused;
but, at the same time, the prelate stated, that if any confessor
disturbed public order, he would take the requisite measures for his
punishment. On the 27th, the Archbishop was told in reply, that "the
Protector's orders were irrevocable, and he must at once decide on the
line of conduct he intended to adopt."

On the 1st of September, the prelate, in an admirable letter, told the
Protector, that "the principal obligation of a bishop was to defend the
deposit of doctrine and faith which had been confided to him, and, if
threatened by any great potentate, to remonstrate with respect and
submission, to the end that he might not be a participator in crime by a
cowardly condescension. God had constituted bishops as the pastors and
guards of the flock, and he tells us, that we are not to be cowards in
the presence of the greatest potentates on earth, but, if necessary, we
must shed our blood, and lay down our lives, in so just a cause;
anathematizing us, on the contrary, as dumb dogs who do not bark when
the spiritual health of the flock is in danger."

The end of this was, that the Protector urged on the Archbishop to
resign, promising him a vessel to convey him to Panama; relying on which
promise, he sent in his resignation, and was ordered to quit Lima in
twenty-four hours! As the promise of a conveyance to Panama was broken,
the Archbishop embarked in a merchant vessel for Rio de Janeiro,
addressing to me the following letter previous to his departure.

   Chancay, Nov. 2, 1821.

   My dear Lord,


   The time is arrived for my return to Spain, the Protector
   having granted me the necessary passport. The polite
   attention which I owe to your Excellency, and the peculiar
   qualifications which adorn and distinguish you, oblige me to
   manifest to you my sincere regard and esteem.

   In Spain, if God grant that I arrive in safety, I request that you
   will deign to command me. On leaving this country, _I am convinced
   that its independence is for ever sealed_. This I will represent to the
   Spanish Government, and to the Papal See, and will do all in my
   power to preserve the tranquillity, and to further the views, of the
   inhabitants of America, who are dear to me.

   Deign, my Lord, to receive these sentiments as emanating from
   the sincerity of my heart, and command

   Your obliged servant and Chaplain,
   BARTOLOMÉ MARIA DE LAS HERAS.


This forcible expulsion of the Archbishop was an act of political folly,
as being tantamount to a declaration that he was too good a man to
countenance the designs of those who had usurped an unjust dominion over
his flock. Had the promises of Chili been carried out in their
integrity, both the Archbishop and his clergy would have used all their
influence to promote the cause of liberty--not more from interest than
inclination. The expression of the Archbishop, that "the independence of
Peru was _for ever_ sealed," was, however, erroneous. Tyranny is not
composed of enduring materials.

The Bishop of Guamanga, who resided at Lima, was also ordered to leave
Peru within eight days, without reason assigned, and thus the
opposition of the Church was got rid of, though not without deep feeling
on the part of the Limeños, who were, however, powerless to help their
clergy or themselves.

The affairs of the squadron becoming every day worse, and a mutinous
spirit being excited from actual destitution, I endeavoured to obtain
possession of the castles of Callao by negociation, offering to the
Spanish Commandant permission to depart with two-thirds of the property
contained in the fort, on condition of the remainder, together with the
forts, being given up to the Chilian squadron. My object was to supply
the crews with the absolute necessaries, of which they stood in need
from the evasive conduct of the Protector, who continued to withhold,
not only pay, but provisions, though the squadron had formed the ladder
on which he had ascended to his present elevated position. There were
large sums and a vast amount of plate in the possession of the Spanish
garrison,--the wealthy citizens of Lima--fearing their liberators--having
deposited both in the forts for security. A third of this would have
relieved us from our embarrassments. The vessels were, in fact, in want
of stores of every kind, their crews being without animal food, clothing,
or spirits, indeed their only means of subsistence was upon money
obtained from the Spanish fugitives, whom I permitted to ransom themselves
by surrendering a third only of the property with which they were escaping.

As soon as my offer to the Spanish Commandant, La Mar, became known to
the Protector--in order to counteract it, and ensure the success of his
design to starve out the Chilian squadron, and so procure its transfer
to himself--he offered La Mar unlimited and unconditional protection,
both as to persons and property, on purchase of letters of citizenship!
The Commandant, therefore, rejected my proposal, and the hope of
obtaining a sufficient sum for the payment of the seamen, and for
refitting the ships, was frustrated.

General San Martin afterwards accused me to the Chilian Government of
aiming at the possession of the fortress of Callao, for the purpose of
setting at defiance the Government of Peru! This was ridiculous; though,
had it been my object, it would have been perfectly consistent with my
duty to Chili, from which State the Protector of Peru had cast off his
allegiance. My object was simply to obtain means to subsist the
squadron; though, had I obtained possession of the forts, I would most
certainly have dictated to General San Martin the fulfilment of his
promises; and should as certainly have insisted on his performing his
solemn engagement to the Peruvians, of giving them the free choice of
their own government.

He also accused me of wishing to appropriate the sum proposed to be
surrendered by the Spanish Commandant to my own use, though the seamen
were in a state of mutiny from actual starvation! Instead of
contributing to this useful end, as before the Protector's interference
La Mar was not unwilling to do, the Spaniards were afterwards permitted
to retire unmolested with the whole of their treasure; and to this, the
most discreditable act which ever sullied the name of a military
commander, we now come. As the whole transaction has been well described
by another writer, who was present throughout, I prefer extracting his
words, in order to prevent any suspicion of mental bias which I may be
supposed to entertain on the subject:--

   "The Spanish army at Janja, in the beginning of September,
   spread alarm in Lima, from advices received of their movements.
   It appeared that they were determined to attack the capital, and on
   the 5th of September the following proclamation was issued at
   head-quarters by the Protector:--"

   "Inhabitants of Lima,"

   "It appears that the justice of heaven, tired of tolerating for so long
   a time the oppressors of Peru, now guides them to destruction. Three
   hundred of those troops who have desolated so many towns, burnt so many
   temples, and destroyed so many thousands of victims, are at San Mateo,
   and two hundred more at San Damian. If they advance on this capital,
   it will be with the design of immolating you to their vengeance (San
   Martin had 12,000 troops to oppose them), and to force you to purchase
   at a high price your decision, and enthusiasm for independence. Vain
   hope! The valiant who have liberated the illustrious Lima, those who
   protect her in the most difficult moments, know how to preserve her
   against the fury of the Spanish army. Yes, inhabitants of this capital,
   my troops will not abandon you; _they and myself are going to triumph
   over that army which--thirsty of our blood and property, is advancing;
   or we will perish with honour, for we will never witness your
   disgrace_. In return for this noble devotion, and that it may receive
   the favourable success of which it is worthy, all we require of you is,
   union, tranquillity, and efficacious co-operation. This alone is
   necessary to ensure the felicity and splendour of Peru."

   "SAN MARTIN."


   "On the morning of the 10th, Lord Cochrane received on board
   the _O'Higgins_ an official communication, informing him that the
   enemy was approaching the walls of Lima, and repeating the
   request that his Lordship would send to the army every kind of
   portable arms then on board the squadron, as well as the marines
   and all volunteers; because the Protector was '_determined to bring
   the enemy to an action, and either conquer or remain buried in the
   ruins of what was Lima_.' This heroic note was, however, accompanied
   by a private one from Monteagudo, containing a request that
   the boats of the vessels of war might be kept in readiness, and a
   look out placed on the beach of Boca Negra."

   "Lord Cochrane immediately pressed forward to San Martin's
   camp, where, being recognised by several officers, a murmur of
   congratulation was heard, and even Guise and Spry exclaimed,
   'We shall have some fighting now the Admiral is come.' General
   Las Heras, acting as General-in-Chief, saluting the Admiral, begged
   of him to endeavour to persuade the Protector to bring the enemy
   to an action. His Lordship, on this, rode up to San Martin, and
   taking him by the hand, in the most earnest manner entreated
   him to attack the enemy without losing a single moment; his
   entreaties were, however, in vain, the only answer received being--'My
   resolutions are taken'--'_mis medidas están tomadas_.'"

   "Notwithstanding this apathy, his Lordship remonstrated, stating
   the situation in which he had, not five minutes before, observed the
   enemy's infantry, and begged of the Protector to ascend an eminence
   at the back of the house, and convince himself how easily a victory
   might be obtained; but he only received the same cold reply--_mis
   medidas están tomadas_.'"

   "The clamour of the officers in the _patio_ of the house roused
   San Martin, who called for his horse and mounted. In a moment
   all was bustle, and the anticipated glow of victory shone in every
   countenance. The order to arms was given, and instantly obeyed
   by the whole army, amounting to about 12,000 men, including
   guerillas, all anxious to begin the fight. The Protector beckoned
   to the Admiral and General Las Heras, who immediately rode up to
   him, hoping that he was either about to consult them respecting the
   attack, or to inform them how it was to be conducted."

   "At this moment a peasant approached San Martin on horseback,
   the General with most unparalleled composure lending an
   attentive ear to his communications as to where the enemy was
   the day before! The Admiral, exasperated at so unnecessary a
   waste of time, bade the peasant 'begone,' adding--'The General's
   time is too important to be employed in listening to your
   fooleries.' At this interruption, San Martin frowned on the
   Admiral, and turning his horse rode up to the door of the house,
   where he alighted and went in."

   "Lord Cochrane then requested a private conference with San
   Martin--which was the last time he ever spoke to him--and assured
   him that it was not even then too late to attack the enemy, begging
   and entreating that the opportunity might not be lost, and offering
   himself to lead the cavalry. But to this he received the reply, 'I
   alone am responsible for the liberties of Peru.'--_'Yo solo soy
   responsable de la libertad del Peru_.' On this the Protector retired
   to an inner apartment of the house to enjoy his customary _siesta_,
   which was disturbed by General Las Heras, who came to receive orders,
   and recalled to the attention of the Protector that the force was still
   under arms, when San Martin ordered that the troops should receive
   their rations!"

   "Thus Gen. Cantarac, with 3,200 men, passed to the southward
   of Lima--within half-musket shot of the protecting army of Peru,
   composed of 12,000--entered the castles of Callao with a convoy of
   cattle and provisions, where he refreshed and rested his troops for
   six days, and then retired on the 15th, taking with him the _whole
   of the vast treasure deposited therein by the Limeños_, and leisurely
   retreating on the north side of Lima."

   "After Cantarac had led his troops into the batteries of Callao,
   the success was announced by the firing of guns and other demonstrations
   which harrowed up the souls of the Chilian officers. The
   patriot army thereupon passively occupied their old camp at the
   Legua, between Callao and Lima."

   "It would be an act of injustice not to mention that the second in
   command, General Las Heras, disgusted with the result, left the
   service of the Protector, and requested his passport to Chili, which
   was granted; his example being followed by several officers of the army,
   who, deeply wounded by what had taken place, preferred obscurity,
   and even poverty, to further serving under such circumstances.
   The British ship of war, _Superb_, was in the bay, and several of
   the officers, expecting to see the decisive blow struck in Peru,
   repaired to San Martin's head-quarters, and were astounded at the
   coolness of a general, who, commanding 12,000 men, could abandon
   a favourable position in which he might at least have intercepted
   the convoy of cattle, and so at once have compelled the surrender of
   Callao, instead of permitting them to pass without a single shot
   being fired."[2]

[Footnote 2: "_Twenty years Residence in South America_," by W.B.
Stevenson. Vol. iii. London, 1825.]

The preceding extract, published in London by one who was by my side
during the whole affair, is perfectly correct. The Limeños were deeply
humiliated by the occurrence, nor was their annoyance mitigated by the
publication of the following proclamation in the ministerial Gazette of
the 19th, in which General San Martin informed them that he had beaten
the enemy and pursued the fugitives! though, the said enemy had relieved
and reinforced the fortress, and then coolly walked off unmolested with
plate and money to the amount of many millions of dollars; in fact, the
whole wealth of Lima, which, as has been said, was deposited by the
inhabitants in the fortress for security.

   Limeños,

   It is now fifteen days since the liberating army left the
   capital, resolved not to permit that even the shadow of the Spanish
   flag should again darken the illustrious city of Lima. The enemy
   haughtily descended the mountains, filled with the calculations they
   had formed in their ignorant meditations. They fancied that to
   appear before our camp was enough to conquer us; but they found
   _valour armed with prudence_! They acknowledged their inferiority.
   _They trembled at the idea of the hour of battle, and profited by the
   hour of darkness_!! and they sought an asylum in Callao. My army
   began its march, and at the end of eight days the enemy has had to
   fly precipitately--convinced of their impotency to try the fortune of
   war, or to remain in the position they held.

   The desertion which they experience ensures us that, before they
   reach the mountains, there will only exist a handful of men, terrified
   and confounded with the remembrance of the colossal power which
   they had a year ago, and which has now disappeared like the fury of
   the waves of the sea at the dawn of a serene morning. _The liberating
   army pursues the fugitives. They shall he dissolved or beaten_.
   At all events, the capital of Peru shall never be profaned with the
   footsteps of the enemies of America--_this truth is peremptory_. The
   Spanish empire is at an end for ever. Peruvians! your destiny is
   irrevocable; consolidate it by the constant exercise of those virtues
   which you have shown in the epoch of conflicts. _You are independent_,
   and nothing can prevent your being happy, if you will it
   to be so,

   SAN MARTIN.

To these monstrous assertions I only know one parallel, viz:--Falstaff's
version of his victory over the robbers at Gadshill. The Protector
asserts that "the shadow of the Spanish flag should never again darken
Lima." It nevertheless passed completely round the city within
half-musket shot. "The enemy thought that to view our camp was to
conquer us." They were only 3,000 to 12,000. "They trembled at the hour
of battle, _and profited by the hour of darkness_!" The fact being that
with droves of cattle and abundance of other provisions, they
triumphantly marched into Callao _at mid-day_! viz, from eleven A.M. to
three P.M. "The liberating army pursues the fugitives." This is the only
fact contained in the proclamation. The enemy _was_ pursued by 1,100
men, who followed them at a distance for ten miles, when Cantarac
suddenly facing about, let loose his cavalry at them, and nearly the
whole were cut up! The Spaniards in fact came to relieve Callao, and
fully effected their object.

Were not the preceding proclamation indelibly imprinted in the columns
of the ministerial Gazette, it would be deemed a malicious fabrication.
Yet the poor, _independent_ Limeños dared not utter a voice against
falsehood so palpable. Disarmed and betrayed, they were completely at
the mercy of the Protector, who, if he can be said to have had a motive
in not encountering the small force of Cantarac, no doubt founded it in
keeping his own troops intact for the further oppression of the unhappy
Limeños--with what effect we shall presently see.

This triumphant retreat of the Spanish force with its large amount of
treasure was a disaster which, after the Limeños had risen against the
tyranny of San Martin and forcibly expelled him from their city,
entailed the shedding of torrents of blood in Peru, for the Spaniards
were thus enabled to reorganize a force which would have subjected the
country to its ancient oppressors, had not the army of Colombia stepped
in to resist a common enemy. Even Chili trembled for her liberties, and,
after I had left the Pacific, begged me to return and check disasters
with which she was incompetent to grapple.

Had not the Protector prevented the Spanish Commandant, La Mar, from
accepting my offer of permitting him to retire with two-thirds of the
enormous treasure deposited in the fort, Chili would, at the lowest
computation, have received ten millions of dollars, whilst the Spaniards
would have retired with twenty millions. Surely this would have been
better than to permit them--as General San Martin did--to retire
unmolested with the whole.

Foiled in this attempt to relieve the necessities of the squadron,
whilst the Protector's Government pertinaciously refused to supply them,
it was impossible to keep the men from mutiny; even the officers--won
over by Guise and Spry, who paid midnightly visits to the ships for the
purpose--began to desert to the Protectoral Government.

The following letter, addressed to Monteagudo, will shew the state of
the matter as regarded the squadron:--

   Most Excellent Sir,

   I have written you an official letter to-day, by which
   you will perceive that the consequences which I have long predicted
   will have so far come to pass, as to render the removal of the
   large ships of the squadron indispensable. If by a total neglect
   of all I tell the Protectoral Government through you, things happen
   prejudicial to the service, the Protector and yourself will at least do
   me the justice to feel that I have done my duty; the base,
   interested, and servile, for the promotion of their selfish views, may
   clamour, but I regard them not.

   I would send you the _original_ reports of the provisions and state
   of the ships issued by the captains, but I must hold these for my
   public justification, should such be necessary.

   What is the meaning of all this, Monteagudo? Are these people
   so base as to be determined to force the squadron to mutiny? And
   are there others so blind as not to foresee the consequences? Ask
   Sir Thomas Hardy, and the British captains, or any other officers,
   what will be the result of such monstrous measures.

   Believe me, with a heavy heart,

   Yours, &c.

   COCHRANE.



CHAPTER VIII.

PROLONGED DESTITUTION OF SQUADRON--THE MEN MUTINY IN A BODY--THE
SEAMEN'S LETTERS--SAN MARTIN SENDS AWAY THE PUBLIC TREASURE--MY SEIZURE
OF IT--PRIVATE PROPERTY RESTORED--SAN MARTIN'S ACCUSATIONS AGAINST
ME--THE SQUADRON PAID WAGES--ATTEMPT ON THE OFFICERS' FIDELITY--I AM
ASKED TO DESERT FROM CHILI--ORDERED TO QUIT ON REFUSAL--MONTEAGUDO'S
LETTER--MY REPLY--JUSTIFICATION OF SEIZING THE TREASURE--NO OTHER COURSE
POSSIBLE.


Previous to this time I had on board the flag-ship the unexpended
portion of the money captured at Arica, but as the Chilian Government,
trusting to Peru to supply the wants of the squadron, neither sent funds
or provisions, I was compelled to spend for our subsistence the
uncondemned portion of the prize money belonging to the seamen--a
necessity which, no less than their want of pay or reward, irritated
them beyond measure, as, in effect, compelling them to fight the battles
of the Republic not only without pay but at their own expense. In
addition to this, I was in possession of the uncondemned portion of
other sums taken on the coast, and these also I was obliged to expend,
at the same time transmitting accounts thereof to the Minister of Marine
at Valparaiso, the appropriation being fully approved by the Chilian
Government. The destitute condition of the squadron, and the consequent
dissatisfaction of the crews, will be best shewn by a few extracts from
the letters of the officers and the men themselves.

On the 2nd of September, Captain Delano, the Commander of the
_Lantaro_, wrote to me as follows:--

   "The officers as well as the men are dissatisfied, having been a
   long time on the cruise, and at present without any kind of meat
   or spirits, and without pay, so that they are not able to provide for
   themselves any longer, though, _until starved_, they have borne it
   without a murmur."

   "The ship's company have now absolutely refused duty on
   account of short allowance. The last _charqui_ (dried beef) they got
   was rotten and full of vermin. They are wholly destitute of clothing,
   and persist in their resolution not to do duty till beef and spirits
   are supplied, alleging that they have served their time, with nothing
   but promises so frequently broken that they will no longer be
   put off."

   "In your Lordship's absence I took the liberty to write to the
   Government and make their complaints known, but the Minister of
   Marine did not even give me an answer."

   "The greater portion have now left the ship and are all gone
   ashore, so that under existing circumstances, and with the
   dissatisfaction of the officers and the remainder of the ship's
   company I do not hold myself responsible for any accident that may
   happen to the ship until these difficulties are removed, as the
   cables are bad and not to be trusted to, and we have no anchor
   sufficient to hold her."

   "PAUL DELANO, _Captain_."

On Captain Delano sending his first lieutenant on shore to persuade the
men to return to the ship, he was arrested by order of the Government
and put in prison, the Protector's object being to get all the men to
desert, thus furthering his views towards the appropriation of the
squadron.

The _Galvarino_ was even in a worse condition, so that I deemed it
expedient to address a letter to the ship's company asking them to
continue at their duty till I could devise means for their relief; with
what result the following letter from Captain Esmond, commanding the
_Galvarino_ will shew.

   _Galvarino_, Sept. 8th, 1821.

   MY LORD,

   Pursuant to your Excellency's order, I have read your
   letter of the 6th instant to the ship's company, respecting your
   communication with His Excellency the Protector, concerning
   arrears of pay, prize-money, &c.

   I am sorry to inform your Excellency that they still persist in
   their demands, _and are determined not to proceed to sea_.

   I. ESMOND, _Captain_.

On the 19th, the foreign seamen of the flag-ship itself mutinied in a
body, on which my flag-captain, Crosbie, wrote me the following
letter:--

   MY LORD,

   It is with the utmost regret I have to inform your Lordship
   that being ready for sea early this morning, the foreigners
   refused heaving up the anchor in consequence of arrears of pay and
   prize-money, and to my great surprise many of the natives also
   came aft.

   I endeavoured by persuasive means to induce them to return
   quietly and willingly to their duty, which had no effect. Knowing
   well, had I commenced hostile measures to enforce those orders the
   consequence might be serious, I refrained therefrom, being aware of
   your Lordship's wish to conduct everything as peaceably as possible.

   The names of the foreigners who refuse going to sea I have the
   honour to enclose to your Lordship, and also to enclose several
   letters sent me officially from Captain Cobbett, of the _Valdivia_.

   I.S. CROSBIE, _Captain_.

Not to multiply these letters from other Commanders, I will adduce two
written by the whole of the English and North-American seamen
themselves.

   Captin Crosby,

   Sir, It his the request of us all in the Ship's Company to
   inform you that we would wish to acquaint his Lordship that we was
   promised by General San Martin to receive a bounty of 50,000
   dollars and the Total Amount of the Spanish Frigate _Ismeralda_, it
   his the Sole thought of us all that if San Martin had any Honure
   he would not breck his promises wish out to have been fulfilled
   Long a go.

   Ship's Company of _O'Higgins_.


   Capt. Corbet

   It is the request of us all On Bord the Chili States
   ship _Valdivia_ To aquaint you that we are disatisfied on account of
   our pay and prize money, and likewise the promises made to us on
   leaving Valpariso, it is likewise our Determination not to weigh the
   anchor of the _Valdivia_ untill we get the whole of our wages and
   prize money, likewise a number of us is a Bove twelvemonths aBove
   our time that we Shipt for And we should likewise wish our Discharge
   and let them that wish to Reenter Again May do as they think
   proppre as we consider this a patriot port.

   The Ship's Company at large of the _Valdivia_.


   Capt Crosby, Esq

   We would wish to acquaint you of wot his bean read to
   us on board of the different C. States ship under his Lordship's
   Command Concerning the Capture of the _Ismeralda_.

   Sir it was thus
   the importance of the Service performed by your Lordship to the
   States by the Capture of the Spanish Frigat _Ismeralda_, and the
   brillant manner in which this noble enterprize was conducted
   under your Command on the memorable night of the fifth
   of November, has aurgumented the claims which your previous
   services gave to the Consideration of the government and those
   that is Interested in thar cause as well as my present esteem.

   All those who partook in the risk and glory of this Interprise
   deserves also the estermation of thar Companions in the Army, and
   I enjoy the pleasure of being the Organ of thar Sentiments of
   Admiration Wich so important an action as praduced in the officers
   and army, Permit me tharfore to express such thar sentiments to
   your Lordship that may be communicated to the Officers and
   Seamen and troops of the Sqwardon.

   Regarding the premium for the Frigat It is to be regretted that
   the memorey of so herioic an Interprise should be mixed with the
   painful ideer that blood as been shed in Accomplishment, and
   we hope that your Lordship and the Gallant Officers and Seamen
   may be enabbled to give new days of Glorry to the cause of
   indispendence.

   Ship's Company, _O'Higgins_.

   N.B.--Warre One Single Sentiment his not been fulfilled.

This letter, though somewhat incomprehensible, was intended as a
farewell complimentary address to myself, previous to the desertion of
the flag-ship; and, had this taken place, there was no doubt that the
ships' companies of the whole squadron would have followed the example,
so that the Protector would have gained his ends, in spite of my
endeavours to keep the men faithful to the flag under which they were
engaged to serve.

Fortunately for Chili and myself, an occurrence took place which averted
the evil, and was brought about by the very means which the Protector
had devised to promote his individual views.

The occurrence alluded to, was the embarkation of large sums of money by
the Protector in his yacht _Sacramento_, which had cast out her ballast
to stow the silver, and in a merchant vessel in the harbour, to the
exclusion of the _Lantaro_ frigate, then at the anchorage. This money
was sent to Ancon, on the pretence of placing it in safety from any
attack by the Spanish forces, but possibly to secure it for the further
purposes of the Protector. The squadron having thus ocular demonstration
that its arrears could be paid, but were not, both officers and men
refused longer to continue in a service which had brought them nothing
but prolonged suffering.

My own views coincided with theirs, and I determined that the squadron
should be no longer starved nor defrauded. I therefore sailed to Ancon,
and personally seized the treasure, before witnesses; respecting all
that professed to belong to private individuals, and also the whole of
that contained in the Protector's schooner, _Sacramento_, considering it
his private property, though it could not have been other than plunder
wrested from the Limeños. Independently of this yacht-load of silver,
there were also on board, seven _surrones_ (sacks) of uncoined gold,
brought down on his account by the Legate Parroisien; so that, after all
the moveable wealth of Lima was supposed to have been previously
deposited for safety in the castles of Callao, but carried off by
Cantarac, the condition of the unhappy Limeños may be imagined, from the
additional sums of which they were subsequently deprived.

I immediately made proclamation, that all private individuals, having
the customary documents, might receive their property upon application,
and considerable sums were thus given up to Dr. Unanue, Don Juan Aguero,
Don Manuel Silva, Don Manuel Primo, Don Francisco Kamirez, and several
others, though connected with the Government. Besides which, I gave up
40,000 dollars to the commissary of the army, who claimed it; so that,
having returned all the money for which dockets were produced, there
remained 285,000 dollars, which was subsequently applied to the payment
of one year's arrears to every individual of the squadron; but relying
on the justice of the Chilian Government, I took no part myself,
reserving the small surplus that remained for the more pressing
exigencies and re-equipment of the squadron.

Accounts of the whole money seized, were forwarded to the Minister of
Marine at Valparaiso, as well as vouchers for its disbursement, and in
due course, I received the approbation of the Chilian Government for
what had been done.

General San Martin entreated, in the most earnest terms, the restoration
of the treasure, promising the faithful fulfilment of all his former
engagements. Letter after letter was sent, begging me to save the credit
of the Government, and pretending that the money seized was all the
Government possessed for indispensable daily expenses. To this I
replied, that had I been aware that the treasure spared in the
_Sacramento_ was the property of Government, and not that of the
Protector, I would have seized it also, and retained it till the debts
due to the squadron were liquidated. Finding all arguments unavailing,
and that no attention was paid to his threats, the Protector--to save
the credit of his Government--addressed a proclamation to the squadron,
confirming the distribution which was going on by my orders, at the same
time writing to me, that I "might employ the money as I thought proper."

San Martin afterwards accused me to the Chilian Government of seizing
the whole of the treasure, that in his yacht included, which, at a low
computation, must have been worth several millions of dollars, which
were all left untouched. He also asserted, that I had retained the
whole belonging to private individuals, though each _real_ claimed was
given up, as was well known to every individual concerned, and he also
knew that I did not retain a penny on my own account. Nevertheless, he
added, that I had kept the whole myself,--that, in consequence, the
squadron was in a state of mutiny, and the seamen were abandoning their
ships to offer their services to the Government of Peru! the fact being,
that those who went on shore to spend their pay after the fashion of
sailors, were prevented from returning on board, a lieutenant of my
flag-ship being put in jail for attempting to bring them off again.

The first intimation of this outrage was conveyed by the officer
himself, in the following letter, from his place of confinement.

   My Lord,

   Whilst obeying your Lordship's orders in bringing off the
   men to the _O'Higgins_, Captain Guise sent his Lieutenant to tell me
   that I could not ship any more men. My answer was, that, till I
   received contrary orders from you I could not think of desisting.
   I then went to Captain Guise to tell him your orders, and he told
   me, that it was the Governor's order that I should not do it; he
   likewise told me, that several officers had spoken against the
   Government, instancing Captain Cobbett and others. He then
   asked me, whether I thought that your Lordship's _robbery_! of the
   money at Ancon was right? and, whether I believed that the
   Government meant to keep its promise, and pay us, or not? My
   answer was, that I thought your Lordship had acted perfectly right,
   and that, in my opinion, the Government never intended to pay us;
   upon which, he ordered me to be seized.

   My Lord, I am now a prisoner in the Case-mates, and am told
   that the Governor has written to you on the subject. The men, my
   Lord, will, I have no doubt, come off, as many have promised me to
   do so, to-morrow morning. Hoping that your Lordship will enquire
   into the circumstance, I remain, &c. &c,

   J. PAYNTOR.

On receipt of this, I immediately demanded his release, which was
complied with.

Before distributing the money to the squadron, I took the precaution to
request that a commissary of the Government might be sent on board to
take part in the payment of the crews. As this was not complied with, I
again urged it, but without effect--the object of not attending to the
request being, as was afterwards learned, the expectation that I should
place the money in his hands ashore, when it doubtless would have been
seized, without payment to officers or men. This was, however, foreseen,
the Government being informed by me that "the money was on board ready
for distribution, whilst the people were on board ready to receive it,
there was, therefore no necessity to take it on shore;" it was then
distributed by my own officers.

Annoyed beyond measure at my having taken such steps to restore order in
the squadron by doing justice to the officers and men, the Protector, on
the very day, September 26th, on which he told me by letter to "make
what use I pleased of the money," sought to revenge himself by sending
on board the ships of the squadron his two _aides-de-camp_, Colonel
Paroissien and Captain Spry, with papers for distribution, stating that
"the squadron of Chili was under the command of the Protector of Peru,
and not under that of the Admiral, who was an inferior officer in the
service; and that it was consequently the duty of the Captains and
Commanders to obey the orders of the Protector and not mine." One of
these papers was immediately brought to me by that excellent and highly
honourable officer, Captain Simpson, of the _Araucano_ (now an Admiral
in the Chilian service), to whose ship's company it had been delivered.
These emissaries offered, in the name of the Protector, commissions, and
the promise of honours, titles, and estates to all such officers as
might accept service under the Government of Peru.

From the _Araucano_, the Protector's envoys went to the _Valdivia_,
where similar papers were given to the men, and Captain Cobbett, nephew
of the celebrated William Cobbett, was reminded of the preference which
an officer, for his own interests, ought to give to the service of a
rich state like Peru, in place of adhering to Chili, which must soon
dwindle to comparative insignificance; besides which the authority of
the Protector over the Chilian forces being unquestionable, it was the
duty of the officers to obey the orders of the Protector as
General-in-Chief. Captain Cobbett, who was a faithful and excellent
officer, sarcastically inquired of Spry whether, if his disobedience to
the Admiral brought him to a court-martial, the Protector's authority
would ensure him an acquittal? This closed the argument; for Spry being
at the time under sentence of court-martial, the question was much too
pertinent to be pleasant, especially as he by no means felt confident
that Cobbett might not seize him as a deserter.

Unfortunately for the emissaries, my flag-captain, Crosbie, was on a
visit to Captain Cobbett, and on learning their errand he pushed off to
the flag-ship with the intelligence. Observing this movement they
immediately followed, judging it more prudent to visit me than to run
the risk of being compelled so to do. At one o'clock in the morning
their boat came alongside, when Paroissien solicited an interview, Spry
remaining in the boat, having his own reasons for not wishing to attract
my attention. Paroissien then addressed me with the most high-flown
promises, assuring me of the Protector's wish, notwithstanding all that
had occurred, to confer upon me the highest honours and rewards, amongst
others the decoration of the newly-created order of "the Sun," and
telling me how much better it would be for me to be First Admiral of a
rich country like Peru, than Vice-Admiral of a poor province like Chili.
He assured me, as one of the Commissioners of confiscated property, that
it was the intention of the Protector to present me with a most valuable
estate, and regretted that the present unlucky difference should form an
obstacle to the Protector's intentions to confer upon me the command of
the Peruvian navy.

Perceiving that he felt nervously uneasy in his attempt at negotiation,
I reminded him that the Peruvian navy had no existence except in
imagination; that I had no doubt whatever of his desire for my
prosperity, but that it might be more agreeable to him to join me in a
bottle of wine than to reiterate his regrets and lamentations. After
taking a glass he went into his boat, and pulled off, glad no doubt to
escape so easily, not that it occurred to me to resent the treachery of
visiting the ships of the squadron in the dark, to unsettle the minds of
the officers and men.

This, however, and other efforts proved but too successful, twenty-three
officers abandoning the Chilian service, together with all the foreign
seamen, who went on shore to spend their pay, and who were either
forced, or allured by promises of a year's additional pay to remain, so
that the squadron was half unmanned.

The fortress, notwithstanding the supplies so successfully introduced by
General Cantarac, having again--by the vigilance of the squadron--been
starved into surrender, I received an order immediately to quit Callao
and proceed to Chili, although the Peruvian Government believed that
from the abandonment of the squadron by the officers and foreign seamen,
it would not be possible to comply with the order. The following is
Monteagudo's letter conveying the commands of the Protector:--

   Lima, Sept. 26th, 1821.
   My Lord,

   Your note of yesterday, in which you explain the motives
   which induced you to decline complying with the positive orders of
   the Protector, _temporarily_ to restore the money which you forcibly
   took at Ancon, has frustrated the hopes which the Government
   entertained of a happy termination to this most disagreeable of all
   affairs which have occurred during the expedition.

   To answer your Excellency in detail, it will be necessary to enter
   into an investigation of acts which cannot be fully understood without
   referring to official communications and documents which prove
   the interest which has been taken in the necessities of the squadron.

   (Here follows a reiteration of the _promises_ and good intentions of
   the Protector, with which the reader is already well acquainted.)

   This has been a mortal blow to the State, and worse could not
   have been received from the hand of an enemy, there only remaining
   to us a hope in the moderation and patient suffering of the
   valiant men who have sacrificed all!

   You will immediately sail from this port to Chili, with the whole
   squadron under your command, and there deliver up the money
   which you have seized, and which you possess without any pretext
   to hold it. In communicating this order to your Excellency, the
   Government cannot avoid expressing its regret at being reduced to
   this extremity towards a chief with whom it has been connected by
   ties of friendship and high consideration since August 20th, 1820.

   I have to complain of the style of your Excellency's Secretary,
   who, perhaps from his ignorance of the idiom of the Spanish
   language, cannot express himself with decency--his soul not having
   been formed to conceive correct ideas.

   MONTEAGUDO.

The complaining tone of this letter about the "valiant sacrificing all,"
is worthy of the writer; when I had left untouched many times the amount
seized, and the army, according to the admission of the Protectoral
Government, had received two-thirds of its pay, whilst the squadron had
even been suffered to starve. On the 28th I replied to the Minister as
follows:--

   Sir,

   I should have felt uneasy, had the letter you addressed
   to me contained the commands of the Protector to quit the ports of
   Peru without reason assigned, and I should have been distressed
   had his motives been founded in reason, or on facts; but finding
   the order based on the groundless imputation that I had declined to
   do what I had no power to effect, I console myself that the Protector
   will ultimately be satisfied that no blame rests on me. At all
   events, I have the gratification of a mind unconscious of wrong, and
   gladdened by the cheering conviction that, however facts may be
   distorted by sycophancy, men who view things in their proper
   colours will do me the justice I deserve.

   You address me as though I required to be convinced of your
   good intentions. No, Sir, it is the seamen who want convincing,
   for it is they who put no faith in professions so often broken. They
   are men of few words and decisive acts, and say that "for their
   labour they have a right to pay and food, and will work no longer
   than they are paid and fed"--though this may be uncourtly
   language, unfit for the ear of high authority. They urge, moreover,
   that they have had no pay whatever, whilst their fellow-labourers,
   the soldiers, have had two-thirds of their wages; they were starved,
   or living on stinking _charqui_, whilst the troops were wholly fed on
   beef and mutton; they had no grog, whilst the troops had money
   to obtain that favourite beverage, and anything else they desired.
   Such, Sir, are the rough grounds on which an English seaman
   founds his opinions. He expects an equivalent for the fulfilment
   of his contract, which, on his part, is performed with fidelity; but,
   if his rights are withheld, he is as boisterous as the element on
   which he lives. It is of no use, therefore, to convince me, but
   them.

   In what communication, Sir, have I insisted on the payment of
   200,000 dollars. I sent you an account of money due, but told you
   in my letter that it was the mutinous seamen who demanded the
   disbursements, and that I was doing all in my power, though
   without effect, to restrain their violence and allay their fears. You
   tell me in your letter that it was impossible to pay the clamorous
   crews. How, then, is it _that they are now paid out of the very money
   then_ lying at your disposal, I having left untouched ten times as much?
   My warning to you, that they were no longer to be trifled with, was
   founded on a long acquaintance with their character and disposition;
   and facts have proved, and may more fully prove, the truth of what
   I told you.

   Why, Sir, is the word "immediate" put into your order to go
   forth from this port? Would it not have been more decorous to
   have been less peremptory, knowing, as you do, that the delay of
   payment had unmanned the ships--that the total disregard of all
   my applications had left the squadron destitute--and that the men
   were enticed away by persons acting under the Peruvian Government?
   This being so, why are matters pushed to this extremity?

   I thank you for the _approval of my services since the 20th of
   August_, 1820, and assure you that no abatement of my zeal for the
   Protector's interest took place till the 5th of August, when I became
   acquainted with his Excellency's installation, and when, in your
   presence, he uttered sentiments that struck a thrill through my
   frame, which no subsequent act, nor protestation of intentions, has
   been able to mitigate. Did he not say--aye, did you not hear him
   declare, that he would never pay the debt to Chili, nor that due to
   the navy, unless Chili would sell the squadron to Peru? What
   would you have thought of me as an officer, sworn to be faithful to
   the state of Chili, had I listened to such language in cold, calculating
   silence, weighing my decision in the scale of personal interest?
   No, Sir, the promise of San Martin, that "my fortune should be
   equal to his own," will not warp from the path of honour

   Your obedient, humble Servant,
   COCHRANE.

After a lapse of nearly forty years' anxious consideration, I cannot
reproach myself with having done any wrong in the seizure of the money
of the Protectoral Government. General San Martin and myself had been,
in our respective departments, deputed to liberate Peru from Spain, and
to give to the Peruvians the same free institutions which Chili herself
enjoyed. The first part of our object had been fully effected by the
achievements and vigilance of the squadron; the second part was
frustrated by General San Martin arrogating to himself despotic power,
which set at naught the wishes and voice of the people. As "my fortune
in common with his own" was only to be secured by acquiescence in the
wrong he had done to Chili by casting off his allegiance to her, and by
upholding him in the still greater wrong he was inflicting on Peru, I
did not choose to sacrifice my self-esteem and professional character by
lending myself as an instrument to purposes so unworthy. I did all in my
power to warn General San Martin of the consequences of ambition so
ill-directed, but the warning was neglected, if not despised. Chili
trusted to him to defray the expenses of the squadron when its
objects--as laid down by the Supreme Director--should be accomplished;
but in place of fulfilling the obligation, he permitted the squadron to
starve, its crews to go in rags, and the ships to be in perpetual danger
for want of the proper equipment which Chili could not afford to give
them when they sailed from Valparaiso. The pretence for this neglect was
want of means, though at the same time money to a vast amount was sent
away from the capital to Ancon. Seeing that no intention existed on the
part of the Protector's Government to do justice to the Chilian
squadron, whilst every effort was made to excite discontent among the
officers and men with the purpose of procuring their transfer to Peru, I
seized the public money, satisfied the men, and saved the navy to the
Chilian Republic, which afterwards warmly thanked me for what I had
done. Despite the obloquy cast upon me by the Protector's Government,
there was nothing wrong in the course I pursued, if only for the reason
that if the Chilian squadron was to be preserved, _it was impossible for
me to have done otherwise_. Years of reflection have only produced the
conviction, that, were I again placed in similar circumstances, I should
adopt precisely the same course.



CHAPTER IX.

ARRIVAL AT GUAYAQUIL--ADDRESS TO GUAYAQUILENOS--INJURIOUS MONOPOLIES
--MINISTERIAL FOLLY--DEPARTURE FROM GUAYAQUIL--ARRIVAL IN
MEXICO--ANCHOR AT ACAPULCO--MOCK AMBASSADORS--PLOT AGAINST ME--RETURN
TO GUAYAQUIL--VENGANZA TAKEN POSSESSION OF--AGREEMENT WITH
JUNTA--GENERAL LA MAR--ORDERS TO WITHHOLD SUPPLIES--ABOMINABLE
CRUELTY--COURTLY SPLENDOUR--DESTRUCTION OF A DIVISION OF THE
ARMY--DISSATISFACTION OF OFFICERS--RENEWED OVERTURES FROM SAN
MARTIN--THEIR REFUSAL BY ME--WARNING TO THE CHILIAN GOVERNMENT.


The orders of the Protector to proceed to Chili were not complied with,
1st, because having thrown off his allegiance to Chili, he had no right
to interfere with the squadron; and, 2ndly, as the Spanish frigates
remained at large, my mission was incomplete till they were taken or
destroyed.

Before going in quest of them, it was essential to repair, equip, and
provision the ships, none of which purposes could be effected in Peru,
the Protector not only having refused supplies, but having also issued
orders on the coast to withhold necessaries of all kinds even to wood
and water. From want of stores, none of the ships were fit for sea; even
the _Valdivia_, so admirably found when captured, was now in as bad a
condition as the rest, from the necessity which had arisen of
distributing her equipment amongst the other ships; and to complete her
inefficiency, the Protector refused to restore the anchors which had
been cut away from her bows at the time of her capture, thus adding to
our embarrassment.

Many of the officers had gone over to the service of Peru, and the
foreign seamen had been kept on shore in such numbers, that there were
not sufficient left to perform the duties of reefing and steering. I
therefore resolved on sending part of the squadron to Chili, and with
the remainder to proceed to Guayaquil, in order to repair and refit for
a cruise on the coast of Mexico in search of the Spanish frigates.

We reached Guayaquil on the 18th of October, and were extremely well
received by the authorities, who saluted the Chilian flag, the like
compliment being paid to their own. The work of repairing and refitting
occupied six weeks, during which period the newly-constituted Government
rendered us all the assistance in its power, entering into the most
friendly intercourse with us. The expenses, which were heavy, were all
defrayed out of the uncondemned prize-money remaining on board, this
rightfully belonging to the officers and seamen, as never having had
their previous claims satisfied by the Government, on which account it
had been retained. To inspire the seamen with the reasonable expectation
that the Chilian Government would reimburse them for their generosity, I
added money of my own, on which they willingly consented to the
appropriation of that due to the squadron.

Before quitting the anchorage, I was honoured with a public address, and
thinking the opportunity good for striking a blow at those Spanish
prejudices which, in spite of independence, still lingered from force of
habit, the compliment was returned by the following address:--

   GUAYAQUILENOS,

   The reception which the Chilian squadron has met
   with from you not only shews the generosity of your sentiments, but
   proves that a people capable of asserting their independence in spite
   of arbitrary power must always possess noble and exalted feelings.
   Believe me, that the state of Chili will ever be grateful for your
   assistance, and more especially the Supreme Director, by whose
   exertions the squadron was created, and to whom, in fact, South
   America owes whatever benefit she may have derived from its
   services.

   May you be as free as you are independent, and as independent
   as you deserve to be free! With the liberty of the press, now
   protected by your excellent Government, which discriminates
   enlightenment from that fount, Guayaquil can never again be
   enslaved.

   See what difference a year of independence has produced in public
   opinion. In those whom you then looked upon as enemies, you have
   discovered your truest friends, whilst those formerly esteemed as
   friends have proved enemies. Remember your former ideas on
   commerce and manufactures, and compare them with those which
   you at present entertain. Accustomed to the blind habits of Spanish
   monopoly, you then believed that Guayaquil would be robbed, were
   not her commerce limited to her own merchants. All foreigners
   were forbidden by restrictive laws from attending even to their own
   business and interests: now you appreciate a true policy, and your
   enlightened Government is ready to further public opinion in the
   promotion of your riches, strength, and happiness, as well as to assist
   these, by disseminating through the press the political opinions of
   great and wise men--without fear of the Inquisition, the faggot, or
   the stake.

   It is very gratifying to me to observe the change which has taken
   place in your ideas of political economy, and to see that you can
   appreciate and despise the clamour of the few who would still interrupt
   the public prosperity; though it is difficult to believe how any
   citizen of Guayaquil can be capable of opposing his private interest
   to the public good, as though his particular profit were superior to
   that of the community, or as if commerce, agriculture, and manufactures
   were to be paralysed for his especial behoof.

   Guayaquilenos! Let your public press declare the consequences of
   monopoly, and affix your names to the defence of your enlightened
   system. Let it shew that, if your province contains 80,000 inhabitants,
   and that if 80 of these are privileged merchants according to
   the old system, 9,999 persons out of 10,000 must suffer because
   their cotton, coffee, tobacco, timber, and other productions must
   come into the hands of the monopolist, as the only purchaser of
   what they have to sell, and the only seller of what they must
   necessarily buy! the effect being that he will buy at the lowest
   possible rate, and sell at the dearest, so that not only are the
   9,999 injured, but the lands will remain waste, the manufactories
   without workmen, and the people will be lazy and poor for want of
   a stimulus, it being a law of nature that no man will labour solely
   for the gain of another.

   Tell the monopolist that the true method of acquiring general
   riches, political power, and even his own private advantage, is to sell
   his country's produce as high, and foreign goods as low as possible--and
   that public competition can alone accomplish this. Let foreign
   merchants who bring capital, and those who practise any art or
   handicraft, be permitted to settle freely; and thus a competition
   will be formed, from which all must reap advantage.

   Then will land and fixed property increase in value; the
   magazines, instead of being the receptacles of filth and crime, will
   be full of the richest foreign and domestic productions, and all will
   be energy and activity, because the reward will be in proportion to
   the labour. Your river will be filled with ships, and the monopolist
   degraded and shamed. You will bless the day in which Omnipotence
   permitted the veil of obscurity to be rent asunder, under which the
   despotism of Spain, the abominable tyranny of the Inquisition, and
   the want of liberty of the press, so long hid the truth from your
   sight.

   Let your customs' duties be moderate, in order to promote the
   greatest possible consumption of foreign and domestic goods; then
   smuggling will cease, and the returns to the treasury increase. Let
   every man do as he pleases as regards his own property, views, and
   interests; because every individual will watch over his own with
   more zeal than senates, ministers, or kings. By your enlarged
   views set an example to the New World; and thus, as Guayaquil
   is from its situation the _Central Republic_, it will become the centre
   of the agriculture, commerce, and riches of the Pacific.

   Guayaquilenos! The liberality of your sentiments, and the justice
   of your acts and opinions, are a bulwark to your independence more
   secure than that of armies and squadrons. That you may pursue
   the path which will render you as free and happy as the territory is
   fertile, and may be rendered productive, is the sincere wish of your
   obliged friend and servant,

   COCHRANE.

The English reader may consider a lecture of this nature superfluous to
an emancipated people, but the adherence to injurious monoplies, in
spite of independence, was one of the most marked features of the South
American Republics, and one which I never lost an opportunity of
combating. Even the Chilian Republic, which was amongst the first to
assert its freedom, increased its monopolistic practices, instead of
diminishing them. One or two examples will not be here out of place.

English malt liquor bore a very high price in Chili, from the heavy
freight and customs' duties. An ingenious Scotchman, named Macfarlane,
set up a brewery at considerable expense, and malt costing in Chili
barely a shilling per _fanega_ (about a bushel), soon produced beer of a
fine quality, at a low price. The Government forthwith imposed a duty on
his beer equal to the whole freight from England, customs' dues, and his
profit, the consequence being, that the brewery was stopped and the
capital employed lost. He had unwittingly interfered with the
established duties on beer!

Some enterprising Americans formed a whale fishery on the Chilian coast
near Coquimbo, where the sperm whale abounded, and so successful was the
fishery, that the speculation promised a fortune to all concerned. A
large plant had been provided, including abundance of casks to contain
the oil. The Government directed the whole of the casks to be seized for
the purpose of watering the squadron, that being easier than to provide
them themselves, which being done, pursuant to orders, the Americans
formed pits lined with clay, in which the oil was put till fresh casks
could be procured. On this, the Governor of Coquimbo forbade the
practice, as the wind might waft an unpleasant smell to Coquimbo, though
the trade wind never blew in that direction. The Americans were
therefore compelled to abandon the pursuit, and with it several sperm
whales which were lying in the bay ready for boiling.

An enterprising English engineer, Mr. Miers, brought out complete
machinery for smelting, rolling, and manufacturing copper, purchasing
land whereon to erect his factory. As soon as his purpose became known,
he was involved in a long and expensive law-suit to prevent the use of
the land which he had bought, the result being great pecuniary loss,
complete prevention of his operations, and the final removal of such of
his machinery as was not utterly spoiled, to Brazil.

It would be easy to multiply similar instances to a great extent, but
these will show that my advice to the Guayaquilenos was not unnecessary;
and to give counsel of this nature, wherever it could be applied, was my
invariable practice, in place of engaging in petty intrigues, or
bargaining for personal power or advantages, which, situated as I was, I
could have commanded to any extent by a sacrifice of my own principles.
Efforts of the above nature to enlighten the people, rendered me
obnoxious to men in power, as interfering with their cherished
monoplies, out of which they contrived to extract individual profit.

The necessity for a speedy pursuit of the enemy's frigates, precluded
more than a temporary repair of the ships; nothing, indeed, had been
done to remedy the leak in the hull of the flag-ship, as, from the
rotten state of her masts, we durst not venture to heave her down, so
that when we got in a sea-way she made six feet of water a day.

We quitted the Guayaquil river on the 3rd of December, coasting along
the shore, and examining every bay for the objects of our search. On the
5th we reached Salango, where we again watered the ships, there being
only twenty-three tons of water casks on board the flag-ship. On the
11th we reached Cocos Island, when we found and took possession of an
English pirate, commanded by a man, named Blair. On the following day we
captured a _felucca_, which turned out to be a deserter from Callao.
From the men on board we learned that, after my departure, San Martin
had refused to fulfil the promises by which they had been induced to
remain, though he had thus allured nearly the whole of the foreign
seamen, who comprised the only skilled portion of the Chilian squadron,
into the service of Peru. The _felucca_ thus manned, and sent as a
_guarda costa_ to Chorillas, the men took advantage of the absence of
their captain on shore, and seized the vessel, which they named the
_Retaliation_, having put to sea, no doubt with the intention of turning
pirates. As they had committed no depredations, and I had no wish to be
encumbered with them, they were suffered to escape.

On the 14th we made the coast of Mexico, the leak of the flag-ship daily
increasing, and on the 19th we anchored in the bay of Fonseca, with five
feet of water in the hold, the chain pumps being so worn as to be
useless, there being no artificers on board to repair them, the ship was
only kept afloat by the greatest possible exertions, in which my
personal skill in smiths' work had to be called into requisition.

After three days' constant baling at the hatchways, we got two pumps
from the _Valdivia_; but these proving too short, I ordered holes to be
cut through the ships' sides, on a level with the berth deck, and thus
managed to keep her clear till the old pumps could be refitted. Nearly
all our ammunition was spoiled, and, in order to preserve the dry
provisions, we were compelled to stow them in the hammock-nettings.

Having transferred forty men from the other ships to assist at the
pumps, we quitted Fonseca bay on the 28th, and on the 6th of January,
1822, arrived at Tehuantepec, a volcano lighting us every night. This
was one of the most imposing sights I ever beheld; large streams of
molten lava pouring down the sides of the mountain, whilst at
intervals, huge masses of solid burning matter were hurled into the air,
and rebounding from their fall, ricocheted down the declivity till they
found a resting place at its base.

On the 29th we anchored at Acapulco, where we met the _Araucano_ and
_Mercedes_, the latter having been sent on to gain intelligence of the
Spanish frigates. We were civilly received by the Governor, though not
without misgivings, on his part, that we might attempt to seize some
Spanish merchantmen at anchor in the harbour; so that we found the fort
manned by a strong garrison, and other preparations made to receive us
in case of hostile demonstration.

We were not a little surprised at this, as nothing could be more
friendly than our intentions towards the newly emancipated Republic. The
mystery was, however, soon cleared up. When at Guayaquil, we met with
two officers, General Wavell and Colonel O'Reilly, to whom the Chilian
Government had given passports to quit the country, not estimating the
value of their services as tantamount to their pay. As no secret was
made of the object of the Chilian squadron, they had, owing to our delay
on the coast, carried their own version of our mission to Mexico, and
had reported to the Mexican Government, both personally and by letter,
that Lord Cochrane had possessed himself of the Chilian Navy,--plundered
the vessels belonging to Peru,--was now on a piratical cruise,--and was
coming to ravage the coast of Mexico; hence the preparations which had
been made.

The two worthies whom I have mentioned had represented to the
authorities at Guayaquil that they were ambassadors from Chili to
Mexico, deputed to congratulate the Mexican Government on their
achievement of independence. Knowing this to be false, I requested them
to shew their credentials, which of course they could not do. Their
passports were then demanded, and evinced by their dates that the
pretended ambassadors had quitted Chili prior to the intelligence of the
establishment of independence in Mexico. This disclosure having become
known to the lady of the Captain-General of Guatemala, who happened to
be at Guayaquil, she forwarded the account to her husband, and he
reported it to the Mexican authorities, who were thus informed of the
true character of their visitors; who, in revenge, trumped up the story
of our piratical intentions, to which the Governor of Acapulco attached
sufficient importance to strengthen his forts as narrated.

The reserve, however, immediately wore off, and the most cordial
relations were entered into; the President of Mexico, Iturbide, writing
me a very polite letter, regretting that he could not visit me
personally, but inviting me to repair to his court, assuring me of the
most honourable reception. This, of course, I could not accept.

On the 2nd of February, a vessel arrived at Acapulco, and reported the
Spanish frigates to the southward, whither, notwithstanding the
unseaworthy state of the ships, I determined to proceed in search of
them.

During our stay an officer of marines, named Erescano--who by cruelty to
his prisoners had made himself notorious at Valdivia--endeavoured to
revenge my disapprobation of his conduct by representing to the men,
that, notwithstanding the expenses we had been put to, there was still
money on board the flag-ship, and that it ought to be divided amongst
them. Failing in this, he had laid a plot to get possession of the
chest, even at the cost of my assassination. All this was duly reported
to me by the commander of the _Valdivia_, Captain Cobbett.

As I did not wish to produce a ferment by punishing this diabolical plot
as it deserved, I contented myself with thwarting its execution, till we
were under weigh, when I ordered Captain Cobbett to send Erescano on
shore with a despatch to the Governor, detailing the whole plot; the
result being, that the traitor was left on shore, the squadron sailing
without him. What afterwards became of him I never heard.

After despatching the _Independencia_ and _Araucano_ to California for
the purpose of purchasing provisions, with instructions to follow us to
Guayaquil, we stood down the coast, and when off Tehuantepec,
encountered a gale of wind, which, owing to the bad state of the
frigate, threatened her destruction. To add to our distress, a sea
struck the _Valdivia_--to which vessel we contemplated escaping--and
forced in the timbers on her port side, so that she was only saved from
sinking by passing a sail over the leak, till the damage could be
repaired.

On the 5th of March we made the coast of Esmeraldas, and came to an
anchor in the bay of Tacames, where we learned that the Spanish frigates
had some time before left for Guayaquil. On receipt of this intelligence
we immediately pursued our voyage, and on the 13th anchored off the
forts of Guayaquil, where we found the _Venganza_.

Our reception was not of the same cordial nature as on the previous
visit--two agents of San Martin having arrived, who by promises had
gained over the Government to the Protector's interests, and had excited
in their minds a jealousy of me which was as unexpected as ill-founded.
Some attempts were even made to annoy me; but as, upon their
manifestation, I laid the flag-ship alongside the _Venganza_, civility
was enforced.

The _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, being short of provisions, were compelled
by our close pursuit, to put into Guayaquil, daily expecting us to
follow. Previous to our arrival, the Peruvian envoy, Salasar, had so
impressed upon the officers commanding the certainty of their being
captured by the Chilian squadron, that he had induced them to give up
the ships to Peru, on the promise that the Protectoral Government would
pay the whole of the officers and crews all the arrears due to them, and
that those who chose to remain in South America should be naturalized,
with lands and pensions assigned to them; whilst such as were desirous
of returning to Spain should have their passages defrayed by the
Peruvian Government.

Many of the Spanish officers and most of the crews were adverse to the
surrender of the ships, so that a mutiny was the consequence; when, at
the instance of Salasar, the Government of Guayaquil was induced to
sanction an assertion that the Chilian squadron was at anchor in the bay
of La Manta, and that letters had been received from me announcing my
intention to come to Guayaquil and seize the ships. This mendacity had
the desired effect, and both officers and crews accepted the terms
offered; so that San Martin's agents had thus tricked the Chilian
squadron out of its prizes.

Under the before-mentioned impression the _Prueba_ was hastily sent to
Callao before our arrival, but the _Venganza_, being in a condition
unfit for sea, remained at Guayaquil. On being positively assured of the
dishonourable transaction which had taken place, on the morning of the
14th of March I sent Captain Crosbie on board the _Venganza_ to take
possession, of her, for Chili and Peru jointly, being unwilling to
embroil Chili in hostilities with Guayaquil by seizing her on our own
account, as we were indisputably entitled to do, having chased her from
port to port, until, destitute of provisions, she was compelled to take
refuge in that port.

My orders to Captain Crosbie were to hoist at the peak of the
_Venganza_, the flag of Chili conjointly with that of Peru. This act
gave great offence to the Guayaquil Government, which manned its
gun-boats, erected breast-works, and brought guns to the river side with
the apparent intention of firing upon us; the Spanish sailors, who
shortly before had sold their ships from the dread of having to fight,
being extremely active in these hostile demonstrations.

Upon this, I ordered the _Valdivia_ to drift with the flood tide in the
direction of the gun-boats, now filled with Spanish officers and seamen.
Imagining that the frigate was about to attack them--though there was no
intention of the kind--these heroes ran the boats ashore, and took to
their heels in most admired disorder, not stopping till they had gained
the protection of the city.

The Junta, finding that we did not consider their warlike demonstration
worthy of notice, remonstrated at my taking possession of the
_Venganza_, but without effect, as I was not going to permit the Chilian
squadron to be thus cheated out of its prize. I therefore proposed such
terms as were best calculated to be accepted and ratified by the Junta
of Government, composed of Olmedo, Kimena, and Roco, as follows:--

   1st.--The frigate _Venganza_ shall remain as belonging to the
   Government of Guayaquil, and shall hoist her flag, which shall be
   duly saluted.

   2nd.--Guayaquil guarantees to the Chilian squadron, on responsibility
   of 40,000 dollars, that the frigate _Venganza_ shall not be
   delivered to, nor negotiated for with any Government, till those of
   Chili and Peru shall have decided on what they may esteem most
   just. Moreover, the Government of Guayaquil is bound to destroy
   her rather than consent that the said vessel shall serve any other
   state till such decision be made.

   _3rd_.--Any Government which may henceforward be established
   in Guayaquil shall be bound to the fulfilment of the articles here
   made.

   _4th_.--These articles shall be understood literally, and in good
   faith, without mental reservations or restrictions.

   (Signed)    &c. &c.

After the ratification of this agreement, the Government of Guayaquil
addressed to me a letter acknowledging the important services which had
been conferred on the States of South America, and assuring me that
"Guayaquil would always be the first to honour my name, and the last to
forget my unparalleled achievements," &c, &c. Yet no sooner had I sailed
from the port, than the _Venganza_ was given up to the agent of Peru,
but the 40,000 dollars have never been paid.

At Guayaquil, I met General La Mar, the late governor of the fortress of
Callao; and a report having been circulated by the Peruvian Government
that during the recent blockade I had made an offer to supply the
fortress with provisions, in order to prevent its falling into the hands
of the Protector, I requested the General to favour me with a statement
whether I did or did not promise to succour his garrison, to which
request the General obligingly returned the following answer:--

   Guayaquil, March 13th, 1823.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   In consequence of the official note which I yesterday
   received from your Excellency through the hands of the Government,
   it is my duty to assert that I have neither said, nor written,
   nor ever heard that you proposed to supply with provisions the place
   of Callao during the whole of the time that it was under my charge.
   God preserve your Excellency many years.

   (Signed)    JOSE DE LA MAR.

On the 27th we left the Guayaquil river, and on the 29th fell in with
Captain Simpson, of the _Araucano_, whose crew had mutinied and carried
off the ship. On the 12th of April we reached Guambucho, whither we had
gone for the purpose of taking in water. To our surprise the Alcalde
shewed a written order from San Martin, telling him that if any vessel
of war belonging to Chili touched there he was to forbid their landing,
and to deny assistance of every kind, not even permitting them to obtain
wood and water.

To this order no attention was paid by us, and we took on board whatever
was required, remaining further to repair the _Valdivia_. On the 16th we
sailed, and on the 25th anchored at Callao, where we found the _Prueba_
under Peruvian colours, and commanded by the senior Chilian captain, who
had abandoned the squadron! On our arrival she was immediately hauled in
close under the batteries, with guns housed, and ports closed, whilst
she was so crammed with troops that three died on the following night
from suffocation; these steps being taken to prevent her sharing the
fate of the _Esmeralda_. To calm their fears, I wrote to the Government
that there was no intention of taking her, otherwise I would have done
so, and at midday too in spite of any such precautions.

Lima was at this time in an extraordinary condition, there being no less
than five different Peruvian flags flying in the bay and on the
batteries. The Protector had passed a decree ordering that all Spaniards
who might quit the place should surrender half their property to the
public treasury, or the whole should be confiscated, and the owners
exiled. Another decree imposed the penalties of exile and confiscation
of property upon all Spaniards who should appear in the streets wearing
a cloak; also against any who should be found in private conversation!
The punishment of death was awarded against all who should be out of
their houses after sunset; and confiscation and death were pronounced on
all who possessed any kind of weapons except table-knives! A wealthy
lady in Lima was so annoyed at the rigour of these decrees, that her
patriotism overcame her prudence, and having called the Protector ill
names, she was compelled to give up her property. She was then habited
in the garb of the Inquisition,--a garment painted with imaginary
devils!--and taken to the great square, where an accusatory libel being
fastened to her breast, a human bone was forced into her mouth--her
tongue being condemned as the offending member--and then secured; in
which state, with a halter round her neck, she was paraded through the
streets by the common hangman, and afterwards exiled to Callao, where
after two days she died from mental anguish arising from the treatment
she had received. Such was the liberty conceded to Peru.

In the midst of this national degradation, the Protector had assumed the
style of a Sovereign Prince. An order of nobility was established, under
the title of "The Institute of the Sun," the insignia being a golden sun
suspended from a white ribbon, the Chilian officers who had abandoned
the squadron coming in for a full share as the reward of their
subserviency.

A quasi-royal guard was established, consisting of the leading youth of
the city, who formed the Protector's escort in public; a precaution
which, notwithstanding that the exasperated Limeños were weaponless, was
not altogether unnecessary. The Solar nobility were permitted to place
their armorial bearings in front of their houses, with the sun blazoned
in the centre, which was certainly an addition to, if not an improvement
on all previous orders of nobility. In short, the Limeños had a Republic
swarming with marquises, counts, viscounts, and other titles of
monarchy, to which consummation all expected the Protector to aspire;
the more so, as the only unfettered portion of the press was that which
saluted him under the title of Emperor. (_See Appendix, Ode of "The
Dove," sung in celebration, of our Protector and Emperor of Peru!_)

The strength of a State so constituted did not keep pace with the
brilliancy of its court. On the 7th of April, General Cantarac had
fallen upon a division of the liberating army, and cut up or made
prisoners of the whole, capturing 5,000 muskets, the military chest,
containing 100,000 dollars, and all their ammunition and baggage. It
would have been thought that so serious a disaster occurring amongst a
justly-exasperated people would have caused some embarrassment to the
Government, but the Gazette of the 13th of April almost turned it into
matter for congratulation.

   LIMEÑOS,

   The division of the south, _without having been beaten_, has
   been surprised and dispersed. In a long campaign all cannot be
   prosperity. You know _my_ character, and you know that _I_ have
   always spoken the truth! I do not mean to search for consolation
   in conflicts, notwithstanding, I dare to assure you, that the iniquitous
   and tyrannical empire of the Spaniards in Peru will cease in the
   year 1823. I will make an ingenuous confession to you. It was
   my intention to go in search of repose after so many years of agitation,
   but I believed your independence was not secured. Some
   trifling danger now presents itself, and so long as there remains the
   least appearance of it, till you are free you shall not be left by your
   faithful friend,

   SAN MARTIN.

His proclamation to the army is still more extraordinary:--

   Companions of the United Army,

   Your brothers in the division of the south
   have not been beaten--but they have been dispersed. To you it
   belongs to revenge this insult. You are valiant, and have known
   long ago the path to glory. Sharpen well your bayonets and your
   swords. The campaign of Peru shall finish in this year. Your old
   general assures it. Prepare to conquer!

   SAN MARTIN.

To the inhabitants of the interior, proclamations of a still more
bombastic nature were despatched, in which they were assured that a
reverse of this kind "weighed nothing in the balance of destiny of Peru.
Providence protects us, and by this action will accelerate the ruin of
the enemies of Peru. Proud of their first victory, _they will spare us
part of our march in search of them_. Fear not! the army that _drove
them from the capital_ is ready to punish them a third time, and to
punish them for ever!"

The army, however, rightly dreaded another reverse, and what remained of
the Chilian force was discontented, as no promise to them had been
fulfilled. All gold and silver had disappeared, and paper money was
issued by the Government in its stead. Contributions from the already
drained inhabitants were increased, and had to be collected at the point
of the bayonet. In short, on my arrival, Peru presented the
extraordinary spectacle of a court whose minions indulged in every
species of costly luxury, and a people impoverished to the dregs to
administer to their rapacity.

Those who had condemned my conduct in taking possession of the money at
Ancon, now admitted that I had adopted the only possible step to
preserve the squadron of Chili. The officers of the liberating army sent
me deplorable accounts of the state of affairs; and the regiment of
Numantia, which had deserted from the Spaniards soon after the capture
of the _Esmeralda_, sent an officer, Captain Doronso, with a message,
asking me to receive them on board, and convey them to Colombia, to
which province they belonged.

My appearance in the port of Callao caused serious, though, as far as I
was concerned, unnecessary alarm to the Government, to which I
transmitted a fresh demand for the sums due to the squadron, further
alluding, in no measured language, to the events which had taken place
at Guayaquil. Without replying to this by letter, Monteagudo came off to
the _O'Higgins_, lamenting that I should have resorted to such
intemperate expressions, as the Protector, before its receipt, had
written me a private letter praying for an interview, but on the receipt
of my note he became so indignant as to place his health in danger.
Monteagudo further assured me that in that letter he had made me the
offer of a large estate, and the decoration of the "Sun" set in
diamonds, if I would consent to command the united navies of Chili and
Peru, in a contemplated expedition to capture the Philippine Islands, by
which I should make an immense fortune. My reply was, "Tell the
Protector from me, Mr. Monteagudo, that if, after the conduct he has
pursued he had sent me a private letter, on any such subject, it would
certainly have been returned unanswered; and you may also tell him, that
it is not my wish to injure him; I neither fear him nor hate him, but I
disapprove of his conduct."

Monteagudo, in spite of his reception, begged of me to reconsider my
determination, saying that the Marquis of Torre Tagle had got ready his
house for my reception; asking me further to recal the letter I had
written the day before, and accept the offers which had been made. I
again told him that "I would not accept either honours or rewards from a
Government constituted in defiance of solemn pledges; nor would I set
foot in a country governed not only without law, but contrary to law.
Neither would I recal my letter, my habits were frugal, and my means
sufficient without a fortune from the Philippine Islands." Finding he
could make no impression upon me, and not liking the scowl on the
countenances of those on board, though he wore his blazing decoration
of the first order of the "Sun," and was covered with ribbons and
embroideries, the minister retired, accompanied by his military escort.

Consequent upon my refusal to comply with his wishes the Protector
shortly afterwards, unknown to me, despatched Colonel Paroissien and
Garcia del Rio to Chili with a long series of the most preposterous
accusations, in which I was represented as having committed every
species of crime, from piracy to petty robbery; calling on the Chilian
Government to visit me with the severest punishment.

On the 8th of May, the schooner _Montezuma_, which had been lent to
General San Martin by the Chilian Government, entered Callao _under
Peruvian colours_. The insolence of thus appropriating a vessel of my
squadron was too great for forbearance, so that I compelled her to come
to an anchor, though not before we were obliged to fire upon her. I then
turned all the officers ashore, and took possession of her; the
Protectoral authorities, by way of reprisal, detaining a boat belonging
to the flag-ship, and imprisoning the men; but, rightly calculating the
consequences of such a step, they were soon set at liberty, and the boat
was, on the same night, permitted to return to the ship.

On the 10th of May we quitted Callao, and arrived at Valparaiso on the
13th of June, after an absence of a year and nine months, during which
the objects of the expedition had been completely accomplished.

Having satisfied myself, that, from the oppression practised, the
Protectoral Government could not endure longer than the first favourable
opportunity for a general revolt which might present itself to the
Limeños, and judging that the fall of San Martin might involve serious
consequences to Chili, I had addressed the following letter to the
Supreme Director:--

   _Private and confidential_.
   Callao Roads, May 2, 1822.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   You will perceive by my public despatches the points of
   most interest as regards the proceedings of the squadron, and the
   result of our pursuit of the enemy's frigates, _Prueba_ and _Venganza_,
   both of which I have embargoed, the one at Guayaquil and the
   other here, until your pleasure shall be known, whatever that may
   be, whether to give up the squadron of Chili, or to bring those
   vessels to you, shall be alike obeyed.

   San Martin has now laid down the external pomp of Protector,
   and, like Cincinnatus, has withdrawn to retirement, but not with the
   same view. This modesty is to captivate the crowd, who are to call
   on him to convert the ploughshare _into an Imperial sceptre!_ I have
   excellent information to this effect, having found means to obtain it
   from behind the scenes of this political actor.

   Great hopes are entertained, from the mission to Chili, that
   the squadron will at least be withdrawn, and that when the sun of
   Peru shall rise on the ocean, the star (the national emblem of Chili)
   which has hitherto shone, will be for ever eclipsed! Some spots
   have, however, appeared on the sun's surface. Two thousand men
   have ceased to see its light at Pasco; and the Numantian regiment,
   once dazzled by its splendour, are about to grope their way to their
   native land.

   As the attached and sincere friend of your Excellency, I hope you
   will take into your serious consideration the propriety of at once
   fixing the Chilian Government upon a base not to be shaken by the
   fall of the present tyranny in Peru, of which there are not only
   indications, but their result is inevitable; unless, indeed, the
   mischievous counsels of vain and mercenary men can suffice to prop
   up a fabric of the most barbarous political architecture, serving as
   a screen from whence to dart their weapons against the heart of
   liberty. Thank God, my hands are free from the stain of labouring
   in any such work, and, having finished all which you gave me to do,
   I may now rest till you shall command my further endeavours for
   the honour and security of my adopted land.

   The enemy's forces, since the destruction of the division at Pasco,
   under Tristan, are superior to those of San Martin at Lima, and are
   said to be advancing on the capital.

   Everything being fully explained in my despatches, I need not
   trouble your Excellency with a repetition. Trusting that you will
   judge of my conduct and intentions by my acts--not by the vile
   scandals of those who have deserted their flag, and set your
   proclamations at defiance,

   I have the honor, &c,
   COCHRANE.



CHAPTER X.

RETURN TO VALPARAISO--THANKS OF THE GOVERNMENT--REASONS FOR
SATISFACTION--ILLEGITIMATE TRADE--TURNED TO GOOD ACCOUNT--DENUNCIATION
OF OFFICERS DESERTED--INVESTIGATION OF ACCOUNTS--SAN MARTIN'S CHARGES
AGAINST ME--MY REFUTATION--GOVERNMENT REFUSES ITS PUBLICATION--CRUELTY
TO SPANISH PRISONERS--RETIREMENT TO QUINTERO--POLITICAL FRUITS OF OUR
SUCCESS--DESTITUTE CONDITION OF SQUADRON--INFAMOUS ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE
DISSATISFACTION THEREIN--OBJECT OF THIS COURSE--STEPS TAKEN TO DEFEAT
IT--DISAVOWED BY THE MINISTER--SYMPATHY OF OFFICERS--ATTEMPT TO GET RID
OF GEN. FREIRE--ITS EVENTUAL RESULT--LETTER OF THE CAPTAINS.


On my arrival at Valparaiso, I found that San Martin's agents,
Paroissien and Garcia del Rio, had produced his accusations against me
to the Government at Santiago, though without effect, as I had taken
care to keep it apprised of everything which had transpired, exercising
the most scrupulous care in furnishing accounts of monies and stores
taken from the Spaniards, but especially as regarded the public money of
the Peruvian Government appropriated at Ancon.

The return of the squadron was announced by me to the Government in the
following letter:--

   The anxious desires of His Excellency the Supreme Director
   are now fulfilled, and the sacrifices of the Chilian people are
   rewarded. The naval power of Spain in the Pacific has succumbed
   and is extinguished, the following vessels having surrendered to
   the unceasing efforts of the squadron of this Free State:--

   _Prueba_, 50 guns; _Esmeralda_, 44; _Venganza_, 44; _Resolution_, 34;
   _Sebastiana_, 34; _Pesuela_, 18; _Potrillo_, 16; _Prosperina_ 14;
   _Arausasu_; seventeen gun-boats; the armed ships _Aguila_ and
   _Begonia_; the block ships at Callao; and many merchantmen.

   It is highly gratifying to me, after labouring under such difficulties
   as were never before witnessed on board ships of war, to announce
   the arrival of the Chilian squadron in Valparaiso--its cradle; where,
   owing to its unceasing services in the cause of liberty and independence
   of Chili, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, it forms an object
   of admiration and gratitude to the inhabitants of the New World.

   (Signed) COCHRANE.

By the inhabitants of Valparaiso our return was hailed with every
manifestation of delight, almost every house in the place being
decorated with the patriot flag, whilst other demonstrations of national
joy showed the importance which the Chilian people attached to our
services, in spite of the obstacles which they well knew had been
opposed to them.

On the 4th of June, the following letters of thanks were forwarded to
me:--

   Ministry of Marine,
   Santiago de Chili, June 4th, 1822.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   The arrival of your Excellency at Valparaiso with the
   squadron under your command, has given the greatest pleasure to
   his Excellency the Supreme Director. In those feelings of gratitude
   which the glory acquired by your Excellency during the late
   campaign has excited, you will find the proof of that high
   consideration which your heroic services so justly deserve.

   Among those who have a distinguished claim are the chiefs and
   officers, who, faithful to their duty, have remained on board the
   vessels of war of this State, a list of whom your Excellency has
   honoured me by enclosing. These gentlemen will most assuredly
   receive the recompense so justly due to their praiseworthy constancy.

   Be pleased to accept the assurance of my highest esteem.

   JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.

   His Excellency the Vice-Admiral and
   Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron,
   the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane.

From the preceding letter it will be observed that my old opponent,
Zenteno, was no longer at the head of the Department of Marine, but was
appointed Governor of Valparaiso, where he exercised the office of
Port-Admiral, a position in which, with all his former enmity, he
contrived, notwithstanding the complete satisfaction of the Government
with my services, to give me great annoyance.

In addition to the above acknowledgment of our services, a decree was
issued commanding a medal to be struck in commemoration thereof.

   Ministry of Marine,
   Santiago de Chili, 19th June, 1822.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   His Excellency the Supreme Director being desirous
   of making a public demonstration of the high services that the
   squadron has rendered to the nation, has resolved that a medal be
   struck for the officers and crews of the squadron, with an inscription
   expressive of the national gratitude towards the worthy supporters
   of its maritime power.

   I have the honour to communicate this to your Excellency by
   supreme command, and to offer you my highest respects.

   JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.

   His Excellency the Rt. Hon. Lord Cochrane,
   Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief, &c. &c.

It is here observable, that whereas San Martin, on the occupation of
Lima, had caused a medal to be struck, arrogating the success of the
expedition entirely to the army, which had done little or nothing
towards it--leaving out all mention of the services of the squadron; the
Chilian Government gave the credit, as was deserved, to the
squadron--omitting all mention of the army, which remained under the
standard of the Protector. Nothing can be more conclusive as to the
opinions of the Chilian Government on the subject.

Chili had indeed reason to be grateful, no less for the management than
the achievements of the squadron. I had now been in command something
more than two years and a half, during which we either took, destroyed,
or forced to surrender, every Spanish ship of war in the Pacific; the
whole of the west coast was cleared of pirates, which before abounded;
we had reduced unaided the most important fortresses of the enemy,
either by storm or blockade; the commerce both of Chili and neutral
powers had been protected; and the cause of independence placed on a
basis so firm, that nothing but folly or corruption could shake it.

For these most important results, Chili had been at no cost whatever
beyond the original ineffective equipment of the ships. With the
exception of three or four cargoes of provisions sent to Callao, I had,
by my own exertions, for the whole period, provided for the maintenance
and subsistence of the squadron, its repairs, equipment, stores,
provisions, and pay, as far as the men had been paid; not a dollar
having been expended for these purposes by the Chilian Government, which
trusted--but in vain--to Peru. To have been ungrateful--as far as the
public expression of gratitude went, for other reward there was
none--would have been a national crime.

As one of my modes of providing for the necessities of the squadron has
not been mentioned, it must be here given.

Under the Spanish régime, no foreign vessel could trade at their ports
in the Pacific. But, for the sake of revenue as well as to obtain
supplies, it had become the practice of the Viceroy to sell licences,
enabling British merchants to employ British vessels in the Spanish
Colonial trade. These had to load in some port in Spain, and were there
furnished with legalized Spanish papers.

Under the altered state of things in Chili, in order to secure such
vessels from capture by the Chilian ships of war, as having Spanish
property on board, the device of simulated papers was resorted to,
representing the cargoes as British property, coming from the port of
Gibraltar; one set of papers being used ashore, and the other afloat, or
as occasion required. Several British vessels had been detained by the
Chilian squadron, whereof the Spanish papers were found in the Peruvian
custom-houses when taken possession of; they were accordingly liable to
be libelled as Spanish property.

In order, however, to land their cargoes in safety, the commanders and
supercargoes of such British vessels voluntarily offered terms which
should confer upon their trade a legitimate character, viz. to pay a
certain impost as an equivalent for customs' duties. I accepted these
terms as furnishing me with means to supply the necessities and defray
the expenses of the squadron, the wants of which were with great
difficulty supplied, as the Protectoral Government refused to aid in
any way, notwithstanding that it owed its very existence to our efforts.

The duties thus collected,--for the most part in contraband of
war,--were duly accounted for by me to the Government of Chili, whilst
such compromise was received as a boon by the British merchants, and
highly approved of by the British naval authorities, Sir Thomas Hardy
especially.

Yet General San Martin, and others interested in a line of policy which
in its prosecution was inimical to the true interests of Chili,
afterwards charged these proceedings upon me as "acts of piracy."

That the Chilian Government was, however, well satisfied with all the
steps taken for provisioning and maintaining the squadron, as well as
with the seizure and disposal of the public money at Ancon, is evident
from the following acknowledgment:--

   Most Excellent Sir,

   I have informed the Supreme Director of the note
   which you addressed to me on the 7th of October, accompanying the
   accounts of the monies supplied to the payment of the officers and
   seamen of the squadron, and to the other objects of the naval
   service; as well as the accounts of money and bars of silver returned
   at Ancon to their respective owners.

   His Excellency approves of all that you have done in these matters
   and orders me in reply to convey his approbation, which I have the
   honour now to do.

   Accept the assurance of my high consideration,

   (Signed) JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA,
   Ministry of Marine, Santiago de Chili.

   To LORD COCHRANE,
   Vice-Adm. & Comm.-in-Chief. Nov. 13, 1821.

On the same date, the following was received relative to the officers
who had deserted from the squadron, for the purpose of entering the
service of the Protector:--

   Santiago de Chili, Nov. 13, 1821.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   His Excellency the Supreme Director has received
   with the greatest dissatisfaction a list of the naval officers who have
   deserted from the squadron. These will not fail to be noted in
   order to be tried by a court-martial, in case they should again tread
   the soil of Chili. It is fortunate that your Excellency has altered
   the private signals, lest Capt. Esmonde should divulge those which
   were in use.

   (Signed) JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.
   Vice-Adm. Lord Cochrane.

Immediately after my arrival, an intimation was forwarded to me by the
Supreme Director of his wish to confer with me privately on the subject
of my letter of May 2nd, in which had been pointed out the danger
arising in Peru, from the tyranny exercised by the Protectoral
Government.

   Santiago, June 4th, 1822.
   My Distinguished Friend Lord Cochrane,

   I do not wish to delay a moment in expressing
   my satisfaction at your arrival, of which you have informed me in
   your letter of the 2nd inst. As in that letter you acquaint me
   that you will speedily be in this Capital, with a view to communicate
   matters which would be better conveyed in a verbal conference,
   shall anxiously await the day to express to you all the consideration
   with which I am

   Your sincere friend,

   BERNARDO O'HIGGINS.

Having as yet received no official acknowledgment of the accounts of the
squadron, beyond the previously mentioned general expression of entire
satisfaction on the part of the Government, I applied to the Minister of
Marine for a more minute investigation into their contents, as from the
charges made against me by San Martin, I was desirous that the most
rigid inquiry should be instituted forthwith, and indeed expressed my
surprise--from the time which had elapsed since they were
forwarded--that this had not been done. On the 14th of June, the
Minister replied as follows:--

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   The accounts of monies applied by your Excellency
   in the necessary requirements of the vessels of war under your
   command, which you conveyed to me in your two notes of the 25th
   of May last, have been passed to the office of the Accountant-General,
   for the purpose indicated by your Excellency.

   JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.

Knowing the dilatory habits of the departments of State, I did not deem
this satisfactory, and being engaged in preparing a refutation of San
Martin's charges, I again urged on the Minister to investigate the
accounts without further delay, when, on the 19th of June, he
acknowledged--in a letter too long for insertion--the specific items; at
the same time declaring his "high consideration for the manner in which
I had made the flag of Chili respected in the Pacific."

This was satisfactory, but it is perhaps necessary to assign a reason
why so much importance is attached to a mere matter of routine,
especially after the Government had declared its satisfaction with all
my proceedings. The reason is this--that for all the services so warmly
acknowledged, the Government of Chili restrained from conferring either
upon myself or the squadron the slightest pecuniary recompense, even the
prize-money due to the officers and seamen, part of which the ministry
had appropriated. On pressing these claims year after year subsequent to
my departure from Chili, I was informed _sixteen years afterwards!_ that
my accounts required explanation! the reason for this unworthy
proceeding being, that, as the claim could not be disputed, it might
thus be evaded.

My refutation of San Martin's accusations was drawn up in the most
minute manner, replying to every charge _seriatim_, and bringing to
light a multitude of nefarious practices on the part of his Government,
which had been previously kept back. Lest I might appear in the
invidious light of an accuser, I was strongly dissuaded from its
publication, as being unnecessary, the Chilian Government paying no
attention whatever to his charges, but being afraid of embroiling
themselves with Peru, the weakness of which they failed rightly to
estimate.

Having, however, my own character to defend, I did not think proper to
comply, and therefore forwarded my refutation to the Government, the
Minister of Marine acknowledging its receipt, with an intimation that it
had been deposited in the archives of the Republic.

As, from the Minister of Marine's reply, the document was evidently
intended to remain there without further notice, I addressed the
following letter to the Supreme Director:--

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   As the game attempted to be played by the Government
   of Peru for the annihilation of the marine of Chili is now being
   put in practice in another form, conjointly with further attacks on
   my character, I have to request permission from the supreme
   authority to publish my correspondence with San Martin and his
   agents on these subjects; together with a copy of his accusation
   against me, with my reply thereto, in order that the public may no
   longer be deceived, and falsehood pass for truth.

   I have the honour, &c.

   COCHRANE.

To this the following reply was returned:--

   Santiago, Oct. 1, 1822.

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   Your Excellency is too well acquainted with political
   affairs not to understand the reasons which oppose the publication
   of the disagreeable occurrences which have taken place with the
   Protector at the termination of the Peruvian campaign. Were they
   made public, it would be opening a vast field of censure to the
   enemies of our cause, and also weakening the credit of the independent
   Governments, by shewing dissensions amongst themselves.

   Already have we felt the inconveniences of the injurious impressions
   _made on the British Cabinet_ by the dissensions between your
   Excellency and Gen. San Martin; for they had no sooner been
   informed thereof, than the diplomatic negociations which had been
   established with our Envoy at that Court were paralysed; and had
   he not laboured to counteract the rumours, which had been exaggerated
   by distance, there is no doubt but that his influence in
   advocating the cause of South America would have most prejudicially
   failed.

   His Excellency the Supreme Director feels confident that these
   reflections will have in your mind all the weight they merit; but
   if you still insist on the publication of your reply to Gen. San
   Martin, you may nevertheless avail yourself of the liberty of the
   press which prevails in Chili.

   (Signed) JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.

It was "_the injurious impressions made on the British Cabinet,_" which
made me chiefly desirous of replying to the Protector's charges; but
being thus adjured not to sacrifice the interests of South America, and
being, moreover, strenuously requested to let the matter drop, as being
of no consequence to me in Chili, I reluctantly yielded, contenting
myself with sending a copy of my reply to the Peruvian Government.
Further to assure me of the disbelief of the Chilian Government in the
charges made, an additional vote of thanks was given me by the Senate,
and inserted in the Gazette.

On my return to Valparaiso, I found a lamentable instance of the cruelty
practised by the military tyrants of Peru, It has been mentioned that
the old Spaniards were ostensibly permitted to quit Lima on surrender of
half their property--a regulation of which many availed themselves
rather than submit to the caprices of the Protectoral Government. In
place of the security which they thus purchased for the remainder of
their property, they were seized and stripped on their way to Callao of
the whole that remained, thrust on board the prison ship, and finally
sent, in a state of complete destitution of the necessaries of life, to
be added to the Spanish prisoners in Chili. The _Milagro_ had arrived
in Valparaiso full of these miserable people, many of whom were shortly
before amongst the most respectable inhabitants of Lima; and, to add to
the bitterness of their treatment, they were accompanied to Chili by the
agents of the Protector, Paroissien and Garcia del Rio, with his charges
against me, no doubt for the further purpose of again tampering with the
officers of the squadron. I did all in my power to interfere on the part
of the unhappy prisoners, but in vain; they were at length transferred
to the hospital of San Juan de Dios, where they were confined with the
common felons, and would have been starved but for the English
inhabitants of Valparaiso, who raised a subscription on their behalf,
and appointed one of their body to see their daily food distributed.
They were afterwards transferred to Santiago. The cruelty practised
towards these prisoners in Peru, is of itself a reason why their tyrants
did not venture to encounter the Spanish General Cantarac. Cruel people
are invariably cowards.

On my arrival at Santiago, I found the Supreme Director on the point of
resigning his high office from the opposition he had to encounter by
adhering to a ministry which in one way or other was constantly bringing
his Government into discredit, and from being supposed to favour the
designs of General San Martin, though to this I attached no credit,
believing that his high sense of principle led him to take upon himself
the obnoxious acts of his Ministers, who were partisans of the
Protector. The dissatisfaction increasing, the Supreme Director at
length tendered his resignation to the Convention, who, being unprepared
for this step, insisted on reinstating him in the supreme executive
authority.

Being indisposed to mingle in the conflicting state of parties which
distracted Chili after my return, and being in need of relaxation after
the two years and a-half of harassing anxiety which I had encountered, I
requested permission of the Government to retire to my estate at
Quintero, intending also to visit the estate which had been conferred
upon me at Rio Clara as an acknowledgment of services rendered at
Valdivia; my object being to bring it into a state of cultivation, which
might give an impetus to the low condition of agriculture in Chili.

At this juncture, the _Rising Star_, the steamer which was spoken of as
having been left behind in England, arrived in Valparaiso, too late,
however, to take any part in the operations which were now brought to a
close by the surrender of the Spanish navy. This delay had been caused
by want of funds to complete her equipment, which could not even now
have been accomplished, had not large means been furnished to the
Chilian agent in London, by my brother, the Hon. Major Cochrane, who, to
this day, has not been reimbursed a shilling of the outlay advanced on
the faith of the accredited Chilian Envoy! Though the _Rising Star_ was
now of little use as regarded naval operations, she was the first
steamer which had entered the Pacific, and might, had she not been
repudiated by the Government, have formed the nucleus of a force which
would have prevented an infinity of disasters which shortly after my
departure from Chili befel the cause of independence, as will presently
be seen.

The political fruits of our successes in Chili and Peru now began to
manifest themselves in the recognition of the South American Republics
by the United States, so that Chili had assumed the rank of a recognised
member of the family of nations.

I took with me as a guest to Quintero, my former prisoner, Colonel
Fausto del Hoyo, the Commandant at Valdivia on our reduction of that
fortress. Previous to my departure for Peru, I had obtained from the
Government a promise for his generous treatment, but no sooner had the
squadron sailed, than he was thrust into prison, without fire, light, or
books, and in this miserable condition he had remained till our return.
As he received the promise of generous treatment from me, I insisted on
and obtained his liberation, and he was now on parole. By paying him
every attention, I hoped to inculcate that national greatness does not
include cruelty to prisoners of war.

No sooner had I arrived at Quintero, than I zealously entered on my
improvements, having now received from England a variety of agricultural
implements, such as ploughs, harrows, spades, &c, all of which were new
to Chili; also European agricultural seeds, such as carrots, turnips,
&c, which, previous to their introduction by me were unknown in the
country.

But I was not long permitted to enjoy the "_otium_" marked out for
myself. Letter after letter came from the squadron, complaining that,
like the Spanish prisoners, they too were in a state of destitution,
without pay, clothes, or provisions. Starting again for Valparaiso, I
found their complaints to be more than realized, upon which I addressed
to the Minister of Marine the following letter:--

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   Three months having passed since the squadron
   anchored in this port, and the same period since my representations
   on its condition were made to the Supreme Government, relative to
   the nakedness and destitute condition of the crews; who still
   continue in the same state as that in which they passed the
   winter, without beds or clothes, the sentinel at my cabin door
   being in rags, no portion of which formed his original uniform. As
   it is impossible that such a state of things can continue, without
   exciting dangerous discontent and mutiny, I beg that you will order
   such clothing as may be found in Valparaiso to be supplied through
   the Commissary of the squadron, in order that it may immediately
   be distributed to the naked crews.

   (Signed) COCHRANE.

The determination with which I had entered upon the relief of the
seamen, was so offensive to those who, in popular estimation, were
deserving of blame, that a report was circulated of my having
surreptitiously shipped on board the English frigate _Doris_, then lying
in the harbour of Valparaiso, 9000 ounces of coined gold, and also a
quantity of gold and silver bars to the like amount! the object no doubt
being to induce a belief in the popular mind, that money had been
applicable for the use of the squadron, but that it had been dishonestly
appropriated by myself.

As I had returned to Quintero, this rumour did not reach me till it had
become widely disseminated amongst the Chilian people. The first
intimation I had of it, was contained in the following letter from
Captain Cobbett, of the _Valdivia_:--

   MY DEAR LORD,

   When I informed you, on my arrival at Quintero,
   that something unpleasant would take place, I was not altogether
   ignorant of a report which has now become prevalent. It was said
   on the day of your departure, that your Lordship had placed a large
   sum of money on board one of the British men of war in the
   harbour, 9,000 ounces in gold in a package directed to Lady
   Cochrane, and an equal amount in gold and silver bars to wait
   further orders from your Lordship. Every exertion was made by
   one interested in injuring your Lordship, to convince me of the fact,
   my reply being, that I had too long been accustomed to rely in
   your Lordship's integrity to believe any such report without proof.

   Yesterday the same person came again to my house to inform me
   that the matter was cleared beyond doubt, for that the master of the
   _Doris_ frigate had told him that the two boxes of gold and silver
   were on board, directed as above-mentioned. This report has created
   great sensation here, and the greatest pains are being taken to
   spread it far and wide. On making inquiry on board the _Doris_,
   Captain Wilkinson and myself found that no packages of the kind
   were on board, and on telling the parties engaged in spreading the
   report the result of our inquiry, they seemed much chopfallen, but
   would not retract their charge, which I am certain they intend
   to carry to the Supreme Director, the consequence of which would
   be, that were the report true or false, the Government would blame
   your Lordship, and accuse us of being your abettors; whilst, as the
   want of pay and prize-money renders the officers irritable, they are
   ready for anything and everything which might promise to relieve
   their necessities.

   I have told your Lordship all I know, and have conceived the
   rumour to be of so much importance, as to send one of my own
   horses with the little doctor to inform you immediately of what is
   going on, as such reports ought not to be treated lightly. I beg to
   subscribe myself, with the greatest respect,

   Your Lordship's grateful Servant,

   HENRY COBBETT.

Another letter, from Captain Wilkinson, was to the same effect:--

   MY DEAR LORD,

   A report is in circulation that your Lordship has put
   on board the British frigate _Doris_ nine thousand ounces in gold. I
   feel it my duty to acquaint you of this, as no person can have your
   Lordship's reputation more at heart than myself. I have been told
   this by two or three persons after your Lordship left for Quintero,
   and in the evening by Moyell, who must have known it to be
   false, and I declared it so to him. I trust your Lordship will
   be able to trace the shameless offender.

   I am, my Lord, &c. &c.

   W. WILKINSON.

As soon as these letters were received, I lost no time in repairing to
Valparaiso, not doubting that Zenteno and the Peruvian agents were again
at work to disorganize the squadron, and in case of the overthrow of the
Supreme Director, which was still impending, to place it in the hands of
San Martin. The object of the party was to cause dissension amongst the
seamen, by making them believe that, amidst their poverty and
sufferings, I had been taking care of myself, and hence they hoped to
destroy that confidence in me which officers and men had all along
exhibited, notwithstanding their privations. As they had never before
been so wretchedly destitute, this circumstance was considered
favourable to the impression, that having secured all I could for
myself, I was about to abandon them.

Though there was not a word of truth in the report which had been thus
sedulously disseminated, it was too serious to be trifled with;
accordingly, on the receipt of Captain Cobbett's letter, I hastened to
Valparaiso, and to the chagrin of Zenteno, again hoisted my flag on
board the _O'Higgins_.

My first step was to demand from the Government the appointment of a
commission to go on board the _Doris_, and there ascertain whether I had
placed any packages on board that frigate for transmission to England or
elsewhere. The reply was, that no such commission was requisite, as no
one gave credit to the assertion that I had done so, or suppose me
capable of acting in the way which had been falsely reported!

The re-hoisting my flag was a step which had not been anticipated, and
as it was unbidden, a remonstrance was addressed to me upon having taken
such a step unauthorised by the Government. My reply was, that I had
taken the step upon my own responsibility, and that as such an infamous
accusation had been promulgated against me, for the purpose of promoting
mutiny amongst the men, I intended to keep my flag flying till they were
paid. At the same time I addressed the following letter to the Minister
of Marine:--

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   Aroused from the tranquillity in which I had
   vainly hoped to spend at least the short period of my leave of
   absence by imputations against my character, propagated with a
   view to excite dissatisfaction and mutiny in the squadron, by taking
   advantage of the irritation occasioned by the necessities of the
   officers, and the destitute and naked condition of the men, which I
   have so often implored you to remedy; I have reluctantly proceeded
   to this port to refute the calumny and prevent the evil anticipated,
   for which purpose I have re-hoisted my flag, to haul it down when
   the discontent shall cease, by the people being clothed and paid, or
   when I shall be ordered to haul it down for ever.

   I enclose a copy of a letter which I have sent to the Governor
   of Valparaiso.

   (Signed) COCHRANE.

It is unnecessary to give the letter to Zenteno, as being to the same
effect with the preceding, with some additional guesses at the infamous
author of the report, these proving sufficient for his discreet silence
on the subject. The following reply from the Minister of Marine was
immediately forwarded to me:--

   Santiago, Oct. 1, 1822.

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   His Excellency the Supreme Director is impressed
   with deep disgust at the calumny to which you allude in your note,
   a copy of which I have forwarded to the Governor of Valparaiso.
   Your Excellency may rest satisfied that the authors thereof will not
   remain unpunished if discovered.

   Accept the assurance of my high consideration.

   The Minister of Marine,

   JOAQUIM DE ECHEVERRIA.

   To the Vice-Admiral Com.-in-Chief of the Squadron.

As a matter of course the libeller was neither discovered nor punished,
otherwise the Governor of Valparaiso, and the agents of San Martin would
have been placed in an unpleasant position. But they had nothing to
fear, as, from the daily increasing perplexities of the Chilian
Government, it was in no condition to defend itself, much less to assert
the majesty of the law.

From the promptitude displayed in meeting a charge as utterly groundless
as it was infamous, and from the conviction of the squadron that I was
incapable of acting in the manner imputed to me, the calumny produced
the opposite effect to that which was intended, viz. by inspiring in the
minds of the officers and men the most intense disgust towards its
originators. On my re-hoisting my flag, I was received with every
demonstration of enthusiasm and affection, the officers unanimously
uniting in the following address;--

   May it please Youe Excellency,

   We, the undersigned officers of the Chilian squadron,
   have heard with surprise and indignation the vile and scandalous
   reports tending to bring your Excellency's high character in
   question, and to destroy that confidence and admiration with which
   it has always inspired us.

   We have seen with pleasure the measures your Excellency has
   adopted to suppress so malicious and absurd a conspiracy, and trust
   that no means will be spared to bring its authors to public shame.

   At a time like the present, when the best interests of the squadron
   and our dearest rights as individuals are at stake, we feel especially
   indignant at an attempt to destroy that union and confidence which
   at present exists, and which we are assured ever will exist, while we
   have the honour to serve under your Excellency's command.
   With these sentiments we subscribe ourselves,

   Your Excellency's most obedient humble Servant,
   (Signed) J.P. GRENFELL, Lieut.-Com. _Mercedes_,
   And all the Officers of the Squadron.

The excellent officer whose name is prominently attached to this
address, is now Admiral Grenfell, Consul-General in England of the
Brazilian Empire. He was my flag-lieutenant at the capture of the
_Esmeralda_, under the batteries of Callao, and it is no more than
justice to mention, that his distinguished gallantry in that affair in
an eminent degree contributed to the success of the enterprise.

But I was not the only person of whom the envoys of San Martin and their
creatures in the Chilian Government desired to get rid. General Santa
Cruz was openly appointed to supersede General Freire as Governor of
Conception and Chief of the Army of the South; the keen discrimination
of Freire having estimated San Martin and his proceedings in Peru as
they deserved, and hence he had become obnoxious to those whose design
it was to lay Chili at the feet of the Protector. On Santa Cruz
proceeding to Conception to take up the command, the troops unanimously
refused to obey his authority, or to permit General Freire to leave
them. The people of Conception, who had suffered more from their
patriotism than any other in Chili, were equally resolute, not only from
attachment to Freire, but because they knew that if the ministry gained
their ends, Conception would be destroyed as a port; it being their
object to shut up every port but Valparaiso, in order that by the
corrupt practices prevalent there, they might monopolize the whole
advantage to be personally gained from the commerce of the country.

The Supreme Director was, as usual, made the scapegoat for the
unsuccessful attempt of his ministers to depose General Freire, and the
consequence was that in three months after the attempt was made, General
O'Higgins was deposed from his authority, and General Freire elevated to
the Supreme Directorate!

As I had been falsely accused of stealing money which ought to have been
divided amongst the seamen, I was determined that no ground for future
accusation of the kind should arise in consequence of their not being
paid; and with this view, pertinaciously insisted on the payment of the
arrears due to the squadron. These efforts were seconded by the
commanding officers of ships, who, in a temperate address to the
Government, set forth the nature of their claims. From this address, the
following extracts are given, as forming an excellent epitome of the
whole events of the war:--

   "Ever since the capture of the _Isabel_, the dominion of the
   Pacific has been maintained by the Chilian navy, and such have
   been the exertions of our Commander and ourselves that with
   Chileno crews unaccustomed to navigation, and a few foreign seamen
   whom we alone could control, not only have the shores of this
   State been effectually protected from injury and insult, but the
   maritime forces of the enemy have been closely blockaded in the
   face of a superior force. By means of the navy the important
   province, fortifications, and port of Valdivia have been added to the
   Republic. By the same means the Spanish power in Peru was
   brought into contempt, and the way opened for the invasion of that
   country. The enemy's ships of war have all fallen into our hands
   or by our means have been compelled to surrender. Their merchant
   vessels have been seized under their very batteries, whilst the
   Chilian transports and trading vessels have been in such perfect
   security that not even the smallest has been compelled to haul down
   its flag. Amongst these achievements, the capture of the _Esmeralda_
   has reflected lustre on the Chilian marine equal to anything recorded
   in the chronicles of ancient States, greatly adding to Chilian
   importance in the eyes of Europe; whilst, from the vigilance of the
   naval blockade, the fortifications of Callao were finally compelled
   to surrender."

   "This happy event, so long hoped for, was by all considered to
   complete our labours in Peru, and to entitle us if not to a remuneration
   from that State, _as in the case of those officers who abandoned
   the Chilian service_! yet, at least, to a share of the valuable property
   taken by our means, as awarded under similar circumstances by
   other States, which, by experience, are aware of the benefit of
   stimulating individuals by such rewards for great enterprises undertaken
   for the public good. But, alas! so far from either of these
   modes of remuneration being adopted, _even the pay so often promised
   was withheld, and food itself was denied, so that we were reduced to a
   state of the greatest privation and suffering; so great, indeed, that
   the crew of the Lautaro abandoned their ship for want of food, and
   the seamen of the squadron, natives as well as foreigners, were in a
   state of open mutiny, threatening the safety of all the vessels of the
   State_."

   "We do not claim merit for not relieving ourselves from this
   painful situation by an act of a doubtful nature, viz. by an
   acquiescence in the intentions of the General Commanding-in-Chief
   the expeditionary forces; _who, having declared us officers of Peru,_
   offered, through his _aides-de camps_, Colonel Paroissien and Captain
   Spry, honours and estates to those who would further his views.
   _Nor do we envy those who received those estates and honours_; but
   having rejected these inducements to swerve from our allegiance,
   we may fairly claim the approbation of Government for providing
   the squadron of Chili with provisions and stores at Callao, _out of
   monies in our hands justly due for the capture of the Esmeralda,
   when such supplies had been refused by General San Martin_. We
   may also claim similar approbation for having repaired the squadron
   at Guayaquil, and for equipping and provisioning it for the pursuit
   of the enemy's frigates, _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, which we drove from
   the shores of Mexico in a state of destitution to the shores of Peru;
   and if they were not actually brought to Chili, it was because they
   were seized by our late General and Commander-in-Chief, and
   appropriated in the same manner as he had previously intended with
   respect to the Chilian squadron itself. We may add, that every
   endeavour short of actual hostilities with the said General, was
   made on our part to obtain the restitution of those valuable frigates
   to the Government of Chili. In no other instance through the
   whole course of our proceedings, has any dispute arisen but what
   has terminated favourably to the interests of Chili, and the honour
   of her flag. Private friendships have been preserved with the naval
   officers of foreign powers; no point has been conceded that could
   be maintained consistently with the maritime laws of civilized
   nations, by which our conduct has been scrupulously guided; and
   such has been the caution observed, that no act of violence contrary
   to the laws of nations, nor any improper exercise of power,
   can be laid to our charge. The Chilian flag has waved in triumph,
   and with universal respect, from the southern extremity of the
   Republic to the shores of California; population and the value of
   property have by our exertions increased threefold; whilst commerce
   and its consequent revenue have been augmented in a far greater
   proportion; which commerce, so productive to the State, might,
   without the protecting aid of its navy, be annihilated by a few of
   those miserable privateers which the terror of its name alone deters
   from approaching."

   "The period has now arrived at which it is essential for the well-being
   of the service in general, and especially for our private affairs,
   that our arrears, so long due, should be liquidated; and far as it is
   from our desire to press our claims on the Government, yet we
   cannot abstain from so doing, in justice to the State, as well as to
   ourselves; because want of regularity in the internal affairs of a
   naval service is productive of relaxation of discipline, as just
   complaints cannot be redressed, nor complainants chastised--discontent
   spreading like a contagious disease, and paralysing the system."

   "Permit us, therefore, to call to the notice of the Government
   that since our return to Valparaiso _with our naked crews, even clothes
   have been withheld for four months_, during which no payment has
   been made, the destitute seamen being _without blankets, ponchos, or
   any covering to protect them from the cold of winter_, the more severely
   felt from the hot climates in which they have for nearly three years
   been employed."

   "The two months' pay offered the other day could not now effect
   its purpose, as the whole--and more is due to the Pulperia keepers,
   to whose benefit, and not that of the seamen, it must have immediately
   accrued. Judge, then, of the irritation produced by such
   privations, and the impossibility of relieving them by such inadequate
   payment; also whether it is possible to maintain order and
   discipline amongst men worse circumstanced than the convicts of
   Algiers! Under such circumstances, it is no exaggeration to affirm
   that confidence will be for ever gone, and the squadron entirely
   ruined, if measures of preservation are not immediately resorted to."

   "With respect to the offer of _one month's pay to ourselves!_ after
   our faithful and persevering services, undergoing privations such as
   were never endured in the navy of any other State, we are afraid to
   trust ourselves to make any observations; but it is quite impossible
   that it could have been accepted under any circumstances, as it
   would have placed us in no better situation than if, on our arrival
   here four months ago, we had actually paid the Government three
   months' salary for the satisfaction of having served it, during a
   period of two years, with unremitting exertions and fidelity."

   "In conclusion, we respectfully hope, that the Supreme Government
   will be pleased to take what we have stated into its serious
   consideration, and more especially that it will be pleased to comply
   with its existing engagements to us, with the same alacrity and
   fidelity with which we have acted towards the Government; the
   duties of each being reciprocal, and equally binding on both parties."

   Signed by all the Captains.

   The preceding statement of the captains is a faithful
   statement of the case as regarded the injustice done to
   the squadron, which had throughout supported itself,
   even to the repairs and equipment of the ships. As
   to the ruin which the captains predict, it was no
   doubt intended by the envoys of San Martin and
   their creatures in the Chilian Ministry, as the effect
   would have been to have driven the men to desertion,
   when the ships would have been turned over to Peru,
   and manned with fresh crews. Fortunately for Chili,
   this consummation was prevented by an occurrence
   as strange as unexpected by her short-sighted rulers,
   though long before predicted by myself.



   CHAPTER XI.

   NEGOCIATIONS WITH BOLIVAR--EXILE OF MONTEAGUDO--COMPLAINTS OF THE
   LIMENOS--EXTRAVAGANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT--EXCULPATION OF SAN
   MARTIN--EFFECTS OF POPULAR DISSENSION--DISAGREEMENT OF BOLIVAR
   AND SAN MARTIN--VOTE OF PERUVIAN CONGRESS--EXTRAORDINARY NEGLECT
   OF THE CHILIAN SQUADRON--SAN MARTIN'S ARRIVAL AT VALPARAISO--
   I DEMAND HIS TRIAL--COUNTENANCE OF THE SUPREME DIRECTOR--
   SQUADRON AT LENGTH PAID WAGES--REVOLT OF CONCEPTION--GENERAL
   FREIRE APPRISES ME OF IT--FREIRE ASKS FOR MY SUPPORT--HIS
   LETTER NOT REPLIED TO--SAN MARTIN'S INFLUENCE.


   Mention has been made in a previous chapter
   of the all but total destruction of a division of the
   liberating army by General Canterac, and of the
   bombastic proclamations issued on that occasion by
   San Martin, to the effect that they were "only
   dispersed, not beaten," &c. The Protector was
   however ill at ease, and entered into a correspondence
   with Bolivar, with a view to procure the assistance
   of Columbian troops against the Spaniards, who,
   following up their success, were making demonstrations
   of attacking the patriot forces in Lima. To
   this request was added another soliciting an interview
   with Bolivar at Guayaquil. A similar despatch was
   sent to Santiago, asking, in the most urgent terms,
   for aid from the Chilian Government.

   The whole affair--as narrated at the time, for
   personally I had nothing to do with it--was somewhat
   curious. San Martin's designs on Guayaquil
   having got wind, Bolivar marched the Columbian
   troops across the Cordillera, successfully invaded
   Quito, and was hastening towards Guayaquil, with a
   view of being beforehand with San Martin, of whose
   intentions upon that province he was aware. After
   the above-mentioned defeat of the Peruvian army by
   Canterac, San Martin had been compelled to withdraw
   his forces from Truxillo, on which Sucre, the
   next in command to Bolivar, advanced to Guayaquil
   and took possession of it. At this time, as was afterwards
   well known, the Limeños were privately
   soliciting Bolivar to give them his assistance in
   liberating Peru, _both from the Protector_ and the
   Spaniards!

   Ignorant of this, the Protector, having delegated
   the supreme authority to the Marquis of Torre Tagle,
   and appointed General Alvarado Commander-in-Chief
   in his absence, departed for Guayaquil, for the
   purpose of the proposed interview.

   No sooner had San Martin turned his back, than a
   public meeting of the Limeños took place in the
   Plaza, and insisted on the reconstitution of the _Cabildo_,
   which assembly had been put down by the Protector
   immediately after the declaration of independence.
   The members having complied, it was decided that
   "the Minister Monteagudo should be deposed, tried,
   and subjected to the severity of the law," a note
   being despatched to this effect to the Supreme
   Delegate, Torre Tagle. The Council of State met,
   and informed Monteagudo of what had taken place,
   when he was induced to resign; the Supreme
   Delegate politely informing the _Cabildo_ that the
   ex-Minister should be made to answer to the Council
   of State for the acts of his administration.

   This note not satisfying the municipality, the
   _Cabildo_ requested that Monteagudo should at once
   be placed in arrest till called upon for his defence,
   which was immediately complied with; but the step
   was disapproved by the Limeños, who feared that
   some crafty subterfuge might again place him in
   authority. The _Cabildo_, therefore, in order to satisfy
   the people and get rid of the ex-Minister,
   requested of the Government that he might be put
   on board ship, and exiled for ever from Peru. This
   was also acceded to; and, on the anniversary of his
   arrival in Lima, Monteagudo was sent under escort
   to Callao, and forthwith taken to sea.

   Torre Tagle was unable to cope with the returning
   spirit of the Limeños, nor did he attempt it, as the
   army was as much disgusted as were the inhabitants,
   and would not have raised a hand against them. The
   liberty of the press returned, and the first use of it
   was the following picture of the exiled Minister, taken
   from the Lima newspapers; this would not have been
   inserted here, except to shew the class of men with
   whom I had so long to contend.

   "Every honourable citizen found in Don Bernardo Monteagudo,
   (this is the name of the man of whom we speak,) an enemy who
   at any price would have sacrificed him. How many victims has he
   not immolated in his one year's ministry! More than eight hundred
   honourable families have been reduced by him to extreme indigence,
   and the whole city to misery! Amongst the patriots of Lima,
   nothing was thought of but where they might find an asylum in a
   foreign land. Without agriculture, commerce, industry, personal
   security, property, and laws, what is society here but a scene of the
   most afflicting torments?"

   "The religion of our forefathers suffered an equal persecution in
   its ministers and its temples; these were deprived of their riches,
   not for the service of our country, but for the reward of _espionage_,
   and to deceive us with useless trickeries. The satellites of this
   bandit were equally despotic with himself, and committed under his
   protection the most horrid crimes. This is not a proper place in
   which to insert the baseness with which he abused the delicacy and
   weakness of females. Fathers of families  *  *  *  *. Every
   man was intimidated. Every feeling man wept, because all were
   the victims of the caprice of this insolent upstart, who made an
   ostentation of atheism and ferocity."

   "It is impossible to recapitulate his actions. Volumes would be
   necessary to shew the world the arbitrary crimes of this atrocious
   individual. It would appear that for the commission of so many
   offences he must have had some cause that impelled him, for they
   could not possibly be the effect of ignorance. It was impossible to
   believe that by insulting and ruining every one, plundering our
   property, despising the ingenuity and talents of the Peruvians, and
   endeavouring to introduce anarchy, he could be longer tolerated in
   this capital. Was the reduction of Peru to the most degrading
   slavery, the means to make us or even himself happy?" &c. &c. &c

The reader can--from what has been narrated in these pages,--form pretty
correct opinions upon the majority of the enormities which drove
Monteagudo into exile. Of his private character I have always foreborn
to speak, as considering it a thing apart from official acts--but as the
Limeños themselves have forcibly alluded to it, I can say that in no
respect can their allegations be called in question.

The opinion of the roused Limeños, that for Monteagudo's plunders,
insults, and cruelties, there "must have been an impelling cause," is
correct, though it is rather surprising that they should not have more
justly estimated that cause. The vast amount of silver and gold which I
spared in the _Sacramento_ at Ancon, as being the property of the
Protector, shews the gulf which swallowed up his plunder of the
inhabitants. The costly extravagance of the Government--amidst which the
degraded Minister's ostentation was even more conspicuous than that of
the Protector himself--could have had no other source but plunder, for
of legitimate revenue there was scarcely enough to carry on the expenses
of the Government--certainly none for luxurious ostentation; which,
nevertheless, emulated that of the Roman Empire in its worst period--but
without the "_panem et circenses_."

The "impelling cause" was the Protector himself. Ambitious beyond all
bounds, but with a capacity singularly incommensurate with his ambition,
he believed that money could accomplish everything. Monteagudo supplied
this literally by plunder and cruelty, whilst San Martin recklessly
flung it away in ostentation and bribes. In return for the means of
prodigality, the Minister was permitted to carry on the Government just
as he chose, the Protector meanwhile indulging in the "_otium cum
dignitate_" at his country palace near La Legua--his physical powers
prostrated by opium and brandy, to which he was a slave, whilst his
mental faculties day by day became more torpid from the same
debilitating influence. This was well known to me, and alluded to in my
letter to him of August 7th, 1821, in which I adjured him to banish his
advisers and act as became his position. I now mention these things, not
to cast a slur on San Martin, but for the opposite purpose of averting
undue reproach, though my bitter enemy. The enormities committed in his
name were for the most part not his, but Monteagudo's; for, to
paraphrase the saying of a French wit, "San Martin reigned, but his
Minister governed." Duplicity and cunning were San Martin's great
instruments when he was not too indolent to wield them; and while he was
wrapped in ease, his Minister superadded to these qualities all the
cruelty and ferocity which sometimes converts a ruler into a monster, as
the Limeños very appropriately designate him. San Martin was not
innately cruel, though, as in the execution of the Carreras, he did not
hesitate to sacrifice men of far greater patriotism and ability than
himself, regarding them as rivals; but he would not, as Monteagudo did,
have endeavoured to tempt me ashore to the house of Torre Tagle, for the
purpose of assassinating me; nor, failing in this, would he as
Monteagudo also did, have liberated a convict for the express purpose of
murdering me on board my own ship. At this distance of time these things
may be mentioned, as there can be no delicacy in thus alluding to
Monteagudo, who, having lived the life of a tyrant, died the death of a
dog; for having sometime afterwards imprudently returned to the Peruvian
capital, he was set upon and killed in the streets by the enraged
Limeños.

This bad commencement of the Peruvian Government subsequently entailed
on the country years of misery and civil war, from intestine feuds and
party strife--the natural results of the early abuse which unhappily
inaugurated its liberation. No such features have been exhibited in
Chili, where the maritime force under my command at once and for ever
annihilated the power of Spain, leaving to the mother country neither
adherents nor defenders, so that all men agreed to consolidate the
liberty which had been achieved. The same good results followed my
expulsion of the Portuguese fleets and army from Brazil, where, whatever
may have been the contentions of the parties into which the country was
divided, the empire has ever since been preserved from those revolutions
which invariably characterise states based at the outset upon virulent
contentions. In Peru, the liberty which had been promised was trodden
under foot by the myrmidons of San Martin, so that a portion of the
people, and that the most influential, would gladly have exchanged the
degradation of their country for a return to Spanish rule, and this was
afterwards very nearly achieved. Another portion, dreading the
Spaniards, invited Bolivar to free them from the despotism to which, in
the name of liberty, they had been subjected. A third party sighed for
independence, as they originally hoped it would have been established.
The community became thus divided in object, and, as a consequence, in
strength; being in constant danger of the oppressor, and in even more
danger from its own intestine dissensions; which have continued to this
day, not in Peru only, but in the majority of the South American States,
which, having commenced their career in the midst of private feud and
public dissension, have never been able to shake off either the one or
the other monuments of their own incipient weakness.

The intelligence of Monteagudo's forced exile was received at Valparaiso
on the 21st of September; and if this excited the surprise of the
Chilians, still greater must have been their astonishment when, on the
12th of October, General San Martin himself arrived at Valparaiso, a
fugitive from his short-lived splendour, amidst the desolation of
despotism.

The story of this event is brief, but instructive. Having met Bolivar,
as previously agreed upon, the Liberator, in place of entering upon any
mutual arrangement, bitterly taunted San Martin with the folly and
cruelty of his conduct towards the Limeños; to such an extent, indeed,
that the latter, fearing designs upon his person, precipitately left
Guayaquil, and returned to Callao shortly after the expulsion of
Monteagudo. Finding what had taken place, he remained on board his
vessel, issuing vain threats against all who had been concerned in
exiling his minister, and insisting on his immediate recal and
reinstatement. A congress had however, by this time been appointed, with
Xavier de Luna Pizarro as its head, so the remonstrances of the
Protector were unheeded. After some time spent in useless recrimination,
he made a virtue of necessity, and sent in his abdication of the
Protectorate, returning, as has been said, to Chili.

One of the first acts of the Peruvian Congress, after his abdication,
was to address to me the following vote of thanks, not only marking my
services in the liberation of their country, but denouncing San Martin
as a military despot:--

   _Resolution of thanks to Lord Cochrane by the Sovereign Congress
   of Peru._

   The Sovereign Constituent Congress of Peru, in consideration
   of the services rendered to Peruvian liberty by Lord Cochrane, by
   whose talent, worth, and bravery, the Pacific Ocean has been
   liberated from the insults of enemies, and the standard of liberty
   has been planted on the shores of the South,

   Has Resolved,--

   That the Supreme Junta, on behalf of the Nation, shall offer to
   Lord Cochrane, Admiral of the Chilian squadron, its most expressive
   sentiments of gratitude for his hazardous exploits on behalf of
   Peru, hitherto under the tyranny of military despotism, but now the
   arbiter of its own fate.

   This resolution being communicated to the Supreme Junta, they
   will do that which is necessary for its fulfilment, by ordering it to
   be printed, published, and circulated.

   Given in the Hall of Congress, at Lima, September 27th, 1822.

   Xavier de Luna Pizarro, President.

   Jose Sanchez Carrion, Deputy and Secretary.

   Francisco Xavier Mariatique, Deputy and Secretary.

   In fulfilment of the preceding Resolution, we direct the same to
   be executed.

   Jose de la Mar,

   Felipe Anto. Alvarado,

   El Conde de Vista Florida.

   By order of His Excellency,
   Francisco Valdivieso.

San Martin had, however, played his cards so cunningly, that, in order
to be well rid of him, the Peruvian congress had been induced to give
him a pension of 20,000 dollars per annum, whilst nothing but thanks
were awarded to me, both for liberating their country and for freeing
them from military despotism! notwithstanding that the new Peruvian
Government was in possession of our prizes, the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_,
the latter only to be given up by paying 40,000 dollars to the Chilian
squadron, which at its own cost had run it down in Guayaquil--these
sums, no less than the value of the other frigate, being, in common
honesty, due from Peru to the Chilian squadron to this day. To have
thanked me so warmly as the exclusive instrument of their independence
and deliverance from military tyranny--yet to have rewarded the tyrant
and not myself in any form beyond the acknowledgment of my services, is
a circumstance to which the Peruvian Government of the present day
cannot look back with satisfaction; the less so as Chili has, after the
lapse of thirty years, partially atoned for the ingratitude of a former
Government in availing itself of my aid, without a shilling in the way
of recompense, though I had supported its squadron by my own exertions,
with comparatively no expense to the Government, during the whole period
that I held the command.

To add to this palpable injustice, the Peruvian Congress distributed
500,000 dollars amongst twenty general and field officers of the army;
but the officers of the squadron, whose prowess had freed the Pacific of
the enemy, and by the admission of the Congress itself Peru also--were
not only excluded from the Peruvian bounty, but were denied the
prize-money which they had won and generously given up to the temporary
exigencies of Chili. Such a monstrous perversion of justice and even
common honesty, never before reflected discredit on a state. But more
of this hereafter.

It having been circulated in Lima that San Martin had secreted a
quantity of gold in the _Puyrredon_, steps were taken to verify the
rumour, on which, at midnight on the 20th of September, he ordered the
Captain to get under weigh, though the vessel was not half manned, and
had scarcely any water on board. He then went to Ancon, and despatched a
messenger to Lima, on whose return, he ordered the Captain instantly to
weigh anchor and proceed to Valparaiso, where on his arrival, it was
given out that an attack of rheumatism compelled him to have resource to
the baths of Cauquenes.

On the arrival of the Ex-protector, two _aides-de-camp_ were sent by
Zenteno to compliment him, and his flag was regularly saluted, the
Governor of Valparaiso's carriage being sent to convey him to the
Government house. Yet shortly before, this very Governor of Valparaiso
had rightly branded those who abandoned the Chilian flag for that of
Peru, as "deserters;" but now he received the man who had not only first
set the example, but had also induced others to desert--with the honours
of a Sovereign Prince! The patriots were eager that I should arrest
General San Martin, and there were those in power who would not have
complained had I done so, but I preferred to leave the Government to its
own course.

On the following day, General San Martin was forwarded in one of the
Director's carriages to Santiago with an escort, the pretence for this
mark of honour being fears for his personal safety, in which, there
might be something of truth, for the Chilian people rightly estimated
his past conduct. Without troubling myself about such matters, I
immediately forwarded to the Supreme Director the annexed demand, that
he should be tried for his desertion and subsequent conduct:--

   MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

   Don Jose de San Martin, late Commander-in-Chief
   of the Expeditionary forces from Chili for the liberation of Peru,
   having this day arrived at Valparaiso, and being now within the
   jurisdiction of the laws of Chili, I lose no time in acquainting you
   that, if it be the pleasure of Government to institute an inquiry into
   the conduct of the said Don Jose de San Martin, I am ready to
   prove his forcible usurpation of the Supreme Authority of Peru, in
   violation of the solemn pledge given by his Excellency the Supreme
   Director of Chili; his attempts to seduce the navy of Chili; his
   receiving and rewarding deserters from the Chilian service; his
   unjustifiably placing the frigates, _Prueba_ and _Venqanza_, under the
   flag of Peru; with other demonstrations and acts of hostility towards
   the Republic of Chili.

   Given under my hand this 12th day of October, 1822, on board
   the Chilian ship _O'Higgins_, in the harbour of Valparaiso.

   (Signed) COCHRANE.

In place of my demand being complied with, San Martin was honoured by
having the palace appointed as his residence, whilst every mark of
public attention was paid him by the Ministry, the object being no other
than to insult me, both as regarded the countenance given to him in the
face of my demand for his trial, and the infamous accusations which he
had made against me, but which he did not dare to sustain.

The passive acquiescence of the Supreme Director in the treachery of his
advisers caused an amount of popular discontent which ended in his exile
also; both Chilenos and Spaniards revolting at the idea of San Martin
being thus publicly honoured. To see the Supreme Director parade himself
as the friend and ally of such a man, was more than the patriot spirit
could bear, and the voice of dissatisfaction was loud in every
direction. By the partisans of San Martin this was attributed to the
squadron; and at his instigation, as was generally believed, troops were
sent to Valparaiso for the purpose of overawing it. I was cautioned to
be on my guard against personal seizure or assault, as had been
attempted in Peru, but did not place sufficient reliance on the courage
of my opponents to adopt any steps evincing doubt of the Chilian people,
who were well disposed to me.

On the 21st of November there occurred an earthquake, which completely
destroyed the town of Valparaiso, so that scarcely a house remained
habitable; the people rushing to the hills or to the ships in the
harbour. On the first shocks, knowing that terrible disasters would
ensue, I went on shore to restore what order could be maintained amongst
the terrified people, and met with the Supreme Director, who had
narrowly escaped with his life when hurrying out of his house. It being
impossible to render the unhappy townspeople any service, I paid His
Excellency every possible attention, even though I had reason to
believe that his visit was unfriendly to me, he being falsely persuaded
that my incessant demands for the payment of the squadron was an act of
hostility to himself, instead of a measure of justice to the officers
and men.

Finding me determined, after what had occurred, to procure the payment
of the squadron, the now tottering Government gave in, and thus far
decided on doing justice; but even in this--as I had reason to
believe--the counsels of San Martin induced them to adopt a plan of
making the payments ashore, and paying the men and petty officers
first--after which, they were to be allowed a furlough of four months.
As this plan was palpably meant to unman the squadron, and thus place
the officers and myself at the mercy of the intriguers, I would not
suffer it to be carried into effect, the men were therefore paid on
board their respective ships.

A new system of annoyance was hereupon practised towards me by Zenteno,
who had again assumed the office of Minister of Marine. From the neglect
to repair the ships--which were left in the same wretched condition as
when they returned from Peru and Mexico--the _Independencia_ was alone
seaworthy; and was sent to sea by Zenteno without even the formality of
transmitting the requisite orders through me.

But a crisis was now at hand. The insult offered to General Freire, by
sending Santa Cruz to supersede him, will be fresh in the reader's
recollection. Soon after this the Provincial Convention of Conception
met, and passed a vote of censure upon the Council of Government at
Santiago, for re-electing General O'Higgins as Supreme Director after
his resignation--an act which it considered illegal, as no such power
was vested in the Ministry--and it became known that General Freire was
about to march with the troops under his command to enforce these views.
On the 17th, General Freire had advanced his troops as far as Talca, and
a division of the army at Santiago was ordered to be in readiness to
meet him. The marines belonging to the squadron, under the command of
Major Hind, were also ordered to reinforce the Director's troops.

I was at this time at my country residence at Quintero, but learning
what was going on, I immediately went to Valparaiso and resumed the
command of the squadron, to which I found that orders had been issued at
variance with the arrangements which had been entered into in regard to
the prize-money due to the officers and men--the _Galvarino_, which was
pledged to be sold for that purpose, being under orders for sea, to
convey San Martin to some place of safety, for, not anticipating the
disorganisation which he found in Chili, he was afraid of falling into
the hands of General Freire, from whom he would doubtless have
experienced the full amount of justice which his conduct deserved. The
squadron in my absence had, however, taken the matter into its own
hands, by placing the _Lautaro_, with her guns loaded, in a position to
sink the _Galvarino_ if she attempted to move. The forts on shore had
also loaded their guns for retaliation, though of these the squadron
would have made short work.

No sooner had I restored order, by resuming the command, than I received
from General Freire the subjoined letter, which no longer left me in
doubt of his intentions:--

   Conception, Dec. 18th, 1822.

   MY LORD,

   The province under my command being tired of
   suffering the effects of a corrupted administration, which has reduced
   the Republic to a state of greater degradation than that under
   which it was labouring when it made the first struggle to obtain its
   liberty; and when, by means of an illegitimately-created convention,
   without the will of the people, they have traced the plans of
   enslaving them, by constituting them as the patrimony of an
   ambitious despot, whilst, in order to ensure him the command, they
   have trodden under foot the imprescriptible right of the citizens,
   exiling them in the most arbitrary manner from their native
   country.

   Nothing now remains for us but heroically to resolve that we will
   place the fruit of eleven years of painful sacrifices in the way of
   saving it; to which effect I have deposited in the hands of its legal
   representatives who are united in this city the authority that I
   have hitherto exercised; but notwithstanding my want of merit, and
   sincere renouncement, the constituent power has deigned to place
   upon my weak shoulders this enormous weight, by again depositing
   the civil and military command in my person, which the adjoining
   resolution I have the honour of remitting will explain to your
   Lordship.

   God preserve your Lordship many years.

   (Signed) RAMON FREIRE.

In short, a revolution to depose the Supreme Director had commenced, and
General Freire, supported by the inhabitants of Conception and Coquimbo,
was in arms to effect it. With this revolution I was determined to have
nothing to do, because, as a foreigner, it was not desirable for me to
become a party to any faction, though it was evident that the authority
of General O'Higgins would shortly be at an end.

Regarding General Freire's letter as an indirect request to me to aid
him in deposing General O'Higgins, I did not even reply to it. On the
20th of September he made the following direct overture to me to join in
the revolution:--

   Conception, Nov. 20th, 1853.
   My Best and Most Distinguished Friend,

   The time has arrived when circumstances and
   the country require the protection of those who generously and
   judiciously know how to maintain its sacred rights. Let us withdraw
   the curtain from the scene which trifles with the interests of the
   Republic, leading it to inevitable ruin. Its deplorable state is
   public and notorious. There is not a man who is unacquainted
   with it, and who does not bewail the prospective loss of its
   independence,
   with a thraldom also in view more grievous than the
   Spanish yoke.

   The self-assumed powers of the Government, the restrictions on
   commerce, and, above all, the constitution recently promulgated,
   place the ambitious views of the Chief Magistrate and the corruption
   of his Ministers in a clear light. Every act proves that the
   intentions of the Supreme Director have undergone a change.
   Fortune, which has hitherto favoured him, has given a new turn to
   his ambition, as if the proposal of a crown could no longer be
   resisted--all the measures pursued throughout the state leading to
   that end. It is grievous to see laurels thus stained in the grasp of
   one who so gloriously obtained them. It is, however, needless to
   trespass on you with further reflections on these occurrences, as
   your judgment cannot fail to be formed both on the facts and their
   consequences. Let us therefore touch on other subjects.

   Permit me, without offence to your delicacy, to make some
   reflections on subjects equally public and notorious.

   You enjoyed honours, rank, and fortune, amidst a people the most
   distinguished in Europe. You generously abandoned ease and
   comfort in order to aid in the attainment of our liberty, and you
   have been the chief instrument which has enabled us to achieve it.
   The whole world is acquainted with your gallant efforts to abolish
   tyranny and give liberty to South America. The people of this
   Republic are full of the most lively gratitude, and are grieved that
   it is not in their power to give you an effectual proof of their deep
   attachment. This Province, holding valour and merit in estimation,
   idolizes you, whilst it holds in abhorrence and detestation the tyrant
   "Liberator of Peru!" who has stained our soil with tears of blood
   shed for his pretended services. Chacabuco would have terminated
   the war throughout the Republic, had it not been deemed necessary
   to foster its continuance for the interests of this individual.

   This Province (Conception) having been completely sacrificed,
   has arrived at the point of exasperation. Its inhabitants are
   unanimously determined on a change and a reform of Government,
   and declare that in Arauco they will breathe the air of liberty, and
   that they will perish in the field of battle to obtain it. This is the
   decision universally adopted without exception. This is the
   determination of the gallant troops which I have the honour to command,
   and of their valiant officers, and is moreover sanctioned by the holy
   orders of the clergy.

   Compromised by these declarations, what am I to reply to them?
   Must I profess my sympathy and accordance of opinion with them,
   and admit to you, that, though yesterday a private citizen, with a
   heart burning to be freed from fetters, _I must to-day gird on the
   sword_. May Heaven favour my lot in the absence of personal
   merit! To my country I owe my life and the position I hold--from
   having contributed to its welfare--can I then neglect the duty
   that I owe to it? No, my dear friend, far be that course from me.
   Freire has sworn to live or perish for the liberty of his native
   country, and he now repeats that solemn oath, grieved at the cause
   which compels him to renew it, but trusting in the hope that God
   will avert the effusion of blood in the accomplishment of the object.

   I know that you are deeply interested in securing the liberty of
   Chili, for which you have so gloriously contended. I know you will
   deeply feel the privation of hope--for neither in your generous
   heart, nor in mine, can such events be received with indifference. Let
   us then pursue a course in uniformity with the glory of Chili, and
   the opinion of the world. Let us listen to the voice of the country,
   which calls us to avert evils when repose might have been anticipated.
   I count, together with the whole Province, on your
   co-operation to avert mischief and advance the good of the country.

   Act as you judge best, but for the promotion of that object, the
   moment has arrived for action. Answer me with promptitude and
   frankness. Let us have the satisfaction of applying effective
   remedies to the evils which afflict the country, zealously and
   disinterestedly for the good of the Republic, and without personal
   views.

   _I hold the residence of San Martin in any part of Chili as suspicious
   and dangerous. Let him be off to make some other quarter happy,
   where he can sell his protection to the ill-fated inhabitants._

   I hope my intentions meet your approbation, and will be seconded
   by the officers of the squadron.

   I trust you will receive this as the sincerest proof that I can give
   of the high consideration with-which I am

   Your most faithful and unchangeable Friend,
   RAMON FREIRE.

   To Vice-Adm. Lord Cochrane,
   Commanding the squadron of Chili.

I did not reply with promptitude, for I felt that it was no part of my
mission to mingle in civil warfare. This letter, however, corroborated
my opinion as to the fact of San Martin's influence over the Supreme
Director, and the recent coolness in his conduct towards me. If General
Freire's information was correct, there was evidently a desire to
restore San Martin to the Empire of Peru! when possession could be got
of the squadron, and he in return had deluded General O'Higgins into
the plot by promise of support. Whether this was so in reality is
problematical, but there is General Freire's letter, for the first time
published, and the Chilian people can thence draw their own conclusions.

Fortunately an occurrence took place, which relieved me from the dilemma
in which I was placed, as will be narrated in the succeeding chapter.



CHAPTER XII.

THE SQUADRON TAKEN FROM ME--I ACCEPT INVITATION FROM BRAZIL--LETTER TO
THE SUPREME DIRECTO--- SAN MARTIN QUITS CHILI--HIS PRUDENCE--OPINION OF
HIS AIDE-DE-CAMP--MINISTERIAL NEGLECT--PERMISSION TO QUIT CHILI--LETTER
TO GENERAL FREIRE--FOR THE FIRST TIME MADE PUBLIC--LETTER TO THE
CAPTAINS AND OFFICERS--TO THE CHILIAN PEOPLE--TO THE FOREIGN
MERCHANTS--TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU--SAN MARTIN ACTUATED BY
REVENGE--THIS SHEWN FROM HIS LETTERS.


The event alluded to in the last chapter was the arrival of an express
from the Brazilian _Charge d'Affaires_ at Buenos Ayres, with a request
from the Imperial Court at Rio de Janeiro, to the effect that, as by my
exertions the Spaniards had now been driven from the Pacific, I would
accept the command of the Brazilian navy, for the purpose of expelling
the Portuguese, who still maintained their hold upon the greater portion
of that side of the South American Continent. As acquiescence in this
offer would relieve me from the embarrassing situation in which I was
placed in Chili, I began seriously to consider the expediency of
accepting it.

At this juncture Freire commenced his march towards the capital, at the
same time sending Captain Casey to Valparaiso with an armed merchantman,
to ascertain the effect of his last letter to me. Without coming to an
anchor, Captain Casey sent a boat on board the _O'Higgins_ to ascertain
my sentiments, but meeting with a refusal to acquiesce in the
revolution, he again sailed. The ministers, however, judging me by
themselves, and suspecting that I was about to become a party to
General Freire's designs, began to withdraw the ships from my command,
on the pretence of repairs or converting them into store-ships, several
being thus taken from the squadron. I was also ordered to place the
_O'Higgins_ and _Valdivia_ under the charge of the Commandant of Marine,
to be repaired, and to make a store-ship of the _Lautaro_, and being
thus deprived of the slightest authority over them, I was now considered
as a sort of state prisoner; but in pursuing this course, the little
schooner _Montezuma_, which I had rescued from Peru, had been
overlooked, and on board of her I hoisted my flag.

The _Galvarino_ was now sent to sea without my permission, and without
an Englishman in her. The _Lautaro_, the pretended store-ship, was also
being got ready for sea, when I addressed the following note to Captain
Worcester, who commanded her:--

   Memo,

   Having received directions from the Supreme Government
   to cause the _Lautaro_ to be placed as a store-ship, under the command
   of the Governor, and observing that the said order is in
   process of violation by the preparations making for sea; you are
   hereby required and directed to hoist my flag, and obey all such
   orders as you shall receive from me on the service of the State.

   Given under my hand this 8th day of January, 1823, on board
   the _Montezuma_.

   COCHRANE.

Tired of this heartless ingratitude, and disgusted with the suspicion
that I was about to join General Freire with the squadron--an idea which
could only have arisen from the expectation that I should thus resent
the injuries inflicted on me--I resolved to accept the invitation from
His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, leaving all which the Chilian
Government owed me to the honour of a juster and more enlightened
administration. Accordingly I addressed to the Supreme Director the
following letter:--

   Valparaiso, Jan. 8, 1822.
   Most Excellent Sir,

   The difficulties which I have experienced in accomplishing
   the naval enterprizes successfully achieved during the
   period of my command as Admiral of Chili, have not been effected
   without responsibility such as I would scarcely again undertake, not
   because I would hesitate to make any personal sacrifice in a cause
   of so much interest, but because even these favourable results have
   led to the total alienation of the sympathies of meritorious officers,
   --whose co-operation was indispensable,--in consequence of the
   conduct of the Government.

   That which has made most impression on their minds has been,
   not the privations they have suffered, nor the withholding of their
   pay and other dues, but the absence of any public acknowledgment
   by the Government of the honours and distinctions promised for
   their fidelity and constancy to Chili; especially at a time when no
   temptation was withheld that could induce them to abandon the
   cause of Chili for the service of the Protector of Peru; even since
   that time, though there was no want of means or knowledge of
   facts on the part of the Chilian Government, it has submitted itself
   to the influence of the agents of an individual whose power having
   ceased in Peru, has been again resumed in Chili.

   The effect of this on me is so keenly sensible that I cannot trust
   myself in words to express my personal feelings. Desiring, as I
   do, to extenuate rather than accuse, nothing shall enter into a
   narrative of these circumstances which is not capable of undeniable
   proof.

   Whatever I have recommended or asked for the good of the
   naval service has been scouted or denied, though acquiescence
   would have placed Chili in the first rank of maritime States in this
   quarter of the globe. My requisitions and suggestions were founded
   on the practice of the first naval service in the world--that of
   England; they have, however, met with no consideration, as
   though their object had been directed to my own personal benefit.

   Until now I have never eaten the bread of idleness. I cannot
   reconcile to my mind a state of inactivity which might even now
   impose upon the Chilian Republic an annual pension for past
   services; especially as an Admiral of Peru is actually in command
   of a portion of the Chilian squadron, whilst other vessels are sent to
   sea without the orders under which they act being communicated
   to me, and are despatched by the Supreme Government through
   the instrumentality of the Governor of Valparaiso (Zenteno.) I
   mention these circumstances incidentally as having confirmed me
   in the resolution to withdraw myself from Chili for a time; asking
   nothing for myself during my absence; whilst as regards the sums
   owing to me, I forbear to press for their payment till the Government
   shall be more freed from its difficulties. I have complied
   with all that my public duty demanded, and if I have not been able
   to accomplish more, the deficiency has arisen from circumstances
   beyond my control--at any rate, having the world still before me,
   I hope to prove that it is not owing to me.

   I have received proposals from Mexico, from Brazil, and from an
   European state, but have not as yet accepted any of these offers.
   Nevertheless, the active habits of my life do not permit me to refuse
   my services to those labouring under oppression, as Chili was before
   the annihilation of the Spanish naval force in the Pacific. In this
   I am prepared to justify whatever course I may pursue. In thus
   taking leave of Chili, I do so with sentiments of deep regret that I
   have not been suffered to be more useful to the cause of liberty,
   and that I am compelled to separate myself from individuals with
   whom I hoped to have lived for a long period, "without violating
   such sentiments of honour as, were they broken, would render me
   odious to myself and despicable in their eyes."

   Until this day I have abstained from pressing upon your Excellency's
   attention my reply to the infamous accusations presented
   against me by the agents of San Martin--knowing that your
   Excellency had more urgent objects to attend to. Nevertheless, I
   now beg your Excellency's consideration of this matter, in order
   that--as has been the case in Peru--these falsehoods may be
   rendered manifest--as well as the despicable character of that man
   who falsely arrogated to himself the attributes of a General and a
   Legislator, though destitute of courage or legislative knowledge--the
   substitution for which was duplicity and cunning.

   (Signed) COCHRANE.

Foiled in getting one of the ships of the squadron, wherein to escape
from the impending storm, San Martin remained in Santiago till the
beginning of January, 1823, when finding matters in Chili becoming
dangerous to his safety, he crossed the Cordillera to Mendoza, and from
thence went to Europe to avoid reprobation in retirement.

Throughout this narrative I have been careful that San Martin's
proceedings should be shown from his own acts and letters, there not
being in this volume one which has not been published in the gazettes of
Chili and Peru, or of which the originals are not now in my possession.
Of the latter, I could communicate San Martin's letters to me by dozens,
and had I so far trespassed on the patience of the reader, his acts
would have appeared in a yet more invidious light. What have been given
are strictly relative to public transactions, and belong to the people
of Chili as part of their national history, which, rather than any
defence of my own conduct--which was never brought in question by the
Chilian Government--is my chief reason for now making them public.

There may be, however, some who think that I have mistaken General San
Martin's _prudence_ in not approaching Lima when every advantage was
before him--for a worse quality, which until my letter to the Supreme
Director O'Higgins, just quoted, I had never publicly attributed to him,
though, in the estimation of every officer of the army and squadron,
richly deserving it. It will be in the recollection of the reader, that
instead of marching on Lima, he wasted nearly two months at Haura, and
that from the pestilential character of the climate, a fearful amount of
sickness amongst the troops was the consequence. I will here give a
letter to me from his _Aide-de-camp_ Paroissien, who was subsequently
employed by San Martin to promulgate his infamous accusations against
me, when he had no longer any hope of securing my co-operation;
premising that in my ardour to get the army at once to Lima, and
unsuspicious at that time of San Martin's secret designs, I had laid
Paroissien a wager that by a given day we should be in the Peruvian
capital; the _Aide-de-camp_ being a better judge of his chief than I
was, accepted the wager, and as a matter of course, won it.

   Haura, 10 April, 1821
   My dear Lord,

   With what pleasure would I lose twenty bets like that
   which I have unfortunately won of you, if you could but tell me
   that I should be _the loser_. Nay more, I will lay you the same
   wager now, that in another three weeks we shall not get to the
   little room over the great entrance of the Palaccio. I have received
   this afternoon a fine fat turtle; and egad, if I thought I _should
   lose_, I would fatten him up all the more--but, alas! I fear we shall
   have to calipee and calipash it in Haura; however, the bustle that has
   lately prevailed seems to indicate some movement; and those of us
   who are well, are ready to march at an hour's notice--but of course
   you are infinitely better acquainted with these things than I am.
   Still, I think that _were we more active and enterprising, a great deal
   might he done, particularly with our cavalry--whose swords for want
   of use are getting rusty. If we do not make a push now, God knows
   when we shall do so._

          *       *       *       *       *

   The General appears desirous of striking a blow against Baldez.
   It may be right---and I dare say it is; _but I should rather we had a
   touch against the Capital_. Thank God we are about to do something.
   Yours very truly,
   PAROISSIEN.

The reader will have gathered from the narrative, that San Martin struck
no blow anywhere, even hesitating to enter Lima when no blow was
required to be struck. His _Aide-de-camp's_ view of the matter can
hardly be mistaken.

It is not a little remarkable, that in a letter addressed to the Supreme
Director, before sailing on the liberating expedition to Peru, I should
have, from the first, correctly estimated San Martin's character in
persisting not to make any military movement without an unnecessary
force to ensure his personal safety, though our recent victory at
Valdivia with a force of 350 men only, could not have given him any very
great idea of the difficulties to be encountered. As this letter was
omitted in its place, I will here transcribe it.

   May 4, 1820.
   Most excellent Sir,

   Finding that all the measures proposed in the
   expedition to Peru are made public--that all that is decided on
   to-day is contradicted to-morrow--that no system is followed, either
   in regard to naval or state matters, which can promote your
   interest--that mischievous delays of all kinds are opposed to the
   success of an enterprise, which your Excellency is desirous of promoting
   --that the expedition of 2,000 men (abundantly sufficient),
   was not to be delayed on any pretence, but that it has been delayed
   in order to increase it to 4,000--and that even now it is kept back,
   in order to ascertain the position and force of the enemy at Callao,
   of which we know just as much now as we should when the
   _Montezuma_ may return, some forty days hence, after an investigation
   to no purpose--in short, finding that everything stipulated and
   agreed upon has been deviated from. I am desirous to give up the
   command of the squadron to whoever may enjoy the confidence of
   your Excellency; which act will, I hope, add to your tranquillity,
   by relieving you from my opinions in regard to what ought to be
   done, but has not been done--and to that which could be effected,
   but has not even been attempted.

   I have abstained from sending the _Montezuma_ on a meaningless
   voyage of forty days to Callao, till I receive your Excellency's
   definitive commands--considering that the despatch of that vessel
   is not only useless, but a pretext for delay, and is calculated to
   frustrate all that your Excellency has in contemplation. Would that
   you could yourself note the palpable treachery which prevents anything
   of importance being collected for the expedition--I say palpable
   treason--as not a single article necessary has yet been procured.

   Can your Excellency believe, that only one vessel is in the hands
   of the contractor; and even she is not prepared for sea? Will you
   believe that the only provisions that the contractor's agent has in
   hand is twenty-one days' rations of bread, and six days' of salt meat,
   whilst to my query whether he had any _charqui_ ready, his reply
   was, "There is plenty in the country." Will your Excellence
   believe that there are only 120 water casks ready for 4,000 troops
   and the crews of the squadron?

   Your Excellency may be assured that only your interest and that
   of the State could induce me to utter these opinions; but, in order
   to convince you that I have no wish to abandon the service, if my
   continuance in it can be of any use--my only wish being to avoid
   becoming the butt of disasters after their occurrence--I now offer
   to give up the command of the squadron, and to accept in lieu
   thereof, the command of the four armed prizes taken by the
   _O'Higgins_ in the last cruise, and with 1,000 troops selected by
   myself, to accomplish all that is expected from the 4,000 troops
   and the squadron; the former being a manageable force, capable of
   defeating all the defensive measures of the enemy--whilst the latter,
   solely under military command, will not only be unmanageable for
   desultory operations, but, from its unhandiness, will paralyse naval
   movements.

   Lastly, I must repeat to your Excellency that the inviolable
   secresy of determinations and the rapidity of operations under
   present circumstances, are the only security for the prosperity of
   the Chilian Government and the hoped-for liberty of Peru. If
   those are to be set at nought, I hereby again place at your Excellency's
   disposal the commission with which I have been honoured,
   in order that you may be convinced of my having no other object
   than to serve your Excellency in every way compatible with honour.


   I have the honour, &c.
   COCHRANE.

   To his Excellency the Supreme Director,
   &c. &c.

To return to my, now in reality, approaching departure from Chili. The
request to be permitted to retire for a time from the service, was
promptly complied with, and no doubt gladly so, from the belief of the
Government that I might otherwise ally myself with General Freire,
though, that I had no such intention, the annexed reply to his
communications--made shortly after I had left Chili, and when he had
succeeded in overthrowing the Government of General O'Higgins--will
shew.

   Bahia, June 21, 1823.
   My respected Friend,


   It would give me great pleasure to learn that the
   change which has been effected in the Government of Chili proves
   alike conducive to your happiness and to the interests of the State.
   For my own part--like yourself--I suffered so long and so much,
   that I could not bear the neglect and double dealing of those in
   power any longer, but adopted other means of freeing myself from an
   unpleasant situation.

   Not being under those imperious obligations which, as a native
   Chileno, rendered it incumbent on you to rescue your country from
   the mischiefs with which it was assailed by the scandalous measures
   of some of those who were unhappily in the confidence of the late
   Supreme Director, I could not accept your offers. My heart was
   with you in the measures you adopted for their removal; and my
   hand was only restrained by a conviction that my interference, as a
   foreigner, in the internal affairs of the State, would not only have
   been improper in itself, but would have tended to shake that confidence
   in my undeviating rectitude which it was my ambition that
   the people of Chili should ever justly entertain. Indeed, before I
   was favoured with your communications, I had resolved to leave the
   country, at least for a time, and return to England, but accident so
   ordered it that at the very moment I was preparing to execute this
   intention, I received an offer from the Emperor of Brazil to
   command his navy, and conditionally accepted it.

   Brazil has one great advantage over other South American States,
   it is free from all question as to the authority of its Chief, who has
   nothing to fear from the rivalry to which those elevated to power
   are so frequently subject. I pray God that this may not be your
   case. The command of the army will enable you to accomplish
   great things without jealousy, but the possession of the Supreme
   power of the State will hardly fail to excite the envy of the selfish
   and ambitious to a degree that may operate to the destruction of
   your expectations of doing good, and to the injury of the cause in
   which you have embarked.

   Permit me to add my opinion, that whoever may possess the
   Supreme authority in Chili--_until after the present generation,
   educated as it has been under the Spanish colonial yoke, shall have
   passed away_, will have to contend with so much error, and so many
   prejudices, as to be disappointed in his utmost endeavours to pursue
   steadily the course best calculated to promote the freedom and
   happiness of the people. I admire the middle and lower classes of
   Chili, but I have ever found the Senate, the Ministers, and the
   Convention, actuated by the narrowest policy, which led them to
   adopt the worst measures. It is my earnest wish that you may
   find better men to co-operate with you; if so, you may be fortunate,
   and may succeed in what you have most at heart--the promotion of
   your country's good.

   Believe me that I am--with gratitude for the disinterested and
   generous manner in which you have always acted towards me--
   your unshaken and faithful friend,

   COCHRANE.

   To His Excellency Don Ramon Freire,
   Supreme Director of Chili, &c.

This letter has never before seen the light, and I here make it public,
in order to show that the Government of General O'Higgins had nothing to
fear, even from its ingratitude to me; my only desire being to escape
from it, even at the cost of leaving behind the whole amount due to my
services, none of which was conceded.

Previous to my departure, I addressed the following letter to the
squadron:--

   To the Captains and Officers generally of the Chilian Navy,

   Gentlemen,

   As I am now about to take my leave of you, at least
   for a time, I cannot refrain from expressing my satisfaction at the
   cheerful manner in which the service has been carried on, the
   unanimity which has prevailed, and the zeal which, on all trying
   occasions, you have shown. These have compensated me for the
   difficulties with which I have had to contend, and which I am
   confident have been such as never before presented themselves in
   any service. Your patience and perseverance under privations of
   all kinds were such as Chili had no right to expect, and such as no
   other country would have demanded, even from its own native
   subjects. In all maritime states the strictest attention is paid to
   the necessities of officers and men--regularity of pay and adequate
   reward for services are deemed necessary as excitements to perseverance,
   and the achievement of effective and heroic exploits--but
   your exertions and achievements have been made independently of
   any such inducements.

   Gentlemen, by our united exertions, the naval power of the
   enemy of these seas, though superior to our own, has been annihilated,
   and the commerce of the Pacific is everywhere carried on in security
   under the protection of the independent flag of Chili. To me it is
   highly gratifying to reflect, that these services have not been sullied
   by any act of illegality or impropriety on your part; and that, while
   you have asserted the rights of Chili, and maintained and confirmed
   her independence, you have so conducted yourselves, as uniformly
   to preserve the strictest harmony and good fellowship with the
   officers of the ships of war of all neutral states. The services you
   have rendered to Chili will, however, be better appreciated at a
   future period, when the passions which now actuate individuals
   shall have ceased to influence those in power, and when your
   honourable motives shall no longer be felt as a reproach by those
   whose selfishness has withheld the reward of your fidelity, and
   whose jealousy has denied you even the official expression of public
   approbation.

   Gentlemen, the best approbation is that of your own hearts--of
   that, none can deprive you. However, if it be any satisfaction to
   you to receive my assurance that your conduct has, on all occasions,
   merited my warmest applause, I can say with perfect truth that I
   have great pleasure in rendering you that assurance, and in conveying
   to you my heartfelt thanks for your uniform cordial and
   efficient co-operation in the cause in which we have been engaged.

   Towards the brave seamen under my command I entertain similar
   sentiments, which you will oblige me by communicating to them in
   terms most gratifying to their feelings.

   In taking my leave of you and them, I have only to add, that if I
   have not been able to evince my gratitude so fully as I ought, it has
   not been owing to any deficiency of zeal, but to circumstances over
   which I had no control.


   I remain, Gentlemen,
   Your grateful and faithful friend and servant,
   COCHRANE.
   Jan. 18th, 1823.

On my acceptance of the Brazilian command becoming known, several highly
meritorious officers begged to accompany me--giving up, like myself, all
present hope of adequate payment for their services. Knowing that in
Brazil--as had been the case in Chili--it would be necessary to organize
a navy, I gladly complied with the requisition; so that neither then,
nor afterwards, did they receive from Chili any recompense for their
unparalleled bravery and perseverance in the cause of independence.

To the people of Chili--amongst whom, disgusted with the treatment I had
received at home, I had once hoped to spend the remainder of my days in
the bosom of my family--I issued the following address:--

   Chilenos--My fellow Countrymen!

   The common enemy of America has fallen in Chili.
   Your tricoloured flag waves on the Pacific, secured by your sacrifices.
   Some internal commotions agitate Chili. It is not my
   business to investigate their causes, to accelerate or retard their
   effects; I can only wish that the result may be favourable to the
   national interest.

   Chilenos. You have expelled from your country the enemies of
   your independence, do not sully the glorious act by encouraging
   discord and promoting anarchy--that greatest of all evils. Consult
   the dignity to which your heroism has raised you, and if you must
   take any step to secure your national liberty--judge for yourselves--act
   with prudence--and be guided by reason and justice.

   It is now four years since the sacred cause of your independence
   called me to Chili. I assisted you to gain it. I have seen it
   accomplished. It only remains to preserve it. I leave you for a
   time, in order not to involve myself in matters foreign to my duties,
   and for other reasons, concerning which I now remain silent, that I
   may not encourage party spirit.

   Chilenos. You know that independence is purchased at the
   point of the bayonet. Know also, that liberty is founded on good
   faith, and on the laws of honour, and that those who infringe upon
   these, are your only enemies, amongst whom you will never find


   COCHRANE.
   Quintero, Jan. 4th, 1823.

On the same day I issued another address to the English and other
merchants at Valparaiso who at the outset had given me every confidence
and assistance, but--notwithstanding the protection imparted by the
squadron to their legitimate commerce, the minds of some had become
alienated because I would not permit illegitimate trading at which the
corrupt ministers not only connived, but for their own individual
profit, encouraged,--by granting licences to supply the enemy, even to
contraband of war. In the subjoined, allusion is made to this matter--

   To the Merchants of Valparaiso.

   Gentlemen,


   I cannot quit this country without expressing to
   you the heartfelt satisfaction which I experience on account of the
   extension which has been given to your commerce, by laying open
   to all the trade of these vast provinces, to which Spain formerly
   asserted an exclusive right. The squadron which maintained the
   monopoly has disappeared from the face of the ocean, and the flag
   of Independent South America waves everywhere triumphant, protecting
   that intercourse between nations which is the source of
   riches, power, and happiness.

   If, for the furtherance of this great object, some restraints were
   imposed, they were no other than those sanctioned by the practice
   of all civilized states: and though they may have affected the
   immediate interests of a few who were desirous to avail themselves of
   accidental circumstances presented during the contest, it is a
   gratification to know that such interests were only postponed for the
   general good. Should there, however, be any who conceive themselves
   aggrieved by my conduct. I have to request them to make known
   their complaints, in order that I may have an opportunity of particular
   reply.

   I trust that you will do me the justice to believe that I have not
   determined to withdraw myself from these seas, whilst anything
   remained within my means to accomplish for your benefit and
   security.


   I have the honour to be, gentlemen,
   Your faithful humble servant,
   COCHRANE.
   Quintero, Chili, Jan. 4, 1823.

Though I remained in Chili a fortnight after the date of this letter,
not a complaint of any kind was forwarded from the merchants; indeed,
considering the protection which the squadron had afforded to their
existing commerce, and the facilities which it had given for extending
it, I had no reason to suppose that any complaint would be made.

The above addresses were printed by a lithographic press in my house at
Quintero, this being the first introduced into the Pacific States. I had
sent for this press from England, together with other social
improvements, and a number of agricultural implements, hoping thereby,
though at my own expense, to give an impetus to industry in Chili. All
this was, however, frustrated, and the mortification was not a little
enhanced by the circumstance that, whilst turning printer for the nonce,
there lay opposite my house at Quintero one of our best prizes, the
_Aguila_, a wreck, tenanted only by shell-fish--she having gone ashore
whilst waiting the decision of the Chilian Government, previous to being
sold for the benefit of her captors!

As the Chilian Government refused to permit my refutation of San
Martin's charges against me in a way as public as they had been
promulgated, I addressed the following note to the Peruvian congress,
together with a copy of the refutation:--

   To His Excellency the President of the Congress of Peru.
   Sir,


   I have the honour to transmit through you to the Sovereign
   Congress a copy of a letter addressed by me to Don Jose de San
   Martin, translations of which I have forwarded to Europe and to
   North America, to be issued to the world through the press.
   Mankind will then cease to accuse the Peruvians of ingratitude,
   and will do longer wonder that an Imperial Crown was withheld
   from the Protector as the reward of labours in the cause of liberty,
   but will applaud your resolution to select from amongst yourselves
   the most enlightened of your citizens--men capable of securing the
   independence and promoting the prosperity of the State on principles
   of national freedom under the rule of law.

   Be pleased to solicit in my name that the Sovereign Congress
   may deign to deposit in their archives that letter and the charges
   against me thereto annexed, which were preferred by Don Jose de
   San Martin to the Chilian Government relative to my conduct in
   Peru, in order that a record may remain whereby to judge of facts
   when the actors shall have passed from this scene. Then the even
   hand of time shall poise the scale of justice, apportioning to all the
   due measure of approbation or reproach.

   That the acts of the Sovereign Congress and of the Executive
   Government of Peru may be such as shall call forth the admiration
   and secure the affections of its people, is the prayer of


   Your Excellency's obedient humble Servant,
   COCHRANE.
   Valparaiso, Dec. 12, 1822.

One word more with regard to these accusations of San Martin. It was not
till all his offers to me to abandon my allegiance to Chili, and to join
him in his defection had proved unavailing, that he sought to revenge
himself by such charges, well knowing that Zenteno and his party in the
Chilian ministry would second any chance of injuring me in public
estimation from their unabating personal enmity to me, arising from my
constant opposition to their selfish measures for private advantage.
Into these matters I have no inclination to enter, though possessing
abundant materials for disclosing a career of state dishonesty without
parallel in the history of Governments.

Up to the time of my last refusal of San Martin's offers, made through
Monteagudo, everything was "couleur de rose"--with all kinds of
declarations that "my lot should be equal to his own"--though, thank
God, my lot has been of a far different nature. It was within a week of
my last refusal that his charges against me were trumped up. I will
select one more from his numerous letters now in my possession, to show
that nothing but revenge at being disappointed in my co-operation to
ensure his personal aggrandisement, could have influenced him to
perpetrate such an act of meanness.

   Lima, 20 Aug., 1821.

   My esteemed friend,

   Your appreciated letter, received yesterday, has convinced
   me that the frankness of your sentiments is only equalled by
   the regard you entertain for the public cause--especially as to
   matters under my charge. I cannot view the counsel and opinions
   you offer, otherwise than as proof of the zeal you entertain for my
   interests. Aware of the estimation in which you hold glorious
   acts, I cannot do otherwise than sympathize with you, as you desire
   that I shall augment those I have acquired. Without entertaining
   a doubt that I shall contribute effectually in the field still open to
   us--_more particularly to you_, I wish that the enterprises in which
   you evince so much zeal, _did not require so great temerity to carry
   them out, and such enthusiasm to bring them to a successful result._
   Believe me, my Lord, that nothing will make me swerve from the
   determination that the _lot of Lord Cochrane shall be that of Gen.
   San Martin._

   I hope that in your correspondence with Sir Thos. Hardy, all
   difficulties will be smoothed in a manner satisfactory to both. I
   understand that he is desirous to accord to _our_ flag all that justice
   demands and the policy of England will permit. On these points I
   confide in your prudence.

   Never doubt, my Lord, of the sincere friendship with which I am
   your affectionate

   JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.

It is so utterly incredible that a man entertaining such opinions of me
should believe in the charges he afterwards made against me, _with
regard to acts occurring long previous to this period_, even to accusing
me of "endangering the safety of the squadron from the first moment of
our quitting Valparaiso," that I will not weary the reader's patience in
commenting further upon them.



CHAPTER XIII.

FREIRE MARCHES ON VALPARAISO--ELECTED SUPREME DIRECTOR--HE BEGS OF ME TO
RETURN--MY REPLY--SUBSEQUENT LETTER TO GENERAL FREIRE.


On the 18th of January, 1823, I hauled down my flag, hoisted in the
_Montezuma_ schooner--the only vessel which the suspicious jealousy of
the Chilian ministers had left me--and sailed for Rio de Janiero in the
chartered brig, Colonel Allen, though my brother's steamer, the _Rising
Star_--or rather the Chilian Government's steamer, upon which he had a
lien for money advanced for its completion and equipment--was lying idle
at Valparaiso. Could I have taken this vessel with me to Brazil, on the
refusal of Chili to repay the sums which my brother had advanced on the
guarantee of its London envoy Alvarez--the Brazilian Government would
have eagerly availed itself of an advantage to which the Chilian
ministry was insensible: though recently by the exertions of Admiral
Simpson, and the more enlightened views of the present Government, Chili
is now beginning to appreciate the advantage of a steam marine, which,
at the period of her liberation, she so perversely rejected by refusing
to honour the comparatively trifling pecuniary engagements of her
minister in London. The probable reason why the Chilian Government
refused to acknowledge these obligations was--that the war being now
ended by the annihilation of the Spanish naval power in the Pacific
through the instrumentality of sailing ships alone, there was no
necessity for a steam ship of war--the narrow-minded policy of the
ministers who have figured in these pages never conceiving that to
maintain maritime preponderance is scarcely less difficult than to
achieve it. Hence, to get rid of the paltry sum of £13,000 due--and
still due--to my brother for his advances on the ship, she was rejected;
the consequence was, that after my departure, the independence of Chili
was again placed in jeopardy, whilst Peru was only saved from a Spanish
reconquest by the intervention of the Colombian liberator, Bolivar.

Shortly after my departure, the partisans of General Freire, and the
enemies of General O'Higgins, having entered into a combination--the
former marched on Valparaiso, where the people ardently espoused his
cause; so that abandoned by his evil genius, San Martin, and equally so
by others who had caused his downfall, the Supreme Director found
himself a prisoner in the hands of the very man who had most conduced to
his overthrow, viz., Zenteno, in whose charge he was placed on pretence
of being made accountable for the expenditure of those who now held him
in durance!

The end of this was, a five months' examination of O'Higgins, which
resulted in his being permitted to leave the country; General Freire
having, meanwhile, been elected to the Supreme Directorate, in the midst
of internal dissensions in Chili, and disasters in Peru, where the
Spaniards, under Cantarac--emboldened by the pusillanimity of the
Protector in permitting them to relieve Callao unmolested, and elated
with their decisive victory over a division of his army, as narrated in
a previous chapter--had availed themselves of the treasure carried away
from Callao in reorganising their forces, which now threatened Lima, and
would no doubt have recovered Peru, had not Bolivar, foreseeing the
result, sent a division of his army, under General Sucre, to the
assistance of the beleaguered city.

In the midst of these embarrassments, the New Government of Chili
despatched the following letter to Rio de Janeiro, for the purpose of
inducing me to return, and reorganise the navy, the officers and men of
which had, as I learned, shortly subsequent to my departure been turned
adrift, without any reward whatever for their extraordinary privations
and exertions in the cause of independence.

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
   Santiago de Chili, April 11, 1823.
   Most Excellent Sir,


   The Representatives of the people of Chili, legally
   assembled, having elected Don Ramon Freire as Supreme Director
   of the State, this event has happily terminated the internal movements
   which agitated the country. The new Government, on
   entering on its delicate functions, has been impressed with the want
   of your Excellency to give preponderance to this maritime state, by
   the imposing aptitude of your Excellency's measures and extraordinary
   renown, so highly prized by the Chilenos, and dreaded by
   their enemies.

   The loss of the Allied army in Moquegua, where it has been
   beaten by General Cantarac, has occasioned such an effect on the
   result of the war, that possibly the capital of Peru may fall into the
   hands of the enemy in consequence of the ascendancy thus acquired.

   In consequence of this event, Chili must give a new impulse to
   her maritime affairs, especially as an expedition is about to sail from
   Cadiz, composed of two ships of the line, to restore the Spanish
   authority in Peru.

   Your Excellency, on leaving Chili, promised not to abandon the
   cause of independence; and Chili--which has ever admired in your
   Excellency one of its most illustrious protectors--must not therefore
   be deprived of your services in a time of danger, and your great
   work thus be left incomplete. These considerations his Excellency
   desires me to lay before you in the name of the nation, and in his
   own name, to request that you will return to this State, at least
   during the period of danger. His Excellency trusts in your
   generosity and zeal for the cause of humanity, that you will return
   as speedily as circumstances require, without taking into account
   fatigue or sacrifices in supporting the cause which you have
   advocated since its commencement.

   Be pleased to accept the expression of my high consideration.


   (Signed)   MARIANO DE EGANA.

It is almost unnecessary to state that my engagements with Brazil, and
the fact that when the invitation to resume the command of the Chilian
navy was received, I was blockading the Portuguese fleet in
Bahia--rendered it impossible to comply with the request. That a state
whose ministers had, by the greatest injustice, compelled me to quit
it--should, in so short a period, have thus earnestly entreated me to
return and free it from impending disaster, is not more a proof of the
peril in which the Government was placed, than of its thorough
satisfaction with my conduct as its admiral, and of its anxiety for my
renewed assistance.

In reply to the request, I addressed the following letter to the
minister:--

   Most Excellent Sir,

   I have just been honoured with your letter of
   April 11th, announcing the elevation of Mareschal Don Ramon
   Freire to the high dignity of Director of the State of Chili, by
   acclamation of the people--a choice at which I cordially rejoice,
   as it has placed in power a patriot and a friend. My sentiments
   with respect to His Excellency have long been well known to the
   late Supreme Director, as well as to his Ministers, and I would
   to God that they had availed themselves of Gen. Freire's able and
   disinterested services in the expedition to Peru--in which case the
   affairs of South America would have now worn a different aspect;
   but the Buenos Ayrean faction, being actuated by ambitious motives
   and more sordid views, interfered, and rendered abortive those plans
   which, under Gen. Freire's management, would have brought the
   war to a speedy and successful termination.

   On my quitting Chili, there was no looking to the past without
   regret, nor to the future without despair, for I had learned by
   experience what were the views and motives which guided the
   councils of the State. Believe me, that nothing but a thorough
   conviction that it was impracticable to render the good people
   of Chili any further service under existing circumstances, or to
   live in tranquillity under such a system, could have induced
   me to remove myself from a country which I had vainly hoped
   would have afforded me that tranquil asylum which, after the
   anxieties I had suffered, I felt needful to my repose. My inclinations,
   too, were decidedly in favor of a residence in Chili, from
   a feeling of the congeniality which subsisted between my own
   habits and the manners and customs of the people, those few only
   excepted who were corrupted by contiguity with the Court, or
   debased in their minds and practices by that species of Spanish
   Colonial education which inculcates duplicity as the chief qualification
   of statesmen in all their dealings, both with individuals
   and the public.

   I now speak more particularly of the persons late in power--
   excepting, however, the late Supreme Director--who I believe
   to have been the dupe of their deceit; and I do assure you
   that nothing would afford me greater pleasure, for the sake of
   the ingenuous Chilian people, than to find that with a change
   of Ministers, a change of measures has also taken place, and that
   the errors of your predecessors, and their consequent fate, shall
   operate as an effectual caution against a course so destructive.

   Point out to me one engagement that has been honourably
   fulfilled--one military enterprise of which the professed object
   has not been perverted--or one solemn pledge that has not been
   forfeited; but my opinions on this want of faith, at various periods
   of the contest, when everything was fresh in my recollection,
   are recorded in my correspondence with the Minister of Marine,
   and more particularly in my private letters to His Excellency, the
   late Supreme Director, whom I unavailingly warned of all that
   has happened. My letter also to San Martin, in answer to his
   accusations--a copy of which was officially transmitted to your
   predecessor in office--contains a brief abstract of the errors and
   follies committed in Peru; as my public letters and those documents
   are, of course, in your possession, I shall abstain from trespassing
   on your attention with a repetition of facts with which you are
   acquainted.

   Look to my representations on the necessities of the navy,
   and see how they were relieved! Look to my memorial, proposing
   to establish a nursery for seamen by encouraging the coasting
   trade, and compare its principles with the code of Rodriguez, which
   annihilated both. You will see in this, as in all other cases, that
   whatever I recommended in regard to the promotion of the good
   of the marine, was set at naught, or opposed by measures directly
   the reverse. Look to the orders which I received, and see whether I
   had more liberty of action than a schoolboy in the execution of his
   task. Look back into the records of the Minister of Marine's
   office, and you will find that, while the squadron was nearly reduced
   to a state of starvation, provisions were actually shipped at
   Valparaiso, _apparently for the navy, but were consigned to Don Luiz
   de Cruz, and disposed of in such a way as to reflect eternal reproach
   and disgrace_. You may probably find also, the copy of an order,
   the original of which is in my possession, (not rubricated by the
   Supreme Director) _to permit a vessel laden with corn to enter the
   blockaded port of Callao at the period of its greatest distress_,
   and which did enter in my absence, and was sold for an enormous amount;
   whilst funds could not be found to send even 500 troops on an eight
   days' voyage from Chili to secure Upper Peru, when the greater part of
   the country was actually in our possession, and when the minds of
   the people, afterwards alienated by the base conduct of San Martin,
   were universally in our favour.

   Sir, that which I suffered from anxiety of mind whilst in the
   Chilian service, I will never again endure for any consideration.
   To organise new crews--to navigate ships destitute of sails, cordage,
   provisions, and stores--to secure them in port without anchors and
   cables, except so far as I could supply these essentials by accidental
   means, were difficulties sufficiently harassing; but to live amongst
   officers and men--discontented and mutinous on account of arrears
   of pay and other numerous privations--to be compelled to incur the
   responsibility of seizing by force from Peru, funds for their payment,
   in order to prevent worse consequences to Chili--and then to be
   exposed to the reproach of one party for such seizure, and the
   suspicions of another that the sums were not duly applied, though the
   pay-books and vouchers for every material item were delivered to the
   Accountant-General--are all circumstances so disagreeable and so
   disgusting that until I have certain proof that the present Ministers
   are disposed to act in another manner, I cannot possibly consent to
   renew my services, where, under such circumstances, they would be
   wholly unavailing to the true interests of the people. Intrigue and
   faction might again place me in the predicament in which I found
   myself previous to my departure from Valparaiso, viz., a cypher and
   a public burthen; for the ships of war might again be placed in the
   hands of a Governor Zenteno, for the purpose of exposing me to
   popular odium, as a person receiving a large salary from the state,
   for which--without a vessel under my command--no adequate
   services could be rendered. That this was the intention of the
   late ministers in withdrawing the ships from my command, on the
   false pretence of repairing them, there can be no doubt; for whilst
   every honorary reward was withheld from me, they refused to accept
   the remission which I offered of 4,000 dollars from my annual pay--
   treating me at the same time with every neglect and indignity.

   Such proceedings, I am aware, are far distant from the contemplation
   of the excellent person who now presides over the affairs of Chili,
   as in my conscience I believe that they were no less distant from
   the mind and heart of the late Supreme Director, who, being placed
   in that elevated situation, was unfortunately exposed to the errors
   that arise from listening to the reports of interested individuals who
   ever surround the powerful, making a gain by concealing the truth
   and propagating falsehood.

   It is a fact--as is well known to all my friends--that I had determined
   to quit Chili, previous to my receiving any proposition from
   the Government of Brazil. By that Government I have been
   hitherto treated with the utmost confidence and candour, and the
   orders they have given me are in everything the reverse of those
   narrow and restricted instructions with which I was hampered by
   the Senate, the Ministers of Chili, and San Martin, under whose
   orders they had placed me. The Government of Brazil, having in
   view the termination of the war, gave orders to that effect, without
   any of those miserable restrictions which are calculated to retard, if
   not finally to defeat, their object. The consequence is, that the war
   in Brazil is already successfully terminated--though we have had to
   contend with a much superior force--by the evacuation of Bahia--
   the flight of the Portuguese fleet--the capture of great part of their
   transports and troops--and the surrender of Maranham--all in
   fewer months than the Chilian Government have employed years
   without having even yet accomplished their object, nay, with no
   other result than that of removing the independence of Peru, and
   their own peace and security to a greater distance.

   I must now call your attention, although I have already addressed
   a letter on the subject to the Minister of Finance, to a breach of
   faith on the part of the late Government of Chili in respect to the
   contract between Senor Alvarez, their Envoy in England, and my
   brother, the Honourable William Erskine Cochrane, for the completion,
   outfit, and navigation to Chili of the steamer _Rising Star_,
   by which my brother has been involved in expenses to a very great
   amount. Whether the inconvenience he is sustaining from the
   perfidy of the late Ministers is in the course of removal by the good
   faith of their successors I have yet to learn, but if not, I must
   respectfully state to you on behalf of my brother that I demand
   payment of the amount due to him under the contract above-mentioned.

   I also respectfully suggest, that it is your duty to examine the
   accounts of Mr. Price, and cause him to pay over the bonus of
   40,000 dollars which was granted by the Government on account of
   the _Rising Star_, which bonus Mr. Price prematurely obtained in
   advance nearly three years ago, although it did not become due till
   the arrival of the ship. This sum, which is part of the remuneration
   due to my brother on account of the said ship, Mr. Price, or the
   house of which he is a member, refuses to deliver up, under the
   pretence that its detention is necessary to their own security, in the
   event of the Chilian Government requiring it to be restored. This
   is a most extraordinary way of justifying the detention of another's
   property, and I trust, Sir, that you will immediately take the
   necessary steps to cause both that sum, and all other sums due to
   my brother for the _Rising Star_--the particulars of which you may
   receive from Mr. Barnard--to be paid without further delay. To
   that end, and in order to prevent the risk and serious expense
   attending the remittance of money to so great a distance, I beg to
   suggest that the best mode of payment will be by an order on your
   agents in London.

   I am much less solicitous on the subject of the debt due to
   myself, but after repeatedly requesting the Accountant-General,
   Correa de Saa, during the last six months of my residence in Chili,
   to investigate and determine on my accounts, without his proceeding
   therein in any effectual way, I was astonished to receive from him
   a communication calling upon me to appoint an agent to explain
   certain particulars, which I had considered as explicitly set forth in
   the documents delivered. This delay and these obstacles, I cannot
   consider in any other light than _as mere pretexts to avoid the
   payment of the balance due to me for my services_, and for the
   expenditure of monies that were my own, inasmuch as I might,
   with perfect justice--instead of employing them for the maintenance
   of the Chilian navy--have applied them to the liquidation of the
   debt due to myself, and have left the service, as the Government
   did, to shift for itself. Besides, Sir, let me call to your recollection
   that not a _real_ of these monies came out of the pocket of any
   Chileno, but that the whole were captured or collected by me from
   sources never before rendered available to supply the necessities of
   a destitute squadron.

   I call upon you, Sir, as the Minister of Marine, to see justice
   done on the above subjects, and if in my accounts or demands you
   find anything false or fraudulent, let it be printed in the _Gazette_,
   and give me the privilege of reply.

   I trust you will excuse my entering into the present detail, and
   do me the justice to feel that no part of it is irrelevant to the
   subject of your letter. Indeed, if I were not desirous of troubling
   you as briefly as possible, I could assign numerous other reasons for
   desiring to have demonstration of a change of ministerial conduct in
   the management of affairs in Chili, before again exposing myself to
   difficulties of so painful a nature, and re-occupying a situation
   which I have found to be harassing, thankless, and unprofitable.

   When the _puertos non habilitados_ (unlicensed ports) shall be
   thrown open to the national commerce--when those obstacles shall
   be removed which now render the transport by sea more expensive
   than carriage by land--when the coasting trade, that nursery for
   native seamen, shall be encouraged instead of prohibited, it will be
   time enough to think of re-establishing the marine, for, with regard
   to foreign seamen, such is the disgust they entertain for a service
   in which they have been so neglected and deceived, that I am confident
   that the ships of Chili will never again be effectively supplied
   with men of that description. Indeed, there was not an individual
   amongst the foreign seamen under my command during the latter
   period of my services in Chili whose fidelity was not shaken to such
   a degree as to be undeserving of confidence on any occasion of
   danger or emergency. Could the late Ministers even expect the
   natives to serve them faithfully without pay and without food?--
   but His Excellency the present Director can solve this question in
   a similar case with regard to the army.

   It will be well if the foreign seamen have sufficient forbearance
   to refrain from revenging--by acts of hostility to the state--the
   deception and breach of promise which they experienced from San
   Martin, and that destitute condition to which they were reduced,
   especially during the last six months of my stay at Valparaiso,
   by similar frauds on the part of Rodriguez, who, I believe, as
   Minister of Finance, has been actuated by the hope of compelling
   the men to abandon their country without remuneration for their
   services, when they appeared to him and to other short-sighted
   individuals to be no longer useful.

   The Chilian expedition to the Intermedios, and the mean methods
   by which it was proposed to obtain Chiloe without my intervention,
   excited in my mind at the time no other feeling than pity and
   contempt, mixed with regret that the sacrifices of so good a people
   should be rendered unavailing by the imbecility of their rulers.
   The failure of both these wretched attempts I predicted. From the
   men now in power I hope better things, and it will gratify me
   extremely to observe that you succeed in establishing just laws--a
   free constitution--and a representative body to direct civil affairs.
   In fine, that you succeed in all you undertake for the public good;
   and when I see you entered on the right path, my most zealous
   cooperation--if required--shall not be withheld.

   I cannot conclude without expressing my high sense of the honour
   which His Excellency the present Director conferred upon me, by
   desiring my continuance in the command of the navy. To him I
   return my heartfelt thanks, and to you also for the polite manner
   in which you communicated his obliging wishes.


   (Signed)   COCHRANE.

   To His Excellency Don Mariano Egana,
   Minister of Foreign Affairs, &c.

I will quote one more letter, subsequently addressed by me to the
Supreme Director, General Freire, in whose administration I felt a
sincere interest, knowing him to be a truly honest man, having only at
heart the good of his country; but from his rough training in the camp,
without the administrative ability to contend with the intrigues by
which he was surrounded.

   Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 14, 1823.

   My respected and esteemed friend,

   It would afford me great satisfaction to learn that
   everything you contemplated for the advancement and happiness of
   your country, has succeeded to the extent of your wishes and
   endeavours, but here we live at so great a distance, and the
   communication by letter is so scanty, that we have no certain
   knowledge with respect to your proceedings. I dare not venture to
   offer you my congratulations, being well aware that the re-union of
   the Congress would present difficulties which might possibly be
   insuperable, fearing also that you may have been subjected to much
   uneasiness by the diversity of views entertained by the members,
   and their deficiency in those habits, and that general information
   in affairs of Government, so necessary in the deliberations of a
   Legislative Assembly.

   Here we have had our Cortes, but their meeting has produced
   nothing beneficial to the State. There existed indeed amongst
   them so great a discordance of opinion, and the temper of those
   who found their crude notions opposed was so violent, that the
   Emperor--finding it impracticable to act with them--determined
   to dissolve them, which he did on the 12th of last month, and
   issued his commands for the meeting of a new Cortes, but I much
   doubt whether the people in the various provinces can find others
   competent to the task. Everything here is quiet, and I have no
   doubt will remain so in the neighbourhood of the capital, but I
   have some fear as to the disposition of the northern provinces. I
   shall regret much should anything occur which will disturb the
   public tranquillity, now that all the provinces are entirely free and
   independent of European authority.

   With regard to myself, the friendship you have always expressed
   and entertained towards me, justifies my belief that you will be
   gratified to learn that everything has succeeded here to the full
   extent of my expectations, the foreign war being entirely brought to
   a close within the short space of six months; during which period
   about seventy vessels have fallen into our hands, including several
   ships of war, amongst which is a beautiful new frigate of the largest
   dimensions.

   We have gone on here in the happy manner that I fondly
   anticipated we should have done in Peru, and which would have
   been the case if the expedition which was intended to be sent to the
   Puertos Intermedios three years ago under your command, had not
   been prevented by the intrigues of San Martin, who was jealous of
   anything being done in which he was not personally engaged,
   though he had neither the courage nor talent to avail himself of
   circumstances when appointed to the command of the Peruvian
   expedition.

   I have heard that my reply to San Martin's accusations has been
   published in Peru, but as it is chiefly a personal defence, it cannot
   be very interesting to the public, to whom I feel a great inclination
   to address a letter on the causes of the miscarriage of their _military
   enterprises_, and the origin and progress of those intrigues which led
   to the mismanagement of public affairs, and disappointed the hopes
   and expectations of the worthy people of Chili, who conducted
   themselves so long with patient submission to rulers who governed
   without law, and often without justice.

   In my letter to you of the 21st of June last, I mentioned at some
   length my reasons for leaving Chili, but as that letter may possibly
   have miscarried, I think it well to repeat here--which I do with
   great truth--that it would have given me great pleasure to have
   been at liberty to co-operate with you; but having, long previous to
   your communications, determined from the ill-treatment I received
   to quit the country, I considered that it was better in every point
   of view to conform to that resolution, without mixing myself in its
   internal affairs, it being my province, as a foreigner, to leave all
   parties uncontrolled, and in the free exercise of their civil rights.
   In adhering to this resolution, I sacrificed both my inclination to
   have acted with you in overthrowing the ministers, and my own
   personal interests--abandoning nearly all that I had individually
   hoped to attain; but I had predetermined to do this, rather than
   endure any longer the base intrigues of those men, and their packed
   Convention; whose injustice became the more conspicuous after
   their receiving the stars and distinctions bestowed by San Martin,
   with the promise of estates and further bounties. Indeed, the
   reception which even the late Supreme Director influenced by these
   persons gave to San Martin after his apostacy to Chili, his cowardice,
   ambition, and tyranny in Peru, formed a sufficient contrast with
   the conduct pursued towards me, to convince me that my presence
   in Chili was no longer desired by the Government, and could not,
   under existing circumstances, be useful to the people.

   I hear that O'Higgins has proceeded to Peru. Personally I wish
   him well, and hope that the lesson he has received will enlighten
   him, and enable him in future to distinguish between sincere
   friends and insidious enemies. I fear, however, that his asylum in
   Peru will not meet his expectations, because his passive acquiescence
   in the barbarities inflicted by San Martin on the Spaniards
   to whom he had tendered protection cannot be forgotten; and the
   Peruvian people are not ignorant that the miseries which they
   have suffered might have been averted by a little firmness on the
   part of O'Higgins.

   I have no reason to believe that the old intrigue on the part of
   Puyrredon and San Martin, is again revived by the latter, and that
   a French frigate which lately sailed hence for Buenos Ayres, has a
   commission on that subject. Whether these intrigues extend from
   Mendoza over the Cordilleras, or not, I have no means to ascertain,
   but I know that the French _Charge d'Affaires_ here has been
   endeavouring underhand to induce this Government to give up the
   fortifications of Monte Video to the State of Buenos Ayres, which
   can only be with the view of extending the influence of France in
   that quarter.

   I fear that I have already trespassed too long on the time of
   your Excellency, otherwise I might take the liberty to throw out
   some suggestions which it appears to me ought to be useful, though
   you may probably have anticipated them. The principal one is the
   benefit which might be derived from having some accredited agent
   here; and from the reciprocal and formal acknowledgment of the
   independence of the respective States. Treatises of commerce and,
   if possible, alliance and mutual protection against any hostile
   attempts on the independence of South America should be entered
   into. This country possesses a squadron of considerable force, in
   addition to which six new frigates and eight large steam gallies
   have been ordered to be built in North America, England, and the
   northern ports of the Empire.

   I shall be gratified if you will do me the favour to honour me
   with the continuance of your friendly correspondence, and believe
   me to be,


   Your respectful and attached friend,

   (Signed) COCHRANE and Marenhaõ.

   His Excellency Don Ramon Freire,

   Supreme Director of Chili.


   P.S. I did not intend to have trespassed on you with anything of
   a private nature, having written at length to the Accountant-General
   on the subject of my brother's claim for the steamer
   "_Rising Star_," and my own claims for monies disbursed _for the
   maintenance of the Chilian squadron, whilst in pursuit of the Prueba
   and Venganza_; but, on consideration, I think it well to request
   you to do me the favour to cause justice to be done.



CHAPTER XIV.

INJUSTICE TO THE SQUADRON--INCONSISTENCY OF THIS--ESTATE TAKEN FROM
ME--MY LOSSES BY LITIGATION--ENDEAVOURS TO ENFORCE MY CLAIMS--PETTY
EXCUSES FOR EVADING THEM--I AM CHARGED WITH EXPENSES OF THE ARMY--AND
WITH COSTS FOR MAKING LEGAL CAPTURES--MY CONDUCT APPROVED AT THE
TIME--MINISTERIAL APPROBATION--PALTRY COMPENSATION AT LENGTH
GIVEN--MINISTERIAL CORRUPTION--PROVED BY SAN MARTIN--CAUSE OF OFFICIAL
ANIMOSITY TO ME----CONCLUSION.


My services to Chili and Peru have been so fully narrated in these
pages, that recapitulation is unnecessary. I will, therefore, briefly
notice their reward.

I was compelled to quit Chili by the political dissensions previously
related--without any of the emoluments due to my position as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, or any share of the sums belonging to
myself, officers, and seamen; which sums, on the faith of repayment had,
at my solicitation, been appropriated to the repairs and maintenance of
the squadron generally, but more especially at Guayaquil and Acapulco,
when in pursuit of the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_. Neither was any
compensation made for the value of stores captured and collected by the
squadron, whereby its efficiency was chiefly maintained during the whole
period of the Peruvian blockade.

The revolutionary movements already detailed, also compelled me to quit
the Pacific without any compensation from Peru, either to myself or the
officers who remained faithful to Chili--though my absence ought not to
have operated as a bar to such compensation as the Sovereign Congress
awarded to the generals and field officers of the army, who, though
restrained by General San Martin from effecting anything of importance
towards the liberation of the country, nevertheless received 500,000
dollars as a reward, whilst nothing was bestowed on myself or the
squadron, except thanks for "hazardous exploits on behalf of Peru,
hitherto," as the Congress expressed it, "under the _tyranny of military
despotism_, but now the arbiter of its own fate." To the "military
despot" himself, a pension of 20,000 dollars was granted, no doubt, as
has been said, in order to be rid of him; but it was I who gave the
death-blow to his usurped power, by seizing the treasure at Ancon to pay
the squadron, and by my constant refusal of his insidious overtures to
aid him in further treading under foot the liberties of Peru. It is
scarcely possible that the Government of Peru, even at this day, can
contrast with any degree of satisfaction, the empty thanks which were
alone given to one--to use the words of the Sovereign Congress in its
laudatory vote to myself--"by whose talent, worth, and bravery, the
Pacific Ocean has been liberated from the insults of enemies, and the
standard of liberty has been planted on the shores of the South"--and
its lavish reward to the enemy of that liberty, and even to those
officers who deserted from Chili to aid the specious views of the
Protector, of which rewards all who remained faithful to their duty were
wholly deprived.

Still more inconsistent has been the neglect of succeeding Peruvian
Governments in not fulfilling existing obligations. The Supreme Director
of Chili, recognising--as must also the Peruvians--the justice of their
paying, at least, the value of the _Esmeralda_, the capture of which
inflicted the death-blow on Spanish power, sent me a bill on the
Peruvian Government for 120,000 dollars, which was dishonoured, and
never since paid by any succeeding Government. Even the 40,000 dollars
stipulated by the authorities at Guayaquil as the penalty of giving up
the _Venganza_ was never liquidated, though the frigate was delivered to
Peru contrary to written stipulations previously adduced--and was thus
added to the Peruvian navy without cost to the State, but in reality at
the expense of the Chilian squadron, which ran it down into Guayaquil.
How the successive Governments of Peru can have reconciled this
appropriation to the injury of one whom their first independent
Government so warmly eulogised, it is difficult to conceive.

To return, however, to my relations with Chili. Shortly after my
departure for Brazil, the Government forcibly and indefensibly resumed
the estate at Rio Clara, which had been awarded to me and my family in
perpetuity, as a remuneration for the capture of Valdivia, and my
bailiff, Mr. Edwards, who had been left upon it for its management and
direction, was summarily ejected. Situated as this estate was, upon the
borders of the Indian frontier, it was, indeed, a trifling remuneration
for overthrowing the last remnant of Spanish power in the continental
territory of Chili. To have resumed it then, without pretext of any
kind, was an act reflecting infinite discredit upon those who
perpetrated that act, whether from revengeful feelings or baser motives.

The sum of 67,000 dollars, the speedy payment of which was promised to
me by the Supreme Director after our return from Valdivia, was never
paid, though the conquest of that fortress proved the immediate cause of
success in negociating a loan in England, which, before that event, had
been found impracticable. By a remarkable coincidence, the first
instalment of the loan arrived at Valparaiso at the period of my
departure; but the English merchants to whose care it was consigned,
refused to permit the money to be landed, in consequence of the
disorganization in which the corrupt conduct of the ministry had
involved the State.

No compensation for the severe wounds received during the capture of the
_Esmeralda_ was either offered or received--though for these all States
make separate provision. Even the Grand Cross of the Legion of Merit,
conferred for the capture of the _Esmeralda_, was suspended; whilst, in
its place, I was exposed to the greatest imaginable insults, even to the
withdrawal of every ship of war from under my command.

Unhappily, this ingratitude for services rendered was the least
misfortune which my devotedness to Chili brought upon me. On my return
to England, in 1825, after the termination of my services in Brazil, I
found myself involved in litigation on account of the seizure of
neutral vessels by authority of the then unacknowledged Government of
Chili. These litigations cost me, directly, upwards of £.14,000, and
indirectly, more than double that amount; for, in order to meet the
expenses, I was compelled to dispose of property at a great sacrifice,
amongst which the loss arising from the sale of my residence and grounds
in the Regent's Park alone was upwards of £.6,000--whilst that on other
property also sacrificed was as much more; thus, in place of receiving
anything for my efforts in the cause of Chilian and Peruvian
independence, I was a loser of upwards of £.25,000, this being more than
double the whole amount I had received as pay whilst in command of the
Chilian squadron: in other words, not only did I obtain no compensation
for my services in Chili--but was, in addition, compelled to sacrifice
all I afterwards earned in Brazil to satisfy claims arising from
seizures made under the authority of the Chilian Government! No
consideration whatever for these losses has been shewn by those whom I
so zealously and faithfully served in their hour of need; not even by
Peru, in behalf of which country nearly all these litigations arose,
though the services of the squadron cost nothing to that country or
Chili, beyond the expense to the latter of its original ineffective
equipment, the provisioning and maintenance of the ships having been
provided for at the cost of the enemy, even to the payment of the crews
with their own prize-money, none of which was ever refunded!

For sixteen years I made unceasing efforts to induce the succeeding
Governments of Chili to liquidate my claims, but without effect. At the
expiration of that period, I was no less surprised than annoyed by
receiving from the Accountant-General a demand for explanation of my
accounts, though, whilst I remained in Chili, I had urged incessantly
their official investigation, for, notwithstanding that the Government
had pronounced its approbation upon all I had done, I foresaw that
quibbles might arise as the pretext for continued injustice.

That the accounts were not adjusted previous to my departure from Chili,
was no fault of mine, as I was, in self-defence, compelled to quit the
country, unless I chose to take part with the late Supreme Director, in
supporting a ministry which, unknown to him, were guilty of the most
avaricious and injurious acts--or aid Gen. Freire in overthrowing one to
whom I was attached, as having always believed him to be a sincere and
honourable man.

To call upon me, therefore, in the year 1838, for an explanation of
complicated accounts delivered to the Chilian Government and
unquestioned in 1821-2, was an unworthy course, the more so as most of
the explanations required were of a paltry description, even to the
expenditure of a single dollar in the purser's accounts--as though
amidst operations of such magnitude as had successfully resulted in the
accomplishment of every object proposed, my time could be occupied in
minor details, yet even to these I was compelled to attend, the
Government not furnishing me with a competent person to register the
expenditure of the squadron.

The explanations thus demanded, after a lapse of nearly twenty years,
were one hundred in number--no great amount in a series of accounts
extending over more than three years' prosecution of an arduous service,
during which I had to find the means of supporting the squadron, the
expenditure of which was now, for the first time, called into question.
The paltry character of many of the matters in dispute will be best
judged of from the following items:--

   No.  4. Vouchers demanded for ten dollars' worth of mutton.
       23 to 32. Certificates for cases of gin lost in the San Martin.
       40. Deficiency of nine dollars in the pay-books of the Lautaro.
       42. Do. of three dollars in the pay-books of the Independencia.
       69. Error of three dollars in the valuation of goods captured at
       Arica.
       73. Forty dollars for repairing pumps at a time when the ships
       could hardly be kept afloat.
       75. Imputed error of _one dollar!_ in the purchase of 756 gals.
       of gin, &c. &c.

In addition to many such petty items, I was accused of giving bounty to
seamen unauthorised--though the seamen had captured the very monies with
which they were rewarded--and was expected to refund some which had been
stolen. My having supplied rudders and rigging to the vessels cut out
from before the batteries at Callao, was called into question, though
the ships could not be sent from the port without re-equipment, the
Spaniards having dismantled them before their capture. I was expected,
after the lapse of sixteen years, to produce the pursers' books of the
division of stores captured, the books having been sent in due course to
the Minister of Marine's office; yet the Government had not furnished
the squadron with the necessary articles for the safety of the ships,
whether under sail or at anchor, whilst the stores which were taken from
the enemy and applied to the use of the expedition, were so much clear
gain to the State.

A still more unjust act of the Chilian Government was that of calling
upon me for vouchers for the expenditure of 50,000 dollars, captured by
Col. Miller, in Upper Peru, and expended by him in paying and
provisioning his troops, of which transactions I was not at all
cognizant: the sums, however, were no doubt faithfully applied by Col.
Miller to the exigencies of the service in which he was engaged; he
merely apprising me that he had captured or otherwise collected 32,000
dollars, with which he had given his men two months' pay, and an
additional month's gratuity for their gallantry, a transaction no less
essential than honourable, but one which the narrow views of the
ministry failed to appreciate. No vouchers were, however, remitted to me
whilst I remained on the coast, as the following letter from Col. Miller
will shew:--

   Ica, Aug. 27, 1821.
   My Lord,


   Inclosed is a memorandum of money received and
   disbursed to the division under my command. So soon as time will
   permit, another more detailed and circumstantial account shall be
   forwarded for your Lordship's approval.

   I have written to Major Soler, who is in Lima, to furnish your
   Lordship with the necessary particulars relative to the capture of
   the cash.


   I have the honour, &c.

   Wm. MILLER,
   Col. Comm. Southern Division.

I never afterwards saw Col. Miller nor his division in Peru; but the
whole that was expended by him in emancipating the country, was charged
to me, and thus I was made responsible for the price of his victories,
though they did not cost either Government a dollar.

But the most flagrant act of injustice was the deduction from my claims
of costs and damages for the detention of neutral vessels seized under
the orders of blockade issued by the Chilian Government. The
circumstances were as follows:--

The Spanish Government had chartered the _Edward Ellice_ and other ships
to transport troops from Spain to Peru, but internal divisions in the
parent state prevented their despatch. The masters of these vessels
thereupon claimed demurrage, which it was not convenient for the Spanish
Government to pay--but in lieu thereof licences were granted to carry
Spanish goods to Peru. These ships, being thus loaded, proceeded to
Gibraltar, where the house of Gibbs & Co. provided them with British
papers, in addition to the Spanish manifests supplied at Cadiz--this
fact alone shewing that they considered the speculation illegitimate.

Furnished with these double sets of papers, they came to Peru for the
purpose of trading; but as I had advice of this proceeding--and
afterwards found the Spanish duplicates in the Peruvian Custom Houses--I
seized the vessels on account of the fraudulent papers, they having also
on board contraband of war, and was about to send them to Valparaiso for
adjudication, when their commanders offered to surrender to me all the
anchors, cables, and other illegal cargo, if I would forego this
determination, which I did, and applied these articles to the use of the
Chilian squadron, which at that time had not a trustworthy anchor in any
of the ships.

The course pursued was satisfactory to the masters and supercargoes, and
subsequently, on explanation, to Sir Thomas Hardy, whilst it was highly
approved by the Chilian Government. After my return to England, actions
were brought against me for even the contraband which had been
voluntarily surrendered by the masters; but as I was fortunately enabled
to produce the Spanish duplicates, they were abandoned, otherwise I
should have been involved in utter ruin, for releasing British vessels
subject to condemnation, and at the same time _gratuitously providing_
for the Chilian ships of war, the essential articles of which they were
entirely destitute.

In order to conciliate the English merchants at Valparaiso, the
Admiralty Court acquitted various vessels seized under the orders of the
Government, charging the costs and damages to my account! and that in
the face of its own right to blockade and seizure as expressed to the
British Commodore, Sir Thomas Hardy, who, though he insisted on the
protection of British ships, disavowed their taking advantage of his
protection to supply the enemy with contraband of war, as had been done.

Sir Thomas Hardy's view was this, that if the blockading power was not
in a position to render the blockade efficient over the whole coast, it
was not recognisable anywhere by the law of nations; but, whilst
expressing this erroneous view of blockade, he added, "nor can I resist
the right which the Government of Chili has to establish and maintain
blockade on the same footing as other belligerents."

But even in the extreme views of Sir Thomas Hardy, we were competent to
establish and maintain a blockade in its widest extent, and the best
proof of the fact is, that the blockade was established. Even Zenteno,
the Minister of Marine, pointed out to Sir Thomas Hardy, the ability of
the squadron to maintain the blockade which he recognised.

   "Our naval forces, perhaps diminished in apparent magnitude by
   distance, was not believed sufficient to maintain the blockade in all
   its extent, yet it has had the glory of setting at liberty, and of
   placing in the hands of the American Independents, all the ports and
   coasts of Peru, excepting only the port of Callao. Moreover, from the
   very centre even of that port, and from under the fire of the
   batteries, the Spanish ship of war, _Esmeralda_, has been cut out by
   our naval forces, and our strength thereby augmented, whilst that
   of the enemy is reduced to nothing."

   (Signed) "JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO."

So that, in face of this declaration by the Chilian Minister himself, as
to the naval supremacy of the squadron on the coast of Peru, and its
consequent right of seizure, the Admiralty Court, for its own sinister
purposes, chose to decide that I was liable for seizures of neutral
vessels made by my captains, without my knowledge--condemning me in
costs and damages for their acts; the result being that I was mulcted in
this, and every other charge it saw fit to make in my absence. The
injustice of this was the more striking, as San Martin was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron as well as the army, so that, even
supposing the decisions of the Admiralty Court to be right, the onus lay
upon him, not me. Yet he was rewarded, and I was compelled to pay for
acts executed under his authority.

In the year 1845, _twenty-three years after_ the liberation of Peru, and
the annihilation of the Spanish power in the Pacific, the Chilian
Government deducted all charges thus unjustly placed to my account, and
awarded me the balance of 30,000 dollars (£.6000) for all the services
rendered to the country. I have before mentioned that, from the
consequence of litigation proceeding from obedience to the orders of the
Chilian Government, I was subjected to a loss in England of nearly
£.25,000; so that in place of my reaping any reward whatever for my
services to Chili and Peru, the liberation of the latter and the
completion of independence of the former cost me £.19,000 out of my own
pocket!

I would ask the Chilian people and Government whether they do not now
see the injurious treatment pursued towards me--arising from the base
impositions then practised upon them, though these have been partly
compensated by the present enlightened Government, which, as its recent
decision has shewn, is composed of men of a far higher stamp than those
with whom I was placed in contact, and, as I have every reason to
believe, would redeem the stigma left on the national character by their
corrupt predecessors of 1820-23, on fully comprehending the treatment to
which I was subjected. That explanation is here truthfully laid before
them, enabling them to judge for themselves. I will only add that not a
single statement has been made in this narrative which is not based on
original documents, the more important of which have been incorporated,
the whole being about to be photographed and sent out to Chili, so that,
comparing them with their official originals, their authenticity shall
be beyond question.

I have said that the ministry which paralysed my operations, and by
their ill-disguised mercenary practices overthrew the Supreme Director,
O'Higgins, was corrupt, though I have thought it beneath the dignity of
historical narrative, more particularly to expose their dishonest
practices, of which I was well apprised. I feel, however, that in making
such a charge, some proof thereof is incumbent on me, I will therefore
in conclusion simply adduce a solitary instance of those practices, so
damning, that, unless supported by irrefutable testimony, I might well
be deemed a malicious libeller for making accusations otherwise utterly
incredible.

It has been proved by the narrative--as indeed it has never been
disputed--that the vigilance of the blockade before Callao starved the
Spanish garrison out of Lima, and ultimately out of the fortress of
Callao, this being the main object of the blockade. Whilst I was thus,
as the only means within my power, endeavouring to starve out the
Spaniards, _the Chilian Ministers were sending corn to be sold, at a
thousand per cent, profit, to the blockaded garrison!_

To such an extent was this carried, that even Gen. San Martin, aware of
the villainy of his pretended supporters in the Chilian ministry, and
dreading the result, put me on my guard by writing to me the following
letter:--

   Haura, Feb. 21, 1821.
   My esteemed Friend,


   I am expecting information from you with great
   anxiety, and sincerely hope that it may be as favourable as that
   which I received in Ancon when I was in similar uncertainty.

   The _Miantinomo_ is on her way from Valparaiso, _by permission of
   the Government, to introduce a cargo of corn into Callao! It is most
   essential at all risks to avert this mischief, for it would be perfect
   ruin to admit such a cargo under existing circumstances!_ I have
   officially given you information on this subject.

   The day before yesterday the _Andromache_ arrived at Huacho;
   Capt. Sherriff tells me that in a few days he shall return to Callao.

   Lady Cochrane is at Huaita, making shift in the best way she
   can. God give you happiness, my friend. Always count on the
   sincere esteem of your affectionate

   JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.

This testimony from one whose creatures the more influential of the
Chilian ministers were, is indisputable, but in the present case their
rapacity alarmed even their patron. San Martin is however wrong in
attributing the traitorous attempt to the Government collectively--the
Supreme Director, O'Higgins, not being capable of such practices as were
carried on under his authority--of which this is only one solitary
instance. The real perpetrators of these enormities are fresh in the
recollection of many Chilenos still living. Yet these were the men who,
under the mask of patriotism, originated the most unworthy charges
against me, without giving me the slightest credit for having carried on
the naval war without national assistance either in money or stores. The
present generation of Chilenos are proud of their country, and--as their
present excellent President, when awarding me an admiral's pay for the
remainder of my life has stated--desire to reward those illustrious
foreigners who assisted them in their struggles for independence--but
they have great reason to regret the conduct of those ministers who
imperilled that independence, and jeopardised the liberties of Chili for
private gain.

It is scarcely necessary to add that not a grain of corn in the
_Miantinomo_, or other vessels similarly despatched, with the exception
of one which arrived during my absence, found its way to the starving
garrison of Callao. Yet on their arrival I was implored to permit its
landing, and on replying that no such treachery to the people of Chili
should be carried on before my face, I was coolly asked to stand off
during the night from the blockade, _that I might not see what was going
on!_ Such was ministerial honesty in the first days of Chilian
independence.

The cause of official animosity to me is now apparent. Had I
participated in these nefarious practices, or had I accepted the rank,
decorations, and estates offered to me by San Martin as the price of my
defection from Chili, I should now be rich, however despicable to
myself--in place of having long and severely suffered in consequence of
my rigorous adherence to the national interests--with the proud
consciousness of never having done an act which I desire to conceal.



APPENDIX.


_Recent Address of the President of Chili to the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies, recognising Lord Dundonald's services, and according to him
full pay as Admiral for the remainder of his life._

_Fellow Citizens of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies,_

Towards the end of 1818, when Chili celebrated the first maritime
triumph obtained by our squadron in Talcahuano, the gallant seaman
Thomas Lord Cochrane, now Earl of Dundonald, and an admiral in the
British service, appeared upon our seas, decided to assist the noble
cause of our independence.

The important services of this chief in the British Navy are well known
during the European war which ended in 1815.

He was a post captain, not in active service, when the squadron of his
country was reduced to the peace establishment, and he accepted the
invitation which was made to him in London by the Chilian agent, to
enter the service of this country, and came to take the command of our
naval forces, bringing in the prestige of his name, his great skill and
intelligence, his active and daring spirit,--a powerful contingent to
that struggle of such vital importance for our independence, the
dominion of the Pacific.

In how far the well-founded hopes in the cooperation of Lord Cochrane
were realised by the able direction which he knew how to give to our
maritime forces, are facts which have been judged by the world at large
and history. Still alive in our memory is the taking of Valdivia, the
feats at Callao, the bloody and splendid triumph of the _Esmeralda_, the
taking of the Spanish frigates _Prueba_ and _Venganza_ on the coast of
the Ecuador, and the complete annihilation of the power of Spain in
these seas executed by our squadron under the command of Lord Cochrane;
and this Chief upon leaving the service of Chili in January 1823, and
when he delivered over to Government, when there were no longer any
enemies to contend with, the triumphant insignia of his rank, he might
with justice and truth have said, "I return this into your hands when
Chili has ensured the dominion of the Pacific."

Chili at the same time that she resists unjust and exaggerated
pretensions, has always been proud of her desire to reward, in a
dignified and honourable manner, the services of illustrious foreigners
who have assisted us in the glorious struggle for our independence. This
noble and spontaneous sentiment of national gratitude was what dictated
the law of 6th October, 1842, incorporating, during his life with the
full pay of his rank, General D. Jose San Martin, even when he might
reside in foreign parts; and it is the same sentiment which induces me
to propose to you at present, and with consent of the Council of State,
the following project of law:--

   Sole Article.--Vice-Admiral Thomas Lord Cochrane,
   now Earl of Dundonald, is to be considered during the term
   of his life as in active service of the squadron of the Republic,
   with the full pay of his rank, even although he may reside
   without the territory of Chili.

   Santiago, July 28, 1857.
   Manuel Montt.
   Jose Francisco Gana.

       *       *       *       *       *

   _Lord Dundonald's reply to the preceding._

   _To His Excellency the President in Council and Congress of Chili._

   Your Excellency magnanimously presented to Congress
   a brief but lucid enumeration of my services to the State, which
   being taken into consideration by the enlightened representatives of
   a judicious and gallant people, "full pay during my life," and an
   honorary medal, were voted to me, accompanied by the truly
   gratifying announcement that such estimable gifts were "en
   testimonio de gratitud nacional por grandes servicios que prestò a
   la Republica durante la guerra de Independencia."

   These honours I most thankfully accept, as highly gratifying
   proofs that, after the lapse of more than thirty years, my zealous,
   official, extra-official, and successful exertions, to ensure to Chili
   complete independence, internal peace, and the dominion of the
   Pacific, are held in grateful remembrance by the Government and
   People of that highly respected nation. Nevertheless I must be
   permitted to observe that the grant of full pay, only prospectively,
   to one who is upwards of eighty years of age, is little more than
   nominal, as my life, in all human probability, is approaching its
   close. I had hoped that, as vast benefits have uninterruptedly
   accrued to the State, ever since the completion of the services so
   honourably recognised, the grant would have dated from that period,
   in the same manner that has recently been accorded to me by the
   Government of Brazil, which has decreed the restitution of arrears
   of pay from the period that my actual command ceased, and also its
   continuance during my life.

   If my services to Chili be acknowledged to have been great, might
   I not expect an equal boon from a country which owes the blessings
   of peace and subsequent tranquillity, and consequent prosperity, to
   the speedy termination of war? I plead not for myself, most
   Excellent Sir, for at my advanced age, I have few wants, but for the
   sake of my children and for the honour of my family. I need only
   point to the additional examples of Spain and Portugal, where all
   general officers and admirals of first rank, employed in the struggle
   for the emancipation and independence of those countries, were
   rewarded by the subsequent continuance of their pay during their
   lives; an engagement ever punctually discharged.

   I have no doubt that had the recollection of my advanced age been
   present to the mind of your Excellency when you proposed the project
   of law in my behalf, and had you remembered that a merely
   prospective grant would be of little personal benefit to me or to my
   numerous family, your Excellency would have been happy to have
   recommended, and the Congress to have conceded, that it should
   likewise be retrospective, especially as Chili had not (as is the case
   in my native country) to rear and maintain numerous officers for
   one found suited to command.

   In order to convince your Excellency that I do not desire _full_ pay
   to be granted to me during the long period elapsed since my services
   were rendered (though from the privations I have suffered and the
   losses I have sustained, such delay in truth might be deemed an
   additional title), I therefore beg most respectfully to suggest to the
   consideration of your Excellency, to that of the Council and National
   Congress, as well as to the just feeling of the honourable people of
   Chili, that _one half_ of the pay which I received in actual service, be
   accorded to me retrospectively, in the same manner that a similar
   boon was granted by the Brazilian nation. This I should accept
   with deep gratitude, in compensation for the wounds I received this
   day thirty-six years, in the capture of the _Esmeralda_, for other
   perilous extra-official services rendered, and the heavy
   responsibilities incurred, all of which terminated in results most
   important to the national cause.

   Be assured, most Excellent Sir, that it is only my advanced age
   that prevents me from attempting to re-visit your now peaceful and
   prosperous country, personally to acknowledge your Excellency's
   courtesy, and the kind feeling evinced towards me by the Council of
   State, by the representatives, and people of Chili. It would be with
   delight that I should see steam vessels now introduced into the
   national marine, the great railroad from Valparaiso to Quillotta and
   Santiago, now in progress, and witness the various important
   improvements accomplished, and advancement in national prosperity
   effected in the course of the last third of a century. Such happy
   results testify highly to the merits of the Government and to the
   character of the Chilian people.

   COCHRANE--DUNDONALD.
   London, Nov. 5, 1857.

_Letter from the Supreme Director of Chili, approving all I had done in
Peru. This letter was written in English, in which tongue His Excellency
was by no means unversed, having, in early life, had the advantage of a
few years spent at Richmond; a circumstance which, in after years, gave
to his mind an English tone, elevating him far above the then
narrow-minded men by whom, unfortunately for Chili, he was surrounded
and thwarted._

   Most secret and confidential.
   Santiago, Nov. 12, 1821.
   My Dear Friend Lord Cochrane,


   Capt. Morgell, the bearer of this, has delivered to
   me the despatches sent by you in the _Ceransasee_, together with your
   interesting notes, Nos. 1 to 9, dated 10th to 30th of September
   last; as also the documents to which they are referred. I have read
   them, with great attention, but have always felt just indignation
   against the ungrateful course pursued towards Chili, which can only
   be tempered by the pleasure which I feel in reading the dignity,
   good judgment, and knowledge with which you knew how to sustain
   your rights, and those of this Republic.

   It was my wish that this reply should not be in writing, but
   personally, and with embraces of approbation for all that you have
   said and practised under the difficult circumstances detailed in your
   private and official letters; but as the great distance in which you
   are from this deprives me of this pleasure, and as you expect to add
   new glories to Chili in the seizure of the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, and
   to bring them to port Bernardo under your orders, I will hastily
   answer the principal points of your communications.

   The party and the words you mention, do not leave any doubt of
   the small hopes which Chili is to have for its sacrifices; yet there
   is nothing to fear from such intentions when discovered. Whilst
   the squadron under your orders commands the Pacific, this Republic
   is very well covered, and it is in our hands to be the masters of the
   moral, political, commercial, and even of the physical force of this
   part of America.

          *       *       *       *       *

   Although the battery placed at Ancon _after_ the enemy went away
   in tranquillity, and the threat (_from San Martin_,) about not paying
   one _real_, unless Chili should sell the squadron to Peru, made it
   excusable not to send any mission there; yet I have named my
   Minister of Finance, in whom I have the greatest confidence,
   to go to Lima to fix the basis of relations, and to ask compensation
   for the active debt of Chili against Peru. My Minister has orders
   to return as soon as possible, let the end of his mission be what it
   will, and by that time you may have returned to Chili, and then
   we will accord the ulterior.

   It is very painful that the garrison of Callao would not capitulate
   under your flag! Then you and Chili would have been implored
   for grants,--then all should have been paid without excuse,--and
   then you would not have found yourself under the necessity
   of taking the property retained, to pay and save the squadron. I
   _would have done the same if I had been there, therefore I say again
   all has my approbation_, and I give to you, as to the meritorious
   officers under your orders, my cordial thanks for their fidelity and
   heroism, in favour of Chili, where, in a more glorious and decorous
   way, the fortune of all will be made in the course of progress which
   events are preparing for this happy country; whilst it is not known
   what is to be had in Peru, because, as you observe, the war is only
   beginning, which will be followed by poverty, discontent, and above
   all, anarchy. They will soon feel the want of you and of the
   squadron, and those ungrateful officers who separated themselves
   from you to enter the Peruvian navy will also feel their deceit and
   punishment. They have been scratched out of the list of the
   Chilian navy, and I only wait your arrival or an official detail
   relating to the expedition, to assign lands and premiums to those
   who have not abandoned you, and in particular to the honourable
   Captains Crosbie, Wilkinson, Delano, Cobbet, and Simpson, whom you
   recommend.

   Although we live in poverty, and the Exchequer continues in
   affliction, yet we have sufficient resignation and courage to make
   convenient sacrifices. All my efforts shall be employed in making
   the _Rising Star_ one of the vessels of our squadron, and then we
   shall be invincible, and by keeping good relations with Sir Thomas
   Hardy, and by his means with England, we shall establish fundamental
   principles to our glories. I am satisfied of the conferences
   and deliberations you had with this gentleman, and I approve the
   whole, although the Valparaiso merchants might scream.

   I like the precautions you have taken in sending correspondence
   directly to me, and not to the ministry. But you must
   understand that even before I had read your private and official
   letters, much of their contents was known to the public, no doubt
   by the private communications of some officers, or by what was
   verbally communicated in Valparaiso by the officers of the _Aransasu_.
   On my part, I also recommend you all necessary secrecy on the
   contents of this letter, so that our reserve may not be frustrated,
   and our best measures disappointed.

   I shall claim from the Lima Government satisfaction for putting
   in prison the First Lieutenant of the _O'Higgins_, and also for
   imprisoning him of the same class belonging to the _Valdivia_, as
   also for the threat of the Ungrateful Guida, as narrated in your
   favour of the 29th of September last. I assure you that I will
   never permit the least insult against the flag of this Republic. I
   felt the greatest pleasure in the answer you gave to Monteagudo
   and Guida in your note of the 28th and 29th.

   As you have left Callao there is nothing officially to communicate
   upon your conduct there. You have not submitted to Lima neither
   directly nor indirectly, and from the moment the independence of
   that country was declared under the protectoral Government of San
   Martin ceased the provisional control that he had upon the
   squadron.

   The province of Conception is almost free of enemies, and I hope
   Chiloe will be so very soon, to accomplish our greatness. There is
   a nursery for a good navy, and when you can visit that archipelago
   you will discover advantages and richness, relieved from the care of
   indolent and despotic Spain.

   Believe me, my dear Lord,
   Your eternal friend,
   O'HIGGINS.





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