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Title: The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume II
Author: Hendrick, Burton Jesse, 1870-1949
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume II" ***
[Illustration: Sir Edward Grey (now Viscount Grey of Fallodon),
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-1916]
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGE
BY
BURTON J. HENDRICK
VOLUME
II
GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1924
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES
AT
THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
CONTENTS
VOLUME II
CHAPTER PAGE
XIV. THE "LUSITANIA" AND AFTER 1
XV. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE LAWYERS 53
XVI. DARK DAYS FOR THE ALLIES 81
XVII. CHRISTMAS IN ENGLAND, 1915 103
XVIII. A PERPLEXED AMBASSADOR 128
XIX. WASHINGTON IN THE SUMMER OF 1916 148
XX. "PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY" 189
XXI. THE UNITED STATES AT WAR 215
XXII. THE BALFOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES 248
XXIII. PAGE--THE MAN 295
XXIV. A RESPITE AT ST. IVES 321
XXV. GETTING THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO FRANCE 349
XXVI. LAST DAYS IN ENGLAND 374
XXVII. THE END 404
APPENDIX 407
INDEX 425
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Sir Edward Grey _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Col. Edward M. House. From a painting by P.A.
Laszlo 88
The Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1908-1916 89
Herbert C. Hoover, in 1914 104
A facsimile page from the Ambassador's letter of
November 24, 1916, resigning his Ambassadorship 105
Walter H. Page, at the time of America's entry into
the war, April, 1917 216
Resolution passed by the two Houses of Parliament,
April 18, 1917, on America's entry into the war 217
The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1916-- 232
The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of
Balfour), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1916-1919 233
Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916-1918,
Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1918 344
General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of
the American Expeditionary Force in the Great
War 345
Admiral William Sowden Sims, Commander of
American Naval Forces operating in European
waters during the Great War 360
A silver model of the _Mayflower_, the farewell gift
of the Plymouth Council to Mr. Page 361
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
WALTER H. PAGE
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGE
CHAPTER XIV
THE "LUSITANIA"--AND AFTER
I
The news of the _Lusitania_ was received at the American Embassy at four
o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915. At that time preparations were
under way for a dinner in honour of Colonel and Mrs. House; the first
_Lusitania_ announcement declared that only the ship itself had been
destroyed and that all the passengers and members of the crew had been
saved; there was, therefore, no good reason for abandoning this dinner.
At about seven o'clock, the Ambassador came home; his manner showed that
something extraordinary had taken place; there were no outward signs of
emotion, but he was very serious. The first news, he now informed Mrs.
Page, had been a mistake; more than one thousand men, women, and
children had lost their lives, and more than one hundred of these were
American citizens. It was too late to postpone the dinner but that
affair was one of the most tragic in the social history of London. The
Ambassador was constantly receiving bulletins from his Chancery, and
these, as quickly as they were received, he read to his guests. His
voice was quiet and subdued; there were no indications of excitement in
his manner or in that of his friends, and hardly of suppressed emotion.
The atmosphere was rather that of dumb stupefaction. The news seemed to
have dulled everyone's capacity for thought and even for feeling. If any
one spoke, it was in whispers. Afterward, in the drawing room, this same
mental state was the prevailing one; there was little denunciation of
Germany and practically no discussion as to the consequences of the
crime; everyone's thought was engrossed by the harrowing and
unbelievable facts which the Ambassador was reading from the little
yellow slips that were periodically brought in. An irresistible
fascination evidently kept everybody in the room; the guests stayed
late, eager for every new item. When they finally left, one after
another, their manner was still abstracted and they said their
good-nights in low voices. There were two reasons for this behaviour.
The first was that the Ambassador and his guests had received the
details of the greatest infamy which any supposedly civilized state had
perpetrated since the massacre of Saint Bartholomew. The second was the
conviction that the United States would at once declare war on Germany.
On this latter point several of the guests expressed their ideas and one
of the most shocked and outspoken was Colonel House. For a month the
President's personal representative had been discussing with British
statesmen possible openings for mediation, but all his hopes in this
direction now vanished. That President Wilson would act with the utmost
energy Colonel House took for granted. This act, he evidently believed,
left the United States no option. "We shall be at war with Germany
within a month," he declared.
The feeling that prevailed in the Embassy this evening was the one that
existed everywhere in London for several days. Emotionally the event
acted like an anæsthetic. This was certainly the condition of all
Americans associated with the American Embassy, especially Page
himself. A day or two after the sinking the Ambassador went to Euston
Station, at an early hour in the morning, to receive the American
survivors. The hundred or more men and women who shambled from the train
made a listless and bedraggled gathering. Their grotesque clothes, torn
and unkempt--for practically none had had the opportunity of obtaining a
change of dress--their expressionless faces, their lustreless eyes,
their uncertain and bewildered walk, faintly reflected an experience
such as comes to few people in this world. The most noticeable thing
about these unfortunates was their lack of interest in their
surroundings; everything had apparently been reduced to a blank; the
fact that practically none made any reference to their ordeal, or could
be induced to discuss it, was a matter of common talk in London. And
something of this disposition now became noticeable in Page himself. He
wrote his dispatches to Washington in an abstracted mood; he went
through his duties almost with the detachment of a sleep-walker; like
the _Lusitania_ survivors, he could not talk much at that time about the
scenes that had taken place off the coast of Ireland. Yet there were
many indications that he was thinking about them, and his thoughts, as
his letters reveal, were concerned with more things than the tragedy
itself. He believed that his country was now face to face with its
destiny. What would Washington do?
Page had a characteristic way of thinking out his problems. He performed
his routine work at the Chancery in the daytime, but his really serious
thinking he did in his own room at night. The picture is still a vivid
one in the recollection of his family and his other intimates. Even at
this time Page's health was not good, yet he frequently spent the
evening at his office in Grosvenor Gardens, and when the long day's
labours were finished, he would walk rather wearily to his home at No. 6
Grosvenor Square. He would enter the house slowly--and his walk became
slower and more tired as the months went by--go up to his room and cross
to the fireplace, so apparently wrapped up in his own thoughts that he
hardly greeted members of his own family. A wood fire was kept burning
for him, winter and summer alike; Page would put on his dressing gown,
drop into a friendly chair, and sit there, doing nothing, reading
nothing, saying nothing--only thinking. Sometimes he would stay for an
hour; not infrequently he would remain till two, three, or four o'clock
in the morning; occasions were not unknown when his almost motionless
figure would be in this same place at daybreak. He never slept through
these nights, and he never even dozed; he was wide awake, and his mind
was silently working upon the particular problem that was uppermost in
his thoughts. He never rose until he had solved it or at least until he
had decided upon a course of action. He would then get up abruptly, go
to bed, and sleep like a child. The one thing that made it possible for
a man of his delicate frame, racked as it was by anxiety and over work,
to keep steadily at his task, was the wonderful gift which he possessed
of sleeping.
Page had thought out many problems in this way. The tension caused by
the sailing of the _Dacia_, in January, 1915, and the deftness with
which the issue had been avoided by substituting a French for a British
cruiser, has already been described. Page discovered this solution on
one of these all-night self-communings. It was almost two o'clock in the
morning that he rose, said to himself, "I've got it!" and then went
contentedly to bed. And during the anxious months that followed the
_Lusitania_, the _Arabic_, and those other outrages which have now
taken their place in history, he spent night after night turning the
matter over in his mind. But he found no way out of the humiliations
presented by the policy of Washington.
"Here we are swung loose in time," he wrote to his son Arthur, a few
days after the first _Lusitania_ note had been sent to Germany, "nobody
knows the day or the week or the month or the year--and we are caught on
this island, with no chance of escape, while the vast slaughter goes on
and seems just beginning, and the degradation of war goes on week by
week; and we live in hope that the United States will come in, as the
only chance to give us standing and influence when the reorganization of
the world must begin. (Beware of betraying the word 'hope'!) It has all
passed far beyond anybody's power to describe. I simply go on day by day
into unknown experiences and emotions, seeing nothing before me very
clearly and remembering only dimly what lies behind. I can see only one
proper thing: that all the world should fall to and hunt this wild beast
down.
"Two photographs of little Mollie[1] on my mantelpiece recall persons
and scenes and hopes unconnected with the war: few other things can.
Bless the baby, she couldn't guess what a sweet purpose she serves."
* * * * *
The sensations of most Americans in London during this crisis are almost
indescribable. Washington's failure promptly to meet the situation
affected them with astonishment and humiliation. Colonel House was
confident that war was impending, and for this reason he hurried his
preparations to leave England; he wished to be in the United States, at
the President's side, when the declaration was made. With this feeling
about Mr. Wilson, Colonel House received a fearful shock a day or two
after the _Lusitania_ had gone down: while walking in Piccadilly, he
caught a glimpse of one of the famous sandwich men, bearing a poster of
an afternoon newspaper. This glaring broadside bore the following
legend: "We are too proud to fight--Woodrow Wilson." The sight of that
placard was Colonel House's first intimation that the President might
not act vigorously. He made no attempt to conceal from Page and other
important men at the American Embassy the shock which it had given him.
Soon the whole of England was ringing with these six words; the
newspapers were filled with stinging editorials and cartoons, and the
music halls found in the Wilsonian phrase materials for their choicest
jibes. Even in more serious quarters America was the subject of the most
severe denunciation. No one felt these strictures more poignantly than
President Wilson's closest confidant. A day or two before sailing home
he came into the Embassy greatly depressed at the prevailing revulsion
against the United States. "I feel," Colonel House said to Page, "as
though I had been given a kick at every lamp post coming down
Constitution Hill." A day or two afterward Colonel House sailed for
America.
II
And now came the period of distress and of disillusionment. Three
_Lusitania_ notes were sent and were evasively answered, and Washington
still seemed to be marking time. The one event in this exciting period
which gave Page satisfaction was Mr. Bryan's resignation as Secretary of
State. For Mr. Bryan personally Page had a certain fondness, but as head
of the State Department the Nebraska orator had been a cause of endless
vexation. Many of Page's letters, already printed, bear evidence of the
utter demoralization which existed in this branch of the Administration
and this demoralization became especially glaring during the _Lusitania_
crisis. No attempt was made even at this momentous period to keep the
London Embassy informed as to what was taking place in Washington;
Page's letters and cablegrams were, for the most part, unacknowledged
and unanswered, and the American Ambassador was frequently obliged to
obtain his information about the state of feeling in Washington from Sir
Edward Grey. It must be said, in justice to Mr. Bryan, that this
carelessness was nothing particularly new, for it had worried many
ambassadors before Page. Readers of Charles Francis Adams's
correspondence meet with the same complaints during the Civil War; even
at the time of the _Trent_ crisis, when for a fortnight Great Britain
and the United States were living on the brink of war, Adams was kept
entirely in the dark about the plans of Washington[2]. The letters of
John Hay show a similar condition during his brief ambassadorship to
Great Britain in 1897-1898[3].
But Mr. Bryan's incumbency was guilty of diplomatic vices which were
peculiarly its own. The "leaks" in the State Department, to which Page
has already referred, were constantly taking place; the Ambassador would
send the most confidential cipher dispatches to his superior, cautioning
the Department that they must be held inviolably secret, and then he
would pick up the London newspapers the next morning and find that
everything had been cabled from Washington. To most readers, the
informal method of conducting foreign business, as it is disclosed in
these letters, probably comes as something of a shock. Page is here
discovered discussing state matters, not in correspondence with the
Secretary of State, but in private unofficial communications to the
President, and especially to Colonel House--the latter at that time not
an official person at all. All this, of course, was extremely irregular
and, in any properly organized State Department, it would have been even
reprehensible. But the point is that there was no properly organized
State Department at that time, and the impossibility of conducting
business through the regular channels compelled Page to adopt other
means. "There is only one way to reform the State Department," he
informed Colonel House at this time. "That is to raze the whole
building, with its archives and papers, to the ground, and begin all
over again."
This state of affairs in Washington explains the curious fact that the
real diplomatic history of the United States and Great Britain during
this great crisis is not to be found in the archives of the State
Department, for the official documents on file there consist of the most
routine telegrams, which are not particularly informing, but in the
Ambassador's personal correspondence with the President, Colonel House,
and a few other intimates. The State Department did not have the first
requisite of a properly organized foreign office, for it could not be
trusted with confidential information. The Department did not tell Page
what it was doing, but it apparently told the whole world what Page was
doing. It is an astonishing fact that Page could not write and cable the
most important details, for he was afraid that they would promptly be
given to the reporters.
* * * * *
"I shall not send another confidential message to the State Department,"
Page wrote to Colonel House, September 15, 1914; "it's too dangerous.
Time and time again now the Department has leaked. Last week, I sent a
dispatch and I said in the body of it, '_this is confidential and under
no condition to be given out or made public, but to be regarded as
inviolably secret_.' The very next morning it was telegraphed from
Washington to the London newspapers. Bryan telegraphed me that he was
sure it didn't get out from the Department and that he now had so fixed
it that there could be no leak. He's said that at least four times
before. The Department swarms with newspaper men, I hear. But whether it
does or not the leak continues. I have to go with my tail between my
legs and apologize to Sir Edward Grey and to do myself that shame and to
do my very best to keep his confidence--against these unnecessary odds.
The only way to be safe is to do the job perfunctorily, to answer the
questions the Department sends and to do nothing on your own account.
That's the reason so many of our men do their jobs in that way--or _one_
reason and a strong one. We can never have an alert and energetic and
powerful service until men can trust the Department and until they can
get necessary information from it. I wrote the President that of course
I'd go on till the war ended and all the questions growing out of it
were settled, and that then he must excuse me, if I must continue to be
exposed to this danger and humiliation. In the meantime, I shall send
all my confidential matter in private letters to him."
* * * * *
Page did not regard Mr. Bryan's opinions and attitudes as a joke: to him
they were a serious matter and, in his eyes, Bryan was most interesting
as a national menace. He regarded the Secretary as the extreme
expression of an irrational sentimentalism that was in danger of
undermining the American character, especially as the kind of thought
he represented was manifest in many phases of American life. In a moment
of exasperation, Page gave expression to this feeling in a letter to his
son:
_To Arthur W. Page_
London, June 6, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... We're in danger of being feminized and fad-ridden--grape juice
(God knows water's good enough: why grape juice?); pensions;
Christian Science; peace cranks; efficiency-correspondence schools;
aid-your-memory; women's clubs; co-this and co-t'other and coddling
in general; Billy Sunday; petticoats where breeches ought to be and
breeches where petticoats ought to be; white livers and soft heads
and milk-and-water;--I don't want war: nobody knows its horrors or
its degradations or its cost. But to get rid of hyphenated
degenerates perhaps it's worth while, and to free us from 'isms and
soft folk. That's the domestic view of it. As for being kicked by a
sauerkraut caste--O Lord, give us backbone!
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
In the bottom of this note, Page has cut a notch in the paper and
against it he has written: "This notch is the place to apply a match to
this letter."
* * * * *
"Again and ever I am reminded," Page also wrote in reference to Bryan's
resignation, "of the danger of having to do with cranks. A certain
orderliness of mind and conduct seems essential for safety in this short
life. Spiritualists, bone-rubbers, anti-vivisectionists, all sort of
anti's in fact, those who have fads about education or fads against it,
Perfectionists, Daughters of the Dove of Peace, Sons of the Roaring
Torrent, itinerant peace-mongers--all these may have a real genius
among them once in forty years; but to look for an exception to the
common run of yellow dogs and damfools among them is like opening
oysters with the hope of finding pearls. It's the common man we want and
the uncommon common man when we can find him--never the crank. This is
the lesson of Bryan."
* * * * *
At one time, however, Mr. Bryan's departure seemed likely to have
important consequences for Page. Colonel House and others strongly urged
the President to call him home from London and make him Secretary of
State. This was the third position in President Wilson's Cabinet for
which Page had been considered. The early plans to make him Secretary of
the Interior or Secretary of Agriculture have already been described. Of
all cabinet posts, however, the one that would have especially attracted
him would have been the Department of State. But President Wilson
believed that the appointment of an Ambassador at one of the belligerent
capitals, especially of an Ambassador whose sympathies for the Allies
were so pronounced as were Page's, would have been an "un-neutral" act,
and, therefore, Colonel House's recommendation was not approved.
_From Edward M. House_
Roslyn, Long Island,
June 25th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The President finally decided to appoint Lansing to succeed Mr.
Bryan. In my opinion, he did wisely, though I would have preferred
his appointing you.
The argument against your appointment was the fact that you are an
Ambassador at one of the belligerent capitals. The President did
not think it would do, and from what I read, when your name was
suggested I take it there would have been much criticism. I am
sorry--sorrier than I can tell you, for it would have worked
admirably in the general scheme of things.
However, I feel sure that Lansing will do the job, and that you
will find your relations with him in every way satisfactory.
The President spent yesterday with me and we talked much of you. He
is looking well and feeling so. I read the President your letter
and he enjoyed it as much as I did.
I am writing hastily, for I am leaving for Manchester,
Massachusetts, where I shall be during July and August.
Your sincere friend,
E.M. HOUSE.
III
But, in addition to the _Lusitania_ crisis, a new terror now loomed on
the horizon. Page's correspondence reveals that Bryan had more reasons
than one for his resignation; he was now planning to undertake a
self-appointed mission to Europe for the purpose of opening peace
negotiations entirely on his own account.
_From Edward M. House_
Manchester, Massachusetts,
August 12th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The Bryans have been stopping with the X's. X writes me that Bryan
told him that he intended to go to Europe soon and try peace
negotiations. He has Lloyd George in mind in England, and it is
then his purpose to go to Germany.
I take it he will want credentials from the President which, of
course, he will not want to give, but just what he will feel
obliged to give is another story. I anticipated this when he
resigned. I knew it was merely a matter of time when he would take
this step.
He may find encouragement in Germany, for he is in high favour now
in that quarter. It is his purpose to oppose the President upon the
matter of "preparedness," and, from what we can learn, it will not
be long before there will be open antagonism between the
Administration and himself.
It might be a good thing to encourage his going to Europe. He would
probably come back a sadder and wiser man. I take it that no one in
authority in England would discuss the matter seriously with him,
and, in France, I do not believe he could even get a hearing.
Please let me have your impressions upon this subject.
I wish I could be near you to-day for there are so many things I
could tell that I cannot write.
Your friend,
E.M. House.
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London [Undated].
DEAR HOUSE:
Never mind about Bryan. Send him over here if you wish to get rid
of him. He'll cut no more figure than a tar-baby at a Negro
camp-meeting. If he had come while he was Secretary, I should have
jumped off London Bridge and the country would have had one
ambassador less. But I shall enjoy him now. You see some peace
crank from the United States comes along every week--some crank or
some gang of cranks. There've been two this week. Ever since the
Daughters of the Dove of Peace met at The Hague, the game has
become popular in America; and I haven't yet heard that a single
one has been shot--so far. I think that some of them are likely
soon to be hanged, however, because there are signs that they may
come also from Germany. The same crowd that supplies money to buy
labour-leaders and the press and to blow up factories in the United
States keeps a good supply of peace-liars on tap. It'll be fun to
watch Bryan perform and never suspect that anybody is lying to him
or laughing at him; and he'll go home convinced that he's done the
job and he'll let loose doves all over the land till they are as
thick as English sparrows. Not even the President could teach him
anything permanently. He can do no harm on this side the world.
It's only your side that's in any possible danger; and, if I read
the signs right, there's a diminishing danger there.
No, there's never yet come a moment when there was the slightest
chance of peace. Did the Emperor not say last year that peace would
come in October, and again this year in October? Since he said it,
how can it come?
The ambitions and the actions of men, my friend, are determined by
their antecedents, their surroundings, and their opportunities--the
great deeds of men before them whom consciously or unconsciously
they take for models, the codes they are reared by, and the chances
that they think they see. These influences shaped Alexander and
Cæsar, and they shaped you and me. Now every monarch on the
Continent has behind him the Napoleonic example. "Can I do that?"
crosses the mind of every one. Of course every one thinks of
himself as doing it beneficently--for the good of the world.
Napoleon, himself, persuaded himself of his benevolent intentions,
and the devil of it was he persuaded other people also. Now the
only monarch in Europe in our time who thought he had a chance is
your friend in Berlin. When he told you last year (1914) that of
course he didn't want war, but that he was "ready," that's what he
meant. A similar ambition, of course, comes into the mind of every
professional soldier of the continent who rises to eminence. In
Berlin you have both--the absolute monarch and the military class
of ambitious soldiers and their fighting machine. Behind these men
walks the Napoleonic ambition all the time, just as in the United
States we lie down every night in George Washington's feather-bed
of no entangling alliances.
Then remember, too, that the German monarchy is a cross between the
Napoleonic ambition and its inheritance from Frederick the Great
and Bismarck. I suppose the three damnedest liars that were ever
born are these three--old Frederick, Napoleon, and Bismarck--not, I
take it, because they naturally loved lying, but because the game
they played constantly called for lying. There was no other way to
play it: they _had_ to fool people all the time. You have abundant
leisure--do this: Read the whole career of Napoleon and write down
the startling and exact parallels that you will find there to what
is happening to-day. The French were united and patriotic, just as
the Germans now are. When they invaded other people's territory,
they said they were attacked and that the other people had brought
on war. They had their lying diplomats, their corruption funds;
they levied money on cities and states; they took booty; and they
were God's elect. It's a wonderful parallel--not strangely, because
the game is the same and the moral methods are the same. Only the
tools are somewhat different--the submarine, for example. Hence the
_Lusitania_ disaster (not disavowed, you will observe), the
_Arabic_ disaster, the propaganda, underground and above, in the
United States. And there'll be more. The Napoleonic Wars were
about eleven years long. I fancy that we shall have war and wars
from this attempt to dominate Europe, for perhaps as long a period.
The Balkans can't be quieted by this war only, nor Russia and Italy
perhaps. And Germany may have a series of earthquakes
herself--internal explosions. Then Poland and perhaps some of the
Scandinavian States. Nobody can tell.
I cannot express my admiration of the President's management, so
far at least, of his colossal task of leading us right. He has
shown his supreme wisdom up to this point and I have the
profoundest confidence in his judgment. But I hope he doesn't fool
himself about the future; I'm sure he doesn't. I see no possible
way for us to keep out, because I know the ignorance and falseness
of the German leaders. They'll drown or kill more Americans--on the
sea and in America. They _may_ at last even attack one of our own
passenger ships, or do something that will dramatically reveal them
to the whole American people. Then, of course, the tune will be
called. It's only a question of time; and I am afraid the war will
last long enough to give them time. An early peace is all that can
prevent them from driving us at last into war; and I can see no
chance of an early peace. You had as well prepare as fast as the
condition of public opinion will permit.
There could be no better measure of the immeasurable moral advance
that the United States has made over Europe than the incredulity of
our people. They simply can't comprehend what the Napoleonic legend
can do, nor the low political morality of the Continent--of Berlin
in particular. Hence they don't believe it. We have gone on for 100
years working might and main to better our condition and the
condition of people about us--the greatest effort made by the
largest number of people since the world began to further the mood
and the arts of peace. There is no other such chapter in human
history as our work for a hundred years. Yet just a hundred years
ago the Capitol at Washington was burned by--a political oligarchy
in the freest country of Europe--as damnable an atrocity as you
will find in history. The Germans are a hundred years behind the
English in political development and political morality.
So, let Willum J. come. He can't hurt Europe--nor help it; and you
can spare him. Let all the Peace-gang come. You can spare _them_,
too; and they can do no harm here. Let somebody induce Hoke Smith
to come, too. You have hit on a great scheme--friendly deportation.
And Bryan won't be alone. Daughters of the Dove of Peace and Sons
of the Olive Branch come every week. The latest Son came to see me
to-day. He said that the German Chancellor told him that he wanted
peace--wants it now and wants it bad, and that only one thing stood
in the way--if England would agree not to take Belgium, Germany
would at once make peace! This otherwise sensible American wanted
me to take him to see Sir Edward to tell him this, and to suggest
to him to go over to Holland next week to meet the German
Chancellor and fix it up. A few days ago a pious preacher chap
(American) who had come over to "fix it all up," came back from
France and called on me. He had seen something in France--he was
excited and he didn't quite make it clear what he had seen; but he
said that if they'd only let him go home safely and quickly he'd
promise not to mention peace any more--did I think the American
boats _entirely_ safe?--So, you see, I do have some fun even in
these dark days.
Yours heartily,
W.H. PAGE.
IV
This letter discloses that Page was pinning his faith in President
Wilson, and that he still had confidence in the President's
determination to uphold the national honour. Page was not one of those
who thought that the United States should declare war immediately after
the _Lusitania_. The President's course, in giving Germany a chance to
make amends, and to disavow the act, met with his approval, and he
found, also, much to admire in Mr. Wilson's first _Lusitania_ note. His
judgment in this matter was based first of all upon the merits of the
case; besides this, his admiration for Mr. Wilson as a public man was
strong. To think otherwise of the President would have been a great
grief to the Ambassador and to differ with his chief on the tremendous
issue of the war would have meant for Page the severance of one of the
most cherished associations of his life. The interest which he had shown
in advocating Wilson's presidential candidacy has already been set
forth; and many phases of the Wilson administration had aroused his
admiration. The President's handling of domestic problems Page regarded
as a masterpiece in reconciling statesmanship with practical politics,
and his energetic attitude on the Panama Tolls had introduced new
standards into American foreign relations. Page could not sympathize
with all the details of the Wilsonian Mexican policy, yet he saw in it a
high-minded purpose and a genuine humanitarianism. But the outbreak of
war presented new aspects of Mr. Wilson's mind. The President's attitude
toward the European struggle, his conception of "neutrality," and his
failure to grasp the meaning of the conflict, seemed to Page to show a
lack of fundamental statesmanship; still his faith in Wilson was
deep-seated, and he did not abandon hope that the President could be
brought to see things as they really were. Page even believed that he
might be instrumental in his conversion.
But in the summer and autumn of 1915 one agony followed another. The
"too proud to fight" speech was in Page's mind nothing less than a
tragedy. The president's first _Lusitania_ note for a time restored the
Ambassador's confidence; it seemed to show that the President intended
to hold Germany to that "strict accountability" which he had threatened.
But Mr. Wilson's course now presented new difficulties to his
Ambassador. Still Page believed that the President, in his own way and
in his own time, would find a path out of his dilemma that would protect
the honour and the safety of the United States. If any of the Embassy
subordinates became impatient over the procedure of Washington, he did
not find a sympathetic listener in the Ambassador. The whole of London
and of Europe might be resounding with denunciations of the White House,
but Page would tolerate no manifestations of hostility in his presence.
"The problem appears different to Washington than it does to us," he
would say to his confidants. "We see only one side of it; the President
sees all sides. If we give him all the facts, he will decide the thing
wisely." Englishmen with whom the Ambassador came into contact soon
learned that they could not become flippant or critical about Mr. Wilson
in his presence; he would resent the slightest hostile remark, and he
had a way of phrasing his rebukes that usually discouraged a second
attempt. About this time Page began to keep closely to himself, and to
decline invitations to dinners and to country houses, even those with
which he was most friendly. The reason was that he could not meet
Englishmen and Englishwomen, or even Americans who were resident in
England, on his old easy familiar terms; he knew the ideas which
everybody entertained about his country, and he knew also what they were
saying, when he was not among them; the restraint which his presence
necessarily put upon his friends produced an uncongenial atmosphere, and
the Ambassador therefore gave up, for a time, those distractions which
had ordinarily proved such a delightful relief from his duties. For the
first time since he had come to England he found himself a solitary man.
He even refused to attend the American Luncheon Club in London because,
in speeches and in conversation, the members did not hesitate to assail
the Wilson policies.
Events, however, eventually proved too strong for the most devoted
supporter of President Wilson. After the _Arabic_ and the _Hesperian_,
Page's official intimates saw signs that the Ambassador was losing
confidence in his old friend. He would discuss Mr. Wilson occasionally,
with those secretaries, such as Mr. Laughlin, in whom his confidence was
strongest; his expressions, however, were never flippant or violent.
That Page could be biting as well as brilliant in his comments on public
personages his letters abundantly reveal, yet he never exercised his
talent for sarcasm or invective at the expense of the White House. He
never forgot that Mr. Wilson was President and that he was Ambassador;
he would still defend the Administration; and he even now continued to
find consolation in the reflection that Mr. Wilson was living in a
different atmosphere and that he had difficulties to confront of which a
man in London could know nothing. The Ambassador's emotion was rather
one of disappointment and sorrow, mingled with anxiety as to the plight
into which his country was being led. As to his duty in this situation,
however, Page never hesitated. In his relations with his Embassy and
with the British world he maintained this non-critical attitude; but in
his letters to President Wilson and Colonel House, he was describing the
situation, and expressing his convictions, with the utmost freedom and
frankness. In both these attitudes Page was consistent and absolutely
loyal. It was his duty to carry out the Wilson instructions and he had
too high a conception of the Ambassadorial office to show to the world
any unfavourable opinions he may have held about his country's course.
His duty to his post made it just as imperative that he set forth to the
President the facts exactly as they were. And this the Ambassador now
proceeded to do. For the mere ornamental dignities of an Ambassadorship
Page cared nothing; he was wasting his health in his duties and
exhausting his private resources; much as he loved the English and
congenial as were his surroundings, the fear of being recalled for
"disloyalty" or insubordination never influenced him. The letters which
he now wrote to Colonel House and to President Wilson himself are
probably without parallel in the diplomatic annals of this or of any
other country. In them he told the President precisely what Englishmen
thought of him and of the extent to which the United States was
suffering in European estimation from the Wilson policy. His boldness
sometimes astounded his associates. One day a friend and adviser of
President Wilson's came into the Ambassador's office just as Page had
finished one of his communications to Washington.
"Read that!" the Ambassador said, handing over the manuscript to his
visitor.
As the caller read, his countenance displayed the progressive stages of
his amazement. When he had finished, his hands dropped helplessly upon
his knees.
"Is that the way you write to the President?" he gasped.
"Of course," Page replied, quietly. "Why not? Why shouldn't I tell him
the truth? That is what I am here for."
"There is no other person in the world who dare talk to him like that!"
was the reply.
This is unquestionably the fact. That President Wilson did not like
people about him whose views were opposed to his own is now no secret,
and during the period when his policy was one of the great issues of the
world there was probably no one except Page who intruded upon his
solitude with ideas that so abruptly disagreed with the opinions of the
White House. The letters which Page wrote Colonel House were intended,
of course, for the President himself, and practically all of them
Colonel House read aloud to the head of the nation. The two men would
closet themselves in the old cabinet room on the second floor of the
White House--that same room in which Lincoln had met his advisers during
Civil War days; and here Colonel House would quietly read the letters in
which Page so mercilessly portrayed the situation as it appeared in
English and European eyes. The President listened impassively, giving no
sign of approval or disapproval, and hardly, at times, of much interest.
In the earlier days, when Page's letters consisted of pictures of
English life and English men, and colourful descriptions of England
under the stress of war, the President was vastly entertained; he would
laugh loudly at Page's wit, express his delight at his graphic and
pungent style and feel deeply the horrors of war as his Ambassador
unfolded them. "I always found Page compelling on paper," Mr. Wilson
remarked to Mr. Laughlin, during one of the latter's visits to
Washington. "I could never resist him--I get more information from his
letters than from any other single source. Tell him to keep it up." It
was during this period that the President used occasionally to read
Page's letters to the Cabinet, expressing his great appreciation of
their charm and historical importance. "The President quoted from one of
the Ambassador's letters to the Cabinet to-day," a member of the Cabinet
wrote to Mrs. Page in February, 1915. "'Some day,' the President said,
'I hope that Walter Page's letters will be published. They are the best
letters I have ever read. They make you feel the atmosphere in England,
understand the people, and see into the motives of the great actors.'"
The President repeated this statement many times, and his letters to
Page show how greatly he enjoyed and profited from this correspondence.
But after the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_ his attitude
toward Page and his letters changed.
He now found little pleasure or satisfaction in the Page communications.
When Mr. Wilson found that one of his former confidants had turned out
to be a critic, that man instantaneously passed out of his life. And
this was now Page's fate; the friendship and associations of forty years
were as though they had never been. Just why Mr. Wilson did not recall
his Ambassador is a question that has puzzled Page's friends. He would
sometimes refer to him as a man who was "more British than the British,"
as one who had been taken completely captive by British blandishments,
but he never came to the point of dismissing him. Perhaps he did not
care to face the public scandal that such an act would have caused; but
a more plausible reason is that Page, despite the causes which he had
given for irritation, was indispensable to him. Page's early letters had
furnished the President ideas which had taken shape in Wilson's
policies, and, disagreeable as the communications now became, there are
evidences that they influenced the solitary statesman in the White
House, and that they had much to do in finally forcing Mr. Wilson into
the war. The alternative question, as to why Page did not retire when he
found himself so out of sympathy with the President, will be
sufficiently answered in subsequent chapters; at present it may be said
that he did resign and only consented to remain at the urgent request of
Washington. In fact, all during 1915 and 1916, there seemed to be a fear
in Washington that Page would definitely abandon the London post. On one
occasion, when the newspapers published rumours to this effect, Page
received an urgent despatch from Mr. Lansing. The message came at a
time--the date was October 26, 1915--when Page was especially
discouraged over the Washington policy. "Representatives of the press,"
said Mr. Lansing, "have repeated rumours that you are planning to
resign. These have been brought to the President's attention, and both
he and I have denied them. Still these rumours persist, and they cause
both the President and me great anxiety. We cannot believe that they are
well founded.
"In view of the fact that they are so persistent, we have thought it
well to inform you of them and to tell you how earnestly we hope that
they are baseless. We trust that you will set both our minds at rest."
If Page had ever had any compunction about addressing the President in
blunt phrases these expressions certainly convinced him that he was a
free agent.
Yet Page himself at times had his doubts as to the value of this
correspondence. He would frequently discuss the matter with Mr.
Laughlin. "That's a pretty harsh letter," he would say. "I don't like to
talk that way to the President, yet it doesn't express half what I
feel."
"It's your duty to tell the President the real state of affairs," Mr.
Laughlin would urge.
"But do you suppose it does any good?" Page would ask.
"Yes, it's bound to, and whether it does or not, it's your business to
keep him informed."
If in these letters Page seems to lay great stress on the judgment of
Great Britain and Europe on American policy, it must be remembered that
that was his particular province. One of an Ambassador's most important
duties is to transmit to his country the public opinion of the country
to which he is accredited. It was Page's place to tell Washington what
Great Britain thought of it; it was Washington's business to formulate
policy, after giving due consideration to this and other matters.
_To Edward M. House_
July 21, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President. I don't know who
wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information.
I don't feel like sending it to him. I send it to you--to do with
as you think best. This thing alone is, of course, of no
consequence. But it is symptomatic. There is much feeling about the
slowness with which he acts. One hundred and twenty people
(Americans) were drowned on the _Lusitania_ and we are still
writing notes about it--to the damnedest pirates that ever blew up
a ship. Anybody who knows the Germans knows, of course, that they
are simply playing for time, that they are not going to "come
down," that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they'd just as lief have
war with us as not--perhaps had rather--because they don't want any
large nation left fresh when the war ends. They'd like to have the
whole world bankrupt. There is a fast growing feeling here,
therefore, that the American Government is pusillanimous--dallies
with 'em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc. Of
course, such a judgment is not fair. It is formed without knowing
the conditions in the United States. But I think you ought to
realize the strength of this sentiment. No doubt before you receive
this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount
to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of
sentiment here. But looking at the thing in a long-range way, we're
bound to get into the war. For the Germans will blow up more
American travellers without notice. And by dallying with them we do
not change the ultimate result, but we take away from ourselves the
spunk and credit of getting in instead of being kicked and cursed
in. We've got to get in: they won't play the game in any other way.
I have news direct from a high German source in Berlin which
strongly confirms this....
It's a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is
another _Lusitania_ outrage, which would force war.
W.H.P.
P.S. The London papers every day say that the President will send a
strong note, etc. And the people here say, "Damn notes: hasn't he
written enough?" Writing notes hurts nobody--changes nothing. The
Washington correspondents to the London papers say that Burleson,
the Attorney-General, and Daniels are Bryan men and are holding the
President back.
* * * * *
The prophecy contained in this letter was quickly fulfilled. A week or
two after Colonel House had received it, the _Arabic_ was sunk with loss
of American life.
Page was taking a brief holiday with his son Frank in Rowsley,
Derbyshire, when this news came. It was telegraphed from the Embassy.
"That settles it," he said to his son. "They have sunk the _Arabic_.
That means that we shall break with Germany and I've got to go back to
London."
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London, August 23, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The sinking of the _Arabic_ is the answer to the President and to
your letter to me. And there'll be more such answers. You said to
me one day after you had got back from your last visit to Berlin:
"They are impossible." I think you told the truth, and surely you
know your German and you know your Berlin--or you did know them
when you were here.
The question is not what we have done for the Allies, not what any
other neutral country has done or has failed to do--such
comparisons, I think, are far from the point. The question is when
the right moment arrives for us to save our self-respect, our
honour, and the esteem and fear (or the contempt) in which the
world will hold us.
Berlin has the Napoleonic disease. If you follow Napoleon's
career--his excuses, his evasions, his inventions, the wild French
enthusiasm and how he kept it up--you will find an exact parallel.
That becomes plainer every day. Europe may not be wholly at peace
in five years--may be ten.
Hastily and heartily,
W.H.P.
I have your note about Willum J.... Crank once, crank always. My
son, never tie up with a crank.
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
London, September 2nd, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
You write me about pleasing the Allies, the big Ally in particular.
That doesn't particularly appeal to me. We don't owe them
anything. There's no obligation. I'd never confess for a moment
that we are under any obligation to any of them nor to anybody. I'm
not out to "please" anybody, as a primary purpose: that's not my
game nor my idea--nor yours either. As for England in particular,
the account was squared when she twice sent an army against us--in
her folly--especially the last time when she burnt our Capitol.
There's been no obligation since. The obligation is on the other
foot. We've set her an example of what democracy will do for men,
an example of efficiency, an example of freedom of opportunity. The
future is ours, and she may follow us and profit by it. Already we
have three white English-speaking men to every two in the British
Empire: we are sixty per cent. of the Anglo-Saxons in the world. If
there be any obligation to please, the obligation is on her to
please us. And she feels and sees it now.
My point is not that, nor is it what we or any other neutral nation
has done or may do--Holland or any other. This war is the direct
result of the over-polite, diplomatic, standing-aloof,
bowing-to-one-another in gold lace, which all European nations are
guilty of in times of peace--castes and classes and uniforms and
orders and such folderol, instead of the proper business of the
day. Every nation in Europe knew that Germany was preparing for
war. If they had really got together--not mere Hague Sunday-school
talk and resolutions--but had really got together for business and
had said to Germany, "The moment you fire a shot, we'll all fight
against you; we have so many millions of men, so many men-of-war,
so many billions of money; and we'll increase all these if you do
not change your system and your building-up of armies"--then there
would have been no war.
My point is not sentimental. It is:
(1) We must maintain our own self-respect and safety. If we submit
to too many insults, _that_ will in time bring Germany against us.
We've got to show at some time that we don't believe, either, in
the efficacy of Sunday-School resolves for peace--that we are
neither Daughters of the Dove of Peace nor Sons of the Olive
Branch, and
(2) About nagging and forever presenting technical legal points as
lawyers do to confuse juries--the point is the point of efficiency.
If we do that, we can't carry our main points. I find it harder and
harder to get answers now to important questions because we ask so
many unimportant and nagging ones.
I've no sentiment--perhaps not enough. My gushing days are gone, if
I ever had 'em. The cutting-out of the "100 years of peace"
oratory, etc., etc., was one of the blessings of the war. But we
must be just and firm and preserve our own self-respect and keep
alive the fear that other nations have of us; and we ought to have
the courage to make the Department of State more than a bureau of
complaints. We must learn to say "No" even to a Gawdamighty
independent American citizen when he asks an improper or
impracticable question. Public Opinion in the United States
consists of something more than the threats of Congressmen and the
bleating of newspapers; it consists of the judgment of honourable
men on courageous and frank actions--a judgment that cannot be made
up till action is taken.
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London, Sept. 8, 1915.
(This is not prudent. It is only true--nothing more.)
DEAR HOUSE:
I take it for granted that Dumba[4] is going, of course. But I must
tell you that the President is being laughed at by our best friends
for his slowness in action. I hardly ever pick up a paper without
seeing some sarcastic remark. I don't mean they expect us to come
into the war. They only hoped we would be as good as our
word--would regard another submarine attack on a ship carrying
Americans as an unfriendly act and would send Bernstorff home. Yet
the _Arabic_ and now the _Hesperian_ have had no effect in action.
Bernstorff's personal _note to Lansing[5], even as far as it goes,
does not bind his Government_.
The upshot of all this is that the President is fast losing in the
minds of our best friends here all that he gained by his courageous
stand on the Panama tolls. They feel that if he takes another
insult--keeps taking them--and is satisfied with Bernstorff's
personal word, which is proved false in four days--he'll take
anything. And the British will pay less attention to what we say.
That's inevitable. If the American people and the President accept
the _Arabic_ and the _Hesperian_ and do nothing to Dumba till the
Government here gave out his letter, which the State Department had
(and silently held) for several days--then nobody on this side the
world will pay much heed to anything we say hereafter.
This, as I say, doesn't mean that these (thoughtful) people wish or
expect us to go to war. They wish only that we'd prove ourselves as
good as the President's word. That's the conservative truth; we're
losing influence more rapidly than I supposed it were possible.
Dumba's tardy dismissal will not touch the main matter, which is
the rights of neutrals at sea, and keeping our word in action.
Yours sincerely,
W.H.P.
P.S. They say it's Mexico over again--watchful waiting and nothing
doing. And the feeling grows that Bryan has really conquered, since
his programme seems to prevail.
_To Edward M. House_
London, Tuesday night, Sept. 8, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The Germans seem to think it a good time to try to feel about for
peace. They have more to offer now than they may have again. That's
all. A man who seriously talks peace now in Paris or in London on
any terms that the Germans will consider, would float dead that
very night in the Seine or in the Thames. The Germans have for the
time being "done-up" the Russians; but the French have shells
enough to plough the German trenches day and night (they've been at
it for a fortnight now); Joffre has been to see the Italian
generalissimo; and the English destroy German submarines now almost
as fast as the Germans send them out. I am credibly told that
several weeks ago a group of Admiralty men who are in the secret
had a little dinner to celebrate the destruction of the 50th
submarine.
While this is going on, you are talking on your side of the water
about a change in German policy! The only change is that the number
of submarines available becomes smaller and smaller, and that they
wish to use Uncle Sam's broad, fat back to crawl down on when they
have failed.
Consequently, they are laughing at Uncle Sam here--it comes near to
being ridicule, in fact, for seeming to jump at Bernstorff's
unfrank assurances. And, as I have telegraphed the President,
English opinion is--well, it is very nearly disrespectful. Men say
here (I mean our old friends) that with no disavowal of the
_Lusitania_, the _Falaba_, the _Gulflight_, or the _Arabic_ or of
the _Hesperian_, the Germans are "stuffing" Uncle Sam, that Uncle
Sam is in the clutches of the peace-at-any-price public opinion,
that the United States will suffer any insult and do nothing. I
hardly pick up a paper that does not have a sarcastic paragraph or
cartoon. We are on the brink of convincing the English that we'll
not act, whatever the provocation. By the English, I do not mean
the lighter, transitory public opinion, but I mean the thoughtful
men who do not wish us or expect us to fire a gun. They say that
the American democracy, since Cleveland's day, has become a mere
agglomeration of different races, without national unity, national
aims, and without courage or moral qualities. And (I deeply regret
to say) the President is losing here the high esteem he won by his
Panama tolls repeal. They ask, why on earth did he raise the issue
if under repeated provocation he is unable to recall Gerard or to
send Bernstorff home? The _Hesperian_ follows the _Arabic_; other
"liners" will follow the _Hesperian_, if the Germans have
submarines. And, when Sackville-West[6] was promptly sent home for
answering a private citizen's inquiry about the two political
parties, Dumba is (yet awhile) retained in spite of a far graver
piece of business. There is a tone of sad disappointment here--not
because the most thoughtful men want us in the war (they don't),
but because for some reason, which nobody here understands, the
President, having taken a stand, seems unable to do anything.
All this is a moderate interpretation of sorrowful public opinion
here. And the result will inevitably be that they will pay far less
heed to anything we may hereafter say. In fact men now say here
every day that the American democracy has no opinion, can form no
opinion, has no moral quality, and that the word of its President
never gets as far as action even of the mildest form. The
atmosphere is very depressing. And this feeling has apparently got
beyond anybody's control. I've even heard this said: "The voice of
the United States is Mr. Wilson's: its actions are controlled by
Mr. Bryan."
So, you see, the war will go on a long long time. So far as English
opinion is concerned, the United States is useful to make
ammunition and is now thought of chiefly in this connection. Less
and less attention is paid to what we say. Even the American
telegrams to the London papers have a languid tone.
Yet recent revelations have made it clearer than ever that the same
qualities that the English accuse us of having are in them and that
these qualities are directly to blame for this war. I recall that
when I was in Germany a few weeks, six years ago, I became
convinced that Germany had prepared to fight England; I didn't
know when, but I did know that was what the war-machine had in
mind. Of course, I had no opportunities to find out anything in
particular. You were told practically that same thing by the
Kaiser, before the war began. "We are ready," said he. Of course
the English feared it and Sir Edward put his whole life into his
effort to prevent it. The day the war began, he told me with tears
that it seemed that his life had been wasted--that his life work
had gone for naught.--Nobody could keep from wondering why England
didn't--
(Here comes a parenthesis. Word came to me a little while ago that
a Zeppelin was on its way to London. Such a remark doesn't arouse
much attention. But just as I had finished the fifth line above
this, Frank and Mrs. Page came in and challenged me to play a game
of cards before we should go to bed. We sat down, the cards were
dealt, and bang! bang!--with the deep note of an explosion. A
third, a fourth shot. We went into the street. There the Zeppelin
was revealed by a searchlight--sailing along. I think it had
probably dropped its bombs; but the aircraft guns were cracking
away at it. Some of them shot explosive projectiles to find the
range. Now and then one such explosive would almost reach the
Zeppelin, but it was too high for them and it sailed away, the air
guns doing their ineffectual best. I couldn't see whether airplanes
were trying to shoot it or not. The searchlight revealed the
Zeppelin but nothing else.--While we were watching this battle in
the air, the maids came down from the top of the house and went
into the cellar. I think they've already gone back. You can't
imagine how little excitement it caused. It produces less fright
than any other conceivable engine of war.
We came back as soon as the Zeppelin was out of sight and the
firing had ceased; we played our game of cards; and here I am
writing you the story-all within about half an hour.--There was a
raid over London last night, too, wherein a dozen or two women and
children and a few men were killed. I haven't the slightest idea
what harm this raid to-night has done. For all I know it may not be
all done. But of all imaginable war-experiences this seems the most
futile. It interrupted a game of cards for twenty minutes!)
Now--to go on with my story: I have wondered ever since the war
began why the Allies were not better prepared--especially England
on land. England has just one _big_ land gun--no more. Now it has
turned out, as you have doubtless read, that the British Government
were as good as told by the German Government that Germany was
going to war pretty soon--this in 1912 when Lord Haldane[7] was
sent to make friends with Germany.
The only answer he brought back was a proposition that England
should in any event remain neutral--stand aside while Germany
whipped Russia and France. This insulting proposal was kept secret
till the other day. Now, why didn't the British Cabinet inform the
people and get ready? They were afraid the English people wouldn't
believe it and would accuse them of fomenting war. The English
people were making money and pursuing their sports. Probably they
wouldn't have believed it. So the Liberal Cabinet went on in
silence, knowing that war was coming, but not exactly when it was
coming, and they didn't make even a second big gun.
Now here was the same silence in this "democracy" that they now
complain of in ours. Rather an interesting and discouraging
parallel--isn't it? Public opinion has turned Lord Haldane out of
office because he didn't tell the public what he declares they
wouldn't have believed. If the English had raised an army in 1912,
and made a lot of big guns, Austria would not have trampled Serbia
in the earth. There would have been no war now; and the strong
European Powers might have made then the same sort of protective
peace-insurance combine that they will try to make after this war
is ended. Query: A democracy's inability to _act_--how much is this
apparently inherent quality of a democracy to blame for this war
and for--other things?
When I am asked every day "Why the United States doesn't _do_
something--send Dumba and Bernstorff home?"--Well, it is not the
easiest question in the world to answer.
Yours heartily,
W.H.P.
P.S. This is the most comical of all worlds: While I was writing
this, it seems the maids went back upstairs and lighted their
lights without pulling their shades down--they occupy three rooms,
in front. The doorbell rang furiously. Here were more than half a
dozen policemen and special constables--must investigate! "One
light would be turned on, another would go out; another one
on!"--etc., etc. Frank tackled them, told 'em it was only the maids
going to bed, forgetting to pull down the shades. Spies and
signalling were in the air! So, in the morning, I'll have to send
over to the Foreign Office and explain. The Zeppelin did more
"frightfulness" than I had supposed, after all. Doesn't this strike
you as comical?
W.H.P.
Friday, September 10, 1915.
P.S. The news is just come that Dumba is dismissed. That will clear
the atmosphere--a little, but only a little. Dumba committed a
diplomatic offence. The German Government has caused the death of
United States citizens, has defied us, has declared it had changed
its policy and yet has gone on with the same old policy. Besides,
Bernstorff has done everything that Dumba did except employ
Archibald, which was a mere incident of the game. The President
took a strong stand: they have disregarded it--no apology nor
reparation for a single boat that has been sunk. Now the English
opinion of the Germans is hardly a calm, judicial opinion--of
course not. There may be facts that have not been made known. There
must be good reasons that nobody here can guess, why the President
doesn't act in the long succession of German acts against us. _But
I tell you with all solemnity that British opinion and the British
Government have absolutely lost their respect for us and their
former high estimate of the President. And that former respect is
gone for good unless he acts now very quickly_[8]. They will pay
nothing more than formal and polite attention to anything we may
hereafter say. This is not resentful. They don't particularly care
for us to get into the war. Their feeling (I mean among our best
old friends) is not resentful. It is simply sorrowful. They had the
highest respect for our people and our President. The Germans defy
us; we sit in silence. They conclude here that we'll submit to
anything from anybody. We'll write strong notes--nothing more.
I can't possibly exaggerate the revulsion of feeling. Members of
the Government say (in private, of course) that we'll submit to any
insult. The newspapers refuse to publish articles which attempt to
make the President's silence reasonable. "It isn't defensible,"
they say, "and they would only bring us thousands of insulting
letters from our readers." I can't think of a paper nor of a man
who has a good word to say for us--except, perhaps, a few Quaker
peace-at-any-price people. And our old friends are disappointed and
sorrowful. They feel that we have dropped out of a position of
influence in the world.
I needn't and can't write more. Of course there are more important
things than English respect. But the English think that every Power
has lost respect for us--the Germans most of all. And (unless the
President acts very rigorously and very quickly) we'll have to get
along a long time without British respect.
W.H.P.
P.S. The last Zeppelin raid--which interrupted the game of
cards--killed more than twenty persons and destroyed more than
seven million dollars' worth of private business property--all
non-combatants!
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
21st of September, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The insulting cartoon that I enclose (destroy it without showing
it) is typical of, I suppose, five hundred that have appeared here
within a month. This represents the feeling and opinion of the
average man. They say we wrote brave notes and made courageous
demands, to none of which a satisfactory reply has come, but only
more outrages and no guarantee for the future. Yet we will not even
show our displeasure by sending Bernstorff home. We've simply
"gone out," like a snuffed candle, in the regard and respect of the
vast volume of British opinion. (The last _Punch_ had six
ridiculing allusions to our "fall.")
It's the loneliest time I've had in England. There's a tendency to
avoid me.
They can't understand here the continued declaration in the United
States that the British Government is trying to take our trade--to
use its blockade and navy with the direct purpose of giving British
trade profit out of American detentions. Of course, the Government
had no such purpose and has done no such thing--with any such
purpose. It isn't thinking about trade but only about war.
The English think they see in this the effect on our Government and
on American opinion of the German propaganda. I have had this
trade-accusation investigated half a dozen times--the accusation
that this Government is using its military power for its own trade
advantage to our detriment: it simply isn't true. They stop our
cargoes, not for their advantage, but wholly to keep things from
the enemy. Study our own trade reports.
In a word, our importers are playing (so the English think)
directly into the hands of the Germans. So matters go on from bad
to worse.
Bryce[9] is very sad. He confessed to me yesterday the utter
hopelessness of the two people's ever understanding one another.
The military situation is very blue--very blue. The general feeling
is that the long war will begin next March and end--nobody dares
predict.
W.H.P.
P.S. There's not a moral shadow of a doubt (1) that the commander
of the submarine that sunk the _Arabic_ is dead--although he makes
reports to his government! nor (2) that the _Hesperian_ was
torpedoed. The State Department has a piece of the torpedo.
V
The letters which Page sent directly to the President were just as
frank. "Incidents occur nearly every day," he wrote to President Wilson
in the autumn of 1915, "which reveal the feeling that the Germans have
taken us in. Last week one of our naval men, Lieutenant McBride, who has
just been ordered home, asked the Admiralty if he might see the piece of
metal found on the deck of the _Hesperian_. Contrary to their habit, the
British officer refused. 'Take my word for it,' he said. 'She was
torpedoed. Why do you wish to investigate? Your country will do
nothing--will accept any excuse, any insult and--do nothing.' When
McBride told me this, I went at once to the Foreign Office and made a
formal request that this metal should be shown to our naval attaché, who
(since Symington is with the British fleet and McBride has been ordered
home) is Lieutenant Towers. Towers was sent for and everything that the
Admiralty knows was shown to him and I am sending that piece of metal by
this mail. But to such a pass has the usual courtesy of a British naval
officer come. There are many such instances of changed conduct. They are
not hard to endure nor to answer and are of no consequence in themselves
but only for what they denote. They're a part of war's bitterness. But
my mind runs ahead and I wonder how Englishmen will look at this subject
five years hence, and it runs afield and I wonder how the Germans will
regard it. A sort of pro-German American newspaper correspondent came
along the other day from the German headquarters; and he told me that
one of the German generals remarked to him: 'War with America? Ach no!
Not war. If trouble should come, we'd send over a platoon of our
policemen to whip your little army.' (He didn't say just how he'd send
'em.)"
_To the President_
American Embassy, London, Oct. 5, 1915.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I have two letters that I have lately written to you but which I
have not sent because they utterly lack good cheer. After reading
them over, I have not liked to send them. Yet I should fail of my
duty if I did not tell you bad news as well as good.
The high esteem in which our Government was held when the first
_Lusitania_ note to Germany was sent seems all changed to
indifference or pity--not hatred or hostility, but a sort of
hopeless and sad pity. That ship was sunk just five months ago; the
German Government (or its Ambassador) is yet holding conversations
about the principle involved, making "concessions" and promises for
the future, and so far we have done nothing to hold the Germans to
accountability[10]. In the meantime their submarine fleet has been
so reduced that probably the future will take care of itself and we
shall be used as a sort of excuse for their failure. This is what
the English think and say; and they explain our failure to act by
concluding that the peace-at-any-price sentiment dominates the
Government and paralyzes it. They have now, I think, given up hope
that we will ever take any action. So deeply rooted (and, I fear,
permanent) is this feeling that every occurrence is made to fit
into and to strengthen this supposition. When Dumba was dismissed,
they said: "Dumba, merely the abject tool of German intrigue. Why
not Bernstorff?" When the Anglo-French loan[11] was oversubscribed,
they said: "The people's sympathy is most welcome, but their
Government is paralyzed." Their respect has gone--at least for the
time being.
It is not that they expect us to go to war: many, in fact, do not
wish us to. They expected that we would be as good as our word and
hold the Germans to accountability. Now I fear they think little of
our word. I shudder to think what our relations might be if Sir
Edward Grey were to yield to another as Foreign Minister, as, of
course, he must yield at some time.
The press has less to say than it had a few weeks ago. _Punch_, for
instance, which ridiculed and pitied us in six cartoons and
articles in each of two succeeding numbers, entirely forgets us
this week. But they've all said their say. I am, in a sense,
isolated--lonely in a way that I have never before been. I am not
exactly avoided, I hope, but I surely am not sought. They have a
polite feeling that they do not wish to offend me and that to make
sure of this the safest course is to let me alone. There is no
mistaking the great change in the attitude of men I know, both in
official and private life.
It comes down and comes back to this--that for five months after
the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the Germans are yet playing with us,
that we have not sent Bernstorff home, and hence that we will
submit to any rebuff or any indignity. It is under these
conditions--under this judgment of us--that we now work--the
English respect for our Government indefinitely lessened and
instead of the old-time respect a sad pity. I cannot write more.
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
"I have authoritatively heard," Page writes to President Wilson in early
September, "of a private conversation between a leading member of the
Cabinet and a group of important officials all friendly to us in which
all sorrowfully expressed the opinion that the United States will submit
to any indignity and that no effect is now to be hoped for from its
protests against unlawful submarine attacks or against anything else.
The inactivity of our Government, or its delay, which they assume is the
same as inactivity, is attributed to domestic politics or to the lack of
national, consciousness or unity.
"No explanation has appeared in the British press of our Government's
inactivity or of any regret or promise of reparation by Germany for the
sinking of the _Lusitania_, the _Falaba_, the _Gulflight_, the
_Nebraskan_, the _Arabic_, or the _Hesperian_, nor any explanation of a
week's silence about the Dumba letter; and the conclusion is drawn that,
in the absence of action by us, all these acts have been practically
condoned.
"I venture to suggest that such explanations be made public as will
remove, if possible, the practically unanimous conclusion here that our
Government will permit these and similar future acts to be explained
away. I am surprised almost every hour by some new evidence of the loss
of respect for our Government, which, since the sinking of the _Arabic_,
has become so great as to warrant calling it a complete revulsion of
English feeling toward the United States. There is no general wish for
us to enter the war, but there is genuine sorrow that we are thought to
submit to any indignity, especially after having taken a firm stand. I
conceive I should be lacking in duty if I did not report this rapid and
unfortunate change in public feeling, which seems likely to become
permanent unless facts are quickly made public which may change it."
* * * * *
There are many expressions of such feelings in Page's letters of this
time. They brought only the most perfunctory acknowledgment from the
White House. On January 3, 1916, Page sent the President a mass of
clippings from the British press, all criticizing the Wilson
Administration in unrestrained terms. In his comment on these, he writes
the President:
"Public opinion, both official and unofficial, is expressed by these
newspaper comments, with far greater restraint than it is expressed in
private conversation. Ridicule of the Administration runs through the
programmes of the theatres; it inspires hundreds of cartoons; it is a
staple of conversation at private dinners and in the clubs. The most
serious class of Englishmen, including the best friends of the United
States, feel that the Administration's reliance on notes has reduced our
Government to a third-or fourth-rate power. There is even talk of
spheres of German influence in the United States as in China. No
government could fall lower in English opinion than we shall fall if
more notes are sent to Austria or to Germany. The only way to keep any
shred of English respect is the immediate dismissal without more
parleying of every German and Austrian official at Washington. Nobody
here believes that such an act would provoke war.
"I can do no real service by mincing matters. My previous telegrams and
letters have been purposely restrained as this one is. We have now come
to the parting of the ways. If English respect be worth preserving at
all, it can be preserved only by immediate action. Any other course than
immediate severing of diplomatic relations with both Germany and Austria
will deepen the English opinion into a conviction that the
Administration was insincere when it sent the _Lusitania_ notes and that
its notes and protests need not be taken seriously on any subject. And
English opinion is allied opinion. The Italian Ambassador[12] said to
me, 'What has happened? The United States of to-day is not the United
States I knew fifteen years ago, when I lived in Washington.' French
officers and members of the Government who come here express themselves
even more strongly than do the British. The British newspapers to-day
publish translations of ridicule of the United States from German
papers."
_To the President_
London,
January 5, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I wish--an impossible thing of course--that some sort of guidance
could be given to the American correspondents of the English
newspapers. Almost every day they telegraph about the visits of the
Austrian Chargé or the German Ambassador to the State Department to
assure Mr. Lansing that their governments will of course make a
satisfactory explanation of the latest torpedo-act in the
Mediterranean or to "take one further step in reaching a
satisfactory understanding about the _Lusitania_." They usually go
on to say also that more notes are in preparation to Germany or to
Austria. The impression made upon the European mind is that the
German and Austrian officials in Washington are leading the
Administration on to endless discussion, endless notes, endless
hesitation. Nobody in Europe regards their pledges or promises as
worth anything at all: the _Arabic_ follows the _Lusitania_, the
_Hesperian_ follows the _Arabic_, the _Persia_ follows the
_Ancona_. "Still conferences and notes continue," these people say,
"proving that the American Government, which took so proper and
high a stand in the _Lusitania_ notes, is paralyzed--in a word is
hoodwinked and 'worked' by the Germans." And so long as these
diplomatic representatives are permitted to remain in the United
States, "to explain," "to parley" and to declare that the
destruction of American lives and property is disavowed by their
governments, atrocities on sea and land will of course continue;
and they feel that our Government, by keeping these German and
Austrian representatives in Washington, condones and encourages
them and their governments.
This is a temperate and even restrained statement of the English
feeling and (as far as I can make out) of the whole European
feeling.
It has been said here that every important journal published in
neutral or allied European countries, daily, weekly, or monthly,
which deals with public affairs, has expressed a loss of respect
for the United States Government and that most of them make
continuous severe criticisms (with surprise and regret) of our
failure by action to live up to the level of our _Lusitania_ notes.
I had (judiciously) two American journalists, resident here--men of
judgment and character--to inquire how true this declaration is.
After talking with neutral and allied journalists here and with men
whose business it is to read the journals of the Continent, they
reported that this declaration is substantially true--that the
whole European press (outside Germany and its allies) uses the same
tone toward our Government that the English press uses--to-day,
disappointment verging on contempt; and many of them explain our
keeping diplomatic intercourse with Germany by saying that we are
afraid of the German vote, or of civil war, or that the
peace-at-any-price people really rule the United States and have
paralyzed our power to act--even to cut off diplomatic relations
with governments that have insulted and defied us.
Another (similar) declaration is that practically all men of public
influence in England and in the European allied and neutral
countries have publicly or privately expressed themselves to the
same effect. The report that I have about this is less definite
than about the newspapers, for, of course, no one can say just what
proportion of men of public influence have so expressed themselves;
but the number who have so expressed themselves is overwhelming.
In this Kingdom, where I can myself form some opinion more or less
accurate, and where I can check or verify my opinion by various
methods--I am afraid, as I have frequently already reported, that
the generation now living will never wholly regain the respect for
our Government that it had a year ago. I will give you three little
indications of this feeling; it would be easy to write down
hundreds of them:
(One) The governing class: Mr. X [a cabinet member] told Mrs. Page
a few nights ago that for sentimental reasons only he would be
gratified to see the United States in the war along with the
Allies, but that merely sentimental reasons were not a sufficient
reason for war--by no means; that he felt most grateful for the
sympathetic attitude of the large mass of the American people, that
he had no right to expect anything from our Government, whose
neutral position was entirely proper. Then he added; "But what I
can't for the life of me understand is your Government's failure
to express its disapproval of the German utter disregard of its
_Lusitania_ notes. After eight months, it has done nothing but
write more notes. My love for America, I must confess, is offended
at this inaction and--puzzled. I can't understand it. You will
pardon me, I am sure."
(Two) "Middle Class" opinion: A common nickname for Americans in
the financial and newspaper districts of London is "Too-prouds."
(Three) The man in the street: At one of the moving picture shows
in a large theatre a little while ago they filled in an interval by
throwing on the screen the picture of the monarch, or head of
state, and of the flag of each of the principal nations. When the
American picture appeared, there was such hissing and groaning as
caused the managers hastily to move that picture off the screen.
Some time ago I wrote House of some such incidents and expressions
as these; and he wrote me that they were only part and parcel of
the continuous British criticism of their own Government--in other
words, a part of the passing hysteria of war. This remark shows how
House was living in an atmosphere of illusion.
As the matter stands to-day our Government has sunk lower, as
regards British and European opinion, than it has ever been in our
time, not as a part of the hysteria of war but as a result of this
process of reasoning, whether it be right or wrong:
We said that we should hold the Germans to strict accountability on
account of the _Lusitania_. We have not settled that yet and we
still allow the German Ambassador to discuss it after the
_Hesperian_ and other such acts showed that his _Arabic_ pledge was
worthless.
The _Lusitania_ grows larger and larger in European memory and
imagination. It looks as if it would become the great type of war
atrocities and barbarities. I have seen pictures of the drowned
women and children used even on Christmas cards. And there is
documentary proof in our hands that the warning, which was really
an advance announcement, of that disaster was paid for by the
German Ambassador and charged to his Government. It is the
_Lusitania_ that has caused European opinion to regard our foreign
policy as weak. It is not the wish for us to go to war. No such
general wish exists.
I do not know, Mr. President, who else, if anybody, puts these
facts before you with this complete frankness. But I can do no less
and do my duty.
No Englishman--except two who were quite intimate friends--has
spoken to me about our Government for months, but I detect all the
time a tone of pity and grief in their studied courtesy and in
their avoidance of the subject. And they talk with every other
American in this Kingdom. It is often made unpleasant for Americans
in the clubs and in the pursuit of their regular business and
occupations; and it is always our inaction about the _Lusitania_.
Our controversy with the British Government causes little feeling
and that is a sort of echo of the _Lusitania_. They feel that we
have not lived up to our promises and professions.
That is the whole story.
Believe me always heartily,
WALTER H. PAGE.
* * * * *
This dismissal of Dumba and of the Attachés has had little more effect
on opinion here than the dismissal of the Turkish Ambassador[13].
Sending these was regarded as merely kicking the dogs of the man who
had stolen our sheep.
VI
One of the reasons why Page felt so intensely about American policy at
this time was his conviction that the severance of diplomatic relations,
in the latter part of 1915, or the early part of 1916, in itself would
have brought the European War to an end. This was a conviction from
which he never departed. Count Bernstorff was industriously creating the
impression in the United States that his dismissal would immediately
cause war between Germany and the United States, and there is little
doubt that the Administration accepted this point of view. But Page
believed that this was nothing but Prussian bluff. The severance of
diplomatic relations at that time, in Page's opinion, would have
convinced the Germans of the hopelessness of their cause. In spite of
the British blockade, Germany was drawing enormous quantities of food
supplies from the United States, and without these supplies she could
not maintain indefinitely her resistance. The severance of diplomatic
relations would naturally have been accompanied by an embargo suspending
trade between the United States and the Fatherland. Moreover, the
consideration that was mainly leading Germany to hope for success was
the belief that she could embroil the United States and Great Britain
over the blockade. A break with Germany would of course mean an end to
that manoeuvre. Page regarded all Mr. Wilson's attempts to make peace in
1914 and early 1915--before the _Lusitania_--as mistakes, for reasons
that have already been set forth. Now, however, he believed that the
President had a real opportunity to end the war and the unparalleled
suffering which it was causing. The mere dismissal of Bernstorff, in
the Ambassador's opinion, would accomplish this result.
In a communication sent to the President on February 15, 1916, he made
this plain.
_To the President_
February 15, 7 P.M.
The Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he can
with prudence, comment which is unfavourable to the United States.
He has taken this action because the public feeling against the
Administration is constantly increasing. Because the _Lusitania_
controversy has been going on so long, and because the Germans are
using it in their renewed U-boat campaign, the opinion of this
country has reached a point where only prompt action can bring a
turn in the tide. Therefore my loyalty to you would not be complete
if I should refrain from sending, in the most respectful terms, the
solemn conviction which I hold about our opportunity and our duty.
If you immediately refuse to have further parley or to yield one
jot or tittle of your original _Lusitania_ notes, and if you at
once break diplomatic relations with the German Empire, and then
declare the most vigorous embargo of the Central Powers, you will
quickly end the war. There will be an immediate collapse in German
credit. If there are any Allies who are wavering, such action will
hold them in line. Certain European neutrals--Sweden, Rumania,
Greece, and others--will put up a firm resistance to Germanic
influences and certain of them will take part with Great Britain
and France. There will be an end at once to the German propaganda,
which is now world-wide. The moral weight of our country will be a
determining influence and bring an early peace. The credit you
will receive for such a decision will make you immortal and even
the people of Germany will be forever grateful.
It is my conviction that we would not be called upon to fire a gun
or to lose one human life.
Above all, such an action will settle the whole question of
permanent peace. The absolute and grateful loyalty of the whole
British Empire, of the British Fleet, and of all the Allied
countries will be ours. The great English-speaking nations will be
able to control the details of the peace and this without any
formal alliance. There will be an incalculable saving of human life
and of treasure. Such an act will make it possible for Germany to
give in honourably and with good grace because the whole world will
be against her. Her bankrupt and blockaded people will bring such
pressure to bear that the decision will be hastened.
The sympathies of the American people will be brought in line with
the Administration.
If we settle the _Lusitania_ question by compromising in any way
your original demands, or if we permit it to drag on longer,
America can have no part in bringing the war to an end. The current
of allied opinion will run so strongly against the Administration
that no censorship and no friendly interference by an allied
government can stem the distrust of our Government which is now so
strong in Europe.
We shall gain by any further delay only a dangerous, thankless, and
opulent isolation. The _Lusitania_ is the turning point in our
history. The time to act is now.
PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The Ambassador's granddaughter.]
[Footnote 2: "A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865," edited by
Worthington Chauncey Ford. Vol. I, p. 84.]
[Footnote 3: "The Life and Letters of John Hay," by William Roscoe
Thayer. Vol. II, p. 166.]
[Footnote 4: On September 6th, certain documents seriously compromising
Dr. Constantin Dumba, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States,
were published in the British press. They disclosed that Dr. Dumba was
fomenting strikes in the United States and conducting other intrigues.
The American Government gave Dr. Dumba his passports on September 17th.]
[Footnote 5: August 26th, Count Bernstorff gave a pledge to the United
States Government, that, in future, German submarines would not attack
liners without warning. This promise was almost immediately violated.]
[Footnote 6: Sir Lionel Sackville-West was British Minister to the
United States from 1881 to 1888. In the latter year a letter was
published which he had written to an American citizen of British origin,
the gist of which was that the reëlection of President Cleveland would
be of advantage to British interests. For this gross interference in
American domestic affairs, President Cleveland immediately handed Sir
Lionel his passports. The incident ended his diplomatic career.]
[Footnote 7: In this passage the Ambassador touches on one of the
bitterest controversies of the war. In order completely to understand
the issues involved and to obtain Lord Haldane's view, the reader should
consult the very valuable book recently published by Lord Haldane:
"Before the War." Chapter II tells the story of Lord Haldane's visit to
the Kaiser, and succeeding chapters give the reasons why the creation of
a huge British army in preparation for the war was not a simple matter.]
[Footnote 8: The italics are Page's.]
[Footnote 9: Viscount Bryce, author of "The American Commonwealth" and
British Ambassador to the United States, 1907-1913.]
[Footnote 10: In a communication sent February 10, 1915, President
Wilson warned the German Government that he would hold it to a "strict
accountability" for the loss of American lives by illegal submarine
attack.]
[Footnote 11: A reference to the Anglo-French loan for $500,000,000,
placed in the United States in the autumn of 1915.]
[Footnote 12: The Marquis Imperiali.]
[Footnote 13: Rustem Bey, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States,
was sent home early in the war, for publishing indiscreet newspaper and
magazine articles.]
CHAPTER XV
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE LAWYERS
References in the foregoing letters show that Page was still having his
troubles over the blockade. In the latter part of 1915, indeed, the
negotiations with Sir Edward Grey on this subject had reached their
second stage. The failure of Washington to force upon Great Britain an
entirely new code of naval warfare--the Declaration of London--has
already been described. This failure had left both the British Foreign
Office and the American State Department in an unsatisfactory frame of
mind. The Foreign Office regarded Washington with suspicion, for the
American attempt to compel Great Britain to adopt a code of naval
warfare which was exceedingly unfavourable to that country and
exceedingly favourable to Germany, was susceptible of a sinister
interpretation. The British rejection of these overtures, on the other
hand, had evidently irritated the international lawyers at Washington.
Mr. Lansing now abandoned his efforts to revolutionize maritime warfare
and confined himself to specific protests and complaints. His
communications to the London Embassy dealt chiefly with particular ships
and cargoes. Yet his persistence in regarding all these problems from a
strictly legalistic point of view Page regarded as indicating a
restricted sense of statesmanship.
_To Edward M. House_
London, August 4, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
... The lawyer-way in which the Department goes on in its dealings
with Great Britain is losing us the only great international
friendship that we have any chance of keeping or that is worth
having. Whatever real principle we have to uphold with Great
Britain--that's all right. I refer only to the continuous series of
nagging incidents--always criticism, criticism, criticism of small
points--points that we have to yield at last, and never anything
constructive. I'll illustrate what I mean by a few incidents that I
can recall from memory. If I looked up the record, I should find a
very, very much larger list.
(1) We insisted and insisted and insisted, not once but half a
dozen times, at the very beginning of the war, on England's
adoption of the Declaration of London entire in spite of the fact
that Parliament had distinctly declined to adopt it. Of course we
had to give in--after we had produced a distinctly unfriendly
atmosphere and much feeling.
(2) We denied the British right to put copper on the contraband
list--much to their annoyance. Of course we had at last to
acquiesce. They were within their rights.
(3) We protested against bringing ships into port to examine them.
Of course we had to give in--after producing irritation.
(4) We made a great fuss about stopped telegrams. We have no case
at all; but, even after acknowledging that we have no case, every
Pouch continues to bring telegrams with the request that I ask an
explanation why they were stopped. Such explanations are
practically refused. I have 500 telegrams. Periodically I wire the
state of the case and ask for more specific instructions. I never
get an answer to these requests. But the Department continues to
send the telegrams! We confessedly have no case here; and this
method can produce nothing but irritation.
I could extend this list to 100 examples--of mere lawyer-like
methods--mere useless technicalities and objections which it is
obvious in the beginning cannot be maintained. A similar method is
now going on about cotton. Now this is not the way Sir Edward Grey
takes up business. It's not the way I've done business all my life,
nor that you have, nor other frank men who mean what they say and
do not say things they do not mean. The constant continuation of
this method is throwing away the real regard and confidence of the
British Government and of the British public--very fast, too.
I sometimes wish there were not a lawyer in the world. I heard the
President say once that it took him twenty years to recover from
his legal habit of mind. Well, his Administration is suffering from
it to a degree that is pathetic and that will leave bad results for
100 years.
I suspect that in spite of all the fuss we have made we shall at
last come to acknowledge the British blockade; for it is pretty
nearly parallel to the United States blockade of the South during
our Civil War. The only difference is--they can't make the blockade
of the Baltic against the traffic from the Scandinavian neutral
states effective. That's a good technical objection; but, since
practically all the traffic between those States and Germany is in
our products, much of the real force of it is lost.
If a protest is made against cotton being made contraband--it'll
amount to nothing and give only irritation. It will only play into
Hoke Smith[14]--German hands and accomplish nothing here. We make
as much fuss about points which we have silently to yield later as
about a real principle. Hence they all say that the State
Department is merely captious, and they pay less and less attention
to it and care less and less for American opinion--if only they can
continue to get munitions. We are reducing English regard to this
purely mercenary basis....
We are--under lawyers' quibbling--drifting apart very rapidly, to
our complete isolation from the sympathy of the whole world.
Yours forever sincerely,
W.H.P.
Page refers in this letter to the "blockade"; this was the term which
the British Government itself used to describe its restrictive measures
against German commerce, and it rapidly passed into common speech. Yet
the truth is that Great Britain never declared an actual blockade
against Germany. A realization of this fact will clear up much that is
obscure in the naval warfare of the next two years. At the beginning of
the Civil War, President Lincoln laid an interdict on all the ports of
the Confederacy; the ships of all nations were forbidden entering or
leaving them: any ship which attempted to evade this restriction, and
was captured doing so, was confiscated, with its cargo. That was a
blockade, as the term has always been understood. A blockade, it is well
to keep in mind, is a procedure which aims at completely closing the
blockaded country from all commercial intercourse with the world. A
blockading navy, if the blockade is successful, or "effective,"
converts the whole country into a beleaguered fortress, just as an army,
surrounding a single town, prevents goods and people from entering or
leaving it. Precisely as it is the purpose of a besieging army to starve
a particular city or territory into submission, so it is the aim of a
blockading fleet to enforce the same treatment on the nation as a whole.
It is also essential to keep in mind that the question of contraband has
nothing to do with a blockade, for, under this drastic method of making
warfare, everything is contraband. Contraband is a term applied to
cargoes, such as rifles, machine guns, and the like, which are needed in
the prosecution of war.
That a belligerent nation has the right to intercept such munitions on
the way to its enemy has been admitted for centuries. Differences of
opinion have raged only as to the extent to which this right could be
carried--the particular articles, that is, that constituted contraband,
and the methods adopted in exercising it. But the important point to be
kept in mind is that where there is a blockade, there is no contraband
list--for everything automatically becomes contraband. The seizure of
contraband on the high seas is a war measure which is availed of only in
cases in which the blockade has not been established.
Great Britain, when she declared war on Germany, did not follow
President Lincoln's example and lay the whole of the German coast under
interdict. Perhaps one reason for this inaction was a desire not unduly
to offend neutrals, especially the United States; but the more impelling
motive was geographical. The fact is that a blockade of the German
seacoast would accomplish little in the way of keeping materials out of
Germany. A glance at the map of northwestern Europe will make this fact
clear. In the first place the seacoast of Germany is a small affair. In
the North Sea the German coast is a little indentation, not more than
two hundred miles long, wedged in between the longer coastlines of
Holland and Denmark; in the Baltic it is somewhat more extensive, but
the entrances to this sea are so circuitous and treacherous that the
suggestion of a blockade here is not a practicable one. The greatest
ports of Germany are located on this little North Sea coastline or on
its rivers--Hamburg and Bremen. It might therefore be assumed that any
nation which successfully blockaded these North Sea ports would have
strangled the commerce of Germany. That is far from being the case. The
point is that the political boundaries of Germany are simply fictions,
when economic considerations are involved. Holland, on the west, and
Denmark, on the north, are as much a part of the German transportation
system as though these two countries were parts of the German Empire.
Their territories and the territories of Germany are contiguous; the
railroad and the canal systems of Germany, Holland, and Denmark are
practically one. Such ports as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen are
just as useful to Germany for purposes of commerce as are Hamburg and
Bremen, and, in fact, a special commercial arrangement with Rotterdam
has made that city practically a port of Germany since 1868. These
considerations show how ineffective would be a blockade of the German
coast which did not also comprehend the coast of Holland and Denmark.
Germany could still conduct her commerce through these neighbouring
countries. And at this point the great difficulty arose. A blockade is
an act of war and can be applied only to a country upon which war has
been declared. Great Britain had declared war on Germany and could
therefore legally close her ports; she had not declared war on Holland
and Denmark, and therefore could not use the same measure against those
friendly countries. Consequently the blockade was useless to Great
Britain; and so, in the first six months of the war, the Admiralty fell
back upon the milder system of declaring certain articles contraband of
war and seizing ships that were suspected of carrying them to Germany.
A geographical accident had apparently largely destroyed the usefulness
of the British fleet and had guaranteed Germany an unending supply of
those foodstuffs without which she could not maintain her resistance for
any extended period. Was Great Britain called upon to accept this
situation and to deny herself the use of the blockade in this, the
greatest struggle in her history? Unless the British fleet could stop
cargoes which were really destined to Germany but which were bound for
neutral ports, Great Britain could not win the war; if the British fleet
could intercept such cargoes, then the chances strongly favoured
victory. The experts of the Foreign Office searched the history of
blockades and found something which resembled a precedent in the
practices of the American Navy during the Civil War. In that conflict
Nassau, in the Bahamas, and Matamoros, in Mexico, played a part not
unlike that played by Rotterdam and Copenhagen in the recent struggle.
These were both neutral ports and therefore outside the jurisdiction of
the United States, just as Rotterdam and Copenhagen were outside the
jurisdiction of Great Britain. They were the ports of powers with which
the United States was at peace, and therefore they could not be
blockaded, just as Amsterdam and Copenhagen were ports of powers with
which Great Britain was now at peace.
Trade from Great Britain to the Bahamas and Mexico was ostensibly trade
from one neutral port to another neutral port in the same sense as was
trade from the United States to Holland and Denmark. Yet the fact is
that the "neutrality" of this trade, in the Civil War, from Great
Britain to the Bahamas and Mexico, was the most transparent subterfuge;
such trade was not "neutral" in the slightest degree. It consisted
almost entirely of contraband of war and was intended for the armies of
the Confederate States, then in arms against the Federal Government.
What is the reason, our Government asked, that these gentle and
unwarlike inhabitants of the Bahamas have so suddenly developed such an
enormous appetite for percussion caps, rifles, cannon, and other
instruments of warfare? The answer, of course, lay upon the surface; the
cargoes were intended for reshipment into the Southern States, and they
were, in fact, immediately so reshipped. The American Government, which
has always regarded realities as more important than logic, brushed
aside the consideration that this trade was conducted through neutral
ports, unhesitatingly seized these ships and condemned both the ships
and their cargoes. Its action was without legal precedent, but our
American courts devised a new principle of international law to cover
the case--that of "continuous voyage" or "ultimate destination." Under
this new doctrine it was maintained that cargoes of contraband could be
seized anywhere upon the high seas, even though they were going from one
neutral port to another, if it could be demonstrated that this
contraband was really on its way to the enemy. The mere fact that it was
transshipped at an intermediate neutral port was not important; the
important point was the "ultimate destination." British shippers
naturally raged over these decisions, but they met with little sympathy
from their own government. Great Britain filed no protest against the
doctrine of "continuous voyage," but recognized its fundamental
soundness, and since 1865 this doctrine has been a part of international
law.
Great Britain's good sense in acquiescing in our Civil War practices now
met its reward; for these decisions of American courts proved a godsend
in her hour of trial. The one neutral from which trouble was anticipated
was the United States. What better way to meet this situation than to
base British maritime warfare upon the decisions of American courts?
What more ideal solution of the problem than to make Chief Justice
Chase, of the United States Supreme Court, really the author of the
British "blockade" against Germany? The policy of the British Foreign
Office was to use the sea power of Great Britain to crush the enemy, but
to do it in a way that would not alienate American sympathy and American
support; clearly the one way in which both these ends could be attained
was to frame these war measures upon the pronouncements of American
prize courts. In a broad sense this is precisely what Sir Edward Grey
now proceeded to do. There was a difference, of course, which Great
Britain's enemies in the American Senate--such men as Senator Hoke
Smith, of Georgia, and Senator Thomas Walsh, of Montana--proceeded to
point out; but it was a difference of degree. Great Britain based her
blockade measures upon the American principle of "ultimate destination,"
but it was necessary considerably to extend that doctrine in order to
meet the necessities of the new situation. President Lincoln had applied
this principle to absolute contraband, such as powder, shells, rifles,
and other munitions of war. Great Britain now proceeded to apply it to
that nebulous class of commodities known as "conditional contraband,"
the chief of which was foodstuffs. If the United States, while a war was
pending, could evolve the idea of "ultimate destination" and apply it
to absolute contraband, could not Great Britain, while another war was
pending, carry it one degree further and make it include conditional
contraband? Thus reasoned the British Foreign Office. To this Mr.
Lansing replied that to stop foodstuffs on the way to Germany through a
neutral port was simply to blockade a neutral port, and that this was
something utterly without precedent. Seizing contraband is not an act of
war against the nation whose ships are seized; blockading a port is an
act of war; what right therefore had Great Britain to adopt measures
against Holland, Denmark, and Sweden which virtually amounted to a
blockade?
This is the reason why Great Britain, in the pronouncement of March 1,
1915, and the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, did not describe these
measures as a "blockade." President Wilson described his attack on
Mexico in 1914 as "measures short of war," and now someone referred to
the British restrictions on neutral commerce as "measures short of
blockade." The British sought another escape from their predicament by
justifying this proceeding, not on the general principles of warfare,
but on the ground of reprisal. Germany declared her submarine warfare on
merchant ships on February 4, 1915; Great Britain replied with her
announcement of March 1st, in which she declared her intention of
preventing "commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany."
The British advanced this procedure as a retaliation for the illegal
warfare which Germany had declared on merchant shipping, both that of
the enemy and of neutrals. "The British and French governments will
therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships
carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, and origin."
This sentence accurately describes the purposes of a blockade--to cut
the enemy off from all commercial relations with the outside world; yet
the procedure Great Britain now proposed to follow was not that of a
blockade. When this interdict is classically laid, any ship that
attempts to run the lines is penalized with confiscation, along with its
cargo; but such a penalty was not to be exacted in the present instance.
Great Britain now proposed to purchase cargoes of conditional contraband
discovered on seized ships and return the ships themselves to their
owners, and this soon became the established practice. Not only did the
Foreign Office purchase all cotton which was seized on its way to
Germany, but it took measures to maintain the price in the markets of
the world. In the succeeding months Southern statesmen in both Houses of
Congress railed against the British seizure of their great staple, yet
the fact was that cotton was all this time steadily advancing in price.
When Senator Hoke Smith made a long speech advocating an embargo on the
shipment of munitions as a punishment to Great Britain for stopping
American cotton on the way to Germany, the acute John Sharp Williams, of
Mississippi, arose in the Senate and completely annihilated the Georgia
politician by demonstrating how the Southern planters were growing rich
out of the war.
That the so-called "blockade" situation was a tortuous one must be
apparent from this attempt to set forth the salient facts. The basic
point was that there could be no blockade of Germany unless the neutral
ports of contiguous countries were also blockaded, and Great Britain
believed that she had found a precedent for doing this in the operations
of the American Navy in the Civil War. But it is obvious that the
situation was one which would provide a great feast for the lawyers.
That Page sympathized with this British determination to keep foodstuffs
out of Germany, his correspondence shows. Day after day the "protests"
from Washington rained upon his desk. The history of our foreign
relations for 1915 and 1916 is largely made up of an interminable
correspondence dealing with seized cargoes, and the routine of the
Embassy was an unending nightmare of "demands," "complaints,"
"precedents," "cases," "notes," "detentions" of Chicago meats, of
Southern cotton, and the like. The American Embassy in London contains
hundreds of volumes of correspondence which took place during Page's
incumbency; more material has accumulated for those five years than for
the preceding century and a quarter of the Government's existence. The
greater part of this mass deals with intercepted cargoes.
The following extract from a letter which Page wrote at this time gives
a fair idea of the atmosphere that prevailed in London while this
correspondence was engaging the Ambassador's mind:
The truth is, in their present depressed mood, the United States is
forgotten--everything's forgotten but the one great matter in hand.
For the moment at least, the English do not care what we do or what
we think or whether we exist--except those critics of
things-in-general who use us as a target since they must take a
crack at somebody. And I simply cannot describe the curious effect
that is produced on men here by the apparent utter lack of
understanding in the United States of the phase the war has now
entered and of the mood that this phase has brought. I pick up an
American paper eight days old and read solemn evidence to show that
the British Government is interrupting our trade in order to
advance its own at our expense, whereas the truth is that the
British Government hasn't given six seconds' thought in six months
to anybody's trade--not even its own. When I am asked to inquire
why Pfister and Schmidt's telegram from New York to Schimmelpfenig
and Johann in Holland was stopped (the reason is reasonably
obvious), I try to picture to myself the British Minister in
Washington making inquiry of our Government on the day after Bull
Run, why the sailing boat loaded with persimmon blocks to make golf
clubs is delayed in Hampton Roads.
I think I have neither heard nor read anything from the United
States in three months that didn't seem so remote as to suggest the
captain of the sailing ship from Hongkong who turned up at
Southampton in February and had not even heard that there was a
war. All day long I see and hear women who come to ask if I can
make inquiry about their sons and husbands, "dead or missing," with
an interval given to a description of a man half of whose body was
splashed against a brick wall last night on the Strand when a
Zeppelin bomb tore up the street and made projectiles of the
pavement; as I walk to and from the Embassy the Park is full of
wounded and their nurses; every man I see tells me of a new death;
every member of the Government talks about military events or of
Balkan venality; the man behind the counter at the cigar store
reads me part of a letter just come from his son, telling how he
advanced over a pile of dead Germans and one of them grunted and
turned under his feet-they (the English alone) are spending
$25,000,000 a day to keep this march going over dead Germans; then
comes a telegram predicting blue ruin for American importers and a
cheerless Christmas for American children if a cargo of German toys
be not quickly released at Rotterdam, and I dimly recall the
benevolent unction with which American children last Christmas sent
a shipload of toys to this side of the world--many of them for
German children--to the tune of "God bless us all"--do you wonder
we often have to pinch ourselves to find out if we are we; and
what year of the Lord is it? What is the vital thing--the killing
of fifty people last night by a Zeppelin within sight of St. Paul's
on one side and of Westminster Abbey on the other, or is it making
representations to Sir Edward Grey, who has hardly slept for a week
because his despatches from Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, and Salonika
come at all hours, each possibly reporting on which side a new
government may throw its army--to decide perhaps the fate of the
canal leading to Asia, the vast British Asiatic empire at stake--is
it making representations to Sir Edward while his mind is thus
occupied, that it is of the greatest importance to the United
States Government that a particular German who is somewhere in this
Kingdom shall be permitted to go to the United States because he
knows how to dye sealskins and our sealskins are yet undyed and the
winter is coming? There will be no new sealskins here, for every
man and woman must give half his income to keep the cigarman's son
marching over dead Germans, some of whom grunt and turn under his
feet. Dumba is at Falmouth to-day and gets just two lines in the
newspapers. Nothing and nobody gets three lines unless he or it in
some way furthers the war. Every morning the Washington despatches
say that Mr. Lansing is about to send a long note to England.
England won't read it till there comes a lull in the fighting or in
the breathless diplomatic struggle with the Balkans. London and the
Government are now in much the same mood that Washington and
Lincoln's administration were in after Lee had crossed the Potomac
on his way to Gettysburg. Northcliffe, the Lord of Yellow Journals,
but an uncommonly brilliant fellow, has taken to his bed from sheer
nervous worry. "The revelations that are imminent," says he, "will
shake the world--the incompetence of the Government, the losses
along the Dardanelles, the throwing away of British chances in the
Balkans, perhaps the actual defeat of the Allies." I regard Lord
Northcliffe less as an entity than as a symptom. But he is always
very friendly to us and he knows the United States better than any
Englishman that I know except Bryce. He and Bryce are both much
concerned about our Note's coming just "at this most distressing
time." "If it come when we are calmer, no matter; but now it cannot
receive attention and many will feel that the United States has hit
on a most unhappy moment--almost a cruel moment--to remind us of
our sins."--That's the substance of what they say.
Overwork, or perhaps mainly the indescribable strain on the nerves
and vitality of men, caused by this experience, for which in fact
men are not built, puts one of our staff after another in bed. None
has been seriously sick: the malady takes some form of "grip." On
the whole we've been pretty lucky in spite of this almost regular
temporary breakdown of one man after another. I've so far escaped.
But I am grieved to hear that Whitlock is abed--"no physical
ailment whatever--just worn out," his doctor says. I have tried to
induce him and his wife to come here and make me a visit; but one
characteristic of this war-malady is the conviction of the victim
that he is somehow necessary to hold the world together. About
twice a week I get to the golf links and take the risk of the
world's falling apart and thus escape both illness and its
illusions.
"I cannot begin to express my deep anxiety and even uneasiness about the
relations of these two great governments and peoples," Page wrote about
this time. "The friendship of the United States and Great Britain is
all that now holds the world together. It is the greatest asset of
civilization left. All the cargoes of copper and oil in the world are
not worth as much to the world. Yet when a shipper's cargo is held up he
does not think of civilization and of the future of mankind and of free
government; he thinks only of his cargo and of the indignity that he
imagines has been done him; and what is the American Government for if
not to protect his rights? Of course he's right; but there must be
somebody somewhere who sees things in their right proportion. The man
with an injury rushes to the Department of State--quite properly. He is
in a mood to bring England to book. Now comes the critical stage in the
journey of his complaint. The State Department hurries it on to me--very
properly; every man's right must be guarded and defended--a right to get
his cargo to market, a right to get on a steamer at Queenstown, a right
to have his censored telegram returned, any kind of a right, if he have
a right. Then the Department, not wittingly, I know, but humanly, almost
inevitably, in the great rush of overwork, sends his 'demands' to me,
catching much of his tone and apparently insisting on the removal of his
grievance as a right, without knowing all the facts in the case. The
telegrams that come to me are full of 'protests' and 'demands'--protest
and demand this, protest and demand that. A man from Mars who should
read my book of telegrams received during the last two months would find
it difficult to explain how the two governments have kept at peace. It
is this serious treatment of trifling grievances which makes us feel
here that the exactions and dislocations and necessary disturbances of
this war are not understood at home.
"I assure you (and there are plenty of facts to prove it) that this
Government (both for unselfish and selfish reasons) puts a higher value
on our friendship than on any similar thing in the world. They will
go--they are going--the full length to keep it. But, in proportion to
our tendency to nag them about little things will the value set on our
friendship diminish and will their confidence in our sincerity decline."
* * * * *
The note which Lord Bryce and Lord Northcliffe so dreaded reached the
London Embassy in October, 1915. The State Department had spent nearly
six months in preparing it; it was the American answer to the so-called
blockade established by the Order in Council of the preceding March.
Evidently its contents fulfilled the worst forebodings:
_To Edward M. House_
London, November 12, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
I have a great respect for the British Navy. Admiral Jellicoe now
has under his command 3,000 ships of all sorts-far and away the
biggest fleet, I think, that was ever assembled. For the first time
since the ocean was poured out, one navy practically commands all
the seas: nothing sails except by its grace. It is this fleet of
course that will win the war. The beginning of the end--however far
off yet the end may be--is already visible by reason of the
economic pressure on Germany. But for this fleet, by the way,
London would be in ruins, all its treasure looted; every French
seacoast city and the Italian peninsula would be as Belgium and
Poland are; and thousands of English women would be violated--just
as dead French girls are found in many German trenches that have
been taken in France. Hence I greatly respect the British fleet.
We have a good navy, too, for its size, and a naval personnel as
good as any afloat. I hear--with much joy--that we are going to
make our navy bigger--as much bigger (God save the mark!) as Bryan
will permit.
Now, whatever the future bring, since any fighting enterprise that
may ever be thrust on us will be just and justified, we must see to
it that we win, as doubtless we shall and as hitherto we always
have won. We must be dead sure of winning. Well, whatever fight may
be thrust on us by anybody, anywhere, at any time, for any
reason--if it only be generally understood beforehand that our
fleet and the British fleet shoot the same language, there'll be no
fight thrust upon us. The biggest bully in the world wouldn't dare
kick the sorriest dog we have. Here, therefore, is a Peace
Programme for you--the only basis for a permanent peace in the
world. There's no further good in having venerable children build
houses of sand at The Hague; there's no further good in peace
organizations or protective leagues to enforce peace. We had as
well get down to facts. So far as ensuring peace is concerned the
biggest fact in the world is the British fleet. The next biggest
fact is the American fleet, because of itself and still more
because of the vast reserve power of the United States which it
implies. If these two fleets perfectly understand one another about
the undesirability of wars of aggression, there'll be no more big
wars as long as this understanding continues. Such an understanding
calls for no treaty--it calls only for courtesy.
And there is no other peace-basis worth talking about--by men who
know how the world is governed.
Since I have lived here I have spent my days and nights, my poor
brain, and my small fortune all most freely and gladly to get some
understanding of the men who rule this Kingdom, and of the women
and the customs and the traditions that rule these men--to get
their trick of thought, the play of their ideals, the working of
their imagination, the springs of their instincts. It is impossible
for any man to know just how well he himself does such a difficult
task--how accurately he is coming to understand the sources and
character of a people's actions. Yet, at the worst, I do know
something about the British: I know enough to make very sure of the
soundness of my conclusion that they are necessary to us and we to
them. Else God would have permitted the world to be peopled in some
other way. And when we see that the world will be saved by such an
artificial combination as England and Russia and France and Japan
and Serbia, it calls for no great wisdom to see the natural way
whereby it must be saved in the future.
For this reason every day that I have lived here it has been my
conscious aim to do what I could to bring about a condition that
shall make sure of this--that, whenever we may have need of the
British fleet to protect our shores or to prevent an aggressive war
anywhere, it shall he ours by a natural impulse and necessity--even
without the asking.
I have found out that the first step toward that end is courtesy;
that the second step is courtesy, and the third step--such a fine
and high courtesy (which includes courage) as the President showed
in the Panama tolls controversy. We have--we and the
British--common aims and character. Only a continuous and sincere
courtesy--over periods of strain as well as of calm--is necessary
for as complete an understanding as will be required for the
automatic guidance of the world in peaceful ways.
Now, a difference is come between us--the sort of difference that
handled as between friends would serve only to bind us together
with a sturdier respect. We send a long lawyer's Note, not
discourteous but wholly uncourteous, which is far worse. I am
writing now only of the manner of the Note, not of its matter.
There is not a courteous word, nor a friendly phrase, nor a kindly
turn in it, not an allusion even to an old acquaintance, to say
nothing of an old friendship, not a word of thanks for courtesies
or favours done us, not a hint of sympathy in the difficulties of
the time. There is nothing in its tone to show that it came from an
American to an Englishman: it might have been from a Hottentot to a
Fiji-Islander.
I am almost sure--I'll say quite sure--that this uncourteous manner
is far more important than its endless matter. It has greatly hurt
our friends, the real men of the Kingdom. It has made the masses
angry--which is of far less importance than the severe sorrow that
our discourtesy of manner has brought to our friends--I fear to all
considerate and thoughtful Englishmen.
Let me illustrate: When the Panama tolls controversy arose, Taft
ceased to speak the language of the natural man and lapsed into
lawyer's courthouse zigzagging mutterings. Knox wrote a letter to
the British Government that would have made an enemy of the most
affectionate twin brother--all mere legal twists and turns, as
agreeable as a pocketful of screws. Then various bovine
"international lawyers" wrote books about it. I read them and
became more and more confused the further I went: you always do. It
took me some time to recover from this word-drunk debauch and to
find my own natural intelligence again, the common sense that I was
born with. Then I saw that the whole thing went wrong from the
place where that Knox legal note came in. Congressmen in the
backwoods quoted cryptic passages from it, thought they were saying
something, and proceeded to make their audiences believe that
somehow England had hit us with a club--or would have hit us but
for Knox. That pure discourtesy kept us apart from English sympathy
for something like two years.
Then the President took it up. He threw the legal twaddle into the
gutter. He put the whole question in a ten-minutes' speech to
Congress, full of clearness and fairness and high courtesy. It won
even the rural Congressmen. It was read in every capital and the
men who conduct every government looked up and said, "This is a
real man, a brave man, a just man." You will recall what Sir Edward
Grey said to me: "The President has taught us all a lesson and set
us all a high example in the noblest courtesy."
This one act brought these two nations closer together than they
had ever been since we became an independent nation. It was an act
of courtesy....
My dear House, suppose the postman some morning were to leave at
your door a thing of thirty-five heads and three appendices, and
you discovered that it came from an old friend whom you had long
known and greatly valued--this vast mass of legal stuff, without a
word or a turn of courtesy in it--what would you do? He had a
grievance, your old friend had. Friends often have. But instead of
explaining it to you, he had gone and had his lawyers send this
many-headed, much-appendiced ton of stuff. It wasn't by that method
that you found your way from Austin, Texas, to your present
eminence and wisdom. Nor was that the way our friend found his way
from a little law-office in Atlanta, where I first saw him, to the
White House.
More and more I am struck with this--that governments are human.
They are not remote abstractions, nor impersonal institutions. Men
conduct them; and they do not cease to be men. A man is made up of
six parts of human nature and four parts of facts and other
things--a little reason, some prejudice, much provincialism, and of
the particular fur or skin that suits his habitat. When you wish to
win a man to do what _you_ want him to do, you take along a few
well-established facts, some reasoning and such-like, but you take
along also three or four or five parts of human nature--kindliness,
courtesy, and such things--sympathy and a human touch.
If a man be six parts human and four parts of other things, a
government, especially a democracy, is seven, or eight, or nine
parts human nature. It's the most human thing I know. The best way
to manage governments and nations--so long as they are disposed to
be friendly--is the way we manage one another. I have a
confirmation of this in the following comment which came to me
to-day. It was made by a friendly member of Parliament.
"The President himself dealt with Germany. Even in his severity he
paid the Germans the compliment of a most courteous tone in his
Note. But in dealing with us he seems to have called in the lawyers
of German importers and Chicago pork-packers. I miss the high
Presidential courtesy that we had come to expect from Mr. Wilson."
An American banker here has told me of the experience of an
American financial salesman in the city the day after our Note was
published. His business is to make calls on bankers and other
financial men, to sell them securities. He is a man of good address
who is popular with his clients. The first man he called on, on
that day, said: "I don't wish to be offensive to you. But I have
only one way to show my feeling of indignation toward the United
States, and that is, to have nothing more to do with Americans."
The next man said: "No, nothing to-day, I thank you. No--nor
to-morrow either; nor the next day. Good morning."
After four or five such greetings, the fellow gave it up and is now
doing nothing.
I don't attach much importance to such an incident as this, except
as it gives a hint of the general feeling. These financial men
probably haven't even read our Note. Few people have. But they have
all read the short and sharp newspaper summary which preceded it in
the English papers. But what such an incident does indicate is the
prevalence of a state of public feeling which would prevent the
Government from yielding any of our demands even if the Government
so wished. It has now been nearly a week since the Note was
published. I have seen most of the neutral ministers. Before the
Note came they expressed great eagerness to see it: it would
champion their cause. Since it came not one of them has mentioned
it to me. The Secretary of one of them remarked, after being
invited to express himself: "It is too--too--long!" And, although I
have seen most of the Cabinet this week, not a man mentioned it to
me. People seem studiously to avoid it, lest they give offense.
I have, however, got one little satisfaction. An American--a
half-expatriated loafer who talks "art"--you know the
intellectually affected and degenerate type--screwed his courage up
and told me that he felt ashamed of his country. I remarked that I
felt sure the feeling was mutual. That, I confess, made me feel
better.
As nearly as I can make out, the highwater mark of English
good-feeling toward us in all our history was after the President's
Panama tolls courtesy. The low-water mark, since the Civil War, I
am sure, is now. The Cleveland Venezuela message came at a time of
no nervous strain and did, I think, produce no long-lasting
effect. A part of the present feeling is due to the English
conviction that we have been taken in by the Germans in the
submarine controversy, but a large part is due to the lack of
courtesy in this last Note--the manner in which it was written even
more than its matter. As regards its matter, I have often been over
what I conceive to be the main points with Sir Edward Grey--very
frankly and without the least offense. He has said: "We may have to
arbitrate these things," as he might say, "We had better take a cab
because it is raining." It is easily possible--or it was--to
discuss anything with this Government without offense. I have, in
fact, stood up before Sir Edward's fire and accused him of stealing
a large part of the earth's surface, and we were just as good
friends afterward as before. But I never drew a lawyer's indictment
of him as a land-thief: that's different.
I suppose no two peoples or governments ever quite understand one
another. Perhaps they never will. That is too much to hope for. But
when one government writes to another it ought to write (as men do)
with some reference to the personality of the other and to their
previous relations, since governments are more human than men. Of
course I don't know who wrote the Note. Hence I can talk about it
freely to you without implying criticism of anybody in particular.
But the man who wrote it never saw the British Government and
wouldn't know it if he met it in the road. To him it is a mere
legal entity, a wicked, impersonal institution against which he has
the task of drawing an indictment--not the task of trying to
persuade it to confess the propriety of a certain course of
conduct. In his view, it is a wicked enemy to start with--like the
Louisiana lottery of a previous generation or the Standard Oil
Company of our time.
One would have thought, since we were six months in preparing it,
that a draft of the Note would have been sent to the man on the
ground whom our Government keeps in London to study the situation
at first hand and to make the best judgment he can about the most
effective methods of approach on delicate and difficult matters. If
that had been done, I should have suggested a courteous short Note
saying that we are obliged to set forth such and such views about
marine law and the rights of neutrals, to His Majesty's Government;
and that the contention of the United States Government was
herewith sent--etc., etc.--Then this identical Note (with certain
court-house, strong, shirt-sleeve adjectives left out) could have
come without arousing any feeling whatsoever. Of course I have no
personal vanity in saying this to you. I am sure I outgrew that
foible many years ago. But such a use of an ambassador--of any
ambassador--is obviously one of the best and most natural uses he
could be put to; and all governments but ours do put their
ambassadors to such a use: that's what they have 'em for.
_Per contra_: a telegram has just come in saying that a certain
Lichtenstein in New York had a lot of goods stopped by the British
Government, which (by an arrangement made with their attorney here)
agreed to buy them at a certain price: will I go and find out why
the Government hasn't yet paid Lichtenstein and when he may expect
his money? Is it an ambassadorial duty to collect a private bill
for Lichtenstein, in a bargain with which our Government has had
nothing to do? I have telegraphed the Department, quite calmly,
that I don't think it is. I venture to say no ambassador ever had
such a request as that before from his Government.
My dear House, I often wonder if my years of work here--the kind of
high good work I've tried to do--have not been thrown away. I've
tried to take and to busy myself with a long-range view of great
subjects. The British Empire and the United States will be here
long after we are dead, and their relations will continue to be one
of the most important matters--perhaps the most important
matter--in the world. Well, now think of Lichtenstein's bill!
To get back where I started--I fear, therefore, that, when I next
meet the Admiral of the Grand Fleet (with whom I used to discuss
everything quite freely before he sailed away to the war), he may
forget to mention that we may have his 3,000 ships at our need.
Since this present difference is in danger of losing the healing
influence of a kindly touch--has become an uncourteous monster of
35 heads and 3 appendices--I see no early end of it. The British
Foreign Office has a lot of lawyers in its great back offices. They
and our lawyers will now butt and rebut as long as a goat of them
is left alive on either side. The two governments--the two human,
kindly groups--have retired: they don't touch, on this matter, now.
The lawyers will have the time of their lives, each smelling the
blood of the other.
If more notes must come--as the English papers report over and over
again every morning and every afternoon--the President might do
much by writing a brief, human document to accompany the
Appendices. If it be done courteously, we can accuse them of
stealing sheep and of dyeing the skins to conceal the theft-without
provoking the slightest bad feeling; and, in the end, they'll pay
another _Alabama_ award without complaint and frame the check and
show it to future ambassadors as Sir Edward shows the _Alabama_
check to me sometimes.
And it'll be a lasting shame (and may bring other Great Wars) if
lawyers are now permitted to tear the garments with which Peace
ought to be clothed as soon as she can escape from her present rags
and tatters.
Yours always heartily,
W.H.P.
P.S. My dear House: Since I have--in weeks and months past--both
telegraphed and written the Department (and I presume the President
has seen what I've sent) about the feeling here, I've written this
letter to you and not to the President nor Lansing. I will not run
the risk of seeming to complain--nor even of seeming to seem to
complain. But if you think it wise to send or show this letter to
the President, I'm willing you should. This job was botched:
there's no doubt about that. We shall not recover for many a long,
long year. The identical indictment could have been drawn with
admirable temper and the way laid down for arbitration and for
keeping our interpretation of the law and precedents intact--all
done in a way that would have given no offense.
The feeling runs higher and higher every day--goes deeper and
spreads wider.
Now on top of it comes the _Ancona_[15]. The English press,
practically unanimously, makes sneering remarks about our
Government. After six months it has got no results from the
_Lusitania_ controversy, which Bernstorff is allowed to prolong in
secret session while factories are blown up, ships supplied with
bombs, and all manner of outrages go on (by Germans) in the United
States. The English simply can't understand why Bernstorff is
allowed to stay. They predict that nothing will come of the
_Ancona_ case, nor of any other case. Nobody wants us to get into
the war--nobody who counts--but they are losing respect for us
because we seem to them to submit to anything.
We've simply dropped out. No English person ever mentions our
Government to me. But they talk to one another all the time about
the political anæmia of the United States Government. They think
that Bernstorff has the State Department afraid of him and that the
Pacifists dominate opinion--the Pacifists-at-any-price. I no longer
even have a chance to explain any of these things to anybody I
know.
It isn't the old question we used to discuss of our having no
friend in the world when the war ends. It's gone far further than
that. It is now whether the United States Government need be
respected by anybody.
W.H.P.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 14: Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, was at this time--and
afterward--conducting bitter campaign against the British blockade and
advocating an embargo as a retaliation.]
[Footnote 15: Torpedoed off Sardinia on Nov. 7, 1915, by the Austrians.
There was a large toss of life, including many Americans.]
CHAPTER XVI
DARK DAYS FOR THE ALLIES
_To Edward M. House_
June 30, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
There's a distinct wave of depression here--perhaps I'd better say
a period of setbacks has come. So far as we can find out only the
Germans are doing anything in the war on land. The position in
France is essentially the same as it was in November, only the
Germans are much more strongly entrenched. Their great plenty of
machine guns enables them to use fewer men and to kill more than
the Allies. The Russians also lack ammunition and are yielding more
and more territory. The Allies--so you hear now--will do well if
they get their little army away from the Dardanelles before the
German-Turks eat 'em alive, and no Balkan state comes in to help
the Allies. Italy makes progress-slowly, of course, over almost
impassable mountains--etc., etc. Most of this doleful recital I
think is true; and I find more and more men here who have lost hope
of seeing an end of the war in less than two or three years, and
more and more who fear that the Germans will never be forced out of
Belgium. And the era of the giant aeroplane seems about to come--a
machine that can carry several tons and several men and go great
distances--two engines, two propellers, and the like. It isn't at
all impossible, I am told, that these machines may be the things
that will at last end the war--possibly, but I doubt it.
At any rate, it is true that a great wave of discouragement is
come. All these events and more seem to prove to my mind the rather
dismal failure the Liberal Government made--a failure really to
grasp the problem. It was a dead failure. Of course they are waking
up now, when they are faced with a certain dread lest many soldiers
prefer frankly to die rather than spend another winter in
practically the same trenches. You hear rumours, too, of great
impending military scandals--God knows whether there be any truth
in them or not.
In a word, while no Englishman gives up or will ever give
up--that's all rot--the job he has in hand is not going well. He's
got to spit on his hands and buckle up his belt two holes tighter
yet. And I haven't seen a man for a month who dares hope for an end
of the fight within any time that he can foresee.
I had a talk to-day with the Russian Ambassador[16]. He wished to
know how matters stood between the United States and Great Britain.
I said to him: "I'll give you a task if you have leisure. Set to
and help me hurry up your distinguished Ally in dealing with our
shipping troubles."
The old man laughed--that seemed a huge joke to him; he threw up
his hands and exclaimed--"My God! He is slow about his own
business--has always been slow--can't be anything else."
After more such banter, the nigger in his wood-pile poked his head
out: "Is there any danger," he asked, "that munitions may be
stopped?"
The Germans have been preparing northern France for German
occupation. No French are left there, of course, except women and
children and old men. They must be fed or starved or deported. The
Germans put them on trains--a whole village at a time--and run
them to the Swiss frontier. Of course the Swiss pass them on into
France. The French have their own and--the Germans will have
northern France without any French population, if this process goes
on long enough.
The mere bang! bang! frightful era of the war is passed. The
Germans are settling down to permanent business with their great
organizing machine. Of course they talk about the freedom of the
seas and such mush-mush; of course they'd like to have Paris and
rob it of enough money to pay what the war has cost them, and
London, too. But what they really want for keeps is
seacoast--Belgium and as much of the French coast as they can win.
That's really what they are out gunning for. Of course, somehow at
some time they mean to get Holland, too, and Denmark, if they
really need it. Then they'll have a very respectable seacoast--the
thing that they chiefly lack now.
More and more people are getting their nerves knocked out. I went
to a big hospital on Sunday, twenty-five miles out of London. They
showed me an enormous, muscular Tommy sitting by himself in a chair
under the trees. He had had a slight wound which quickly got well.
But his speech was gone. That came back, too, later. But then he
wouldn't talk and he'd insist on going off by himself. He's just
knocked out--you can't find out just how much gumption he has left.
That's what the war did for him: it stupefied him. Well, it's
stupefied lots of folks who have never seen a trench. That's what's
happened. Of all the men who started in with the game, I verily
believe that Lloyd George is holding up best. He organized British
finance. Now he's organizing British industry.
It's got hot in London--hotter than I've ever known it. It gets
lonelier (more people going away) and sadder--more wounded coming
back and more visible sorrow. We seem to be settling down to
something that is more or less like Paris--so far less, but it may
become more and more like it. And the confident note of an earlier
period is accompanied by a dull undertone of much less
cheerfulness. The end is--in the lap of the gods.
W.H.P.
_To Arthur W. Page_
American Embassy, London,
July 25, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... Many men here are very active in their thought about the future
relations of the United States and Great Britain. Will the war
bring or leave them closer together? If the German machine be
completely smashed (and it may not be completely smashed) the
Japanese danger will remain. I do not know how to estimate that
danger accurately. But there is such a danger. And, if the German
wild beast ever come to life again, there's an eternal chance of
trouble with it. For defensive purposes it may become of the very
first importance that the whole English-speaking world should stand
together--not in entangling alliance, but with a much clearer
understanding than we have ever yet had. I'll indicate to you some
of my cogitations on this subject by trying to repeat what I told
Philip Kerr[17] a fortnight ago--one Sunday in the country. I can
write this to you without seeming to parade my own opinions.--Kerr
is one of "The Round Table," perhaps the best group of men here for
the real study and free discussion of large political subjects.
Their quarterly, _The Round Table_, is the best review, I dare
say, in the world. Kerr is red hot for a close and perfect
understanding between Great Britain and the United States. I told
him that, since Great Britain had only about forty per cent. of the
white English-speaking people and the United States had about sixty
per cent., I hoped in his natural history that the tail didn't wag
the dog. I went on:
"You now have the advantage of us in your aggregation of three
centuries of accumulated wealth--the spoil of all the world--and in
the talent that you have developed for conserving it and adding to
it and in the institutions you have built up to perpetuate it--your
merchant ships, your insurance, your world-wide banking, your
mortgages on all new lands; but isn't this the only advantage you
have? This advantage will pass. You are now shooting away millions
and millions, and you will have a debt that is bound to burden
industry. On our side, we have a more recently mixed race than
yours; you've begun to inbreed. We have also (and therefore) more
adaptability, a greater keenness of mind in our masses; we are
Old-World men set free--free of classes and traditions and all that
they connote. Your so-called democracy is far behind ours. Your
aristocracy and your privileges necessarily bring a social and
economic burden. Half your people look backward.
"Your leadership rests on your wealth and on the power that you've
built on your wealth."
When he asked me how we were to come closer together--"closer
together, with your old-time distrust of us and with your
remoteness?"--I stopped him at "remoteness."
"That's the reason," I said. "Your idea of our 'remoteness.'
'Remoteness' from what? From you? Are you not betraying the only
real difficulty of a closer sympathy by assuming that you are the
centre of the world? When you bring yourself to think of the
British Empire as a part of the American Union--mind you, I am not
saying that you would be formally admitted--but when you are
yourselves in close enough sympathy with us to wish to be admitted,
the chief difficulty of a real union of thought will be gone. You
recall Lord Rosebery's speech in which he pictured the capital of
the British Empire being moved to Washington if the American
Colonies had been retained under the Crown? Well, it was the Crown
that was the trouble, and the capital of English-speaking folk has
been so moved and you still remain 'remote.' Drop 'remote' from
your vocabulary and your thought and we'll actually be closer
together."
It's an enormous problem--just how to bring these countries closer
together. Perhaps nothing can do it but some great common danger or
some great common adventure. But this is one of the problems of
your lifetime. England can't get itself clean loose from the
continent nor from continental mediævalism; and with that we can
have nothing to do. Men like Kerr think that somehow a great push
toward democracy here will be given by the war. I don't quite see
how. So far the aristocracy have made perhaps the best showing in
defence of English liberty. They are paying the bills of the war;
they have sent their sons; these sons have died like men; and their
parents never whimper. It's a fine breed for such great uses as
these. There was a fine incident in the House of Lords the other
day, which gave the lie to the talk that one used to hear here
about "degeneracy." Somebody made a perfectly innocent proposal to
complete a list of peers and peers' sons who had fallen in the
war--a thing that will, of course, be done, just as a similar list
will be compiled of the House of Commons, of Oxford and Cambridge
Universities. But one peer after another objected vigorously lest
such a list appear immodest. "We are but doing our duty. Let the
matter rest there."
In a time like this the aristocracy proves its worth. In fact, all
aristocracies grew chiefly out of wars, and perhaps they are better
for wars than a real democracy. Here, you see, you run into one of
those contradictions in life and history which make the world so
hard to change....
You know there are some reasons why peace, whenever it may come,
will bring problems as bad as the problems of the war itself. I can
think of no worse task than the long conferences of the Allies with
their conflicting interests and ambitions. Then must come their
conferences with the enemy. Then there are sure to be other
conferences to try to make peace secure. And, of course, many are
going to be dissatisfied and disappointed, and perhaps out of these
disappointments other wars may come. The world will not take up its
knitting and sit quietly by the fire for many a year to come....
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
One happiness came to Mr. and Mrs. Page in the midst of all these war
alarums. On August 4, 1915, their only daughter, Katharine, was married
to Mr. Charles G. Loring, of Boston, Massachusetts. The occasion gave
the King an opportunity of showing the high regard in which Page and his
family were held. It had been planned that the wedding should take place
in Westminster Abbey, but the King very courteously offered Miss Page
the Royal chapel in St. James's Palace. This was a distinguished
compliment, as it was the first time that any marriage, in which both
bride and bridegroom were foreigners, had ever been celebrated in this
building, which for centuries has been the scene of royal weddings. The
special place which his daughter had always held in the Ambassador's
affections is apparent in the many letters that now followed her to her
new home in the United States. The unique use Page made of the initials
of his daughter's name was characteristic.
_To Mrs. Charles G. Loring_
London, September 1, 1915.
MY DEAR K.A. P-TAIN:
Here's a joke on your mother and Frank: We three (and Smith) went
up to Broadway in the car, to stay there a little while and then to
go on into Wales, etc. The hotel is an old curiosity shop; you sit
on Elizabethan chairs by a Queen Anne table, on a drunken floor,
and look at the pewter platters on the wall or do your best to look
at them, for the ancient windows admit hardly any light. "Oh!
lovely," cries Frank; and then he and your mother make out in the
half-darkness a perfectly wonderful copper mug on the mantelpiece;
and you go out and come in the ramshackle door (stooping every
time) after you've felt all about for the rusty old iron latch, and
then you step down two steps (or fall), presently to step up two
more. Well, for dinner we had six kinds of meat and two meat pies
and potatoes and currants! My dinner was a potato. I'm old and
infirm and I have many ailments, but I'm not so bad off as to be
able to live on a potato a day. And since we were having a
vacation, I didn't see the point. So I came home where I have seven
courses for dinner, all good; and Mrs. Leggett took my place in the
car. That carnivorous company went on. They've got to eat six
kinds of meat and two meat pies and--currants! I haven't. Your
mother calls me up on the phone every morning--me, who am living
here in luxury, seven courses at every dinner--and asks anxiously,
"And how _are_ you, dear?" I answer: "Prime, and how are _you_?" We
are all enjoying ourselves, you see, and I don't have to eat six
kinds of meat and two meat pies and--currants! They do; and may
Heaven save 'em and get 'em home safe!
[Illustration: Col. Edward M. House. From a painting by P.A.
Laszlo]
[Illustration: The Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1908-1916]
It's lovely in London now--fine, shining days and showers at night
and Ranelagh beautiful, and few people here; but I don't deny its
loneliness--somewhat. Yet sleep is good, and easy and long. I have
neither an ocean voyage nor six kinds of meat and two meat pies and
currants. I congratulate myself and write to you and mother.
You'll land to-morrow or next day--good; I congratulate you. Salute
the good land for me and present my respectful compliments to
vegetables that have taste and fruit that is not sour--to the
sunshine, in fact, and to everything that ripens and sweetens in
its glow.
And you're now (when this reaches you) fixing up your home--your
_own_ home, dear Kitty. Bless your dear life, you left a home
here--wasn't it a good and nice one?--left it very lonely for the
man who has loved you twenty-four years and been made happy by your
presence. But he'll love you twenty-five more and on and
on--always. So you haven't lost that--nor can you. And it's very
fit and right that you should build your own nest; that adds
another happy home, you see. And I'm very sure it will be very
happy always. Whatever I can do to make it so, now or ever, you
have only to say. But--your mother took your photograph with her
and got it out of the bag and put it on the bureau as soon as she
went to her room--a photograph taken when you were a little girl.
Hodson[18] came up to see me to-day and with tears of gratitude in
his voice told me of the present that you and Chud had made him. He
is very genuinely pleased. As for the rest, life goes on as usual.
I laugh as I think of all your new aunts and cousins looking you
over and wondering if you'll fit, and then saying to one another as
they go to bed: "She is lovely--isn't she?" I could tell 'em a
thing or two if I had a whack at 'em.
And you'll soon have all your pretty things in place in your pretty
home, and a lot more that I haven't seen. I'll see 'em all before
many years--and you, too! Tell me, did Chud get you a dinner book?
Keep your record of things: you'll enjoy it in later years. And
you'll have a nice time this autumn--your new kinsfolk, your new
friends and old and Boston and Cambridge. If you run across Mr.
Muffin, William Roscoe Thayer, James Ford Rhodes, President
Eliot--these are my particular old friends whose names occur at the
moment.
My love to you and Chud too,
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
The task of being "German Ambassador to Great Britain" was evidently not
without its irritations.
_To Arthur W. Page_
September 15, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
Yesterday was my German day. When the boy came up to my room, I
told him I had some official calls to make. "Therefore get out my
oldest and worst suit." He looked much confused; and when I got up
both my worst and best suits were laid out. Evidently he thought he
must have misunderstood me. I asked your mother if she was ready to
go down to breakfast. "Yes."--"Well, then I'll leave you." She
grunted something and when we both got down she asked: "What _did_
you say to me upstairs?" I replied: "I regard the incident as
closed." She looked a sort of pitying look at me and a minute or
two later asked: "What on earth is the matter with you? Can't you
hear at all?" I replied: "No. Therefore let's talk." She gave it
up, but looked at me again to make sure I was all there.
I stopped at the barber shop, badly needing a shave. The barber got
his brush and razor ready. I said: "Cut my hair." He didn't talk
for a few minutes, evidently engaged in deep thought.
When I got to my office, a case was brought to me of a runaway
American who was caught trying to send news to Germany. "Very
good," said I, "now let it be made evident that it shall appear
therefore that his innocence having been duly established he shall
be shot."
"What, sir?"
"That since it must be evident that his guilt is genuine therefore
see that he be acquitted and then shot."
Laughlin and Bell and Stabler were seen in an earnest conference in
the next room for nearly half an hour.
Shoecraft brought me a letter. "This is the most courteous
complaint about the French passport bureau we have yet had. I
thought you'd like to see this lady's letter. She says she knows
you."
"Do not answer it, then."
He went off and conferred with the others.
Hodson spoke of the dog he sold to Frank. "Yes," said I, "since he
was a very nice dog, therefore he was worthless."
"Sir?"
And he went off after looking back at me in a queer way.
The day went on in that fashion. When I came out to go to lunch,
the stairs down led upward and I found myself, therefore, stepping
out of the roof on to the sidewalk--the house upside down. Smith
looked puzzled. "Home, Sir?"
"No. Go the other way." After he had driven two or three blocks, I
told him to turn again and go the other way--home!
Your mother said almost as soon as I got into the door--"What was
the matter with you this morning?"
"Oh, nothing. You forget that I am the German Ambassador."
Now this whole narrative is a lie. Nothing in it occurred. If it
were otherwise it wouldn't be German.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Mrs. Charles G. Loring_
London, 6 Grosvenor Square.
Sunday, September 19, 1915.
DEAR KITTY:
You never had a finer autumnal day in the land of the free than
this day has been in this old kingdom--fresh and fair; and so your
mother said to herself and me: "Let's go out to the Laughlins' to
lunch," and we went. There never was a prettier drive. We found out
among other things that you pleased Mrs. Laughlin very much by your
letter. Her garden changes every week or so, and it never was
lovelier than it is now.--Then we came back home and dined alone.
Well, since we can't have you and Chud and Frank, I don't care if
we do dine alone sometimes for some time to come. Your mother's
monstrous good company, and sometimes three is a crowd. And now is
a good time to be alone. London never was so dull or deserted since
I've known it, nor ever so depressed. The military (land)
operations are not cheerful; the hospitals are all full; I see more
wounded soldiers by far than at any previous time; the Zeppelins
came somewhere to this island every night for a week--one of them,
on the night of the big raid, was visible from our square for
fifteen or twenty minutes--in general it is a dull and depressing
time. I have thought that since you were determined to run off with
a young fellow, you chose a pretty good time to go away. I'm afraid
there'll be no more of what we call "fun" in this town as long as
we stay here.
Worse yet: in spite of the Coalition Government and everybody's
wish to get on smoothly and to do nothing but to push the war,
since Parliament convened there's been a great row, which doesn't
get less. The labour men give trouble; people blame the
politicians: Lloyd George is saving the country, say some; Lloyd
George ought to be hanged, say others. Down with Northcliffe! They
seem likely to burn him at the stake--except those who contend that
he has saved the nation. Some maintain that the cabinet is too
big--twenty-two. More say that it has no leadership. If you favour
conscription, you are a traitor: if you don't favour it, you are
pro-German. It's the same sort of old quarrel they had before the
war, only it is about more subjects. In fact, nobody seems very
clearly to know what it's about. Meantime the Government is
spending money at a rate that nobody ever dreamed of before. Three
million pounds a day--some days five million. The Germans,
meantime are taking Russia; the Allies are not taking the
Dardanelles; in France the old deadlock continues. Boston at its
worst must be far more cheerful than this.
Affectionately and with my love to Chud,
W.H.P.
_To the President_
London, September 26, 1915.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
The suppression of facts about the military situation is more
rigorous than ever since the military facts have become so
discouraging. The volume of pretty well authenticated news that I
used to hear privately has become sensibly diminished. Rumours that
reach me by the back door, in all sorts of indirect ways, are not
fewer, but fewer of them are credible. There is great confusion,
great fear, very great depression--far greater, I think, than
England has felt, certainly since the Napoleonic scare and probably
since the threat of the Armada. Nobody, I think, supposes that
England herself will be conquered: confidence in the navy is
supreme. But the fear of a practical defeat of the Allies on the
continent is become general. Russia may have to pay a huge
indemnity, going far to reimburse Germany for the cost of the war;
Belgium may be permanently held unless Germany receive an indemnity
to evacuate, and her seaports may be held anyhow; the Germans may
reach Constantinople before the Allies, and Germany may thus hold,
when the war ends, an open way to the East; and France may have to
pay a large sum to regain her northern territory now held by the
Germans. These are not the convictions of men here, but they have
distinctly become the fears; and many men's mind are beginning to
adjust themselves to the possible end of the war, as a draw, with
these results. Of course such an end would be a real German
victory and--another war as soon as enough men grow up to fight it.
When the more cheerful part of public opinion, especially when any
member of the Government, affects to laugh at these fears, the
people say: "Well, make known the facts that you base your hope on.
Precisely how many men have volunteered? Is the voluntary system a
success or has it reached its limit? Precisely what is the
situation in the Dardanelles? Are the allied armies strong enough
to make a big drive to break through the German line in France?
Have they big guns and ammunition enough? What are the facts about
the chance in the Dardanelles? What have we done with reference to
the Balkan States?" Thus an angry and ominous political situation
is arising. The censorship on war news apparently becomes severer,
and the general fear spreads and deepens. The air, of course,
becomes heavily charged with such rumours as these: that if the
Government continue its policy of secrecy, Lloyd George will
resign, seeing no hope of a real victory: that, if he do resign,
his resignation will disrupt the Government--cause a sort of
earthquake; that the Government will probably fall and Lloyd George
will be asked to form another one, since he is, as the public sees
it, the most active and efficient man in political life; that, if
all the Balkan States fail the Allies, Sir Edward Grey will be
reckoned a failure and must resign; and you even now hear talk of
Mr. Balfour's succeeding him.
It is impossible to say what basis there is for these and other
such rumours, but they show the general very serious depression and
dissatisfaction. Of that there is no doubt. Nor is there any doubt
about grave differences in the Cabinet about conscription nor of
grave fear in the public mind about the action of labour unions in
hindering the utmost production of ammunition, nor of the
increasing feeling that the Prime Minister doesn't lead the nation.
Except Lloyd George and the Chancellor of the Exchequer[19] the
Cabinet seems to suffer a sort of paralysis. Lord Kitchener's
speech in the House of Lords, explaining the military situation,
reads like a series of month-old bulletins and was a great
disappointment. Mr. Asquith's corresponding speech in the House
seemed to lack complete frankness. The nation feels that it is
being kept in the dark, and all the military information that it
gets is discouraging. Sir Edward Grey, as philosophic and enduring
a man as I know, seems much more depressed than I have ever known
him to be; Bryce is very very far from cheerful; Plunkett[20], whom
also you know, is in the dumps--it's hard to find a cheerful or a
hopeful man.
The secrecy of official life has become so great and successful
that prophecy of political changes must be mere guess work. But,
unless good news come from the Dardanelles in particular, I have a
feeling that Asquith may resign--be forced out by the gradual
pressure of public opinion; that Lloyd George will become Prime
Minister, and that (probably) Sir Edward Grey may resign. Yet I
cannot take the prevailing military discouragement at its face
value. The last half million men and the last million pounds will
decide the contest, and the Allies will have these. This very
depression strengthens the nation's resolution to a degree that
they for the moment forget. The blockade and the armies in the
field will wear Germany down--not absolutely conquer her, but wear
her down--probably in another year.
In the meantime our prestige (if that be the right word), in
British judgment, is gone. As they regard it, we have permitted
the Germans to kill our citizens, to carry on a world-wide underhand
propaganda from our country (as well as in it), for which they have
made no apology and no reparation but only vague assurances for the
future now that their submarine fleet has been almost destroyed.
They think that we are credulous to the point of simplicity to
accept any assurances that Bernstorff may give--in a word, that the
peace-at-any-price sentiment so dominates American opinion and the
American Government that we will submit to any indignity or
insult--that we will learn the Germans' real character when it is
too late to save our honour or dignity. There is no doubt of the
definiteness or depth of this opinion.
And I am afraid that this feeling will show itself in our future
dealings with this government. The public opinion of the nation as
well as the Government accepts their blockade as justified as well
as necessary. They will not yield on that point, and they will
regard our protests as really inspired by German influence--thus
far at least: that the German propaganda has organized and
encouraged the commercial objection in the United States, and that
this propaganda and the peace-at-any-price sentiment demand a stiff
controversy with England to offset the stiff controversy with
Germany; and, after all, they ask, what does a stiff controversy
with the United States amount to? I had no idea that English
opinion could so quickly become practically indifferent as to what
the United States thinks or does. And as nearly as I can make it
out, there is not a general wish that we should go to war. The
prevalent feeling is not a selfish wish for military help. In fact
they think that, by the making of munitions, by the taking of
loans, and by the sale of food we can help them more than by
military and naval action. Their feeling is based on their
disappointment at our submitting to what they regard as German
dallying with us and to German insults. They believe that, if we
had sent Bernstorff home when his government made its
unsatisfactory reply to our first _Lusitania_ note, Germany would
at once have "come down"; opportunist Balkan States would have come
to the help of the Allies; Holland and perhaps the Scandinavian
States would have got some consideration at Berlin for their losses
by torpedoes; that more attention would have been paid by Turkey to
our protest against the wholesale massacre of the Armenians; and
that a better settlement with Japan about Pacific islands and
Pacific influence would have been possible for the English at the
end of the war. Since, they argue, nobody is now afraid of the
United States, her moral influence is impaired at every capital;
and I now frequently hear the opinion that, if the war lasts
another year and the Germans get less and less use of the United
States as a base of general propaganda in all neutral countries,
especially all American countries, they are likely themselves to
declare war on us as a mere defiance of the whole world and with
the hope of stirring up internal trouble for our government by the
activity of the Germans and the Irish in the United States, which
may hinder munitions and food and loans to the Allies.
I need not remark that the English judgment of the Germans is
hardly judicial. But they reply to this that every nation has to
learn the real, incredible character of the Prussian by its own
unhappy experience. France had so to learn it, and England, Russia,
and Belgium; and we (the United States), they say, fail to profit
in time by the experience of these. After the Germans have used us
to the utmost in peace, they will force us into war--or even flatly
declare war on us when they think they can thus cause more
embarrassment to the Allies, and when they conclude that the time
is come to make sure that no great nation shall emerge from the war
with a clear commercial advantage over the others; and in the
meantime they will prove to the world by playing with us that a
democracy is necessarily pacific and hence (in their view)
contemptible. I felt warranted the other day to remark to Lord
Bryce on the unfairness of much of the English judgment of us (he
is very sad and a good deal depressed). "Yes," he said, "I have
despaired of one people's ever really understanding another even
when the two are as closely related and as friendly as the
Americans and the English."
You were kind enough to inquire about my health in your last note.
If I could live up to the popular conception here of my labours and
responsibilities and delicate duties (which is most flattering and
greatly exaggerated), I should be only a walking shadow of a man.
But I am most inappreciately well. I imagine that in some year to
come, I may enjoy a vacation, but I could not enjoy it now. Besides
since civilization has gone backward several centuries, I suppose
I've gone back with it to a time when men knew no such thing as a
vacation. (Let's forgive House for his kindly, mistaken
solicitude.) The truth is, I often feel that I do not know
myself--body or soul, boots or breeches. This experience is making
us all here different from the men we were--but in just what
respects it is hard to tell. We are not within hearing of the guns
(except the guns that shoot at Zeppelins when they come); but the
war crowds itself in on us sensibly more and more. There are more
wounded soldiers on the streets and in the parks. More and more
families one knows lose their sons, more and more women their
husbands. Death is so common that it seems a little thing. Four
persons have come to my house to-day (Sunday) in the hope that I
may find their missing kinsmen, and two more have appealed to me on
the telephone and two more still have sent me notes. Since I began
this letter, Mrs. Page insisted on my going out on the edge of the
city to see an old friend of many years who has just lost both his
sons and whose prospective son-in-law is at home wounded. The first
thing he said was: "Tell me, what is America going to do?" As we
drove back, we made a call on a household whose nephew is
"missing."--"Can't you possibly help us hear definitely about him?"
This sort of thing all day every day must have some effect on any
man. Then--yesterday morning gave promise of a calm, clear day. I
never know what sensational experience awaits me around the next
corner. Then there was put on my desk the first page of a reputable
weekly paper which was filled with an open letter to me written by
the editor and signed. After the usual description of my
multitudinous and delicate duties, I was called on to insist that
my government should protest against Zeppelin raids on London
because a bomb might kill me! Humour doesn't bubble much now on
this side the world, for the censor had forbidden the publication
of this open letter lest it should possibly cause American-German
trouble! Then the American correspondents came in to verify a
report that a news agency is said to have had that I was deluged
with threatening letters!--More widows, more mothers looking for
lost sons!... Once in a while--far less often than if I lived in a
sane and normal world--I get a few hours off and go to a lonely
golf club. Alas! there is seldom anybody there but now and then a
pair of girls and now and then a pair of old fellows who have
played golf for a century. Yet back in London in the War Office I
hear they indulge in disrespectful hilarity at the poor game I
play. Now how do they know? (You'd better look to your score with
Grayson: the English have spies in America. A major-general in
their spy-service department told Mrs. Page that they knew all
about Archibaldi[21] before he got on the ship in New York.)
All this I send you not because it is of the slightest permanent
importance (except the English judgment of us) but because it will
prove, if you need proof, that the world is gone mad. Everything
depends on fighting power and on nothing else. A victory will save
the Government. Even distinctly hopeful military news will. And
English depression will vanish with a turn of the military tide. If
it had been Bernstorff instead of Dumba--_that_ would have affected
even the English judgment of us. Tyrrell[22] remarked to me--did I
write you? "Think of the freaks of sheer, blind Luck; a man of
considerable ability like Dumba caught for taking a risk that an
idiot would have avoided, and a fool like Bernstorff escaping!"
Then he added: "I hope Bernstorff will be left. No other human
being could serve the English as well as he is serving them." So,
you see, even in his depression the Englishman has some humour
left--e.g., when that old sea dog Lord Fisher heard that Mr.
Balfour was to become First Lord of the Admiralty, he cried out:
"Damn it! he won't do: Arthur Balfour is too much of a gentleman."
So John Bull is now, after all, rather pathetic--depressed as he
has not been depressed for at least a hundred years. The nobility
and the common man are doing their whole duty, dying on the
Bosphorus or in France without a murmur, or facing an insurrection
in India; but the labour union man and the commercial class are
holding hack and hindering a victory. And there is no great
national leader.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 16: Count Beckendorff.]
[Footnote 17: Afterward private secretary to Premier Lloyd George.]
[Footnote 18: A messenger in the American Embassy.]
[Footnote 19: The Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna.]
[Footnote 20: Sir Horace Plunkett.]
[Footnote 21: It was Archibald's intercepted baggage that furnished the
documents which caused Dumba's dismissal.]
[Footnote 22: Sir William Tyrrell, private secretary to Sir Edward
Grey.]
CHAPTER XVII
CHRISTMAS IN ENGLAND, 1915
To Edward M. House
London, December 7, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
I hear you are stroking down the Tammany tiger--an easier job than
I have with the British lion. You can find out exactly who your
tiger is, you know the house he lives in, the liquor he drinks, the
company he goes with. The British lion isn't so easy to find. At
times in English history he has dwelt in Downing Street--not so
now. So far as our struggle with him is concerned, he's all over
the Kingdom; for he is public opinion. The governing crowd in usual
times and on usual subjects can here overrun public opinion--can
make it, turn it, down it, dodge it. But it isn't so now--as it
affects us. Every mother's son of 'em has made up his mind that
Germany must and shall be starved out, and even Sir Edward's scalp
isn't safe when they suspect that he wishes to be lenient in that
matter. They keep trying to drive him out, on two counts: (1) he
lets goods out of Germany for the United States "and thereby
handicaps the fleet"; and (2) he failed in the Balkans. Sir Edward
is too much of a gentleman for this business of rough-riding over
all neutral rights and for bribing those Balkan bandits.
I went to see him to-day about the _Hocking_, etc. He asked me: "Do
_you know_ that the ships of this line are really owned, in good
faith, by Americans?"
"I'll answer your question," said I, "if I may then ask you one.
No, I don't know of my own knowledge. Now, _do you know_ that they
are _not_ owned by Americans?"
He had to confess that he, of his own knowledge, didn't know.
"Then," I said, "for the relief of us both, I pray you hurry up
your prize court."
When we'd got done quarrelling about ships and I started to go, he
asked me how I liked Wordsworth's war poems. "The best of all war
poems," said he, "because they don't glorify war but have to do
with its philosophy." Then he told me that some friend of his had
just got out a little volume of these war poems selected from
Wordsworth; "and I'm going to send you a copy."
"Just in time," said I, "for I have a copy of 'The Life and Letters
of John Hay'[23] that I'm sending to you."
He's coming to dine with me in a night or two: he'll do anything
but discuss our Note with me. And he's the only member of the
Government who, I think, would like to meet our views; and he
can't. To use the language of Lowell about the campaign of Governor
Kent--these British are hell-bent on starving the Germans out, and
neutrals have mighty few rights till that job's done.
The worst of it is that the job won't be done for a very long time.
I've been making a sort of systematic round of the Cabinet to see
what these fellows think about things in general at this stage of
the game. Bonar Law (the Colonies) tells me that the news from the
Balkans is worse than the public or the newspapers know, and that
still worse news will come. Germany will have it all her own way in
that quarter.
"And take Egypt and the canal?"
"I didn't say _that_," he replied. But he showed that he fears even
that.
[Illustration: Herbert C. Hoover, in 1914]
[Illustration: A facsimile page from the Ambassador's letter of
November 24. 1916, resigning his Ambassadorship]
I could go on with a dozen of 'em; but I sat down to write you a
Christmas letter, and nothing else. The best news I have for you is
not news at all, but I conceive it to be one of the best hopes of
the future. In spite of Irishmen past, present, and to come; in
spite of Germans, whose fuss will soon be over; in spite of
lawyers, who (if left alone) would bankrupt empires as their
clients and think they'd won a victory; I'm going to leave things
here in a year and a half so that, if wise men wish to lay a plan
for keeping the peace of the world, all they need to do will be to
say first to Uncle Sam: "This fellow or that must understand that
he can't break loose like a wild beast." If Uncle Sam agrees (and
has a real navy himself), he'll wink at John Bull, and John will
follow after. You see our blackleg tail-twisters have the whole
thing backward. They say we truckle to the British. My plan is to
lead the British--not for us to go to them but to have them come to
us. We have three white men to every two white men in their whole
Empire; and, when peace comes, we'll be fairly started on the road
to become as rich as the war will leave them. There are four clubs
in London which have no other purpose than this; and the best
review[24] in the world exists chiefly for this purpose. All we
need to do is to be courteous (we can do what we like if we do it
courteously). Our manners, our politicians, and our newspapers are
all that keep the English-speaking white man, under our lead, from
ruling the world, without any treaty or entangling alliance
whatsoever. If, when you went to Berlin to talk to your gentle and
timid friend, the Emperor, about disarmament before the war--if
about 200 American dreadnaughts and cruisers, with real grog on
'em, had come over to make a friendly call, in the North Sea, on
the 300 English dreadnaughts and cruisers--just a friendly call,
admirals on admirals--the "Star-Spangled Banner" and "God Save the
King"--and if General Bell, from the Philippines, had happened in
London just when Kitchener happened to be home from Egypt--_then,
there wouldn't have been this war now_. Nothing need have been
said--no treaty, no alliance, nothing. For then 100 or more British
naval ships would have joined the Panama naval procession and any
possible enemy would have seen that combined fleet clean across the
Pacific.
Now this may all be a mere Christmas fancy--a mere yarn about what
might have been--because we wouldn't have sent ships here in our
old mood; the crew would have missed one Sunday School. But it's
_this kind_ of thing that does the trick. But this means the
practice of courtesy, and we haven't acquired the habit. Two years
or more ago the training ships from Annapolis with the cadets
aboard anchored down the Thames and stayed several weeks and let
the boys loose in England. They go on such a voyage every two years
to some country, you know. The English didn't know that fact and
they took the visit as a special compliment. Their old admirals
were all greatly pleased, and I hear talk about that yet. We ought
to have two or three of our rear-admirals here on their fleet now.
Symington, of course, is a good fellow; but he's a mere commander
and attaché--not an admiral--in other words, not any particular
compliment or courtesy to the British Navy. (As soon as the war
began, a Japanese admiral turned up here and he is here now.) We
sent over two army captains as military observers. The Russians
sent a brigadier-general. We ought to have sent General Wood. You
see the difference? There was no courtesy in our method. It would
be the easiest and prettiest job in the world to swallow the whole
British organization, lock, stock, and barrel--King, Primate,
Cabinet, Lords, and Commons, feathers and all, and to make 'em
follow our _courteous_ lead anywhere. The President had them in
this mood when the war started and for a long time after--till the
_Lusitania_ seemed to be forgotten and till the lawyers began to
write his Notes. He can get 'em back, after the war ends, by
several acts of courtesy--if we could get into the habit of doing
such things as sending generals and admirals as compliments to
them. The British Empire is ruled by a wily use of courtesies and
decorations. If I had the President himself to do the
correspondence, if I had three or four fine generals and admirals
and a good bishop or two, a thoroughbred senator or two and now and
then a Supreme Court Justice to come on proper errands and be
engineered here in the right way--we could do or say anything we
liked and they'd do whatever we'd say. I'd undertake to underwrite
the whole English-speaking world to keep peace, under our
leadership. Instead whereof, every move we now make is to _follow_
them or to _drive_ them. The latter is impossible, and the former
is unbecoming to us.
But to return to Christmas.--I could go on writing for a week in
this off-hand, slap-dash way, saying wise things flippantly. But
Christmas--that's the thing now. Christmas! What bloody irony it is
on this side the world! Still there will be many pleasant and
touching things done. An Englishman came in to see me the other day
and asked if I'd send $1,000 to Gerard[25] to use in making the
English prisoners in Germany as happy as possible on Christmas
Day--only I must never tell anybody who did it. A lady came on the
same errand--for the British prisoners in Turkey, and with a less
but still a generous sum. The heroism, the generosity, the
endurance and self-restraint and courtesy of these people would
melt a pyramid to tears. Of course there are yellow dogs among 'em,
here and there; but the genuine, thoroughbred English man or woman
is the real thing--one of the realest things in this world. So
polite are they that not a single English person has yet mentioned
our Note to me--not one.
But every one I've met for two days has mentioned the sending of
Von Papen and Boy-Ed[26] home--not that they expect us to get into
the war, but because they regard this action as maintaining our
self-respect.
Nor do they neglect other things because of the war. I went to the
annual dinner of the Scottish Corporation the other night-an
organization which for 251 years has looked after Scotchmen
stranded in London; and they collected $20,000 then and there.
There's a good deal of Christmas in 'em yet. One fellow in a little
patriotic speech said that the Government is spending twenty-five
million dollars a day to whip the Germans.--"Cheap work, very cheap
work. We can spend twice that if necessary. Why, gentlemen, we
haven't exhausted our pocket-change yet."
Somehow I keep getting away from Christmas. It doesn't stay put.
It'll be a memorable one here for its sorrows and for its grim
determination--an empty chair at every English table. But nowhere
in the world will it be different except in the small neutral
states here and in the lands on your side the world.
How many Christmases the war may last, nobody's wise enough to
know. That depends absolutely on Germany. The Allies announced
their terms ten months ago, and nothing has yet happened to make
them change them. That would leave the Germans with Germany and a
secure peace--no obliteration or any other wild nonsense, but only
a secure peace. Let 'em go back home, pay for the damage they've
done, and then stay there. I do hope that the actual fighting will
be ended by Christmas of next year. Of course it _may_ end with
dramatic suddenness at any time, this being the only way, perhaps,
for the Kaiser to save his throne. Or it may go on for two or three
years. My guess is that it'll end next year--a guess subject to
revision, of course, by events that can't be foreseen.
But as I said before--to come back to Christmas. Mrs. Page and I
send you and Mrs. House our affectionate good wishes and the hope
that you keep very well and very happy in your happy, prosperous
hemisphere. We do, I thank you. We haven't been better for
years--never before so busy, never, I think, so free from care. We
get plenty to eat (such as it is in this tasteless wet zone), at a
high cost, of course; we have comfortable beds and shoes (we spend
all our time in these two things, you know); we have good company,
enough to do (!!), no grievances nor ailments, no ill-will, no
disappointments, a keen interest in some big things--all the chips
are blue, you know; we don't feel ready for halos, nor for other
uncomfortable honours; we deserve less than we get and are content
with what the gods send. This, I take it, is all that Martin[27]
would call a comfortable mood for Christmas; and we are old enough
and tough enough to have thick armour against trouble. When Worry
knocks at the door, the butler tells him we're not at home.
And I see the most interesting work in the world cut out for me
for the next twenty-five or thirty years--to get such courtesy into
our dealings with these our kinsmen here, public and private--as
will cause them to follow us in all the developments of democracy
and-in keeping the peace of the world secure. I can't impress it on
you strongly enough that the English-speaking folk have got to set
the pace and keep this world in order. Nobody else is equal to the
job. In all our dealings with the British, public and private, we
allow it to be assumed that _they_ lead: they don't. _We_ lead.
They'll follow, if we do really lead and are courteous to them. If
we hold back, the Irishman rears up and says we are surrendering to
the English! Suppose we go ahead and the English surrender to us,
what can your Irishmen do then? Or your German? The British Navy is
a pretty good sort of dog to have to trot under your wagon. If we
are willing to have ten years of thoughtful good manners, I tell
you Jellicoe will eat out of your hand.
Therefore, cheer up! It's not at all improbable that Ford[28] and
his cargo of cranks, if they get across the ocean, may strike a
German mine in the North Sea. Then they'll die happy, as martyrs;
and the rest of us will live happy, and it'll be a Merry Christmas
for everybody.
Our love to Mrs. House.
Always heartily yours,
W.H.P.
_To Frank N. Doubleday and Others_
London, Christmas, 1915.
DEAR D.P. & Co.
... Now, since we're talking about the war, let me deliver my
opinion and leave the subject. They're killing one another all
right; you needn't have any doubt about that--so many thousand
every day, whether there's any battle or not. When there's "nothing
to report" from France, that means the regular 5,000 casualties
that happen every day. There isn't any way of getting rid of men
that has been forgotten or neglected. Women and children, too, of
course, starve in Serbia and Poland and are massacred in Turkey.
England, though she has by very much the largest army she ever had,
has the smallest of all the big armies and yet I don't know a
family that had men of fighting age which hasn't lost one or more
members. And the worst is to come. But you never hear a complaint.
Poor Mr. Dent[29], for instance (two sons dead), says: "It's all
right. England must be saved."
And this Kingdom alone, as you know, is spending twenty-five
million dollars a day. The big loan placed in the United States[30]
would last but twenty days! if this pace of slaughter and of
spending go on long enough, there won't be any men or any money
left on this side the world. Yet there will be both left, of
course; for somehow things never quite go to the ultimate smash
that seems to come. Read the history of the French Revolution. How
did the French nation survive?
It will go on, unless some unexpected dramatic military event end
it, for something like another year at least--many say for two
years more, and some, three years more. It'll stop, of course,
whenever Germany will propose terms that the Allies can
consider--or something near such terms; and it won't stop before.
By blockade pressure and by fighting, the Allies are gradually
wearing the Germans out. We can see here the gradual pressure of
events in that direction. My guess is that they won't go into a
third winter.
Well, dear gentlemen, however you may feel about it, that's enough
for me. My day--every day--is divided into these parts: (1) two to
three hours listening to Americans or their agents here whose
cargoes are stopped, to sorrowing American parents whose boys have
run away and gone into the English Army, to nurses and doctors and
shell makers who wish to go to France, to bereaved English men and
women whose sons are "missing": can I have them found in Germany?
(2) to answering letters about these same cheerful subjects; (3) to
going over cases and documents prepared about all these sorts of
troubles and forty other sorts, by the eight or ten secretaries of
the Embassy, and a conference with every one of them; (4) the
reading of two books of telegrams, one incoming, the other
outgoing, and the preparation of a lot of answers; (5) going to the
Foreign Office, not every day but often, to discuss more troubles
there; (6) home to dinner at 8 o'clock--at home or somewhere else,
and there is more talk about the war or about the political
troubles. That for a regular daily routine for pretty nearly a year
and a half! As I say, if anybody is keeping the war up for my
entertainment, he now has my permission to stop. No time to read,
no time to write, little time to think, little or no time to see
the people you most wish to see, I often don't know the day of the
week or of the month: it's a sort of life in the trenches, without
the immediate physical danger. Then I have my cabinet meetings, my
financial reports (money we spend for four governments: I had till
recently about a million dollars subject to my check); then the
commission for the relief of Belgium; then the Ambassadors and
Ministers of the other neutral states--our task is worse than war!
Well, praise God for sleep. I get from seven to nine hours a night,
unbroken; and I don't take Armageddon to bed with me.
I don't mind telling _you_ (nobody else) that the more I see just
how great statesmen work and manage great governments--the more I
see of them at close range--whether in Washington or London or
Berlin or Vienna or Constantinople (for these are _my_ Capitals),
the more I admire the methods of the Long Island farmers. Boys, I
swear I could take our crowd and do a better job than many of these
great men do. I have to spend a lot of time to correct their moves
before the other fellow finds out the mistake. For instance I know
I spent $2,000 in telegrams before I could make the German
Government understand the British military age, and the British
Government understand the German military age, for exchanging
prisoners who had lost two legs or arms or both eyes; and I've had
to send a man to Berlin to get a financial report from one man on
one floor of a building there and to take it to another man on the
floor above. Just yesterday I was reminded that I had made eighteen
requests for the same information of the British Government, when
the nineteenth request for it came from Washington; and I have now
telegraphed that same thing nineteen times since the war began. Of
course everybody's worked to death. But something else ails a lot
of 'em all the way from Constantinople to London. Leaving out
common gutter lying (and there's much of it) the sheer stupidity of
governments is amazing. They are all so human, so mighty human! I
wouldn't be a government for any earthly consideration. I'd rather
be a brindled dog and trot under the wagon.
But it has been an inexpressibly interesting experience to find all
this out for myself. There's a sort of weary satisfaction in
feeling that you've seen too much of them to be fooled by 'em any
more. And, although most men now engaged in this game of government
are mere common mortals with most of the common mortal weaknesses,
now and then a really big man does stumble into the business. I
have my doubts whether a really big man ever deliberately goes into
it. And most of the men who the crowd for the moment thinks are big
men don't really turn out so. It's a game like bull fighting. The
bull is likely to kill you--pretty sure to do so if you keep at the
business long enough; but in the meantime you have some exciting
experiences and the applause of the audience. When you get killed,
they forget you--immediately. There are two rather big men in this
Government, and you wouldn't guess in three rounds who they are.
But in general the war hasn't so far developed very big men in any
country. Else we are yet too close to them to recognize their
greatness. Joffre seems to have great stuff in him; and (I assure
you) you needn't ever laugh at a Frenchman again. They are a great
people. As for the British, there was never such a race. It's
odd--I hear that it happens just now to be the fashion in the
United States to say that the British are not doing their share.
There never was a greater slander. They absolutely hold the Seven
Seas. They have caught about seventy submarines and some of them
are now destroying German ships in the Baltic Sea. They've sent to
France by several times the largest army that any people ever sent
over the sea. They are financing most of their allies and they have
turned this whole island into gun and shell factories. They made a
great mistake at the Dardanelles and they are slower than death to
change their set methods. But no family in the land, from charcoal
burners to dukes, hesitates one moment to send its sons into the
army. When the news comes of their death, they never whimper. When
you come right down to hard facts, the courage and the endurance of
the British and the French excel anything ever before seen on this
planet. All the old stories of bravery from Homer down are outdone
every day by these people. I see these British at close range,
full-dress and undress; and I've got to know a lot of 'em as well
as we can ever come to know anybody after we get grown. There is
simply no end to the silly sides of their character. But, when the
real trial comes, they don't flinch; and (except the thoroughbred
American) there are no such men in the world.
A seven-foot Kansas lawyer (Kansas all over him) came to see me
yesterday. He came here a month ago on some legal business. He told
me yesterday that he had always despised Englishmen. He's seen a
few with stud-horse clothes and white spats and monocles on who had
gone through Kansas to shoot in the Rocky Mountains. He couldn't
understand 'em and he didn't like 'em. "So infernally uppish," said
he.
"Well, what do you think of 'em now?"
"The very best people in the world," said he. I think he has a
notion of enlisting!
You're still publishing books, I hear. That's a good occupation.
I'd like to be doing it myself. But I can't even get time to read
'em now.
But, as you know, nobody's writing anything but war books--from
Kipling to Hall Caine. Poor Kipling!--his boy's dead. I have no
doubt of it. I've had all the German hospitals and prison camps
searched for him in vain. These writing men and women, by the way,
are as true blue and as thoroughbred as any other class. I can
never forget Maurice Hewlett's brave behaviour when he thought that
his flying corps son had been killed by the Germans or drowned at
sea. He's no prig, but a real man. And the women are as fine as the
men....
To go back to books: Of course nobody can tell what effect the war
will have on the writing of them, nor what sort of new writers may
come up. You may be sure that everything is stirred to its
profoundest depths and will be stirred still more. Some old stagers
will be laid on the shelf; that's certain. What sort of new ones
will come? I asked H.G. Wells this question. He has promised to
think it out and tell me. He has the power to guess some things
very well. I'll put that question to Conrad when I next see him.
Does anybody in the United States take the Prime Minister, Mr.
Asquith, to be a great man? His wife is a brilliant woman; and she
has kept a diary ever since he became Prime Minister; and he now
has passed the longest single term in English history. Mr. Dent
thinks he's the biggest man alive, and Dent has some mighty good
instincts.
Talk about troubles! Think of poor Northcliffe. He thinks he's
saved the nation from its miserable government, and the government
now openly abuses him in the House of Commons. Northcliffe puts on
his brass knuckles and turns the _Times_ building upside down and
sets all the _Daily Mail_ machine guns going, and has to go to bed
to rest his nerves, while the row spreads and deepens. The
Government keeps hell in the prayer-book because without it they
wouldn't know what to do with Northcliffe; and Northcliffe is just
as sure that he has saved England as he is sure the Duke of
Wellington did.
To come back to the war. (We always do.) Since I wrote the first
part of this letter, I spent an evening with a member of the
Cabinet and he told me so much bad military news, which they
prevent the papers from publishing or even hearing, that to-night I
almost share this man's opinion that the war will last till 1918.
That isn't impossible. If that happens the offer that I heard a
noble old buck make to a group of ladies the other night may be
accepted. This old codger is about seventy-five, ruddy and saucy
yet. "My dear ladies," said he, "if the war goes on and on we shall
have no young men left. A double duty will fall on the old fellows.
I shall be ready, when the need comes, to take four extra wives,
and I daresay there are others of my generation who are as
patriotic as I am."
All of which is only my long-winded, round-about diplomatic way of
wishing you every one and every one of yours and all the folk in
the office, their assigns, superiors, dependents, companions in
labour--all, everyone and sundry, the happiest of Christmases; and
when you take stock of your manifold blessings, don't forget to be
thankful for the Atlantic Ocean. That's the best asset of safety
that we have.
Affectionately yours,
W.H.P.
_To Mrs. Charles G. Loring_
6 Grosvenor Square,
London, December 7, 1915.
DEAR KITTY:
This is my Christmas letter to you and Chud--a poor thing, but the
best I have to give you. At least it carries my love, dear, and my
wishes that every Christmas under your own roof will be happier
than the preceding one. Since your starting point is on the high
level of your first Christmas in your own home--that's a good wish:
isn't it?
I'm beginning to think a good deal of your mother and me. Here we
are left alone by every one of you--in a foreign land; and,
contrary to all predictions that any of you would have made about
us four or five years ago, we're faring pretty well, thank you, and
not on the edge of dying of loneliness at all. I tell you, I think
we're pretty brave and hardy.
We're even capable of becoming cocky and saucy to every one of you.
Be careful, then.
You see if you have a war to live with you don't necessarily need
children: you'll have strife enough without 'em. We'll console
ourselves with such reflections as these.
And the truth is--at least about me--that there isn't time to think
of what you haven't got. Of course, I'm working, as always, to
soften the relations between these two governments. So far, in
spite of the pretty deep latent feeling on both sides--far worse
than it ought to be and far worse than I wish it were--I'm working
all the time to keep things as smooth as possible. Happily, nobody
can prove it, but I believe it, that there is now and there has
been all along more danger of a serious misunderstanding than
anybody has known. The Germans have, of course, worked in 1000 ways
to cause misunderstanding between England and the United States.
Then, of course, there has been constant danger in the English
bull-headed insularity which sees nothing but the Englishman's
immediate need, and in the English slowness. Add to these causes
the American ignorance of war and of European conditions. It has
been a God's mercy for us that we have so far had a man like Sir
Edward Grey in his post. And in my post, while there might well
have been a better man, this much at least has been lucky--that I
do have a consciousness of English history and of our common
origin and some sense of the inevitable destiny of the great
English-speaking race--so that, when we have come to sharp corners
in the road, I have known that whatever happen we must travel in
the right general direction--have known that no temporary
difference must be allowed to assume a permanent quality. I have
thought several times that we had passed the worst possible place,
and then a still worse one would appear. It does look now as if we
had faced most of the worst difficulties that can come, but I am
not sure what Congress may do or provoke. If we outlast Congress,
we shall be safe. Now to come through this enormous war even with
no worse feeling than already exists between the two
countries--that'll be a big thing to have done. But it's work like
the work of the English fleet. Nobody can prove that Jellicoe has
been a great admiral. Yet the fleet has done the whole job more
successfully than if it had had sea-fights and lost a part of their
ships.
Our Note has left a great deal of bad feeling--suppressed, but
existent. A part of it was inevitable and (I'd say) even necessary.
But we put in a lot of things that seem to me to be merely
disputatious, and we didn't write it in the best form. It
corresponds to what you once called _suburban_: do you remember?
Not thoroughbred. But we'll get over even that, especially if the
Administration and the courts continue to bring the Germans to book
who are insulting our dignity and destroying our property and
killing Americans. If we can satisfactorily settle the _Lusitania_
trouble, the whole outlook will be very good.
Your mother and I are hearing much interesting political talk. We
dined last night with Mr. Bonar Law. Sir Edward Carson was there.
To-day we lunched with Lady P.--the other side, you see. There are
fundamental differences continually arising. They thought a few
weeks ago that they had the Prime Minister's scalp. He proved too
nimble for them. Now one person after another says to you:
"Kitchener doesn't deserve the reverence the people give him." More
and more folks say he's hard to work with--is domineering and
selfish. Nobody seems really to know him; and there are some signs
that there may be a row about him.
We've heard nothing from Harold in quite a little while. We have,
you know, three of our footmen in the war. Allen was wounded at
Loos--a flesh, bullet-wound. He's about well now and is soon going
back. Leslie is in the trenches and a postal card came from him the
other day. The third one, Philip, is a prisoner in Germany. Your
mother sent him a lot of things, but we've never heard whether he
received them or not. The general strain--military, political,
financial--gets greater. The streets are darker than ever. The
number of wounded increases rapidly. More houses are turned into
hospitals. The Manchesters', next door, is a hospital now. And
everybody fears worse days are to come. But they have no nerves,
these English. They grit their teeth, but they go on bravely,
enduring everything. We run into experiences every day that melt
you, and the heroic things we hear outnumber and outdo all the
stories in all the books.
I keep forgetting Xmas, Kitty, and this is my Xmas letter. You
needn't put it in your stocking, but you'd really better burn it
up. It would be the ruination of the world if my frank comments got
loose. It's for you and Chud only. You may fill your stocking full
of the best wishes you ever received--enough to fill the polar bear
skin. And I send you both my love.
W.H.P.
_To Ralph W., Arthur 147., and Frank C. Page_[31]
London, Christmas, 1915.
DEAR Boys: R.W.P., A.W.P., F.C.P.
A Merry Christmas to you! Good cheer, good company, good food, good
fires, good golf. I suppose (though the Lord only knows) that I'll
have to be here another Christmas; but another after that? Not on
your life!
I think I'm as cheerful and hopeful as I ever was, but this
experience here and the war have caused my general confidence in
the orderly progress of civilization somewhat to readjust itself. I
think that any man who looks over the world and who knows something
of the history of human society--I mean any American who really
believes in democracy and in human progress--is somewhat saddened
to see the exceeding slowness of that progress. In the early days
of our Republic hopeful Americans held the opinion that the other
countries of the world would follow our example; that is to say,
would educate the people, would give the masses a chance to become
real men, would make their governments and institutions serve the
people, would dispense with kings and gross privileges and become
free. Well, they haven't done it. France is nominally a republic,
but the masses of its people are far, far backward. Switzerland
_is_ a republic, but a very small one. Denmark is a very free
state, in spite of its monarchical form of government. In South
America they think they have republics, but they haven't the
slightest idea of the real education and freedom of the people.
Practically, therefore, the United States and the self-governing
British colonies are the only really free countries of much
importance in the whole world--these and this Kingdom. Our example
hasn't been followed. In Europe, Germany and Russia in particular
have monarchs who are in absolute command. Thus on both sides the
world, so far as government and the danger of war are concerned,
there hasn't been very much real progress in five hundred years.
This is a little disappointing. And it means, of course, that we
are likely to have periodical earthquakes like this present one
till some radical change come. Republics have their faults, no
doubt. But they have at least this virtue: that no country where
the people really have the control of their government is likely to
start out deliberately on any war of conquest--is not likely to run
amuck--and will not regard its population as mere food for shell
and powder.
Nor do I believe that our example of our government has, relatively
to our strength and wealth and population, as much influence in the
world as we had one hundred years ago. Our people have no foreign
consciousness and I know that our government knows almost nothing
about European affairs; nor do our people know. As regards foreign
affairs our government lacks proper machinery. Take this as an
illustration: The President wrote vigorous and proper notes about
the _Lusitania_ and took a firm stand with Germany. Germany has
paid no attention to the _Lusitania_ outrage. Yet (as I understand
it) the people will not run the risk of war--or the Administration
thinks they will not--and hence the President can do nothing to
make his threat good. Therefore we stand in a ridiculous situation;
and nobody cares how many notes we write. I don't know that the
President could have done differently--unless, before he sent the
_Lusitania_ notes, he had called Congress together and submitted
his notes to Congress. But, as the matter stands, the Germans are
merely encouraged to blow up factories and practically to carry on
war in the United States, because they know we can (or will) do
nothing. Mere notes break nobody's skin.
We don't seem to have any machinery to bring any influence to bear
on foreign governments or on foreign opinion; and, this being so,
it is little wonder that the rest of the world does not follow our
republican example.
And this sort of impotence in influence has curious effects at
home. For example, the ship-purchase bill, as it was at the last
session of Congress, was an economic crime. See what has happened:
We have waked up to the fact that we must have a big navy. Well, a
navy is of no far-fighting value unless we have auxiliary ships and
a lot of 'em. Admiral Jellicoe has 3,000 ships under his command;
and he couldn't keep his fleet on the job if he didn't have them.
Most of them are commandeered merchant, passenger, and fishing
ships. Now we haven't merchant, passenger, and fishing ships to
commandeer. We've got to build and buy auxiliary ships to our navy.
This, to my mind, makes the new ship-purchase bill, or something
like it, necessary. Else our navy, when it comes to the scratch,
will be of no fighting value, however big it be. It's the price
we've got to pay for not having built up a merchant marine. And we
haven't built up a merchant marine because we've had no foreign
consciousness. While our Irishmen have been leading us to twist the
Lion's tail, we've been depending almost wholly on English
ships--and, in late years, on German ships. You can't cross the
ocean yet in a decent American ship. You see, we've declared our
independence; and, so far as individual development goes, we've
worked it out. But the governmental machinery for maintaining it
and for making it visible to the world--we've simply neglected to
build it or to shape it. Hence the President's notes hurt nobody
and accomplish nothing; nor could our navy put up a real fight, for
lack of colliers and supply ships. It's the same way all around the
horizon. And these are the reasons we haven't made our democracy
impress the world more.
A democracy is not a quick-trigger war-engine and can't be made
into one. When the quick-trigger engines get to work, they forget
that a democracy does not consider fighting the first duty of man.
You can bend your energies to peaceful pursuits or you can bend
them to war. It's hard to do both at the same time. The Germans are
the only people who have done both at the same time; and even they
didn't get their navy big enough for their needs.
When the infernal thing's over--that'll be a glad day; and the
European world won't really know what it has cost in men and money
and loss of standards till it is over....
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Walter H. Page, Jr._[32].
London, Christmas, 1915.
SIR:
For your first Christmas, I have the honour to send you my most
affectionate greetings; and in wishing you all good health, I take
the liberty humbly to indicate some of the favours of fortune that
I am pleased to think I enjoy in common with you.
_First_--I hear with pleasure that you are quite well content with
yourself--not because of a reasoned conviction of your own worth,
which would be mere vanity and unworthy of you, but by reason of a
philosophical disposition. It is too early for you to bother over
problems of self-improvement--as for me it is too late; wherefore
we are alike in the calm of our self-content. What others may think
or say about us is a subject of the smallest concern to us.
Therefore they generally speak well of us; for there is little
satisfaction in speaking ill of men who care nothing for your
opinion of them. Then, too, we are content to be where we happen to
be--a fact that we did not order in the beginning and need not now
concern ourselves about. Consider the eternal coming and going of
folk. On every road many are travelling one way and an equal number
are travelling the other way. It is obvious that, if they were all
content to remain at the places whence they set forth, the
distribution of the population would be the same. Why therefore
move hither and yon at the cost of much time and labour and money,
since nothing is accomplished thereby? We spare ourselves by being
content to remain where we are. We thereby have the more time for
reflection. Nor can we help observing with a smile that all persons
who have good reasons to see us themselves make the necessary
journey after they discover that we remain fixed.
Again, people about us are continually doing this service and that
for some other people--running errands, mending fences, bearing
messages, building, and tearing down; and they all demand equal
service in return. Thus a large part of mankind keeps itself in
constant motion like bubbles of water racing around a pool at the
foot of a water-fall--or like rabbits hurrying into their warrens
and immediately hurrying out again. Whereas, while these antics
amuse and sadden us, we for the most part remain where we are.
Hence our wants are few; they are generally most courteously
supplied without our asking; or, if we happen to be momentarily
forgotten, we can quickly secure anything in the neighbourhood by a
little judicious squalling. Why, then, should we whirl as bubbles
or scurry as rabbits? Our conquering self-possession gives a
masterful charm to life that the victims of perpetual locomotion
never seem to attain.
You have discovered, and my experience confirms yours, that a
perpetual self-consciousness brings most of the misery of the
world. Men see others who are richer than they; or more famous, or
more fortunate--so they think; and they become envious. You have
not reached the period of such empty vanity, and I have long passed
it. Let us, therefore, make our mutual vows not to be disturbed by
the good luck or the good graces of others, but to continue,
instead, to contemplate the contented cat on the rug and the
unenvious sky that hangs over all alike.
This mood will continue to keep our lives simple. Consider our
diet. Could anything be simpler or better? We are not even tempted
by the poisonous victuals wherewith mankind destroys itself. The
very first sound law of life is to look to the belly; for it is
what goes into a man that ruins him. By avoiding murderous food, we
may hope to become centenarians. And why not? The golden streets
will not be torn up and we need be in no indecent haste to travel
even on them. The satisfactions of this life are just beginning for
us; and we shall be wise to endure this world for as long a period
as possible.
And sleep is good--long sleep and often; and your age and mine
permit us to indulge in it without the sneers of the lark or the
cock or the dawn.
I pray you, sir, therefore, accept my homage as the philosopher
that you are and my assurance of that high esteem indicated by my
faithful imitation of your virtues. I am,
With the most distinguished consideration,
With the sincerest esteem, and
With the most affectionate good wishes,
Sir,
Your proud,
Humble,
Obedient
GRANDDADDY.
To Master Walter Hines Page,
On Christmas, 1915.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 23: By William Roscoe Thayer, published in 1915.]
[Footnote 24: The Ambassador had in mind _The Round Table_.]
[Footnote 25: James W. Gerard, American Ambassador to Germany, and, as
such, in charge of British interests in Germany.]
[Footnote 26: The German military and naval attachés, whose persistent
and outrageous violation of American laws led to their dismissal by
President Wilson.]
[Footnote 27: E.S. Martin, Editor of _Life_.]
[Footnote 28: Mr. Henry Ford at this time was getting together his
famous peace ship, which was to sail to Europe "to get the boys out of
the trenches by Christmas."]
[Footnote 29: J.M. Dent, the London publisher.]
[Footnote 30: $500,000,000.]
[Footnote 31: The Ambassador's Sons.]
[Footnote 32: The Ambassador's infant grandson, son of Arthur W. Page.]
CHAPTER XVIII
A PERPLEXED AMBASSADOR
The beginning of the new year saw no improvement in German-American
relations. Germany and Austria continued to violate the pledge given by
Bernstorff after the sinking of the _Arabic_--if that shifty statement
could be regarded as a "pledge." On November 7, 1915, the Austrians sank
the _Ancona_, in the Mediterranean, drowning American citizens under
conditions of particular atrocity, and submarine attacks on merchant
ships, without the "warning" or attempt to save passengers and crew
which Bernstorff had promised, took place nearly every day. On April 18,
1916, the _Sussex_ was torpedoed in the English Channel, without warning
and with loss of American life. This caused what seemed to be a real
crisis; President Wilson sent what was practically an ultimatum to
Germany, demanding that it "immediately declare and effect an
abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and
freight carrying vessels," declaring that, unless it did so, the United
States would sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire. In
reply, Germany apparently backed down and gave the promise the President
had demanded. However, it coupled this concession with an expression of
its expectation that the United States would compel Great Britain to
observe international law in the blockade. As this latter statement
might be interpreted as a qualification of its surrender, the incident
hardly ended satisfactorily.
_To Arthur W. Page_
Bournemouth
May 22, 1916.
DEAR ARTHUR:
I stick on the back of this sheet a letter that Sydney Brooks wrote
from New York (May 1st) to the _Daily Mail_. He formulates a
question that we have many times asked ourselves and that, in one
way or other, comes into everybody's mind here. Of course the
common fellow in Jonesville who has given most of his time and
energy to earning a living for his wife and children has no foreign
consciousness, whether his Jonesville be in the United States or in
England or in France or in Zanzibar. The real question is, _Do_
these fellows in Jonesville make up the United States? or has there
been such a lack of prompt leadership as to make all the Jonesville
people confused? It's hard for me to judge at this distance just
how far the President has led and just how far he has waited and
been pushed along. Suppose he had stood on the front steps every
morning before breakfast for a month after the _Lusitania_ went
down and had called to the people in the same tone that he used in
his note to Germany--had sounded a bugle call--would we have felt
as we now feel? What would the men in Jonesville have done then?
Would they have got their old guns down from over the doors? Or do
they so want peace and so think that they can have peace always
that they've lost their spine? Have they really been Bryanized,
Fordized, Janeaddamsized, Sundayschooled, and Chautauquaed into
supine creatures to whom the United States and the ideals of the
Fathers mean nothing? Who think a German is as good as an
Englishman? Who have no particular aims or aspirations for our
country and for democracy? When T.R. was in the White House he
surely was an active fellow. He called us to exercise ourselves
every morning. He bawled "Patriotism" loudly. We surely thought we
were awake during those strenuous years. Were we really awake or
did we only look upon him and his antics as a sort of good show?
All that time Bryan was peace-a-footing and prince-of-peacing. Now
did he really have the minds of the people or did T.R.?
If we've really gone to sleep and if the United States stands for
nothing but personal comfort and commercialism to our own people,
what a job you and the patriotic men of your generation have cut
out for you!
My own conviction (which I don't set great store by) is that our
isolation and prosperity have not gone so far in softening us as it
seems. They've gone a good way, no doubt; but I think that even the
Jonesville people yet feel their Americanism. What they need
is--leadership. Their Congressmen are poor, timid, pork-barrel
creatures. Their governors are in training for the Senate. The
Vice-President reads no official literature of the war, "because
then I might have a conviction about it and that wouldn't be
neutral." And so on. If the people had a _real_ leadership, I
believe they'd wake up even in Jonesville.
Well, let's let these things go for the moment. How's the
Ambassador[33]? And the Ambassador's mother and sister? They're
nice folks of whom and from whom I hear far too little. Give 'em my
love. I don't want you to rear a fighting family. But these kids
won't and mustn't grow up peace-cranks--not that anybody objects to
peace, but I do despise and distrust a crank, a crank about
anything. That's the lesson we've got to learn from these troubled
times. First, let cranks alone--the other side of the street is
good enough for them. Then, if they persist, I see nothing to do
but to kill 'em, and that's troublesome and inconvenient.
But, as I was saying, bless the babies. I can't begin to tell you
how very much I long to see them, to make their acquaintance, to
chuckle 'em and punch 'em and see 'em laugh, and to see just what
sort of kids they be.
I've written you how in my opinion there's no country in the world
fit for a modern gentleman and man-of-character to live in except
(1) the United States and (2) this island. And this island is
chiefly valuable for the breed of men--the right stock. They become
more valuable to the world after they go away from home. But the
right blood's here. This island's breed is the best there is. An
Englishman or a Scotchman is the best ancestor in this world, many
as his shortcomings are. Some Englishman asked me one night in
what, I thought, the Englishman appeared at his best. I said, "As
an ancestor to Americans!" And this is the fundamental reason why
we (two peoples) belong close together. Reasons that flow from
these are such as follows: (1) The race is the sea-mastering race
and the navy-managing race and the ocean-carrying race; (2) the
race is the literary race, (3) the exploring and settling and
colonizing race, (4) the race to whom fair play appeals, and (5)
that insists on individual development.
Your mother having read these two days 1,734 pages of memoirs of
the Coke family, one of whose members wrote the great law
commentaries, another carried pro-American votes in Parliament in
our Revolutionary times, refused peerages, defied kings and--begad!
here they are now, living in the same great house and saying and
doing what they darn please--we know this generation of 'em!--well,
your mother having read these two big volumes about the old ones
and told me 175 good stories out of these books, bless her soul!
she's gone to sleep in a big chair on the other side of the table.
Well she may, she walked for two hours this morning over hills and
cliffs and through pine woods and along the beach. I guess I'd
better wake her up and get her to go to bed--as the properer thing
to do at this time o'night, viz. 11. My golf this afternoon was too
bad to confess. But I must say that a 650 and a 730 yard hole
argues the audacity of some fellow and the despair of many more.
Nature made a lot of obstructions there and Man made more. It must
be seven or eight miles around that course! It's almost a three
hour task to follow my slow ball around it. I suggested we play
with howitzers instead of clubs. Good night!
W.H.P.
_To Frank N. Doubleday and Others_
Royal Bath and East Cliff Hotel,
Bournemouth, May 29, 1916.
DEAR D.P. & Co.:
I always have it in mind to write you letters; but there's no
chance in my trenches in London; and, since I have not been out of
London for nearly two years--since the war began--only an
occasional half day and a night--till now--naturally I've concocted
no letter. I've been down here a week--a week of sunshine, praise
God--and people are not after me every ten minutes, or Governments
either; and my most admirable and efficient staff (now grown to one
hundred people) permit few letters and telegrams to reach me. There
never was a little rest more grateful. The quiet sea out my window
shows no sign of crawling submarines; and, in general, it's as
quiet and peaceful here as in Garden City itself.
I'm on the home-stretch now in all my thoughts and plans. Three of
my four years are gone, and the fourth will quickly pass. That's
not only the limit of my leave, but it's quite enough for me. I
shouldn't care to live through another such experience, if the
chance should ever come to me. It has changed my whole life and my
whole outlook on life; and, perhaps, you'd like to hear some
impressions that it has made upon me.
The first impression--perhaps the strongest--is a loss of permanent
interest in Europe, especially all Europe outside of this Kingdom.
I have never had the illusion that Europe had many things that we
needed to learn. The chief lesson that it has had, in my judgment,
is the lesson of the art of living--the comforts and the courtesies
of life, the refinements and the pleasures of conversation and of
courteous conduct. The upper classes have this to teach us; and we
need and can learn much from them. But this seems to me all--or
practically all. What we care most for are individual character,
individual development, and a fair chance for every human being.
Character, of course, the English have--immense character, colossal
character. But even they have not the dimmest conception of what we
mean by a fair chance for every human being--not the slightest. In
one thousand years they _may_ learn it from us. Now on the
continent, the only important Nation that has any character worth
mentioning is the French. Of course the little nations--some of
them--have character, such as Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, etc.
But these are all. The others are simply rotten. In giving a free
chance to every human creature, we've nothing to learn from
anybody. In character, I bow down to the English and Scotch; I
respect the Frenchman highly and admire his good taste. But, for
our needs and from our point of view, the English can teach us only
two great lessons--character and the art of living (if you are
rich).
The idea that we were brought up on, therefore, that Europe is the
home of civilization in general--nonsense! It's a periodical
slaughter-pen, with all the vices that this implies. I'd as lief
live in the Chicago stock-yards. There they kill beeves and pigs.
Here they kill men and (incidentally) women and children. I should
no more think of encouraging or being happy over a child of mine
becoming a European of any Nation than I should be happy over his
fall from Grace in any other way.
Our form of government and our scheme of society--God knows they
need improving--are yet so immeasurably superior, as systems, to
anything on this side the world that no comparison need be made.
My first strong impression, then, is not that Europe is
"effete"--that isn't it. It is mediæval--far back toward the Dark
Ages, much of it yet uncivilized, held back by _inertia_ when not
held back by worse things. The caste system is a constant burden
almost as heavy as war itself and often quite as cruel.
The next impression I have is, that, during the thousand years that
will be required for Europe to attain real (modern) civilization,
wars will come as wars have always come in the past. The different
countries and peoples and governments will not and cannot learn the
lesson of federation and coöperation so long as a large mass of
their people have no voice and no knowledge except of their
particular business. Compare the miles of railway in proportion to
population with the same proportion in the United States--or the
telephones, or the use of the mails, or of bank checks; or make any
other practical measure you like. Every time, you'll come back to
the discouraging fact that the masses in Europe are driven as
cattle. So long as this is true, of course, they'll be driven
periodically into wars. So many countries, so many races, so many
languages all within so small an area as Europe positively invite
deadly differences. If railroads had been invented before each
people had developed its own separate language, Europe could
somehow have been coordinated, linked up, federated, made to look
at life somewhat in the same way. As it is, wars will be bred here
periodically for about another thousand years. The devil of this
state of things is that they may not always be able to keep their
wars at home.
For me, then, except England and the smaller exceptions that I have
mentioned, Europe will cut no big figure in my life. In all the
humanities, we are a thousand years ahead of any people here. So
also in the adaptabilities and the conveniences of life, in its
versatilities and in its enjoyments. Most folk are stolid and sad
or dull on this side of the world. Else how could they take their
kings and silly ceremonies seriously?
Now to more immediate and definite impressions. I have for a year
had the conviction that we ought to get into the war--into the
economic war--for the following among many reasons.
1. That's the only way to shorten it. We could cause Germany's
credit (such as she has) instantly to collapse, and we could hasten
her hard times at home which would induce a surrender.
2. That's the only way we can have any real or important influence
in adjusting whatever arrangements can be made to secure peace.
3. That's the best way we can inspire complete respect for us in
the minds of other nations and thereby, perhaps, save ourselves
from some wars in the future.
4. That's the best way we can assert our own character--our
Americanism, and forever get rid of all kinds of hyphens.
5. That's the only way we shall ever get a real and sensible
preparedness, which will be of enormous educational value even if
no military use should ever be made of our preparation.
6. That's the only way American consciousness will ever get back to
the self-sacrificing and patriotic point of view of the Fathers of
the Republic.
7. That's the best way to emancipate ourselves from cranks.
8. That's the only way we'll ever awaken in our whole people a
foreign consciousness that will enable us to assert our natural
influence in the world--political, financial, social,
commercial--the best way to make the rest of the world our
customers and friends and followers.
All the foregoing I have fired at the Great White Chief for a year
by telegraph and by mail; and I have never fired it anywhere else
till now. Be very quiet, then. No man with whom I have talked or
whose writings I have read seems to me to have an adequate
conception of the colossal changes that the war is bringing and
will bring. Of course, I do not mean to imply that I have any
adequate conception. Nobody can yet grasp it. The loss of (say) ten
million men from production of work or wares or children; what a
changed world that fact alone will make! The presence in all Europe
of (perhaps) fifteen or twenty million more women than men will
upset the whole balance of society as regards the sexes. The loss
of most of the accumulated capital of Europe and the vast burdens
of debt for the future to pay will change the financial relations
of the whole world. From these two great losses--men and money--God
knows the many kinds of changes that will come. Women are doing and
will continue to do many kinds of work hitherto done by men.
Of course there are some great gains. Many a flabby or abject
fellow will come out of the war a real man: he'll be nobody's slave
thereafter. The criminal luxury of the rich will not assert itself
again for a time. The unparalleled addition to the world's heroic
deeds will be to the good of mankind, as the unparalleled suffering
has eclipsed all records. The survivors will be in an heroic mood
for the rest of their lives. In general, life will start on a new
plane and a lot of old stupid habits and old party quarrels and
class prejudices will disappear. To get Europe going again will
call for new resolution and a new sort of effort. Nobody can yet
see what far-reaching effects it will have on government.
If I could make the English and Scotch over, I could greatly
improve them. I'd cut out the Englishman's arrogance and key him up
to a quicker gait. Lord! he's a slow beast. But he's worked out the
germ and the beginning of all real freedom, and he has character.
He knows how to conserve and to use wealth. He's a great John Bull,
after all. And as for commanding the sea, for war or trade, you may
properly bow down to him and pay him homage. The war will, I think,
quicken him up. It will lessen his arrogance--to _us_, at least. I
think it will make him stronger and humbler. And, whatever his
virtues and his faults, he's the only Great Power we can go hand in
hand with....
These kinds of things have been going on now nearly two years, and
not till these ten days down here have I had time or chance or a
free mind to think them over; and now there's nothing in particular
to think--nothing but just to go on, doing these 40,000 things (and
they take a new turn every day) the best I can, without the
slightest regard to consequences. I've long ago passed the place
where, having acted squarely according to my best judgment, I can
afford to pay the slightest attention to what anybody thinks. I see
men thrown on the scrap heap every day. Many of them deserve it,
but a good many do not. In the abnormal state of mind that
everybody has, there are inevitable innocent misunderstandings,
which are as fatal as criminal mistakes. The diplomatic service is
peculiarly exposed to misunderstandings: and, take the whole
diplomatic service of all nations as shown up by this great strain,
it hasn't stood the test very well. I haven't the respect for it
that I had when I started. Yet, God knows, I have a keen sympathy
for it. I've seen some of 'em displaced; some of 'em lie down; some
of 'em die.
As I've got closer and closer to big men, as a rule they shrink up.
They are very much like the rest of us--many of 'em more so. Human
nature is stripped in these times of most of its disguises, and men
have to stand and be judged as a rule by their real qualities.
Among all the men in high place here, Sir Edward Grey stands out in
my mind bigger, not smaller, than he stood in the beginning. He's a
square, honourable gentleman, if there is one in this world. And it
is he, of course, with whom I have had all my troubles. It's been a
truly great experience to work and to quarrel with such a man.
We've kept the best friendship--a constantly ripening one. There
are others like him--only smaller.
Yet they are all in turn set upon by the press or public opinion
and hounded like criminals. They try (somebody tries) to drive 'em
out of office every once in a while. If there's anything I'm afraid
of, it's the newspapers. The correspondents are as thick as flies
in summer--all hunting sensations--especially the yellow American
press. I play the game with these fellows always squarely,
sometimes I fear indiscreetly. But what is discretion? That's the
hardest question of all. We have regular meetings. I tell 'em
everything I can--always on the condition that I'm kept out of the
papers. If they'll never mention me, I'll do everything possible
for them. Absolute silence of the newspapers (as far as I can
affect it) is the first rule of safety. So far as I know, we've
done fairly well; but always in proportion to silence. I don't want
any publicity. I don't want any glory. I don't want any office. I
don't want nothin'--but to do this job squarely, to get out of this
scrape, to go off somewhere in the sunshine and to see if I can
slip back into my old self and see the world sane again. Yet I'm
immensely proud that I have had the chance to do some good--to keep
our record straight--as far as I can, and to be of what service I
can to these heroic people.
Out of it all, one conviction and one purpose grows and becomes
clearer. The world isn't yet half-organized. In the United States
we've lived in a good deal of a fool's paradise. The world isn't
half so safe a place as we supposed. Until steamships and
telegraphs brought the nations all close together, of course we
could enjoy our isolation. We can't do so any longer. One mad fool
in Berlin has turned the whole earth topsy-turvy. We'd forgotten
what our forefathers learned--the deadly dangers of real monarchs
and of castes and classes. There are a lot of 'em left in the world
yet. We've grown rich and-weak; we've let cranks and old women
shape our ideas. We've let our politicians remain provincial and
ignorant.
And believe me, dear D.P. & Co. with affectionate greeting to every
one of you and to every one of yours, collectively and singly,
Yours heartily,
W.H.P.
_Memorandum written after attending the service at St. Paul's in
memory of Lord Kitchener_[34].
American Embassy, London.
There were two Kitcheners, as every informed person knows--(1) the
popular hero and (2) the Cabinet Minister with whom it was
impossible for his associates to get along. He made his
administrative career as an autocrat dealing with dependent and
inferior peoples. This experience fixed his habits and made it
impossible for him to do team work or to delegate work or even to
inform his associates of what he had done or was doing. While,
therefore, his name raised a great army, he was in many ways a
hindrance in the Cabinet. First one thing and then another was
taken out of his hands--ordnance, munitions, war plans. When he
went to Gallipoli, some persons predicted that he would never come
back. There was a hot meeting of the Cabinet at which he was asked
to go to Russia, to make a sort of return visit for the visit that
important Russians had made here, and to link up Russia's military
plans with the plans of the Western Allies. He is said to have
remarked that he was going only because he had been ordered to go.
There was a hope and a feeling again that he might not come back
till after the war.
Now just how much truth there is in all this, one has to guess; but
undoubtedly a good deal. He did much in raising the army, but his
name did more. What an extraordinary situation! The great hero of
the Nation an impossible man to work with. The Cabinet could not
tell the truth about him: the people would not believe it and would
make the Cabinet suffer. Moreover, such a row would have given
comfort to the enemy. Kitchener, on his part, could not afford to
have an open quarrel. The only solution was to induce him to go
away for a long time. Both sides saw that. Such thoughts were in
everybody's mind while the impressive funeral service was said and
sung in St. Paul's. The Great Hero, who had failed, was celebrated
of course as a Great Hero--quite truly and yet far from true. For
him his death came at a lucky time: his work was done.
There is even a rumour, which I don't for a moment believe, that he
is alive on the Orkney Islands and prefers to disappear there till
the war ends. This is fantastic, and it was doubtless suggested by
the story that he did disappear for several years while he was a
young officer.
I could not help noticing, when I saw all the Cabinet together at
the Cathedral, how much older many of them look than they looked
two years ago. Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Balfour, who is
really an old man, Lloyd George--each of these seems ten years
older. And so does the King. The men in responsible places who are
not broken by the war will be bent. General French, since his
retirement to command of the forces in England, seems much older.
So common is this quick aging that Lady Jellicoe, who went to
Scotland to see her husband after the big naval battle, wrote to
Mrs. Page in a sort of rhapsody and with evident surprise that the
Admiral really did not seem older! The weight of this thing is so
prodigious that it is changing all men who have to do with it. Men
and women (who do not wear mourning) mention the death of their
sons in a way that a stranger might mistake for indifference. And
it has a curious effect on marriages. Apparently every young fellow
who gets a week's leave from the trenches comes home and marries
and, of course, goes straight back--especially the young officers.
You see weddings all day as you pass the favourite churches; and
already the land is full of young widows.
_To Edwin A. Alderman_[35]
Embassy of the U.S.A., London,
June 22, 1916.
MY DEAR ED ALDERMAN:
I shall not forget how good you were to take time to write me a
word about the meeting of the Board--_the_ Board: there's no other
one in that class--at Hampton[36], and I did most heartily
appreciate the knowledge that you all remembered me. Alas! it's a
long, long time ago when we all met--so long ago that to me it
seems a part of a former incarnation. These three years--especially
these two years of the war--have changed my whole outlook on life
and foreshortened all that came before. I know I shall never link
back to many things (and alas! too, to many people) that once
seemed important and surely were interesting. Life in these
trenches (five warring or quarrelling governments mining and
sapping under me and shooting over me)--two years of universal
ambassadorship in this hell are enough--enough I say, even for a
man who doesn't run away from responsibilities or weary of toil.
And God knows how it has changed me and is changing me: I sometimes
wonder, as a merely intellectual and quite impersonal curiosity.
Strangely enough I keep pretty well--very well, in fact. Perhaps
I've learned how to live more wisely than I knew in the old days;
perhaps again, I owe it to my old grandfather who lived (and
enjoyed) ninety-four years. I have walked ten miles to-day and I
sit down as the clock strikes eleven (P.M.) to write this letter.
You will recall more clearly than I certain horrible, catastrophic,
universal-ruin passages in Revelation--monsters swallowing the
universe, blood and fire and clouds and an eternal crash, rolling
ruin enveloping all things--well, all that's come. There are,
perhaps, ten million men dead of this war and, perhaps, one hundred
million persons to whom death would be a blessing. Add to these as
many millions more whose views of life are so distorted that blank
idiocy would be a better mental outlook, and you'll get a hint (and
only a hint) of what the continent has already become--a bankrupt
slaughter-house inhabited by unmated women. We have talked of
"problems" in our day. We never had a problem; for the worst task
we ever saw was a mere blithe pastime compared with what these
women and the few men that will remain here must face. The hills
about Verdun are not blown to pieces worse than the whole social
structure and intellectual and spiritual life of Europe. I wonder
that anybody is sane.
Now we have swung into a period and a state of mind wherein all
this seems normal. A lady said to me at a dinner party (think of a
dinner party at all!), "Oh, how I shall miss the war when it ends!
Life without it will surely be dull and tame. What can we talk
about? Will the old subjects ever interest us again?" I said,
"Let's you and me try and see." So we talked about books--not war
books--old country houses that we both knew, gardens and gold and
what not; and in fifteen minutes we swung back to the war before we
were aware.
I get out of it, as the days rush by, certain fundamental
convictions, which seem to me not only true--true beyond any
possible cavil--truer than any other political things are true--and
far more important than any other contemporary facts whatsoever in
any branch of endeavour, but better worth while than anything else
that men now living may try to further:
1. The cure for democracy is more democracy. The danger to the
world lies in autocrats and autocracies and privileged classes; and
these things have everywhere been dangerous and always will be.
There's no security in any part of the world where people cannot
think of a government without a king, and there never will be. You
cannot conceive of a democracy that will unprovoked set out on a
career of conquest. If all our religious missionary zeal and cash
could be turned into convincing Europe of this simple and obvious
fact, the longest step would be taken for human advancement that
has been taken since 1776. If Carnegie, or, after he is gone, his
Peace People could see this, his Trust might possibly do some good.
2. As the world stands, the United States and Great Britain must
work together and stand together to keep the predatory nations in
order. A League to Enforce Peace and the President's idea of
disentangling alliances are all in the right direction, but vague
and general and cumbersome, a sort of bastard children of
Neutrality. _The_ thing, the _only_ thing is--a perfect
understanding between the English-speaking peoples. That's
necessary, and that's all that's necessary. We must boldly take the
lead in that. I frankly tell my friends here that the English have
got to throw away their damned arrogance and their insularity and
that we Americans have got to throw away our provincial ignorance
("What is abroad to us?"), hang our Irish agitators and shoot our
hyphenates and bring up our children with reverence for English
history and in the awe of English literature. This is the only job
now in the world worth the whole zeal and energy of all
first-class, thoroughbred English-speaking men. _We_ must lead. We
are natural leaders. The English must be driven to lead. Item: We
must get their lads into our universities, ours into theirs. They
don't know how to do it, except the little driblet of Rhodes men.
Think this out, remembering what fools we've been about exchange
professors with Germany! How much good could Fons Smith[37] do in a
thousand years, on such an errand as he went on to Berlin? And the
English don't know _how_ to do it. They are childish (in some
things) beyond belief. An Oxford or Cambridge man never thinks of
going back to his university except about twice a lifetime when his
college formally asks him to come and dine. Then he dines as
docilely as a scared Freshman. I am a D.C.L. of Oxford. I know a
lot of their faculty. They are hospitality itself. But I've never
yet found out one important fact about the university. They never
tell me. I've been down at Cambridge time and again and stayed with
the Master of one of the colleges. I can no more get at what they
do and how they do it than I could get at the real meaning of a
service in a Buddhist Temple. I have spent a good deal of time with
Lord Rayleigh, who is the Chancellor of Cambridge University. He
never goes there. If he were to enter the town, all the men in the
university would have to stop their work, get on their parade-day
gowns, line-up by precedent and rank and go to meet him and go
through days of ceremony and incantations. I think the old man has
been there once in five years. Now this mediævalism must go--or be
modified. You fellers who have universities must work a real
alliance--a big job here. But to go on.
The best informed English opinion is ripe for a complete working
understanding with us. We've got to work up our end--get rid of our
ignorance of foreign affairs, our shirt-sleeve, complaining kind of
diplomacy, our sport of twisting the lion's tail and such things
and fall to and bring the English out. It's the _one_ race in this
world that's got the guts.
Hear this in confirmation: I suppose 1,000 English women have been
to see me--as a last hope--to ask me to have inquiries made in
Germany about their "missing" sons or husbands, generally sons.
They are of every class and rank and kind, from marchioness to
scrubwoman. Every one tells her story with the same dignity of
grief, the same marvellous self-restraint, the same courtesy and
deference and sorrowful pride. Not one has whimpered--but one. And
it turned out that she was a Belgian. It's the breed. Spartan
mothers were theatrical and pinchbeck compared to these women.
I know a lady of title, very well to do, who for a year got up at
5:30 and drove herself in her own automobile from her home in
London to Woolwich where she worked all day long in a shell factory
as a volunteer and got home at 8 o'clock at night. At the end of a
year they wanted her to work in a London place where they keep the
records of the Woolwich work. "Think of it," said she, as she shook
her enormous diamond ear-rings as I sat next to her at dinner one
Sunday night not long ago, "think of it--what an easy time I now
have. I don't have to start till half-past seven and I get home at
half-past six!"
I could fill forty pages with stories like these. This very Sunday
I went to see a bedridden old lady who sent me word that she had
something to tell me. Here it was: An English flying man's machine
got out of order and he had to descend in German territory. The
Germans captured him and his machine. They ordered him to take two
of their flying men in his machine to show them a particular place
in the English lines. He declined. "Very well, we'll shoot you,
then." At last he consented. The three started. The Englishman
quietly strapped himself in. There were no straps for the two
Germans. The Englishman looped-the-loop. The Germans fell out. The
Englishman flew back home. "My son has been to see me from France.
He told me that. He knows the man"--thus said the old lady and
thanked me for coming to hear it! She didn't know that the story
has been printed.
But the real question is, "How are you?" Do you keep strong? Able,
without weariness, to keep up your good work? I heartily hope so,
old man. Take good care of yourself--very.
My love to Mrs. Alderman. Please don't quote me--yet. I have to be
very silent publicly about everything. After March 4th, I shall
again be free.
Yours always faithfully,
W.H.P.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 33: A playful reference to the Ambassador's infant grandson,
Walter H. Page, Jr.]
[Footnote 34: Drowned on the Hampshire, June 5, 1916, off the coast of
Scotland.]
[Footnote 35: President of the University of Virginia.]
[Footnote 36: Hampton Institute, at Hampton, Va.]
[Footnote 37: C. Alphonso Smith, Professor of English, U.S. Naval
Academy; Roosevelt Professor at Berlin, 1910-11.]
CHAPTER XIX
WASHINGTON IN THE SUMMER OF 1916
I
In July Page received a cablegram summoning him to Washington. This
message did not explain why his presence was desired, nor on this point
was Page ever definitely enlightened, though there were more or less
vague statements that a "change of atmosphere" might better enable the
Ambassador to understand the problems which were then engrossing the
State Department.
The President had now only a single aim in view. From the date of the
so-called _Sussex_ "pledge," May 4, 1916, until the resumption of
submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, Mr. Wilson devoted all his
energies to bringing the warring powers together and establishing peace.
More than one motive was inspiring the president in this determination.
That this policy accorded with his own idealistic tendencies is true,
and that he aspired to a position in history as the great "peace maker"
is probably the fact, but he had also more immediate and practical
purposes in mind. Above all, Mr. Wilson was bent on keeping the United
States out of the war; he knew that there was only one certain way of
preserving peace in this country, and that was by bringing the war
itself to an end. "An early peace is all that can prevent the Germans
from driving us at last into the war," Page wrote at about this time;
and this single sentence gives the key to the President's activities for
the succeeding nine months. The negotiations over the _Sussex_ had
taught Mr. Wilson this truth. He understood that the pledge which the
German Government had made was only a conditional one; that the
submarine campaign had been suspended only for the purpose of giving the
United States a breathing spell during which it could persuade Great
Britain and France to make peace.
"I repeat my proposal," Bernstorff cabled his government on April
26,[38] "to suspend the submarine war at least for the period of
negotiations. This would remove all danger of a breach [with the United
States] and also enable Wilson to continue his labours in his great plan
of bringing about a peace based upon the freedom of the seas--i.e., that
for the future trade shall be free from all interference in time of war.
According to the assurances which Wilson, through House, has given me,
he would in that case take in hand measures directly against England. He
is, however, of the opinion that it would be easier to bring about peace
than to cause England to abandon the blockade. This last could only be
brought about by war and it is well known that the means of war are
lacking here. A prohibition of exports as a weapon against the blockade
is not possible as the prevailing prosperity would suffer by it.
"The inquiries made by House have led Wilson to believe that our enemies
would not be unwilling to consider peace. In view of the present
condition of affairs, I repeat that there is only one possible course,
namely, that Your Excellency [Von Jagow] empower me to declare that we
will enter into negotiations with the United States touching the conduct
of the submarine war while the negotiations are proceeding. This would
give us the advantage that the submarine war, being over Mr. Wilson's
head, like the sword of Damocles, would compel him at once to take in
hand the task of mediation."
This dispatch seems sufficiently to explain all the happenings of the
summer and winter of 1916-1917. It was sent to Berlin on April 26th; the
German Government gave the _Sussex_ "pledge" on May 4th, eight days
afterward. In this reply Germany declared that she would now expect Mr.
Wilson to bring pressure upon Great Britain to secure a mitigation or
suspension of the British blockade, and to this Mr. Wilson promptly and
energetically replied that he regarded the German promise as an
unconditional one and that the Government of the United States "cannot
for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by
German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States
upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made
contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights
of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single
not joint; absolute not relative."
This reply gave satisfaction to both the United States and the countries
of the Allies, and Page himself regarded it as a master stroke. "The
more I think of it," he wrote on May 17th, "the better the strategy of
the President appears, in his latest (and last) note to Germany. They
laid a trap for him and he caught them in their own trap. The Germans
had tried to 'put it up' to the President to commit the first unfriendly
act. He now 'puts it up' to them. And this is at last bound to end the
controversy if they sink another ship unlawfully. The French see this
clearly and so do the best English, and it has produced a most
favourable impression. The future? The German angling for peace will
prove futile. They'll have another fit of fury. Whether they will again
become reckless or commit 'mistakes' with their submarines will depend
partly on their fury, partly on their fear to make a breach with the
United States, but mainly on the state of their submarine fleet. How
many have the English caught and destroyed? That's the main question,
after all. The English view may not be fair to them. But nobody here
believes that they will long abstain from the luxury of crime."
It is thus apparent that when the Germans practically demanded, as a
price of their abstention from indiscriminate submarine warfare, that
Mr. Wilson should move against Great Britain in the matter of the
blockade, they realized the futility of any such step, and that what
they really expected to obtain was the presidential mediation for peace.
President Wilson at once began to move in this direction. On May 27th,
three weeks after the Sussex "pledge," he made an address in Washington
before the League to Enforce Peace, which was intended to lay the basis
for his approaching negotiations. It was in this speech that he made the
statement that the United States was "not concerned with the causes and
the objects" of the war. "The obscure fountains from which its
stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or
to explain." This was another of those unfortunate sentences which made
the President such an unsympathetic figure in the estimation of the
Allies and seemed to indicate to them that he had no appreciation of the
nature of the struggle. Though this attitude of non-partisanship, of
equal balance between the accusations of the Allies and Germany, was
intended to make the President acceptable as a mediator, the practical
result was exactly the reverse, for Allied statesmen turned from Wilson
as soon as those sentences appeared in print. The fact that this same
oration specified the "freedom of the seas" as one of the foundation
rocks of the proposed new settlement only accentuated this unfavourable
attitude.
This then was clearly the "atmosphere" which prevailed in Washington at
the time that Page was summoned home. But Page's letters of this period
indicate how little sympathy he entertained for such negotiations. "It
is quite apparent," he had recently written to Colonel House, "that
nobody in Washington understands the war. Come over and find out."
Extracts from a letter which he wrote to his brother, Mr. Henry A. Page,
of Aberdeen, North Carolina, are especially interesting when placed side
by side with the President's statements of this particular time. These
passages show that a two years' close observation of the Prussians in
action had not changed Page's opinion of their motives or of their
methods; in 1916, as in 1914, Page could see in this struggle nothing
but a colossal buccaneering expedition on the part of Germany. "As I
look at it," he wrote, "our dilly-dallying is likely to get us into war.
The Germans want somebody to rob--to pay their great military bills.
They've robbed Belgium and are still robbing it of every penny they can
lay their hands on. They robbed Poland and Serbia--two very poor
countries which didn't have much. They set out to rob France and have so
far been stopped from getting to Paris. If they got to Paris there
wouldn't be thirty cents' worth of movable property there in a week, and
they'd levy fines of millions of francs a day. Their military scheme and
teaching and open purpose is to make somebody pay for their vast
military outlay of the last forty years. They must do that or go
bankrupt. Now it looks as if they would go bankrupt. But in a little
while they may be able to bombard New York and demand billions of
dollars to refrain from destroying the city. That's the richest place
left to spoil.
"Now they say that--quite openly and quite frankly. Now if we keep
'neutral' to a highwayman--what do we get for our pains? That's the
mistake we are making. If we had sent Bernstorff home the day after the
_Lusitania_ was sunk and recalled Gerard and begun to train an army we'd
have had no more trouble with them. But since they have found out that
they can keep us discussing things forever and a day, they will keep us
discussing things till they are ready. We are very simple; and we'll get
shot for it yet....
"The prestige and fear of the United States has gone down, down,
down-disappeared; and we are regarded as 'discussors,' incapable of
action, scared to death of war. That's all the invitation that robbers,
whose chief business is war, want--all the invitation they need. These
devils are out for robbery--and you don't seem to believe it in the
United States: that's the queer thing. This neutrality business makes us
an easy mark. As soon as they took a town in Belgium, they asked for all
the money in the town, all the food, all the movable property; and
they've levied a tax every month since on every town and made the town
government borrow the money to pay it. If a child in a town makes a
disrespectful remark, they fine the town an extra $1,000. They haven't
got enough so far to keep them going flush; and they won't unless they
get Paris--which they can't do now. If they got London, they'd be rich;
they wouldn't leave a shilling and they'd make all the rich English get
all the money they own abroad. This is the reason that Frenchmen and
Englishmen prefer to be killed by the 100,000. In the country over which
their army has passed a crow would die of starvation and no human being
has ten cents of real money. The Belgian Commission is spending more
than 100 million dollars a year to keep the Belgians alive--only because
they are robbed every day. They have a rich country and could support
themselves but for these robbers. That's the meaning of the whole thing.
And yet we treat them as if they were honourable people. It's only a
question of time and of power when they will attack us, or the Canal, or
South America. Everybody on this side the world knows that. And they are
'yielding' to keep us out of this war so that England will not help us
when they (the Germans) get ready to attack America.
"There is the strangest infatuation in the United States with Peace--the
strangest illusion about our safety without preparation."
Several letters to Colonel House show the state of the British mind on
the subject of the President's peace proposals:
_To Edward M. House_
Royal Bath and East Cliff Hotel,
Bournemouth,
23 May, 1916.
DEAR HOUSE:
The motor trip that the Houses, the Wallaces, and the Pages took
about a year ago was the last trip (three days) that I had had out
of London; and I'd got pretty tired. The _China_ case having been
settled (and settled as we wanted it), I thought it a good time to
try to get away for a week. So here Mrs. Page and I are--very much
to my benefit. I've spent a beautiful week out of doors, on this
seashore; and I have only about ten per cent. of the fatal diseases
that I had a week ago. That is to say, I'm as sound as a dollar and
feel like a fighting cock.
Sir Edward was fine about the China[39] case. He never disputed the
principle of the inviolability of American ships on the high seas;
but the Admiralty maintained that some of these men are officers in
the German Army and are now receiving officers' pay. I think that
that is probably true. Nevertheless, the Admiralty had bungled the
case badly and Sir Edward simply rode over them. They have a fine
quarrel among themselves and we got all we wanted and asked for.
Of course, I can't make out the Germans but I am afraid some huge
deviltry is yet coming. When the English say that the Germans must
give up their militarism, I doubt if the Germans yet know what they
mean. They talk about conquered territory--Belgium, Poland, and the
rest. It hasn't entered their heads that they've got to give up
their armies and their military system. When this does get into
their heads, if it ever do, I think they may so swell with rage at
this "insult" that they may break loose in one last desperate
effort, ignoring the United States, defying the universe, running
amuck. Of course it would be foolhardy to predict this, but the
fear of it keeps coming into my mind. The fear is the more
persistent because, if the worst comes to them, the military caste
and perhaps the dynasty itself will prefer to die in one last
terrific onslaught rather than to make a peace on terms which will
require the practical extinction of their supreme power. This, I
conceive, is the really great danger that yet awaits the world--if
the Allies hold together till defeat and famine drive the Germans
to the utmost desperation.
In the meantime, the Allies still holding together as they are,
there's no peace yet in the British and French minds. They're after
the militarism of Prussia--not territory or other gains; and they
seem likely to get it, as much by the blockade as by victories on
land. Do you remember how in the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck
refused to deal with the French Emperor? He demanded that
representatives of the French people should deal with him. He got
what he asked for and that was the last of the French Emperor.
Neither the French nor the English have forgotten that. You will
recall that the Germans starved Paris into submission. Neither the
French nor the English have forgotten that. These two leaves out of
the Germans' own book of forty-five years ago--these two and no
more--_may_ be forced on the Germans themselves. They are both
quite legitimate, too. You can read a recollection of both these
events between the lines of the interviews that Sir Edward and Mr.
Balfour recently gave to American newspapers.
There is nothing but admiration here for the strategy of the
President's last note to Germany. That was the cleverest play made
by anybody since the war began--clever beyond praise. Now he's "got
'em." But nobody here doubts that they will say, sooner or later,
that the United States, not having forced the breaking of the
British blockade, has not kept its bargain--that's what they'll
say--and it is in order again to run amuck. This is what the
English think--provided the Germans have enough submarines left to
keep up real damage. By that time, too, it will be clear to the
Germans that the President can't bring peace so long as only one
side wishes peace. The Germans seem to have counted much on the
Irish uprising, which came to pass at all only because of the
customary English stupid bungling; and the net result has been only
to put the mass of the Irish on their mettle to show that they are
not Sinn Feiners. The final upshot will be to strengthen the
British Army. God surely is good to this bungling British
Government. Wind and wave and the will of High Heaven seem to work
for them. I begin to understand their stupidity and their
arrogance. If your enemies are such fools in psychological tactics
and Heaven is with you, why take the trouble to be alert? And why
be modest? Whatever the reason, these English are now more cocky
and confident than they've been before since the war began. They
are beginning to see results. The only question seems to be to hold
the Allies together, and they seem to be doing that. In fact, the
battle of Verdun has cemented them. They now have visible proof
that the German Army is on the wane. And they have trustworthy
evidence that the blockade is telling severely on the Germans.
Nobody, I think, expects to thrash 'em to a frazzle; but the almost
universal opinion here is that the hold of militarism will be
shaken loose. And the German High Canal Navy--what's to become of
that? Von Tirpitz is down and out, but there are thousands of
Germans, I hear, who complain of their naval inactivity. But God
only knows the future--I don't. I think that I do well if I keep
track of the present....
My kindest regards to Mrs. House,
Yours very heartily,
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
London, 25 May, 1916.
DEAR HOUSE:
No utterance by anybody has so stirred the people of this kingdom
for many months as Sir Edward Grey's impromptu speech last night in
the House of Commons about Peace, when he called the German
Chancellor a first-class liar. I sent you to-day a clipping from
one of the morning papers. Every paper I pick up compliments Sir
Edward. Everyone says, "We must fight to a finish." The more
sensational press intimates that any Englishman who uses the word
"peace" ought to be shot. You have never seen such a rally as that
which has taken place in response to Sir Edward's cry. In the first
place, as you know, he is the most gentle of all the Cabinet, the
last man to get on a "war-rampage," the least belligerent and
rambunctious of the whole lot. When he felt moved to say that there
can be no peace till the German military despotism is broken,
everybody from one end of the Kingdom to the other seems to have
thrown up his hat and applauded. Except the half-dozen peace-cranks
in the House (Bryan sort of men) you can't find a man, woman,
child, or dog that isn't fired with the determination to see the
war through. The continued talk about peace which is reported
directly and indirectly from Germany--coming from Switzerland, from
Rome, from Washington--has made the English and the French very
angry: no, "angry" isn't quite the right word. It has made them
very determined. They feel insulted by the impudence of the
Germans, who, since they know they are bound to lose, seem to be
turning heaven and earth to induce neutrals to take their view of
peace. People are asking here, "If they are victorious, why doesn't
their fleet come out of the canal and take the seas, and again open
their commerce? Why do they whimper about the blockade when they
will not even risk a warship to break it?" You'll recall how the
talk here used to be that the English wouldn't wake up. You
wouldn't know 'em now. Your bulldog has got his grip and even
thunder doesn't disturb him.
Incidentally, all the old criticism of Sir Edward Grey seems to
have been forgotten. You hear nothing but praise of him now. I am
told that he spoke his impromptu speech last night with great fire
and at once left the House. His speech has caused a greater stir
than the Irish rebellion, showing that every Englishman feels that
Sir Edward said precisely what every man feels.
The Germans have apparently overdone and overworked their premature
peace efforts and have made things worse for them. They've
overplayed their hand.
In fact, I see no end of the war. The Allies are not going to quit
prematurely. They won't even discuss the subject yet with one
another, and the Germans, by their peace-talk of the sort that they
inspire, simply postpone the day when the Allies will take the
subject up.
All the while, too, the Allies work closer and closer together.
They'll soon be doing even their diplomatic work with neutrals, as
a unit--England and France as one nation, and (on great subjects)
Russia and Italy also with them.
I've talked lately not only with Sir Edward but with nearly half
the other members of the Cabinet, and they are all keyed up to the
same tune. The press of both parties, too, are (for once) wholly
agreed: Liberal and Conservative papers alike hold the same
war-creed.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Before leaving for Washington Page discussed the situation personally
with Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce. He has left memoranda of both
interviews.
_Notes of a Private and Informal Conversation with Sir Edward Grey, at
his residence, on July 27, 1916, when I called to say good-bye before
sailing on leave to the United States_
... Sir Edward Grey went on to say quite frankly that two thoughts
expressed in a speech by the President some months ago had had a very
serious influence on British opinion. One thought was that the causes or
objects of the war were of no concern to him, and the other was his (at
least implied) endorsement of "the freedom of the seas," which the
President did not define. Concerning the first thought, he understood of
course that a neutral President could not say that he favoured one side
or the other: everybody understood that and nobody expected him to take
sides. But when the President said that the objects of the war did not
concern him, that was taken by British public opinion as meaning a
condemnation of the British cause, and it produced deep feeling.
Concerning the "freedom of the seas," he believed that the first use of
the phrase was made by Colonel House (on his return from one of his
visits to Berlin)[40], but the public now regarded it as a German
invention and it meant to the British mind a policy which would render
British supremacy at sea of little value in time of war; and public
opinion resented this. He knew perfectly well that at a convenient time
new rules must be made governing the conduct of war at sea and on the
land, too. But the German idea of "the freedom of the seas" ("freedom"
was needed on land also) is repulsive to the British mind.
He mentioned these things because they had produced in many minds an
unwillingness, he feared, to use the good offices of the President
whenever any mediatorial service might be done by a neutral. The
tendency of these remarks was certainly in that direction. Yet Sir
Edward carefully abstained from expressing such an unwillingness on his
own part, and the inference from his tone and manner, as well as from
his habitual attitude, is that he feels no unwillingness to use the
President's good office, if occasion should arise.
I asked what he meant by "mediatorial"--the President's offering his
services or good offices on his own initiative? He said--No, not that.
But the Germans might express to the President their willingness or even
their definite wish to have an armistice, on certain terms, to discuss
conditions of peace coupled with an intimation that he might sound the
Allies. He did not expect the President to act on his own initiative,
but at the request or at least at the suggestion of the German
Government, he might conceivably sound the Allies--especially, he added,
"since I am informed that the notion is wide-spread in America that the
war will end inconclusively--as a draw." He smiled and remarked, as an
aside, that he didn't think that this notion was held by any
considerable group of people in any other country, certainly not in
Great Britain.
In further talk on this subject he said that none of the Allies could
mention peace or discuss peace till France should express such a wish;
for it is the very vitals of France that have received and are receiving
the shock of such an assault as was never before launched against any
nation. Unless France was ready to quit, none of France's Allies could
mention peace, and France showed no mood to quit. Least of all could the
English make or receive any such suggestion at least till her new great
army had done its best; for until lately the severest fighting had not
been done by the British, whose army had practically been held in
reserve. There had for a long time been a perfect understanding between
Joffre and Haig--that the English would wait to begin their offensive
till the moment arrived when it best suited the French.
The impression that I got from this part of the conversation was that
Sir Edward hoped that I might convey to the President (as, of course, he
could not) Sir Edward's idea of the effect of these parts of the
President's speech on feeling in England toward him. Nowhere in the
conversation did he make any request of me. Any one, overhearing it,
might have supposed it to be a conversation between two men, with no
object beyond expressing their views. But, of course, he hoped and meant
that I should, in my own way, make known to the President what he said.
He did not say that the President's good offices, when the time should
come, would be unwelcome to him or to his government; and he meant, I am
sure, to convey only the fear that by these assertions the President had
planted an objection to his good offices in a large section of British
opinion.
Among the conditions of peace that Sir Edward himself personally would
like to see imposed (he had not yet discussed the subject with any of
his colleagues in the Government) was this: that the German Government
should agree to submit to an impartial (neutral) commission or court the
question, Who began the war and who is responsible for it? The German
Chancellor and other high German officials have put it about and
continue to put it about that England is responsible, and doubtless the
German people at least believe it. All the governments concerned must
(this is his idea) submit to the tribunal all its documents and other
evidence bearing on the subject; and of course the finding of the
tribunal must be published.
Then he talked a good deal about the idea that lies behind the League
for Enforcing Peace--in a sympathetic mood. He went on to point out how
such a league--with force behind it--would at any one of three stages
have prevented this war--(1) When England proposed a conference to
France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, all agreed to it but Germany.
Germany alone prevented a discussion. If the League to Enforce Peace had
included England, France, Italy, and Russia--there would have been no
war; for Germany would have seen at once that they would all be against
her. (2) Later, when the Czar sent the Kaiser a personal telegram
proposing to submit their differences to some tribunal, a League to
Enforce Peace would have prevented war. And (3) when the question of the
invasion of Belgium came up, every signatory to the treaty guaranteeing
Belgium's integrity gave assurance of keeping the treaty--but Germany,
and Germany gave an evasive answer. A league would again have prevented
a war--or put all the military force of all its members against Germany.
Throughout the conversation, which lasted about an hour, Sir Edward said
more than once, as he has often said to me, that he hoped we should be
able to keep the friction between our governments at the minimum. He
would regard it as the greatest calamity if the ill-feeling that various
events have stirred up in sections of public opinion on each side should
increase or should become permanent. His constant wish and effort were
to lessen and if possible to remove all misunderstandings.
* * * * *
Lord Bryce was one of the Englishmen with whom Page was especially
inclined to discuss pending problems.
_Notes on a conversation with Lord Bryce, July 31, 1916_
Lord Bryce spoke of the President's declaration that we were not
concerned with the causes or objects of the war and he said that that
remark had caused much talk--all, as he thought, on a misunderstanding
of Mr. Wilson's meaning. "He meant, I take it, only that he did not
propose at that time to discuss the causes or the objects of the war;
and it is a pity that his sentence was capable of being interpreted to
mean something else; and the sentence was published and discussed here
apart from its context--a most unfair proceeding. I can imagine that the
President and his friends may be much annoyed by this improper
interpretation."
I remarked that the body of the speech in which this remark occurred
might have been written in Downing Street, so friendly was it to the
Allies.
"Quite, quite," said he.
This was at dinner, Lady Bryce and Mrs. Page and he and I only being
present.
When he and I went into the library he talked more than an hour.
"And what about this blacklist?" he asked. I told him. He had been in
France for a week and did not know just what had been done. He said that
that seemed to him a mistake. "The Government doesn't know
America--neither does the British public. Neither does the American
Government (no American government) know the British. Hence your
government writes too many notes--all governments are likely to write
too many notes. Everybody gets tired of seeing them and they lose their
effect."
He mentioned the blockade and said that it had become quite
effective--wonderfully effective, in fact; and he implied that he did
not see why we now failed to recognize it. Our refusal to recognize it
had caused and doubtless is now causing such ill-feeling as exists in
England.
Then he talked long about peace and how it would probably be arranged.
He judged, from letters that he receives from the United States as well
as from Americans who come over here, that there was an expectation in
America that the President would be called in at the peace settlement
and that some persons even expected him to offer mediation. He did not
see how that could be. He knew no precedent for such a proceeding. The
President might, of course, on the definite request of either side, make
a definite inquiry of the other side; but such a course would be, in
effect, merely the transmission of an inquiry.
But after peace was made and the time came to set up a League for
Enforcing Peace, or some such machinery, of course the United States
would be and would have to be a party to that if it were to succeed. He
reminded me that a little group of men here, of whom he was one, early
in the war sketched substantially the same plan that the American League
to Enforce Peace has worked out. It had not seemed advisable to have any
general public discussion of it in England till the war should end:
nobody had time now to give to it.
As he knew no precedent for belligerents to call in a third party when
they met to end a war, so he knew no precedent for any outside
government to protest against the invasion of a country by a Power that
had signed a treaty to guarantee the integrity of the invaded
country--no precedent, that is to say, for the United States to protest
against the invasion of Belgium. "That precedent," I said, "was found in
Hysteria."
Lord Bryce, who had just returned from a visit to the British
headquarters in France, hardly dared hope for the end of the war till
next year; and the intervening time between now and the end would be a
time, he feared, of renewed atrocities and increasing hatred. He cited
the killing of Captain Fryatt of the _Brussels_ and the forcible
deportation of young women from Lille and other towns in the provinces
of France occupied by the Germans.
The most definite idea that he had touching American-British relations
was the fear that the anti-British feeling in the United States would
become stronger and would outlast the war. "It is organized," he said.
"The disaffected Germans and the disaffected Irish are interested in
keeping it up." He asked what effect I thought the Presidential campaign
would have on this feeling. He seemed to have a fear that somehow the
campaign would give an occasion for stirring it up even more.
"Good-bye. Give my regards to all my American friends; and I'm proud to
say there are a good many of them."
* * * * *
One episode that was greatly stirring both Great Britain and the United
States at this time was the trial of Sir Roger Casement, the Irish
leader who had left Wilhelmshaven for Ireland in a German submarine and
who had been captured at Tralee in the act of landing arms and munitions
for an Irish insurrection. Casement's subsequent trial and conviction on
a charge of high treason had inspired a movement in his favour from
Irish-Americans, the final outcome of which was that the Senate, in
early August, passed a resolution asking the British Government for
clemency and stipulating that this resolution should be presented to the
Foreign Office. Page was then on the ocean bound for the United States
and the delicate task of presenting this document to Sir Edward Grey
fell upon Mr. Laughlin, who was now Chargé d'affaires. Mr. Laughlin is a
diplomat of great experience, but this responsibility at first seemed to
be something of a poser even for him. He had received explicit
instructions from Washington to present this resolution, and the one
thing above all which a diplomatic officer must do is to carry out the
orders of his government, but Mr. Laughlin well knew that, should he
present this paper in the usual manner, the Foreign Secretary might
decline to receive it; he might regard it as an interference with
matters that exclusively concerned the sovereign state. Mr. Laughlin,
however, has a technique all his own, and, in accordance with this, he
asked for an interview with Sir Edward Grey to discuss a matter of
routine business. However, the Chargé d'affaires carried the Casement
resolution tucked away in an inside pocket when he made his call.
Like Mr. Page, Mr. Laughlin was on the friendliest terms with Sir Edward
Grey, and, after the particular piece of business had been transacted,
the two men, as usual, fell into casual conversation. Casement then
loomed large in the daily press, and the activities of the American
Senate had likewise caused some commotion in London. In round-about
fashion Mr. Laughlin was able to lead Sir Edward to make some reference
to the Casement case.
"I see the Senate has passed a resolution asking clemency," said the
Foreign Secretary--exactly the remark which the American wished to
elicit.
"Yes," was the reply. "By the way, I happen to have a copy of the
resolution with me. May I give it to you?"
"Yes, I should like to have it."
The Foreign Secretary read it over with deliberation.
"This is a very interesting document," he said, when he had finished.
"Would you have any objection if I showed it to the Prime Minister?"
Of course that was precisely what Mr. Laughlin did wish, and he replied
that this was the desire of his government. The purpose of his visit had
been accomplished, and he was able to cable Washington that its
instructions had been carried out and that the Casement resolution had
been presented to the British Government. Simultaneously with his
communication, however, he reported also that the execution of Roger
Casement had taken place. In fact, it was being carried out at the time
of the interview. This incident lends point to Page's memorandum of the
last interview which he had before leaving England.
* * * * *
August 1st. I lunched with Mr. Asquith. One does not usually bring away
much from his conversations, and he did not say much to-day worth
recording. But he showed a very eager interest in the Presidential
campaign, and he confessed that he felt some anxiety about the
anti-British feeling in the United States. This led him to tell me that
he could not in good conscience interfere with Casement's execution, in
spite of the shoals of telegrams that he was receiving from the United
States. This man, said he, visited Irish prisoners in German camps and
tried to seduce them to take up arms against Great Britain--their own
country. When they refused, the Germans removed them to the worst places
in their Empire and, as a result, some of them died. Then Casement came
to Ireland in a German man-of-war (a submarine) accompanied by a ship
loaded with guns. "In all good conscience to my country and to my
responsibilities I cannot interfere." He hoped that thoughtful opinion
in the United States would see this whole matter in a fair and just way.
I asked him about anti-American feeling in Great Britain. He said: "Do
not let that unduly disturb you. At bottom we understand you. At bottom
the two people surely understand one another and have unbreakable bonds
of sympathy. No serious breach is conceivable." He went on quite
earnestly: "Mr. Page, after any policy or plan is thought out on its
merits my next thought always is how it may affect our relations with
the United States. That is always a fundamental consideration."
I ventured to say that if he would keep our relations smooth on the
surface, I'd guarantee their stability at the bottom. It's the surface
that rolls high at times, and the danger is there. Keep the surface
smooth and the bottom will take care of itself.
Then he asked about Mexico, as he usually has when I have talked with
him. I gave him as good a report as I could, reminding him of the great
change in the attitude of all Latin-America caused by the President's
patient policy with Mexico. When he said, "Mexico is a bad problem," I
couldn't resist the impulse to reply: "When Mexico troubles you, think
of--Ireland. As there are persons in England who concern themselves with
Mexico, so there are persons in the United States who concern themselves
about Ireland. Ireland and Mexico have each given trouble for two
centuries. Yet these people talk about them as if they could remove all
trouble in a month."
"Quite true," he said, and smiled himself into silence. Then he talked
about more or less frivolous subjects; and, as always, he asked about
Mr. Bryan and Mr. Roosevelt, "alike now, I suppose, in their present
obscure plight." I told him I was going from his house to the House of
Lords to see Sir Edward Grey metamorphosed into Viscount Grey of
Fallodon.
"The very stupidest of the many stupid ceremonies that we have," said
he--very truly.
He spoke of my "onerous duties" and so on and so on--tut, tut! talk that
gets nowhere. But he did say, quite sincerely, I think, that my
frankness called forth frankness and avoided misunderstanding; for he
has said that to other people about me.
Such is the Prime Minister of Great Britain in this supreme crisis in
English history, a remarkable man, of an abnormally quick mind, pretty
nearly a great man, but now a spent force, at once nimble and weary.
History may call him Great. If it do, he will owe this judgment to the
war, with the conduct of which his name will be forever associated.
II
Mr. and Mrs. Page's homecoming was a tragedy. They sailed from Liverpool
on August 3rd, and reached New York on the evening of August 11th. But
sad news awaited them upon the dock. About two months previously their
youngest son, Frank, had been married to Miss Katherine Sefton, of
Auburn, N.Y., and the young couple had settled down in Garden City, Long
Island. That was the summer when the epidemic of infantile paralysis
swept over the larger part of the United States. The young bride was
stricken; the case was unusually rapid and unusually severe; at the
moment of the Pages' arrival, they were informed that there was
practically no hope; and Mrs. Frank Page died at two o'clock on the
afternoon of the following day. The Pages had always been a particularly
united and happy family; this was the first time that they had suffered
from any domestic sorrow of this kind, and the Ambassador was so
affected that it was with difficulty that he could summon himself for
the task that lay ahead.
In a few days, however, he left for Washington. He has himself
described his experience at the Capital in words that must inevitably
take their place in history. To appreciate properly the picture which
Page gives, it must be remembered that the city and the officialdom
which he portrays are the same city and the same men who six months
afterward declared war on Germany. When Page reached Washington, the
Presidential campaign was in full swing, with Mr. Wilson as the
Democratic candidate and Mr. Charles E. Hughes as the Republican. But
another crisis was absorbing the nation's attention: the railway unions,
comprising practically all the 2,000,000 railway employees in the United
States, were threatening to strike--ostensibly for an eight-hour day, in
reality for higher wages.
_Mr. Page's memorandum of his visit to Washington in August, 1916_
The President was very courteous to me, in his way. He invited me to
luncheon the day after I arrived. Present: the President, Mrs. Wilson,
Miss Bones, Tom Bolling, his brother-in-law, and I. The conversation was
general and in the main jocular. Not a word about England, not a word
about a foreign policy or foreign relations.
He explained that the threatened railway strike engaged his whole mind.
I asked to have a talk with him when his mind should be free. Would I
not go off and rest and come back?--I preferred to do my minor errands
with the Department, but I should hold myself at his convenience and at
his command.
Two weeks passed. Another invitation to lunch. Sharp, the Ambassador to
France, had arrived. He, too, was invited. Present: the President, Mrs.
Wilson, Mrs. Wallace, the Misses Smith of New Orleans, Miss Bones,
Sharp, and I. Not one word about foreign affairs.
After luncheon, the whole party drove to the Capitol, where the
President addressed Congress on the strike, proposing legislation to
prevent it and to forestall similar strikes. It is a simple ceremony and
somewhat impressive. The Senators occupy the front seats in the House,
the Speaker presides and the President of the Senate sits on his right.
An escorting committee is sent out to bring the President in. He walks
to the clerk's or reader's desk below the presiding officer's, turns and
shakes hands with them both and then proceeds to read his speech, very
clearly and audibly. Some passages were applauded. When he had done, he
again shook hands with the presiding officer and went out, preceded and
followed by the White House escort. I sat in the Presidential (or
diplomatic?) gallery with the White House party, higgledy-piggledy.
The speech ended, the President drove to the White House with his escort
in his car. The crowds in the corridors and about the doors waited and
crowded to see Mrs. Wilson, quite respectful but without order or
discipline. We had to push our way through them. Now and then a
policeman at a distance would yell loudly, "Make way there!"
When we reached the White House, I asked the doorman if the President
had arrived.
"Yes."
"Does he expect me to go in and say good-bye?"
"No."
Thus he had no idea of talking with me now, if ever. Not at lunch nor
after did he suggest a conversation about American-British affairs or
say anything about my seeing him again.
This threatened strike does hold his whole mind--bothers him greatly.
It seems doubtful if he can avert a general strike. The Republicans are
trying "to put him in a political hole," and they say he, too, is
playing politics. Whoever be to blame for it, it is true that politics
is in the game. Nobody seems to foresee who will make capital out of it.
Surely I can't.
There's no social sense at the White House. The President has at his
table family connections only--and they say few or no distinguished men
and women are invited, except the regular notables at the set
dinners--the diplomatic, the judiciary, and the like. His table is his
private family affair--nothing more. It is very hard to understand why
so intellectual a man doesn't have notable men about him. It's the
college professor's village habit, I dare say. But it's a great
misfortune. This is one way in which Mr. Wilson shuts out the world and
lives too much alone, feeding only on knowledge and subjects that he has
already acquired and not getting new views or fresh suggestions from men
and women.
He sees almost nobody except members of Congress for whom he sends for
special conferences, and he usually sees these in his office. The
railroad presidents and men he met in formal conference--no social
touch.
A member of his Cabinet told me that Mr. Wilson had shown confidence in
him, given him a wide range of action in his own Department and that he
relies on his judgment. This Cabinet member of course attends the
routine state dinners and receptions, as a matter of required duty. But
as for any social recognition of his existence--he had never received a
hint or nod. Nor does any member of the Cabinet (except, no doubt, Mr.
McAdoo, his son-in-law). There is no social sense nor reason in this. In
fact, it works to a very decided disadvantage to the President and to
the Nation.
By the way, that a notable man in our educational life could form such a
habit does not speak well for our educational life.
What an unspeakably lamentable loss of opportunity! This is the more
remarkable and lamentable because the President is a charming
personality, an uncommonly good talker, a man who could easily make
personal friends of all the world. He does his own thinking, untouched
by other men's ideas. He receives nothing from the outside. His domestic
life is spent with his own, nobody else, except House occasionally. His
contact with his own Cabinet is a business man's contact with his
business associates and kind--at his office.
He declined to see Cameron Forbes[41] on his return from the
Philippines.
The sadness of this mistake!
Another result is--the President doesn't hear the frank truth about the
men about him. He gives nobody a chance to tell him. Hence he has
several heavy encumbrances in his official family.
The influence of this lone-hand way of playing the game extends very
far. The members of the Cabinet do not seem to have the habit of
frankness with one another. Each lives and works in a water-tight
compartment. I sat at luncheon (at a hotel) with Lansing, Secretary of
State; Lane, Secretary of the Interior; Gregory, Attorney-General;
Baker, Secretary of War; Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; and Sharp,
Ambassador to France; and all the talk was jocular or semi-jocular, and
personal--mere cheap chaff. Not a question was asked either of the
Ambassador to France or of the Ambassador to Great Britain about the war
or about our foreign relations. The war wasn't mentioned. Sharp and I
might have come from Bungtown and Jonesville and not from France and
England. We were not encouraged to talk--the local personal joke held
the time and conversation. This astounding fact must be the result of
this lone-hand, water-tight compartment method and--of the neutrality
suppression of men. The Vice-President confessed to his neighbour at a
Gridiron dinner that he had read none of the White Papers, or Orange
Papers, etc., of the belligerent governments--confessed this with
pride--lest he should form an opinion and cease to be neutral! Miss X, a
member of the President's household, said to Mrs. Y, the day we lunched
there, that she had made a remark privately to Sharp showing her
admiration of the French.
"Was that a violation of neutrality?" she asked in all seriousness.
I can see it in no other way but this: the President suppressed free
thought and free speech when he insisted upon personal neutrality. He
held back the deliberate and spontaneous thought and speech of the
people except the pro-Germans, who saw their chance and improved it! The
mass of the American people found themselves forbidden to think or talk,
and this forbidding had a sufficient effect to make them take refuge in
indifference. It's the President's job. He's our leader. He'll attend to
this matter. We must not embarrass him. On this easy cushion of
non-responsibility the great masses fell back at their intellectual and
moral ease--softened, isolated, lulled.
That wasn't leadership in a democracy. Right here is the President's
vast failure. From it there is now no escape unless the Germans commit
more submarine crimes. They have kept the United States for their own
exploiting after the war. They have thus had a real triumph of us.
I have talked in Washington with few men who showed any clear conception
of the difference between the Germans and the British. To the minds of
these people and high Government officials, German and English are alike
foreign nations who are now foolishly engaged in war. Two of the men who
look upon the thing differently are Houston[42] and Logan Waller
Page[43]. In fact, there is no realization of the war in Washington.
Secretary Houston has a proper perspective of the situation. He would
have done precisely what I recommended--paved the way for claims and let
the English take their course. "International law" is no strict code and
it's all shot to pieces anyhow.
The Secretary [of State] betrayed not the slightest curiosity about our
relations with Great Britain. I saw him several times--(1) in his
office; (2) at his house; (3) at the French Ambassador's; (4) at
Wallace's; (5) at his office; (6) at Crozier's[44]--this during my first
stay in Washington. The only remark he made was that I'd find a
different atmosphere in Washington from the atmosphere in London. Truly.
All the rest of his talk was about "cases." Would I see Senator Owen?
Would I see Congressman Sherley? Would I take up this "case" and that?
His mind ran on "cases."
Well, at Y's, when I was almost in despair, I rammed down him a sort of
general statement of the situation as I saw it; at least, I made a
start. But soon he stopped me and ran off at a tangent on some
historical statement I had made, showing that his mind was not at all on
the real subject, the large subject. When I returned to Washington, and
he had read my interviews with Grey, Asquith, and Bryce[45], and my own
statement, he still said nothing, but he ceased to talk of "cases." At
my final interview he said that he had had difficulty in preventing
Congress from making the retaliatory resolution mandatory. He had tried
to keep it back till the very end of the session, etc.
This does not quite correspond with what the President told me--that the
State Department asked for this retaliatory resolution.
I made specific suggestions in my statement to the President and to
Lansing. They have (yet) said nothing about them. I fancy they will not.
I have found nowhere any policy--only "cases."
I proposed to Baker and Daniels that they send a General and an Admiral
as attachés to London. They both agreed. Daniels later told me that
Baker mentioned it to the President and he "stepped on the suggestion
with both feet." I did not bring it up. In the Franco-Prussian War of
1870, both General McClellan (or Sheridan[46]?) and General Forsythe
were sent to the German Army. Our military ideas have shrunk since then!
I find at this date (a month before the Presidential election), the
greatest tangle and uncertainty of political opinion that I have ever
observed in our country. The President, in spite of his unparalleled
leadership and authority in domestic policy, is by no means certain of
election. He has the open hostility of the Germans--all very well, if he
had got the fruits of a real hostility to them; but they have, in many
ways, directed his foreign policy. He has lost the silent confidence of
many men upon whose conscience this great question weighs heavily. If he
be defeated he will owe his defeat to the loss of confidence in his
leadership on this great subject. His opponent has put forth no
clear-cut opinion. He plays a silent game on the German "issue." Yet he
will command the support of many patriotic men merely as a lack of
confidence in the President.
Nor do I see any end of the results of this fundamental error. In the
economic and political readjustment of the world we shall be "out of the
game," in any event--unless we are yet forced into the war by Hughes's
election or by the renewal of the indiscriminate use of submarines by
the Germans.
There is a great lesson in this lamentable failure of the President
really to lead the Nation. The United States stands for democracy and
free opinion as it stands for nothing else and as no other nation stands
for it. Now when democracy and free opinion are at stake as they have
not before been, we take a "neutral" stand--we throw away our very
birthright. We may talk of "humanity" all we like: we have missed the
largest chance that ever came to help the large cause that brought us
into being as a Nation....
And the people, sitting on the comfortable seats of neutrality upon
which the President has pushed them back, are grateful for Peace, not
having taken the trouble to think out what Peace has cost us and cost
the world--except so many as have felt the uncomfortable stirrings of
the national conscience.
There is not a man in our State Department or in our Government who has
ever met any prominent statesmen in any European Government--except the
third Assistant Secretary of State, who has no authority in forming
policies; there is not a man who knows the atmosphere of Europe. Yet
when I proposed that one of the under Secretaries should go to England
on a visit of a few weeks for observation, the objection arose that
such a visit would not be "neutral."
III
The extraordinary feature of this experience was that Page had been
officially summoned home, presumably to discuss the European situation,
and that neither the President nor the State Department apparently had
the slightest interest in his visit.
"The President," Page wrote to Mr. Laughlin, "dominates the whole show
in a most extraordinary way. The men about him (and he sees them only on
'business') are very nearly all very, very small fry, or worse--the
narrowest twopenny lot I've ever come across. He has no real companions.
Nobody talks to him freely and frankly. I've never known quite such a
condition in American life." Perhaps the President had no desire to
discuss inconvenient matters with his Ambassador to Great Britain, but
Page was certainly determined to have an interview with the President.
"I'm not going back to London," he wrote Mr. Laughlin, "till the
President has said something to me or at least till I have said
something to him. I am now going down to Garden City and New York till
the President send for me; or, if he do not send for me, I'm going to
his house and sit on his front steps till he come out!" Page had brought
from England one of the medals which the Germans had struck in honour of
the _Lusitania_ sinking, and one reason why he particularly wished to
see the President alone was to show him this memento.
Another reason was that in early September Page had received important
news from London concerning the move which Germany was making for peace
and the attitude of Great Britain in this matter. The several plans
which Germany had had under consideration had now taken the form of a
definite determination to ask for an armistice before winter set in. A
letter from Mr. Laughlin, Chargé d'affaires in Page's absence, tells the
story.
_From Irwin Laughlin_
Embassy of the United States of America.
London, August 30, 1916.
DEAR MR. PAGE:
For some little time past I have heard persistent rumours, which
indeed are more than rumours, since they have come from important
sources, of an approaching movement by Germany toward an early
armistice. They have been so circumstantial and so closely
connected--in prospect--with the President, that I have examined
them with particular attention and I shall try to give you the
results, and my conclusions, with the recommendation that you take
the matter up directly with the President and the Secretary of
State. I have been a little at a loss to decide how to communicate
what I have learned to the Government in Washington, for the
present conditions make it impossible to set down what I want to
say in an official despatch, but the fortunate accident of your
being in the United States gives me the safe opportunity I want,
and so I send my information to you, and by the pouch, as time is
of less importance than secrecy.
There seems to be no doubt that Germany is casting about for an
opportunity to effect an armistice, if possible before the winter
closes in. She hopes it may result in peace--a peace more or less
favourable to her, of course--but even if such a result should fail
of accomplishment she would have gained a breathing space; have
secured an opportunity to improve her strategic position in a
military sense, perhaps by shortening her line in Flanders: have
stiffened the resistance of her people; and probably have
influenced a certain body of neutral opinion not only in her favour
but against her antagonists.
I shall not try to mention the various sources from which the
threads that compose this fabric have been drawn, but I finally
fastened on X of the Admiralty as a man with whom I could talk
profitably and confidentially, and he told me positively that his
information showed that Germany was looking in the direction I have
indicated, and that she would soon approach the President on the
subject--even if she had not already taken the first steps toward
preparing her advance to him.
I asked X if he thought it well for me to broach the subject to
Lord Grey and he suggested that I first consult Y, which I did. The
latter seemed very wary at the outset, but he warmed up at last and
in the course of the conversation told me he had reliable
information that when Bethmann-Hollweg went to Munich just before
the beginning of the allied offensive in the west in June he told
the King of Bavaria that he was confident the Allies would be
obliged to begin overtures for peace next October; adding that if
they didn't Germany would have to do so. The King, it appears,
asked him how Germany could approach the Allies if it proved to be
advisable and he replied: "Through our good friend Wilson."
I asked Y if the King of Spain's good offices would not be enlisted
jointly with those of the President in attempting to arrange an
armistice, but he thought not, and said that the King of Spain was
very well aware that the Allies would not consider anything short
of definite peace proposals from Germany and that His Majesty knew
the moment for them had not arrived. I then finally asked him point
blank if he thought the Germans would approach the President for an
armistice, and, if so, when. He said he was inclined to think they
might do so perhaps about October. On my asking him if he was
disposed to let me communicate his opinion privately to the
Government in Washington he replied after some hesitation that he
had no objection, but he quickly added that I must make it clear at
the same time that the British Government would not listen to any
such proposals.
These conversations took place during the course of last week, and
on Sunday--the 27th--I invited the Spanish Ambassador to luncheon
at Tangley when I was able to get him to confirm what Y had said of
his Sovereign's attitude and opinions.
I may mention for what it is worth that on Hoover's last trip to
Germany he was told by Bullock, of the Philadelphia _Ledger_, that
Zimmermann of the Berlin Foreign Office had told him that the
Germans had intended in June to take steps for an armistice which
were prevented by the preparations for the allied offensive in the
west.
Y was very emphatic in what he said of the attitude of his
government and the British people toward continuing the war to an
absolutely conclusive end, and I was much impressed. He said among
other things that the execution of Captain Fryatt had had a
markedly perceptible effect in hardening British public opinion
against Germany and fixing the determination to fight to a
relentless finish. This corresponds exactly with my own
observations.
I leave this letter entirely in your hands. You will know what use
to make of it. It is meant as an official communication in
everything but the usual form from which I have departed for
reasons I need not explain further.
I look forward eagerly to your return,
Very sincerely yours,
IRWIN LAUGHLIN.
Page waited five weeks before he succeeded in obtaining his interview
with Mr. Wilson.
_To the President_
The New Willard, Washington, D.C.
Thursday, September 21, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
While I am waiting for a convenient time to come when you will see
me for a conference and report, I send you notes on conversations
with Lord Grey and Lord Bryce[47]. They are, in effect, though of
course not in form, messages to you.
The situation between our government and Great Britain seems to me
most alarming; and (let me add) easily removable, if I can get the
ear of anybody in authority. But I find here only an atmosphere of
suspicion--unwarranted by facts and easily dissipated by straight
and simple friendly methods. I am sure of this.
I have, besides, a most important and confidential message for you
from the British Government which they prefer should be orally
delivered.
And I have written out a statement of my own study of the situation
and of certain proposals which, I think, if they commend themselves
to you, will go far to remove this dangerous tension. I hope to go
over them with you at your convenience.
Yours faithfully,
WALTER H. PAGE.
The situation was alarming for more reasons than the determination of
Germany to force the peace issue. The State Department was especially
irritated at this time over the blockade. Among the "trade advisers"
there was a conviction, which all Page's explanations had not destroyed,
that Great Britain was using the blockade as a means of destroying
American commerce and securing America's customers for herself. Great
Britain's regulations on the blacklist and "bunker coal" had intensified
this feeling. In both these latter questions Page regarded the British
actions as tactless and unjust; he had had many sharp discussions at the
Foreign Office concerning them, but had not made much headway in his
efforts to obtain their abandonment. The purpose of the "blacklist" was
to strike at neutral firms with German affiliations which were trading
with Germany. The Trading with the Enemy Act provided that such firms
could not trade with Great Britain; that British vessels must refuse to
accept their cargoes, and that any neutral ship which accepted such
cargoes would be denied bunker coal at British ports. Under this law the
Ministry of Blockade issued a "blacklist" of more than 1,000 proscribed
exporting houses in the United States. So great was the indignation
against this boycott in the United States that Congress, in early
September, had passed a retaliatory act; this gave the President the
authority at any time to place an embargo upon the exports to the United
States of countries which discriminated against American firms and also
to deny clearance to ships which refused to accept American cargoes. The
two countries indeed seemed to be hastening toward a crisis.
Page's urgent letter to Mr. Wilson brought a telegram from Mr. Tumulty
inviting the Ambassador to spend the next evening and night with the
President at Shadow Lawn, the seaside house on the New Jersey coast in
which Mr. Wilson was spending the summer. Mr. Wilson received his old
friend with great courtesy and listened quietly and with apparent
interest to all that he had to say. The written statement to which Page
refers in his letter told the story of Anglo-American relations from the
time of the Panama tolls repeal up to the time of Page's visit to Shadow
Lawn. Quotations have already been made from it in preceding chapters,
and the ideas which it contains have abundantly appeared in letters
already printed. The document was an eloquent plea for American
coöperation with the Allies--for the dismissal of Bernstorff, for the
adoption of a manly attitude toward Germany, and for the vindication of
a high type of Americanism.
Page showed the President the _Lusitania_ medal, but that did not
especially impress him. "The President said to me," wrote Page in
reference to this visit, "that when the war began he and all the men he
met were in hearty sympathy with the Allies; but that now the sentiment
toward England had greatly changed. He saw no one who was not vexed and
irritated by the arbitrary English course. That is, I fear, true--that
he sees no one but has a complaint. So does the Secretary of State, and
the Trade Bureau and all the rest in Washington. But in Boston, in New
York, and in the South and in Auburn, N.Y., I saw no one whose sympathy
with the Allies had undergone any fundamental change. I saw men who felt
vexed at such an act as the blacklist, but that was merely vexation, not
a fundamental change of feeling. Of course, there came to see me men who
had 'cases.' Now these are the only kind of men, I fear, whom the
Government at Washington sees--these and the members of Congress whom
the Germans have scared or have 'put up' to scare the Government--who
are 'twisting the lion's tail,' in a word."
"The President said," wrote Page immediately after coming from Shadow
Lawn, "Tell those gentlemen for me'--and then followed a homily to the
effect that a damage done to any American citizen is a damage to him,
etc. He described the war as a result of many causes, some of long
origin. He spoke of England's having the earth and of Germany wanting
it. Of course, he said, the German system is directly opposed to
everything American. But I do not gather that he thought that this
carried any very great moral reprehensibility.
"He said that he wouldn't do anything with the retaliatory act till
after election lest it might seem that he was playing politics. But he
hinted that if there were continued provocation afterward (in case he
were elected) he would. He added that one of the worst provocations was
the long English delay in answering our Notes. Was this delay due to
fear or shame? He evidently felt that such a delay showed contempt. He
spoke of the Bryan treaty[48]. But on no question had the British
'locked horns' with us--on no question had they come to a clear issue so
that the matter might be referred to the Commission."
Page delivered his oral message about the German determination to obtain
an armistice. This was to the effect that Great Britain would not grant
it. Page intimated that Britain would be offended if the President
proposed it.
"If an armistice, no," answered Mr. Wilson. "That's a military matter
and is none of my business. But if they propose an armistice looking
toward peace--yes, I shall be glad."
The experience was an exceedingly trying one for both men. The
discussion showed how far apart were the President and his Ambassador on
practically every issue connected with the crisis. Naturally the
President's reference to the causes of the war--that there were many
causes, some of them of long persistence, and that Great Britain's
domination of the "earth" was one of them--conflicted with the judgment
of a man who attributed the origin of the struggle to German aggression.
The President's statement that American sympathy for the Allies had now
changed to irritation, and the tolerant attitude toward Germany which
Mr. Wilson displayed, affected Page with the profoundest discouragement.
The President's intimation that he would advance Germany's request for
an armistice, if it looked toward peace--this in reply to Page's message
that Great Britain would not receive such a proposal in a kindly
spirit--seemed to lay the basis of further misunderstandings. The
interview was a disheartening one for Page. Many people whom the
Ambassador met in the course of this visit still retain memories of his
fervour in what had now become with him a sacred cause. With many
friends and officials he discussed the European situation almost like a
man inspired. The present writer recalls two long conversations with
Page at this time: the recollection of his brilliant verbal portraiture,
his description of the determination of Englishmen, his admiration for
the heroic sacrifice of Englishwomen, remain as about the most vivid
memories of a life-time. And now the Ambassador had brought this same
eloquence to the President's ear at Shadow Lawn. It was in this
interview that Page had hoped to show Mr. Wilson the real merits of the
situation, and persuade him to adopt the course to which the national
honour and safety pointed; he talked long and eloquently, painting the
whole European tragedy with that intensity and readiness of utterance
and that moral conviction which had so moved all others with whom he had
come into contact during this memorable visit to the United States; but
Mr. Wilson was utterly cold, utterly unresponsive, interested only in
ending the war. The talk lasted for a whole morning; its nature may be
assumed from the many letters already printed; but Page's voice, when it
attempted to fire the conscience of the President, proved as ineffective
as his pen. However, there was nothing rasping or contentious about the
interview. The two men discussed everything with the utmost calmness and
without the slightest indications of ill-nature. Both men had in mind
their long association, both inevitably recalled the hopes with which
they had begun their official relationship three years before, at that
time neither having the faintest intimation of the tremendous problems
that were to draw them asunder. Mr. Wilson at this meeting did not
impress his Ambassador as a perverse character, but as an extremely
pathetic one. Page came away with no vexation or anger, but with a real
feeling for a much suffering and a much perplexed statesman. The fact
that the President's life was so solitary, and that he seemed to be so
completely out of touch with men and with the living thoughts of the
world, appealed strongly to Page's sympathies. "I think he is the
loneliest man I have ever known," Page remarked to his son Frank after
coming away from this visit.
Page felt this at the time, for, as he rose to say good-bye to the
President, he put his hand upon his shoulder. At this Mr. Wilson's eyes
filled with tears and he gave Page an affectionate good-bye. The two men
never met again.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 38: This is quoted from a hitherto unpublished despatch of
Bernstorff's to Berlin which is found among Page's papers.]
[Footnote 39: The _China_ case was a kind of _Trent_ case reversed. In
1861 the American ship _San Jacinto_ stopped the British vessel _Trent_
and took off Mason and Slidell, Confederate commissioners to Great
Britain. Similarly a British ship, in 1916, stopped an American ship,
the _China_, and removed several German subjects. As the British quickly
saw the analogy, and made suitable amends, the old excitement over the
_Trent_ was not duplicated in the recent war.]
[Footnote 40: See Chapter XIII, page 434.]
[Footnote 41: Mr. Forbes had been Governor-General of the Philippines
from 1909 to 1913. His work had been extraordinarily successful.]
[Footnote 42: Secretary of Agriculture.]
[Footnote 43: In charge of government road building, a distant relative
of the Ambassador.]
[Footnote 44: Major General William Crozier, U.S.A., Chief of Ordnance.]
[Footnote 45: See Chapter XIX, pages 160-164.]
[Footnote 46: It was General Sheridan.]
[Footnote 47: See Chapter XIX, pages 160 and 164.]
[Footnote 48: The treaty between the United States and Great Britain,
adopted through the urgency of Mr. Bryan, providing for the arbitration
of disputes between the two countries.]
CHAPTER XX
"PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY"
"Of one thing I am sure," Page wrote to his wife from Washington, while
waiting to see President Wilson. "We wish to come home March 4th at
midnight and to go about our proper business. There's nothing here that
I would for the world be mixed up with. As soon as I can escape with
dignity I shall make my bow and exit.... But I am not unhappy or
hopeless for the long run. They'll find out the truth some day, paying,
I fear, a heavy penalty for delay. But the visit here has confirmed me
in our previous conclusions--that if we can carry the load until March
4th, midnight, we shall be grateful that we have pulled through."
Soon after President Wilson's reëlection, therefore, Page sent his
resignation to Washington. The above quotation shows that he intended
this to be more than a "courtesy resignation," a term traditionally
applied to the kind of leave-takings which Ambassadors usually send on
the formation of a new administration, or at the beginning of a new
Presidential term, for the purpose of giving the President the
opportunity of reorganizing his official family. Page believed that his
work in London had been finished, that he had done everything in his
power to make Mr. Wilson see the situation in its true light and that he
had not succeeded. He therefore wished to give up his post and come
home. This explains the fact that his resignation did not consist of the
half dozen perfunctory lines which most diplomatic officers find
sufficient on such an occasion, but took the form of a review of the
reasons why the United States should align itself on the side of the
Allies.
_To the President_
London, November 24, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
We have all known for many years that the rich and populous and
organized states in which the big cities are do not constitute the
political United States. But, I confess, I hardly expected so soon
to see this fact proclaimed at the ballot-box. To me that's the
surprise of the election. And your popular majority as well as your
clear majority in the Electoral College is a great personal triumph
for you. And you have remade the ancient and demoralized Democratic
party. Four years ago it consisted of a protest and of the wreck
wrought by Mr. Bryan's long captaincy. This rebirth, with a popular
majority, is an historical achievement--of your own.
You have relaid the foundation and reset the pillars of a party
that may enjoy a long supremacy for domestic reasons. Now, if you
will permit me to say so, from my somewhat distant view (four years
make a long period of absence) the big party task is to build up a
clearer and more positive foreign policy. We are in the world and
we've got to choose what active part we shall play in it--I fear
rather quickly. I have the conviction, as you know, that this whole
round globe now hangs as a ripe apple for our plucking, if we use
the right ladder while the chance lasts. I do not mean that we want
or could get the apple for ourselves, but that we can see to it
that it is put to proper uses. What we have to do, in my judgment,
is to go back to our political fathers for our clue. If my longtime
memory be good, they were sure that their establishment of a great
free Republic would soon be imitated by European peoples--that
democracies would take the place of autocracies in all so-called
civilized countries; for that was the form that the fight took in
their day against organized Privilege. But for one reason or
another--in our life-time partly because we chose so completely to
isolate ourselves--the democratic idea took root in Europe with
disappointing slowness. It is, for instance, now perhaps for the
first time, in a thoroughgoing way, within sight in this Kingdom.
The dream of the American Fathers, therefore, is not yet come true.
They fought against organized Privilege exerted from over the sea.
In principle it is the same fight that we have made, in our
domestic field, during recent decades. Now the same fight has come
on a far larger scale than men ever dreamed of before.
It isn't, therefore, for merely doctrinal reasons that we are
concerned for the spread of democracy nor merely because a
democracy is the only scheme of organization yet wrought out that
keeps the door of opportunity open and invites all men to their
fullest development. But we are interested in it because under no
other system can the world be made an even reasonably safe place to
live in. For only autocracies wage aggressive wars. Aggressive
autocracies, especially military autocracies, must be softened down
by peace (and they have never been so softened) or destroyed by
war. The All-Highest doctrine of Germany to-day is the same as the
Taxation-without-Representation of George III--only more virulent,
stronger, and farther-reaching. Only by its end can the German
people recover and build up their character and take the permanent
place in the world that they--thus changed--will be entitled to.
They will either reduce Europe to the vassalage of a military
autocracy, which may then overrun the whole world or drench it in
blood, or they must through stages of Liberalism work their way
toward some approach to a democracy; and there is no doubt which
event is impending. The Liberal idea will win this struggle, and
Europe will be out of danger of a general assault on free
institutions till some other autocracy which has a military caste
try the same Napoleonic game. The defeat of Germany, therefore,
will make for the spread of the doctrine of our Fathers and our
doctrine yet.
An interesting book might be made of concrete evidences of the
natural antipathy that the present German autocracy has for
successful democracy and hence for us. A new instance has just come
to me. My son, Arthur, who succeeded to most of my activities at
home, has been over here for a month and he has just come from a
visit to France. In Paris he had a long conversation with Delcassé,
who told him that the Kaiser himself once made a proposal to him to
join in producing "the complete isolation" of the United States.
What the Kaiser meant was that if the great Powers of Europe would
hold off, he would put the Monroe Doctrine to the test and smash
it.
The great tide of the world will, by reason of the war, now flow
toward democracy--at present, alas! a tide of blood. For a century
democracies and Liberal governments have kept themselves too much
isolated, trusting prematurely and too simply to international law
and treaties and Hague conventions. These things have never been
respected, except as springs to catch woodcock, where the Divine
Right held sway. The outgrowing or the overthrow of the Divine
Right is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of
international law and treaties.
It has seemed to me, looking at the subject only with reference to
our country's duty and safety, that somehow and at some early time
our championship of democracy must lead us to redeclare our faith
and to show that we believe in our historic creed. Then we may
escape falling away from the Liberal forces of the Old World and
escape the suspicion of indifference to the great scheme of
government which was set up by our fathers' giving their blood for
it. I see no other way for us to take the best and biggest
opportunity that has ever come to prove true to our faith as well
as to secure our own safety and the safety of the world. Only some
sort of active and open identification with the Allies can put us
in effective protest against the assassins of the Armenians and the
assassins of Belgium, Poland, and Serbia, and in a friendly
attitude to the German people themselves, as distinguished from
their military rulers. This is the attitude surely that our fathers
would have wished us to take--and would have expected us to
take--and that our children will be proud of us for taking; for it
is our proper historic attitude, whether looked at from the past or
looked back at from the future. There can be no historic approval
of neutrality for years, while the world is bleeding to death.
The complete severance of relations, diplomatic at first and later
possibly economic as well, with the Turks and the Germans, would
probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable treasure;
for the moral effect of withdrawing even our formal approval of
their conduct--at least our passive acquiescence--would be--that
the Germans would see that practically all the Liberal world stands
against their system, and the war would end before we should need
to or could put an army in the field. The Liberal Germans are
themselves beginning to see that it is not they, but the German
system, that is the object of attack because it is _the_ dangerous
thing in the world. Maximilian Harden presents this view in his
Berlin paper. He says in effect that Germany must get rid of its
predatory feudalism. That was all that was the matter with George
III.
Among the practical results of such action by us would, I believe,
be the following:
1. The early ending of the war and the saving of, perhaps, millions
of lives and of incalculable treasure;
2. The establishment in Germany of some form of more liberal
government;
3. A league to enforce peace, ready-made, under our guidance--i.e.,
the Allies and ourselves;
4. The sympathetic coöperation and the moral force of every Allied
Government in dealing with Mexico:
5. The acceptance--and even documentary approval--of every Allied
Government of the Monroe Doctrine;
6. The warding off and no doubt the final prevention of danger from
Japan, and, most of all, the impressive and memorable spectacle of
our Great Democracy thus putting an end to this colossal crime,
merely from the impulse and necessity to keep our own ideals and to
lead the world right on. We should do for Europe on a large scale
essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale and thereby usher
in a new era in human history.
I write thus freely, Mr. President, because at no time can I write
in any other way and because I am sure that all these things can
quickly be brought to pass under your strong leadership. The United
States would stand, as no other nation has ever stood in the
world--predominant and unselfish--on the highest ideals ever
reached in human government. It is a vision as splendid as the Holy
Grael. Nor have I a shadow of doubt of the eager and faithful
following of our people, who would thereby reëstablish once for all
our weakened nationality. We are made of the stuff that our Fathers
were made of.
And I write this now for the additional reason that I am within
sight of the early end of my service here. When you called me I
answered, not only because you did me great honour and laid a
definite patriotic duty on me, but because also of my personal
loyalty to you and my pride in helping forward the great principles
in which we both believe. But I understood then (and I am sure the
subject lay in your mind in the same way) that my service would be
for four years at the most. I made all my arrangements,
professional and domestic, on this supposition. I shall, therefore,
be ready to lay down my work here on March 4th or as soon
thereafter as meets your pleasure.
I am more than proud of the confidence that you have shown in me.
To it I am indebted for the opportunity I have had to give such
public service to my country as I could, as well as for the most
profitable experience of my life. A proper and sympathetic
understanding between the two English-speaking worlds seems to me
the most important duty of far-seeing men in either country. It has
taken such a profound hold on me that I shall, in whatever way I
can, work for its complete realization as long as I can work for
anything.
I am, Mr. President, most faithfully and gratefully yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
This letter was written at a time when President Wilson was exerting his
best energies to bring about peace. The Presidential campaign had caused
him to postpone these efforts, for he believed that neither Germany nor
Great Britain could take seriously the activities of a President whose
own political position was insecure. At the time Page's letter was
received, the President was thinking only of a peace based upon a
stalemate; it was then his apparent conviction that both sides to the
struggle were about equally in the wrong and that a decisive victory of
either would not be a good thing for the world. Yet it is interesting to
compare this letter with the famous speech which the President made six
months afterward when he asked Congress to declare the existence of a
state of war with Germany. Practically all the important reasons which
Mr. Wilson then advanced for this declaration are found in Page's letter
of the preceding November. That autocracies are a constant menace to
world peace, that the United States owes it to its democratic tradition
to take up arms against the enemy of free government, that in doing
this, it was not making war upon the German people, but upon its
imperialistic masters--these were the arguments which Page laid before
the President in his letter of resignation, and these were the leading
ideas in Mr. Wilson's address of April 2nd. There are even sentences in
Page's communication which seem to foreshadow Mr. Wilson's assertion
that "The world must be made safe for democracy." This letter in itself
sufficiently makes it clear that Page's correspondence, irritating in
its later phases as it may have been, strongly influenced Mr. Wilson in
his final determination on war.
On one point, indeed, Colonel House afterward called the Ambassador to
account. When America was preparing to raise armies by the millions and
to spend its treasure by the billions, he reminded Page of his statement
that the severance of diplomatic relations "would probably not cost us a
man in battle nor any considerable treasure." Page's statement in this
November letter merely reiterated a conviction which for more than a
year he had been forcing upon the President and Colonel House--that the
dismissal of Bernstorff would not necessarily imply war with Germany,
but that it would in itself be enough to bring the war to an end. On
this point Page never changed his mind, as is evident from the letter
which he wrote to Colonel House when this matter was called to his
attention:
_To Edward M. House_
London, June 29, 1917.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor on
anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet I do
think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and a half ago
when I said that we could then have ended the war without any
appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:
If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from
reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then
have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:
(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.
(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine fleet.
She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.
(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she got
food and oil; and continues to get it.
(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force and gave
her more time, more armies for France and more supplies. Russian
guns have been sold to the Germans.
If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would have been
over before any of these things happened. This delay is what will
cost us billions and billions and men and men.
And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period we
were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which were
in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are now eager
to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend, and who was
unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged to, was
thrown out of office and his career ended because the blockade,
owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough. Our delay
caused his fall.
But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent
material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were at
work on them all the while and according to the best opinion here
they continue to build them faster than the British destroy them;
and the submarines are destroying more merchant ships than all the
shipbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out. This is
the most serious aspect of the war--by far the most serious. I am
trying to get our Government to send over hundreds of improvised
destroyers--armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral Sims and the
British Admiralty have fears that unless such help come the full
fruits of the war may never be gathered by the Allies--that some
sort of a compromise peace may have to be made.
It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited after the
_Lusitania_ will prove to be the most costly year and a half in our
history; and for once at least my old prophecy was quite a good
guess. But that water has flowed over the dam and it is worth
mentioning now only because you challenged me....
That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had a curious
history. It was practically a resignation and therefore called for an
immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge its receipt.
For two months the Ambassador was left in the dark as to the attitude
of Washington. Finally, in the latter part of January, 1917, Page wrote
urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him to bring the matter to the
President's attention. On February 5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was
received. "The President," he said, "under extreme pressure of the
present situation, has been unable to consider your communication in
regard to your resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes
that, at the present time, you will not press to be relieved from
service; that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal
sacrifice, but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in
the crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly
need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought of
resigning your post for the present."
At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the question.
The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was every likelihood
that the country would soon be at war. Page would have regarded his
retirement at this crisis as little less than the desertion of his post.
Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted the policy which the Ambassador
had been urging for nearly two years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any
logical excuse that may have existed for his resignation existed no
longer. Mr. Wilson had now adopted a course which Page could
enthusiastically support.
"I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice"--such was his reply to Mr.
Lansing--"until after the end of the war, and I am making my
arrangements to stay for this period."
The months that intervened between the Presidential election and the
declaration of war were especially difficult for the American Embassy in
London. Page had informed the President, in the course of his interview
of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain regarded his efforts
in the direction of peace; he had in fact delivered a message from the
Foreign Office that any Presidential attempt to "mediate" would be
rejected by the Allies. Yet his earnest representation on this point had
produced no effect upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was
bringing to bear upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count
Bernstorff's memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed
the intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most
startling fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on
October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words, that,
unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the German
Government "would be forced to regain the freedom of action which it has
reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last[49]." It is unlikely that
the annals of diplomacy contain many documents so cool and insolent as
this one. It was a notification from the Kaiser to the President that
the so-called "Sussex pledge" was not regarded as an unconditional one
by the Imperial Government; that it was given merely to furnish Mr.
Wilson an opportunity to bring the war to an end; and that unless the
Presidential attempt to accomplish this were successful, there would be
a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious
developments of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly
because the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his
proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously
and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign
against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December 6th,
and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food supplies,
strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany, with her
characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own open efforts would
lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions. At any rate, on
December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing to launch his own
campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached her enemies with a
proposal for a peace conference. A few days afterward Page, as the
representative of Germany, called at the Foreign Office to deliver the
large white envelope which contained the Kaiser's "peace proposal." In
delivering this to Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign
Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the
fact that the American Government entirely disassociated itself from its
contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of "German
Ambassador." Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil Spring
Rice, British Ambassador at Washington, tell the story and also reveal
that it was almost impossible for Page, even when engaged in an official
proceeding, to conceal his contempt for the whole enterprise:
_Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice_
Foreign Office,
December 18, 1916.
SIR:
The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented
to me the German note containing what is called in it the "offer of
peace." He explained that he did so on instructions of his
Government as representing the German Government, and not in any
way as representing their own opinions. He also explained that the
note must be regarded as coming from the four Central Powers, and
as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who were represented
by the United States.
He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined to
leave me a copy of it. The first part of the telegram explained
that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate a
confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German
note and that they would themselves have certain representations to
make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged the
closest consideration. The telegram went on to explain that the
Government of the United States had had it in mind for some time
past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations and
humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were prompted
by the Governments of the Central Powers. They wished us to
understand that the note of the Central Powers created a good
opportunity for making the American representations, but was not
the cause of such representations being made.
I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such an
important matter without consulting my colleagues.
I am, etc.,
ROBERT CECIL.
_Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice_
Foreign Office,
19 December, 1916.
SIR:
The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.
I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were
anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of our
response to the German peace note. He replied that he did not know,
but he imagined it was to enable them to frame the representations
of which he had spoken to me.
I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply, and
that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all
probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the
German note. I thought it probable that we should express our view
that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since it
contained no specific proposals.
He said that he quite understood this, and that we should in fact
reply that it was an offer "to buy a pig in a poke" which we were
not prepared to accept. He added that he thought his Government
would fully anticipate a reply in this sense, and he himself
obviously approved it.
Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard people in
London treating the German offer with derision, but that no doubt
the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.
I said that it was certainly a serious thing, and no doubt would be
treated seriously.
I asked him if he knew what would be contained in the proposed
representations from his government.
He said that he did not; but as he understood that they were to be
made to all the belligerents, he did not think that they could be
much more than a pious aspiration for peace; since that was the
only thing that was equally applicable to the Germans and to us.
As he was leaving he suggested that the German note might be
published in our press.
I am, etc.,
ROBERT CECIL.
This so-called German "peace proposal" began with the statement that the
war "had been forced" upon Germany, contained the usual reference to the
military might of the Central Powers, and declared that the Fatherland
was fighting for "the honour and liberty of national evolution." It is
therefore not surprising that Lord Robert received it somewhat
sardonically, especially as the communication contained no specific
proposals, but merely a vague suggestion of "negotiations." But another
spectacular performance now drove the German manoeuvre out of
everybody's mind. That President Wilson resented this German
interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop them,
however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated peace
communication to all the warring Powers. His appeal took the form of
asking that they state the objects for which they were fighting, the
Presidential belief evidently being that, if they did this, a common
meeting ground might possibly be found. The suggestion that the Allied
war aims were not public property, despite the fact that British
statesmen had been broadly proclaiming them for three years, caused a
momentary irritation in England, but this was not a serious matter,
especially as the British Cabinet quickly saw that this request gave
them a position of advantage over Germany, which had always refused to
make public the terms on which it would end the war. The main substance
in this Presidential approach, therefore, would have produced no
ill-feeling; as usual, it was a few parenthetical phrases--phrases which
were not essential to the main argument--which set the allied countries
seething with indignation. The President, this section of his note ran,
"takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects
which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in
this war, are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their
own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and
privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression
and denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and
powerful states now at war." This idea was elaborated in several
sentences of a similar strain, the general purport of the whole passage
being that there was little to choose between the combatants, inasmuch
as both were apparently fighting for about the same things. Mr. Wilson's
purpose in this paragraph is not obscure; he was making his long
expected appearance as a mediator, and he evidently believed that it was
essential to this rôle that he should not seem to be prejudiced in
favour of either side, but should hold the balance impartially between
them.
It is true that a minute reading indicates that Mr. Wilson was merely
quoting, or attempting to paraphrase, the statements of the leaders of
both sides, but there is such a thing as quoting with approval, and no
explanation could convince the British public that the ruler of the
greatest neutral nation had not declared that the Allies and the Central
Powers stood morally upon the same level. The popular indignation which
this caused in Great Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British
authorities. The publication of this note in the British press was
withheld for several hours, in order to give the Government an
opportunity to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it
was feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that
relations with the United States might be imperilled. The messages which
the London correspondents were permitted to send to the United States
were carefully censored for the same reason. The dispatch sent by the
Associated Press was the product of a long struggle between the Foreign
Office and its London correspondent. The representatives spent half an
hour considering whether the American correspondents could cable their
country that the note had been received in England with "surprise and
irritation." After much discussion it was decided that "irritation"
could not be used, and the message of the Associated Press, after
undergoing this careful editing by the Foreign Office, was a weak and
ridiculous description of the high state of excitement which prevailed
in Great Britain. The fact that the British Foreign Office should have
given all this trouble over the expressions sent to American newspapers
and should even have spent half an hour debating whether a particular
word should be used, almost pathetically illustrates the great care
taken by the British Government not to influence American opinion
against the Allies.
The Government took the same precautions with its own press in England.
When the note was finally released the Foreign Office explicitly
directed the London newspapers to comment with the utmost caution and in
no case to question the President's sincerity. Most of them acquiesced
in these instructions by maintaining silence. There was only one London
newspaper, the _Westminster Gazette_, which made even a faint-hearted
attempt to explain away the President's statement. From the first day of
the war the British people had declared that President Wilson did not
understand the issues at stake; and they now declared that this note
confirmed their worst forebodings. The comments of the man-in-the-street
were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression which
Mr. Wilson's dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen who had always
been especially friendly to the United States and who had even defended
the President in previous crises. Lord Bryce, who had accepted
philosophically the Presidential statement that the United States was
not "concerned with the causes" of the war, could not regard so
indulgently this latest judgment of Great Britain and Germany. "Bryce
came to see me in a state of great depression," wrote Page. "He has sent
Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter." Northcliffe commanded his
newspapers, the _Times_ and the _Daily Mail_, to discuss the note in a
judicial spirit, but he himself told Mr. Page that "everybody is as
angry as hell." When someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with
Mr. Asquith, he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture.
"Don't talk to me about it," he said. "It is most disheartening." But
the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was King
George. A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace on December
21st gave Page a description of the royal distress. The King, expressing
his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should think that Englishmen
were fighting for the same things in this war as the Germans, broke
down.
The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which was opening
before Europe at the moment when this Presidential note added a new
cause for general despondency. Rumania had collapsed, the first inkling
of the Russian revolution had been obtained, the British well knew that
the submarine warfare was to be resumed, and British finances were also
in a desperate plight. More and more it was becoming evident to the
British statesmen that they needed the intervention of the United
States. This is the reason why they could not destroy the chances of
American help by taking official offense even at what Page, in a
communication to the Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call
President Wilson's "insulting words"; and hence their determination to
silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they felt.
Page's interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th, while the
Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses the real
emotions of Englishmen. Apparently Page's frank cables concerning the
reception of this paragraph had caused a certain interest in the State
Department; at least the Ambassador was instructed to call at the
Foreign Office and explain that the interpretation which had been
commonly put upon the President's words was not the one which he had
intended. At the same time Page was instructed to request the British
Foreign Office, in case its reply were "favourable," not to publish it,
but to communicate it secretly to the American Government. The purpose
of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the President's
plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany likewise to display
an acquiescent mood. The object of Page's call was to present this
disclaimer.
Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the late Lord Salisbury,--that same Lord
Salisbury whose combats with Secretary Blaine and Secretary Olney form
piquant chapters in British-American history--is one of the most able
and respected of British statesmen. In his earlier life Lord Salisbury
had been somewhat overbearing in his attitude toward the United States;
in his later years, however, perhaps owing to the influence of his
nephew, Mr. Balfour, his manner had changed. In his attitude toward the
United States Lord Robert Cecil reflected only the later phases of his
father's career. To this country and to its peaceful ideals he had
always been extremely sympathetic, and to Page especially he had never
manifested anything but cordiality. Yet it was evident, as Page came
into his office this morning, that to Lord Robert, as to every member of
the Government, the President's note, with its equivocal phrases, had
been a terrible shock. His manner was extremely courteous, as always,
but he made no attempt to conceal his feelings. Ordinarily Lord Robert
did not wear his emotions on the surface; but he took occasion on this
visit to tell Page how greatly the President's communication had grieved
him.
"The President," he said, "has seemed to pass judgment on the allied
cause by putting it on the same level as the German. I am deeply hurt."
Page conveyed Mr. Lansing's message that no such inference was
justified. But this was not reassuring.
"Moreover," Lord Robert added, "there is one sentence in the note--that
in which the President says that the position of neutrals is becoming
intolerable--that seems almost a veiled threat."
Page hastened to assure Lord Robert that no threat was intended.
Lord Robert's manner became increasingly serious.
"There is nothing that the American Government or any other human power
can do," he remarked slowly and solemnly, "which will bring this war to
a close before the Allies have spent their utmost force to secure a
victory. A failure to secure such a victory will leave the world at the
mercy of the most arrogant and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been
organized. It is far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny
than to perish under its success."
On any occasion Lord Robert is an impressive or at least a striking and
unusual figure; he is tall, lank, and ungainly, almost Lincolnesque in
the carelessness of his apparel and the exceeding awkwardness of his
postures and manners. His angular features, sharp nose, pale face, and
dark hair suggest the strain of ascetism, almost of fanaticism, which
runs in the present generation of his family. And the deep sincerity and
power of his words on this occasion made an impression which Page never
forgot; they transformed the British statesman into an eloquent, almost
an heroic figure. If we are to understand the full tragedy of this
moment we must remember that, incredible as it now seems, there was a
fear in British officialdom that the United States might not only not
pursue a course favourable to the Allies, but that it might even throw
its support to Germany. The fear, of course, was baseless; any
suggestion of such a policy in the United States would have destroyed
any official who had brought it forward; but Lord Robert knew and Page
knew that there were insidious influences at work at that time, both in
the United States and in Great Britain, which looked in this direction.
A group of Americans, whom Page used to refer to as "peace spies," were
associated with English pacifists, for the purpose of bringing about
peace on almost any terms. These "peace spies" had worked out a
programme all their own. The purpose was to compel Great Britain to
accept the German terms for ending the war. Unless she did accept them,
then it was intended that the American Government should place an
embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs and munitions to the Allies. There
is little question that the United States, by taking such action, could
have ended the war almost instantaneously. Should the food of her people
and the great quantities of munitions which were coming from this
country be suddenly cut off, there is little likelihood that Great
Britain could have long survived. The possibility that an embargo might
shut out these supplies had hung over the heads of British statesmen
ever since the war began; they knew that the possession of this mighty
power made the United States the potential dictator of events; and the
fear that it might be used had never ceased to influence their thoughts
or their actions. Even while this interview was taking place, certain
anti-British forces in the United States, such as Senator Hoke Smith of
Georgia, were urging action of this kind.
"I have always been almost a Pacifist," Lord Robert continued. "No man
has ever hated war worse than I. No man has ever had a more earnest
faith that war can be abolished. But European civilization has been
murderously assaulted and there is nothing now to do but to defeat this
desperate enemy or to perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United
States understood what is at stake."
Lord Robert went on:
"I will go so far as to say that if the United States will come into the
war it will decide which will win, freedom or organized tyranny. If the
United States shall help the Germans, civilization will perish and it
will be necessary to build it up slowly again--if indeed it will ever
appear again. If the United States will help the Allies, civilization
will triumph[50]."
As to the proposal that the British terms should be conveyed
confidentially to Mr. Wilson, Lord Robert said that that would be a
difficult thing to do. The President's note had been published, and it
therefore seemed necessary that the reply should also be given to the
press. This was the procedure that was ultimately adopted.
* * * * *
Startling as was the sensation caused by the President's December note,
it was mild compared with that which was now to come. Page naturally
sent prompt reports of all these conversations to the President and
likewise kept him completely informed as to the state of public feeling,
but his best exertions apparently did not immediately affect the Wilson
policy. The overwhelming fact is that the President's mind was fixed on
a determination to compel the warring powers to make peace and in this
way to keep the United States out of the conflict. Even the disturbance
caused by his note of December 18th did not make him pause in this peace
campaign. To that note the British sent a manly and definite reply,
drafted by Mr. Balfour, giving in detail precisely the terms upon which
the Allies would compose their differences with the Central Powers. The
Germans sent a reply consisting of ten or a dozen lines, which did not
give their terms, but merely asked again for a conference. Events were
now moving with the utmost rapidity. On January 9th, a council of German
military chieftains was held at Pless; in this it was decided to resume
unrestricted submarine warfare. On January 16th the Zimmermann-Mexico
telegram was intercepted; this informed Bernstorff, among other things,
that this decision had been made. On January 16th, at nine o'clock in
the morning, the American Embassy in London began receiving a long
cipher despatch from Washington. The preamble announced that the
despatch contained a copy of an address which the President proposed to
deliver before the Senate "in a few days." Page was directed to have
copies of the address "secretly prepared" and to hand them to the
British Foreign Office and to newspapers of the type of the Nation, the
Daily News, and the Manchester Guardian--all three newspapers well known
for their Pacifist tendencies. As the speech approached its end, this
sentence appeared: "It must be a peace without victory." The words
greatly puzzled the secretary in charge, for they seemed almost
meaningless. Suspecting that an error had been made in transmission, the
secretary directed the code room to cable Washington for a verification
of the cipher groups. Very soon the answer was received; there had been
no mistake; the Presidential words were precisely those which had been
first received: "Peace without victory." The slips were then taken to
Page, who read the document, especially these fateful syllables, with a
consternation which he made no effort to conceal. He immediately wrote a
cable to President Wilson, telling him of the deplorable effect this
sentence would produce and imploring him to cut it out of his
speech--with what success the world now knows.
An astonishing feature of this episode is that Page had recently
explained to the Foreign Office, in obedience to instructions from
Washington, that Mr. Wilson's December note should not be interpreted as
placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the same moral level. Now
Mr. Wilson, in this "peace without victory" phrase, had repeated
practically the same idea in another form. On the day the speech was
received at the Embassy, about a week before it was delivered in the
Senate, Page made the following memorandum:
The President's address to the Senate, which was received to-day
(January 16th)[51], shows that he thinks he can play peace-maker.
He does not at all understand, (or, if he do, so much the worse for
him) that the Entente Powers, especially Great Britain and France,
cannot make "peace without victory." If they do, they will become
vassals of Germany. In a word, the President does not know the
Germans; and he is, unconsciously, under their influence in his
thought. His speech plays into their hands.
This address will give great offense in England, since it puts each
side in the war on the same moral level.
I immediately saw the grave danger to our relations with Great
Britain by the Peace-without-Victory plan; and I telegraphed the
President, venturing to advise him to omit that phrase--with no
result.
Afterward Page added this to the above:
Compare this Senate speech with his speech in April calling for
war: Just when and how did the President come to see the true
nature of the German? What made him change from Peace-Maker to
War-Maker? The Zimmermann telegram, or the February U-boat renewal
of warfare? Had he been so credulous as to believe the German
promise? This promise had been continuously and repeatedly broken.
Or was it the pressure of public opinion, the growing impatience of
the people that pushed him in?
This distressing peace-move--utterly out of touch with the facts of
the origin of the war or of its conduct or of the mood and
necessities of Great Britain--a remote, academic deliverance, while
Great Britain and France were fighting for their very lives--made a
profoundly dejected feeling; and it made my place and work more
uncomfortable than ever. "Peace without victory" brought us to the
very depths of European disfavour.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 49: "My Three Years in America," by Count Bernstorff, p. 294.]
[Footnote 50: This narrative is based upon memoranda made by Page.]
[Footnote 51: It was delivered and published on January 22nd.]
CHAPTER XXI
THE UNITED STATES AT WAR
I
The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on
February 3, 1917. The occasion was a memorable one in the American
Embassy in London, not unrelieved by a touch of the ridiculous. All day
long a nervous and rather weary company had waited in the Ambassador's
room for the decisive word from Washington. Mr. and Mrs. Page, Mr. and
Mrs. Laughlin, Mr. Shoecraft, the Ambassador's secretary, sat there hour
after hour, hardly speaking to one another in their tense excitement,
waiting for the news that would inform them that Bernstorff's course had
been run and that their country had taken its decision on the side of
the Allies. Finally, at nine o'clock in the evening, the front door bell
rang. Mr. Shoecraft excitedly left the room; half way downstairs he met
Admiral William Reginald Hall, the head of the British Naval
Intelligence, who was hurrying up to the Ambassador. Admiral Hall, as he
spied Mr. Shoecraft, stopped abruptly and uttered just two words:
"Thank God!"
He then went into the Ambassador's room and read a secret code message
which he had just received from Captain Gaunt, the British naval attaché
at Washington. It was as follows:
"Bernstorff has just been given his passports. I shall probably get
drunk to-night!"
It was in this way that Page first learned that the long tension had
passed.
Page well understood that the dismissal of Bernstorff at that time meant
war with the Central Empires. Had this dismissal taken place in 1915,
after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, or in 1916, after the sinking of
the _Sussex_, Page believed that a simple break in relations would in
itself have brought the war to an early end. But by February, 1917,
things had gone too far. For Germany had now decided to stake everything
upon the chance of winning a quick victory with the submarine. Our
policy had persuaded the Kaiser's advisers that America would not
intervene; and the likelihood of rapidly starving Great Britain was so
great--indeed the Germans had reduced the situation to a mathematical
calculation of success--that an American declaration of war seemed to
Berlin to be a matter of no particular importance. The American
Ambassador in London regarded Bernstorff's dismissal much more
seriously. It justified the interpretations of events which he had been
sending to Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and others for nearly three years.
If Page had been inclined to take satisfaction in the fulfilment of his
own prophecies, Germany's disregard of her promises and the American
declaration of war would have seemed an ample justification of his
course as ambassador.
[Illustration: Walter H. Page, at the time of America's entry into the
war, April, 1917]
[Illustration: Resolution passed by the two Houses of Parliament, April
18, 1917, on America's entry into the war]
But Page had little time for such vain communings. "All that water," as
he now wrote, "has flowed over the dam." Occasionally his mind would
revert to the dreadful period of "neutrality," but in the main his
activities, mental and physical, were devoted to the future. A letter
addressed to his son Arthur shows how quickly and how sympathetically he
was adjusting himself to the new prospect. His mind was now occupied
with ships, food, armies, warfare on submarines, and the approaching
resettlement of the world. How completely he foresaw the part that
the United States must play in the actual waging of hostilities, and to
what an extent he himself was responsible for the policies that
ultimately prevailed, appears in this letter:
_To Arthur W. Page_
25 March, 1917, London.
DEAR ARTHUR:
It's very hard, not to say impossible, to write in these swiftly
moving days. Anything written to-day is out of date to-morrow--even
if it be not wrong to start with. The impression becomes stronger
here every day that we shall go into the war "with both feet"--that
the people have pushed the President over in spite of his vision of
the Great Peacemaker, and that, being pushed over, his idea now
will be to show how he led them into a glorious war in defense of
democracy. That's my reading of the situation, and I hope I am not
wrong. At any rate, ever since the call of Congress for April 2nd,
I have been telegraphing tons of information and plans that can be
of use only if we go to war. Habitually they never acknowledge the
receipt of anything at Washington. I don't know, therefore, whether
they like these pieces of information or not. I have my staff of
twenty-five good men getting all sorts of warlike information; and
I have just organized twenty-five or thirty more--the best business
Americans in London--who are also at work. I am trying to get the
Government at Washington to send over a committee of conference--a
General, an Admiral, a Reserve Board man, etc., etc. If they do
half the things that I recommend we'll be in at the final lickin'
big, and will save our souls yet.
There's lots of human nature in this world. A note is now
sometimes heard here in undertone (Northcliffe strikes it)--that
they don't want the Americans in the war. This means that if we
come in just as the Allies finish the job we'll get credit, in
part, for the victory, which we did little to win! But that's a
minor note. The great mass of people do want us in, quick, hard,
and strong--our money and our guns and our ships.
A gift of a billion dollars[52] to France will fix Franco-American
history all right for several centuries. Push it through. Such a
gift could come to this Kingdom also but for the British stupidity
about the Irish for three hundred years. A big loan to Great
Britain at a low rate of interest will do the work here.
My mind keeps constantly on the effect of the war and especially of
our action on our own country. Of course that is the most important
end of the thing for us. I hope that--
1. It will break up and tear away our isolation;
2. It will unhorse our cranks and soft-brains.
3. It will make us less promiscuously hospitable to every kind of
immigrant;
4. It will reëstablish in our minds and conscience and policy our
true historic genesis, background, kindred, and destiny--i.e., kill
the Irish and the German influence.
5. It will revive our real manhood--put the molly-coddles in
disgrace, as idiots and dandies are;
6. It will make our politics frank and manly by restoring our true
nationality;
7. It will make us again a great sea-faring people. It is this that
has given Great Britain its long lead in the world;
8. Break up our feminized education--make a boy a vigorous animal
and make our education rest on a wholesome physical basis;
9. Bring men of a higher type into our political life.
We need waking up and shaking up and invigorating as much as the
Germans need taking down.
There is no danger of "militarism" in any harmful sense among any
English race or in any democracy.
By George! all these things open an interesting outlook and series
of tasks--don't they?
My staff and I are asking everybody what the Americans can best do
to help the cause along. The views are not startling, but they are
interesting.
_Jellicoe_: More ships, merchant ships, any kind of ships, and take
over the patrol of the American side of the Atlantic and release
the British cruisers there.
_Balfour_: American credits in the United States big enough to keep
up the rate of exchange.
_Bonar Law_: Same thing.
_The military men_: An expeditionary force, no matter how small,
for the effect of the American Flag in Europe. If one regiment
marched through London and Paris and took the Flag to the front,
that would be worth the winning of a battle.
Think of the vast increase of territory and power Great Britain
will have--her colonies drawn closer than ever, the German
colonies, or most of them, taken over by her, Bagdad hers--what a
way Germany chose to lessen the British Empire! And these gains of
territory will be made, as most of her gains have been, not by any
prearranged, set plan, but as by-products of action for some other
purpose. The only people who have made a deliberate plan to conquer
the earth--now living--are the Germans. And from first to last the
additions to the British Empire have been made because she has been
a first-class maritime power.
And that's the way she has made her trade and her money, too.
On top of this the President speculates about the danger of the
white man losing his supremacy because a few million men get
killed! The truth is every country that is playing a big part in
the war was overpopulated. There will be a considerable productive
loss because the killed men were, as a rule, the best men; but the
white man's control of the world hasn't depended on any few million
of males. This speculation is far up in the clouds. If Russia and
Germany really be liberated from social and political and
industrial autocracy, this liberation will bring into play far more
power than all the men killed in the war could have had under the
pre-war régime. I observe this with every year of my
observation--there's no substitute for common-sense.
The big results of the war will, after all, be the freedom and the
stimulation of men in these weary Old-World lands--in Russia,
Germany itself, and in England. In five or ten years (or sooner,
alas!) the dead will be forgotten.
If you wish to make a picture of the world as it will be when the
war ends, you must conjure up such scenes as these--human bones
along the Russian highways where the great retreat took place and
all that such a sight denotes; Poland literally starved; Serbia,
blasted and burned and starved; Armenia butchered; the horrible
tragedy of Gallipoli, where the best soldiers in the world were
sacrificed to politicians' policies; Austria and Germany starved
and whipped but liberalized--perhaps no king in either country;
Belgium--belgiumized; northern France the same and worse; more
productive Frenchmen killed in proportion to the population perhaps
than any other country will have lost; Great Britain--most of her
best men gone or maimed; colossal debts; several Teutonic countries
bankrupt; every atrocity conceivable committed somewhere--a
hell-swept great continent having endured more suffering in three
years than in the preceding three hundred. Then, ten years later,
most of this suffering a mere memory; governments reorganized and
liberalized; men made more efficient by this strenuous three years'
work; the fields got back their bloom, and life going on much as it
did before--with this chief difference--some kings have gone and
many privileges have been abolished. The lessons are two--(1) that
no government can successfully set out and conquer the world; and
(2) that the hold that privilege holders acquire costs more to
dislodge than any one could ever have guessed. That's the sum of
it. Kings and privilege mongers, of course, have held the parts of
the world separate from one another. They fatten on provincialism,
which is mistaken for patriotism. As they lose their grip, human
sympathy has its natural play between nations, and civilization has
a chance. With any Emperor of Germany left the war will have been
half in vain.
If we (the U.S.A.) cultivate the manly qualities and throw off our
cranks and read our own history and be true to our traditions and
blood and get some political vigour; then if we emancipate
ourselves from the isolation theory and from the landlubber
theory--get into the world and build ships, ships, ships, ships,
and run them to the ends of the seas, we can dominate the world in
trade and in political thought.
You know I have moments when it occurs to me that perhaps I'd
better give whatever working years I may have to telling this
story--the story of the larger meaning of the war. There's no
bigger theme--never was one so big.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
On April 1st, the day before President Wilson made his great address
before Congress requesting that body to declare the existence of a state
of war with Germany, Page committed to paper a few paragraphs which
summed up his final judgment of President Wilson's foreign policy for
the preceding two and a half years.
Embassy of the United States of America,
April 1, 1917.
In these last days, before the United States is forced into war--by
the people's insistence--the preceding course of events becomes
even clearer than it was before; and it has been as clear all the
time as the nose on a man's face.
The President began by refusing to understand the meaning of the
war. To him it seemed a quarrel to settle economic rivalries
between Germany and England. He said to me last September[53] that
there were many causes why Germany went to war. He showed a great
degree of toleration for Germany; and he was, during the whole
morning that I talked with him, complaining of England. The
controversies we had with England were, of course, mere by-products
of the conflict. But to him they seemed as important as the
controversy we had with Germany. In the beginning he had made--as
far as it was possible--neutrality a positive quality of mind. He
would not move from that position.
That was his first error of judgment. And by insisting on this he
soothed the people--sat them down in comfortable chairs and said,
"Now stay there." He really suppressed speech and thought.
The second error he made was in thinking that he could play a
great part as peacemaker--come and give a blessing to these erring
children. This was strong in his hopes and ambitions. There was a
condescension in this attitude that was offensive.
He shut himself up with these two ideas and engaged in what he
called "thought." The air currents of the world never ventilated
his mind.
This inactive position he has kept as long as public sentiment
permitted. He seems no longer to regard himself nor to speak as a
leader--only as the mouthpiece of public opinion after opinion has
run over him.
He has not breathed a spirit into the people: he has encouraged
them to supineness. He is _not_ a leader, but rather a stubborn
phrasemaker.
And now events and the aroused people seem to have brought the
President to the necessary point of action; and even now he may act
timidly.
* * * * *
"One thing pleases me," Page wrote to his son Arthur, "I never lost
faith in the American people. It is now clear that I was right in
feeling that they would have gladly come in any time after the
_Lusitania_ crime. Middle West in the front, and that the German hasn't
made any real impression on the American nation. He was made a bug-a-boo
and worked for all he was worth by Bernstorff; and that's the whole
story. We are as Anglo-Saxon as we ever were. If Hughes had had sense
and courage enough to say: 'I'm for war, war to save our honour and to
save democracy,' he would now be President. If Wilson had said that,
Hughes would have carried no important states in the Union. The
suppressed people would have risen to either of them. That's God's truth
as I believe it. The real United States is made up of you and Frank and
the Page boys at Aberdeen and of the 10,000,000 other young fellows who
are ready to do the job and who instinctively see the whole truth of the
situation. But of course what the people would not have done under
certain conditions--that water also has flowed over the dam; and I
mention it only because I have resolutely kept my faith in the people
and there has been nothing in recent events that has shaken it."
Two letters which Page wrote on this same April 1st are interesting in
that they outline almost completely the war policy that was finally
carried out:
_To Frank N. Doubleday_
Embassy of the United States of America,
April 1, 1917.
DEAR EFFENDI:
Here's the programme:
(1) Our navy in immediate action in whatever way a conference with
the British shows we can best help.
(2) A small expeditionary force to France immediately--as large as
we can quickly make ready, if only 10,000 men--as proof that we are
ready to do some fighting.
(3) A large expeditionary force as soon as the men can be organized
and equipped. They can be trained into an effective army in France
in about one fourth of the time that they could be trained anywhere
else.
(4) A large loan to the Allies at a low rate of interest.
(5) Ships, ships, ships--troop ships, food ships, munition ships,
auxiliary ships to the navy, wooden ships, steel ships, little
ships, big ships, ships, ships, ships without number or end.
(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue involved in the war.
Every social and political ideal that we stand for is at stake. If
we value democracy in the world, this is the chance to further it
or--to bring it into utter disrepute. After Russia must come
Germany and Austria; and then the King-business will pretty nearly
be put out of commission.
(7) We must go to war in dead earnest. We must sign the Allies'
agreement not to make a separate peace, and we must stay in to the
end. Then the end will be very greatly hastened.
It's been four years ago to-day since I was first asked to come
here. God knows I've done my poor best to save our country and to
help. It'll be four years in the middle of May since I sailed. I
shall still do my best. I'll not be able to start back by May 15th,
but I have a feeling, if we do our whole duty in the United States,
that the end may not be very many months off. And how long off it
may be may depend to a considerable degree on our action.
We are faring very well on army rations. None of us will live to
see another time when so many big things are at stake nor another
time when our country can play so large or important a part in
saving the world. Hold up your end. I'm doing my best here.
I think of you engaged in the peaceful work of instructing the
people, and I think of the garden and crocuses and the smell of
early spring in the air and the earth and--push on; I'll be with
you before we grow much older or get much grayer; and a great and
prosperous and peaceful time will lie before us. Pity me and hold
up your end for real American participation. Get together? Yes; but
the way to get together is to get in!
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To David F. Houston_[54]
Embassy of the United States of America,
April 1, 1917.
DEAR HOUSTON:
The Administration can save itself from becoming a black blot on
American history only by vigorous action--acts such as these:
Putting our navy to work--vigorous work--wherever and however is
wisest. I have received the Government's promise to send an Admiral
here at once for a conference. We must work out with the British
Navy a programme whereby we can best help; and we must carry it
without hesitancy or delay.
Sending over an expeditionary military force immediately--a small
one, but as large as we can, as an earnest of a larger one to come.
This immediate small one will have a good moral effect; and we need
all the moral reinstatement that we can get in the estimation of
the world; our moral stock is lower than, I fear, any of you at
home can possibly realize. As for a larger expeditionary force
later--even that ought to be sent quite early. It can and must
spend some time in training in France, whatever its training
beforehand may have been. All the military men agree that soldiers
in France back of the line can be trained in at least half the time
that they can be trained anywhere else. The officers at once take
their turn in the trenches, and the progress that they and their
men make in close proximity to the fighting is one of the
remarkable discoveries of the war. The British Army was so trained
and all the colonial forces. Two or three or four hundred thousand
Americans could be sent over as soon almost as they are organized
and equipped-provided transports and a continuous supply of food
and munition ships can be got. They can be trained into fighting
men--into an effective army--in about one third of the time that
would be required at home.
I suppose, of course, we shall make at once a large loan to the
Allies at a low rate of interest. That is most important, but that
alone will not save us. We must also _fight_.
All the ships we can get--build, requisition, or confiscate--are
needed immediately.
Navy, army, money, ships--these are the first things, but by no
means all. We must make some expression of a conviction that there
is a moral question of right and wrong involved in this war--a
question of humanity, a question of democracy. So far we have
(officially) spoken only of the wrongs done to our ships and
citizens. Deep wrongs have been done to all our moral ideas, to our
ideals. We have sunk very low in European opinion because we do not
seem to know even yet that a German victory would be less desirable
than (say) a Zulu victory of the world.
We must go in with the Allies, not begin a mere single fight
against submarines. We must sign the pact of London--not make a
separate peace.
We mustn't longer spin dreams about peace, nor leagues to enforce
peace, nor the Freedom of the Seas. These things are mere
intellectual diversions of minds out of contact with realities.
Every political and social ideal we have is at stake. If we make
them secure, we'll save Europe from destruction and save ourselves,
too. I pray for vigour and decision and clear-cut resolute action.
(1) The Navy--full strength, no "grapejuice" action.
(2) An immediate expeditionary force.
(3) A larger expeditionary force very soon.
(4) A large loan at a low interest.
(5) Ships, ships, ships.
(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue. Thus (and only thus)
can we swing into a new era, with a world born again.
Yours in strictest confidence,
W.H.P.
A memorandum, written on April 3rd, the day after President Wilson
advised Congress to declare a state of war with Germany:
_The Day_
When I went to see Mr. Balfour to-day he shook my hand warmly and
said: "It's a great day for the world." And so has everybody said,
in one way or another, that I have met to-day.
The President's speech did not appear in the morning papers--only a
very brief summary in one or two of them; but the meaning of it was
clear. The fact that the House of Representatives organized itself
in one day and that the President addressed Congress on the evening
of that day told the story. The noon papers had the President's
speech in full; and everybody applauds.
My "Cabinet" meeting this morning was unusually interesting; and
the whole group has never before been so delighted. I spoke of the
suggestive, constructive work we have already done in making
reports on various war preparations and activities of this kingdom.
"Now we have greater need than ever, every man to do constructive
work--to think of plans to serve. We are in this excellent
strategical position in the capital of the greatest belligerent--a
position which I thank my stars, the President, and all the powers
that be for giving us. We can each strive to justify our
existence."
Few visitors called; but enthusiastic letters have begun to come
in.
Nearly the whole afternoon was spent with Mr. Balfour and Lord
Robert Cecil. Mr. Balfour had a long list of subjects. Could we
help in (1)--(2)--(3)?--Every once in a while he stopped his
enumeration of subjects long enough to tell me how the action of
the United States had moved him.
To Lord Robert I said: "I pray you, give the Black List a decent
burial: It's dead now, but through no act of yours. It insulted
every American because you did not see that it was insulting:
that's the discouraging fact to me." He thanked me earnestly. He'll
think about that.
II
These jottings give only a faint impression of the change which the
American action wrought in Page. The strain which he had undergone for
twenty-nine months had been intense; it had had the most unfortunate
effect upon his health; and the sudden lifting might have produced that
reaction for the worse which is not unusual after critical experiences
of this kind. But the gratification which Page felt in the fact that the
American spirit had justified his confidence gave him almost a certain
exuberance of contentment. Londoners who saw him at that time describe
him as acting like a man from whose shoulders a tremendous weight had
suddenly been removed. For more than two years Page had been compelled,
officially at least, to assume a "neutrality" with which he had never
had the slightest sympathy, but the necessity for this mask now no
longer existed. A well-known Englishman happened to meet Page leaving
his house in Grosvenor Square the day after the Declaration of War. He
stopped and shook the Ambassador's hand.
"Thank God," the Englishman said, "that there is one hypocrite less in
London to-day."
"What do you mean?" asked Page.
"I mean you. Pretending all this time that you were neutral! That isn't
necessary any longer."
"You are right!" the Ambassador answered as he walked on with a laugh
and a wave of the hand.
A few days after the Washington Declaration, the American Luncheon Club
held a feast in honour of the event. This organization had a membership
of representative American business men in London, but its behaviour
during the war had not been based upon Mr. Wilson's idea of neutrality.
Indeed its tables had so constantly rung with denunciations of the
_Lusitania_ notes that all members of the American Embassy, from Page
down, had found it necessary to refrain from attending its proceedings.
When Page arose to address his compatriots on this occasion, therefore,
he began with the significant words, "I am glad to be back with you
again," and the mingled laughter and cheers with which this remark was
received indicated that his hearers had caught the point.
The change took place not only in Page, but in London and the whole of
Great Britain. An England that had been saying harsh things of the
United States for nearly two years now suddenly changed its attitude.
Both houses of Parliament held commemorative sessions in honour of
America's participation; in the Commons Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith,
and other leaders welcomed their new allies, and in the Upper Chamber
Lord Curzon, Lord Bryce, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and others
similarly voiced their admiration. The Stars and Stripes almost
instantaneously broke out on private dwellings, shops, hotels, and
theatres; street hucksters did a thriving business selling rosettes of
the American colours, which even the most stodgy Englishmen did not
disdain to wear in their buttonholes; wherever there was a band or an
orchestra, the Star Spangled Banner acquired a sudden popularity; and
the day even came when the American and the British flags flew side by
side over the Houses of Parliament--the first occasion in history that
any other than the British standard had received this honour. The
editorial outgivings of the British press on America's entrance form a
literature all their own. The theatres and the music halls, which had
found in "notes" and "nootrality" an endless theme of entertainment for
their patrons, now sounded Americanism as their most popular refrain.
Churches and cathedrals gave special services in honour of American
intervention, and the King and the President began to figure side by the
side in the prayer book. The estimation in which President Wilson was
held changed overnight. All the phrases that had so grieved Englishmen
were instantaneously forgotten. The President's address before Congress
was praised as one of the most eloquent and statesmanlike utterances in
history. Special editions of this heartening document had a rapid sale;
it was read in school houses, churches, and at public gatherings, and it
became a most influential force in uplifting the hopes of the Allies and
inspiring them to renewed activities. Americans everywhere, in the
streets, at dinner tables, and in general social intercourse, could feel
the new atmosphere of respect and admiration which had suddenly become
their country's portion. The first American troops that passed through
London--a company of engineers, an especially fine body of men--aroused
a popular enthusiasm which was almost unprecedented in a capital not
celebrated for its emotional displays. Page himself records one
particularly touching indication of the feeling for Americans which was
now universal. "The increasing number of Americans who come through
England," he wrote, "most of them on their way to France, but some of
them also to serve in England, give much pleasure to the British
public--nurses, doctors, railway engineers, sawmill units, etc. The
sight of every American uniform pleases London. The other morning a
group of American nurses gathered with the usual crowd in front of
Buckingham Palace while the Guards band played inside the gates. Man
after man as they passed them and saw their uniforms lifted their hats."
[Illustration: The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 1908-1915, Minister of Munitions, 1915-1916, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1916-1922]
[Illustration: The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of
Balfour) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916-1919]
The Ambassador's mail likewise underwent a complete transformation. His
correspondence of the preceding two years, enormous in its extent, had
contained much that would have disturbed a man who could easily get
excited over trifles, but this aspect of his work never caused Page the
slightest unhappiness. Almost every crank in England who disliked the
American policy had seemed to feel it his duty to express his opinions
to the American Ambassador. These letters, at times sorrowful, at others
abusive, even occasionally threatening, varying in their style from
cultivated English to the grossest illiteracy, now written in red ink to
emphasize their bitterness, now printed in large block letters to
preserve their anonymity, aroused in Page only a temporary amusement.
But the letters that began to pour in upon him after our Declaration,
many of them from the highest placed men and women in the Kingdom,
brought out more vividly than anything else the changed position of his
country. Sonnets and verses rained upon the Embassy, most of them
pretty bad as poetry, but all of them commendable for their admiring and
friendly spirit. Of all these letters those that came from the steadfast
friends of America perhaps gave Page the greatest satisfaction. "You
will have been pleased at the universal tribute paid to the spirit as
well as to the lofty and impressive terms of the President's speech,"
wrote Lord Bryce. "Nothing finer in our time, few things so fine." But
probably the letter which gave Page the greatest pleasure was that which
came from the statesman whose courtesy and broad outlook had eased the
Ambassador's task in the old neutrality days. In 1916, Sir Edward
Grey--now become Viscount Grey of Fallodon--had resigned office, forced
out, Page says in one of his letters, mainly because he had refused to
push the blockade to a point where it might produce a break with the
United States. He had spent the larger part of the time since that event
at his country place in Northumberland, along the streams and the
forests which had always given him his greatest pleasure, attempting to
recover something of the health that he had lost in the ten years which
he had spent as head of the British Foreign Office and bearing with
characteristic cheerfulness and fortitude the tragedy of a gradually
failing eyesight. The American Declaration of War now came to Lord Grey
as the complete justification of his policy. The mainspring of that
policy, as already explained, had been a determination to keep the
friendship of the United States, and so shape events that the support of
this country would ultimately be cast on the side of the Allies. And now
the great occasion for which he had prepared had come, and in Grey's
mind this signified more than a help to England in soldiers and ships;
it meant bringing together the two branches of a common race for the
promotion of common ideals.
_From Viscount Grey of Fallodon_
Rosehall Post Office,
Sutherland,
April 8, 1917.
DEAR MR. PAGE:
This is a line that needs no answer to express my congratulations
on President Wilson's address. I can't express adequately all that
I feel. Great gratitude and great hope are in my heart. I hope now
that some great and abiding good to the world will yet be wrought
out of all this welter of evil. Recent events in Russia, too,
stimulate this hope: they are a good in themselves, but not the
power for good in this war that a great and firmly established free
country like the United States can be. The President's address and
the way it has been followed up in your country is a splendid
instance of great action finely inspired. I glow with admiration.
Yours sincerely,
GREY OF FALLODON
One Englishman who was especially touched by the action of the United
States was His Majesty the King. Few men had watched the course of
America during the war with more intelligent interest than the head of
the British royal house. Page had had many interviews with King George
at Buckingham Palace and at Windsor, and his notes contain many
appreciative remarks on the King's high character and conscientious
devotion to his duties. That Page in general did not believe in kings
and emperors as institutions his letters reveal; yet even so profound a
Republican as he recognized sterling character, whether in a crowned
head or in a humble citizen, and he had seen enough of King George to
respect him. Moreover, the peculiar limitations of the British monarchy
certainly gave it an unusual position and even saved it from much of the
criticism that was fairly lavished upon such nations as Germany and
Austria. Page especially admired King George's frankness in recognizing
these limitations and his readiness to accommodate himself to the
British Constitution. On most occasions, when these two men met, their
intercourse was certainly friendly or at least not formidable. After all
formalities had been exchanged, the King would frequently draw the
Ambassador aside; the two would retire to the smoking room, and there,
over their cigars, discuss a variety of matters--submarines,
international politics, the Irish question and the like. His Majesty was
not averse even to bringing up the advantages of the democratic and the
monarchical system. The King and Ambassador would chat, as Page himself
would say, like "two human beings"; King George is an emphatic and
vivacious talker, fond of emphasizing his remarks by pounding the table;
he has the liveliest sense of humour, and enjoys nothing quite so much
as a good story. Page found that, on the subject of the Germans, the
King entertained especially robust views. "They are my kinsmen," he
would say, "but I am ashamed of them."
Probably most Englishmen, in the early days of the war, preferred that
the United States should not engage in hostilities; even after the
_Lusitania_, the majority in all likelihood held this view. There are
indications, however, that King George favoured American participation.
A few days after the _Lusitania_ sinking, Page had an audience for the
purpose of presenting a medal sent by certain societies in New Orleans.
Neither man was thinking much about medals that morning. The thoughts
uppermost in their minds, as in the minds of most Americans and
Englishmen, were the _Lusitania_ and the action that the United States
was likely to take concerning it. After the formalities of presentation,
the King asked Page to sit down and talked with him for more than half
an hour. "He said that Germany was evidently trying to force the United
States into the war; that he had no doubt we would soon be in it and
that, for his part, he would welcome us heartily. The King also said he
had reliable information from Germany, that the Emperor had wished to
return a conciliatory answer to our _Lusitania_ note, but that Admiral
von Tirpitz had prevented it, even going so far as to 'threaten' the
Kaiser. It appears that the Admiral insisted that the submarine was the
only weapon the Germans could use with effect against England and that
they could not afford to give it up. He was violent and the Kaiser
finally yielded[55]."
The statement from the King at that crisis, that he would "heartily
welcome the United States into the war," was interpreted by the
Ambassador as amounting practically to an invitation--and certainly as
expressing a wish that such an intervention should take place.
That the American participation would rejoice King George could
therefore be taken for granted. Soon after this event, the Ambassador
and Mrs. Page were invited to spend the night at Windsor.
"I arrived during the middle of the afternoon," writes Page, "and he
sent for me to talk with him in his office.
"'I've a good story on you,' said he. 'You Americans have a queer use of
the word "some," to express mere bigness or emphasis. We are taking that
use of the word from you over here. Well, an American and an Englishman
were riding in the same railway compartment. The American read his
paper diligently--all the details of a big battle. When he got done, he
put the paper down and said: "Some fight!" "And some don't!" said the
Englishman.'
"And the King roared. 'A good one on you!'
"'The trouble with that joke, sir,' I ventured to reply, 'is that it's
out of date.'
"He was in a very gay mood, surely because of our entry into the war.
After the dinner--there were no guests except Mrs. Page and me, the
members of his household, of course, being present--he became even
familiar in the smoking room. He talked about himself and his position
as king. 'Knowing the difficulties of a limited monarch, I thank heaven
I am spared being an absolute one.'
"He went on to enumerate the large number of things he was obliged to
do, for example, to sign the death warrant of every condemned man--and
the little real power that he had--not at all in a tone of complaint,
but as a merely impersonal explanation.
"Just how much power--perhaps 'influence' is a better word--the King
has, depends on his personality. The influence of the throne--and of him
on the throne, being a wholly thoughtful, industrious, and conscientious
man--is very great--greatest of all in keeping the vested interests of
the aristocratic social structure secure.
"Earlier than this visit to Windsor he sent for me to go to Buckingham
Palace very soon after we declared war. He went over the whole course of
events--and asked me many questions. After I had risen and said
'good-bye' and was about to bow myself out the door, he ran toward me
and waving his hand cried out, 'Ah--Ah!--we knew where _you_ stood all
the time.'
"When General Pershing came along on his way to France, the King
summoned us to luncheon. The luncheon was eaten (here, as everywhere,
strict war rations are observed) to a flow of general talk, with the
Queen, Princess Mary, and one of the young Princes. When they had gone
from the luncheon room, the King, General Pershing, and I stood smoking
by the window; and the King at once launched into talk about guns,
rifles, ammunition, and the American place in the battle line. Would our
place be with the British or with the French or between the two?
"General Pershing made a diplomatic reply. So far as he knew the
President hadn't yet made a final decision, but there was a feeling
that, since we were helping the British at sea, perhaps we ought to help
the French on land.
"Then the King expressed the earnest hope that our guns and ammunition
would match either the British or the French. Else if we happened to run
out of ammunition we could not borrow from anybody. He thought it most
unfortunate that the British and French guns and rifles were of
different calibres."
_To Arthur W. Page_
Brighton, England,
April 28, 1917.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... Well, the British have given us a very good welcome into the
war. They are not very skillful at such a task: they do not know
how to say "Welcome" very vociferously. But they have said it to
the very best of their ability. My speeches (which I send you, with
some comment) were very well received indeed. Simple and obvious as
they were, they meant a good deal of work.
I cannot conceal nor can I express my gratification that we are in
the war. I shall always wonder but never find out what influence I
had in driving the President over. All I know is that my letters
and telegrams for nearly two years--especially for the last twelve
months--have put before him every reason that anybody has expressed
why we should come in--in season and out of season. And there is no
new reason--only more reason of the same old sort--why we should
have come in now than there was why we should have come in a year
ago. I suspect that the pressure of the press and of public opinion
really became too strong for him. And, of course, the Peace-Dream
blew up--was torpedoed, mined, shot, captured, and killed. I trust,
too, much enlightenment will be furnished by the two Commissions
now in Washington[56]. Yet it's comical to think of the attitude of
the poor old Department last September and its attitude now. But
thank God for it! Every day now brings a confession of the blank
idiocy of its former course and its long argument! Never mind that,
so long as we are now right.
I have such a sense of relief that I almost feel that my job is now
done. Yet, I dare say, my most important work is still to come.
The more I try to reach some sort of rational judgment about the
war, the more I find myself at sea. It does look as if the very
crisis is near. And there can be no doubt now--not even, I hope, in
the United States--about the necessity of a clear and decisive
victory, nor about punishment. All the devastation of Northern
France, which outbarbarizes barbarism, all the ships sunk,
including hospital ships, must be paid for; that's all. There'll be
famine in Europe whenever it end. Not only must these destructions
be paid for, but the Hohenzollerns and all they stand for must go.
Trust your Frenchman for that, if nobody else!
If Europe had the food wasted in the United States, it would make
the difference between sustenance and famine. By the way, the
submarine has made every nation a danger zone except those few that
have self-feeding continents, such as ours. It can bring famine to
any other kind of a country.
You are now out in the country again--good. Give Mollie my love and
help her with the garden. I envy you the fresh green things to eat.
Little Mollie, kiss her for granddaddy. The Ambassador, I suppose,
waxes even sturdier, and I'm glad to hear that A.W.P., Jr., is
picking up. Get him fed right at all costs. If Frank stays at home
and Ralph and his family come up, you'll all have a fine summer.
We've the very first hint of summer we've had, and it's cheerful to
see the sky and to feel the sunshine.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Frank N. Doubleday_
American Embassy,
London, May 3, 1917.
DEAR EFFENDI:
I aim this at you. It may hit a German submarine. But we've got to
take our chances in these days of risk. Your letter from the
tropics--a letter from you from any place is as scarce as
peace!--gave me a pleasant thrill and reminder of a previous state
of existence, a long way back in the past. I wonder if, on your
side the ocean you are living at the rate of a century a year, as
we are here? Here in bountiful England we are living on rations. I
spent a night with the King a fortnight ago, and he gave us only so
much bread, one egg apiece, and--lemonade. We are to begin bread
tickets next week. All this is perfectly healthful and wholesome
and as much as I ever eat. But the hard part of it is that it's
necessary. We haven't more than six weeks' food supply and the
submarines sunk eighty-eight ships--237,000 tons--last week. These
English do not publish these harrowing facts, and nobody knows them
but a few official people. And they are destroying the submarines
at a most beggarly slow rate. They work far out at sea--100 to 200
miles--and it's as hard to find them as it would be to find whales.
The simple truth is we are in a dangerous plight. If they could
stop this submarine warfare, the war would pretty quickly be won,
for the Germans are in a far worse plight for food and materials
and they are getting much the worst of it on land. The war would be
won this summer or autumn if the submarine could be put out of
business. If it isn't, the Germans may use this success to keep
their spirits up and go on till next year.
We (the United States) have about 40 destroyers. We are sending
over 6! I'm doing my best to persuade the Government at Washington
to send every one we have. But, since the British conceal the facts
from their own press and the people and from all the world, the
full pressure of the situation is hard to exert on Washington. Our
Admiral (Sims) and I are trying our best, and we are spending
enough on cables to build a destroyer. All this, you must, of
course, regard as a dark secret; but it's a devilish black secret.
I don't mean that there's any danger of losing the war. Even if the
British armies have to have their food cut down and people here go
hungry, they'll win; but the winning may be a long time off.
Nothing but their continued success can keep the Germans going.
Their people are war-weary and hungry. Austria is knocked out and
is starving. Turkey is done up but can go on living on nothing,
but not fighting much more. When peace comes, there'll be a general
famine, on the continent at least, and no ships to haul food. This
side of the world will have to start life all over again--with
insufficient men to carry things on and innumerable maimed men
who'll have (more or less) to be cared for. The horror of the whole
thing nobody realizes. We've all got used to it here; and nobody
clearly remembers just what the world was like in peace times;
those times were so far away. All this I write not to fill you with
horrors but to prove that I speak the literal truth when I say that
it seems a hundred years since I had before heard from you.
Just how all this affects a man, no man can accurately tell. Of how
much use I'll be when I can get home, I don't know. Sometimes I
think that I shall be of vastly greater use than ever. Plans and
publishing ambitions pop up in my mind at times which look good and
promising. I see books and series of books. I see most useful
magazine stuff. Then, before I can think anything out to a clear
plan or conclusion, the ever-increasing official duties and
responsibilities here knock everything else out of my head, perhaps
for a whole month. It's a literal fact that many a month I do not
have an hour to do with as I please nor to think about what I
please, from the time I wake up till I go to bed. In spite of
twenty-four secretaries (the best fellows that ever were and the
best staff that any Embassy ever had in the world) more and more
work comes to me. I thank Heaven we no longer have the interests of
Germany, Austria, and Turkey to look after; but with our coming
into the war, work in general has increased enormously. I have to
spend very much more time with the different departments of the
British Government on war plans and such like things. They have
welcomed us in very handsomely; and one form of their welcome is
consulting with me about--navy plans, war plans, loans of billions,
ships, censorship, secret service--everything you ever heard of. At
first it seemed a little comical for the admirals and generals and
the Governor of the Bank of England to come and ask for advice. But
when I gave it and it worked out well, I went on and, after all,
the thing's easier than it looks. With a little practice you can
give these fellows several points in the game and play a pretty
good hand. They don't know half as much as you might suppose they'd
know. All these years of lecturing the State Department and the
President got my hand in! The whole game is far easier than any
small business. You always play with blue chips better than you
play with white ones.
This country and these people are not the country and the people
they were three years ago. They are very different. They are much
more democratic, far less cocksure, far less haughty, far humbler.
The man at the head of the army rose from the ranks. The Prime
Minister is a poor Welsh schoolteacher's son, without early
education. The man who controls all British shipping began life as
a shipping "clark," at ten shillings a week. Yet the Lords and
Ladies, too, have shown that they were made of the real stuff. This
experience is making England over again. There never was a more
interesting thing to watch and to be part of.
There are about twenty American organizations here--big, little,
rag-tag, and bobtail. When we declared war, every one of 'em
proceeded to prepare for some sort of celebration. There would have
been an epidemic of Fourth-of-July oratory all over the
town--before we'd done anything--Americans spouting over the edges
and killing Kruger with their mouths. I got representatives of 'em
all together and proposed that we hold our tongues till we'd won
the war--then we can take London. And to give one occasion when we
might all assemble and dedicate ourselves to this present grim
business, I arranged for an American Dedicatory Service at St.
Paul's Cathedral. The royal family came, the Government came, the
Allied diplomats came, my Lords and Ladies came, one hundred
wounded American (Canadian) soldiers came--the pick of the Kingdom;
my Navy and Army staff went in full uniform, the Stars and Stripes
hung before the altar, a double brass band played the Star Spangled
Banner and the Battle Hymn of the Republic, and an American bishop
(Brent) preached a red-hot American sermon, the Archbishop of
Canterbury delivered the benediction; and (for the first time in
English history) a foreign flag (the Stars and Stripes) flew over
the Houses of Parliament. It was the biggest occasion, so they say,
that St. Paul's ever had. And there's been no spilling of American
oratory since! If you had published a shilling edition of the words
and music of the Star Spangled Banner and the Battle Hymn you could
have sent a cargo of 'em here and sold them. There isn't paper
enough in this Kingdom to get out an edition here.
Give my love to all the Doubledays and to all the fellows in the
shop, and (I wonder if you will) try your hand at another letter.
You write very legibly these days!
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
"Curiously enough," Page wrote about this time, "these most exciting
days of the war are among the most barren of exciting topics for private
correspondence. The 'atmosphere' here is unchanging--to us--and the
British are turning their best side to us continuously. They are
increasingly appreciative, and they see more and more clearly that our
coming into the war is all that saved them from a virtual defeat--I mean
the public sees this more and more clearly, for, of course, the
Government has known it from the beginning. I even find a sort of morbid
fear lest they do not sufficiently show their appreciation. The
Archbishop last night asked me in an apprehensive tone whether the
American Government and public felt that the British did not
sufficiently show their gratitude. I told him that we did not come into
the war to win compliments but to whip the enemy, and that we wanted all
the help the British can give: that's the main thing; and that
thereafter of course we liked appreciation, but that expressions of
appreciation had not been lacking. Mr. Balfour and Sir Edward Carson
also spoke to me yesterday much in the same tone as the Archbishop of
Canterbury.
"Try to think out any line of action that one will, or any future
sequence of events or any plan touching the war, one runs into the
question whether the British are doing the best that could be done or
are merely plugging away. They are, as a people, slow and unimaginative,
given to over-much self-criticism; but they eternally hold on to a task
or to a policy. Yet the question forever arises whether they show
imagination, to say nothing of genius, and whether the waste of a slow,
plodding policy is the necessary price of victory.
"Of course such a question is easy to ask and it is easy to give
dogmatic answers. But it isn't easy to give an answer based on facts.
Our General Lassiter[57], for instance--a man of sound judgment--has in
general been less hopeful of the military situation in France than most
of the British officers. But he is just now returned from the front,
much cheered and encouraged. 'Lassiter,' I asked, 'have the British in
France or has any man among them what we call genius, or even wide
vision; or are they merely plodding along at a mechanical task? His
answer was, 'We don't see genius till it has done its job. It is a
mechanical task--yes, that's the nature of the struggle--and they surely
do it with intelligence and spirit. There is waste. There is waste in
all wars. But I come back much more encouraged.'
"The same sort of questions and answers are asked and given continuously
about naval action. Every discussion of the possibility of attacking the
German naval bases ends without a plan. So also with preventing the
submarines from coming out. These subjects have been continuously under
discussion by a long series of men who have studied them; and the total
effect so far has been to leave them among the impossible tasks. So far
as I can ascertain all naval men among the Allies agree that these
things can't be done.
"Here again--Is this a merely routine professional opinion--a merely
traditional opinion--or is it a lack of imagination? The question will
not down. Yet it is impossible to get facts to combat it. What are the
limits of the practicable?
"Mr. Balfour told me yesterday his personal conviction about the German
colonies, which, he said, he had not discussed with his associates in
the Cabinet. His firm opinion is that they ought not to be returned to
the Germans, first for the sake of humanity. 'The natives--the Africans
especially--have been so barbarously treated and so immorally that it
would be inhuman to permit the Germans to rule and degrade them further.
But Heaven forbid that we should still further enlarge the British
Empire. As a practical matter I do not care to do that. Besides, we
should incur the criticism of fighting in order to get more territory,
and that was not and is not our aim. If the United States will help us,
my wish is that these German Colonies that we have taken, especially in
Africa, should be "internationalized." There are great difficulties in
such a plan, but they are not insuperable if the great Powers of the
Allies will agree upon it.' And much more to the same effect. The parts
of Asiatic Turkey that the British have taken, he thought, might be
treated in the same way."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 52: At this time the proposal of such a gift found much
popular favour. However, the plan was not carried through.]
[Footnote 53: At the meeting of Page and the President at Shadow Lawn,
September 22, 1916. See Chapter XIX.]
[Footnote 54: Secretary of Agriculture in President Wilson's Cabinet.]
[Footnote 55: The quotation is from a memorandum of the conversation
made by one of the secretaries of the American Embassy.]
[Footnote 56: The British and French Commissions, headed by Mr. Balfour
and M. Viviani.]
[Footnote 57: American military attaché in London.]
CHAPTER XXII
THE BALFOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES
I
Page now took up a subject which had been near his heart for a long
time. He believed that one of the most serious causes of Anglo-American
misunderstanding was the fact that the leading statesmen of the two
countries had never had any personal contact with one another. At one
time, as this correspondence shows, the Ambassador had even hoped that
President Wilson himself might cross the ocean and make the British
people an official visit. The proposal, however, was made before the
European war broke out, the occasion which Page had in mind being the
dedication of Sulgrave Manor, the old English home of the Washington
family, as a perpetual memorial to the racial bonds and common ideals
uniting the two countries. The President found it impossible to act upon
this suggestion and the outbreak of war made the likelihood of such a
visit still more remote. Page had made one unsuccessful attempt to bring
the American State Department and the British Foreign Office into
personal contact. At the moment when American irritation had been most
keen over the blockade and the blacklist, Page had persuaded the Foreign
Office to invite to England Mr. Frank L. Polk, at that time Counsellor
of the Department; the Ambassador believed that a few conversations
between such an intelligent gentleman as Mr. Polk and the British
statesmen would smooth out all the points which were then making things
so difficult. Unfortunately the pressure of work at Washington prevented
Mr. Polk from accepting Sir Edward Grey's invitation.
But now a greater necessity for close personal association had arisen.
The United States had entered the war, and this declaration had
practically made this country an ally of Great Britain and France. The
British Government wished to send a distinguished commission to the
United States, for two reasons: first, to show its appreciation of the
stand which America had taken, and secondly, to discuss plans for
coöperation in the common task. Great Britain frankly admitted that it
had made many mistakes in the preceding three years--mistakes naval,
military, political, and economic; it would welcome an opportunity to
display these errors to Washington, which might naturally hope to profit
from them. As soon as his country was in the war, Page took up this
suggestion with the Foreign Office. There was of course one man who was
preëminently fitted, by experience, position, and personal qualities, to
head such a commission; on this point there was no discussion. Mr.
Balfour was now in his seventieth year; his activities in British
politics dated back to the times of Disraeli; his position in Great
Britain had become as near that of an "elder statesman" as is tolerable
under the Anglo-Saxon system. By this time Page had established the
friendliest possible relations with this distinguished man. Mr. Balfour
had become Foreign Secretary in December, 1916, in succession to Lord
Grey. Greatly as Page regretted the resignation of Grey, he was much
gratified that Mr. Balfour had been selected to succeed him. Mr.
Balfour's record for twenty-five years had been one of consistent
friendliness toward the United States. When President Cleveland's
Venezuelan message, in 1896, had precipitated a crisis in the relations
of the two countries, it was Mr. Balfour's influence which was
especially potent in causing Great Britain to modify its attitude and to
accept the American demand for arbitration. That action not only
amicably settled the Venezuelan question; it marked the beginning of a
better feeling between the English-speaking countries and laid the basis
for that policy of benevolent neutrality which Great Britain had
maintained toward the United States in the Spanish War. The excellent
spirit which Mr. Balfour had shown at this crisis he had manifested on
many occasions since. In the criticisms of the United States during the
_Lusitania_ troubles Mr. Balfour had never taken part. The era of
"neutrality" had not ruffled the confidence which he had always felt in
the United States. During all this time the most conspicuous dinner
tables of London had rung with criticisms of American policy; the fact
was well known, however, that Mr. Balfour had never sympathized with
these reproaches; even when he was not in office, no unfriendly word
concerning the United States had ever escaped his lips. His feeling
toward this country was well shown in a letter which he wrote Page, in
reply to one congratulating him on his seventieth birthday. "I have now
lived a long life," said Mr. Balfour, "and most of my energies have been
expended in political work, but if I have been fortunate enough to
contribute, even in the smallest degree, to drawing closer the bonds
that unite our two countries, I shall have done something compared with
which all else that I may have attempted counts in my eyes as nothing."
Page's letters and notes contain many references to Mr. Balfour's kindly
spirit. On the day following the dismissal of Bernstorff the American
Ambassador lunched with the Foreign Secretary at No. 4 Carlton Gardens.
"Mr. Balfour," Page reported to Washington, "gave expression to the
hearty admiration which he entertained for the President's handling of a
difficult task. He said that never for a moment had he doubted the
President's wisdom in the course he was pursuing. He had the profoundest
admiration for the manner in which he had promptly broken with Germany
after receiving Germany's latest note. Nor had he ever entertained the
slightest question of the American people's ready loyalty to their
Government or to their high ideals. One of his intellectual pleasures,
he added, had long been contemplation of the United States as it is and,
even more, as its influence in the world will broaden. 'The world,' said
Mr. Balfour, 'will more and more turn on the Great Republic as on a
pivot.'"
Occasionally Mr. Balfour's discussion of the United States would take a
more pensive turn. A memorandum which Page wrote a few weeks after the
above touches another point:
March 27, 1917.
I had a most interesting conversation with Mr. Balfour this
afternoon. "It's sad to me," said he, "that we are so unpopular, so
much more unpopular than the French, in your country. Why is it?
The old school books?"
I doubted the school-book influence.
"Certainly their influence is not the main cause. It is the
organized Irish. Then it's the effect of the very fact that the
Irish question is not settled. You've had that problem at your very
door for 300 years. What's the matter that you don't solve it?"
"Yes, yes,"--he saw it. But the plaintive tone of such a man asking
such a question was significant and interesting and--sad.
Then I told him the curious fact that a British Government made up
of twenty individuals, every one of whom is most friendly to the
United States, will, when they act together as a Government, do the
most offensive things. I mentioned the blacklist; I mentioned
certain complaints that I then held in my hand--of Americans here
who are told by the British Government that they must turn over to
the British Government's agent in New York their American
securities which they hold in America!
There's a sort of imperious, arrogant, Tory action that comes
natural to the English Government, even when not natural to the
individual Englishman.
* * * * *
On April 5th, the day before the United States formally declared war,
Page notified Washington that the British Government wished Mr. Balfour
to go to the United States as the head of a Commission to confer with
our Government. "Mr. Balfour is chosen for this mission," Page reported,
"not only because he is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but
because he is personally the most distinguished member of the
Government." Page tells the story in more detail in a letter to Mr.
Polk, at that time Counsellor of the State Department.
_To Frank L. Polk_
London, May 3, 1917.
DEAR MR. POLK:
... Mr. Balfour accurately represents British character, British
opinion, and the British attitude. Nobody who knows him and knows
British character and the British attitude ever doubted that. I
know his whole tribe, his home-life, his family connections, his
friends; and, of course, since he became Foreign Secretary, I've
come to know him intimately. When the question first came up here
of his going, of course I welcomed it enthusiastically. About that
time during a two-hour conversation he asked me why the British
were so unpopular in the United States. Among other reasons I told
him that our official people on both sides steadfastly refused to
visit one another and to become acquainted. Neither he nor Lord
Grey, nor Mr. Asquith, nor Mr. Lloyd George, had ever been to the
United States, nor any other important British statesman in recent
times, and not a single member of the Administration was personally
known to a single member of the British Government. "I'll go," said
he, "if you are perfectly sure my going will be agreeable to the
President." He himself recalled the fact, during one of our several
conversations just before he left, that you had not come when he
and Lord Grey had invited you. If you had come, by the way, this
era of a better understanding would have begun then, and half our
old troubles would then have been removed. Keeping away from one
another is the best of all methods of keeping all old
misunderstandings alive and of making new ones.
I have no doubt that Mr. Balfour's visit will cause visits of many
first-class British statesmen during the war or soon afterward.
That's all we need to bring about a perfect understanding.
You may remember how I tried to get an official report about the
behaviour of the _Benham_[58], and how, in the absence of that,
Lord Beresford made a disagreeable speech about our Navy in the
House of Lords, and how, when months later you sent me
Roosevelt's[59] letter, Lord Beresford expressed regret to me and
said that he would explain in another speech. I hadn't seen the old
fellow for a long time till a fortnight ago. He greeted me
cheerily, and I said, "I don't think I ought to shake hands with
you till you retract what you said about our navy." He insisted on
my dining with him. He invited Admiral Sims also, and those two
sailors had a jolly evening of it. Sims's coming has straightened
out all that naval misunderstanding and more. He is of immense help
to them and to us. But I'm going to make old Beresford's life a
burden till he gets up in the Lords and takes that speech
back--publicly. He's really all right; but it's just as well to
keep the records right. The proceedings of the House of Lords are
handsomely bound and go into every gentleman's library. I have seen
two centuries of them in many a house.
We can now begin a distinctly New Era in the world's history and in
its management if we rise to the occasion: there's not a shadow of
doubt about that. And the United States can play a part bigger than
we have yet dreamed of if we prove big enough to lead the British
and the French instead of listening to Irish and Germans. Neither
England nor France is a democracy--far from it. We can make them
both democracies and develop their whole people instead of about 10
per cent. of their people. We have simply to conduct our affairs by
a large national policy and not by the complaints of our really
non-American people. See how a declaration of war has cleared the
atmosphere!
We're happy yet, on rations. There are no potatoes. We have
meatless days. Good wheat meantime is sunk every day. The
submarine must be knocked out. Else the earth will be ruled by the
German bayonet and natural living will be _verboten_. We'll all
have to goose-step as the Crown Prince orders or--be shot. I see
they now propose that the United States shall pay the big war
indemnity in raw materials to the value of hundreds of billions of
dollars! Not just yet, I guess!
As we get reports of what you are doing, it's most cheerful. I
assure you, God has yet made nothing or nobody equal to the
American people; and I don't think He ever will or can.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
One of the curious developments of this Balfour Mission was a request
from President Wilson that Great Britain should take some decisive step
for the permanent settlement of the Irish question. "The President,"
this message ran, "wishes that, when you next meet the Prime Minister,
you would explain to him that only one circumstance now appears to stand
in the way of perfect coöperation with Great Britain. All Americans who
are not immediately connected with Germany by blood ties find their one
difficulty in the failure of Great Britain so far to establish a
satisfactory form of self-government in Ireland. In the recent debates
in Congress on the War Resolution, this sentiment was especially
manifest. It came out in the speeches of those enemies of the
Declaration who were not Irish themselves nor representatives of
sections in which Irish voters possessed great influence--notably
members from the Southern States.
"If the American people were once convinced that there was a likelihood
that the Irish question would soon be settled, great enthusiasm and
satisfaction would result and it would also strengthen the coöperation
which we are now about to organize between the United States and Great
Britain. Say this in unofficial terms to Mr. Lloyd George, but impress
upon him its very great significance. If the British Government should
act successfully on this matter, our American citizens of Irish descent
and to a great extent the German sympathizers who have made common cause
with the Irish, would join hands in the great common cause."
_To the President_
London, May 4, 1917.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
... It is a remarkable commentary on the insularity of the British
and on our studied isolation that till Mr. Balfour went over not a
member of this Government had ever met a member of our
Administration! Quite half our misunderstandings were due to this.
If I had the making of the laws of the two governments, I'd have a
statutory requirement that at least one visit a year by high
official persons should be made either way. We should never have
had a blacklist, etc., if that had been done. When I tried the
quite humble task of getting Polk to come and the excuse was made
that he couldn't be spared from his desk--Mr. President, I fear we
haven't half enough responsible official persons in our Government.
I should say that no man even of Polk's rank ought to have a desk:
just as well give him a mill-stone. Even I try not to have a desk:
else I'd never get anything of importance done; for I find that
talks and conferences in my office and in the government offices
and wherever else I can find out things take all my waking hours.
The Foreign Office here has about five high position men to every
one in the State Department. God sparing me, I'm going one of
these days to prepare a paper for our Foreign Affairs Committee on
the Waste of Having too Few High Grade Men in the Department of
State; a Plea for Five Assistant Secretaries for Every One Now
Existing and for Provision for International Visits by Them.
Here's an ancient and mouldy precedent that needs shattering--for
the coming of our country into its proper station and influence in
the world.
I am sure that Mr. Balfour's visit has turned out as well as I
hoped, and my hopes were high. He is one of the most interesting
men that I've ever had the honour to know intimately--he and Lord
Grey. Mr. Balfour is a Tory, of course; and in general I don't like
Tories, yet liberal he surely is--a sort of high-toned Scotch
democrat. I have studied him with increasing charm and interest.
Not infrequently when I am in his office just before luncheon he
says, "Come, walk over and we'll have lunch with the family." He's
a bachelor. One sister lives with him. Another (Lady Rayleigh, the
wife of the great chemist and Chancellor of Cambridge University)
frequently visits him. Either of those ladies could rule this
Empire. Then there are nieces and cousins always about--people of
rare cultivation, every one of 'em. One of those girls confirmed
the story that "Uncle Arthur" one day concluded that the niblick
was something more than a humble necessity of a bad golfer--that it
had positive virtues of its own and had suffered centuries of
neglect. He, therefore, proceeded to play with the niblick only,
till he proved his case and showed that it is a club entitled to
the highest respect.
A fierce old Liberal fighter in Parliamentary warfare, who entered
politics about the time Mr. Balfour did, told me this story the
other day. "I've watched Balfour for about forty years as a cat
watches a rat. I hate his party. I hated him till I learned better,
for I hated that whole Salisbury crowd. They wanted to Cecil
everything. But I'll tell you, Sir, apropos of his visit to your
country, that in all those years he has never spoken of the United
States except with high respect and often with deep affection. I
should have caught him, if he had."
I went with him to a college in London one afternoon where he
delivered a lecture on Dryden, to prove that poetry can carry a
certain cargo of argument but that argument can't raise the
smallest flight of poetry. Dry as it sounds, it was as good a
literary performance as I recall I ever heard.
At his "family" luncheon, I've found Lord Milner or Lord Lansdowne,
or some literary man who had come in to find out from Lady Rayleigh
how to conduct the Empire or to write a great book; and the modest
old chemical Lord sits silent most of the time and now and then
breaks loose to confound them all with a pat joke. This is a
vigorous family, these Balfours. There's one of them (a cousin of
some sort, I think, of the Foreign Secretary) who is a Lord of much
of Scotland, about as tall as Ben Nevis is high--a giant of a man.
One of his sons was killed early in the war and one was
missing--whether dead or not he did not know. Mrs. Page expressed
her hope one day to the old man that he had had news from his
missing son. "No, no," said he simply, "and me lady is awearying."
We've been lucky, Mr. President, in these days of immortal horrors
and of difficulties between two governments that did not know one
another--uncommonly lucky, in the large chances that politics gives
for grave errors, to have had two such men in the Foreign Office
here as Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour. There are men who were
mentioned for this post that would have driven us mad--or to war
with them. I'm afraid I've almost outgrown my living hero worship.
There isn't worshipful material enough lying around in the world to
keep a vigorous reverence in practice. But these two gentlemen by
birth and culture have at least sometimes seemed of heroic size to
me. It has meant much to know them well. I shall always be grateful
to them, for in their quiet, forceful way they helped me much to
establish right relations with these people--which, pray God, I
hope to retain through whatever new trials we may yet encounter.
For it will fall to us yet to loose and to free the British, and a
Briton set free is an American. That's all you can do for a man or
for a nation of men.
These Foreign Secretaries are not only men of much greater
cultivation than their Prime Ministers but of greater moral force.
But I've come to like Lloyd George very much. He'd never deliver a
lecture on Dryden, and he doesn't even play a good game of golf;
but he has what both Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour lack--a touch of
genius--whatever that is--not the kind that takes infinite pains,
but the kind that acts as an electric light flashed in the dark. He
said to me the other day that experts have nearly been the death of
him. "The Government has experts, experts, experts, everywhere. In
any department where things are not going well, I have found boards
and committees and boards of experts. But in one department at
least I've found a substitute for them. I let twenty experts go and
I put in one Man, and things began to move at once. Do you know any
real Men? When you hear of any, won't you let me know?"
A little while ago he dined with me, and, after dinner, I took him
to a corner of the drawing room and delivered your message to him
about Ireland. "God knows, I'm trying," he replied. "Tell the
President that. And tell him to talk to Balfour." Presently he
broke out--"Madmen, madmen--I never saw any such task," and he
pointed across the room to Sir Edward Carson, his First Lord of the
Admiralty--"Madmen." "But the President's right. We've got to
settle it and we've got to settle it now." Carson and Jellicoe came
across the room and sat down with us. "I've been telling the
Ambassador, Carson, that we've got to settle the Irish question
now--in spite of you.
"I'll tell you something else we've got to settle now," said
Carson. "Else it'll settle us. That's the submarines. The press and
public are working up a calculated and concerted attack on Jellicoe
and me, and, if they get us, they'll get you. It's an attack on the
Government made on the Admiralty. Prime Minister," said this Ulster
pirate whose civil war didn't come off only because the big war was
begun--"Prime Minister, it may be a fierce attack. Get ready for
it." Well, it has been developing ever since. But I can't for the
life of me guess at the possible results of an English
Parliamentary attack on a government. It's like a baseball man
watching a game of cricket. He can't see when the player is out or
why, or what caused it. Of course, the submarine may torpedo Lloyd
George and his Government. It looks very like it may overturn the
Admiralty, as Gallipoli did. If this public finds out the whole
truth, it will demand somebody's head. But I'm only a baseball man;
cricket is beyond me.
But Lloyd George will outlive the war as an active force, whatever
happen to him in the meantime. He's too heavily charged with
electricity to stop activity. The war has ended a good many careers
that seemed to have long promise. It is ending more every day. But
there is only one Lloyd George, and, whatever else he lack, he
doesn't lack life.
I heard all the speeches in both Houses on the resolution of
appreciation of our coming into the war--Bonar Law's, Asquith's
(one of the best), Dillon's, a Labour man's, and, in the Lords,
Curzon's, Crewe's, the Archbishop's (who delivered in the course of
his remarks a benediction on me) and Bryce's (almost the best of
all). It wasn't "oratory," but it was well said and well meant.
They know how badly they need help and they do mean to be as good
to us as their benignant insularity will permit. They are changing.
I can't describe the great difference that the war has made in
them. They'll almost become docile in a little more time.
And we came in in the nick of time for them--in very truth. If we
hadn't, their exchange would have gone down soon and they know it.
I shall never forget the afternoon I spent with Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Bonar Law on that subject. They saw blue ruin without our financial
help. And now, if we can save them from submarines, those that know
will know how vital our help was. Again, the submarine is the great
and grave and perhaps the only danger now. If that can be scotched,
I believe the whole Teutonic military structure would soon tumble.
If not, the Germans may go on as long as they can feed their army,
allowing their people to starve.
Of course, you know, we're on rations now--yet we suffer no
inconvenience on that score. But these queer people (they are the
most amusing and confusing and contradictory of all God's
creatures, these English, whose possibilities are infinite and
whose actualities, in many ways, are pitiful)--these queer people
are fiercely pursuing food-economy by discussing in the newspapers
whether a hen consumes more food than she produces, and whether
what dogs eat contains enough human food to justify the shooting of
every one in the Kingdom. That's the way we are coming down to
humble fare. But nothing can quite starve a people who all live
near the sea which yields fish enough near shore to feed them
wastefully.
All along this South shore, where I am to-day[60], I see the Stars
and Stripes; and everywhere there is a demand for the words and
music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic and the Star Spangled
Banner.
This our-new-Ally business is bringing me a lot of amusing
troubles. Theatres offer me boxes, universities offer me degrees,
hospitals solicit visits from me, clubs offer me dinners--I'll have
to get a new private secretary or two well-trained to say "No"
politely, else I shall not have my work done. But all that will
presently wear away as everything wears away (quickly, too) in the
grim face of this bloody monster of war which is consuming men as a
prairie fire consumes blades of grass. There's a family that lives
around the corner from this hotel. One son is in the trenches,
another is in a madhouse from shell-shock, a third coming home
wounded the other day was barely rescued when a torpedo sunk a
hospital ship and may lose his reason. I suppose I saw one hundred
men this afternoon on a single mile of beach who had lost both
legs. Through the wall from my house in London is a hospital. A
young Texan has been there, whose legs are gone at the thighs and
one arm at the elbow. God pity us for not having organized the
world better than this! We'll do it, yet, Mr. President--_you'll_
do it; and thank God for you. If we do not organize Europe and
make another such catastrophe impossible, life will not be worth
being born into except to the few whose days happen to fall between
recurring devastations of the world.
Yours sincerely,
WALTER H. PAGE.
"I hope that the English people," Colonel House wrote to Page about this
time, "realize how successful Mr. Balfour's visit to America really was.
There is no man they could have sent who could have done it better. He
and the President got along marvellously well. The three of us dined and
spent the evening together and it was delightful to see how sympathetic
their minds were."
A letter from Mr. Polk also discloses the impression which Mr. Balfour
made upon Washington:
_From Frank L. Polk_
Washington, May 25, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. PAGE:
I just want to get off a line to catch the pouch.
You probably know what a wonderful success the British Mission has
been, but I do not think you can realize what a deep impression
they have made on all of us. Mr. Balfour really won the affection
of us all, and I do not know when I was more sorry to have a man
leave than I was to have him go last night. He expressed himself as
having been very much impressed with his reception and the way he
was treated. He was most fair in all discussions, and I think has a
better understanding of our point of view. I had the good fortune
of being present at the financial and the diplomatic conferences,
and I think we all felt that we were dealing with a sympathetic
friend.
He and the President got on tremendously. The best evidence of that
was the fact that the President went up to Congress and sat in the
gallery while Mr. Balfour addressed the House. This is without
precedent.
The difficult problem of course was the blacklist and bunkering
agreement, but I think we are by that. The important thing now is
for the British to make all the concessions possible in connection
with the release of goods in Rotterdam and the release of goods in
Prize Court, though the cases have not been begun. Of course I mean
cases of merely suspicion rather than where there is evidence of
wrongdoing.
The sending of the destroyers and troops abroad is going to do a
great deal toward impressing our people with the fact that we
really are in the war. I do not think it is thoroughly borne home
on the majority yet what a serious road we have chosen.
With warm regards,
Yours faithfully,
FRANK L. POLK.
Mr. Polk's reference to the blacklist recalls an episode which in itself
illustrates the changed character of the relations that had now been
established between the American and the British governments. Mr.
Balfour discussed shipping problems for the most part with Mr. Polk,
under whose jurisdiction these matters fell. As one of these conferences
was approaching its end Mr. Balfour slightly coughed, uttered an "er,"
and gave other indications that he was about to touch upon a ticklish
question.
"Before I go," he said, "there--er--is one subject I would--er--like to
say something about."
Mr. Polk at once grasped what was coming.
"I know what you have in mind," said Mr. Polk in his characteristically
quick way. "You want us to apply your blacklist to neutrals."
In other words, the British hoped that the United States, now that it
was in the war, would adopt against South America and other offenders
those same discriminations which this country had so fiercely objected
to, when it was itself a neutral.
The British statesman gave Mr. Polk one of his most winning smiles and
nodded.
"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. Polk, "it took Great Britain three years to
reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade.
You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great
criminals as you are!"
Mr. Balfour is usually not explosive in his manifestations of mirth, but
his laughter, in reply to this statement, was almost uproarious. And the
State Department was as good as its word. It immediately forgot all the
elaborate "notes" and "protests" which it had been addressing to Great
Britain. It became more inexorable than Great Britain had ever been in
keeping foodstuffs out of neutral countries that were contiguous to
Germany. Up to the time the United States entered the war, Germany, in
spite of the watchful British fleet, had been obtaining large supplies
from the United States through Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian
peninsula. But the United States now immediately closed these leaks. In
the main this country adopted a policy of "rationing"; that is, it would
furnish the little nations adjoining Germany precisely the amount of
food which they needed for their own consumption. This policy was one of
the chief influences in undermining the German people and forcing their
surrender. The American Government extended likewise the blacklist to
South America and other countries, and, in doing so, it bettered the
instruction of Great Britain herself.
Though the whole story of the blockade thus seems finally to have ended
in a joke, the whole proceeding has its serious side. The United States
had been posing for three years as the champion of neutral rights; the
point of view of Washington had been that there was a great principle at
stake. If such a principle were involved, it was certainly present in
just the same degree after the United States became belligerent as in
the days when we were neutrals. The lofty ideals by which the
Administration had professed to be guided should have still controlled
its actions; the mere fact that we, as a belligerent, could obtain
certain advantages would hardly have justified a great and high-minded
nation in abandoning its principles. Yet abandon them we did from the
day that we declared war. We became just as remorseless in disregarding
the rights of small states as Great Britain--according to our numerous
blockade notes--had been. Possibly, therefore, Mr. Balfour's mirth was
not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that
our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that
the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really
believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were
involved. At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great
Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always
been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the
technicalities of the international lawyers. And now the Wilson
Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun
theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since
August 4, 1914, accepted--and accepted joyously--his point of view.
II
One of the first things which Mr. Balfour did, on his arrival in
Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the
so-called "secret treaties." The "secret treaty" that especially preyed
upon Mr. Wilson's mind, and which led to a famous episode at the
Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915,
as consideration for Italy's participation in the war. Mr. Balfour, in
telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy,
naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he
regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be
informed.
"This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a
war," he explained, and then he gave Mr. Wilson the details.
Probably the most important information which Mr. Balfour and the French
and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate
situation of the Allied cause. On that point not one of the visiting
statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at
concealment. Mr. Balfour emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in one
of his earliest talks with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The
British statesman was especially interested in the financial situation
and he therefore took up this matter at an early date with the Treasury
Department.
"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. McAdoo, "before we make any plans of financial
assistance it is absolutely necessary that we know precisely where we
stand. The all-important thing is the question as to how long the war is
likely to last. If it is only to last a few months, it is evident that
we need to make very different arrangements than if it is to last
several years. Just what must we make provision for? Let us assume that
the United States goes in with all its men and resources--that we
dedicate all our money, our manufacturing plants, our army, our navy,
everything we have got, to bringing the war to an end. How long will it
take?"
Mr. Balfour replied that it would be necessary to consult his naval and
military advisers before he answered that question. He said that he
would return in a day or two and make an explicit statement. He did so
and his answer was this: Under these circumstances--that the United
States should make war to the full limit of its power, in men and
resources--the war could not be ended until the summer or the autumn of
1919. Mr. McAdoo put the same question in the same form to the French
and Italian Missions and obtained precisely the same answer.
Page's papers show that Mr. Balfour, in the early stages of American
participation, regarded the financial situation as the thing which
chiefly threatened the success of the Allied cause. So much greater
emphasis has been laid upon the submarine warfare that this may at first
seem rather a misreading of Great Britain's peril. Yet the fact is that
the high rate of exchange and the depredatory U-boat represented almost
identically the same danger. The prospect that so darkened the horizon
in the spring of 1917 was the possible isolation of Great Britain.
England's weakness, as always, consisted in the fact that she was an
island, that she could not feed herself with her own resources and that
she had only about six weeks' supply of food ahead of her at any one
time. If Germany could cut the lines of communication and so prevent
essential supplies from reaching British ports, the population of Great
Britain could be starved into surrender in a very brief time, France
would be overwhelmed, and the triumph of the Prussian cause would be
complete. That the success of the German submarine campaign would
accomplish this result was a fact that the popular mind readily grasped.
What it did not so clearly see, however, was that the financial collapse
of Great Britain would cut these lines of communication quite as
effectually as the submarine itself. The British were practically
dependent for their existence upon the food brought from the United
States, just as the Allied armies were largely dependent upon the steel
which came from the great industrial plants of this country. If Great
Britain could not find the money with which to purchase these supplies,
it is quite apparent that they could not be shipped. The collapse of
British credit therefore would have produced the isolation of the
British Isles and led to a British surrender, just as effectively as
would the success of the German submarine campaign.
As soon as Bernstorff was sent home, therefore, and the participation of
this country in the war became extremely probable, Mr. Balfour took up
the financial question with Page.
_To the President_
March 5, 1917.
The inquiries which I have made here about financial conditions
disclose an international situation which is most alarming to the
financial and industrial outlook of the United States. England has
not only to pay her own war bills, but is obliged to finance her
Allies as well. Up to the present time she has done these tasks out
of her own capital. But she cannot continue her present extensive
purchases in the United States without shipping gold as payment for
them, and there are two reasons why she cannot make large
shipments of gold. In the first place, both England and France must
keep the larger part of the gold they have to maintain issues of
their paper at par; and, in the second place, the German U-boat has
made the shipping of gold a dangerous procedure even if they had it
to ship. There is therefore a pressing danger that the
Franco-American and Anglo-American exchange will be greatly
disturbed; the inevitable consequence will be that orders by all
the Allied Governments will be reduced to the lowest possible
amount and that trans-Atlantic trade will practically come to an
end. The result of such a stoppage will be a panic in the United
States. The world will therefore be divided into two hemispheres,
one of them, our own, will have the gold and the commodities; the
other, Great Britain and Europe, will need these commodities, but
it will have no money with which to pay for them. Moreover, it will
have practically no commodities of its own to exchange for them.
The financial and commercial result will be almost as bad for the
United States as for Europe. We shall soon reach this condition
unless we take quick action to prevent it. Great Britain and France
must have a credit in the United States which will be large enough
to prevent the collapse of world trade and the whole financial
structure of Europe.
If the United States declare war against Germany, the greatest help
we could give Great Britain and its Allies would be such a credit.
If we should adopt this policy, an excellent plan would be for our
Government to make a large investment in a Franco-British loan.
Another plan would be to guarantee such a loan. A great advantage
would be that all the money would be kept in the United States. We
could keep on with our trade and increase it, till the war ends,
and after the war Europe would purchase food and an enormous supply
of materials with which to reëquip her peace industries. We should
thus reap the profit of an uninterrupted and perhaps an enlarging
trade over a number of years and we should hold their securities in
payment.
On the other hand, if we keep nearly all the gold and Europe cannot
pay for reëstablishing its economic life, there may be a world-wide
panic for an indefinite period.
Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with
Germany. But is there no way in which our Government might
immediately and indirectly help the establishment in the United
States of a large Franco-British credit without violating armed
neutrality? I do not know enough about our own reserve bank law to
form an opinion. But these banks would avert such a danger if they
were able to establish such a credit. Danger for us is more real
and imminent, I think, than the public on either side the Atlantic
understands. If it be not averted before its manifestations become
apparent, it will then be too late to save the day.
The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone
beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British
and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are
too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every
such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional
antagonisms.
It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present
preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war
on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of
a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our
being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be
privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse
may come.
PAGE.
Urgent as this message was, it really understated the desperate
condition of British and Allied finances. That the warring powers were
extremely pressed for money has long been known; but Page's papers
reveal for the first time the fact that they were facing the prospect of
bankruptcy itself. "The whole Allied combination on this side the ocean
are very much nearer the end of their financial resources," he wrote in
July, "than anybody has guessed or imagined. We only can save them....
The submarines are steadily winning the war. Pershing and his army have
bucked up the French for the moment. But for his coming there was more
or less danger of a revolution in Paris and of serious defection in the
army. Everybody here fears that the French will fail before another
winter of the trenches. Yet--the Germans must be still worse off."
The matter that was chiefly pressing at the time of the Balfour visit
was the fact that the British balances in the New York banks were in a
serious condition. It should always be remembered, however, that Great
Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the
difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not
too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the
war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with
J.P. Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with
which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the
purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and the allied governments;
and securities, largely British owned stocks and bonds, had been
deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the
obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country
would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight
misunderstanding about this matter, the American Government finally
paid this over-draft out of the proceeds of the first Liberty Loan. This
act saved the credit of the allied countries; it was, of course, only
the beginning of the financial support that America brought to the
allied cause; the advances that were afterward furnished from the
American Treasury made possible the purchases of food and supplies in
enormous quantities. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and
starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome. It was the joint
product of Page's work in London and that of the Balfour Commission in
the United States.
III
Until these financial arrangements had been made there was no certainty
that the supplies which were so essential to victory would ever leave
the United States; this obstruction at the source had now been removed.
But the greater difficulty still remained. The German submarines were
lying off the waters south and west of Ireland ready to sink the supply
ships as soon as they entered the prohibited zone. Mr. Balfour and his
associates were working also on this problem in Washington; and, at the
same time, Page and Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty were bending
all their energies in London to obtain immediate coöperation.
A remark which Mr. Balfour afterward made to Admiral Sims shows the
frightful nature of the problem which was confronting Great Britain at
that time.
"That was a terrible week we spent at sea in that voyage to the United
States," Mr. Balfour said. "We knew that the German submarine campaign
was succeeding. Their submarines were destroying our shipping and we
had no means of preventing it. I could not help thinking that we were
facing the defeat of Great Britain."
Page's papers show that as early as February 25th he understood in a
general way the disheartening proportions of the German success. "It is
a momentous crisis," he wrote at that time. "The submarines are
destroying shipping at an appalling rate." Yet it was not until Admiral
Sims arrived in London, on April 9th, that the Ambassador learned all
the details. In sending the Admiral to England the Navy Department had
acted on an earnest recommendation from Page. The fact that the American
Navy was inadequately represented in the British capital had long been a
matter of embarrassment to him. The ability and personal qualifications
of our attachés had been unquestioned; but none of them during the war
had been men of high rank, and this in itself proved to be a constant
impediment to their success. While America was represented by
Commanders, Japan, Italy, and France had all sent Admirals to London.
Page's repeated requests for an American Admiral had so far met with no
response, but the probability that this country would become involved in
the war now gave new point to his representations. In the latter part of
March, Page renewed his request in still more urgent form, and this time
the President and the Navy Department responded favourably. The result
was that, on April 9th, three days after the American declaration of
war, Admiral Sims and his flag-lieutenant, Commander Babcock, presented
themselves at the American Embassy. There was little in the appearance
of these men to suggest a violent naval demonstration against Germany.
Both wore civilian dress, their instructions having commanded them not
to bring uniforms; both were travelling under assumed names, and both
had no more definite orders than to investigate the naval situation and
cable the results to Washington. In spite of these attempts at secrecy,
the British had learned that Admiral Sims was on the way; they rejoiced
not only in this fact, but in the fact that Sims had been chosen, for
there was no American naval officer whose professional reputation stood
so high in the British Navy or who was so personally acceptable to
British officialdom and the British public. The Admiralty therefore met
Admiral Sims at Liverpool, brought him to London in a special train,
and, a few hours after his arrival, gave him the innermost secrets on
the submarine situation--secrets which were so dangerous that not all
the members of the British Cabinet had been let into them.
Page welcomed Admiral Sims with a cordiality which that experienced sea
veteran still gratefully remembers. He at once turned over to him two
rooms in the Embassy. "You can have everything we've got," the
Ambassador said. "If necessary to give you room, we'll turn the whole
Embassy force out into the street." The two men had not previously met,
but in an instant they became close friends. A common sympathy and a
common enthusiasm were greatly needed at that crisis. As soon as Admiral
Sims had finished his interview with Admiral Jellicoe, he immediately
sought out the Ambassador and laid all the facts before him. Germany was
winning the war. Great Britain had only six weeks' food supply on hand,
and the submarines were sinking the ships at a rate which, unless the
depredations should be checked, meant an early and unconditional
surrender of the British Empire. Only the help of the United States
could prevent this calamity.
Page, of course, was aghast: the facts and figures Admiral Sims gave him
disclosed a situation which was even more desperate than he had
imagined. He advised the Admiral to cable the whole story immediately to
Washington. Admiral Sims at first had some difficulty in obtaining the
Admiralty's consent to doing this, and the reason was the one with which
Page had long been familiar--the fear, altogether too justified, that
the news would "leak" out of Washington. Of course there was no
suspicion in British naval circles of the good faith of the Washington
officials, but important facts had been sent so many times under the
seal of the strictest secrecy and had then found their way into the
newspapers that there was a deep distrust of American discretion.
Certainly no greater damage could have been done the allied cause at
that time than to have the Germans learn how successfully their
submarine campaign was progressing. The question was referred to the
Imperial War Council and its consent obtained. The report, however, was
sent to the Navy Department in the British naval code, and decoded in
the British Embassy in Washington.
Admiral Sims's message gave all the facts about the submarine situation,
and concluded with the recommendation that the United States should
assemble all floating craft that could be used in the anti-submarine
warfare, destroyers, tugs, yachts, light cruisers, and similar vessels,
and send them immediately to Queenstown, where they would do valuable
service in convoying merchant vessels and destroying the U-boats. At
that time the American Navy had between fifty and sixty destroyers that
were patrolling the American coast; these could have been despatched,
almost immediately, to the scene of operations; but, in response to this
request, the Department sent six to Queentown.
The next few months were very unhappy ones for Admiral Sims. He was the
representative in London of one of the world's greatest naval powers,
participating in the greatest war that had ever enlisted its energies,
yet his constant appeals for warships elicited the most inadequate
response, his well-reasoned recommendations for meeting the crisis were
frequently unanswered and at other times were met with counter-proposals
so childish that they seemed almost to have originated in the brains of
newspaper amateurs, and his urgent pictures of a civilization rapidly
going to wreck were apparently looked upon with suspicion as the
utterances of a man who had been completely led astray by British guile.
To give a fair idea of Washington's neglect during this period it is
only necessary to point out that, for four months, Admiral Sims occupied
the two rooms in the Embassy directly above Page's, with Commander
Babcock as his only aid. Sims's repeated requests to Secretary Daniels
for an additional staff went unheeded. Had it not been for the Admiral's
constant daily association with Page and the comfort and encouragement
which the Ambassador gave him, this experience would have been almost
unbearable. In the latter part of April, the Admiral's appeals to
Washington having apparently fallen on deaf ears, he asked Page to
second his efforts. The Admiral and Commander Babcock wrote another
message, and drove in a motor car to Brighton, where Page was taking a
little rest. The Admiral did not know just how strong a statement the
Ambassador would care to sponsor, and so he did not make this
representation as emphatic as the judgment of both men would have
preferred.
The Admiral handed Page the paper, saying that he had prepared it with
the hope that the Ambassador would sign it and send it directly to
President Wilson.
"It is quite apparent," Admiral Sims said, "that the Department doesn't
believe what I have been saying. Or they don't believe what the British
are saying. They think that England is exaggerating the peril for
reasons of its own. They think I am hopelessly pro-British and that I
am being used. But if you'll take it up directly with the President,
then they may be convinced."
Page put on his spectacles, took the paper, and read it through. Then,
looking over the rim of his glasses in his characteristic way, he leaned
toward Admiral Sims and said:
"Admiral, it isn't half strong enough! I think I can write a better
despatch than that, myself! At least let me try."
He immediately took a pen and paper and in a few minutes he had written
his own version which he gave the Admiral to read. The latter was
delighted with it and in a brief time it was on its way to Washington.
From: Ambassador Page.
To: Secretary of State.
Sent: 27 April, 1917.
_Very confidential for Secretary and President_
There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war
caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have
it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88
ships of 237,000 tons, allied and neutral, were lost. The number of
vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the
number of submarines in action.
This means practically a million tons lost every month till the
shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about
clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and
southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available
anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they
hardly discourage the submarines.
The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to
the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is
threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population
only not more than six weeks or two months.
Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the
future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more
seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the
Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else.
After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister
and other members of the Government, I can not refrain from most
strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer
and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems
to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous
situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.
If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three
months, the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective
help immediately, it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot
exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of this situation.
Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us
immediately would very likely be decisive.
There is no time to be lost.
(Signed) PAGE.
This cablegram had a certain effect. The reply came from Washington that
"eventually" thirty-six destroyers would be sent.
* * * * *
Page's letters of this period are full of the same subject.
_To the President_
London, May 4, 1917.
Dear Mr. President:
The submarines have become a very grave danger. The loss of British
and allied tonnage increases with the longer and brighter days--as
I telegraphed you, 237,000 tons last week; and the worst of it is,
the British are not destroying them. The Admiralty publishes a
weekly report which, though true, is not the whole truth. It is
known in official circles here that the Germans are turning out at
least two a week--some say three; and the British are not
destroying them as fast as new ones are turned out. If merely the
present situation continue, the war will pretty soon become a
contest of endurance under hunger, with an increasing proportion of
starvation. Germany is yet much the worse off, but it will be
easily possible for Great Britain to suffer to the danger point
next winter or earlier unless some decided change be wrought in
this situation.
The greatest help, I hope, can come from us--our destroyers and
similar armed craft--provided we can send enough of them quickly.
The area to be watched is so big that many submarine hunters are
needed. Early in the war the submarines worked near shore. There
are very many more of them now and their range is one hundred
miles, or even two hundred, at sea.
The public is becoming very restive with its half information, and
it is more and more loudly demanding all the facts. There are
already angry threats to change the personnel of the Admiralty;
there is even talk of turning out the Government. "We must have
results, we must have results." I hear confidentially that Jellicoe
has threatened to resign unless the Salonica expedition is brought
back: to feed and equip that force requires too many ships.
And there are other troubles impending. Norway has lost so many of
her ships that she dare not send what are left to sea. Unarmed
they'll all perish. If she arms them, Germany will declare war
against her. There is a plan on foot for the British to charter
these Norwegian ships and to arm them, taking the risk of German
war against Norway. If war comes (as it is expected) England must
then defend Norway the best she can. And _then England may ask for
our big ships to help in these waters_. All this is yet in the
future, but possibly not far in the future.
For the present the only anti-submarine help is the help we may be
able to give to patrol the wide area off Ireland. If we had one
hundred destroyers to send, the job there could, I am told, be
quickly done. A third of that number will help mightily. At the
present rate of destruction more than four million tons will be
sunk before the summer is gone.
Such is this dire submarine danger. The English thought that they
controlled the sea; the Germans, that they were invincible on land.
Each side is losing where it thought itself strongest.
Admiral Sims is of the greatest help imaginable. Of course, I gave
him an office in one of our Embassy buildings, and the Admiralty
has given him an office also with them. He spends much of his time
there, and they have opened all doors and all desks and drawers to
him. He strikes me (and the English so regard him) as a man of
admirable judgment--unexcitable and indefatigable. I hope we'll
soon send a general over, to whom the War Department will act
similarly. Hoover, too, must have a good man here as, I dare say,
he has already made known. These will cover the Navy, the Army,
Food, and Shipping. Perhaps a Censor and an Intelligence (Secret
Service) group ought to come. I mean these for permanent--at least
indefinite--service. Exchange visits by a Congressional Committee
(such as the French and British make) and by high official persons
such as members of your Cabinet (such also as the French and
British make)--you will have got ideas about these from Mr.
Balfour.
W.H.P.
In the latter part of June Admiral Sims went to Queenstown. Admiral
Bayly, who directed the operation of the anti-submarine forces there,
had gone away for a brief rest, and Admiral Sims had taken over the
command of both the British and American forces at that point. This
experience gave Admiral Sims a first-hand picture of a really deplorable
situation. The crisis was so desperate that he made another appeal to
Page.
_From Admiral William S. Sims_
Admiralty House, Queenstown,
June 25, 1917.
My Dear Mr. Page:
I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].
I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the
war; that it will be already lost when the loss of shipping reaches
the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the
various battle fronts.
I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the
necessary anti-submarine craft to this side.
There are at least seventeen more destroyers employed on our
Atlantic coast, _where there is no war_, not to mention numerous
other very useful anti-submarine craft, including sea-going tugs,
etc.
Can you not do something to bring our Government to an
understanding of how very serious the situation is? Would it not be
well to send another telegram to Mr. Lansing and the President, and
also send them the enclosed correspondence?
I am sending this by mail because I may be somewhat delayed in
returning to London.
Very sincerely yours,
Wm. S. Sims.
Page immediately acted on this suggestion.
_Most confidential for the Secretary of State and President only_
Sims sends me by special messenger from Queenstown the most
alarming reports of the submarine situation which are confirmed by
the Admiralty here. He says that the war will be won or lost in
this submarine zone within a few months. Time is of the essence of
the problem, and anti-submarine craft which cannot be assembled in
the submarine zone almost immediately may come too late. There is,
therefore, a possibility that this war may become a war between
Germany and the United States alone. Help is far more urgently and
quickly needed in this submarine zone than anywhere else in the
whole war area.
Page.
The United States had now been in the war for three months and only
twenty-eight of the sixty destroyers which were available had been sent
into the field. Yet this latest message of Page produced no effect, and,
when Admiral Sims returned from Queenstown, the two men, almost in
despair, consulted as to the step which they should take next. What was
the matter? Was it that Washington did not care to get into the naval
war with its full strength, or was it that it simply refused to believe
the representations of its Admiral and its Ambassador? Admiral Sims and
Page went over the whole situation and came to the conclusion that
Washington regarded them both as so pro-British that their reports were
subject to suspicion. Just as Page had found that the State Department,
and its "trade advisers," had believed that the British were using the
blockade as a means of destroying American trade for the benefit of
Britain, so now he believed that Mr. Daniels and Admiral Benson, the
Chief of Naval Operations, evidently thought that Great Britain was
attempting to lure American warships into European waters, to undergo
the risk of protecting British commerce, while British warships were
kept safely in harbour. Page suggested that there was now only one thing
left to do, and that was to request the British Government itself to
make a statement to President Wilson that would substantiate his own
messages.
"Whatever else they think of the British in Washington," he said, "they
know one thing--and that is that a British statesman like Mr. Balfour
will not lie."
Mr. Balfour by this time had returned from America. The fact that he had
established these splendid personal relations with Mr. Wilson, and that
he had impressed the American public so deeply with his sincerity and
fine purpose, made him especially valuable for this particular appeal.
Page and Admiral Sims therefore went to the Foreign Office and laid all
the facts before him. Their own statements, Page informed the Foreign
Secretary, were evidently regarded as hysterical and biased by an
unreasoning friendliness to Great Britain. If Mr. Balfour would say the
same things over his own signature, then they would not be disbelieved.
Mr. Balfour gladly consented. He called in Admiral Jellicoe and asked
him to draft a despatch, so that all the technical facts would be
completely accurate. He also consulted with Sir Edward Carson, the First
Lord of the Admiralty. Then Mr. Balfour put the document in its final
shape and signed it. It was as follows:
_Mr. Balfour to the President_
June 30, 1917.
The forces at present at the disposal of the British Admiralty are
not adequate to protect shipping from submarine attack in the
danger zone round the British Islands. Consequently shipping is
being sunk at a greater rate than it can be replaced by new tonnage
of British origin.
The time will come when, if the present rate of loss continues, the
available shipping, apart from American contribution, will be
insufficient to bring to this country sufficient foodstuffs and
other essentials, including oil fuel. The situation in regard to
our Allies, France, and Italy, is much the same.
Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to add to our forces as a
first step, pending the adoption or completion of measures which
will, it is hoped, eventually lead to the destruction of enemy
submarines at a rate sufficient to ensure safety of our sea
communications.
The United States is the only allied country in a position to help.
The pressing need is for armed small craft of every kind available
in the area where commerce concentrates near the British and French
coasts. Destroyers, submarines, gunboats, yachts, trawlers, and
tugs would all give invaluable help, and if sent in sufficient
numbers would undoubtedly save a situation which is manifestly
critical. But they are required now and in as great numbers as
possible. There is no time for delay. The present method of
submarine attack is almost entirely by torpedo with the submarine
submerged. The gun defense of merchant ships keeps the submarine
below the surface but does no more; offensively against a submerged
submarine it is useless, and the large majority of the ships
torpedoed never see the attacking submarine until the torpedo has
hit the ship[62].
The present remedy is, therefore, to prevent the submarine from
using its periscope for fear of attack by bomb or ram from small
craft, and this method of defense for the shipping and offense
against the submarine requires small craft in very large numbers.
The introduction of the convoy system, provided there are
sufficient destroyers to form an adequate screen to the convoy,
will, it is hoped, minimize losses when it is working, and the
provision of new offensive measures is progressing; but for the
next few months there is only one safeguard, viz., the immediate
addition to patrols of every small vessel that can possibly be sent
to European waters.
Page, moreover, kept up his own appeal:
_To the President_
July 5th.
_Strictly confidential to the President and the Secretary_
The British Cabinet is engaging in a threatening controversy about
the attitude which they should take toward the submarine peril.
There is a faction in the Admiralty which possesses the
indisputable facts and which takes a very disheartening view of
the situation. This group insists that the Cabinet should make a
confession at least to us of the full extent of the danger and that
it should give more information to the public. The public does not
feel great alarm simply because it has been kept in too great
ignorance. But the political faction is so far the stronger. It
attempts to minimize the facts, and, probably for political
reasons, it refuses to give these discouraging facts wide
publicity. The politicians urge that it is necessary to conceal the
full facts from the Germans. They also see great danger in throwing
the public into a panic.
Mr. Lloyd George is always optimistic and he is too much inclined
to yield his judgment to political motives. In his recent address
in Glasgow he gave the public a comforting impression of the
situation. But the facts do not warrant the impression which he
gave.
This dispute among the political factions is most unfortunate and
it may cause an explosion of public feeling at any time. Changes in
the Cabinet may come in consequence. If the British public knew all
the facts or if the American people knew them, the present British
Government would probably fall. It is therefore not only the
submarine situation which is full of danger. The political
situation is in a dangerous state also.
PAGE.
_To Arthur W. Page_
Wilsford Manor, Salisbury,
July 8, 1917.
DEAR ARTHUR:
Since admirals and generals began to come from home, they and the
war have taken my time so completely, day and night, that I haven't
lately written you many things that I should like to tell you. I'll
try here--a house of a friend of ours where the only other guest
besides your mother and me is Edward Grey. This is the first time
I've seen him since he left office. Let me take certain big
subjects in order and come to smaller things later:
1. The German submarines are succeeding to a degree that the public
knows nothing about. These two things are true: (a) The Germans are
building submarines faster than the English sink them. In this way,
therefore, they are steadily gaining. (b) The submarines are
sinking freight ships faster than freight ships are being built by
the whole world. In this way, too, then, the Germans are
succeeding. Now if this goes on long enough, the Allies' game is
up. For instance, they have lately sunk so many fuel oil ships,
that this country may very soon be in a perilous condition--even
the Grand Fleet may not have enough fuel. Of course the chance is
that oil ships will not continue to fall victims to the U-boats and
we shall get enough through to replenish the stock. But this
illustrates the danger, and it is a very grave danger.
The best remedy so far worked out is the destroyer. The submarines
avoid destroyers and they sink very, very few ships that are
convoyed. If we had destroyers enough to patrol the whole approach
(for, say, 250 miles) to England, the safety of the sea would be
very greatly increased; and if we had enough to patrol and to
convoy every ship going and coming, the damage would be reduced to
a minimum. The Admiral and I are trying our best to get our
Government to send over 500 improvised destroyers--yachts,
ocean-going tugs--any kind of swift craft that can be armed. Five
hundred such little boats might end the war in a few months; for
the Germans are keeping the spirit of their people and of their
army up by their submarine success. If that success were stopped
they'd have no other cry half so effective. If they could see this
in Washington as we see it, they'd do it and do it not halfway but
with a vengeance. If they don't do it, the war may be indefinitely
prolonged and a wholly satisfactory peace may never be made. The
submarine is the most formidable thing the war has produced--by
far--and it gives the German the only earthly chance he has to win.
And he _may_ substantially win by it yet. That's what the British
conceal. In fact, half of them do not see it or believe it. But
nothing is truer, or plainer. One hundred thousand submarine
chasers next year may be worth far less than 500 would be worth
now, for next year see how few ships may be left! The mere arming
of ships is not enough. Nearly all that are sunk are armed. The
submarine now carries a little periscope and a big one, each
painted the colour of the sea. You can't see a little periscope
except in an ocean as smooth as glass. It isn't bigger than a
coffee cup. The submarine thus sinks its victims without ever
emerging or ever being seen. As things now stand, the Germans are
winning the war, and they are winning it on the sea; that's the
queer and the most discouraging fact. My own opinion is that all
the facts ought to be published to all the world. Let the Germans
get all the joy they can out of the confession. No matter, if the
Government and the people of the United States knew all the facts,
we'd have 1,000 improvised destroyers (yachts, tugs, etc., etc.)
armed and over here very quickly. Then the tide would turn.
Then there'd be nothing to fear in the long run. For the military
authorities all agree that the German Army is inferior to the
British and French and will be whipped. That may take a long time
yet; but of the result nobody who knows seems to have any
doubt--unless the French get tired and stop. They have periods of
great war weariness and there is real danger that they may quit and
make a separate peace. General Pershing's presence has made the
situation safe for the moment. But in a little while something else
spectacular and hopeful may be required to keep them in line.
Such is an accurate picture of the war as it is now, and it is a
dangerous situation.
2. The next grave danger is financial. The European Allies have so
bled the English for money that the English would by this time
probably have been on a paper money basis (and of course all the
Allies as well) if we had not come to their financial aid. And
we've got to keep our financial aid going to them to prevent this
disastrous result. That wouldn't at once end the war, if they had
all abandoned specie payments; but it would be a frightfully severe
blow and it might later bring defeat. That is a real danger. And
the Government at Washington, I fear, does not know the full extent
of the danger. They think that the English are disposed to lie down
on them. They don't realize the cost of the war. This Government
has bared all this vast skeleton to me; but I fear that Washington
imagines that part of it is a deliberate scare. It's a very real
danger.
Now, certain detached items:
Sims is the idol of the British Admiralty and he is doing his job
just as well as any man could with the tools and the chance that he
has. He has made the very best of the chance and he has completely
won the confidence and admiration of this side of the world.
Pershing made an admirable impression here, and in France he has
simply set them wild with joy. His coming and his little army have
been worth what a real army will be worth later. It is well he came
to keep the French in line.
The army of doctors and nurses have had a similar effect.
Even the New England saw-mill units have caused a furor of
enthusiasm. They came with absolute Yankee completeness of
organization--with duplicate parts of all their machinery, tents,
cooks, pots, and pans, and everything ship-shape. The only question
they asked was: "Say, where the hell are them trees you want sawed
up?" That's the way to do a job! Yankee stock is made high here by
such things as that.
We're getting a crowd of Yankee lecturers on the United States to
go up and down this Kingdom. There's the greatest imaginable
curiosity to hear about the United States in all kinds of society
from munition workers to universities. I got the British Government
to write Buttrick[63] to come as its guest, and the Rockefeller
Boards rose to the occasion. He'll probably be along presently. If
he hasn't already sailed when you get this, see him and tell him to
make arrangements to have pictures sent over to him to illustrate
his lectures. Who else could come to do this sort of a job?
I am myself busier than I have ever been. The kind of work the
Embassy now has to do is very different from the work of the days
of neutrality. It continues to increase--especially the work that I
have to do myself. But it's all pleasant now. We are trying to help
and no longer to hinder. To save my life I don't see how the
Washington crowd can look at themselves in a mirror and keep their
faces straight. Yesterday they were bent on sending everything into
European neutral states. The foundations of civilization would give
way if neutral trade were interfered with. Now, nothing must go in
except on a ration basis. Yesterday it must be a peace without
victory. Now it must be a complete victory, every man and every
dollar thrown in, else no peace is worth having. I don't complain.
I only rejoice. But I'm glad that kind of a rapid change is not a
part of my record. The German was the same beast yesterday that he
is to-day; and it makes a simple-minded, straight-minded man like
me wonder which attitude was the (or is the) attitude of real
conviction. But this doesn't bother me now as a real problem--only
as a speculation. What we call History will, I presume, in time
work this out. But History is often a kind of lie. But never mind
that. The only duty of mankind now is to win. Other things can
wait.
I walked over to Stonehenge and back (about six miles) with Lord
Grey (Sir Edward, you know) and we, like everybody else, fell to
talking about when the war may end. We know as well as anybody and
no better than anybody else. I have very different moods about
it--no convictions. It seems to me to depend, as things now are,
more on the submarines than on anything else. If we could
effectually discourage them so that the Germans would have to
withdraw them and could no more keep up the spirit of their people
by stories of the imminent starvation of England, I have a feeling
that the hunger and the war weariness of the German people would
lead them to force an end. But, the more they are called on to
suffer the more patriotic do they think themselves and they _may_
go on till they drop dead in their tracks.
What I am really afraid of is that the Germans may, before winter,
offer all that the Western Allies most want--the restoration of
Belgium and France, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, etc., in the
West and the surrender of the Colonies--provided Austria is not
dismembered. That would virtually leave them the chance to work out
their Middle Europe scheme and ultimately there'd probably have to
be another war over that question. That's the real eventuality to
be feared--a German defeat in the West but a German victory in the
Southeast. Everybody in Europe is so war weary that such a plan
_may_ succeed.
On the other hand, what Hoover and Northcliffe fear may come
true--that the Germans are going to keep up the struggle for
years--till their armies are practically obliterated, as Lee's army
was. If the Allies were actually to kill (not merely wound, but
actually kill) 5,000 Germans a day for 300 days a year, it would
take about four years to obliterate the whole German Army. There is
the bare possibility, therefore, of a long struggle yet. But I
can't believe it. My dominant mood these days is an end within a
very few months after the submarines are knocked out. Send over,
therefore, 1,000 improvised destroyers the next two months, and
I'll promise peace by Christmas. Otherwise I can make no promises.
That's all that Lord Grey and I know, and surely we are two wise
men. What, therefore, is the use in writing any more about this?
The chief necessity that grows upon me is that all the facts must
be brought out that show the kinship in blood and ideals of the two
great English-speaking nations. We were actually coming to believe
ourselves that we were part German and Slovene and Pole and
What-not, instead of essentially being Scotch and English. Hence
the unspeakable impudence of your German who spoke of eliminating
the Anglo-Saxon element from American life! The truth should be
forcibly and convincingly told and repeated to the end of the
chapter, and our national life should proceed on its natural
historic lines, with its proper historic outlook and background. We
can do something to bring this about.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
The labour of getting the American Navy into the war was evidently at
first a difficult one, but the determination of Page and Admiral Sims
triumphed, and, by August and September, our energies were fully
engaged. And the American Navy made a record that will stand
everlastingly to its glory. Without its help the German submarines could
never have been overcome.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 58: The reference is to the attack made in October, 1916, by
the German Submarine U-53, off Nantucket on several British ships. An
erroneous newspaper account said that the _Benham_, an American
destroyer, had moved in a way that facilitated the operations of the
German submarine. This caused great bitterness in England, until Page
showed the Admiralty a report from the Navy Department proving that the
story was false.]
[Footnote 59: This, of course, is Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy in 1917.]
[Footnote 60: This letter is dated London and was probably begun there.
It is evident, however, that the latter part was written at Brighton,
where the Ambassador was taking a brief holiday.]
[Footnote 61: This was a long document describing conditions in great
detail.]
[Footnote 62: The Navy Department had taken the position that arming
merchantmen was the best protection against the submarine. This
statement was intended to refute this belief.]
[Footnote 63: Dr. Wallace Buttrick, President of the General Education
Board, who was sent at this time to deliver lectures throughout Great
Britain on the United States.]
CHAPTER XXIII
PAGE--THE MAN
The entrance of America into the war, followed by the successful
promotion of the Balfour visit, brought a period of quiet into Page's
life. These events represented for him a personal triumph; there were
many things still to be done, it is true, and Page, as always, was
active in advancing the interests that were nearest his heart; yet the
mighty relief that followed the American declaration was the kind that
one experiences after accomplishing the greatest task of a lifetime.
Page's letters have contained many references to the sense of moral
isolation which his country's policy had forced upon him; he probably
exaggerated his feeling that there was a tendency to avoid him; this was
merely a reflection of his own inclination to keep away from all but the
official people. He now had more leisure and certainly more interest in
cultivating the friends that he had made in Great Britain. For the fact
is that, during all these engrossing years, Page had been more than an
Ambassador; by the time the United States entered the war he had
attained an assured personal position in the life of the British
capital. He had long since demonstrated his qualifications for a post,
which, in the distinction of the men who have occupied it, has few
parallels in diplomacy. The scholarly Lowell, the courtly Bayard, the
companionable Hay, the ever-humorous Choate, had set a standard for
American Ambassadors which had made the place a difficult one for their
successors. Though Page had characteristics in common with all these
men, his personality had its own distinctive tang; and it was something
new to the political and social life of London. And the British capital,
which is extremely exacting and even merciless in its demands upon its
important personages, had found it vastly entertaining. "I didn't know
there could be anything so American as Page except Mark Twain," a
British literary man once remarked; and it was probably this strong
American quality, this directness and even breeziness of speech and of
method, this absence of affectation, this almost openly expressed
contempt for finesse and even for tradition, combined with those other
traits which we like to think of as American--an upright purpose, a
desire to serve not only his own country but mankind--which made the
British public look upon Page as one of the most attractive and useful
figures in a war-torn Europe.
There was a certain ruggedness in Page's exterior which the British
regarded as distinctly in keeping with this American flavour. The
Ambassador was not a handsome man. To one who had heard much of the
liveliness of his conversation and presence a first impression was
likely to be disappointing. His figure at this time was tall, gaunt, and
lean--and he steadily lost weight during his service in England; his
head was finely shaped--it was large, with a high forehead, his thin
gray hair rather increasing its intellectual aspect; and his big frank
brown eyes reflected that keen zest for life, that unsleeping interest
in everything about him, that ever-working intelligence and sympathy
which were the man's predominant traits. But a very large nose at first
rather lessened the pleasing effects of his other features, and a rather
weather-beaten, corrugated face gave a preliminary suggestion of
roughness. Yet Page had only to begin talking and the impression
immediately changed. "He puts his mind to yours," Dr. Johnson said,
describing the sympathetic qualities of a friend, and the same was true
of Page. Half a dozen sentences, spoken in his quick, soft, and
ingratiating accents, accompanied by the most genial smile, at once
converted the listener into a friend. Few men have ever lived who more
quickly responded to this human relationship. The Ambassador, at the
simple approach of a human being, became as a man transformed. Tired
though he might be, low in spirits as he not infrequently was, the press
of a human hand at once changed him into an animated and radiating
companion. This responsiveness deceived all his friends in the days of
his last illness. His intimates who dropped in to see Page invariably
went away much encouraged and spread optimistic reports about his
progress. A few minutes' conversation with Page would deceive even his
physicians. The explanation was a simple one: the human presence had an
electric effect upon him, and it is a revealing sidelight on Page's
character that almost any man or woman could produce this result. As an
editor, the readiness with which he would listen to suggestions from the
humblest source was a constant astonishment to his associates. The
office boy had as accessible an approach to Page as had his partners. He
never treated an idea, even a grotesque one, with contempt; he always
had time to discuss it, to argue it out, and no one ever left his
presence thinking that he had made an absurd proposal. Thus Page had a
profound respect for a human being simply because he was a human being;
the mere fact that a man, woman, or child lived and breathed, had his
virtues and his failings, constituted in Page's imagination a tremendous
fact. He could not wound such a living creature any more than he could
wound a flower or a tree; consequently he treated every person as an
important member of the universe. Not infrequently, indeed, he stormed
at public men, but his thunder, after all, was not very terrifying; his
remarks about such personages as Mr. Bryan merely reflected his
indignation at their policies and their influence but did not indicate
any feeling against the victims themselves. Page said "Good morning" to
his doorman with the same deference that he showed to Sir Edward Grey,
and there was not a little stenographer in the building whose joys and
sorrows did not arouse in him the most friendly interest. Some of the
most affecting letters written about Page, indeed, have come from these
daily associates of more humble station. "We so often speak of Mr.
Page," writes one of the Embassy staff--"Findlater, Short, and
Frederick"--these were all English servants at the Embassy; "we all
loved him equally, and hardly a day passes that something does not
remind us of him, and I often fancy that I hear his laugh, so full of
kindness and love of life." And the impression left on those in high
position was the same. "I have seen ladies representing all that is most
worldly in Mayfair," writes Mr. Ellery Sedgwick, the editor of the
_Atlantic Monthly_, "start at the sudden thought of Page's illness,
their eyes glistening with tears."
Perhaps what gave most charm to this human side was the fact that Page
was fundamentally such a scholarly man. This was the aspect which
especially delighted his English friends. He preached democracy
and Americanism with an emphasis that almost suggested the
back-woodsman--the many ideas on these subjects that appear in his
letters Page never hesitated to set forth with all due resonance at
London dinner tables--yet he phrased his creed in language that was
little less than literary style, and illuminated it with illustrations
and a philosophy that were the product of the most exhaustive reading.
"Your Ambassador has taught us something that we did not know before,"
an English friend remarked to an American. "That is that a man can be a
democrat and a man of culture at the same time." The Greek and Latin
authors had been Page's companions from the days when, as the holder of
the Greek Fellowship at Johns Hopkins, he had been a favourite pupil of
Basil L. Gildersleeve. British statesmen who had been trained at
Balliol, in the days when Greek was the indispensable ear-mark of a
gentleman, could thus meet their American associate on the most
sympathetic terms. Page likewise spoke a brand of idiomatic English
which immediately put him in a class by himself. He regarded words as
sacred things. He used them, in his writing or in his speech, with the
utmost care and discrimination; yet this did not result in a halting or
stilted style; he spoke with the utmost ease, going rapidly from thought
to thought, choosing invariably the one needful word, lighting up the
whole with whimsicalities all his own, occasionally emphasizing a good
point by looking downward and glancing over his eyeglasses, perhaps, if
he knew his companion intimately, now and then giving him a monitory tap
on the knee. Page, in fact, was a great and incessant talker; hardly
anything delighted him more than a companionable exchange of ideas and
impressions; he was seldom so busy that he would not push aside his
papers for a chat; and he would talk with almost any one, on almost any
subject--his secretaries, his stenographers, his office boys, and any
crank who succeeded in getting by the doorman--for, in spite of his
lively warnings against the breed, Page did really love cranks and took
a collector's joy in uncovering new types. Page's voice was normally
quiet; though he had spent all his early life in the South, the
characteristic Southern accents were ordinarily not observable; yet his
intonation had a certain gentleness that was probably an inheritance of
his Southern breeding. Thus, when he first began talking, his words
would ripple along quietly and rapidly; a characteristic pose was to sit
calmly, with one knee thrown over the other, his hands folded; as his
interest increased, however, he would get up, perhaps walk across the
room, or stand before the fireplace, his hands behind his back; a large
cigar, sometimes unlighted, at other times emitting huge clouds of
smoke, would oscillate from one side of his mouth to the other; his talk
would grow in earnestness, his voice grow louder, his words come faster
and faster, until finally they would gush forth in a mighty torrent.
All Page's personal traits are explained by that one characteristic
which tempered all others, his sense of humour. That Page was above all
a serious-minded man his letters show; yet his spirits were constantly
alert for the amusing, the grotesque, and the contradictory; like all
men who are really serious and alive to the pathos of existence, he
loved a hearty laugh, especially as he found it a relief from the gloom
that filled his every waking moment in England. Page himself regarded
this ability to smile as an indispensable attribute to a well-rounded
life. "No man can be a gentleman," he once declared, "who does not have
a sense of humour." Only he who possessed this gift, Page believed, had
an imaginative insight into the failings and the virtues of his
brothers; only he could have a tolerant attitude toward the stupidities
of his fellows, to say nothing of his own. And humour with him assumed
various shades; now it would flash in an epigram, or smile indulgently
at a passing human weakness; now and then it would break out into genial
mockery; occasionally it would manifest itself as sheer horse-play; and
less frequently it would become sardonic or even savage. It was in this
latter spirit that he once described a trio of Washington statesmen,
whose influence he abhorred as, "three minds that occupy a single
vacuum." He once convulsed a Scottish audience by describing the
national motto of Scotland--and doing so with a broad burr in his voice
that seemed almost to mark the speaker a native to the heath--as
"Liber-r-ty, fra-a-ternity and f-r-r-u-gality." The policy of his
country occasioned many awkward moments which, thanks to his talent for
amiable raillery, he usually succeeded in rendering harmless. Not
infrequently Page's fellow guests at the dinner table would think the
American attitude toward Germany a not inappropriate topic for small
talk. "Mr. Page," remarked an exaltedly titled lady in a conversational
pause, "when is your country going to get into the war?" The more
discreet members of the company gasped, but Page was not disturbed.
"Please give us at least ninety days," he answered, and an exceedingly
disagreeable situation was thus relieved by general laughter.
On another occasion his repudiation of this flippant spirit took a more
solemn and even more effective form. The time was a few days before the
United States had declared war. Bernstorff had been dismissed; events
were rapidly rushing toward the great climax; yet the behaviour of the
Washington Administration was still inspiring much caustic criticism.
The Pages were present at one of the few dinners which they attended in
the course of this crisis; certain smart and tactless guests did not
seem to regard their presence as a bar to many gibes against the
American policy. Page sat through it all impassive, never betraying the
slightest resentment.
Presently the ladies withdrew. Page found himself sitting next to Mr.
Harold Nicolson, an important official in the Foreign Office. It so
happened that Mr. Nicolson and Page were the only two members of the
company who were the possessors of a great secret which made ineffably
silly all the chatter that had taken place during the dinner; this was
that the United States had decided on war against Germany and would
issue the declaration in a few days.
"Well, Mr. Nicolson," said Page, "I think that you and I will drink a
glass of wine together."
The two men quietly lifted their glasses and drank the silent toast.
Neither made the slightest reference to the forthcoming event. Perhaps
the other men present were a little mystified, but in a few days they
understood what it had meant, and also learned how effectively they had
been rebuked.
"Is it any wonder," says Mr. Nicolson, telling this story, "that I think
that Mr. Page is perhaps the greatest gentleman I have ever known? He
has only one possible competitor for this distinction--and that is
Arthur Balfour."
The English newspapers took delight in printing Page's aphorisms, and
several anecdotes that came from America afforded them especial joy. One
went back to the days when the Ambassador was editor of the _Atlantic
Monthly_. A woman contributor had sent him a story; like most literary
novices she believed that editors usually rejected the manuscripts of
unknown writers without reading them. She therefore set a trap for Page
by pasting together certain sheets. The manuscript came back promptly,
and, as the prospective contributor had hoped, these sheets had not been
disturbed. These particular sections had certainly not been read. The
angry author triumphantly wrote to Page, explaining how she had caught
him and denouncing the whole editorial tribe as humbugs. "Dear Madam,"
Page immediately wrote in reply, "when I break an egg at breakfast, I do
not have to eat the whole of it to find out that it is bad." Page's
treatment of authors, however, was by no means so acrimonious as this
little note might imply. Indeed, the urbanity and consideration shown in
his correspondence with writers had long been a tradition in American
letters. The remark of O. Henry in this regard promises to become
immortal: "Page could reject a story with a letter that was so
complimentary," he said, "and make everybody feel so happy that you
could take it to a bank and borrow money on it."
Another anecdote reminiscent of his editorial days was his retort to
S.S. McClure, the editor of _McClure's Magazine_.
"Page," said Mr. McClure, "there are only three great editors in the
United States."
"Who's the third one, Sam?" asked Page.
Plenty of stories, illustrating Page's quickness and aptness in retort,
have gathered about his name in England. Many of them indicate a mere
spirit of boyish fun. Early in his Ambassadorship he was spending a few
days at Stratford-on-Avon, his hostess being an American woman who had
beautifully restored an Elizabethan house; the garden contained a
mulberry tree which she liked to think had been planted by Shakespeare
himself. The dignitaries of Stratford, learning that the American
Ambassador had reached town, asked permission to wait upon him; the Lord
Mayor, who headed the procession, made an excellent speech, to which
Page appropriately replied, and several hundred people were solemnly
presented. After the party had left Page turned to his hostess:
"Have they all gone?"
"Yes."
"All?"
"Yes."
"Are you sure?"
"Yes."
"Then let's take hands and dance around the mulberry tree!"
Page was as good as his word; he danced as gaily as the youngest member
of the party, to the singing of the old English song.
The great service in St. Paul's Cathedral, in commemoration of America's
entry into the war, has already been described. A number of wounded
Americans, boys whose zeal for the Allies had led them to enlist in the
Canadian Army, were conspicuous participants in this celebration. After
the solemn religious ceremonies, the Ambassador and these young men
betook themselves for lunch to a well-known London restaurant. In an
interval of the conversation one of the Americans turned to Page.
"Mr. Ambassador, there was just one thing wrong with that service."
"What was that?"
"We wanted to yell, and we couldn't."
"Then why don't you yell now?"
The boy jumped on a chair and began waving his napkin. "The Ambassador
says we may yell," he cried. "Let's yell!"
"And so," said Page, telling the story, "they yelled for five minutes
and I yelled with them. We all felt better in consequence."
This geniality, this disposition not to take life too solemnly,
sometimes lightened up the sombre atmosphere of the Foreign Office
itself. "Mr. Balfour went on a sort of mild rampage yesterday," Page
records. "The British and American navies had come to an arrangement
whereby the Brazilian ships that are coming over to help us fight
should join the American unit, not the British, as was at first
proposed. Washington telegraphed me that the British Minister at Rio was
blocking the game by standing out for the first British idea--that the
Brazilian ships should join the British. It turned out in the
conversation that the British Minister had not been informed of the
British-American naval arrangement. Mr. Balfour sent for Lord Hardinge.
He called in one of the private secretaries. Was such a thing ever heard
of?
"Did you ever know,' said the indignant Mr. Balfour, turning to me, 'of
such a thing as a minister not even being informed of his Government's
decisions?' 'Yes,' I said, 'if I ransack my memory diligently, I think I
could find such cases.' The meeting went into laughter!"
Evidently the troubles which Page was having with his own State
Department were not unfamiliar to British officialdom.
Page's letters sufficiently reveal his fondness for Sir Edward Grey and
the splendid relations that existed between them. The sympathetic chords
which the two men struck upon their first meeting only grew stronger
with time. A single episode brings out the bonds that drew them
together. It took place at a time when the tension over the blockade was
especially threatening. One afternoon Page asked for a formal interview;
he had received another exceedingly disagreeable protest from
Washington, with instructions to push the matter to a decision; the
Ambassador left his Embassy with a grave expression upon his face; his
associates were especially worried over the outcome. So critical did the
situation seem that the most important secretaries gathered in the
Ambassador's room, awaiting his return, their nerves strung almost to
the breaking point. An hour went by and nothing was heard from Page;
another hour slowly passed and still the Ambassador did not return. The
faces of the assembled staff lengthened as the minutes went by; what was
the Ambassador doing at the Foreign Office? So protracted an interview
could portend only evil; already, in the minds of these nervous young
men, ultimatums were flying between the United States and Great Britain,
and even war might be hanging in the balance. Another hour drew out its
weary length; the room became dark, dinner time was approaching, and
still Page failed to make his appearance. At last, when his distracted
subordinates were almost prepared to go in search of their chief, the
Ambassador walked jauntily in, smiling and apparently carefree. What had
happened? What was to be done about the detained ships?
"What ships?" asked Page, and then suddenly he remembered. "Oh,
yes--those." That was all right; Sir Edward had at once promised to
release them; it had all been settled in a few minutes.
"Then why were you so long?"
The truth came out: Sir Edward and Page had quickly turned from
intercepted cargoes to the more congenial subject of Wordsworth,
Tennyson, and other favourite poets, and the rest of the afternoon had
been consumed in discussing this really important business.
Perhaps Page was not so great a story-teller as many Americans, but he
excelled in a type of yarn that especially delights Englishmen, for it
is the kind that is native to the American soil. He possessed an
inexhaustible stock of Negro anecdotes, and he had the gift of bringing
them out at precisely the right point. There was one which the
Archbishop of York never tired of repeating. Soon after America entered
the war, the Archbishop asked Page how long his country was "in for."
"I can best answer that by telling you a story," said Page. "There were
two Negroes who had just been sentenced to prison terms. As they were
being taken away in the carriage placed at their disposal by the United
States Government, one said to the other, 'Sam, how long is you in fo'?'
'I guess dat it's a yeah or two yeahs,' said Sam. 'How long is you in
fo'?' 'I guess it's from now on,' said the other darky." "From now on,"
remarked the Archbishop, telling this story. "What could more eloquently
have described America's attitude toward the war?"
The mention of the Archbishop suggests another of Page's talents--the
aptness of his letters of introduction. In the spring of 1918 the
Archbishop, at the earnest recommendation of Page and Mr. Balfour, came
to the United States. Page prepared the way by letters to several
distinguished Americans, of which this one, to Theodore Roosevelt, is a
fair sample:
_To Theodore Roosevelt_
London, January 16, 1918.
DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT:
The Archbishop of York goes to the United States to make some
observations of us and of our ways and to deliver addresses--on the
invitation of some one of our church organizations; a fortunate
event for us and, I have ventured to tell him, for him also.
During his brief stay in our country, I wish him to make your
acquaintance, and I have given him a card of introduction to you,
and thus I humbly serve you both.
The Archbishop is a man and a brother, a humble, learned, earnest,
companionable fellow, with most charming manners and an attractive
personality, a good friend of mine, which argues much for him and
(I think) implies also something in my behalf. You will enjoy him.
I am, dear Mr. Roosevelt,
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Greatly as Page loved England he never ceased to preach his Americanism.
That he preferred his own country to any other and that he believed that
it was its greatest destiny to teach its institutions to the rest of the
world, Page's letters show; yet this was with him no cheap
spread-eagleism; it was a definite philosophy which the Ambassador had
completely thought out. He never hesitated to express his democratic
opinions in any company, and only once or twice were there any signs
that these ideas jarred a little in certain strongholds of conservatism.
Even in the darkest period of American neutrality Page's faith in the
American people remained complete. After this country had entered the
war and the apparent slowness of the Washington Administration had
raised certain questionings, Page never doubted that the people
themselves, however irresolute and lukewarm their representatives might
be, would force the issue to its only logical end. Even so friendly a
man as Mr. Balfour once voiced a popular apprehension that the United
States might not get into the war with all its strength or might
withdraw prematurely. This was in the early period of our participation.
"Who is going to stop the American people and how?" Page quickly
replied. "I think that was a good answer," he said, as he looked back at
the episode in the summer of 1918, when hundreds of thousands of
Americans were landing in France every month. A scrap of his writing
records a discussion at a dinner party on this question: "If you could
have a month in any time and any country, what time and what country
would you choose?" The majority voted for England in the time of
Elizabeth, but Page's preference was for Athens in the days of Pericles.
Then came a far more interesting debate: "If you could spend a second
lifetime when and where would you choose to spend it?" On this Page had
not a moment's hesitation: "In the future and in the U.S.A.!" and he
upheld his point with such persuasiveness that he carried the whole
gathering with him. His love of anything suggesting America came out on
all occasions. One of his English hostesses once captivated him by
serving corn bread at a luncheon. "The American Ambassador and corn
bread!" he exclaimed with all the delight of a schoolboy. Again he was
invited, with another distinguished American, to serve as godfather at
the christening of the daughter of an American woman who had married an
Englishman. When the ceremony was finished he leaned over the font
toward his fellow godfather. "Born on July 4th," he exclaimed, "of an
American mother! And we two Yankee godfathers! We'll see that this child
is taught the Constitution of the United States!"
One day an American duchess came into Page's office.
"I am going home for a little visit and I want a passport," she said.
"But you don't get a passport here," Page replied. "You must go to the
Foreign Office."
His visitor was indignant.
"Not at all," she answered. "I am an American: you know that I am; you
knew my father. I want an American passport."
Page patiently explained the citizenship and naturalization laws and
finally convinced his caller that she was now a British subject and must
have a British passport. As this American duchess left the room he
shook at her a menacing forefinger.
"Don't tell me," was the Ambassador's parting shot, "that you thought
that you could have your Duke and Uncle Sam, too!"
The judgments which Page passed on men and things were quick and they
were not infrequently wise. One of these judgments had historic
consequences the end of which cannot even yet be foreseen. On the
outbreak of hostilities, as already related, an American Relief
Committee was organized in London to look out for the interests of
stranded Americans. Page kept a close eye on its operations, and soon
his attention was attracted by the noiseless efficiency of an American
engineer of whom he had already caught a few fleeting glimpses in the
period of peace. After he had finished his work with the American
Committee, Mr. Herbert C. Hoover began to make his arrangements to leave
for the United States. His private affairs had been disorganized; he had
already sent his family home, and his one ambition was to get on the
first ship sailing for the United States. The idea of Belgian relief, or
of feeding starving people anywhere, had never occurred to him. At this
moment an American, Mr. Millard K. Shaler, came from Brussels and gave
the most harrowing account of conditions in Belgium. Mr. Hoover took Mr.
Shaler to Page, who immediately became sympathetic. The Ambassador
arranged an interview between Mr. Hoover and Sir Edward Grey, who
likewise showed great interest and promised government support. Soon
afterward three Belgians arrived and described the situation as
immediately alarming: Brussels had only food enough to feed the people
for thirty-six hours; after that, unless help were forthcoming, the
greatest distress would set in. Five men--Page, the three Belgians, and
Mr. Hoover--at once got together at the American Embassy. Upon the
result of that meeting hung the fate of millions of people. Who before
had ever undertaken a scheme for feeding an entire nation for an
indefinite period? That there were great obstacles in the way all five
men knew; the British Admiralty in particular were strongly opposed;
there was a fear that the food, if it could be acquired and sent to
Belgium, would find its way to the German Army. Unless the British
Government could be persuaded that this could be prevented, the
enterprise would fail at the start. How could it be done?
"There is only one way," said Page. "Some government must give its
guarantee that this food will get to the Belgian people." "And, of
course," he added, "there is only one government that can do that. It
must be the American Government."
Mr. Hoover pointed out that any such guarantee involved the management
of transportation; only by controlling the railroads could the American
Government make sure that this food would reach its destination.
And that, added Page, involved a director--some one man who could take
charge of the whole enterprise. Who should it be?
Then Page turned quickly to the young American.
"Hoover, you're It!"
Mr. Hoover made no reply; he neither accepted nor rejected the proposal.
He merely glanced at the clock, then got up and silently left the room.
In a few minutes he returned and entered again into the discussion.
"Hoover, why did you get up and leave us so abruptly?" asked Page, a
little puzzled over this behaviour.
"I saw by the clock," came the answer--and it was a story that Page was
fond of telling, as illustrating the rapidity with which Mr. Hoover
worked--"that there was an hour left before the Exchange closed in New
York. So I went out and cabled, buying several millions of bushels of
wheat--for the Belgians, of course."
* * * * *
For what is usually known as "society" Page had little inclination. Yet
for social intercourse on a more genuine plane he had real gifts. Had he
enjoyed better health, week ends in the country would have afforded him
welcome entertainment. He also liked dinner parties but indulged in them
very moderately. He was a member of many London clubs but he seldom
visited any of them. There were a number of organizations, however,
which he regularly attended. The Society of Dilettanti, a company of
distinguished men interested in promoting the arts and improving the
public taste, which has been continuously in existence since 1736,
enrolling in each generation the greatest painters and writers of the
time, elected Page to membership. He greatly enjoyed its dinners in the
Banquet Hall of the Grafton Gallery. "Last night," he writes, describing
his initial appearance, "I attended my first Dilettanti dinner and was
inducted, much as a new Peer is inducted into the House of Lords. Lord
Mersey in the chair--in a red robe. These gay old dogs have had a fine
time of it for nearly 200 years--good wine, high food, fine
satisfaction. The oldest dining society in the Kingdom. The blue blood
old Briton has the art of enjoying himself reduced to a very fine point
indeed." Another gathering whose meetings he seldom missed was that of
the Kinsmen, an informal club of literary men who met occasionally for
food and converse in the Trocadero Restaurant. Here Page would meet such
congenial souls as Sir James Barrie and Sir Arthur Pinero, all of whom
retain lively memories of Page at these gatherings. "He was one of the
most lovable characters I have ever had the good fortune to encounter,"
says Sir Arthur Pinero, recalling these occasions. "In what special
quality or qualities lay the secret of his charm and influence? Surely
in his simplicity and transparent honesty, and in the possession of a
disposition which, without the smallest loss of dignity, was responsive
and affectionate. Distinguished American Ambassadors will come and go,
and will in their turn win esteem and admiration. But none, I venture to
say, will efface the recollection of Walter Page from the minds of those
who were privileged to gain his friendship."
One aspect of Page that remains fixed in the memory of his associates is
his unwearied industry with the pen. His official communications and his
ordinary correspondence Page dictated; but his personal letters he wrote
with his own hand. He himself deplored the stenographer as a deterrent
to good writing; the habit of dictating, he argued, led to wordiness and
general looseness of thought. Practically all the letters published in
these volumes were therefore the painstaking work of Page's own pen. His
handwriting was so beautiful and clear that, in his editorial days, the
printers much preferred it as "copy" to typewritten matter. This habit
is especially surprising in view of the Ambassador's enormous epistolary
output. It must be remembered that the letters included in the present
book are only a selection from the vast number that he wrote during his
five years in England; many of these letters fill twenty and thirty
pages of script; the labour involved in turning them out; day after day,
seems fairly astounding. Yet with Page this was a labour of love. All
through his Ambassadorship he seemed hardly contented unless he had a
pen in his hand. As his secretaries would glance into his room, there
they would see the Ambassador bending over his desk-writing, writing,
eternally writing; sometimes he would call them in, and read what he had
written, never hesitating to tear up the paper if their unfavourable
criticisms seemed to him well taken. The Ambassador kept a desk also in
his bedroom, and here his most important correspondence was attended to.
Page's all-night self-communings before his wood fire have already been
described, and he had another nocturnal occupation that was similarly
absorbing. Many a night, after returning late from his office or from
dinner, he would put on his dressing gown, sit at his bedroom desk, and
start pouring forth his inmost thoughts in letters to the President,
Colonel House, or some other correspondent. His pen flew over the paper
with the utmost rapidity and the Ambassador would sometimes keep at his
writing until two or three o'clock in the morning. There is a frequently
expressed fear that letter writing is an art of the past; that the
intervention of the stenographer has destroyed its spontaneity; yet it
is evident that in Page the present generation has a letter writer of
the old-fashioned kind, for he did all his writing with his own hand and
under circumstances that would assure the utmost freshness and vividness
to the result.
An occasional game of golf, which he played badly, a trip now and then
to rural England--these were Page's only relaxations from his duties.
Though he was not especially fond of leaving his own house, he was
always delighted when visitors came to him. And the American Embassy,
during the five years from 1913 to 1918, extended a hospitality which
was fittingly democratic in its quality but which gradually drew within
its doors all that was finest in the intellect and character of
England. Page himself attributed the popularity of his house to his
wife. Mrs. Page certainly embodied the traits most desirable in the
Ambassadress of a great Republic. A woman of cultivation, a tireless
reader, a close observer of people and events and a shrewd commentator
upon them, she also had an unobtrusive dignity, a penetrating sympathy,
and a capacity for human association, which, while more restrained and
more placid than that of her husband, made her a helpful companion for a
sorely burdened man. The American Embassy under Mr. and Mrs. Page was
not one of London's smart houses as that word is commonly understood in
this great capital. But No. 6 Grosvenor Square, in the spaciousness of
its rooms, the simple beauty of its furnishings, and especially in its
complete absence of ostentation, made it the worthy abiding place of an
American Ambassador. And the people who congregated there were precisely
the kind that appeal to the educated American. "I didn't know I was
getting into an assembly of immortals," exclaimed Mr. Hugh Wallace, when
he dropped in one Thursday afternoon for tea, and found himself
foregathered with Sir Edward Grey, Henry James, John Sargent, and other
men of the same type. It was this kind of person who most naturally
gravitated to the Page establishment, not the ultra-fashionable, the
merely rich, or the many titled. The formal functions which the position
demanded the Pages scrupulously gave; but the affairs which Page most
enjoyed and which have left the most lasting remembrances upon his
guests were the informal meetings with his chosen favourites, for the
most part literary men. Here Page's sheer brilliancy of conversation
showed at its best. Lord Bryce, Sir John Simon, John Morley, the
inevitable companions, Henry James and John Sargent--"What things have
I seen done at the Mermaid"; and certainly these gatherings of wits and
savants furnished as near an approach to its Elizabethan prototype as
London could then present.
Besides his official activities Page performed great services to the two
countries by his speeches. The demands of this kind on an American
Ambassador are always numerous, but Page's position was an exceptional
one; it was his fortune to represent America at a time when his own
country and Great Britain were allies in a great war. He could therefore
have spent practically all his time in speaking had he been so disposed.
Of the hundreds of invitations received he was able to accept only a
few, but most of these occasions became memorable ones. In any
spectacular sense Page was not an orator; he rather despised the grand
manner, with its flourishes and its tricks; the name of public speaker
probably best describes his talents on the platform. Here his style was
earnest and conversational: his speech flowed with the utmost readiness;
it was invariably quiet and restrained; he was never aiming at big
effects, but his words always went home. Of the series of speeches that
stand to his credit in England probably the one that will be longest
remembered is that delivered at Plymouth on August 4, 1917, the third
anniversary of the war. This not only reviewed the common history of the
two nations for three hundred years, and suggested a programme for
making the bonds tighter yet, but it brought the British public
practical assurances as to America's intentions in the conflict. Up to
that time there had been much vagueness and doubt; no official voice had
spoken the clear word for the United States; the British public did not
know what to expect from their kinsmen overseas. But after Page's
Plymouth speech the people of Great Britain looked forward with
complete confidence to the coöperation of the two countries and to the
inevitable triumph of this coöperation.
_To Arthur W. Page_
Knebworth House, Knebworth,
August 11, 1917.
Dear Arthur:
First of all, these three years have made me tired. I suppose
there's no doubt about that, if there were any scientific way of
measuring it. While of course the strain now is nothing like what
it was during the days of neutrality, there's yet some strain.
I went down to Plymouth to make a speech on the anniversary of the
beginning of the war--went to tell them in the west of England
something about relations with the United States and something
about what the United States is doing in the war. It turned out to
be a great success. The Mayor met me at the train; there was a
military company, the Star Spangled Banner and real American
applause. All the way through the town the streets were lined with
all the inhabitants and more--apparently millions of 'em. They made
the most of it for five solid days.
On the morning of August 4th the Mayor gave me an official
luncheon. Thence we went to the esplanade facing the sea, where
soldiers and sailors were lined up for half a mile. The American
Flag was flung loose, the Star Spangled Banner broke forth from the
band, and all the people in that part of the world were there
gathered to see the show. After all this salute the Mayor took me
to the stand and he and I made speeches, and the background was a
group of dozens of admirals and generals and many smaller fry. Then
I reviewed the troops; then they marched by me and in an hour or
two the show was over.
Then the bowling club--the same club and the same green as when
Drake left the game to sail out to meet the Armada.
Then a solemn service in the big church, where the prayers were
written and the hymns selected with reference to our part in the
war.
Then, of course, a dinner party. At eight o'clock at night, the
Guildhall, an enormous town hall, was packed with people and I made
my speech at 'em. A copy (somewhat less good than the version I
gave them) goes to you, along with a leader from the _Times_. They
were vociferously grateful for any assuring word about the United
States. It's strange how very little the provincial Englander knows
about what we have done and mean to do. They took the speech
finely, and I have had good letters about it from all sorts of
people in every part of the Kingdom.
Then followed five days of luncheons and dinners and garden
parties--and (what I set out to say) I got back to London last
night dead tired. To-day your mother and I came here--about
twenty-five miles from London--for a fortnight.
This is Bulwer-Lytton's house--a fine old English place hired this
year by Lady Strafford, whom your mother is visiting for a
fortnight or more, and they let me come along, too. They have given
me the big library, as good a room as I want--with as bad pens as
they can find in the Kingdom.
Your mother is tired, too. Since the American Red Cross was
organized here, she has added to her committee and hospitals. But
she keeps well and very vigorous. A fortnight here will set her up.
She enjoyed Plymouth very much in spite of the continual rush, and
it was a rush.
What the United States is doing looks good and large at this
distance. The gratitude here is unbounded; but I detect a feeling
here and there of wonder whether we are going to keep up this
activity to the end.
I sometimes feel that the German collapse _may_ come next winter.
Their internal troubles and the lack of sufficient food and raw
materials do increase. The breaking point may be reached before
another summer. I wish I could prove it or even certainly predict
it. But it is at least conceivable. Alas, no one can _prove_
anything about the war. The conditions have no precedents. The sum
of human misery and suffering is simply incalculable, as is the
loss of life; and the gradual and general brutalization goes on and
on and on far past any preceding horrors.
With all my love to you and Mollie and the trio,
W.H.P.
And so for five busy and devastating years Page did his work. The
stupidities of Washington might drive him to desperation, ill-health
might increase his periods of despondency, the misunderstandings that he
occasionally had with the British Government might add to his
discouragements, but a naturally optimistic and humorous temperament
overcame all obstacles, and did its part in bringing about that united
effort which ended in victory. And that it was a great part, the story
of his Ambassadorship abundantly proves. Page was not the soldier
working in the blood and slime of Flanders, nor the sea fighter spending
day and night around the foggy coast of Ireland, nor the statesman
bending parliaments to his will and manipulating nations and peoples in
the mighty game whose stake was civilization itself. But history will
indeed be ungrateful if it ever forget the gaunt and pensive figure,
clad in a dressing gown, sitting long into the morning before the
smouldering fire at 6 Grosvenor Square, seeking to find some way to
persuade a reluctant and hesitating President to lead his country in the
defense of liberty and determined that, so far as he could accomplish
it, the nation should play a part in the great assize that was in
keeping with its traditions and its instincts.
CHAPTER XXIV
A RESPITE AT ST. IVES
_To Edward M. House_
Knebworth House
Sunday, September,[sic] 1917.
Dear House:
... By far the most important peace plan or utterance is the
President's extraordinary answer to the Pope[64]. His flat and
convincing refusal to take the word of the present rulers of
Germany as of any value has had more effect here than any other
utterance and it is, so far, the best contribution we have made to
the war. The best evidence that I can get shows also that it has
had more effect in Germany than anything else that has been said by
anybody. That hit the bull's-eye with perfect accuracy; and it has
been accepted here as _the_ war aim and _the_ war condition. So far
as I can make out it is working in Germany toward peace with more
effect than any other deliverance made by anybody. And it steadied
the already unshakable resolution here amazingly.
I can get any information here of course without danger of the
slightest publicity--an important point, because even the mention
of peace now is dangerous. All the world, under this long strain,
is more or less off the normal, and all my work--even routine
work--is done with the profoundest secrecy: it has to be.
Our energetic war preparations call forth universal admiration and
gratitude here on all sides and nerve up the British and hearten
them more than I know how to explain. There is an eager and even
pathetic curiosity to hear all the details, to hear, in fact,
anything about the United States; and what the British do not know
about the United States would fill the British Museum. They do
know, however, that they would soon have been obliged to make an
unsatisfactory peace if we hadn't come in when we did and they
freely say so. The little feeling of jealousy that we should come
in and win the war at the end has, I think, been forgotten,
swallowed up in their genuine gratitude.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
_To Arthur W. Page_
American Embassy,
London, Sept. 3, 1917.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... The President has sent Admiral Mayo over to study the naval
situation. So far as I can learn the feeling at Washington is that
the British Navy has done nothing. Why, it hasn't attacked the
German naval bases and destroyed the German navy and ended the war!
Why not? I have a feeling that Mayo will supplement and support
Sims in his report. Then gradually the naval men at Washington may
begin to understand and they may get the important facts into the
President's head. Meantime the submarine work of the Germans
continues to win the war, although the government and the people
here and in the United States appear not to believe it. They are
still destroying seventy-five British ships a month besides an
additional (smaller) number of allied and neutral ships. And all
the world together is not turning out seventy-five ships a month;
nor are we all destroying submarines as fast as the Germans are
turning _them_ out. Yet all the politicians are putting on a
cheerful countenance about it because the Germans are not starving
England out and are not just now sinking passenger ships. They may
begin this again at any time. They have come within a few feet of
torpedoing two of our American liners. The submarine _is_ the war
yet, but nobody seems disposed to believe it. They'll probably wake
up with a great shock some day--or the war may possibly end before
the destruction of ships becomes positively fatal.
The President's letter to the Pope gives him the moral and actual
leadership now. The Hohenzollerns must go. Somehow the subjects and
governments of these Old World kingdoms have not hitherto laid
emphasis on this. There's still a divinity that doth hedge a king
in most European minds. To me this is the very queerest thing in
the whole world. What again if Germany, Austria, Spain should
follow Russia? Whether they do or not crowns will not henceforth be
so popular. There is an unbounded enthusiasm here for the
President's letter and for the President in general.
In spite of certain details which it seems impossible to make
understood on the Potomac, the whole American preparation and
enthusiasm seem from this distance to be very fine. The _people_
seem in earnest. When I read about tax bills, about the food
regulation and a thousand other such things, I am greatly
gratified. And it proves that we were right when we said that
during the days of neutrality the people were held back. It all
looks exceedingly good from this distance, and it makes me
homesick.
_To Frank N. Doubleday_
American Embassy.
[Undated, but written about October I, 1917]
DEAR EFFENDI:
... The enormous war work and war help that everybody seems to be
doing in the United States is heartily appreciated here--most
heartily. The English eat out of our hands. You can see American
uniforms every day in London. Every ship brings them. Everybody's
thrilled to see them. The Americans here have great houses opened
as officers' clubs, and scrumptious huts for men where countesses
and other high ladies hand out sandwiches and serve ice cream and
ginger beer. Our two admirals are most popular with all classes,
from royalty down. English soldiers salute our officers in the
street and old gentlemen take off their hats when they meet nurses
with the American Red Cross uniform. My Embassy now occupies four
buildings for offices, more than half of them military and naval.
And my own staff, proper, is the biggest in the world and keeps
growing. When I go, in a little while, to receive the Freedom of
the City of Edinburgh, I shall carry an Admiral or a General as my
aide!
That's the way we keep a stiff upper lip.
And Good Lord! it's tiresome. Peace? We'd all give our lives for
the right sort of peace, and never move an eyelid. But only the
wrong sort has yet come within reach. The other sort is coming,
however; for these present German contortions are the beginning of
the end. But the weariness of it, and the tragedy and the cost. No
human creature was ever as tired as I am. Yet I keep well and keep
going and keep working all my waking hours. When it ends, I shall
collapse and go home and have to rest a while. So at least I feel
now. And, if I outlive the work and the danger and the weariness,
I'll praise God for that. And it doesn't let up a single day. And
I'm no worse off than everybody else.
So this over-weary world goes, dear Effendi; but the longest day
shades at last down to twilight and rest; and so this will be. And
poor old Europe will then not be worth while for the rest of our
lives--a vast grave and ruin where unmated women will mourn and
starvation will remain for years to come.
God bless us.
Sincerely yours, with my love to all the boys,
W.H.P.
_To Frank N. Doubleday_
London, November 9, 1917.
DEAR EFFENDI:
... This infernal thing drags its slow length along so that we
cannot see even a day ahead, not to say a week, or a year. If any
man here allowed the horrors of it to dwell on his mind he would go
mad, so we have to skip over these things somewhat lightly and try
to keep the long, definite aim in our thoughts and to work away
distracted as little as possible by the butchery and by the
starvation that is making this side of the world a shambles and a
wilderness. There is hardly a country on the Continent where people
are not literally starving to death, and in many of them by
hundreds of thousands; and this state of things is going to
continue for a good many years after the war. God knows we (I mean
the American people) are doing everything we can to alleviate it
but there is so much more to be done than any group of forces can
possibly do, that I have a feeling that we have hardly touched the
borders of the great problem itself. Of course here in London we
are away from all that. In spite of the rations we get quite enough
to eat and it's as good as it is usually in England, but we have no
right to complain. Of course we are subject to air raids, and the
wise air people here think that early next spring we are going to
be bombarded with thousands of aeroplanes, and with new kinds of
bombs and gases in a well-organized effort to try actually to
destroy London. Possibly that will come; we must simply take our
chance, every man sticking to his job. Already the slate shingles
on my roof have been broken, and bricks have been knocked down my
chimney; the sky-light was hit and glass fell down all through the
halls, and the nose of a shrapnel shell, weighing eight pounds,
fell just in front of my doorway and rolled in my area. This is the
sort of thing we incidentally get, not of course from the enemy
directly, but from the British guns in London which shoot these
things at German aeroplanes. What goes up must come down. Between
our own defences and the enemy, God knows which will kill us first!
In spite of all this I put my innocent head on my pillow every
night and get a good night's sleep after the bombing is done, and I
thank Heaven that nothing interrupts my sleep. This, and a little
walking, which is all I get time to do in these foggy days,
constitute my life outdoors and precious little of it is outdoors.
Then on every block that I know of in London there is a hospital or
supply place and the ambulances are bringing the poor fellows in
all the time. We don't get any gasolene to ride so we have to walk.
We don't get any white bread so we have to eat stuff made of flour
and corn meal ground so fine that it isn't good. While everybody
gets a little thinner, the universal opinion is that they also get
a little better, and nobody is going to die here of hunger. We
feel a little more cheerful about the submarines than we did some
time ago. For some reason they are not getting so many ships. One
reason, I am glad to believe, is that they are getting caught
themselves. If I could remember all the stories that I hear of good
fighting with the submarines I could keep you up two nights when I
get home, but in these days one big thing after another crowds so
in men's minds that the Lord knows if, when I get home, I shall
remember anything.
Always heartily yours,
W.H.P.
_To the President_
London, December 3, 1917.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
... Some of the British military men in London are not hopeful of
an early end of the war nor even cheerful about the result. They
are afraid of the war-weariness that overcame Russia and gave Italy
a setback. They say the military task, though long and slow and
hard, can be done if everybody will pull together and keep at the
job without weariness--_be done by our help_. But they have fits of
fear of France. They are discouraged by the greater part of Lord
Lansdowne's letter[65]. I myself do not set great value on this
military feeling in London, for the British generals in France do
not share it. Lord French once said to me and General Robertson,
too, that when they feel despondent in London, they go to the front
and get cheered up. But it does seem to be a long job. Evidently
the Germans mean to fight to the last man unless they can succeed
in inducing the Allies to meet them to talk it over without naming
their terms in advance. That is what Lord Lansdowne favours, and no
public outgiving by any prominent man in England has called forth
such a storm of protest since the war began. I think I see the
genesis of his thought, and it is this: there is nothing in his
letter and there was nothing in the half dozen or more rather long
conversations that I have had with him on other subjects to show
that he has the slightest conception of democracy as a social creed
or as a political system. He is, I think, the most complete
aristocrat that I have ever met. He doesn't see the war at all as a
struggle between democracy and its opposite. He sees it merely as a
struggle between Germany and the Allies; and inferentially he is
perfectly willing the Kaiser should remain in power. He is of
course a patriotic man and a man of great cultivation. But he
doesn't see the deeper meaning of the conflict. Add to this defect
of understanding, a long period of bad health and a lasting
depression because of the loss of his son, and his call to the
war-weary ceases to be a surprise.
I am, dear Mr. President,
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
_To Arthur W. Page_
American Embassy,
London, December 23, 1917.
DEAR ARTHUR:
I sent you a Christmas cable yesterday for everybody. That's about
all I can send in these days of slow mail and restricted shipping
and enormously high prices; and you gave all the girls each $100
for me, for the babies and themselves? That'll show 'em that at
least we haven't forgotten them. Forgotten? Your mother and I are
always talking of the glad day when we can go home and live among
them. We get as homesick as small boys their first month at a
boarding school. Do you remember the day I left you at
Lawrenceville, a forlorn and lonely kid?--It's like that.
A wave of depression hangs over the land like a London fog. And
everybody on this tired-out side of the world shows a disposition
to lean too heavily on us--to depend on us so completely that the
fear arises that they may unconsciously relax their own utmost
efforts when we begin to fight. Yet they can't in the least afford
to relax, and, when the time comes, I dare say they will not. Yet
the plain truth is, the French may give out next year for lack of
men. I do not mean that they will quit, but that their fighting
strength will have passed its maximum and that they will be able to
play only a sort of second part. Except the British and the French,
there's no nation in Europe worth a tinker's damn when you come to
the real scratch. The whole continent is rotten or tyrannical or
yellow-dog. I wouldn't give Long Island or Moore County for the
whole of continental Europe, with its kings and itching palms.
... Waves of depression and of hope--if not of elation--come and
go. I am told, and I think truly, that waves of weariness come in
London far oftener and more depressingly than anywhere else in the
Kingdom. There is no sign nor fear that the British will give up;
they'll hold on till the end. Winston Churchill said to me last
night: "We can hold on till next year. But after 1918, it'll be
your fight. We'll have to depend on you." I told him that such a
remark might well be accepted in some quarters as a British
surrender. Then he came up to the scratch: "Surrender? Never." But
I fear we need--in some practical and non-ostentatious way--now
and then to remind all these European folk that we get no
particular encouragement by being unduly leaned on.
It is, however, the weariest Christmas in all British annals,
certainly since the Napoleonic wars. The untoward event after the
British advance toward Cambrai caused the retirement of six British
generals and deepened the depression here. Still I can see it now
passing. Even a little victory will bring back a wave of
cheerfulness.
Depression or elation show equally the undue strain that British
nerves are under. I dare say nobody is entirely normal. News of
many sorts can now be circulated only by word of mouth. The
queerest stories are whispered about and find at least temporary
credence. For instance: The report has been going around that the
revolution that took place in Portugal the other day was caused by
the Germans (likely enough); that it was a monarchical movement and
that the Germans were going to put the King back on the throne as
soon as the war ended. Sensation-mongers appear at every
old-woman's knitting circle. And all this has an effect on conduct.
Two young wives of noble officers now in France have just run away
with two other young noblemen--to the scandal of a large part of
good society in London. It is universally said that the morals of
more hitherto good people are wrecked by the strain put upon women
by the absence of their husbands than was ever before heard of.
Everybody is overworked. Fewer people are literally truthful than
ever before. Men and women break down and fall out of working ranks
continuously. The number of men in the government who have
disappeared from public view is amazing, the number that would like
to disappear is still greater--from sheer overstrain. The Prime
Minister is tired. Bonar Law in a long conference that Crosby and
I had with him yesterday wearily ran all round a circle rather than
hit a plain proposition with a clear decision. Mr. Balfour has kept
his house from overwork a few days every recent week. I lunched
with Mr. Asquith yesterday; even he seemed jaded; and Mrs. Asquith
assured me that "everything is going to the devil damned fast."
Some conspicuous men who have always been sober have taken to
drink. The very few public dinners that are held are served with
ostentatious meagreness to escape criticism. I attended one last
week at which there was no bread, no butter, no sugar served. All
of which doesn't mean that the world here is going to the bad--only
that it moves backward and forward by emotions; and this is
normally a most unemotional race. Overwork and the loss of Sons and
friends--the list of the lost grows--always make an abnormal
strain. The churches are fuller than ever before. So, too, are the
"parlours" of the fortune-tellers. So also the theatres--in the
effort to forget one's self. There are afternoon dances for young
officers at home on leave: the curtains are drawn and the music is
muffled. More marriages take place--blind and maimed, as well as
the young fellows just going to France--than were ever celebrated
in any year within men's memory. Verse-writing is rampant. I have
received enough odes and sonnets celebrating the Great Republic and
the Great President to fill a folio volume. Several American
Y.M.C.A. workers lately turned rampant Pacifists and had to be sent
home. Colonial soldiers and now and then an American sailor turn up
at our Y.M.C.A. huts as full as a goat and swear after the event
that they never did such a thing before. Emotions and strain
everywhere!
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
In March Page, a very weary man--as these letters indicate--took a brief
holiday at St. Ives, on the coast of Cornwall. As he gazed out on the
Atlantic, the yearning for home, for the sandhills and the pine trees of
North Carolina, again took possession of his soul. Yet it is evident,
from a miscellaneous group of letters written at this time, that his
mind revelled in a variety of subjects, ranging all the way from British
food and vegetables to the settlement of the war and from secret
diplomacy to literary style.
_To Mrs. Charles G. Loring_
St. Ives, Cornwall, March 3, 1918.
DEAR KITTY:
Your mother of course needed a rest away from London after the
influenza got done with her; and I discovered that I had gone
stale. So she and I and the golf clubs came here yesterday--as near
to the sunlit land of Uncle Sam as you can well get on this island.
We look across the ocean--at least out into it--in your direction,
but I must confess that Labrador is not in sight. The place is all
right, the hotel uncommonly good, but it's Greenlandish in its
temperature--a very cold wind blowing. The golf clubs lean up
against the wall and curse the weather. But we are away from the
hordes of people and will have a little quiet here. It's as quiet
as any far-off place by the sea, and it's clean. London is the
dirtiest town in the world.
By the way that picture of Chud came (by Col. Honey) along with
Alice Page's adorable little photograph. As for the wee chick, I
see how you are already beginning to get a lot of fun with her. And
you'll have more and more as she gets bigger. Give her my love and
see what she'll say. You won't get so lonesome, dear Kitty, with
little Alice; and I can't keep from thinking as well as hoping
that the war will not go on as long as it sometimes seems that it
must. The utter collapse of Russia has given Germany a vast victory
on that side and it may turn out that this will make an earlier
peace possible than would otherwise have come. And the Germans may
be--in fact, _must_ be, very short of some of the essentials of war
in their metals or in cotton. They are in a worse internal plight
than has been made known, I am sure. I can't keep from hoping that
peace may come this year. Of course, my guess may be wrong; but
everything I hear points in the direction of my timid prediction.
Bless you and little Alice,
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
Page's oldest son was building a house and laying out a garden at
Pinehurst, North Carolina, a fact which explains the horticultural and
gastronomical suggestions contained in the following letter:
_To Ralph W. Page_
Tregenna Castle Hotel,
St. Ives, Cornwall, England,
March 4, 1918.
DEAR RALPH:
Asparagus
Celery
Tomatoes
Butter Beans
Peas
Sweet Corn
Sweet Potatoes
Squash--the sort you cook in the rind
Cantaloupe
Peanuts
Egg Plant
Figs
Peaches
Pecans
Scuppernongs
Peanut-bacon, in glass jars
Razor-back hams, divinely cured
Raspberries
Strawberries
etc. etc. etc. etc.
You see, having starved here for five years, my mind, as soon as it
gets free, runs on these things and my mouth waters. All the
foregoing things that grow can be put up in pretty glass jars, too.
Add cream, fresh butter, buttermilk, fresh eggs. Only one of all
the things on page one grows with any flavour here at
all--strawberries; and only one or two more grow at all. Darned if
I don't have to confront Cabbage every day. I haven't yet
surrendered, and I never shall unless the Germans get us. Cabbage
and Germans belong together: God made 'em both the same stinking
day.
Now get a bang-up gardener no matter what he costs. Get him
started. Put it up to him to start toward the foregoing programme,
to be reached in (say) three years--two if possible. He must learn
to grow these things absolutely better than they are now grown
anywhere on earth. He must get the best seed. He must get muck out
of the swamp, manure from somewhere, etc. etc. He must have the
supreme flavour in each thing. Let him take room enough for
each--plenty of room. He doesn't want much room for any one thing,
but good spaces between.
This will be the making of the world. Talk about fairs? If he fails
to get every prize he must pay a fine for every one that goes to
anybody else.
How we'll live! I can live on these things and nothing else. But
(just to match this home outfit) I'll order tea from Japan, ripe
olives from California, grape fruit and oranges from Florida. Then
poor folks will hang around, hoping to be invited to dinner!
Plant a few fig trees now; and pecans? Any good?
The world is going to come pretty close to starvation not only
during the war but for five or perhaps ten years afterward. An acre
or two _done right_--divinely right--will save us. An acre or two
on my land in Moore County--no king can live half so well if the
ground be got ready this spring and such a start made as one
natural-born gardener can make. The old Russian I had in Garden
City was no slouch. Do you remember his little patch back of the
house? That far, far, far excelled anything in all Europe. And
you'll recall that we jarred 'em and had good things all winter.
This St. Ives is the finest spot in England that I've ever seen.
To-day has been as good as any March day you ever had in North
Carolina--a fine air, clear sunshine, a beautiful sea--looking out
toward the United States; and this country grows--the best golf
links that I've ever seen in the world, and nothing else worth
speaking of but--tin. Tin mines are all about here. Tin and golf
are good crops in their way, but they don't feed the belly of man.
As matters stand the only people that have fit things to eat now in
all Europe are the American troops in France, and their food comes
out of tins chiefly. Ach! Heaven! In these islands man is
amphibious and carnivorous. It rains every day and meat, meat,
meat is the only human idea of food. God bless us, one acre of the
Sandhills is worth a vast estate of tin mines and golf links to
feed the innards of
Yours affectionately,
W.H.P.
P.S. And cornfield peas, of just the right rankness, cooked with
just the right dryness.
When I become a citizen of the Sandhills I propose to induce some
benevolent lover of good food to give substantial prizes to the
best grower of each of these things and to the best cook of each
and to the person who serves each of them most daintily.
We can can and glass jar these things and let none be put on the
market without the approval of an expert employed by the community.
Then we can get a reputation for Sandhill Food and charge double
price.
W.H.P.
_To Arthur W. Page_
St. Ives, Cornwall,
England, March 8, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
Your letter, written from the University Club, is just come. It
makes a very distinct impression on my mind which my own
conclusions and fears have long confirmed. Let me put it at its
worst and in very bald terms: The Great White Chief is at bottom
pacifist, has always been so and is so now. Of course I do not mean
a pacifist at any price, certainly not a cowardly pacifist. But
(looked at theoretically) war is, of course, an absurd way of
settling any quarrel, an irrational way. Men and nations are
wasteful, cruel, pigheaded fools to indulge in it. Quite true. But
war is also the only means of adding to a nation's territory the
territory of other nations which they do not wish to sell or to
give up--the robbers' only way to get more space or to get booty.
This last explains this war. Every Hohenzollern (except the present
Emperor's father, who reigned only a few months) since Frederick
the Great has added to Prussian and German area of rule. Every one,
therefore, as he comes to the throne, feels an obligation to make
his addition to the Empire. For this the wars of Prussia with
Austria, with Denmark, with France were brought on. They succeeded
and won the additions that old William I made to the Empire. Now
William II must make _his_ addition. He prepared for more than
forty years; the nation prepared before he came to the throne and
his whole reign has been given to making sure that he was ready.
It's a robber's raid. Of course, the German case has been put so as
to direct attention from this bald fact.
Now the philosophical pacifists--I don't mean the cowardly,
yellow-dog ones--have never quite seen the war in this aspect. They
regard it as a dispute about something--about trade, about more
seaboard, about this or that, whereas it is only a robber's
adventure. They want other people's property. They want money,
treasure, land, indemnities, minerals, raw materials; and they set
out to take them.
Now confusing this character of the war with some sort of rational
dispute about something, the pacifists try in every way to stop it,
so that the "issue" may be reasoned out, debated, discussed,
negotiated. Surely the President tried to reach peace--tried as
hard and as long as the people would allow him. The Germans argued
away time with him while they got their submarine fleet built. Then
they carried out the programme they had always had in mind and had
never thought of abandoning. Now they wish to gain more time, to
slacken the efforts of the Allies, if possible to separate them by
asking for "discussions"--peace by "negotiation." When you are
about to kill the robber, he cries out, "For God's sake, let's
discuss the question between us. We can come to terms."--Now here's
where the danger comes from the philosophical pacifist--from any
man who does not clearly understand the nature of the war and of
the enemy. To discuss the difference between us is so very
reasonable in sound--so very reasonable in fact if there were a
discussable difference. It is a programme that would always be in
order except with a burglar or a robber.
The yet imperfect understanding of the war and of the nature of the
German in the United States, especially at Washington--more
especially in the White House--herein lies the danger.
... This little rest down here is a success. The weather is a
disappointment--windy and cold. But to be away from London and away
from folks--that's much. Shoecraft is very good[66]. He sends us
next to nothing. Almost all we've got is an invitation to lunch
with Their Majesties and they've been good enough to put that off.
It's a far-off country, very fine, I'm sure in summer, and with
most beautiful golf links. The hill is now so windy that no sane
man can play there.
We're enjoying the mere quiet. And your mother is quite well again.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
To Mrs. Charles G. Loring
St. Ives, Cornwall,
March 10, 1918.
DEAR KITTY:
A week here. No news. Shoecraft says we've missed nothing in
London. What we came for we've got: your mother's quite well. She
climbs these high hills quite spryly. We've had a remarkable week
in this respect--we haven't carried on a conversation with any
human being but ourselves. I don't think any such thing has ever
happened before. I can stand a week, perhaps a fortnight of this
now. But I don't care for it for any long period. At the bottom of
this high and steep hill is the quaintest little town I ever saw.
There are some streets so narrow that when a donkey cart comes
along the urchins all have to run to the next corner or into doors.
There is no sidewalk, of course; and the donkey cart takes the
whole room between the houses. Artists take to the town, and they
have funny little studios down by the water front in tiny houses
built of stone in pieces big enough to construct a tidewater front.
Imagine stone walls made of stone, each weighing tons, built into
little houses about as big as your little back garden! There's one
fellow here (an artist) whom I used to know in New York, so small
has the world become!
On another hill behind us is a triangular stone monument to John
Knill. He was once mayor of the town. When he died in 1782, he left
money to the town. If the town is to keep the money (as it has) the
Mayor must once in every five years form a procession and march up
to this monument. There ten girls, natives of the town, and two
widows must dance around the monument to the playing of a fiddle
and a drum, the girls dressed in white. This ceremony has gone on,
once in five years, all this time and the town has old Knill's
money!
Your mother and I--though we are neither girls nor widows--danced
around it this morning, wondering what sort of curmudgeon old John
Knill was.
Don't you see how easily we fall into an idle mood? Well, here's a
photograph of little Alice looking up at me from the table where I
write--a good, sweet face she has.
And you'll never get another letter from me in a time and from a
place whereof there is so little to tell.
Affectionately, dear Kitty,
W.H.P.
To Ralph W. Page
Tregenna Castle Hotel,
St. Ives, Cornwall,
March 12, 1918.
MY DEAR RALPH:
Arthur has sent me Gardiner's 37-page sketch of American-British
Concords and Discords--a remarkable sketch; and he has reminded me
that your summer plan is to elaborate (into a popular style) your
sketch of the same subject. You and Gardiner went over the same
ground, each in a very good fashion. That's a fascinating task, and
it opens up a wholly new vista of our History and of Anglo-Saxon,
democratic history. Much lies ahead of that. And all this puts it
in my mind to write you a little discourse on _style_. Gardiner has
no style. He put his facts down much as he would have noted on a
blue print the facts about an engineering project that he sketched.
The style of your article, which has much to be said for it as a
magazine article, is not the best style for a book.
Now, this whole question of style--well, it's the gist of good
writing. There's no really effective writing without it. Especially
is this true of historical writing. Look at X Y Z's writings. He
knows his American history and has written much on it. He's written
it as an Ohio blacksmith shoes a horse--not a touch of literary
value in it all; all dry as dust--as dry as old Bancroft.
Style is good breeding--and art--in writing. It consists of the
arrangement of your matter, first; then, more, of the gait; the
manner and the manners of your expressing it. Work every group of
facts, naturally and logically grouped to begin with, into a
climax. Work every group up as a sculptor works out his idea or a
painter, each group complete in itself. Throw out any superfluous
facts or any merely minor facts that prevent the orderly working up
of the group--that prevent or mar the effect you wish to present.
Then, when you've got a group thus presented, go over what you've
made of it, to make sure you've used your material and its
arrangement to the best effect, taking away merely extraneous or
superfluous or distracting facts, here and there adding concrete
illustrations--putting in a convincing detail here, and there a
touch of colour.
Then go over it for your vocabulary. See that you use no word in a
different meaning than it was used 100 years ago and will be used
100 years hence. You wish to use only the permanent words--words,
too, that will be understood to carry the same meaning to English
readers in every part of the world. Your vocabulary must be chosen
from the permanent, solid, stable parts of the language.
Then see that no sentence contains a hint of obscurity.
Then go over the words you use to see if they be the best. Don't
fall into merely current phrases. If you have a long word, see if a
native short one can be put in its place which will be more natural
and stronger. Avoid a Latin vocabulary and use a plain English
one--short words instead of long ones.
Most of all, use _idioms_--English idioms of force. Say an
agreement was "come to." Don't say it was "consummated." For the
difference between idioms and a Latin style, compare Lincoln with
George Washington. One's always interesting and convincing. The
other is dull in spite of all his good sense. How most folk do
misuse and waste words!
Freeman went too far in his use of one-syllable words. It became an
affectation. But he is the only man I can think of that ever did go
too far in that direction. X--would have written a great history if
he had had the natural use of idioms. As it is, he has good sense
and no style; and his book isn't half so interesting as it would
have been if he had some style--some proper value of short,
clear-cut words that mean only one thing and that leave no
vagueness.
You'll get a good style if you practice it. It is in your blood and
temperament and way of saying things. But it's a high art and must
be laboriously cultivated.
Yours affectionately,
W.H.P.
This glimpse of a changing and chastened England appears in a letter of
this period:
* * * * *
The disposition shown by an endless number of such incidents is
something more than a disposition of gratitude of a people helped when
they are hard pressed. All these things show the changed and changing
Englishman. It has already come to him that he may be weaker than he
had thought himself and that he may need friends more than he had once
imagined; and, if he must have helpers and friends, he'd rather have his
own kinsmen. He's a queer "cuss," this Englishman. But he isn't a liar
nor a coward nor any sort of "a yellow dog." He's true, and he never
runs--a possible hero any day, and, when heroic, modest and quiet and
graceful. The trouble with him has been that he got great world power
too easily. In the times when he exploited the world for his own
enrichment, there were no other successful exploiters. It became an easy
game to him. He organized sea traffic and sea power. Of course he became
rich--far, far richer than anybody else, and, therefore, content with
himself. He has, therefore, kept much of his mediæval impedimenta, his
dukes and marquesses and all that they imply--his outworn ceremonies and
his mediæval disregard of his social inferiors. Nothing is well done in
this Kingdom for the big public, but only for the classes. The railway
stations have no warm waiting rooms. The people pace the platform till
the train comes, and milord sits snugly wrapt up in his carriage till
his footman announces the approach of the train. And occasional
discontent is relieved by emigration to the Colonies. If any man becomes
weary of his restrictions he may go to Australia and become a gentleman.
The remarkable loyalty of the Colonies has in it something of a
servant's devotion to his old master.
Now this trying time of war and the threat and danger of extinction are
bringing--have in fact already brought--the conviction that many changes
must come. The first sensible talk about popular education ever heard
here is just now beginning. Many a gentleman has made up his mind to try
to do with less than seventeen servants for the rest of his life since
he now _has_ to do with less. Privilege, on which so large a part of
life here rests, is already pretty well shot to pieces. A lot of old
baggage will never be recovered after this war: that's certain. During a
little after-dinner speech in a club not long ago I indulged in a
pleasantry about excessive impedimenta. Lord Derby, Minister of War and
a bluff and honest aristocrat, sat near me and he whispered to
me--"That's me." "Yes," I said, "that's you," and the group about us
made merry at the jest. The meaning of this is, they now joke about what
was the most solemn thing in life three years ago.
None of this conveys the idea I am trying to explain--the change in the
English point of view and outlook--a half century's change in less than
three years, radical and fundamental change, too. The mother of the Duke
of X came to see me this afternoon, hobbling on her sticks and feeble,
to tell me of a radiant letter she had received from her granddaughter
who has been in Washington visiting the Spring Rices. "It's all very
wonderful," said the venerable lady, "and my granddaughter actually
heard the President make a speech!" Now, knowing this lady and knowing
her son, the Duke, and knowing how this girl, his daughter, has been
brought up, I dare swear that three years ago not one of them would have
crossed the street to hear any President that ever lived. They've simply
become different people. They were very genuine before. They are very
genuine now.
It is this steadfastness in them that gives me sound hope for the
future. They don't forget sympathy or help or friendship. Our going into
the war has eliminated the Japanese question. It has shifted the virtual
control of the world to English-speaking peoples. It will bring into the
best European minds the American ideal of service. It will, in fact,
give us the lead and make the English in the long run our willing
followers and allies. I don't mean that we shall always have plain
sailing. But I do mean that the direction of events for the next fifty
or one hundred years has now been determined.
[Illustration: Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916-18,
Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918]
[Illustration: General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the
American Expeditionary Force in the Great War]
* * * * *
Yet Page found one stolid opposition to his attempts to establish the
friendliest relations between the two peoples. That offish attitude of
the Washington Administration, to which reference has already been made,
did not soften with the progress of events. Another experience now again
brought out President Wilson's coldness toward his allies. About this
time many rather queer Americans--some of the "international"
breed--were coming to England on more or less official missions. Page
was somewhat humiliated by these excursions; he knew that his country
possessed an almost unlimited supply of vivid speakers, filled with zeal
for the allied cause, whose influence, if they could be induced to cross
the Atlantic, would put new spirit into the British. The idea of having
a number of distinguished Americans come to England and tell the British
public about the United States and especially about the American
preparations for war, was one that now occupied his thoughts. In June,
1917, he wrote his old friend Dr. Wallace Buttrick, extending an
invitation to visit Great Britain as a guest of the British Government.
Dr. Buttrick made a great success; his speeches drew large crowds and
proved a source of inspiration to the British masses. So successful were
they, indeed, that the British Government desired that other Americans
of similar type should come and spread the message. In November,
therefore, Dr. Buttrick returned to the United States for the purpose of
organizing such a committee. Among the eminent Americans whom he
persuaded to give several months of their time to this work of
heartening our British allies were Mr. George E. Vincent, President of
the Rockefeller Foundation, Mr. Harry Pratt Judson, President of Chicago
University, Mr. Charles H. Van Hise, President of the University of
Wisconsin, Mr. Edwin A. Alderman, President of the University of
Virginia, Mr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, and Bishop Lawrence of
Massachusetts. It was certainly a distinguished group, but it was the
gentleman selected to be its head that gave it almost transcendent
importance in the eyes of the British Government. This was ex-President
William H. Taft. The British lay greater emphasis upon official rank
than do Americans, and the fact that an ex-President of the United
States was to head this delegation made it almost an historic event. Mr.
Taft was exceedingly busy, but he expressed his willingness to give up
all his engagements for several months and to devote his energies to
enlightening the British public about America and its purposes in the
war. An official invitation was sent him from London and accepted.
Inasmuch as Mr. Taft was an ex-President and a representative of the
political party opposed to the one in power, he thought it only
courteous that he call upon Mr. Wilson, explain the purpose of his
mission, and obtain his approval. He therefore had an interview with the
President at the White House; the date was December 12, 1917. As soon as
Mr. Wilson heard of the proposed visit to Great Britain he showed signs
of irritation. He at once declared that it met with his strongest
disapproval. When Mr. Taft remarked that the result of such an
enterprise would be to draw Great Britain and the United States more
closely together, Mr. Wilson replied that he seriously questioned the
desirability of drawing the two countries any more closely together than
they already were. He was opposed to putting the United States in a
position of seeming in any way to be involved with British policy. There
were divergencies of purpose, he said, and there were features of the
British policy in this war of which he heartily disapproved. The motives
of the United States in this war, the President continued, "were
unselfish, but the motives of Great Britain seemed to him to be of a
less unselfish character." Mr. Wilson cited the treaty between Great
Britain and Italy as a sample of British statesmanship which he regarded
as proving this contention. The President's reference to this Italian
treaty has considerable historic value; there has been much discussion
as to when the President first learned of its existence, but it is
apparent from this conversation with ex-President Taft that he must have
known about it on December 12, 1917, for President Wilson based his
criticism of British policy largely upon this Italian convention[67].
The President showed more and more feeling about the matter as the
discussion continued. "There are too many Englishmen," he said, "in this
country and in Washington now and I have asked the British Ambassador to
have some of them sent home."
Mr. Wilson referred to the jealousy of France at the close relations
which were apparently developing between Great Britain and the United
States. This was another reason, he thought, why it was unwise to make
the bonds between them any tighter. He also called Mr. Taft's attention
to the fact that there were certain elements in the United States which
were opposed to Great Britain--this evidently being a reference to the
Germans and the Irish--and he therefore believed that any conspicuous
attempts to increase the friendliness of the two countries for each
other would arouse antagonism and resentment.
As Mr. Taft was leaving he informed Mr. Wilson that the plan for his
visit and that of the other speakers had originated with the American
Ambassador to Great Britain. This, however, did not improve the
President's temper.
"Page," said the President, "is really an Englishman and I have to
discount whatever he says about the situation in Great Britain."
And then he added, "I think you ought not to go, and the same applies to
the other members of the party. I would like you to make my attitude on
this question known to those having the matter in charge."
Despite this rebuff Dr. Buttrick and Mr. Taft were reluctant to give up
the plan. An appeal was therefore made to Colonel House. Colonel House
at once said that the proposed visit was an excellent thing and that he
would make a personal appeal to Mr. Wilson in the hope of changing his
mind. A few days afterward Colonel House called up Dr. Buttrick and
informed him that he had not succeeded. "I am sorry," wrote Colonel
House to Page, "that the Buttrick speaking programme has turned out as
it has. The President was decidedly opposed to it and referred to it
with some feeling."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 64: August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV sent a letter to the
Powers urging them to bring the war to an end and outlining possible
terms of settlement. On August 29th President Wilson sent his historic
reply. This declared, in memorable language, that the Hohenzollern
dynasty was unworthy of confidence and that the United States would have
no negotiations with its representatives. It inferentially took the
stand that the Kaiser must abdicate, or be deposed, and the German
autocracy destroyed, as part of the conditions of peace.]
[Footnote 65: On November 29, 1917, the London _Daily Telegraph_
published a letter from the Marquis of Lansdowne, which declared that
the war had lasted too long and suggested that the British restate their
war aims. This letter was severely condemned by the British press and by
practically all representative British statesmen. It produced a most
lamentable impression in the United States also.]
[Footnote 66: Eugene C. Shoecraft, the Ambassador's secretary.]
[Footnote 67: As related in Chapter XXII, page 267, President Wilson was
informed of the so-called "secret treaties" by Mr. Balfour, in the
course of his memorable visit to the White House.]
CHAPTER XXV
GETTING THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO FRANCE
A group of letters, written at this time, touch upon a variety of topics
which were then engaging the interest of all countries:
_To Arthur W. Page_
London, January 19, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
While your letter is still fresh in my mind I dictate the following
in answer to your question about Palestine.
It has not been settled--and cannot be, I fancy, until the Peace
Conference--precisely what the British will do with Palestine, but
I have what I think is a correct idea of their general attitude on
the subject. First, of course, they do not propose to allow it to
go back into Turkish hands; and the same can be said also of
Armenia and possibly of Mesopotamia. Their idea of the future of
Palestine is that whoever shall manage the country, or however it
shall be managed, the Jews shall have the same chance as anybody
else. Of course that's quite an advance for the Jews there, but
their idea is not that the Jews should have command of other
populations there or control over them--not in the least. My guess
at the English wish, which I have every reason to believe is the
right guess, is that they would wish to have Palestine
internationalized, whatever that means. That is to say, that it
should have control of its own local affairs and be a free country
but that some great Power, or number of Powers, should see to it
that none of the races that live there should be allowed to impose
upon the other races. I don't know just how such a guarantee can be
given by the great Powers or such a responsibility assumed except
by an agreement among two or three of them, or barely possibly by
the English keeping control themselves; but the control by the
English after the war of the former German colonies will put such a
large task on them that they will not be particularly eager to
extend the area of their responsibility elsewhere. Of course a
difficult problem will come up also about Constantinople and the
Dardanelles. The Dardanelles must be internationalized.
I have never been able to consider the Zionist movement seriously.
It is a mere religious sentiment which will express itself in
action by very few people. I have asked a number of Jews at various
times who are in favour of the Zionist movement if they themselves
are going there. They always say no. The movement, therefore, has
fixed itself in my mind as a Jewish movement in which no Jew that
you can lay your hands on will ever take part but who wants other
Jews to take part in it. Of course there might be a flocking to
Palestine of Jews from Russia and the adjoining countries where
they are not happy, but I think the thing is chiefly a sentiment
and nothing else. Morgenthau[68] is dead right. I agree with him
_in toto_. I do not think anybody in the United States need be the
least concerned about the Zionist movement because there isn't a
single Jew in our country such a fool as to go to Palestine when he
can stay in the United States. The whole thing is a sentimental,
religious, more or less unnatural and fantastic idea and I don't
think will ever trouble so practical a people as we and our Jews
are.
The following memorandum is dated February 10, 1918:
General Bliss[69] has made a profound and the best possible
impression here by his wisdom and his tact. The British have a deep
respect for him and for his opinions, and in inspiring and keeping
high confidence in us he is worth an army in himself. I have seen
much of him and found out a good deal about his methods. He is
simplicity and directness itself. Although he is as active and
energetic as a boy, he spends some time by himself to think things
out and even to say them to himself to see how his conclusions
strike the ear as well as the mind. He has been staying here at the
house of one of our resident officers. At times he goes to his room
and sits long by the fire and argues his point--out loud--oblivious
to everything else. More than once when he was so engaged one of
his officers has knocked at the door and gone in and laid telegrams
on the table beside him and gone out without his having known of
the officer's entrance. Then he comes out and tries his conclusion
on someone who enjoys his confidence. And then he stands by it and
when the time comes delivers it slowly and with precision; and
there he is; and those who hear him see that he has thought the
matter out on all sides and finally.
Our various establishments in London have now become big--the
Embassy proper, the Naval and Army Headquarters, the Red Cross, the
War Trade Board's representatives, and now (forthwith) the Shipping
Board, besides Mr. Crosby of the Treasury. The volume of work is
enormous and it goes smoothly, except for the somewhat halting
Army Headquarters, the high personnel of which is now undergoing a
change; and that will now be all right. I regularly make the rounds
of all the Government Departments with which we deal to learn if
they find our men and methods effective, and the rounds of all our
centres of activity to find whether there be any friction with the
British The whole machine moves very well. For neither side
hesitates to come to me whenever they strike even small snags. All
our people are at work on serious tasks and (so far as I know)
there are now none of those despicable creatures here who used
during our neutrality days to come from the United States on peace
errands and what-not to spy on the Embassy and me (their inquiries
and their correspondence were catalogued by the police). I have
been amazed at the activity of some of them whose doings I have
since been informed of.
We now pay this tribute to the submarines--that we have entered the
period of compulsory rations. There is enough to eat in spite of
the food that has gone to feed the fishes. But no machinery of
distribution to a whole population can be uniformly effective. The
British worker with his hands is a greedy feeder and a sturdy
growler and there will be trouble. But I know no reason to
apprehend serious trouble.
The utter break-up of Russia and the German present occupation of
so much of the Empire as she wants have had a contrary effect on
two sections of opinion here, as I interpret the British mind. On
the undoubtedly enormously dominant section of opinion these events
have only stiffened resolution. They say that Germany now must be
whipped to a finish. Else she will have doubled her empire and will
hold the peoples of her new territory as vassals without regard to
their wishes and the war lord caste will be more firmly seated
than ever before. If her armies be literally whipped she'll have to
submit to the Allies' terms, which will dislodge her from
overlordship over these new unwilling subjects--and she can be
dislodged in no other way. This probably means a long war, now that
after a time she can get raw materials for war later and food from
Rumania and the Ukraine, etc. This will mean a fight in France and
Belgium till a decisive victory is won and the present exultant
German will is broken.
The minority section of public opinion--as I judge a small
minority--has the feeling that such an out-and-out military victory
cannot be won or is not worth the price; and that the enemies of
Germany, allowing her to keep her Eastern accretions, must make the
best terms they can in the East; that there's no use in running the
risk of Italy's defeat and defection before some sort of bargain
could be made about Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Serbia. Of course
this plan would leave the German warlordship intact and would bring
no sort of assurance of a prolonged peace. It would, too, leave
European Russia at least to German mercy, and would leave the
Baltic and the Black Seas practically wholly under German
influence. As for the people of Russia, there seems small chance
for them in this second contingency. The only way to save them is
to win a decisive victory.
As matters stand to-day Lord Lansdowne and his friends (how
numerous they are nobody knows) are the loudest spokesmen for such
a peace as can be made. But it is talked much of in Asquith circles
that the time may come when this policy will be led by Mr. Asquith,
in a form somewhat modified from the Lansdowne formula. Mr. Asquith
has up to this time patriotically supported the government and he
himself has said nothing in public which could warrant linking his
name with an early peace-seeking policy. But his friends openly
and incessantly predict that he will, at a favourable moment, take
this cue. I myself can hardly believe it. Political victory in
Great Britain doesn't now lie in that direction.
The dominant section of opinion is much grieved at Russia's
surrender, but they refuse to be discouraged by it. They recall how
Napoleon overran most of Europe, and the French held practically
none of his conquests after his fall.
Such real political danger as exists here--if any exists, of which
I am not quite sure--comes not only now mainly of this split in
public opinion but also and to a greater degree from the personal
enemies of the present government. Lloyd George is kept in power
because he is the most energetic man in sight--by far. Many who
support him do not like him nor trust him-except that nobody doubts
his supreme earnestness to win the war. On all other subjects he
has enemies of old and he makes new ones. His intense and superb
energy has saved him in two notable crises. His dismissal of Sir
William Robertson[70] has been accepted in the interest of greater
unity of military control, but it was a dangerous rapids that he
shot, for he didn't do it tactfully. Yet there's a certain danger
to the present powers in the feeling that some of them are wearing
out. Parliament itself--an old one now--is thought to have gone
stale. Bonar Law is over-worked and tired; Balfour is often said to
be too philosophical and languid; but, when this feeling seems in
danger of taking definite shape, he makes a clearer statement than
anybody else and catches on his feet. The man of new energy, not
yet fagged, is Geddes[71], whose frankness carries conviction.
_To the President_
London, March 17, 1918.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
The rather impatient and unappreciative remarks made by the Prime
Minister before a large meeting of preachers of the "free" churches
about a League of Nations reminds me to write you about the state
of British opinion on that subject. What Lloyd George said to these
preachers is regrettable because it showed a certain impatience of
mind from which he sometimes suffers; but it is only fair to him to
say that his remarks that day did not express a settled opinion.
For on more than one previous occasion he has spoken of the subject
in a wholly different tone--much more appreciatively. On that
particular day he had in mind only the overwhelming necessity to
win the war--other things, _all_ other things must wait. In a way
this is his constant mood--the mood to make everybody feel that the
only present duty is to win the war. He has been accused of almost
every defect in the calendar except of slackness about the war.
Nobody has ever doubted his earnestness nor his energy about
_that_. And the universal confidence in his energy and earnestness
is what keeps him in office. Nobody sees any other man who can push
and inspire as well as he does. It would be a mistake, therefore,
to pay too much heed to any particular utterance of this electrical
creature of moods, on any subject.
Nevertheless, he hasn't thought out the project of a league to
enforce peace further than to see the difficulties. He sees that
such a league might mean, in theory at least, the giving over in
some possible crisis the command of the British Fleet to an officer
of some other nationality. That's unthinkable to any red-blooded
son of these islands. Seeing a theoretical possibility even of
raising such a question, the British mind stops and refuses to go
further--refuses in most cases even to inquire seriously whether
any such contingency is ever likely to come.
The British Grand Fleet, in fact, is a subject that stands alone in
power and value and in difficulties. It classifies itself with
nothing else. Since over and over again it has saved these islands
from invasion when nothing else could have saved them and since
during this war in particular it has saved the world from German
conquest--as every Englishman believes--it lies in their reverence
and their gratitude and their abiding convictions as a necessary
and perpetual shield so long as Great Britain shall endure. If the
Germans are thrashed to a frazzle (and we haven't altogether done
that yet) and we set about putting the world in order, when we come
to discuss Disarmament, the British Fleet will be the most
difficult item in the world to dispose of. It is not only a Fact,
with a great and saving history, it is also a sacred Tradition and
an Article of Faith.
The first reason, therefore, why the British general mind has not
firmly got hold on a league is the instinctive fear that the
formation of any league may in some conceivable way affect the
Grand Fleet. Another reason is the general inability of a somewhat
slow public opinion to take hold on more than one subject at a time
or more than one urgent part of one subject. The One Subject, of
course, is winning the war. Since everything else depends on that,
everything else must wait on that.
The League, therefore, has not taken hold on the public imagination
here as it has in the United States. The large mass of the people
have not thought seriously about it: it has not been strongly and
persistently presented to the mass of the people. There is no
popular or general organization to promote it. There is even, here
and there, condemnation of the idea. The (London) _Morning Post_,
for example, goes out of its way once in a while to show the
wickedness of the idea because, so it argues, it will involve the
sacrifice, more or less, of nationality. But the _Morning Post_ is
impervious to new ideas and is above all things critical in its
activities and very seldom constructive. The typical Tory mind in
general sees no good in the idea. The typical Tory mind is the
insular mind.
On the other hand, the League idea is understood as a necessity and
heartily approved by two powerful sections of public opinion--(1)
the group of public men who have given attention to it, such as
Bryce, Lord Robert Cecil, and the like, and (2) some of the best
and strongest leaders of Labour. There is good reason to hope that
whenever a fight and an agitation is made for a League these two
sections of public opinion will win; but an agitation and a fight
must come. Lord Bryce, in the intervals of his work as chairman of
a committee to make a plan for the reorganization of the House of
Lords, which, he remarked to me the other day, "involves as much
labour as a Government Department," has fits of impatience about
pushing a campaign for a league, and so have a few other men. They
ask me if it be not possible to have good American public speakers
come here--privately, of course, and in no way connected with our
Government nor speaking for it--to explain the American movement
for a League in order to arouse a public sentiment on the subject.
Thus the case stands at present.
Truth and error alike and odd admixtures of them come in waves over
this censored land where one can seldom determine what is true,
before the event, from the newspapers. "News" travels by word of
mouth, and information that one can depend on is got by personal
inquiry from sources that can be trusted.
There is a curious wave of fear just now about what Labour may do,
and the common gossip has it that there is grave danger in the
situation. I can find no basis for such a fear. I have talked with
labour leaders and I have talked with members of the government who
know most about the subject. There is not a satisfactory
situation--there has not been since the war began. There has been a
continuous series of labour "crises," and there have been a good
many embarrassing strikes, all of which have first been hushed up
and settled--at least postponed. One cause of continuous trouble
has been the notion held by the Unions, sometimes right and
sometimes wrong, that the employers were making abnormal profits
and that they were not getting their due share. There have been and
are also other causes of trouble. It was a continuous quarrel even
in peace times. But I can find no especial cause of fear now. Many
of the Unions have had such advances of wages that the Government
has been severely criticized for giving in. Just lately a large
wing of the Labour Party put forth its war aims which--with
relatively unimportant exceptions--coincide with the best
declarations made by the Government's own spokesmen.
Of course, no prudent man would venture to make dogmatic
predictions. There have been times when for brief intervals any one
would have been tempted to fear that these quarrels might cause an
unsatisfactory conclusion of the war. But the undoubted patriotism
of the British workman has every time saved the situation. While a
danger point does lie here, there is no reason to be more fearful
now than at any preceding time when no especial trouble was
brewing. This wave of gossip and fear has no right to sweep over
the country now.
Labour hopes and expects and is preparing to win the next General
Election--whether with good reason or not I cannot guess. But most
men expect it to win the Government at some time--most of them
_after_ the war. I recall that Lord Grey once said to me, before
the war began, that a general political success of the Labour Party
was soon to be expected.
Another wave which, I hear, has swept over Rome as well as London
is a wave of early peace expectation. The British newspapers have
lately been encouraging this by mysterious phrases. Some men here
of good sense and sound judgment think that this is the result of
the so-called German "peace offensive," which makes the present the
most dangerous period of the war.
W.H.P.
_To David F. Houston_[72]
London, March 23, 1918.
MY DEAR HOUSTON:
It is very kind of you indeed to write so generously about the
British visitors who are invading our sacred premises, such as the
Archbishop of York, and it is good to hear from you anyhow about
any subject and I needn't say that it is quite a rare experience
also. I wish you would take a little of your abundant leisure and
devote it to good letters to me.
And in some one of your letters tell me this.--The British send
over men of this class that you have written about to see us, but
they invite over here--and we permit to come--cranks on
prohibition, experts in the investigation of crime, short-haired
women who wish to see how British babies are reared, peace cranks
and freaks of other kinds[73]. Our Government apparently won't let
plain, honest, normal civilians come over, but if a fellow comes
along who wants to investigate some monstrosity then one half of
the Senate, one half of the House of Representatives, and a number
of the executive offices of the Government give him the most
cordial letters. Now there are many things, of course, that I don't
know, but it has been my fate to have a pretty extensive
acquaintance with cranks of every description in the United States.
I don't think there is any breed of them that didn't haunt my
office while I was an editor. Now I am surely punished for all my
past sins by having those fellows descend on me here. I know them,
nearly all, from past experience and now just for the sake of
keeping the world as quiet as possible I have to give them time
here far out of proportion to their value.
Now, out of your great wisdom, I wish you would explain to me why
the deuce we let all this crew come over here instead of sending a
shipload of perfectly normal, dignified, and right-minded
gentlemen. These thug reformers!--Baker will be here in a day or
two and if I can remember it I am going to suggest to him that he
round them all up and put them in the trenches in France where
those of them who have so far escaped the gallows ought to be put.
I am much obliged to have the illuminating statement about our
crops. I am going to show it to certain gentlemen here who will be
much cheered by it. By gracious, you ought to hear their
appreciation of what we are doing! We are not doing it for the sake
of their appreciation, but if we were out to win it we could not do
it better. Down at bottom the Englishman is a good fellow. He has
his faults but he doesn't get tired and he doesn't suffer spasms of
emotion.
Give my love to Mrs. Houston, and do sit down and write me a
good long letter--a whole series of them, in fact.
Believe me, always most heartily yours,
WALTER HINES PAGE.
[Illustration: From a painting by Irving R. Wiles Admiral William Sowden
Sims, Commander of American naval forces operating in European waters
during the Great War]
[Illustration: A silver model of the _Mayflower_, the farewell gift of
the Plymouth Council to Mr. Page]
_To Frank L. Polk_
London, March 22, 1918.
DEAR MR. POLK:
You are good enough to mention the fact that the Embassy has some
sort of grievance against the Department. Of course it has, and you
are, possibly, the only man that can remove it. It is this: You
don't come here to see the war and this government and these people
who are again saving the world as we are now saving them. I thank
Heaven and the Administration for Secretary Baker's visit. It is a
dramatic moment in the history of the race, of democracy, and of
the world. The State Department has the duty to deal with foreign
affairs--the especial duty--and yet no man in the State Department
has been here since the war began. This doesn't look pretty and it
won't look pretty when the much over-worked "future historian"
writes it down in a book. Remove that grievance.
The most interesting thing going on in the world to-day--a thing
that in History will transcend the war and be reckoned its greatest
gain--is the high leadership of the President in formulating the
struggle, in putting its aims high, and in taking the democratic
lead in the world, a lead that will make the world over--and in
taking the democratic lead of the English-speaking folk. Next most
impressive to that is to watch the British response to that lead.
Already they have doubled the number of their voters, and even more
important definite steps in Democracy will be taken. My aim--and
it's the only way to save the world--is to lead the British in this
direction. They are the most easily teachable people in our way of
thinking and of doing. Of course everybody who works toward such an
aim provokes the cry from a lot of fools among us who accuse him of
toadying to the English and of "accepting the conventional English
conclusion." They had as well talk of missionaries to India
accepting Confucius or Buddha. Their fleet has saved us four or
five times. It's about time we were saving them from this bloods
Thing that we call Europe, for our sake and for theirs.
The bloody Thing will get us all if we don't fight our level best;
and it's only by _our_ help that we'll be saved. That clearly gives
us the leadership. Everybody sees that. Everybody acknowledges it.
The President authoritatively speaks it--speaks leadership on a
higher level than it was ever spoken before to the whole world. As
soon as we get this fighting job over, the world procession toward
freedom--our kind of freedom--will begin under our lead. This being
so, can't you delegate the writing of telegrams about "facilitating
the license to ship poppy seed to McKesson and Robbins," and come
over and see big world-forces at work?
I cannot express my satisfaction at Secretary Baker's visit. It was
historic--the first member of the Cabinet, I think, who ever came
here while he held office. He made a great impression and received
a hearty welcome.
That's the only grievance I can at the moment unload on you. We're
passing out of our old era of isolation. These benighted heathen on
this island whom we'll yet save (since they are well worth saving)
will be with us as we need them in future years and centuries.
Come, help us heighten this fine spirit.
Always heartily yours,
WALTER HINES PAGE.
P.S. You'd see how big our country looks from a distance. It's
gigantic, I assure you.
The above letter was written on what was perhaps the darkest day of the
whole war. The German attack on the Western Front, which had been long
expected, had now been launched, and, at the moment that Page was
penning this cheery note to Mr. Polk, the German armies had broken
through the British defenses, had pushed their lines forty miles ahead,
and, in the judgment of many military men, had Paris almost certainly
within their grasp. A great German gun, placed about seventy miles from
the French capital, was dropping shells upon the apparently doomed city.
This attack had been regarded as inevitable since the collapse of
Russia, which had enabled the Germans to concentrate practically all
their armies on the Western Front.
The world does not yet fully comprehend the devastating effect of this
apparently successful attack upon the allied morale. British statesmen
and British soldiers made no attempt to conceal from official Americans
the desperate state of affairs. It was the expectation that the Germans
might reach Calais and thence invade England. The War Office discussed
these probabilities most freely with Colonel Slocum, the American
military attaché. The simple fact was that both the French and the
British armies were practically bled white.
"For God's sake, get your men over!" they urged General Slocum. "You
have got to finish it."
Page was writing urgently to President Wilson to the same purpose. Send
the men and send them at once. "I pray God," were his solemn words to
Mr. Wilson, "that you will not be too late!"
One propitious event had taken place at the same time as the opening of
the great German offensive. Mr. Newton D. Baker, the American Secretary
of War, had left quietly for France in late February, 1918, and had
reached the Western Front in time to obtain a first-hand sight of the
great March drive. No visit in history has ever been better timed, and
no event could have better played into Page's hands. He had been urging
Washington to send all available forces to France at the earliest
possible date; he knew, as probably few other men knew, the extent to
which the Allies were depending upon American troops to give the final
blow to Germany; and the arrival of Secretary Baker at the scene of
action gave him the opportunity to make a personal appeal. Page
immediately communicated with the Secretary and persuaded him to come at
once to London for a consultation with British military and political
leaders. The Secretary spent only three days in London, but the visit,
brief as it was, had historic consequences. He had many consultations
with the British military men; he entered into their plans with
enthusiasm; he himself received many ideas that afterward took shape in
action, and the British Government obtained from him first-hand
information as to the progress of the American Army and the American
determination to cooperate to the last man and the last dollar. "Baker
went straight back to France," Page wrote to his son Arthur, "and our
whole coöperation began."
Page gave a dinner to Mr. Baker at the Embassy on March 23rd--two days
after the great March drive had begun. This occasion gave the visitor a
memorable glimpse of the British temperament. Mr. Lloyd George, Mr.
Balfour, Lord Derby, the War Secretary, General Biddle, of the United
States Army, and Admiral Sims were the Ambassador's guests. Though the
mighty issues then overhanging the world were not ignored in the
conversation the atmosphere hardly suggested that the existence of the
British Empire, indeed that of civilization itself, was that very night
hanging in the balance. Possibly it was the general sombreness of events
that caused these British statesmen to find a certain relief in jocular
small talk and reminiscence. For the larger part of the evening not a
word was said about the progress of the German armies in France. Mr.
Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, seated on opposite sides of the table,
apparently found relaxation in reviewing their political careers and
especially their old-time political battles. They would laughingly
recall occasions when, in American parlance, they had put each other "in
a hole"; the exigencies of war had now made these two men colleagues in
the same government, but the twenty years preceding 1914 they had spent
in political antagonism. Page's guests on this occasion learned much
political history of the early twentieth century, and the mutual
confessions of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour gave these two men an
insight into each others' motives and manoeuvres which was almost as
revealing. "Yes, you caught me that time," Mr. Lloyd George would say,
and then he would counter with an episode of a political battle in which
he had got the better of Mr. Balfour. The whole talk was lively and
bantering, and accompanied with much laughter; and all this time shells
from that long-distance gun were dropping at fifteen minute intervals
upon the devoted women and children of Paris and the Germans were every
hour driving the British back in disorder. At times the conversation
took a more philosophic turn. Would the men present like to go back
twenty-five years and live their lives all over again? The practically
unanimous decision of every man was that he would not wish to do so.
All this, of course, was merely on the surface; despite the laughter and
the banter, there was only one thing which engrossed the Ambassador's
guests, although there were not many references to it. That was the
struggle which was then taking place in France. At intervals Mr. Lloyd
George would send one of the guests, evidently a secretary, from the
room. The latter, on his return, would whisper something in the Prime
Minister's ear, but more frequently he would merely shake his head.
Evidently he had been sent to obtain the latest news of the battle.
At one point the Prime Minister did refer to the great things taking
place in France.
"This battle means one thing," he said. "That is a generalissimo."
"Why couldn't you have taken this step long ago?" Admiral Sims asked Mr.
Lloyd George.
The answer came like a flash.
"If the cabinet two weeks ago had suggested placing the British Army
under a foreign general, it would have fallen. Every cabinet in Europe
would also have fallen, had it suggested such a thing."
_Memorandum on Secretary Baker's visit_
Secretary Baker's visit here, brief as it was, gave the heartiest
satisfaction. So far as I know, he is the first member of an
American Cabinet who ever came to England while he held office, as
Mr. Balfour was the first member of a British Cabinet who ever went
to the United States while he held office. The great governments of
the English-speaking folk have surely dealt with one another with
mighty elongated tongs. Governments of democracies are not exactly
instruments of precision. But they are at least human. But personal
and human neglect of one another by these two governments over so
long a period is an astonishing fact in our history. The wonder is
that we haven't had more than two wars. And it is no wonder that
the ignorance of Englishmen about America and the American
ignorance of England are monumental, stupendous, amazing, passing
understanding. I have on my mantelpiece a statuette of Benjamin
Franklin, an excellent and unmistakable likeness which was made
here during his lifetime; and the inscription burnt on its base is
_Geo. Washington_. It serves me many a good turn with my English
friends. I use it as a measure of their ignorance of us. Of course
this is a mere little error of a statuette-maker, an error,
moreover, of a hundred years ago. But it tells the story of to-day
also. If I had to name the largest and most indelible impression
that has been made on me during my five years' work here, I should
say the ignorance and aloofness of the two peoples--not an
ignorance of big essential facts but of personalities and
temperaments--such as never occur except between men who had never
seen one another.
But I was writing about Mr. Baker's visit and I've got a long way
from that. I doubt if he knows himself what gratification it gave;
for these men here have spoken to me about it as they could not
speak to him.
Here is an odd fact: For sixty years, so far as I know, members of
the Administration have had personal acquaintance with some of the
men in power in Salvador, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru, etc., etc.,
and members of the British Government have had personal
acquaintance with some men in authority in Portugal, Serbia,
Montenegro and Monte Carlo; but during this time (with the single
exception of John Hay) I think no member of any Administration had
a real personal acquaintance while he held office with any member
of the British Government while he held office, and vice
versa--till Mr. Balfour's visit. Suspicion grows out of ignorance.
The longer I live here the more astonished I become at the
fundamental ignorance of the British about us and of our
fundamental ignorance about them. So colossal is this ignorance
that every American sent here is supposed to be taken in, to become
Anglophile; and often when one undertakes to enlighten Englishmen
about the United States one becomes aware of a feeling inside the
English of unbelief, as if he said, "Oh, well! you are one of those
queer people who believe in republican government." All this is
simply amazing. Poor Admiral Sims sometimes has a sort of mania, a
delusion that nobody at Washington trusts his judgment because he
said seven or eight years ago that he liked the English. Yet every
naval officer who comes here, I understand, shares his views about
practically every important naval problem or question. I don't
deserve the compliment (it's a very high one) that some of my
secretaries sometimes pay me when they say that I am the only man
they know who tries to tell the whole truth to our Government in
favour of the Englishman as well as against him. It is certain that
American public opinion is universally supposed to suspect any
American who tries to do anything with the British lion except to
twist his tail--a supposition that I never believed to be
true.--But it is true that the mutual ignorance is as high as the
Andes and as deep as the ocean. Personal acquaintance removes it
and nothing else will.
_To Arthur W. Page_
American Embassy,
London, April 7, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
I daresay you remember this epic:
Old Morgan's wife made butter and cheese;
Old Morgan drank the whey.
There came a wind from West to East
And blew Old Morgan away.
I'm Old Morgan and your mother got ashamed of my wheyness and made
the doctor prescribe cream for me. There's never been such a
luxury, and anybody who supposes that I am now going to get fat and
have my cream stopped simply doesn't know me. So, you see why I'm
intent on shredded wheat biscuits. That's about the best form of
real wheat that will keep. And there's no getting real wheat-stuff,
pure and simple, in any other form.
There's no use in talking about starving people--except perhaps in
India and China. White men can live on anything. The English could
fight a century on cabbage and Brussels sprouts. I've given up hope
of starving the Germans. A gut of dogmeat or horse flesh and a
potato will keep them in fighting trim forever. I've read daily for
two years of impending starvation across the Rhine; but I never
even now hear of any dead ones from hunger. Cold steel or lead is
the only fatal dose for them.
Therefore I know that shredded wheat will carry me through.
You'll see, I hope, from the clippings that I enclose that I'm not
done for yet anyhow. Two speeches a day is no small stunt; and I
did it again yesterday--hand running; and I went out to dinner
afterward. It was a notable occasion--this celebration of the
anniversary of our coming into the war[74].
Nobody here knows definitely just what to fear from the big battle;
but everybody fears more or less. It's a critical time--very. I am
told that that long-range gunning of Paris is the worst form of
frightfulness yet tried. The shells do not kill a great many
people. But their falling every fifteen minutes gets on people's
nerves and they can't sleep. I hear they are leaving Paris in great
numbers. Since the big battle began and the Germans have needed all
their planes and more in France, they've let London alone. But
nobody knows when they will begin again.
Nobody knows any future thing about the war, and everybody faces a
fear.
Secretary Baker stayed with me the two days and three nights he was
here. He made a good impression but he received a better one. He
now knows something about the war. I had at dinner to meet him:
Lloyd George, Prime Minister.
Balfour, Foreign Secretary.
The Chief of Staff.
Lord Derby, War Secretary.
General Biddle, U.S.A., in command in London.
Admiral Sims, U.S.N.
The talk was to the point--good and earnest. Baker went straight
back to France and our _whole_ coöperation began. With the first
group of four he had conferences besides for two days. His coming
was an admirable move.
Yours affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Ralph W. Page_
London, April 13, 1918.
DEAR RALPH:
Your cheery letters about entertaining governors, planting trees
and shrubbery and your mother's little orchard give us much
pleasure. The Southern Pines paper brings news of very great damage
to the peach crop. I hope it is much exaggerated. Is it?
We haven't any news here, and I send you my weekly note only to
keep my record clear. The great battle--no one talks or thinks of
anything else. We have suffered and still suffer a good deal of
fear and anxiety, with real reason, too. But the military men are
reassuring. Yet I don't know just how far to trust their judgment
or to share their hopes. Certainly this is the most dangerous
situation that modern civilization was ever put in. If we can keep
them from winning any _great_ objective, like Paris or a channel
port, we ought to end the war this year. If not, either they win or
at the least prolong the war indefinitely. It's a hazardous and
trying time.
There were never such casualties on either side as now. Such a
bloody business cannot keep up all summer. But before everybody is
killed or a decisive conclusion is reached, the armies will, no
doubt, dig themselves in and take a period of comparative rest.
People here see and feel the great danger. But the extra effort now
_may_ come too late. Still we keep up good hope. The British are
hard to whip. They never give up. And as for the French army, I
always remember Verdun and keep my courage up.
The wounded are coming over by the thousand. We are incomparably
busy and in great anxiety about the result (though still pretty
firm in the belief that the Germans will lose), and luckily we keep
very well.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Ralph W. Page_
London, April 7, 1918.
DEAR RALPH:
There used to be a country parson down in Wake County who, when
other subjects were talked out, always took up the pleasing topic
of saving your soul. That's the way your mother and I do--with the
subject of going home. We talk over the battle, we talk over the
boys, we talk over military and naval problems, we discuss the
weather and all the babies, and then take up politics, and talk
over the gossip of the wiseacres; but we seldom finish a
conversation without discussing going home. And we reach just about
as clear a conclusion on our topic as the country parson reached on
his. I've had the doctors going over me (or rather your mother has)
as an expert accountant goes over your books; and I tried to bribe
them to say that I oughtn't to continue my arduous duties here
longer. They wouldn't say any such thing. Thus that device
failed--dead. It looks as if I were destined for a green old age
and no _martyr_ business at all.
All this is disappointing; and I don't see what to do but to go on.
I can't keep from hoping that the big battle may throw some light
on the subject; but there's no telling when the big battle will
end. Nothing ends--that's the trouble. I sometimes feel that the
war may never end, that it may last as the Napoleonic Wars did, for
20 years; and before that time we'll all have guns that shoot 100
miles. We can stay at home and indefinitely bombard the enemy
across the Rhine--have an endless battle at long range.
So, we stick to it, and give the peach trees time to grow up.
We had a big day in London yesterday--the anniversary of our entry
into the war. I send you some newspaper clippings about it.
The next best news is that we have a little actual sunshine--a very
rare thing--and some of the weather is now almost decent....
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 68: Mr. Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey,
1913-16, an American of Jewish origin who opposed the Zionist movement
as un-American and deceptive.]
[Footnote 69: American member of the Supreme War Council. Afterward
member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.]
[Footnote 70: Sir Henry Wilson had recently succeeded Sir William
Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff.]
[Footnote 71: First Lord of the Admiralty.]
[Footnote 72: Secretary of Agriculture.]
[Footnote 73: See Chapter XXIV.]
[Footnote 74: This meeting, on April 6, 1918, was held at the Mansion
House. Page and Mr. Balfour were the chief speakers.]
CHAPTER XXVI
LAST DAYS IN ENGLAND
In spite of the encouraging tone of the foregoing letters, everything
was not well with Page. All through the winter of 1917-1918 his
associates at the Embassy had noticed a change for the worse in his
health. He seemed to be growing thinner; his face was daily becoming
more haggard; he tired easily, and, after walking the short distance
from his house to his Embassy, he would drop listlessly into his chair.
His general bearing was that of a man who was physically and nervously
exhausted. It was hoped that the holiday at St. Ives would
help him; that he greatly enjoyed that visit, especially the
westward--homeward--outlook on the Atlantic which it gave him, his
letters clearly show; there was a temporary improvement also in his
health, but only a temporary one. The last great effort which he made in
the interest of the common cause was Secretary Baker's visit; the
activities which this entailed wearied him, but the pleasure he obtained
from the resultant increase in the American participation made the
experience one of the most profitable of his life. Indeed, Page's last
few months in England, though full of sad memories for his friends,
contained little but satisfaction for himself. He still spent many a
lonely evening by his fire, but his thoughts were now far more
pleasurable than in the old _Lusitania_ days. The one absorbing subject
of contemplation now was that America was "in." His country had
justified his deep confidence. The American Navy had played a
determining part in defeating the submarine, and American shipyards
were turning out merchant ships faster than the Germans were destroying
them. American troops were reaching France at a rate which necessarily
meant the early collapse of the German Empire. Page's own family had
responded to the call and this in itself was a cause of great
contentment to a sick and weary man. The Ambassador's youngest son,
Frank, had obtained a commission and was serving in France; his
son-in-law, Charles G. Loring, was also on the Western Front; while from
North Carolina Page's youngest brother Frank and two nephews had sailed
for the open battle line. The bravery and success of the American troops
did not surprise the Ambassador but they made his last days in England
very happy.
Indeed, every day had some delightful experience for Page. The
performance of the Americans at Cantigny especially cheered him. The day
after this battle he and Mrs. Page entertained Mr. Lloyd George and
other guests at lunch. The Prime Minister came bounding into the room
with his characteristic enthusiasm, rushed up to Mrs. Page with both
hands outstretched and shook hands joyously.
"Congratulations!" he exclaimed. "The Americans have done it! They have
met the Prussian guard and defeated them!"
Mr. Lloyd George was as exuberant over the achievement as a child.
This was now the kind of experience that had become Page's daily
routine. Lively as were his spirits, however, his physical frame was
giving way. In fact Page, though he did not know it at the time, was
suffering from a specific disease--nephritis; and its course, after
Christmas of 1917, became rapid. His old friend, Dr. Wallace Buttrick,
had noted the change for the worse and had attempted to persuade him to
go home.
"Quit your job, Page," he urged. "You have other big tasks waiting you
at home. Why don't you go back?"
"No--no--not now."
"But, Page," urged Dr. Buttrick, "you are going to lay down your life."
"I have only one life to lay down," was the reply. "I can't quit now."
_To Mary E. Page_[75]
London, May 12, 1918.
DEAR MARY:
You'll have to take this big paper and this paint brush pen--it's
all the pen these blunt British have. This is to tell you how very
welcome your letter to Alice is--how very welcome, for nobody
writes us the family news and nothing is so much appreciated. I'll
try to call the shorter roll of us in the same way:
After a miserable winter we, too, are having the rare experience of
a little sunshine in this dark, damp world of London. The constant
confinement in the city and _in the house_ (that's the worst of
it--no outdoor life or fresh air) has played hob with my digestion.
It's not bad, but it's troublesome, and for some time I've had the
feeling of being one half well. It occurred to me the other day
that I hadn't had leave from my work for four years, except my
short visit home nearly two years ago. I asked for two months off,
and I've got it. We are going down by the shore where there is
fresh air and where I can live outdoors and get some exercise. We
have a house that we can get there and be comfortable. To get away
from London when the weather promises to be good, and to get away
from people seemed a joyous prospect. I can, at any time I must,
come to London in two hours.
The job's too important to give up at this juncture. This, then, is
the way we can keep it going. I've no such hard task now as I had
during the years of our neutrality, which, praise God! I somehow
survived, though I am now suffering more or less from the physical
effects of that strain. Yet, since I have had the good fortune to
win the confidence of this Government and these people, I feel that
I ought to keep on now until some more or less natural time to
change comes.
Alice keeps remarkably well--since her influenza late in the
winter; but a rest away from London is really needed as much by her
as by me. They work her to death. In a little while she is to go,
by the invitation of the Government and the consent of the King, to
christen a new British warship at Newcastle. It will be named the
"Eagle." Meantime I'll be trying to get outdoor life at Sandwich.
Yesterday a regiment of our National Army marched through the
streets of London and were reviewed by the King and me; and the
town made a great day of it. While there is an undercurrent of
complaint in certain sections of English opinion because we didn't
come into the war sooner, there is a very general and very genuine
appreciation of everything we have done and of all that we do.
Nothing could be heartier than the welcome given our men here
yesterday. Nor could any men have made a braver or better showing
than they made. They made us all swell with pride.
They are coming over now, as you know, in great quantities. There
were about 8,000 landed here last week and about 30,000 more are
expected this week. I think that many more go direct to France
than come through England. On their way through England they do not
come to London. Only twice have we had them here, yesterday and one
day last summer when we had a parade of a regiment of engineers.
For the _army_ London is on a sidetrack--is an out of the way
place. For our navy, of course, it's the European headquarters,
since Admiral Sims has his headquarters here. We thus see a good
many of our sailors who are allowed to come to London on leave. A
few days ago I had a talk with a little bunch of them who came from
one of our superdreadnaughts in the North Sea. They had just
returned from a patrol across to the coast of Norway. "Bad luck,
bad luck," they said, "on none of our long patrol trips have we
seen a single Hun ship!"
About the war, you know as much as I know. There is a general
confidence that the Allies will hold the Germans in their
forthcoming effort to get to Calais or to Paris. Yet there is an
undercurrent of fear. Nobody knows just how to feel about it.
Probably another prodigious onslaught will be made before you
receive this letter. It seems to me that we can make no intelligent
guess until this German effort is finished in France--no guess
about the future. If the Germans get the French ports (Calais, for
example) the war will go on indefinitely. If they are held back, it
_may_ end next autumn or winter--partly because of starvation in
Germany and partly because the Germans will have to confess that
they can't whip our armies in France. But, even then, since they
have all Russia to draw on, they may keep going for a long time.
One man's guess is as good as another's.
One sad thing is certain: we shall at once begin to have heavy
American casualties. Our Red Cross and our army here are getting
hospitals ready for such American wounded as are brought over to
England--the parts of our army that are fighting with the British.
We have a lot of miserable politics here which interfere with the
public feeling. The British politician is a worse yellow dog than
the American--at times he is, at least; and we have just been going
through such a time. Another such time will soon come about the
Irish.
Well, we have an unending quantity of work and wear--no very acute
bothers but a continuous strain, the strain of actual work, of
uneasiness, of seeing people, of uncertainty, of great expense, of
doubt and fear at times, of inability to make any plans--all which
is only the common lot now all over the world, except that most
persons have up to this time suffered incomparably worse than we.
And there's nothing to do but to go on and on and on and to keep
going with the stoutest hearts we can keep up till the end do at
last come. But the Germans now (as the rest of us) are fighting for
their lives. They are desperate and their leaders care nothing for
human life.
The Embassy now is a good deal bigger than the whole State
Department ever was in times of peace. I have three buildings for
offices, and a part of our civil force occupies two other
buildings. Even a general supervision of so large a force is in
itself a pretty big job. The army and the Navy have each about the
same space as the Embassy proper. Besides, our people have huts and
inns and clubs and hospitals all over the town. Even though there
be fewer vexing problems than there were while we were neutral,
there is not less work--on the contrary, more. Nor will there be an
end to it for a very long time--long after my time here. The
settling of the war and the beginning of peace activities, whenever
these come, will involve a great volume of work. But I've no
ambition to have these things in hand. As soon as a natural time of
relief shall come, I'll go and be happier in my going than you or
anybody else can guess.
Now we go to get my digestion stiffened up for another long
tug--unless the Germans proceed forthwith to knock us out--which
they cannot do.
With my love to everybody on the Hill,
Affectionately yours,
W.H.P.
Mr. and Mrs. Waldorf Astor--since become Viscount and Viscountess
Astor--had offered the Pages the use of their beautiful seaside house at
Sandwich, Kent, and it was the proposed vacation here to which Page
refers in this letter. He obtained a six weeks' leave of absence and
almost the last letters which Page wrote from England are dated from
this place. These letters have all the qualities of Page at his best:
but the handwriting is a sad reminder of the change that was
progressively taking place in his physical condition. It is still a
clear and beautiful script, but there are signs of a less steady hand
than the one that had written the vigorous papers of the preceding four
years.
_Memorandum_
Sandwich, Kent, Sunday, 19 May, 1918.
We're at Rest Harrow and it's a fine, sunny early spring Carolina day.
The big German drive has evidently begun its second phase. We hear the
guns distinctly. We see the coast-guard aeroplanes at almost any time
o'day. What is the mood about the big battle?
The soldiers--British and French--have confidence in their ability to
hold the Germans back from the Channel and from Paris. Yet can one rely
on the judgment of soldiers? They have the job in hand and of course
they believe in themselves. While one does not like in the least to
discount their judgment and their hopefulness, for my part I am not
_quite_ so sure of their ability to make sound judgments as I wish I
were. The chances are in favour of their success; but--suppose they
should have to yield and give up Calais and other Channel ports? Well,
they've prepared for it as best they can. They have made provision for
commandeering most of the hotels in London that are not yet taken
over--for hospitals for the wounded now in France.
And the war would take on a new phase. Whatever should become of the
British and American armies, the Germans would be no nearer having
England than they now are. They would not have command of the sea. The
combined British and American fleets could keep every German ship off
the ocean and continue the blockade by sea--indefinitely; and, if the
peoples of the two countries hold fast, a victory would be won at
last--at sea.
_To Ralph W. Page_
Rest Harrow, Sandwich, Kent.
May 19, 1918.
DEAR RALPH:
I felt very proud yesterday when I read T.R.'s good word in the
_Outlook_ about your book[76]. If I had written what he said
myself--I mean, if I had written what I think of the book--I should
have said this very thing. And there is one thing more I should
have said, viz.:--All your life and all my life, we have cultivated
the opinion at home that we had nothing to do with the rest of the
world, nothing to do with Europe in particular--and in our
political life our hayseed spokesmen have said this over and over
again till many people, perhaps most people, came really to believe
that it was true. Now this aloofness, this utterly detached
attitude, was a pure invention of the shirt-sleeve statesman at
home. I have long concluded, for other reasons as well as for this,
that these men are the most ignorant men in the whole world; more
ignorant--because they are viciously ignorant--than the Negro boys
who act as caddies at Pinehurst; more ignorant than the inmates of
the Morganton Asylum; more ignorant than sheep or rabbits or
idiots. They have been the chief hindrances of our country--worse
than traitors, in effect. It is they, in fact, who kept our people
ignorant of the Germans, ignorant of the English, ignorant of our
own history, ignorant of ourselves. Now your book, without
mentioning the subject, shows this important fact clearly, by
showing that our aloofness has all been a fiction. _We've been in
the world--and right in the middle of the world--the whole time_.
And our public consciousness of this fact has enormously slipped
back. Take Franklin, Madison, Monroe, Jefferson; take Hay,
Root--and then consider some of our present representatives! One
good result of the war and of our being in it will be the
restoration of our foreign consciousness. Every one of the half
million, or three million, soldiers who go to France will know more
about foreign affairs than all Congress knew two years ago.
A stay of nearly five years in London (five years ago to-day I was
on the ship coming here) with no absence long enough to give any
real rest, have got my digestion wrong. I've therefore got a real
leave for two months. Your mother and I have a beautiful house here
that has been lent to us, right on the Channel where there's
nothing worth bombing and where as much sunshine and warmth come
as come anywhere in England. We got here last night and to-day is
as fine an early spring day as you ever had in the Sandhills. I
shall golf and try to find me an old horse to ride, and I'll stay
out in the sunshine and try to get the inside machinery going all
right. We may have a few interruptions, but I hope not many, if the
Germans leave us alone. Your mother has got to go to Newcastle to
christen a new British warship--a compliment the Admiralty pays her
"to bind the two nations closer together" etc. etc. And I've got to
go to Cambridge to receive an LL.D. for the President. Only such
things are allowed to interrupt us. And we are very much hoping to
see Frank here.
We are in sound of the battle. We hear the big guns whenever we go
outdoors. A few miles down the beach is a rifle range and we hear
the practice there. Almost any time of day we can hear aeroplanes
which (I presume) belong to the coast guard. There's no danger of
forgetting the war, therefore, unless we become stone deaf. But
this decent air and sunshine are blessings of the highest kind. I
never became so tired of anything since I had the measles as I've
become of London. My Lord! it sounded last night as if we had
jumped from the frying pan into the fire. Just as we were about to
go to bed the big gun on the beach--just outside the fence around
our yard--about 50 yards from the house, began its thundering
belch--five times in quick succession, rattling the windows and
shaking the very foundation of things. Then after a pause of a few
minutes, another round of five shots. Then the other guns all along
the beach took up the chorus--farther off--and the inland guns
followed. They are planted all the way to London--ninety miles. For
about two hours we had this roar and racket. There was an air raid
on, and there were supposed to be twenty-five or thirty German
planes on their way to London. I hear that it was the worst raid
that London has had. Two of them were brought down--that's the only
good piece of news I've heard about it. Well, we are not supposed
to be in danger. They fly over us on the way to bigger game. At any
rate I'll take the risk for this air and sunshine. Trenches and
barbed wire run all along the beach--I suppose to help in case of
an invasion. But an invasion is impossible in my judgment. Holy
Moses! what a world!--the cannon in the big battle in France
roaring in our ears all the time, this cannon at our door likely to
begin action any night and all the rest along the beach and on the
way to London, and this is what we call rest! The world is upside
down, all crazy, all murderous; but we've got to stop this barbaric
assault, whatever the cost.
Ray Stannard Baker is spending a few days with us, much to our
pleasure.
With love to Leila and the babies,
Yours affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To Arthur W. Page_
Rest Harrow, Sandwich Beach,
Sandwich, Kent, England.
May 20, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... I can't get quite to the bottom of the anti-English feeling at
Washington. God knows, this people have their faults. Their social
system and much else here is mediæval. I could write several
volumes in criticism of them. So I could also in criticism of
anybody else. But Jefferson's[77] letter is as true to-day as it
was when he wrote it. One may or may not have a lot of sentiment
about it; but, without sentiment, it's mere common sense, mere
prudence, the mere instinct of safety to keep close to Great
Britain, to have a decent respect for the good qualities of these
people and of this government. Certainly it is a mere
perversity--lost time--lost motion, lost everything--to cherish a
dislike and a distrust of them--a thing that I cannot wholly
understand. While we are, I fear, going to have trade troubles and
controversies, my feeling is, on the whole, in spite of the
attitude of our official life, that an increasing number of our
people are waking up to what England has done and is and may be
depended on to do. Isn't that true?
We've no news here. We see nobody who knows anything. I am far from
strong--the old stomach got tired and I must gradually coax it back
to work. That's practically my sole business now for a time, and
it's a slow process. But it's coming along and relief from seeing
hordes of people is as good as medicine.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
_To the President_
Sandwich, May 24, 1918.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
Your speeches have a cumulative effect in cheering up the British.
As you see, if you look over the mass of newspaper clippings that I
send to the Department, or have them looked over, the British press
of all parties and shades of opinion constantly quote them
approvingly and gratefully. They have a cumulative effect, too, in
clearing the atmosphere. Take, for instance, your declaration in
New York about standing by Russia. All the allied governments in
Europe wish to stand by Russia, but their pressing business with
the war, near at hand, causes them in a way to forget Russia; and
certainly the British public, all intent on the German "drive" in
France had in a sense forgotten Russia. You woke them up. And your
"Why set a limit to the American Army?" has had a cheering effect.
As leader and spokesman of the enemies of Germany--by far the best
trumpet-call spokesman and the strongest leader--your speeches are
worth an army in France and more, for they keep the proper moral
elevation. All this is gratefully recognized here. Public opinion
toward us is wholesome and you have a "good press" in this Kingdom.
In this larger matter, all is well. The English faults are the
failings of the smaller men--about smaller matters--not of the
large men nor of the public, about large matters.
In private, too, thoughtful Englishmen by their fears pay us high
tribute. I hear more and more constantly such an opinion as this:
"You see, when the war is over, you Americans will have much the
largest merchant fleet. You will have much the largest share of
money, and England and France and all the rest of the world will
owe you money. You will have a large share of essential raw
materials. You will have the machinery for marine insurance and for
foreign banking. You will have much the largest volume of
productive labour. And you will know the world as you have never
known it before. What then is going to become of British trade?"
The best answer I can give is: "Adopt American methods of
manufacture, and the devil take the hindmost. There will be for a
long time plenty for everybody to do; and let us make sure that we
both play the game fairly: that's the chief matter to look out
for." That's what I most fear in the decades following the end of
the war--trade clashes.
The Englishman's pride will be hurt. I recall a speech made to me
by the friendliest of the British--Mr. Balfour himself: "I confess
that as an Englishman it hurts my pride to have to borrow so much
even from you. But I will say that I'd rather be in your debt than
in anybody else's."
_To Edward M. House_
May 27, 1918.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
... I can write in the same spirit of the Labour Group which left
for home last week. Nobody has been here from our side who had a
better influence than they. They emphatically stuck by their
instructions and took pleasure, against the blandishments of
certain British Socialists, in declaring against any meeting with
anybody from the enemy countries to discuss "peace-by-negotiation"
or anything else till the enemy is whipped. They made admirable
speeches and proved admirable representatives of the bone and sinew
of American manhood. They had dead-earnestness and good-humour and
hard horse-sense.
This sort of visit is all to the good. Great good they do, too, in
the present English curiosity to see and hear the right sort of
frank, candid Americans. Nobody who hasn't been here lately can
form an idea of the eagerness of all classes to hear and learn
about the United States. There never was, and maybe never will be
again, such a chance to inform the British and--to help them toward
a rights understanding of the United States and our people. We are
not half using the opportunity. There seems to be a feeling on your
side the ocean that we oughtn't to send men here to "lecture" the
British. No typical, earnest, sound American who has been here has
"lectured" the British. They have all simply told facts and
instructed them and won their gratitude and removed misconceptions.
For instance, I have twenty inquiries a week about Dr. Buttrick. He
went about quietly during his visit here and talked to university
audiences and to working-men's meetings and he captured and
fascinated every man he met. He simply told them American facts,
explained the American spirit and aims and left a grateful memory
everywhere. Buttrick cost our Government nothing: he paid his own
way. But if he had cost as much as a regiment it would have been
well spent. The people who heard him, read American utterances,
American history, American news in a new light. And most of his
talk was with little groups of men, much of it even in private
conversation. He did no orating or "lecturing." A hundred such men,
if we had them, would do more for a perfect understanding with the
British people than anything else whatsoever could do.
Yours sincerely,
WALTER H. PAGE.
_To Arthur W. Page_
Sandwich, May 27, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... I do get tired--my Lord! how tired!--not of the work but of the
confinement, of the useless things I have to spend time on, of the
bad digestion that has overtaken me, of London, of the weather, of
absence from you all--of the general breaking up of the world, of
this mad slaughter of men. But, after all, this is the common lot
now and I am grateful for a chance to do what I can. That's the
true way to look at it.
... Worry? I don't worry about anything except the war in general
and this mad world so threatened by these devil barbarians. And I
have a feeling that, when we get a few thousand flying machines,
we'll put an end to that, alas! with the loss of many of our brave
boys. I hear the guns across the channel as I write--an unceasing
boom! boom! boom! That's what takes the stuff out of me and gets my
inside machinery wrong. Still, I'm gradually getting even that back
to normal. Golf and the poets are fine medicine. I read Keats the
other day, with entire forgetfulness of the guns. Here we have a
comfortable house, our own servants (as many as we need), a
beautiful calm sea, a perfect air and for the present ideal
weather. There's nobody down here but Scottish soldiers. We've
struck up a pleasant acquaintance with them; and some of the
fellows from the Embassy come down week ends. Only the murderous
guns keep their eternal roar.
Thanks, thanks, a thousand thanks, old man. It'll all work out
right.
... I look at it in this way: all's well that ends well. We are now
doing our duty. That's enough. These things don't bother me,
because doing our duty now is worth a million years of past errors
and shortcomings.
Your mother's well and spry--very, and the best company in the
world. We're having a great time.
Bully for the kids! Kiss 'em for me and Mollie too.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
Make Shoecraft tell you everything. He's one of the best boys and truest
in the world.
_To Ralph W. Page_
Rest Harrow, Sandwich, Kent.
June 7, 1918.
MY DEAR RALPH:
... I have all along cherished an expectation of two things--(1)
That when we did get an American Army by conscription, if it should
remain at war long enough to learn the game, it would become the
best army that the world ever saw, for the simple reason that its
ranks would contain more capable men than any other country has
ever produced. The proof of this comes at once. Even our new and
raw troops have astonished the veterans of the French and British
armies and (I have no doubt) of the German Army also. It'll be our
men who will whip the Germans, and there are nobody else's men who
could do it. We've already saved the Entente from collapse by our
money. We'll save the day again by our fighting men. That is to
say, we'll save the world, thank God; and I fear it couldn't have
been saved in any other way. (2) Since the people by their mood
command and compel efficiency, the most efficient people will at
last (as recent events show) get at the concrete jobs, in spite of
anybody's preferences or philosophy. And this seems at last to be
taking place. What we have suffered and shall suffer is not failure
but delays and delays and bunglings. But they've got to end by the
sheer pressure of the people's earnestness. These two things, then,
are all to the good.
I get the morning papers here at noon. And to-day I am all alone.
Your mother went early on her journey to launch a British
battleship. I haven't had a soul to speak to all day but my
servants. At noon, therefore, I was rather eager for the papers. I
saw at a glance that a submarine is at work off the New Jersey
coast! It's an awful thing for the innocent victims, to be
drowned. But their deaths have done us a greater service than 100
times as many lives lost in battle. If anybody lacked earnestness
about the war, I venture to guess that he doesn't lack it any
longer. If the fools would now only shell some innocent town on the
coast, the journey to Berlin would be shortened.
If the Germans had practised a chivalrous humanity in their war for
conquest, they'd have won it. Nothing on earth can now save them;
for the world isn't big enough to hold them and civilized people.
Nor is there any room for pacifists till this grim business is
done.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
The last piece of writing from Sandwich is the following memorandum:
Sandwich, Kent.
June 10, 1918.
The Germans continue to gain ground in France--more slowly, but
still they gain. The French and British papers now give space to
plans for the final defense--the desperate defense--of Paris. The
Germans are only forty miles away. Slocum, military attaché, thinks
they will get it and he reports the same opinion at the War
Office--because the Germans have taken such a large number of guns
and so much ammunition. Some of these guns were meant for the
American troops, and they cannot now be replaced in time if the
German advance continues. But I do not know enough facts at first
hand to form an opinion. But, if Paris be taken, the war will go on
a long time--unless the English-speaking rulers make a compromise.
And, then, in another form--and forms--it'll go on
indefinitely.--There has been no more perilous or uncertain or
anxious time than now.
The United States too late, too late, too late: what if it should
turn out so?
* * * * *
But it did not turn out so. Even while Page was penning these lines
great events were taking place in France and the American troops were
having a large share in them. In June the Americans stopped the German
troops at Belleau Wood--a battle which proved the mettle of these fresh
levies not only for the benefit of the Germans but of the Allies as
well. Thus Page had the great satisfaction of returning to London while
the city was ringing with the praise of these achievements. He found
that the atmosphere had materially changed since he had last been in the
British capital; when he had left for Sandwich there had been a general
expectation that the Germans would get Paris or the Channel ports; now,
however, there was every confidence of victory. Greatly as Page rejoiced
over the new prospect, however, the fight at Belleau Wood brought him
his last great sorrow. His nephew, Allison M. Page, of Aberdeen, North
Carolina, the son of his youngest brother, Frank, lost his life in that
engagement. At first the young man was reported "missing"; the
investigation set afoot by the Ambassador for some time brought no
definite information. One of the most pathetic of Page's papers is a
brief note addressed by him to Allison Page, asking him for news: "It's
been a long time since we heard from you," Page wrote his nephew. "Write
how it goes with you. Affectionately, Uncle Wat." After travelling over
a considerable part of France, this note found its way back to the
Embassy. The boy--he was only 19--had been killed in action near Belleau
Wood, on June 25th, while leading his detachment in an attack on a
machine gun. Citations and decorations for gallantry in action were
given posthumously by General Pershing, Marshal Pétain, Major-General
Omar Bundy, and Major-General John A. LeJeune.
And now the shadows began to close in rapidly on Page. In early July
Major Frank C. Page, the Ambassador's youngest son, came over from
France. A brief glance at his father convinced him that he was dying. By
this time the Ambassador had ceased to go to the Chancery, but was
transacting the most imperative business propped up in a chair at home.
His mind was possessed by two yearnings: one was to remain in London
until the end of the war, the other was to get back to his childhood
home in North Carolina. Young Page urged his father to resign, but the
weary invalid insisted on sticking to his post. On this point it seemed
impossible to move him. Knowing that his brother Arthur had great
influence with his father, Frank Page cabled, asking him to come to
England immediately. Arthur took the first boat, reaching London late in
July.
The Ambassador's two sons then gently pressed upon their father the fact
that he must resign. Weak as he was, the Ambassador was still obdurate.
"No," he said. "It's quitting on the job. I must see the war through. I
can't quit until it's over."
But Sir William Osler, Page's physician and devoted friend, exercised
his professional authority and insisted on the resignation. Finally Page
consented.
_To the President_
American Embassy, London,
August 1, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I have been struggling for a number of months against the necessity
to write you this note; for my doctors now advise me to give up all
work for a period--my London doctor says for six months. I have a
progressive digestive trouble which does not yield to the usual
treatment. It's the war, five London winters, and the unceasing
labour which is now the common lot. I am ashamed to say that these
have brought me to something near a breakdown. I have had Sir
William Osler as well as two distinguished London physicians for
several months. The digestive trouble has brought other ills in its
train; and I am assured that they will yield to freedom from
responsibility and complete rest for a time in a dry, warm climate
and that they are not likely to yield to anything else.
I see nothing else to do then but to bow to the inevitable and to
ask you to be kind enough to relieve me and to accept my
resignation to take effect as soon as I can go to Washington and
make a somewhat extended report on the work here, which, I hope,
will be of some use to the Department; and I ought to go as soon as
possible--say, in September. I cannot tell you how great my
disappointment is that this request has become necessary.
If the world and its work were so organized that we could do what
we should like to do, I should like a leave of absence till winter
be broken and then to take up my duties here again till the war
end. But that, of course, is impracticable. And it is now a better
time to change Ambassadors than at any time since the war began. My
five years' service has had two main phases--the difficult period
of our neutrality and the far easier period since we came into the
war. But when the war ends, I fear that there will be again more or
less troublesome tasks arising out of commercial difficulties.
But for any reasonable period the Embassy's work fortunately can
now go on perfectly well with Mr. Laughlin as Chargé--until my
successor can get here. The Foreign Office like him, he is _persona
grata_ to all other Departments of the Government, and he has had
a long experience; and he is most conscientious and capable. And
the organization is in excellent condition.
I venture to ask you to have a cable message sent to me (to be
deciphered by me alone). It will require quite a little time to
pack up and to get away.
I send this, Mr. President, with more regret than I can express and
only after a struggle of more than six months to avoid it.
Yours sincerely,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Arthur Page took his father to Banff, in Scotland, for a little rest in
preparation for the voyage. From this place came Page's last letter to
his wife:
_To Mrs. Page_
Duff House, Banff, Scotland.
Sunday, September 2, 1918.
MY DEAR:
... I've put the period of our life in London, in my mind, as
closed. That epoch is ended. And I am glad. It was time it ended.
My job (_that_ job) is done. From the letters that Shoecraft has
sent me and from what the papers say, I think I couldn't have ended
it more happily--or at a better time. I find myself thinking of the
winter down South--of a Thanksgiving Day dinner for the older folks
of our family, of a Christmas tree for the kids, of frolics of all
sorts, of Rest, of some writing (perhaps not much), going over my
papers with Ralph--that's what he wants, you know; etc., etc.,
etc.--
And I've got to eat more. I myself come into my thinking and
planning in only two ways--(1) I'm going to have a suit like old
Lord N.'s and (2) I'm going to get all the good things to eat that
there are!
Meantime, my dear, how are you? Don't you let this getting ready
wear you out. Let something go undone rather. Work Miss Latimer and
the boys and the moving and packing men, and Petherick and the
servants. Take it very easy yourself.
Nine and a half more days here--may they speed swiftly. Comfortable
as I am, I'm mortal tired of being away from you--dead tired.
Praise God it's only 9-1/2 days. If it were 9-3/4, I should not
stand it, but break for home prematurely.
Yours, dear Allie, with all my love,
W.H.P.
On August 24th came the President's reply:
I have received your communication of August 1st. It caused me
great regret that the condition of your health makes it necessary
for you to resign. Under the circumstances I do not feel I have the
right to insist on such a sacrifice as your remaining in London.
Your resignation is therefore accepted. As you request it will take
effect when you report to Washington. Accept my congratulations
that you have no reason to fear a permanent impairment of your
health and that you can resign knowing that you have performed your
difficult duties with distinguished success.
WOODROW WILSON.
The news of Page's resignation inspired tributes from the British press
and from British public men such as have been bestowed upon few
Americans. The London _Times_ headed its leader "A Great Ambassador" and
this note was echoed in all sections of Great Britain. The part of
Page's career which Englishmen chiefly recalled was his attitude during
the period of neutrality. This, the newspapers declared, was Page's
great contribution to the cause. The fact that it had had such
far-reaching influences on history was the one especially insisted on.
His conciliatory and skillful behaviour had kept the United States and
Great Britain friends at a time when a less tactful ambassador might
easily have made them enemies; the result was that, when the time came,
the United States could join forces against the common enemy, with
results that were then daily unfolding on the battlefields of France. "I
really believe," wrote the Marquess of Crewe, "that there were several
occasions when we might have made it finally impossible for America to
join us in the war; that these passed by may have been partly due to
some glimmering of common sense on our part, with Grey as its main
exponent; but it was more largely owing to your patience and courtesy
and to the certainty which the Foreign Office always enjoyed that its
action would be set before the Secretary of State in as favourable a
light as it conscientiously could be." That, then, was Page's
contribution to the statesmanship of this crisis--that of holding the
two countries together so that, when the time came, the United States
could join the Allies. A mass of private letters, all breathing the same
sentiment, began to pour in on Page. There was hardly an illustrious
name in Great Britain that was not represented among these
leave-takings. As illustrating the character and spirit animating them,
the following selections are made:
_From the King_
The information communicated to me yesterday through Mr. Laughlin
of Your Excellency's resignation of the Post of Ambassador and the
cause of this step fill me with the keenest regret. During your
term of office in days of peace and of war your influence has done
much to strengthen the ties of friendship and good-will which unite
the two English-speaking nations of the world. I trust your health
will soon be restored and that we may have the pleasure of seeing
you and Mrs. Page before your departure.
GEORGE R.I.
_From the Prime Minister_
10, Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
30th August, 1918.
MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:
It is with the deepest regret that my colleagues and I have
received the news that you have been forced by ill health to resign
your office and that the President has consented to your
relinquishing your ambassadorial duties. We are sorry that you are
leaving us, all the more because your tenure of office has
coincided with one of the greatest epochs in the history of our two
countries and of the world, and because your influence and counsel
throughout this difficult time have been of the utmost value to us
all.
The power for good or evil which can be exerted by the occupant of
your high position is at all times necessarily very great. That our
peoples are now fighting side by side in the cause of human freedom
and that they are manifesting an ever growing feeling of cordiality
to one another is largely attributable to the exceptional wisdom
and good-will with which you have discharged your duties. For the
part you have played during the past five years in bringing about
this happy result we owe you our lasting gratitude.
May I add that while you have always firmly presented the point of
view of your own country, you have succeeded in winning, not only
the respect and admiration of official circles, but the confidence,
and I can say without hesitation, the affection of all sections of
our people? It will be with universal regret that they will learn
that, owing to the strain of the great responsibilities you have
borne, you are no longer to remain among us. I earnestly trust that
a well-earned rest will speedily restore you to complete health,
and that you have many years of public service still in store for
you.
I should like also to say how much we shall miss Mrs. Page. She has
won a real place in all our hearts. Through her unfailing tact, her
genuine kindliness, and her unvarying readiness to respond to any
call upon her time and energy, she has greatly contributed to the
success of your ambassadorship.
Ever sincerely,
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
_From Viscount Grey of Fallodon_
Glen Innerleithen, Scotland.
September 2, 1918.
DEAR MR. PAGE:
I have been out of touch with current events for a few days, but
yesterday I read the two articles in the _Times_ on your
retirement. I am very grieved to think that you are going. There
was not a word of eulogy in the _Times_ articles that was not under
rather than over-stated, and reflecting thus I thought how rare it
is in public life to have an occasion that justifies the best that
can be said. But it is so now, and I am filled with deep regret
that you are going and with deep gratitude that you came to us and
were here when the war broke out and subsequently. If the United
States had been represented here by any one less decided as to the
right and wrong of the war and less firm and courageous than
yourself, the whole of the relations between your country and ours
would have been in peril. And if the two countries had gone apart
instead of coming together the whole fate of the world would be
very different from what I hope it will now be.
I have often thought that the forces behind public affairs are so
tremendous that individuals have little real, even when much
apparent, influence upon the course of events. But in the early
years of the war I think everything might have gone wrong if it had
not been that certain men of strong moral conviction were in
certain places. And you were preëminently one of these. President
Wilson I am sure was another, though I know him only through you
and Colonel House and his own public utterances. Even so your
influence must have counted in his action, by your friendship with
him as well as by the fact of your being the channel through which
communications passed between him and us.
I cannot adequately express what it was to me personally in the
dark days of 1914, 1915, and 1916 to know how you felt about the
great issues involved in the war.
I go to Fallodon at the end of this week and come to London the
first week of September--if you and Mrs. Page have not left by then
I hope I may see you. I long to do so before you go. I wish you may
recover perfect health. My eyesight continues to fail and I shall
soon be absolutely dependent upon other eyes for reading print.
Otherwise I feel as well as a schoolboy, but it is depressing to be
so well and yet so crippled in sight.
Please do not trouble to answer this letter--you must have too many
letters of the kind to be able to reply to them separately--but if
there is a chance of my seeing you before you go please let me
have a message to say when and where.
Yours sincerely,
GREY OF F.
A few months before his resignation Page had received a letter from
Theodore Roosevelt, who was more familiar than most Americans with
Page's work in London. This summed up what will be probably the judgment
of history upon his ambassadorship. The letter was in reply to one
written to the Ex-President, asking him to show hospitality to the
Archbishop of York[78], who was about to visit the United States.
(Office of the Metropolitan Magazine)
342 Fourth Ave., New York,
March 1st, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:
I am very much pleased with your letter, and as soon as the
Archbishop arrives, he will be addressed by me with all his titles,
and I will get him to lunch with me or dine with me, or do anything
else he wishes! I shall do it for his own sake, and still more, my
dear fellow, I shall do it for the sake of the Ambassador who has
represented America in London during these trying years as no other
Ambassador in London has ever represented us, with the exception of
Charles Francis Adams, during the Civil War.
Faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
The seriousness of Page's condition was not understood in London;
consequently there were many attempts to do him honour in which he was
unable to participate. Custom demands that a retiring Ambassador shall
go to Windsor Castle to dine and to sleep; but King George, who was very
solicitous about Page's health, offered to spare the Ambassador this
trip and to come himself to London for this leave-taking. However, Page
insisted on carrying out the usual programme; but the visit greatly
tired him and he found it impossible personally to take part in any
further official farewells. The last ceremony was a visit from the Lord
Mayor and Council of Plymouth, who came to the Ambassador's house in
September to present the freedom of the city. Ever since Page's speech
of August 4, 1917, Plymouth had been planning to do him this honour;
when the Council heard that the Ambassador's health would make it
impossible for him to visit Plymouth, they asked if they might not come
to London. The proceeding was most impressive and touching and the
Ambassador's five-minute speech, the last one which he made in England,
had all his old earnestness and mental power, though the physical
weakness of the man saddened everybody present. The Lord Mayor presented
the freedom of the ancient borough in a temporary holder, explaining
that a more permanent receptacle would follow the Ambassador to America.
When this arrived, it proved to be a beautiful silver model of the
_Mayflower_. Certainly there could have been no more appropriate
farewell gift to Page from the English town whose name so closely links
the old country with the United States.
The last scene took place at Waterloo Station. Sir Arthur Walsh came
representing the King, while Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and other
ministers represented the cabinet. The Government had provided a special
railway carriage, and this was stationed at a convenient place as Page's
motor drew up. So weak was the Ambassador that it was with difficulty
that his companions, the ever devoted Mr. Laughlin, on one side, and
Page's secretary, Mr. Shoecraft, on the other, succeeded in supporting
him to his chair. Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil and the others then
entered the carriage, and, with all that sympathetic dignity in which
Englishmen of this type excel, said a few gracious and affectionate
words of good-bye. They all stood, with uncovered heads, as the train
slowly pulled out of the station, and caught their final glimpse of Page
as he smiled at them and faintly waved his hand.
* * * * *
Perhaps the man most affected by this leave-taking was Mr. Balfour. He
knew, as did the others, that that frail and emaciated figure had been
one of the greatest friends that Britain had had at the most dreadful
crisis in her history. He has many times told of this parting scene at
Waterloo Station and always with emotion.
"I loved that man," he once said to an American friend, recalling this
event. "I almost wept when he left England."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 75: Of Aberdeen, N.C., the Ambassador's sister.]
[Footnote 76: "Dramatic Moments in American Diplomacy," by Ralph W.
Page, 1918.]
[Footnote 77: The reference is to a letter written in 1823 by Thomas
Jefferson to President Monroe at the time when the Holy Alliance was
threatening the independence of South America. "With Great Britain,"
Jefferson wrote, "we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship
and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting
once more, side by side, in the same cause."]
[Footnote 78: See Vol. II, page 307.]
CHAPTER XXVII
THE END
Page came home only to die. In fact, at one time it seemed improbable
that he would live to reach the United States. The voyage of the
_Olympic_, on which he sailed, was literally a race with death. The
great-hearted Captain, Sir Bertram Hayes, hearing of the Ambassador's
yearning to reach his North Carolina home, put the highest pressure upon
his ship, which almost leaped through the waves. But for a considerable
part of the trip Page was too ill to have much consciousness of his
surroundings. At times he was delirious; once more he lived over the
long period of "neutrality"; again he was discussing intercepted cargoes
and "notes" with Sir Edward Grey; from this his mind would revert to his
English literary friends, and then again he was a boy in North Carolina.
The _Olympic_ reached New York more than a day ahead of schedule; Page
was carried down the gangplank on a stretcher, propped up with pillows;
and since he was too weak then to be taken to his Southern home, he was
placed temporarily in St. Luke's Hospital. Page arrived on a beautiful
sunshiny October day; Fifth Avenue had changed its name in honour of the
new Liberty Loan and had become the "Avenue of the Allies"; each block,
from Forty-second Street north, was decorated with the colours of one of
the nations engaged in the battle against Germany; the street was full
of Red Cross workers and other picturesquely clad enthusiasts selling
Liberty Bonds; in its animated beauty and in its inspiring significance
it formed an appropriate setting for Page's homecoming.
The American air seemed to act like a tonic on Page; in a short time he
showed such improvement that his recovery seemed not impossible. So far
as his spirits and his mind were concerned, he became his old familiar
self. He was able to see several of his old friends, he read the
newspapers and discussed the international situation with his customary
liveliness. With the assistance of his daughter, Mrs. Loring, he even
kept track of his correspondence. Evidently the serious nature of his
illness was not understood, for invitations to speak poured in from all
quarters. Most of these letters Mrs. Loring answered, but there was one
that Page insisted on attending to himself. The City of Cleveland was
organizing some kind of a meeting dedicated to closer relations with
Great Britain, and the Mayor wrote Page asking him to speak. The last
thing which Page wrote with his own hand was his reply to this
invitation; and it is an impressive fact that his final written word
should have dealt with the subject that had been so close to his heart
for the preceding five years.
_To Harry L. Davis, Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio_
I deeply regret my health will not permit me to attend any public
function for some time to come; for I deeply appreciate your
invitation on behalf of the City of Cleveland for the meeting on
December 7th, and have a profound sympathy with its purpose to
bring the two great English-speaking worlds as close together as
possible, so that each shall thoroughly understand the courage and
sacrifice and ideals of the other. This is the greatest political
task of the future. For such a complete and lasting understanding
is the only basis for the continued, progress of civilization. I
am proud to be associated in your thought, Mr. Mayor, with so
fitting and happy an occasion, and only physical inability could
cause absence.
Sincerely,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Page's improvement was only temporary; a day or two after this letter
was written he began to sink rapidly; it was therefore decided to grant
his strongest wish and take him to North Carolina. He arrived in
Pinehurst on December 12th, so weak that his son Frank had to carry him
in his arms from the train.
"Well, Frank," said Page, with a slightly triumphant smile, "I did get
here after all, didn't I?"
He lingered for a few days and died, at eight o'clock in the evening, on
December 21st, in his sixty-fourth year. He suffered no pain. He was
buried in the Page family plot in the Bethesda Cemetery near Aberdeen.
He was as much of a war casualty as was his nephew Allison Page, who
lost his life with his face to the German machine guns in Belleau Wood.
THE END
APPENDIX
SCRAPS FROM UNFINISHED DIARIES
Page was not methodical in keeping diaries. His documents, however,
reveal that he took many praiseworthy resolutions in this direction.
They include a large number of bulky books, each labelled "Diary" and
inscribed with the year whose events were to be recorded. The outlook is
a promising one; but when the books are opened they reveal only
fragmentary good intentions. Entries are kept up for a few days, and
then the work comes to an end. These volumes contain many scraps of
interesting writing, however, which are worth preserving; some of them
are herewith presented in haphazard fashion, with no attempt at order in
subject matter.
1913
PETHERICK
Petherick: may he be immortal; for he is a man who has made of a humble
task a high calling; and without knowing it he has caused a man of a
high calling to degrade it to a mean level. Now Petherick is a humble
Englishman, whose father many years ago enjoyed the distinction of
carrying the mail pouch to and from the post office for the American
Embassy in London. As father, so son. Petherick succeeded Petherick. In
this remote period (_the_ Petherick must now be 60) Governments had
"despatch agents," men who distributed mail and whatnot, sent it on
from capital to capital--were a sort of general "forwarding" factotums.
The office is really out of date now. Telegraph companies, express
companies, railway companies, the excellent mail service and the like
out-despatch any conceivable agent--except Petherick. Petherick has
qualities that defy change, such as an unfailing courtesy, a genuine joy
in serving his fellows, the very genius of helpfulness. Well, since a
governmental office once established acquires qualities of perpetuity,
three United States despatch agents have survived the development of
modern communication, one in London, one in New York, and the third (I
think) in San Francisco. At any rate, the London agent remains.
Now in the beginning the London despatch agent was a mail messenger (as
I understand) for the Embassy. He still takes the pouch to the post
office, and brings it back. In ordinary times, that's all he does for
the Embassy, for which his salary of about ---- is paid by the State
Department--too high a salary for the labour done, but none too high for
the trustworthy qualities required. If this had been all that Petherick
did, he would probably have long ago gone to the scrap heap. It is one
mark of a man of genius that he always makes his job. So Petherick. The
American Navy came into being and parts of it come to this side of the
world. Naval officers need help when they come ashore. Petherick was
always on hand with despatches and mail for them, and Petherick was a
handy man. Did the Captain want a cab? Petherick had one waiting. Did
the Captain want rooms? Such-and-such a hotel was the proper one for
him. Rooms were engaged. Did the Captain's wife need a maid? Petherick
had thought of that, too. Then a Secretary from some continental
legation wished to know a good London tailor. He sought Petherick. An
American Ambassador from the continent came to London. London yielded
Petherick for his guidance and his wants. Petherick became omni-present,
universally useful--an American institution in fact. A naval officer who
had been in Asiatic waters was steaming westward to the Mediterranean.
His wife and three babies came to London, where she was to meet her
husband, who was to spend several weeks here. A telegram to Petherick:
they needed to do nothing else. When the lady arrived a furnished flat,
a maid and a nurse and a cook and toys awaited her. When her husband
arrived, a pair of boots awaited him from the same last that his last
pair had been made on, in London, five years before. At some thoughtful
moment $1,000 was added to Petherick's salary by the Navy Department;
and a few years ago a handsome present was made to Petherick by the
United States Naval Officers all over the world.
But Petherick, with all his virtues, is merely an Englishman, and it is
not usual for an Englishman to hold a $3,000 office under appointment
from the United States Government. The office of despatch agent,
therefore, has been nominally held by an American citizen in London.
This American citizen for a good many years has been Mr. Crane, a
barrister, who simply turns over the salary to Petherick; and all the
world, except the Secretary of State, knows that Petherick is Petherick
and there is none other but him.
Now comes the story: Mr. Bryan, looking around the world for offices for
his henchmen, finds that one Crane has been despatch agent in London for
many years, and he writes me a personal and confidential letter, asking
if this be not a good office for some Democrat!
I tell the story to the Naval Attaché! He becomes riotous. He'll have
to employ half a dozen clerks to do for the Navy ill what Petherick does
well with ease, if he's removed. Life would not be worth living anyhow.
I uncover Petherick to the Secretary and show him in his glory. It must
be said to the Secretary's credit that he has said nothing more about
it. Petherick, let us hope, will live forever. The Secretary's
petty-spoils mind now works on grand plans for Peace, holy Peace, having
unsuccessfully attacked poor Petherick. And Petherick knows nothing
about it and never dreams of an enemy in all the world, and in all naval
and diplomatic life he has only fast friends. If Mr. Bryan had removed
him, he might have made a temporary friend of one Democrat from
Oklahoma, and lasting enemies of all that Democrat's rivals and of the
whole naval and diplomatic service.
_November, 1914._
We have to get away from it--or try to--a minute at a time; and the
comic gods sometimes help us. Squier[79] has a junior officer here to
hold his desk down when he's gone. He's a West Point Lieutenant with a
German name. His study is ordnance. A new kind of bomb gives him the
same sort of joy that a new species would have given Darwin. He was over
in France--where the armies had passed to and from Paris--and one day he
found an unexploded German bomb of a new sort. The thing weighed half a
ton or thereabouts, and it was loaded. Somehow he got it to London--I
never did hear how. He wrapped it in blankets and put it under his bed.
He went out of town to study some other infernal contraption and the
police found this thing under his bed. The War Office took it and began
to look for him--to shoot him, the bomb-harbouring German! They soon
discovered, of course, that he was one of our men and an officer in the
United States Army. Then I heard of it for the first time. Here came a
profuse letter of apology from the Government; they had not known the
owner was one of my attachés. Pardon, pardon--a thousand apologies. But
while this letter was being delivered to me one of the under-secretaries
of the Government was asking one of our secretaries, "In Heaven's name,
what's the Ambassador going to do about it? We have no right to molest
the property of one of your attachés, but this man's room is less than
100 yards from Westminster Abbey: it might blow up half of London. We
can't give the thing back to him!" They had taken it to the Duck Pond,
wherever that is. About that time the Lieutenant came back. His pet bomb
gone--what was I going to do about it?
The fellow actually wanted to bring it to his office in the Embassy!
"Look here, Lieutenant, besides the possibility of blow-up this building
and killing every mother's son of us, consider the scandal of the
American Embassy in London blown up by a German bomb. That would go down
in the school histories of the United States. Don't you see?" No, he
didn't see instantly--he does so love a bomb! I had to threaten to
disown him and let him be shot before he was content to go and tell them
to unload it--he _would_ have it, unloaded, if not loaded.
Well, I had to write half a dozen letters before the thing was done for.
He thinks me a chicken-livered old coward and I know much more about him
than I knew before; and we are at peace. The newspapers never got the
story, but his friends about town still laugh at him for trying first to
blow up Westminster Abbey and then his own Ambassador. He was at my
house at dinner the other night and one of the ladies asked him:
"Lieutenant, have you any darling little pet lyddite cartridges in your
pocket?" Think of a young fellow who just loves bombs! Has loaded bombs
for pets! How I misspent my youth!
_February, 1915._
This is among the day's stories: The British took a ship that had a
cargo of 100,000 busts of Von Hindenburg--filled with copper.
Another: When Frederick Watts was painting Lord Minto he found it hard
to make the portrait please him. When he was told that Lord Minto liked
it and Lady Minto didn't and that So-and-So praised it, he exclaimed: "I
don't care a d--n what anyone thinks about it--except a fellow named
Sargent."
And the King said (about the wedding[80]): "I have the regulation of the
dress to be worn at all functions in the Chapel Royal. I, therefore,
declare that the American Ambassador may have any dress worn that he
pleases!"
E.M. House went to Paris this morning, having no peace message from this
Kingdom whatever. This kind of talk here now was spoken of by the Prime
Minister the other day "as the twittering of a sparrow in a tumult that
shakes the world."
Lady P. remarked to me to-day, as many persons do, that I am very
fortunate to be Ambassador here at this particular time. Perhaps; but it
isn't easy to point out precisely wherein the good fortune consists.
This much is certain: it is surely a hazardous occupation now. Henry
James remarked, too, that nobody could afford to miss the experience of
being here--nobody who could be here. Perhaps true, again; but I confess
to enough shock and horror to keep me from being so very sure of that.
Yet no other phenomenon is more noticeable than the wish of every sort
of an American to be here. I sometimes wonder whether the really
well-balanced American does. Most of them are of the overwrought and
excitable kinds.
A conservative lady, quite conscientious, was taken down to dinner by
Winston Churchill. Said she, to be quite frank and fair: "Mr. Churchill,
I must tell you that I don't like your politics. Yet we must get on
together. You may say, if you like, that this is merely a matter of
personal taste with me, as I might not like your--well, your moustache."
"I see no reason, Madam, why you should come in contact with either."
My talk with Bonar Law: He was disposed to believe that if England had
declared at once that she would go to war with Germany if France was
attacked, there would have been no war. Well, would English opinion,
before Belgium was attacked, have supported a government which made such
a declaration?
Mr. Bonar Law thinks that President Wilson ought to have protested about
Belgium.
He didn't agree with me that much good human material goes to waste in
this Kingdom for lack of opportunity. (That's the Conservative in him.)
_Friday, April 30, 1915._
Sir Edward Grey came to tea to talk with Mr. House and me--little talk
of the main subject (peace), which is not yet ripe by a great deal. Sir
Edward said the Germans had poisoned wells in South Africa. They have
lately used deadly gases in France. The key to their mind says Sir
Edward, is this--they attribute to other folk what they are thinking of
doing themselves.
While Sir Edward was here John Sargent came in and brought Katharine the
charcoal portrait of her that he had made--his present to her for her
and Chud to give to W.A.W.P.[81] and me. A very graceful and beautiful
thing for him to do.
_April 30, 1915._
Concerning Peace: The German civil authorities want peace and so does
one faction of the military party. But how can they save their face?
They have made their people believe that they are at once the persecuted
and the victorious. If they stop, how can they explain their stopping?
The people might rend them. The ingenious loophole discovered by House
is--mere moonshine, viz., the freedom of the seas in war. That is a
one-sided proposition unless they couple with it the freedom of the land
in war also, which is nonsense. Nothing can be done, then, until some
unfavourable military event brings a new mind to the Germans. Peace
talk, therefore, is yet mere moonshine. House has been to Berlin, from
London, thence to Paris, then back to London again--from Nowhere (as far
as peace is concerned) to Nowhere again.
_May 3, 1915._
Why doesn't the President make himself more accessible? Dismiss X and
get a bigger man? Take his cabinet members really into his confidence?
Everybody who comes here makes these complaints of him!
We dined to-night at Y's. Professor M. was there, etc. He says we've got
to have polygamy in Europe after the war to keep the race up.
_Friday, May 21, 1915._
Last night the Italian Parliament voted to give the Government
war-powers; and this means immediate war on the side of the Allies.
There are now eight nations fighting against Germany, Austria, and
Turkey; viz., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, Belgium,
Serbia, Montenegro. And it looks much as if the United States will be
forced in by Germany.
The British Government is wrestling with a very grave internal
disruption--to make a Coalition Government. The only portfolios that
seem absolutely secure are the Prime Minister's and the Foreign
Secretary's (Sir Edward Grey's)--for which latter, many thanks. The
two-fold trouble is--(1) a difference between Churchill (First Lord of
the Admiralty) and Lord Fisher--about the Dardanelles campaign and (I
dare say) other things, and (2) Lord Kitchener's failure to secure
ammunition--"to organize the industries of the Kingdom." Some even
declare K. of K. (they now say Kitchener of Kaos) is a general colossal
failure. But the prevailing opinion is that his raising of the new army
has been good work but that he has failed with the task of procuring
munitions. As for Churchill, he's too restless and erratic and
dictatorial and fussy and he runs about too much. I talked with him at
dinner last night at his mother's. He slips far down in his chair and
swears and be-dams and by-Gods his assertions. But his energy does
interest one. An impromptu meeting in the Stock Exchange to-day voted
confidence in K. of K. and burned up a copy of the _Daily Mail_, which
this morning had a severe editorial about him.
Washington, having sent a severe note to Germany, is now upbraided for
not sending another to England, to match and pair it. That's largely
German influence, but also the Chicago packers and the cotton men. These
latter have easy grievances, like the Irish. The delays of the British
Government are exasperating, but they are really not so bad now as they
have been. Still, the President can be influenced by the criticism that
he must hit one side every time he hits the other, else he's not
neutral! I am working by every device to help the situation and to
prevent another note. I proposed to-day to Sir Edward Grey that his
Government make an immediate advance payment on the cotton that it
proposes to buy.
Unless Joffre be a man of genius--of which there are some
indications--and unless French also possibly have some claim to this
distinction and _perhaps_ the Grand Duke Nikolas, there doesn't yet seem
to be a great man brought forth by the war. In civil life, Sir Edward
Grey comes to a high measure. As we yet see it from this English corner
of the world, no other statesman now ranks with him.
_March 20, 1916._
I am sure I have the best secret service that could be got by any
neutral. I am often amazed at its efficiency. It is good because it is
not a secret--certainly not a spy service at all. It is all aboveboard
and it is all done by men of high honour and good character--I mean the
Embassy staff. Counting the attachés there are about twenty good men,
every one of whom moves in a somewhat different circle from any other
one. Every one cultivates his group of English folk, in and out of
official life, and his group in the diplomatic corps. There isn't a week
but every man of them sees his particular sources of information--at
their offices, at the Embassy, at luncheon, at dinner, at the
clubs--everywhere. We all take every possible occasion to serve our
friends and they serve us. The result is, I verily believe, that we hear
more than any other group in London. These young fellows are all keen as
razors. They know when to be silent, too; and they are trusted as they
deserve to be. Of course I see them, singly or in pairs, every day in
the regular conduct of the work of the Embassy; and once a week we all
meet together and go over everything that properly comes before so large
a "cabinet" meeting. Thus some of us are on confidential terms with
somebody in every department of the Government, with somebody in every
other Embassy and Legation, with all the newspapers and
correspondents--even with the censors. And the wives of those that are
married are abler than their husbands. They are most attractive young
women--welcome everywhere--and indefatigable. Mrs. Page has them spend
one afternoon a week with her, rolling bandages; and that regular
meeting always yields something else. They come to my house Thursday
afternoons, too, when people always drop in to tea-visitors from other
countries, resident Americans, English--everybody--Sometimes one
hundred.
Nobody in this company is a "Spy"--God forbid! I know no more honourable
or attractive group of ladies and gentlemen. Yet can conceive of no
organization of spies who could find out as many things. And the loyalty
of them all! Somebody now and then prefaces a revelation with the
declaration, "This is in strict confidence--absolutely nobody is to hear
it." The answer is--"Yes, only, you know, I have no secrets from the
Ambassador: no member of his staff can ever have."--Of course, we get
some fun along with our tragedies. If I can find time, for instance, I
am going to write out for House's amusement a verbatim report of every
conversation that he held in London. It has all come to me--from what he
said to the King down; and it all tallies with what House himself told
me. He went over it all himself to me the other day at luncheon.--I not
only believe--I am sure--that in this way I do get a correct judgment
of public feeling and public opinion, from Cabinet Ministers to
stock-brokers.
_December 11, 1916._
The new Government is quite as friendly to us in its intentions as the
old, and much more energetic. The old Government was a spent force. Mr.
Balfour is an agreeable man to deal with, with a will to keep our
sympathy, unless the dire need of ships forces him to unpleasantness.
The Prime Minister is--American in his ways. Lord Robert has the old
Cecil in him, and he's going to maintain the blockade at any cost that
he can justify to himself and to public opinion, and the public opinion
is with him. They are all eager to have American approval--much more
eager, I think, than a large section of public opinion, which has almost
ceased to care what Americans think or do. The more we talk about peace,
the more they think about war. There is no vindictiveness in the
English. They do not care to do hurt to the German people: they regard
them as misguided and misled. But no power on earth can stop the British
till the German military caste is broken--that leadership which attacked
Belgium and France and would destroy England. Balfour, Lloyd George, the
people, the army and the navy are at one in this matter, every labouring
man, everybody, except a little handful of Quakers and professors and
Noel Buxton. I think I know and see all the peace men. They feel that
they can talk to me with safety. They send me their pamphlets and
documents. I think that all of them have now become warlike but three,
and one of them is a woman. If you meet a woman you know on the street
and express a sympathy on the loss of her second son, she will say to
you, "Yes, he died in defence of his country. My third son will go next
week. They all die to save us." Doubtless she sheds tears in private.
But her eyes are dry in public. She has discarded her luxuries to put
money in the war loan. Say "Peace" to her? She would insult you.
_May 10, 1917._
We dined at Lambeth Palace. There was Lord Morley, whom I had not seen
since his long illness--much reduced in flesh, and quite feeble and
old-looking. But his mind and speech were most alert. He spoke of Cobden
favouring the Confederate States because the constitution of the
Confederacy provided for free trade. But one day Bright informed Cobden
that he was making the mistake of his life. Thereafter Cobden came over
to the Union side. This, Morley heard direct from Bright.
The Archbishop spoke in high praise of Charnwood's Lincoln--was
surprised at its excellence, etc. Geoffrey Robinson[82] asked who wrote
the _Quarterly_ articles in favour of the Confederacy all through the
war--was it Lord Salisbury? Nobody knew.
The widow of the former Archbishop Benson was there--the mother of all
the Bensons, Hugh, A.C., etc., etc.--a remarkable old lady, who talked
much in admiration of Balfour.
The Bishop of--Winchester(?)--was curious to know whether the people in
the United States really understood the Irish question--the two-nation,
two-religion aspect of the case. I had to say no!
There is an orphan asylum founded by some preceding Archbishop, by the
sea. The danger of bombardment raised the question of safety. The
Archbishop ordered all the children (40) to be sent to Lambeth Palace.
We dined in a small dining room: "The children," Mrs. Davidson
explained, "have the big dining room." Each child has a lady as
patroness or protector who "adopts" her, i.e., sees that she is looked
after, etc. Some of the ladies who now do this were themselves orphans!
At prayers as usual at 10 o'clock in the chapel where prayers have been
held every night--for how many centuries?
At lunch to-day at Mr. Asquith's--Lord Lansdowne there; took much
interest in the Knapp farm work while I briefly explained.
Lord Morley said to Mrs. Page he had become almost a Tolstoyan--Human
progress hasn't done much for mankind's happiness, etc. Look at the
war--by a "progressive" nation. Now the mistake here is horn of a
class-society, a society that rests on privilege. "Progress," has done
everything (1) in liberating men's minds and spirits in the United
States. This is the real gain; (2) in arraying all the world _against_
Germany.
_Tuesday, January 22, 1918._
Some days bring a bunch of interesting things or men. Then there
sometimes come relatively dull days--not often, however. To-day came:
General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief-of-Staff, now 64--the wisest (so I judge)
of our military men, a rather wonderful old chap. He's on his way to
Paris as a member of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. The big
question he has struck is: Shall American troops be put into the British
and French lines, in small groups, to fill up the gaps in those armies?
The British have persuaded him that it is a military necessity. If it
were less than a necessity, it would, of course, be wrong--i.e., it
would cut across our national pride, force our men under another flag,
etc. It is not proposed to deprive Pershing of his command nor even of
his army. The plan is to bring over troops that would not otherwise now
come and to lend these to the British and French armies, and to let
Pershing go on with his army as if this hadn't been done. Bliss is
inclined to grant this request on condition the British bring these men
over, equip and feed them, etc. He came in to ask me to send a telegram
for him to-morrow to the President, making this recommendation. But on
reflection he decided to wait till he had seen and heard the French
also, who desire the same thing as the British.
General Bliss is staying with Major Warburton; and Warburton gave me
some interesting glimpses of him. A telegram came for the General.
Warburton thought that he was out of the house and he decided to take it
himself to the General's room. He opened the door. There sat the General
by the fire talking to himself, wrapped in thought. Warburton walked to
the middle of the room. The old man didn't see him. He decided not to
disturb him, for he was rehearsing what he proposed to say to the
Secretary of State for War or to the Prime Minister--getting his ears as
well as his mind used to it. Warburton put the telegram on the table
near the General, went out, and wasn't discovered.
Several nights, he sat by the fire with Warburton and began to talk,
again rehearsing to himself some important conclusions that he had
reached. Every once in a while he'd look up at Warburton and say: "Now,
what do you think of that?"
That's an amazing good way to get your thought clear and your plans well
laid out. I've done it myself.
I went home and Kipling and Carrie[83] were at lunch with us. Kipling
said: "I'll tell you, your coming into the war made a new earth for me."
He is on a committee to see that British graves are properly marked and
he talked much about it. I could not help thinking that in the back of
his mind there was all the time thought of his own dead boy, John.
Then in the afternoon Major Drain brought the copy of a contract between
the United States Government and the British to build together 1500
tanks ($7,500,000). We took it to the Foreign Office and Mr. Balfour and
I signed it. Drain thinks that the tanks are capable of much development
and he wishes our army after the war to keep on studying and
experimenting with and improving such machines of destruction. Nobody
knows what may come of it.
Then I dined at W.W. Astor's (Jr.) There were Balfour, Lord Salisbury,
General and Lady Robertson, Mrs. Lyttleton and Philip Kerr.
During the afternoon Captain Amundsen, Arctic explorer came in, on his
way from Norway to France as the guest of our Government, whereafter he
will go to the United States and talk to Scandinavian people there.
That's a pretty good kind of a full day.
_April, 19, 1918._
Bell[84], and Mrs. Bell during the air raid took their little girl
(Evangeline, aged three) to the cellar. They told her they went to the
cellar to hear the big fire crackers. After a bomb fell that shook all
Chelsea, Evangeline clapped her hands in glee. "Oh, mummy, what a _big_
fire cracker!"
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 79: Colonel (now Major General) George O. Squier, Military
Attaché at the American Embassy.]
[Footnote 80: The wedding of Mr. Page's daughter at the Chapel Royal.]
[Footnote 81: Mrs. Page.]
[Footnote 82: Editor of the London _Times_.]
[Footnote 83: Mrs. Kipling.]
[Footnote 84: Mr. Edward Bell, Second Secretary of the American
Embassy.]
INDEX
_Age_, Louisville, connection with, I 32
Aid to stranded Americans in Europe on outbreak of war, I 304, 307, 329
_Alabama_ claims, the framed check for, in British Foreign Office,
I 390, II 78
Alderman, Dr. Edwin A., early efforts in behalf of public education,
I 73, 78;
stricken with tuberculosis, but recovers health, I 120;
on committee to lecture in England, II 346.
_Letters to_: expressing fear and hope of Wilson, I 121;
on meeting of the Southern and the General Education Boards, I 125;
after Wilson's inauguration, I 128;
while enroute to port as Ambassador, I 129;
on changed world conditions, II 142
Ambassador, some activities of an, I 159;
as a preventer of calamities, I 166
America and Great Britain, only free countries in the world, II 121
American Government, slight regard for by British, I 145, 152, 190, II 153;
strong feeling against uncourteous Notes of, II 74;
on handling of _Lusitania_ case, II 79;
on being under German influence, II 80, 97
American Luncheon Club, could not adhere to neutrality, II 230
American Navy, its aid in combatting the submarine, II 294
American supremacy, a before-the-war prophecy, I 144;
why the British will acknowledge, I 170
_Ancona_, torpedoed, II 79 _note_
Anderson, Chandler P., counsel for Committee for relief of stranded
Americans, I 307;
backs up Ambassador in neutrality letter to Wilson, I 373;
gives reasons why unwise to demand adoption of Declaration of London,
I 387
Anglo-American-German "pact," planned by Wilson and House, I 281
Anglomania, charged against ambassadors, I 257
Anti-Imperialists, protest declaration of war against Spain, I 62
_Arabic_, sinking of, thought surely to bring on war, II 26
Arbitration Treaty, renewal of, I 285;
significance of Germany's refusal to sign, I 294
Archbold, John D., attempts to explain Foraker letters, I 88
Archibald, James, trapped by British secret service, II 101
Asquith, H.H., opposition to the House of Lords, I 137;
at state dinner to King Christian, I 167;
hint to, on Mexican situation, I 185;
conciliatory remarks at Guildhall banquet, I 210;
explains Dardanelles preparations, I 430;
his ministry suspected of pacifist or "defeatist" tendencies, I 430;
aged by the war, II 141;
conversation with, regarding Casement case, and relations between
Great Britain and America, II 168;
refuses to discuss Wilson's peace note, II 207;
in House of Commons speech welcomes America as ally, II 230;
inclined toward seeking peace, II 353
Astor, Mr. and Mrs. Waldorf, at the home of, II 380
_Atlantic Monthly_, editor of, I 53
Atlantic Ocean, a blessing to America, I 162, 170, 310; II 117
Austrian Embassy, left in charge of American Ambassador, I 305, 321;
difficulties incident to, I 345
Aycock, Gov. Charles B., efforts in educational reform, I 85;
commendatory letter from, I 86
Babcock, Commander, arrival in England, II 274
Bacon, Senator Augustus O., declared he would have blocked Page's
Ambassadorship had he known he was author of "The Southerner,"
I 93, 226
Baker, Secretary Newton D., sees the war at first-hand, II 364;
dinner at Embassy to, II 364, 370;
Page's memorandum of his visit, II 366
Baker, Ray Stannard, visit at Sandwich, II 384
Balfour, aged by the war, II 141;
drafts reply to Wilson's peace note, II 212;
reply to question how best America could help, II 219;
on the disposition of the German colonies, II 246;
friendliness toward United States averts crisis in Venezuela dispute,
II 249;
much concerned at feeling toward British in the United States, II 251;
his home life, II 257;
conference with Bonar Law and, over financial help from America, II 261;
satisfactory conference with Mr. Polk over blacklist and blockade,
II 265;
explains "secret
treaties" to President Wilson, II 267;
conference with McAdoo on financial situation, II 267;
sends dispatch to President Wilson substantiating previous reports
of Page and Sims on submarine peril which were not taken seriously,
II 284;
indignant over misunderstanding with Brazilian Navy, II 304;
at the Embassy dinner to Secretary Baker, II 365, 370;
at train to bid good-bye, II 402;
most affected at leave-taking, 403
Balfour Mission to the United States, II 249 _et seq._
Barclay, Esther, Mr. Page's maternal grandmother, I 6
Bayard, Thomas F., accused of Anglomania while Ambassador, I 257
Beckendorff, Count, talk with, II 82
Belgium, violation of, the cause of Great Britain's participation in
the war, I 315;
sending food supplies to aid starving, I 346
_Benham_, misunderstanding over American destroyer's action during
submarine operations off Nantucket, II 253
Benton, William S., Englishman, murdered in Mexico, I 285
Beresford, Lord Charles, complains of attitude of Foreign Office in
pacifying America, I 365;
makes speech in House of Lords on attitude of U.S. Destroyer
_Benham_, II 253
Bernstorff, Count von, objectionable activities of, I 335;
efforts to secure intercession of the United States toward peace, I 403;
at the Speyer dinner, I 404;
instructed to start propaganda for "freedom of the seas," I 436;
gives pledge that liners would not be submarined without warning,
II 30 _note_;
thought in England to dominate our State Department, II 80;
cable proposing suspending of submarine war, II 149;
threatens President Wilson with resumption of submarine sinkings
unless he moves for peace, II 200;
news of his dismissal received in London, II 215
Bethmann-Hollweg, not seen by Colonel House, I 289;
tells King of Bavaria peace must be secured, II 181
Biddle, General, at the Embassy dinner to Secretary Baker, II 365, 370
Bingham School, studies and environment at, I 16;
selected for honour prize by Ambassador, I 17
Blacklist, feeling in America over the, II 184;
conditions change on American entry into war, II 264, 265, 266
Blanquet, General, in Mexican uprising, I 175
Bliss, General Tasker, wisdom and tact impress the Allies, II 351
Blockade, British, compared to our blockade in Civil War, II 55 _et seq._;
the American Note protesting against, II 69
Blockade, strong feeling in America against, II 184
Bolling, Thomas, at President Wilson's luncheon, II 171
Bones, Miss, at President Wilson's luncheon, II 171
Boy-Ed, dismissal of, II 108
Brazilian Navy, ships join American unit in European waters, II 304
Breitung, E.N., makes test case with _Dacia_ registry, I 393
British Navy League, activity in keeping up the navy, I 284
Bryan, William Jennings, uncomplimentary editorial on, in _World's
Work_, I 87;
attitude toward concession holders in Mexico, I 181;
refuses to consider intervention in Mexico, I 193;
an increasing lack of confidence in, I 193;
tirade against British, to Sir William Tyrrell, I 202,
to Col. House, I 206;
Asquith's opinion of, 236;
Page's appeal to Colonel House that he be kept out of Europe, I 235, 236;
regards Ambassador as un-neutral, I 362;
insists that Great Britain adopt the Declaration of London, I 373, 377;
interested in the Straus peace proposal, I 407;
resignation after _Lusitania_ notes, II 6;
proposes going to England and Germany to try peace negotiations, II 12
Bryan, comments on his political activity but diplomatic laxity,
I 194, 225, 236;
crank once, crank always, II 27;
democratic party wrecked by his long captaincy, II 190
Bryce, Lord, hopeless of the two countries ever understanding one
another, II 39;
concern at our trivial notes, II 67;
conversation with, on misunderstandings between America and Great
Britain, and the peace settlement, II 165;
depressed at tenor of Wilson's note proposing peace, sends him
personal letter, II 207;
in House of Lords speech welcomes America as ally, II 230;
frequent visitor at the Embassy, II 315;
attitude toward a League of Nations, II 357
Burns, John, resigns from British Cabinet on declaration of war, I 316
Buttrick, Dr. Wallace, intimacy with, I 85;
efforts in building up Southern agriculture, I 94;
in hookworm eradication, I 99;
lectures on the United States throughout Great Britain, II 291;
his speeches a source of inspiration to British masses, II 345;
asked to organize a committee of Americans to extend the work, II 345;
informed by Colonel House of Wilson's disapproval, II 348;
warns Page of breakdown if he does not at once return to America, II 375;
beneficial effects of his lectures, II 388
Canterbury, Archbishop of, in House of Lords speech welcomes America as
ally, II 231;
on gratitude shown to America, II 245
Carden, Sir Lionel Edward Gresley, his being sent to Mexico, a British
mistake, I 187;
anti-American propaganda in Cuba, I 196;
as British Minister to Mexico shows great hostility to the United
States, I 197;
formally advises Huerta to abdicate, I 209;
Page's part in recall from Mexican post, I 215 _et seq._
Carlyle, Thomas, new letters from, discovered in Canada, I 60
Carnegie, Andrew, visit to, at Skibo, I 142
Carranza, Venustiano, thought by Wilson to be a patriot, I 227, 228
Carson, Sir Edward, resists the Home Rule Bill, I 137;
at Bonar Law dinner, II 119;
tells Lloyd George submarines must be settled before Irish question,
II 260
Casement, Sir Roger, trial and conviction inspire movement from
Irish-Americans resulting in Senate resolution, II 166
Cecil, Lord Robert, incident of the "Boston Tea Party," I 392;
receives German proposal from Page as "German Ambassador," II 201;
letters to Sir C. Spring Rice on Germany's peace proposal, II 201, 202;
Page's interview with to explain Wilson's peace communication, II 208;
at train to bid good-bye, II 402
Chamberlain, Senator, presents petition demanding Ambassador's removal,
I 259;
demands Senate be furnished with copy of Panama tolls speech, I 260
Chancery, removal of, to better quarters, I 341
Children, crusade for education of, I 72
China case, the, satisfactorily settled, II 154, 155
Choate, Joseph H., understanding of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, I 242;
accused of Anglomania while Ambassador, I 257
Christian, King, royal reception to, I 167
Christmas in England, 1915, II 103
Churchill, Winston, proposal for naval holiday, I 277, 278, 279, 298
Civil War, first contact with, I 1;
his father's attitude toward, I 5;
early recollections of Sherman's invasion, II 10;
the aftermath, I 13
Clark, Champ, opponent of repeal of Panama Tolls Bill, I 264
Cleveland, President, an influence in formation of ideals, I 40;
conversation with, I 40
Cotton, the question of contraband, I 267
Country Life Commission, appointed on, by President Roosevelt, I 89
Court, presentations at, I 156, 172
Courtesies in diplomatic intercourse, necessity for, I 147, 190
Cowdray, Lord, head of British oil concessions in Mexico, I 181;
withdraws request for Colombian oil concession, I 217;
long talk with on intervention in Mexico, I 225;
great monetary loss in giving up oil concessions, I 227
Cradock, Admiral, does not approve American policy toward Mexico, I 230
Crewe, Marquis of, on Page's tact as Ambassador, II 397
Criticisms and attacks on Ambassador Page;
the "knee-breeches" story, I 133;
Hearst papers watching for opportunity, I 149, 261;
furor over "English-led and English-ruled" phrase, I 258;
speech before Associated Chambers of Commerce, on Panama tolls, I 259
Cuba, a problem, I 176
Curzon, Lord, in House of Lords speech welcomes America as ally, II 230
_Dacia_ incident, the, a serious crisis averted, I 392, II 4
Daniels, Josephus, protest made against his appointment to
Secretaryship of Navy, I 119
Dardanelles:
Asquith explains preparations, I 430
Daughters of the Confederacy, considered not helpful to Southern
regeneration, I 44
Davis, Harry L., Mayor of Cleveland, letter to, expressing regret at
not being able to attend meeting for purpose of bringing England and
America closer together, II 405
Davis, Jefferson, call on, I 37
Declaration of London, Bryan insists on adoption by Great Britain,
I 373, 377;
history of the articles, I 375;
the solution of the difficulty, I 385
Declaration of War, America's, and its effect in Great Britain,
II 230 _et seq._
Delcassé, Kaiser makes proposal to, to join in producing "complete
isolation" of the United States, II 192
De Kalb, Courtney, congratulations from, I 59
Dent, J.M., loses two sons in the war, II 111;
opinion of Asquith, II 116
Depression in England, the dark days of the war, II 64, 81, 94
Derby, Lord, "excessive impedimenta," II 344;
at the Embassy dinner to Secretary Baker, I 365, 370
Dernburg, Bernhard, instructed to start propaganda for "freedom of the
seas," I 436
Desart, Earl of, formulates Declaration of London, I 375
Diaz, Porfirio, authority maintained by genius and force, I 175
Dilettanti, Society of, dinners at, II 312
Doubleday, Frank N., joins in publishing venture with S.S. McClure,
I 64;
the Harper experiment, I 65;
has "business" visit from a politician, I 88
_Letters to_: impressions of England, I 138;
anent the Christmas holidays, etc., I 164;
Christmas letter, 1915, II 110;
impressions of Europeans, II 132;
on America's programme after declaration of war, II 224;
on wartime conditions and duties, II 240;
on the good showing of the Americans in war preparation, II 324;
depressed at long continuation and horrors of the war, II 325
Doubleday, Page & Co., founding of the firm, I 66;
attains great influence and popularity, I 86
Dumba, Dr. Constantin, given his passports, II 30 _note_
Duncan, Dr., president of Randolph-Macon College, I 20
Education:
efforts in behalf of Southern child, I 72;
church system declared a failure, I 78;
organization of Southern Educational Conference, I 83;
Southern Education Board organized, I 84;
General Education Board founded by John D. Rockefeller, I 84;
the South's awakening, I 85
England, why unprepared for war, II 35;
changed and chastened, II 342
Englishwoman's letter from Berlin giving Germany's intentions toward
England, America, and the world, I 347
"English-led and English-ruled," furor over phrase, I 258
"Excoriators," disregarded, I 80-83
Falkenhayn, cynical toward proposals of Colonel House, I 289
Farming, love of, and home in South, I 115, 127, 128
Field, Eugene, succeeds to desk of, on St. Joseph _Gazette_, I 36
Fisher, Lord, remark that Balfour was "too much of a gentleman" for
First Lord of the Admiralty, II 101
Flexner, Dr. Abraham, cites Page as greatest educational statesman, I 85
Flexner, Dr. Simon, interested in hookworm campaign, I 100
Foraker, Senator Joseph B., career destroyed by exposure of
Archbold-Standard Oil letters, I 88
Forbes, Cameron, fails to see President Wilson on his return from
Philippines, II 174
Ford, Henry, the venture in the peace ship, II 110 _note_
Forgotten Man, The, address at Greensboro, I 74
_Forum_, The, made of great influence and a business success,
under editorship, I 49
Fosdick, Harry Emerson, on proposed committee to lecture in England, II 346
Fowler, Harold, in London, I 134;
sent to Belgium, I 338;
enlists in British Army, I 358
France, not in favour of England reducing naval programme, I 284;
a gift of a billion dollars to, proposed, II 218
"Freedom of the seas," Colonel House's proposed reform, I 435
French, Field Marshal Sir John, informs Page of undiplomatic methods of
State Departments in peace proposals, I 425, 427;
aged by the war, II 141
Frost, W.G., writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60
Fryatt, Captain, execution of, hardens British people to fight to
finish, II 182
Garfield, President, assassination deplored throughout the South, I 39
Gates, Dr. Frederick T., interested in hookworm campaign, I 99
Gaunt, Captain, sends news from Washington of Bernstorff's dismissal,
II 215
General Education Board, organized by John D. Rockefeller, I 84;
assists Dr. Knapp in agricultural demonstration work, I 96
George V, received by, I 135;
very likeable, I 157;
overwrought condition in speaking with Page on declaration of war, I 309;
much distressed at tenor of Wilson's note proposing peace, II 207;
as a "human being," II 235;
night spent with, II 236, 240;
luncheon to General Pershing, II 237;
telegram of regret at resignation of Mr. Page and ill-health that
occasioned it, II 397
German Embassy, left in charge of American Ambassador, I 306;
difficulties incident to, I 306, 345, 359
Germany:
ridicules idea of naval holiday, I 279;
would have been victorious in World War had she signed arbitration
treaty with United States, I 294;
attempts to embroil the United States and Great Britain, I 393, 400;
move for peace, 1916, II 179
Germany, travels in, in 1877, I 30
Gildersleeve, Professor, Basil L., at Johns Hopkins University
I 24, 25;
Page a favourite pupil of, in Greek, II 299
Gilman, Daniel Coit, constructive work as president of Johns Hopkins
University, I 23
Godkin, E.L., writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60
Grady, Henry, kindness of, I 34, 37
Great Britain and the United States only free countries in the world,
II 121
Great Britain's participation in the war, the cause of, I 315
Greek, proficiency in, I 21, 24, 25, 30; II 299
Grey, Lord, ex-Governor-General of Canada, I 150
Grey, Sir Edward, credentials presented to, I 135;
high regard for, I 150;
his fairness facilitates diplomatic business, I 155;
talks with on Mexican situation, I 184, 185, 188, 199;
informed as to Carden's activities, I 219, 220;
asked to meet Colonel House at luncheon, I 245;
note to Sir C. Spring Rice on Wilson's address to Congress on
Tolls Bill, I 254;
criticized for "bowing too low to the Americans," I 261;
depressed at extent of Anglophobia in the United States, I 266;
evinces satisfaction at clearing up of problems, I 285;
weeps as he informs Page of ultimatum to Germany, I 309, 315;
"subservience" to American interests, I 364;
accepts Declaration of London with modifications, I 384;
joking over serious affairs, I 390;
welcomes Page's solution of the _Dacia_ tangle, I 394;
letter to Sir Cecil Spring Rice regarding Speyer-Straus peace
proposal, I 408;
states war could be ended more quickly if America ceased protests
against seizure of contraband, I 421;
talk on detained shipping and Wordsworth poems, II 103;
"a God's mercy for a man like him at his post," II 118;
aged by the war, II 141;
satisfactory settlement of the _China_ case, II 155;
speech in House of Commons on Peace, II 157;
nothing but praise heard of him, II 159;
memorandum of conversation with, on conditions of peace, II 160;
receives Senate Resolution asking clemency for Sir Roger Casement,
II 167;
forced to resign, because he refused to push the blockade and risk
break with America, II 233;
guest with Mr. and Mrs. Page at Wilsford Manor, II 288;
walk to Stonehenge with, II 292;
serious blockade questions give way to talks on poets, II 305;
promises government support of Belgian Relief plan, II 310;
frequent visitor at the Embassy, II 315
_Letters from_: congratulations on Wilson's address to Congress
advising declaration of war, II 234;
expressing grief at Page's departure and citing his great help, II 400
Haldane, Viscount, at Thanksgiving Dinner of the American Society, I 213;
discussion with Von Tirpitz as to relative sizes of navies, I 278;
knew that Germany intended war, II 35
Hall, Admiral William Reginald, brings news of Bernstorff's dismissal,
II 215
Hanning, Mrs. Robert, sister of Thomas Carlyle, I 60
Harcourt, Right Honourable Lewis, eulogizes work of International
Health Board, I 101
Harden, Maximilian, says Germany must get rid of its predatory
feudalism, II 193
Harper & Brothers, difficulties of, I 64
Harrow, visit to, and talk to schoolboys, I 17
Harvey, George, succeeds Page as editor of Harper's, I 66
Hay, John, understanding of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, I 242;
accused of Anglomania while Ambassador, I 257
Hays, Sir Bertram, captain of the _Olympic_, races ship to hasten
Page's homecoming, II 404
Hearst, William Randolph, used by Germans in their peace propaganda,
I 410, 411
Hearst papers, antagonism of, I 149, 256, 264, 286
_Hesperian_, submarined in violation of Bernstorff's pledges, II 30
Hewlett, Maurice, his son among the missing, II 115
Home Rule Bill, Carson threatens resistance to, I 137;
"division" in house of Lords, I 138
Hookworm eradication, efforts in, I 98
Hoover, Charles L., war relief work while American Consul at Carlsbad,
I 334
Hoover, Herbert C., relief work at beginning of war, I 333;
selected by Page for Belgian Relief post, II 310
House, Colonel Edward M., wires Page to come North, expecting to offer
Secretaryship of Interior, I 118;
transmits offer of Ambassadorship, I 130;
on Cowdray and Carden, I 218, 220;
meets Sir Edward Grey to talk over Panama Tolls question, I 246;
mission to the Kaiser a disappointment, I 289;
no success in France, I 297;
fancied security in England, thinks his mission unnecessary, I 298;
telegrams, to and from Wilson on proffering good offices to avert
war, I 317, 318;
declares bill admitting foreign ships to American registry "full of
lurking dangers," I 392;
declares America will declare war on Germany after _Lusitania_
sinking, II 2;
sees "too proud to fight" poster in London, II 6;
recommends Page's appointment as Secretary of State, II 11;
fails to alter Wilson's opposition to Taft Committee visiting
England, I 348
_Letters from_: reporting progress in Panama Tolls matter, I 253;
plans to visit Kaiser and bring about naval holiday between nations,
I 277;
cites further plans for visiting Germany, I 281;
respecting proposed trip to Germany, I 285, 286,
en route, I 288;
note from Berlin, I 296;
from Paris, I 297;
on the outbreak of the war, I 299;
transmitting Wilson's warning to adhere more strictly to neutrality,
I 362;
explains the toning down of demands that Declaration of London be
adhered to, I 378;
on German peace proposals, and giving his ideas for a settlement,
I 413;
proposing that Wilson start peace parleys, I 416;
thinks Germany ready for peace proposals, I 424, 425;
decides to visit combatants in interests of peace, I 425, 429;
talks in Berlin with Zimmermann and others regarding peace parleys,
I 432, 433, 434;
on appointment of Lansing to succeed Bryan, II 11;
on Bryan's intentions of going to England and Germany to try peace
negotiations, II 12;
reporting success of Balfour Mission, II 263
_Letters to_: comparing the Civil War with the World War, I 5;
on the Mexican situation, I 189;
asked personally to deliver memorandum to President on intervention
in Mexico, I 194;
on visit of Sir William Tyrrell to the United States, I 201;
letters to Page on Mexican situation, I 205, 206;
on Mexican question, I 210, 211;
on Lord Cowdray and oil concessions in Mexico, etc., I 216;
protesting publication of secret information respecting Carden, I 223;
suggesting intervention in Mexico, I 230;
on serious disadvantage in not having suitable Embassy, I 233;
on rashness of Bryan's visit to Europe, I 235;
appeal for attention to cables and letters by State Department, I 239;
on necessity of repeal of Panama Tolls Bill, I 247;
on the prevention of wars, I 270;
asked to further plan to have Wilson visit England, as a
preventative of European war, I 275;
favouring alliance of English-speaking peoples, I 282;
on French protest against reduction of British naval programme, I 283;
transmitting pamphlets on "federation" and disarmament, I 284;
told he will have no effect on Kaiser, I 287;
reply to note as to prevention of the war, I 300;
describing conditions in second month of the war, I 327;
on the horrors of war, and the settlement, I 340;
on difficulties of Sir Edward Grey with Army and Navy officers in
releasing American cargoes, I 365;
on evil of insisting on Declaration of London adoption, I 380;
regarding the Straus peace proposal, I 410;
explaining there can be no premature peace, I 417;
on harmlessness of Bryan on proposed peace visit and cranks in
general, II 13;
commenting on slowness of Wilson in _Lusitania_ matter, II 26;
on sinking of _Arabic_, II 27;
not interested in "pleasing the Allies," II 28;
on Dumba's intrigues, and Wilson's "watchful waiting and nothing
doing," II 30, 31, 37, 38;
on the lawyer-like attitude of the State Department, II 54;
the best peace programme--the British and American fleets, II 69;
on uncourteous notes from State Department, II 72;
on British adherence to the blockade, and an English Christmas,
1915, II 103;
on the conditions of peace and the German militarism, II 134, 157;
on prophecy as to ending the war by dismissal of Bernstorff, II 197;
on the beneficial visit of the Labour Group and others, II 387
Houston, David F., suggested to Wilson for Secretary of Agriculture,
II 114; has proper perspective of European situation, II 176
_Letters to_: impressions of diplomatic life, II 151;
suggesting vigorous action of Administration in prosecuting the war,
II 226;
on American cranks being sent to England, others prevented, II 359
Houston, Herbert S., letters to, giving impressions of England, I 139
Huerta, General Victoriano, seizes presidency of Mexico, I 175;
attitude of Great Britain and the United States toward recognition,
I 180;
an epochal figure, I 183;
rejects proposals submitted by Lind, I 193;
proclaims himself dictator, I 197
Huxley, Thomas H., delivers address at opening of Johns Hopkins
University, I 25
International Health Commission, endowed by John D. Rockefeller, I 100;
coöperation by British Government, I 101
Irish Question, the, British difficulties with, I 159;
cause of feeling against British in the United States, II 251;
Wilson requests Great Britain to settle, II 255;
Lloyd George striving for solution, II 259
James, Henry, frequent visitor at the Embassy, II 315
Jeanes Board, appointment to, I 89
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, vigilance in war time, I 335;
after battle of Jutland, II 141;
reply to question how best America could help, II 219;
drafts dispatch explaining seriousness of submarine situation which
Balfour sends to President Wilson, II 285
Johns Hopkins University, teaching on new lines, I 23
Johnston, Miss Mary, noted serial of, in _Atlantic Monthly_, I 56, 61
Judson, Harry Pratt, on proposed Committee to lecture in England, II 346
Jusserand, opinion of the Straus peace proposal, I 407
Keller, Helen, persuaded to write "Story of My Life," I 90
Kent, Mr., forms American Citizens Relief Committee in London at
outbreak of war, I 304, 307
Kerr, Philip, conversation with on future relations of the United
States and Great Britain, II 84
Kipling, Rudyard, loses his son in the war, II 115
Kitchener, Lord, speech in House of Lords a disappointment, II 96;
criticism of, II 120;
Memorandum after attending service in memory of, II 140
Knapp, Dr. Seaman A., his "Demonstration Work" in Southern agriculture,
I 95;
his funeral, I 96
Kropotkin, Prince Peter, writes Memoirs for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 61
Lane, Secretary Franklin, comment on feeling against British for
conduct in Huerta affair, I 198
Lansdowne, Marquis of, letter favouring premature peace severely
criticized, II 327, 353
Lansing, Robert, regards Ambassador as un-neutral, I 362;
a lawyer, not a statesman, I 369;
insistence that Great Britain adopt Declaration of London, I 378 _et seq._;
attitude of lawyer, not statesman, II 53;
arguments against British blockade, II 62;
mind running on "cases", not diplomacy, II 176;
answers Page's letter of resignation, transmitting President Wilson's
request to reconsider and stay at his post, II 199
Lassiter, General, encouraged on trip to the front, II 245
Laughlin, Irwin, First Secretary of the Embassy, I 133;
requested to ascertain Great Britain's attitude toward recognition of
Huerta, I 180;
tells Colonel House he will have no success with Kaiser, I 285;
on Germany's intentions toward America, I 351 _note_;
as to depressing effect of the war on Page, I 357;
backs up Ambassador in neutrality letter to Wilson, I 373;
gives opinion that persistence is unwise in demanding acceptance of
Declaration of London, I 387;
Wilson's comment to, on Page's letters, II 22;
diplomatically presents to Sir Edward Grey the Senate Resolution
asking clemency' for Casement, II 167;
letters from, on occasion of Germany's 1916 peace movement, II 180;
commended to President Wilson in letter of resignation, II 394
Law, Ponar, gives depressing news from the Balkans, II 104;
dinner with, II 119;
reply to question how best America could help, II 219;
conference with Balfour and, over financial help from America, II 261
Lawrence, Bishop, on proposed committee to lecture in England, II 346
Leadership of the world, American, II 105, 110, 145, 254
League to Enforce Peace, Page's opinion of, II 144;
Sir Edward Grey in sympathy with objects of, II 163;
Lord Bryce, remarks as to favourable time for setting up such a
league, II 165
Leaks in diplomatic correspondence, gravity of,
I 147, 148, 151, 222, 223, 224, 235, II 7, 276
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, almost demented at breaking
out of the war, I 306, 309, 315;
places blame for war on Germany, I 322
Lincoln, Abraham, monument to, erected at Westminster, I 274
Lind, John, failure of mission to Mexico, I 193
Literary style and good writing, advice on, II 341
Lloyd George, his taxing of the aristocracy, I 137;
landowners fear of, I 158;
at state dinner to King Christian, I 167;
on the necessity of reducing navy programme, I 283;
holding up under strain of war, II 83;
aged by the war, II 141;
in House of Commons speech welcomes America as ally, II 230;
has the touch of genius in making things move, II 259;
working for solution of Irish question, II 259;
too optimistic regarding submarine situation, II 287;
his energy keeps him in power, II 354;
at the Embassy dinner to Secretary Baker, II 365, 370;
congratulates Mr. and Mrs. Page on American success at Cantigny, II 375;
letter expressing sorrow at Mr. and Mrs. Page's departure and
reviewing their good work, II 398
Loring, Charles G., marries Miss Katharine Page, II 87;
in service on western front, II 375
Loring, Mrs. Charles G., letters to, on travelling-and staying at home,
II 88;
autumn, gardens, family, and war news, II 92;
Christmas letter, 1915, II 117;
from St. Ives, II 332, 339
Lowell, James Russell, accused of Anglomania while Ambassador, I 257
_Lusitania_, torpedoed, I 436;
bulletins of the tragedy received at the dinner given in honour of
Colonel and Mrs. House, II 1;
distress and disillusionment of the Wilson notes, II 6
Madero, Francisco, overthrown as president of Mexico, and assassinated,
I 175
_Mayflower_ Pilgrims, dedication of monument to, at Southampton, I 258
Mayo, Admiral, sent to Europe to study naval situation, II 322
McAdoo, Secretary, conference with Balfour Mission on financial
situation, II 267
McClure, S.S., joins forces with F.N. Doubleday, I 64;
the Harper experiment, I 65;
anecdote of, II 303
McCrary, Lieut.-Commander, on Committee for relief of stranded
Americans, 307
McIver, Dr. Charles D., educational statesman, I 73, 74, 78;
as the character, Professor Billy Bain, in "The Southerner," I 93
McKinley Administration endorsed on measures against Spain, by
_Atlantic Monthly_, I 63
Mary, Queen, received by, I 136
Mensdorf, Austrian Ambassador, marooned in London, at outbreak of war.
I 305, 309;
the war a tragedy to, I 321
Mersey, Lord, comments on the tariff, I 150;
at dinner of Dilettanti Society, II 312
Mexico, "policy and principle" in, I 175 _et seq._;
difficulties of self-government, II 177;
progress due to foreign enterprise, I 178;
the problem of oil concessions, I 179, 181;
intervention believed by Page the only solution,
I 188, 193, 194, 200, 230, 273
Mims, Professor Edwin, letter to, on attacks of Southern theologians, I 80
Monroe Doctrine, the Kaiser's proposal to smash it, II 192
Moore, John Bassett, suggestion that he be put in charge of
American-British affairs, I 239
Morley, John, at state dinner to King Christian, I 167;
resigns from British cabinet on declaration of war, I 316;
visitor at the Embassy, II 315
Morley, Lord, on reforms, I 141
Morgan, J.P., account of Allies with, greatly overdrawn at time of
America's entrance into war, II 272;
this paid by proceeds of Liberty Loans, II 273
Morgan, J.P. & Co., in control of Harper & Brothers, I 64
"Mummy" theme applied to the unawakened South, I 45, 75
Munitions, American, importance of to the Allies, I 368
Munsterberg, Prof. Hugo, pro-German activities of, I 335
Navy Department, ignores urgent recommendations of Admiral Sims that
destroyers be sent, II 276, 284
Negro, the, the invisible "freedom", I 12;
wrong leadership after the Civil War, I 14;
fails to take advantage of university education during
Reconstruction, I 18
Negro education, and industrial training advocated, I 43
Neutrality, strictly observed, I 358, 360;
the mask of, II 230
New York _Evening Post_, connection with, I 48
New York _World_, correspondent for, at Atlanta Exposition, I 34;
on editorial staff, I 35
Northcliffe, Lord, illness from worry, II 66;
"saving the nation from its government", II 116;
attitude on Wilson's peace note, II 207
Norway, shipping destroyed by submarines, II 281
Nicolson, Harold, the silent toast with, II 301
Ogden, Robert C., organizes Southern Educational Conference, I 83;
after twenty years of zealous service, I 126
O'Gorman, Senator, active in Panama Tolls controversy, I 243, 283
"O. Henry," on Page's "complimentary" rejection of manuscripts, II 303
Osler, Sir William, Page's physician, insists on the return home, II 393
Pacifism, work of the "peace spies," II 210
Pact of London, binding the Allies not to make a separate peace, I 409 _note_
Page, Allison Francis, a builder of the commonwealth, I 4;
attitude toward slavery and the Civil War, I 5;
ruined by the war, I 13
Page, Allison M., falls at Belleau Wood, II 392, 406
Page, Anderson, settles in Wake County, N.C., I 4
Page, Arthur W., Delcassé in conversation with tells of Kaiser's
proposal to join in producing "complete isolation" of the United
States, II 192;
called to London in hopes of influencing his father to resign and
return home before too late, II 393
_Letters to_;
on the motor trip to Scotland, I 142;
on conditions in second month of the war, I 335;
a national depression and the horrors of war, I 344;
emotions after _Lusitania_ sinking, II 5;
on the tendency toward fads and coddling, II 10;
on the future relations of the United States and Great Britain, II 84;
on the vicissitudes of the "German Ambassador to Great Britain," 1190;
Christmas letter, 1915, II 121;
on the attitude in the United States toward Germany, II 129;
on the effect of the war on future of America, and the world, II 217;
never lost faith in American people, II 223;
on America's entrance into the war, II 238;
on grave conditions, submarine and financial, II 287;
on the occasion of the Plymouth speech, and the receptions, II 317;
on the Administration's lack of confidence in British Navy, Wilson's
reply to Pope, etc., II 322;
Christmas letter, 1917, depicting a war-weary world, II 328;
on pacifists-from the President down, II 337;
views on Palestine, II 350;
on personal diet, and the benefit of Secretary Baker's visit, II 369;
on the anti-English feeling at Washington, II 385;
while resting at Sandwich, II 388
Page, Mrs. Catherine, mother and close companion, I 7;
Christmas letter to, I 8
Page, Frank C. in London, I 134;
with his father in Rowsley when news of _Arabic_ sinking was
received, II 26;
in service with American troops, II 375;
realizes his father is failing fast and insists on his returning home,
II 393
_Letters to_: on building up the home farm, and the stress of war, I 353;
Christmas letter, 1915, II 121
Page, Henry A., letters to, stating a government might be neutral, but
no _man_ could be, I 361;
on illusions as to neutrality and the peace proposals, II 152
Page, Miss Katharine A., arrival in London, I 134;
married in the chapel Royal, II 87;
_see also_, Loring, Mrs. Charles G.
Page, Lewis, leaves Virginia to settle in North Carolina, I 3
Page, Logan Waller, has proper perspective of European situation, II 176
Page, Mary E., letter to, II 376
Page, Ralph W., letters to;
impressions of London life, I 161;
on wartime conditions, I 352;
Christmas letter, 1915, II 121;
on longings for fresh Southern vegetables and fruits and farm life,
II 335;
on style and good writing, II 340;
on the big battle, etc., II 371, 372;
in praise of book on American Diplomacy, II 381;
on success of our Army and Navy, II 390
Page, Mrs. Ralph W., Christmas letter to, 163
Page, Robert N., letters to, impressions of social London, I 153
Page, Thomas Nelson, Colonel House confers with in regard to peace
parleys, I 434
Page, Walter Hines, impressions of his early life, 1;
family an old one in Virginia and North Carolina, 3;
maternal ancestry, 6;
close sympathy between mother and son, 8, 11;
birthplace, and date of birth, 9;
recollections of the Civil War, 10;
finds a market for peaches among Northern soldiers, 14;
boyhood and early studies, 16;
intense ambition, 20;
Greek Fellowship at Johns Hopkins University, 24;
renewed for the next year, 27;
early prejudices against Yankees, 28;
travels in Germany, 1877, 30;
lectures on Shakespeare, 30;
teacher of English at Louisville, Ky., 32;
enters journalism, 32;
experience with Louisville _Age_, 32;
reporter on, then editor of, _Gazette_, at St. Joseph, Mo., 33;
a free lance, 34;
correspondent for N.Y. _World_ at Atlanta Exposition, 34;
on the staff of N.Y. _World_, 35;
married, 37;
first acquaintance with Woodrow Wilson, 37;
Americanism fully developed, 40;
regard for President Cleveland, 40;
founds _State Chronicle_ at Raleigh, 42;
a breaker of images--of the South, 44;
the "mummy letters," 45;
instrumental in establishment of State College, Raleigh, 47;
with N.Y. _Evening Post_, 48;
makes the _Forum_ of great influence and a business success, 49;
a new type of editor, 50;
editor of _Atlantic Monthly_, 53;
discovers unpublished letters of Thomas Carlyle, 60;
attitude toward Spanish American War, 62;
the Harper experiment, 65;
joins in founding Doubleday, Page & Co., 66;
his policy for the _World's Work_, 66;
public activities, 72;
in behalf of education, 72;
his address, "The Forgotten Man," 74;
his Creed of Democracy, 78;
work with General Education Board, 85;
independence as an editor, 87;
severely criticizes John D. Archbold for Foraker bribery, 88;
appointed by Roosevelt on Country Life Commission, 89;
other public services, 89;
author of "the Southerner" 90;
activities in behalf of Southern agriculture and Hookworm
eradication, 94;
his interest in Wilson's candidacy and election, 102, _et seq._;
discourages efforts to have him named for Cabinet position, 113;
why he was not named, 118;
protests against appointment of Daniels, 119;
love for farming, 127, 128;
offered Ambassadorship, 130;
impressions of London and the Embassy, 132, 144;
impressions of Scotland, 142;
handling of the Mexican situation, 183;
belief in intervention in Mexico, 193, 194;
complimented by President Wilson, Bryan, and Sir William Tyrrell, 208;
his part in the removal of Sir Lionel Carden from Mexican post, 215;
commended by Wilson, 219, 221;
suggested for Secretary of Agriculture, 232, 286;
why he wished to remain in London, 240;
work in behalf of Panama Tolls Bill repeal, 244;
assailed for certain speeches, 258, 259;
opposed to including Germany in international alliance, favouring
understanding between English-speaking peoples, 282;
difficulties at outbreak of the war, 301 _et seq._;
asked to take over Austrian Embassy, 305, German Embassy, 306;
varied duties of war time, 337;
difficulties in charge of German and Austrian and Turkish embassies, 345;
relief work in starving Belgium, 346;
ageing under the strain and the depressing environment, 357;
difficulties of maintaining neutrality, 358;
warned from Washington, 362;
tactful handling of the demands that Declaration of London be
adopted, 370, 373;
writes Colonel House that he will resign if demands are insisted on, 383;
memorandum of the affair, 385;
his solution of the _Dacia_ puzzle, 394;
attitude toward a premature peace, 417;
learns through General French of the undiplomatic methods of State
Department in peace proposals, 425, 427
VOL. II
Humiliations from Washington's failure to meet the situation, 5;
remarks on Bryan's resignation, 10;
considered for appointment as Secretary of State, 11;
his feeling toward policies of Wilson, 18;
boldness of his criticism, 21;
Wilson and Lansing express anxiety that he may resign, 24;
describes Zeppelin attack on London, 34, 38;
Christmas in England, 1915, 103;
perplexed at attitude of the United States, 128;
his impressions of Europeans, 132;
summoned to Washington, 148;
memorandum of his visit to Washington, 171;
Impressions of President Wilson, 172;
waits five weeks before obtaining interview, 183;
disappointing interview at Shadow Lawn, 184;
letter of resignation seat to Wilson, 189;
and the reply, 199;
delivers Germany's peace proposal to Lord Robert Cecil, 201;
comments to Secretary of State on "insulting words" of President
Wilson's peace proposal, 207;
implores Wilson to leave out the "peace without victory" phrase
from his speech, 213;
learns of Bernstorff's dismissal, 215;
memorandum of his final judgment of Wilson's foreign policy to
April 1, 1917, 222;
memorandum written on April 3, the day after Wilson advised Congress
to declare war, 228;
on friendly footing with King George, 234;
joins with Admiral Sims in trying to waken the Navy Department to
seriousness of the submarine situation, 278;
Page--the man, 295-320;
moves for relief of Belgium, 310,
and delegates Hoover, 311;
Speech at Plymouth, 316;
goes to St. Ives for brief rest, 332;
heatedly referred to as "really an Englishman" by President Wilson, 348;
memorandum on Secretary Baker's visit, 366;
failing health, 374;
resignation in obedience to physicians orders, 393;
representatives from King, and Cabinet at train to bid good-bye, 402;
rallies somewhat on arrival in America, 405;
the end--at home, 406
Page, Walter H. Jr., Christmas letter from his "granddaddy," II 124
Page, Mrs. Walter H., arrival in London, I 134;
plays part in diplomacy, I 215, 224, 226;
her great help to the Ambassador, II 315;
the last letter, II 395
Palestine and Zionism, views on, II 351
Panama Tolls, a wrong policy, I 190;
Sir William Tyrrell's talk with President Wilson, I 207, 209
Panama Tolls Bill, Wilson writes of hopes for repeal, I 222;
repeal of, I 232 _et seq._, the bill a violation of solemn treaties, I 242;
the contest before Congress, I 255
Paris, capture of city thought inevitable, I 401
Parliament, holds commemorative sessions in honour of America's
participation in the war, II 230
Pasha, Tewfik, leaves Turkish Embassy in charge of American
Ambassador, I 345
Peace, Germany's overtures, I 389;
her first peace drives, I 398;
Wilson's note to warring powers, received with surprise and
irritation, II 205
"Peace without Victory" speech, of President Wilson, and its
reception in Great Britain, II 212
Peace Centennial, plans being formed for, I 236, 274
Pershing, General, at luncheon with King George, II 237;
his presence of moral benefit to French Army, II 290
Philippines, a problem, I 176
Pinero, Sir Arthur, reminiscences of Page at Dilettante gatherings, II 313
Plymouth, Mayor and Council, present the freedom of the city, II 402
Plymouth Speech, inspires confidence in American coöperation, II 316
Polk, Frank L., invited by British Foreign Office to consultation in
England, II 248;
"could not be spared from his desk," II 256
_Letter from_: on wonderful success of Balfour Mission, II 263
_Letters to_: on Balfour and his Mission to the United States, II 252;
on Secretary Baker's visit, II 361
Price, Thomas R., noted professor at Randolph-Macon, I 22
Probyn, Sir Dighton, calls at Embassy, I 339
Raboteau, John Samuel, Mr. Page's maternal grandfather, I 6
Randolph-Macon College, studies at, I 20
Rawnsley, Rev. Hardwicke Drummond, a subject of conversation, I 149
Rayleigh, Lady, political ability, II 257, 258
Rayleigh, Lord Chancellor of Cambridge University, II 145
Reconstruction, more agonizing than war, I 14;
effects of, upon State University, I 18
Reed, John, account of Mexican conditions influences Wilson's policy, I 228
Religion, deepest reverence for, I 80
Rüs, Jacob, writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60
Rockefeller, John D., organizes General Education Board, I 84;
publication of Reminiscences, I 88;
founds Hookworm Commission and International Health Commission, I 100
Roosevelt, Theodore, writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60;
appoints Country Life Commission, I 89
_Letter to_: introducing the Archbishop of York, II 307
_Letter from_: praising the Ambassador's services, II 401
Root, Elihu, understanding of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, I 242
Rose, Dr. Wickliffe, dinner to, in London, as head of International
Health Board, I 101;
hookworm work, I 127
Round Table, The, organization for study of political subjects, II 84;
_Round Table, The_, organ of above, a quarterly publication, II 84, 105
Royal Institution of Great Britain, address before, I 191
Royce, Josiah, associate at Johns Hopkins, I 25
Russian Collapse, effect on the Allies, II 353
Rustem Bey, Turkish Ambassador, given passports, II 49 _note_
St. Ives, Cornwall, seeking rest at, II 332
St. Joseph _Gazelle_, connection with, I 33, 37,
succeeds to Eugene Field's desk, on I 36
Sackville-West, Sir Lionel, handed his passports by Cleveland, II 33 _note_
Sargent, John, frequent visitor at the Embassy, II 315
Saw-mill units, favourable reception of, II 291
Sayre, Mr. and Mrs., hearty reception in London, I 213, 222, 275
Schrippenfest, celebration of, in Berlin, I 291
Schwab, Charles M., supplying war material to Allies, I 341
Scotland, impressions of, I 142
Scudder, Horace E., succeeded as editor of _Atlantic Monthly_, I 53
Secret treaties, explained to President Wilson by Mr. Balfour, II 267
Sedgwick, Ellery, recollections of Mr. Page, as editor of _Atlantic
Monthly_, I 55;
on the high regard in which Page was held, II 298
Shakespeare, lectures on, I 30
Sharp, Ambassador, his mention of peace resented by the French, I 389;
at President Wilson's luncheon, II 171
Sherman's army, cavalry troop camp at Page home, ransack, and destroy
contents, I 10
Shoecraft, Mr., receives news of Bernstorff's dismissal, II 215
Sihler, Prof. E.G., reminiscences of Page at Johns Hopkins, I 27
Simon, Sir John, frequent visitor at the Embassy, II 315
Sims, Admiral, with Ambassador Page, dines with Lord Beresford, II 254;
advised of terrible submarine situation, II 273, 275;
arrival and welcome in England, II 274;
recommendations ignored by Washington, II 276;
backed up by Page in strong dispatch, II 278;
praised in letter to Wilson, II 281;
in command of both English and American naval forces at Queenstown,
II 282;
letters from, on submarine situation, II 282;
in high regard with British Admiralty, II 290;
at the Embassy dinner to Secretary Baker, II 365, 370
Shaler, Millard, reports on destitution in Belgium, II 310
Skinner, Consul-General, on Committee for relief of stranded
Americans, I 307
Slocum, Colonel, urged to hasten arrival of American troops, II 363
Smith, C. Alphonso, an exchange professor to Germany, II 145
Smith, Senator Hoke, "friendly deportation" of, suggested, II 17;
campaign against British Blockade, II 56, 61, 63;
urging embargo on shipments to Allies, II 211
South, the, efforts in behalf of, I 38, 43, 74;
three "ghosts" which prevent progress, I 91
Southampton speech, press comments on, I 41
Southern Education Board, active work with, I 84
Southern Educational Conference, organization of, I 83
"Southerner, The," only effort at novel writing, I 90
Spanish-American War, attitude toward, I 62
Speyer, James, connected with German peace move, I 403
Spring Rice, Sir Cecil, notifies Washington of British change of
attitude toward recognition of Huerta, I 181;
confidentially consulted by Cot. House regarding demands that
Declaration of London be adopted, I 379;
notifies Washington that _Dacia_ would be seized, I 393;
opinion of Straus peace proposal, I 407;
letters from Lord Robert Cecil on Germany's peace proposal, II 201, 202
Squier, Colonel, American military attaché in London at outbreak of the
war, I 301
Standard Oil Co., editorial against, in Archbold-Foraker scandal,
I 88
_State Chronicle_, connection with, I 42;
editorially a success, I 48
State College, Raleigh, N.C., instrumental in establishment of,
I 47, 48
State Department, leaks of diplomatic correspondence through,
I 147, 148, 151, 223, 224
State Dept., ignores official correspondence,
I 94, 213, 219, 224, 225, 232, 238, 239, II 7, 55, 217, 253;
not properly organized and conducted, II 8;
trivial demands and protests, II 54, 68;
uncourteous form of Notes, I 72
Stiles, Dr. Charles W., discovers hookworm, I 98;
work in combatting, I 127
Stone, Senator William J., spokesman of pro-German cause, I 380
Stovall, Pleasant A., Colonel House confers with, regarding peace
parleys, I 434
Straus, Oscar S., used as a tool in German peace propaganda,
I 389, 403 _et seq._
Submarine sinkings, Germany threatens to resume, unless Wilson moves
for peace, II 200;
German military chieftains at Pless conference decide to resume
unrestricted warfare, II 212;
the most serious problem at time of American entry into war,
II 273, 275, _et seq._
Sulgrave Manor, ancestral home of the Washingtons, restoration and
preservation, I 274;
plan to have President Wilson at dedication of, I 274, 275, II 248
_Sussex_ "pledge", a peace move of Germany, II 150
Taft, William H., fails in having Carden removed from Cuba,
I 196, 215, 219;
accepts British invitation to head delegation explaining America's
purposes in the war, II 346;
Wilson's strong disapproval interferes with the project, II 347
Tariff Commission, travelling with, for N.Y. _World_, I 35
Teaching democracy to the British Government, I 187, 211
_Tennessee_, sent to England on outbreak of war with gold for
relief of stranded Americans, I 307
Thayer, William Roscoe, disappointed in policy of the _World's Work_, I 66;
letter to, in explanation, I 67
Tillett, Wilbur Fisk, friend at Randolph-Macon College, I 20
Towers, Lieutenant, shown remnant of torpedo from _Hesperian_, II 40
Trinity College, studies at, I 19
Turkish Embassy left in charge of American Ambassador, I 346
Tyrrell, Sir William, significance of his visit to the United States,
I 201;
unsatisfactory consultation with Bryan, I 202;
explains to President Wilson the British policy toward Mexico,
I 204, 207;
conversation with Colonel House, I 206;
Colonel House informs him of plan to visit Kaiser in behalf of
naval holiday plan, I 277;
advises House not to stop in England on way to Germany, I 289;
expresses relief on withdrawal of demands that Declaration of
London be adopted, I 387;
comment on Dumba's dismissal, and Bernstorff, II 101
Underwood Tariff Bill, impressions of in Great Britain, 150, 172
Van Hise, on proposed committee to lecture in England, II 346
Vanderlip, Frank A., at the Speyer "peace dinner", I 404
Villa, Pancho, thought by Wilson to be a patriot, I 227, 228
Vincent, George, on proposed committee to lecture in England, II 346
Von Jagow, offers no encouragement to Colonel House's proposals, I 289
Von Papen, dismissal of, II 108
Von Tirpitz, discussion with Viscount Haldane as to relative sizes of
navies, I 278;
hostile to Colonel House's proposals, I 289
Waechter, Sir Max, efforts for "federation" and disarmament, I 284
"Waging neutrality", policy of, I 362
Wallace, Henry, letters to:
on Wilson's candidacy, I 105;
on backing up new Secretary of Agriculture, etc., I 115
Wallace, Hugh C., accompanies Colonel House to Europe, I 288;
joins "assemblage of immortals" at Embassy, II 315
Walsh, Sir Arthur, Master of the Ceremonies, I 135;
at train to bid good-bye, II 402
Walsh, Senator Thomas, anti-English attitude, II 61
War, American efforts to prevent the, I 270 _et seq._
War, memorandum at outbreak of the, I 301
Washington, Booker T., writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60;
induced to write "Up From Slavery", I 90
Wantauga Club, activities of the, I 47;
crusade for education of Southern child, 73
Wheeler, Benjamin Ide, gives Colonel House information of conditions
in Germany, I 281
White, Henry, understanding of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, I 242
White, William Allen, writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60
Whitlock, Brand, eulogized, I 334
Willard, Joseph E., Colonel House confers with, in regard to peace
parleys, I 434
Williams, Senator John Sharp, demonstrates blockade against Germany
not an injury to cotton-producing states, II 63
Wilhelm II, nullifies Hague Conferences, I 280;
Colonel House disappointed in mission to, I 289;
derides American arbitration treaty, I 294;
Colonel House's impressions of, I 295;
asks President Wilson to transmit peace offer to Great Britain, I 426;
makes proposal to Delcassé to join in producing "complete isolation"
of the United States, II 192
Wilson, Miss Willia Alice, married to Page, I 37
Wilson, Dr. William, father of Mrs. Page, I 37
Wilson, Sir Henry, succeeds Sir William Robertson as Chief of Imperial
General Staff, II 354 _note_
Wilson, Woodrow, first acquaintance with, I 37;
writes for _Atlantic Monthly_, I 60;
Page greatly interested in his candidacy and election, I 102, _et seq._;
Colonel House introduced to, I 107;
memorandum of interview with, soon after election, I 110;
offers Ambassadorship, I 130;
attitude toward recognition of Huerta, I 180;
formulates new principle for dealing with Latin American republics,
I 182;
refuses to consider intervention in Mexico, I 193;
suggestion that he officially visit Sulgrave Manor, the ancestral
home of the Washingtons, I 195;
explains attitude on Panama Toll question to Sir William Tyrrell, I 207;
expresses gratification in way Page has handled Mexican situation, I 208;
letter giving credit for Carden's recall from Mexico, and for
constructive work, I 221;
addresses Congress asking repeal of Panama Tolls Bill, I 253;
plan to visit England on occasion of restoration of Sulgrave Manor,
1274, 275, II 248;
requested by resolution of the Senate to proffer his good offices
for mediation between Austria and Serbia, I 317;
telegrams to and from Colonel House on proffering good offices to
avert war, I 317, 318;
message to King George proffering good offices to avert war, I 320;
neutrality letter to the Senate, I 360;
desires to start peace parleys, I 416;
insists on pressing the issue, I 423;
the "Too proud to fight" speech derided and denounced in England, II 6;
the _Lusitania_ notes, II 6;
Page's feeling toward policies of, II 8;
appreciation of Page letters, II 22;
peace activities after Sussex "pledge", II 148;
his reply to the German note concerning the submarine cessation,
II 150, 156;
reluctant to speak on foreign matters with his ambassadors, II 171, 172;
lived too much alone, no social touch, II 173;
addresses Congress on threatened railroad strike, II 172;
refuses to send high ranking officers as military attachés, II 177;
interview with Ambassador Page at Shadow Lawn, II 185;
sends peace communication to all the warring Powers, II 204;
reception in Great Britain of the "Peace without Victory" speech, II 212;
answer to the Pope's peace proposal, II 321, 323;
coldness toward the Allies, II 345;
his strong disapproval of closer relations with Great Britain,
prevents visit of Taft and noted committee, II 346
_Letters from_:
on "mistaken" opinion of British critics of Carranza and Villa,
I 227, 228;
expressing gratitude and regard of and hopes for repeal of Toll
Bill, I 254;
regarding the criticized speeches, I 262, 265;
reply to proposal to visit England, I 276;
acceptance of Page's resignation, II 396
_Letters to_:
congratulations and suggestions on Election Day, I 108;
as to best man for Secretary of Agriculture, I 114;
impressions of the British people, I 144;
on royal reception to King Christian of Denmark, I 167;
on the Mexican situation, I 184, 185, 188;
memorandum sent through Colonel House on intervention in Mexico, I 194;
on feeling in England toward Panama Tolls question, I 248;
recapitulating events bringing the two countries more in unity, I 251;
explanation of speech before Associated Chambers of Commerce, I 260, 263;
suggests speech attacking Anglophobia, I 264;
on the outbreak of war, I 303;
on German atrocities, I 325;
on agreement of nations not to make peace separately, etc., I 338;
attempts to enlighten on the real nature of the war, I 370;
"Rough notes toward an explanation of the British feeling toward the
United States," I 373;
on liability of Paris being captured and German peace drive being
launched, I 401;
on feeling of English toward American inaction after _Lusitania_
notes, II 40, 41, 43, 44, 45;
told that if he broke diplomatic relations with Germany he would end
the war, II 51;
on the military situation, fall of 1915, and the loss of American
prestige, II 94;
while waiting for interview sends notes of conversations with Lord
Grey and Lord Bryce, II 183;
letter of resignation--with some great truths, II 190;
regarding success of Balfour Mission, etc., II 256;
on financial situation among the Allies and the necessity of
American assistance, II 269;
on seriousness of submarine situation, II 280, 283, 286;
on slow progress of war and comments on Lord Lansdowne's peace
letter, II 327;
on British opinion on subject of League of Nations, II 355;
on the cheering effect of his war speeches and letters, II 385;
the resignation in obedience to physician's orders, II 393
Wilson Doctrine, the, I 217
Wood, Gen. Leonard, methods in Cuba an object lesson, I 177
_World's Work_, founding of, I 66
Worth, Nicholas, nom de plume in writing "The Southerner", I 90
York, Archbishop of, letter commending him to Roosevelt, II 401
Zeppelin attack on London, II 34, 38
Zionism, view of, II 350
Zimmermann, German under Foreign Secretary in communication with
Colonel House regarding peace proposals to Great Britain, I 426;
talk with House on peace terms, I 432
Zimmermann, says Germany must apply for armistice, II 182
Zimmermann-Mexico telegram influence on the United States declaration
of war, II 214.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume II" ***
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