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Title: Slavery and Four Years of War, Vol. 1-2 - A Political History of Slavery in the United States Together - With a Narrative of the Campaigns and Battles of the Civil - War In Which the Author Took Part: 1861-1865
Author: Keifer, Joseph Warren
Language: English
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Transcriber's note:

  Footnotes are at the end of each chapter, except at the end of
  each section in Chapter I.  Duplicate notes were on adjacent pages
  in the book.

  Right-hand-page heads are omitted.

  Names have been corrected (except possibly "Hurlburt").

  LoC call number:  E470.K18


SLAVERY AND
FOUR YEARS OF WAR

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY
IN THE UNITED STATES

TOGETHER WITH A NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGNS
AND BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN WHICH
THE AUTHOR TOOK PART:  1861-1865

BY
JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS; EX-SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, U. S. A.; AND MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS,
SPANISH WAR.

ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME I.
1861-1863

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1900


Copyright, 1900

BY
JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER

The Knickerbocker Press, New York


To the

memory of the dead and as a tribute of esteem to the living officers
and soldiers who served immediately with and under the author in
battles and campaigns of the great American rebellion

This Book is Dedicated


PREFACE

The writer of this book was a volunteer officer in the Union army
throughout the war of the Great Rebellion, and his service was in
the field.

The book, having been written while the author was engaged in a
somewhat active professional life, lacks that literary finish which
results from much pruning and painstaking.  He, however, offers no
excuse for writing it, nor for its completion; he has presumed to
nothing but the privilege of telling his own story in his own way.
He has been at no time forgetful of the fact that he was a subordinate
in a great conflict, and that other soldiers discharged their duties
as faithfully as himself; and while no special favors are asked,
he nevertheless opes that what he has written may be accepted as
the testimony of one who entertains a justifiable pride in having
been connected with large armies and a participant in important
campaigns and great battles.

He flatters himself that his summary of the political history of
slavery in the United States, and of the important political events
occurring upon the firing on Fort Sumter, and the account he has
given of the several attempts to negotiate a peace before the final
overthrow of the Confederate armies, will be of special interest
to students of American history.

Slavery bred the doctrine of State-rights, which led, inevitably,
to secession and rebellion.  The story of slavery and its abolition
in the United States is the most tragic one in the world's annals.
The "Confederate States of America" is the only government ever
attempted to be formed, avowedly to perpetuate _human slavery_.
A history of the Rebellion without that of slavery is but a recital
of brave deeds without reference to the motive which prompted their
performance.

The chapter on slavery narrates its history in the United States
from the earliest times; its status prior to the war; its effect
on political parties and statesmen; its aggressions, and attempts
at universal domination if not extension over the whole Republic;
its inexorable demands on the friends of freedom, and its plan of
perpetually establishing itself through secession and the formation
of a slave nation.  It includes a history of the secession of eleven
Southern States, and the formation of "The Confederate States of
America"; also what the North did to try to avert the Rebellion.
It was written to show why and how the Civil War came, what the
conquered lost, and what the victors won.

In other chapters the author has taken the liberty, for the sake
of continuity, of going beyond the conventional limits of a personal
_memoir_, but in doing this he has touched on no topic not connected
with the war.

The war campaigns cover the first one in Western Virginia, 1861;
others in Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, 1862; in
West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, 1863; and in
Virginia, 1864; ending with the capture of Richmond and Petersburg,
the battles of Five Forks and Sailor's Creek, and the surrender of
Lee to Grant at Appomattox, 1865.  A chapter on the New York riots
of 1863, also one on the "Peace Negotiations," will be found, each
in its proper place.

Personal mention and descriptions of many officers known to the
writer are given; also war incidents deemed to be of interest to
the reader.

But few generalizations are indulged in either as to events,
principles, or the character of men; instead, facts are given from
which generalizations may be formed.

The author is indebted to his friends, General George D. Ruggles
(General Meade's Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac,
late Adjutant-General, U.S.A.), for important data furnished from
the War Department, and to his particular friends, both in peace
and war, General John Beatty and Colonel Wm. S. Furay of Columbus,
Ohio, for valuable suggestions.

  J. W. K.
December, 1899.


CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
Slavery:  Its Political History in the United States,
(I.) Introductory--(II.) Introduction of Slavery into the Colonies
--(III.) Declaration of Independence--(IV.) Continental Congress:
Articles of Confederation--(V.) Ordinance of 1787--(VI.) Constitution
of the United States--(VII.) Causes of Growth of Slavery--(VIII.)
Fugitive-Slave Law, 1793--(IX.) Slave Trade Abolished--(X.) Louisiana
Purchase--(XI.) Florida--(XII.) Missouri Compromise--(XIII.)
Nullification--(XIV.) Texas--(XV.) Mexican War, Acquisition of
California and New Mexico--(XVI.) Compromise Measures, 1850--(XVII.)
Nebraska Act--(XVIII.) Kansas Struggle for Freedom--(XIX.) Dred
Scott Case--(XX.) John Brown Raid--(XXI.) Presidential Elections,
1856-1860--(XXII.) Dissolution of the Union--(XXIII.) Secession of
States--(XXIV.) Action of Religious Denominations--(XXV.) Proposed
Concessions to Slavery--(XXVI.) Peace Conference--(XXVII.) District
of Columbia--(XXVIII.) Slavery Prohibited in Territories--(XXIX.)
Benton's Summary--(XXX.) Prophecy as to Slavery and Disunion.

CHAPTER II
Sumter Fired on--Seizure by Confederates of Arms, Arsenals, and
Forts--Disloyalty of Army and Navy Officers--Proclamation of Lincoln
for 75,000 Militia, and Preparation for War on Both Sides

CHAPTER III
Personal Mention--Occupancy of Western Virginia under McClellan
(1861)--Campaign and Battle of Rich Mountain, and Incidents

CHAPTER IV
Repulse of General Lee and Affairs of Cheat Mountain and in Tygart's
Valley (September, 1861)--Killing of John A. Washington, and
Incidents--and Formation of State of West Virginia

CHAPTER V
Union Occupancy of Kentucky--Affair at Green River--Defeat of
Humphrey Marshall--Battles of Mill Springs, Forts Henry and Donelson
--Capture of Bowling Green and Nashville, and Other Matters

CHAPTER VI
Battle of Shiloh--Capture of Island No. 10--Halleck's Advance on
Corinth, and Other Events

CHAPTER VII
Mitchel's Campaign to Northern Alabama--Andrews' Raid into Georgia,
and Capture of a Locomotive--Affair at Bridgeport--Sacking of
Athens, Alabama, and Court-Martial of Colonel Turchin--Burning of
Paint Rock by Colonel Beatty--Other Incidents and Personal Mention
--Mitchel Relieved

CHAPTER VIII
Confederate Invasion of Kentucky (1862)--Cincinnati Threatened,
and "Squirrel Hunters" Called Out--Battles of Iuka, Corinth, and
Hatchie Bridge--Movements of Confederate Armies of Bragg and Kirby
Smith--Retirement of Buell's Army to Louisville--Battle of Perryville,
with Personal and Other Incidents

CHAPTER IX
Commissioned Colonel of 110th Ohio Volunteers--Campaigns in West
Virginia under General Milroy, 1862-1863--Emancipation of Slaves
in the Shenandoah Valley, and Incidents


ILLUSTRATIONS

J. Warren Keifer

Andrew H. Reeder, first governor of Kansas Territory, Flight in
Disguise, 1855 [From a painting in Coates' House, Kansas City,
Missouri.]

Abraham Lincoln

Map of the United States, 1860 [Showing free and slave States and
Territories.]

General Ulysses S. Grant, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Confederate Silver Half-Dollar

John Beatty, Brigadier-General of Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1863.]

Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain Country, W. Va.

General William T. Sherman, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1881.]

Major-General O. M. Mitchel [From a photograph taken 1862.]

Brevet Brigadier-General Wm. H. Ball [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Rev. William T. Meloy, D. D., Lieutenant 122d Ohio Volunteers [From
a photograph taken 1896.]

Major-General Robert H. Milroy [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Lieutenant James A. Fox, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1863.]

Map of Shenandoah valley [From Major W. F. Tiemann's _History of
the 159th New York_.]

Rev. Milton J. Miller, Chaplain 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a
photograph taken 1865.]

Rev. Charles C. McCabe, D. D., Bishop M. E. Church, Chaplain 122d
Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1868.]


SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS OF WAR


SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS
OF WAR

CHAPTER I
SLAVERY:  ITS POLITICAL HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES
(I.) Introductory--(II.) Introduction of Slavery into the Colonies
--(III.) Declaration of Independence--(IV.) Continental Congress:
Articles of Confederation--(V.) Ordinance of 1787--(VI.) Constitution
of the United States--(VII.) Causes of Growth of Slavery--(VIII.)
Fugitive-Slave Law, 1793--(IX.) Slave Trade Abolished--(X.) Louisiana
Purchase--(XI.) Florida--(XII.) Missouri Compromise--(XIII.)
Nullification--(XIV.) Texas--(XV.) Mexican War, Acquisition of
California and New Mexico--(XVI.) Compromise Measures, 1850--(XVII.)
Nebraska Act--(XVIII.) Kansas Struggle for Freedom--(XIX.) Dred
Scott Case--(XX.) John Brown Raid--(XXI.) Presidential Elections,
1856-1860--(XXII.) Dissolution of the Union--(XXIII.) Secession of
States--(XXIV.) Action of Religious Denominations--(XXV.) Proposed
Concessions to Slavery--(XXVI.) Peace Conference--(XXVII.) District
of Columbia--(XXVIII.) Slavery Prohibited in Territories--(XXIX.)
Benton's Summary--(XXX.) Prophecy as to Slavery and Disunion.

I
INTRODUCTORY

Slavery is older than tradition--older than authentic history, and
doubtless antedates any organized form of human government.  It
had its origin in barbaric times.  Uncivilized man never voluntarily
performed labor even for his own comfort; he only struggled to gain
a bare subsistence.  He did not till the soil, but killed wild
animals for food and to secure a scant covering for his body; and
cannibalism was common.  Tribes were formed for defence, and thus
wars came, all, however, to maintain mere savage existence.  Through
primitive wars captives were taken, and such as were not slain were
compelled to labor for their captors.  In time these slaves were
used to domesticate useful animals and, later, were forced to
cultivate the soil and build rude structures for the comfort and
protection of their masters.  Thus it was that mankind was first
forced to toil and ultimately came to enjoy labor and its incident
fruits, and thus human slavery became a first step from barbarism
towards the ultimate civilization of mankind.

White slavery existed in the English-American colonies antecedent
to black or African slavery, though at first only intended to be
conditional and not to extend to offspring.  English, Scotch, and
Irish alike, regardless of ancestry or religious faith, were, for
political offenses, sold and transported to the dependent American
colonies.  They were such persons as had participated in insurrections
against the Crown; many of them being prisoners taken on the battle-
field, as were the Scots taken on the field of Dunbar, the royalist
prisoners from the field of Worcester; likewise the great leaders
of the Penruddoc rebellion, and many who were taken in the insurrection
of Monmouth.

Of these, many were first sold in England to be afterwards re-sold
on shipboard to the colonies, as men sell horses, to the highest
bidder.

There was also, in some of the colonies, a conditional servitude,
under indentures, for servants, debtors, convicts, and perhaps
others.  These forms of slavery made the introduction of negro and
perpetual slavery easy.

Australasia alone, of all inhabited parts of the globe, has the
honor, so far as history records, of never having a slave
population.

Egyptian history tells us of human bondage; the patriarch Abraham,
the founder of the Hebrew nation, owned and dealt in slaves.  That
the law delivered to Moses from Mt. Sinai justified and tolerated
human slavery was the boast of modern slaveholders.

Moses, from "Nebo's heights," saw the "land of promise," where
flowed "milk and honey" in abundance, and where slavery existed.
The Hebrew people, but forty years themselves out of bondage,
possessed this land and maintained slavery therein.

The advocates of slavery and the slave trade exultingly quoted:

"And I will sell your sons and your daughters into the hands of
the children of Judah, and they shall sell them to the Sabeans, to
a people far off; for the Lord hath spoken it."--Joel iii, 8.

They likewise claimed that St. Paul, while he preached the gospel
to slaveholders and slaves alike in Rome, yet used his calling to
enable him to return to slavery an escaped human being--Onesimus.( 1)

The advocates of domestic slavery justified it as of scriptural
and divine origin.

From the Old Testament they quoted other texts, not only to justify
the holding of slaves in perpetual bondage, but the continuance of
the slave trade with all its cruelties.

"And he said, I am Abraham's servant."--Gen. xxiv., 34.

"And there was of the house of Saul a _servant_ whose name was
Ziba.  And when they had called him unto David, the King said unto
him, Art thou Ziba?  And he said, Thy servant is he. . . .

"Then the King called to Ziba, Saul's _servant_, and said unto him,
I have given unto thy master's son all that pertained to Saul, and
to all his house.

"Thou, therefore, and thy sons, and they servants shall till the
land for him, and thou shalt bring in _the fruits_, that thy master's
son may have food to eat," etc.  "Now Ziba had fifteen sons and
_twenty servants_."--2 Samuel ix., 2, 9-10.

"I got me servants and maidens and had servants born in my house;
also I had great possessions of great and small cattle above all
that were in Jerusalem before me."--Eccles. ii., 7.

"And he said, Hagar, Sarai's maid, whence comest thou? and she
said, I flee from the face of my mistress Sarai.

"And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Return to thy mistress,
and submit thyself to her hands."--Gen. xvi., 8, 9.

"A servant will not be corrected by words; for though he understand,
he will not answer."--Prov. xxix., 19.

And from the New Testament they triumphantly quoted:

"Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called.
Art thou called being a servant? care not for it; but if thou mayest
be made free, use it rather."--I Cor., vii., 20-22.

"Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to
the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart,
as unto Christ," etc.

"And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening:
knowing that your Master also is in heaven; neither is there respect
of persons with him."--Eph., vi., 5-9.

"Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh,
not with eye service, as men pleasers; but in singleness of heart,
fearing God."--Col. iii., 22.

"Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal;
knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven."--Col. iv., 1.

"Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters
worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrines be not
blasphemed," etc.--I Tim., vi., 1, 2.

"Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own masters, and to
please them well in all things; not answering again; not purloining,
but showing all good fidelity; that they may adorn the doctrine of
God our Saviour in all things."--Titus ii., 9, 10.

"Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward."--I. Pet. ii, 18.

The advocates of slavery maintained that Christ approved the calling
as a slaveholder as well as the faith of the Roman centurion, whose
servant, "sick of a palsy," Christ miraculously healed by saying:
"_I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel_."--Matt.
viii., 10.

They also cited Dr. Adam Clark, the great Bible commentator; Dr.
Neander's work, entitled _Planting and Training the Church_, and
Dr. Mosheim's _Church History_, as evidence that the Bible not only
sanctioned slavery but authorized its perpetuation through all
time.( 2)  In other words, pro-slavery advocates in effect affirmed
that these great writers:

  "Torture the hollowed pages of the Bible,
   To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,
   And, in oppression's hateful service, libel
   Both man and God."

While the teachings of neither the Old nor the New Testament, nor
of the _Master_, were to overthrow or to establish political
conditions as established by the temporal powers of the then age,
yet it must be admitted that large numbers of people, of much
learning and a high civilization, believed human slavery was
sanctioned by divine authority.

The deductions made from the texts quoted were unwarranted.  The
principles of justice and mercy, on which the Christian religion
is founded, cannot be tortured into even a toleration (as, possibly,
could the law of Moses) of the existence of the unnatural and
barbaric institution of slavery, or the slave trade.

Slavery was wrong _per se;_ wholly unjustifiable on the plainest
principles of humanity and justice; and the consciences of all
unprejudiced, enlightened, civilized people led them in time to
believe that it had no warrant from God and ought to have no warrant
from man to exist on the face of the earth.

The friends of freedom and those who believed slavery sinful never
for a moment assented to the claim that it was sanctioned by Holy
Writ, or that it was justified by early and long-continued existence
through barbaric or semi-barbaric times.  They denied that it could
thus even be sanctified into a moral right; that time ever converted
cruelty into a blessing, or a wrong into a right; that any human
law could give it legal existence, or rightfully perpetuate it
against natural justice; they maintained that a Higher Law, written
in God's immutable decrees of mercy, was paramount to all human
law or practice, however long continuing; that the lessons taught
by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount and in all his life and
teachings were a condemnation of it; and that an enlightened,
progressive civilization demanded its final overthrow.

In America:  Slavery is _dead_.  We return to its history.

Greece had her slaves before tradition blended into history, though,
four centuries before Christ, Alcidamas proclaimed:  "_God has sent
forth all men free:  Nature has made no man slave_."

Alexander, the mighty Macedonian (fourth century B.C.), sold captives
taken at Tyre and Gaza, the most accomplished people of that time,
into slavery.( 3)

Rome had her slaves; and her slave-marts were open at her principal
ports for traffic in men and women of all nationalities, especially
Christians and captives taken in war.

The German nations of the shores of the Baltic carried on the
desolating traffic.  Russia recognized slavery and carried on a
slave trade through her merchantmen.

The Turks forbade the enslaving of Mussulmans, but sold Christian
and other captives into slavery.  Christian and Moor, for seven
hundred years in the doubtful struggle in Western Europe, respectively,
doomed their captives to slavery.

Contemporary with the discovery of America, the Moors were driven
from Granada, their last stronghold in Spain, to the north of
Africa; there they became corsairs, privateers, and holders of
Christian slaves.  Their freebooter life and cruelty furnished the
pretext, not only to enslave the people of the Moorish dominion,
but of all Africa.  The oldest accounts of Africa bear testimony
to the existence of domestic slavery--of negro enslaving negro,
and of caravans of dealers in negro slaves.

Columbus, whose glory as the discoverer of this continent we
proclaim, on a return voyage (1494) carried five hundred native
Americans to Spain, a present to Queen Isabella, and American
Indians were sold into foreign bondage, as "spoils of war," for
two centuries.

The Saxon carried slavery in its most odious form into England,
where, at one time, not half the inhabitants were absolutely free,
and where the price of a man was but four times the price of an ox.

He sold his own kindred into slavery.  English slaves were held in
Ireland till the reign of Henry II.

In time, however, the spirit of Christianity, pleading the cause
of humanity, stayed slavery's progress, and checked the slave
traffic by appeals to conscience.

Alexander III, Pope of Rome in the twelfth century, proclaimed
against it, by writing:  "_Nature having made no slaves, all men
have an equal right to liberty_."

Efficacious as the Christian religion has been to destroy or mitigate
evil, it has failed to render the so-called Christian slaveholder
better than the pagan, or to improve the condition of the bondsmen.

It may be observed that when slavery seemed to be firmly planted
in the Republic of the United States of America, Egypt, as one of
the powers of the earth, had passed away; her slavery, too, was
gone--only her Pyramids, Sphinx, and Monoliths have been spared by
time and a just judgment.  Greece, too, had perished, only her
philosophy and letters survive; Israel's people, though the chosen
of God, had, as a nation, been bodily carried into oriental
Babylonian captivity, and in due time had, in fulfillment of divine
judgment, been dispersed through all lands.  God in his mighty
wrath also thundered on Babylon's iniquity, and it, too, passed
away forever, and the prophet gives as a reason for this, that
Babylon dealt in "_slaves and the souls of men_."

Rome, once the mistress of the world, cased as a nation to live;
her greatness and her glory, her slave markets and her slaves, all
gone together and forever.

Germany, France, Spain, and other slave nations renounced slavery
barely in time to escape the general national doom.

Russia, though her mighty Czars possessed absolute power to rule,
trembled before the mighty insurrections of peasant-serfs that
swept over the bodies of slain nobles and slave-masters from remote
regions to the very gates of Moscow.  Catherine II., Alexander I.,
Nicholas I., and Alexander II. listened to the threatened doom,
and, to save their empire, put forth decrees to loosen and finally
to break the chains of twenty millions of slaves and serfs.  Even
Moorish slavery in Northern Africa in large part passed away.
Mohammedan,( 4) Brahmin, and Buddhist had no sanction for human
slavery.

England heard the warning cry just in time to save the kingdom from
the impending common destiny of slave nations.

It was not, however, until 1772, that Lord Mansfield, from the
Court of the King's Bench of Great Britain, announced that no slave
could be held under the English Constitution.  This decision was
of binding force in her American colonies when the Declaration of
Independence was adopted, and the "Liberty Bell" proclaimed "_Liberty
throughout all the land to all the inhabitants thereof_."

The argument that the institution of slavery was sanctified by age
ceased, long since, to be satisfying to those who learned justice
and mercy in the light of Christian love, and who could read, not
only that human slavery had existed from the earliest times, but
that it had existed without right, only by the power of might, not
sanctioned by reason and natural justice, and that in its train a
myriad of coincident evils, crimes, and immoralities had taken
birth and flourished, blasting both master and slave and the land
they inhabited, and that God's just and retributive judgment has
universally been visited on all nations and peoples continuing to
maintain and perpetuate it.

Murder has existed in the world since Cain and Abel met by the
altar of God, yet no sane person for that reason justifies it.  So
slavery has stalked down the long line of centuries, cursing and
destroying millions with its damning power, but time has not
sanctioned it into a right.  The longer it existed the more foul
became the blot upon history's pages, and the deeper the damnation
upon humanity it wrought.

When all the civilized nations of Europe, as well as the nations
and even tribes of Asia, had either abolished slavery and taken
steps effectually to do so, it remained for the _United States_ to
stand alone upholding it in its direst form.

The nations of the ancient world either shook off slavery in attempts
to wash away its bloody stain, or slavery wiped them from the powers
of the earth.  So of the more modern nations.

Our Republic, boastful of its free institutions, of its constitutional
liberty, of its free schools and churches, of its glories in the
cause of humanity, its patriotism, resplendent history, inventive
genius, wealth, industry, civilization, and Christianity, maintained
slavery until it was only saved from its common doom of slave
nations by the atoning sacrifice of its best blood and the mercy
of an offended God.

More than two centuries (1562) before Lord Mansfield judicially
announced _freedom_ to be the universal law of England, Sir John
Hawkins acquired the infamous distinction of being the first
Englishman to embark in the slave trade, and the depravity of public
sentiment in England then approved his action.  He then seized, on
the African coast, and transported a large cargo of negroes to
Hispaniola and bartered them for sugar, ginger, and pearls, at
great profit.( 5)  Here commenced a traffic in human beings by
English-speaking people (scarcely yet ceased) that involved murder,
arson, theft, and all the cruelty and crimes incident to the capture,
transportation, and subjection of human beings to the lust, avarice,
and power of man.

Sir John Hawkins' success coming to the notice of the avaricious
and ambitious Queen Elizabeth, she, five years later (1567), became
the open protector of a new expedition and sharer in the nefarious
traffic, thus becoming a promoter, abettor, and participant in all
its crimes.

To the "African Company," for a long period, was granted by England
a monopoly of the slave trade, but it could not be confined to this
company.  In 1698, England exacted a tariff on the slave cargoes
of her subjects engaged in the trade.

From 1680 to 1700, by convention with Spain, the English, it is
estimated, stole from Africa 300,000 negroes to supply the Spanish
West Indies with slaves.  By the treaty of Utrecht (1713) Spain
granted to England, during thirty years, the absolute monopoly of
supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies.  By this treaty England
agreed to take to the West Indies not less than 144,000 negroes,
or 4800 each year; and, to guard against scandal to the Roman
Catholic religion, heretical slave-traders were forbidden.  This
monopoly was granted by England to the "South Sea Company."

England did not confine her trade to the West Indies.  In 1750, it
was shown in the English Parliament that 46,000 negroes were annually
sold to English colonies.( 6)

As early as 1565, Sir John Hawthorne and Menendez imported negroes
as slaves into Florida, then a Spanish possession, and with Spain's
sanction many were carried into the West Indies and sold into
slavery.

( 1)  Epistle to Philemon.

( 2)  The references to the Bible are taken from the most learned
advocates of the divinity of slavery, in its last years.  _Ought
American Slavery to be Perpetuated?_ (Brownlow and Pryne debate),
p. 78, etc.  _Slavery Ordained of God_ (Ross), 146, etc., 176, etc.

Rev. Frederick A. Ross, D. D. (the author), a celebrated Presbyterian
minister, was arrested in 1862 at Huntsville, Alabama, while it
was occupied by the Union forces, for praying from the pulpit for
the success of secession.

Parson Brownlow was a Union man in 1861, was much persecuted at
his home in Knoxville, Tenn., later advocated emancipation.

( 3)  It is interesting to note that more than fifteen hundred
years (twelfth century) after Alexander's conquests, Saladin, the
great Sultan, and other Mohammedan rulers, and Richard Coeur de
Lion, and other crusade leaders in Syria, respectively, doomed
their captives to slavery, regardless of nationality or color.--
_Saladin_ (Heroes of Nations, Putnams), 229-232, 338.

( 4)  Slavery and the slave trade, in spite of the teachings of
the Koran, grew up in Mohammedan countries.  The traffic in slaves,
however, had been frequently proclaimed against by the Ottoman
Porte.

( 5)  But the first trace of negro slavery in America came in 1502,
only ten years after its discovery, through a decree of Ferdinand
and Isabella permitting negro slaves born in Spain, descendants of
natives brought from Guinea, to be transported to Hispaniola.--
_Life of Columbus_, by Irving (Putnams), p. 275.

( 6)  _History for Ready Reference_, vol. iv., p. 2923.


II
INTRODUCTION OF SLAVERY INTO THE COLONIES

In August, 1619, a Dutch man-of-war sailed up the James River in
Virginia, landed and sold to the colony at Jamestown _twenty_
negroes as slaves.  This event marked the beginning of negro slavery
in English-American colonies.  Two centuries and a half did not
suffice to put an end the Ethiopian slavery and the evils of a
traffic begun on so small a scale.

One year later (1620) the Puritans landed at Plymouth Rock, bringing
with them stern religious convictions and severe morals which soon
ripened into written laws and were likewise woven into social,
political, and religious life, the resultant effect of which, on
human existence in America, is never to end.  One year later still,
cotton was first planted in the virgin soil of America, where it
grew to perfection, and thenceforth becoming the staple production,
made slavery and slave-breeding profitable to the slaveholder.( 7)

The earliest importation of negro slaves into New England was to
Providence Isle in the shp _Desire_ (1637).

From Boston, Mass. (1645), the first American ship from the colonies
set sail to engage in the stealing of African negroes.  Massachusetts
then held, under sanction of law, a few blacks and Indians in
bondage.( 8)  But slavery did not flourish in New England.  It was
neither profitable nor in consonance with the judgment of the people
generally.  The General Court of Massachusetts, as early as 1646,
"bearing witness against the heinous crimes of man-stealing, ordered
the recently imported negroes to be restored, at the public charge,
to their native country, with a _letter_ expressing the indignation
of the General Court."  Unfortunately, persons guilty of stealing
men could not be tried for crimes committed in foreign lands.

But the African slave trade, early found to be extremely profitable,
and hence popular, did not cease.  England, then as now, the most
enterprising of commercial nations on the high seas, engrossed the
trade, in large part, from 1680 to 1780.  In 1711, there was
established a slave depot in New York City on or near what is now
Wall Street; and about the same time a depot was established for
receiving slaves in Boston, near where the old Franklin House stood.
From New England ships, and perhaps from others, negroes were landed
and sent to these and other central slave markets.

But few of these freshly stolen negroes were sold to Northern
slaveholders.  Slave labor was not even then found profitable in
the climate of the North.  The bondsman went to a more southern
clime, and to the cotton, rice, and tobacco fields of the large
plantations of the South.

As late as 1804-7, negroes from the coast of Africa were brought
to Boston, Bristol, Providence, and Hartford to be sold into
slavery.

Shipowners of all the coast colonies, and later of all the coast
States of the United States, engaged in the slave trade.

But it was among the planters of Maryland, Virginia, and the
Carolinas that slaves proved to be most profitable.  The people in
these sections were principally rural; plantations were large, not
subject to be broken up by frequent partition, if at all.  The
crops raised were better suited to cultivation by slaves in large
numbers; and the hot climate was better adapted to the physical
nature of the African negro.

The first inhabitants of the South preferred a rural life, and on
large plantations.  The Crown grants to early proprietors favored
this, especially in the Virginia and Carolina colonies.  The Puritans
did not love or foster slavery as did the Cavalier of the South.
Castes or classes existed among the Southern settlers from the
beginning, which, with other favoring causes, made it easier for
slavery to take root and prosper, and ultimately fasten itself upon
and become a dominating factor in the whole social and political
fabric of the South.  Slavery there soon came to be considered of
paramount importance in securing a high social status or a high,
so-called, civilization.

But we have, by this brief _résumé_, sufficiently shown that the
responsibility for the introduction and maintenance of slavery and
the slave trade does not rest exclusively on any of our early
colonies, North or South, nor on any one race or nationality of
the world; it remains now to show, in a summary way, how slavery
and the slave trade were treated and regarded by the different
sections of the United States after allegiance to England was thrown
off.

While slavery died out from local and natural causes, if not wholly
for moral, social, and religious reasons, in the States north of
Maryland, it flourished and ripened into strength and importance
in States south, casting a controlling influence and power over
the whole of the United States socially, and for the most part
dominating the country politically.  The greatest statesmen and
brightest intellects of the North, though convinced of the evils
of slavery and of its fatal tendencies, were generally too cowardly
to attack it politically, although but about one fifth of the whole
white population of the slave states in 1860, or perhaps at any
time, was, through family relationship, or otherwise, directly or
indirectly interested in slaves or slave labor.

Old political parties were in time disrupted, and new ones were
formed on slavery issues.

The slavery question rent in twain the Methodist Episcopal and
Presbyterian churches.  The followers of Wesley and Calvin divided
on slavery.  It was always essentially an aristocratic institution,
and hence calculated to benefit only a few of the great mass of
freemen.

In 1860, there was in the fifteen slave States a white population
of 8,039,000 and a slave population of 3,953,696.  Of the white
population only 384,884 were slaveholders, and, including their
families, only about 1,600,000 were directly or indirectly interested
in slaves or their labor.  About 6,400,000 (80 per cent.) of the
whites in these States had, therefore, no interest in the institution,
and yet they were wholly subordinated to the few who were interested
in it.

Curiously enough, slavery continued to exist, until a comparatively
recent period, in many of the States that had early declared it
abolished.  The States formed out of the territory "Northwest of
the River Ohio" cannot be said to have ever been slave States.
The sixth section of the Ordinance of 1787 prohibited slavery
forever therein.  The slaves reported in such States were only
there by tolerance.  They were free of right.  The Constitution of
Illinois, as we shall presently see, did not at first abolish
slavery; only prohibited the introduction of slaves.

The rebellion of the thirteen colonies in 1776 and the war for
independence did not grow out of slavery; that war was waged neither
to perpetuate nor to abolish it.  The Puritan and Cavalier, the
opponents and the advocates of slavery and the slave trade, alike,
fought for independence, and, when successful, united in the purpose
to foster and build up an American Republic, based on the sovereignty
of individual citizenship, but ignoring the natural rights of the
enslaved negro.

The following table, compiled from the United States Census Reports,
may be of interest.

It shows the number of slaves reported in each State and Territory
of the United States at each Federal census.( 9)

_North_
             1790    1800    1810    1820    1830    1840    1850    1860
Cal.  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .
Conn. . . .  2,759     951     310      97      25      17   . . .   . . .
Ills. . . .  . . .   . . .     168     917     747     331   . . .   . . .
Ind.  . . .  . . .     135     237     190       3       3   . . .   . . .
Iowa  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .      16   . . .   . . .
Kansas  . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .       2
Maine   . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .       2   . . .   . . .   . . .
Mass. . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .       1   . . .   . . .   . . .
Mich. . . .  . . .   . . .      24   . . .      32   . . .   . . .   . . .
Minn. . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .
Neb.  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .      15
N. H. . . .    158       8   . . .   . . .       3       1   . . .   . . .
N. J. . . . 11,423  12,422  10,851   7,557   2,254     674     236      18
N. Y. . . . 21,324  20,343  15,017  10,088      75       4   . . .   . . .
Ohio  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .       6       3   . . .   . . .
Oregon  . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .
Penn. . . .  3,737   1,706     796     211     403      64   . . .   . . .
R. I. . . .    952     381     108      48      17       5   . . .   . . .
Utah  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .      26      29
Vermont . .     17   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .
Wis.  . . .  . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .   . . .      11   . . .   . . .
            ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------
  Totals  . 40,370  35,646  27,510  19,108   3,568   1,129     262      64

/South/
                  1790     1800       1810       1820       1830       1840       1850       1860
D. C.  . . . . . . . . .    3,244      5,395      6,377      6,119      4,694      3,687      3,185
Ala. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .     41,879    117,549    253,532    342,844    435,080
Ark. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .      1,617      5,476     19,935     47,100    111,115
Del. . . . . . .   8,887    6,153      4,177      4,509      3,292      2,605      2,290      1,798
Florida  . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .     16,501     25,717     39,310     61,745
Ga.  . . . . . .  29,264   59,404    105,218    149,654    217,531    280,944    381,682    462,198
Ky.  . . . . . .  11,830   40,434     80,561    126,732    165,213    182,258    210,981    225,483
La.  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .     34,660     69,064    109,588    168,452    244,809    331,726
Md.  . . . . . . 103,036  105,635    111,502    107,397    102,994     89,737     90,368     87,189
Miss.  . . . . . . . . .    3,489     17,088     32,814     65,659    195,211    309,878    436,631
Mo.  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .      3,011     10,222     25,091     58,240     87,422    114,931
N. C.  . . . . . 100,572  133,296    168,824    205,017    245,601    245,817    288,548    331,059
S. C.  . . . . . 107,094  146,151    196,365    258,475    315,401    327,088    384,984    402,406
Tenn.  . . . . .   3,417   13,584     44,535     80,107    141,603    183,059    239,459    275,719
Tex. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .     58,161    182,566
Va.  . . . . . . 293,427  345,796    392,518    425,153    469,757    449,087    472,528    490,865
                 -------  -------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------
  Totals . . . . 657,527  857,095  1,163,854  1,519,017  2,005,475  2,486,326  3,204,051  3,953,696
                 -------  -------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------
  Grand totals . 697,897  892,741  1,191,364  1,538,125  2,009,043  2,487,455  3,204,313  3,953,760

( 7)  It is curious to note that 1621 dates the first bringing into
Virginia and America bee-hives for the production of honey.

( 8)  The following letter of Cotton Mather will show the Puritan's
intolerance of Wm. Penn and his Society of Friends, and the prevailing
opinion in his time on slavery and the slave trade.

  "Boston, Massachusetts, September, 3, 1681.
"To ye Aged and Beloved John Higginson:  There be now at sea a
skipper (for our friend Esaias Holderoft of London did advise me
by the last packet that it would sail sometime in August) called
ye _Welcome_ (R. Green was master), which has aboard a hundred or
more of ye heretics and malignants called Quakers, with W. Penn,
who is ye scamp at ye head of them.

"Ye General court has accordingly given secret orders to master
Malachi Huxtell of ye brig _Porpoise_ to waylaye ye said _Welcome_
as near ye coast of Codd as may be, and make captives of ye Penn
and his ungodly crew, so that ye Lord may be glorified, and not
mocked on ye soil of this new country with ye heathen worshippe of
these people.  Much spoil can be made by selling ye whole lot to
Barbadoes, where slaves fetch good prices in rumme and sugar.  We
shall not only do ye Lord great service by punishing the Wicked,
but shall make gayne for his ministers and people.  Yours in the
bowels of Christ,

  "Cotton Mather."

( 9)  Slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia by law of
Congress, passed April 16, 1862.

President Lincoln's proclamation of January 1, 1863, emancipated
all slaves in the seceded States (save in Tennessee and in parts
of Louisiana and Virginia excepted therefrom) to the number of
3,063,395; those remaining were freed by the thirteenth amendment
to the Constitution, December 18, 1865.


III
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The Declaration of Independence, though accepted at once and to be
regarded through all time by the liberty-loving world as the best
and boldest declaration in favor of human rights, and the most
pronounced protest against oppression of the human race, is totally
silent as to the rights of the slaves in the colonies.  It is true
that Jefferson in his draft of this instrument, in the articles of
indictment against King George III., used this language:

"He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its
most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of distant
people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into
slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in the
transportation thither, . . . determined to keep open a market
where white men should be bought and sold; he has prostituted his
negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or
restrain this execrable commerce."

To conciliate Georgia and South Carolina, this part of the indictment
was struck out.  These colonies had never sought to restrain, but
had always fostered the slave trade.  Jefferson, in his _Autobiography_
(vol. i, p. 19), suggests that other sections sympathized with
Georgia and South Carolina in this matter.

"Our Northern brethren . . . felt a little tender under these
censures: for though their people had very few slaves themselves,
yet they had been considerable carriers of them to others."

Jefferson said King George preferred the advantage:

"of a few British corsairs to the lasting interests of the American
States and to the rights of human nature, deeply wounded by this
infamous practice."(10)

While it is not true, as has often been claimed, that England is
solely responsible for the introduction of slavery into her American
colonies, it is true that her King and Parliament opposed almost
every attempt to prohibit it or to restrict the importation of
slaves.  Colonial legislative enactments of Virginia and other
colonies directed against slavery were vetoed by the King or by
his command by his royal governors.  Such governors were early
forbidden to give their assent to any measure restricting slavery
in the American colonies, and this policy was pursued until the
colonies became independent.(11)

The treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States,
signed at Paris, September 3, 1783, contained a stipulation that
Great Britain should withdraw her armies from the United States
"with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction,
or _carrying_ away any _negroes or other property_ of the American
inhabitants."  Both governments thus openly recognized, not only
the existence of slavery in the United States, but that slaves were
merely _property_.

While slavery was deeply seated in the colonies and had many
advocates, including noted divines, who preached the "divinity of
slavery," there were, in 1776, and earlier, many great men, South
as well as North, who looked confidently to an early emancipation
of slaves, and who were then active in suppressing the African
slave trade, among whom were Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, and
the two Adamses.

Washington presided at a "Fairfax County Convention," before the
Revolution.  It resolved that "no slaves ought to be imported into
any of the British colonies"; and Washington himself expressed "the
most earnest wish to see an entire stop forever put to such a
wicked, cruel, and unnatural trade."(12)

John Wesley, when fully acquainted with American slavery and the
slave trade, pronounced the latter as "_the execrable sum of all
villanies_," and he inveighed against the former as the wickedest
of human practices.

The Continental Congress of 1776 resolved, "that no slaves be
imported into any of the thirteen United Colonies."

There had then been imported by the cruel traffic above 300,000
blacks, bought or stolen from the African shore; and the blacks
then constituted twenty per cent. of the total population, a greater
per centum than at any time since.

During the century previous to 1776, English and colonial slavers
had carried into the West Indies and to English colonies nearly
3,000,000 negroes; and it is estimated that a quarter of a million
more died of cruel treatment on shipboard, and their bodies were
cast into the sea.

The words of the Declaration:  "We hold these truths to be self-
evident:  That _all men are created equal;_ that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are _life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,_" were not accepted
in fact as a charter of freedom for the enslaved African, but it
remained for a Chief-Justice of the United States (Taney) more than
eighty years later (March 5, 1857), in the Dred Scott decision,
that did so much (as we will hereafter show) to disrupt the Union,
to say:

"The language used in the Declaration of Independence shows that
neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor
their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included
in the general words used."

And the Chief-Justice said further:

"They [the negroes] had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and
so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit."

Quoting the Declaration, "_that all men are created equal_," he
continued:

"The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this
day would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute that
the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and
formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
Declaration."

Notwithstanding this interpretation of the Declaration, free negroes
fought for American independence at Bunker Hill; and although later
it was decided that colored men should not be accepted as enlisted
soldiers, General Washington did accept them, and thereafter they
served in his army to the end of the war,(13) notably in large
numbers at Yorktown.

The Royal Governor of Virginia in vain tried to induce slaves to
revolt against their masters by promising them their freedom.

During Lord Howe's march through Pennsylvania it is said the slaves
prayed for his success, believing he would set them free.

The British Parliament discussed a measure to set the slaves in
the colonies free with a view to weaken their masters' ardor for
freedom.  In Rhode Island slaves were, by law, set free on condition
that they enlisted in the army for the war.

(10)  Parton's _Life of Jefferson_, p. 138.

(11)  _History Ready Reference_, etc., vol. iv., p. 2923.

(12)  Sparks's _Life of Washington_, vol. ii., p. 494.

(13)  Bancroft, _History of the United States_, vol. iv., 223,322.


IV
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS--ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 1774-1789

The Continental Congress, which assembled for the first time,
September 5, 1774, at Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia, assumed few
powers, and its proceedings were, until the adoption by it of the
Declaration of Independence, little more than protests against
British oppression.  Nor was any central government formed on the
adoption of the Declaration.  That Congress continued, by common
agreement, to direct affairs, though, in the beginning, possessing
no delegated political or governmental powers.

Slavery existed in the colonies or States prior to the Declaration
by the connivance of British colonial authorities without the
sanction of and against English law; and after the Declaration, by
mere toleration as an existing domestic institution, not even by
virtue of express colonial or State authority.

In 1772 Lord Mansfield, from the Court of the King's Bench, announced
that slavery could not exist under the English Constitution.

The Articles of Confederation did nothing more than formulate, in
a weak way, a government for the United States, solely through a
Congress to which was delegated little political power.  This
Congress continued to govern (if government it could be called)
until the Constitution went into effect, March 4, 1789.

The "_Articles of Confederation_," adopted (July 9, 1778) by the
Continental Congress of the thirteen original States in the midst
of the Revolution, were substantially silent on slavery.  They
constituted in all respects a weak and impotent instrument.  But
they recognized the existence of slavery by speaking of _free_
citizens (Art. 4).

They provided for a "Confederation and perpetual Union" between
the thirteen States, but provided no power to raise revenue, levy
taxes, or enforce law, save with the consent of nine of the States.
The government created had power to contract debts, but no power
to pay them; it could levy war, raise armies and navies, but it
could not raise revenue to sustain them; it could make treaties,
but could not compel their observance by the States; it could make
laws, but could not enforce them.

Washington said of it:

"The Confederation appears to be little more than a shadow without
the substance, and Congress a nugatory body."

Chief-Justice Story said:

"There was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry into
effect its own constitutional measures."

The Articles were, professedly, not in the interest of the whole
people.

They provided only for a "_league_" of states, guaranteeing to each
state-rights in all things.

Art. IV. runs thus:

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States of this Union, the _free_
inhabitants of each of these States, _paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted_, shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of _free_ citizens in the several States,"
etc.

What a classification of persons for exception from the privileges
of government!

_Free_ negroes were not of the excepted class.  Nor were criminals,
unless they became fugitives from justice.

For ten years the new Republic existed under these Articles by the
tolerance of a people bound together by the spirit of liberty and
the cohesion of patriotism.

The Articles created no status for slavery, nor did they interfere
with it in the States.  They made no provision for a fugitive-slave
law, if, indeed, such a law was dreamed of until after the Constitution
went into effect.

The Articles of Confederation provided no executive head, no supreme
judiciary, and they provided for no perfect legislative body,
organized on the principle of checks and restraints, possessed of
true republican representation.  Congress--the sole governing power
--was composed of one body, each State sending not less than two
or more than seven representatives.  The voting in this body was
done by States, each State having one vote.

It therefore soon became necessary to frame and adopt a new organic
act, supplementing the many deficiencies of these Articles.


V
ORDINANCE OF 1787

The memorable Congress of 1776 was willing to do much to the end
that slavery might be restricted, hence, as we have seen, it resolved
"_that no slaves be imported into any of the thirteen United
Colonies_."

Had it been possible thus early to stop effectually the slave trade,
and to prevent the extension of slavery to new territory, slavery
would have died out.  Jefferson sought, shortly after the treaty
of peace, to prohibit slavery extension, and to this end he prepared
and reported an Ordinance (1784) prohibiting slavery _after the
year 1800_ in all the territory then belonging to the United States
above the parallel of 31° North latitude, which included what became
the principal parts of the slave States of Alabama and Mississippi,
all of Tennessee and Kentucky, as well as the whole Northwest
Territory.  In 1784 the United States owned no territory south of
31° North latitude.

This Ordinance of freedom was lost by a single vote.  Had that one
vote been reversed, what a "hell of agony" would have been closed,
and what a sea of blood would have been saved!  Slavery would have
died in the hands of its friends and the new Republic would have
soon been free in _fact_ as well as name.

Jefferson, though himself a slaveholder, was desperately in earnest
in advocacy of this Ordinance, and, speaking of its prohibitory
slave-clause two years later, he wrote:

"The voice of a single individual would have prevented that abominable
crime.  Heaven will not always be silent; the friends to the rights
of human nature will in the end prevail."(14)

The most important victory for freedom in the civil history of the
United States (until the Rebellion of 1861) was the Ordinance of
1787, reported by Nathan Dane,(15) of Massachusetts, as a substitute
for the defeated one just referred to, but differing from it in
two important respects:

(1) It applied only to the territory northwest of the River Ohio
recently (March 1, 1784) ceded to the United States by Virginia;

(2) It prohibited slavery at once and forever therein.  Its sixth
section is in these words:

"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the
said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted."

But it has been, with much force, claimed by those who denied the
binding character of this Ordinance, that as it was an act of the
old Congress under the Articles of Confederation, and established
a territorial form of government, not in all respects in conformity
with the Constitution, it was necessarily superseded by it.

This view was general on the meeting of the First Congress (1789)
under the Constitution, but the Ordinance, so dear to the hearts
of Jefferson and other lovers of liberty, was early attended to.

On August 7, 1789, the eighth act of the First Congress, embodying
a long explanatory and declaratory preamble, was passed, and approved
by President Washington.  This act in effect re-enacted the Ordinance
of 1787, adapting and applying it, however, to the Constitution by
requiring the Governor of the Northwest Territory to report and
become responsible to the President of the United States, instead
of to Congress as originally provided.(16)

The territory which the ordinance governed was in area 260,000
square miles, and included what is now the great states of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, with, in 1890, 13,471,840
inhabitants.

The Ordinance is a model of perfection.  It was the only great act
of legislation under the Articles of Confederation.  There is
evidence that, as some members of the Congress that enacted the
Ordinance were at the same time members of the Convention that
framed the Constitution,(17) there was much intercommunication of
views between the members of the two bodies, especially on the
slavery clause of the Ordinance.  It is probable that the clause
of the Constitution respecting the rendition of slaves, as well as
other provisions, was copied from the Ordinance.(18)

Upon the surpassing excellence of this Ordinance, no language of
panegyric would be extravagant.

It is a matchless specimen of sagacious forecast.  It provides for
the descent of property, for the appointment of territorial officers,
and for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious
liberty by securing religious freedom in the inhabitants.  It
prohibits legislative interference with private contracts, secures
the benefit of the writ of _habeas corpus_, trial by jury, and of
the common law in judicial proceedings: it forbids the infliction
of cruel or unusual punishments, and enjoins the encouragement of
schools and the means of education.

The Ordinance has not only stood, unaltered, as the charter of
government for the Northwest Territory, but its clause respecting
slavery was incorporated into most of the acts passed prior to the
Rebellion providing for territorial governments.

Historically, it will stand as the great _Magna Charta_, which, by
the prescient wisdom of our fathers, dedicated in advance of the
coming civilization the fertile and beautiful Northwest, with all
its possibilities, for all time, to freedom, education, and liberty
of conscience.

Frequent efforts to rescind or suspend the clause restricting
slavery were made, especially after Indiana Territory was formed
in 1800.

At the adoption of the Ordinance some slaves were held in what is
now Indiana and Illinois by immigrants from Southern States.
Slavery also existed at the Vincennes, Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and
other French settlements, where it had been planted under the
authority of the King of France while the territory was a part of
the French possessions.  The Government of Great Britain authorized
the continuance of slavery when the territory was under its
jurisdiction.  Indians as well as black men were held as slaves in
the French settlements.(19)

Immigrants and old inhabitants favorable to slavery united in
memorials to Congress asking a suspension of the article prohibiting
slavery.  The first of these was reported on adversely by a committee
of Congress, May 12, 1796.  Governor William Henry Harrison,
December, 1802, presided, at Vincennes, over a meeting of citizens
of the Indiana Territory, at which it was resolved to make an
effort to secure a suspension of this article.  A memorial was
drawn up, which Governor Harrison, with a letter of his own favoring
it, forwarded to Congress.  They were referred to a special committee,
of which John Randolph, of Virginia, was chairman.

He, March 2, 1803, reported:

"That it is inexpedient to suspend, even for a limited time, the
operation of the sixth article of the compact between the original
States and the people and States west of the river Ohio."

Adding, by way of reason, that:

"The rapid population of the State of Ohio sufficiently evinces,
in the opinion of your committee, that the labor of slaves is not
necessary to promote the growth and settlement of the colonies in
that region."

This did not end the effort to secure slavery in the Indiana
Territory.  In March, 1804, a special committee of Congress reported
in favor of the suspension of the inhibition for ten years; a
similar report was made in 1806 by Mr. Garnett, of Virginia; and
in 1807 Mr. Parker, delegate from Indiana, reported favorably on
a memorial of Governor Harrison and the Territorial Legislature,
praying for a suspension of that part of the Ordinance relating to
slavery.  These reports were not acted on in the House.  Subsequently,
Governor Harrison and his Legislature appealed to the Senate and
a special committee to suspend the article, but when the committee
reported adversely, all efforts to break down the legal barrier to
slavery in the Northwest Territory ceased.(20)

But notwithstanding the mandatory terms of the Ordinance, and the
repeated failures in Congress to suspend the provision relating to
slavery, it existed in the Northwest throughout its territorial
existence and in the State of Illinois until 1844.(21)  The early
slaveholding inhabitants well understood the Ordinance to mean the
absolute emancipation of their slaves, and hence manumitted them
or commenced to remove them to the Spanish territory beyond the
Mississippi.  Some few of the inhabitants complained to Governor
St. Clair that the inhibition against slavery retarded the growth
of the Territory.  He volunteered the opinion that the Ordinance
was not retroactive; that it did not apply to existing conditions;
that it was "a declaration of a principle which was to govern the
Legislature in all acts respecting that matter (slavery) and the
courts of justice in their decisions in cases arising after the
date of the Ordinance"; and that if Congress had intended the
immediate emancipation of slaves, compensation would have been
provided for to their owners.  But he admitted Congress "had the
right to determine that _property_ of that kind afterwards acquired
should not be protected in future, and that slaves imported into
the Territory after that declaration might reclaim their freedom."(22)
This unfortunate opinion operated to continue slavery in the
Territory, and fostered the idea that the sixth article might be
annulled and slavery be made perpetual in the Territory.  Governor
St. Clair was President of the Congress when the Ordinance was
passed, and his opinion in relation to it was therefore given much
weight.

By Act of Congress, passed May 7, 1800, what is now the State of
Ohio became the Territory of Ohio, and that part of the Northwest
Territory lying west and north of Ohio was erected into the Territory
of Indiana; by like Acts, January 11, 1805, the Territory of Michigan
was formed, and February 3, 1809, all that part lying west of
Indiana and Lake Michigan became the Territory of Illinois.  Prior,
however, to the last Act, the Legislature of Indiana Territory
(September 17, 1807) passed an act "to encourage emigration," making
it lawful to bring negroes and mulattoes into the Territory, "owing
service or labor as slaves."

The act provided that these people and their children should be
held for a term of years, and if they refused to serve as slaves
they might be removed, "within sixty days thereafter," to any place
where they could be lawfully held.  This statute was substantially
re-enacted by the Legislature of the Territory of Illinois in 1812.

The first Constitution (1818) of Illinois did not prohibit slavery.
The first section of Article VI, declared that:  "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude _shall hereafter be introduced_ into this
State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes."  Slavery
existed in Illinois after it became a State.  The French and Canadian
inhabitants or their descendants continued to hold colored and
Indian slaves, and others were held under the Territorial Acts of
1807 and 1812.  The old slaves and their descendants, held at the
time of the cession by Virginia to the United States, were sold
from hand to hand in the State, and transported to and sold in
other slave States.(23)

The Constitution of Indiana (1816) prohibited slavery, but slaves
were held therein until its Supreme Court in 1820, in a _habeas
corpus_ case, held the Constitution freed all persons hitherto held
in bondage, including the old French slaves, regardless of the
Ordinance of 1787, of the deed of cession of Virginia, or of any
treaty stipulations.(24)

After the separation (1805) of Michigan from Indiana, the former's
Territorial Chief Justice held slavery existed in Michigan by virtue
of the Jay treaty (1796) with Great Britain (not otherwise)
notwithstanding the Ordinance of 1787,(25) but Michigan's Constitution
(1837) put an end to slavery in the State, as did also the Constitution
(1802) of Ohio, likewise the Constitution (1848) of Wisconsin.
Slaves shown by census reports in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and
Wisconsin after they became States, were there by tolerance, not
by legal right.

Whatever contrariety of views obtained, and regardless of the
conflicting opinions of the courts or judges as to the effect of
the great Ordinance on the condition of the slaves in the Northwestern
Territory, certain it is that the Ordinance operated to prevent,
after its date, the legal importation of slaves into the Territory,
and hence resulted in each of the States formed therefrom becoming
free States.  In the light of history it seems certain that at
least Indiana and Illinois would have become slave States but for
the Ordinance.(26)

This Ordinance contained a clause requiring the rendition of
fugitives from "service or labor," and being applicable to only a
part of the Territory of the United States, partook of the nature
of a compromise on the slavery question,(27) and was the first of
a series of compromises, some of which are found in the Federal
Constitution, others in the Act of 1820 admitting Missouri as a
State, and also the Compromise Measures of 1850, in which Clay,
Webster, Calhoun, Seward, and others of the great statesmen of the
Union participated, all of which were, however, ruthlessly overthrown
by the Nebraska Act (1854), of which Douglas, of Illinois, was the
author.

The slavery-restriction section of the Ordinance was copied into
and became a part of the Act of 1848 organizing the Territory of
Oregon, the champions of slavery, then in Congress, voting therefor;
and three years after the enactment of the Compromise Measures of
1850, this provision of the Ordinance was again extended over the
newly organized Territory of Washington by the concurrent votes of
substantially the same persons who voted, a year later, that all
such legislation was unconstitutional.

But neither origin, age, nor precedent then sanctified anything in
the interest of freedom,--slavery only could appeal to such things
for justification.  The propagators of human slavery were on the
track of this Ordinance; they overtook and overthrew it by
Congressional legislation in 1854; then by the Dred Scott decision
of 1857, as we shall soon see.  But it reappeared in principle, in
1862, as we shall also see, and spread its wings of universal
liberty (as was its great author's purpose in 1784) over all the
territory belonging to the United States, to remain irrepealable
through time, immortalized by the approval of President Lincoln,
and endorsed by the just judgment of enlightened mankind.

Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia each held territory not
subject to the Ordinance of 1787.

North Carolina (December, 1789), in ceding her territory west of
her present limits, provided that:

"No regulations made or to be made by Congress shall tend to
emancipate slaves."

Thus Tennessee became a slave State.

A year later (1790) Virginia consented to relinquish her remaining
territory; as Kentucky it was (June 1, 1792) admitted into the
Union and became a slave State, without ever having a separate
territorial organization.

Georgia, in 1802, ceded the territory on her west to the United
States, and provided that the Ordinance of 1787 should extend to
the ceded territory, "the article only excepted which forbids
slavery."  Thus, later, Alabama and Mississippi each became a slave
State.(28)

(14)  Jefferson's _Works_, vol. ix., 276.

(15)  The authorship of the admirably-drawn Ordinance has been much
in dispute.  Thomas H. Benton, Gov. Edward Coles, and others
attribute the authorship to Jefferson; Daniel Webster and others
to Nathan Dane, while a son of Rufus King claimed him to be the
author of the article prohibiting slavery.  Wm. Frederick Poole,
in a contribution to the _North American Review_, gives much of
the credit of authorship to Mr. Dane, but the chief credit for the
formation and the entire credit for the passage of the Ordinance
to Dr. Manasseh Cutler, _St. Clair Papers_, vol. i, p. 122.

(16)  On the continuing binding force of the Ordinance on States
formed out of the Northwest Territory there has been some contrariety
of opinion.  In Ohio it was early held the Ordinance was more
obligatory than the State Constitution, which might be amended by
the people of the State, whereas the Ordinance could not.  (5
_Ohio_, 410, 416.)  But see:  10 Howard (_U. S._), 82, and 3 Howard,
589.

(17)  Madison of Virginia, Rufus King of New York, Johnson of
Connecticut, Blount and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, and
Few of Georgia were members of both bodies.--_Historical Ex._,
etc., Dred Scott Case (Benton), p. 37 _n_.

The Ordinance was adopted July 13, 1787; the Constitution was
adopted by the Convention September 17, 1787.

(18)  _St. Clair Papers_, vol. i, p. 134.

(19)  Dunn's _Indiana_, p. 126.

(20)  _St. Clair Papers_, vol. i, pp 120-1, note.  _Historical
Ex_., etc., Dred Scott Case, pp. 32-47, etc.  _Political Text Book_,
1860 (McPherson), pp. 53-4.

(21)  Not until 1844 did the highest court of Illinois decide (four
to three) that a colored man, held as a slave by a descendant of
an old French family, was free.  Jarrot case (2 Gillman), 7 _Ill._, 1.

(22)  _St. Clair Papers_, vol. i., pp. 120, 206, and vol. ii, pp.
117-119, 318, 331.

(23)  Much valuable information in relation to the legal history
of slavery in the Northwest has been obtained from the manuscript
of "An Unwritten Chapter of Illinois," by ex-U. S. Judge Blodgett,
of Chicago.

(24)  State _vs_. Lasselle, 1 _Blatchford_, 60.

(25)  Cooley's _Michigan_, pp. 136-7.

(26)  For an exhaustive legal history of the slavery restriction
clause of the Ordinance and its effect on slavery in the Northwest
Territory, see Dunn's _Indiana_, pp. 219-260.

(27)  _St. Clair Papers_, vol. i., p. 122, note.

(28)  _Political Text-Book_, 1860 (McPherson), p. 53.


VI
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Convention to frame the Constitution met in Philadelphia (1787).
George Washington was its President; it was composed of the leading
statesmen of the new nation, sitting in a delegate capacity, but
in voting on measures the rule of the then Congress was observed,
which was to vote by States.

The majority of the thirteen States were then slave States, and
all, save Massachusetts, still held slaves; and all the coast States
indulged in the African slave trade.

Massachusetts provided for the abolition of slavery in 1780 by
constitutional provision declaring that:

"All men are born _free and equal_, and have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights," etc., by which declaration its
highest judicial tribunal struck the shackles at once from every
slave in the Commonwealth.

Connecticut provided in 1784 for freeing her slaves.

New Hampshire did not prohibit slavery by express law, but all
persons born after her Constitution of 1776 were free; and slave
importation was thereafter prohibited.

Pennsylvania, in 1780, by law provided for the gradual emancipation
of slaves within her territory.  To her German population and the
Society of Friends the credit is mainly due for this act of justice.
This Society had theretofore (1774) disowned, in its "yearly
Meeting," all its members who trafficked in slaves; and later (1776)
it resolved:

"That the owners of slaves, who refused to execute proper instruments
for giving them their freedom, were to be disowned likewise."

New York adopted gradual emancipation in 1799, but final emancipation
did not come until 1827.

Rhode Island, in the first year of the First Continental Congress
(1774), enacted:

"That for the future no negro or mulatto slave shall be brought
into the colony . . . and that all previously enslaved persons on
becoming residents of Rhode Island should obtain their freedom."

New Jersey in 1778, through Governor Livingstone, made an attempt
at emancipation which failed; it was not until 1804 that she
prohibited slavery in what proved a qualified way, and it seems
she held slaves at each census, including that of 1860, and possibly
in some form human slavery was abolished there by the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.

The census of 1790 showed slaves in all the original States save
Massachusetts alone; Vermont was admitted into the Union in 1790;
her Constitution prohibited slavery, but she returned at that census
seventeen slaves.

The first census under the Constitution, however, showed, in the
Northern States, 40,370 slaves, and in the Southern States, 657,572;
there being in Virginia alone 293,427, nearly one half of all.

The Convention closed its work September 17, 1787, and on the same
date George Washington, its President, by letter submitted the
"Constitution to the consideration of the United States in Congress
assembled," saying:

"It is obviously impracticable in the Federal Government of these
States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each and
yet provide for the interest and safety of all. . . . In all our
deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view that
which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American,
_the consolidation of our Union_, in which is involved our prosperity,
felicity, safety; perhaps our national existence."

This Constitution by its preamble showed it was, in many things,
to supersede and become paramount to State authority.  It was to
become a _charter of freedom_ for the people collectively, and in
some sense individually.  Its preamble runs thus:

"We, the _people_ of the United States, in order to form a _more_
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."

Nine States were, by its seventh article, necessary to ratify it
before it went into effect.

The ratification of the Constitution, on various grounds, was
fiercely opposed by many patriotic men, Patrick Henry among the
number.  Some thought it did not contain sufficient guarantees for
individual freedom, others that private rights of property were
not adequately secured, and still others that States were curtailed
or abridged of their governmental authority and too much power was
taken from the people and centered in the Federal Government.
Mason, of Virginia, a member of the Convention that framed it, led
a party who opposed it on the ground, among others, that it authorized
Congress to levy duties on imports and to thus encourage home
industries and manufactories, promotive of free labor, inimical
and dangerous to human slavery.  The best efforts and influence of
Washington and other friends of the Constitution would not have
been sufficient to secure its ratification had they not placated
many of its enemies by promising to adopt, promptly on its going
into effect, the amendments numbered one to ten inclusive. (The
First Congress, September 25, 1789, submitted those ten amendments
according to the agreement, and they were shortly thereafter ratified
and became a part of the Constitution.)

By a resolution of the Old Congress, of September 13, 1788, March
4, 1789, was fixed as the time for commencing proceedings under
the Constitution.  At the date of this resolution eleven of the
thirteen States had ratified it.  North Carolina ratified it November
21, 1789, and Rhode Island, the last, on May 29, 1790.

Vermont, not of the original thirteen States, ratified the Constitution
January 10, 1791, over a month prior to her admission into the
Union.  This latter event occurred February 18, 1791.

Thus fourteen States became, almost at the same time, members of
the Union under the Constitution, and each and all of which then
held or had theretofore held slaves.

Notwithstanding all this, there were many of the framers of the
Constitution and its warmest friends who sincerely desired to
provide for the early abolition of slavery, some by gradual
emancipation, others by heroic measures; and there were many from
the South who favored emancipation, while by no means all the
leading and influential citizens of the Northern States desired it.

It may, however, be assumed, in the light of authentic history,
that the majority of the framers of the Constitution, and a majority
of its friends in the States, hoped and believed that slavery would
not be permanent under it.  In this belief it was framed.  Slavery
was not affirmatively recognized in it, though there was much
discussion as to it in the Constitutional Convention.  There was
no attempt to abolish it; such an attempt would have failed in the
Convention, and the Constitution, so necessary to the new nation,
had it even provided for gradual emancipation, would not have been
ratified by the States.

It can hardly be said that the Constitution was framed on the line
of compromise as to the preservation of human slavery, though it
was necessary, in some occult ways, to recognize its existence.
This was in the nature, however, of a concession to it; the word
_slave_ or _slavery_ was not used in it.

The Supreme Court of the United States, however, early interpreted
the third clause of Section IV., Article 2, as providing for the
return from one State to another of fugitive slaves.  This
interpretation has been, on high authority, and with much reason,
in the light of history, stoutly denied.  The clause reads:

"No person _held to service or labor_ in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor,
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service
or labor is due."

The "service or labor" here referred to, it is claimed, was that
owing by persons who were under indentures of some kind, growing
out of contracts for transportation into the colonies of persons
from the Old World, and possibly growing out of other contract
obligations wherein they had agreed, for a long or short term, to
perform "service or labor."  Many such obligations then existed.

Slaves were not then nor since regarded by their owners as "_persons_"
merely "held to service or labor," but they were held as personal
chattels, owing no duty to their masters distinguishable from that
owing by an ox, a horse, or an ass.

But the supreme judiciary and the executive and legislative
departments of the government came soon to treat this as a fugitive-
slave clause.  It is only now interesting to examine its peculiar
phraseology and the history and surrounding circumstances under
which it became a part of the Constitution, to demonstrate the
great care and desire of the eminent and liberty-loving framers of
the Constitution to avoid the direct recognition of African slavery.

The only other clause in which the adherents of slavery claimed it
was recognized is paragraph 3, Section 2, Article I., which provided
that:

"Representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States . . . according to their respective numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, _three fifths of all other persons_."

The "other persons" referred to here, if only slaves, are very
delicately described.  But this clause, too, came to be recognized
by all the departments of the government as referring to slaves.
It is quite sure that if the good and plain men of the Revolutionary
period had been dealing with a subject not shocking to their
consciences, sense of justice, and humanity, they would have dealt
with it in plain words, of direct and not doubtful import.

The clause of the Constitution giving representation in the House
of Representative of Congress and in the Electoral College in the
choice of President and Vice-President, came soon to be regarded
as unjust to the free States.  Three fifths of all slaves were
counted to give representation to free persons of the South; that
is, three fifths of all _slave property_ was counted numerically,
and thus, in many Congressional districts, the vote of one slaveholder
was more than equal to two votes in a free State.  For example, in
1850, the number of free inhabitants in the slave States was
6,412,605, and in the free States, 13,434,686, more than double.
The representation in Congress from the slave States was 90 members,
from the free States 144.  Three fifths of the slaves were 1,920,182,
giving the South 20 (a fraction more) members, the ratio of
representation then being 93,420.  If the 234 representatives had
been apportioned equally, according to free inhabitants, the North
would have had 159 and the South 75, a gain of fifteen to the free
and a loss of that number to the slave States, a gain of 30 to the
North.

The same injustice was shown in levying direct taxes.  (All this,
however, has been changed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.)

The same discriminating language is used (Sec. 9, Art. I.) when
obviously referring to the African slave trade.  A strong sentiment
existed in favor of putting an end at once to the traffic in human
being; the Christian consciences of our forefathers revolted at
its wickedness, and there was then beginning a general movement
throughout the civilized world against it.  Some European countries
had denounced it as piracy.

It was, however, profitable, and much capital was invested in it,
and there was even then an increased demand for slaves in the
cotton, rice, and tobacco States.

It was feared so radical a measure as the immediate stoppage of
this trade would endanger the Constitution, and as to this, also,
it was deemed wise to compromise; so Congress was prohibited from
legislating to prevent it prior to the year 1808.  This trade was
not only then carried on by our own people, but, through ships of
other countries, slaves were imported into the United States.  Each
State was left free to prohibit the importation of slaves within
its limits.

We have now referred to all the clauses of the Constitution as
originally adopted relating, by construction or possibility, to
slavery or slave labor.

The Republic, under this _great charter_, set out upon the career
of a nation, properly aspiring to become of the first among the
powers of the earth, and succeeding in the higher sense in this
ambition, it yet remains to be told how near our Republic came, in
time, to the brink of that engulfing chasm which in past ages has
swallowed up other nations for their wicked oppression and enslavement
of man.

Slavery, thus delicately treated in our Constitution, brought that
Republic, in less than three quarters of a century, to the throes
of death, as we shall see.


VII
CAUSES OF GROWTH OF SLAVERY

It may be well here, before speaking of slavery in its legislative
history under the Constitution, to refer briefly to some of the
more important causes of its growth and extension, other than
political.

First in importance was cotton.  It required cheap labor to cultivate
it with profit, and even then, at first, it was not profitable.
The invention by Whitney of the cotton-gin, in 1793, was the most
important single invention up to that time in agriculture, if not
the most important of any time, and especially is this true as
affecting cotton planters.

Cotton was indigenous to America; the soil and climate of the South
were well adapted to its growth.  Its culture from the seed was
there very easy, but the separation of the seed from the fibre was
so slow that it required an average hand one day to secure one
pound.

Whitney's cotton-gin, however, at once increased the amount from
one to fifty pounds.

This invention came at a most opportune time for slavery in the
United States, as the cheapness of rice, indigo, and other staples
of the South were such as to prevent their large and profitable
production even with the labor of slaves.  Cotton was not, in 1794,
the date of Jay's treaty with Great Britain, known to him as an
article of export.  Soon, by the use of the cotton-gin, cotton
became the principal article of export from the United States;
cotton plantations rapidly increased in size and number, and their
owners multiplied their slaves and grew rich.  Cotton production
increased from 1793 to 1860 one thousand fold.

It is highly probably that Eli Whitney's cotton-gin operated to
prevent the much-hoped-for early emancipation of slaves in America,
and that thus the inventive genius of man was instrumental in
forging the fetters of man.

Other products, such as rice and sugar, were successfully produced
in the South, but the demand for them was limited by competition
in other countries, in some of which slave labor was employed.
The ease of producing cotton stimulated its common use throughout
the world, and it soon became a necessary commodity in all civilized
countries.  "Cotton is king" was the cry of the slaveholder and
the exporter.  Southern aristocracy rested on it.  In the more
northern of the slave States, where cotton, on account of the
climate, could not be successfully grown, the breeding of slaves
with which to supply the cotton planters with the requisite number
of hands became a source of great profit; and the slave trade was
revived to aid in supplying the same great demand.

Tobacco and some of the cereals were also produced by slave labor,
but they could be produced by free labor North as well as South.
Of the above 3,000,000 slaves in the United States in 1850, it has
been estimated that 1,800,000 were employed in the growth and
preservation of cotton alone, and its value that year was $105,600,000,
while the sugar product was valued, the same year, at only $12,400,000,
and rice at $3,000,000.  The total domestic exports for the year
ending 1850 were $137,000,000, of which cotton reached $72,000,000,
and all breadstuffs and provisions only $26,000,000.(29)

(29)  DeBow's _Resource_, etc., vol. iii., p. 388.


VIII
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW--1793

Contemporaneous with the cotton-gin came, in 1793, the first fugitive-
slave law.

The Constitution was not self-executing, if it really contained,
as we have seen, a clause requiring escaped slaves to be surrendered
from one State to their masters in another.

The Governor of the State of Virginia refused the rendition of
three kidnappers of a free negro, on the requisition of the Governor
of Pennsylvania, from which State he had been kidnapped, on the
sole ground that no law required the surrender of fugitive slaves
from Virginia.  The controversy thus arising was called to the
attention of President Washington and by him to Congress, and it
ended by the passage of the first fugitive-slave act.  It was for
a time tolerably satisfactory to the different sections of the
country, though in itself the most flagrant attempt to violate
state-rights, judged from the more modern secession, state-rights
standpoint, ever attempted by Federal authority.

It required _state magistrates_, who owed their offices solely to
state law, to sit in judgment in fugitive-slave cases, and to aid
in returning to slavery negroes claimed as slaves by masters from
foreign States.  The act provided for the return of fugitive
apprentices as well as fugitive slaves.

In time the Northern States became free, and the public conscience
in them became so changed that the magistrates were deterred or
unwilling to act in execution of the law.  Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania each passed a law making it penal for any of their
officers to perform any duties or to take cognizance of any case
under the fugitive-slave law.  Other States, through their judiciary,
pronounced it unconstitutional, even some of the Federal judges
doubted its consonance with the Constitution, but, such as it was,
it lasted until 1850.  It did not provide for a jury trial.  The
scenes enacted in its execution shocked the moral sense of mankind,
and even the slaveholder often shrank from attempting its execution.

But it was not until about the time of the excitement of the fugitive-
slave law of 1850 that the highest excitement prevailed in the
North over its enforcement, and of this we shall speak hereafter.


IX
SLAVE TRADE:  ABOLISHED BY LAW

In the English Parliament, in 1776, the year of the Declaration of
Independence, the first motion was made towards the abolition of
the slave trade, long theretofore fostered by English kings and
queens, but not until 1807 did the British moral sense rise high
enough to pass, at Lord Granville's instance, the famous act for
"the Abolition of the Slave Trade."  As early as 1794 the United
States prohibited their subjects from trading in slaves to foreign
countries; and in 1807, they prohibited the importation of slaves
into any of the States, to take effect at the beginning of 1808,
the earliest time possible, as we have seen, under the Constitution.
But it was not until 1820 that slave-traders were declared pirates,
punishable as such.

The prohibition of the slave trade by law did not effectually end
it, nor was the law declaring it piracy wholly effectual, though
the latter did much, through the co-operation of other nations, to
restrict it.

There were active movements in 1852 and 1858, in the South, to
revive the African slave trade, and especially was there fierce
opposition to the "piracy act."  Jefferson Davis, at a convention
in Mississippi, July, 1858, advocated the repeal of the latter act,
but doubted the practicability then of abrogating the law prohibiting
slave traffic.(30)

It is worthy of mention here that April 20th, eight days after
Sumter was fired upon, Commander Alfred Taylor, commanding the
United States naval ship _Saratoga_, in the port of Kabenda, Africa,
captured the _Nightingale of Boston_, flying American colors, with
a cargo of 961 recently captured, stolen, or purchased African
negroes, destined to be carried to some American part and there
sold into slavery.  This human cargo was sent to the humane Rev.
John Seys, at Monrovia, Liberia, to be provided for.  One hundred
and sixty died on a fourteen-days' sea-voyage, from ship-fever and
confinement, though the utmost care was taken by Lieutenant Guthrie
and the crew of the slaver for their comfort.(31)

The laws abolishing the foreign slave trade and prohibiting the
introduction of African slaves (after 1807) into the United States
even helped to rivet slavery more firmly therein.  They more than
doubled the value of a slave, and, therefore, incited slave-breeding
to supply the increasing demand in the cotton States, and in time
this proved so profitable that the South sought new territory whence
slavery could be extended, and out of which slave States could be
formed.

The "_Declaration against the Slave Trade_" of the world, signed
by the representatives of the "Powers" at the Congress of Vienna,
in 1815, and repeated at the Congress of Paris at the end of the
Napoleonic wars, was potential enough to abate but not to end this
most inhuman and sinful trade.(32)

Even as late as 1816, English merchants, supported by the corporations
of London and Liverpool, through mercantile jealousy, and pretending
to believe that the very existence of commerce on the seas and
their own existence depended on the continuance of the slave trade,
not only opposed the abolition of the black slave traffic, but they
opposed the abolition of _white slavery_ in Algiers.(33)

This nefarious traffic did not cease in the United States, although
at the Treaty of Ghent (1815) it was declared that:  "Whereas the
traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity
and justice," and the two countries (Great Britain and the United
States) therein stipulated to use their best endeavors to abolish it.

The revival of the slave trade was openly advocated by leading
Southern politicians, and the illicit traffic greatly increased
immediately after the admission into the Union of Texas as a State
and the aggressions on Mexico for more slave territory, and especially
just after the discussions over the Compromise measures of 1850
and the Nebraska Act of 1854, followed by the Dred Scott decision
in 1857.  It was principally carried on under the United States
flag, the ships carrying it denying the right of search to foreign
vessels engaged in suppressing the trade.  British officials claimed
in June, 1850, "that at least one half of the successful part of
the slave trade was carried on under the American flag."  The
fitting out of slavers centred at New York city; Boston and New
Orleans being good seconds.  Twenty-one of twenty-two slavers taken
by British cruisers in 1857-58 were from New York, Boston, and New
Orleans.

"During eighteen months of the years 1859-60 eighty-five slavers
are reported to have fitted out in New York harbor, and these alone
transported from 30,000 to 60,000 slaves annually to America."(34)

The greed of man for gain has smothered and will ever smother the
human conscience.  The slave trade, under the denunciation of
piracy, still exists, and will exist until African slavery ceases
throughout the world.  So long as there is a demand, at good prices,
this wicked traffic will go on, and in the jungles of Africa there
will be found stealers of human beings.

(30)  Rhode's _Hist. United States_, vol. ii., p. 372.

(31)  Official Records, etc., _Navies of the War of the Rebellion_,
vol. i., p. 11.

(32)  It stands to the eternal credit of Napoleon that on his return
from Elba to Paris (1815) he decreed for France the total abolition
of the slave-trade.  This decree was confirmed by the Bourbon
dynasty in 1818.  _Suppression of African Slave Trade U. S._
(DuBois), p. 247.

(33)  Osler's _Life of Exmouth_, p. 303; _Slavery, Letters_, etc.,
Horace Mann, p. 276.

(34)  _Sup. of African Slave Trade_ (DuBois) pp. 135, 178-9.


X
LOUISIANA PURCHASE

In 1803, Napoleon, fearing that he could not hold his distant
American possession, known as the Louisiana Province, acquired from
Spain, and which by treaty was to be re-ceded to Spain and not
disposed of to any other nation, put aside all scruples and good
faith, and for 60,000,000 francs, on April 30th signed a treaty of
cession of the vast territory, then mostly uninhabited, to the
United States.  This was in Jefferson's administration.

The United States bought this domain and its people just as they
might buy unoccupied lands with animals on it.

It was early claimed as slave territory.  There were only a few
slaves within its limits when purchased, though slavery was recognized
there.  This purchase was a most important one, although at the
time it was not so regarded.

The Louisiana Purchase was much greater, territorially speaking,
than all the States then in the Union, with all its other
possessions.(35)

It comprised what are now the States of Louisiana, Arkansas,
Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, nearly all
of Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Wyoming, large parts of Colorado
and the Indian Territory, and a portion of Idaho.  These States
and Territories in 1890 contained 11,804,101 inhabitants.

At the time of this great acquisition a conviction prevailed that
slavery was rapidly diminishing.  Adams and Jefferson, each, while
President, entertained the belief that slavery would, ere long,
come to a peaceful end.  It might then have been possible, by law
of Congress, to devote this new region to freedom, but, as slavery
existed at and around New Orleans in 1812 when the State of Louisiana
was admitted into the Union, it became a slave State.  This fate
was largely due to the claim of its original inhabitants that they
were secured the right to hold slaves by the treaty of cession from
France.

Later on, the provision of this treaty, under which it was claimed
slavery was perpetuated, was a subject of much discussion, and on
it was founded the most absurd arguments on behalf of the slave
power.

Its third article was the sole one referred to as fastening forever
the institution of slavery on the inhabitants of this vast empire.
There are those yet living who deny that, even under the present
Constitution of the United States or the constitutions of the States
since erected therein, slavery is _lawfully_ excluded therefrom.

This article reads:

"The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in
the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained
and protected in the enjoyment of their liberty, _property_, and
the religion they profess."

Justice Catron, of the United States Supreme Court, speaking in
the Dred Scott case, for the majority of the court and of this
article, says:

"Louisiana was a province where slavery was not only lawful, but
where property in slaves was the most valuable of all personal
property.  The province was ceded as a _unit_, with an equal right
pertaining to all its inhabitants, in every part thereof, to own
slaves."

He and others of the concurring justices held that the inhabitants
at the time of the purchase, also all immigrants after the cession,
were protected in the right to hold slaves in the entire purchase.

Near the close of his opinion, still speaking of this article and
the acquired territory, he says:

"The right of the United States in or over it depends on the contract
of cession, which operates to incorporate as well the Territory as
its inhabitants into the Union.

"My opinion is that the third article of the treaty of 1803, ceding
Louisiana to the United States, stands protected by the Constitution,
and cannot be repealed by Congress."

This view was heroically combatted by a minority of the court,
especially by Justices McLean and Curtis.  The latter, in his
opinion, said

"That a treaty with a foreign nation cannot deprive Congress of
any part of its legislative power conferred by the people, so that
it no longer can legislate as it is empowered by the Constitution."

Also, that if the treaty expressly prohibited (as it did not) the
exclusion of slavery from the ceded territory the "court could not
declare that an act of Congress excluding it was void by force of
the treaty. . . . A refusal to execute such a stipulation would
not be a judicial, but a political and legislative question. . . .
It would belong to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the
administration of existing laws."(36)

Plainly no part of the treaty of cession fastened slavery, or any
other institution of France, on the territory ceded to the United
States.  If its provisions were violated by the United States,
France, internationally, or the inhabitants at the date of the
treaty, might have complained and had redress.  Obviously the treaty
had no bearing on the question of slavery in the United States,
but its provisions were seized upon, as was every possible pretext,
by the votaries of slavery to maintain and extend it.

It was also, by a majority of the court, held in this memorable
case (hereafter to be mentioned) that under the third article of
the cession slaves could be taken from any State into any part of
the Louisiana Purchase during its territorial state, and there
held, and hence that the Missouri Compromise, of 1820, forbidding
slavery in the territory north of 36° 30´, was in violation of the
treaty and was unconstitutional, as were all other acts of Congress
excluding slavery from United States territory.  This was in the
heyday (1857) of the slave power, and when it aspired, practically,
to make slavery national.

This aggressive policy, as we shall see when we come to consider
the Nebraska Act of 1854 relating to a principal part of the
Louisiana Purchase, led to a great uprising of the friends of
freedom, the political overthrow of the advocates of slavery in
most branches of the Union; then to secession; then to war, whence
came, with peace, universal freedom, and slavery in the Republic
forever dead.

(35)  For map showing territory acquired by the U. S., by each
treaty, etc., see _History Ready Ref._, vol. v., p. 3286, and
_Louisiana Purchase_ (Hermann, Com. Gen. Land Office).  The original
thirteen States and Territories comprised 8,927,844 sq. mi.  The
Louisiana Purchase, 1,171,931, sq. mi.

(36)  Dred Scott Case, 19 Howard, 393, etc.


XI
FLORIDA

Florida did not become a slave colony even on being taken possession
of by the English in 1763, nor on its re-conquest by Spain in 1781.

By the treaty of peace at the end of the war of the Revolution
(1783) Great Britain recognized as part of the southern boundary
of the United States a line due east from the Mississippi at 31°
of latitude; and at the same time, by a separate treaty, she ceded
to Spain the then two Floridas.  Florida became a refuge for fugitive
slaves from Georgia and South Carolina.

"Georgians could never forget that the _fugitive_ slaves were
roaming about the Everglades of Florida."(37)

The Seminole Indians welcomed to their wild freedom the escaped
negro from the lash of the overseer, and consequently the long and
bloody Florida Indian wars were literally a slave hunt.  The wild
tribes of Indians knew no fugitive-slave law.

In the War of 1812, Spain permitted the English to occupy, for
their purposes, some points in Florida.  When the war ended they
abandoned a fort on the Appalachicola, about fifteen miles above
its mouth, with a large amount of arms and ammunition.  This fort
the fugitive negroes seized and held for about _three years_ as a
refuge for escaped slaves, and, consequently, as a menace to slavery.
It was during this time called "Negro Fort."  At the instigation
of slave owners, it was attacked by General Gaines of the United
States Army.

"A hot shot penetrated one of the magazines, and the whole fort
was blown to pieces, July 27, 1816.  There were 300 negro men,
women, and children, and 20 Choctaws in the fort; 270 were killed.
Only three came out unhurt, and these were killed by the allied
Indians."

Thus slavery established and maintained itself, through individual
and national crime and blood, until the day when God's retributive
justice should come.  And we shall see how thoroughly His justice
was meted out; how "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,"
measure of blood for measure of blood, anguish for anguish, came
to the dominating white race!

It was not until February, 1821, that notice of the ratification
of a treaty, made two years before, was received, by which Spain
ceded Florida to the United States in consideration of their paying
$5,000,000 in satisfaction of American claims against Spain.

This was not all the Republic paid for Florida.  A second Seminole
war (1835-43) ensued, the bloodiest and most costly of all our
Indian wars, in which the Indians were assisted by fugitive slaves
and their descendants, in whom the negro blood was admixed, often
with the white blood of former masters, and again with the
Indian.(38)

At the end of eight years, after many valuable lives had been lost,
and $30,000,000 had been expended, but not until after the great
Seminole leader (Osceola (39)) had been, by deliberate treachery
and bad faith, captured, and the Indians had been worn out rather
than conquered, Florida became an American province, and two years
thereafter (1845) a slave State in the Union.

The extinction of the brave Seminole Indians left no _race_-friend
of the poor enslaved negro.  Untutored as they were, they knew what
freedom was, and, until 1861, they were the only people on the
American continent to furnish an asylum and to shed their blood
for the wronged African.

Florida, as a slave State, was a factor in establishing a balance
of power, politically, between the North and South.

As the war between the United States and Great Britain (1812-15)
did not grow out of slavery, nor was it waged to acquire more slave
territory, nor did it directly tend to perpetuate slavery where
established, we pass it over.

(37)  W. G. Summer's _Andrew Jackson_, ch. iii.

(38)  In 1821 at Indian Springs, Florida, a forced treaty was
negotiated with the Creek Indians for part of their lands by which
the United States agreed to apply $109,000 of the purchase price
as compensation to Georgia claimants for escaped slaves, and $141,000
for "_the offsprings which the females would have borne to their
masters had they remained in bondage_."--_Rise and Fall of Slavery_
(Wilson), vol. i, 132,454.

(39)  _Osceola_, or _As-Se-He-Ho-Lar_ (black drink), was the son
of Wm. Powell, an English Indian-trader, born in Georgia, 1804, of
a daughter of a Seminole chief.  His mother took him early to
Florida.  He rose rapidly to be head war-chief, and married a
daughter of a fugitive slave who was treacherously stolen from him,
as a slave, while he was on a visit to Fort King.  When he demanded
of General Thompson, the Indian agent, her release, he was put in
irons, but released after six days.  A little later, December,
1835, he avenged himself by killing Thompson and four others outside
of the fort, thus inaugurating the second Seminole war.  He hated
the white race, and his ambition was to furnish a safe asylum for
fugitive slaves.

Surprises and massacres ensued for two years, Osceola showing great
bravery and skill, and _not_ excelling his white adversaries in
treachery.  He fought Generals Clinch, Gaines, Taylor and Jesup,
of the U. S. A.  Jesup induced him (Oct. 21, 1837) under a flag of
truce to hold a parley near St. Augustine, where Jesup treacherously
caused him to be seized, and the U. S. authorities (treating him
as England treated Napoleon) immured him in captivity for life,
hopelessly, at Fort Moultrie.  His free spirit could not endure
this, and he died of a broken heart three months later (January
30, 1838), at thirty-four years of age.  His body lies buried on
Sullivan's Island, afterwards the scene of a larger struggle for
human freedom.

The remains of the _civilized_ statesman-champion of perpetual
_human_ slavery, Calhoun, and the remains of the savage, untutored
Seminole _Chief_, Oscoeola, the champion of _human liberty_, lie
buried near Charleston, S. C.  Let the ages judge each--kindly!


XII
MISSOURI COMPROMISE--1820

In pursuance of the policy of trying to balance, politically,
freedom and slavery, and to deal tenderly with the latter, and not
offend its champions, new States were admitted into the Union in
pairs, one free and one slave.

Thus Vermont and Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio, Louisiana and Indiana,
Mississippi and Illinois were coupled, preserving in the Senate an
exact balance of power.(40)

When Missouri had framed a Constitution (1819) and applied for
admission into the Union, Alabama was on the point of admission as
a slave State, and was admitted the same year, and thus the usage
required the admission of Missouri as a free State.  In 1790 the
two sections were nearly equal in population, but in 1820 the North
had nearly 700,000 more inhabitants than the South.

Missouri was a part of the Louisiana Purchase, and she had in 1820
above 10,000 slaves.

The usual form of a bill was prepared admitting her, with slavery,
on an equal footing with other States.  It came up for consideration
in the House during the session of 1818-1819, and Mr. Tallmadge,
of New York, precipitated a controversy, which was participated in
by all the great statesmen, North and South, who were then on the
political stage.

He offered to amend the bill so as to prohibit the further introduction
of slaves into Missouri, and providing that all children born in
the State after its admission should be free at twenty-five years
of age.

This amendment was a signal for the fiercest opposition.  Clay and
Webster, Wm. Pinckney of Maryland, and Rufus King of New York, John
Randolph of Roanoke, Fisher Ames, and others, who were in the early
prime of their manhood, were heard in the fray.  In it the first
real threats of disunion, if slavery were interfered with, were
heard.  It is more than possible those threats pierced the ears of
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who still survived,(41) and caused
them to despair of the Republic.

It is worthy of note that none of the great statesmen engaged in
this first memorable combat in which the Union was threatened in
slavery's cause, lived to confront disunion in fact, face to face.

Clay, then Speaker of the House, and possessed of great influence,
spoke first in opposition to the amendment.  Though his speech,
like others of that time, was not reported, we know he denied the
power of Congress to impose conditions upon a new State after its
admission to the Union.  He maintained the sovereign right of each
State to be slave or free.  He did not profess to be an advocate
of slavery.  He, however, vehemently asserted that a restriction
of slavery was cruel to the slaves already held.  While their
numbers would be the same, it would so crowd them in narrow limits
as to expose them "in the old, exhausted States to destitution,
and even to lean and haggard starvation, instead of allowing them
to share the fat plenty of the new West."(42)  (What an argument
in favor of perpetuating an immoral thing!  So spread it over the
world as to make it thin, yet fatten it!)

Clay's arguments were the most specious and weighty of those made
against the amendment.  And they did not fail to claim the amendment
was in violation of the third article of the cession of Louisiana,
already, in another connection, referred to.

The Missouri delegate denounced the amendment as a shameful
discrimination against Missouri and slavery, which would endanger
the Union; in this latter cry a member from Georgia joined.

The friends of the amendment fearlessly answered Clay's speech and
the speeches of others.  The House was reminded that the great
Ordinance of 1787, passed contemporaneous with the adoption of the
Constitution, and approved and enforced by its framers (some of
whom were also then members of the Continental Congress) imposed
an absolute inhibition on slavery forever, precedent to the admission
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and the other States to be formed from
the Northwest Territory; they showed the treaty with France did
not profess to perpetuate slavery in the ceded Territory; they
denounced slavery as an evil, unnatural, cruel, opposed to the
principles of the Declaration of Independence, and that it had only
been tolerated, not approved, by the Constitution; and Mr. Talmadge
closed the debate by characterizing slavery as a "scourge of the
human race," certain to bring on "dire calamities to the human
race"; ending by boldly defying those who threatened, if slavery
were restricted, to dissolve the Union of the States.  This amendment
passed the House, 87 to 76, but was beaten, the same session, in
the Senate, 22 to 16; one Senator from Massachusetts, one from
Pennsylvania, and two from Illinois voted with the South.  Again
the too often easily frightened Northern statesmen struck their
colors just when the battle was won.

In January (1820) of the succeeding Congress the measure was again
under consideration in the Senate, then composed of only forty-four
members.  It was then that Rufus King and Wm. Pinckney, the former
for, the latter against, the slavery restriction amendment, displayed
their eloquence.  Pinckney, a lawyer of much general learning,
paraphrased a passage of Burke to the effect that "the spirit of
liberty was more high and haughty in the slaveholding colonies than
in those to the northward."  He also planted himself, with others
from the South, on state-sovereignty, afterwards more commonly
called "state-rights," and in time tortured into a doctrine which
led to nullification--Secession--_War_.

All these speeches were answered in both Houses by able opponents
of slavery extension, but meantime a matter arose which did much
to favor the admission of Missouri as a slave State.

Maine, but recently separated from Massachusetts, applied for
statehood, and could not be refused.

A Senator from Illinois (Mr. Thomas) introduced a proviso which
prohibited slavery north of 36° 30´ in the Louisiana acquisition,
except in Missouri.

Here, again, at the expense of freedom, was an opportunity for
_compromise_.  It was promptly seized upon.  It was agreed that
Maine, where by no possibility slavery would or could go, should
come into the Union as a free State; Missouri as a slave State,
and the proviso limiting slavery in the remaining territory south
of 36° 30´ should be adopted.  This compromise was adopted in the
Senate, and later, after close votes on amendments, the House also
agreed to it.  John Randolph and thirty-seven Southern members
voted against it, and, but for weak-kneed Northern members, it
would have failed.  This compromise Randolph said was a "_dirty
bargain_," and the Northern members who supported it he denounced
as "doughfaces,"--a coined phrase still known to our political
vocabulary.

Missouri, however, did not become a State until August, 1821.
Thus, for the time only was this question settled.

Of it Jefferson wrote, as if in prophecy:

"This momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened
and filled me with terror.  I considered it the knell of the
Union."(43)

Clay wrote of the height to which the heated debate arose:

"The words civil war and disunion are uttered almost without
emotion."(44)

(40)  Later, Arkansas and Michigan (1836-7), Florida and Iowa (March
3, 1845) and Maine and Missouri were, in pairs--slave and free--
admitted as States.

(41)  Both died July 4, 1826.

(42)  Hildreth, vol. vi., p. 664.

(43)  Jefferson's _Works_, vol. vii., p. 159.

(44)  Clay's _Priv. Cor._, p. 61.


XIII
NULLIFICATION--1832-3 (1835)

A debate arose in the United States Senate over a resolution of
Senator Foote of Connecticut proposing to limit the sale of the
public lands, which took a wide range.  Hayne of South Carolina
elaborately set forth the doctrine of nullification, claiming it
inhered in each State under the Constitution.  He boldly announced
that the Union formed was only a _league_ or a _compact_.  This
called forth from Webster his celebrated "Reply to Hayne," of
January 26, 1830, in which he assailed and apparently overthrew
the then new doctrine of nullification.  He denounced its exercise
as incompatible with a loyal adherence to the Constitution, and
showed historically that the government formed under it was not a
mere "compact" or "_league_" between sovereign or independent States
terminable at will.  He then asserted that any attempt of any State
to act on the theory of nullification would inevitably entail civil
war or a dissolution of the Union.

The first real attempt, however, at nullification, or the first
attempt of a State to declare laws of Congress nugatory and of no
binding force when not approved by the State, was made in South
Carolina in 1832, under the leadership of John C. Calhoun, then
Vice-President of the United States, and hitherto a statesman of
so much just renown, and esteemed so moderate and patriotic in his
views on all national questions as to have been looked upon, with
the special approval of the North, as eminently qualified for the
Presidency.  He hopefully aspired to it until he quarrelled with
President Jackson; he had been in favor of a protective tariff.

Cotton was, as we have seen, the principal article of export, and
the slaveholding cotton planters conceived the idea that to secure
a market for it there must be no duties on imports, and that home
manufactures of needed articles for consumption would restrict the
foreign demand for the raw material.  Besides, the South with its
slave labor could not indulge in manufacturing.  A tariff on imports
meant protection to home industries and to free white labor, both
inimical to slavery.  Some leading Southern statesmen, adherents
of slavery, had vehemently opposed the ratification of the Constitution
of 1787, on the ground that as it empowered Congress to levy import
duties, it would encourage and build up home industries, with free
labor; and they prophesied that with them slavery would eventually
become unprofitable and therefore unpopular, hence would die.  This
idea never left the Southern mind, so, when the Confederacy of 1861
was formed, its Constitution (framed at Montgomery, Alabama)
prohibited such duties for the express reason that no branch of
industry was to be promoted in the new slave government, using this
language:

"Nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations
be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry."(45)

This was then supposed to be the highest bulwark of slavery.  Its
votaries understood its strength and weakness.  Independent, well-
paid free labor and industries (46) would ennoble the men of toil,
bring wealth and power, build up populous towns and cities, and
consequently overwhelm, politically and otherwise, the institution
of slavery, or draw into successful social competition with plantation
life wealthy inhabitants who knew not slavery and its demoralizing
influences.

Already, in 1832, the effects of protection on the prosperity of
our country were manifest, especially since the Tariff Act of 1828,
which levied a duty equivalent to 45 per cent. ad valorem.  The
Act of 1832 made a small reduction in the duties, but because it
was claimed it did not distribute them equally, nullification was
determined on as the remedy.

It was agreed by the strict constructionists of that day that a
State Legislature could not declare a law of the United States
void, but to do this the _people_ must speak through a convention.
Such a convention met in South Carolina, in November, 1832, and
passed a Nullification Ordinance, declaring the tariff acts "null
and void," not binding on the State, and that under them no duties
should be paid in the State after February 1, 1833.

Immediately thereafter medals were struck, inscribed "_John C.
Calhoun, first President of the Southern Confederacy_."  Nullification,
thus proclaimed, was the legitimate forerunner of secession.

President Jackson, with his heroic love of the Union, regarded the
movement as only _treason;_ he called it that in his proclamations;
he prepared to collect the duties in Charleston or to confiscate
the cargoes; he warned the nullifiers by the presence of General
Scott there that he would be promptly used to coerce the State into
loyalty; and he seemed eager to find an excuse for arresting,
condemning for treason, and hanging Calhoun, who then went to
Washington as a Senator, resigning the Vice-Presidency.(47)

Jackson tersely said:

"To say that any State may, at pleasure, secede from the Union, is
to say that the United States are not a nation."

The situation was too imminent for Calhoun's nerves.  To confront
an indignant nation, led by a fearless, never doubting President,
was a different thing then from what it was in 1860-61 with Buchanan
as President, surrounded as he was by traitors in his Cabinet.
Calhoun and his State backed down, and import duties continued to
be collected in South Carolina, although a gradual reduction of
them was made an excuse for Calhoun and his friends in Congress,
in 1833, to vote for a protective tariff act, so recently before
by them declared unconstitutional.(48)

On a "Force Bill" and a new tariff act being passed (March 15,
1833) the Nullification Ordinance was repealed in South Carolina.
The next Ordinance of Secession of this State (1860) was based on
the principles of the first one and the doctrines of Calhoun,
slavery being the direct, as it had been the indirect, cause of
their first enunciation.  We must not anticipate here.

In the debate, in 1833, between Webster and Calhoun, the former,
as in his great reply to Hayne,(49) expounded the Constitution as
a "Charter of Union for all the States."

"The Constitution does not provide for events that must be preceded
by its own destruction.

"That the Constitution is not a league, confederacy, or compact
between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacity,
but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people,
and creating direct relations between itself and individuals.  That
no State authority has power to dissolve these relations.  That as
to certain purposes the people of the United States are one people."

Nullification, attempted first on account of a protective tariff
to foster home and young industries and for needed revenue to carry
on the Federal government, was in two years, by its author, Calhoun,
transferred, for a new cause on which to attempt to justify it--
from the tariff to domestic slavery.  Calhoun soon discovered and
admitted that the South could not be united against the North and
for _disunion_ on opposition to a protective tariff.  He therefore
promptly sought an opportunity to bring forward in Congress the
slavery question, and to attack the "_agitators_" and opponents of
slavery extension in the North, and to threaten disunion if the
institution of slavery was not permitted to dictate the political
policy of the Republic.

The exact method of reviving in Congress the whole subject of
slavery so soon after nullification had been so signally suppressed
by Jackson is worth briefly stating.

President Jackson, in his Annual Message, December, 1835, called
attention to attempts to use the mails to circulate matter calculated
to excite slaves to insurrection, but he did not recommend any
legislation to prevent it.  Mr. Calhoun moved in the Senate that
so much of the message relating to mail transportation of incendiary
publications be referred to a select committee of five.

He was made chairman of this committee, and, on his request, three
others from the South, with but one from the North, were put on
the committee, and he promptly made an elaborate and carefully-
prepared report, going into the whole doctrine of states-rights
and nullification.

In it he said:

"That the States which form our Federal Union are sovereign and
independent communities, bound together by a constitutional _compact_,
and are possessed of all the powers belonging to distinct and
separate States, etc.

"The Compact itself expressly provides that all powers not delegated
are reserved to the States and the people. . . . On returning to
the Constitution, it will be seen that, while the power of defending
the country against _external_ danger is found among the enumerated,
the instrument is wholly silent as to the power of defending the
_internal_ peace and security of the States: and of course reserves
to the States this important power, etc.

"It belongs to slave-holding States, whose institutions are in
danger, and not to _Congress_, as is supposed by the message, to
determine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite
insurrection among the slaves, etc.

"It has already been stated that the States which comprise our
Federal Union are sovereign and independent communities, united by
a constitutional compact.  Among its members the laws of nations
are in full force and obligation, except as altered or modified by
the compact, etc.

"Within their limits, the rights of the slave-holding States are
as full to demand of the States within whose limits and jurisdiction
their peace is assailed, to adopt the measures necessary to prevent
the same, and, if refused or neglected, _to resort to means to
protect themselves_, as if they were separate and independent
communities."

Here, perhaps, was the clearest statement yet made, not only of
the independence of States from Federal interference and of their
right, on their own whim, to break the "_compact_," but of the
right of the slaveholding States to dictate to the other States
legislation on the subject of slavery.

It was at once a declaration of independence for the Southern
States, and a declaration of their right to hold all the Northern
States so far subject to them as to be obliged, on demand, to pass
and enforce any prescribed law in the interest of slavery.  The
South was to be the sole judge of what law on this subject was
requisite for slavery's purposes.

No duty was demanded on this question of the Federal Government;
and Southern States, according to Calhoun, owed it none where
slavery was concerned.

Calhoun and his committee could discover no power in the Southern
States to enforce their demands save to act as separate and
independent communities--that is, by setting up for themselves.
This led logically to disunion, the result intended.

There was much in this report setting forth and professing to
believe that it was the purpose of the North to emancipate the
slaves, and through the agencies of organized anti-slavery societies
bring about slave insurrections.  The fanaticism of the North was
descanted on, and the character of slavery and its wisdom as a
social institution upheld.

He further said:

"He who regards slavery in those States simply under the relation
of master and slave, as important as that relation is, viewed merely
as a question of property to the slave-holding section of the Union,
has a very imperfect conception of the institution, and the
impossibility of abolishing it without disasters unexampled in the
history of the world.  To understand its nature and importance
fully, it must be borne in mind that slavery, as it exists in the
Southern States, involves _not only the relation of master and
slave, but also the social and political relation of the two races_,
of nearly equal numbers, from different quarters of the globe, and
the most opposite of all others in every particular that distinguishes
one race of men from another."

The whole report was replete with accusations against the North,
and full of warning as to what the South would do should its demands
not be complied with.  The bill brought in by the committee was
more remarkable than the report itself, and wholly inconsistent
with its doctrine.

The bill provided high penalties for any postmaster who should
knowingly receive and put into the mail any publication or picture
_touching the subject of slavery_, to go into any State or Territory
in which its circulation _was forbidden by state law_.

The report concluded:

"Should such be your decision, by refusing to pass this bill, I
shall say to the people of the South, look to yourselves.

"But I must tell the Senate, be your decision what it may, the
South will never abandon the principles of this bill. . . . We have
a remedy in our own hands."

Clay, Webster, Benton, and others ably and effectually combated
both the report and the bill, and the latter failed (25 to 19) in
the Senate.

Besides denying the doctrine of the report, they showed the evil
was not in mailing, but in taking from the mails and circulating
by their own citizens the supposed objectionable publications.

Benton, himself a slaveholder, then and in subsequent years assailed
and pronounced the doctrine of this report as the "_birth of
disunion_."  He has also shown that Calhoun delighted over the
agitation of slavery more than he deprecated it; that he profoundly
hoped that on the slavery question the South would be united and
a Slave-Confederacy formed.(50)

In support of this Mr. Benton quotes from a letter of Mr. Calhoun
to a gentleman in Alabama (1847) in which he says:

"I am much gratified with the tone and views of your letter, and
concur entirely in the opinion you express, that instead of shunning,
we ought to court the issue with the North on the slavery question.
I would even go one step further and add that it is our duty _to
force the issue_ on the North.  We are now stronger relatively than
we shall be hereafter, politically and morally.  Unless we bring
on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed. . . . Something
of the kind was indispensable to the South.  On the contrary, if
we should not meet it as we ought, I fear, greatly fear, our _doom_
will be fixed."(51)

Comment is unnecessary, but the letter, almost exultantly, mentions
as fortunate that the Wilmot Proviso was offered, as it gave an
opportunity to unite the South.

It proceeds:

"With this impression, I would regard any compromise or adjustment
of the proviso, _or even its defeat_, without meeting the danger
in its whole length and breadth, as very unfortunate for us.

"This brings up the question, how can it be so met, without resorting
to the dissolution of the Union.

"There is and can be but one remedy short of disunion, and that is
to retaliate on our part by refusing to fulfill the stipulations
in their (other States) favor, or such as we may select, as the
most efficient."

The letter, still proceeding to discuss modes of dissolution or
retaliation against Northern States, declares a convention of
Southern States indispensable, and their co-operation absolutely
essential to success, and says:

"Let that be called, and let it adopt measures to bring about the
co-operation, and I would underwrite for the rest.  The non-
slaveholding States would be compelled to observe the stipulations
of the Constitution _in our favor_, or abandon their trade with
us, _or to take measures to coerce us_, which would throw on them
the responsibility of dissolving the Union.  Their unbounded avarice
would in the end control them."(52)

It is certain that President Jackson's heroic proclamation of
December, 1832, aborted the project of nullification under the
South Carolina Ordinance, and certain it is, also, that the
disappointed leaders of it turned from a protective tariff as a
ground for it, to what they regarded as a better excuse, to wit:
A slavery agitation, generated out of false alarms in the slave
States.

After the tariff compromise of 1833, in which Calhoun sullenly
acquiesced, he returned home and immediately announced that the
South would never unite against the North on the tariff question,
--"That the sugar interest of Louisiana would keep her out,--and
consequently the basis of Southern union must be shifted to the
slave question," which was then accordingly done.(53)

Jackson, discussing nullification, is reported to have said:

"It was the _tariff_ this time; next time it will be the _negro_."

This new and dangerous departure was not overlooked.  The report
and bill of 1835 relating to the use of the mails was only a chapter
in execution of the new plan.

The observing friends of the Union did not overlook or misunderstand
the movement.  They at once took alarm.  Mr. Clay, in May, 1833,
wrote a letter to Mr. Madison expressing his apprehensions of the
new danger, which brought from him a prompt response.

Mr. Madison in his letter said:

"It is painful to see the unceasing efforts to alarm the South by
imputations against the North of unconstitutional designs on the
subject of the slaves.  You are right.  I have no doubt that no
such intermeddling disposition exists in the body of our Northern
brethren.  Their good faith is sufficiently guaranteed by the interest
they have as merchants, ship-owners, and as manufacturers, in
preserving a union with the slave-holding states.  On the other
hand, what madness in the South to look for greater safety in
_disunion_."(54)

What Clay and Madison saw in 1833 as the real starting-point for
ultimate secession proved true to history.  From that time dates
the machinations which led, through the steps that successively
followed, to actual dissolution of the Union in 1860-61; then to
coercion--War; then to the eradication of slavery.  It was Southern
madness that hastened the destruction of American slavery.  "Whom
the gods would destroy, they first make mad."

The excuse for even this much significance given to "nullification"
is, that in less than thirty years, under a new name--"state-rights"
--it worked secession--disunion, and lit up the whole country with
the flames and frenzy of internal war that did not die down for
four years more; and then only when slavery was consumed.

The great abolition movement commenced in earnest, January 1, 1831.
Wm. Lloyd Garrison published, at Boston, the _Liberator_, with the
motto--"_Our countrymen are all mankind_."  Benjamin Lundy, and
perhaps others, had preceded Garrison, but not until after the
Webster-Hayne debate did the abolition movement spread.  Thenceforth
it took deeper root in the human conscience, and it had advocates
of determined spirit throughout the North, led on fearlessly, not
alone by Garrison, but by Rev. Dr. Channing, Rev. James Freeman
Clarke, and, later, by Rev. Samuel May (Syracuse, N. Y.), Gerritt
Smith, the poet Whittier, Wendell Phillips, Theodore Parker, Horace
Mann, Charles Sumner, Joshua R. Giddings, Owen Lovejoy, and others,
who spoke from pulpit, rostrum, and some in the halls of legislation;
others in the courts and through the press.  The enforcement of
the fugitive-slave law was often violent, and always added new fuel
to the fierce and constantly growing opposition to slavery.

The Anti-Slavery party was not one wholly built on abstract sentiment
of philanthropists, but it involved physical resistance:  Violence
to violence.

The American Anti-Slavery Society was founded at a National Anti-
Slavery Convention held in Philadelphia, in December, 1831.

Hard upon the establishment of the _Liberator_ came the Nat Turner
insurrection in Southampton County, Virginia (August, 1831).  This
gave to the South a fresh ground to complain of the North.  Turner's
insurrection was held to be the legitimate fruit of abolition
agitation.  Turner was an African of natural capacity, who quoted
the Bible fluently, prayed vehemently, and preached to his fellow
slaves.

He told them, as did Joan of Arc, of "_Voices_" and "_Visions_,"
and of his communion with the Holy Spirit.  An eclipse of the sun
was the signal to strike their enemies and for freedom.  The massacre
lasted forty-eight hours, and sixty-one whites, women and children
not spared, were victims.  On the other hand, negroes were shot,
tortured, hanged, and burned at the stake on whom the slightest
suspicion of complicity fell.

The Nat Turner negro slave insurrection is the only one known to
slavery in the United States.  Others may possibly have been
contemplated.  The John Brown raid was not a negro insurrection.
Even in the midst of the war (1861-65), believed by most slaves to
be a war for their freedom, insurrections were unknown.(55)

The African race, the most wronged through the centuries, has been
the most docile and the least revengeful of the races of the world.

(45)  Confederate Con., Art. 1, Sec. 8, par. 1.

(46)  The South in the days of slavery had, practically, no
manufactories.

(47)  Benton, _Thirty Years' View_, vol. i., p. 343.

(48)  Rhodes, _Hist. U. S._, vol. i., pp. 49-50.

(49)  January 26, 1830.

(50)  For this report and history see Benton's _Thirty Years' View_,
vol. i, pp. 580, etc.

(51)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., chap. clxxxix.; Historical,
etc. Examination, _Dred Scott Case_ (Benton), p. 139.

(52)  Historical, etc., Examination, _Dred Scott Case_ (Benton),
p. 141-4.

(53)  _Ibid_., p. 181.

(54)  Historical, etc., Ex., _Dred Scott Case_, pp. 181-2.

(55)  There were some small insurrections and some threatened ones
in the colonies as early as 1660, the guilty negroes or Indians
being then punished by crucifixion, burning, and by starvation;
other insurrections took place in the Carolinas and Georgia in
1734, and the Cato insurrection occurred at Stono, S. C., in 1740.
There was a wide spread "Negro Plot" in New York in 1712.  These
attempts alarmed the colonies and caused some of them to take steps
to abolish slavery.--_Sup. of African Slave-Trade U. S._, pp. 6,
10, 22, 206.


XIV
TEXAS--ADMISSION INTO THE UNION (1845)

Texas was a province of Mexico when the latter seceded from Spain
through a "Proclamation of Independence" by Iturbide (February 24,
1821) with a view to establishing a constitutional monarchy.  At
the end of about two years of Iturbide's reign, this form of
government was overthrown, and he was compelled (March 19, 1823)
to resign his crown.  Through the efforts, principally of General
Santa Anna, a Republic was established under a Constitution,
modelled, in large part, on that of the United States, which went
into full effect October 4, 1824.  Spain did not formally recognize
the independence of Mexico until 1836.  The Mexican Republic was
opposed to slavery, and after some of her provinces had decreed
freedom to slaves its President (Guerro), September 15, 1829,
decreed its total abolition, but as Texas, on account of slave-
holding settlers from the United States, demurred to the decree,
another one followed, April 5, 1837, by the Mexican Congress, also
abolishing slavery, without exception, in Texas.  Despite these
decrees the American settlers carried slaves into Texas, which
became part of the State of Coahuila, whose Constitution also
forbade the importation of slaves.

Thus was slavery extension to the southwest cut off by a power not
likely ever to be in sympathy with it.  It is worthy of note that
neither the independent Spanish blood (notwithstanding Spain's deep
guilt in the conduct of the slave trade), nor that blood as intermixed
with the Indian, nor the Mexican Indians themselves, ever willingly
maintained human slavery in America.  Mexico's established religion
under the Constitution, being Roman Catholic, did not permit its
perpetuation.  The Pope of Rome, in the nineteenth century and
earlier, had denounced it as inhuman and contrary to the divine
justice.

The maintenance of slavery in Texas was regarded as of paramount
importance to the South, and as slavery could not exist in Texas
under Mexican authority, efforts were put forth to secure her
independence, then to annex her to the United States as a State
wherein slavery should exist.  Even Clay, as Secretary of State,
under Adams, in 1827, proposed to purchase Texas.  President Jackson,
in 1830, offered $5,000,000 for Texas.  The Mexican Government,
foreseeing the coming danger, by law prohibited American immigration
into Texas, but this was unavailing, as the ever-unscrupulous hand
of slavery was reaching out for more room and more territory to
perpetuate itself.  Americans, like their natural kinsmen the
Englishmen, then regarded not the rights of others, the weak
especially, when the slave power was involved.

Sam Houston, of Tennessee, a capable man who had fought under
Jackson in the Indian wars, inspired by his pro-slavery proclivities
in 1835, went to Texas avowedly to wrest Texas from free Mexico,
and, it is said, of his real intentions President Jackson was not
ignorant.

The unfortunate internal political contentions in Mexico gave the
intruding Americans pretexts for disputes which soon led to the
desired conflicts with the Mexican authorities.

Santa Anna, who had, through a revolution, put himself at the head
of the new Mexican Republic, attempted to coerce the invading
settlers to observance of the laws, but in this was only partially
successful.  On March 2, 1836, a Texas _Declaration of Independence_
was issued, signed by about _sixty_ men, _two_ of whom only were
Texas-Mexicans, and this was followed by a Constitution for the
Republic of Texas, chief among its objects being the establishment
of human slavery.  Santa Anna, with the natural fierceness of the
Spanish-Indian, waged a ferocious war on the revolutionists.  A
garrison of 250 men at "The Alamo," a small mission church near
San Antonio, was taken by him after heroic resistance, and massacred
to a man.

"Thermopylae had her messenger of defeat, but The Alamo had none."

David Crockett, an uneducated, eccentric Tennessean, who was a
celebrated hunter, Indian fighter, story teller, wit, and member
of Congress three terms (where he opposed President Jackson, and
refused to obey any party commanding him "to-go-wo-haw-gee," just
at his pleasure) here lost his life.  On the 27th of the same month
500 more Americans at Goliad were also massacred.  These atrocities
were used successfully to produce sympathy and create excitement
in the United States.  On April 21, 1836, a decisive battle was
fought at San Jacinto between Santa Anna's army of 1500 men and a
body of 800 men under General Sam Houston, in which the former was
defeated, and Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, captured.  While
a prisoner, to save his life he immediately concluded an armistice
with Houston, agreeing to evacuate Texas and procure the recognition
by Mexico of its independence.  This the Mexican Congress afterwards
refused.  But in October, 1836, with a Constitution modelled on
that of the United States, the Republic of Texas (recognizing
slavery) was organized, with Houston as President, and forthwith
the United States recognized its independence.

In a few months application was made to the United States to receive
it into the Union, but on account of a purpose to divide Texas into
a number of slave States to secure the preponderance of the slave
political power in the Union, which for want of sufficient population
was not immediately possible, her admission was delayed, and Sam
Houston's Republic of Texas existed for above eight years.  President
Van Buren, who succeeded Jackson as President, was opposed to its
annexation, and it was left to the apostate Tyler to take up the
business.

He, too, would have failed but Mr. Upshur, his Secretary of State,
being killed in 1844 by the accidental explosion of a cannon, John
C. Calhoun became his successor.  The latter at once arranged a
treaty of annexation, but this the Senate rejected.  Both Van Buren
and Clay, leading candidates of their respective parties for the
Presidency in 1844, were opposed to the annexation; the former was
defeated for nomination, and the latter at the election, because,
during the canvass, to please the slaveholding Whigs he sought to
shift his position, thus losing his anti-slavery friends, "whose
votes would have elected him"; and Polk became President.  Annexation,
however, did not wait for his administration.

In the House of Representatives, in December, 1844, an attempt was
made to admit Texas, half to be free and half slave, making two
States.

By resolutions of Congress, dated March 1, 1845, consent was given
to erect Texas into a State with a view to annexation; and in order
that she might be admitted into the Union such resolutions provided
that thereafter four other States, with her consent, might be formed
out of its territory.  In August succeeding, a Constitution was
framed prohibiting emancipation of slaves (56) and authorizing
their importation into Texas, which was thereafter adopted by the
people of the Republic of Texas, under which Congress, by resolution
(December 29, 1845) formally admitted Texas into the Union--the
last slave State admitted.

As a sop to Northern "dough-faces," and to induce them to vote for
the resolutions of March 1st, it recited that the new States lying
south of latitude 36° 30´ should be admitted with or without slavery
as their inhabitants might decide, those north of the line without
slavery.  In the subsequent adjustment of the north boundary line
of Texas, it was found _no part of it_ was within two hundred miles
of 36° 30´; so all of Texas (in territory an empire, in area 240,000
square miles, six times greater than Ohio) was thus dedicated
forever, by law, to human slavery, in the professed interest of
the nineteenth century civilization.  The intrigue, the bad faith,
the perfidy by which this great political and moral wrong was
consummated were laid up against the "day of wrath."

(56)  How different is Texas' Constitution of 1876, the first
paragraph of which runs:  "Texas is a free and independent State."


XV
MEXICAN WAR--ACQUISITION OF CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO 1846-8

With Texas came naturally a desire for more slave territory.  Wrong
is never satiated; it hungers as it feeds on its prey.

Pretence for quarrel arose over the boundary between Texas and
Mexico.  The United States unjustly claimed that the Rio Grande
was the southwestern boundary of Texas instead of the Nueces, as
Mexico maintained.  Mexico was invaded, her cities, including her
ancient capital, were taken, and her badly-organized armies
overthrown.  Congress, by an Act of May 13, 1846, declared that
"by the act of the Republic of Mexico a state of war existed between
that government and the United States," and it virtually ended in
September, 1847, though the final treaty of peace at Guadalupe
Hidalgo was not signed until February 2, 1848.  While the annexation
of Texas was regarded by Mexico as a cause of war, yet she did not
declare war on that ground.

The principle of "manifest destiny" was proclaimed for the United
States.  In the prosecution of the war, with shameless effrontery
it was justified on the necessity that "_we want room_" for the
two hundred millions of inhabitants soon to be under our flag.

Answering this cry, put up by Senator Cass of Michigan, Senator
Thomas Corwin, in a spirit of prophecy, said:

"But you still say you want _room_ for your people.  This has been
the plea of every robber-chief from Nimrod to the present hour.
I dare say, when Tamerlane descended from his throne, built of
seventy thousand human skulls, and marched his ferocious battalions
to further slaughter,--I dare say he said, 'I want room.'  Alexander,
too, the mighty 'Macedonian Madman,' when he wandered with his
Greeks to the plains of India, and fought a bloody battle on the
very ground where recently England and the Sikhs engaged in a strife
for 'room' . . . Sir, he made quite as much of that sort of history
as you ever will.  Mr. President, do you remember the last chapter
in that history?  It is soon read.  Oh! I wish we could understand
its moral.  Ammon's son (so was Alexander named), after all his
victories, died drunk in Babylon.  The vast empire he conquered to
'get room' became the prey of the generals he trained; it was
desparted, torn to pieces, and so ended.  Sir, there is a very
significant appendix; it is this:  The descendants of the Greeks--
of Alexander's Greeks--are now governed by a descendant of Attilla."

Through the greed of the slave power Texas was acquired, and they
still longed for more slave territory, and weak Mexico alone could
be depleted to obtain it.

Southern California and New Mexico had a sufficiently warm climate
for slavery to flourish in.

The war was far from popular, though the pride of national patriotism
supported it.  Clay and Webster each opposed it, and each gave a
son to it.(57)

Abraham Lincoln, then for a single term in Congress, spoke against
it, but, like most other members holding similar views, voted men,
money, and supplies to carry it on.

Senator Benton of Missouri, a party friend to the administration
of Polk and favoring the war, said:

"The truth was, an intrigue was laid for peace before the war was
declared!  And this intrigue was even part of the scheme for making
war.  It is impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike,
or more intriguing, than that of Mr. Polk.  They were men of peace,
with objects to be accomplished by means of war. . . .  They wanted
a small war, just large enough to require a treaty of peace, and
not large enough to make military reputations dangerous for the
Presidency."(58)

It was predicted the war would not last to exceed "90 to 120 days."
The proposed conquest of Mexico was so inlaid with treachery that
this prediction was justified.  The Administration conspired with
the then exiled Santa Anna "not to obstruct his return to Mexico."

"It was the arrangement with Santa Anna!  We to put him back in
Mexico, and he to make peace with us: of course an _agreeable peace_
. . . not without receiving a consideration: and in this case some
millions of dollars were required--not for himself, of course, but
to enable him to promote the peace at home."(59)

Accordingly, in August, 1846, before Buena Vista and other signal
successes in the war, the President asked an appropriation of
$2,000,000 to be used in promoting a peace.

But already jealousy and envy toward the generals in the field had
arisen, which culminated in President Polk offering to confer on
Senator Thomas H. Benton (of his own party) the rank of Lieutenant-
General, with full command, thus superseding the Whig Generals,
Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, then possible Presidential
candidates.(60)

The acquisition of more territory from Mexico being no secret, a
bill for the desired appropriation precipitated, unexpectedly, a
most violent discussion of the slavery question, never again allayed
until slavery was eliminated from the Union.

A Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania, David Wilmot, who
favored the acquisition of California and New Mexico, for the
purpose of "_preserving the equilibrium of States_," and as an
offset to the already acquired slave State of Texas, which was then
expected to be soon erected into five slave States, moved, August,
1846, the following proviso to the "two million bill":

"That no part of the territory to be acquired should be open to
the introduction of slavery."

This famous "Wilmot Proviso" never became a part of any law; its
sole importance was in its frequent presentation and the violent
discussions over it.

Thus far the national wrong against Mexico had for its manifest
object the spread of slavery.

The proposition to seize Mexican territory and dedicate it to
freedom threw the advocates of slavery and the war into a frenzy,
and consternation in high circles prevailed.

The proviso was adopted in the House, but failed in the Senate.
It was, in February, 1847, again, by the House, tacked on the "three
million bill," but being struck out in the Senate, the bill passed
the House without it.  But the proviso had done its work; the whole
North was alive to its importance, and Presidential and Congressional
_timber_ blossomed or withered accordingly as it did or did not
fly a banner inscribed "_Wilmot Proviso_."

Calhoun, professing great alarm and great concern for the Constitution,
on February 19, 1847, introduced into the Senate his celebrated
resolution declaring, among other things, that the Territories
belonged to the "several States . . . as their joint and common
property."  "That the enactment of any law which should . . .
deprive the citizens of any of the States . . . from emigrating
with their property [slaves] into any of the Territories . . .
would be a violation of the Constitution and the rights of the
States, . . . and would tend directly to subvert the Union itself."

Here was the doctrine of state-rights born into full life, with
the old doctrine of nullification embodied.  Benton, speaking of
the dangerous character of Calhoun's resolution, said of them:

"As Sylla saw in the young Caesar many Mariuses, so did he see in
them many nullifications."

Benton, quite familiar with the whole history of slavery before,
during, and after the Mexican War, himself a Senator from a slave
State, says the Wilmot proviso "was secretly cherished as a means
of keeping up discord, and forcing the issue between the North and
the South," by Calhoun and his friends, citing Mr. Calhoun's Alabama
letter of 1847, already quoted, in proof of his statement.

By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February, 1848) for $15,000,000
(above $3,000,000 more than was paid Napoleon for the Louisiana
Purchase), New Mexico and Upper California were ceded by Mexico to
the United States, and the Rio Grande from El Paso to its mouth
became the boundary between the two countries.  Upper California
is now the State of California, and the New Mexico thus acquired
included much of the present New Mexico, nearly all of Arizona,
substantially all of Utah and Nevada, and the western portion of
Colorado, in area 545,000 square miles, which, together with the
Gadsden Purchase, by further treaty with Mexico (December 30, 1853)
for $10,000,000 more, completed the despoiling of the sister
Republic.  The territory acquired by the last treaty now constitutes
the southern part of Arizona and the southwest corner of New Mexico.

Almost contemporaneous with the invasion of Mexico, and as part of
the plan for the acquisition of her territory, Buchanan, then
Secretary of State, dispatched Lieutenant Gillespie, of the United
States Army, _via_ Vera Cruz, the City of Mexico, and Mazatlan, to
Monterey, Upper California, ostensibly with dispatches to a consul,
but really for the purpose of presenting a mere _letter of
introduction_ and a verbal request to Captain John C. Fremont,
U.S.A., then on an exploring expedition to the Pacific Coast.  The
Lieutenant found Fremont at the north end of the Great Klamath
Lake, Oregon, in the midst of hostile Indians.  The _letter_ being
presented, Gillespie verbally communicated from the Secretary a
request for him to counteract any foreign scheme on California,
and to cultivate the good-will of the inhabitants towards the United
States.

On this information Fremont returned, in May, 1846 (the month the
war opened on the Rio Grande), to the valley of the Sacramento.
His arrival there was timely, as already the ever-grasping hand of
the British was at work.  There had been inaugurated (1) the massacre
of American settlers, (2) the subjection of California to British
protection, and (3) the transfer of its public domain to British
subjects.  Fremont did not even know war had broken out between
the United States and Mexico, yet he organized at first a defensive
war in the Sacramento Valley for the protection of American settlers,
and blood was shed; then he resolved to overturn the Mexican
authority, and establish "California Independence."  The celerity
with which all this was accomplished was romantic.  In thirty days
all Northern California was freed from Mexican rule--the flag of
independence raised; American settlers were saved, and the British
party overthrown.

Since its discovery by Sir Francis Drake--two hundred years--England
had sought to possess the splendid Bay of California, with its
great seaport and the tributary country.  The war between the United
States and Mexico seemed her opportune time for the acquisition,
but her efforts, both by sea and land, were thwarted by her only
less voracious daughter.(61)

Often in human affairs events concur to control or turn aside the
most carefully guarded plans.  California and the other Mexican
acquisitions were by the war party--the slave propagandists--fore-
ordained to be slave territory.  The free State men had done little
to favor its theft and purchase, and it was therefore claimed that
they of right should have little interest in its disposition.

Just nine days (January 24, 1848) before the treaty of peace
(Guadalupe Hidalgo), John A. Sutter, a Swiss by parentage, German
by birth (Baden), American by residence and naturalization (Missouri),
Mexican in turn, by residence and naturalization, together with
James A. Marshall, a Jerseyman wheelwright in Sutter's employ,
while the latter was walking in a newly-constructed and recently
flooded saw-mill tail-race, in the small valley of Coloma, about
forty-five miles from Sacramento (then Sutter's Fort), in the foot-
hills of the Sierras, picked up some small, shining yellow particles,
which proved to be free _gold_.(62)

"_The accursed thirst for gold_" was now soon to outrun the _accursed
greed_ for more slave territory.  The race was unequal.  The whole
world joined in the race for gold.  The hunger for wealth seized
all alike, the common laborer, the small farmer, the merchant, the
mechanic, the politician, the lawyer and the clergyman, the soldier
and the sailor from the army and navy; from all countries and climes
came the gold seeker; only the slaveholder with his slaves alone
were left behind.  There was no place for the latter with freemen
who themselves swung the pick and rocked the cradle in search of
the precious metal.

California, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona still give
up their gold and their silver to the free miner; and the financial
condition and prosperity of the civilized countries of the world
have been favorably affected by these productions, but of this we
are not here to speak.  Slavery is our text, and we must not stray
too far from it.

Turning back to the negotiations for the first treaty with Mexico,
we find, to her everlasting credit, though compelled to part with
her possessions, she still desired they should continue to be free.

Slavery, as has already been shown, did not exist in Mexico by law;
and California and New Mexico held no slaves, so, during the
negotiations, the Mexican representatives begged for the incorporation
of an article providing that slavery should be prohibited in all
the territory to be ceded.  N. P. Trist, the American Commissioner,
promptly and fiercely resented the bare mention of the subject.
He replied that if the territory to be acquired were tenfold more
valuable, and covered _a foot thick_ with pure gold, on the single
condition that slavery was to be excluded therefrom, the proposition
would not be for a moment entertained, nor even communicated to
the President.(63)

Though the invocation was in behalf of humanity, the "invincible
Anglo-Saxon race" (so cried Senator Preston in 1836) "could not
listen to the prayer of superstitious Catholicism, goaded on by a
miserable priesthood."

Now that California and New Mexico were United States territory,
how was it to be devoted to slavery to reward the friends of its
acquisition?

As slavery was prohibited under Mexican law, this territory must
by the law of nations remain free until slavery was, by positive
enactment, authorized therein.  This ancient and universal law,
however, was soon to be disregarded or denied by the advocates of
the doctrine that the Constitution of the United States spread
itself over territories, and, by force of it, legalized human
slavery therein, and guaranteed to citizens of a State the right
to carry their property--human slaves included--into United States
territory and there hold it, by force of and protected by the
Constitution, in defiance of unfriendly territorial or Congressional
legislation.  This novel claim also sprung from the brain of Calhoun,
and was met with the true view of slavery, to wit:  That it was a
creature solely of law; that it existed nowhere of natural right;
that whenever a slave was taken from a jurisdiction where slaves
could be held by law, to one where no law made him a slave, his
shackles fell off and he became a free man.  The soundness of the
rule that a citizen of a State could carry his personal property
from his State to a Territory was admitted, but it was claimed he
could not hold it there if it were not such as the laws of the
Territory recognized as property.  In other words, he might transfer
his property from a State to a Territory, but he could not take
with him the law of his State authorizing him to hold it as property.
The law of the _situs_ is of universal application governing
property.

It remains to briefly note the effort to extend and interpret the
Constitution, with the sole view to establish and perpetuate human
slavery.

Near the close of the session of Congress (1848-49), Mr. Walker of
Wisconsin, at the instigation of Calhoun moved, as a rider on an
appropriation bill, a section providing a temporary government for
such Territories, including a provision to "_extend the Constitution
of the United States to the Territories_."  This astounding
proposition was defended by Calhoun, and, with his characteristic
straightforwardness, he avowed the true object of the amendment
was to override the anti-slavery laws of the Territories, and plant
the institution of slavery therein, beyond the reach of Congressional
or territorial law.

Mr. Webster expounded the Constitution and combated the newly
brought forward slave-extension doctrine, but a majority of the
Senate voted for the amendment.

The House, however, voted down the rider, and between the two
branches of Congress it failed.  For a time appropriations of
necessary supplies for the government were made to depend on the
success of the measure.(64)

Thus again the newly acquired domain escaped the doom of perpetual
slavery.

But we have done with the Mexican War and the acquisition of Mexican
territory.  It remains to be told how this vast domain was disposed
of.  No part of it ever became slave.

There was not time in Polk's administration to dispose of it.
General Zachary Taylor, the hero of Palo Alto, Resaca, Monterey,
and Buena Vista, became President, March 4, 1849.  He was wholly
without political experience and had never even voted at an election.
He was purely a professional soldier, and a Southerner by birth
and training; was a patriot, possessed of great common sense, and
knew nothing of intrigue, and was endowed with a high sense of
justice, and believed in the rights of the majority.  He belonged
to no cabal to promote, extend, or perpetuate slavery, and, probably,
in his conscience was opposed to it.  His Southern friends could
not use him, and when they demanded his aid, as President, to plant
slavery in California, he not only declined to serve them, but
openly declared that California should be free.  In different words,
but words of like import, he responded to them, as he did to General
Wool, at a critical moment in the battle of Buena Vista.  Wool
remarked:  "_General, we are whipped_."  Taylor responded:  "_That
is for me to determine_."(65)

(57)  Lt.-Col. Henry Clay, Jr., fell at Buena Vista February 23,
1847, and Maj. Edward Webster died at San Angel, Mexico, January
23, 1848.

(58)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., p. 680.

(59)  _Ibid_., p. 681.

(60)  Taylor became President March, 1849, succeeding Polk, and
died in office July 9, 1850.  Scott was nominated by his party
(Whig) in 1852, and defeated; Franklin Pierce, a subordinate General
of the war, was elected by his party (Democrat) President in 1852.

(61)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., pp. 688-692.

(62)  _Hist. Ready Ref._, vol. i, p. 350.

(63)  Trist's letter to Buchanan, Secretary of State, Von Holst,
vol. iii., p. 334.

(64)  Historical Ex., etc., _Dred Scott Case_, pp. 151-9.  This is
the first Congress where its sessions were continued after twelve
o'clock midnight, of March 3d, in the odd years.  _Ibid_., pp. 136-9.

(65)  _Hist. of Mexican War_ (Wilcox), p. 223.


XVI
COMPROMISE MEASURES--1850

The slavery agitation first began in 1832 on a false tariff issue,
and precipitated upon the country in 1835, on the lines of
nullification and disunion, and was again revived at the close of
the Mexican War, and continued violently through 1849 and 1850.
The year 1850 will be ever memorable in the history of the United
States as a year wherein all the baleful seeds of disunion were
sown, which grew, to ripen, a little more than ten years later,
into _disunion_ in fact.  Prophetically, a leading South Carolina
paper in its New Year-Day edition, said:

"When the future historian shall address himself to the task of
portraying the rise, progress, and decline of the American union,
the year _1850_ will arrest his attention, as denoting and presenting
the first marshalling and arraying of those hostile forces and
opposing elements which resulted in dissolution."

At the close of Polk's administration an inflammatory address,
drawn and signed by Calhoun and forty-one other members of Congress
from the slave States, was issued, filled with unfounded charges
against the North, professing to be a warning to the South that a
purpose existed to abolish slavery and bring on a conflict between
the white and black races, and to San Domingoize the South, which
could only be avoided, the address states:

"By fleeing the homes of ourselves and ancestors, and by abandoning
our country to our slaves, to become the permanent abode of disorder,
anarchy, poverty, misery, and wretchedness."

This manifesto did not go quite to the extent of declaring for a
dissolution of the Union, but it appealed to the South to become
united, saying, if the North did not yield to its demands, the
South would be the assailed, and

"Would stand justified by all laws, human and divine, in repelling
a blow so dangerous, without looking to consequences, and to resort
to all means necessary for that purpose."(66)

The _Southern Press_ was set up in Washington to inculcate the
advantages of disunion, and to inflame the South against the North.
It portrayed the advantages which would result from Southern
independence; and assumed to tell how Southern cities would recover
colonial superiority; how ships of all nations would crowd Southern
ports and carry off the rich staples, bringing back ample returns,
and how Great Britain would be the ally of the new "United States
South."  In brief, it asserted that a Southern convention should
meet and decree a separation unless the North surrendered to Southern
demands for the extension of slavery, for its protection in the
States, and for the certain return of fugitive slaves; it urged
also that military preparation be made to maintain what the convention
might decree.

A disunion convention actually met at Nashville, near the home of
Jackson, but the old hero was then in his grave.(67)  It assumed
to represent seven States.  It invited the assembling of a "Southern
Congress."  South Carolina and Mississippi alone responded to this
call.  In the Legislature of South Carolina secession and disunion
speeches were delivered, and throughout the South public addresses
were made, and the press advocated and threatened dissolution of
the Union unless the North yielded all.(68)

All this and more to immediately effect the introduction of slavery
into California and New Mexico.  The South saw clearly that the
free people of the Republic were resolved that there should be no
more slave States, but believed that the mercantile, trading people,
and small farmers of the North would not fight for their rights,
and hence intimidation seemed to them to promise success.

It had its effect on many, and, unfortunately, on some of America's
greatest statesmen.

By a singular coincidence the Thirty-first Congress, which met
December, 1849, embraced among its members Webster, Clay, Calhoun,
Benton, Cass, Corwin, Seward, Salmon P. Chase, John P. Hale, Hamlin
of Maine, James M. Mason, Douglas of Illinois, Foote and Davis of
Mississippi, of the Senate; and Joshua R. Giddings, Horace Mann,
Wilmot of Pennsylvania, Robert C. Schenck, Robert C. Winthrop,
Alexander H. Stephens, and Thaddeus Stevens, of the House.

To avert the impending storm of slavery agitation then threatening
disunion, Clay, by a set of resolutions, with a view to a "_lasting
compromise_," on January 29, 1850, proposed in the Senate a general
plan of compromise and a committee of thirteen to report a bill or
bills in accordance therewith.

His plan was:

1.  The admission of California with her free Constitution.

2.  Territorial governments for the other territory acquired from
Mexico, without any restriction as to slavery.

3.  The disputed boundary between Texas and New Mexico to be
determined.

4.  The _bona fide_ public debt of Texas, contracted prior to
annexation, to be paid from duties on foreign imports, upon condition
that Texas relinquish her claim to any part of New Mexico.

5.  The declaration that it was inexpedient to abolish slavery in
the District of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland and the
people of the District, and without compensation to owners of
slaves.

6.  The prohibition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.

7.  A more effectual provision for the rendition of fugitive slaves.

8.  A declaration that Congress has no power to interfere with the
slave trade between States.

These resolutions and the plan embodied led to a most noteworthy
discussion, chiefly participated in by Clay, Webster, Calhoun,
Benton, Seward, and Foote.  The debate was opened by Clay.  He
favored the admission of California with her already formed free
State Constitution, but he exclaimed:

"I shall go with the Senator from the South who goes farthest in
making penal laws and imposing the heaviest sanctions for the
recovery of fugitive slaves and the restoration of them by their
owners."

He, however, tried to hold the olive branch to both the North and
the South, and pleaded for the Union.  He pathetically pleaded for
mutual concessions, and deprecated, what he then apprehended, _war_
between the sections, exclaiming:

"War and dissolution of the Union are identical."

After prophesying that if a war came it would be more ferocious,
bloody, implacable, and exterminating than were the wars of Greece,
the Commoners of England, or the Revolutions of France, Senator
Clay predicted that it would be "not of two or three years' duration,
but a war of interminable duration, during which some Philip or
Alexander, some Caesar or Napoleon, would arise and cut the Gordian
knot and solve the problem of the capacity of man for self-government,
and crush the liberties of both the several portions of this common
empire."

Happily, events have falsified most of these prophecies.

Then came the dying Calhoun, with a last speech in behalf of slavery
and on the imaginary wrongs of the South.  His last appearance in
public life was pathetic.  Broken with age and disease, enveloped
in flannels, he was carried into the Capitol, where he tottered to
the old Senate Hall and to a seat.  He found himself too weak to
even read his last warning to the North and appeal for his beloved
institution.  The speech was written, and was read in his presence
by Senator Mason of Virginia.  He referred to the disparity of
numbers between the North and the South by which the "equilibrium
between the two sections had been destroyed."  He did not recognize
the fact that slavery alone was the cause of this disparity.  He
professed to believe the final object of the North was "the abolition
of slavery in the States."  He contended that one of the "cords"
of the Union embraced "plans for disseminating the Bible," and "for
the support of doctrines and creeds."

He said:

"The first of these _cords_ which snapped under its explosive force
was that of the powerful Methodist Episcopal Church.  The next
_cord_ that snapped was that of the Baptists, one of the largest
and most respectable of the denominations.  That of the Presbyterian
is not entirely snapped, but some of its strands have given way.
That of the Episcopal Church is the only one of the four great
Protestant denominations which remains unbroken and entire."

He referred to the strong ties which held together the two great
parties, and said:

"This powerful _cord_ has fared no better than the spiritual.  To
this extent the union has already been destroyed by agitation."

He laid at the door of the North all the blame for the slavery
agitation.

The admission of California as a free State was the immediate,
exciting cause for Calhoun's speech.

Already, on October 13, 1849, after a session of forty days, a
Convention in California had, with much unanimity, framed a
Constitution which, one month later, was, with like unanimity,
adopted by her free, gold-mining people.  It prohibited slavery.
It had been laid before Congress by President Taylor, who recommended
the immediate admission under it of California as a State.

President Taylor had not overlooked the disunion movements.  In
his first and only message to Congress he expressed his affection
for the Union, and warningly said:

"In my judgment its dissolution would be the greatest of calamities,
and to avert that should be the study of every American.  Upon its
preservation must depend our own happiness, and that of countless
generations to come.  Whatever dangers may threaten it, I shall
stand by it and maintain it in its integrity, to the full extent
of the obligations imposed and the power conferred on me by the
Constitution."

Recommending specially that territorial governments for New Mexico
and Utah should be formed, leaving them to settle the question of
slavery for themselves, President Taylor, in his Message, said
further:

"I repeat the solemn warning of the first and most illustrious of
my predecessors against furnishing any ground for characterizing
parties by geographical discriminations."

Alluding to these passages, Calhoun, in his last speech, said:

"It (the Union) cannot, then, be saved by eulogies on it, however
splendid or numerous.  The cry of 'Union, Union, the glorious
Union,' can no more prevent _disunion_ than the cry of 'Health,
Health, glorious Health,' on the part of the physician can save
a patient from dying that is lying dangerously ill."

To the allusion of the President to Washington, Calhoun sneeringly
said:

"There was nothing in _his_ history to deter us from seceding from
the Union should it fail to fulfil the objects for which it was
instituted."

The prime objects for which the Union was formed, were, as he
contended, the preservation, perpetuation, and extension of the
institution of human slavery.  In the antithesis of this speech he
asked and answered:

"How can the Union be saved?

"To provide for the insertion of a provision in the Constitution,
by an amendment which will restore to the South in substance the
power she possessed of protecting herself before the equilibrium
between the sections was destroyed by the action of this
government."

The speech did not state what, exactly, this amendment was to be,
but it transpired that it was to provide for the election of _two_
Presidents, one from the free and one from the slave States, each
to approve all acts of Congress before they became laws.

Of this device, Senator Benton said:

"No such double-headed government could work through even one
session of Congress, any more than two animals could work together
in the plough with their heads yoked in opposite directions."(69)

In the same month (March 31, 1850) the great political gladiator
and pro-slavery agitator and originator and disseminator of disunion
doctrines was dead;(70) but there were others to uphold and carry
forward his work to its fatal ending.

Calhoun was early accounted a sincere and honest man, a patriot of
moderate views, and at one time was much esteemed North as well as
South.  It is believed than an unfortunate quarrel with President
Jackson dashed his hopes of reaching the Presidency, and so embittered
him that he became the champion, first of nullification, then of
disunion.

There is not room here to speak in detail of the other champions
of the great debate on the Clay resolutions.

On the 18th of April these resolutions, and others of like import,
were referred to a committee of thirteen, with Clay as its chairman.
This was Clay's last triumph, and he accepted it with the greatest
joy, though then in ill health and fast approaching the grave.(71)

Of his joy, Benton, in a speech at the time, said:

"We all remember that night.  He seemed to ache with pleasure.  It
was too great for continence.  It burst forth.  In the fullness of
his joy and the overflow of his heart he entered upon the series
of congratulations."(72)

The sincere old hero was doomed to much disappointment; he did not
live, however, to see his views on slavery contained in the Compromise
measures (1) overthrown by an act of Congress four years later,
(2) by a decision of the Supreme Court seven years later, and then
(3) made an issue on which the South seceded from the Union and
precipitated a war, in which for ferocity, duration, and bloodshed,
his prophecies fell far short.  On the 8th of May this memorable
committee reported its recommendations somewhat different from his
resolutions.

Its report favored:

1.  The postponement of the subject of the admission of new States
formed out of Texas until they present themselves, when Congress
should faithfully execute the compact with Texas by admitting them.

2.  The admission forthwith of California with the boundaries she
claimed.

3.  The establishment of territorial government, without the Wilmot
Proviso, for New Mexico and Utah; embracing all territory acquired
from Mexico not included in California.

4.  The last two measures to be combined in one bill.

5.  The establishment of the boundary of Texas by the exclusion of
all New Mexico, with the grant of a pecuniary equivalent to Texas;
also to be a part of a bill including the last two measures.

6.  A more effectual fugitive-slave law.

7.  To prohibit the slave trade, not slavery, in the District of
Columbia.

Bills to carry out these recommendations were also reported.

A discussion ensued in both branches of Congress, which continued
for five months; and daily Clay met and presided in caucus over
what he called the Union men of the Senate, including Whigs and
Democrats.

These measures were supported by Clay, Webster, Cass, Douglas, and
Foote; opposed by Seward, Chase, Hale, Davis of Massachusetts, and
Dayton, anti-slavery men; also by Benton, an independent Democrat,
a slaveholder in Missouri and the District of Columbia,(73) and by
Jefferson Davis, and others of the Calhoun Southern type.

President Taylor opposed the Clay plan.  He denominated the blending
on incongruous subjects as an "Omnibus Bill."  He favored dealing
with each subject on its own merits.  He regarded the Texas and
New Mexico boundary dispute as a question between the United States
and New Mexico, not between Texas and New Mexico.(74)  He favored
the admission of California with her free State Constitution.  Even
earlier, he announced that he would approve a bill containing the
Wilmot Proviso.  He indignantly responded to Stephens' and Toombs'
demands in the interests of slavery, coupled with threatened
disunion, by giving them to understand he would, if necessary, take
the field himself to enforce the laws, and if the gentlemen were
taken in rebellion he would hang them as he had deserters and spies
in Mexico.(75)

Taylor died (July 8, 1850) pending the great discussion, chagrined
and mortified over the unsettled condition of his country.  His
last words were:  "_I have always done my duty; I am ready to die.
My only regret is for the friends I leave behind me_."

He was a great soldier and patriot, and his character hardly
justified the whole of the common appellation, "Rough and Ready."
He was perhaps always ready, but not rough; on the contrary, he
was a man of peace and order.  On his election to the Presidency
he desired some plan to be adopted for California by which "to
substitute the rule of law and order there for the bowie knife and
revolver."(76)

In August, 1850, the great debate ceased, and voting in the Senate
commenced.  The plan of the "thirteen" underwent changes, their
bills being segregated, substitutes were offered for them, and many
amendments were made to the several bills.  Davis of Mississippi
insisted upon the extension of the Missouri Compromise line--36°
30´--to the Pacific Ocean.  This brought out Mr. Clay's best
sentiments.  He said:

"Coming as I do from a slave State, it is my solemn, deliberate,
and well matured determination that no power, no earthly power,
shall compel me to vote for the positive introduction of slavery,
either south or north of that line.  Sir, while you reproach, and
justly, too, our British ancestors for the introduction of this
institution upon the continent of America, I am, for one, unwilling
that the posterity of the present inhabitants of California and
New Mexico shall reproach us for doing just what we reproach Great
Britain for doing for us."

The Wilmot Proviso made its appearance for the last time when Seward
offered it as an amendment.  It failed in the Senate by a vote of
23 to 33.

Finally, when the bill for the admission of California was ready
for a vote, Turney of Tennessee moved to limit the southern boundary
of the State to 36° 30´, so as to allow slavery in all territory
south of that line.  This failed, 24 to 32, the South voting almost
unitedly for the amendment.

Mr. Benton was a prominent exception.  To him the friends of freedom
owed much for support, by speech and vote.  While he opposed Clay's
plan, he voted with the free State party on all questions of slavery,
save on the Wilmot Proviso, which he deemed unnecessary to the
exclusion of slavery from territory where the laws of Mexico, still
in force, excluded it.

The California bill passed, August 13th, 34 to 18.  Clay is not
recorded as voting.  He may have been absent or paired.  Webster
had become Secretary of State, and Winthrop succeeded him in the
Senate.  To emphasize the opposition, ten Senators immediately had
read at the Secretary's desk a protest, with a view to its being
spread on the Journal.  This was refused, after a most spirited
debate, as being against precedent.(77)  The protest was a long
complaint against making the Territory of California a State without
its being first organized, territorially, and an opportunity given
to the South to make it a slave State, and for admitting it as a
free State, thus destroying the equilibrium of the States; the
protestors declaring that if such course were persisted in, it
would lead to a dissolution of the Union.  A bill establishing New
Mexico with its present boundaries, also Utah, was passed in August,
leaving both to become States with or without slavery.  A fugitive-
slave act was likewise passed at the same time in the Senate.  The
whole of the bills covered by the compromise having in some form
passed the Senate, went to the House, where, after some animated
discussion, they all passed, in September following, and were
approved by President Fillmore.

It remains to speak briefly of the Fugitive-Slave Act.  It was
odious to the North in the extreme.  United States Commissioners
were provided for to act instead of state magistrates, on whom
jurisdiction was attempted to be conferred by the Act of 1793.
_Ex-parte_ testimony was made sufficient to determine the identity
of the negro claimed, and the affidavit of an agent or attorney
was made sufficient.  The alleged fugitive was not permitted, under
any circumstances, to testify.  He was denied the right to trial
by jury.  The cases were to be heard in a summary manner.  The
claimant was authorized to use all necessary force to remove the
fugitive adjudged a slave.  All process of any court or judge was
forbidden to molest the claimant, his agent or attorney, in carrying
away the adjudged slave.  United States marshals and their deputies
were authorized to summon bystanders as a _posse comitatus_; and
all good citizens were commanded, by the act, to aid and assist in
the prompt and efficient execution of the law; all under heavy
penalty for failing to do so.  The officers were liable, in a civil
suit, for the value of the negro if he escaped.  Heavy fine or
imprisonment was to be imposed for hindering or preventing the
arrest, or for rescuing or attempting to rescue, or for harboring
or concealing the fugitive, and, if any person was found guilty of
causing his escape, a further fine of $1000 by way of civil damages
to the owner.  In case the commissioner adjudged the negro was the
claimant's slave, his fee was fixed at $10, and if he discharged
the negro, it was only $5.  The claimant had a right, in case of
apprehended danger, to require the officer arresting the fugitive
to remove him to the State from whence he fled, with authority to
employ as many persons to aid him as he might deem necessary, the
expense to be paid out of the United States Treasury.  This act
became a law September 18, 1850.  The law contained so many odious
provisions against all principles of natural justice and judicial
precedents that it could not be executed in many places in the
North.  The consciences of civilized men revolted against it, and
the Abolitionists did not fail to magnify its injustice; on the
other hand, the pro-slavery agitators saw in its imperfect execution
new and additional grounds for complaint against the North.

What, then, was intended to be a settlement of the slavery agitation
proved to be really a most violent reopening of it.

Webster, like Clay, did not survive to witness the next great
discussion in Congress on the slavery question, which resulted in
overturning much that was supposed to have been settled; nor did
they live to hear thundered from the supreme judicial tribunal of
the Union the appalling doctrines of the Dred Scott decision.
Webster died October 24, 1852.  Benton lived to condemn the great
tribunal for this decision in most vehement terms.  He died April
10, 1858.  But few of the leading participants of the 1850 debates
lived to witness the final overthrow of slavery.  Lewis Cass,
however, who, though a Democrat, generally followed and supported
Clay in his plan of compromise, not only lived to witness the birth
of the new doctrine of "Squatter Sovereignty" (and to support it),
but to hear that slavery was, according to our Supreme Court, almost
national; then to see disunion in the _live tree;_ then war; then
slaves proclaimed free as a war measure; then disunion overthrown
on the battle-field; then restoration of a more perfect Union,
wherein slavery and involuntary servitude was forbidden by the
Constitution.(78)

In the succeeding Presidential election (1852) the two great parties
endorsed the late action of Congress in relation to the Territories
and slavery.

The Whig platform declared the acquiescence of the party in all
its acts:  "The act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included. . . .
as a settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and
exciting questions which they embrace. . . . We will maintain them
and insist on their strict enforcement."

On this platform General Winfield Scott was nominated for the
Presidency.

The Democratic platform of the same year, having first denied that
Congress had power under the Constitution to interfere with slavery
in the States, declared also that the party would "abide by and
adhere to a faithful execution of the acts known as the Compromise
measures settled by the last Congress,--the act for reclaiming
fugitives from service or labor included."

Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, a subordinate officer (Brigadier-
General) under Scott in Mexico, of no special renown, but a polite
and respectable gentleman, was nominated and elected on this platform
by a decided vote; Scott carrying only Massachusetts, Vermont,
Kentucky, and Tennessee.  The "Free-Soil" party nominated John P.
Hale of New Hampshire on a platform repudiating the Compromise
measures, declaring against the aggressions of the slave power and
for:

"No more slave States, no slave territory, no nationalized slavery,
and no national legislation for the extradition of slaves.  That
slavery is a sin against God, and a crime against man, which no
human enactment or usage can make right; and that Christianity,
humanity, and patriotism alike demand its abolition.

"That the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 is repugnant to the Constitution,
to the principles of the common law," etc.

The Whig party, with this election, disappeared; its great leaders
were dead, and it could not vie with the Democratic party in pro-
slavery principles.  There was no longer room for two such parties.
The American people were already divided and dividing on the living
issue of freedom or slavery.  Slavery, like all wrong, was ever
aggressive, and demanded new constitutional expositions in its
interest by Congress and the courts, and it tolerated no more
temporizing or compromises.  Its advocates tried for a time to
unite in the Democratic party.

(66)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., pp. 733-6.

(67)  Jackson died June 8, 1845, past seventy-eight years of age.

(68)  _Thirty Years' View_, ii., p. 782.

(69)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., p. 747.

(70)  His remains were entombed in St. Philip's churchyard,
Charleston, S. C.  In 1865, on that city's occupancy by the Union
forces, friends seized and secreted them from fancied desecration
by the conquerors.--Draper's _Civil War in Am._, vol. i., p. 565.

(71)  Born April 12, 1777, died June 29, 1852.

(72)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., p. 764.

(73)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., p. 759.

(74)  _Ibid_., p. 765.

(75)  _Hist. of the U. S._ (Rhodes), vol. i., pp. 134 (190).

(76)  _Hist. Pac. States_, H. H. Bancroft, vol. xviii., p. 262.

(77)  _Thirty Years' View_, vol. ii., p. 770.

(78)  Cass died March 17, 1866, eighty-two years of age.


XVII
NEBRASKA ACT--1854

Over the disposition of the Territory of Nebraska it remained to
have the last Congressional struggle for the extension of slavery.
This Territory in 1854 comprised what are now the States of Kansas,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana, and parts of
Colorado and Wyoming.  It was a large part of the Louisiana Purchase,
in area 485,000 square miles, twelve times as large as Ohio, about
ten times the size of New York, 140,000 square miles larger than
the original thirteen States,(79) and more than four times the area
of Great Britain and Ireland.  It was what was left of the purchase
after Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Indian
Territory were carved out.  It then had only about one thousand
white inhabitants.

The desire to still placate the threatening South and to win its
political favor, led some great and patriotic men of the North to
attempt measures in the interest of slavery.

On January 4, 1854, Stephen A. Douglas, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Territories, made a report embodying constitutional
theories not hitherto promulgated, and questioning or repudiating
others long supposed to have been settled.

The report announced the discovery of a new principle of the Compromise
measures of 1850.

It declared:

"They were intended to have a far more comprehensive and enduring
effect than the mere adjustment of difficulties arising out of the
recent acquisition of Mexican territory.  They were designed to
establish certain great principles, which would not only furnish
adequate remedies for existing evils, but in all time to come avoid
the perils of similar agitation by withdrawing the question of
_slavery_ from the halls of Congress and the political arena,
committing it to the arbitration of those who are immediately
interested in and alone responsible for its consequences. . . . A
question has arisen in regard to the right to hold slaves in the
Territory of Nebraska. . . . It is a disputed point whether slavery
is prohibited in the Nebraska country by _valid_ enactment.  In
the opinion of eminent statesmen. . . . the eighth section of the
act preparatory to the admission of Missouri is null and void."

The eighth section prohibited slavery in the Louisiana Territory
north of 36° 30´, hence from the Nebraska Territory.  The report
reiterated the absurd doctrine:

"That the Constitution. . . . secures to every citizen an inalienable
right to move into any of the Territories with his property, of
whatever kind and description, and to hold and enjoy the same under
the sanction of law."

(What law?  The law of the place whence it came, or the law of the
place to which it was taken?  Not even an ox or an ass can be held
as property save under the law of the place where it is; nor is
the title to the soil valid except under the law of the place where
it is located.  As well as might a person claim the right to move
to a Territory and there own the land by virtue of the Constitution
and the laws of the State of his former residence as to claim under
them the right to own and sell his slave in a Territory.  The
difficulty is, while the emigrant might take with him his human
chattel, he could not take with him the law permitting him to hold
it.)

The report did not, however, as presented, propose to repeal the
Missouri Compromise line that had stood thirty-four years with the
approval of the first statesmen of all parties in the Union.

It assumed simply to interpret for the dead Clay and Webster their
only four-year-old work, and ran thus:

"The Compromise Measures of 1850 affirm and rest upon the following
propositions:

"First--That all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories,
and the new States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the
decision of the people residing therein.

"Second--That 'all cases involving the title to slaves' and 'questions
of personal freedom' are to be referred to the jurisdiction of the
local tribunals, with the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States.

"Third--That the provisions of the Constitution, in respect to
fugitives from service, are to be carried into faithful execution
in all 'the organized Territories,' the same as in the States."

The first of these propositions, in another form, announced the
new doctrine of popular sovereignty, soon thereafter popularly
called "Squatter Sovereignty," in derision of the rights thus to
be vested in the territorial _squatter_, however temporary his stay
might be.  It was opposed to the principle of Congressional right
(expressly granted by the Constitution (80)) to provide rules (laws)
and regulations for United States territory until it became clothed
with statehood.

The second proposition announced nothing new, as cases involving
titles to slaves, or questions of personal freedom, must necessarily
go for final determination to the courts, with a right of appeal.

The third proposition, like the second, was a mere platitude.

The bill accompanying the report, as first presented, required that
any part of Nebraska Territory admitted as a state (as provided in
the New Mexico and Utah Acts of 1850) "shall be received into the
Union with or without slavery, as its Constitution may prescribe
at the time of admission."  This, too, was not new in any sense,
as new States had ever been thus received.  The anti-slavery press
and societies, and all people opposed to further slavery aggression
and extension, at once took alarm and violently assailed the new
doctrines of the report; the South, too, at first viewed them with
surprise, denominating them "a snare set for the South," yet later
regarded them as favorable to the extension of slavery.  Southern
statesmen, however, determined to force Douglas to amend them so
as to accomplish the ends of the South.  Accordingly, Senator Dixon
of Kentucky, on January 16th, offered an amendment to the Nebraska
Bill providing for the absolute repeal of the Missouri Compromise
line.  This amendment Douglas, apparently with reluctance,(81)
accepted, after a consultation with Jefferson Davis, then Secretary
of War, and President Pierce, both of whom promised it their
support.(82)

January 23, 1854, Douglas presented a substitute for his original
bill, wherein it was provided that the restriction of the Missouri
Compromise "was superseded by the principles of the legislation of
1850, and is hereby declared inoperative."

The new bill divided the Territory in two parts; the southern,
called Kansas, lay between 37° and 40° of latitude, extending west
to the Rocky Mountains, and the northern was still called Nebraska.

As early as 1853 a movement in Missouri was started, avowedly to
make Nebraska slave Territory, and this was well known to Douglas
and the supporters of his newly announced doctrines.  Kansas, lying
farthest south, was climatically better suited for slavery than
the new Nebraska.  Before the bill passed, plans were made to invade
Kansas from Missouri and Arkansas by slaveholders with their slaves.

January 24, 1854, the _Appeal of the Independent Democrats in
Congress to the People of the United States_ was published.

Chase and Giddings of Ohio were its authors; some verbal additions,
however, were made to it by Sumner and Gerritt Smith.(83)

This _Appeal_ was signed by S. P. Chase, Charles Sumner, Joshua R.
Giddings, Edward Wade, Gerritt Smith, and Alexander De Witt; three
at least of whom were then, or soon became first among the great
statesmen opposed to human slavery.  The _Appeal_ declared the new
Nebraska Bill would "open all the unorganized Territories of the
Union to the ingress of slavery."  A plot to convert them "into a
dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves," to
the exclusion of immigrants from the Old World and free laborers
from our own States.  It reviewed the history of Congressional
legislation on slavery in the Territories, reciting, among other
things, that President Monroe approved the Missouri Compromise
after his Cabinet had given him a written opinion that the section
restricting slavery was constitutional.

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, Secretary
of War, Wm. H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, and Wm. Wirt,
Attorney-General--three from slave States--then constituted Monroe's
Cabinet.

The _Appeal_ warningly proceeded:

"The dearest interests of freedom and the Union are in imminent
peril.  Demagogues may tell you that the Union can be maintained
only by submitting to the demands of slavery.  We tell you that
the Union can only be maintained by the full recognition of the
just claims of freedom and man.  When it fails to accomplish these
ends it will be worthless, and when it becomes worthless it cannot
long endure. . . . Whatever apologies may be offered for the
toleration of slavery in the States, none can be offered for its
extension into the Territories where it does not exist, and where
that extension involves the repeal of ancient law and the violation
of solemn compact.

"For ourselves, we shall resist it by speech and vote, and with
all the abilities which God has given us.  Even if overcome in the
impending struggle, we shall not submit.  We shall go home to our
constituents, erect anew the standard of freedom, and call on the
people to come to the rescue of the country from the dominion of
slavery.  We will not despair; for the cause of human freedom is
the cause of God."

These patriotic expressions electrified the whole country.  The
North was aroused to their truth, the South seized upon them as
threats of disunion, and still louder than before, if possible,
called for a united South to vindicate slavery's rights in the
Territories.  Douglas attempted in the Senate to answer the _Appeal_.
This led to an acrimonious debate, participated in by Chase, Sumner,
Seward, Everett, and others, too long to be reviewed here.

Senator Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, took a prominent part in the
memorable debate over the Douglas-Nebraska Bill.  He was bold, and
never dealt in sophistry, but in plain speech.

Mr. Badger, of North Carolina, while making a slavery-dilution
argument, appealingly said:

"Why, if some Southern gentleman wishes to take the nurse who takes
charge of his little baby, or the old woman who nursed him in
childhood, and whom he called 'Mammy' until he returned from college,
. . . and whom he wishes to take with him . . . into one of these
new Territories, . . . why, in the name of God, should anybody
prevent it?"

Mr. Wade responded:

"The Senator entirely mistakes our position.  We have not the least
objection, and would oppose no obstacle to the Senator's migrating
to Kansas and taking his old 'Mammy' along with im.  We only insist
that he shall not be empowered to _sell_ her after taking her
there."

Mr. Chase moved to amend the bill by adding the words:

"Under which the people of the Territories, through their appropriate
representatives, may, if they see fit, prohibit the existence of
slavery therein."

This amendment failed, but it served to test the good faith of
those who supported the squatter sovereignty feature of the bill.

After a long struggle the bill passed, and was approved by the
President in May, 1854.

(79)  Area of original thirteen States, 354,504 square miles.

(80)  "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States," etc.--Art. IV., Sec. 3, Con. U. S.

(81)  _Three Decades of Fed. Leg._ (Cox), p. 49.

(82)  _Rise and Fall Con. Government_ (Davis), vol. i., p. 28.

(83)  Schucker's _Life of Chase_, p. 140.


XVIII
KANSAS' STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

The storm that arose over the Nebraska Act was ominous of the
future.  Public meetings in New York and other great cities of the
North were held, where it and slavery were denounced.  The clergyman
from the pulpit, the orator from the rostrum, and the great press
of the North vehemently denounced the measure.  Anti-slavery
movements appeared everywhere.

And as Kansas was thrown open to settlement, with Missouri slaveholders
already moved and organized to move in and take possession of and
dedicate it to slavery under the new doctrine of Popular Sovereignty,
emigration at once commenced from the North, encouraged and promoted
by aid societies.

Douglas, in the next Congress (March, 1856), as Chairman of the
Committee on Territories, made a report on Kansas affairs, condemning
the action of the free State people and of the aid societies,
referring especially to an imaginary "Emigration Aid Company" of
Massachusetts, with a capital of $5,000,000, and in consequence
holding their existence justified the Border Ruffians of Missouri.
The crack of the rifle was soon to be heard on the plains of Kansas.

The first election in Kansas was held in November, 1854, when, by
fraud and violence, Whitfield, a pro-slavery man, was elected
delegate to Congress.  Non-residents from Missouri cast the majority
of votes at this election.  Though not of the requisite population,
this was regarded as the opportune time for Kansas' admission as
a slave State.  Douglas in his report so recommended.

The House, the political complexion of which had changed at the
recent election, appointed Howard of Michigan, Sherman of Ohio,
and Oliver of Missouri a special committee to investigate the Kansas
outrages and election frauds.

A majority of this committee, July 1, 1856, reported, showing in
a most conclusive way that frauds and outrages had been perpetrated
to control the several Kansas elections.

From this report it appeared that in February, 1855, the total
population of Kansas was 8501; slaves 242, free negroes 151.  A
lengthy debate ensued over the report and over Kansas affairs,
Wade, Seward, Sumner, and others participating.

Presidents Pierce and Buchanan successively appointed governor
after governor of their party--Reeder, Shannon, Geary, Walker,
Stanton--all of whom resigned or were removed because they each
failed to support or endorse the determined and fraudulent efforts
to make Kansas a slave State against the will of the majority of
the resident people.  Hon. J. W. Denver of Ohio, a sensible, quiet
man, was the last of this long line of governors.  One of them,
Andrew Reeder, who was indicted with others for high treason on
the ground of their participation in the organization of a free
State government under the Topeka Constitution, for fear of
assassination fled the territory in disguise.  Robert J. Walker,
though himself pro-slavery, firmly refused to participate in forcing
the Lecompton Constitution on Kansas, even after President Buchanan,
at the demand of his pro-slavery party friends, had decided Kansas
should be admitted under it without its submission to a vote of
the people.  This Constitution was framed at Lecompton by fraudulently
elected delegates to a pro-slavery convention, and it provided for
perpetual slavery in the State.  In Governor Walker's letter of
resignation, December 16, 1857, he said:

"I state it as a fact . . . that an overwhelming majority of the
people (of Kansas) are opposed to the Lecompton Constitution. . . .
but one out of twenty of the press of Kansas sustains it. . . .
Any attempt by Congress to force this Constitution upon the people
of Kansas will be an effort to substitute the will of a small
minority for that of an overwhelming majority of the people."

It is due to Douglas to say that he was opposed to the Lecompton
Constitution scheme of admission.  He was doubtless disappointed
in not having the South rally to his support and nominate him for
President in 1856.  A more pliant tool of the pro-slavery party
from the North was given the preference in the person of Buchanan.

President Buchanan, having early expressed the purpose to support
the Lecompton plan, announced this purpose to Douglas, and urged
him to co-operate in admitting Kansas as a State under it, which,
being refused, terminated their party relations.  Douglas did not
go far enough.  Popular Sovereignty was only recognized by pro-
slavery advocates when it insured the success of slavery; and it
was now certain to make Kansas a free State if the actual settlers
alone were permitted to vote unintimidated and their votes were
honestly counted and returned.

On December 9, 1857, Douglas, almost heroically, in opposition to
President Buchanan and his administration and the majority of his
party in the Senate, denounced the Lecompton scheme, and showed
that it was an attempt to foist slavery on Kansas against the will
of the people.

The peculiar feature of the Lecompton Constitution was that, while
it was submitted to the vote of the people of Kansas, they were
required to vote for it or not vote at all.  The ballot provided
required them to vote "_For the Constitution with Slavery_," or
"_For the Constitution without Slavery_."  Thus the Constitution
must be adopted, and necessarily with slavery, as there was no
provision for excluding the clauses authorizing it.  At an election,
where for fraud and violence nothing thitherto had approached it,
and by the special feature of ballot-box stuffing (actual settlers
generally being driven from the polls when willing to vote), this
Constitution was returned adopted by about 6000 majority in favor
of slavery.(84)

The Senate, March 23, 1858, passed (33 to 25) a bill to admit Kansas
as a State under the Lecompton Constitution, _with slavery;_ but
notwithstanding the active efforts of the Administration, the House
(120 to 112) so amended the Senate bill as to require it, before
the State was admitted, to be voted on by the people, the ballot
to be--"For the Constitution" or "Against the Constitution."  This
amendment the Senate reluctantly concurred in.

On January 4, 1858, according to an act of the Territorial Legislature,
a vote was again taken and, notwithstanding many temptations offered
in lands, etc., and the desire for statehood, this Constitution
was rejected by over 10,000 majority.

February 11, 1859, the Territorial Legislature authorized another
convention to form a constitution.  Fifty-two delegates were elected,
and they met July 5, 1859, at Wyandotte, and on the 27th adjourned
after framing a constitution prohibiting slavery, and limiting and
establishing the western boundary of Kansas as it now is.  This
Constitution was ratified at an election held in October following.
April 11, 1860, the House of Representatives passed a bill (134 to
73) for the admission of Kansas under this Wyandotte Constitution,
but a similar bill failed in the Senate, and both Houses adjourned,
still leaving Kansas a Territory.

January 29, 1861, when secession had depleted Congress of many
members, Kansas was admitted under the Wyandotte Constitution--_a
free State_.

This last struggle for slavery extension was by no means bloodless.
The angry flash of Sharps' rifles was seen on the plains; the Bible
and the shot-gun were companions of the free State advocate, and
many were the daring deeds of men, and women, too, to save fair
Kansas to liberty.  John Brown (Osawatomie) here first became famous
for his zeal in the cause of freedom; and it is said he did not
fail to retaliate, blood for blood, man for man.

Douglas, who, by his "Popular Sovereignty" invention, brought on
the contest over Kansas which came so near making it slave, lived
to see his new doctrine fail in practice, but first to be cast down
by the Supreme Court, as we shall presently see.

Douglas, however, cannot, in justice to him, be thus carelessly
dismissed.  After being defeated in the previous election, he held
his great opponent's hat when the latter was inaugurated President,
and gave him warm assurance of support in maintaining the Union,
personally and by speech and votes in Congress; and, on the war
breaking out, in April, 1861, he proclaimed to the people, from
the political rostrum, that "there are now only two parties in this
country:  _patriots and traitors_."  He appealed to his past party
friends to stand by the Union and fight for its integrity, come
what might.  But he, too, did not live to see the triumph of freedom
and of his country.  He died June 3, 1861.

It is believed by many that if slavery had been forced upon California
and into the New Mexico and Nebraska Territories four more slave
States would soon have been admitted from Texas (as the act of
annexation provided), and that thus the slave power having secured
such domination in the Union as was desired and expected by its
leaders, there would have been no secession,--no rebellion, but,
instead, slavery would have become _national_.

But with California free and Kansas free, all hope of further
extending slavery in the United States was forever gone.

Had Kansas even become slave, what then?

The final contest in Kansas was augmented and intensified by a
national event partly passed over.

During the Kansas struggle the excitement of debate in Congress
rose to its zenith, surpassing any other period.

The North had been bullied into a frenzy over the demands of those
desiring the extension of slavery.  The anti-slavery members of
Congress met this in many instances by sober, candid discussion,
but in others by sharp invective, dealt out by superior learning
and consummate skill in the use of the English language.

Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was a profound student and scholar,
and an inveterate hater of slavery and all that was incident to it.

On May 19 and 20, 1856, he pronounced his famous philippic against
slavery and its supporters.  Regarding the opening of the Kansas-
Nebraska Territory to the influx of slavery, and the evident purpose
of the Administration to dedicate it to slavery, he poured out
warning invectives against all who in any way favored the new policy
of opening this Territory to the chance of coming into the Union
as slave States.  Mr. Sumner's remarks were personal in the extreme,
only justified by the general dictatorial and bullying attitude of
some Southern Senators.  A mere extract here would do him and the
occasion injustice.  Senators Cass and Douglas, on the floor of
the Senate, resented this speech of Sumner.

On the 22nd of May, two days after the speech, at the close of a
session of the Senate, while Sumner was seated at his desk in the
Senate chamber writing, he was approached by Preston Brooks, a
member of the House from South Carolina, who accosted him:  "I have
read your speech twice over carefully.  It is a libel on South
Carolina and Mr. Butler, who is a relative of mine," and he forthwith
assaulted Mr. Sumner by blows on the head with a gutta-percha cane
one inch in diameter at the larger end.  The blows were repeated,
the cane broken, and Brooks still continued to strike with the
broken parts of it.  Sumner, thus taken by surprise, and being
severely injured, could not defend himself, and soon, after vain
efforts to protect himself, fell prostrate to the floor, covered
with his own blood.  He was severely injured, and though he lived
for many years, he never wholly recovered from the injuries.  He
died March 11, 1874.

This outrage did much to precipitate events and to intensify
hostility to slavery.  Southern Senators and Representatives assumed
to justify the assault.(85)

The House did not expel Brooks, as the requisite two thirds vote
was not obtained.  He resigned, and was re-elected by his district,
six votes only being cast against him, but he died in January,
1857.  Butler, of South Carolina, the alleged immediate cause of
Brooks' assault on Sumner, died in the same year.

The whole North looked upon the personal assault upon Sumner as
not only brutal, but as intended to be notice to other Senators
and members of Congress of a common design and plan to intimidate
the friends of freedom.  The assault was largely justified throughout
the South, also by leading Southern statesmen in both branches of
Congress.(86)

Remarks on the manner of Brooks' assault in the House made by
Burlingame of Massachusetts led to a challenge from Brooks, which
was accepted, the duel to be fought near the Clifton House, Canada;
but Brooks declined to fight at the place named, alleging a fear
to go there through the enraged North.

Brooks also, for remarks in the Senate characterizing the assault,
challenged Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, but the latter declined
the challenge because he "regarded duelling as the lingering relic
of a barbarous civilization, which the law of the country has
branded as a crime."(86)

So threatening, then, was the attitude of the Southern members of
both Senate and House that Senators Wade of Ohio, Chandler of
Michigan, and Cameron of Pennsylvania made a compact to resent any
insult from a Southerner by a challenge to fight.(87)

A last attempt was made in Buchanan's administration, pending the
Kansas agitation, to buy and annex Cuba in the interest of the
slave power.  It was then a province of Spain.  Buchanan was both
dull and perverse in obeying the demands of his party, especially
on the slavery issue.  In his Annual Message of 1858 he expressed
satisfaction that the Kansas question no longer gave the country
trouble.  He also expressed gratitude to "Almighty Providence" that
it no longer threatened the peace of the country, and congratulated
himself over his course in relation to the Lecompton policy, saying,
"it afforded him heartfelt satisfaction."  He, in the same message,
set forth his anxiety to acquire Cuba, assigning as a reason that
it was "the only spot in the civilized world where the African
slave trade is tolerated."

Cuba was wanted simply to make more slave States to extend the
waning slave power, and thus to offset the incoming new free States,
which then seemed to the observing as inevitable.

Buchanan suggested that circumstances might arise where the law of
self-preservation might call on us to acquire Cuba by force, thus
affirming the policy set forth in the Ostend Manifesto, prepared
and signed by Mason, Soulé, and himself four years earlier.

Slidell of Louisiana, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
Senate, promptly reported a bill appropriating $30,000,000 to be
used by the President to obtain Cuba; and it soon transpired that
Southern Senators were willing to make the sum $120,000,000.

The introduction of the bill caused a sensation in Spain, and her
Cortes voted at once to support her King in maintaining the integrity
of the Spanish dominions.

A most violent debate ensued in Congress, reopening afresh the
slavery question.

The bill was antagonized by the friends of a homestead bill--"A
question of homes; of lands for the landless freemen."  The friends
of the latter bill denominated the Cuba bill a "question of slaves
for the slaveholders."

Toombs of Georgia, ever a fire-eater, save in war,(88) vehemently
denounced the opponents of the Cuba appropriation and the friends
of "lands for the landless" as the "shivering in the wind of men
of particular localities."  This brought to his feet Senator Wade
of Ohio, impetuous to meet attacks from all quarters, who exclaimed:

"I am very glad this question has at length come up.  I am glad,
too, it has antagonized with the nigger question.  We are 'shivering
in the wind,' are we, sir, over your Cuba question?  You may have
occasion to shiver on that question before you are through with
it.  The question will be, shall we give niggers to the niggerless,
or land to the landless, etc. . . . When you come to niggers to
the niggerless, all other questions sink into perfect insignificance."(89)

Although a majority of the Senate seemed to favor the bill, Mr.
Slidell withdrew it after much discussion, declaring it was then
impracticable to press it to a final vote.

The once famous Ostend Manifesto, dated October 18, 1854, was a
remarkable document, prepared and signed by Pierre Soulé, John Y.
Mason, and James Buchanan, then Ministers, respectively, to Spain,
France, and England, at a conference held at Ostend and Aix-la-
Chapelle, France.  It assumed to offer $120,000,000 for Cuba, and,
if this were refused, it announced that it was the duty of the
United States to apply the "great law" of "self-preservation" and
take Cuba in "disregard of the censures of the world."  The further
excuse stated in the Manifesto was that "Cuba was in danger of
being Africanized and become a second St. Domingo."

The real purpose, however, was to acquire it, and then admit it
into the Union as two or more slave States.

Buchanan, as Secretary of State under Polk, had offered $100,000,000
for Cuba.  His efforts to obtain Cuba secured for him the support
of the South for President in 1856.

There was no special instance of acquiring or attempting to acquire
territory by the United States authorities to dedicate to freedom.

Cuba is still Spanish (though not slave) (90) and just now in the
throes of insurrection, and the Congress of the United States has
just voted (April, 1896) to grant the Cuban Provisional Government
belligerent rights.(91)

(84)  From one election, held in 1857 at Oxford, Kansas, a roll
was returned on which 1624 persons' names appeared which had been
copied in alphabetical order from a Cincinnati directory.  These
persons were reported as voting with the anti-slavery party.

(85)  Keitt of South Carolina and Edmundson of Virginia stood by
during the assault, in a menacing manner, to protect Brooks from
assistance that might come to Sumner.

(86)  _Life of Sumner_ (Lesten), pp. 250, etc.

(87)  Appleton's _Cyclop. Am. Biography_, vol. vi., p. 311.

(88)  _Manassas to Appotmattox_ (Longstreet), pp. 113, 161.

(89)  In 1862 the first homestead bill became a law, under which,
by July 30, 1878, homesteads were granted to the number of 384,848;
in area, 61,575,680 acres, or 96,212 square miles; greater in extent
by 7000 square miles than England, Wales, and Scotland.

(90)  In 1870 the Spanish Government enacted a law emancipating
all slaves in Cuba over sixty years of age, and declaring all free
who were born after the enactment.  In 1886 but 25,000 slaves
remained, and these were emancipated _en masse_ by a decree of the
Spanish Cortes.  The last vestige of slavery (the patronato system)
was swept away by a royal decree dated October 7, 1886.

(91)  But see _Service in Spanish War_, Appendix A.


XIX
DRED SCOTT CASE--1857

On March 6, 1857, two days after Buchanan was inaugurated President
of the United States, the famous Dred Scott case was decided.

Chief-Justice Taney of Maryland, Justices Wayne of Georgia, Catron
of Tennessee, Daniel of Virginia, Campbell of Alabama, Grier of
Pennsylvania, and Nelson of New York concurred in the decision,
though some of them only in a qualified way.

Chief-Justice Taney read the opinion of the court.

Justices McLean of Ohio and Curtis of Massachusetts dissented on
all points.  All the justices read opinions at length.(93)

Chief-Justice Taney was a devout Roman Catholic, given much to
letters, of great industry, and generally regarded as a great
jurist.  When the case was decided he was nearly eighty years of
age, and he was then, in the distracted condition of the country,
deeply imbued with the idea that the Supreme Court had the power
to and could settle the slavery question.

All the other justices were eminent jurists and men of learning.

The decision reached marked an epoch in American history, and it
gave slavery an apparent perpetual lease of life; this was, however,
only apparent.

The case was twice argued by eminent lawyers; Blair and G. F. Curtis
for Dred Scott, and by Geyer and Johnson for the defendant.

Dred Scott brought a suit in the United States Circuit Court in
Missouri for trespass against one Sanford, charging him with assault
on him, his wife, and two children--in fact, for his and their
freedom.

The facts, as agreed, were as follows:

"In the year 1834, the plaintiff (Dred Scott) was a negro slave
belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the
United States.  In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the
plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock
Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave
until the month of April or May, 1836.  At the time last mentioned,
said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at
Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the
west bank of the Mississippi River, in the Territory known as Upper
Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate
north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north,
and north of the State of Missouri.  Said Dr. Emerson held the
plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling from said last-mentioned
date until the year 1838.

"In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of
the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro,
who belonged to the army of the United States.  In that year, 1835,
said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a
military post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there
as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as
a slave at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore
named.  Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort
Snelling until the year 1838.

"In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet, at said Fort
Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed
to be their master and owner, intermarried, and took each other
for husband and wife.  Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count
of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruits of that marriage.
Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the
steamship _Gipsey_, north of the north line of the State of Missouri,
and upon the river Mississippi.  Lizzie is about seven years old,
and was born in the State of Missouri, and at the military post
called Jefferson Barracks.

"In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said
Harriet and their said daughter Eliza from said Fort Snelling to
the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.

"Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and
conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the
defendant as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to
hold them and each of them as slaves.

"At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant,
claiming to be the owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said
plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing
in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do
if they were of right his slaves at such times."

It is our purpose here only to set forth what was decided, or
attempted to be decided, bearing upon slavery and its political
status in the United States.

This purpose we can accomplish no better than by quoting parts of
the Syllabi of the case.

We quote:

"A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to
this country and sold as slaves, is not a 'citizen' within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

"When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any
of the States as members of the community which constituted the
State, and were not numbered among its 'people or citizens.'
Consequently, the special rights and immunities guaranteed to
citizens do not apply to them.  And not being 'citizens' within
the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in
that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit
Court has no jurisdiction in such a suit.

"The only two clauses in the Constitution which point to this race
treat them as persons whom it was _morally_ lawful to deal in as
articles of property and to hold as slaves.

"The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African
race which has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution
cannot change its construction and meaning, and it must be construed
and administered now according to its true meaning and intention
when it was formed and adopted.

"The plaintiff, having admitted (by his demurrer to the plea in
abatement) that his ancestors were imported from Africa and sold
as slaves, he is not a citizen of the State of Missouri according
to the Constitution of the United States, and was not entitled to
sue in that character in the Circuit Court.

"The clause in the Constitution authorizing Congress to make all
needful rules and regulations for the government of the territory
and other property of the United States applies only to territory
within the chartered limits of some of the States when they were
colonies of Great Britain, and which was surrendered by the British
Government to the old Confederation of States in the treaty of
peace.  It does not apply to territory acquired by the present
Federal Government, by treaty or conquest, from a foreign nation.

"The United States, under the present Constitution, cannot acquire
territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at its will and
pleasure.  But it may acquire and may govern it as a Territory
until it has a population which, in the judgment of Congress,
entitles it to be admitted as a State of the Union.

"During the time it remains a Territory Congress may legislate over
it within the scope of its constitutional powers in relation to
citizens of the United States--and may establish a territorial
government--and the form of this local government must be regulated
by the discretion of Congress--but with powers not exceeding those
which Congress itself, by the Constitution, is authorized to exercise
over citizens of the United States, in respect to their rights of
persons or rights of property.

"The Territory thus acquired is acquired by the people of the United
States for their common and equal benefit, through their agent and
trustee, the Federal Government.  Congress can exercise no power
over the rights of persons or property of a citizen in the Territory
which is prohibited by the Constitution.  The government and its
citizens, whenever the Territory is open to settlement, both enter
it with their respective rights defined and limited by the
Constitution.

"Congress has no right to prohibit the citizens of any particular
State or States from taking up their home there, while it permits
citizens of other States to do so.  Nor has it a right to give
privileges to one class of citizens which it refuses to another.
The territory is acquired for their equal and common benefit--and
if open to any it must be open to all upon equal and the same terms.

"Every citizen has a right to take with him into the Territory any
article of property which the Constitution of the United States
recognizes as property.

"The Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property,
and pledges the Federal Government to protect it.  And Congress
cannot exercise any more authority on property of that description
than it may constitutionally exercise over property of any other
kind.

"The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United
States from taking with him his slaves when he removes to the
Territory in question to reside, is an exercise of authority over
private property which is not warranted by the Constitution--and
the removal of the plaintiff, by his owner, to that Territory, gave
him no title to freedom.

"The plaintiff himself acquired no title to freedom by being taken
by his owner to Rock Island, in Illinois, and brought back to
Missouri.  This court has heretofore decided that the status or
condition of a person of African descent depended on the laws of
the State in which he resided."

Thus the highest and most august judicial tribunal of this country
pronounced doctrines abhorrent to the age, overthrowing the acts
and practices of the fathers and framers of the Republic, and
pronouncing the Ordinance of 1787, in so far as it restricted human
slavery, and all like enactments as, from the beginning,
_unconstitutional_.

This decision startled the bench and bar and the thinking people
of the whole country, not alone on account of the doctrines laid
down by the court, but because of the new departure of a high court
in going beyond the confines of the case made on the record to
announce them.

It is, to say the least, only usual for any court to decide the
issues necessary to a determination of the real case under
consideration, nothing more; but the court in this case first
decided that the Circuit Court, from which error was prosecuted,
had no jurisdiction to render any judgment, it having found "upon
the showing of Scott himself that he was still a slave; not even
to render a judgment against him and in favor of defendants for
costs."

In the opinion it is said:

"It is the judgment of this court that it appears by the record
before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri,
in the same sense in which that word is used in the Constitution;
and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason,
had _no jurisdiction_ in the case, and could give no judgment in
it.  Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed,
and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction."

Having thus decided, it followed that anything said or attempted
to be decided on other questions was extra-judicial--mere _obiter
dicta_, if even that.

Nor does the objection to the matters covered by the decision rest
alone on its extra-judicial character, but on the fact that in
settling a mere individual controversy it passed from private rights
to public rights of the people in their national character, wholly
pertaining to political questions, entirely beyond the province of
the court, legally, judicially, or potentially.  It had no legal
right as a court to decide or comment upon what was not before it;
it had no judicial power to make any decree to enforce public or
political rights, nor yet to enforce, by any instrumentalities or
judicial machinery,--fines, jails, etc.,--any such decrees.

Moreover, the decision invaded the express powers of the Constitution
grated to it by the Constitution "respecting the Territory of other
property belonging to the United States."  This grant is preceded
in the Constitution by the language, "The Congress shall have power
to,"(93) etc.

The court entered the political field, though clothed only with
judicial power, one of the three distinct powers of the government.
For wise purposes executive, legislative, and judicial departments
were provided by the Constitution, each to be potential within its
sphere, acting always, of course, within their respective proper,
limited, constitutionally conferred authority.

"The judicial power shall extend to all _cases_ in law and equity
arising under this Constitution."(94)

This highest judicial tribunal, it is seen, passed from a case
wherein no jurisdiction, as it held, rested in the courts to enter
any form of judgment--not even for costs, to decide matters not
pertaining in any sense to the particular case, nor even to _judicial_
public rights of the people or the government, but wholly to the
political, legislative powers of Congress, not in any degree involved
in the jurisdictional question arising and decided.  If it be said
that courts of review or error sometimes decide all the questions
made on the record, though some of them may not be necessary to a
complete disposition of the case before it, it must be answered
that this is most rare, if at all, where the case is disposed of,
as was the Dred Scott case, against the trial court's jurisdiction.
But, manifestly, the many political questions discussed at great
length in the opinions and formulated as _syllabi_ (quoted above)
for the case, did not and could not arise of record, and they were
not covered by assignments of error, and hence, whether the sole
question decided or to be decided was one of jurisdiction or not,
these questions can only be regarded as discussions--personal
opinions of the justices--not rising to the dignity of mere volunteer
opinions on matters of _law_; of no binding force even as _legal
precedents_, because outside of the case and record--not even
properly _obiter dicta_.

But slavery then dominated and permeated everything and everybody.
Why should the justices of the Supreme Court be free from its
influence?  The Ordinance of 1787 was re-enacted by the First
Congress under the Constitution, and its slavery restriction clause
was enforced, without question, by Washington, Adams, Jefferson,
Madison, Monroe, and Jackson and their administrations.  The Missouri
Compromise line had stood unassailed for above a third of a century.
In 1848 Polk and his Cabinet approved the Oregon Bill prohibiting
slavery; also Pierce and his Administration approved (1853) the
extension of the same prohibition over Washington Territory.

Earlier, in 1845, the Texas Annexation Act, as we have seen, re-
enacted the 36° 30´ line of restriction for slavery, and in 1848
the pro-slavery party in Congress voted to extend this line to
California.  Congress again and again exercised the power of
legislating for the Territories; eleven times, between 1823 and
1838, it amended the laws of the Legislature of Florida, thus
asserting the absolute right to legislate for the Territories.
The Supreme Court of the United States for nearly seventy years
had assumed and acted on the principle of the right of Congress to
legislate for them.

Now all became changed, as though a new oracle of construction had
appeared, higher and wiser than all who had gone before--an oracle
who knew more of the Constitution than its makers.  This new oracle
did not divine the fates.  The announcement of the principle that
the Constitution treats negroes "as persons whom it is _morally_
lawful to deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves,"
shocked the consciences of just men throughout the earth.

Referring to the times when the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution of the United States were adopted, and speaking
of the African race, the Chief-Justice, in his opinion, said:

"They had, for more than a century before, been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations: and so far
inferior, _that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect:_ and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced
to slavery for his benefit."

These and kindred expressions astonished all civilization and all
Christian people.

The North was stunned by the decision, some fearing that slavery
was soon to become national.  The South exulted boastfully of their
cause,(95) loudly proclaiming the paramount, binding force of the
supreme judicial tribunal in the Republic.  Free labor and free
laborers were decried.  They were, in speech and press, called
"_mud sills of society:_" only negro slavery ennobled the white
race.

The over-zealous South was even persuaded that the small farmers,
trafficking merchants, and mechanics did not possess bravery enough
to fight for _liberty_.

Justice Catron, especially, claimed that Napoleon I., by the
insertion of the third article of the treaty of cession of the
Louisiana Province, had forever fastened slavery on it.  But of
this we have already spoken.(96)

It was slavery's last triumph.  Dred Scott, his wife, and two little
girls were remanded to slavery, to be freed by the irresistible
might of divine justice, worked out through the expiating blood of
the long-offending white race, commingled on many fields with the
blood of their own race.

(92)  19th Howard (_U. S._), pp. 393-633.

(93)  Con., Art. IV., Sec. 3, Par. 2.

(94)  Con., Art. III., Sec. 2.

(95)  Robert Toombs of Georgia in extravagant exuberance is reported
to have said:  "I expect to call the roll of my slaves at the foot
of Bunker Hill."

(96)  _Ante_, p. 43-5.


XX
JOHN BROWN RAID--1859

John Brown, of Kansas fame, eccentric, misguided, and intense in
his hatred of slavery, and of martyr stuff, encouraged by some of
the most influential anti-slavery men of the North, who were goaded
on by slavery's perennial aggressions, with a "_pike-pole_" at
Harper's Ferry (October 16, 1859) pricked the fetid pit of slavery,
causing a tremor to run through the whole body of it.  He had with
him an _army of eighteen_, five of whom were free negroes.(97)
They had rifles and pistols for themselves, and a few pikes for
the slaves they hoped to free.

Brown had assembled his band at the Kennedy farm in Maryland, a
few miles distant from Harper's Ferry, Virginia.

He professed to believe he might succeed if he could take the latter
place, as it "would serve as a notice to the slaves that their
friends had come, and as a trumpet to rally them to his standard."
This he stated to Frederick Douglass, whom he urged in vain to join
his expedition.(98)  His object was to free slaves, not to take
life.

This daring body seized the United States armory, arsenal, and the
rifle-works, all government property.  By midnight Brown was in
full possession of Harper's Ferry.  Before morning he caused the
arrest of two prominent slave owners, one of whom was Colonel Lewis
Washington, the great grandson of a brother of George Washington,
capturing of him the sword of Frederick the Great, and a brace of
pistols of Lafayette, presents from them, respectively, to General
Washington.  It was Brown's special ambition to free the Washington
slaves.  Fighting began at daybreak of the 17th.  The Mayor of
Harper's Ferry and another fell mortally wounded.

Brown and his party by noon were driven into an engine-house near
the armory, where they had barred the doors and windows, and made
port-holes for their rifles.  There they were besieged and fired
on by their assailants.

Colonel Washington and others of their captives were held by Brown
in the engine-house.  Shots were returned by Brown and his men.
Some idea of Brown's character and bravery can be formed from
Colonel Washington's description of his conduct in the engine-house
fort:

"Brown was the coolest and firmest man I ever saw in defying danger
and death.  With one son dead by his side, and another shot through,
he felt the pulse of his dying son with one hand and held his rifle
with the other, and commanded his men with the utmost composure,
encouraging them to be firm and sell their lives as dearly as they
could."

He wreaked no vengeance on his prisoners.  Though his sons and
friends were dead and dying around him, and himself, near the end
of the fight, cleaved down with a sword, and bayonets were thrust
in his body, he sheltered his prisoners so that not one of them
was harmed.  And non-combatants were not fired on by his band.

When Brown's party in the _fort_ were reduced to himself and six
men, two or more of these being wounded, Colonel Robert E. Lee,
_then of the United States Army_, arrived with a company of marines.
After Lee's demand to surrender was refused by Brown, an entrance
was forced, and, bleeding, some dying, he and those left were taken.
Of the nineteen, ten were killed, five taken prisoners, and four
had succeeded in escaping, two of the four being afterwards captured
in Pennsylvania.  They had killed five and wounded nine of the
inhabitants and of their besiegers.

Not only was all the vicinity wildly excited, but the whole South
was in an uproar.  Slavery had been physically assaulted in its
home.  The North partook of the excitement, generally condemning
the rash proceeding, though many deeply sympathized with the purpose
of Brown's movement, and his heroic conduct and life caused many
to admire him.  He was a devout believer in the literal reading of
the Holy Bible, and of the special judgments of God, as he interpreted
them in the Old Testament.  His attack on slavery he regarded as
more rational than and as likely to triumph as Joshua's attack on
a walled city with trumpets and shouts, and as Gideon's band of
three hundred, armed only with trumpets, lamps, and pitchers in
its encounter with a great army.  As Jericho's walls had fallen,
and Gideon's band had put to flight Midianites and Amalekites in
countless multitudes like grasshoppers, so, Brown expected, at
least fondly hoped and devoutly prayed, to see the myriads of
human slaves go free in America.  He did not, however, expect a
general rising of the slaves.

He did not seek to San Domingoize the South, and against this he
provided penalties in his prepared provisional constitution.(99)

Brown had been encouraged and materially aided by Gerritt Smith,
Dr. Howe of Boston, Stearns, Sanborn, Frederick Douglass, Higginson,
Emerson, Parker, Phillips, and others of less renown; some, if not
all, of whom had neither understood nor approved of his plan of
attack.

The slaves did not rise, not did they in any considerable number
even know at the time the real purpose of their would-be liberator.

During the excitement of the first news Greeley prophetically wrote:

"We deeply regret this outbreak; but remembering if their fault
was grievous, grieviously have they answered for it, we will not
by one reproachful word disturb the bloody shrouds wherein John
Brown and his compatriots are sleeping.  They dared and died for
what they felt to be right, though in a manner which seems to us
to be fatally wrong.  Let their epitaphs remain unwritten until
the _not distant day_ when no slave shall clank his chains in the
shades of Monticello or by the graves of Mount Vernon."(100)

Brown's raid did not seriously, as was then expected, affect the
November elections of that year, and they were favorable to the
young, aggressive Republican party, formed to stay the extension
of slavery.

It is not the purpose here to write a detailed history of particular
events, only to name such as had a substantial effect on slavery;
yet John Brown's _fate_ should be recorded.  He was captured October
18th; indicted on October 20th; arraigned and put on his trial at
Charlestown, in Jefferson County, Virginia, though his open wounds
were still bleeding; and on October 31, 1859, a jury brought in a
verdict finding him "Guilty of treason, and conspiring and advising
with slaves and others to rebel; and murder in the first degree."
Save in the matter of precipitation, his trial was fair, under all
the circumstances, and no other result could have been expected.
November 2 he was sentenced to be hung on December 2, 1859.

When arraigned for sentence, among other things he said:

"If it is deemed necessary I should forfeit my life in furtherance
of the end of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood
of my children, and with the blood of millions in this slave country
whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust exactments,
I say, let it be done."

A little later he wrote:

"I can leave to God the time and manner of my death, for I believe
now that the sealing of my testimony before God and man with my
blood will do far more to further the cause to which I have earnestly
devoted myself than anything I have done in my life . . . I am
quite cheerful concerning my approaching end, since I am convinced
I am worth infinitely more on the gallows than I could be anywhere
else."

On his way from the prison to the scaffold he handed to a guard a
paper on which were written his last words.

"I, John Brown, am now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty
land will never be purged away but with blood.  I had, as I now
think vainly, flattered myself that without very much bloodshed it
might be done."

Emerson, Parker, and the Abolition press of the North eulogized
Brown and his followers.

His raid was made another pretence for uniting the South.

The American Anti-Slavery Society in its calendar of events designated
_1859_ as "The John Brown Year."

John Brown was immortalized in a song written and sung first in
1861, and thereafter by the Union army wherever it marched.  On
the spot where he was hanged a Massachusetts regiment (1862) sung:

  "John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave,
   But his soul goes marching on," etc.

The significance of John Brown's attack, small as it was in the
point of numbers engaged in it, lies in the fact that it is the
only one of its character openly made on slavery in the history of
the United States, and in the further fact that it was at the
threshold of _Secession--War_, ending in _universal emancipation_.

(97)  _Hist. of the U. S._ (Rhodes), vol. ii., p. 393.

(98)  _Ibid_., p. 392.

(99)  Mason's _Report_, p. 57.

(100) _Hist. of U. S._ (Rhodes), vol. ii., p. 403; New York _Tribune_,
Oct. 19th.


XXI
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1856-1860

The political campaign of 1856 has thus far been passed by, as it
more appropriately belongs to a history of the political movements
leading up to secession.

Between the two great parties--Republican and Democratic--the most
important issue was the slavery question.

The Republican party, born of the slavery agitation, in its platform
(1856) denied

"The authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, of any
individual or association of individuals, to give legal existence
to slavery in any Territory of the United States.

"Declared that the Constitution confers on Congress sovereign power
over the Territories of the United States for their government,
and that in the exercise of this power it is both the right and
the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin
relics of barbarism--Polygamy and Slavery."

On the other hand, the Democratic party in 1856, fresh from the
contest in Congress over the Nebraska Bill and the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise, denied the right of Congress to exclude slavery
from the Territories, and declared it

"The right of the people of all the Territories, including Kansas
and Nebraska . . . to form a Constitution, with or without domestic
slavery, and be admitted into the Union."

There were other but minor issues discussed in 1856.  John C.
Fremont was nominated by the Republicans and James Buchanan by the
Democrats.  Douglas failed of the Presidential prize through violent
antagonism from the South, especially from Jefferson Davis, Wm. L.
Yancey, Robert Toombs, and other leading pro-slavery statesmen.
They distrusted him, though he had led them to victory in 1854 in
repealing the 36° 30´ restriction of slavery, and in throwing open,
as we have seen, the Nebraska territorial empire to the influx of
slaves.  He was patriotic, and hence could not be depended on to
take the next step towards forcing slavery into the Territories
and to favor a dissolution of the Union.

Buchanan, a pliant tool, was elected by a plurality vote over
Fremont and Fillmore, the candidate of the American party.  Fremont
carried, with good majorities, all the free States save Indiana,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California.

The popular discussion of the slavery question in the campaign was
thorough, memorable, exciting, educating, and, though resulting in
defeat to the anti-slavery party, it marked the trend of public
sentiment, and clearly foreshadowed that it would soon triumph.

The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 still further elucidated to
the masses of the people the issues impending, and indicated that
the end of slavery extension was near.

The Dred Scott decision, announced March, 1857, had completely
overthrown, so far as it could be done by judicial-political _obiter
dicta_, Douglas's Popular Sovereignty theory, leaving him with only
the northern end (and that not united) of his party endeavoring to
uphold it.

Next came the Presidential campaign of 1860, the last in which a
slave party participated.

The Democratic party met in delegate convention in April, 1860, in
Charleston, South Carolina, and after seven days of struggle, during
which disunion threats were made by Yancey and others, the delegates
from the Cotton States--South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas--seceded, for the alleged
reason that a majority of the convention adopted the 1856 Democratic
platform which upheld the Douglas - Popular Sovereignty doctrine
as applied to the Territories.

The seceding delegates had voted for a platform declaring the right
of all citizens to settle in the Territories with all their property
(including slaves) "without its being destroyed or impaired by
Congressional or territorial legislation," and further,

"That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all its departments
to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in
the Territories, and wherever else its constitutional authority
extends."

This was not only the new doctrine of the Supreme Court, but to it
was superadded the further claim that the Constitution _required_
Congress and all the departments of the government to protect the
slaveholder with his slaves, when once in a Territory, against
territorial legislation or other unfriendly acts.  By this most
startling doctrine the Constitution was to become an instrument to
_establish and protect slavery_ in all the territorial possessions
of the Republic.

Douglas failed of nomination at Charleston for want of a two thirds
vote of the entire convention as originally organized.  The convention
adjourned to meet, June 11th, at Baltimore, and the seceding branch
of it also adjourned to meet at the same time at Richmond, but
later it decided to meet with and again become a part of the
convention at Baltimore.  At this time the South had control of
the Senate, and May 25, 1860, before the convention reassembled,
and after a most acrimonious debate into which Douglas was drawn
and in which Jefferson Davis bitterly assailed him, the resolutions
of the latter were passed, affirming the "_property_" theory, with
the new doctrine of constitutional protection of it in the Territories
added.

The convention reassembled, and at the end of five days' wrangle
and recrimination, during which the members called each other
"disorganizers," "bolters," "traitors," "disunionists," "abolitionists,"
accompanied by violent threats, it disrupted again, its chairman,
Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, led the bolters and was followed
by the delegates generally from the Southern States.  They organized
at once a separate convention.

Douglas was nominated by the originally organized convention, and
John C. Breckinridge by the bolters, each on the sharply defined
platform relating to slavery, mentioned above.

Still another political body assembled in Baltimore in 1860, to
wit:  "The Constitutional Union Convention."  It met May 9th.  Its
platform was intended to be comprehensive and so simple and patriotic
that everybody might endorse it.  It declared against recognizing
any principle other than

"_The Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, and
the Enforcement of the Laws._"

John Bell of Tennessee was nominated on this broad platform for
President, with Edward Everett of Massachusetts for Vice-President,
both eminently respectable statesmen, but the times were not
auspicious for mere generalized principles or mere respectability.

The great Wigwam - Republican Convention met at Chicago, May 16,
1860, with delegates from all the free States, the Territories of
Kansas and Nebraska, and from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky,
and Missouri.

Its platform was long, and affirmed the principles of the Declaration
of Independence, pronounced against interfering with slavery in
the States, denounced the John Brown raid as "among the gravest of
crimes," and, in the main, was temperate and conservative.

On the question of slavery in the Territories it was radical:

"That the new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries
slavery in to any or all of the Territories of the United States,
is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit
provisions of that instrument itself," etc.

"That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States
is that of freedom, . . . and we deny the authority of Congress,
or a Territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal
existence to slavery in any Territory in the United States."

Lincoln of Illinois, Seward of New York, Chase of Ohio, and Cameron
of Pennsylvania were the principal candidates for nomination, but
the contest turned out to be between Lincoln and Seward, each of
whom was regarded eminently qualified for the Presidency and an
especial representative of his party on the slavery issue.

Lincoln was nominated on the third ballot, and Hannibal Hamlin, a
sturdy New England statesman, was nominated for Vice-President.

Slavery, with its tri-cornered issues, was the sole absorbing
question discussed in the campaign.  In the South, the Breckinridge
wing assailed the Douglas party, which combated _it_ there in turn.
In the North, the Republican party attacked furiously both the
Douglas and Breckinridge wings of the Democratic party; they, in
turn, fighting back and fighting each other.

The Bell and Everett party, though it claimed to be the only party
of the Constitution, fell into ridicule, as it really advocated no
well-defined principles on any subject whatsoever.  Bell and Everett,
however, carried Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia.  Lincoln carried
all the Northern States, save three of the electoral votes in New
Jersey.

Of the 303 electoral votes, Lincoln had 180, Douglas 12 (Missouri
9 and New Jersey 3), Breckinridge 72, and Bell 39, thus giving
Lincoln 57 over all.  He was the first and only President elected
on a direct slavery issue.

The slavery question, thus sharply presented, was decided at the
polls by the people, and their verdict was for freedom in the
Territories.  No more slave States; no more dilution of slavery by
spreading it (as was once advocated by Clay and others) for its
amelioration.

It must live or die in States wherein it was established.  Neither
successful secession, state-rights, nor accomplished disunion could
extend it.  Like all wrong, it could not stand still; to flourish,
it must be aggressive and progressive.  To limit it was to strangle
it.  This its votaries well understood.

In the history of the world there never were more brilliant, more
devoted, more earnest, more infatuated, and yet more inconsistent
propagandists of the institution of human slavery than in our
Republic during the period of the agitation of nullification--state-
rights--secession--disunion lines.  They were of the Calhoun school.
They declaimed in halls of legislation and on the stump and rostrum
for "Liberty," and hugged closely _human slavery_, often professing
to believe it of _divine right_.


XXII
DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION

Secession was at hand!  At first it was justified under the banner
of state-rights, on the theory that the Union was a voluntary
compact of States which could be broken at the will of one or all.
That a Republic was only an experiment, to exist until overthrown
by any member of it.  That the blood of the Revolution was shed,
not for the establishment of an independent nation, but for a
confederacy of separate states.  In the guise of nullification it
appeared, as we have seen, 1832; excessive tariff duties were the
pretext.  In 1835 it assumed to be the champion of slavery, because
on the slavery question only could the South be united.  It is due
to history to say, of the decade preceding 1860, patriotism was
not universal even in the free States.  Slavery had her votaries
there.  Interests of trade affected many.  Prejudice against the
blacks and ties of kinship affected others.  Parties and affiliations
and love of political power controlled the policy of influential
men in all sections of the country.

The South was aggressive, and smarted under its defeats in attempts
to extend its beloved institution.  The prayer of Calhoun for a
united South was fast being realized, and a fatal destiny goaded
on its leaders.  Slavery, indeed, no longer stood on a firm
foundation.  Public sentiment had sapped it.  It could not live
and tolerate free speech, and a free press, or universal education
even of the white race where it existed.  All strangers sojourning
in the South were under espionage; they, though innocent of any
designs on slavery, were often brutally treated and driven away.
It was only the distinguished visitors who were entertained with
the much boasted-of Southern hospitality.  The German or other
industrious foreign emigrant rarely, if ever, ventured into the
South.

Its towns and cities languished.  Slavery was bucolic and patriarchal.
It could not, in its most prosperous state, flourish on small
plantations; nor could the many own slaves or be interested in
their labor.  Not exceeding two tenths of the white race South
owned, at any time, or were interested in slave labor or slaves.
The eight tenths had no political or social standing.  They were,
in a large sense, in another form, white slaves.

The Border States held their negroes by a precarious tenure.  The
most intelligent were constantly escaping.  The inter-traffic in
slaves bred in the more northern slave States was likely to become
less profitable.  And patrols by night, to insure order, had become
generally necessary.

The publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's _Uncle Tom's Cabin_ had
a great effect on public sentiment North, and some influence even
in the South.  _The Impending Crisis of the South:  How to Meet
It_, written by Hilton R. Helper, a poor white man of North Carolina
(1857), an arraignment of slavery from the standpoint of the white
majority South, was denounced as incendiary in Congress.  Sherman
of Ohio, having in some way endorsed its publication, when a
candidate for Speaker, was denounced by Millson of Virginia, who
declared that "one who consciously, deliberately, and of purpose
lent his name and influence to the propagation of such writings is
not only not fit to be Speaker, but is not fit to live."

Sherman's endorsement of the Helper book caused his defeat for
Speaker, and a riot occurred in the House during this contest:
Not quite bloodshed.  Of the scene, Morris of Illinois said:

"A few more such scenes . . . and we shall hear the crack of the
revolver and see the gleam of the brandished blade."

The contents of the book, though temperate in tone, were said by
Pryor of Virginia to deal only "in rebellion, treason, and
insurrection."

Scenes, most extraordinary, were not unfrequently enacted in the
House of Representatives, all having the effect to inflame the
public mind.  Some of these were brought on by violent speeches of
Northern statesmen, made in response to the defiant attitude or
utterances of Southern men, boastful of their bravery.

One such scene was precipitated in 1860 by Owen Lovejoy of Illinois,
who, in a speech to the House, denounced

"Slaveholding as worse than robbing, than piracy, than polygamy.
The enslavement of human beings because they are inferior . . . is
the doctrine of the Democrats, and the doctrine of devils as well!
and there is no place in the universe outside the five-points of
hell and the Democratic party where the practice and prevalence of
such doctrines would not be a disgrace."

Lovejoy had more than an ordinary excuse for using such violent
language.

As long before as November 7, 1837, his brother, Elijah P. Lovejoy,
had been murdered at Alton, Illinois, while defending his printing-
press from a mob, chiefly from Missouri, his offence being that he
published an Abolition paper (_The Observer_).  His press had thrice
before in a year been destroyed.

Pryor of Virginia, Barksdale of Mississippi, and others resented
Lovejoy's expletives, calling him "an infamous, perjured villain,"
"a perjured negro-thief," and demanding of the Speaker to "order
that blackhearted scoundrel and negro-stealing thief to take his
seat."

Personal conflicts were imminent between opposing members.  Potter
of Iowa, Kellogg of Illinois, and others promptly and fiercely came
to Lovejoy's defence.  The latter finished his speech amid excitement
and threats.  Pryor afterwards demanded of Potter "the satisfaction
usual among gentlemen," who promptly proposed to give it to him,
naming bowie-knives as the weapons for the duel.  This mode of
gaining "_satisfaction_" was not accepted, because it was "vulgar,
barbarous, and inhuman."  Potter thenceforth became a hero, and
less was heard of Northern cowardice.

This, and like incidents, kindled the fast-spreading flame,--real
battle-fires were then almost in sight.

It must not be assumed the Republican party, before the war, favored
the abolition of slavery.  Its principal leaders denied they were
abolitionists; on the contrary, they insisted that their party
would not interfere with slavery where it existed by State law.

The sentiment of the people in that party, however, was, on this
question, in advance even of its progressive leaders.  The enforcement
of the Fugitive-Slave Law caused many and most important accessions
to the Abolitionists.  Wendell Phillips became an Abolitionist on
seeing Garrison dragged by a mob through the streets of Boston;
Josiah Quincy by the martyrdom of Lovejoy; other men of much note,
and multitudes of the moving, controlling masses, were decided to
oppose human slavery by kindred scenes all over the North.  They
took solemn, often secret vows, on witnessing men and women carried
off in chains to slavery, to wage eternal war on the institution;
this, in imitation of the vow of Hannibal of old to his father,
Hamilcar, to wage eternal war on Rome.

At last, through causes for the existence of which the South was
chiefly to blame, the sentiment North was culminating so strongly
against slavery that soon, had secession and war not come, slavery
would have everywhere been assailed.  It is impossible to stay the
march of a great moral movement, when backed by enlightened masses,
as to stem the rushing waters of a great stream in flood time.
Hence, the experiment of dissolution of the Union to save slavery
was due, if ever, to be tried in _1861!_

Secession was made easier by reason of a long cherished habit of
the Southern people to speak of themselves boastfully as citizens
of their respective States, thus, "I am a Virginian"; "I am a
Kentuckian," seemingly oblivious to the fact that they were citizens
of the United States.  This habit destroyed in some degree national
patriotism, and promoted a State pride, baleful in its consequences.
In many of the slave State voting was done _viva voce;_ that is,
by the voter announcing at the polls to the judges the name of the
person for whom he voted for each office.  This, it was contended,
promoted frankness, manliness, independence, and honesty in elections.
On the other hand, it was claimed, with much truth, that it was a
most refined and certain method of coercing the dependent poorer
classes into voting as the dominant class might desire, and hence
almost totally destructive of independence in voting.

An anecdote is told of John Randolph of Roanoke, who, when at the
Court of St. James (England) was conspicuous for his boasting that
he was a _Virginian_.  He was introduced by an English official
for an after-dinner speech with a request that he should tell the
distinguishing difference between a _Virginian_ and a citizen of
the American Republic.  He curtly responded:

"The difference is in the system of voting on election days; in
Virginia a voter must stand up, look the candidates in the eye,
and bravely and honestly name his preference, like a man; while
generally a voter in other States of the Union is permitted to
sneak to the polls like a thief, and slip a folded paper into a
hole in a box, then in a cowardly way steal home; the one promotes
manliness, the other cowardice."


XXIII
SECESSION OF STATES--1860-1

From what has been said, it will be seen the hour had arrived for
practical secession--disunion--or a total abandonment by the South
of its defiant position on slavery.  The latter was not to be
expected of the proud race of Southern statesmen and slaveholders.
They had pushed their cause too far to recede, and the North, though
conceding generally that there was no constitutional power to
interfere with slavery where it existed, was equally determined
not to permit its extension.  In secession lay the only hope of
either forcing the North to recede from its position, or, if
successful, to create a new government wherein slavery should be
universal and fundamental.  Never before had it been proposed to
establish a nation solely to perpetuate human slavery.

The election of Lincoln was already announced as a sufficient cause
for secession.  The South had failed to make California slave; to
make four more slave States out of Texas; to secure pledges that
out of the New Mexico Territory other slave States should be formed;
and to make Kansas a slave State.  It had also failed to acquire
Cuba, already slave, for division into more slave States.  There
was, moreover, a certainly that many more free States would be
admitted from the territorial domain of the great West.  The
political equilibrium in Congress on the line of slavery had
therefore become impossible for all the future.  These were the
grievances over which the South brooded.

But was it not in the divine plan that slavery in the Republic
should come to a violent end?  Nowhere among the kingdoms and
empires of the earth had it become, or had it ever been so deeply
implanted, as a part of a political system.  In the proud, boastful,
free Republic of America, in the afternoon of the nineteenth century,
where the Christian religion was taught, where liberty of conscience
was guaranteed by organic law, where civilization was assumed to
exist in its most enlightened and progressive stage, there, _alone_,
the slave owner marshalled boastfully his human slaves, selling
them on the auction block or otherwise at will, to be carried to
distant parts, separating wife and husband, parents and children,
and in a thousand ways shocking all the purer instincts of humanity.

Nor did its evil effects begin or cease with the black slave.

Jefferson, speaking of slavery in the United States when it existed
in a more modified form, described its immoral effect on the master
and his family thus:

"The whole commerce between master and slave is perpetual exercise
of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on
the one part and degrading submission on the other.  Our children
see this, and learn to imitate it. . . . The parent storms, the
child looks on, catches the lineaments of wrath, puts on the same
airs in the circle of small slaves, gives a loose to the worst of
passions, and thus nursed, educated, and daily exercised in tyranny,
cannot but be stamped by it with odious peculiarities."(101)

The virtue of the white race was necessarily involved in the
institution.  The blood of the dominant race became intermingled
with the black, and often white blood predominated in the slave.
The offspring of slaveholders became slaves, and were dealt in the
same as the pure African.  Concubinage existed generally where
slaves were numerous.

The rule was that any person born of a slave mother was doomed to
perpetual slavery.

As early as 1856, perhaps earlier, conferences were proposed among
leaders in some of the Southern States looking to secession.  They
were repeated again in 1858, and before the election of Lincoln in
1860.(102)  And Southern secret societies were formed in 1860 to
promote the same end.

The existence of a disunion cabal in Buchanan's Cabinet, working
to bring about disunion, was hardly a secret.

Howell Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, John B. Floyd
of Virginia, Secretary of War, Jacob Thompson of Mississippi,
Secretary of the Interior, and possibly others, were of the Cabinet
cabal.

Buchanan, though himself desiring to preserve the Union, had not
the bold temperament, and he had too long been a political tool of
the slave power to effectually resist its violent aggressions; nor
did he have the discernment to discover that his official household
was the centre of a disunion movement.  His Secretary of War
distributed officers of the army believed to be friendly to the
South where they could become available to it; he sent from the
North small arms and cannon, ammunition and stores where they could
be seized at the right time.(103)  Members of the Cabinet kept the
secession leaders advised of all acts of the administration, and
generally aided them.  The auspicious time, if ever, seemed to have
come for a successful dissolution of the Union.  The army and navy
were full of able Southern men, ready, as the sequel proves, to go
with their States, abandon the country that had nurtured and educated
them, and the flag that had been their glory.

Governor Wm. H. Gist, of South Carolina, October 5, 1860, by
confidential letters to the governors of the cotton States, fairly
inaugurated disunion, based on the anticipated election of Abraham
Lincoln a month thence.(104)

One week later, without waiting for a consultation of governors of
slave States, he, by proclamation, convened the Legislature of
South Carolina to "_take action for the safety and protection of
the State_."

This body met November 5th, the day preceding the Presidential
election.

The alleged grounds of justification for this early meeting were:

"The strong possibility of the election to the Presidency of a
sectional candidate by a party committed to the support of measures
which, if carried out, will inevitably destroy _our equality in
the Union_," etc.

This was the avowed reason, finally, for secession, though the true
reason was the absolute restriction of slavery and the overthrow
of the slave power in the Republic.  The election of a Republican
President was, of course, a disappointment to Southern statesmen,
long used to absolute sway in Congress and in the administration
of the government.  The charge that Lincoln was a sectional President
was true only to the extent that freedom was sectional.  Slavery
only was then, by secessionists, regarded as national.

The first important step of the South Carolina Legislature was to
appropriate $100,000 to be expended by the Governor in purchasing
small-arms and a battery of rifled cannon.  Without opposition a
convention was called to take "into consideration the dangers
incident to the position of the State in the Federal Union."  Her
two United States Senators and other of her Federal officers forthwith
resigned.  A grand mass meeting was held, November 17th, at
Charleston, generally participated in by the ladies, merchants,
etc.  The Stars and Stripes were not displayed, but a white palmetto
flag, after solemn prayer, was unfurled in its stead.  Disunion
was here inaugurated.  November 13th the Legislature of South
Carolina stayed the collection of all debts due to citizens of non-
slaveholding States.  It was not sufficient to repudiate the Union,
but honest debts must also be repudiated.

The convention thus called first met at Columbia, December 17th,
thence adjourned to Charleston, where (appropriately) on December
20, 1860, an Ordinance of Secession was passed reading thus:

"_An Ordinance,

"To dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and
other States united with her under the compact entitled 'The
Constitution of the United States of America_.'

"We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention
assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and
ordained:  That the Ordinance adopted by us in convention on the
23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution
of the United States was ratified, and also, all acts and parts of
acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments
of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and the Union now
subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name
of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved."

This action was taken in Buchanan's administration while secessionists
and promoters of disunion were yet in his Cabinet, and Jefferson
Davis and others were still plotting in Congress.

Great stress was laid upon the right to rescind the original
Ordinance of 1788 ratifying the Constitution of the United States,
and the Union of the States was denominated only a "_compact_."
The passage of the Ordinance of Secession was followed by "bonfires
and illuminations, ringing of bells, insults to the Stars and
Stripes," participated in by South Carolina aristocracy, especially
cheered on by the first ladies of the State and city, little dreaming
that slavery's opening death-knell was being proclaimed.(105)

It was fitting that South Carolina should lead the van of secession.
She had, in a Colonial state, furnished more Tories in the Revolution
of 1776 than any of the other colonies; she had initiated secession
through nullification in 1832; and her greatest statesman, Calhoun,
was the first to propose disunion as a remedy for slavery
restrictions.

Events succeeded rapidly.

An Alabama convention met, and, on January 8, 1861, received
commissioners from South Carolina, and on the 11th passed, in secret
session, an Ordinance of Secession, refusing to submit it to a vote
of her people.

Mississippi, on January 9, 1861, passed, through a convention, a
like Ordinance.

Georgia, January 19th, by a convention passed her Ordinance of
Secession.

Louisiana's convention passed an Ordinance of Secession January
25, 1861.

Texas passed, in convention, on February 1, 1861, a like Ordinance,
which was ratified by a vote of her people February 24th.(106)

Thus seven States resolved to secede before Abraham Lincoln became
President.

And each of these States had prepared for armed opposition; most,
if not all, of their Senators and Representatives in Congress had
withdrawn; in most of the States named United States forts, arms,
military stores, and other public property had been seized; and
many officers of the army and navy had deserted, weakly excusing
their action by declaring they must go with their States.

Events were happening in Washington.  Cass resigned as Secretary
of State because Buchanan adhered to the doctrine that there was
no power to coerce a seceding State.  Under this baleful doctrine,
secession had secured, apparently, a free and bloodless right of
way in its mad rush to dissolve the Union and to establish a slave
empire.  It was at first thought by Southern leaders wise to postpone
the formation of a "Confederacy" until Lincoln was inaugurated.
But about January 1st there came a Cabinet rupture.  Floyd was
driven from it, and Joseph Holt of Kentucky, a most able and patriotic
Union man, succeeded him.  Later, Edwin M. Stanton and Jeremiah
Black came into the Cabinet, Buchanan yielding to more patriotic
influences and adopting more decided Union measures, though not
based wholly on a coercive policy.

But, on January 5, 1861, a "Central Cabal," consisting of "Southern
Statesmen," who still lingered at Washington, where they could best
promote and direct the secession of the States and keep the
administration in check, if not control it, met in one of the rooms
of the _Capitol_ to devise an ultimate programme for the future.
It agreed on these propositions:

First.  Immediate secession of States.

Second.  A convention to meet at Montgomery, Alabama, not later
than February 15th, to organize a Confederacy.

To prevent hostile legislation under the changed and more loyal
impulses of the President and his reconstructed Cabinet, the cotton
States Senators should remain awhile in their places, to "keep the
hands of Buchanan tied."(107)

This cabal appointed Senators Jefferson Davis, Slidell, and Mallory
"to carry out the objects of the meeting."

Thus, beneath the "Dome of the Capitol," treason was plotted by
Senators and Representatives who still held their seats and official
places, and still received their pay from the United States Treasury,
for the sole purpose of enabling them the better to accomplish the
end sought.  Think of the prospective President of the "Confederate
States of America," their future Minister to the Court of France,
and their future Secretary of the Navy, plotting secretly in the
Capitol at Washington to destroy the Union!  But these were
treasonable times.

Through resolution of the Mississippi Legislature, the Montgomery
Convention was hastened, and it met February 4, instead of February
15, 1861, as suggested by the Washington caucus of Southern
Congressmen.  The delegates from the six seceded States east of
the Mississippi assembled, and a little later (March 2d) delegates
from Texas joined them.  On the fourth day of its session the
national _slave-child_ was born, and christened "_Confederate States
of America_."  The next day Jefferson Davis was elected President,
and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, Vice-President.  Stephens
took the oath of office on the day following his election.  Davis
arrived from Washington, and was, on the 18th, inaugurated the
first (and last) President of this Confederacy.

The next step was a permanent Constitution.  With characteristic
celerity, this was prepared and adopted March 11, 1861, one week
after Lincoln became President of the United States, though the
Confederacy had been formed almost a month before his official term
commenced.

This instrument was modelled on the Constitution of the United
States.

It forbade the importation of negroes of the African race from any
foreign country, other than the slaveholding States or Territories
of the United States.  Then following, for the first time probably
in the history of nations, the proposed new Republic dedicated
itself to eternal slavery, thus:

"No bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, or _law denying or
impairing_ the right of property in negro slaves, shall be
passed."(108)

Singularly enough, the astute friends of the institution of slavery,
knowing and avowing that it could not survive competition with the
free, well-paid labor necessary to manufacturing industries, and
knowing also that slavery was only adapted to rural pursuits, not
to skilled mechanical labor, and desiring to plant human slavery
permanently in the new nation, removed from all possibility of
competition with anything that might, by dignifying labor, build
up wealth as witnessed in the great Northern cities and thus endanger
slavery, sought to protect it by a clause incorporated in their
organic act, prohibiting any form of _tariff_ to protect home
industries.

"Nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations
be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry."(109)

Cotton was ever to be "King" in the Confederacy.

Mississippi's "Declaration of the Immediate Causes" justifying
secession with perfect honesty announced:

"Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of
slavery--the greatest material interest in the world. . . . A blow
at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization.  That blow has
been long aimed at the institution, and was at the point of reaching
its consummation.  There was no choice left us but submission to
the mandates of abolition or a dissolution of the Union."

The best, most candid, conservative, and comprehensive statement
in explanation and vindication of the Confederate Constitution,
the purposes and objects of the nation and people to be governed
by and under it, is found in a speech of Vice-President Stephens
at Savannah, Georgia, delivered ten days (March 21, 1861) after
its adoption.

Here is a single extract:

"The new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating
questions relating to our peculiar institution--African slavery as
it exists among us--the proper status of the negro in our form of
civilization.  _This was the immediate cause of the late rupture
and present revolution.  Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated
this as the rock upon which the old Union would split_.  He was
right.  What was conjecture with him is now a realized fact.  But
whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock
stood and stands, may be doubted.  The prevailing ideas entertained
by him, and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the
formation of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement of
the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was
wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically.  It was an
evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion
of the men of that day was that, somehow or other, in the order of
Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away.
This idea, though not incorporated in the Constitution, was the
prevailing idea at the time.  The Constitution, it is true, secured
every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last,
and hence no argument can be justly used against the constitutional
guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the
day.  Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong.  They rested
upon the assumption of the equality of the races.  This was an
error.  It was a sandy foundation, and the idea of a government
built upon it: when the 'storms came and the wind blew, it fell.'

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its
foundations are laid, _its corner stone rests upon the great truth
that the negro is not equal to the white man_.  That slavery--
subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal
condition.  This, our new government, is the first in the history
of the world based upon this great physical and moral truth.  This
truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all
the other truths in the various departments of science.  It has
been so even amongst us.  Many who hear me, perhaps, can recollect
well that this truth was not generally admitted, even within their
day.  The errors of the past generation still clung to many as late
as twenty years ago.  Those at the North who still cling to these
errors, with a zeal above knowledge, we justly denominate fanatics."

This is a fair and truthful exposition of the fundamental principles
of the Confederacy, fallacious as they were.

North Carolina, after her people had voted down a convention to
consider the question of secession at an extra session of her
Legislature, called a convention which, on May 21, 1861, when the
war had begun, passed an Ordinance of Secession without submission
to a vote of her people.

Virginia through her Legislature called a convention which, April
17, 1861, passed an Ordinance of Secession in secret session,
subject to ratification by a vote of her people.  This was after
Sumter had been fired on.

The vote was taken June 25th, and the Ordinance was ratified.

Arkansas defeated in convention an Ordinance for secession March
18, but passed one May 6, 1861, without a vote of her people.

Tennessee, by a vote of her people, February 8, 1861 (67,360 to
54,156) voted against a convention, but her Legislature (May 7,
1861) in secret session adopted a "Declaration of Independence and
Ordinance dissolving her Federal relations," subject to a vote of
her people on June 8th.  The vote being for separation, her Governor,
June 24, 1861, declared the State out of the Union.(110)

This was the last State of the eleven to secede.  All these four
ratified the Confederate Constitution and joined the already-formed
Confederacy.

The seceded States early passed laws authorizing the organization
of their militia, and making appropriations for defence against
coercion, and providing for the seizure of United States forts,
arsenals, and other property within their respective limits, and
later, that they should be turned over to the Confederate States.

Some of the States by law provided severe penalties against any of
their citizens holding office under the Government of the United
States.  Virginia, in July, 1861, in convention, passed an ordinance
declaring that any citizen of Virginia holding office under the
old Government should be forever banished from that State, and if
he undertook to represent the State in the Congress of the United
States, he should, in addition, be guilty of treason and his property
confiscated.

The other Border States failed to break up their relation to the
Union, though in all of them (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri) various irregular expedients were resorted to, to declare
them a part of the Confederacy.  From their people, however, much
material and moral support was given to the Confederate cause.

(101) Jefferson's _Works_, viii., p. 403.--Notes on Virginia.

(102) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. ii., pp. 299-314.

(103) _Annual Cyclopaedia_ (Appleton), 1861, p. 123.

(104) For this letter, see _Lincoln_ (N. and H.), vol. ii., p. 306.

(105) The prophecy:  "The rebellion, which began where Charleston
is, shall end where Charleston _was_," was fulfilled.

For a vivid, though sad description of Charleston at the end of
the war, by an eye-witness, see _Civil war in Am._ (Draper), vol.
i, p. 564.  Andrew's Hall, where the first Ordinance passed, and
the Institute in which it was signed, were then charred rubbish.

The _Demon_ war had been abroad in Charleston--who respects not
life or death.

(106) Sam Houston was the rightful Governor of Texas in 1861, but
on the adoption of an Ordinance of Secession (February 24, 1861)
he declined to take an oath of allegiance to the new government
and was deposed by a convention March 16, 1861.  Just previous to
the vote of the State on ratifying the ordinance, at Galveston,
before an immense, seething, secession audience, with few personal
friends to support him, in face of threatened violence, he denounced
the impolicy of Secession, and painted a prophetic picture of the
consequences that would result to his State from it.  He said:

"Let me tell you what is coming on the heels of secession.  The
time will come when your fathers and husbands, your sons and brothers,
will be herded together like sheep and cattle, at the point of the
bayonet, and your mothers and wives, your sisters and daughters,
will ask:  Where are they?  You may, after the sacrifice of countless
millions of treasure and hundreds and thousands of precious lives,
succeed, if God is not against you, in winning Southern independence.
But I doubt it.  It is a bare possibility at best.  I tell you that
while I believe, with you, in the doctrine of state rights, the
North is determined to preserve this Union.  They are not a fiery,
impulsive people, as you are, for the live in cooler climates.
But when they begin to move in a given direction, where great
interests are involved, they move with the steady momentum of a
giant avalanche, and what I fear is that they will overwhelm the
South with ignoble defeat."

During this speech a horse in a team near by grew restive, and
kicked out of harness, but was soon beaten to submission by his
driver.  Houston seized on the incident for an illustration, saying:
"That horse tried a little practical secession--See how speedily
he was whipped back into the Union."  This quick-witted remark
brought him applause from unsympathetic hearers.

Houston refused to recognize any Secession authority, and a few
days subsequent to his deposition retired to his home near Huntsville,
without friends, full of years, weak in body, suffering from wounds
received in his country's service, but strong in soul, and wholly
undismayed, though mourning his State's folly.  In front of his
house on the prairie he mounted a four-pound cannon, saying:  "Texas
may go to the devil and ruin if she pleases, but she shall not drag
me along with her."  History does not record another such incident.
To the credit of the Secessionists, they respected the age and
valor of the old hero, and did not molest, but permitted him to
hold his personal "fortress" until his death, which occurred July
26, 1863 (three weeks after Vicksburg fell), in his seventy-first
year.

He died satisfied the Confederacy and secession would soon be
overthrown and the Union preserved.

(107) _Lincoln_ (N. and H.), vol. iii, pp. 180-1.

(108) Con., Art. I., Sec. 9, pars. 1, 4.

(109) Confederate Con., Art. I., Sec. 8, par. 1.

(110) McPherson's _Hist. of the Rebellion_, pp. 4-8.


XXIV
ACTION OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS, ETC.--1860-1

Significant above all other of the great events resulting from the
secession of the Southern States was the dissolution of the great
religious denominations in the United States.(111)

First, the Old School Presbyterian Church Synod of South Carolina,
early as December 3, 1860, declared for a slave Confederacy.  This
was followed by other such synods in the South, all deciding for
separation from the Church North.  The Baptists in Alabama, Georgia,
and South Carolina were equally prompt in taking similar action.

Likewise the Protestant Episcopal Church, in a General Convention,
held in Columbia, South Carolina, after having endorsed the
Confederacy, adopted a "Constitution of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the Confederate States of America"; all its Southern
bishops being present and approving, save Bishop Leonidas Polk of
Louisiana, who was absent, a Major-General in the Confederate
army.(112)

The Methodist Episcopal Church South endorsed disunion and slavery;
it had, however, in 1845, separated from the Methodist Church North.

The Roman Catholic Church, through Bishop Lynch, early in 1861,
espoused the Confederate cause, and he, later, corresponded with
the Pope of Rome in its interests, receiving a conciliatory answer
in the Pope's name by Cardinal Antonelli.

The Young Men's Christian Association of New Orleans, May 22, 1861,
issued an _Address to the Young Men's Christian Associations of
North America_, declaring secession justifiable, and protesting,
"in the name of Christ and his divine teachings," against waging
war against the Southern States and their institutions.

Later, in 1863, the "Confederate clergy" issued a most memorable
"_Address to Christians throughout the World_," likewise protesting
against further prosecution of the war; declaring that the Union
was forever dissolved, and specially pointing out "the most
indefensible act growing out of the inexcusable war" to be

"The recent proclamation of the President of the United States
seeking the _emancipation of the slaves_ of the South."

And saying further:

"It is in our judgment a suitable occasion for solemn protest on
the part of the people of God throughout the world."

Thus encouraged and upheld, the new Confederacy, with slavery for
its "corner-stone," defiantly embarked.

The counter-action of the Church North was equally emphatic for
_freedom_, and the Union of the States under one flag and one
God.(113)

It is appropriate in connection with the attitude of the religious
people of the country toward slavery and the Confederacy, and the
war to preserve the one and to establish the other, to quote from
President Lincoln's valedictory Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865),
in which he refers to the attitude of opposing parties, the cause
of the conflict, and to each party invoking God's aid.

"Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration
which it has already attained.  Neither anticipated that the cause
of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict
itself should cease.  Each looked for an easier triumph, and a
result less fundamental and astounding.  _Both read the same Bible
and pray to the same God_, and each invoked His aid against the
other.  It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just
God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other
men's faces; but let us 'judge not that we be not judged.'  The
prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been
answered fully.

"The Almighty has His own purposes.  'Woe unto the world because
of offences.  For it must needs be that offences come; but woe to
that man by whom the offence cometh.'  If we shall suppose that
American slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence
of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His
appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both
North and South this terrible war, as the woe to those by whom the
offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those
divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe
to Him?  Fondly do we hope--fervently do we pray that this mighty
scourge of woe may speedily pass away.  Yet if God wills that it
continue until all the wealth piled up by the bondsman's two hundred
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every
drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn
with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it
must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous
altogether.'

"With malice toward none, with charity for all; with firmness in
the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to
finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care
for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and
his orphan--to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and
lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

(111) _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), 508-520.

(112) He was, as Lieutenant-General, June 14, 1864, killed by a
shell, at Marietta, Ga., while reconnoitering the Union lines.

(113) _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), pp. 460-508.


XXV
PROPOSED CONCESSIONS TO SLAVERY--BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION AND
CONGRESS--1860-1

The manner of receiving and treating the secession of the States
by the administration of Buchanan and the Thirty-Sixth Congress
can only here have a brief notice.  There was a pretty general
disposition to make further concessions and compromises to appease
the disunion sentiment of the South.  His administration was weak
and vacillating.  Two serious attempts at conciliation were made.
President Buchanan, in his last Annual Message (December 4, 1860),
while declaring that the election of any one to the office of
President was not a just cause for dissolving the Union, and while
denying that "Secession" could be justified under the Constitution,
yet announced his conclusion that the latter had not "delegated to
Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is
attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the
Confederacy"; that coercion was "not among the specific and enumerated
powers granted to Congress."  He did not think it was constitutional
to preserve the Constitution or the Union of the States.  This view
was held by most leaders of his party at the time and throughout
the ensuing war; not so, however, by the rank and file.

Buchanan did not believe that self-preservation inhered in the
Constitution or the Union.

The President in this Message suggested an explanatory amendment
to the Constitution:  (1) To recognize the right of property in
slaves in the States where it existed; (2) to protect this right
in the Territories until they were admitted as States with or
without slavery; (3) a like recognition of the right of the master
to have his escaped slave delivered up to him; and (4) declaring
all unfriendly State laws impairing this right unconstitutional.

This was the signal for the presentation of a numerous brood of
propositions to amend the Constitution in the interest of slavery,
and by way of concessions to the South.

A committee of thirty-three, one from each State, of which Thomas
Corwin of Ohio was chairman, was (December 4, 1860) appointed to
consider the part of the President's Message referred to.

Mr. Noel of Missouri proposed to instruct this committee to report
on the expediency of abolishing the office of President, and in
lieu thereof establishing an Executive Council of three, elected
by districts composed of contiguous States--each member armed with
a veto power; and he also proposed to restore the equilibrium of
the States by dividing slave States into two or more.

Mr. Hindman of Arkansas proposed to amend the Constitution so as
to expressly recognize slavery in the States; to protect it in the
Territories; to allow slaves to be transported through free States;
to prohibit representation in Congress to any State passing laws
impairing the Fugitive-Slave Act; giving slave States a negative
upon all acts relating to slavery, and making such amendment
unalterable.

Mr. Florence of Pennsylvania and Mr. Kellogg of Illinois each
proposed to amend the Constitution "granting the right to hold
slaves in all territory south of 36° 30´, and prohibiting slavery
in territory north of this line," etc.

Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio proposed a long amendment to the Constitution,
the central idea of which was a division of the Union into four
sections, with a complicated and necessarily impracticable plan of
voting in Congress, and of voting for the election of President
and Vice-President.

These are only samples of the many propositions to amend the
Constitution, but they will suffice for all.  None of them had the
approval of both Houses of Congress.

There were many patriotic propositions offered looking to the
preservation of the Union as it was.  They too failed.

The great committee reported (January 14, 1861) five propositions.
The first a series of resolutions declaratory of the duty of Congress
and the government to the States, and in relation to slavery; the
second an amendment to the Constitution relating to slavery; the
third a bill for the admission of New Mexico, including therein
Arizona, as a State; the fourth a bill amending and making more
efficient the Fugitive-Slave Law, among other things giving the
United States Commissioner _ten dollars_ whether he remanded or
discharged the alleged fugitive; and the fifth a bill for the
rendition of fugitives from justice.  These several propositions
(save the fifth, which was rejected) passed the House, the proposed
constitutional amendment of the committee being amended on motion
of Mr. Corwin before its passage.

None of the propositions were considered in the Senate save the
second, and even this one did not receive the support of the
secessionists still lingering in Congress.

The proposition to amend the Constitution passed both Houses by
the requisite two thirds vote.  It read:

"Art. XIII.  No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which
will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere,
within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of any State."

_Two_ States _only_--Maryland and _Ohio_ (114)--ratified this
proposed amendment.  It was needless, and, if adopted, would have
taken no power from Congress, which any respectable party had ever
claimed it possessed, but the amendment was tendered to answer the
false cry that slavery in the slave States was in danger from
Congressional action.

(What a contrast between this proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and the Thirteenth Amendment adopted four years later!
The former proposed to establish slavery forever; the latter
abolished it _forever_.)

The resolutions of John J. Crittenden in the Senate proposed various
amendments to the Constitution, among others to legalize slavery
south of 36° 30´; to admit States from territory north of that
line, with or without slavery; to prohibit the abolition of slavery
in the States and also in the District of Columbia so long as it
existed in Virginia or Maryland, such abolition even then to be
only with the consent of the inhabitants of the District and with
compensation to the slave owners; to require the United States to
pay for fugitive slaves who were prevented from arrest or return
to slavery by violence and intimidation, and to make all the
provisions of the Constitution, including the proposed amendments,
unchangeable forever.  The Crittenden resolutions, at the end of
much debate, and after various votes on amendments proposed thereto,
failed (19 to 20) in the Senate, and therefore were never considered
in the House.(115)

It was claimed at the time that had the Congressmen from the Southern
States remained and voted for the Corwin and Crittenden propositions
the Constitution might have been amended, giving slavery all these
guarantees.

(114) Joint resolution of ratification, _Ohio Laws_, 1861, p. 190.

(115) _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), pp. 57-67.


XXVI
PEACE CONFERENCE--1861

By appointments of governors or legislatures, commissioners from
each of twenty States, chosen at the request of the Legislature of
Virginia, met in Washington, February 4, 1861, in a "_Peace
Conference_."(116)  Ex-President John Tyler of Virginia was made
President, and Crafts J. Wright of Ohio Secretary.(117)

It adjourned February 27th, having agreed to recommend to the
several States amendments to the Constitution, in substance:  That
north of 36° 30´ slavery in the Territories shall be, and south of
that line it shall not be, prohibited; that neither Congress nor
a Territorial Legislature shall pass any law to prevent slaves from
being taken from the States to the Territories; that no Territory
shall be acquired by the United States, except by discovery and
for naval stations, without the consent of a majority of the Senators
from the slave and also from the free States; that Congress shall
have no power to abolish slavery in any State, nor in the District
of Columbia without the consent of Maryland; nor to prohibit
Congressmen from taking their slaves to and from said District;
nor the power to prohibit the free transportation of slaves from
one slave State or Territory to another; that bringing slaves into
the District of Columbia for sale, or to be placed in depot for
transfer and sale at other places, is prohibited; that the clauses
in the Constitution and its amendments relating to slavery shall
never be abolished or amended without the consent of all the States;
and that Congress shall provide by law for paying owners for escaped
slaves where officers, whose duty it was to arrest them, were
prevented from arresting them or returning them to their owners
after being arrested.

"The Peace Conference" was composed of 133 members, among whom were
some of the most eminent men of the country, though generally,
however, only conservatives from each section were selected as
members.  Its remarkable recommendations were made with considerable
unanimity, voting in the conference being by States, the Continental
method.

Wm. Pitt Fessenden and Lot M. Morrill of Maine, Geo. S. Boutwell
of Massachusetts, David Dudley Field and Erastus Corning of New
York, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, David Wilmot of
Pennsylvania, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, John Tyler, Wm. C. Rives,
and John A. Seddon of Virginia, Wm. O. Butler, James B. Clay, James
Guthrie, and Charles A. Wickcliffe of Kentucky, C. P. Wolcott,
Salmon P. Chase, John C. Wright, Wm. S. Groesback, Franklin T.
Backus, Reuben Hitchcock, Thomas Ewing (Sen.), and Valentine B.
Horton of Ohio, Caleb B. Smith and Godlove S. Orth of Indiana, John
M. Palmer and Burton C. Cook of Illinois, and James Harlan and
James W. Grimes of Iowa were of the number.  Many of them were
then, or afterwards, celebrated as statesmen; and some of them
subsequently held high rank as soldiers.

March 2, 1861, the "Peace Conference" propositions were offered
twice to the Senate, and each time overwhelmingly defeated, as they
had been, on the day preceding, by the House.(118)

There were many other propositions offered, considered, and defeated,
to wit:  Propositions from the Senate Committee of thirteen appointed
December 18, 1860; propositions of Douglas, Seward, and others;
also propositions from a meeting of Senators and members from the
border, free, and slave States, all relating to slavery, and proposed
with a view of stopping the already precipitated secession of
States.(119)

Some of these propositions were exasperatingly humiliating, and
only possibly justifiable by the times.

Though Lincoln's election as President was claimed to be a good
cause for secession, and though much of the compromise talk was to
appease his party opponents as well as the South, he was opposed
to bargaining himself into the office to which the people had
elected him.  With respect to this matter (January 30, 1861) he
said:

"I will suffer death before I will consent, or advise my friends
to consent, to any concession or compromise which looks like buying
the privilege of taking possession of the government to which we
have a constitutional right."

We have now done with legislation, attempted legislation, and
constitutional amendments to protect and extend slavery in the
Republic.  Slavery appealed to war, and by the inexorable decree
of war its fate must be decided.

The _Emancipation Proclamation of Abraham Lincoln_ (January 1,
1863) and the _Thirteenth_ Amendment to the Constitution (1865)
freed all slaves in the Union; the _Fourteenth_ Amendment (1868)
provided that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside"; and the _Fifteenth_
Amendment (1870) gave the right to vote to all citizens of the
United States regardless of "_race, color, or previous condition
of servitude_."  These are all simply the decrees of war, written
in the organic law of the United States at the end of the national
four years' baptism of blood.  Embodied in them are no concessions
or compromises; the evil was torn out by the roots, and the Christian
world, the progressive civilization of the age, and the consciences
of enlightened mankind _now_ approve what was done.

The war, with its attendant horrors and evils, was necessary to
terminate the deep-seated, time-honored, and unholy institution of
human slavery, so long embedded in our social, political, and
commercial relations, and sustained by our prejudices, born of a
selfish disposition, common to white people, to esteem themselves
superior to others.

The history of emancipation and of these constitutional amendments
belongs, logically, to periods during and at the end of the war.

There are, however, two important acts relating to slavery which
passed Congress during the War of the Rebellion, not strictly the
_result_ of that war, though incident to it, which must be
mentioned.

(116) Kansas joined later, and Michigan, California, and Oregon
were not represented; nor were the then seceded Southern States,
or Arkansas, represented.

(117) Blaine (_Twenty Years of Congress_, vol. i., p. 269), says:
"Puleston, a delegate from Pennsylvania, a subject of Queen Victoria,
later (1884) of the British Parliament, was chosen Secretary of
the Conference."--This is an error.  He was not a delegate: only
one of several assistant secretaries.

On the next page of Blaine's book he falls into another error in
saying the Wilmot Proviso was embodied (1848) in the Oregon
territorial act.  It was never embodied in any act.  The sixth
section of the Ordinance of 1787 is embodied in that act word for
word.

(118) _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), pp. 68-9.

(119) _Ibid_., p. 76.


XXVII
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA--SLAVERY ABOLISHED--1862

The District of Columbia, acquired by the United States in 1791
for the purpose of founding the city of Washington as the permanent
Federal Capital, was, by the laws of Virginia and Maryland, slave
territory.  The District was originally ten miles square, and
included the city of Alexandria.  Later (1846) the part acquired
from Virginia (about forty square miles) was retroceded to that
State.  Congress had complete jurisdiction over it, though the laws
of Maryland and Virginia, for some purposes, were continued in
force.  It was, however, from the beginning claimed that Congress
had the right to abolish slavery within its boundaries.

Congress is given the right "to exercise exclusive legislation in
all cases whatsoever over such District."(120)  But slavery was
claimed to be excepted because of its peculiar character.

The institution of slavery was therefore perpetuated in the District,
and in the Capital of the Republic slave-marts existed where men
and women were sold from the auction block, and families were torn
asunder and carried to different parts of the country to be continued
in bondage.  In the shadow of the Capitol the voice of the auctioneer
proclaiming in the accustomed way the merits of the slave commingled
with that of the statesmen in the Halls of Congress proclaiming
the boasted liberty of the great American Republic!  Daniel Drayton
(1848) was tried in the District for the larceny of seventy-four
human beings, his crime consisting of affording means (in the
schooner _Pearl_) for their escape to freedom.(121)

Under the laws of the District many others were punished for like
offences.

As late as 1856, when the sculptor Crawford furnished a design for
the _Statue of Liberty_ to crown the dome of the Capitol, Secretary
of War Jefferson Davis ordered the "_liberty cap_" struck from the
model, because in art it had an "established origin in its use as
a badge of the freed slave."(122)

We have seen how much the consciences of just men were shocked,
and how assiduously such men labored to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia, and with what tenacity the slave party fought
to maintain it there, and even by constitutional amendments to fix
it there forever.

But when slavery had brought the country to war, the emancipation
of slaves in the District was early considered.

Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, December 16, 1861, introduced a bill
in the Senate, which, after a most memorable debate in both Houses
of Congress, passed, and on April 16, 1862, became a law, with the
approval of President Lincoln.  This act emancipated forthwith all
the slaves of the District, and annulled the laws of Maryland over
it relating to slavery and all statutes giving the cities of
Washington and Georgetown authority to pass ordinances discriminating
against persons of color.

(120) Con. U. S., Art. I., Sec. 8, par. 17.

(121) Drayton did not succeed in the attempt to afford these slaves
means to escape.  He was tried on two indictments for larceny,
convicted, and on each sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.
The Circuit Court reversed these convictions on the erroneous charge
of the trial judge (Crawford), to the effect that a man might be
guilty of larceny of property--slaves--without the intent to
appropriate it to his own use.  On re-trial Drayton was acquitted
on the larceny indictments; but verdicts were taken against him on
seventy-four indictments for transporting slaves--not a penitentiary
offense--and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $10,000, and to
remain in prison until paid.  He was most ably defended by Horace
Mann of Boston, and J. M. Carlisle of Washington, D. C., either as
volunteer counsel or employed by Drayton's friends, he being poor.
There were 115--41 for larceny, 64 for transportation--indictments
against Drayton, which led Mr. Mann to remark of the threatened
penalty:  "_Methuselah himself must have been caught young in order
to survive such a sentence_."--_Slavery, Letters, etc._ (Mann), p.
93.

President Fillmore, being defeated in 1852 for nomination for
President, pardoned Drayton after four years' and four months'
imprisonment, which pardon, it was claimed, defeated Scott, the
Whig nominee, at the polls.--_Memoir of Drayton_, p. 118.

(122) Correspondence in War Department between Davis and Quartermaster-
General Meigs.

The present nondescript hood, giving the statue crowning the dome
its appearance, in some views, of a wild Indian, was substituted
for the Liberty cap.


XXVIII
SLAVERY PROHIBITED IN THE TERRITORIES--1862

Growing out of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia,
the question was raised by Lovejoy of Illinois and others as to
the duty of Congress to declare freedom _national_ and slavery
_sectional;_ and also to prohibit slavery in all the Territories
of the Union.

A bill was passed, which (June 19, 1862) was approved by the
President, and became the last general law of Congress on the
subject of slavery in the Territories.  It reads:

"That from and after the passage of this act there shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the Territories of the
United States, now existing, or which may at any time hereafter be
formed or acquired by the United States, otherwise than in punishment
of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

By this act the principles of the Ordinance of 1787 (sixth section)
were applied universally to all existing and to be acquired territory
of the United States.

It was only, in effect, Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784, defeated by
_one_ vote in the old Congress, the loss of which he deplored so
much.  His benign purpose to restrict slavery was delayed seventy-
eight years--until blood flowed to sanction it.


XXIX
BENTON'S SUMMARY

We close this already too long history of human slavery in the
United States with Thomas H. Benton's summary of the "cardinal
points" in the aggressive policy of the impetuous South in pushing
forward slavery as a cause for disunion.  He wrote, four years
anterior to the Rebellion of 1861, with a prophetic pen, nibbed by
the experience of a Senator for thirty years, and as a slaveholder.
He had actively participated in most of the events of which he
speaks, and was personally familiar with all of them.(123)

"But I am not now writing the history of the present slavery
agitation--a history which the young have not learnt, and the old
have forgotten, and which every American ought to understand.  I
only indicate cardinal points to show its character; and of these
a main one remains to be stated.  Up to Mr. Pierce's administration
the plan had been defensive--that is to say, to make the secession
of the South a measure of self-defence against the abolition
encroachments, aggressions, and crusades of the North.  In the time
of Mr. Pierce, the plan became offensive--that is to say, to commence
the expansion of slavery, and the acquisition of territory to spread
it over, so as to overpower the North with new slave States, and
drive them out of the Union.  In this change of tactics originated
the abrogation of the Missouri Compromise, the attempt to purchase
one half of Mexico, and the actual purchase of a large part; the
design to take Cuba; the encouragement to Kinney and to Walker in
Central America; the quarrels with Great Britain for outlandish
coasts and islands; the designs upon the Tehuantepec, the Nicaragua,
the Panama, and the Darien routes; and the scheme to get a foothold
in the Island of San Domingo.  The rising in the free States in
consequence of the abrogation of the Missouri Compromise checked
these schemes, and limited the success of the disunionists to the
revival of the agitation which enables them to wield the South
against the North in all the Federal elections and Federal legislation.
Accidents and events have given this part a strange pre-eminence--
under Jackson's administration proclaimed for treason; since, at
the head of the government and of the Democratic party.  The death
of Harrison, and the accession of Tyler, was their first great
lift; the election of Mr. Pierce was their culminating point.  It
not only gave them the government, but power to pass themselves
for the Union party, and for democrats; and to stigmatize all who
refused to go with them as disunionists and abolitionists.  And to
keep up this classification is the object of the eleven pages of
the message which calls for this Review--unhappily assisted in that
object by the conduct of a few real abolitionists (not five per
centum of the population of the free States); but made to stand,
in the eyes of the South, for the whole."

(123) Hist., etc., Ex., _Dred Scott Case_, pp. 184-5.


XXX
PROPHECY AS TO SLAVERY'S FATE:  ALSO AS TO DISUNION

We are approaching the period for the fulfilment of prophecy in
relation to the perpetuity of human slavery in the United States.

We summarize a few of the prophecies made by distinguished American
statesmen and citizens.  George Washington, Patrick Henry, and
other Virginia statesmen and slaveholders at the close of the
Revolution predicted that slaves would be emancipated, or they
would acquire their freedom violently.  These patriots advocated
emancipation.  The stumbling-block to abolition in Virginia at that
time was, what to do with the blacks.  The white population could
not reconcile themselves to the idea of living on an equality with
them, as they deemed they must if the blacks were free.  As early
as 1782 Jefferson expressed his serious forebodings:

"Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that
these people are to be free; nor is it less certain that the two
races, equally free, cannot live in the same government. . . .

"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, that
His justice cannot sleep forever.  The way, I hope, is preparing,
under the auspices of Heaven, for a total emancipation."

The anti-slavery societies when they first met in annual convention
(1804) proclaimed that

"Freedom and slavery cannot long exist together."

John Quincy Adams, in 1843, prophesied:

"I am satisfied slavery will not go down until it goes down in
blood."(124)

Abraham Lincoln, at the beginning of his celebrated debate with
Douglas (1858) expressed his belief that this nation could not
exist "half slave and half free."  He had, however, made the same
declaration in a letter to a Kentucky friend to whom he wrote:

"Experience has demonstrated, I think, that there is no peaceful
extinction of slavery in prospect for us. . . .

"On the question of liberty as a principle, we are not what we have
been.  When we were the political slaves of King George, and wanted
to be free, we called the maxim that 'all men are created equal'
a _self-evident truth;_ but now, when we have grown fat, and have
lost all dread of being slaves ourselves, we have become so greedy
to be masters that we call the maxim '_a self-evident lie_.'  The
Fourth of July has not quite dwindled away; it is still a great dy
for burning fire-crackers.  That spirit which desired the peaceful
extinction of slavery has itself become extinct with the occasion
and the men of the Revolution. . . . So far as peaceful, voluntary
emancipation is concerned, the condition of the negro slave in
America, scarcely less terrible to the contemplation of the free
mind, is now as fixed and hopeless of change for the better as that
of lost souls of the finally impenitent.  The autocrat of all the
Russias will resign his crown, and proclaim his subjects free
Republicans, sooner than will our masters voluntarily give up their
slaves.

"Our political problem now is, 'Can we as a nation continue together
_permanently_--forever--half slave, and half free'?  The problem
is too mighty for me.  May God in his mercy superintend the
solution."

(Under God, within ten years after this was written, Lincoln was
the instrument for the solution of the _mighty problem!_)

This was a fitting prelude to his speech on slavery at Springfield,
Illinois (June, 1858), wherein he said:

"In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been
reached and passed.  '_A house divided against itself cannot
stand_.'

"I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave
and half free.  I do not expect the house to fall--but I do expect
it will cease to be divided.  It will become all one thing, or all
the other."(125)

Seward of New York compressed the issue between freedom and slavery
into a single sentence in his Rochester speech (October 25, 1858):

"It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring
forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner
or later, become either an entirely slave holding nation or entirely
a free labor nation."(126)

But statesmen were not the only persons who predicted the downfall
of slavery in the Republic; not the only persons who contributed
to that end, nor yet the only persons who foretold its overthrow
in blood.

The institution had grown to arrogant and intolerant as to brook
no opposition, and its friends did not even seek to clothe its
enormities.

A leading Southern journal, in 1854, honestly expressed the affection
in which slavery was held:

"We cherish slavery as the apple of our eye, and we are resolved
to maintain it, peaceably, if we can, forcibly, if we must."(127)

The clergy and religious people of the North came to believe slavery
must, in the mill of justice, be ground to a violent death, in
obedience to the will of God.

Theodore Parker, the celebrated Unitarian divine, a personal friend
of John Brown, on hearing, in Rome, of his failure, trial, and
sentence to the scaffold, in a letter to Francis Jackson of Boston,
November 24, 1859, gave vent to what was then regarded as fanatical
prophecy, but now long since fulfilled:

"The American people will have to march to rather severe music, I
think, and it is better for them to face it in season.  A few years
ago it did not seem difficult, first to check slavery, and then to
end it without bloodshed.  I think this cannot be done now, nor
ever in the future.  All the great charters of _Humanity_ have been
writ in blood.  I once hoped that American _Democracy_ would be
engrossed in less costly ink; but it is plain, now, that our
pilgrimage must lead through a Red Sea, wherein many a _Pharoah_
will go under and perish. . . .

"Slavery will not _die a dry death_.  It may have as many lives as
a cat; at last, it will dies like a mad dog in a village, with only
the enemies of human kind to lament its fate, and they too cowardly
to appear as mourners."(128)

Parker was fast descending, from broken health, into the grave,
but in the wildest of his dreams he did not peer into futurity far
enough to see that within a single decade the "_sin of the nation_"
would be washed out, root and branch, in blood; and that in Virginia
--the State that hung John Brown--at the home of its greatest
Governor, Henry A. Wise, there would be seen "a Yankee school-marm"
teaching free negroes--sons of Africa--to read and write--to read
the Holy Bible, and she the humble daughter of "Old John
Brown."(129)

One sample of prophecy of what _disunion_ would be, we give from
a speech of Henry Winter Davis of Maryland:

"It would be an act of suicide, and sane men do not commit suicide.
The act itself is insanity.  It will be done, if ever, in a fury
and madness which cannot stop to reason.  _Dissolution_ means death,
the suicide of Liberty, without a hope of resurrection--death
without the glories of immortality; with no sister to mourn her
fall, none to wrap her decently in her winding-sheet and bear her
tenderly to a sepulchre--_dead Liberty_, left to all the horrors
of corruption, a loathsome thing, with a stake through the body,
which men shun, cast out naked on the highway of nations, where
the tyrants of the earth who feared her living will mock her dead,
passing by on the other side, wagging their heads and thrusting
their tongues in their cheeks at her, saying, 'Behold _her_ now,
how _she_ that was fair among the nations is fallen! is fallen!'--
and only the few wise men who loved her out of every nation will
shed tears over her desolation as they pass, and cast handfuls of
earth on her body to quiet her manes, while we, her children,
stumble about our ruined habitations to find dishonorable graves
wherein to hide our shame.  Dissolution?  How shall it be?  Who
shall make it?  Do men dream of Lot and Abraham parting, one to
the east and the other to the west, peacefully, because their
servants strive?  That States will divide from States and boundary
lines will be marked by compass and chain?  Sir, that will be a
portentous commission that shall settle that partition, for cannon
will be planted at the corners and grinning skeletons be finger-
posts to point the way.  It will be no line gently marked on the
bosom of the Republic--some meandering vein whence generations of
her children have drawn their nourishment--but a sharp and jagged
chasm, rending the hearts of commonwealths, lacerated and smeared
with fraternal blood.  On the night when the stars of her constellation
shall fall from heaven the blackness of darkness forever will settle
on the liberties of mankind in this Western World.  _This is
dissolution!_  If such, Sir, is _dissolution_ seen in a glass
darkly, how terrible will it be face to face?  They who reason
about it are half crazy now.  They who talk of it do not mean it,
and dare not mean it.  They who speak in earnest of a dissolution
of this Union seem to me like children or madmen.  He who would do
such a deed as that would be the maniac without a tongue to tell
his deed, or reason to arrest his steps--an instrument of mad
impulse impelled by one idea to strike his victim.  Sir, _there
have been maniacs who have been cured by horror at the blood they
have shed_."(130)

This eloquent, patriotic, word-picture of _dissolution_, intended
to deter those who so impetuously and glibly talked of it, was not,
as the sequel proved, overdrawn.  When delivered it was not generally
believed that a dissolution of the Union could or would be attempted.
In the Presidential campaigns of 1856 and 1860, as well as in
Congress, there was much eloquence displayed in line with the above;
few of the orators, however, believed that dissolution, with all
the wild terrors of war, was near at hand.  But there were some
men in public life who early comprehended the destiny awaiting the
politically storm-racked Republic, and as it approached, boldly
gave the opinion that "_a little blood-letting would be good for
the body politic_."(131)

The story of the war which secession inaugurated remains to be in
part narrated in succeeding chapters, portraying the impetuous rush
to battle; the unparalleled heroism of the mighty hosts on either
side; the slaughter of men; the hell of suffering; the bitter tears;
the incalculable sorrow; the billions expended; the destruction of
property; the alternating defeats and triumphs; the final victory
of the Union arms; the overthrow of state-rights, nullification,
secession--disunion; the emancipation of four million human slaves,
and the annihilation in the United States of the institution of
slavery, including all its baleful doctrines, whether advanced by
partisan, pro-slavery statesmen, or advocated by learned politicians,
or upheld by church or clergy in the name of the prophets of Holy
Writ or of Christ and his Apostles, or expounded by a tribunal
clothed in the ermine, majesty, dignity, and power of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America.

Abraham Lincoln, whose beautiful character is illumined in the
intense light of a third of a century of heightened civilization,
will be immortalized through all time as God's chiefest instrument
in accomplishing the end.

In closing this chapter we desire again to remind the reader that
in 1861 the Congress of the United States, by a two thirds majority
in each branch, voted to so amend the Constitution as to make
forever unalterable its provisions for the recognition and perpetuation
of human bondage; that if the amendment thus submitted had been
ratified by three fourths of the States, this nation would have
been the first and only one in the history of the world wherein
the right to enslave human beings was fundamental and decreed to
be eternal.

This amendment, guaranteeing perpetual slavery, was the tender made
by Union men in 1861 to avert disunion and war.  It was the
humiliating and unholy pledge offered to a slave-loving people to
induce them to remain true to the Constitution and the Union.  In
the providence of God the amendment was not ratified, nor was a
willingness to accept it shown by the defiant South.  On the
contrary, it was spurned by it with singular unanimity and deserved
contempt.  A nation to be wholly slave was alone acceptable to the
disunionists; and to establish such a nation the hosts were arrayed
on the one side; to preserve and perpetuate the Union and to
overthrow the would-be slave nation, they were also, thank God,
arrayed on the other.

This was the portentous issue made up--triable by the tribunal of
last resort from which there is no earthly appeal.

Promptly, even enthusiastically, did the South respond to the
summons to battle, and with a heroism worthy of a better cause did
it devote life and property to the maintenance of the Confederacy.
But from mountain, hillside, vale, plain, and prairie, from field,
factory, counting-house, city, village, and hamlet, from all
professions and occupation alike came the sons of freedom, with
the cry of "Union and Liberty," under one flag, to meet the opposing
hosts, heroically ready to make the necessary sacrifice that the
unity of the American Republic should be preserved.

The effort to establish a slave nation in the afternoon of the
nineteenth century resulted in a civil war unparalleled in magnitude,
and the bloodiest in the history of the human race.  In the eleven
seceding States the authority of the Constitution was thrown off;
the National Government was defied; former official oaths of army,
navy, and civil officers were disregarded, and other oaths were
taken to support another government; the public property of the
United States was seized in the seceding States as of right, Cabinet
officers of the President assisting in the plunder; Senators and
Representatives in Congress, while yet holding seats, making laws,
and drawing pay, plotted treason, and, later, defiantly joined the
Confederacy; sequestration acts were passed by the Confederate
Congress, and citizens of the United States were made aliens in
the Confederacy, and their property there was confiscated, and
debts due loyal men North were collected for the benefit of the
Confederate Treasury; piratical vessels, with the aid and connivance
of boastful _civilized_ monarchies of Europe, destroyed our commerce
and drove our flag from the high seas; above a half million of men
fell in battle, and another half million died of wounds and disease
incident to war; above sixty thousand Union soldiers died in Southern
prisons; the direct cost of the Rebellion, paid from the United
States Treasury, approximated seven billions of dollars, and the
indirect cost to the loyal people, in property destroyed, etc.,
was at least equal to seven billions more.  Fairly estimated, slaves
not considered, the people of the seceding States expended and lost
in the prosecution and devastations of the war more than double
the expenditures and losses of the North; imagination cannot compass
or language portray the suffering and sorrow, agony and despair,
which pervaded the whole land.  All this to settle the momentous
question, whether or not human slavery should be fundamental as a
domestic, social, and political institution.

Thus far slavery has been our theme, and the war for the suppression
of the Rebellion only incidentally referred to, but in succeeding
chapters slavery will only be incidentally referred to, and the
war will have such attention as the scope of the narrative permits.

(124) _Life of Seward_, vol. i., p. 672.

(125) A. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, vol. i., pp. 215, 240, 251.

(126) Seward's _Works_, vol. iv, p. 289.

(127) _Hist. U. S._ (Rhodes), vol. i, p. 469.

(128) _Life of Parker_ (Weiss), vol. ii., p. 172-4 (406).

(129) _Civil War in America_ (Draper), vol. i, 565-6.

(130) Speech of Henry Winter Davis, House of Representatives, Aug.
7, 1856.

(131) Zachariah Chandler, 1860.


CHAPTER II
Sumter Fired on--Seizure by Confederates of Arms, Arsenals, and
Forts--Disloyalty of Army and Navy Officers--Proclamation of Lincoln
for Seventy-Five Thousand Militia, and Preparation for War on Both
Sides

The _Star of the West_, a merchant vessel, was sent from New York,
with the reluctant consent of President Buchanan, by Lieutenant-
General Winfield Scott, Commander-in-Chief of the army, to carry
re-enforcements and provisions to Fort Sumter.  As this vessel
attempted to enter Charleston harbor (January 9, 1861) a shot was
fired across its bows which turned it back, and its mission failed.
"Slapped in the mouth" was the opprobrious epithet used to express
this insult to the United States.  This was not the shot that
summoned the North to arms.  It was, however, the first angry gun
fired by a citizen of the Union against his country's flag, and it
announced the dawn of civil war.  When this shot was fired, only
South Carolina had passed an Ordinance of Secession; the Confederate
States were not yet formed.

On the night of December 26, 1860, Major Robert Anderson, in command
of the land forces, forts, and defences at Charleston, South
Carolina, being threatened by armed secession troops, and regarding
his position at Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, untenable if
attacked from the land side, as a matter of precaution, without
order from his superiors, but possessing complete authority within
the limits of his command, removed his small force, consisting of
only sixty-five soldiers, from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, where,
at high noon of the next day, after a solemn prayer by his chaplain,
the Stars and Stripes were run up on a flagstaff, to float in
triumph only for a short time, then to be insulted and shot down,
not to again be unfurled over the same fort until four years of
war had intervened.

An ineffectual effort was made by Governor Pickens of South Carolina
to induce Major Anderson by his demands and threats to return to
his defenceless position at Fort Moultrie.  President Buchanan, at
the instigation of his Secretary of War, Floyd, was on the point
of ordering him to do so, but when the matter was considered in a
Cabinet meeting, other counsels prevailed, and Floyd made this his
excuse for leaving the Cabinet.( 1)  Fortunately, his place was
filled by Hon. Joseph Holt of Kentucky, a Union man of force,
energy, will power, and true courage, who, later, became Judge-
Advocate-General U.S.A., serving as such until after the close of
the war.

To the end of Buchanan's administration, Sumter was held by Major
Anderson with his small force, and around it centered the greatest
anxiety.  It was the policy of the South to seize and occupy all
forts, arsenals, dock-yards, public property, and all strongholds
belonging to the United States located within the limits of seceded
States, and to take possession of arms and material of war as though
of right belonging to them.  The right and title to United States
property thus located were not regarded.  Louisiana seized the
United States Mint at New Orleans, and turned over of its contents
$536,000 in coin to the Confederate States treasury, for which she
received a vote of thanks from the Confederate Congress.( 2)  All
the forts of the United States within or on the coast of the then
seceded States, save Forts Sumter and Pickens, were soon, with
their armament and military supplies, in possession of and manned
by Southern soldiers.  At first seizures were made by State authority
alone, but on the organization, at Montgomery, of the Confederacy
(February 8, 1861) it assumed charge of all questions between the
seceded States and the United States relating to the occupation of
forts and other public establishments; and, March 15th, the
Confederacy called on the States that had joined it to cede to it
all the forts, etc., thus seized, which was done accordingly.

On February 28th the Confederate Congress passed an act under which
President Davis assumed control of all military operations and
received from the seceding States all the arms and munitions of
war acquired from the United States and all other material of war
the States of the Confederacy saw proper to turn over to him.

A letter from the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army to
Secretary of War Holt, of date, January 15, 1861, shows that,
commencing in 1859, under orders from Secretary of War Floyd,
115,000 muskets were transferred from the Springfield (Mass.) and
Watervliet (N. Y.) arsenals to arsenals South; and, under like
orders, other percussion muskets and rifles were similarly transferred,
all of which were seized, together with many cannon and other
material of war, by the Confederate authorities.( 3)

Harper's Ferry, and the arsenal there, with its arms and ordnance
stores, were seized by the Confederates, April 18, 1861, and the
machinery and equipment for manufacturing arms, not burned, was
taken South.

The arsenal at Fayetteville, N. C., was also seized, April 22, 1861.

In February, 1861, Beauregard ( 4) was commissioned by Davis a
Brigadier-General, and ordered to Charleston, South Carolina, to
organize an army.  Other officers were put in commission by the
Confederacy, and a large force was soon mustering defiantly for
the coming struggle.

Beauregard took command at Charleston, March 1st, three days before
Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States.( 5)

Disloyalty extended to the army and navy.

The regular army was small, and widely scattered over the Western
frontiers and along the coasts of lake and ocean.  March 31, 1861,
it numbered 16,507, including 1074 officers.  Some officers had
joined the secession movement before this date.

The disaffection was among the officers alone.  Two hundred and
eighty-two officers resigned or deserted to take service in the
Confederate Army; of these 192 were graduates of West Point Military
Academy, and 178 of the latter became general officers during the
war.( 6)

The number of officers, commissioned and warrant, who left the
United States Navy and entered the Confederate service was,
approximately, 460.( 7)

To the credit of the rank and file of the regular army, and of the
seamen in the navy, it is, on high authority, said that:

"It is worthy of note that, while in this government's hour of
trial large numbers of those in the army and navy who have been
favored with the offices have resigned and proved false to the hand
which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common sailor
is known to have deserted his flag."( 8)

David E. Twiggs, a Brevet Major-General, on February 18, 1861,
surrendered, at San Antonio, Texas, all the military posts and
other property in his possession; and this after receiving an order
relieving him from command.  He was an old and tried soldier of
the United States Army, and his example was pernicious in a high
degree.

There were few, however, who, like him, took the opportunity to
desert and at the same time to do a dishonorable official act
calculated to injure the government they had served.

March 5, 1861, Twiggs was given a grand reception in New Orleans;
salutes were fired in honor of his recent treachery.( 9)  President
Buchanan, to his credit, through Secretary of War Holt, March 1st,
dismissed him from the army.(10)

It is a curious fact that this order of dismissal was signed by _S.
Cooper_, Adjutant-General of the United States Army (_a native_ of
New Jersey), who, _six days later_, resigned his position, hastened
to Montgomery, Alabama, and there accepted a like office in the
Confederate government.  Disloyalty among prominent army officers
seemed, for a time, the rule.(11)

It was industriously circulated, not without its effect, that
General Winfield Scott had deserted his country and flag to take
command of the Confederate Army.  To his honor it must be said,
however, that he never faltered, and the evidence is overwhelming
that he never entertained a thought of joining his State--Virginia.
He early foresaw that disunion and war were coming, and not only
deprecated them but desired to strengthen the United States Government
and to avert both.  Only his great age prevented his efficiently
leading the Union armies.

George H. Thomas, like General Scott, was a native of Virginia.
He was also unjustly charged with having entertained disloyal
notions and to have contemplated joining the South, but later both
Scott and Thomas were bitterly denounced by secessionists for not
going with Virginia into the Rebellion.

Officers connected with the United States Revenue Service stationed
in Southern cities were, generally, not only disloyal, but property
in their custody was without scruple turned over to the Confederate
authorities.  The revenue cutters under charge and direction of
the Secretary of the Treasury were not only seized, but their
commanding officers in many cases deserted to the Confederacy and
surrendered them.  A notable example is that of Captain Breshwood,
who commanded the revenue cutter _Robert McClelland_, stationed at
New Orleans.  When ordered, January 29, 1861, to proceed with her
to New York, he refused to obey.  This led John A. Dix, Secretary
of the Treasury, to issue his celebrated and patriotic "Shoot-him-
on-the-spot" order.(12)  Louisiana had not at that time seceded,
but the cutter, with Captain Breshwood, went into the Confederacy.
So of all other such vessels coming within reach of the now much-
elated, over-confident, and highly excited Confederate authorities.

Before the end of February, 1861, the "Pelican Flag" was flying
over the Custom-House, Mint, City Hall, and everywhere in Louisiana.
At the New Orleans levees ships carried every flag on earth except
that of the United States.  The only officer of the army there at
the time who was faithful to the country was Col. C. L. Kilburn,
of the Commissary Department, and he was preparing to escape
North.(13)

So masterful had become the spirit of the South, born of the nature
of the institution of slavery, that many disinclined to disunion
were carried away with the belief that it was soon to be an
accomplished fact, and that those who had favored it would alone
be the heroes, while those who remained with the broken Union would
be socially and forever ostracized.  There were also many, indeed,
who seriously entertained the belief that the North, made up as it
was of merchants, manufacturers, farmers, and laborers, and with
the education and disposition to follow pursuits incident to money-
getting by their own personal efforts, would not be willing to
engage in war, and thus destroy their prospects.  There were also
others who regarded Northern men as cowards, who, even if willing
to fight, would not at best be equal, a half dozen of them, to one
Southern man.  These false notions were sincerely entertained.
The Southern people regarded slavery as ennobling to the white
race, and free white labor as degrading to the people of the free
States, and hence were confident of their own superiority in arms
and otherwise.  There were even some people North who had so long
heard the Southern boasts of superior courage that they half believed
in it themselves, until the summons to arms dispelled all such
illusions.

To the half credit of most of the officers of the United States
army, and many of the navy, it may be said that when they determined
to desert their country and flag they resigned their commissions,
or at least tendered them, so they might go into rebellion with
some color of excuse.

The War Department was generally, even under Lincoln's administration,
gracious enough in most cases to accept such resignations, even
when it knew or suspected the purpose for which they were tendered.
Lieut. Julius A. De Lagnel, of the artillery, a Virginian, who
remained long enough in the Union to be surrendered to Secession
authorities (not discreditable to himself) at Fayetteville, North
Carolina, with the North Carolina arsenal (April 22, 1861) informed
the writer since the war that, on sending his resignation to the
War Department, he followed it to the Adjutant-General's office,
taking with him some bags of coin he had in the capacity of disbursing
officer, for the purpose of making a settlement.  He found Adjutant-
General Lorenzo Thomas not in good humor, and when requested to
direct him to a proper officer to settle his accounts, Thomas flew
at him furiously, ordered him to drop his coin-bags, and decamp
from his presence and from the Department, which he did accordingly.
His accounts were thus summarily settled.  (We shall soon hear of
De Lagnel again.)

Captain James Longstreet, of Georgia, who became a Lieutenant-
General in the C.S.A., and one of the ablest fighting generals in
either army, draws a rather refined distinction as to the right of
an officer to resign his commission and turn enemy to his country,
while denying the right of a non-commissioned officer or private
soldier to quit the army in time of rebellion to follow his State.

Longstreet was stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, when Sumter
was fired on.  On receiving the news of its capture he resigned
and went South, through Texas, to join his State, or rather, as it
proved, to join the Confederate States Army.

He says his mind was relieved by information that his resignation
was accepted, to take effect June 1st.  He tells us a sergeant from
Virginia and other soldiers wished to accompany him, but he would
not entertain that proposition; he explained to them that they
could not go without authority of the War Department, but it was
different with commissioned officers; they could resign, and when
their resignations were accepted could do as they pleased, while
the sergeant and his comrades were bound by their oaths to the term
of their enlistment.(14)

It might be hard to construct a more satisfactory constitutional
or moral theory than this for persons situated as were Captain
Longstreet and others, disposed as they were to desert country and
comrades for the newly formed slave Confederacy; yet if the secession
of the native State of an officer is sufficient to dissolve allegiance
he has sworn to maintain, it requires a delicate discrimination to
see why the common soldier might not also be absolved from his term
contract and oath for the same reasons.

There is a point of honor as old as organized warfare, that in the
presence of danger or threatened danger it is an act of cowardice
for an officer to resign for any but a good physical cause.

The better way is to justify, or if that cannot be done, to excuse
as far as possible, the desertion of the Union by army and navy
officers on the ground that the times were revolutionary, when
precedents could not be followed, and legal and moral rights were
generally disregarded.  Such periods come occasionally in the
history of nations.  They are properly called _rebellions_, when
they fail.

"_Rebellion_, indeed, appears on the back of a flying enemy, but
_revolution_ flames on the breastplate of the victorious
warriors."(15)

Robert E. Lee, born in Virginia, of Revolutionary stock, had won
reputation as a soldier in the Mexican War.  He was fifty-four
years of age, a Colonel of the First Cavalry, and, though in
Washington, was but recently under orders from the Department of
Texas.  There is convincing evidence that General Scott and Hon.
Frank P. Blair tendered him the command of the army of the United
States in the impending war.  This is supposed to have caused him
to hesitate as to his course.  In a letter (April 20, 1861) to a
sister he deplores the "state of revolution into which Virginia,
after a long struggle, has been drawn," saying:

"I recognize no necessity for this state of things, . . . yet in
my own person I had to meet the question whether I would take part
against my native State.  With all my devotion to the Union, and
the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not
been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives,
my children, my home.  I have, therefore, resigned my commission
in the army, and, _save in defence of my native State_, with the
hope that my poor services will never be needed, I hope I may never
be called on to draw my sword."

On the same day, in a letter to General Scott accompanying his
resignation, he says:  "Save in defence of my State, I never desire
to draw my sword."

Lee registered himself, March 5, 1861, in the Adjutant-General's
office as Brevet-Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel Second Cavalry.(16)
He was nominated, March 21, 1861, _by President Lincoln_, Colonel
First Cavalry, and on March 23d the nomination was confirmed by
the Senate.  He was then commissioned by the President, Colonel,
March 25th, to rank from March 16, 1861; he received this commission
March 28th, and accepted it by letter March 30, 1861.  Seven States
had then seceded from the Union, and the Confederate States of
America had existed since February 8, 1861.

Three weeks after (April 20th) Lee accepted this last commission
he tendered his resignation in the United States Army.  It did not
reach the Secretary of War until April 24th, nor was it accepted
until April 27th, to take effect April 25, 1861.(17)

Lee, however, accepted, April 22nd, a commission as Major-General
in the "Military and Naval Forces of Virginia," assuming command
of them by direction of Governor John Letcher, April 23, 1861.

It thus appears that two months and a half after the Confederate
States were formed Robert E. Lee accepted President Lincoln's
commission in the U.S.A.; then twenty-four days later, and pending
the acceptance of his resignation, took command of forces hostile
to the Federal Union.  He, April 24th, gave instructions to a
subordinate:  "Let it be known that you intend no attack; but
invasion of our soil will be considered an act of war."

He did not have Longstreet's consolation of knowing his resignation
had been accepted before he abandoned his rank and duties in the
United States Army; nor had his State yet seceded from the Union.
Virginia did not enter into any relations with the Confederacy
until April 25, 1861, and then only conditionally.  Her convention
passed an Ordinance of Secession April 17th, to take effect, if
ratified by the votes of her people, at an election to be held May
23, 1861.  An election held in Virginia the previous February
resulted in choosing to a convention a very large majority of
delegates opposed to secession.  The convention, March 17th--90 to
45--rejected an Ordinance of Secession.  Virginia's people were,
until coerced by her disloyal State Governor, faithful to the Union
of Washington.  The fact remains that Lee, before his State voted
to secede, accepted a commission in the army of the Confederacy,
and took an oath to support its laws and Constitution, and thenceforth
drew his sword to overthrow the Union of his fathers and to establish
a new would-be nation under another flag.  His son, G. W. Custis
Lee, did not resign from the U.S.A. until May 2, 1861.  Fitzhugh
Lee also accepted a commission from Lincoln, and resigned (May 21,
1861) after his illustrious uncle.

It is hard to understand how fundamental principles in government
and individual patriotism and duty may be made, on moral or political
grounds, to depend on the conduct of the temporary authorities of
a State, or even on the voice of its people.

The action of Robert E. Lee in leaving the United States Army, and
his reasons therefor, serve to show how and why many other army
and navy officers abandoned their country's service.  The Confederacy
promptly recognized these "_seceding officers_," and for the most
part gave them, early, high rank, and otherwise welcomed them with
enthusiasm.

It is probably that the slowness of promotion in time of peace, in
both the army and navy of the United States, caused many officers
to resign and seek, with increased rank, new fortunes and renown
in war.

It is not to be denied that the custom of hospitably treating
officers while serving in the South, and otherwise socially
recognizing them and their families, had won many to love the
Southern people and their gallant ways.  This, at least, held the
most of the Southern-born officers to their own States, though in
some cases, and perhaps in many, they did not believe in slavery.

It may be said also that the generally cold business character of
the well-to-do Northern people, and their social indifference to
one another, and especially to officers and their families serving
at posts and in cities, did not attach them to the North.  An
officer in the regular service in time of peace, having no hope of
high promotion before he reaches old age, has but little, save
social recognition of himself and family, to make him contented
and happy.  This somewhat helpless condition makes him grateful
for attentions shown, and jealous of inattention.

Turning more directly to the military situation on Lincoln's
inauguration, we find Major Anderson holding Sumter, but practically
in a state of siege, the Confederate authorities having assembled
a large army at Charleston under Beauregard.  Fort Moultrie and
Castle Pinckney had been seized and manned; heavy ordnance had been
placed in them, and batteries had been established commanding Fort
Sumter.

Finally, on April 7th, Anderson was forbidden to purchase fresh
provisions for his little band.  On April 10th, Captain G. V. Fox,
an ex-officer of the navy, sailed with a relief expedition, consisting
of four war-ships, three steam-tugs, and a merchant steamer, having
on board two hundred men and the necessary supplies of ammunition
and provisions.

Beauregard and the Confederate authorities hearing promptly of
Captain Fox's expedition and destination, on April 11th, formally
demanded of Major Anderson the evacuation of Fort Sumter, which
demand was refused.

At 4.30 o'clock, April 12th, a signal shell was fired at Fort Sumter
from a mortar battery on James Island, and, immediately after,
hostile guns were opened from batteries on Morris Island, Sullivan's
Island, and Fort Moultrie, which were responded to from Fort Sumter.

This signal shell opened actual war; its discharge was, figuratively
speaking, heard around the world; it awakened a lethargic people
in the Northern States of the Union; it caused many who had never
dreamed of war to prepare for it; it set on fire the blood of a
people, North and South, of the same race, not to cool down until
a half-million of men had been consumed in the fierce heat of
battle; it was the opening shot intended to vindicate and establish
human slavery as the essential pillar of a new-born nation, the
first and only one on earth formed solely to eternally perpetuate
human bondage as a social and fundamental political institution;
but, in reality, this shot was also a signal to summon the friends
of human freedom to arms, and to a battle never to end until slavery
under the Constitution of the restored Union should cease to exist.

Captain Fox's expedition was not organized as he had planned it,
and though it reached its destination off Sumter an hour before
the latter was fired on, it could not, from want of light boats or
tugs, send to the fort the needed supplies or men.  Major Anderson,
after two days' bombardment, was therefore forced to agree to
evacuate the fort, which he accordingly did on Sunday afternoon,
April 14th, after having saluted the flag as it was lowered.(18)

There were men North as well as South who censured President Lincoln
and his advisers for not, as was at one time contemplated, peacefully
evacuating Fort Sumter, thus removing the immediate cause for
bringing on hostilities, and leaving still more time for compromise
talk and Northern concession.  But the Union was already dissolved
so far as the seceding States were able to do it, and a peaceable
restoration of those States to loyalty and duty was then plainly
impossible.

South Carolina was the first to secede, and it is more than probable
that President Lincoln clearly discerned that the overt act of
assailing the Union by war would take place at Charleston.  So long
as surrenders of public property went on without resistance, the
Confederacy was growing stronger and more defiant, and in time
foreign recognition might come.  It was much better for the Union
cause for the first shot to be fired by Confederate forces in taking
United States public property than by United States forces in
retaking it after it had been lost.

The people North had wavered, not in their loyalty to the Union,
but in their judgment as how to preserve it, or whether it could
be preserved at all, until Sumter came, then firmness of conviction
took immediate possession of them, and life and treasure alike
thenceforward devoted to the maintenance of Federal authority.  Of
course, there was a troublesome minority North, who, either through
political perversity, cowardice, or disloyalty, never did support
the war, at least willingly.  It was noticeable, however, that many
of these were, through former residence or family relationship,
imbued with pro-slavery notions and prejudice against the negro.

It should be said, also, that there were many in the North, born
in slave States, who were the most pronounced against slavery.
And there were those also, even in New England, who had never had
an opportunity of being tainted with slavery, who opposed the
coercion of the seceding States, and who would rather have seen
the Union destroyed than saved by war.  Again, long contact and co-
operation of certain persons North with Southern slave-holders
politically, and bitter opposition to President Lincoln and his
party, made many reluctant to affiliate with the Union war-party.
Some were too weak to rise above their prejudices, personal and
political.  Some were afraid to go to battle.  There was also,
though strangely inconsistent, a very considerable class of the
early Abolitionists of the Garrison-Smith-Phillips school who did
not support the war for the Union, but who preferred the slave-
holding States should secede, and thus perpetuate the institution
of slavery in America--the very thing, on moral grounds, such
Abolitionists had always professed a desire to prevent.  They
opposed the preservation of the Union by coercion.  They thus laid
themselves open to the charge that they were only opposed to slavery
_in the Union_, leaving it to flourish wherever it might outside
of the Union.  This position was not only inconsistent, but
unpatriotic.  The persons holding these views gave little or no
moral or other support to the war for the preservation of the
integrity of the Republic.

There were many loyal men in the South, especially in sections where
slavery did not dominate.  In the mountain regions of the South,
opposition to secession was the rule, notably in Western Virginia,
Eastern Kentucky, Eastern Tennessee, and Western North Carolina.
There were also loyal men in Northern Alabama and Georgia.  But
wherever the determined spirit of the slave-holding disunionists
controlled, as in the cities and more densely populated parts of
the South, though the slave-holding population was even therein
the minority, the white community was forced to array themselves
with the Confederates.  There were many South who, at first,
determined to oppose disunion, but who succumbed to the pressure,
under the belief that the Confederacy was an accomplished fact, or
that the North either would not or could not fight successfully,
and would be beaten in battle.  Boasts of superiority and the great
display and noisy preparation for war were misleading to those who
only witnessed one side of the pending conflict.  The North had,
up to Sumter, been slow to act, and this was not reassuring to the
friends of the Union South, or, perhaps, anywhere.  The proneness
of mankind to be on the successful side has shown itself in all
trying times.  It is only the virtue of individual obstinacy that
enables the few to go against an unjust popular clamor.

But political party ties North were the hardest to break.  Those
who had been led to political success generally by the pro-slavery
politicians of the South could not easily be persuaded that coercion
did not mean, in some way, opposition to themselves and their past
party principles.  Though patriotism was the rule with persons of
all parties North, there were yet many who professed that true
loyalty lay along lines other than the preservation of the Union
by war.  These even, after Sumter fell, pretended to, and possibly
did, believe what the South repudiated, to wit:  That by the siren
song of peace it could be wooed back to loyalty under the Constitution.
There were, of course, those in the North who honestly held that
the Abolitionists by their opposition to slavery and its extension
into the Territories had brought on secession, and that such
opposition justified it.  This number, however, was at first not
large, and as the war progressed it grew less and less.  It should
be remembered that coercion of armed secession was not undertaken
to abolish slavery or to alter its status in the slave States.
The statement, however, that the destruction of slavery was the
purpose and end in view was persistently put forth as the justifying
cause for dissolving the Union of States.  The cry that the war on
the part of the North was "an abolition war," that it was for "negro
equality," had its effect on the more ignorant class of free laborers
in both sections.  There is an inherent feeling of or desire for
superiority in all races, and this weakness, if it is such, is
exceedingly sensitive to the touch of the demagogue.

There were those high in authority in the Confederate councils who
were not entirely deluded by the apparent indifference and supineness
of the Northern people.  When Davis and his Cabinet held a conference
(April 9th) to consider the propriety of firing on Fort Sumter,
there was not entire unanimity on the question.  Robert Toombs,
Secretary of State, is reported to have said:

"The firing on that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than
any the world has yet seen; and I do not feel competent to advise
you."(19)

And later in the conference Toombs, in opposing the attack on
Sumter, said:

"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose
us every friend at the North.  You will wantonly strike a hornet's
nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet
will swarm out and sting us to death.  It is unnecessary; it puts
us in the wrong; it is fatal."(20)

The taking of Fort Sumter was the signal for unrestrained exultation
of the part of the Secessionists.  They for a time gave themselves
up to the wildest demonstrations of joy.  The South now generally
looked upon the Confederacy as already established.  The Confederate
flag floated over Sumter in place of the Stars and Stripes.  At
the Catholic cathedral in Charleston a _Te Deum_ was celebrated
with great pomp, and the Episcopal bishop there attributed the
event to the "infinite mercy of God, who specially interposed His
hand in behalf of _their_ righteous cause."

The taking of Sumter was undoubtedly the most significant event of
the age.  The achievement was bloodless; not a man was killed or
a drop of blood spilled by a hostile shot, yet in inaugurated a
war that freed four millions of God's people.(21)

Montgomery, the temporary Capital of the Confederacy, wildly
celebrated the event as the first triumph.

Bloodless was Sumter; but the war it opened was soon to swallow up
men by the thousand.

Fort Pickens, in Pensacola Harbor, now only remained in the possession
of the United States of all the forts or strongholds in the seceded
South.

This fortification was taken possession of by Lieut. A. J. Slemmer
of the United States Army, and though in great danger of being
attacked and taken, it was successfully reinforced on April 23,
1861, and never fell into Confederate hands.  At a special session
of the Confederate Congress at Montgomery (May 21, 1861), Richmond,
Virginia, was made the Capital of the Confederacy, and the Congress
adjourned to meet there.

Howell Cobb (late Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury), the
President of this Congress, with some of the truth of prophecy
defiantly said:

"We have made all the necessary arrangements to meet the present
crisis.  Last night we adjourned to meet in Richmond on the 20th
of July.  I will tell you why we did this.  The 'Old Dominion,' as
you know, has at last shaken off the bonds of Lincoln, and joined
her noble Southern sisters.  Her soil is to be the battle-ground,
and her streams are to be dyed with Southern blood.  We felt that
her cause was our cause, and that if she fell we wanted to die by
her."

How was the news of the failure to reinforce Sumter, and of its
being fired on and taken possession of by a rebellious people,
received in the North?  The evacuation of Fort Sumter was known in
Washington and throughout the country almost as soon as at Charleston.
Hostilities could no longer be averted, save by the ignominious
surrender of all the blood-bought rights of the founders of the
Republic.

It must not be assumed that the President of the United States had
not already calculated on the probabilities of war.  The portentous
clouds had been long gathering, and the certain signs of the
impending battle-storm had been discerned by Lincoln and his
advisers.  He had prepared, as best he could under the circumstances,
to meet it.  The long suspense was now broken.  This was some relief.
There were to be no more temporizing, no more compromises, no more
offers of concession to slavery or to disunionists.  The doctrine
of the assumed right of a State, at will, and for any real or
pretended grievance, to secede from and to dissolve its relation
with the Union of the States, and to absolve itself from all its
constitutional relations and obligations, was now about to be tried
before a tribunal that would execute its inexorable decree with a
power from which there is no appeal.  Mercy is not an attribute of
war, either in its methods or decisions.  The latter must stand in
the end as against the conquered.  From war there is no appeal but
to war.  Time and enlightenment may modify or alter the mandates
of war, but in this age of civilization and knowledge, neither
nations nor peoples move backward.  Ground gained for freedom or
humanity, in politics, science, literature, or religion, is held,
and from this fresh advances may be made.  Needless cruelty may be
averted in the conduct of war, but mercy is not an element in the
science of destroying life and shedding blood on the battle-field.

Sunday, April 14th (though bearing date the 15th), the same day
Sumter was evacuated, President Lincoln issued his proclamation,
reciting that the laws of the United States had been and then were
opposed and their execution obstructed in the States of South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by ordinary
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by
law; he called for seventy-five thousand of the militia of the
several States of the Union; appealed to all loyal citizens to
maintain the honor, integrity, and existence of the National Union,
and "the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs
already long enough endured."  "The first service," the proclamation
recites, "assigned to the forces called forth will probably be to
repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized
from the Union."

It commanded the persons composing the combinations referred to,
"to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within
twenty days."

It called Congress to convene Thursday, July 4, 1861, in extraordinary
session, "to consider and determine such measures as, in their
wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand."

This proclamation was the first announcement by President Lincoln
of a deliberate purpose to preserve the integrity of the Republic
by a resort to arms.  In his recent Inaugural Address he had, almost
pathetically, pleaded for peace--for friendship; and there is no
doubting that his sincere desire was to avoid bloodshed.  He then
had no thought of attacking slavery, but rather to protect and
grant it more safeguards in the States where it existed.  Later,
on many occasions, when the war had done much to inflame public
sentiment in the North against the South, he publicly declared he
would save the "Union as it was."  His most pronounced utterance
on this point was:

"I would save the Union.  I would save it the shortest way under
the Constitution.  The sooner the national authority can be restored,
the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.'  If there be
those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same
time save slavery, I do not agree with them.  If there be those
who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time
destroy slavery, I do not agree with them.  My paramount object in
this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or
destroy slavery.  If I could save the Union without freeing any
slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and
leaving others alone, I would also do that."(22)

But Abraham Lincoln was not understood in 1861, nor even later
during the war, and not fully during life, by either his enemies
or his personal or party friends.  The South, in its leadership,
was implacable in the spirit of its hostility, but the masses, even
there, in time came to understand his true purposes and sincere
character.

Two days after the call for seventy-five thousand troops, President
Davis responded to it by proclaiming to the South that President
Lincoln had announced the intention of "invading the Confederacy
with an armed force for the purpose of capturing its fortresses,
subverting its independence, and subjecting the free people thereof
to a foreign power."  In the same proclamation he invited persons
to take service in private armed vessels on the high seas, tendering
to such persons as would accept them commissions or letters of
_marque_ and reprisal.

At this time a military spirit had been aroused throughout the
seceded States, and a large number of well-equipped Southern troops
were already in the field, chiefly at Charleston and Pensacola--in
all (including about 16,000 on their way to Virginia) about 35,000.
The field, staff, and general officers in charge of these troops
were mainly graduates of West Point or other military schools; even
the captains of companies were many of them educated in the
institutions referred to.  It is not to be denied that a higher
military spirit existed in the South than in the North prior to
the war.  The young men from plantations were more generally
unemployed at active labor, and hence had more time to cultivate
a martial spirit than the hard-working young men of the North.

The summons to arms found the North unprepared so far as previous
spirit and training were concerned; yet it did not hesitate, and
troops were, within two days, organized and on their way from
several of the States to the defense of Washington.  The 6th
Massachusetts was fired upon by a riotous mob in the streets of
Baltimore on April 19th.  On every side war levies and preparations
for war went forward.  The farm, the shop, the office, the counting-
room, the professions, the schools and colleges, the skilled and
the unskilled in all kinds of occupation, gave up of their best to
fill the patriotic ranks.  The wealthy, the well-to-do, and the
poor were found in the same companies and regiments, on a common
footing as soldiers, and often men theretofore moving in the highest
social circles were contentedly commanded by those of the humblest
social civil life.

The companies were, as a general rule, commanded by men of no
previous military training, though wherever a military organization
existed it was made a nucleus for a volunteer company.  Often
indifferent men, with a little skill in drilling soldiers, and with
no other known qualifications, were sought out and eagerly commissioned
by governors of States as field officers, a colonelcy often being
given to such persons.  A volunteer regiment was considered fortunate
if it had among its field officers a lieutenant from the regular
army, or even a person from civil life who had gained some little
military experience.

General officers were too often, from apparent necessity, taken
from those who had more influence than military skill.  Some of
these, however, by patient toil, coupled with zeal and brains,
performed valuable service to their country and won honorable names
as soldiers.  But the most of them made only moderate officers and
fair reputations.  War develops and inspires men, and if it continues
long, great soldiers are evolved from its fierce conflicts.

Accidental _good_ fortune in war sometimes renders weak and unworthy
men conspicuous.  Accidental _bad_ fortune in war often overtakes
able, worthy, honest, honorable men of the first promise and destroys
them.(23)  Very few succeed in a long war through pure military
genius alone, if there is such a thing.  Many, in the heat of battle-
field experiences and in campaigns are inspired with the _common
sense_ that makes them, through success, really great soldiers.
The indispensable quality of personal bravery, commonly supposed
sufficient to make a man a valuable officer, is often of the smallest
importance.  A merely brave, rash man in the ranks may be of some
value as an inspiring example to his immediate comrades, but he is
hardly equal for that purpose to the intelligent soldier who obeys
orders, and, though never reckless, yet, through a proper amount
of individual pride, does his whole duty without braggadocio.

A mere dashing officer is more and more a failure, and unfitted to
command, in proportion as he is high in rank.  Rash personal conduct
which might be tolerated in a lieutenant would in a lieutenant-
general be conclusive of his unfitness to hold any general command.
Of course, there are rare emergencies when an officer, let his rank
be what it may, should lead in an assault or forlorn hope, or rush
in to stay a panic among his own troops.

This, like all other actions of a good officer, must also be an
inspiration of duty.  The coward in war has no place,(24) and when
found in an army (which is rare) should be promptly mustered out.
There was no such thing in the late war as a regiment of cowards.
Inefficient or timid officers may have given their commands a bad
name, and caused them to lose confidence in success, and hence to
become unsteady or panicky.  The average American is not deficient
in true courage.

Careful drill and discipline make good soldiers.

The American people were now awake to the realities of a war in
which the same race, blood, and kindred were to contend, on the
one side for a separate nationality and for a form of government
based on the single idea of perpetuating and fostering the institution
of domestic slavery and a so-called civilization based thereon,
and on the other for the preservation of the integrity of the Union
of States, under one Constitution and one flag.

In addition to the 15th of April proclamation for 75,000 volunteers
for ninety days' service, the President (May 3d) called into the
United States service 42,034 more volunteers to serve for three
years, unless sooner discharged.  He at the same time directed that
eight regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery
should be added to the regular army, making a maximum of 22,714
regular officers and enlisted men; he also called for 18,000 seamen
for the naval service.

All these calls for enlistment were responded to by the loyal States
with the greatest promptness, and the numbers called for were more
then furnished, notwithstanding the failure of some of the Southern
non-seceding States to promptly fill their assigned quotas.

Governor Burton of Delaware (April 26th) issued a proclamation for
the formation of volunteer companies to protect lives and property
in the State, not to be subject to be ordered into the United States
service, the Governor, however, to have the option of offering them
to the general government for the defence of the Capital and the
support of its Constitution and laws.

Governor Hicks of Maryland (May 14th) called for four regiments to
serve within the limits of the State, or for the defence of the
Capital of the United States.

Governor Letcher of Virginia (April 16th) spitefully denied the
constitutionality of the call for troops "to subjugate the Southern
States."

Governor Ellis of North Carolina (April 15th) dispatched that he
regarded the levy of troops "for the purpose of subjugating the
States of the South as in violation of the Constitution and a
usurpation of power."

Governor Magoffin of Kentucky (April 15th) wired:

"Your dispatch is received.  In answer I say emphatically, Kentucky
will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister
Southern States."

Governor Harris of Tennessee (April 18th) replied:

"Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional,
and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and can
not be complied with."

Governor Rector of Arkansas (April 22d) responded:

"None will be furnished.  The demand is only adding insult to
injury."(25)

Four of the slave-holding States thus responding to the President's
call, to wit:  Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina,
soon joined the Confederate States; Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky,
and Delaware remained in the Union, and, later, filled their quotas
under the several calls for troops for the United States service,
though from each many also enlisted in the Confederate Army.

The Union volunteers were either hastened, unprepared by complete
organization or drill, to Washington, D. C., to stand in its defence
against an anticipated attack from Beauregard's already large
organized army, or they were assembled in drill camps, selected
for convenience of concentration and dispersion, to the scenes of
campaigns soon to be entered upon.

Arms in the North were neither of good quality nor abundant.  Some
were hastily bought abroad--Enfield rifles from England, Austrian
rifles from Austria; each country furnishing its poorest in point
of manufacture.  But there were soon in operation establishments
in the North where the best of guns then known in warfare were
made.  The old flint-lock musket had theretofore been superseded
by the percussion-lock musket, but some of the guns supplied to
the troops were old, and altered from the flint-lock.  These muskets
were muzzle-loaders, smooth bores, firing only buck and ball
cartridges--.69 calibre.  They were in the process of supersession
by the .58 calibre rifle for infantry, or the rifle-carbine for
cavalry, generally of a smaller calibre.  The English Enfield rifle
was of .58 calibre, and the Springfield rifle, which soon came into
common use, was of like calibre.  The Austrian rifle of .54 calibre
proved to be of poor construction, and was generally condemned.(26)
A rifle for infantry of .58 calibre was adopted, manufactured and
used in the Confederacy.  The steel rifled cannon for field artillery
also came to take the place, in general, of the smooth-bore brass
gun, though many kinds of cannon of various calibres and construction
were in use in both armies throughout the war.

The general desire of new volunteers was to be possessed of an
abundance of arms, such as guns, pistols, and knives.  The two
latter weapons were even worse than useless for the infantry soldier
--mere incumbrances.  An officer even had little use for a pistol;
only sometimes in a melée.  The cavalry resorted, under some
officers, to the pistol instead of the sword.  In the South, at
the opening of the wr, shot-guns and squirrel rifles were gathered
together for arms, and long files were forged in large quantities
by common blacksmiths into knives or a sort of cutlass (or macheté)
for use in battle.(27)  These were never used by regularly-organized
troops.  Guerillas, acting in independent, small bands, were,
however, often armed with such unusual weapons.  The North had no
such soldiers.  The South had many bands of them, the leaders of
which gained much notoriety, but they contributed little towards
general results.  Guerillas were, at best, irregular soldiers, who
in general masqueraded as peaceful citizens, only taking up arms
to make raids and to attack small, exposed parties, trains, etc.
This sort of warfare simply tended to irritate the North and
intensify hatred for the time.

Not in the matter of arms alone was there much to learn by experience.
McClellan and others had visited the armies of Europe and made
reports thereon; Halleck had written on the _Art of War;_ General
Scott and others had practical experience in active campaigns, but
nobody seemed to know what supplies an army required to render it
most effective on the march or in battle.

When the volunteers first took the field the transportation trains
occupied on the march more than four times the space covered by
the troops.  Large details had, as a consequence, to be made to
manage the trains and drive the teams; large detachments, under
officers, to go with them as guards.  To supply forage for the
immense number of horses and mules was not only a great tax upon
the roads but a needless expense to the government.  Excessive
provision of tents for headquarters and officers as well as the
soldiers was also made.  Officers as well as private soldiers
carried too much worse than useless personal clothing, including
boots (wholly worthless to a footman) and other baggage; each
officer as a rule had one or more trunks and a mess-chest, with
other supplies.  McClellan, in July, 1861, had about fifteen four-
horse or six-mule teams to carry the personal outfit of the General
and his staff; brigade headquarters (there were no corps or divisions)
had only a proportionately smaller number of teams; and for the
field and staff of a regimental headquarters not less than six such
teams were required, including one each for the adjutant and the
regimental quartermaster and commissary; and the surgeon of the
regiment and his assistants required two more.

Each company was assigned one team.  A single regiment--ten companies
--would seldom have less than eighteen large teams to enable it to
move from its camp.  Something was, however, due to the care of
new and unseasoned troops, but in the light of future experience,
the extreme folly of thus trying to make war seems ridiculous.  A
great change, however, occurred during the later years of the war.
When I was on active campaigns with a brigade of seven regiments,
one team was allowed for brigade headquarters, and one for each
regiment.  In this arrangement each soldier carried his own half-
ten (dog-tent) rolled on his knapsack, and the quartermaster,
commissary, medical and ordnance supplies were carried in general
trains.  This applied to all the armies of the Union.  The Confederates
had even less transportation with moving troops.

But we must not tarry longer with these details.  Henceforth we
shall briefly try to tell the story of such of the campaigns,
events, and scenes of the conflict as in the ensuing four years of
war came under our observation or were connected with movements in
which we participated, interweaving some personal history.

( 1)  His resignation was accepted December 29, 1860.  Howell Cobb,
of Georgia, Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury, resigned December
8, 1860, and was, on February 4, 1861, chosen the presiding officer
of the first Confederate Congress.  He left the United States
Treasury empty.  Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, Buchanan's Secretary
of the Interior, resigned January 8, 1861.  He had corresponded
with secessionists South, and while yet in the Cabinet had been
appointed a commissioner by his State to urge North Carolina to
secede.  He became an aid to Beauregard, but attained no military
distinction.  In 1864 he went to Canada, and there promoted a plan
to release prisoners at Camp Douglas, Chicago, and to seize the
city, and was charged with instigating plots to burn New York and
other Northern cities.

( 2)  _Am. Cyclopedia_, 1861 (Appleton), pp. 430, 431.

It is interesting to note that Louisiana, jointly with the Confederate
States, issued in April and May, 1861, made from captured United
States bullion, on United States dies of 1861, gold coin, $254,820
in double eagles, and silver coin, $1,101,316.50 in half dollars.
In May, 1861, the remaining bullion was transferred to A. J. Guizot,
Assistant Treasurer Confederate States of America, who at once
destroyed the United States dies and had a Confederate States die
for silver half dollars engraved by the coiner, A. H. M. Peterson.
From this die _four_ pieces only were struck on a screw press, the
die being of such high relief that its use was impracticable.
These _four_ coins composed the _entire_ coinage of the Confederate
States.  Its design, _Obverse:_ Goddess of Liberty (same as United
States coins) with arc of thirteen stars (representing original
States), date, "1861."  _Reverse:_ American shield beneath a "Liberty
Cap"; union of shield and seven stars (representing original seceded
States), surrounded by a wreath, to the left (cotton in bloom), to
the right (sugar cane).  _Legend:  "Confederate States of America_,"
exergue, "_Half Dol._"--_U. S._(Townsend), p. 427.

( 3)  _Am. Cyclop._, 1861, p. 123.

( 4)  P. G. T. Beauregard resigned, February 20, 1861, a captaincy
in the United States army while holding the appointment of
Superintendent of West Point.

( 5)  _Life of Beauregard_ (Roman), vol. i., p. 25.

( 6)  _Hist. Reg. U. S. A._ (Heitman), pp. 836-845.

( 7)  Scharf's _Hist. C. S. N._, p. 14.

( 8)  President Lincoln's Message, July, 1861.

( 9)  _Am. Cyclop._, 1861, p. 431.

(10)  This is the only instance where Buchanan issued such an order,
hence we give it.

  "March 1, 1861.
"By direction of the President, etc., it is ordered that Brig.-Gen.
David E. Twiggs, Major-General by brevet, be, and is hereby dismissed
from the army of the United States for his treachery to the flag
of his country, in having surrendered on the 18th of February,
1861, on demand of the authorities of Texas, the military posts
and other property of the United States in his department and under
his charge.

  "J. Holt, Secretary of War.
"S. Cooper, Adjutant-General."

(11)  Lieutenant Frank C. Armstrong (First Cavalry), pending his
resignation, fought at Bull Run (July, 1861) for the Union, then
went into the Confederacy and became a Brigadier-General.

(12)  "Treasury Department, Jan. 29, 1861.
"W. Hemphill Jones, New Orleans:

"Tell Lieutenant Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume
command of the cutter and obey the order through you.  If Captain
Breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command
of the cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him a mutineer,
and treat him accordingly.

"_If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, Shoot him on
the Spot._

  "John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury."

(13)  Sherman's _Memoirs_, vol. i, p. 163.

(14)  _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), pp. 29-30.

(15)  John Wilkes, British Par., 1780 (_Pat. Reader_, p. 135).

(16)  In 1861 an army officer was not required (as now) to take an
oath of office on receiving promotion.  The following is a copy of
the last oath taken by Robert E. Lee as a United States Army officer,
and it shows the form of oath then taken by other army officers.

"I, Robert E. Lee, appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second
Regiment of Cavalry in the Army of the United States, do solemnly
swear that I will bear true allegiance to the United States of
America, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against
all their enemies or opposers whatsoever; and observe and obey the
orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of
the officers appointed over me, according to the Rules and Articles
for the government of the Armies of the United States.

  "R. E. Lee, Bt.-Col., U. S. A.

"Sworn to and subscribed before me at West Point, N. Y., this 15th
day of March, 1855.

  "Wm. H. Carpenter, Justice of the Peace."

(17)  Letter of Adjutant-General Thomas to Garfield.  _Army of
Cumberland Society Proceedings_ (Cleveland), 1870, p. 94.

(18)  _War Records_, vol. i., pp. 11-13.

It is worthy of note that at high noon, exactly four years later
(1865) the identical flag lowered in dishonor was "raised in glory"
over Fort Sumter, Robert Anderson participating.

(19)  Crawford, p. 421.

(20)  _Life of Toombs_ (Stovall), p. 226.

(21)  One man was killed on each side by accident.

(22)  Letter to Greeley, August 22, 1862, Lincoln's _Com. Works_,
vol. ii., p. 227; also same sentiment, letter to Robinson, August
17, 1864, p. 563.

(23)  General Benjamin Lincoln, of the Revolution, affords a striking
example.  He was brave, skillful, often held high command, and
always possessed Washington's confidence, yet he never won a battle.
To compensate him somewhat for his misfortunes Washington designated
him to receive the surrender at Yorktown, October 19, 1781.--
_Washington and His Generals_ (Headley), vol. ii., pp. 104, 121.

(24)  Euripides said, more than two thousand years ago:  "Cowards
do no _count_ in battle; they are _there_, but _not in it._"

(25)  _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), pp. 114, 115.

(26)  Ordnance and inspecting officers during the War of the
Rebellion contended that the .58 calibre rifle was the smallest
practicable.  In 1863 I purchased for special use a small number
of Martini-Henry repeating rifles, calibre .44, and on applying
for ammunition, the ordnance officer protested against supplying
it on the ground that the ball used was too small for effective
use.  This, I demonstrated at the time, was a mistake.  And now
(1896), after years of most careful experiments and tests by the
most skilled boards of officers, English, German, French, Austrian,
Swedish, United States, etc., it has been ascertained that a steel-
jacket, leaden ball fired from a rifle of .30 calibre has the
highest velocity and greatest penetrating power.

The armies of all these countries are now, or are fast being, armed
with this superior, small-calibre rifle.

(27)  As late as April, 1862, Jeff. Davis, though a soldier by
training and experience, attached importance to "pikes and knives"
as war-weapons.--_War Records_, vol. x., pt. 2., p. 413.


CHAPTER III
Personal Mention--Occupancy of Western Virginia under McClellan
(1861)--Campaign and Battle of Rich Mountain, and Incidents

Events leading, as we have seen, to the secession of States; to
the organization of the Confederate States of America; to the
assembling of Confederate forces in large numbers; to the firing
on Fort Sumter and its subsequent capitulation, and to the summons
to arms of seventy-five thousand volunteer United States troops,
ended all thoughts of peace through means other than war.

President Lincoln and his advisers did not delude themselves with
the notion that three months would end the war.  He and they knew
too well how deep-seated the purpose was to consummate secession,
hence before the war had progressed far the first three years' call
was made.

By common judgment, South as well as North, Virginia was soon the
be the scene of early battle.  Its proximity to Washington, the
Capital, made it necessary to occupy the south side of the Potomac.
The western part of the State was not largely interested in slaves
or slave labor, and it was known to have many citizens loyal to
the Union.  These it was important to protect and recognize.  The
neutral and doubtful attitude Kentucky at first assumed made its
occupation a very delicate matter.

While many volunteer troops were hastened to the defense of
Washington, large numbers were gathered in camps throughout the
North for instruction, organization, and equipment.

When Lincoln's first call for troops was made I was at Springfield,
Ohio, enjoying a fairly lucrative law practice as things then went,
but with competition acutely sharp for future great success.

I had, in November, 1856, come from the common labor of a farm to
a small city, to there complete a course of law reading, commenced
years before and prosecuted at irregular intervals.  After my
removal to Springfield I finished a preparatory course, and January
12, 1858, when not yet twenty-two years of age, I was admitted to
practice law by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and settled in Springfield,
where I had the good fortune to enjoy a satisfactory share of the
clientage.  I had from youth a desire to learn as much as possible
of war and military campaigns, but, save a little volunteer militia
training of a poor kind, obtained as a member of a uniformed military
company, and a little duty on a militia general's staff, I had no
education or preparation for the responsible duties of a soldier--
certainly none for the important duties of an officer of any
considerable command.

Thus situated and unprepared, on the first call for volunteers I
enlisted as a private soldier in a Springfield company, and went
with it to Camp Jackson, now Goodale Park, Columbus, Ohio.( 1)

The first volunteers were allowed to elect their own company and
field officers.  I was elected Major of the 3d Ohio Volunteer
Infantry, and commissioned, April 27, 1861, by Governor William
Dennison.

A few days subsequently, my regiment was sent to Camp Dennison,
near Cincinnati, to begin its work of preparation for the field.
Here I saw and came to know in some sense Major-General George B.
McClellan, also Wm. S. Rosecrans, Jacob D. Cox, Gordon Granger,
and others who afterward became Major-Generals.  I also met many
others, whom in the campaigns and battles of the succeeding four
years I knew and appreciated as accomplished officers.  But many
I met there fell by the way, not alone by the accidents of battle
but because of unfitness for command or general inefficiency.

The Colonel of my regiment (Marrow) so magnified a Mexican war
experience as to make the unsophisticated citizen-soldier look upon
him with awe, yet he never afterwards witnessed a real battle.  John
Beatty, who became later a Colonel, then Brigadier-General, was my
Lieutenant-Colonel; he did not, I think, even possess the equivalent
of my poor pretense of military training.  He was, however, a
typical volunteer Union soldier; brainy, brave, terribly in earnest,
always truthful, and what he did not know he made no pretense of
knowing, but set about learning.  He had by nature the spirit of
a good soldier; as the war progressed the true spirit of the warrior
became an inspiration to him; and at Perryville, Stone's River,
Chickamauga, and on other fields he won just renown, not alone for
personal gallantry but for skill in handling and personally fighting
his command.

The 3d Ohio and most of the three-months' regiments at Camp Dennison
were promptly re-enlisted under the President's May 3d call for
three years' volunteers, and I was again (June 12, 1861) commissioned
its Major.

In early June, McClellan, who commanded the Department of Ohio,
including Western Virginia, crossed the Ohio and assembled an army,
mainly at and in the vicinity of Grafton.

He had issued, May 26th, 1861, from his headquarters at Cincinnati,
a somewhat bombastic proclamation to the people of Western Virginia,
relating in part to the recent vote on secession, saying his invasion
was delayed to avoid the appearance of influencing the result.  It
promised protection to loyal men against armed rebels, and indignantly
disclaimed any disposition to interfere with slaves or slavery,
promising to crush an attempted insurrection "with an iron hand."

The proclamation closed thus:

"Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce
you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized with
interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly--not
only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on
the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection
on their part.  Now that we are in your midst, I call upon you to
fly to arms and support the General Government.

"Sever the connection that binds you to traitors.  Proclaim to the
world that the faith and loyalty so long boasted by the Old Dominion
are still preserved in Western Virginia, and that you remain true
to the Stars and Stripes."( 2)

This proclamation won no friends for the Union in the mountains of
Western Virginia, where slaves were few and slavery was detested.
The mountaineers were naturally for the Union, and such an appeal
was likely to do more harm than good.

The proclamation, however, was in harmony with the then policy of
the Administration at Washington and with public sentiment generally
in the North.

Colonel George A. Porterfield, on May 4th, was ordered by Robert
E. Lee, then in command of the Virginia forces, to repair to Grafton,
the junction of two branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
and there assemble the Confederate troops with a view to holding
that part of the State of Virginia; in case, however, he failed in
this and was unable permanently to hold that railroad, he was
instructed to cut it.

On June 8th, General R. S. Garnett was assigned by Lee to the
command of the Confederate troops of Northwestern Virginia.

The Union forces under Col. B. F. Kelley, 1st Virginia Volunteers,
occupied Grafton May 30th, the forces under Porterfield having
retired without a fight to Philippi, about sixteen miles distant
on a turnpike road leading from Webster (four miles from Grafton)
over Laurel Hill to Beverly.  As roads are few in Western Virginia,
and as this road proved to be one of great importance in the campaign
upon which we are just entering, it may be well to say that it
continues through Huttonville, across Tygart's Valley River, through
Cheat Mountain Pass over the summit of Cheat Mountain, thence
through Greenbrier to Staunton at the head of the Shenandoah Valley.
At Beverly it is intersected by another turnpike from Clarksburg,
through Buchannon _via_ Middle Fork Bridge, Roaring Creek (west of
Rich Mountain), Rich Mountain Summit, etc.  From Huttonville a road
leads southward up the Tygart's Valley River, crossing the mouth
of Elk Water about seven miles from Huttonville, thence past Big
Springs on Valley Mountain to Huntersville, Virginia.  The region
through which these roads pass is mountainous.

Ohio and Indiana volunteers made up the body of the army under
McClellan.  These troops assembled first in the vicinity of Grafton.
The first camp the 3d Ohio occupied was at Fetterman, two miles west
of Grafton.  Porterfield made a halt at Philippi, where he gathered
together about eight hundred poorly-armed and disciplined men.
Detachments under Col. B. F. Kelley and Col. E. Dumont of Indiana,
surprised him, June 3d, by a night march, and captured a part of
his command, much of his supplies, and caused him to retreat with
his forces disorganized and in disgrace.  There Colonel Kelley was
seriously wounded by a pistol shot.  General Garnett, soon after
the affair at Philippi, collected about four thousand men at Laurel
Hill, on the road leading to Beverly.  This position was naturally
a strong one, and was soon made formidable with earthworks and
artillery.  He took command there in person.  At the foot of Rich
Mountain (western side), on the road leading from Clarksville
through Buchannon to Beverly, a Confederate force of about two
thousand, with considerable artillery, was strongly fortified,
commanded by Colonel John Pegram, late of the U.S.A.  Beverly was
made the base of supplies for both commands.  Great activity was
displayed to recruit and equip a large Confederate force to hold
Western Virginia.  They had troops on the Kanawha under Gen. Henry
A. Wise and Gen. J. B. Floyd.  The latter was but recently President
Buchanan's Secretary of War.

Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Morris of Indiana was given about 4000 men
after the affair at Philippi to hold and watch Garnett at Laurel
Hill.  McClellan having concentrated a force at Clarksburg on the
Parkersburg stem of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, moved it thence
on the Beverly road, _via_ Buchannon, to the front of Pegram's
position.

His army on this road numbered about 10,000.

Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans, the second in command, led a brigade; Gen.
N. Schleich, a three-months' general from Ohio, and Col. Robert L.
McCook (9th O.V.I.), also in some temporary way commanded brigades.

The 3d Ohio Infantry was of Schleich's brigade.

While the troops were encamped at Buchannon, Schleich, on July 6th,
without the knowledge of McClellan, sent two companies under Captain
Lawson of the 3d Ohio on a reconnoitring expedition to ascertain
the position of the enemy.  Lawson found the enemy's advance pickets
at Middle Fork Bridge, and a spirited fight occurred in which he
lost one man killed and inflicted some loss on the enemy.  This
unauthorized expedition caused McClellan to censure Schleich, who
was only to be excused on the score of inexperience.

By the evening of July 9th the Union army reached and camped on
Roaring Creek, near the base of Rich Mountain, about one and a half
miles from the front of Pegram's fortified position.

General Morris was ordered at this time to take up a position
immediately confronting Garnett's entrenched position at Laurel
Hill, to watch his movements, and, if he attempted to retreat, to
attack and pursue him.

On the 10th of July the 4th and 9th Ohio Regiments with Capt. C.
O. Loomis' battery (Cold Water, Mich.), under the direction of
Lieut. O. M. Poe of the engineers, made a reconnoissance on the
enemy's front, which served to lead McClellan to believe the enemy's
"intrenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in
position to command the front approaches, and that a direct assault
would result in heavy and unnecessary loss of life."

This belief, he says, determined him to make an effort to turn the
enemy's flank and attack him in the rear.

Rosecrans, however, has the honor of submitting, about 10 P.M. of
the night of July 10th, a plan for turning the enemy's position,
which, with some reluctance, McClellan directed him to carry out.

Rosecrans' brigade consisted of the 8th, 10th, and 13th Indiana,
19th Ohio and Burdsell's company of cavalry, numbering in all 1917
men.

The plan proposed by Rosecrans and approved by McClellan was first
suggested by a young man by the name of Hart, whose father's house
stood on the pike near the summit of Rich Mountain, two miles in
the rear of Pegram's position.  Young Hart had been driven from home
by the presence of Confederates, and was eager to do what he could
for the Union cause.  He sought Rosecrans, and proposed to lead
him by an unfrequented route around the enemy's _left_, and under
cover of the dense timber, by a considerable circuit, to the crest
of Rich Mountain, thence to the road at his old home in the enemy's
rear.  He so impressed himself on Rosecrans and those around him
as to secure their confidence in him and his plan.  In arranging
details it was ordered that Rosecrans, guided by Hart, should, at
daylight of the 11th, leave the main road about one mile in front
of the enemy's fortifications, keep under cover of the declivities
of the mountain spurs, avoid using an axe or anything to make a
noise, reach the road at the mountain summit, establish himself
there as firmly as possible, and from thence attack the enemy's
rear by the main road.  While Rosecrans was doing this McClellan
was to move the body of the army close under the enemy's guns and
be in readiness to assault the front on its being known that
Rosecrans was ready to attack in the rear.

The whole distance the flanking column would have to make was
estimated to be five miles, but it proved to be much greater.  The
mountain was not only steep, but extremely rocky and rugged.
Pegram, after inspection, had regarded a movement by his left flank
to his rear as absolutely impossible.( 3)

His right flank, however, was not so well protected by nature, and
to avoid surprise from this direction he kept pickets and scouts
well out to his right.  Hart regarded a movement around the enemy's
right as certain of discovery, and hence not likely to be
successful.

Promptly at day-dawn Rosecrans passed into the mountain fastness,
whither the adventurous hunter only had rarely penetrated, accompanied
by Col. F. W. Lander, a volunteer aide-de-camp of McClellan's staff
--a man of much frontier experience in the West.  In a rain lasting
five hours the column slowly struggled through the dense timber,
up the mountain, crossing and recrossing ravines by tortuous ways,
and by 1 P.M. it had arrived near the mountain top, but yet some
distance to the southward of where the Beverly road led through a
depression, over the summit.  After a brief rest, when, on nearing
the road at Hart's house, it was discovered and fired on unexpectedly
by the enemy.

To understand how it turned out that the enemy was found near the
summit where he was not expected, it is necessary to recur to what
McClellan was doing in the enemy's front.  Hart had assured Rosecrans
there was no hostile force on the summit of the mountain, and on
encountering the Confederates there, Rosecrans for the time suspected
his guide of treachery.

But first an incident occurred in the 3d Ohio Regiment worth
mentioning.  I. H. Marrow, its Colonel, who professed to be in
confidential relations with McClellan, returned from headquarters
about midnight of the 10th, and assuming to be possessed of the
plans for the next day, and pregnant with the great events to
follow, called out the regiment, and solemnly addressed it in
substance as follows:

"Soldiers of the Third:  The assault on the enemy's works will be
made in the early morning.  The Third will lead the column.  The
secessionists have ten thousand men and forty rifled cannon.  They
are strongly fortified.  They have more man and more cannon than
we have.  They will cut us to pieces.  Marching to attack such an
enemy, so intrenched and so armed, is marching to a butcher-shop,
rather than to a battle.  There is bloody work ahead.  Many of you,
boys, will go out who will never come back again."( 4)

This speech, thus delivered to soldiers unused to battle was
calculated to cause the credulous to think of friends, home--death,
and it certainly had no tendency to inspire the untried volunteers
with hope and confidence.  The speech was, of course, the wild,
silly vaporings of a weak man.

I was sent with a detachment of the 3d Ohio to picket the road in
front of the enemy and in advance of the point from whence Rosecrans
had left it to ascend the mountain.  My small force took up a
position less than one half mile from the enemy's fortified position,
driving back his pickets at the dawn of day through the dense timber
on each side of the road.  About 9 A.M. a mounted orderly from
McClellan came galloping from camp carrying a message for Rosecrans,
said to be a countermand of former orders, and requiring him to
halt until another and better plan of movement could be made.  The
messenger was, as he stoutly insisted, directed to overtake Rosecrans
by pursuing a route to the enemy's _right_, whereas Rosecrans had
gone to our _right_ and the enemy's _left_.  Of this the orderly
was not only informed by me, but he was warned of the proximity of
the Confederate pickets.  He persisted, however, in the error, and
presented the authority of the commanding General to pass all Union
pickets.  This was reluctantly respected, and the ill-fated orderly
galloped on in search of a route to his _left_.  In a moment or
two the sharp crack of a rifle was heard, and almost immediately
the horse of the orderly came dashing into our picket lines, wounded
and riderless.  The story was told.  The dispatch, with its bearer,
dead or alive, was in the enemy's hands.  The orderly was, however,
not killed, but had been seriously hurt by a rifle ball.  He and
his dispatch for Rosecrans gave Pegram his first knowledge of the
movements of the column to the mountain summit.

For reasons already stated, Pegram entertained no fear of an attack
on his left and rear, but was somewhat apprehensive that his right
was not equally secure, and hence, early on the 11th, he had sent
a small picket to near Hart's house and taken the further precaution
to have his right vigilantly watched.  The message found on the
captured orderly informed Pegram that Rosecrans was leading a column
to his rear.( 5)  The latter thereupon sent a strong reinforcement
under Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to the picket already on the
mountain summit.  By reason of the expected approach of a force
around the right, breastworks were hastily thrown up and two pieces
of artillery put in position to repel an attack from that direction.
Pegram, in his uncertainty, concluded that Rosecrans might take a
still wider circuit around his right and thus pass over the mountain
by a pathway or road leading into the turnpike one and a half miles
from Beverly; and to guard against this he ordered Col. Wm. C.
Scott, with the 44th Virginia, then at Beverly, to take position
with two pieces of artillery at the junction of the roads mentioned,
and to scout well the flanking road.( 6)

The unexpected presence of the enemy at the summit of the mountain
is thus explained, and the reliability and faithfulness of the
guide vindicated.  Captain De Lagnel, as well as Rosecrans, was
doomed also to a surprise.

Rosecrans' command debouched from the wooded mountain and along
its crest upon the rear of De Lagnel's position, and new dispositions
of the Confederate force had to be made to meet the attack.

The position of De Lagnel's force was on and near the line of the
turnpike as it passed over the mountain, and hence Rosecrans'
column, in its approach from the southward, having gained the
heights some distance from the road, was from a greater elevation.

The 10th Indiana, under Colonel Manson, was in advance and received
the first fire of the enemy.

After a delay of some forty minutes, during which time the enemy
was receiving reinforcements, and both sides rectifying their
positions to the real situation, the order to advance and attack
was given by Rosecrans, and though the troops were new and little
drilled, they were well led and responded gallantly.  The battle
proper did not last beyond fifteen minutes.  The Confederates made
a brave resistance, but they were not exceeding 800 strong, and
though they had the advantage of artillery, they were not advantageously
posted, consequently were soon overthrown, their commander being
shot down, and 21 prisoners, about 50 stand of arms, 2 pieces of
artillery, and some supplies taken.  The Union loss was 12 killed
and 69 wounded, and the Confederate loss probably about the same.

Captain De Lagnel was, by both sides, reported killed, and his
gallantry was highly lauded.( 7)  General McClellan and others of
the regular army officers assumed next day to recognize his body
and to know him, and to deplore his early death.  He had been
shortly before, as we have seen, captured as a _Union_ officer at
Fayetteville, N. C., and had at a still later date resigned from
the U.S.A.  His alleged death, being generally reported through
the Confederacy, was made the occasion of many funeral sermons and
orations, eulogizing his _Southern_ loyalty and glorious sacrifice
of life "on the heights of Rich Mountain" in the cause of human
slavery, called Southern rights, or Southern freedom.

But we shall hear of De Lagnel again.

Pegram, learning of the disaster on the mountain in his rear, called
his best troops around him and in person started to attack and
dislodge Rosecrans.  He reached the proximity of the battlefield
about 6 P.M., but being advised by his officers that his men were
demoralized, and could not be relied on, desisted from attacking,
and returned to his main camp and position.( 8)

Of the dispersed Confederate forces some escaped towards Beverly,
joining Scott's 44th Virginia on the way, and some were driven back
to the fortified camp and to join Pegram.

While Rosecrans was operating on the enemy's rear, McClellan was
inactive in front.  McClellan claimed he was to receive hourly word
from Rosecrans during his progress through and up the rugged
mountain, and not thus often hearing from him, he, in the presence
of his officers, denounced the movement, and put upon Rosecrans
the responsibility of its then predicted certain failure.

The only information received from Rosecrans during the day was a
message announcing the successful progress of the column at 11 A.M.
on the 11th; it was then approaching Hart's house, and about one
and a half miles distant from it.( 9)

The arrangement made in advance was that on Rosecrans gaining a
position on the mountain he was to move down it upon Pegram's rear,
and McClellan with the main army was to attack from the front.  It
was not contemplated that Pegram should be fully advised of the
plan before it could be, in considerable part, executed.  Rosecrans'
men, being much exhausted by the laborious ascent of the precipitous
mountain, and having to fight an unexpected battle, did not advance
to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the rear, but awaited the
sound of McClellan's guns on the front.  The day was too far spent
the communicate the situation by messenger, and McClellan remained
for the day and succeeding night in total ignorance of the real
result of the battle; and though its smoke could be plainly seen,
and the sound of musketry and artillery distinctly heard from his
position, from circumstances which appeared to be occurring in the
enemy's camp after the sound of the battle had ceased, McClellan
reached the conclusion that Rosecrans was defeated, if not captured
and destroyed, and this led McClellan and certain members of his
staff to industriously announce that Rosecrans had disobeyed orders
and would be held responsible for the disaster which had occurred.
McClellan remained with the main body of his army quietly in camp
on Roaring Creek until about midday when, he states in his report,
"I moved up all my available force to the front and remained in
person just in rear of the advance pickets, ready to assault when
the indicated movement arrived."

While the troops were waiting for the "indicated movement," the
enemy had drawn in his skirmishers in expectation of an assault.
I was on the front with the skirmishers, and in my eagerness and
inexperience naturally desired to see the real situation of the
enemy's fortifications and guns.  With two or three fearless soldiers
following closely, and without orders, by a little detour through
brush and timber to the left of the principal road, I came out in
front of the fortifications close under some of the guns and obtained
a good survey of them.  The enemy, apprehending an assault, opened
fire on us with a single discharge from one piece of artillery,(10)
which he was not able to depress sufficiently to do us any harm.
We, however, withdrew precipitately, and I attempted at once to
report to McClellan the situation and location of the guns of the
enemy and the strength and position of his fortified camp, but,
instead of thanks for the information, I received a fierce rebuke,
and was sharply told that my conduct might have resulted in bringing
on a general battle before the _General_ was ready.  I never sinned
in that way again while in McClellan's command.

Late in the afternoon of the 11th, when the sound of the battle on
the mountain had ceased, an officer was seen to gallop into the
camp of the enemy on the mountain side; he made a vehement address
to the troops there, and the loud cheers with which they responded
were distinctly heard in our camp.

This proceeding being reported to McClellan, at once settled him
and others about him in the belief that Rosecrans had been defeated.
A little later Confederate troops were seen moving to the rear and
up the mountain.  This, instead of being as reinforcements for
defeated troops, as it really was, was taken as a possible aggressive
movement which, in some occult way, must assail and overthrow the
main army in front.  As the day wore away, Poe, of the engineers,
was sent to our right to find a position on the immediate left of
the enemy where artillery could be used.  I was detailed with two
companies of the 3d Ohio to accompany him.  We climbed a mountain
spur and soon reached a position within rifle-musket range of the
enemy which completely commanded his guns and fortifications.  So
near was my command that I desired permission to open fire without
awaiting the arrival of artillery, but this not being given by Poe,
of the headquarters staff, and being fresh from a rebuke from that
quarter, I gave a peremptory order _not_ to fire unless attacked.
On discovering us in his rear, the enemy turned his guns and fired
a few artillery shots at us, doing no harm, but affording a plausible
excuse for a discharge of musketry that seemed to silence the
enemy's guns, as their firing at once ceased.

Poe was a young officer of fine personal appearance, superb physique,
a West Point graduate, and a grandson of one of the celebrated
Indian fighters, especially noted for killing the Wyandot Chief,
Big Foot, on the Ohio River in 1782.

Poe was on staff duty throughout the war; became a Brevet-Brigadier,
corps of engineers, and died as a Colonel in the United States army
at Detroit, Michigan, October 2, 1895.

My acquaintance with him commenced on the spur of Rich Mountain
under the circumstances mentioned.

McClellan, in his report, says:

"I sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery
as would enable us to command the works.  Late in the afternoon I
received his report that he had found such a place.  I immediately
detailed a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too
late to get them into position before dark, and as I had received
no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, I finally
determined to return to camp, leaving merely sufficient force to
cover the working party.  Orders were then given to move up the
guns with the entire available infantry at daybreak the following
morning.  _As the troops were much fatigued_, some delay occurred
in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting intelligence
was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over
the mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation,
ammunition, tents, and baggage behind.

"Then for the first time since 11 o'clock the previous day, I
received a communication from General Rosecrans, giving me the
first intimation that he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's
farm."(11)

Here was a commanding general in the peculiar situation that he
could almost see and could plainly hear a battle raging, but did
not learn its successful result until fifteen hours after it ceased.

I remained on the mountain spur in command of a few companies of
infantry with orders to keep the men standing in line of battle,
without fires, during the entire night.  It rained most of the
time, and the weather becoming cold the men suffered intensely.
The rest of the army retired to its camp a mile and a half distant.

Pegram gathered his demoralized forces together, and with such as
were supposed able to make a long march, started about midnight to
escape by a mountain path around to the westward of the Hart farm,
hoping to gain the main road and join Garnett's forces, still
supposed to be at Laurel Hill.

On the morning of the 12th of July we found a few broken-down men
in Pegram's late camp, and a considerable number of mere boys--
students from William and Mary and Hamden-Sidney colleges--too
young yet for war.

McClellan and his staff, with dazzling display, rode through the
deserted works, viewed the captured guns, gazed on the dejected
prisoners, and then wired the War Department:  "In possession of
all the enemy's works up to a point in sight of Beverly.  Have
taken all his guns. . . . Behavior of troops in action and towards
prisoners admirable."

The army moved up the mountain to the battle-field, and halted a
few moments to view it.  The sight of men with gunshot wounds was
the first for the new volunteers, and they were deeply impressed
by it; all looked upon those who had participated in the battle as
veritable heroes.

Late on the 12th the troops reached Beverly, the junction of the
turnpike roads far in the rear of Laurel Hill, and there bivouacked.

Garnett, learning of Pegram's disaster at Rich Mountain, abandoned
his intrenchments at Laurel Hill, and leaving his tents and other
property hastily retreated towards Beverly, pursued rather timidly
by Morris' command.  Had Garnett pushed his army rapidly through
Beverly he could have passed in safety on the afternoon of the
12th, but being falsely informed that it was occupied in the
morning of that day by McClellan's troops, he turned off at Leadsville
Church, about five miles from Beverly, and retreated up the Leading
Creek road, a very rough and difficult one to travel.  A portion
of Morris' command, led by Captain Benham of the regular army,
followed in close pursuit, while other went quietly into camp under
Morris' orders.

Pegram, with his fleeing men, succeeded in finding a way over the
mountain, and at 7 P.M. of the 12th reached Tygart's Valley River,
near the Beverly and Laurel Hill road, about three miles from
Leadsville Church.  They had travelled without road or path about
twelve miles, and were broken down and starving.  Pegram here
learned from inhabitants of Garnett's retreat, the Union pursuit,
and of the Union occupancy of Beverly.  All hope of escape in a
body was gone, and though distant six miles from Beverly, he
dispatched a note to the commanding officer of the Union forces,
saying:

"Owing to the reduced and almost famished condition of the force
now here under my command, I am compelled to offer to surrender
them to you as prisoners of war.  I have only to ask that they
receive at your hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have
invariably received from the South."

McClellan sent staff officers to Pegram's camp to conduct him and
his starving soldiers to Beverly, they numbering 30 officers and
525 men.(12)  Others escaped.

The prisoners were paroled and sent South on July 15th, save such
of the officers, including Colonel Pegram, as had recently left
the United States army to join the Confederate States army; these
were retained and sent to Fort McHenry.(13)

Garnett retreated through Tucker County to Kalea's Ford on Cheat
River, where he camped on the night of the 12th.  His rear was
overtaken on the 13th at Carrick's Ford, and a lively engagement
took place, with loss on both sides; during a skirmish at another
ford about a mile from Carrick's, Garnett, while engaged in covering
his retreat and directing skirmishers, was killed by a rifle
ball.(14)

Garnett had been early selected for promotion in the Confederate
army, and he promised to become a distinguished leader.  His army,
now much demoralized and disorganized, continued its retreat _via_
Horse-Shoe Run and Red House, Maryland, to Monterey, Virginia.
General C. W. Hill, through timidity or inexperience, permitted
the broken Confederate troops to pass him unmolested at Red House,
where, as ordered, he should have concentrated a superior force.

McClellan, July 14th, moved his army over the road leading through
Huttonville to Cheat Mountain Pass, and a portion of it pursued a
small force of the enemy to and beyond the summit of Cheat Mountain,
on the Staunton pike, but no enemy was overtaken, and the campaign
was at an end.

It was the first campaign; it had the appearance of success, and
McClellan, by his dispatches, gathered to himself all the glory of
it.  He received the commendation of General Scott, the President,
and his Cabinet.(15)

From Beverly, July 16, 1861, McClellan issued a painfully vain,
congratulatory address to the "_Soldiers of the Army of the
West_."(16)

As early as July 21, 1861, he dispatched his wife that he did not
"feel sure that the men would fight very well under any one but
himself"; and that it was absolutely necessary for him to go in
person to the Kanawha to attack General Wise.  Thus far _he had
led no troops in battle_.  The Union defeat, on this date, at Bull
Run, however, turned attention to McClellan, as he alone, apparently,
had achieved success, though a success, as we have seen, mainly,
if not wholly, due to Rosecrans.

On July 22, 1861, he was summoned to Washington, and on the 24th
left his "Army of the West" to assume other and more responsible
military duties, of which we will not here speak.  In dismissing
him from this narrative, I desire to say that I wrote to a friend
in July, 1861, an opinion as to the capacity and character of
McClellan as a military leader, which I have not since felt called
on to revise, and one now generally accepted by the thoughtful men
of this country.  McClellan was kind and generous, but weak, and
so inordinately vain that he thought it unnecessary to accept the
judgment of men of higher attainments and stronger character.  Even
now strong men shudder when they recall the fact that George B.
McClellan apparently had, for a time, in his keeping the destiny
of the Republic.

To indicate the state of his mind, and likewise the immensity of
his vanity, I here give an extract from a letter, of August 9,
1861, to his wife, leaving the reader to make his own comment and
draw his own conclusions.

"General Scott is the great obstacle.  He will not comprehend the
danger.  I have to fight my way against him.  To-morrow the question
will probably be decided by giving me absolute control independently
of him. . . . The people call on me to save the country.  _I_ must
save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way.

"I receive letter after letter, have conversation after conversation,
calling on me to save the nation, alluding to the presidency,
dictatorship, etc. . . . _I would cheerfully take the dictatorship
and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved_," etc.(17)

General McClellan was not disloyal, nor did he lack a technical
military education.  He was a good husband, an indulgent father,
a kind and devoted friend, of pure life, but unfortunately he was
for a time mistaken for a great soldier, and this mistake _he_
never himself discovered.

He had about him, while holding high command, many real and professed
friends, most of whom partook of his habits of thought and possessed
only his characteristics.  President Lincoln did not fail to
understand him, but sustained and long stood by him for want of a
known better leader for the Eastern army, and because he had many
adherents among military officers.

Greeley, in the first volume of his _American Conflict_, written
at the beginning of the war, has a page containing the portraits
of twelve of the then most distinguished "Union Generals."  Scott
is the central figure, and around him are McClellan, Butler,
McDowell, Wool, Fremont, Halleck, Burnside, Hunter, Hooker, Buell,
and Anderson.  All survived the war, and not one of them was at
its close a distinguished commander in the field.  One or two at
most had maintained only creditable standing as officers; the others
(Scott excepted, who retired on account of great age) having proved,
for one cause or another, failures.

In Greeley's second volume, published at the close of the war, is
another group of "Union Generals."  Grant is the central figure,
and around him are Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Hancock, Blair,
Howard, Terry, Curtis, Banks, and Gilmore--not one of the first
twelve; and he did not even then exhaust the list of great soldiers
who fairly won eternal renown.

The true Chieftains had to be evolved in the flame of battle, amid
the exigencies of the long, bloody war, and they had to win their
promotions on the field.

( 1)  For a summary life of the writer before and after the war,
see Appendix A.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. ii., p. 48.

( 3)  Colonel Pegram's Rep., _War Records_, vol. ii., p. 267.

( 4)  _Citizen Soldier_ (John Beatty), p. 22.

( 5)  It seems that this orderly did decline to say which flank
Rosecrans was turning, as he must have had doubts after what had
transpired as to his instructions; nevertheless Pegram decided
Rosecrans was passing around his right, and so notified Garnett.--
_War Records_, vol. ii., pp. 256, 260, 272.

( 6)  _Ibid_., vol. ii., p. 275.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. ii., p. 245.

( 8)  _Ibid_., (Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 265.

( 9)  _War Records_ (McClellan's Report), vol. ii., p. 206.

(10)  _Citizen Soldier_ (Beatty), p. 24.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. ii., p. 206.

(12)  _War Records_ (Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 267.

(13)  At Beverly lived a sister of Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall),
Mrs. Arnold, who, though her husband was also disloyal, was a
pronounced Union woman and remained devoted to the Union cause
throughout the war.

(14)  _War Records_, vol. ii., p. 287.

(15)  _Ibid_., p. 204.

(16)  _Ibid_., p. 236.

(17)  _McClellan's Own Story_, p. 84.


CHAPTER IV
Repulse of General Lee and Affairs of Cheat Mountain and in Tygart's
Valley (September, 1861)--Killing of John A. Washington, and
Incidents, and Formation of State of West Virginia

General Rosecrans, from headquarters at Grafton, July 25, 1861,
assumed command of the "Army of Occupation in Western Virginia."
He subsequently removed his headquarters to the field on the Kanawha
and there actively participated in campaigns.

Brigadier-General Joseph J. Reynolds, of Indiana, a regular officer,
was assigned to the first brigade and to command the troops in the
Cheat Mountain region.

Many of the troops who served under McClellan were three-months'
men who responded to President Lincoln's first call and, as their
terms of service expired, were mustered out, thus materially reducing
the strength of the army in Western Virginia, and as the danger
apprehended at Washington was great, new regiments, as rapidly as
they could be organized, were sent there.

Already a movement at Wheeling had commenced to repudiate the
secession of Virginia, and to organize a state government, and
subsequently a new State.

Great efforts were put forth at Richmond by Governor Letcher and
the Confederate authorities to regain possession of Western Virginia
and to suppress this loyal political movement.

John B. Floyd and Henry A. Wise, both in the Confederate service,
and others were active on the Kanawha and in Southwestern Virginia,
but as the line from Staunton across Cheat Mountain led to Buchannon
and Clarksburg, and also _via_ Laurel Hill to Webster and Grafton,
striking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at two points, it was
regarded at Richmond as the gateway to Western Virginia which, if
opened, would insure its permanent recovery.

General R. E. Lee, from the first a favorite of the Confederate
authorities, who had thus far won no particular renown, not even
participating in the Bull Run battle and campaign, was now (about
August 1st) sent to Western Virginia "to strike a decisive blow at
the enemy in that quarter."( 1)

He established his headquarters at Staunton, but we find him, in
August, with his main army at Valley Mountain (Big Springs), on
the Huntersville road, and about twelve miles south of the Union
camp at Elk Water on the Tygart's Valley River.  General W. W.
Loring, late of the United States Army, an officer who won some
fame in the Mexican War, was in immediate command of the Confederate
troops at Valley Mountain.  Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson--not
Stonewall Jackson, as so often stated--commanded the Confederate
forces, subject to the orders of Loring, on the Greenbrier, on the
Staunton road leading over Cheat Mountain to Huttonville.  On these
two lines Lee soon had above 11,000 effective soldiers present for
duty, and he could draw others from Floyd and Wise in the Kanawha
country.( 2)

Confronting Lee's army was the command of General Reynolds, with
headquarters at Cheat Mountain Pass,( 3) three miles from Huttonville
on the Staunton pike.  Here Colonel Sullivan's 13th Indiana, part
of Loomis' battery, and Bracken's Indiana Cavalry were camped.  On
Cheat Mountain, at the middle mountain-top, about nine miles to
the southeast of Huttonville on the Staunton pike, were the 14th
Indiana, 24th and 25th Ohio, and parts of the same battery and
cavalry, Colonel Nathan Kimball of the 14th in command.  At Camp
Elk Water, about one mile north of the mouth of Elk Water in the
Tygart's River Valley, and about seven miles southward from
Huttonville on the Huntersville pike, the 15th and 17th Indiana
and the 3d and 6th Ohio Infantry, and still another part of Loomis'
battery, were posted.  Reynolds' entire command did not exceed 4000
available men, and in consequence of almost incessant rains the
roads became so bad that it was difficult to supply it with food
and forage.  The troops being new and unseasoned to camp life,
suffered much from sickness.  The service for them was hard in
consequence of the necessarily great amount of scouting required
on the numerous paths leading though the precipitous spurs of the
ranges of both Rich and Cheat Mountains, which closely shut in the
valley of the Tygart's.

The writer was often engaged leading scouting parties through the
mountains.

(The accompanying map will give some idea of the location of the
troops and the physical surroundings.)

Whole companies were sometimes posted at somewhat remote and
inaccessible places for observation and picket duty.

Scouts and spies constantly reported large accessions to the enemy.
Reynolds, therefore, called loudly for reinforcements, but only a
few came.  On August 26th five companies of the 9th Ohio (Bob
McCook's German regiment) and five companies of the 23d Ohio (Col.
E. P. Scammon) reached Camp Elk Water.  These companies numbered,
present for duty, about eight hundred.

The two regiments later became famous.  Robert L. McCook and August
Willich were then of the 9th, and both afterwards achieved distinction
as soldiers.

The 23d was originally commanded by Colonel Wm. S. Rosecrans; then
by Colonel E. P. Scammon, who became a Brigadier-General; then by
Colonel Stanley Matthews, who became a United States Senator from
Ohio, and a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; then
by Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, who became a Brigadier-General and
Brevet Major-General, and distinguished himself in many battles;
he subsequently became a Representative in Congress, was thrice
Governor of Ohio, and then President of the United States.  Its
last commander was Colonel James M. Comly, a brilliant soldier who,
after the war, became a distinguished journalist, and later honorably
represented his country as Minister at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.
Lieutenant Robert P. Kennedy was of this regiment, and not only
became a Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General, but was brevetted
a Brigadier-General, and since the war has been Lieutenant-Governor
of Ohio and four years in Congress.  Wm. McKinley was also of this
regiment, serving as a private, Commissary Sergeant, became a Second
and First Lieutenant, then a Captain and Brevet Major, and, since
the war, has served four terms as Representative in Congress, has
been twice Governor of Ohio, and (as I write) the indications are
that he will be nominated in June, 1896, for President, with a
certainty of election the following November.( 4)

On August 14, 1861, while Captain Henry E. Cunard, of the 3d Ohio,
with part of his company, was on advanced picket on the Brady's
Gate road, privates Vincent and Watson, under Corporal Stiner,
discovered a man stealthily passing around them through the woods,
whom they halted and proceeded to interrogate.

"He professed to be a farm hand; said his employer had a mountain
farm not far away, where he pastured cattle; that a two-year-old
steer had strayed away, and he was looking for him.  His clothes
were fearfully torn by brush and briars.  His hands and face were
scratched by thorns.  He had taken off his boots to relieve his
swollen feet, and was carrying them in his hands.  Imitating the
language and manners of an uneducated West Virginian, he asked the
sentinel if he 'had seed anything of a red steer.'  The sentinel
had not.  After continuing the conversation for a time he finally
said:  'Well, I must be a-going, it is a-gettin' late and I'm durned
feared I won't get back to the farm afore night.  Good-day.'  'Hold
on,' said the sentinel; 'better go and see the Captain.'  'O, no,
don't want to trouble him, it is not likely he has seed the steer,
and it's a-gettin' late.'  'Come right along,' replied the sentinel,
bringing down his gun; 'the Captain will not mind being troubled;
in fact, I am instructed to take such as you to him.'"( 5)

The boots were discovered by the keen instinct of the inquiring
Yankee to be too neatly made and elegant for a Western Virginian
mountaineer employed at twelve dollars a month in caring for cattle
in the hackings.  When asked the price paid for the boots, the
answer was fifteen dollars.  The suspect was a highly educated
gentleman, wholly incapable of acting his assumed character.  He
had touched the higher education and civilization of men of learning,
and his tongue could not be attuned to lie and deceive in the guise
of one to the manor born.  Though at first Captain Cunard hesitated,
he told the gentleman he would take him for further examination to
camp.  Finding the Captain, in his almost timid native modesty,
was nevertheless obdurate, the now prisoner, knowing hope of escape
was gone, declared himself to be Captain Julius A. De Lagnel, late
commander of the Confederates in the battle of Rich Mountain, where
he was reported killed.  His tell-tale boots were made in Washington.
He was severely wounded July 11th, and had succeeded in reaching
a friendly secluded house near the battle-field, where he remained
and was cared for until his wound healed and he was able to travel.
He had been in the mountains five days and four nights, and just
as he was passing the last and most advanced Union picket he was
taken.

His little stock of provisions, consisting of a small sack of
biscuits, was about exhausted, and what remained was spoiled.  He
was taken to camp, wet, shivering, and exhausted from starvation,
cold, and exposure.  It is needless to say his wants of all kinds
were supplied at once by the Union officers.  After remaining a
few days in our camp, and meeting General Reynolds, who knew him
in the United States Army, he was sent to join Pegram at Fort
McHenry.  Both these officers were soon exchanged, and served
through the war, neither rising to great eminence.  Pegram became
a Major-General, and died, February 6, 1865, of wounds received at
Hatcher's Run.  De Lagnel became a Brigadier-General, and survived
the war.  He had the misfortune of being twice captured, as we have
seen,( 6) once as a Union and once as a Confederate officer; neither
capture, however, occurred through any fault of his.

The 3d Ohio was encamped on the banks of Tygart's Valley River,
usually an innocent, pleasantly-flowing mountain stream, but, as
it proved, capable of a sudden rise to a dangerous height, as most
streams are that are located to catch the waters from many rivulets,
gulches, and ravines leading from the adjacent mountain sides and
spurs.

Illustrating the exigencies of camp life, an incident is given of
this river suddenly rising (August 20th) so as to threaten to sweep
away in the flood the 3d Ohio hospital, located by Surgeon McMeans
for health and safety on a small island, ordinarily easy of access.
The hospital tent contained two wounded and a dozen or more sick.
The tents and inmates were at the first alarm removed to the highest
ground on the island by men who swam out thither for the purpose.
By seven in the evening, however, it became apparent that the whole
island would soon be submerged; and logs, driftwood, green trees,
etc., were sweeping down the river at a tremendous speed.  To rescue
the wounded, sick, and attendants at the hospital seemed impossible.
Various suggestions were made; a raft was proposed, but this was
decided impracticable as, if made and launched, it would in such
a current be uncontrollable.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Beatty, of the 3d Ohio, with that Scotch-
Irish will and heroic determination which characterized him in all
things, especially in fighting the enemy, met the emergency.  He
got into an army wagon and compelled the teamster to drive into
the rushing stream above the island so that he could move, in part,
with the current.  Thus, by swimming the horses, he, with a few
others, escaped the floating timbers and reached the imperiled
hospital.  He found at once that it was impossible to carry back
the occupants or even to return with the wagon.  He promptly ordered
the driver to unhitch the horses and swim them to shore, and to
return in like manner with two or three more wagons.  Two more
wagons reached Beatty, but one team was carried down the stream
and drowned.  He placed the three wagons on the highest ground,
though all the island was soon overflowed, chained and tied them
securely together and to stakes or trees.  On the wagon boxes the
hospital tent was rolled, and the sick and wounded were placed
thereon with some of the hospital supplies.  He, with those
accompanying him, decided to remain and share their fate, and he,
with some who could not get into the wagon, climbed into the trees.
The river at 10 P.M. had reached the hubs of the wagons and threatened
to submerge them, but soon after it commenced to recede slowly,
though a rain again set in, lasting through the night.  Morning
found the river fast resuming its normal state, and the Colonel
and his rescuing party, with the hospital occupants, were all
brought safely to the shore.

Two diverting incidents occurred in the night.  A false alarm led
to the long roll being beaten, the noise of which, and of the men
rapidly assembling, could just be heard on the island above the
roar of the water.  Francis Union, of Company A of the 3d, was shot
in the dark and killed, without challenge, by a frightened sentinel.
This caused the long roll to be beaten.

Beatty mentions an entertainment, not on the bill, to which he and
others were treated while clinging to the trees above the flood,
and which was furnished by a soldier teamster (Jake Smith) who had
swum to the aid of the hospital people, and a hospital attendant,
both of whom were so favorably located as to enjoy unrestrained
access to the hospital "commissary."  They both became intoxicated,
and then quarrelled over their relative _rank_ and social standing.
The former insisted upon the other addressing him as _Mr._ Smith,
not as "Jake."  The Smith family, he asserted, was not only numerous
but highly respectable, and, as one of its honored members, no
person of rank below a major-general should take the liberty of
calling him "_Jake;_" especially would this not be tolerated from
"one who carried out pukes and slop-buckets from a field hospital"
--such a one should not even call him "_Jacob_."  This disrespectful
allusion to his calling ruffled the temper of the hospital attendant,
and, growing profane, he insisted that he was as good as _Smith_,
and better, and at once challenged "the bloviating mule scrubber
to get down off his perch and stand up before him like a man."
"Jake" was unmoved by this counter-assault, and towards morning,
with a strong voice and little melody, sang:( 7)

  "Ho, gif glass uf goodt lauger du me,
   Du mine fader, mine modter, mine vife;
   Der day's vork vas done, undt we'll see
   Vot bleasures der vos in dis life.

  "Undt ve sit us aroundt mit der table,
   Undt ve speak of der oldt, oldt time,
   Ven ve lif un dot house mit der gable,
   Un der vine-cladt banks of der Rhine," etc.

While at camp at Elk Water my wife and three months' old son, Joseph
Warren, Jr., Hon. William White (brother-in-law) and his wife
Rachel, and their son, Charles R. White (then twelve years old),
visited me for a brief experience in camp with the army.  They
remained until the morning of September 12th.  On the 11th Judge
White accompanied me to Reynolds' headquarters, at Cheat Mountain
Pass, and while there he was, by the General, invited to visit the
camp on Cheat Mountain summit.  It was suggested that in doing so
I should, with the Judge, join Lieutenant Wm. E. Merrill, of the
engineers, at Camp Elk Water the following morning, go by the main
road to the summit, thence down the mountain path _via_ the Rosecrans
house to camp.  This suggestion we were inclined to adopt, but on
regaining camp I ascertained that the enemy had been seen nearer
our camp than usual, and decided it was safest for the visiting party
to depart for home.  They accordingly bade us good-by on the next
morning and proceeded _via_ Huttonville, Beverly, Laurel Hill,
Philippi, Webster, and Grafton, safely to their homes at Springfield,
Ohio.

Lieutenant Merrill, with a small escort, departed as arranged, and
soon, on the main road, ran into a Confederate force (Anderson's);
he and his party were captured and carried with the retreating
Confederates to Valley Mountain camp, thence to Richmond, where
they remained for a considerable time in Libby Prison.  Thus
narrowly, Judge White ( 8) and myself escaped the fate of Lieutenant
Merrill.

Having disposed of some of the incidents of camp life and spoken
of family and friends, I return to the situation, as stated, of
the opposing forces of Reynolds and Lee.

At this time Floyd and Wise were actively operating in the Kanawha
country, confronting Rosecrans, who was commanding there in person,
their special purpose then being to prevent reinforcements going
to Reynolds, upon whom the heavy blow was to fall; Lee in person
directing it.

Lee was accompanied to Valley Mountain by two aides-de-camp, Colonels
John A. Washington and Walter H. Taylor.

General Loring, who retained the immediate command on this line,
had the 1st North Carolina and 2d Tennessee, under General Donnelson;
a Tennessee brigade, under General Anderson; the 21st and 42d
Virginia and an Irish Virginia regiment, under Colonel Wm. Gilham;
a brigade under Colonel Burke; a battalion of cavalry under Major
W. H. F. Lee; three batteries of artillery, and perhaps other
troops.  On the Staunton pike at Greenbriar River, about twelve
miles in front of Kimball's camp on Cheat Mountain, General Jackson
had the 1st and 2d Georgia, 23d, 31st, 37th, and 44th Virginia,
the 3d Arkansas, and two battalions of Virginia volunteers; also
two batteries of artillery and several companies of cavalry.

Though conscious of superior strength, Lee sought still further to
insure success by grand strategy, hence he caused Loring to issue
a confidential order detailing a plan of attack, which is so
remarkable in its complex details that it is given here.

"(_Confidential_.)

  "Headquarters, Valley Mountain,
  "September 8, 1861.
  "(Special Order No. 28.)
"1.  General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division will detach
a column of not more than two thousand men under Colonel Rust, to
turn the enemy's position at Cheat Mountain Pass ('summit') at
daylight on the 12th inst. (Thursday).  General Jackson, having
left a suitable guard for his own position, with the rest of his
available force, will take post on the Eastern Ridge of Cheat
Mountain, occupy the enemy in front, and co-operate in the assault
of his attacking column, should circumstances favor.  The march of
Colonel Rust will be so regulated as to attain his position during
the same night, and at the dawn of the appointed day (Thursday,
12th) he will, if possible, surprise the enemy in his trenches and
carry them.

"2.  The 'Pass' having been carried, General Jackson with his whole
fighting force will immediately move forward towards Huttonville,
prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking every precaution
against firing upon the portion of the army operating west of Cheat
Mountain, and ready to co-operate with it against the enemy in
Tygart's Valley.  The supply wagons of the advancing columns will
follow, and the reserve will occupy Cheat Mountain.

"3.  General Anderson's brigade will move down Tygart's Valley,
following the west slope of Cheat Mountain range, concealing his
movements from the enemy.  On reaching Wymans (or the vicinity) he
will refresh his force unobserved, send forward intelligent officers
to make sure his further course, and during the night of the 11th
(Wendesday) proceed to the Staunton turnpike, where it intersects
the west top of Cheat Mountain, so as to arrive there as soon after
daylight on the 12th (Thursday) as possible.

"He will make disposition to hold the turnpike, prevent reinforcements
reaching Cheat Mountain Pass (summit), cut the telegraph wire, and
be prepared, if necessary, to aid in the assault of the enemy's
position on the middle-top (summit) of Cheat Mountain, by General
Jackson's division, the result of which he must await.  He must
particularly keep in mind that the movement of General Jackson is
to _surprise_ the enemy in their defences.  He must, therefore,
not discover his movements nor advance--before Wednesday night--
beyond a point where he can conceal his force.  Cheat Mountain Pass
being carried, he will turn down the mountain and press upon the
left and rear of the enemy in Tygart's Valley, either by the new
or old turnpike, or the Becky's Run road, according to circumstances.

"4.  General Donnelson's brigade will advance on the right of
Tygart's Valley River, seizing the paths and avenues leading from
that side of the river, and driving back the enemy that may endeavor
to retard the advance of the center, along the turnpike, or to turn
his right.

"5.  Such of the artillery as may not be used upon the flanks will
proceed along the Huntersville turnpike, supported by Major Mumford's
battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel Gilham's brigade in
reserve.

"6.  Colonel Burke's brigade will advance on the left of Tygart's
Valley River, in supporting distance of the center, and clear that
side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that might obstruct
the advance of the artillery.

"7.  The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to the
nature of the ground, in rear of the left of Colonel Burke's brigade.
It will watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter, give
notice of, and prevent if possible, any attempt to turn the left
of the line, and be prepared to strike when opportunity offers.

"8.  The wagons of each brigade, properly parked and guarded, under
the charge of their respective quartermasters--who will personally
superintend their movements--will pursue the main turnpike, under
the general direction of their chief quartermaster, in rear of the
army, and out of cannon-range of the enemy.

"9.  Commanders on both lines of operations will particularly see
that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and that both
officers and men take every precaution not to fire on our own
troops.  This is essentially necessary, as the forces on both sides
of Cheat Mountain may unite.  They will also use every exertion to
prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, correct quietly any
confusion that may occur, and cause their commands to rapidly
execute their movement when in the presence of the enemy.

"By order of General W. W. Loring,

  "Carter L. Stevenson,
  "Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General."

General Lee, to stimulate his army to great effort, himself, by
another special order of same date, exhorted it as follows:

"The forward movement announced to the Army of the Northwest in
special order No. 28, from its headquarters, of this date, gives
the general commanding the opportunity of exhorting the troops to
keep steadily in view the great principles for which they contend,
and to manifest to the world their determination to maintain them.
The eyes of the country are upon you.  The safety of your homes
and the lives of all you hold dear depend upon your courage and
exertions.  Let each man resolve to be victorious, and that the
right of self-government, liberty, and peace shall in him find a
defender.  The progress of this army must be forward."( 9)

The column from Greenbrier under Colonel Albert Rust, of Arkansas,
was given the initiative, and on its success the plan detailed
pivoted, but the several columns were expected to act at the same
time and in concert.  Colonel Rust's command, about 2000 strong,
by a blind road to the Union right reached its designated position
between the Red Bridge and Kimball's fortified position.  Here it
captured an assistant commissary, and from him received such an
exaggerated account of the strength of Kimball's camp and the number
of its men that, without awaiting the columns of Donnelson and
Anderson, it retired with the one prisoner.  Lee's main army moved
north from Valley Mountain camp, on the turnpike, Anderson and
Donnelson taking their designated routes to the right, the former
passing to the head of Becky's Run, thence through the mountains
to a position on the road in the rear of Cheat Summit camp, arriving
at daylight of the 12th of September.  Donnelson, by another path
nearer the road which the principal column under Loring pursued,
marched to Stuart's Run, then down it to the Simmons house, where,
on the 11th, it captured Captain Bense and about sixty men of the
6th Ohio, who were in an exposed position and had not been vigilant.
Donnelson then marched to Becky's Run and to a point where, from
a nearby elevation, he could see the Union camp at Elk Water, and
he was to the eastward of it and partially in its rear.  Here, with
his command, he remained for the night.  General Lee followed and
joined Donnelson in the early morning of the 12th, and together
they advanced to Andrew Crouch's house, within a mile of Elk Water
camp and fairly in its rear.  Lee, however, ordered Donnelson to
retire his column to Becky's Run at the Rosecrans house.  Neither
Rust, Anderson, nor Donnelson, though each led a column into the
region between the Elk Water and Cheat Mountain camps (distant
apart through the mountains about six miles) seemed, at the critical
time, to know where the others were, or what they were doing.  The
presence of Lee with Donnelson on the morning of the 12th did not
materially improve the conditions in this respect.  Donnelson,
before Lee's arrival, contemplated an attack on a body of what he
supposed a thousand men (the detachments of the 9th and 23d Ohio)
camped in rear of the main Union camp and near Jacob Crouch's house.
Colonel Savage of the 16th Tennessee advised against the attempt,
and Lee, on his arrival, must have regarded it as too hazardous.
Lee wrote Governor Letcher five days later that "it was a tempting
sight" to see our tents on Valley River.

Loring, with the principal command, accompanied by all the artillery,
forced the Union pickets back to the mouth of Elk Water, where he
encountered resistance from a strong grand-guard and the pickets.
Here some shots both of infantry and artillery were exchanged, but
with little result.

It is due to the truth of history to say that none of the movements
of Lee's army were known or anticipated by Reynolds and his officers,
and whatever was done to prevent its success was without previous
plan or methods.  As late as the evening of the 11th, Reynolds was
still with his headquarters at Cheat Mountain Pass, six miles
distant by the nearest route from either camp.  On this day Captain
Bense was surprised and his entire company taken where posted some
three miles from Camp Elk Water, but this capture was not known
until the next day.  The proximity of Donnelson's command to this
camp was also unknown until after it had withdrawn, and Rust's and
Anderson's presence on the Staunton pike in rear of Cheat Summit
camp was likewise unknown both to Reynolds and Kimball until about
the time they commenced to retreat.  True, on the 12th, the presence
of some force in the mountain between the Union camps became known.
Lieutenant Merrill and his party departed from the valley to the
mountain summit on the morning of the 12th entirely ignorant of
any movement of the enemy.  But both Reynolds and Kimball acted,
under the circumstances, with energy and intelligence.  General
Reynolds moved his headquarters to Camp Elk Water, the better to
direct affairs.  On the morning of the 12th of September Kimball
started a line of wagons from his camp to the pass, for the usual
supplies, and it was attacked by Rust's command before it had
proceeded a mile.  This attack was reported to Kimball, who supposed
it was made by a small scouting party, but on going to the scene
of it with portions of the 25th Ohio, under Colonel Jones, 24th
Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, and Captains Brooks and
Williamson's companies of the 14th Indiana, a body of the enemy
supposed to number 2500 was encountered.  Kimball, supposing serious
work was at hand, ordered the position held until further dispositions
could be made to meet the danger.  A sharp skirmish ensued, which
ended in Rust's troops precipitately retreating from their position
on the road under cover of the timber, and becoming so demoralized
that they threw away "guns, clothing, and everything that impeded
their progress."(10)

Rust's command continued its retreat through the mountains, and at
10 P.M. of the 13th Rust dispatched General Loring that "_The
expedition against Cheat Mountain failed_."  He indulged in some
criticism on his men, denouncing some ("not Arkansians") as cowards.
At the same time General Jackson reported to Loring that he was in
possession of the first summit of Cheat Mountain in front of
Kimball's position, but only holding it until he should receive
orders, meanwhile hoping something would be done in Tygart's valley.
He, however, did nothing more, and soon withdrew to his former
camp.(11)

Captain Coons of the 14th Indiana was sent on the evening of the
18th from Cheat Mountain summit with 60 men of the 14th Indiana,
24th and 25th Ohio, on a path leading to Elk Water camp, with
instruction to take position at the Rosecrans house on Becky's Run.
Kimball, on the 12th, sent 90 men under Captain David J. Higgins,
of the 24th Ohio, to relieve Captain Coons.  In going thither, when
about two miles from where Colonel Rust was attacked, Higgins ran
unexpectedly into Colonel Anderson's column from Valley Mountain,
and engaged it with great spirit.  The enemy was thrown into some
confusion by this unexpected encounter, but the loss on either side
was slight, and when Major Wm. Harrow of Indiana arrived from
Kimball's camp with two more companies, and ascertained that Anderson
had a brigade in the vicinity, he ordered the Union troops withdrawn
to within about one mile of camp.

Captain Coons, owing to a heavy rain, darkness, and the difficulty
in following the mountain path, did not reach the Rosecrans house
until after daybreak of the 12th.  He passed to the rear of Anderson's
brigade as it marched to the pike in rear of Cheat Mountain camp.
When Captain Coons reached the Rosecrans house he found evidence
of troops having been there recently, and soon discovered smoke
and heard the snapping of caps on a mountain spur towards Elk Water
camp.  He concluded, however, that he was near a Union picket post
from that camp, and sent forward five men to ascertain who his
neighbors were.  As these men ascended the mountain they were fired
on and three were shot down, two killed, and the others captured.
They were not challenged.  This was Donnelson's command, General
Lee and his aide, Colonel Taylor, then being with it.  Colonel
Savage of Tennessee commanded the troops first encountered.  The
Confederates advanced, firing wildly.  Captain Coons' men returned
the fire promptly, killed and wounded some, and when they had
checked the enemy retired to higher ground to the eastward and took
position behind fallen timber.  As the enemy approached across the
narrow valley, Coons made a most gallant resistance and drove back
the large force attacking him, but feeling his complete isolation,
he finally retired by a trail towards the pike.  He had not gone
far, however, until he ran into a bunch of the enemy consisting of
surgeons, quartermasters, and negroes, who, on being fired into,
fled to a main force nearer the pike.  This was Anderson's column,
and about the time when Major Harrow and Captain Higgins' men were
firing on it from the other side.

Thus the several bodies of the enemy, without special design, seemed
to be seriously attacked from many directions and became dismayed.
Captain Coons withdrew safely, and later found his way to camp.

Rust had failed, and the two other columns having become entangled
in the mountains, and not knowing how soon they would again be
assailed, beat a disorderly retreat, and, like Rust's men, threw
away overcoats, knapsacks, haversacks, and guns.  Lee says he
ordered a retreat because the men were short of provisions, as well
as on account of Rust's failure.  Had Captain Coons reached his
destination a few hours earlier he would probably have captured
Lee and his escort of ten men, who, in the previous night, having
lost their way, had to remain unprotected near the Rosecrans house
until daybreak.  But few prisoners were taken on either side.  The
columns of Anderson and Donnelson, broken, disheartened, and
disorganized, reached Loring in the Valley.  There was then and
since much contention among Confederate officers as to the causes
of this humiliating failure.

On the morning of the 13th, at 3 A.M., Reynolds dispatched Sullivan
from the Pass by the main road, and Colonels Marrow and Moss with
parts of the 3d Ohio and 2d Virginia (Union) from Elk Water camp,
by the path leading past the Rosecrans house, to cut their way to
Cheat Mountain summit, but these columns encountered no enemy, and
only found the débris of the three retreating bodies.  The real
glory of the fighting in the mountains belonged to the intrepid
Captain Coons, who afterwards became Colonel of his regiment and
fell in the battle of the Wilderness.

Both Lee and Loring, deeply chagrined, were reluctant to give up
a campaign so hopefully commenced and so comprehensively planned,
but thus far so ingloriously executed.

They decided to look for a position on Reynolds' right from which
an attack could be made on Elk Water camp in conjunction with a
front attack, and accordingly Colonel John A. Washington, escorted
by Major W. H. F. Lee (son of General Lee) with his cavalry command,
was dispatched to ascertain the character of the country in that
direction.

Early on the 12th of September I was sent with a detachment of four
companies of the 3d Ohio, as grand-guard at an outpost and for
picket duty as well as scouting, to the point of a spur of Rich
Mountain near the mouth and to the north of Elk Water, west of the
Huntersville pike, and about one mile and a half in advance of the
camp.  This position covered the Elk Water road from Brady's Gate,
the pike, the there narrow valley of the Tygart's, and afforded a
good point of observation up the valley towards the enemy.  A
portion of the time I had under me a section of artillery and other
detachments.  Here Reynolds determined to first stubbornly resist
the approach of the enemy, and consequently I was ordered to
construct temporary works.  Another detachment was located east of
the river with like instructions.  On the 12th the enemy pushed
back our skirmishers and pickets in the valley and displayed
considerable disposition to fight, but as we exchanged some shots
and showed our willingness to give battle, no real attack was made.
We noticed that each Confederate officer and soldier had a white
_patch_ on his cap or hat.  This, as we knew later, was in accordance
with Loring's order, to avoid danger of being fired upon by friends.
From the badge, however, we argued that raiding parties were abroad.

In the night of the 12th Loring, during a rain and under cover of
darkness, sent a small body to the rear of my position, and thus
having gained a position on the spur of the mountain behind and
above us, attempted by surprise to drive us out or capture us; but
the attack was feebly made and a spirited return fire and a charge
scattered the whole force.

Colonel Washington, on the 13th, in endeavoring to get on our right
came into Elk Water Valley _via_ Brady's Gate, and descended it
with Major Lee's cavalry as escort.  A report came to me of cavalry
approaching, but knowing the road ran through a narrow gorge and
much of the way in the bed of the stream, little danger was
apprehended, especially as the road led directly to my position.
A few troops of an Indiana regiment then on picket duty were,
however, sent up the Elk Water road a short distance, and a company
of the 3d Ohio was dispatched by me along the mountain range skirting
the ravine and road, with instruction to gain the rear of the
approaching cavalry if possible.

Washington was too eager to give time for such disposition to be
carried out; he soon galloped around a curve and came close upon
the pickets, Major Lee accompanying him.  Sergeant Weiler and three
or four others fired upon them as they turned their horses to fly.
Three balls passed through Washington's body near together, coming
out from his breast.  He fell mortally wounded.  Major Lee was
unhurt, though his horse was shot.  Lee escaped on foot for a short
distance and then by mounting Washington's horse.(12)

When reached, Colonel Washington was struggling to rise on his
elbow, and, though gasping and dying, he muttered, "_Water_," but
when it was brought to his lips from the nearby stream he was dead.
His body was carried to my outpost headquarters, thence later by
ambulance to Reynolds' headquarters at camp.  Washington's name or
initials were on his gauntlet cuffs and upon a napkin in his
haversack; these served to identify him.  He was richly dressed
for a soldier, and for weapons had heavy pistols and a large knife
in his belt.  He also had a powder-flask, field-glass, gold-plated
spurs, and some small gold coin on his person.  His sword, tied to
the pommel of his saddle, was carried off by his horse.

On the next day Colonel W. E. Starke, of Louisiana,(13) appeared
in front of my position bearing a flag of truce, and a letter
addressed to the commanding officer of the United States troops,
reading:

"Lt. Col. John A. Washington, my aide-de-camp, while riding yesterday
with a small escort, was fired upon by your pickets, and I fear
killed.  Should such be the case, I request that you shall deliver
to me his dead body, or should he be a prisoner in your hands, that
I be informed of his condition.

  "I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
  "R. E. Lee,
  "General Commanding."

Colonel Milo S. Hascall of the 17th Indiana conveyed Washington's
body, on the 14th, by ambulance, to Lee's line, and there delivered
it to Major Lee.

One of Colonel Washington's pistols was sent by Reynolds to Secretary
of War Cameron; the Secretary directed the other one to be presented
to Sergeant John J. Weiler, the knife to Corporal Birney, and the
gauntlets to private Johnson, all soldiers of the 17th Indiana.
General Reynolds obtained the field-glass, but subsequently gave
it to Colonel Washington's son George.  Hascall took possession of
the spurs and powder-flask, and Captain George L. Rose, of Reynolds'
staff, retained one or more letters (now in possession of his son,
Rev. John T. Rose), through which one or more of the fatal bullets
passed.

Colonel Washington was buried on his plantation, "Waveland," near
Marshall, Fauquier county, Virginia.

Thus early, on his first military campaign, fell John Augustine
Washington, born in Jefferson County, Virginia, May 3, 1821, the
great-grandson of General Washington's brother, John Augustine
Washington, and on his mothers' side a great-grandson of Richard
Henry Lee, Virginia's great Revolutionary patriot statesman.  He
inherited Mount Vernon, but sold it before the war to an association
of patriotic ladies, who still own it.

The tragic death of Colonel Washington was a fitting close of the
complex plan of campaign, which, though entered upon under most
favorable circumstances, failed fatally in execution in each and
all important parts, though Generals Lee and Loring, Colonel Savage,
and others of the Confederate officers present with the troops,
had seen much real service in the Mexican War, and many of them
were educated West Point officers.

Neither Lee or Loring ever made an official report of the campaign,
and both for a time were under the shadow of disgrace because of
its ineffectiveness.

General Lee was not quite candid with his own army when, on the
14th of September, he announced to it:

"The _forced_ reconnoissance of the enemy's positions, both at
Cheat Mountain Pass and on Valley River, having been completed,
and the character of the natural approaches and the nature of the
artificial defences exposed, the Army of the Northwest will resume
its former position."

In a private letter, however, dated Valley Mountain, September 17,
1861, addressed to Governor John Letcher, Lee speaks of the failure
of the campaign with great candor.

"I was very sanguine of taking the enemy's works on last Thursday
morning.  I had considered the subject well.  With great effort,
the troops intended for the surprise had reached their destination,
having travelled twenty miles of steep rugged mountain paths; and
the last day through a terrible storm which lasted all night, and
in which they had to stand drenched to the skin in cold rain.
Still their spirits were good.  When the morning broke I could see
the enemy's tents on Valley River at the point on the Huttonville
road just below me.  It was a tempting sight.  We waited for the
attack on Cheat Mountain, which was to be the signal, till 10 A.M.
The men were cleaning their unserviceable arms.  But the signal
did not come.  All chance for a surprise was gone.  The provisions
of the men had been destroyed the preceding day by the storm.  They
had had nothing to eat that morning, could not hold out another
day, and were obliged to be withdrawn.  The attack to come off from
the east side failed from the difficulties in the way; the opportunity
was lost and our plan discovered.  It was a grievous disappointment
to me, I assure you; but for the rain storm I have no doubt it
would have succeeded.  This, Governor, is for your own eye.  Please
do not speak of it; we must try again.

"Our greatest loss in the death of our dear friend, Colonel
Washington.  He and my son were reconnoitering the front of the
enemy.  They came unawares upon a concealed party, who fired upon
them within twenty yards, and the Colonel fell pierced by three
shots.  My son's horse received three shots, but he escaped on the
Colonel's horse.

"His zeal for the cause to which he had devoted himself carried
him, I fear, too far."

Lee, finding trouble in the Kanawha country, repaired thither, and
on September 21st assumed immediate direction of the forces there.
A violent quarrel had just then arisen between the fiery Henry A.
Wise and Floyd.

Lee, however, soon returned to Richmond, and though still in favor
with his Governor and President Davis, his failure in Western
Virginia brought him under a cloud from which he did not emerge
until after he succeeded General Joseph E. Johnston on the latter
being wounded while in command of the Confederate Army at Seven
Pines near Richmond, May, 1862.(14)

The principal part of Reynolds' command assembled at Cheat Mountain,
and, advancing, attacked Jackson in position at Greenbrier, October
3d, but was repulsed.  Thereafter active operations ceased in the
Cheat and Rich Mountain and Tygart's Valley region.

An unimportant and indecisive affair, hardly above a skirmish,
occurred at Scarey Creek, July 17th, between a part of General J.
D. Cox's command and forces under Henry A. Wise; the capture of
Colonels Norton, Woodruff, and De Villiers, with two or three other
officers, being the principal Union loss.  No decisive advantage
was gained on either side.  Carnifax Ferry, on the Gauley River,
was a more important affair.  It was fought, October 10, 1861,
between troops led by Rosecrans and those under Floyd.  Floyd was
found strongly posted, but was compelled to precipitately retreat
across the river and abandon his stores.

The campaign season ended with the Union forces practically in
possession of the forty-eight counties, soon to become the State
of West Virginia.(15)

A convention held at Wheeling, June 11, 1861, declared the State
offices of Virginia vacant by reason of the treason of those who
had been chosen to fill them, and it then proceeded to form a
regular state government for Virginia, with Francis H. Pierpont
for its Governor, maintaining that the people loyal to the Union
should speak for the whole State.  The Pierpont government was
recognized by Congress.  This organization, on August 20, 1861,
adopted an ordinance "for the formation of a new State out of a
portion of the territory of this State."  This ordinance was approved
by a vote of the people, and, November 26, 1861, a convention
assembled in Wheeling and framed a constitution for the proposed
new State.  This also was ratified, April, 1862, by the people,
18,862 voting for and 514 against it.  The recognized Legislature
of Virginia, in order to comply with the Constitution of the United
States, May 13, 1862, consented to the creation of a new State out
of territory hitherto included in the State of Virginia.  The people
of the forty-eight counties having thus made the necessary preparation,
Congress, December 31, 1862, passed an act for the admission of
West Virginia into the Union, annexing, however, a condition that
her people should first ratify a substitute for the Seventh Section,
Article Eleven of her Constitution, providing that children of
slaves born in her limits after July 4, 1863, should be free; that
slaves who at that time were under ten years of age should be free
at the age of twenty-one; and all slaves over ten and under twenty-
one years of age should be free at the age of twenty-five; and no
slave should be permitted to come into the State for permanent
residence.

March 26, 1863, the slavery emancipation clause was almost unanimously
ratified by a vote of the people, and, April 20, 1863, President
Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring that West Virginia had
complied with all required conditions and was therefore a State in
the Union.

The anomalous creation and admission of this new State was justified
only by the rebellious times and in aid of the loyal cause.  It
is the only State carved out of another or other States.  It remains
a singular fact that the day preceding the final Emancipation
Proclamation of Lincoln, he approved a law of Congress admitting
West Virginia as a slave State (with gradual emancipation) into
the Union.  The proclamation excepted the counties, commonly then
called West Virginia, from its application.

The fruit of the successful occupancy of Western Virginia in 1861
by the Union Army and the consequent failures there in the same
year of the Confederate leaders, Lee, Floyd, Wise, and others, was
the formation of a new State, thenceforth loyal to the flag and
the Constitution.

We now dismiss West Virginia, where we first learned something of
war, but in time shall return to it again.  I have in this chapter
dealt more largely in detail than I intend to do in those to follow,
as the reader, if even inexperienced in war, will have by this time
learned sufficient to enable him to comprehend much belonging to
a great military campaign which is often difficult and sometimes
impossible to narrate.

( 1)  No order assigning Lee to Western Virginia seems to have been
issued, but see Davis to J. E. Johnston of August 1, 1861, _War
Records_, vol. v., p. 767.

( 2)  An abstract of a return of Loring's forces for October, 1861,
shows present for duty 11,700 of all arms.--_War Records_, vol.
v., p. 933.

( 3)  While the Third Ohio was temporarily camped in Cheat Mountain
Pass (July, 1861) word came of the Bull Run disaster, and while
brooding over it Colonel John Beatty, in the privacy of our tent,
early one morning before we had arisen, exclaimed in substance:
"That so long as the Union army fought to maintain human slavery
it deserved defeat; that only when it fought for the liberty of
all mankind would God give us victory."  Such prophetic talk was
then premature, and if openly uttered would have insured censure
from General McClellan and others.

( 4)  This prediction has been fulfilled.  Major Wm. McKinley was
inaugurated President of the United States March 4, 1897.

( 5)  _Citizen Soldier_ (Beatty), p. 51.

( 6)  _Ante_, pp. 161, 196.

( 7)  _Citizen Soldier_, p. 60-1.

( 8)  William White was then a common pleas Judge; in March, 1864,
he became a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, a position he held
until his death.  He was appointed by President Arthur and confirmed
by the Senate (March, 1883) United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Ohio; his sudden death prevented his qualifying
and entering upon the duties of the office.  He was remarkable for
his judicial learning, combined with simplicity and purity of
character.  Born (January 28, 1822) in England, both parents dying
when he was a child, having no brother or sister or very near
relative, poor, and almost a homeless waif, he, when about ten
years of age, came in the hold of a ship to America.  From this
humble start, through persevering energy and varying vicissitudes
he, under republican institutions, acquired an education, won
friends, became eminent as a lawyer and jurist, and earned the high
esteem of his fellow-men, dying (March 12, 1883) at Springfield,
Ohio, at sixty years of age, having served as a common pleas Judge
eight years and Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio nineteen years.

His only son, Charles Rodgers White (born May 25, 1845), also became
a distinguished lawyer and judge, and died prematurely, July 29,
1890, on a Pullman car on the Northern Pacific Railroad, near
Thompson's Falls, Montana, while returning from Spokane Falls,
where he, while on a proposed journey to Alaska, was taken fatally
ill.

( 9)  _War Records_, vol. v., p. 192.

(10)  Kimball's Report, _War Records_, vol. v., p. 186.

(11)  Rust's Report, _War Records_, vol. v., p. 291.

(12)  W. H. F. Lee served through the war; was wounded and captured
at Brandy Station, 1863; chiefly commanded cavalry; became a Major-
General and was surrendered at Appomattox.  He, later, became a
farmer at White House, Virginia, on the Pamunkey, and was elected
to Congress in 1886.  His older brother, George Washington Custis
Lee, a graduate of West Point, served with distinction through the
war; also became a Confederate Major-General, and was captured by
my command at the battle of Sailor's Creek, April 6, 1865.  Robert
E. Lee, Jr., General Lee's other son, also served in the Confederate
army, but not with high rank.

(13)  Colonel Starke was, as a General, killed at Antietam.  His
son, Major Starke, met me March 26, 1865, between the lines in
front of Petersburg, under a flag of truce, while the killed of
the previous day were being removed or buried.  On Lee's surrender
I found him, and gave him his supper and a bed for the night.

(14)  _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), p. 112.

(15)  West Virginia was admitted as a State in April, 1863, with
forty-eight counties, but Congress consented, by an act approved
March 10, 1866, that the counties of Berkeley and Jefferson should
be added.--_Charters and Cons._, Par II., p. 1993.


CHAPTER V
Union Occupancy of Kentucky--Affair at Green River--Defeat of
Humphrey Marshall--Battles of Mill Springs, Forts Henry and Donelson
--Capture of Bowling Green and Nashville, and Other Matters

The State of Kentucky, with its disloyal Governor (Magoffin), also
other state officers, was early a source of much perplexity and
anxiety at Washington.

The State did not secede, but her authorities assumed a position
of neutrality by which they demanded that no Union troops should
occupy the State, and for a time also pretended no Confederates
should invade the State.

It was supposed that if Union forces went into Kentucky her people
would rise up in mass to expel them.  This delusion was kept up
until it was found her Legislature was loyal to the Union and civil
war was imminent in the State, when, in September, 1861, both Union
and Confederate armed forces entered the State.

General Robert Anderson was (August 15, 1861) assigned to the
command of the Department of the Cumberland, consisting of the
States of Kentucky and Tennessee.

Bowling Green was occupied, September 8th, by General Simon Bolivar
Buckner, a native Kentuckian, formerly of the regular army.  It
had been confidently hoped he would join the Union cause.  President
Lincoln, August 17th, for reasons not given, ordered a commission
made out for him as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and placed in
General Anderson's hands to be delivered at his discretion.( 1)

Buckner decided to espouse the Confederate cause while still acting
as Adjutant-General of the State of Kentucky.  The commission,
presumably, was never tendered to him.

Changes of Union commanders were taking place in the West with such
frequency as to alarm the loyal people and shake their faith in
early success.

Brigadier-General W. S. Harney, in command of the Department of
the West, with headquarters at St. Louis when the war broke out,
was relieved, and, on May 31, 1861, Nathaniel Lyon, but recently
appointed a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, succeeded him.  Lyon
lost his life, August 10th, while gallantly leading his forces at
Wilson's Creek against superior numbers under General Sterling
Price.  General John C. Fremont assumed command of the Western
Department, July 25th, with headquarters at St. Louis.  He was the
first to proclaim martial law.  This he did for the city and county
of St. Louis, August 14, 1861.( 2)

He followed this (August 30th) with an _emancipation proclamation_,
undertaking to free the slaves of all persons in the State of
Missouri who took up arms against the United States or who took an
active part with their enemies in the field; the other property of
all such persons also to be confiscated.  The same proclamation
ordered all disloyal persons taken within his lines with arms in
their hands to be tried by court-martial, and if found guilty,
shot.( 3)

President Lincoln disapproved this proclamation in the main.  He
ordered Fremont, by letter dated September 2d, to allow no man to
be shot without his consent, and requested him to modify the clause
relating to confiscation and emancipation of slaves so as to conform
to an act of Congress limiting confiscation to "_property_ used
for insurrectionary purposes."

Lincoln assigned as a reason for this request that such confiscation
and liberation of slaves "would alarm our Southern Union friends
and turn them against us; perhaps _ruin our rather fair prospect
for Kentucky_.":  Fremont declining to modify his proclamation,
Lincoln, September 11th, ordered it done as stated.( 4)

But as matters did not progress satisfactorily in Fremont's
Department, he was relieved by General David Hunter, October 24th,
who was in turn relieved by General H. W. Halleck, November 2,
1861.( 4)

Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, September 1, 1861, assumed command
of the troops in the District of Southeastern Missouri, headquarters
Cairo, Illinois.( 5)

The most notable event of 1861, in Grant's district, was the spirited
battle of Belmont, fought November 7th, a short distance below
Cairo.  Grant commanded in person, and was successful until the
Confederates were largely reinforced, when he was obliged to retire,
which he did in good order.

The Confederates were led in three columns by Generals Leonidas
Polk, Gideon J. Pillow, and Benjamin F. Cheatham.

The event, really quite devoid of substantial results to either
side, save to prove the valor of the troops, was the subject of a
congratulatory order by Grant, in which he states he was in "all
the battles fought in Mexico by General Scott and Taylor, save
Buena Vista, and he never saw one more hotly contested or where
troops behaved with more gallantry."( 5)  The Confederate Congress
voted its thanks to the Confederate commanders and their troops
for their "desperate courage," by which disaster was converted into
victory.( 5)

General Robert Anderson was relieved, October 6, 1861, and General
W. T. Sherman was assigned to command the Department of the
Cumberland.( 6)

Sherman personally informed Secretary of War Cameron and Adjutant-
General Lorenzo Thomas (October 16th) that the force necessary in
his Department was 200,000 men.( 6)  This was regarded as so wild
an estimate that he was suspected of being _crazy_, and he was
relieved from his Department November 13th.( 7)  Thereafter, for
a time, he was under a cloud in consequence of this estimate of
the number of troops required to insure success in a campaign
through Kentucky and Tennessee.  We next hear of him prominently in
command of a division under Grant at Shiloh.

As the war progressed his conception of the requirements of the
war was more than vindicated, and he became later the successful
commander of more than two hundred thousand men.( 8)

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell relieved Sherman of the command
of the Department of the Cumberland, and was assigned (November
9th) to the Department of Ohio, a new one, consisting of the States
of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that part of Kentucky east of the
Cumberland River, and Tennessee, headquarters, Louisville.( 9)

The War Department ordered from the commands of Generals Cox and
Reynolds in Western Virginia certain of the Ohio and Indiana
regiments, and this order caused the 3d Ohio, with others, to
counter-march over November roads _via_ Huttonville, Beverly, Rich
Mountain, and Buchannon to Clarksburg, from whence they were moved
by rail to Parkersburg, thence by steamboat to Louisville.  By
November 30th, the 3d was encamped five miles south of the city on
the Seventh Street plank road, and soon became part of the Seventeenth
Brigade, Colonel Ebenezer Dumont commanding, and (December 5th
(10)) of the Third Division, commanded by General O. M. Mitchel,
both highly intelligent officers, active, affable, and zealous;
the latter untried in battle.

Mitchel's division moved _via_ Elizabethtown to Bacon Creek, where
it went into camp for the winter, December 17, 1861.

McCook's division was advanced about six miles to Munfordville on
Green River, and General George H. Thomas' division was ordered to
Liberty, where he would be nearer the main army, and later his
headquarters were at Lebanon, and his division, consisting of four
brigades and some unattached cavalry and three batteries of artillery,
was posted there and at Somerset and London.(11)

December 17th, four companies of the 32d Indiana (German), under
Lieutenant-Colonel Von Treba, from McCook's command, on outpost
duty at Rowlett's Station, south of Green River, were assailed by
two infantry regiments, one of cavalry--Texas Rangers--and a battery
of artillery.  The gallantry and superiority of the drill of these
companies enabled them to drive back the large force and hold their
position until other companies of the regiment arrived, when the
enemy was forced to a hasty retreat, both sides suffering considerable
loss.  Colonel B. F. Terry (12) of the Texas Rangers forced his
men to repeatedly charge into the ranks of the infantry.  In a last
charge he was killed, and the attacking force retired in disorder.
Great credit was due to Colonel Treba and his small command for
their conduct.

Colonel James A. Garfield was placed in command of the field forces
in the Big Sandy country, Eastern Kentucky, and General Humphrey
Marshall, of Kentucky, who made pretensions to military skill,
confronted him, each with a force, somewhat scattered, of about
five thousand men.  Inexperienced as Garfield then was in war, he,
in mid-winter, in a rough country, with desperate roads and with
a poorly equipped command, with no artillery, displayed much energy
and ability in pushing his forces upon the enemy at Prestonburg
and Paintsville, Kentucky.  There were skirmishes December 25,
1861, at Grider's Ferry on the Cumberland River, at Sacramento on
the 28th, at Fishing Creek January 8, 1862, and a considerable
engagement at Middle Creek, near Prestonburg, on the 10th, the
result of which was to drive Marshall practically out of Kentucky,
and to greatly demoralize his command and put him permanently in
disgrace.

Next in importance came the more considerable fight at Logan's
Cross-Roads, on Fishing Creek, Kentucky, commonly called the battle
of Mill Springs, fought January 19, 1862, General George H. Thomas
commanding the Union forces, and General George B. Crittenden the
Confederates.  The Confederate troops occupied an intrenched camp
at Beech Grove, on the north side of the Cumberland River, nearly
opposite Mill Springs.  General Thomas, with a portion of the Second
and Third Brigades, Kenny's battery, and a battalion of Wolford's
cavalry, reached Logan's Cross-Roads, about nine miles north of
Beech Grove, on the 17th, and there halted to await the arrival of
other troops before moving on Crittenden's position.

The latter, conceiving that he might strike Thomas before his
division was concentrated, and learning that Fishing Creek divided
his forces, and was so flooded by recent rains as to be impassable,
marched out of his intrenchments at Beech Grove at midnight of the
18th, and about 7 A.M. of the 19th fell upon Thomas at Logan's
Cross-Roads with eight regiments of infantry and six pieces of
artillery.  The battle lasted about three hours, when the Confederate
troops gave way and beat a disorderly retreat to their intrenched
camp, closely pursued.  They were driven behind their fortifications
and cannonaded by the Union batteries until dark.  General Thomas
prepared to assault the works the following morning.  With the aid
of a small river steamboat Crittenden succeeded during the night
in passing his troops across the Cumberland, abandoning twelve
pieces of artillery, with their caissons and ammunition, a large
number of small arms and ammunition, about 160 wagons, 1000 horses
and mules, also commissary stores.

Brigadier-General F. K. Zollicoffer, of Tennessee, who commanded
a Confederate brigade, was killed at a critical time in the battle.
The number actually engaged on each side was about 5000.  The Union
loss was 1 officer and 38 men killed, and 13 officers and 194 men
wounded, total 246.(13)  The Confederate killed was 125, wounded
309, total 434.  This victory was of much importance, as it was
the first of any significance in the Department of the Ohio.  It
was the subject of a congratulatory order by the President.(13)

Notwithstanding this victory, President Lincoln, long impatient of
the delays of the Union Army to advance and gain some decided
success, issued his first (and last, looking to its character, only
(14)) "_General War Order_" in these words:

  "_President's General War Order No. 1._
  "Executive Mansion, Washington
  "January 27, 1862.
"_Ordered_, That the 22d of February, 1862, be the day for a general
movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against
the insurgent forces.  That especially the army in and about Fortress
Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, and
army near Munfordville, Ky., the army and flotilla at Cairo, and
a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
additional orders when duly given.

"That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of
War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-
in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and
naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full
responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

  "Abraham Lincoln."

Conservative commanding officers criticised this Presidential order
as an assumption on Mr. Lincoln's part of the direction of the war
in the field, and the naming of a day for the army and navy to move
was denounced an unwise and a notice to the enemy.  Under other
circumstances, the President would have been open to criticism from
a strategist's standpoint, but the particular circumstances and
the state of the country and the public mind warranted his action.
Foreign interference or recognition of the Confederacy was threatened.
No decided Union victory had been won.  McClellan had held the Army
of the Potomac idle for six months in sight of the White House.
Halleck at St. Louis, in command of a large and important department,
had long talked of large plans and so far had executed none.
Matters were at a standstill in Western Virginia.  Buell was, so
far, giving little promise of an early forward movement.

The Confederate forces held advanced positions in Missouri and high
up on the Mississippi.  They were fortified at Forts Henry and
Donelson, on the Tennessee and the Cumberland respectively, and at
Bowling Green and other important places in Kentucky.  They still
held the Upper Kanawha, the Greenbrier country, Winchester, and
other points in the Shenandoah Valley.  The Confederate Army was
holding McClellan almost within the fortifications south of the
Potomac at Washington.  The President was held responsible for the
inactivity of the army.  Under other circumstances, with other army
commanders, the order would not have been issued.  It served to
notify these commanders that the army must attack the enemy, and
it advised the country of the earnestness of the President to
vigorously prosecute the war, and thus aided enlistments, inspired
confidence, and warned meddling nations to keep hands off.(15)

On January 28, 1862, both General Grant and Commodore A. H. Foote,
Flag Officer United States Naval Forces in the Western waters,
wired Halleck at St. Louis that, with his permission, Fort Henry
on the Tennessee could be taken by them.  Authority being obtained,
they invested and attacked it by gunboats on the river side and
with the army by land.  The fire of the gunboats silenced the
batteries, and all the garrison abandoned the fort, save General
Lloyd Tilghman (its commander), his staff, and one company of about
70 men, who surrendered February 6th.  A hospital boat containing
60 sick and about 20 heavy guns, barracks, tents, ammunition, etc.,
also fell into Union hands.  The only serious casualty was on the
_Essex_, caused by a shot in her boilers, which resulted in wounding
and scalding 29 officers and men, including Commodore David D.
Porter.

General Grant reported on the same day that he would take Fort
Donelson, and on February 12, 1862, he sent six regiments around
by water and moved the body of his command from Fort Henry across
the country, distant about twelve miles.

Three gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander S. L. Phelps went up the
Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama, while others proceeded to
the mouth of the Cumberland and ascended it to aid the land forces.

Commander Phelps on his way up the river seized two steamers, caused
six others loaded with supplies to be destroyed, took at Cerro
Gordo a half-finished gunboat, and made other important captures
of military supplies.  He discovered considerable Union sentiment
among the inhabitants, some of them voluntarily enlisting to fight
the Confederacy.(16)

Grant was assigned to the District of West Tennessee February 14,
1862.(17)

General Grant had, when he commenced the attack of Fort Donelson,
about 15,000 men, in three divisions, commanded, respectively, by
Generals C. F. Smith, John A. McClernand, and Lew Wallace.  The
total force of the enemy was not less than 20,000, under the command
of General J. B. Floyd.(18)  The investment of the fort commenced
on the 12th, but it was not complete until the evening of the 13th,
on the arrival of the gunboats and the troops sent by water.  Flag
Officer Foote opened fire on the enemy's works at 3 P.M. on the
14th, from four gunboats, which continued for an hour and a half
with a brilliant prospect of complete success, when each of the
two leading boats received disabling shots and were carried back
by the current.  The other two were soon partially disabled and
hence withdrawn from the fight.  Grant then concluded to closely
invest the fort, partially fortify his lines, and allow time for
Commodore Foote to retire, repair his gunboats, and return.  But
the enemy did not permit this to be done.  He drew out from his
left the principal part of his effective troops under Generals
Gideon J. Pillow, B. R. Johnson, and S. B. Buckner during the night
of the 14th, and at early dawn of the 15th assailed, with the
purpose of raising the siege or of escaping, the extreme right of
Grant's army.  A battle of several hours' duration ensued, and for
the most part the Confederates gained ground, driving back the
Union right upon the centre.  Grant was absent in consultation with
Commodore Foote (19) when the attack began.  Foote was then
contemplating a return to Cairo to repair damages, and was likewise
wounded.(19)  Grant on returning to the battle-ground ordered a
counter-attack on the enemy's right by Smith's division, which met
with such success as to gain, at the close of the day, possession
of parts of the Confederate intrenchments.  After Smith's charge
had commenced, McClernand and Wallace were ordered to assume the
offensive on the enemy's left flank, which resulted in driving the
Confederates back to the works from whence they had emerged in the
morning.  Preparation was then made for an assault all along the
line early next morning.

Consternation and demoralization prevailed in the Confederate camps
during the night, especially at headquarters.

A council of war was held at midnight of the 15th between Floyd,
Pillow, and Buckner, at which the number of Grant's army was greatly
magnified, and it was decided that it was impracticable to attempt
to cut through the investment.  Floyd pretended to believe that
his capture was of the first importance to the Union cause, and,
although the senior in command, he announced a determination "_not
to survive a surrender there_."  Pillow, the next in command, also
assumed the same importance and individual right for himself; hence
Floyd, through Pillow, turned over the command, at the end of the
council, to Buckner, with the understanding that the latter would,
at the earliest hour possible, open negotiations for the surrender
of the forces.(20)  Floyd and Pillow, with the aid of two small
steamboats, which arrived from Nashville in the night, succeeded
in ferrying across the river and in getting away with about 1000
officers and men, principally belonging to Floyd's old brigade.
Some cavalry and small detachments and individual officers with
Colonel Forrest escaped in the night by the river road, which was
only passable, on account of back-water, for mounted men.(21)

The action of both Floyd and Pillow in not sharing the fate of
their commands, and the conduct of Floyd especially in carrying
off the troops of his old brigade in preference to others, were
strongly condemned by President Davis and his Secretary of War.
Both Generals were, by Davis's orders, relieved,(21) and neither,
thereafter, held any command of importance.  The sun of their
military glory set at Donelson.  Floyd had been unfaithful to his
trust as Buchanan's Secretary of War, and early, as we have seen,
deserted his post to join the Rebellion.  Pillow as a general
officer had won a name in fighting under Taylor and Scott and the
flag of the Republic in Mexico.

At an early hour on the 16th Buckner sent a note to Grant proposing
"the appointment of commissioners to agree upon the terms of
capitulation of the forces and post" under his command, and suggesting
an armistice until 12 o'clock of that day.  To this note Grant
responded thus:

"Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of
commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.
_No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted.  I propose to move immediately on your works_."

General Buckner denominated Grant's terms as "_ungenerous and
unchivalrous_," but accepted them, forthwith capitulating with
about 15,000 officers and men, about 40 pieces of artillery, and
a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

The casualties in Grant's army were 22 officers and 478 enlisted
men killed, and 87 officers and 2021 men wounded, total 2608.(22)
The loss in the navy under Foote was 10 killed and 44 wounded.
The Confederate killed and wounded probably did not exceed 1500,(23)
as they fought, in most part, behind intrenchments.  The capture
of Fort Donelson was thus far the greatest achievement of the war,
and won for Grant just renown.

The writer's regiment, as we have stated, went into camp in December,
1861, at Bacon Creek, Kentucky.  The winter was rainy and severe,
the camps were much of the time muddy, and the troops underwent
many hardships.  It was their first winter in tents, and many were
sick.

Colonel Marrow, on one pretence or another, was generally absent
at Louisville, and the responsibility of the drill and discipline
of the regiment devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Beatty, who was
quite equal to it, notwithstanding Marrow said and did much to
prejudice the regiment against him.  The writer also had the
Colonel's displeasure.

On his return to the regiment, January 28th, Beatty handed him, to
be forwarded, charges relating to his disloyalty, unmilitary conduct,
and inefficiency; whereupon he decided to resign and the charges
were withdrawn.  Beatty became Colonel and I Lieutenant-Colonel,
February 12, 1862.

Buell's army commenced to move southward February 10th, Mitchel's
division in the advance.

The high railroad bridge over Green River at Munfordville had no
railing or protection on the sides, but it was safely passed over
with the teams by moonlight.  The scene of the crossing was highly
picturesque, and attracted much attention from the troops just
starting on a new campaign.

The march of the 14th developed much of interest.  There were
evident signs of loyalty at the houses of all who owned no slaves,
and where slaves appeared they exhibited the greatest delight to
see the Union soldiers.  All slaves had the belief that we had come
to free them, and there was much difficulty in preventing them from
marching with us.  The country through which we passed was cavernous,
and the surface had many bowl-like depressions, at the bottom of
which was, generally, considerable water.  Springs and streams were
scarce.  The Confederates on retiring drove their disabled, diseased
and broken-down horses, mules, etc., into these ponds and shot
them, leaving them to decay and thus render the water unfit for
use by the Union Army.(24)  The troops had no choice but to use
the water from the befouled ponds.  We shall hear of them again.

On this day the division reached Barren River and exchanged a few
artillery shots with the rear of General A. S. Johnston's army,
under the immediate command of General Hardee.  The next day--the
last day of fighting at Fort Donelson--the advance of Mitchel's
division crossed the river and occupied Bowling Green, which was
found strongly fortified and a naturally good position for defence.
In its hasty evacuation many stores were burned; others distributed
to the inhabitants, and some abandoned to capture.  After an
unaccountable delay here of one week, during which time we heard
of the victory at Fort Donelson, Mitchel's division, still in
advance, resumed its march towards Nashville, distant about seventy
miles.  The head of the division reached Edgefield (suburb of
Nashville on the north bank of the Cumberland) on the evening of
the 24th of February, and the following morning the Mayor and a
committee of citizens formally surrendered the city of Nashville
while yet Forrest's cavalry occupied it.  General Nelson's division
of Buell's army arrived by boats the night of the 24th, and at once
landed in the city.

Nashville would have been a rich prize and easily taken if troops
from either Donelson or Bowling Green had been pushed forward
without delay when Fort Donelson fell.

General A. S. Johnston abandoned the city as early as the 16th,
and concentrated his forces at Murfreesboro, thirty or more miles
distant, leaving only Floyd with a demoralized brigade and Colonel
N. B. Forrest's small cavalry command to remove or destroy the guns
and stores, of which there was an immense quantity.

Floyd was ordered by Johnston not to fight in the city.(25)
Pandemonium reigned everywhere in Nashville for a week before it
was taken.  The mob, in which all classes participated, had possession
of it.  The proper officers abandoned their stores of ordnance,
quartermaster and commissary supplies, and such as were portable
were, as far as possible, carried off by anybody who might desire
them.  No kind of property was safe, private houses and property
were seized and appropriated.  No other such disgraceful scene has
been enacted in modern times.(26)

Johnston had a right to expect the arrival of the Union Army as
early as the 18th, and had wise counsel prevailed, Nashville might
have been taken on that or an earlier day.

A diversity of views led to delays in the movement of Buell's army.
Buell early expressed himself favorably to moving directly on
Nashville _via_ Bowling Green or by embarking his divisions at
Louisville on steamboats and thence by water up the Cumberland.(27)

Halleck pronounced the movement from Bowling Green on Nashville as
not good strategy, and this opinion he telegraphed both Buell and
McClellan.  Success at Fort Donelson did not change Halleck's views,
and Grant was condemned for advancing Smith's division to Clarksville.
After Buell reached Nashville he became panic-stricken, and, though
he had 15,000 men, possessed of an idea he was about to be overwhelmed.
He assumed, therefore, to order Smith's command of Grant's army to
move by boat from Clarksville to his relief.(28)

The first time I saw Grant was on the wharf at Nashville, February
26, 1862.  He was fresh from his recent achievements, and we looked
upon him with interest.  He was then only a visitor at Nashville.
His quiet, modest demeanor, characteristic of him under all
circumstances, led persons to speak of him slightingly, as only a
common-looking man who had, by luck, or through others, achieved
success.  He was then forty years old,(29) below medium height and
weight, but of firm build and well proportioned.  His head, for
his body, seemed large.  His somewhat pronounced jaw indicated
firmness and decision.  His hands and feet were small, and his
movements deliberate and unimpassioned.  He then, as always, talked
readily, but never idly or solely to entertain even his friends.

Both Halleck and Buell were apparently either jealous of Grant or
they entertained or assumed to entertain a real contempt for his
talents.  Buell paid him little attention at Nashville, and Halleck
reported him to the War Department for going there, although the
city was within the limits of his district.  His going to Nashville
was subsequently assigned as a reason for practically relieving
him of his command.(30)

Reports that Grant was frequently intoxicated, and that to members
of his staff and to subordinate commanders he was indebted for his
recent victories, were at this time freely circulated.  Grant, like
most great generals in war, had to develop through experience, and
even through defeats.  He, however, early showed a disposition to
take responsibilities and to seize opportunities to fight the enemy.
He had the merit of obstinacy, a quality indispensable in a good
soldier.

In contrast with him, Halleck and Buell, each pretending to more
military education and accomplishments, lacked either confidence
in their troops or in themselves, and hence were slow to act.
Complicated and difficult possible campaigns were talked of by them
but never personally executed.  They were each good organizers of
armies on paper, knew much of the equipment and drilling of troops,
also of their discipline in camp, but the absence in each of an
eagerness to meet the enemy and fight him disqualified them from
inspiring soldiers with that confidence which wins victories.  Mere
reputation for technical military education rather detracts from
than adds to the confidence an army has in its commander.  Such a
commander will be esteemed a good military clerk or adjutant-general,
but not likely to seek and win battles.

The 3d Ohio, with the brigade, marched through Nashville on the
27th of February, and went into camp at a creek on the Murfressboro
turnpike about four miles from the city.  Quiet was restored in
Nashville, the inhabitants seeming to appreciate the good order
preserved by the Union troops, especially after the recent experience
with the mob.

At Nashville the 3d Ohio's officers (especially Colonel Beatty) were
charged with harboring negro slaves, and Buell gave some slave-
hunters permission to search the regiment's camp for their escaped
"_property_."  The Colonel ordered all the colored men to be
assembled for inspection, but it so happened that not one could be
found.  One of the slave-hunters proposed to search a tent for a
certain runaway slave, and he was earnestly told by Colonel Beatty
that he might do so, but that if he were successful in his search
it would cost him his life.  No further search was made.  One of
the runaway slaves, "Joe," a handsome mulatto, _borrowed_ (?) from
Colonel Beatty, Assistant Surgeon Henry H. Seys, and perhaps others,
small sums of money and disappeared.  Some time afterwards I saw
"Joe" in the employ of Hon. Samson Mason in Springfield, Ohio.

On the 8th of March, John Morgan, the then famous partisan irregular
cavalry raider, dashed from a narrow road along the west side of
the Insane Asylum, located about five miles from Nashville on the
Murfreesboro pike, and captured, in daylight, a part of a wagon
train inside our lines and made off over a by-road with Captain
Braden of General Dumont's staff, who had the train in charge, the
teamsters, and about eighty horses and mules.  Colonel John Kennett,
with a portion of his regiment (4th Ohio Cavalry) pursued and
overtook Morgan, killed and wounded a portion of his raiders, and
recaptured Captain Braden and the drivers; also the horses and
mules.  About this time Mitchel organized a party of infantry to
be rapidly transported in wagons, and some cavalry, to move by
night upon Murfreesboro, with the expectation of surprising a small
force there.  The expedition started, but had not proceeded far
when about nine o'clock at night the head of the expedition was
met by Morgan and about twenty-five of his men with a flag of truce,
he pretending to desire to make some inquiry.  The flag of truce
at night was so extraordinary that he and his party were escorted
to the Asylum grounds, and there detained until Buell could be
communicated with.  The expedition was, of course, abandoned, and
about midnight Morgan and his escort were dismissed.

Columbus, Kentucky, regarded as a Gibraltar of strength, strongly
fortified and supplied with many guns, most of which were of heavy
calibre, deemed necessary to prevent the navigation of the Mississippi,
was occupied by General Leonidas Polk with a force of 22,000 men,
but on being threatened with attack by Commodore Foote and General
W. T. Sherman, was evacuated March 2, 1862.(31)  The State of
Kentucky thus became practically free from Confederate occupancy,
and the Mississippi, for a considerable distance below Cairo was
again open to navigation from the North.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 255, 442.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 255, 442.

( 3)  _Ibid_., pp. 466, 469, 485, 553, 567.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 466, 469, 485, 533, 567

( 5)  _Ibid_., pp. 144, 274, 312.

( 6)  _Ibid_., vol. iv., pp. 296-7, 300, 314, and 333, 341.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. v., p. 570.

( 8)  Sherman was, in January, 1861, Superintendent of the Military
Academy at Alexandria, Louisiana, over the door of which, chiselled
in marble, was its motto:  "_By the liberality of the General
Government of the United States.  The Union--Esto perpetua_."

As early as January 9th, an expedition of five hundred New Orleans
militia under Colonel Wheat, accompanied by General Braxton Bragg,
went by boat to Baton Rouge and captured the United States arsenal
with a large amount of arms and ammunition.  The Confederates sent
two thousand muskets, three hundred Jäger rifles and a quantity of
ammunition to Sherman at Alexandria, to be by him received and
accounted for.  Finding himself required to become the custodian
of stolen military supplies from the United States, and having the
prescience to know that war was inevitable, he, January 18, 1861,
resigned his position, settled his accounts with the State, and
took his departure North.

Later we find him in St. Louis, President of the Fifth Street
Railroad, and when, May 10th, the rebels at Camp Jackson were
surrounded and captured, he, with his young son, "Willie"--now
Father Sherman, and high in the Catholic Church--were on-lookers
and in danger of losing their lives when the troops, returning from
camp, were assailed and aggravated to fire upon the mob, killing
friend and foe alike.  Sherman fled with his boy to a gulley, which
covered him until firing ceased.--Sherman's _Memoirs_, vol. i.,
pp. 155, 174.

( 9)  _War Records_, vol. iv., pp. 349, 358.

(10)  The Seventeenth Brigade consisted of the 3d, 10th and 13th
Ohio, and 15th Kentucky.--_War Records_., vol. vii., p. 476.

(11)  _Ibid_., p. 479.

(12)  Colonel Terry was a brother of David S. Terry, who, while
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, killed David C.
Broderick, then a United States Senator, in a duel at Lake Merced,
Cal.

Davis S. Terry, for alleged grievances growing out of a decision
of the U. S. Circuit Court of California against his wife (formerly
Sarah Althea Hill), setting aside an alleged declaration of marriage
between the late millionaire, Senator Wm. Sharon and herself, in
a railroad dining-room at Lathrop, Cal. (August 14, 1889), assaulted
Justice Stephen J. Field, of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and was himself twice shot and instantly killed by David Neagle,
a deputy marshal, who accompanied Justice Field to protect him from
threatened assaults of the Terrys.  The Supreme Court, on _habeas
corpus_, discharged Neagle from state custody, where held for trial
charged with Terry's murder.  Justice Lamar and Chief-Justice
Fuller, adhering to effete state-rights notions, denied the right
to so discharge him, holding he should answer for shooting Terry
to state authority, that the Federal Government was powerless to
protect its marshals from prosecution for necessary acts done by
them in defence of its courts, judges or justices while engaged in
the performance of duty.--_In re_ Neagle, 135 _U. S._, 1, 52, 76.

(13)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 82, 102, 108.

(14)  Only two other orders were issued (March 8, 1862) denominated
"President's General War Orders"; one relates to the organization
of McClellan's army into corps, and the other to its movement to
the Peninsula and the security of Washington.--_Mess. and Papers
of the Presidents_, vol. vi., p. 110.

(15)  The taking by Captain Wilkes (Nov. 8, 1861) from the British
steamer _Trent_ of the Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell,
came so near causing a war with England, although they were, with
an apology, surrendered (January 1, 1862) to British authority,
that great fear existed that something would produce a foreign war
and consequent intervention.

(16)  _War Records_, vol. vii., p. 155.

(17)  _Ibid_., vol. viii., p. 555.

(18)  Grant estimates his own force on the surrender of the fort
at 27,000, but not all available for attack, and the number of
Confederates on the day preceding at 21,000--_Memoirs of Grant_,
vol. i., p. 314.

(19)  _War Records_, vol. viii., pp. 160, 167.

(20)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 269, 283, 288.

(21)  _Ibid_., pp. 274, 254.

(22)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 167, 270.

(23)  _Ibid_., pp. 269, 283, 288.

(24)  General Beatty accuses me, justly, of depriving him, at Bell's
Tavern when very hungry, of a supper, by too freely commenting,
when we were seated at the mess-table, on the _soupy_ character
and the _color_ of the mule hairs in the coffee.--_Citizen Soldier_,
p. 106.

(25)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 426, 433.

(26)  Forrest's Rep., _Ibid_., vol. vii., p. 429.

(27)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 619-621, 624.

(28)  Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. i., p. 320.

(29)  Grant was born April 27, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont
Co., Ohio.

(30)  Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. i, p. 326; _War Records_, vol. vii.,
pp. 683-3.

(31)  _War Records_, vol. vii., p. 853.


CHAPTER VI
Battle of Shiloh--Capture of Island No. 10--Halleck's Advance on
Corinth, and Other Events

General Albert Sidney Johnston, while at Murfreesboro (February 3,
1862) assumed full command of the Central Army, Western Department,
and commenced its reorganization for active field work, and on the
27th commenced moving it, with a view to concentrate to Corinth,
Miss.( 1)

General P. G. T. Beauregard, March 5th, assumed command of the Army
of the Mississippi.  On the 29th the Confederate armies of Kentucky
and the Mississippi were consolidated at Corinth under the latter
designation, Johnston in chief command, with Beauregard as second,
and Generals Leonidas Polk, Braxton Bragg, Wm. J. Hardee, and Geo.
B. Crittenden, respectively, commanding corps.  Later, General John
C. Breckinridge was assigned to the Reserve Corps, relieving
Crittenden.  The total strength of this army was 59,774, and present
for duty (April 3d) 49,444.( 2)  This was, then, the most formidable
and best officered and organized army of the Confederacy for active
field operations.  To confront this large force there was the Army
of the Tennessee, with an aggregate present for duty of 44,895, of
all arms.( 3)  Grant had sixty-two pieces of artillery, and his
troops consisted of five divisions commanded, respectively, by
Generals John A. McClernand, W. H. L. Wallace, Lew Wallace, Stephen
A. Hurlburt, W. T. Sherman, and B. M. Prentiss.

On April 3, 1862, the Army of the Mississippi was started for
Shiloh, about twenty miles distant, under a carefully prepared
field-order, assigning to each corps its line of march and place
of assembling and giving general and detailed instructions for the
expected battle, the purpose being to surprise the Union army at
daylight on Saturday, the 5th.  Hardee's corps constituted the left
of the Confederate army, and on reaching the battle-ground his left
was to rest on Owl Creek, a tributary of Snake Creek, his right
extending toward Lick Creek.  Bragg's corps constituted the
Confederate right, its right to rest on Lick Creek.  Both these
corps were to be formed for the battle in two lines, 1000 yards
apart, the right wing of each corps to form the front line.  Polk's
corps was to move behind the two corps mentioned, and mass in column
and halt on the Back Road, as a reserve.  The Reserve Corps under
Breckinridge was ordered to concentrate at Monterey and there take
position from whence to advance, as required, on either the direct
road to Pittsburg Landing or to Hamburg.  Other instructions were
given for detachments of this army.  The order was to make every
effort in the approaching battle to turn the left of the Union
Army, cut it off from the Tennessee, and throw it back on Owl Creek,
and there secure its surrender.( 4)

Johnston issued this address:

"_Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi:_

"I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your
country.  With the resolution and disciplined valor becoming men
fighting, as you are, for all worth living or dying for, you cannot
but march to decisive victory over agrarian mercenaries, sent to
subjugate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor.
Remember the precious stake involved.  Remember the dependence of
your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children on the
result.  Remember the fair, broad, abounding land, the happy homes,
and ties that will be desolated by your defeat.  The eyes and hopes
of 8,000,000 of people rest upon you.  You are expected to show
yourselves worthy of your valor and lineage; worthy of the women
of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been
exceeded in any time.  With such incentives to brave deeds and with
the trust that God is with us, your generals will lead you confidently
to the combat, assured of success."

Five of Grant's divisions were encamped at or in front of Pittsburg
Landing, between Owl and Lick Creeks; Sherman's division (except
Stuart's brigade) being in front, near and to the right of Shiloh
Church, was most advanced.  McClernand's division was located about
one half mile to his rear, covering his left.  Prentiss' division
lay within about one half mile (a little retired) of McClernand's
left in the direction of the mouth of Lick Creek, and Stuart's
brigade was still to Prentiss' left on the Hamburg road.  Hurlburt's
and Smith's divisions--the latter on the right, commanded on the
field by General W. H. L. Wallace in consequence of Smith's absence
at Savannah sick--were about a mile in rear of McClernand and
Prentiss, and about three quarters of a mile from Pittsburg Landing.( 5)

Lew Wallace's division, numbering present for duty 7302 men, with
ten pieces of artillery, was near Crump's Landing on the west bank
of the Tennessee, five miles below Pittsburg Landing and four miles
above Savannah.( 6)

By a straight line Savannah is seven miles below Pittsburg Landing.
Hamburg is four miles above this landing, on the same side of the
river and above the mouth of Lick Creek.  Shiloh Church, a log
structure about two and a half miles from the river, gave the name
to the battle.

We left Buell's army at Nashville.  It remained there from February
25 to March 15, 1862, when his cavalry started for Savannah, where
the Army of the Tennessee was then partially assembled under General
C. F. Smith.  Halleck had, March 4th, relieved Grant from any active
command in the field, and ordered him to place Smith in command of
the "expedition," and himself to remain at Fort Henry.  Grant chafed
much under this treatment, and repeatedly asked to be relived of
further service under Halleck.  Grant's recent success at Forts
Henry and Donelson, and his exceptional character for assuming
responsibilities and fighting, led to a public demand for his
restoration, which reached Washington and Halleck, and forced the
latter, on the 13th of March, to restore him to the command of his
army and district.  Grant reached Savannah on the 17th of March,
and found Smith fatally ill, and a portion of the troops already
at Pittsburg Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee.  He
subsequently ordered other divisions to the Landing, and although
the question of intrenching was considered, his chief engineer
officer, Colonel (afterwards Major-General) James B. McPherson,
reported against the necessity or practicability of employing the
raw troops in constructing defensive works.  It was decided the
undisciplined and undrilled soldiers (as most of them were) could
be better prepared for the impending campaign by drilling them.

Grant made his headquarters at Savannah (east of the Tennessee),
leaving Sherman in charge of that portion of the army in front of
Pittsburg Landing.

Besides some troops of Buell's army who were left to hold Nashville,
Mitchel's division was detached to operate on a line through
Murfreesboro south into Alabama or to Chattanooga, as might seem
best.

McCook's division left Nashville March 16th, following the cavalry,
and other divisions of Buell's army followed at intervals.  At
Columbia, Tennessee, McCook was detained, reconstructing a burned
bridge over Duck River, until the 30th.  Nelson reached this river,
and by fording crossed his division on the 29th, and was then given
the advance.  Buell did not hasten his march nor did Grant, it
would seem, regard his early arrival important.  The purpose was
to concentrate the Army of the Ohio at Savannah, not earlier than
Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th of April.

Nelson's division reached there the evening of the 5th, of which
Grant had notice.  Buell arrived about the same time, but did not
report his arrival, or attempt to do so until 8 A.M. the 6th, when
Grant had gone to Pittsburg Landing to take personal command in
the battle then raging with great fury.

It is well to remember that General Grant, on whom the responsibility
of the campaign and impending conflict rested, had been actually
present with his army but twenty days when the battle commenced;
that he did not select the position of the advance divisions of
his army, and could not, if he had chosen to do so, have changed
the place of the junction of Buell's army with his, as Halleck had
fixed upon Savannah as that place, and Buell was slowly marching
towards it before Grant's arrival there.

The unfriendly disposition of Halleck and the lack of cordiality
of Buell towards Grant made matters extremely embarrassing.  Buell
was Grant's junior, but he had commanded a department for a
considerable time while Grant only commanded a district, and this
alone may account for a natural reluctance on Buell's part to serve
under him.  Had Buell's army arrived promptly on the Tennessee,
the battle of Shiloh would not have been fought, as both Johnston
and Beauregard determined the attack was only practicable before
Grant's and Buell's armies united.

Grant was seriously injured, after dark on the 4th of April, while
returning to Pittsburg Landing in a rain storm from investigating
some unusual picket firing at the front.  His horse had fallen on
him, injuring his leg and spraining an ankle so much that his boot
had to be cut off.  He was unable to walk without the aid of crutches
for some days after the battle.( 7)

In the controversy as to whether the Union Army at Shiloh was
surprised on the morning of the first day I do not care to enter.
The testimony of Sherman and his brigade commander, General Ralph
P. Buckland, as well as that of Grant, will all of whom I have
conversed on this point, should be taken as conclusive, that as
early as the 4th of April they knew of the presence of considerable
organizations of Confederate cavalry, and that on the evening of
the 5th they had encountered such numbers of the enemy as to satisfy
the Union officers on the field that the enemy contemplated making
an attack; yet it is quite certain these officers did not know on
the evening of April 5th that the splendidly officered and organized
Confederate Army was in position in front and close up to Shiloh
Church as a centre, in full array, with a definite plan, fully
understood by all its officers, for a battle on the morrow.  Nothing
had gone amiss in Johnston's plan, save the loss of _one day_,
which postponed the opening of the attack from dawn of Saturday to
the same time on Sunday.  The friends of the Confederacy will never
cease to deplore the loss, on the march from Corinth of this _one_
day.  Many yet pretend to think the fate of slavery and the
Confederacy turned on it.  Grant was not quite so well prepared
for battle on Saturday as on Sunday, and no part of the Army of
the Ohio could or would have come to his aid sooner than Sunday.
Grant, however, says he did not despair of success without Buell's
army,( 7)

Grant, when the battle opened, was nine miles by boat from Pittsburg
Landing, which was at least two more miles from Shiloh Church,
where the battle opened.  Up to the morning of the battle he had
apprehensions that an attack might be made on Crump's Landing, Lew
Wallace's position, with a view to the destruction of the Union
stores and transports.( 7)  He heard the first distant sound of
battle while at Savannah eating breakfast,( 7) and by dispatch-boat
hastened to reach his already fiercely assailed troops, pausing
only long enough to order Nelson to march to Pittsburg Landing and,
while _en route_, to direct Wallace, at Crump's Landing, to put
his division under arms ready for any orders.  Certain it is that
the Union division commanders at Shiloh did not, on retiring the
night of the 5th, anticipate a general attack on the next morning.
They took, doubtless, the usual precautions against the ordinary
surprise of pickets, grand-guards, and outposts, but they made no
preparation for a general battle, the more necessary as three of
the five divisions had never been under fire, and most of them had
little, if any, drill in manoeuvres or loading and firing, and few
of the officers had hitherto heard the thunder of an angry cannon-
shot or the whistle of a dangerous bullet.  But it may be said the
private soldiers of the Confederate Army were likewise inexperienced
and illy disciplined.  In a large sense this was true, though many
more of the Confederate regiments had been longer subjected to
drill and discipline than of the Union regiments, and they had
great confidence in their corps and division commanders, many of
whom had gained considerable celebrity in the Mexican and Indian
Wars.

The corps organization of the Confederate Army, in addition to the
division, gave more general officers and greater compactness in
the handling of a large army.  At this time corps were unknown in
the Union Army.  And of still higher importance was the fact that
one army came out prepared and expecting battle, with all its
officers thoroughly instructed in advance as to what was expected,
and the other, without such preparation, expectancy, or instruction,
found itself suddenly involved against superior numbers in what
proved to be the greatest battle thus far fought on the American
continent.  The Confederate hosts in the early morning moved to
battle along their entire front with the purpose of turning either
flank of the imperfectly connected Union divisions, but their
efforts were, in no substantial sense, successful.  The reckless
and impetuous assaults, however, drove back, at first precipitately,
then more slowly, the advance Union divisions, though at no time
without fearful losses to the Confederates.  These heavy losses
made it necessary soon to draw on the Confederate reserves.  The
Union commanders took advantage of the undulations of the ground,
and the timber, to protect their men, often posting a line in the
woods on the edge of fields to the front, thus compelling their
foes to advance over open ground exposed to a deadly fire.  The
early superiority of the attacking army wore gradually away, and
while it continued to gain ground its dead and wounded were numerous
and close behind it, causing, doubtless, many to straggle or stop
to care for their comrades.  It has been charged that much
disorganization arose from the pillage of the Union captured camps.
The divisions of Hurlburt and W. H. L. Wallace were soon, with the
reserve artillery, actively engaged, and, save for a brief period,
about 5 P.M., and immediately after, and in consequence of the
capture at that hour of Prentiss and about 2000 of his division,
a continuous Union line from Owl Creek to Lick Creek or the Tennessee
was maintained intact, though often retired.

In the afternoon, so desperate had grown the Confederate situation,
and so anxious was Johnston to destroy the Union Army before night
and reinforcements came, that he led a brigade in person to induce
it to charge as ordered, during which he received a wound in the
leg, which, for want of attention, shortly proved fatal.  To his
fall is attributed the ultimate Confederate defeat, though his
second, Beauregard, had written and was familiar with the order of
battle, and had then much reputation as a field general.  He had,
in part at least, commanded at Bull Run.  Beauregard now assumed
command, and continued the attack persistently until night came.
No reinforcements arrived for either army in time for the Sunday
battle.  Through some misunderstanding of orders, and without any
indisposition on his part, General Lew Wallace did not reach the
battle-field until night, and after the exhausted condition of the
troops of both armies had ended the first day's conflict.  The Army
of the Tennessee, with a principal division away, had nobly and
heroically met the hosts which sought to overwhelm it; some special
disasters had befallen two of its five divisions in the battle;
General W. H. L. Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss captured,
both division commanders; the Union losses in officers and men were
otherwise great, probably reaching 7000 (first day of battle), yet
when night came the depleted Army of the Tennessee stood firmly at
bay about two miles in rear of its most advanced line of the morning.
Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, had massed, near and above
Pittsburg Landing, about twenty pieces of artillery (pointed
generally south and southwest) on the crest of a ridge just to the
north of a deep ravine extending across the Union left and into
the Tennessee.  Hurburt's division was next on the right of this
artillery, extending westward almost at right angles with the river.
A few troops were placed between the artillery and the river.  The
gunboats _Tyler_ and _Lexington_, commanded, respectively, by naval
Lieutenants Grim and Shirk, were close to the mouth of the ravine,
and when the last desperate attack came their fire materially aided
in repulsing it.  Next on Hurlburt's right came McClernand's
division, also extending westward; then Sherman's, making almost a
right angle by extending its right northward towards Snake Creek,
to the overflowed lands and swamp just below the mouth of Owl Creek.
Broken portions of other divisions and organizations were intermixed
in this line, the three divisions named being the only ones on the
field still intact.( 8)  In this position Grant's army received at
sunset and repelled the last Confederate assault, hurling back,
for the last time on that memorable Sunday, the assailing hosts.
Dismayed, disappointed, disheartened, if not defeated, the Confederate
Army was withdrawn for bivouac for the night to the region of the
Union camps of the morning.  After firing had ceased, Lew Wallace
reached the field on Sherman's right.

It is known that many stragglers appeared during the day in the
rear of the Union Army, and soon assembled near the Tennessee in
considerable numbers.  The troops were new and undisciplined, and
it was consequently hard for the officers to maintain the organizations
and keep the men in line; but it is doubtful whether the number of
stragglers, considering the character of the battle, was greater
than usual, and they were not greater than, if as great as, in the
rear of the Confederate Army.  An advancing and apparently successful
army in battle usually has comparatively few stragglers in the
rear, but the plan of fighting adopted by Johnston and Beauregard,
in masses, often in close column by regiments, proved so destructive
of life as to cause brave men to shrink from the repeated attacks.

However, the gallantry displayed by the attacking force, and the
stubborn defensive battle maintained by the Union Army, have seldom,
if ever, been excelled or equalled by veteran troops in any war by
any race or in any age.

Union officers of high rank may perhaps be justly criticised for
not having been better prepared for the battle by intrenchments,
concentration, etc., but certainly both officers and soldiers
deserve high commendation for their heroic, bloody, and successful
resistance after the conflict began.  About twenty-five per cent.
of those actually engaged fell dead or wounded, and at least a like
number of the enemy was disabled.  Napoleon fought no single battle
in one day where the proportionate losses, dead and wounded, in
either contending army were so great; and no battle of modern times
shows so great a proportionate loss in the numerically weaker army,
which was forced to retire steadily during an entire day, and yet
at night was still defiantly standing and delivering battle, and
its commander giving orders to assume the offensive at dawn on the
morrow.

Grant was not perfection as a soldier at Shiloh, but who else would
or could have done so well?  If not a war genius, he was the
personification of dogged, obstinate persistency, never allowing
a word of discouragement or doubt to escape during the entire day,
not even to his personal staff, though suffering excruciating pain
from the recent injury from the fall of his horse.  To him and to
the valor of his officers and soldiers the country owes much for
a timely victory, though won at great cost of life and limb.  To
him and them are due praise, not blame.

Thus far the Army of the Ohio is given no credit for participation
in the Sunday battle.  Buell and Nelson's division of that army
were at Savannah on the evening of the 5th, but Buell refrained
from attempting to report his presence to Grant until the next
morning.  Grant had then departed for the battle-field.  Grant was
eating his breakfast at Savannah when the battle opened, and at
first determined to find Buell before going to his army; but the
sound of guns was so continuous, he felt that he should not delay
a moment, and hence left a note for Buell asking him to hasten with
his reinforcements to Pittsburg Landing, gave an order for Nelson
to march at once, and then proceeded by boat up the river.  Buell,
after reiterating Grant's instructions to Nelson to march to opposite
the Landing, himself about noon proceeded by boat to that place
with his chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry.( 9)

Buell seems to have been much impressed by the number and temper
of the stragglers he saw on his arrival, and he made some inquiry
as to Grant's preparations for the retreat of his army.  Grant,
learning that Buell was on board a steamboat at the Landing, sought
him there, hastily explained the situation and the necessity for
reinforcements, and again departed for the battle-field.  He had
before that been in the thick of the fight, where his sword and
scabbard had been shot away.  Not until 1 or 1.30 P.M.( 9) did
the head of Nelson's column move, Ammen's brigade leading, for
Pittsburg Landing, and then by a swampy river road over which
artillery could not be hauled.  The artillery went later by boat.
At 5 or 6 P.M. the advance,--eight companies of the 36th Indiana
(Col. W. Grose)--reached a point on the river opposite the Landing.
These companies were speedily taken across the Tennessee in steamboats
and marched immediately, less than a quarter of a mile to the left
of the already massed artillery, to the support of Grant's army,
then engaged in its struggle to repel the last assault of the
Confederates for the day.  Other regiments (6th Ohio, Colonel N.
L. Anderson, 24th Ohio, Colonel F. C. Jones) of Ammen's brigade
followed closely, but only the 36th Indiana participated in the
engagement then about spent.  This regiment lost one man killed.(10)
The expected arrival of the Army of the Ohio and the presence of
such of it as arrived may have had a good moral effect, but its
late coming gives to it little room to claim any credit for the
result of the first day's battle.

As always, those who only see the rear of an army during a battle
gain from the sight and statements of the demoralized stragglers
exaggerated notions of the condition and situation of those engaged.
That Grant's army was in danger, and in sore need of reinforcements,
cannot be doubted.  That the Confederate Army had been fearfully
punished in the first day's fighting is certain.  Beauregard reports
that he could not, on Monday, bring 20,000 men into action (11)--
less than half the number Johnston had when the battle began.  The
arrival of Nelson's and Lew Wallace's divisions six hours earlier
would have given a different aspect, probably, to the fist day's
battle.  The Army of the Ohio was then composed, generally, of
better equipped, better disciplined and older troops, though unused
to battle, than the majority of those of the Army of the Tennessee.

Though night had come, dark and rainy, when the four divisions of
Buell's army reached the west bank of the Tennessee, and Lew
Wallace's division arrived on the right, Grant directed the ground
in front to be examined and the whole army to be put in readiness
to assume the offensive at daybreak next morning.  Wallace was
pushed forward on the extreme right above the mouth of Owl Creek,
and Sherman, McClernand, and Hurlbut, in the order named, on
Wallace's left, then McCook (A. McD.),(12) Crittenden (Thomas T.),
and Nelson (Wm.) were assigned positions in the order named, from
Hurlburt to the left, Nelson on the extreme left, well out towards
Lick Creek; all advanced (save McCook) during the night a considerable
distance from the position of the Army of the Tennessee at the
close of the battle.(13)

Buell's artillery arrived and went into battery during the night.
General George H. Thomas' division and one brigade of General Thomas
J. Wood's division did not arrive in time for the battle.  There
were present, commanding brigades in the Army of the Ohio, Brigadier-
Generals Lovell H. Rosseau, J. T. Boyle, Colonels Jacob Ammen, W.
Sooy Smith, W. N. Kirk (34th Illinois), and William H. Gibson (49th
Ohio).  These Colonels became, later, general officers.

Soon after 5 o'clock in the morning the entire Union Army went
forward, gaining ground steadily until 6 A.M., when the strong
lines of Beauregard's army with his artillery in position were
reached, and the battle became general and raged with more or less
fury throughout the greater part of the day, and until the Confederate
Army was beaten back at all points, with the loss of some guns and
prisoners, besides killed and wounded.  The last stand of the enemy
was made about 3 P.M. in front of Sherman's camp preceding the
first day's battle.  Both Grant and Buell accompanied the troops,
often personally directing the attacks, as did division and brigade
commanders.  Grant, late in the day, near Shiloh Church, rode with
a couple of regiments to the edge of a clearing and ordered them
to "_Charge_."  They responded with a yell and a run across the
opening, causing the enemy to break and disperse.  This practically
ended the two days' memorable battle at the old log church where
it began.(14)

The Confederate Army of the Mississippi which came, but four days
before, so full of hope and confidence, from its intrenched camp
at Corinth, was soon in precipitate retreat.  Its commander was
dead; many of its best officers were killed or wounded; its columns
were broken and demoralized; much of its material was gone; hope
and confidence were dissipated, yet it maintained an orderly retreat
to its fortifications at Corinth.  Beauregard claimed for it some
sort of victory.(15)

From Monterey, on the 8th of April, Beauregard addressed Grant a
note saying that in consequence of the exhausted condition of his
forces by the extraordinary length of the battle, he had withdrawn
them from the conflict, and asking permission to send a mounted
party to the battle-field to bury the dead, to be accompanied by
certain gentlemen desiring to remove the bodies of their sons and
friends.  To this Grant responded that, owing to the warmth of the
weather, he had caused the dead of both sides to be buried
immediately.(16)

The total losses, both days, in the Army of the Tennessee, were 87
officers and 1426 enlisted men killed, 336 officers and 6265 enlisted
men wounded, total killed and wounded 8114.  The captured and
missing were 115 officers and 2318 men, total 2433, aggregate
casualties, 10,547.(16)

The total losses in the Army of the Ohio were 17 officers and 224
privates killed, 92 officers and 1715 privates wounded, total 2048.
The captured were 55.(16)  The grand total of the two Union armies
killed, wounded, captured, or missing, 12,650.

The first reports of casualties are usually in part estimated, and
not accurate for want of full information.  The foregoing statement
of losses is given from revised lists.  Grant's statement of losses
does not materially differ from the above.(17)

The losses of the Confederate Army in the two days' battle, as
stated in Beauregard's report of April 11th, were, killed 1728,
wounded 8012; total killed and wounded, 9740, missing 959, grand
total, 10,699.(16)  Grant claimed that Beauregard's report was
inaccurate, as above 1728 were buried, by actual count, in front
of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions alone.  The burial parties
estimated the number killed at 4000.(17)

Besides Johnston, the army commander, there were many Confederate
officers killed and wounded.  Hon. George W. Johnson, then assuming
to act as (Confederate) Provisional Governor of Kentucky, was killed
while fighting in the ranks on the second day; General Gladden was
killed the first day, and Generals Cheatham, Clark, Hindman, B. R.
Johnson, and Bowen were wounded.

Thenceforth during the war there was little boasting of the superior
fighting qualities of Southern over Northern soldiers.  Both armies
fought with a courage creditable to their race and nationality.
Americans may always be relied upon to do this when well commanded.
I have already taken more space than I originally intended in giving
the salient features of the battle of Shiloh, and I cannot now
pursue the campaign further than to say General Halleck arrived at
Pittsburg Landing April 11th, and assumed command, for the first
and only time in the field.  He soon drew to him a third army (Army
of the Mississippi), about 30,000 strong, under General John Pope.

Island No. 10, in the bend of the Mississippi above New Madrid,
was occupied early by the Confederates with a strong force, well
fortified, with the hope that it could be held and thus close the
Mississippi River against the Union forces from the North.  Early
after Fort Donelson was taken, Flag Officer Foote took his fleet
of gunboats into the Mississippi, and in conjunction with the army
under General John Pope sought the capture of the island.  Pope
moved about 20,000 men to Point Pleasant, on the west bank of the
river, March 6, 1862, which compelled the Confederates, on the
14th, to evacuate New Madrid, on the same side of the river, about
ten miles above Point Pleasant and the same distance below the
island.  Pope cut, or "_sawed_," a canal from a point above Island
No. 10 through a wood to Wilson's and St. John's Bayou, leading to
New Madrid.(18)  The position of the Confederates was still so
strong with their batteries and redoubts on the eastern shore of
the river that Pope with his army alone could not take it.  Attacks
were made with the gunboats from the north, but they failed to
dislodge the enemy.  Foote, though requested by Pope, did not think
it possible for a gunboat to steam past the batteries and go to
the assistance of the army at Point Pleasant.  With the assistance
of gunboats Pope could cross his army to the east side and thus
cut off all supplies for the Confederate Army on the island.
Captain Henry Walke, U.S.N., having expressed a willingness to
attempt to pass the island and batteries with the _Carondelet_,
was given orders to do so.  He accordingly made ready, taking on
board Captain Hottenstein and twenty-three sharpshooters of the
42d Illinois.  The sailors were all armed; hand-grenades were placed
within reach, and hoses were attached to the boilers for throwing
scalding water to drive off boarding parties.  Thus prepared, the
_Carondelet_, on the night of April 4th, "in the black shadow of
a thunderstorm," safely passed the island and batteries.  It was
fired on, but reached New Madrid without the loss of a man.  The
_Pittsburg_, under Lieutenant-Commander Thompson, in like manner
ran the gauntlet without injury, also in a thunderstorm, April 7th.
These two gunboats the same day attacked successfully the Confederate
batteries on the east shore and covered the crossing of Pope's
army.  Seeing that escape was not possible, the garrison on the
island surrendered to Flag Officer Foote on April 7th, the same
day the Confederates were driven from the field of Shiloh.  Pope
pursued and captured, on the morning of the 8th, nearly all the
retreating troops.  General W. W. Mackall, commanding at Island
No. 10, and two other general officers, over 5000 men, 20 pieces
of heavy artillery, 7000 stand of arms, and quantities of ammunition
and provisions were taken without the loss of a Union soldier.(19)

Not until April 30th did Halleck's army move on Corinth.  Grant,
though nominally in command of the right wing, was little more than
an observer, as orders were not even sent through him to that wing.
For thirty days Halleck moved and intrenched, averaging not to
exceed two thirds of a mile a day, until he entered Corinth, May
30th, to find it completely evacuated.  He commenced at once to
build fortifications for 100,000 men.  But the dispersion of this
grand army soon commenced; the Army of the Ohio (Buell's) was sent
east along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with
orders to repair the road as it proceeded.  We shall soon meet this
army and narrate its future movements to the Ohio River--in retreat
_after_ Bragg's army.

Grant, chafing under his treatment, on Corinth being occupied, at
his own request was relieved from any duty in Halleck's department.
Later, on Sherman's advice, he decided to remain, but to transfer
his headquarters to Memphis, to which place he started, June 21st,
on horseback with a small escort.

Halleck was, July 11, 1862, notified of his own appointment to the
command of all the armies, with headquarters at Washington.  Grant
was therefore recalled to Corinth again.  He reached that place
and took command, July 15th, Halleck departing two days later,
never again to take the field in person.  The latter was not under
fire during the war, nor did he ever command an army in battle.
We here leave Grant and his brilliant career in the West.  We shall
speak of him soon again, and still later when in command of all
the armies of the Union (Halleck included), but with headquarters
in the field with the Army of the Potomac.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 904, 911.

( 2)  _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 398 (396).

( 3)  _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 112.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 392-7.

( 5)  _War Records_, atlas, Plate XII.

( 6)  _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 112.

( 7)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., p. 466.

( 8)  For maps showing positions of troops of each army both days
see _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., pp. 470, 508.

( 9)  General Ammen's diary, Nelson's and Ammen's reports, _War
Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 323, 328, 332.

(10)  Ammen, _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., pp. 334,337.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 391 (398).

(12)  McCook did not arrive until early on the 7th.  _War Records_,
vol. x., Part I., p. 293.

(13)  Official map, _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., p. 598.

(14)  Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. i., p. 351.

(15)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part II., pp. 384-5, 424, 482 (407-8).

(16)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 111, 105, 108, 391.

(17)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., p. 485.

(18)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., p. 460.

(19)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., pp. 446, etc.


CHAPTER VII
Mitchel's Campaign to Northern Alabama--Andrews' Raid into Georgia,
and Capture of a Locomotive--Affair at Bridgeport--Sacking of
Athens, Alabama, and Court-Martial of Colonel Turchin--Burning of
Paint Rock by Colonel Beatty--Other Incidents and Personal Mention
--Mitchel Relieved

General Mitchel's division (to which I belonged) of the Army of
the Ohio we left at Nashville, ready to move on an independent
line.  When the other divisions had started for Savannah, Mitchel,
March 18, 1862, resumed his march southward, encamping the first
night at Lavergne, fifteen miles from Nashville.  The next day we
marched on a road leading by old cotton fields, and felt we were
in the heart of the slaveholding South.  The slaves were of an
apparently different type from those in Kentucky, though still of
many shades of color, varying from pure African black to oily-white.
The eye, in many instances, had to be resorted to, to decide whether
there was any black blood in them.  But these negroes were shrewd,
and had the idea of liberty uppermost in their minds.  They had
heard that the Northern army was coming to make them free.  Their
masters had probably talked of this in their hearing.  They believed
the time for their freedom had come.  Untutored as they all were,
they understood somehow they were the cause of the war.  As our
column advanced, regardless of sex, and in families, they abandoned
the fields and their homes, turning their backs on master and
mistress, many bearing their bedding, clothing, and other effects
on their heads and backs, and came to the roadsides, shouting and
singing a medley of songs of freedom and religion, confidently
expecting to follow the army to immediate liberty.  Their number
were so great we marched for a good part of a day between almost
continuous lines of them.  Their disappointment was sincere and
deep when told they must return to their homes: that the Union Army
could not take them.  Of course some never returned, but the mass
of them did, and remained until the final decree of the war was
entered and their chains fell off, never to be welded in America
on their race again.  They shouted "_Glory_" on seeing the _Stars
and Stripes_, as though it had been a banner of protection and
liberty, instead of the emblem of a power which hitherto had kept
them and their ancestors in bondage.  The "_old flag_" has a peculiar
charm for those who have served under it.  It was noticeable that
wherever we marched in the South, particularly in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Virginia, we found men at the roadside who had fought in the
Mexican War, often with tears streaming down their cheeks, who
professed sincere loyalty to the flag and the Union.

We reached Murfreesboro on the 20th without a fight, the small
Confederate force retiring and destroying bridges as we advanced.

The division was kept busy in repairing the railroad, and especially
in rebuilding the recently destroyed railroad bridge near Murfreesboro
across Stone's River.  I worked industriously in charge of a detail
of soldiers on this bridge.  In ten days it was rebuilt, though
the heavy timbers had to be cut and hewed from green timber in the
nearby woods.  The Union Army never called in vain for expert
mechanics, civil or locomotive engineers.

I took a train of ninety wagons, starting to Nashville on the 31st,
for quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies, with instructions
to repair, while on the way, broken places in the railroad.  In
consequence of the destruction of bridges the train and guard had
to travel a longer route than the direct one, making the distance
above forty miles.  We repaired the railroad, and reached Nashville
and loaded my wagons by the evening of the second day.  The city
was a demoralizing place for soldiers.  A few of my men of the 10th
Ohio became drunk, and while I was engaged in the night trying to
move the train and guard out of the city, some one threw a stone
which struck me in the back of the head, cutting the scalp and
causing it to bleed freely.  I got the train under way about
midnight, and then searched for a surgeon, but at that hour could
find none.  Knowing that Mrs. McMeans, the wife of the surgeon of
the 3d Ohio, was at the City Hotel, I had her called, and she
performed the necessary surgery, and stopped the flow of blood.
Long before sunrise my train was far on the road, and by 8 P.M. of
the 2d of April it was safely in our camps at Murfreesboro.  It
was attacked near Lavergne by some irregular cavalry, or guerillas,
but they were easily driven off.  Such troops did not, as a rule,
care to fight.  The conduct of a supply-train through a country
infested by them is attended with much responsibility and danger,
and requires much energy and skill.

Mitchel, now being supplied, marched south, April 3d, and we reached
Shelbyville the next day--a town famed for its great number of
Union people.  Loyalty seemed there to be the rule, not the exception.
The Union flag was displayed on the road to and at Shelbyville by
influential people.  Our bands played as we entered the town, and
there were many manifestations of joy over our coming.  This is
the only place in the South where I witnessed such a reception.
I recall among those who welcomed us the names of Warren, Gurnie,
Story, Cooper, and Weasner.

While here Colonel John Kennett, with part of his 4th Ohio Cavalry,
made a raid south and captured a train on the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad and some fifteen prisoners.

A short time before we reached Shelbyville, Mitchel sent a party
of eight soldiers, in disguise, under the leadership of a citizen
of Kentucky, known as Captain J. J. Andrews, to enter the Confederate
lines and proceed _via_ Chattanooga to Atlanta, with some vague
idea of capturing a train of cars or a locomotive and escaping with
it, burning the bridges behind them.  The party reached its
destination, but for want of an engineer who had promised to join
it at Atlanta, the plan was abandoned, and each of the party returned
in safety, joining their respective regiments at Shelbyville.
Andrews, still desiring to carry out the plan, organized a second
party, composed of himself and another citizen of Kentucky, Wm.
Campbell, and twenty-four soldiers, detailed from Ohio regiments,
seven from the 2d, eight from the 33d, and nine from the 21st.( 1)
This party started from Shelbyville, Monday night, April 7, 1862,
disguised as citizens, professing to be driven from their homes in
Kentucky by the Union Army and going South to join the Confederate
Army.  They were to travel singly or in couples over roads not
frequented by either army, but such as were usually taken by real
Kentucky refugees to Chattanooga or some station where passage on
cars could be taken to Marietta, Georgia, where the whole party
were to assemble in four days ready to take a train northward the
following (Friday) morning.  Each man was furnished by Andrews with
an abundance of Confederate money to pay bills.  It was understood
that if any were suspected and in danger of capture they were to
enlist in the Southern army until an opportunity for escape presented.
Mitchel, it was known to Andrews and his party, was to start for
Huntsville, Alabama, in a day or two, and Andrews hoped to be able
to escape with his captured train through Chattanooga, thence west
over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and join Mitchel at some
point east of Huntsville.

The distance was too great for all the party to reach their
destination before Friday, and on the way Andrews managed to notify
most of his men that the enterprise would not be undertaken until
Saturday.  About midnight of the 11th of April the members reached
Marietta, and, with two exceptions, spent the night at a small
hotel near the depot.  Big Shanty (where passengers on the early
morning train were allowed to take breakfast), north of Marietta,
was the place where the party proposed to seize the locomotive and
such part of the train as might seem practicable, the engineer
(Brown) of the party to run it north, stopping at intervals only
long enough to cut telegraph wires, to prevent information being
sent ahead, tear up short portions of the track to prevent pursuit,
and to burn bridges, the latter being the principal object of the
raid.  Porter and Hawkins of the party, who had lodging at a
different hotel from the others, were not awakened in time, and
consequently did not participate in the daring act for which the
party was organized.

During the night Andrews carefully instructed those at his hotel,
each man being told what was expected of him.  The party were almost
to a man strangers to him until five days before, and hardly two
of them, though of the same regiment, until then knew each other.
Never before, for so extraordinary an attempt, was so incongruous
a band assembled.  I knew one of them--Sergeant-Major Marion A.
Ross, of the 2d Ohio.  He had no previous training, and no special
skill for such an expedition.  He was a farmer boy (Champaign Co.,
Ohio) of more than ordinary retiring modesty, with no element of
reckless daring in his nature.  He had almost white silky flaxen
hair, and at Antioch College, where I first met him, he rarely
associated with his schoolmates in play or amusement.  He was called
a ladies' man; and this because he did not care for the active
pursuits usually enjoyed by young men.

It is said that when Ross ascertained the number of trains, regular
and irregular, with which the exigencies of war had covered the
railroad, and considered also the distance to be passed over, he
tried at the last moment to dissuade Andrews from undertaking the
execution of the enterprise.  In this he failed, but Andrews gave
any of the party who regarded the design too hazardous the right
to withdraw.( 2)  Not one, however, availed himself of this liberty.
Ross saw that the scheme must fail, but was too manly to abandon
his comrades.

Saturday morning before daylight the party was seated in one
passenger car, moving north.  In this and other coaches there were
several hundred passengers.( 3)  At sunrise, when eight miles from
Marietta, the train stopped, and the trainmen shouted:  "_Big Shanty
--twenty minutes for breakfast_."  At this, conductor, engineer,
fireman, and train-hands, with most of the passengers, left the
train.  Thus the desired opportunity of Andrews and his party was
presented.  They did not hesitate.  Three cars back from the tender,
including only box-cars, the coupling-pin was drawn, and the
passenger cars cut off.  Andrews mounted the engine, with Brown
and Knight as engineers and Wilson as fireman.  Others took places
as brakemen, or as helpers and guards, and, to the amazement of
the bystanders, the locomotive moved rapidly north.  The conductor,
engineer, and train-men were dazed.  The capture was accomplished,
but how were the trains and the stations to be passed on the long
journey to Chattanooga; and how was that place to be passed, and
still a run of a hundred miles made over the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad before they were within the Union lines at Huntsville?
The train proceeded only a short distance when it was stopped and
the telegraph wires cut, then it moved on again, stopping now and
then long enough to enable Andrews and his men to tear up the track
behind them.  They reached Kingston, thirty-two miles north, where
a stop had to be made, but by claiming their train was a powder
train hastening to Beauregard's army, they were allowed to pass
on; so the flight continued until Dalton and the tunnel north of
it were passed.  The conductor, Fuller, started from Big Shanty
with a small party on foot, then procured a hand-car and at Dalton
a locomotive.  His pursuit was both energetic and intelligent.  At
Dalton he succeeded in getting a telegram through to Chattanooga
giving notice of the coming of the raiders.  The locomotive seized,
known as _General_, proved a poor one, and fuel soon gave out, and
finally the pursuers came in sight.  Cars were dropped and bridges
were fired, but the pursuers pushed the cars ahead and put out the
flames.  At last, not far from Chattanooga, the _General_ was
abandoned, and the raiders scattered to the woods and, generally
singly, sought to evade capture; but as the whole country was
aroused and Confederate soldiers were at hand, most of the party
were soon captured; one or two evaded discovery by going boldly to
recruiting stations and enlisting in the Confederate Army.  The
history of the suffering, trials, and fate of this daring band is
one of the most thrilling and tragic of the war.  It is too long
to be here told.  The captured were imprisoned at Chattanooga, and
Andrews, the leader (after making one attempt to escape), was
heavily ironed, and a scaffold was prepared at Chattanooga for his
execution, but for some reason he and his companions were transferred
to Atlanta, where, on the day of their arrival, he was taken to a
scaffold and hung, and his body buried in an unmarked and still
unknown grave.( 3)  He died bravely, resigned to his fate.  He was
a man of quiet demeanor, of extraordinary resolution, and more than
ordinary ability.  He was tried and sentenced by a sort of drum-
head court-martial, charged with being disloyal to the Confederacy
and hanged as a spy.( 3)  Other men of more fame have died on the
gallows, and others of less merit have occupied high positions.

Seven of the band were taken to Knoxville, and in June, 1862, tried
by court-martial and condemned to be hanged as spies.  Campbell,
Wilson, Ross, Shadrack, Slaven, Robinson, and Scott were hanged
June 18th, by order of General E. Kirby Smith, at Atlanta.( 3)
Their bodies were buried in a rude trench at the foot of the
scaffold.  A grateful government has caused this trench to be opened
and the mortal remains of these unfortunate heroes of cruel war to
be removed to the beautiful National Cemetery near Chattanooga and
buried amidst the heroes of Chickamauga, there to rest until the
Grand Army of Soldier-dead shall be summoned to rise on the
resurrection morn.

Eight others, Brown, Knight, Porter, Wood, Wilson, Hawkins, Wallam,
and Dorsey, after suffering more than the pangs of death in prison,
in various ways and at different times escaped; and after like
suffering, six others, Parrot, Buffem, Bensinger, Reddick, Mason,
and Pittenger were (March, 1863) exchanged.  These fourteen were,
save Wood and Buffem, living in 1881, honored and upright citizens.
Pittenger was a member of the New Jersey Methodist Episcopal
Conference, and the author of _Capturing a Locomotive_, in which
is given the story of the tragic affair in all its painful details.

Mitchel's division resumed its march southward April 9th, and
reached Fayetteville the next day; two brigades--Turchin's and
Sill's--continued the march towards Huntsville on the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad.  At Fayetteville the inhabitants seemed to be
wholly disloyal, and extended no welcome.  Huntsville was surprised
and captured before daylight on April 11th.  A large number of cars
and fifteen locomotives were taken.( 4)  One train was found at
the depot loaded with recruits for Beauregard's army at Corinth.
Many Confederates who had been wounded at Shiloh were captured and
paroled.  The next day, at Stevenson, five more locomotives and a
large amount of rolling stock were taken.( 4)

The only instance witnessed by me during the war of a body of
soldiers refusing to obey orders was of the 10th Ohio when it was
ordered at Fayetteville to prepare to march, each man carrying his
knapsack.  On some occasions prior to this time the company wagons
carried the knapsacks of the men.  Colonel Wm. H. Lytle (then
commanding a brigade), being greatly chagrined and enraged at the
insubordination of his regiment, ordered a section of a battery
pointed on it, took out his watch, and gave the men two minutes to
take up their knapsacks and be ready to march.  The order was obeyed
complainingly, and the incident was not again repeated.  This
regiment was a good one, and later it was distinguished for valor
and good soldierly conduct.

As we proceeded south into the cotton regions, the slaves were more
numerous and still flocked to the roadsides, seeking and desiring
to follow the army.  All believed the "Yankee army" had come solely
to free them.

Colonel John Beatty was made Provost-Marshal and President of a
Board of Administration for Huntsville.

Huntsville was a beautiful, aristocratic little Southern city.  A
feature of it was a large spring near its centre which furnished
an abundant supply of water for the men and animals of a large
army.  It was the home of the Alabama Clays, all disloyal; of ex-
Senator Jerry Clemens, who had early been a Union man, but later
was disposed to accept secession as an accomplished fact; then, on
the Union occupancy of Northern Alabama, he boldly advocated a
restoration of the State to the Union.  Colonel Nick Davis, likewise
an original Union man, at first opposed secession; then, after Bull
run, accepted a colonelcy in an Alabama rebel regiment; then declined
it, and thereafter tried to remain loyal to the Union.  The conduct
of such strong men as Clemens and Davis is not to be wondered at
when their surroundings are considered.  There were many who,
feeling bound to continue their residence in the South, and believing,
after Bull Run, that the Confederacy was established, yielded their
opposition to it.

Reverend Frederick A. Ross, a distinguished Presbyterian minister,
who preached the divinity of slavery, resided here.( 5)  Reverend
Ross was arrested by General Rousseau and sent north to prison for
publicly _praying_ in his church at Huntsville (while occupied by
the Union Army) for the success of the Confederacy, the overthrow
of the Union, and the defeat of its armies.

There were some men, among whom were Hon. George W. Lane (later
appointed a United States Judge), who adhered firmly to the Union.
That part of Alabama north of the Tennessee had opposed secession.

Clement Comer Clay, a lawyer, who had been a soldier in the Creek
Indian War, Chief-Justice of his State, and had served in both
branches of Congress and as Governor of Alabama, was arrested and
tried at Huntsville, when seventy-three years of age, by a military
commission of which I was president.  There were several charges
against him, the most serious of which was for aiding and advising
guerillas to secretly shoot down Union soldiers, cut telegraph
lines, and wreck trains.  This charge he vehemently denied until
a letter in his own handwriting was produced, recently written to
a guerilla chief, advising him and his band to do the things
mentioned.  He was not severely dealt with, but was sent to Camp
Chase, Ohio, for detention.  He was later liberated, and died in
Huntsville in 1866.  His son, Clement Claiborne Clay, had been a
judge, and subsequently a United States Senator.  He withdrew from
the Senate in February, 1861, and was formally expelled in March,
1861.  He became a Senator in the Confederate Congress in 1862,
and during the last two years of the war was the secret agent of
the Confederacy in Canada, where he plotted raids on the Northern
frontier.

General O. M. Mitchel held advanced notions on the subject of the
treatment and disposition of slaves of masters in arms against the
government.  The slaves of such masters, he thought, should be
confiscated.  He used some slaves as spies to gain information of
the enemy, and to located secreted Confederate supplies, and to
them he promised protection, if not freedom.  Secretary Stanton
approved his action and views in this matter.( 6)

But Buell, his immediate commander, wholly disapproved of all
employment or use of slaves in any manner as instruments to put
down the rebellion.  Mitchel, therefore, soon fell into disfavor
with him.  Buell, on learning that Mitchel had employed some able-
bodied escaped slaves to aid the soldiers in constructing stockades
to protect railroad bridges, necessary to be maintained to enable
supplies to be brought up, ordered Mitchel to send an officer to
see that slaves thus employed were forthwith returned to their
masters.  I was accordingly directed by Mitchel to take a small
guard, and, with a locomotive and car, go to the bridges west of
Huntsville and north of the Tennessee River, on the line of railroad
from Decatur through Athens towards Nashville, to execute this
order of Buell's.  I executed it to the _letter--only_.  While on
this unpleasant duty I came to a place where a scouting party,
commanded by a lieutenant sent out by Mitchel, had two citizen-
disguised Confederate guerillas, just taken in the act of cutting
the telegraph wires, an offence, by a proclamation of Mitchel,
punishable by death.  The scouting party proceeded to hang them
with wire to telegraph poles.  I did not approve the summary
punishment, but was powerless and without authority over the officer;
and was then engaged only in returning slaves to their owners.

Prior to this order of Buell's, Congress had passed an act, as an
Article of War, prohibiting the employment of any of the United
States forces "for the purpose of returning fugitives from service
or labor who may have escaped, and any officer found guilty, by a
court-martial, of violating this article to be dismissed from the
service."( 7)  The order, and my execution of it, were alike in
violation of the law, for the issuing and execution of which both
Buell and I could have been dismissed from the service.  Just after
the capture of Fort Donelson Grant issued an order prohibiting the
return of the fugitive slaves with his army and of all slaves at
Fort Donelson at the time of its capture.( 8)

Both Stevenson and Decatur, to the east and west of Huntsville,
were, by the use of captured locomotives and cars, seized by Mitchel
on the 12th of April, and his command was soon so extended as to
hold the one hundred miles of railroad between Stevenson and
Tuscumbia.  The last of the same month, however, the troops were
withdrawn from Tuscumbia and south of the Tennessee.  The 3d and
10th Ohio being in occupancy of Decatur, evacuated it under orders,
and, on the night of April 27th, burned the railroad bridge (one
half mile in length) over the Tennessee River.

An expedition started the same day for Bridgeport, where the railroad
again crosses the Tennessee, and where General Danville Leadbetter
had command of a small force on the west side of the river, somewhat
intrenched.  The expedition consisted of two companies of cavalry,
two pieces of artillery, and six regiments of infantry, Mitchel
commanding.  Owing to the destruction by the Confederates of a
bridge over Widow's Creek, it was impossible to transport by rail
the artillery with caissons and horses nearer than four miles of
Bridgeport.  By the use of cotton bales the two guns were floated
over the deep stream, and the artillery horses and caissons with
extra ammunition were left behind.  The guns were dragged by two
companies of the 3d Ohio, and the whole expedition pushed on to a
ridge within about five hundred yards of Leadbetter's redoubts near
the north end of the bridge.  The enemy was surprised or demoralized,
and Leadbetter did not decide either to retreat or fight until a
shot or two from our cannon emptied his redoubts and intrenched
position near the end of the bridge.

Precipitately his guns were loaded on a platform-car, and a hasty
retreat was made across the Tennessee by the railroad bridge; but
before all the Confederate troops had succeeded in crossing Leadbetter
caused to be exploded two hundred pounds of powder, with a view of
blowing up the east span of the bridge.  The explosion did not do
the work, hence the drawbridge at the east end was fired, to complete
its destruction.( 9)  But few captures were made.  Leadbetter also
abandoned his camp east of the river, and was forced to abandon
two guns placed in position on the east bank.  One of the Andrews
raiders of the 33d Ohio, who, to save himself from capture and
punishment, had joined Captain Kain's battery, and was acting as
artillery sergeant with the two guns captured, hid under the river
bank and signalled his desire to be allowed to surrender.  He was
permitted to cross over to us, and, his old regiment being present,
he at once rejoined it.

Mitchel moved his command on Bridgeport with great rapidity and
skill, but he showed a nervous temper, which gave the impression
that in a great battle he would become too much excited for a
commanding officer.

Just after Leadbetter's retreat a body of cavalry appeared below
Bridgeport in an open field, not knowing the place had been taken,
and would have been captured had Mitchel not ordered them fired on
before they came near enough to be cut off.

I was sent on the morning of the 30th, in command of a detachment,
across the Tennessee to reconnoitre towards Chattanooga.  We
improvised rafts from logs and timber to carry the men, and a few
horses for mounted officers were forced into the stream, and by
holding their heads to the rafts compelled to swim the east channel
of the Tennessee.  We secured the two guns mentioned, some muskets
and supplies at the enemy's camps, and found evidence of a hasty
flight of the Confederates.  By a détour we came into a valley
flanked to the east by Raccoon Mountain, and we visited a large
saltpetre works at Nick-a-Jack Cave.  These works we destroyed by
breaking the large iron kettles and by burning all combustible
structures.  A portion of the detachment was sent under cover of
the thick woods to the railroad east of Shellmound, a station near
the river, where we expected to cut off a train of cars engaged in
loading, for removal, supplies of provisions.  The engineer, a few
moments before the party reached the railroad, had run his engine
to a water-station located east of the point of our intersection,
and it thus escaped capture.  We, however, captured one captain
and about a dozen men; also the cars of the train and considerable
supplies, all of which we were obliged to destroy, save some choice,
much-needed hams.  These we loaded on a flat car, which we pushed
about ten miles to the east abutment of the broken bridge.  This
raid caused great consternation at Chattanooga for several days.
The detachment was reported as 5000 strong at Shellmound, and
Leadbetter ordered "all bridges on the railroad and country roads"
burned, and a retreat to Lookout Mountain.(10)  It would have been
easy then to have taken Chattanooga.  A year and a half later it
cost many lives and became about the only Union trophy of the battle
of Chickamauga.

I learned on this raid, from prisoners, that Farragut and Butler
had, on April 29, 1862, obtained possession of New Orleans.  This
was the first information of their success received at the
North.(11)

My expedition was the first armed one of the war upon the mainland
of Georgia.

On my return to the west side of the river I found my regiment,
with others, under orders to march at 9 o'clock at night for
Stevenson, destination Athens, Alabama.  The enemy, under Colonel
J. S. Scott, attacked (May 1st) and drove out of Athens the 18th
Ohio, under Colonel T. R. Stanley.  The affair was not a creditable
one to either side.  The troops under Scott were said to have been
harbored in houses from which they fired on Stanley's men as the
latter fled through the streets, and it was claimed citizens aided
in shooting down Union soldiers, though this was never shown to be
true.  Scott, in his report to Beauregard, dated the day of the
fight, boasted that the "boys took few prisoners, their shots
proving singularly fatal."(11)

The affair itself was of but little consequence, as Colonel Scott
was driven out of Athens the succeeding night, and the next day
across the Tennessee, he only having captured Stanley's baggage,
four wagons, and twenty men, having suffered in killed and wounded
a greater loss than he had inflicted.

Out of this incident arose one of the most exceptional occurrences
of the whole war.

Colonel John Basil Turchin, of the 19th Illinois, in command of a
brigade in Mitchel's division, reached Athens, May 2d, and, it was
said, in retaliation for the alleged bad conduct of its citizens
the day preceding, he retired to his tent and gave the place up
for two hours to be sacked by his command.  It was asserted that
private houses were invaded during this time, money and valuables
seized and carried off, and revolting outrages committed.  Turchin
was a Russian,(12) a soldier of experience, and a military man,
educated in the best schools of Europe.  He had served on the
general staff of the Czar of Russia and in the Imperial Guard,
rising to the rank of Colonel, and he had served his Czar also in
the Hungarian War, 1848-49, and in the Crimean War of 1854-56.

It is more than possible that he had imbibed notions as to the
manner and believed in methods of treating the enemy's property,
including their slaves, and of dealing with captured towns and
cities and their inhabitants, not in harmony with modern and more
humane and civilized rules of war.

He did not believe war could be successfully waged by an invading
army with its officers and soldiers acting as missionaries of mercy
for and protectors and preservers of the property of hostile
inhabitants.  Later, and after General McCausland burned Chambersburg,
Penna., less criticism fell on Turchin for his behavior at Athens.

His conduct and that of his command were doubtless exaggerated in
many particulars, but enough was true to excite much comment and
fierce denunciation and condemnation.  The affair was especially
unfortunate as to place, Athens being justly celebrated for the
number of inhabitants who honestly adhered to the Union cause.

General Mitchel repaired to Athens on hearing it had been sacked,
addressed the citizens, induced them to organize a committee to
hear and report on all complaints; then ordered the brigade commander
to cause every soldier under him to be searched, and every officer
to state in writing, upon honor, that he had no pillaged property.
The committee subsequently reported, but no charge was made against
any officer or soldiers by name.  The bills of forty-five citizens,
however, were presented by it, aggregating $54,689.80, for alleged
depredations.  The search was made without finding an article and
the reports of officers showed that they had no stolen property.

Strict orders against pillaging and plundering were issued and
thereafter enforced in Mitchel's division.  The outrages upon women,
if any occurred, were greatly magnified.(13)

Buell caused Turchin to be placed in arrest, and he was later tried,
convicted, and sentenced to be dismissed the service of the United
States, the court having found him guilty of "neglect of duty, to
the prejudice of good order and military discipline," and of
"disobedience of orders," and of certain specifications to the
charges, among others one embodying the allegation that he did "on
or about the 2d of May, 1862, march his brigade into the town of
Athens, State of Alabama, and having had the arms of the regiments
stacked in the streets, did allow his command to disperse, and in
his presence, or with his knowledge and that of his officers, to
plunder and pillage the inhabitants of said town and of the country
adjacent thereto, without taking adequate steps to restrain them."
He pleaded guilty to one specification only, namely, that of
permitting his _wife_ to be with him in Athens, and to accompany
him while serving with troops in the field.  This court-martial
was ordered by Buell, July 5, 1862, and it met first at Athens and
then at Huntsville, Alabama, July 20th.(14)  General James A.
Garfield was its President, and Colonels John Beatty, Jacob Ammern,
Curran Pope, J. G. Jones, Marc Mundy, and T. D. Sedgwick were the
other members.

During the session of the court, General Garfield and Colonel Ammen
were the guests of Colonel Beatty and myself at our camp near
Huntsville.  Though I had met Garfield, I had no previous acquaintance
with either of them.  They were even them remarkable men--both
accomplished and highly educated, Ammen having previously had a
military education.  We were enabled to get intimately acquainted
with them at our meals and during the long evenings spent in discussing
the war and all manner of subjects.  Both were fine talkers and
enjoyed controversial conversation.  Ammen, though not alone from
vanity, was disposed to occupy the most of the time, and sometimes
he would occupy an entire evening telling stories, narrating an
event, or maintaining his own side of a controversy.  He was the
oldest of the party, and always interesting, so he was tolerated in
this--_generally_.  He was superstitious, and believed in the
supernatural to a certain extent, denying that such belief was a
weakness, else "Napoleon and Sir Walter Scott were the weakest of
men."  General Beatty relates an incident of an evening's talk
(July 24th) at our camp thus:

"We ate supper, and immediately adjourned to the adjoining tent.
Before Garfield was fairly seated on his camp stool, he began to
talk with the easy and deliberate manner of a man who had much to
say.  He dwelt eloquently on the minutest details of his early
life, as if they were matters of the utmost importance.  Keifer
was not only an attentive listener, but seemed wonderfully interested.
Uncle Jacob undertook to thrust in a word here and there, but
Garfield was much too absorbed to notice him, and so pushed on
steadily, warming up as he proceeded.  Unfortunately for his scheme,
however, before he had gone far he made a touching reference to
his mother, when Uncle Jacob, gesticulating energetically, and with
his forefinger levelled at the speaker, cried:  'Just a word--just
one word right there,' and so persisted until Garfield was compelled
either to yield or be absolutely discourteous.  The General,
therefore, got in his word; nay, he held the floor for the remainder
of the evening.  The conspirators made brave efforts to put him
down and cut him off, but they were unsuccessful.  At midnight,
when Keifer and I had left, he was still talking; and after we had
got into bed, he, with his suspenders dangling about his legs,
thrust his head into our tent-door, and favored us with the few
observations we had lost by reason of our hasty departure.  Keifer
turned his face to the wall and groaned.  Poor man, he had been
hoisted by his own petard.  I think Uncle Jacob suspected that the
young men had set up a job on him."(15)

The court having concluded the case, Buell, August 6, 1862, issued
an order approving its proceedings and sentence of dismissal from
the service, and declaring that Colonel Turchin ceased "to be in
the service of the United States."(16)

Although the charges against him and his trial were notorious, and
well known at the War Department and to the country, President
Lincoln, the day preceding Buell's order of dismissal, appointed
Colonel Turchin a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and the Senate
promptly confirmed the appointment, and thus he came out of his
trial and condemnation with increased rank.  He accepted the
promotion, served in the field afterwards, was distinguished in
many battles, and left the army October 4, 1864.

Turchin at the time he entered the Union Army was, and still is,
a resident of Illinois.

There were many excellent men of foreign birth and residence who
found places in the Union Army and filled them with credit.(17)

At Paint Rock, on the railroad east of Huntsville, the train on
which the 3d Ohio was being transported from Stevenson (May 2d)
was fired upon from ambush by guerillas, and six or eight men more
or less seriously wounded.

Colonel Beatty stopped the train, and after giving the citizens
notice that all such acts of bushwhacking would bring on them
certain destruction of property, as it was known that professed
peaceful citizens were often themselves the guilty parties or
harbored the guilty ones, himself fired the town as an earnest of
what a repetition of such deeds would bring.

Many fruitless small expeditions were undertaken to drive out the
constant invasions made by Wheeler's, Morgan's, Adams', and Scott's
cavalry north of the Tennessee and upon our lines of communication.

On May 18th, having become restless in camp, I volunteered as
special aide to Colonel Wm. H. Lytle on an expedition to Winchester,
Tennessee.  We passed through a region thickly infested with the
most daring bands of guerillas, and at Winchester had an encounter
with some of Adams' regular cavalry, who, after making a rash charge
into the town while we occupied it and losing a few men, retreated
eastward to the mountains.

On May 13th General James S. Negley led a force from Pulaski against
Adams' cavalry at Rogersville, north of the Tennessee opposite the
Muscle Shoals, and with slight loss drove it across the river.
Later there was a more determined effort by the Confederates to
occupy, with considerable bodies of cavalry and light artillery,
the country north of the Tennessee below Chattanooga, but June 4th,
an expedition under Negley, composed of troops selected from
Mitchel's command, surprised Adams with his principal force twelve
miles northwest of Jasper, and routed him, killing about twenty of
his men and wounding and capturing about one hundred more; also
capturing arms, ammunition, commissary wagons, and supplies.(18)
Negley pushed his command over the mountains up to the Tennessee,
threatening to cross to the south side at Shellmound, and at other
points, and finally took position opposite Chattanooga.

The expedition caused much consternation among the rebels, though
little was actually accomplished.  The attack made on Chattanooga,
June 7th and 8th, failed, and Negley's command returned.(19)
Colonel Joshua W. Sill, 33d Ohio, afterwards Brigadier-General,
and killed at the battle of Stone's River, commanded a brigade
under Mitchel and in the Chattanooga expedition.  He was an
accomplished, educated officer, modest almost to a fault, yet brave
and capable of great deeds.  His body is buried at Chillicothe,
Ohio.

Mitchel's position in Northern Alabama was at all times precarious;
he covered too much country; lacked concentration, and was constantly
in danger of being assailed in detail; besides, his relations to
Buell, his immediate commander, were not cordial.  He complained
frequently directly to the Secretary of War for want of support.
Shortly after Buell's arrival from Corinth, the last of June,
Mitchel tendered his resignation and asked to be granted immediate
leave of absence, but the next day (July 2d) he was, by the Secretary
of War, ordered to repair to Washington,(20) and General Lovell H.
Rousseau, a Kentuckian, who also believed in a vigorous prosecution
of the war, succeeded him.  General Mitchel on reaching Washington
was selected by President Lincoln for command of an expedition on
the Mississippi, but Halleck opposed his suggestion and failed to
give the necessary orders for the contemplated movement, consequently
Mitchel remained inactive until September, when he was assigned
the command of the Department of the South, headquarters Hilton
Head.  He was stricken with yellow fever and died at Beaufort,
South Carolina, October 30, 1862.  He is buried at Greenwood
Cemetery, Brooklyn, N. Y.

( 1)  Pittenger, _Capturing a Locomotive_, pp. 26, 40.

( 2)  _Capturing a Locomotive_, pp. 66-8.

( 3)  _Capturing a Locomotive_, pp. 204-5, 182, 224, 353.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 641; Part II., p. 104.

( 5)  _Ante_, p. 5.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part II., pp. 115, 162-5, 195.

( 7)  Quoted in Lincoln's 22d of September, 1862, proclamation.

( 8)  McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, p. 293.

( 9)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 657.

(10)  Leadbetter's report, _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 658.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 878.

(12)  Russian name--Ivan Vasilevitch Turchinoff.  Turchin, _Battle
of Chickamauga_, pp. 5, 6.

(13)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part II., pp. 204, 212, 290, 294-5.

(14)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part II., pp. 99, 273.

(15)  _Citizen Soldier_, p. 159.

(16)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., p. 277.

(17)  My last letter from Gen. Robert C. Schenck speaks of meeting,
while Minister in England, a former Ohio soldier.  I give his
letter, omitting unimportant parts.

  "Marshall House, York Harbor, Maine, July 10, 1889.
"My Dear General Keifer,--Your letter came to me just as I was
leaving Washington. . . . I keep fairly well and vigorous for an
old fellow so near to the octogenarian line.  Accept my thanks for
your kind remembrance and good wishes.  You want to know about
Colonel John DeCourcey, who commanded the [16th] regiment of Ohio
Infantry for some time during our late war.  I have not much to
tell you of him, except that I made his acquaintance afterwards as
a British nobleman.  He was appointed a Union officer, I believe,
by Governor Dennison, and had had, as I understand, some previous
military experience and training.

"One night, in a party at the house of a friend in London, about
1872, I was told that Lord Kinsale desired especially to be presented
to me.  I said of course it would be agreeable.  On being introduced
he explained that, besides a general desire to pay his respects to
the American Minister, he took an interest in me as being from
Ohio.  I was a little surprised to find an English gentleman having
any particular knowledge about Ohio.  He went on to tell me he had
not been in London for some time, and had been ill, or he would
have called on me before that time, for that he had served as
commander of an Ohio regiment during our late war.  This surprised
me, but he explained that he was not then Lord Kinsale, else the
fact might have attracted some attention, but only John DeCourcey,
having succeeded rather unexpectedly to the title.  I think he said
on the death of a cousin, and perhaps the end of two or three other
lives intervening.  He was himself then an invalid, apparently,
and has since died.  I found him an agreeable gentleman.

"The Barony of Kinsale is an old title.  I believe this Lord Kinsale
was the 31st or 32d Baron.  His ancestor, Earl of Ulster, for
defending King John, in single combat, with a champion provided by
Philip Augustus of France, was granted the privilege for himself
and heirs, _forever to go with covered head in the presence of
Royalty_.  This, my dear general, must be about all that I told
you of John DeCourcey, or could remember when I met you on the
occasion you mention, at Springfield.  Hope you are in good heart
and health, I am

  "Very sincerely yours,
  "Robt. C. Schenck."

(18)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 904, 919-920.

(19)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp, 904, 919-920.

(20)  _Battles and Leaders_, etc., vol. ii., pp. 706-7; _War
Records_, vol. xvi., Part II., p. 92.


CHAPTER VIII
Confederate Invasion of Kentucky (1862)--Cincinnati Threatened,
and "Squirrel Hunters" Called Out--Battles of Iuka, Corinth, and
Hatchie Bridge--Movements of Confederate Armies of Bragg and Kirby
Smith--Retirement of Buell's Army to Louisville--Battle of Perryville,
with Personal and Other Incidents

As we have seen, Halleck's great army at Corinth was dispersed,
the Army of the Ohio going eastward.  It spent the month of June,
1862, in rebuilding bridges, including the great bridge across the
Tennessee at Decatur, but recently burned under his direction, and
soon again to be abandoned to the Confederates.

The Confederate authorities projected an invasion on two lines and
with two armies,--one under General E. Kirby Smith and the other
under General Braxton Bragg,--the Ohio River and the cities of
Louisville and Cincinnati being the objective points; the design
being, also, to recruit the Confederate armies in Kentucky, obtain
supplies, and force the evacuation by the Union Army of Alabama
and Tennessee, and especially of Nashville.  Early in August, 1862,
these two Confederate armies were assembled at Knoxville and
Chattanooga and along the Upper Tennessee, Kirby Smith's main force
at the former and Bragg's at the latter place.  The objectives of
these armies were soon known, and the Army of the Ohio was therefore
ordered to concentrate from its scattered situation at Decherd and
Winchester, Tennessee.

General Robert L. McCook, late Colonel of the 9th Ohio, commanding
a brigade under General George H. Thomas, while riding in an
ambulance at the head of his command, ill and helpless, was shot
and mortally wounded, August 5th, about three miles eastward of
New Market, Alabama, by a body of ambushed men, said to have been
guerillas in citizens' dress.  He died at 12 M., August 6th.  His
command, in retaliation, laid the country waste around the scene
of his death.( 1)  McCook had fought in Western Virginia; at Mill
Springs (where he was wounded), at Shiloh, and elsewhere.  He was
one of the ten sons of Major Daniel McCook, who was killed (July
21, 1863), at sixty-five years of age, near Buffington's Island,
during the Morgan raid in Ohio, while leading a party to cut off
Morgan's escape across the Ohio River.  Two brothers of his were
killed in battle--Charles M., at Bull Run, July 21, 1861, and Daniel
at Kenesaw, July 21, 1864.  Alexander McDowell McCook commanded a
corps, and all the brothers had honorable war records.  Dr. John
McCook, brother of the senior Daniel McCook, likewise served and
died in the war.  He had five sons, three of whom served with
distinction in the volunteer army and two in the navy.  I knew
John's son, General Anson George McCook, first in Mitchel's division
as Major and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2d Ohio, then in the Forty-
fifty, Forty-sixth, and Forty-seventh Congresses, and later as
Secretary of the United States Senate.

The killing of General R. L. McCook, under the circumstances, was
regarded as murder, and excited deep indignation both in and out
of the army.  Even Buell issued orders to arrest every able-bodied
man of suspicious character within a radius of ten miles of the
place where McCook was shot, to take all horses fit for service
within that circuit, and to pursue and destroy bushwhackers.( 2)
With the arrest of a few men and the taking of some horses, however,
the incident closed so far as official action was concerned.

Memphis was taken, on June 6, 1862, by Flag Officer C. H. Davis,
who had with him a Ram Fleet under Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., and an
Indiana brigade under Colonel G. N. Fitch.( 3)

The plan of the Confederate invasion, as already stated, was to
operate on two lines.  Kirby Smith from Knoxville was first to move
on and take Cumberland Gap, then held by General George W. Morgan.
Bragg was at Tupelo, Mississippi, July 18th, but, fired with the
idea that on Kentucky being invaded her people would flock to arms
under the Confederate standard, he commenced transferring his army
to the new field of operations and removed his headquarters, July
29th, to Chattanooga.

Kirby Smith took the field August 13th, moving on Cumberland Gap,
but, finding it impregnable by direct attack, he left General
Stevenson with a division to threaten it and advanced on Lexington.
John Morgan with a considerable body of cavalry preceded Smith into
Middle Kentucky, and his incursion was taken as a forerunner of
the greater one to follow.  Alarm over the audacious movement was
not limited to Kentucky; it spread to Ohio, and there were fears
for the safety of Cincinnati.

General Horatio G. Wright was assigned to a new Department of the
Ohio, composed of the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Kentucky east of the Tennessee River, including
Cumberland Gap, and he assumed command of it August 23d, headquarters
at Cincinnati.( 4)  On the 16th, Buell had ordered General Wm.
Nelson from the vicinity of Murfreesboro, with some artillery and
infantry, to Kentucky, to there organize troops to keep open
communications and operate against John Morgan.( 5)  Wright, on
the 23d, ordered Nelson to Lexington to assume command of the troops
in that vicinity and relieve General Lew Wallace.  Nelson, with
insufficient, and mainly new, undrilled, and undisciplined troops,
moved to Richmond, Ky., where (August 30th) he was assailed by
Kirby Smith's army and his forces disastrously routed with much
loss, principally in captured.  He was himself wounded in the leg
by a musket ball.  There were few organized Union troops now between
Smith's army and the Ohio River, and such organizations as could
be assembled were new and unable to cope with the Confederate
veterans.  The news of the defeat at Richmond reached Cincinnati
the same evening, and it was at once assumed that Lexington and
Frankfort would soon be in the enemy's hands, and Kirby Smith's
army would forthwith march on Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati.
The assumption proved correct, as the defeated troops retreated
through Frankfort and Lexington.

The Mayor (George Hatch) and City Council of Cincinnati acted with
courage and energy to meet the impending emergency, and the loyal
people earnestly responded to all requirements and submitted to
the military authorities, either to take up arms or to work on
intrenchments.  Lew Wallace, assigned by Wright to the immediate
command of the three cities, proclaimed martial law to be executed
(until relieved by the military) by the police; and business
generally was suspended.

The Mayor, with Wallace's sanction, permitted the banks to remain
open from 1 to 2 P.M.; bakers to pursue their occupation; physicians
to attend their patients; employees of newspapers to pursue their
business; funerals to be permitted, but mourners only to leave the
city; all druggists were allowed to do business, but all drinking
saloons, eating-houses, and places of amusement were to be kept
closed.  Governor David Tod, September 1st, authorized the reception
of armed citizens from throughout the State, who were denominated
"_Squirrel Hunters_."  The patriotism of the people of Ohio and
Indiana was heroically shown, and their rushing in large numbers
to the defence of Cincinnati and other threatened cities may have
had its influence, and was, at least, highly commendable; yet, if
a real attack had been made on these cities, it is hardly likely
that the "Squirrel Hunters" would have proved efficient as soldiers.
Kirby Smith entered Lexington, Ky., September 1st, and two days
later he dispatched General Heth with about six thousand men to
threaten Cincinnati.  Heth was joined the next day by Morgan and
his raiders.  By the 10th these forces were near Covington and
threatened a serious attack.  There were some artillery shots fired
and some light skirmishing, but the next day it was ascertained
the Confederates had commenced a retreat, and in a few days the
"_Squirrel Hunters_" returned to their homes amid the plaudits of
a loyal people, and business was resumed in the Queen City.  A
single act of disorder is reported in Cincinnati on the part of
some citizens who began tearing up a street railroad because it
was believed to be invidious to allow it to do business "when lager-
beer saloons could not."( 6)

The Legislature of Ohio authorized the presentation by the Governor
of a lithographic discharge to each "_Squirrel Hunter_."

Before narrating the movements of Bragg's army from the Tennessee
to the vicinity of Louisville, and of Buell's army in pursuit on
Bragg's flank and rear, an attempt by another Confederate column
to co-operative with Bragg in carrying out his general plan of
invading Kentucky should be mentioned.

General Sterling Price, hitherto operating in Arkansas and Missouri,
immediately after Shiloh, had been transferred with his army to
Corinth to reinforce Beauregard, and when Bragg, who succeeded
Beauregard, decided upon his plan of invasion, and had concentrated
the bulk of his army at Chattanooga for that purpose, he assigned
General Earl Van Dorn to the District of Mississippi and Price to
the District of Tennessee, the latter to hold the line of the Mobile
and Ohio Railroad, and both were to confront and watch Grant and
prevent him from sending reinforcements to Buell.  Price was left
at Tupelo, Mississippi, with about 15,000 men.  Later, September
11th, President Davis ordered Van Dorn to assume command of both
his own and Price's army, the latter then on its march to Iuka,
Mississippi, intending to move thence into Middle Tennessee if it
should be found, as Bragg was led to believe, that Rosecrans (who,
June 11th, had succeeded Pope in command of the Army of the
Mississippi) had gone with his army to Nashville to reinforce Buell.
Two of Grant's divisions, Paine's and Jeff C. Davis', had gone
there, leaving the force for the defence of North Mississippi much
reduced.  Price entered Iuka September 14th, the garrison retiring
without an engagement.  Price, on learning that Rosecrans had
retired on Corinth, telegraphed Van Dorn that he would turn back
and co-operate in an attack on Corinth.  Bragg telegraphed him to
hasten towards Nashville.  Rosecrans wired Grant to "watch the old
wood-pecker or he would get away from them."  September 17th,
Halleck telegraphed Grant to prevent Price from crossing the
Tennessee and forming a junction with Bragg.  Grant telegraphed he
would "do everything in his power to prevent such a catastrophe,"
and he began concentrating his troops against Price at Iuka.
General E. O. C. Ord was moved to Burnsville, where Grant established
his headquarters, and Rosecrans marched his two divisions to Jacinto,
with orders to move on Iuka, flank Price, and cut off his retreat.
General Stephen A. Hurlburt was ordered to make a strong demonstration
from Bolivar, Tennessee, against Van Dorn, then near Grand Junction
with about 10,000 effective men, and lead him to believe he was in
immediate danger of an attack, and thus prevent him from making a
diversion in aid of Price by marching on Corinth.  This ruse was
successful.  Orders were given by Grant and preparation was made
by Ord to attack Price at Iuka as soon as Rosecrans' guns on the
Jacinto road were heard.  About 4 P.M., September 19th, C. S.
Hamilton's division, under Rosecrans, attacked Little's division
of Price's army on the Jacinto road, and a severe combat ensued
until night, with varying success, both sides at dark claiming a
victory.  Neither Grant nor Ord heard the sound of the battle in
consequence of the intervening dense woods and an unfavorable wind.
Rosecrans did not or could not advise Grant of the state of affairs,
and the latter did not learn of the battle until 8.30 A.M. of the
20th.  Price retreated in the night with his forces towards Baldwyn,
on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, whither Grant ordered Ord with
Hamilton's and Stanley's divisions and the cavalry to pursue.  The
pursuit was ineffectual.  The battle of Iuka was fought after 4
P.M., principally by two opposing brigades, each about 4000 strong.
The Union loss was, killed 141, wounded 613, missing 36, total 790.

The Confederate loss, as reported, was, killed 85, wounded 410,
missing 40, total 535.( 7)

After Iuka Rosecrans was placed in command at Corinth, Grant having
established his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee.  Hurlburt was
at Bolivar, Tennessee, with his division.  Though Halleck had partly
constructed defensive works around Corinth on occupying it in May,
1862, they were too remote from the town and too elaborate for a
small army.

Grant had, more recently, partly constructed some open batteries
with connecting breastworks on College Hill.  These Rosecrans
further completed, and also constructed some redoubts to cover the
north of the town.

From Ripley, Mississippi, September 29th, Van Dorn, with his own
and Price's army, his force numbering about 25,000, by a rapid
march advanced on Corinth, where Rosecrans could assemble not
exceeding 18,500 men, consisting of the divisions of Generals David
S. Stanley and C. S. Hamilton and the cavalry division of Colonel
John K. Mizner, of the Army of the Mississippi, and the divisions
of Generals Thomas A. Davies and Thomas J. McKean, of the Army of
the Tennessee.  It was not known certainly until the 3d of October
whether Van Dorn designed to attack Bolivar, Jackson, or Corinth.
The advance of Van Dorn and Price was met on the Chewalla road by
Oliver's brigade of McKean's division, which was steadily driven
back, together with reinforcements until, at 10 A.M., all the Union
troops were inside the old Halleck intrenched line, and by 1.30
P.M. the Confederates had taken it and were pushing vigorously
towards the more recently established inner line of intrenchments.
Price's army formed on the Confederate left and Van Dorn's on the
right.  The brunt of the afternoon battle fell on McKean's and
Davies' divisions.  General Hackleman of Davies' division was
killed, and General Richard J. Oglesby of the same division was
severely wounded.  The Union troops engaged lost heavily.  One
brigade of Stanley's division and Sullivan's brigade of Hamilton's
division late in the day came to the relief of the heavily pressed
Union troops.  The coming of night put an end to the battle, but
with the Confederate Army within six hundred yards of Corinth and
the Union troops mainly behind their inner and last line of defence.
The situation was critical.  The morning of the 4th found Rosecrans'
army formed, McKean on the left, Stanley and Davies to his right
in the order named, one brigade of Hamilton on the extreme right
and the rest of Hamilton's division in reserve behind the right.( 8)

Van Dorn opened fire at 4.30 A.M. with artillery, but he did not
advance to the real attack until about 8 A.M.  It came from north
of town and fell heaviest on Davies' division.  His front line gave
way, and later his command was broken, and some of the Confederates
penetrated the town and to where the reserve artillery was massed.
Stanley's reserves, however, speedily fell on them and drove them
out with great loss.  Then the attack came on Battery-Robinett, to
the westward near the Union centre.  Three successive charges were
made in column on this battery and on the centre with the greatest
determination, and much close fighting occurred until the last
assault was repulsed about 11 A.M. (October 4, 1862), when the
enemy fell back under cover beyond cannon-shot.  Van Dorn had hoped
to take Corinth on the 3d, and now, being repulsed at every point,
he beat a retreat, knowing Grant would not be inactive.  It was
not until about 2 P.M. that Rosecrans ascertained the enemy had
commenced a retreat.( 9)  General James B. McPherson arrived,
October 4th, from Jackson with five regiments, but too late for
the battle.  The engagement was a severe one; both armies fought
with desperation and skill; the Union troops, being outnumbered,
made up the disparity by fighting, in part, behind breastworks.

The losses were heavy, especially in officers of rank.  The Union
loss was, killed 27 officers and 328 men, wounded 115 officers and
1726 men, captured or missing 5 officers and 319 men; grand total,
2520.(10)  The Confederate loss (as stated in Van Dorn's report
(11)), including casualties at Hatchie Bridge (October 5th), was,
killed 594, wounded 2162, prisoners or missing 2102; grand total,
4858.

Grant, besides sending McPherson to Rosecrans' support, had directed
Hurlburt at Bolivar to march with his division on the enemy's rear.
Hurlburt started on the 4th by way of Middletown and Pocahontas.
At the former place he encountered the enemy's cavalry and forced
them by night to and across the Big Muddy, where the division
encamped, one brigade having taken and crossed the bridge to the
east side.  Hurlburt's orders from Grant were to reach Rosecrans
at all hazards.(12)  The situation for Hurlburt was critical.  He
had in front of his single division both Van Dorn and Price.  But
the situation was in a high degree desperate for the retreating
army.  If its retreat were arrested long enough for Rosecrans'
column to assail it in the rear it must be lost or dispersed.  It
was this that Grant confidently calculated on.  On the morning of
the 5th Hurlburt pushed vigorously forward to Davis' Bridge over
the Hatchie.  General Ord arrived about 8 A.M. and took command of
Hurlburt's forces.  The movement had hardly commenced when strong
resistance was met with.  Ord pushed the enemy back for about three
miles with General Veatch's brigade, taking a ridge--Metamora--about
one mile from the Hatchie.  Here a severe battle ensued, the enemy
was driven from the field across the bridge, and a portion of Ord's
command gained a position just east of the river, though not without
much loss.  Ord was himself wounded at the bridge, and the command
again devolved on Hurlburt.  The latter soon thereafter secured a
permanent lodgement on the east of the Hatchie, thus effectively
stopping the retreat of Van Dorn by that route and forcing him to
fall back and find another less desirable one.  Under cover of
night Van Dorn retreated upon another road to the southward, and
crossed the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six miles farther up the
river.(13)

The success of Ord and Hurlburt was so complete that Grant believed
Van Dorn's army should have been destroyed.(14)

Rosecrans did not move from Corinth until the morning of the 5th
of October, and then not fast or far enough to overtake Van Dorn
in the throes of battle with Ord and Hurlburt or in time to cut
off his retreat by another route.  Rosecrans gave as an excuse the
exhausted condition of his troops after the battle of the 4th.  At
2 P.M., the last day of the battle, he was certain the enemy had
decided to retreat, yet he directed the victorious troops to proceed
to their camps, provide five days' rations, take food and rest,
and be ready to move early the next morning.(15)  McPherson, having
arrived with a fresh brigade, could have been at once pushed upon
the rear of Van Dorn's exhausted troops.  Rosecrans' army went into
camp again in the afternoon of the 5th, while Ord and Hurlburt were
fighting their battle.  Although the pursuit was resumed by Rosecrans
on the 6th, and thereafter continued to Ripley, it was after the
flying enemy had passed beyond reach.  But while it is possible
that Rosecrans could have done better, it is certain that he and
his troops did well; Van Dorn's diversion in favor of Bragg's grand,
central invasion, at any rate, failed amid disaster.

But we must return to Bragg and Buell, the principal actors in the
march to Kentucky.

Bragg's army commenced to cross the Tennessee at Chattanooga August
26, 1862, and immediately set out to the northward, his cavalry,
under Wheeler, keeping well towards the foot of the mountains to
the westward, covering and masking the real movement.  Buell's
army, as we have stated, was concentrated in the neighborhood of
Dechard, Tennessee, with detachments of it still holding Huntsville,
Battle Creek, and Murfreesboro.

Numerous and generally unimportant skirmishes took place at Battle
Creek and other places.  Murfreesboro was surprised and disgracefully
surrendered to Forrest's cavalry July 13th, and Morgan's forces
captured Gallatin, Tennessee, August 12th; but these places were
not held.

Bragg continued his march through Pikeville and Sparta, Tennessee,
crossing the Cumberland at Carthage and Gainesborough.  Uniting
his army at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, he proceeded through Glasgow
to Munfordville, on Green River, where there was a considerable
fortification, occupied by Colonel J. T. Wilder with about 4000 men.

Buell, after having sent some of his divisions as far east into
the mountains as Jasper, Altamont, and McMinnville, with no results,
moved his army to Nashville, thence with the reinforcements from
Grant (two divisions), leaving two divisions and some detachments
under Thomas to hold that city, through Tyree Springs and Franklin
to Bowling Green, Kentucky, the advance arriving there September
11th.(16)  Bragg was then at Glasgow.  General James R. Chalmers
and Colonel Scott, each with a brigade, the former of infantry,
the other of cavalry, attacked, and Chalmers' brigade assaulted
Wilder's position September 14th.  The assault was repelled with
much slaughter, Chalmers' loss being 3 officers and 32 men killed
and 28 officers and 225 men wounded.(17)  Chalmers then retired to
Cave City, but returned with Bragg's main army on the 16th.  Bragg
having his army up, and Polk's corps north of Munfordville and
Hardee's south of the river, opened negotiations for the surrender
of the place.  Being completely surrounded, with heavy batteries
on all sides, Wilder capitulated, including 4133 officers and men.
Chalmers was designated to take possession of the surrendered works
on the morning of the 17th.  Had Buell marched promptly on Munfordville
from Bowling Green he would have found Bragg with one half of his
army south of Green River and Polk with the other half north of
it, and Wilder still holding a position on the river between the
two.

Bragg, after the surrender, concentrated his army south of Green
River opposite Munfordville along a low crest of hills.  He had
not yet formed a junction with Kirby Smith, and his force then in
position probably did not much exceed 20,000.(18)

The position had no special advantages, was well known to many of
Buell's officers, and should have been to Buell himself.  In case
of defeat, Bragg's army must have been lost and Kirby Smith's left
to the same fate.  Green River, passable in few places in Bragg's
rear and to the north, would have rendered retreat impossible for
a defeated army, and, besides, Bragg had no base north to retreat
to.  The situation was well understood in our army, except by Buell,
who seemed to fear a junction with Kirby Smith had been formed,
though Wilder (just paroled) and others of his officers on the day
of the surrender informed Buell that no junction had been made.
Wilder, however, had an exaggerated opinion of Bragg's strength at
Munfordville.  The junction of the two Confederate armies did not
take place until October 9th, at Harrodsburg, the day succeeding
the battle of Perryville.(19)

Buell had, south of Bragg, not less than 50,000 effective men.  He
since admits he had 35,000 men present before he ordered Thomas'
division and other troops up from Nashville.(19)  Thomas arrived
on the 19th and 20th.  There was some skirmishing on the 20th, and
Bragg was then permitted to withdraw without further molestation
across the river, whence he marched northward.  The slowness of
the movement of Buell's army from Nashville to Bowling Green and,
after delaying there five days, thence towards Munfordville, was
freely commented on by his army at the time.  It was composed of
seasoned and experienced troops, eager to find the enemy and give
him battle.(20)  In the history of no war was a more favorable
opportunity presented to fight and reap a victor's fruits than at
Green River, but the time and men for great and controlling success
were not yet come.

The water supply northward of Bowling Green, already spoken of,
was at best poor and deficient, especially in the hot September
weather.  The pools or ponds, befouled by the shooting in the
February preceding of diseased and broken-down animals of Hardee's
army on its retirement from Bowling Green, contained the most
noxious and revolting water, yet it was at one time, for a large
part of the army, all that was to be had for man or beast.  I
remember Colonel John Beatty and I, on one occasion near Cave City,
stood in a hard rain storm holding the corners of a rubber blanket
so as to catch a supply of water to slake our thirst.  The army,
however, as was generally the case when moving, suffered little
from sickness.

The wagon train of Buell's army was dispatched with a cavalry guard
from Bowling Green on a road to the westward of Munfordville through
Brownsville, Litchifield, and Big Spring to West Point at the mouth
of Salt River on the Ohio, thence to Louisville.(21)

Bragg continued his march unmolested and unresisted north from
Green River along the railroad to near Nolin, thence northwestward
by Hodgensville to Bardstown, then through Perryville to Harrodsburg,
some part of his army going as far as Lawrenceburg, Lexington, and
Frankfort.(21)

Buell marched _after_ Bragg to near Nolin, thence keeping to the
west through Elizabethtown and West Point to Louisville, the advance,
General Thomas' division, arrived there September 25th, and the
last division the 29th.  Both train and army reaching the city in
safety had the effect, at least, of relieving the place from further
danger of capture, and for this Buell had due credit, though the
country and the authorities at Washington were highly displeased
with the result of his campaign.

Cumberland Gap, for want of supplies, was, on the night of the 17th
of September, evacuated by General George W. Morgan, and though
pursued by General Stevenson and John Morgan's cavalry, he made
his way through Manchester, Booneville, West Liberty, and Grayson
to Greenup, on the Ohio, arriving there the 2d of October.  Stevenson
then rejoined Kirby Smith at Frankfort.

It is true Nashville was still held of the Union forces, but Northern
Alabama and nearly all else in Middle Tennessee occupied during
the campaigns of the previous spring were lost or abandoned.  Grant
alone held his ground in Northern Mississippi and Western Tennessee,
and his army had been dangerously depleted to reinforce Buell.

Clarksville, on the Cumberland below Nashville, in Grant's department,
was captured, August 18th, 1862, and some steamboats and some
supplies were there taken and destroyed.  Colonel Rodney Mason
(71st Ohio) was in command, and had under him at the time only
about 225 men.  His position was not a good one for defence; he
had no fortifications, and was without cavalry to give him information
of the approach or strength of the enemy.  It was variously claimed
that Mason surrendered to only a few irregular cavalry with no
artillery, and without firing a gun, on being deceived into the
belief that he was surrounded by a superior force with six pieces
of artillery.(22)  The War Department, somewhat hastily, August
22d, by order, without trial, dismissed Colonel Mason from the
service.  This order was revoked March 22, 1866.(22)  Twelve officers
of the regiment signed a statement to the effect that they had
advised the surrender.  For this the War Department mustered them
out August 29, 1862.  The President directed the order revoked as
to Captain Sol. J. Houck, because he signed the statement under a
misapprehension of its contents.(23)  The order dismissing the
others was revoked after the war, except as to Lieutenant Ira L.
Morris, who enlisted in 1864 as a private soldier, and was thereupon
honorably discharged as a Lieutenant.

The Confederate Army was now in occupancy of Frankfort, Lexington,
Cumberland Gap, and most of middle Kentucky.  Buell's army, largely
reinforced by fresh troops and numbering, present for duty,
65,886,(24) was apparently besieged at Louisville.  Nelson had
retired there from his disaster at Richmond (August 30th), and had
collected a very considerable army and thrown up some breastworks.

At West Point I obtained permission to proceed with the advance of
the army to Louisville, having previously been notified of my
appointment as Colonel of a newly-organized regiment.

On reaching Louisville I first saw President Lincoln's 22d of
September Proclamation, announcing that on January 1, 1863, he
would proclaim all slaves within States or designated parts of a
State, the people whereof should be in rebellion, "thenceforward
and forever free."  The idea of prosecuting the war for the liberation
of slaves in rebellious States had, to say the least, had not been
fostered in Buell's army, hence there was much criticism of this
proclamation by officers, and some foolish threats of resigning
rather than "fight for the freedom of the negro."  Even the army,
fighting patriotically to suppress the rebellion, did not then
fully appreciate that it was not in God's divine plan that peace
should ever come to our stricken country until our banner of liberty
waved over none but freemen.

On the 24th of September the President issued an order creating
the Department of the Tennessee and assigned to its command Major-
General George H. Thomas; and the same day Buell was ordered to
turn his command over to him and to retire to Indianapolis.(25)
These orders were forwarded by Colonel McKibben, but not delivered
until the 29th.(26)  Buell immediately turned over his command to
Thomas, but the latter, with his natural modesty, protested against
accepting it in the emergency.  Halleck suspended the order, and
Buell again resumed command, announcing Thomas as second in
command.(26)

More than a year elapsed before General Thomas was again given so
important a command as the one he thus declined, and then he relieved
Rosecrans and took command of the Army of the Cumberland when it
was besieged by Bragg at Chattanooga.  Thomas, though diffident to
a degree, was one of our greatest soldiers.  He served uninterruptedly
from the opening to the close of the war, distinguishing himself
in many battles, especially at Stone's River, at Chickamauga, on
the Atlanta campaign (1864), and at Nashville, December 15 and 16,
1864.  He was admired, almost adored, by the soldiers of the Army
of the Cumberland, and he deserved their affection.  His principal
characteristics differed from those of Grant, Sherman, Meade, or
Sheridan, who, though great soldiers, each differed in disposition,
temper, and quality from the others.  General Thomas, being a
Virginian by birth, was at first expected and coaxed to go into
the rebellion, then later he was abused and slandered by statements
coming from the South to the effect that he had contemplated going
with his State.  There is no evidence that he ever wavered in his
loyalty to the Union.

I had Grant's opinion of General Thomas as a commanding officer
when I was making an official call on him at City Point, December
5, 1864, just at the time Hood was besieging Nashville.  Grant had
been urging Thomas to fight Hood and raise the siege, fearing, as
Grant then said, Hood would cross the Cumberland and make a winter
raid into Kentucky.  Thomas refused to fight until fully ready.
Grant, after inquiring of me about the roads and hills around the
south of Nashville, of which I had acquired some knowledge in the
spring and fall of 1862, said, somewhat impatiently:

"Thomas is a great soldier, and though able, at any time, with his
present force to whip Hood, he lacks confidence in himself and the
disposition to assume the offensive until he has seventy-five per
centum of the chances of battle, in his own opinion, in favor of
success."

Thomas was born July 31, 1816, and died in San Francisco, March
28, 1870.  His body is buried at Troy, N. Y.  Sherman, in command
of the army, in announcing his death, said:

"The very impersonation of honesty, integrity and honor, he will
stand to posterity as the _beau-ideal_ of the soldier and gentleman.
Though he leaves no child to bear his name, the old Army of the
Cumberland, numbered by tens of thousands, called him father, and
will weep for him in tears of manly grief."

I witnessed, in principal part, a great tragedy resulting from a
quarrel between high officers of the Union Army.  This occurred
September 29, 1862, at the Galt House, Louisville, whither I had
repaired to tender my resignation to Buell as Lieutenant-Colonel
of the 3d Ohio Infantry, to enable me to accept promotion.

General Jeff C. Davis had been in command of a division under
General William Nelson at Louisville, and had in some way incurred
Nelson's censure.  Nelson relieved him of command and ordered him
to report to Wright, the department commander, at Cincinnati.
Wright ordered Davis to return to Louisville and report to Buell
for duty.  Davis, being from Indiana, returned _via_ Indianapolis,
and from there was accompanied to Louisville by Governor Oliver P.
Morton, who, with another friend, was with Davis in the vestibule
of the Galt House about 9 A.M. when Davis accosted Nelson, demanding
satisfaction for the injustice he claimed had been done him, and,
it was said, at the same time flipped a paper wad in Nelson's
face.(27)  Nelson retorted by slapping Davis in the face with the
back of his hand, and then, after denouncing Morton as Davis'
"abettor of the deliberate insult," at once passed from the vestibule
to adjoining hallway and started up the steps of a stairway,
apparently going towards his room.  He soon, however, returned to
the hall and walked quietly in the direction of Davis.  The latter
meantime had obtained a pistol from his friend, and as Nelson
approached fired on him, the bullet striking Nelson in the left
breast, just over the heart, producing what proved, in half an
hour, to be a mortal wound.(27)  The incident was a deplorable one.
Nelson was an able, valuable officer, and had proved himself such
on many fields.  He was known to be hasty, and sometimes unwarrantably
rough in his treatment of others, yet he promptly repented of any
act of injustice and made amends as far as possible.  Davis was
placed in military arrest by Buell, but later was released, by
orders from Washington, to be allowed to become amenable to civil
authority.  Still later he was restored to the command of a division,
then given a corps, and, by his gallantry, soldierly bearing, and
general good conduct to the end of the war, atoned in some degree
for the bloody deed.

My resignation was accepted on this memorable 29th of September,
1862, and thenceforth my official connection with my first regiment,
its gallant officers and soldiers, and with the noble Army of the
Ohio and the other great armies of the West, ceased, and forever,
and not without the deepest regret, especially in parting from
Colonel John Beatty, with whom I had, as more than a friend and
companion, eaten and slept, marched and bivouacked, on the closest
terms of confidence, without receiving from him an unkind or
ungenerous word, for seventeen months, although he was my immediate
superior officer, and we had both gone through many hardships and
vexatious trials together.  This was the more remarkable as we were
each of sanguine temperament and obstinate by nature.

Beatty was appointed by President Lincoln a Brigadier-General of
Volunteers, November 29, 1862, and he thereafter, as before at
Perryville, especially distinguished himself at Stone's River and
Chickamauga.  He has since served three terms in Congress with
distinction.

It was my good fortune to meet and shake hands, one year and about
eight months later, with some of the survivors of this Western army
at Greensborough, North Carolina, after Lee's surrender, and on
the occasion of the surrender of Joe Johnston's army to Sherman.

Although my humble connection with Buell's army ceased at Louisville,
I will summarize its history, covering a few days longer.

Polk's and Hardee's corps constituting Bragg's army we left in the
vicinity of Bardstown and Harrodsburg, with some portions at
Frankfort and Lexington.  Kirby Smith was at Salvisa, about twenty
miles northeast of Perryville, with the main body of his army, and,
believing he would be the first attacked, called loudly for
reinforcement, and Bragg sent him, on the eve of Perryville, Withers
and Cheatham's divisions from Polk and Hardee's corps.  Bragg placed
Polk in command of his army in the vicinity of Perryville, and
repaired to Frankfort to witness the inauguration (October 4th) of
a new Secession Provisional Governor of Kentucky--Richard Hawes
(28)--her former one, George W. Johnson, having been killed at
Shiloh while fighting as a private soldier.

Buell, being further reinforced with new troops, mostly from Ohio
and Indiana, commenced, October 2d, a general movement against both
Bragg and Smith.  General Joshua W. Sill's division of General
Alexander McD. McCook's corps, followed by General Ebenezer Dumont
with a raw division, moved through Shelbyville towards Frankfort.
McCook, with the two remaining divisions of the First Corps,
commanded, respectively, by Generals L. H. Rousseau and James S.
Jackson, moved from Bloomfield to Taylorsville, where he halted
the second night.  Crittenden's corps marched _via_ Bardstown on
the Lebanon and Danville road, which passed about four miles to
the south of Perryville, with a branch to it.  Gilbert's corps
moved on the more direct road to Perryville.  Thomas, second in
command, accompanied Crittenden on the right, and Buell kept his
headquarters with Gilbert's corps, the centre one in the movements.
As the Union columns advanced, the armies of Bragg and Kirby Smith
found it necessary to commence concentrating.  For some reason,
not warranted by good strategy, two points of concentration were
designated by Bragg, Perryville and Salvisa, twenty miles apart.
Smith persisted in the belief he would be the first to be struck
by the advancing army.

General Sill, on the road to Frankfort, encountered some opposition
on the 3d, but on the 4th pressed the enemy back so close that the
booming of his cannon interrupted Richard Hawes in the reading of
his inaugural address.  Bragg, while witnessing the ceremony,
received dispatches announcing the near approach of the Union
columns.(29)  This led to a general stampede of the assembly, most
of which was Confederate military, and the inaugural was never
finished.  Hawes fled from the capital, half inaugurated, accompanying
the army, and this was about the last heard of a secession Governor
of Kentucky.

Bragg personally hurried to Harrodsburg and there met Polk, who
gave him news of the movements of his army and of the approach of
the Union columns.  Bragg reached the conclusion that the wide
front covered by the Union forces (about fifteen miles) afforded
an opportunity to beat a part of them in an early engagement, and
he therefore, at 5.40 P.M. of the 7th, ordered Polk to recall
Cheatham's division, hitherto ordered to reinforce Smith, and to
form a junction with Hardee's corps near Perryville, and there give
battle immediately, and then move to Versailles, whither Smith was
ordered with his army.(30)  McCook was turned directly on Perryville
and Sill was ordered in the same direction.  Buell, at 7 P.M. of
the 7th, seemed to be aware that stubborn resistance would be met
with the next day at Perryville.  He so advised General Thomas.(31)
Polk, with Cheatham's division, reached Perryville about midnight
of the 7th, and the troops were placed in position on a line
previously established with the expectation that a battle would be
opened early the following morning.  The Confederate troops thus
in position numbered about 18,000, while immediately opposed to
them were no divisions yet in position, and, in fact, no real
preparation for battle had been made on the Union side.  There was
some skirmishing on the Confederate extreme left in the night,
between Colonel Dan McCook's brigade of Sheridan's division, for
the possession of the water in Doctor's Fork, but nothing more.

Bragg, at Harrodsburg, not hearing the battle open at dawn, hastened
to Perryville, and there learned at 10 A.M. that a council of
Confederate generals had been held, on Polk's suggestion, at which
it was determined to act only on the defensive.  He, however, after
some reconnoissances and adjustment of the lines, ordered Polk to
bring on an engagement.(32)

McCook with his two divisions came within about three miles of
Perryville about 10.30 A.M. of the 8th, and there encountered some
resistance, and later his troops were advanced and formed with the
right of Rousseau's division, resting near a barn south of the
Perryville and Mackville road, its left extending on a ridge through
a corn field to a wood occupied by the 2d and 33d Ohio.  The right
of General William R. Terrill's brigade of Jackson's division rested
on woods to the left of Rousseau, his left forming a crotchet to
the rear.  Starkweather and Webster's brigades of Rousseau and
Jackson's divisions, respectively, were posted by McCook in support
of the line named.  Sheridan and R. B. Mitchell's divisions of the
Third Corps were posted, not in preparation for battle, several
hundred yards to McCook's right, but supposed to be near enough to
protect it.(33)

Save some clashes of the skirmish lines and bodies seeking positions,
no fierce engagement took place until 2 P.M., when a determined
attack in force fell on Terrill's brigade, causing it to soon give
way, General James S. Jackson, division commander, being killed at
the first fire, and Terrill fell soon after.  McCook had previously
(about 12.30 P.M.) ridden to Buell's headquarters, about two and
a half miles distant, and informed him of the situation, but this
did not awaken him to the apprehension that a battle was about to
be fought.  McCook's entire command present on the field was soon
engaged against great odds.  Of this Captain Fisher of McCook's
staff informed Buell in his tent at 3.30 or 4 P.M., and Buell
claimed it was his first news that a battle had been raging on his
front.

Polk, with three divisions of infantry and a complement of artillery,
and with cavalry on each flank, had fallen on the two unsupported
divisions of McCook, choosing his place and manner of attack
skilfully.  Rousseau's right was struck soon after Terrill's brigade
was driven back, and the whole of his division was soon in action.
The Confederates advanced under cover of their artillery fire,
outflanking Rousseau's right.  His troops stood to their work
against odds and made a most gallant resistance.  Their right was
turned, when Gilbert's idle corps was near enough to have come at
once into action and afforded it protection.  McCook's command,
though suffering much, was not driven from the field.  My old
regiment occupied the crest of a hill, its right behind a hay-barn.
In this position, under Colonel John Beatty, it fought, exposed to
a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries and to a front and flank
fire from his infantry.  The barn at last took fire, and its flames
were so hot the right of the regiment was forced to temporarily
give way.  Its loss was 190 of its then 500 men in line, including
Captains Cunard and McDougal and Lieutenants St. John and Starr
among the killed.  Colonel W. H. Lytle, commanding the brigade,
was wounded and captured.

The Confederates gained possession temporarily of only portions of
the battle-ground, and night found McCook's corps still confronting
them.

Sheridan and R. B. Mitchell's divisions of the Third Corps in the
evening made some diversion, driving back and threatening Polk's
left.  Buell late in the day ordered reinforcements sent to McCook,
but they reached him too late for the battle.  Polk claimed a
victory, but while he had some temporary success, both armies slept
on the field.

The failure of Buell to know or hear of the battle until too late
to put his numerous troops near the field into it was the subject
of much comment.  Had Crittenden and Gilbert been pushed forward
while Bragg's forces were engaged with McCook, his army should have
been cut off, captured, or dispersed; Kirby Smith's lying farther
to the north, would also have been imperilled.

Such an opportunity never occurred again in the war.  It is said
Buell was in his tent and the winds were unfavorable.  But where
were his staff officers, who should furnish eyes and ears for their
General?

The Union loss was 39 officers and 806 men killed, 94 officers and
2757 men wounded, total 3696; and captured or missing 13 officers
and 502 men, grand total 4211.  Of these Rousseau's division lost
18 officers and 466 men killed, and 52 officers and 1468 men wounded,
total 2004; and Jackson's division lost 6 officers and 81 men
killed, and 8 officers and 338 men wounded, total 433; grand total,
two divisions, 2437.  The few others killed and wounded were of
the three divisions of the Third Corps.(34)

The Confederate loss, as reported by General Polk, was 510 killed
and 2635 wounded, total 3145; captured 251, grand total 3396.(34)

Bragg withdrew from the field of Perryville during the night after
the battle and united his army with Smith's at Harrodsburg.
Commencing October 13th, he retreated through Southeastern Kentucky
_via_ Cumberland Gap to the Tennessee, thence transferred his army
to Murfreesboro, to which place Breckinridge, also Forrest's cavalry,
had been previously sent.

Thus the great invasion ended.  It bore none of the anticipated
fruits.  Both Bragg and Kirby Smith felt keenly the disappointment
that Kentucky's sons did not rally under their standards.  Bragg
frequently remarked while in Kentucky:  "The people here have too
many fat cattle and are too well off to fight."

From Bryantsville he wrote the Adjutant-General at Richmond:

"The campaign here was predicated on the belief and the most positive
assurances that the people of this country would rise in mass to
assert their independence.  No people ever had so favorable an
opportunity, but I am distressed to add there is little or no
disposition to avail of it."(35)

The conception of the invasion was admirable, and the execution of
the campaign was vigorous, and, under all the circumstances, skilful,
but if the Army of the Ohio had been rapidly moved and boldly
fought, together with its numerous auxiliaries, both Bragg and
Kirby Smith's armies would have been separately beaten and
destroyed.

Buell's army pursued the enemy from Kentucky, and finally concentrated
in front of Nashville.  By direction of the President, October 24,
1862, the State of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River and Northern
Alabama and Georgia became the Department of the Cumberland, and
General W. S. Rosecrans was assigned to its command, his troops to
constitute the Fourteenth Army Corps.(36)  Buell was, at the same
date, ordered to turn over his command to Rosecrans.  The latter
relived Buell at Louisville October 30th.  Buell retired to
Indianapolis to await orders.  He was never again assigned to active
duty, though he held his Major-General's commission until May 23,
1864.  He was not without talent, and possessed much technical
military learning; was a good organizer and disciplinarian, but
was better qualified for an adjutant's office than a command in
the field.  Many things said of him were untrue or unjust, yet the
fact remains that he failed as an independent commander of an army
during field operations.  With great opportunities, he did not
achieve _success_--the only test of greatness in war--possibly in
any situation in life.  He was not, however, the least of a class
developed and brought to the front by the exigencies of war, who
were not equal to the work assigned them, or who could not or did
not avail themselves of the opportunities presented.

Rosecrans, while in command of the Army of the Cumberland, won the
battle of Stone's River (December 31, 1862); then pushed Bragg across
the Tennessee and fought the great battle of Chickamauga, September
19 and 20, 1863.  He was relieved at Chattanooga by Thomas, October
19, 1863, and was assigned to the Department of Missouri, January
28, 1864.  In this new field Rosecrans displayed much activity and
performed good service, but he was relieved again, December 9,
1864, and thereafter was on waiting orders at Cincinnati.
Notwithstanding some mistakes, his character as a great soldier
and commanding general will stand the severe scrutiny of military
critics.  He was a man of many attainments, a fine conversationalist,
and a genial gentleman who drew to him many devoted friends.

This chapter, already of greater length than was originally designed,
must here end, as I must turn to other campaigns, armies, and fields
of battle more nearly connected with my further career in the War
of the Rebellion.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 838-841.

( 2)  _Ibid_., Part II., p. 290.

( 3)  _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 910.

( 4)  _Ibid_., vol. xvi., Part II., p. 404.

( 5)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., p. 39, and see _War Records_,
vol. xvi., Part II., pp. 394, 395.

( 6)  _Ohio in the War_, vol. i., p. 93.

( 7)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. ii., p. 736.

( 8)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. ii., p. 744, map.

( 9)  _War Records_, vol. xvii., Part I., pp. 158, 170; _Battles
and Leaders_, vol. ii., p. 752.

(10)  _War Records_, vol. xvii., Part I., p. 176.

(11)  _Ibid_., p. 381 (382-4).

(12)  _Ibid_., p. 158, 308.

(13)  _War Records_, vol. xvii., Part I., pp. 205-8, 302, 322.

(14)  _Ibid_., p. 158; Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. i., p. 417.

(15)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. ii., p. 753; _War Records_
(Rosecrans' Report), vol. xvii., Part I., p. 170.

(16)  Atlas, _War Records_, Part V., plate 24.

(17)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., p. 978.

(18)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 966, 970.

(19)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., pp. 603-42.

(20)  While the army was massed at Dripping Springs, a beef-ox
escaped from a herd about midnight, and in wild frenzy rushed back
and forth through the army, jumping on and running over the bivouacked
sleeping soldiers, seriously injuring many, until a large part of
the army was alarmed and called up.  He was finally surrounded and
bayoneted to death.

(21)  Atlas, _War Records_, Part V., plate 24.

(22)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 862-8.

(23)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., p. 862-8.

(24)  _Ibid_., Part II., p. 564.

(25)  _Ibid_., pp. 539, 554-5, 560.

(26)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part II., pp. 554-5, 560.

(27)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., pp. 43, 61.

(28)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., pp. 47, 602.

(29)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., pp. 602, 47.

(30)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 1092-6.

(31)  _Ibid_., Part II., p. 580.

(32)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 1092-3.

(33)  _Ibid_., p. 1040.

(34)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., pp. 1033, 1112.

(35)  _War Records_, vol. xvi., Part I., p. 1088.

(36)  _Ibid_., Part II., pp. 641, 654.


CHAPTER IX
Commissioned Colonel of 110th Ohio Volunteers--Campaigns in West
Virginia under General Milroy, 1862-3--Emancipation of Slaves in
the Shenandoah Valley, and Incidents

On September 30, 1862, I arrived at Columbus, Ohio, from Louisville,
and was at once commissioned Colonel of the 110th Ohio Volunteer
Infantry.  My regiment was at Camp Piqua, Ohio, not yet organized
and without arms or clothing.  I found the camp in command of a
militia colonel, appointed for the purpose.

The men of the 110th Ohio were for the most part recruited from
the country, and were being fed in camp, in large part, by home-
food voluntarily furnished by their friends.  They were a fine body
of young men, but none of the officers had seen military service.

I declined to assume command of the camp or regiment until clothing
and arms could be procured.  Three or four days sufficed to obtain
these supplies, but only percussion-cap smooth-bore .69 calibre
muskets could be obtained.  These guns were heavy, long, and
unwieldy, and much inferior to the Springfield .58 calibre rifle,
but I accepted them temporarily rather than be delayed in the drill
and discipline of the regiment, which was impossible without them.

On assuming command, I called the officers of the regiment together
and explained to them their duties as well as my own, and especially
informed each company commander that he would be required to qualify
himself to command his company, and that all times he would be held
responsible for its soldierly conduct.  A school of officers was
established, and the whole camp soon wore a military aspect.  The
work thus commenced in time transformed these raw volunteers into
officers and soldiers as good as ever fought in any war or country.( 1)

The environments of Camp Piqua were not favorable to discipline,
but on October 19, 1862, the regiment took cars and proceeded _via_
Columbus to Zanesville, thence by water to Marietta, and from the
latter place on foot to Parkersburg, West Virginia, where it first
occupied and camped in what was called the enemy's country.  An
early but severe snow-storm came during the first night of our
encampment, and suggested the hardship and suffering which were
not to cease until the final victory at Appomattox.  Drill and
discipline went on satisfactorily.  New troops will bravely stand
to their work in battle if they can be manoeuvred successfully,
and also know how to use their arms.  General J. D. Cox, in command
of the District of West Virginia, with his uniform courtesy welcomed
me by telegraph to my new field of operations.  In a few days I
was ordered to Clarksburg and to a section familiar to me when
serving under McClellan.

At Parkersburg I first me the 122d Ohio Infantry, commanded by Col.
Wm. H. Ball.  He was my junior in date of muster eight days and,
consequently, in more than two years our regiments served together,
I generally commanded him.  He was not an educated soldier, and
did not aspire to become one, nor did he take pains to appear well
on drill or on parade, yet he was a most valuable officer, loyal
and intelligently brave, possessing enough mental capacity to
successfully fill any position.  He did not aspire to high command,
but at all times faithfully performed his duty in camp and on the
battle-field.  His loyalty to me, while my senior in years, still
claims my gratitude.

His regiment, like the volunteer regiments generally, had in it
many men who became prominent in the war, and, still later, in
peace.  Lieutenant-Colonel Moses M. Granger was a most accomplished
officer, and deserved a higher rank.  In addition to the distinction
won by him as a soldier he has attained a high reputation as a
citizen, lawyer, and jurist.

The first surgeon (Thaddeus A. Reamy) of the 122d, though not long
in the field, has taken a first place in his profession, as has
also its next surgeon, Wm. M. Houston, and its assistant surgeon,
Wilson G. Bryant.  Its chaplain, Charles C. McCabe, was one of the
best and most efficient in the war.  His zeal in the performance,
under all circumstances, of the high duties of his office, and his
cheerful disposition, aided in trying times to keep up the spirits
and courage of the soldiers.  He ministered to the wounded and the
dying on the battlefield, and to the sick and disabled in hospital.
He was famed throughout the armies he served with for singing at
appropriate times, with a strong, melodious voice, patriotic and
religious songs, in which, often even on the march, a large part
of the army would join.

He has since achieved success in the Methodist Episcopal Church,
in which he is now a bishop.  William T. Meloy, D. D., of the United
Presbyterian Church--now in Chicago--was a lieutenant in this
regiment.  He has become eminent for his learning and high character.
Those named of these companion regiments are examples only of others
who voluntarily and heroically endured the trying ordeal of war.

A false report that Stonewall Jackson was threatening a raid on
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at New Creek (now Keyser), West
Virginia, caused a precipitate transfer by rail of my command to
that place.  There I came first under the direct command of Major-
General Robert H. Milroy, then distinguished for his zeal for the
Union and for personal bravery.  He was tall and of commanding
presence.  His head of white, shocky, stiff hair led his soldiers
to dub him the "Gray Eagle."  He had much military learning, and
had fought in many of the bloodiest battles of the war, notably at
the second Bull Run under Pope.  He had seen service also in the
Mexican War.  Notwithstanding his excessive impetuosity, he was a
just, generous, kind-hearted man, and possessed the confidence of
his troops to a high degree.  He incurred the ill-will of Secretary
of War Stanton, and, regarding himself as unjustly treated, more
than reciprocated the Secretary's dislike.  He ardently admired
President Lincoln, and only criticised him for delay in emancipating
the slaves.  He believed the slaves of those in rebellion should
have been given their freedom from the beginning of the war.  He
was so bitterly hostile to slavery and to individual Secessionists,
and so radical in his methods, that Jefferson Davis, by proclamation,
excepted him and his officers from being treated, if captured, as
prisoners of war.  He was charged with making assessments on
inhabitants and of requiring them to take an oath to support the
Constitution and the Union.  He also had the distinction of being
mentioned by Davis in a Message to the Confederate Congress, January
12, 1863.  There was much correspondence between the opposing
authorities on the subject of his mode of conducting the war,( 2)
and it seems General Halleck disavowed and condemned Milroy's
alleged acts.  Much charged against Milroy was false, though it
was true he believed in prosecuting the war with an iron hand.  He
regarded the Confederate soldier in the field with more favor than
the Confederate stay-at-home who acted as a spy, or who, as a
guerilla, engaged in shooting from ambush passing soldiers or
teamsters and cutting telegraph wires.  He did require certain
influential persons who resided within his lines to take an oath
of allegiance to the United States and to West Virginia or to
forfeit all right to the protection of his division.  Further than
this he did not go.

At New Creek I first met G. P. Cluseret, a French soldier of fortune,
but recently appointed a Brigadier-General.  He held a command
under Milroy in the Cheat Mountain Division.  He assumed much
military and other learning, was imperious and overbearing by
nature, spoke English imperfectly, and did not seem to desire to
get in touch with volunteers.  With him I had my only personal
difficulty of a serious nature during the war.

At New Creek a constant drill was kept up.  To avoid surprises by
sudden dashes, the companies as well as the battalion were taught
to form squares quickly and to guard against cavalry.  Early in
December Milroy marched to Little Petersburg, on the South Branch
of the Potomac, and I was assigned to command a post at Moorefield
to include Hardy County, West Virginia, Milroy's headquarters being
ten miles distant.  General Lee ordered General W. E. Jones, then
temporarily in command in the Shenandoah Valley, to retake the
county we occupied.  A feeble effort to do this failed.  We were
kept constantly on the alert, however, by annoying attacks of
Captain McNeil's irregular cavalry or guerillas.  Late in December,
1862, it was decided to make a raid into the lower Shenandoah
Valley, and, if found practicable, occupy it permanently.  I was
designated to lead the raid with about two thousand infantry,
cavalry, and artillery.  This made it necessary for me to be relieved
of the command of the post.  Cluseret was therefore ordered from
Petersburg to relieve me.  He arrived late in the evening with his
staff and escort, showed his orders, and I suggested that he assume
the command at once.  This he declined to do until he ascertained
the position of the troops, roads, etc.  I provided him comfortable
quarters, and everything would have gone along pleasantly but for
an unexpected incident.

Before Cluseret's arrival, a lieutenant-colonel of a West Virginia
regiment applied for leave to go to Petersburg to visit a lady
friend.  This I refused, and he undertook to go without leave.
After he had proceeded along the river road by moonlight about
three miles, he was halted by a man who, from behind a tree, pointed
a musket at him and demanded his surrender and that he deliver up
his sword, pistols, overcoat, horse, and trappings, all of which
he did promptly, and accepted a parole.  The man who made the
capture claimed to be a regular Confederate soldier returning from
a furlough to his command.  With the colonel's property and on the
horse he proceeded by a mountain path on his journey.  The colonel
walked back to Moorefield and related his adventure.  I at once
ordered Captain Rowan with a small number of his West Virginia
cavalry to pursue the Confederate.  As there was snow on the ground,
his pursuit was easy, and before midnight the Captain had captured
him and all the colonel's property was returned to Moorefield.
When the man was brought before me, I made some examination of him
and then ordered him taken to the guard-house.  At this time Cluseret
appeared on the scene, and in an excited way demanded that I should
order the prisoner to be shot forthwith.  This being declined, he
again produced his order to supersede me, and declared he would at
once take command and himself order the man shot that night.  I
could not deny his right to assume command notwithstanding what
had taken place, but I strongly denied his authority to shoot the
captive, and insisted that there was no cause for shooting him
summarily; that only through a court-martial or military commission
could he be condemned, and a sentence to death would, to carry it
out, require the approval of the President.  (It was not until
later in the war that department, district, or army commanders
could approve a capital sentence.)  Cluseret vehemently denounced
the authorities, including the President, for their mild way of
carrying on the war, and talked himself into a frenzy.  As he was
preparing an order to require the Provost-Marshal to shoot the man
without trial, I repaired to the telegraph office and made Milroy
acquainted with the situation, whereupon he ordered me to retain
command of the post until further orders.  Milroy, on coming to
Moorefield the next day, sustained me, and the soldier was treated
as an ordinary prisoner of war.  Cluseret pretended to be satisfied,
and later succeeded in getting himself assigned to command the
expedition to the Shenandoah Valley--not a very desirable one in
mid-winter.  He reached Strasburg, and moved through the Valley
northward to Winchester, but was pursued by a small force under
Jones.  This made it necessary to reinforce him, and I started
under orders for that place _via_ Romney and Blue's Gap, and was
joined on the way by Milroy with the body of his division.  On
leaving Moorefield, on the 30th of December, I with two orderlies
rode ahead about a mile to the South Branch of the Potomac to
examine the ford, as we had no pontoons, and, having crossed the
river, awaited the approach of the wagon train and its guard, which
was to take the advance, as no enemy was known to be in that
direction.  As the head of the train reached the ford Captain J.
H. McNeil (whose home was near by), with about fifty of his guerilla
band, attacked it by emerging from ambush on the Moorefield side
of the river.  A short fight ensued, during which I recrossed the
river and joined in it.  McNeil was driven off with little loss,
but for a brief time I was in much danger of capture, at least.

On this day a colored boy, an escaped slave, whom we named Andrew
Jackson, joined me.  He became my servant to the end of the war.
He was always faithful, honest, good-natured, and brave.  He was
a full-blood African, and during a battle would voluntarily take
a soldier's arms and fight with the advance lines.  He became widely
known throughout the Army of the Potomac and other armies in which
I served, and was kindly treated and welcomed wherever he went.
He resided after the war in Springfield, Ohio, and died there (1895)
of an injury resulting from the kick of a horse.

On the night of December 31, 1862, the command bivouacked on the
western slope of the Alleghany Mountains in a fierce snow-storm,
and early the next morning my troops led the way in the continuing
storm over the summit.  Shortly after the head of the column
commenced the eastern descent, and when the chilling winter blasts
had caused the lowest ebb of human enthusiasm to be reached, shouts
were heard by me, at first indistinctly, then nearer and louder.
This was so unusual and unexpected under the depressing circumstances
that I ordered the column to halt until I could go back and ascertain
the cause.  My first impression was that a sudden attack had been
made on the rear of the troops, but as the shouts came nearer I
took them to be for a great victory, news of which had just arrived.
When I reached the crest of the mountain I descried, through the
flying snow, General Milroy riding along the line of troops and
halting at intervals as though to briefly address the men.  I
awaited his approach, and on his arrival accosted him with the
inquiry, "What is the matter, General?"  He had his hat and sword
in his right hand, and with the other guided his horse at a reckless
gallop through the snow, his tall form, shocky white hair fluttering
in the storm, and evident agitation making a figure most picturesque
and striking.  He pulled up his horse abruptly to answer my question.
A natural impediment in his speech, affecting him most when excited,
caused some delay in his first vehement utterance.  He said:

"_Colonel, don't you know that this is Emancipation Day, when all
slaves will be made free?_"

He then turned to the halted troops and again broke forth:

"_This day President Lincoln will proclaim the freedom of four
millions of human slaves, the most important event in the history
of the world since Christ was born.  Our boast that this is a land
of liberty has been a flaunting lie.  Henceforth it will be a
veritable reality.  The defeats of our armies in the past we have
deserved, because we waged a war to protect and perpetuate and to
rivet firmer the chains of slavery.  Hereafter we shall prosecute
the war to establish and perpetuate liberty for all mankind beneath
the flag; and the Lord God Almighty will fight on our side, and he
is a host, and the Union armies will triumph_."

This is the character of speech that aroused the soldiers to voiceful
demonstrations on the summit of the Appalachian chain on this cold
and stormy mid-winter morning.  The sequel shows how Milroy's
prophecy was fulfilled; but not always did victory come to the
Union arms.  As in the days of the Crusades, when the Lord was
supposed to battle on the side of the Crusaders, victory was not
uniformly with them.  Charles Martel, believing in prayer for divine
aid on going into battle, yet testified that the "Lord always fights
on the side of the heaviest battalions"; which was only another
way of saying, "The Lord helps those who help themselves."

Milroy's command debouched into the Valley of the Shenandoah,
already memorable for its many bloody conflicts, and destined to
become yet more memorable by reason of still other and far bloodier
battles.

This war-stricken valley, from Staunton to the Potomac, was beautiful
and rich, and its inhabitants were, prior to the war, proud and
boastful; they possessed many slaves to till the soil and for
personal servants.  It was also a breeding-ground for slaves which,
in a more southern market, brought great profit to their owners.
Winchester was the home of the Masons and others, distinguished as
statesmen and soldiers through all the history of Virginia.

But not all the inhabitants of the Shenandoah valley were disloyal.
A majority of its voting population was, before the war actually
commenced, in favor of the Union, and its Representatives voted
against an Ordinance of Secession.  I have seen an address of Philip
Williams, Esq., an old, respected, and distinguished lawyer of
Winchester, made when the question of Secession was pending, in
which he attempted to depict the horrors of the war that would
follow an attempt to set up an independent government.  He prophesied
that the valley would be a battle-ground for the contending hosts;
that the fields would be overrun, the crops destroyed, grain and
stock confiscated; and the slaves carried off and set free.  His
address brought him for a time into ridicule.  He lived to see his
word-picture appear as only a vain, faint representation of the
reality.  When the war came, and his sons and friends joined the
Confederate Army, his sympathies were with the South.  He often
recurred, however, to his more than fulfilled prophecy.  He lived
to see the valley for ninety or more miles of its length reek with
blood; the houses, whether in city or village, turned into hospitals,
and the war-lit fires of burning mills, barns, and grain stacks
illuminate the valley and the mountain slopes to the summits of
the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies on its east and west.  Pen cannot
adequately describe the hell of agony, desolation, and despair
witnessed in this fertile region in the four years of war; and long
before the conflict ended not a human slave was held therein.  It,
however, has long since, under a new civilization, recovered its
wonted prosperity, and no inhabitant thereof, though many are the
sons and daughters of slaveholders, desires to again hold slaves.
Not all the affluent ante-bellum inhabitants of this valley owned
slaves or believed in slavery.  Many were Quakers, others Dunkards
(or Tunkers), all of whom were, by religious training and conviction,
opposed to human slavery, hence opposed to Secession and a slave
power.  Some of the younger men of Quaker or Dunkard families
through compulsion joined the Confederate Army, but the number was
small.  Though opposed to war, no more loyal Union people could be
found anywhere.  Their Secession neighbors called them "_Tories_,"
and the Quakers descendants of Tories of the Revolution.  It was
common to hear related the story of the imprisonment at Winchester,
under General Washington's order, of certain Quakers of Philadelphia,
claimed to have been Tories, who were given a twenty-mile prison-
bound limit, and who, when peace came, coveting the rich lands of
the valley, and being humiliated over their imprisonment, sent for
their families and settled there permanently.  Whether or not this
story gives the true reason for the early settlement of the Quakers
in Virginia, certain it is that they were loyal to the Union that
Washington helped to found and opposed to human bondage.

Milroy's enthusiasm over Emancipation was put in practice when he
entered Winchester.  Without seeing the Proclamation of the President,
and without knowing certainly it was issued and made applicable to
the Shenandoah Valley district, Milroy issued a proclamation headed,
"Freedom to Slaves."  This had the effect of causing those within
the lines of his command at once to leave their masters.  Though
the slaves could not read, not one failed during the succeeding
night to hear that liberty had been proclaimed, and all, even to
the most trusted and faithful personal or house servant, regardless
of age, sex, or previous kind treatment, so far as known, asserted
their freedom.  In some way it had been inculcated into the minds
of these people that if they, by word or act, however simple or
unimportant it might be, after the Proclamation acquiesced in their
previous condition they would again for life become slaves.  They
probably derived this notion from the Bible story of Hebrew slavery,
wherein it is said that after six years' service the slave should
become free, save when, preferring slavery, he voluntarily permitted
his former master to bore his ears with an awl at the door-post
and thus consecrate himself to slavery forever.( 3)

So it turned out that many aristocratic matrons and maidens, reared
in luxury and accustomed to the personal service of servants, had
to cook their own breakfasts or go hungry, as no amount of persuasion,
kind treatment, or promises would induce the former slave to do
the least act that by possibility could be construed to be an
acquiescence in a previous condition of servitude.  Even the
assurance of a Union officer could not shake their position.  The
"Year of Jubilee," of which they had sung in their hearts, had been
long coming for them, and there was no use for awls and door-posts
for their ears, nor were they going to take chances.  Many of them,
though offered food for their own use by their masters, would not
cook it, lest it might be construed as a recognition of a master's
continuing authority over them.  Most of them gathered up their
little property with marvellous dispatch and presented themselves
ready to emigrate.  General Milroy used the otherwise empty trains
going north for supplies to carry these freed people from the land
of their birth to where a slave condition could not overtake them.
Most of the knew the story of John Brown, and many of them had, in
some way, been supplied with cheap wood-cut pictures of this early
champion of their liberty.  In some way they had learned also to
sing songs of John Brown, and other songs of liberty.  When the
trains proceeded towards the Potomac freighted with these people
they commingled songs of freedom and the religious hymns peculiar
to their race with the universal but more cheerful music of the
fiddle and banjo.

They were light-hearted and free from care, though abandoning all
of home they had ever known, and going whither, for home and
protection, they knew not,--all was compensated for with them, if
only they were forever free.  The prompt emancipation of slaves
was exceptional in the Shenandoah Valley, especially at Winchester.
Most of these freed people soon found homes and employment, some
of the younger men with the army, later as soldiers, and others on
farms, or as house servants North, where the war had called away
the able-bodied men.  It was not until after the war that the great
trials of the freedmen came.

It must not be assumed that the slave owners in the Valley were,
in war times at least, cruel to their slaves; on the contrary,
kindness and indulgence were the rule.  This was probably true in
ante-war days, save when members of families were sold and separated
to be transported to distant parts.  I recall no word of censure
to the blacks for accepting freedom.  Pity was in some cases
expressed.  Tokens of remembrance were offered and accepted with
emotion.  Those who had been house or personal servants often
evinced feelings of compassion for the pitiable and helpless
condition of those whom they had so long served.  It must be
remembered that, regardless of estates once owned, the war had
impoverished the people of this Valley, and but few of them could,
even with money, secure enough food, clothing, and help to enable
them to live in anything approaching comfort.  And the future then
had no promise of relief.

The plight of some of the affluent people might well excite sympathy.
I remember an excellent Winchester family of four ladies, a mother
and three grown daughters, who were educated and accomplished,
unused to work, and thus far wholly dependent on their slaves.
White or black servants could not, after the Proclamation, be
procured for money.  These ladies therefore held a consultation to
determine what could be done.  The mother would not attempt to do
what she deemed menial service.  The daughters at length decided
to work "week about," and in this way each could be a _lady_ two
weeks out of three.  This plan seemed to operate well, and they
soon became quite cheerful over it, and boastful of domestic
accomplishments.

Cluseret while on his raid into the Valley brooded over the incident
which resulted in his being prevented from taking command of the
post at Moorefield, and pretended to believe that I had wronged
him.  He went so far as to talk freely to officers about the
incident, and to declare that if he should meet me again he would
shoot me unless I made amends.  These threats came to me on my
arrival at Winchester, and my friends seemed to apprehend serious
consequences.  As I always deprecated personal conflicts, and was
careful to avoid them, I was somewhat annoyed.  I knew little of
Cluseret or his character, except that he was an adventurer or
soldier of fortune.  I announced nothing as to what I should do if
he attempted to assault me, but I took pains to carry a revolver
with which I purposed, if attacked, to kill him if possible before
I received any serious injury.  I soon met, saluted, and passed
him without receiving and recognition in return except a fierce,
vicious stare.  After this, on several occasions, I passed him
about the camps or on the roads without noticing him, and although
his threats were repeated I was not molested by him.  Soon the
incident and his subsequent conduct led to some trouble between
him and Milroy.  Milroy placed him in arrest, and he was later
ordered from the command.  On March 2, 1863, he was permitted to
resign, having served as a Brigadier-General of Volunteers from
October 11, 1862, and having previously, from March 10, 1862, been
a Colonel and acting aide-de-camp.  He repaired to New York, and
there did some newspaper work in which he assailed President Lincoln
and the conduct of the war, and subsequently disappeared.  Afterwards
he became the Secretary of War of the Commune in Paris, near the
close of the Franco-Prussian War.  He escaped from Paris at its
close, and years later, being pardoned, he returned to France, and
is now, I am informed, a Socialist member of the Chamber of
Deputies.

There were many such adventurers as Cluseret from foreign countries
who received commissions in our volunteer army on account of their
supposed military knowledge or experience, who almost without
exception proved failures or worse.  They were generally domineering,
and of a temperament not suited to command the American volunteer
soldier.  They had, in fact, no affinity with him, and did not gain
his confidence.  This was not true, however, of General John B.
Turchin, the Russian, and perhaps a very few others.

Milroy's command during the winter was chiefly engaged in holding
the Valley and in protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from
the raids of small bodies of Confederates.  In this it was successful.
We were now in the Middle Department, commanded by General Robert
C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore.  Schenck was
appointed a Brigadier-General of Volunteers May 17, 1861, and a
Major-General August 30, 1862.  Prior to his assignment to this
department he served with distinction in the Eastern army, and was
elected to Congress in 1862, but retained his commission until
Congress met, December 5, 1863.  Schenck, though without military
education or experience, was a man of military instincts and
possessed many of the high qualities of a soldier.  He was a trained
statesman, lawyer, and thinker, and an earnest, energetic, forceful,
successful man.

For the most part, while at Winchester I commanded a brigade composed
of infantry and artillery, located on the heights, but I was for
a time under Brigadier-General Washington L. Elliott, a regular
officer, who was amiable and capable in all that pertained to
military discipline, but timid and unenterprising.  He performed
all duty faithfully to orders, but little further.  Milroy, on the
other hand, was restless and constantly on the alert, eager to
achieve all it was possible for his command to accomplish, hence
we were frequently sent on raids up the Valley to Staunton, Front
Royal, and through the mountains.  Colonel Mosby's guerillas infested
the country east of the Valley, and frequently dashed into it
through the gaps of the Blue Ridge and attacked our supply trains
and small scouting parties and pickets, accomplishing little save
to keep us on the alert.

Imboden and Jenkins' cavalry held the upper valley in the neighborhood
of Mount Jackson and New Market, but generally retired without
fighting when an expedition moved against them.  As we were in the
enemy's country, our movements were generally made known promptly
to the Confederates, and our expeditions usually proved fruitless
of substantial results.  I led a force of about one thousand men
in January, 1863, to Front Royal, then held by a small cavalry
force which I hoped to surprise and capture, but I succeeded in
doing nothing more than take a few prisoners and drive the enemy
from the place, with little fighting.  We took Front Royal late in
the evening of a very cold night, and decided to hold it until the
next day.  Not being sure of our strength, and to avoid a surprise,
I was obliged to keep my men on duty throughout the night.  A feeble
attack only was made on us at daybreak.

Illustrating the way Union officers were regarded and treated by
the Secession inhabitants, I recall an incident which occurred at
Front Royal.  A member of my staff arranged for supper at the house
of Colonel Bacon, an old man and Secessionist.  The Colonel treated
us politely, but while we were eating a number of ladies of the
town assembled in an adjoining parlor in which there was a piano,
threw the communicating door open, and proceeded to sing such
Confederate war-songs as _Stonewall Jackson's Away_ and _My Maryland_.
We of course accepted good humoredly this concert for our benefit,
but when we had finished supper, uninvited, Chaplain McCabe--now
Bishop McCabe--and I stepped into the parlor.  We were not even
offered a seat, and in a short time the music ceased and the lady
at the piano left it.  Chaplain McCabe at once seated himself at
the piano, and, to the amazement of the ladies, commenced singing,
with his extraordinarily strong, sonorous voice, "We are coming,
Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more."  The ladies stood
their ground courageously for a time, but while the Chaplain,
playing his own accompaniment, was singing _My Maryland_, with
words descriptive of Lee's invasion and retreat from Maryland,
including the words, "And they left Antietam in their track, in
their track," the ladies threw open the front door and rushed
precipitately to the street and thence to their homes.  It was
afterwards said that we were ungallant to these ladies.

While at Winchester, besides the usual camp duty and participation
in an occasional raid, I was President of a Military Commission
composed of three officers, with an officer for recorder.  It was
modelled on the military commission first established, I believe,
by General Scott in Mexico for the trial of citizens for offences
not punishable under the Articles of War.  There was a necessity
for some authority to take jurisdiction of common law crimes, as
all courts in the valley were suspended.  Besides citizens charged
with such crimes, there were referred to the commission for trial
citizens charged with offences against the Union Army, such as
shooting soldiers from ambush, etc.  The constitutionality of the
commission was questioned, yet it tried on only formal charges
citizens charged with murder, larceny, burglary, arson, and breaches
of the peace.  Generally its findings and sentences were approved
by the War Department or the President, even when the accused was
sentenced to imprisonment in a Northern penitentiary.  There were
one or two cases where the accused were sentenced to be shot, but
in no case did the President allow such a sentence to be carried
out.  During the trial for murder of an old man by the name of
Buffenbarger, I learned that he had, at Sharpsburg, Maryland, been
a friend of my father when both were young men.( 4)  It turned out
that Buffenbarger had killed a young and powerful man who had
assaulted him violently without good cause.  A majority of the
commission found him guilty of manslaughter, and the commission
gave him the lightest sentence--one year in a penitentiary.  His
early friendship for my father perhaps caused me to find grounds
on which to favor his acquittal.  Counsel were allowed in all cases;
generally Philip Williams, Esq., an old and distinguished lawyer
of Winchester, represented the accused, and Captain Zebulon Baird,
Judge-Advocate on Milroy's staff (an able Indiana lawyer), appeared
for the prosecution.

( 1)  For special mention of the officers of this regiment, see
Appendix B.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. xxi., p. 1054.

( 3)  Ex. xxi., 6; Deut. xv., 17.

( 4)  My father, Joseph Keifer, was born at Sharpsburg, February
28, 1784.


SLAVERY AND
FOUR YEARS OF WAR

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY
IN THE UNITED STATES

TOGETHER WITH A NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGNS
AND BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN WHICH
THE AUTHOR TOOK PART:  1861-1865

BY
JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS; EX-SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, U. S. A.; AND MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS,
SPANISH WAR.

ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME II.
1863-1865

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1900


Copyright, 1900

BY
JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER

The Knickerbocker Press, New York


CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
General Observations on Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville
--Battles at Winchester under General Milroy--His Defeat and Retreat
to Harper's Ferry--With Incidents

CHAPTER II
Invasion of Pennsylvania--Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg--Lee's
Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses on Both Sides

CHAPTER III
New York Riots, 1863--Pursuit of Lee's Army to the Rappahannock--Action
of Wapping Heights, and Skirmishes--Western Troops Sent to New York
to Enforce the Draft--Their Return--Incidents, etc.

CHAPTER IV
Advance of Lee's Army, October, 1863, and Retreat of the Army of
the Potomac to Centreville--Battle of Bristoe Station--Advance of
the Union Army, November, 1863--Assault and Capture of Rappahannock
Station, and Forcing the Fords--Affair Near Brandy Station, and
Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan--Incidents, etc.

CHAPTER V
Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863--Winter
Cantonment (1863-4) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court-House,
and its Reorganization--Grant Assigned to Command the Union Armies,
and Preparation for Aggressive War

CHAPTER VI
Plans of Campaigns, Union and Confederate--Campaign and Battle of
the Wilderness, May, 1864--Author Wounded, and Personal Matters--
Movements of the Army to the James River, with Mention of Battles
of Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Other Engagements, and Statement
of Losses and Captures

CHAPTER VII
Campaign South of James River and Petersburg--Hunter's Raid--Battle
of Monocacy--Early's Advance on Washington (1864)--Sheridan's
Movements in Shenandoah Valley, and Other Events

CHAPTER VIII
Personal Mention of Generals Sheridan, Wright, and Ricketts, and
Mrs. Ricketts; also Generals Crook and Hayes--Battle of Opequon,
under Sheridan, September 1864, and Incidents

CHAPTER IX
Battle of Fisher's Hill--Pursuit of Early--Devastation of the
Shenandoah Valley (1864)--Cavalry Battle at Tom's Brook, and Minor
Events

CHAPTER X
Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments thereon--
also Personal Mention and Incidents

CHAPTER XI
Peace Negotiations--Lee's Suggestion to Jefferson Davis, 1862--
Fernando Wood's Correspondence with Mr. Lincoln, 1862--Mr. Stephens
at Fortress Monroe, 1863--Horace Greeley, Niagara Falls Conference,
1864--Jacquess-Gilmore's Visits to Richmond, 1863-4--F. P. Blair,
Sen., Conferences with Mr. Davis, 1865--Hampton Roads Conference,
Mr. Lincoln and Seward and Stephens and Others, 1865--Ord-Longstreet,
Lee and Grant, Correspondence, 1865; and Lew Wallace and General
Slaughter, Point Isabel Conference, 1865

CHAPTER XII
Siege of Richmond and Petersburg--Capture and Recapture of Fort
Stedman, and Capture of Part of Enemy's First Line in Front of
Petersburg by Keifer's Brigade, March 25, 1865--Battle of Five
Forks, April 1st--Assault and Taking of Confederate Works on the
Union Left, April 2d--Surrender of Richmond and Petersburg, April
3d--President Lincoln's Visit to Petersburg and Richmond, and His
Death

CHAPTER XIII
Battle of Sailor's Creek, April 6th--Capitulation of General Robert
E. Lee's Army at Appomattox Court-House, April 9, 1865--Surrender
of Other Confederate Armies, and End of the War of The Rebellion

APPENDICES

_A_
General Keifer
  Ancestry and Life before the Civil War
  Public Services in Civil Life
  Service in Spanish War

_B_
Mention of Officers of the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry

_C_
Farewell Order of General Keifer in Civil War
Casualties in Keifer's Brigade

_D_
Correspondence between Generals Wright and Keifer Relating to Battle
of Sailor's Creek

_E_
Letter of General Keifer to General Corbin on Cuba

_F_
List of Officers who Served on General Keifer's Staff in Spanish War

_G_
Farewell Order of General Keifer in Spanish War


ILLUSTRATIONS

Major-General George Gordon Meade, U.S.A., August 18, 1864

Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Major-General Robert C. Schenck [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Major-General Frank Wheaton [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Brevet Brigadier-General J. Warren Keifer [From a photograph taken
1865.]

Major-General William H. French [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Map of Orange Grove Battle-Field, Mine Run, Va. [November 27, 1863.]

Brevet Brigadier-General John W. Horn, Sixth Maryland Volunteers
[From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brevet Brigadier-General M. R. McClennan, 138th Pennsylvania
Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brigadier-General Joseph B. Carr [From a photograph taken since
the war.]

Colonel James W. Snyder, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery [From a
photograph taken 1865.]

Major Wm. S. McElwain, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1863.]

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron Spangler, 110th Ohio Volunteers
[From a photograph taken 1863.]

Major-General Horatio G. Wright [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Major-General James B. Ricketts [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Fanny Ricketts [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Captain Wm. A. Hathaway, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1863.]

Brevet Major Jonathan T. Rorer, 138th Pennsylvania Volunteers [From
a photograph taken 1865.]

General Philip H. Sheridan, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1885.]

Battle-Field of Opequon, Va. [September 19, 1864.  From the official
map, 1873.]

Brevet Major-General Rutherford B. Hayes [From a photograph taken
from a painting.]

Brevet Colonel Moses M. Granger, 122d Ohio Volunteers [From a
photograph taken 1864.]

Lieutenant-Colonel Aarom W. Ebright, 126th Ohio Volunteers [From
a photograph taken 1864.]

Battle-Field of Fisher's Hill, Va. [September, 1864.  From the
official map.]

Major-General George Crook, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1888.]

Major-General Geo. W. Getty [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brigadier-General Wm. H. Seward [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Map of Cedar Creek Battle-Field, Va. [October 19, 1864.]

Captain J. C. Ullery, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1865.]

Brevet Colonel Otho H. Binkley, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a
photograph taken 1865.]

Petersburg, Va., Fortifications, 1865

Brevet Colonel Clifton K. Prentiss, Sixth Maryland Volunteers [From
a photograph taken 1865.]

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. N. Foster, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a
photograph taken 1863.]

John W. Warrington, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1899.]

John B. Elam, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1899.]

Brevet Major-General J. Warren Keifer and Staff, 1865, Third
Division, Sixth Army Corps

J. Warren Keifer, Major-General of Volunteers [From a photograph
taken 1898.]

President McKinley and Major-Generals Keifer, Shafter, Lawton, and
Wheeler [From a photograph taken on ship-deck at Savannah, Ga.,
December 17, 1898.]


SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS
OF WAR

CHAPTER I
General Observations on Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville
--Battles at Winchester under General Milroy--His Defeat and Retreat
to Harper's Ferry--With Incidents

The Confederate Army, under Lee, invaded Maryland in 1862, and
after the drawn battle of Antietam, September 17th, it retired
through the Shenandoah Valley and the mountain gaps behind the
Rappahannock.

McClellan had failed to take Richmond, and although his army had
fought hard battles on the Chickahominy and at Malvern Hill, it
won no victories that bore fruits save in lists of dead and wounded,
and his army, on being withdrawn from the James in August, 1862,
did not effectively sustain General John Pope at the Second Bull
Run.  On being given command of the combined Union forces at and
about Washington, McClellan again had a large and splendidly equipped
army under him.  He at first exhibited some energy in moving it
into Maryland after Lee, but by his extreme caution and delays
suffered Harper's Ferry to be taken (September 15, 1862), with
10,000 men and an immense supply of arms and stores, and finally,
when fortune smiled on his army at Antietam, he allowed it to lay
quietly on its arms a whole day and long enough to enable Lee to
retreat across the Potomac, where he was permitted to leisurely
withdraw, practically unmolested, southward.  The critical student
of the battle of Antietam will learn of much desperate fighting on
both sides, with no clearly defined general plan of conducting the
battle on either side.  As Lee fought on the defensive, he could
content himself with conforming the movements of his forces to
those of the Union Army.  Stonewall Jackson, after maintaining a
short, spirited battle against Hooker's corps, withdrew his corps
from the engagement at seven o'clock in the morning and did not
return to the field until 4 P.M.( 1)

Generally the Union Army was fought by divisions, and seldom more
than two were engaged at the same time, often only one.  In this
way some of the divisions, for want of proper supports, were cut
to pieces, and others were not engaged at all.  Acting on interior
lines, Lee was enabled to concentrate against the Union attacks
and finally to repulse them.  Notwithstanding this mode of conducting
the battle, the Confederate Army was roughly handled and lost
heavily.

General Ambrose E. Burnside late in the day succeeded in crossing
Antietam Creek at the Stone Bridge and planting himself well on
the Confederate right flank.  McClellan also had, at night, many
fresh troops ready and eager for the next day's battle.  Considerable
parts of his army had not been engaged, and reinforcements came.
The two armies confronted each other all day on the 18th, being
partly engaged in burying the dead, as though a truce existed, and
at night Lee withdrew his army into Virginia.( 2)

Indecisive as this battle was, it is ever to be memorable as, on
its issue, President Lincoln kept a promise to "himself and his
Maker."( 3)  On September 22, 1862, five days later, he issued a
preliminary proclamation announcing his purpose to promulgate,
January 1, 1863, a war measure, declaring free the slaves in all
States or parts of States remaining at that time in rebellion.  He
had long before the battle of Antietam contemplated taking this
action, and hence had prepared this proclamation, and promised
himself to issue it on the Union Army winning a victory.  The
driving of Lee's army out of Maryland, and thus relieving Washington
from further menace, was accepted by him as a fulfilment of the
self-imposed condition.

McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac
while at Orleans, Virginia, November 7, 1862, and Burnside became
his successor.  McClellan never again held any command.

Burnside moved the army to Falmouth, Virginia, opposite Fredericksburg,
on the Rappahannock.  Though only urged to prepare for the offensive,
he precipitated an attack on the Confederate Army, then strongly
intrenched on the heights of Fredericksburg.  He suffered a disastrous
repulse (December 14, 1862) and next day withdrew his army across
the Rappahannock to his camps.

Burnside was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac
January 25, 1863, and Major-General Joseph Hooker succeeded him.

The battle of Chancellorsville was fought, May 1 to 5, 1863, in
the Wilderness country, south of the Rapidan, and resulted in the
defeat of the Union Army and its falling back to its former position
at Falmouth.

The defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville led to a general
belief that another invasion of the North would be made by Lee's
army.  Such an invasion involved Milroy's command at Winchester,
then in the Middle Department, commanded by Major-General Robert
C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore.

This much in retrospect seems necessary to give a better understanding
of the events soon to be mentioned.

Soon after Chancellorsville, the Confederate forces in the upper
Shenandoah Valley became more active, and frequent indecisive
conflicts between them and our scouting parties took place.  Our
regular scouts, who generally travelled by night in Confederate
dress, brought in rumors almost every day of an intended attack on
Winchester by troops from Lee's army.  In May I was given special
charge of these scouts.  So uniform were their reports as to the
proposed attacks that I gave credence to them, and advised Milroy
that unless he was soon to be largely reinforced it would be well
to retire from his exposed position.  He refused to believe that
anything more than a cavalry raid into the Valley or against him
would be made, and he felt strong enough to defeat it.  He argued
that Lee would not dare to detach any part of his infantry force
from the front of the Army of the Potomac.  But in addition to the
reports referred to, I learned as early as the 1st of June, through
correspondence secretly brought within our lines from an officer
of Lee's army to which I gained access, that Lee contemplated a
grand movement North, and that his army would reach Winchester on
June 10, 1863.  The Secessionists of Winchester generally believed
we would be attacked on that day.  I gave this information to
Milroy, but he still persisted in believing the whole story was
gotten up to cause him to disgracefully abandon the Valley.( 4)

The 10th of June came, and the Confederate Army failed to appear.
This confirmed Milroy in his disbelief in a contemplated attack
with a strong force, and my credulity was ridiculed.  As early,
however, as June 8th, Milroy wired Schenck at Baltimore that he
had information that Lee had mounted an infantry division to join
Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper; that the cavalry force there was
"probably more than twice 12,000," and that there was "doubtless
a mighty raid on foot."( 5)  Colonel Don Piatt, Schenck's chief of
staff, visited and inspected the post at Winchester on the 10th
and 11th, and when he reached Martinsburg, Va., on his return on
the 11th, he dispatched Milroy to immediately take steps to remove
his command to Harper's Ferry, leaving at Winchester only a lookout
which could readily fall back to Harper's Ferry.( 6)  This order
was sent in the light of what Piatt deemed the proper construction
of a dispatch of that date from Halleck to Schenck, and from the
latter to him.  Milroy at once wired Schenck of the receipt of the
Piatt dispatch, saying:

"I have sufficient force to hold the place safely, but if any force
is withdrawn the balance will be captured in twenty-four hours.
All should go, or none."

This brought, June 12th, a dispatch from Schenck to Milroy in this
language:

"Lt.-Col. Piatt has . . . misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded
his instructions.  You will make all the required preparations for
withdrawing, but will hold your position in the meantime."

On the 12th Milroy reported skirmishes with Confederate cavalry on
the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, adding:

"I am perfectly certain of my ability to hold this place.  Nothing
but cavalry appears yet.  Let them come."

As late as the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Schenck, in answer to an
inquiry, that he had no reliable information as to rebel infantry
being in the Valley, and the same day Schenck wired his chief of
staff at Harper's Ferry to "Instruct General Milroy to use great
caution, risking nothing unnecessarily, and be prepared for falling
back in good order if overmatched."

Milroy advised Schenck of fighting at Winchester on the 13th, and
from General Kelley, on the same day, Schenck learned for the first
time that General Lee was on his way to drive Milroy out of
Winchester.  Schenck at once _attempted_ to telegraph Milroy to
"fall back, fighting, if necessary, and to keep the road to Harper's
Ferry."

Halleck wired Schenck on the 14th:  "It is reported that Longstreet
and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville,
towards the Valley."( 7)

This was the first intimation that came from Halleck or Hooker that
Lee's army contemplated moving in the direction of the Valley, or
that there was any apprehension that it might escape the vigilance
of the Army of the Potomac, supposed to be confronting it or at
least watching its movements.  Another dispatch came on the 14th
to General Schenck as follows:

"Get Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry if possible.  He will
be 'gobbled up' if he remains, if he is not already past salvation.

  "A. Lincoln,
  "President United States."

It remains to narrate what did take place at Winchester, and then,
in the full light of the facts, to decided upon whom censure or
credit should fall.

When, on the 14th, Halleck announced that Longstreet and Ewell's
corps "have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville towards the
Valley," we had been fighting Ewell's corps, or parts of it, for
two days at Winchester, three days' march from Culpeper, and other
portions of Lee's army had reached the Valley and Martinsburg.
The report that Winchester was to have been attacked on June 10th
was true, but the advance of the Union cavalry south of the
Rappahannock, and its battle on the 9th at Brandy Station, north
of Culpeper Court House (Lee's then headquarters), so disorganized
the Confederate cavalry as to cause a delay in the movement of
Ewell's corps into the Valley, then proceeding _via_ Front Royal.

On the night of the 12th of June my scouts found it impossible to
advance more than four or five miles on the Front Royal, Strasburg,
and Cedar Creek roads before encountering Confederate cavalry
pickets.  This indicated, as was the fact, that close behind them
were heavy bodies of infantry which it was desired to closely mask.
At midnight I had an interview at my own solicitation with Milroy
at his headquarters, when the whole subject of our situation was
discussed.  I was not advised of the orders or dispatches he had
received, nor of his dispatches to Schenck expressing confidence
in his ability to hold Winchester.  Milroy persisted in the notion
that only cavalry were before him, and he was anxious to fight them
and especially averse to retreating under circumstances that might
subject him to the charge of cowardice.  He also sincerely desired
to hold the Valley and protect the Union residents.  He reminded
me fiercely that I had believed in the attack coming on the 10th,
and it had turned out that I was mistaken.  I could make no answer
to this save to suggest that the cavalry battle at Brandy Station
had operated to postpone the attack.

During my acquaintance with Milroy he had evinced confidence in
and friendship for me; now he manifested much annoyance over my
persistence in urging him to order a retreat at once, and finally
he dismissed me rather summarily.( 8)

Early the next morning I received an order to report with my regiment
near Union Mills on the Strasburg pike, and to move upon the Cedar
Creek road, located west of and extending, in general, parallel
with the Strasburg pike.  It was soon ascertained that the enemy
had massed a heavy force upon that road about three miles south of
Winchester.  A section of Carlin's battery under Lieutenant Theaker
reported to me, and with it my regiment moved about a mile southward,
keeping well on the ridge between the pike and the Cedar Creek
road.  The enemy kept under cover, and not having orders to bring
on an engagement I retired the troops to the junction of the two
roads.  About 2 P.M. I was informed that Milroy desired me to make
a strong reconnoissance and develop the strength and position of
the enemy.  To strengthen my forces, the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, and a squadron of the 13th Pennsylvania
Cavalry, were assigned to me.  I moved forward promptly with the
12th on the left on the plain, the infantry and artillery in the
centre covering the Strasburg pike, and the squadron on the ridge
to my right, which extended parallel with the pike.  We proceeded
in this order about a mile, when my skirmishers became closely
engaged with those of the enemy.  It was soon apparent to me that
the enemy extended along a wide front, has advance being only a
thin cover.  But as my orders were to develop the enemy, I brought
my whole command into action, drove in his advance line and with
the artillery shelled the woods behind this line.  We suffered some
loss, but pressed forward until the enemy fell back to the woods
on the left of Kearnstown.  My artillery opened with canister, and
for a few moments our front seemed to be cleared.  But my flankers
now reported the enemy turning my right with at least a brigade of
infantry.  I therefore withdrew slowly and in good order, embracing
every possible opportunity to halt and open fire.  Reinforcements
were reported on the way.  I directed that they should, on their
arrival, be posted on the high ground to the right of the pike in
front of the bridge at Union (or Barton's) Mills to cover our
retreat, which must be made with the artillery and infantry over
this bridge.

Colonel Moss, not believing he could cross the tail-race with its
embankments and the stream below the Mills, commenced moving his
cavalry towards the bridge.  I turned him back with imperative
orders to cover the left flank as long as necessary or possible,
then find a crossing below the Mills.  Unfortunately, when the
artillery reached the bridge in readiness to cross, it was found
occupied by the 123d Ohio, Colonel T. W. Wilson commanding, marching
by the flank to my relief under the guidance of Captain W. L. Shaw,
a staff officer of General Elliott.  This regiment was directed,
as soon as it cleared the bridge, to deploy to the right, advance
upon the high ground, and engage the enemy then pressing forward
in great numbers.  Before Colonel Wilson could get his regiment
into battle-line it was under a destructive fire and lost heavily.
Nevertheless, though the regiment was a comparatively new one, it
soon successfully engaged the enemy, and drove back his advance.
A more gallant fight, under all the circumstances, was never made.
It enabled me to take the artillery over the bridge, and to withdraw
to a new position from which we could cover the bridge with our
artillery and easily repulse the enemy.  Colonels Wilson and Moss
were each withdrawn in good order, the former above and the latter
below the bridge.  Gordon's brigade of Early's division, in an
attempt to cross the bridge, was driven back with considerable loss,
and night came to end this opening battle of Winchester.  A
Confederate prisoner was taken to General Milroy (who, with General
Elliott, joined me at nightfall), who frankly said he was of Hays'
Louisiana brigade, Early's division, Ewell's corps; that Ewell was
on the field commanding in person.  Milroy until then was unwilling
to believe that troops other than cavalry were in his front.

Besides Early's division of Ewell's corps, we fought Maryland troops
which had long been operating in the upper Valley, consisting of
a battalion of infantry (Colonel Herbert), a battalion of cavalry
(Major W. W. Goldsborough), and a battery of artillery.( 9)  I was
not forced to order a retreat until the object of the advance had
been fully attained, and then only when Hays' Louisiana brigade
appeared on my right flank, and the cavalry there were broken and
driven back.  General John B. Gordon (10) (since Senator from
Georgia), who confronted me with five infantry regiments, reports
of this battle:

"About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers,
and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments in reserve.
After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to
bring into line these two regiments on the right and on the left.
The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle-line, a portion of
which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from
which he was driven.  A battery which I had hoped to capture was
rapidly withdrawn.  In this charge my brigade lost seventy-five
men, including some efficient officers."(11)

The total loss of the enemy in this engagement must have been at
least as many more.  The Union loss, of all arms, was not more than
one hundred.  It was now obvious Milroy's command could not hold
Winchester.  I assumed a retreat would be undertaken in the night,
but in a brief interview with Milroy at the close of the battle he
said nothing on the subject, and the reproof of the night before
warned me to make no further suggestions to him with respect to
his duty in this emergency.

General Elliott, my immediate superior, informed me, as I rode late
at night through Winchester to my camp on the heights northwest of
the city, that he thought it was too late to retreat on Harper's
Ferry.  I suggested that the Romney, Pughtown, and Apple-Pie Ridge,
or Back Creek roads were open, and that we could safely retire over
one or more of them.  He said he would call Milroy's attention to
my suggestion and recommend these lines of retreat, but if he did
the suggestion was not favorably considered.  At daybreak on the
14th of June I received a written order to take the 110th Ohio
Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. N. Foster, one company
of the 116th Ohio Infantry, commanded by Captain Arkenoe, and L
Company of the 5th Regular Battery, six guns, commanded by Lieutenant
Wallace F. Randolph, and occupy an open, isolated earthwork located
three fourths of a mile west of the fortifications on the heights
between the Romney and Pughtown roads, but in sight of the main
works.  The earthwork was barely sufficient for one regiment.  The
troops assigned me were soon in position, and quiet reigned in my
front.  The enemy appeared to be inactive.  Milroy advised me that
the Pughtown and Romney roads were picketed and patrolled by cavalry,
and I was not, therefore, charged with the duty of watching them.
About 3 P.M. I rode to the main fort, and directed my horse to be
unsaddled and fed while I sought an interview with Milroy.  I found
him in high spirits.  He complimented me on the strong fight I put
up the previous day, and declared his belief that the enemy were
only trying to scare him out of the Valley.  He referred to the
quiet of the day as evidence that they had no purpose to assail
him in his works.  He said the cavalry had just reported no enemy
in my front on any of the roads.

About 4 P.M. I started leisurely to get my horse to return to the
earthwork, when, from the face of Round Mountain, about one mile
to the southwest of my command, not less than twenty guns opened
fire on it.  I dismounted a passing wagon-master, and on his horse
in less than five minutes reached the foot of the hill on which
the earthwork was situated, and then, hastening on foot through a
storm of shot and exploding shell, I was soon in it.  Lieutenant
Randolph with his six rifle guns replied to the enemy as long as
possible, but his battery was soon largely disabled, the horses
mostly killed, and most of the ammunition chests exploded.  Two of
his guns only could be kept in position for the anticipated assault.
About 6 P.M., under cover of the cannonade, and protected by some
timber and the nature of the ground, Hays' Louisiana brigade of
five regiments, supported by Smith and Hoke's brigades, advanced
to the assault.  My men stood well to their work, and the two guns
fired canister into the enemy.  Many Confederate officers and men
were seen to fall, and the head of the column wavered, but there
were no trenches or abattis to obstruct the enemy's advance.  There
was stubborn fighting over the low breastworks, and some fighting
inside of them, but not until our exposed flanks were attacked did
I order a retreat.  The battery was lost, but most of the command
reached the main fortification safely, though exposed to the fire
of the enemy for most of the distance.  Captain Arkenoe was killed,
and Lieutenant Paris Horney of the 110th Ohio was captured.  Our
loss in killed, wounded, and captured was small.  General Milroy,
from an observation-stand on a flag-staff at the main fort, witnessed
this affair.  In his report of it he says:

"The enemy opened upon me with at least four full batteries, some
of his guns being of his longest range, under cover of which fire
he precipitated a column at least _ten thousand_ strong upon the
outer work held by Colonel Keifer, which, after a stubborn resistance,
he carried."(12)

General Early, in his report, says twenty guns under Colonel Jones
opened fire on this position.  General Hays reports his loss, 14
killed, 78 wounded, 13 missing.

Part of the guns left in the earthworks we had abandoned, and the
artillery of Colonel Jones now opened on our fortifications.  An
artillery duel ensued which was maintained until after dark.  No
other hard fighting occurred on this day, only some slight skirmishing
took place with Gordon's brigade south and with portions of Johnson's
division east of Winchester.

The most notable event of the day was the opening fire of a score
of artillery pieces in broad daylight from a quarter where no enemy
was known to be.  Captain Morgan (13th Pennsylvania Cavalry), who
was charged with the duty of patrolling the Romney and Pughtown
roads, was censured for failing to discover and report the presence
of the enemy.  In a large sense this censure was unjust.  His
report, made about 2 P.M., that no enemy was found on these roads
or near them, was doubtless then true, yet an hour later Early with
three of his brigades reached them about one mile in front of the
earthwork occupied by me.  At that time Captain Morgan had finished
his reconnoissance and returned to camp.  There was, however, a
lack of vigilance on the part of somebody; possibly General Milroy
was not altogether blameless.

As has already been stated, I was not charged with the duty of
ascertaining the movements of the enemy; on the contrary, I had
been informed that pickets and scouts covered my front.  It is the
only instance, perhaps, in the war of such a surprise.

The situation of Milroy's command was now critical.  He had about
7000 men able for duty, more troops than could be used in the forts
or protected by them.  Colonel A. T. McReynolds, of the 1st New
York Cavalry, who commanded Milroy's Third Brigade at Berryville,
some ten miles eastward of us, was attacked on the 13th, and,
pursuant to orders, retired, reaching Winchester at 9 P.M.  It was
certainly known on the 14th that Ewell had at least 20,000 men of
all arms, and it was clear that while we might stand an assault,
our artillery ammunition would soon be exhausted, and the surrender
of the entire command, if it remained, become inevitable.  About 11
A.M. I was present in the principal fort at what was called a
council of war, but my opinion was not asked or expressed as to
the propriety of undertaking to escape.  I ventured, however, to
suggest that if a surrender were contemplated, I could take my
infantry command out that night, with perhaps others, by the Back
Creek or Apple-Pie Ridge road without encountering the enemy, and
could safely reach Pennsylvania by keeping well to the west of
Martinsburg.  It was decided about midnight, however, to spike the
guns, abandon all wagons, and all sick and wounded and stores of
all kinds, and evacuate Winchester.  The teamsters, artillerists,
and camp followers were to ride and lead the horses and mules,
following closely the armed troops, who were to move at 1 A.M. on
the Martinsburg road.  If the enemy were encountered, we were to
attack him, and, if possible, cut through.  The movement did not
commence until 2 A.M., and the night was dark.  The great body of
horses and mules, being ridden by undisciplined men and unused to
riders, fell into great confusion as they crowded on the pike close
on the heels of the infantry.  The mules brayed a chorus seldom
heard, and as if prompted by a malicious desire to notify the enemy
of our departure.  My regiment was in the advance on the turnpike.
Milroy did not accompany the head of the column.  Elliott was,
however, with it a portion of the time.  When we had proceeded
about three miles the familiar _chuck_ of the hubs of artillery
wheels was heard to the eastward, and it soon became apparent the
enemy was moving towards the pike, intending to strike it on our
front.  Some of our troops were then moving on a line parallel with
the pike, eastward of it.  When the head of the column had proceeded
about four miles, and as it approached Stephenson's Depot (located
a short distance east of the Martinsburg pike), firing in a desultory
way commenced on my right and soon extended along a line obliquely
towards one front.  The column was moved by the flank to the left,
at right angles with the road, my regiment being followed by the
122d Ohio Regiment.  A line of battle was formed with these regiments
in the darkness, and skirmishers thrown forward.  The line advanced
northward, feeling for the enemy, but it was soon halted, and the
troops were again moved by the flank.  My regiment, being on the
left, again took the advance, keeping about one hundred yards
westward of the pike.  I had been informed that the whole army was
to follow and share our fate.  When about five miles from Winchester,
and when the head of the column was about west of the Depot named,
some straggling shots notified us that the enemy were on the pike
near us.  I halted and faced the men in line of battle towards the
pike, and, though still dark, a personal investigation revealed
the fact that the Confederates were in confusion, and the commands
they were giving indicated also that they were greatly excited.
I found Elliott some distance in the rear, and obtained his consent
to charge them.  Colonel Wm. H. Ball, with the 122d Ohio, was
requested to support me on the right.  My command charged rapidly
across the road without firing.  It fortunately struck the enemy's
flank.  We took a few prisoners and drove the enemy's right through
the woods for about two hundred yards and upon his approaching
artillery.  Our line then halted and opened fire into the enemy's
ranks, causing great confusion and killing and wounding large
numbers.  A battery now opened upon us, but this we soon silenced
by killing or driving away its gunners.  The enemy retreated for
protection to a railroad cut,(13) and the woods were cleared in
my front, but my right was unprotected, and at this juncture a
considerable force of infantry and two pieces of artillery threatened
that flank.  I withdrew a short distance, changed direction to the
right, and again advanced.  Colonel Ball came up gallantly with
his regiment on my right, and in twenty minutes our front was
cleared, the enemy's guns silenced, the gunners shot down or driven
away, and the artillery horses killed.  We were only prevented from
taking possession of the guns by the appearance of another and
larger body of the enemy on our right.  Daylight was now approaching.
Without waiting the enemy's fire, I ordered both my regiments
withdrawn, which was effected in good order, to the west of the
pike.  The enemy at once reoccupied the woods in our front in
superior force, but obviously without a good battle-line.  Again
I ordered the two regiments to a charge, which was splendidly
responded to, although a promised attack in our support was not
made.  Elliott I did not see or receive any order from after the
battle began.  Milroy was trying to maintain the fight nearer
Winchester, to the east of the pike, and he gave no order that
reached me.

After a conflict in which the two lines were engaged in places not
twenty feet apart, the enemy gave way, and our line advanced to
his artillery, shooting and driving the gunners from their pieces
and completely silencing them, the Confederates again taking refuge
in the railroad cut.  I could learn nothing of the progress of the
fight at other points, and could hear no firing, save occasional
shots in the direction of Winchester.  I concluded the object of
the attack was accomplished so far as possible, and that the non-
combatants had had time to escape.  It was now day-dawn, and we
could not hope to further surprise the enemy or long operate on
his flank.  About 5 A.M., therefore, I ordered the whole line
withdrawn from the woods, and resumed the march northward along
the Martinsburg road.  I was soon joined by Generals Milroy and
Elliott and by members of their staffs, but with few men.  Milroy
had personally led a charge with the 87th Pennsylvania and had a
horse shot under him, but there was no concert of action in the
conduct of the battle.  Colonel Wm. G. Ely and a part of the brigade
he commanded were captured between Stephenson's Depot and Winchester,
having done little fighting, and a portion of McReynolds' brigade
shared the same fate.

The cavalry became panic-stricken and, commingling with the mules
and horses on which teamsters and others were mounted, all in great
disorder took wildly to the hills and mountains to the northwest,
followed by infantry in somewhat better order; the mules brayed,
the horses neighed, the teamsters and riders indulged in much
vigorous profanity, but the most of the retreating mass reached
Bloody Run, Pennsylvania, marching _via_ Sir John's Run, Hancock,
and Bath.  Citizens on Apple-Pie Ridge who witnessed the wild scene
describe it as a veritable bedlam.(14)

Captain Z. Baird, of Milroy's staff, who joined me while engaged
in the night fight in the woods, but who was under the erroneous
impression Elliott had ordered the attack, in his testimony before
the Milroy Court of Inquiry, gives this account of the engagement:

"General Elliott ordered Colonel Keifer with the 110th Ohio to
proceed into the woods.  The order was promptly obeyed.  As soon
as the regiment reached the woods, a severe firing of musketry
occurred.  General Elliott remarked to me that the enemy must be
there in force, and that the 110th should be immediately supported
by the 122d Ohio.  I volunteered to deliver the order to Colonel
Ball of the 122d Ohio, and to guide him to the woods, so as to
place him on the right flank of the 110th Ohio, and to avoid shooting
our own men by mistake.  The 122d Ohio arrived on the right flank
of the 110th in tolerably good order, and immediately commenced
firing.  Both regiments then advanced, and drove the enemy out of
the woods.  There were indications of a surprise to the enemy by
the suddenness of their attack.  They took one of their caissons
or passed it.  We could look into their camp and see that their
artillery horses were ungovernable.  We were so close that we could
hear the orders given by their officers in endeavoring to restore
order.  The fire of the enemy, though rapid, went over us, both of
small arms and artillery.  As we progressed, we saw evidences from
the wounded and slain of the enemy that our fire had been efficient.
After this contest had lasted perhaps an hour Colonel Keifer
requested me to return to the rear and learn what dispositions were
going on on the right to sustain Colonel Ball and himself.  I
complied with his order.  When I arrived at the rear, I noticed
the 87th Pennsylvania, the 18th Connecticut, and the 123d Ohio
advancing on the right in line of battle, under the immediate
command of Colonel Ely of the 18th Connecticut.  General Milroy
was also present, but dismounted, his horse being, as I supposed,
disabled.  He was engaged in changing horses.  Without reporting
to General Milroy, as I now recollect, I returned with all possible
expedition to Colonel Keifer, to notify him of the support which
he was about to have on the right.  I supposed at the time that
from the effect of the fire of the 110th and 122d Ohio, that when
Colonel Ely with his force attacked on the right we would rout
them.  I met, however, the 110th and 122d Ohio falling back.  The
officers were so busy in preserving order that I could not communicate
with them.  After we had fallen back to the Martinsburg road, I
saw Generals Milroy and Elliott.  I was informed by the former that
the retreat was again in progress."(15)

Colonel Wm. H. Ball (122d Ohio), in his official report speaks of
the fight thus:

"I was ordered to follow the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which
had been moved off the field some time before, and was out of sight.
The regiments being so separated, I did not engage the enemy as
soon as the 110th.  I formed on the right of the 110th Ohio Volunteer
Infantry, and the two regiments advanced within the skirt of the
woods and engaged the enemy, who occupied the woods with infantry
and artillery.  After a sharp action, the line was advanced at
least 100 yards and to within twenty paces of the enemy's artillery,
where a terrible fire was maintained for fifteen or twenty minutes
by both parties.  The artillery was driven back over 100 yards,
and for a time silenced by the fire of our rifles.  By order of
Colonel Keifer the two regiments then retreated beyond the range
of the enemy's infantry, reformed, and again advanced within the
woods, and, after a sharp engagement, retreated, by order of Colonel
Keifer, the enemy then moving on our flank."

The contemplated attack by Colonel Ely and others was not made.

We marched _via_ Smithfield (Wizzard's Clip), Charlestown, and
Halltown, and reached Harper's Ferry about 3 P.M., having marched
thirty-five miles and fought two hours on the way.

Berryville, held by McReynolds' brigade of Milroy's command, was
taken by Rodes' division of five brigades on the 13th of June;
Bunker Hill, on the direct road to Martinsburg from Winchester,
was occupied by the enemy early the morning of the 14th; and
Martinsburg was taken (all by the same division) the evening of
that day.  General Daniel Tyler and Colonel B. F. Smith (126th
Ohio), with a small command of infantry and cavalry and one battery,
made a gallant stand for a few hours, to enable their baggage and
supply trains, escorted by a small number of cavalry, to escape
_via_ Williamsport.  A portion of the battery was captured, but
Tyler and Smith's troops retreated on Shepherdstown, thence to
Harper's Ferry.

We pursued, in the retreat from Stephenson's Depot, the only possible
route then open to us to Harper's Ferry.  About 2000 men of all
arms reached Harper's Ferry with us, and others straggled in later.
But much the larger part of Milroy's command escaped with the
animals to Pennsylvania; 2700 soldiers assembled at Bloody Run
alone.  The losses in captured, including the sick and wounded left
in hospital, and the wounded left on the field, were about 3000.
The losses in my command, considering the desperate nature of the
fighting, were small, and but few of my officers and soldiers, fit
for duty and not wounded in battle, were captured.  Lieutenants T.
J. Weakley and C. M. Gross, through neglect of the officer of the
day, were left on picket near Winchester, with 60 men of the 110th
Ohio, and, consequently captured.  The surgeons, with their
assistants, were left at the hospital and on the field in charge
of the sick and wounded.  Chaplain McCabe remained to assist in
the care of the wounded left on the battle-field.  The enemy's loss
in killed and wounded much exceeded the Union loss on each of the
three days' fighting.  I was bruised by a spent ball on the 13th,
and slightly wounded by a musket fired by a soldier not ten feet
from me near the close of the fight at the earthwork on the 14th,
and my horse was shot under me in the night engagement at Stephenson's
Depot.  We fought the best of the troops of Lee's army.  General
Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, in the night engagement,
consisted of Stewart, Nicholl, and Walker's (Stonewall) brigades.
Johnson was censured for not having reached and covered the
Martinsburg road earlier in the night of the 14th of June.  He
reported his command in a critical situation for a time after our
attack upon it; that "two sets of cannoniers (13 out of 16) were
killed or disabled."(16)

The war furnishes no parallel to the fighting at Winchester, and
there is no instance of the war where a comparatively small force,
after being practically surrounded by a greatly superior one, cut
its way out.

Johnson's division was so roughly handled on the morning of the
15th that it did not pursue us, nor was it ordered to march again
until some time the next day.  The plan of Lee was for Ewell's
corps to push forward rapidly into Pennsylvania.  His delay at
Winchester postponed Lee's giving the order to Ewell "to take
Harrisburg" until June 21st.(17)  The loss of three or more days
at Winchester most likely saved Pennsylvania's capital from capture.

The disaster to the Union arms at Winchester was, by General Halleck,
charged upon General Milroy, and General Schneck was ordered by
Halleck to place Milroy in arrest.  In August, 1863, a Court of
Inquiry convened at Washington to investigate and report upon
Milroy's conduct and the evacuation of Winchester.  Schenck's action
in relation to the matter was also drawn in question.  The court
was in session twenty-seven days, heard many witnesses, including
Generals Schenck and Milroy, and had before it a mass of orders
and dispatches.  I was a known friend of Milroy, hence was not
called against him, and he did not have me summoned because I had
differed so radically with him as to the necessity of evacuating
Winchester.  The testimony, while doing me ample justice, did not
disclose much of the information communicated by me to Milroy, nor
my views with respect to the judgment displayed by him in a great
emergency.  Milroy and his friends maintained, with much force,
that his holding Winchester for about three days delayed, for that
time or longer, Lee's advance into Pennsylvania, and thus saved
Harrisburg from capture, and gave the Army of the Potomac time to
reach Gettysburg, and there force Lee to concentrate his army and
fight an unsuccessful battle.  The Court of Inquiry made no formal
report, but Judge-Advocate-General Holt reviewed the testimony,
and reached conclusions generally exonerating Milroy from the charge
of disobedience of orders and misconduct during the evacuation,
but reflecting somewhat on Schenck for not positively ordering the
place evacuated.  President Lincoln made a characteristic indorsement
on this record, not unfavorable to either Schenck or Milroy,
concluding with this paragraph:

"Serious blame is not necessarily due to any serious disaster, and
I cannot say that in this case any of the officers are deserving
of serious blame.  No court-martial is deemed necessary or proper
in this case."(18)

Halleck did not, however, cease in his hostility to Milroy, and
not until in the last months of the war did the "Gray Eagle" have
another command in the field.  He was a rashly-brave and patriotic
man, and his whole heart was in the Union cause.  In battle he
risked his own person unnecessarily and without exercising a proper
supervision over his entire command.  He died at Olympia, Washington,
March 29, 1890, when seventy-five years of age.  The colored people
of America should erect a monument to his memory.  He was their
friend when to be so drew upon him much adverse criticism.

( 1)  _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), pp. 242, 257, 401.

( 2)  _Ibid_., 263.

( 3)  _Abraham Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vi., p. 159.

( 4)  In letters, dated in May, 1863, to Col. Wm. S. Furay (then
a correspondent (Y. S.) of the Cincinnati _Gazette_ with Rosecrans'
army in Tennessee, I detailed the general plan of Lee's advance
northward, and gave the date when the movement would commence.

( 5)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part III., p. 36.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 125.  Piatt, June
11th, wired Schenck from Winchester, after inspecting the place,
that Milroy "can whip anything the rebels can fetch here."--_Ibid_.,
p. 161.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 130-7, 159-81.

( 8)  A few days before this event I peremptorily ordered all
officers' wives and citizens visiting in my command to go North,
but the ladies held an indignation meeting and waited on General
Milroy, with the request that he countermand my order, which he
did, at the same time saying something about my being too apprehensive
of danger.  I had the pleasure of meeting and greeting these same
ladies in Washington, July 5th, on their arrival from Winchester
_via_ Staunton, Richmond, _Castle-Thunder_, the James and Potomac
Rivers.

( 9)  _War Records_, Early's Rep., vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 460.

(10)  His son, Major Hugh H. Gordon, served efficiently on my staff
in Florida, Georgia, and Cuba (Spanish War), as did Captain J. E.
B. Stuart, son of the great Confederate cavalry General; also
Major John Gary Evans (ex-Governor South Carolina), and others
closely related to distinguished Confederate officers.  See Appendix F.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 491.

(12)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 46.

(13)  General Johnson's Report (Confederate), _War Records_, vol.
xxvii., Part II., p. 501.

(14)  An orderly who attempted to carry on horseback a valise
containing papers, etc., of mine, threw it way in a field as he
rode into the mountains.  A Quakeress, Miss Mary Lupton, witnessed
the act from her home, and found the valise and returned it to me
with all its contents, after the battle of Opequon, Sept. 19, 1864.

(15)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 136.

(16)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 501-2.

(17)  _Ibid_., p. 443.

(18)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 88-197.


CHAPTER II
Invasion of Pennsylvania--Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg--Lee's
Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses in Both Armies

At Harper's Ferry, June 16th, I was assigned to command a brigade
under General W. H. French, a regular officer.  General Joseph
Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac, June 25th, ordered
French to be ready to march at a moment's notice.  French took
position on Maryland Heights, where, June 27th, Hooker visited him
and gave him orders to prepare to evacuate both the Heights and
Harper's Ferry.  French had under him there about 10,000 effective
men.  Halleck, on being notified of Hooker's purpose to evacuate
these places and to unite French's command with the Army of the
Potomac for the impending battle, countermanded Hooker's order;
thereupon the latter, by telegram from Sandy Hook, requested to be
relieved from the command of that army.  His request being persisted
in, he was, on June 28th, relieved, and Major-General George G.
Meade was, by the President, assigned to succeed him.  Meade, also
feeling in need of reinforcements, on the same day asked permission
to order French, with his forces, to join him.  Halleck, though
placing French under Meade's command, did not consent to this.
French, however, with all his troops (save my brigade), under orders
from Washington, abandoned Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights,
and became a corps of observation to operate in the vicinity of
Frederick, Maryland, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac.  And
though no enemy was threatening, nor likely to do so soon, I was
ordered to dismantle the fortified heights, load the guns and stores
on Chesapeake and Ohio Canal boats, and escort them to Washington,
repairing the canal and locks on the way.  This work was done
thoroughly, and we arrived with a fleet of twenty-six boats in
Washington shortly after midnight, July 4, 1863.  It was my first
visit to that city.

Under orders from Halleck, I started on the 6th, by rail, to reoccupy
Harper's Ferry, but was stopped by Meade at Frederick, and there
again reported to French.  French had been assigned to command the
Third Army Corps (to succeed General Daniel E. Sickles, wounded at
Gettysburg), and his late command became the Third Division of that
corps, under Elliott; my brigade, consisting of the 110th and 122d
Ohio, 6th Maryland, and 138th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments,
became the Second Brigade of this division.  This brigade (with,
later, three regiments added) was not broken up during the war,
and was generally known as "_Keifer's Brigade_."

It is not my purpose to attempt to write the full story of the
battle of Gettysburg, the greatest, measured by the results, of
the many great battles of the war.  Gettysburg marks the high tide
of the Rebellion.  From it dates the certain downfall of the
Confederacy, though nearly two years of war followed, and more
blood was spilled after Lee sullenly commenced his retreat from
the heights of Gettysburg than before.

About this stage of the war, President Lincoln took an active
interest in the movements of the armies, although he generally
refrained from absolutely directing them in the field.  It was not
unusual for army commanders to appeal to him for opinions as to
military movements, and he was free in making suggestions, volunteering
to take the responsibility if they were adopted and his plans
miscarried.  Hooker, in an elaborate dispatch (June 15th) relating
to the anticipated movements of Lee's army from the Rappahannock
to the northward, said:

"I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although
in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I
can return."

The President, answering, said:

"I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and
that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock,
I would by no means cross to the south of it.  If he should leave
a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it
would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so,
man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would
in some way be getting the advantage of you northward.  In one
word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river,
_like an ox jumped half over the fence and liable to be torn by
dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick
the other_."( 1)

The President, answering another dispatch from Hooker, June 10th,
said:

"I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point.
If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow him on his flank and
on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens him.
Fight him, too, when opportunity offers.  If he stays where he is,
_fret him and fret him_."( 2)

When deeply concerned about the fate of Winchester (June 14th),
this dispatch was sent:

"Major General Hooker:

"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded
at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg.  If they could hold out a
few days, could you help them?  _If the head of Lee's army is at
Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere.
Could you not break him?_"

  "A. Lincoln."( 2)

Hooker did not cross the river and attack the rear of Lee's army,
nor did he "_fret_" Lee's army, nor "_break_" it, however "_slim_"
"_the animal_" must have been, and hence Milroy was sacrificed,
and the rich towns, cities, and districts of Maryland and Pennsylvania
were overrun by a hungry and devastating foe; but Gettysburg came;
the Union hosts there being successfully led by another commander
--Meade!

George Gordon Meade came to the command of the Army of the Potomac
under the most trying circumstances.  The situation of that army
and the country was critical.  He had been distinguished as a
brigade, division, and corps commander under McClellan, Burnside,
and Hooker; in brief, he had won laurels on many fields, especially
at Fredericksburg, where he broke through the enemy's right and
reached his reserves, yet he never had held an independent command.
He was of Revolutionary stock (Pennsylvania), though born in Cadiz,
Spain, December 31, 1815, where his parents then resided, his father
being a merchant and shipowner there.  He was graduated at West
Point; was a modest, truthful, industrious, studious man, with the
instincts of a soldier.  He was wounded at New Market, or Glendale,
in the Peninsula campaign (1862).  He was commanding in person,
and ambitious to succeed, prudent, yet obstinate, and when aroused
showed a fierce temper; yet he was, in general, just.  On the third
day after he assumed command of the army its advance corps opened
the battle of Gettysburg.  What great soldier ever before took an
army and moved it into battle against a formidable adversary in so
short a time?  It must also be remembered that the troops composing
his army were not used to material success.  They had never been
led to a decisive victory.  Some of them had been defeated at Bull
Run; some of them on the Peninsula; some of them at the Second Bull
Run; some of them were in the drawn battle of Antietam; some of
them had suffered repulse at Fredericksburg, and defeat at
Chancellorsville, and the army in general had experienced more of
defeat than success, although composed of officers and soldiers
equal to the best ever called to battle.  When Meade assumed command,
Lee's army was, in the main, far up the Cumberland Valley, and
pressing on; Ewell had orders to take Harrisburg, and was then,
with most of his corps, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  York and
Wrightsville, Pa., were taken on the 28th by Gordon of Early's
division.  On the 29th Ewell ordered his engineer, with Jenkins'
cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg, and he was
starting for that place himself on the same day when Lee recalled
him and his corps to join the main army at Cashtown, or Gettysburg.( 3)

Longstreet's corps marched from Fredericksburg, June 3d, _via_
Culpeper Court-House, thence up the Rappahannock and along the
eastern slope of the Blue Ridge; on the 19th occupied Ashby's and
Snicker's Gaps, leading to the Valley; on the 23d marched _via_
Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland, reaching Chambersburg
on the 27th; thence marched on the 30th to Greenwood, and the next
day to Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, Pickett's division
and Hood's brigade being left, respectively, at Chambersburg and
New Guilford.( 4)

A. P. Hill's corps did not leave Fredericksburg until the 14th of
June, just after Hooker put the Army of the Potomac in motion to
the northward.  Hill marched into the Valley and joined Longstreet
at Berryville, and from there preceded him to Chambersburg, and by
one day to Cashtown and Gettysburg.( 5)

General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry,
crossed the upper Rappahannock, June 16th, and moved east of the
Blue Ridge on Longstreet's right flank, leaving only a small body
of cavalry on the Rappahannock, in observation, with instructions
to follow on the right flank of Hill's corps.  Severe cavalry
engagements took place at Aldie, the 17th, and at Middleburg,
Uppeville, and Snicker's Gap, without decisive results, both sides
claiming victories.  On the 24th Stuart, with the main body of his
cavalry, succeeded in eluding the Union cavalry and Hooker's army
(then feeling its way north), and passed east of Centreville, thence
_via_ Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, and crossed, July 27th,
the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and captured a large supply train
between Washington and Rockville.  Stuart's cavalry caused some
damage in the rear and east of the Army of the Potomac, but, on
the whole, this bold movement contributed little, if any, towards
success in Lee's campaign.  Stuart's advance reached the Confederate
left _via_ Dover and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, late on the afternoon
of the second day of the battle, his troopers and horses in a
somewhat exhausted condition.  The consensus of opinion among
military critics was then, and since is, that Lee committed a great
strategic error in authorizing his main cavalry force to be separated
from close contact with the right of his moving army.  General Lee
seems to have come to this conclusion himself, as frequently, in
his official reports of the campaign, he deplores the absence of
his cavalry and his consequent inability to obtain reliable
information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac.( 6)
Longstreet severely criticises Stuart's raid, and attributes to
the absence of the cavalry, in large part, the failure of the
Gettysburg campaign.( 7)  Cavalry, under an energetic commander,
are the _eyes and ears_ of a large army, especially when it is on
an active campaign against a vigilant enemy.

Having with some particularity traced the main bodies composing
Lee's army, as to time and routes, to the vicinity of Gettysburg,
it remains to briefly follow the Army of the Potomac to the same
place.  While some of its corps moved earlier, the headquarters of
that army did not leave Falmouth until the 14th of June, when it
was established at Dumfries; on the next day at Fairfax Station,
on the 18th at Fairfax Court-House, on the 26th at Poolesville,
Maryland, and the next day at Frederick, Maryland, where Meade
succeeded Hooker.  Before the Army of the Potomac left Falmouth a
division of the Sixth Corps had been thrown across the river to
observe the enemy, but it did not attack him, and was withdrawn on
the 13th.

Meade found his army, mainly, in the vicinity of Frederick, though
some of his corps had passed northward and others were moving up
by converging lines, the Sixth Corps having just arrived at
Poolesville from Virginia.  June 29th, Meade moved his headquarters
from Frederick to Middleburg, the next day to Taneytown, Maryland,
about fifteen miles south of Gettysburg.

The movements of the Army of the Potomac were such as to cover
Washington and Baltimore, and at the same time bring, as soon as
possible, the invading army to battle.

The First, Eleventh, and Third Corps, under Major-General John F.
Reynolds, were in the advance on Gettysburg on July 1st, the First
Corps leading, and preceded only by General John Buford's division
of cavalry.  Lee was then rapidly concentrating his army at
Gettysburg.  Reynolds found Buford fiercely engaging infantry of
Hill's corps as they were debouching through the mountains on the
Cashtown road.  He promptly moved the First Corps to Buford's
support, and it soon became hotly engaged.  The Eleventh Corps,
commanded by General Oliver O. Howard, was ordered to hasten to
join in the battle.  Howard arrived about 11.30 A.M., just as
Reynolds fell mortally wounded, and the command of the field devolved
on Howard.  He pushed forward two divisions of the Eleventh to the
support of the First Corps, then engaged on Seminary Hill, northeast
of Gettysburg, and posted a third division on Cemetery Ridge, south
of the town.  The battle continued with great fierceness on the
Cashtown road.  For a time the Union success was considerable, and
the Confederates were forced back, and numerous prisoners, including
General Archer, were captured; but reinforcements from Cashtown
and the unexpected arrival, at 1.30 P.M., over the York and Harrisburg
roads, of Ewell's corps on Howard's right left him outnumbered and
outflanked.  He maintained the unequal contest until about 4 P.M.,
then ordered a withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, which was accomplished
with considerable loss, chiefly in prisoners taken in the streets
of Gettysburg.  Meade, learning of Reynolds' death, dispatched
General W. S. Hancock to represent him on the field.  Hancock
arrived in time to aid Howard in posting the troops advantageously
on the Ridge, where they handsomely repulsed an attack on the right
flank.  Slocum and Sickles' corps arrived about 7 P.M., and were
posted on the right and left, respectively, of those in position.
Hancock reported to Meade the position held was a strong one, and
advised that the army be concentrated there for battle.  At 10 P.M.
Meade left Taneytown and reached the battle-field at 1 A.M. of the
2d of July, having, on the reports received, decided to stand and
give general battle there.( 8)  The Second and Fifth Corps and the
rest of the Third arrived early on the 2nd.  The Second and Third
Corps went into position on the Union left on a continuation of
the ridge towards Little Round Top Mountain.  The Fifth was held
in reserve until the arrival of the Sixth at 2 P.M., when it was
moved to the extreme left, the Sixth taking its place in reserve
owing to the exhaustion of its troops, they having just accomplished
a thirty-two mile march from 9 P.M. of the day previous.  The Third,
under Sickles, was moved by him to a peach orchard about one half
mile in advance, and out of line with the corps on its right and
left.  Here it received the shock of battle, precipitated about 3
P.M. by Longstreet's corps from the Confederate right.  The Second
and Fifth Corps were hastened to cover the flanks of the Third.
The battle raged furiously for some hours and until night put an
end to it.  The Third was forced, after a desperate conflict, to
retire on its proper line.  Sickles was severely wounded, losing
a leg.  The Fifth, after a most heroic conflict, succeeded in
gaining and holding Round Top (big) Mountain, the key to the position
on the Union left, as were Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, on its
right.  Longstreet, at nightfall, after suffering great loss, was
forced to retire, having gained no substantial advantage.  The
Sixth and part of the First Corps, having been ordered to the left,
participated in this battle and aided in Longstreet's repulse.
Geary's division of the Twelfth, moving from the extreme right,
had also reinforced the left.  It was this withdrawal from the
right which enabled Ewell's corps to capture and occupy a part of
the Union line in the vicinity of Culp's Hill.  An assault was made
about 8 P.M. on the Eleventh Corps at Cemetery Hill, where the
enemy penetrated to a battery, over which a _melée_ took place,
the Confederates, after a hand-to-hand fight, being driven from
the hill and forced to retreat.  Thus the second day's fighting at
Gettysburg ended, neither side having gained any decisive advantage.
Most of the Union Army had been, however, more or less engaged,
while Longstreet's corps (save Pickett's division), and only portions
of Ewell's corps of the Confederate Army, had been seriously in
battle.  There had been some spirited artillery duels, but these
rarely contribute materially to important results.

The third day opened, at early dawn, by Geary's division (returned
from the left) attacking, and after a lively battle retaking its
former position on the right.  A spirited contest also raged on
the right at Culp's Hill and along Rock Creek all the morning, in
which Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps participated.  With this
exception, quiet reigned along the lines of the two great armies
during the forenoon of the 3d.

Lee, flushed with some appearance of success on the first and second
days, and over-confident of the fighting qualities of his splendid
army, born of its defeats of the Army of the Potomac on the
Rappahannock, decided to deliver offensive battle, though far from
his natural base.  Orders were accordingly given to Longstreet to
mass a column of not less than 15,000 men for an assault, under
cover of artillery, on the Union left centre, to be supported by
simultaneous real or pretended attacks by other portions of the
Confederate Army.

Longstreet did not believe in the success of the attack, and hence
offered many objections to it, and predicted its failure.  He
advised swinging the Confederate Army by its right around the Union
left, and thus compel Meade to withdraw from his naturally strong
position.( 9)  Lee would not listen to his great Lieutenant.
Pickett's division of three brigades was assigned to the right of
the column, and it became the division of direction.  Kemper's
division of four brigades from Hill's corps was formed on the left
of Pickett, and Wilcox's brigade of Hill's corps was placed in
echelon in support on Pickett's right, and the brigades of Scales
and Lane of Hill's corps, under Trimble, were to move in support
of Kemper's left.  The whole column of ten brigades, composed of
forty-six regiments, numbered about 20,000 men.

Generals Pendleton and Alexander, chiefs of artillery of the Army
of Northern Virginia and of Longstreet's corps, respectively, massed
150 guns on a ridge extending generally parallel to the left of
the Union Army and about one mile therefrom, and so as to be able
to pour a converging fire on its left centre.(10)  While this
preparation for decisive battle went on in the Confederate lines,
the Union Army stood at bay, in readiness for the battle-storm
foreboded by the long lull and the active preparations observed in
its front.  At 1 P.M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and the superior
guns of the Union Army, though not in position in such great number,
promptly responded.  This terrific duel lasted about two hours.
Meade, recognizing the futility of his artillery fire, and in
anticipation of the assault soon to come, ordered a large portion
of his artillery withdrawn under cover, to give the guns time to
cool and to be resupplied with ammunition.  This led the enemy to
believe he had silenced them effectively, and the assaulting column
went forward.(11)  The Union artillery, with fresh batteries added,
was again quickly put in position for its real work.  The close
massed column of assault, well led, gallantly moved to the charge
down the slope and across the open ground, directed against a
portion of the Union line partially on Cemetery Ridge.  The supporting
Confederate batteries now almost ceased firing.  As the assaulting
column went forward the Union guns turned on it, cutting gaps in
it at each discharge.  These were generally closed from the support,
but when the head of the column got well up to, and in one place
into, the Union breastworks, the fire of the Union infantry became
irresistible.  Longstreet ordered the divisions of McLaws and Hood,
holding his line on the right of the assaulting column, to advance
to battle.  Union forces moved out and attacked Pickett's supporting
brigade on the right.  Under the fierce fire of infantry and
artillery the head of the great Confederate column fast melted
away.  Generals Garnett, Pender, Semmes, Armistead, and Barksdale
were killed, Generals Kemper, Trimble, Pettigrew, and many other
officers fell wounded, and many Confederate colors were shot down.
The Confederates who penetrated the Union line were killed or
captured.  When success was demonstrated to be impossible, Pickett
ordered a retreat, and such of his men as were not cut off by the
fire that continued to sweep the field escaped to cover behind the
batteries, leaving the broad track of the assaulting column strewn
with dead, dying, and wounded.  The great battle was now substantially
ended.  Meade did not draw out his army and pursue the broken
Confederates, as their leaders expected him to do.  Lee, while
personally aiding in restoring the lines of his shattered troops,
recognized the fearful consequences of Pickett's assault, and
magnanimously said to an officer, "_It is all my fault_."

Generals Hancock and Gibbon and many important Union officers were
wounded.  This, together with other causes, prevented Meade from
assuming the offensive.  Two-thirds of the Confederate Army had
not been engaged actively in the last struggle, and the day was
too far spent for Meade to make the combinations indispensable to
the success of an immediate attack.

Longstreet withdrew McLaws and Hood from their advance position.
Kilpatrick moved his cavalry division to attack the Confederate
right, and Farnsworth's cavalry brigade made a gallant charge on
the rear of Longstreet's infantry, riding over detachments until
the dashing leader lost his life and his command was cut to pieces
by the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry.  A
great fight also ensued on the Union right near Rock Creek, between
the Confederate cavalry under Stuart and the main body of the Union
cavalry under General Alfred Pleasanton, in which our cavalry held
the field and drove back Stuart from an attempt to penetrate behind
the Union right.  The infantry corps of the two armies were not
again engaged at Gettysburg.  Lee drew in his left to compact his
army, holding his cavalry still on his left.

At nightfall, July 4th, Lee, having previously sent in advance his
trains and ambulances filled with sick and wounded, commenced a
retreat by the Fairfield and Emmittsburg roads through Hagerstown
to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters, his cavalry
covering his rear.  The Sixth Corps and our cavalry followed in
close pursuit on the morning of the 5th, but the main body of the
Army of the Potomac marched on the Confederate flank, directed on
Middletown, Maryland.  French (left at Frederick) had pushed a
column to Williamsport and Falling Waters, and destroyed a pontoon
bridge and captured its guard and a wagon train.  Buford's cavalry
was sent by Meade to Williamsport, where it encountered Lee's
advance, destroyed trains, and made many captures of guns and
prisoners.  Recent heavy rains had swollen the Potomac so that it
could not be forded.  Most of the Confederate sick and wounded
were, with great effort, ferried over the swollen river in improvised
boats, but not without several days' delay.  Lee's army reached
the Potomac on the 11th, having suffered considerable loss during
its retreat in prisoners, arms, and trains.  It took up a strong
position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, and intrenched.

The Union Army, after reaching Middletown and being reinforced by
French's command and somewhat reorganized, deployed on the 11th
for battle, and on the 12th moved close up to the front of the
Confederate Army.  Orders were issued looking to an attack on the
morning of the 13th, but the day was spent in reconnoissances and
further preparations.  On the following morning the enemy had
succeeded in crossing the river, and only a rear-guard was taken.

Great disappointment was felt that Meade did not again force Lee
to battle north of the Potomac.  Certain it is that Lee's army was
deficient in ammunition for all arms, and rations were scarce.
Lee, in dispatches to Jefferson Davis, dated July 7th, 8th, and
10th, showed great apprehension as to the result of a battle if
attacked in his then situation.(12)

Meade's army was also greatly impeded by circumstances beyond human
control.  When, on the 13th of July, a general attack was contemplated,
rain fell in torrents, and the cultivated fields were so soft as
to render the movement of artillery and troops almost impossible.
The wheels of the gun-carriages sunk so deep in the soft earth as
to forbid the guns being fired safely.  Meade was urged, by dispatches
from Halleck, and by one from President Lincoln, to attack Lee
before he crossed the Potomac.(13)  Meade was fully alive to the
importance of doing this, but he displayed some timidity peculiar
to his nature, and sought to have all the conditions in his favor
before risking another battle.  His combinations were made with
too much precision for the time he had to do it in.

A less cautious commander might, during the first few days, have
assailed Lee precipitately on his front or flank, or both
simultaneously, relying on his not being able to concentrate his
army to resist it.  But after Lee had concentrated his forces and
intrenched in a well selected position, covering Williamsport and
Falling Waters, the result of an attack would have been doubtful,
yet, in the light of what was later known, one should have been
made.  Meade, however, had done well under the circumstances at
Gettysburg, and a two-weeks'-old independent commander, not yet
accustomed to fighting a large army in aggressive battle, is entitled
to considerate judgment.

The revised lists of losses in the battle and campaign of Gettysburg
in the Army of the Potomac show 246 officers and 2909 enlisted men
killed, 1145 officers and 13,384 enlisted men wounded, total 17,684;
also 183 officers and 5182 enlisted men captured, grand total
23,049.  The First and Eleventh Corps lost, chiefly on the first
day, in captured, 3527.(14)

The imperfect lists of losses in the Army of Northern Virginia do
not show the number of killed and wounded officers separately from
enlisted men, and from some of the commands no reports are found,
yet, so far as made, they show 2592 killed and 12,709 wounded,
total 15,301, and 5150 captured, grand total 20,541.(15)  The
records of prisoners of war in the Adjutant-General's Office,
U.S.A., give the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates
captured at Gettysburg, July 1st to 5th, inclusive.(15)

When the Gettysburg campaign ended I was fairly in the Army of the
Potomac, destined to be with it and of it and to share its fortunes
for two years and to the end of the war.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., pp. 30-1.

( 2)  _Ibid_., pp. 35, 39.

( 3)  Ewell's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 443.

( 4)  Longstreet's Report, _Ibid_., 358.

( 5)  Lee's Report, _Ibid_., 317.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 316, 321-2.

( 7)  _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 342-3, 351-9, 362.

( 8)  Meade's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 115.

( 9)  _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 386-7.

(10)  Pendleton's Report, _War Records_., vol. xxvii., Part II.,
p. 352.

(11)  _Manassas to Appomattox_, p. 392.

(12)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 299-302.

(13)  _Ibid_., p. 82-3.

(14)  _Ibid_., p. 187.

(15)  _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., 346.


CHAPTER III
New York Riots, 1863--Pursuit of Lee's Army to the Rappahannock--
Action of Wapping Heights, and Skirmishes--Western Troops Sent to
New York to Enforce the Draft--Their Return--Incidents, etc.

During the Gettysburg campaign the organized militia of New York
City and the volunteer and regular troops stationed there were sent
to Pennsylvania to aid in repelling the invading army, thus leaving
that city without its usual protection.

Horatio Seymour, Governor of the State of New York in 1863, was
not, at all times, in harmony with President Lincoln and the War
Department with respect to the conduct of the war, the necessity
for raising troops, and the means by which they were obtained.
His opposition to the draft was well understood, and gave encouragement
to a turbulent population in New York City who were opposed to the
war, and, consequently, to all radical measures to fill the city's
quota.  The poor believed they had a just ground of complaint.  A
clause in the Enrollment Act of Congress allowed a drafted man to
be discharged upon the payment of three hundred dollars commutation.
This gave the wealthier people a right the poor were not able to
avail themselves of.

The city of New York had responded loyally with men and money in
support of the Union at the breaking out of the war, but as the
struggle progressed and the burdens of the city increased and many
calls for men came, there occurred some reaction in public sentiment,
especially among the masses, who imagined they were the greatest
sufferers.  Her Mayor, Fernando Wood, prior to the war (January 6,
1861), in a Message to her Common Council, denominated the Union
as only a "confederacy" of which New York was the "Empire City";
and said further that dissolution of the Union was inevitable; that
it was absolutely impossible to keep the States "together longer
than they deemed themselves fairly treated"; that the Union could
"not be preserved by coercion or held together by force"; that with
the "aggrieved brethren of the slave States" the city had preserved
"friendly relations and a common sympathy," and had not "participated
in a warfare upon their constitutional rights or their domestic
institutions," and, "therefore, New York has a right to expect,
and should endeavor to preserve, a continuance of uninterrupted
intercourse with every section."  He denounced other parts of New
York state as a "foreign power" seeking to legislate for the city's
government; claimed that "much, no doubt," could "be said in favor
of the justice and policy of a separation," and that the Pacific
States and Western States as well as the Southern States would each
soon set up an independent Republic.  But Mayor Wood, not content
with all this disunion nonsense, said further:

"Why should not New York City, instead of supporting by her
contributions in revenue two thirds of the expenses of the United
States, become also equally independent?  As a _free city_, with
but nominal duty on imports, her local government could be supported
without taxation upon her people.  Thus we could live free from
taxes, and have cheap goods nearly duty free.  In this she would
have the whole and united support of the Southern states, as well
as all the other States to whose interests and rights under the
Constitution she has always been true; and when disunion has become
a fixed and certain fact, why may not New York disrupt the bonds
which bind her to a venal and corrupt master--to a people and party
that have plundered her revenues, taken away the power of self-
government and destroyed the Confederacy of which she was the proud
Empire City?  Amid the gloom which the present and prospective
condition of things must cast over the country, New York, as a Free
City, may shed the only light and hope of a future reconstruction
of our once blessed Confederacy."( 1)

This most audacious communication ante-dated all Ordinances of
Secession save that of South Carolina, and preceded President
Lincoln's inauguration by about two months.  The proposed secession
of New York City involved disrupting the bonds which bound her to
the State as well as the nation, and could not therefore possess
even the shadow of excuse of separate sovereignty, such as was
claimed for a State.

The dangerous doctrine of this Message and the suggestions for
making New York a _free city_, and other like political teaching,
bore fruit, and had much to do with building up a public sentiment
which culminated in resistance to the draft and the monstrous,
bloody, and destructive riots that ensued in New York City.

The significance of the defeat of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg
and the capture of Vicksburg on the 4th of July, 1863, were not
well understood in New York when, on Saturday, July 11, 1863,
pursuant to instructions, Provost-Marshal Jenkins commenced the
initial work on the corner of 46th Street and Third Avenue, by
drawing from the wheel the names of those who must respond to the
call of the Government or pay the commutation money.

The first day passed without any open violence, and with even some
good-humored pleasantry on the part of the great crowd assembled.
The draft was conducted openly and fairly, and the names of the
conscripts were publicly announced and published by the press of
Sunday morning.  It appeared that the names of many men, too poor
to pay the commutation, had been drawn from the wheel, and these
would therefore have to go to the army in person regardless of
inclination or ability to provide for their families in their
absence.  Others not drawn were apprehensive that their fate would
be the same.  On Sunday, therefore, in secret places, inhabitants
of the district where the draft had commenced, met, and resolved
to resist it even to bloodshed.  The absence of the organized
militia and other regular and volunteer soldiers was, by the leaders
of the movement, widely proclaimed, to encourage the belief that
resistance would be successful.  The police, though efficient, were
not much feared, as they would have to be widely scattered over
the city to protect persons and property.  In the promotion of the
scheme of resistance to Federal authority, organized parties went
early Monday morning to yard, factory, and shop, and compelled men
to abandon their labor and join the procession wending its way to
the corner of Third Avenue and 46th Street.

Captain Jenkins and his assistants, not apprehending any danger,
recommenced the draft in the presence of a great multitude, many
of whom had crowded into his office, and a few names had been called
and registered when a paving-stone was hurled through a window,
shivering the glass into a thousand pieces, knocking over some
quiet observers in the room and startling the officials.  This was
the initial act of the celebrated New York riots.  A second and a
third stone now crashed through the broken window at the fated
officers and reporters, and with frantic yells the crowd developed
into a mob, and, breaking down the doors, rushed into the room,
smashed the desks, tables, furniture, and destroyed whatever could
be found.  The wheel alone was carried upstairs and eventually
saved.  The Marshal escaped alive, but his deputy, Lieutenant
Vanderpoel, was horribly beaten and taken home for dead.  The
building wherein the office was located was fired, and the hydrants
were taken possession of by the mob to prevent the Fire Department
from extinguishing the flames, and in two hours an entire block
was burned down.  Police Superintendent Kennedy was assailed by
the rioters and left for dead.  The most exaggerated rumors of the
success of the mob spread through the city, and other anti-conscript
bands were rapidly formed, especially in its southern parts.

While General Sanford of the State Militia, Mayor Opdyke of the
city, and General John E. Wool were hastily consulting, and, in
the absence of any military force adequate to suppress the already
formidable riot, were trying to devise means for its suppression,
the mob, joined by numerous gangs of thieves and thugs, grew to
the size of a great army, and feeling possessed of an irresistible
power, moved rapidly about the apparently doomed city, engaging in
murder, pillage, and arson.  Neither person nor property was
regarded.  Peaceful citizens were openly seized, maltreated, and
robbed wherever found.  Those who tried to resist were often dragged
mercilessly about the streets, stamped upon, and left for dead.
A brown-stone block on Lexington Avenue was destroyed.  An armed
detachment of marines, some fifty strong, was sent to quell the
riot.  At the corner of 43d Street these marines attempted to
disperse the mob by firing on it with blank cartridges, but they
were rushed upon with such fierce fury that they were broken and
overpowered, their guns were taken from then, several of them
killed, and all terribly beaten.  A squad of the police attempted
to arrest some of the leaders at this point, but it was defeated,
badly beaten, and one of its number killed.  Elated with these
triumphs, and excited by the blood already spilled, the passion of
the mob knew no bounds, and it proposed an immediate onslaught upon
the principal streets, hotels, and public buildings.  The city was
filled with consternation; all business ceased, public conveyances
stopped running, and terror seized the public authorities as well
as the peaceful citizens.

The negroes seemed to be the first object of the mob's animosity;
public places where they were employed were seized, and the colored
servants there employed were maltreated, and in some instances
killed.  The Colored Half-Orphan Asylum, on Fifth Avenue, near 43d
Street, the home for about 800 colored children, was visited, its
attendants and inmates maltreated, the interior of the building
sacked, and in spite of the personal efforts of Chief Decker, it
was fired and burned.  Robbery was freely indulged in, and many
women who were of the rioters carried off booty.

The armory on Second Avenue, in which some arms and munitions were
stored, although guarded by a squad of men, was soon taken possession
of, its contents seized, and the building burned.  This was not
accomplished until at least five of the mob were killed and many
more wounded by the police.  In the lower part of the city the
assaults of the rioters were mainly upon unoffending colored men.

At least one dozen were brutally murdered, while many more were
beaten, and others driven into hiding or from the city.  One colored
man was caught, kicked, and mauled until life seemed extinct, and
then his body was suspended from a tree and a fire kindled beneath
it, the heat of which restored him to consciousness.

A demonstration was made against the _Tribune_ newspaper office.
The great mob from the vicinity of 46th Street reached the park
near this office about five o'clock in the evening, and some of
its leaders, breaking down the doors, rushed into the building and
commenced destroying its contents, and preparing to burn it.  A
determined charge of the police, however, drove them out, and the
building was saved.

The police, though heroic in their efforts to protect the city,
were only partially successful.  The draft was suspended.  The
building on Broadway near 28th Street, in part occupied as an office
by Provost-Marshal Marriere, was fired, and the entire block burned.
The Bull's Head Hotel on 44th Street was likewise burned to the
ground because its proprietor declined to furnish liquor to the
mob.  The residences of Provost-Marshal Jenkins and Postmaster
Wakeman and two brown-stone dwellings on Lexington Avenue were also
destroyed by fire, and several members of the police and marines
were stoned to death, and others fatally injured.

The Board of Aldermen met and adopted a resolution instructing a
committee to report a plan whereby an appropriation could be made
to pay the commutation ($300) of such of the poorest citizens as
might be conscripted.  General Wool, who commanded the Department,
issued a call to the discharged returned soldiers to tender their
services to the Mayor for the defence of the city.  This call met
with some response on the following morning, and General Harvey
Brown assumed command of the troops in the city.  The second day
(14th) the riot was even more malignant than on the first.  The
mob had complete control of the city and spread terror wherever it
moved.

Governor Horatio Seymour now reached the city, and promptly issued
a proclamation, commanding the rioters to disperse to their homes
under penalty of his using all power necessary to restore peace
and order.  The riot continuing, he, on the same day, issued another
proclamation, declaring the city in a state of insurrection, and
giving notice that all persons resisting any force called out to
quell the insurrection would be liable to the penalties prescribed
by law.  These proclamations, however, had little effect.  The
second day was attended with still further atrocities upon negroes.
The mob in its brutality regarded neither age, infirmity, nor sex.
Whenever and wherever a colored population was found, death was
their inexorable fate.  Whole neighborhoods inhabited by them were
burned out.

On several occasions the small military force collected on the
second day met and turned back the rioters by firing ball cartridges.
Lieutenant Wood, in command of 150 regular troops from Fort Lafayette,
in dispersing about 2000 men assembled in the vicinity of Grand
and Pitt Streets, was obliged to fire bullets into them, killing
about a score, and wounding many, two children among the number.
This mob was dispersed.  Citizens organized to defend themselves
and the city.

Governor Seymour spoke to an immense gathering from the City Hall
steps, and counselled obedience to the law and the constituted
authorities.  He read a letter to show that he was trying to have
the draft suspended, and announced that he had information that it
was postponed in the city of New York.  This announcement did
something to allay the excitement and to prevent a spread of the
riot.

Colonel O'Brien, with a detachment of troops, was ordered to disperse
a mob in Third Avenue.  He was successful in turning it back, but
sprained his ankle during the excitement, and stopped in a drug
store on 32d Street, while his command passed on.  A body of rioters
discovering him, surrounded the store and threatened its destruction.
He stepped out, and was at once struck senseless, and the crowd
fell upon his prostrate form, beating, stamping, and mutilating
it.  For hours his body was dragged up and down the pavement in
the most inhuman manner, after which it was carried to the front
of his residence, where, with shouts and jeers, the same treatment
was repeated.

The absent militia were hurried home from Pennsylvania, and by the
15th the riot had so far spent itself that many of its leaders had
fallen or were taken prisoners, and the mob was broken into fragments
and more easily coped with.  Mayor Opdyke, in announcing that the
riot was substantially at an end, advised voluntary associations
to be maintained to assure good order, and thereafter business was
cautiously resumed.

Archbishop John Hughes caused to be posted about the city, on the
16th, a card inviting men "called in many of the papers rioters"
to assemble the next day to hear a speech from him.  At the appointed
hour about 5000 persons met in front of his residence, when the
Archbishop, clad in his purple robes and other insignia of his high
sacerdotal function, spoke to them from his balcony.  He appealed
to their patriotism, and counselled obedience to the law as a tenet
of their Catholic faith.  He told them "no government can stand or
protect itself unless it protects its citizens."  He appealed to
them to go to their homes and thereafter do no unlawful act of
violence.  This assembly dispersed peaceably, and the great riot
was ended.

But the draft had been suspended for the time, and Governor Seymour
had given some assurance it would not again be resumed in the city.
The municipal authorities had passed a bill to pay the $300
commutation, or substitute money, to drafted men of the poorer
classes.

The total killed and wounded during the riots is unknown.  Governor
Seymour, in a Message, said the "number of killed and wounded is
estimated by the police to be at least one thousand."  The rioters,
as usual, suffered the most.  Claims against the city for damages
to property destroyed were presented, aggregating $2,500,000, and
the city paid claimants about $1,500,000.

This brief summary of the great New York riot is given to explain
movements of troops soon to be mentioned.  But in order to afford
the reader a fuller conception of the opposition encountered by
Federal officers in the enforcement of the conscript laws, it should
be said in this connection that draft riots, on a small scale, took
place in Boston, Mass.; Troy, N. Y.; Portsmouth, N. H., and in
Holmes County, Ohio, and at other places.

We left the Army of the Potomac in Maryland, at the close of the
arduous Gettysburg campaign, watching the Army of the Northern
Virginia, just escaped across the Potomac.

Harper's Ferry had been reoccupied by Union troops as early as July
6, 1863.  Meade moved his army to that place, and promptly crossing
the Potomac and the Shenandoah River near its mouth, took possession
of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and marched southward along its
eastern slope.  Passing through Upperville and Piedmont towards
Manassas Gap and Front Royal, he threatened Lee's line of retreat
to his old position behind the Rapidan, and thus compelled the
Confederate Army to evacuate the Shenandoah Valley somewhat
precipitately.

At Wapping Heights, near Manassas Gap, on the 23d of July, a somewhat
lively action took place between portions of the two armies in
which my troops were engaged and suffered a small loss.  The enemy
were driven back, and one corps of Lee's army was forced to retreat
_via_ routes higher up the valley.  There were lively skirmishes
between the 14th of July and August 1st, at Halltown, Shepherdstown,
Snicker's Gap, Berry's Ferry, Ashby's Gap, Chester Gap, Battle
Mountain, Kelly's Ford, and Brandy Station, but each and all of
these were without material results.  By the 26th of July the Army
of the Potomac arrived in the vicinity of Warrenton, Virginia, and
occupied the north bank of the Rappahannock, while the Army of
Northern Virginia took position behind the Rapidan, covering its
fords.  Both of these great armies were now allowed by their
commanders to remain quiet to recuperate.  Occasional collisions
occurred between picket posts and scouting detachments, but none
worthy of special notice.

It having been determined by the War Department to enforce the
draft in New York and Brooklyn, and a recurrence of the riots being
again imminent, orders were issued to send veteran troops to New
York harbor for such disposition and service as the exigencies
might require.  Western troops were mainly selected, and, with a
view to sending me upon this service, I was ordered on the 14th of
August to Alexandria with the 110th and 122d Ohio, the former in
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Foster and the latter in that of
Colonel Wm. H. Ball.  On the 16th I embarked these regiments and
the 3d Michigan on a transport ship at Alexandria, with instructions
from Halleck to report on my arrival in New York Harbor to General
E. R. S. Canby.( 2)  On reaching our destination, my troops, with
others from the Army of the Potomac, were distributed throughout
both cities.  My own headquarters were for a short time on Governor's
Island, then more permanently at Carroll Park, Brooklyn.

The threatened riots and the incipient movements to again prevent
the draft were easily averted, as it was evident that no unlawful
assemblage of persons would be tolerated by the authorities when
backed by veteran soldiers.  This service proved to be a great
picnic for the men.  Officers and soldiers were received warmly
everywhere in the cities, and socially feasted and flattered.  It
was evident, however, that the good people had not yet recovered
from the terrors of the recent riots, and they manifested a painful
apprehension that a recurrence of these would take place.  The
draft, however, went on peacefully, and when all danger seemed past
the troops were ordered to return to their proper corps in the Army
of the Potomac.

At a public breakfast given to the soldiers of the 110th Ohio in
Carroll Park, Brooklyn, a very aged man appeared with a morning
paper, and asked and was granted permission to read President
Lincoln's memorable and characteristic letter of August 26, 1863,
addressed to Hon. James C. Conkling, of Illinois, in response to
an invitation to attend a mass-meeting at Springfield, "of
unconditional Union men."  The letter answered many objections
urged against the President on account of the conduct of the war,
his Emancipation Proclamation, and his purpose to enlist colored
men as soldiers.  For perspicuity, terseness, plainness, and
conclusiveness of argument this letter stands among the best of
all President Lincoln's writings.  It came at an opportune time,
and it did much to silence the caviler, to satisfy the doubter,
and to reconcile honest people who sincerely desired the complete
restoration of the Union.  Its effect was especially salutary and
satisfying to the soldiers in the field, who, somehow, felt that
the burden of maintaining the Union rested unequally upon them.

Addressing those who were dissatisfied with him, and desired _peace_,
he said:

"You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it.  But
how can we attain it?  There are but three conceivable ways.  First,
to suppress the rebellion by force of arms.  This I am trying to
do.  Are you for it?  If you are, so far we are agreed.  If you
are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union.  I am against
this,  Are you for it?  If you are, you should say so plainly.  If
you are not for force, nor yet for _dissolution_, there only remains
some imaginable _compromise_.  I do not believe that any compromise
embracing a maintenance of the Union is now possible."

To those who opposed the Emancipation Proclamation, and desired
its revocation, he said:

"You say it is unconstitutional.  I think differently.  I think
the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of
war in the time of war.  The most that can be said, if so much,
is, that slaves are property.  Is there, has there ever been, any
question that by the laws of war, property, both of enemies and
friends, may be taken when needed?"

And further:

"But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid.
If it is not valid it needs no retraction.  If it is valid it cannot
be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life."

And still further:

"You say that you will not fight to free negroes.  Some of them
seem willing to fight for you; but no matter.  Fight you, then,
exclusively to save the Union.  I issued the Proclamation on purpose
to aid you in saving the Union. . . . I thought that whatever
negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for
white soldiers to do in saving the Union.

"The signs look better.  The Father of Waters again goes unvexed
to the sea.  Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly
to them.  Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire,
Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left.  The sunny
South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a helping hand.  On
the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and
white.  The job was a great national one, and let none be slighted
who bore an honorable part in it.  And while those who have cleared
the great river may well be proud, even that is not all.  It is
hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than
at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on fields of less note.
Nor must Uncle Sam's web feet be forgotten.  At all the watery
margins they have been present, not only on the deep sea, the broad
bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and
wherever the ground was a little damp they have been and made their
tracks.  Thanks to all."

During my stay in New York my wife visited me, and accompanied me
with the troops to Alexandria.

On the 6th of September the Ohio troops of my command took ship,
and when landed at Alexandria, Virginia, marched to Fox's Ford on
the Rappahannock, and on the 14th rejoined the Third Corps, having
been absent one month.

The next day the whole army moved across the river and encamped
around Culpeper Court-House.

( 1)  _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), p. 42.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part II., pp. 46, 54.


CHAPTER IV
Advance of Lee's Army, October, 1863 and Retreat of the Army of
the Potomac to Centreville--Battle of Bristoe Station--Advance of
the Union Army, November, 1863--Assault and Capture of Rappahannock
Station, and Forcing the Fords--Affair near Brandy Station and
Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan--Incidents, etc.

Events occurred elsewhere that affected the aspect of affairs in
Virginia.

General Rosecrans, early in September, commenced to move the Army
of the Cumberland across the Tennessee River into Georgia, his
objective being Chattanooga.  Burnside at about the same time began
a movement towards Knoxville, and on the way recaptured Cumberland
Gap.  The Confederate authorities, fearing Bragg was in danger,
decided to send large reinforcements to his army, and, on September
9, 1863, Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps and a complement
of artillery, was dispatched by rail from Lee to reinforce Bragg.
The sanguinary battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and
20th of September.  It resulted in Rosecrans and his army gaining
possession of Chattanooga, and Bragg and his army being left in
possession of the battlefield.  Rosecrans held Chattanooga in little
less than a state of siege; his communications were in danger of
being effectively cut off, and to aid his imperilled forces the
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on
September 24th, ordered west, in command of General Joseph Hooker.

The loss of these corps reduced the relative strength of Meade's
army to Lee's materially below what it was before Longstreet's two
divisions were detached from the latter's army.

Elliott was relieved of the command of the Third Division, Third
Corps of the Army of the Potomac, October 3, 1863, and ordered to
report to Rosecrans.  General Joseph B. Carr (Troy, N. Y.) succeeded
him.  Carr was a charming man socially, of fine appearance, amiable
and lovable, but not strong as a soldier.  He was understood to be
a favorite of the President, who appointed him Brigadier-General
September 7, 1862; the Senate, however, failing to confirm him,
the President reappointed him in March, 1863, with rank from date
of first appointment, thus giving him high rank in spite of the
Senate.  He was finally confirmed, on a third appointment in 1864,
through some compromise, after a sharp controversy between the
President and the Senate, but with junior rank, and then ordered
to Butler's army.( 1)

For a time active operations were not contemplated by Meade.  But
Lee, about the 9th of October, crossed the Rapidan and commenced
a movement around Meade's right, threatening his rear.  This
compelled Meade to retire across the Rappahannock, and by the 14th
to Centreville and Union Mills, near the first Bull Run battle-
field.

On the 13th, while my brigade, with a New York battery temporarily
attached to it, was holding "Three Mile Station," near Warrenton,
and skirmishing with the enemy, ballot-boxes were opened, and a
_regular_ election was held for the Ohio troops, both the boxes
and ballots being carried to the voters along the battle-line so
they might vote without breaking it.( 2)

The Third Corps was encamped that night at Greenwich.  The next
morning I was ordered with my brigade and Captain McKnight's battery
(N. Y.) to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the Third Corps
to Manassas Heights _via_ Bristoe Station.  My orders were to avoid
anything like a general engagement, but to beat back the advancing
enemy whenever possible, prevent captures, and baffle him in his
endeavors to delay or reach the main column.  The successful conduct
of a rear-guard of a retreating army, when pursued by an energetic
foe, requires not only bravery but skill and tact.  After the main
body of my corps had left camp on its march towards Bristoe, and
soon after daylight, the head of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's
corps appeared from the direction of Warrenton.  I displayed my
troops with as much show of strength as possible, and with a few
shots from the battery forced the enemy to halt his head of column
and form line of battle.  I thereupon retired by column quickly,
and resumed the march until the enemy again pushed forward by the
flank too near for my safety, when, in a chosen position, my troops
were again speedily brought into line and a fire opened, which
necessarily compelled him to halt and again make disposition for
battle.  This movement was frequently repeated.  At each such halt
the enemy necessarily consumed much time, thus giving the main body
of the corps ample opportunity to proceed leisurely towards its
destination.  The weak or broken-down men of the rear-guard were
not required to halt and fight, but were allowed to make such speed
as they could.  The day was almost spent when a courier reached me
from French with the information that the corps had passed Bristoe
Station, and was on the north side of Broad Run.  Having now no
further responsibility than for the safety of my own command, I
moved more rapidly, and by 4 P.M. I had safely passed Bristoe
Station to the high ground north of Broad Run, from whence I could,
from a distance of less than a mile, see Bristoe, and, for a
considerable distance, the line of railroad running, in general
direction, north and south.  The Third Corps had moved on out of
sight towards the heights at Manassas.  My command was much wearied,
and I halted it for a short rest, but I soon ordered it forward
where it took position in obedience to an order of General Meade
to cover a blind road over which he feared the enemy might march
to seize the heights.

General A. P. Hill, in his report of the day, says:

"From this point (Greenwich) to Bristoe we followed close upon the
rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 [?] stragglers.  Upon
reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the
plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting,
a portion of it just commencing the march toward Manassas.  I
determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division,
forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and
parallel to Broad Run.  Poague's battalion was brought to the front
and directed to open on the enemy.  They were evidently taken by
surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion [?].  Seeing this,
General Heth was directed to advance his line until he reached the
run, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and
press the enemy.  This order was being promptly obeyed, when I
perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this
side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division.
Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of
Heth's division, to look out for his right flank, and he promptly
changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back. . . .
In the meantime I sent back General Anderson to send McIntosh's
battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position
threatened and protect the right flank of Heth. . . . The three
brigades advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily, Cooke's
brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came
within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad
embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware."( 3)

Hill was unexpectedly caught in a fatal trap.  He was mistaken
about seeing any considerable portion of the Third Corps north of
Broad Run, or as to any of it being taken by surprise and retiring
in confusion.  But for my halting my command to rest he would have
seen little of it.  We had baffled the head of his column all day,
and had passed beyond danger for the time, and, according to his
report, we had killed and wounded many more than we had lost.  The
stragglers he reported captured could not have been of my command,
as it left no men behind.

The fortuitous circumstance of Warren arriving at Bristoe with the
head of the Second Corps moving on a road paralleling the railroad,
just at the moment Hill was deploying his forces for an attack on
the Third Corps, led to a serious and bloody battle.  When the rear-
guard of the Third Corps passed Bristoe Station, no part of the
Second was in sight.  I saw no part of it until after Hill commenced
arraying his troops on the crest of the hills south of Broad Run.
Seeing a battle was on, and my own command too far on its way and
too much exhausted to be recalled in time to participate in it, I
dismounted from a tired horse and, with a single staff officer,
ate a lunch from my orderly's haversack ( 4) and watched the progress
of the engagement.  It is a rare occurrence that any person has an
opportunity to quietly witness the whole of a considerable battle.
From my position I could see between the lines of the opposing
forces; I could note the manoeuvres of each separate organization;
and I could almost anticipate to a certainty the result of the
attacks and counter attacks.  It was at first plainly evident that
each commander knew little of what he had to meet.  Lieutenant-
General Hill's formation, as described by him in his report, was
arranged with reference to a supposed force north of Broad Run,
and was consequently very faulty.  Warren had no notice of the
presence of an enemy until Hill ran unexpectedly into his line of
march.  Hill seemed to be eager for a fight with the Third Corps,
then far beyond his reach, and found one with the Second Corps,
which was quietly marching to a concentration near Centreville.
General Warren's command was strung out upon the road, and he had
no order of battle.  Hill, with two divisions, and others soon to
arrive, was better prepared, though his formation was bad, to meet
the Second Corps.  Warren wisely used the slightly raised railroad
bed for a breastwork, and promptly opened the battle without giving
the enemy time for a change of position or for new formations.
The battle was at first with musketry, but artillery soon arrived
on both sides and opened fire at short range.  Warren, in his
report, after describing the preliminary movements of his command
for position, says:

"A more inspiring scene could not be imagined.  The enemy's line
of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily
awaiting it, and another moving against it at double-quick, while
the artillery was taking up a position at a gallop and going into
action. . . . Under our fire the repulse of the enemy soon became
assured, and Arnold's battery arrived in time to help increase the
demoralization and reach the fugitives.

"The enemy was gallantly led, as the wounding of three of his
general officers in this attack shows, and even in retiring many
retired but sullenly.  An advance of a thin line along our front
secured 450 prisoners, two stand of colors, and five field pieces."( 5)

The battle was of short duration, but owing to the exposed position
of the Confederates their losses were great, and out of proportion
to short engagements generally.  General Warren and his officers
justly won honors for meeting the emergency so handsomely.

Hill's command was so signally defeated that the Second Corps
remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued
its march unmolested to a junction with the main army.  Hill reported
his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was
claimed on good authority to have been much larger.  The loss in
the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total
losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)

Hill's conduct was criticised, and his report bears, of dates in
November, 1863, the following indorsements:

"General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army
Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which
was the cause of the disaster that ensued.

  "R. E. Lee, General."

"The disaster at Bristoe Station seems due to a gallant but over-
hasty pressing on of the enemy.

  "J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War."

"There was a want of vigilance, by reason of which it appears the
Third Army Corps of the enemy got a position, giving great advantage
to them.

  "J. D." (Davis) ( 7)

The last two indorsements do not show that Seddon and Davis clearly
comprehended the real situation.

Lee by continued flank movements indicated a purpose to force the
Union Army back into its intrenchments at Alexandria, but this plan
was abandoned after the disaster at Bristoe.  Soon the Confederates
commenced falling back towards the Rappahannock, destroying the
railroad track and bridges, and Lee finally put his army into camp
on the Botts plantation, near Brandy Station.  He built winter
quarters there, keeping possession of the fords of the Rappahannock,
and strongly fortifying north of the river at Rappahannock Station.

The Union Army commenced a cautious forward movement on the 19th
of October, keeping close to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
On the 21st I encamped on the battlefield of Bristoe, and we finished
the burial of the dead.  On the 26th, about 9 P.M., an order came
advising me that General John Buford's cavalry division was threatened
and in peril near Catlett's Station, and directing me to go to his
relief.  My brigade, with a battery attached, reached him about
midnight, and under his direction formed line of battle, my left
resting on the railroad, the cavalry on the flanks.  He had been
attacked at dark by what seemed to be an overwhelming force of
infantry and cavalry, but he had stubbornly held his ground.  Buford
was an accomplished soldier and a hard fighter.  He it was who
opened the battle of Gettysburg on Seminary Hill.

When the best possible dispositions had been made for the expected
attack of the morning, he invited me to an excuse for a headquarters,
consisting of a tattered tent-fly.  The night was dark and rainy,
and everybody was wet and uncomfortable.  The bronzed old soldier,
from some hidden recess, had an orderly produce a bottle of whisky,
the corkage of which was perfect, and, in the absence of a corkscrew,
presented a problem.  He said, "All right, you hold the candle."
He then held the bottle in his left hand, and with his sword in
the right struck the neck of it so skillfully as to cut it off
smoothly.  The problem was solved.  Further details are unnecessary.
I understood the art of making drinking-cups by cutting a bottle
in two with a strong string, but this feat of Buford's was new to
me.( 8)

John Buford died of disease, December 16, 1863, a Major-General of
Volunteers.  He had won great renown as an able, fighting soldier.

Lee was not to be allowed to rest in his chosen winter quarters.
On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved to the fords
on the Rappahannock, and preparation was made to pass then, although
they were strongly defended by the enemy.  The Third Corps massed
at Kelly's Ford, some five miles below Rappahannock Station.  This
corps forced a crossing about 5 P.M., and massed in battle order
on the bluffs near the river.  My command did no fighting this day.
The Third Brigade, with some assistance from the Second Brigade of
the First Division of the Sixth Corps, at dusk, under the leadership
of the accomplished General David A. Russell, gallantly assaulted
and carried the strongly fortified _tête-de-pont_ on the north of
the river at Rappahannock Station.  The principal parts of Hoke's
and Hays' brigades of Early's division of Ewell's corps were
captured, numbering, including killed and wounded, 1630.  Russell's
loss in this affair, all told, was 327.  He captured seven battle
flags and Green's battery of four rifled guns.( 9)  Lee had intended
to hold this position as a centre, and then fall, alternately, on
the divided portions of the Army of the Potomac after they crossed
the river above and below it.(10)  Its loss forced him to retire
from the river and take position in front of Culpeper Court-House,
with his right resting on Mount Pony.

The next day the principal part of Meade's army, having succeeded
in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle.  Late
in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill
(Miller's) about two miles in front of Brandy Station.  The place
was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry.  This was
Lee's most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of
observation.  My command was disposed for the attack in the following
order:  The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on
the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the
122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support.  The 110th Ohio
(Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad,
with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy;
the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance
to the right.  There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was
ordered at once.  The distance to the hill was about one half mile.
The 138th drew the enemy's artillery fire, but continued its advance.
The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration,
and in person I led the 110th to the real work.  Not a gun was
fired by my men as they advanced to the charge.  I made every
exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the
foot of the hill the enemy's artillery was withdrawn, and his
infantry made a precipitate retreat.  I was the first to gain the
crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops
not two hundred feet away.  A Confederate was reported wounded with
a pistol ball at this place.  This is the nearest I can come to
having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle.  We
pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the
enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries
of artillery, which compelled us to halt.  Night came on, and the
day's work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station.  Captain
Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed,
and my loss was otherwise light.  We made the charge with the
commanding General--Meade--and much of his army looking on.  It
was Meade's belief that behind the heights assaulted would be found
Lee's army arrayed for battle.

Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in
front of Culpeper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided
it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the
Rapidan,(11) and, by the morning of the 9th of November, his army
was south of this historic stream.

The Army of Northern Virginia never again crossed the Rapidan or
Rappahannock.  Henceforth it was to be confined to a narrower
theatre of operations, and a closer defence of the capital of the
Confederate States, but this defence was still to be most memorable
and bloody, even in comparison with what had gone before.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 34.

( 2)  This was in the famous Brough-Vallandigham Ohio election for
Governor.

( 3)  _War Records_, vol. xxi., Part I., p. 426.

( 4)  This lunch consisted of a box of sardines and "hardtack."

( 5)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 242.

( 6)  _Ibid_., pp. 250, 428.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 428.

( 8)  A string tightly drawn around a bottle where the cut is
desired to be made, and then rapidly drawn back and forth until
the friction heats the glass, renders it easy to be separated by
a sharp jar against the hand or some hard substance.

( 9)  Three of these had belonged to Randolph's battery, lost at
Winchester.--_War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 626.

(10)  _Ibid_., pp. 613-616.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 611, 616 (Lee's
Report).


CHAPTER V
Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863--Winter
Cantonment (1863-64) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court-
House, and its Reorganization--Grant Assigned to Command the Union
Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War

Though the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and
November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field
campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross
the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed,
yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpeper,
the public cry was heard--"On to Richmond!"

Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff
that should have been "called" by Meade while the Army of Northern
Virginia was north of the Rappahannock.  Meade, however, acted
persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in
the light of the best knowledge he could obtain.  He would not
stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and
sometimes--said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia--was
unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards
superiors and inferiors.  Notwithstanding this, he never lost his
equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere
appearances to move him.  Nor could his superiors induce him to
act against his judgment as to a particular military situation.
It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the
Potomac after Gettysburg.  He was urged to bring on a battle before
the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and
when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have
come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed
by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against
Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his
army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detachments.

The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the
President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without
a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck:

"If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than
equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he,
his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds,
and the blame may be mine if he fails.

  "Yours truly,
  "A. Lincoln."

This note was forwarded to Meade.

To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the
enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of
information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of
jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his
doing so sooner.  But the pressure continued.  Halleck, the 18th,
wired Meade:

"Lee is unquestionably bullying you.  If you cannot ascertain his
movements, I certainly cannot.  If you pursue and fight him, I
think you will find out where he is.  I know of no other way."

This was too much for Meade's temper.  He responded:

" . . . If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive
and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of
such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored
me with, particularly as they have not been asked for.  I take this
occasion to repeat what I have before stated, that if my course,
based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to
be, and I desire to be, relieved from command."

Although Halleck apologized "if he had unintentionally given
offence," and Meade thanked him for the "explanation," these and
other like occurrences had their influence on Meade's conduct.

As he had failed to bring Lee to bay at Culpeper, the only
opportunity to do so must be sought south of the Rapidan.  Meade
was not averse to battle.

On November 26, 1863, Meade's army was put in motion with a view
to a general concentration south of the Rapidan, at Robertson's
Tavern on the turnpike road, by evening of that day.  Lee's army
of about 50,000 men was mainly massed and in winter quarters in
front of Orange Court-House, with an intrenched line in its front
across the plank road and turnpike, extending to the river.

Meade's design was, by a rapid movement, to carry this line before
Lee had time to concentrate behind it.

The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was directed to cross the Rapidan at
Culpeper Mine Ford, and thence move by the plank road to Parker's
Store and the junction of the road to Robertson's Tavern; the First
Corps (Newton), with two divisions, to follow the Fifth.  The Second
Corps (Warren) was to force a crossing at Germanna Ford, thence
march directly to Robertson's Tavern, and there await the arrival
of other corps.

The Third Corps (General William H. French), followed closely by
the Sixth (Sedgwick), was directed to cross at Jacob's Ford (Mill),
and continue the march, bearing to the left, to Robertson's Tavern.
Jacob's Ford, with its steep banks, proved so difficult to pass
that some delay occurred, and the artillery had to be sent around
by Germanna Ford, and did not rejoin the corps until the morning
of the 27th.  Jacob's Ford was the highest up the river, and
consequently brought French, on passing it, in close proximity to
the enemy.  Lee, by the evening of the 26th, had thrown forward
cavalry and some infantry of Hill's corps to the vicinity of
Robertson's Tavern, though not in sufficient force to prevent Warren
taking his designated position.  Nor was Sykes seriously interfered
with.  The cavalry crossed at Ely's and other fords.  French, with
the aid of pontoons, safely passed the river, but he did not advance
on the 26th more than three miles beyond the crossing, time having
been lost in hunting blind country roads, waiting for artillery to
arrive, and reconnoitering.  A force of the enemy showed itself on
intersecting roads to his right, where were a number of such roads
leading from Sisson, Witchell, Tobaccostick and Morton's Fords,
and one which led from Raccoon Ford--still higher up the river--to
an intersection at Jones' house, with the most direct road to the
Tavern.  The enemy's intrenchments covered a considerable part of
this last road, from which he could easily debouch and attack the
flank and rear or the trains of the marching columns.( 1)  These
conditions rendered French's situation perilous, and caused him to
move with extreme caution, as the Sixth Corps could not arrive
until he was out of the way.  Notwithstanding French had some miles
farther to march than Warren, and unusual difficulties to overcome
or guard against, Meade dispatched him, as early as 1 P.M. of the
26th, that his delay was retarding the operations of Warren, and
again at 3 P.M. he dispatched French:

"I would not move forward farther from the river than to clear the
way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses."

The Second Division, General Henry Prince, with some cavalry, was
in the advance; the Third, Carr's, and the First, General David B.
Birney's, following in the order named.  At the Widow Morris', a
somewhat obscure road bore off abruptly to the left, but which,
somewhat circuitously, led to Robertson's Tavern.  The head of
Prince's column, however, was on the more direct road to Tom Morris'
house, with flankers and cavalry well to the right.  These were
soon attacked and driven in or recalled.

It seems Prince was led to believe he was in communication with
Warren's left.( 2)

It soon became evident that the head of French's column was near
the Raccoon Ford road, and the intrenchments held by at least two
divisions of Ewell's corps of Lee's army, and there seemed to be
no possible chance to extricate it without a battle.

At 11.45 A.M., on the 27th, Meade dispatched French:

"If you cannot unite with Warren by the route you are on, you must
move through to him by the left."

At 1.45 P.M. Meade again dispatched French:

"Attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left
forward to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern.  The
object of an attack is to form junction with General Warren, which
must be effected immediately."

Prince had, by this time, formed line of battle and engaged the
enemy.  Carr's division was ordered forward to take position on
Prince's left, and at 3 P.M. Birney's division was ordered to form
in support of Carr.

Prince covered the road leading to a junction with the Raccoon Ford
road.  The First Brigade of Carr's division (General W. H. Morris)
moved to the left of Prince, my brigade--the Second--was ordered
to pass behind Morris, and take position on his left, and Colonel
B. F. Smith's brigade--the Third--was sent to my left.

Morris became somewhat entangled in a ravine and in thick timber,
and was slow in forming good line.  In this position he was fired
upon from a ridge not two hundred yards from his front, the bullets
falling among my men as they passed his rear.  I appealed to Morris
to face to the front, charge, and take the ridge, but he declined
to do so for want of orders.

As soon as I could get my two leading regiments, 110th and 122d
Ohio, on Morris' left, I led them to the crest of the ridge, captured
some prisoners, and posted the regiments in good position behind
a fence on the summit.  My other regiments, 6th Maryland and 138th
Pennsylvania, successively, on their arrival, took position on the
left of the Ohio troops.  The ridge which extended to my right
along Morris' front was still held by the enemy in strong force,
and both my flanks were threatened.  Through a misunderstanding of
orders the Ohio regiments fell back a short distance, but soon
retook the crest and were again fiercely engaged, though under an
enfilading fire of artillery and a galling fire of musketry.  The
ground being somewhat open to the front, I could see the enemy
massing for an attack.  I again, but vainly, appealed to Morris to
advance and close the gap, as otherwise his position in the ravine
and thick woods could not be held.  The assault came, and Morris
was forced, in some confusion, to retire.  By refusing my right
somewhat, I maintained my isolated position and threatened the
enemy's right.  The First Brigade, though composed in part of
regiments not before in strong battle, was quickly re-formed, and,
under Carr's order, soon obtained full possession of the ridge by
a splendid charge, and thus the gap was closed.  The battle by this
time raged furiously all along the front.  Colonel Smith, passing
too far to the rear, lost his way in the thickets, and failed to
come up on my left.  He did not rejoin the division until the battle
was over.  This misfortune was hard to account for, as Colonel
Smith was an intelligent, brave, and skilled officer--a graduate
of West Point.  He met some scouting parties of the enemy, and, as
directed, sought to find a connection with troops of Warren's corps.
His failure caused my left to remain uncovered.

Two assaults were made upon my line by the enemy in columns not
less than three lines deep.  The first came in front of Horn's
regiment, but was anticipated, and McClennan's regiment, moving
into the open ground, struck the right flank of the enemy and
(firing buck and ball from .69 calibre muskets) did great execution.
McClennan was severely wounded, and in consequence was obliged to
leave the field.

The battle raged with unabated fury until dark, and as late as 8
P.M. enfilading shells from heavy guns on our right screamed and
crashed through the timber over our heads, bursting with loud noise,
producing a most hideous and weird appearance, but really doing
little damage.

As night approached, the ammunition of my regiments gave out, and
all my command, save one regiment, was relieved by regiments of
Birney's division.( 3)

The bravery and fighting skill of Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan,
also of Lieutenant-Colonels M. M. Granger and W. N. Foster, and
Major Otho H. Binkley, and others, was most conspicuous.  Lieutenant
James A. Fox of the 110th here lost his life.  He had risen from
the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer.  We
buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket,
behind a near-by garden fence.

I wish to bear testimony also, at this late day, to the quiet
gallantry and high soldierly qualities of the long-since-dead
General David B. Birney.( 4)  He did not obey orders to the letter
only.  His division being in reserve and support, he took position
where he could watch the progress of the battle, and note in time
when and where he was needed.  He made no display on the field.
When he noticed, by the slackening fire of my men, that their
ammunition was about exhausted, he rode to my side and quietly
suggested that he be allowed to order regiments from his own command
to take their places.  That there might not be, even momentarily,
a break in the line, his regiments were moved up, and my men lay
down while his stepped over them and opened fire.  The relieved
troops were then withdrawn and resupplied with ammunition.

While the battle was in progress, the Sixth Corps, still some
distance to the rear, was directed by another road on Robertson's
Tavern, and during the night the Third Corps was ordered to withdraw
and follow the Sixth.

The enemy retired at the close of the battle, leaving in our
possession his dead, unburied, and his wounded on the field and in
hospitals.  We fought a great part, if not all, of Ewell's corps.

Casualties were reported in thirteen Confederate brigades, in forty-
four regiments, and in the artillery of Early, Johnson, and Rodes'
divisions, total 601.( 5)

The losses in the Third Corps were 10 officers and 115 enlisted
men killed, 28 officers and 719 enlisted men wounded, total 872.

The brigades of Morris and Keifer suffered the most severely,
although Prince's division was first engaged.  My own killed and
wounded numbered 172, those of Prince's division 163.  There were
no captured or missing men of my command.

This engagement has been called by the Confederates the battle of
Payne's Farm;( 5) but by the Union side it is generally known as
the battle of Orange Grove; the place, however, is sometimes referred
to as Locust Grove, and by both sides it is often mentioned as Mine
Run, though in no proper sense did the contest occur on that stream.

The battle, fought by French under the circumstances narrated, gave
rise to much crimination and recrimination between Generals Meade
and French, and probably led to a reorganization of the Army of
the Potomac four months later.

Meade attributed the miscarriage of the campaign to French's failure
on the 26th, and his further failure on the 27th, to connect with
Warren's left at Robertson's Tavern.  He claimed that if such
junction had been made he could have fallen on the portion of Lee's
army on the turnpike and destroyed it, and that he would then have
been able to seize the line behind Mine Run before Lee could occupy
it with his united forces.  Meade further contended that, on the
27th, French got on the wrong road, and, consequently, had to fight
a fruitless battle alone, while the other corps of the army were
standing idle, waiting for him.  French stoutly insisted that his
march, being on the extreme right and exposed flank, on the longest
line, and _via_ a difficult ford, without a good guide and over
blind roads, with a doubt as to which one should be taken, warranted
him in acting with caution, and in fighting where he did when he
found his command attacked; and he further claimed that when he
brought Ewell's corps to battle, Meade should have fallen on the
enemy in Warren's front and overwhelmed it; that by fighting when
and where he did, he was doing more than he otherwise could have
done to prevent a concentration of the Confederate Army, especially
in preventing it from massing in front of Robertson's Tavern.  A
considerable part of the Union Army sympathized with French, yet
the fact remained that Meade's plan of concentration and of battle
at the appointed time and place failed.

On the 28th the armies were brought face to face, the Confederate
army in fortifications behind and along the high west bank of Mine
Run, both armies extending from a short distance south of the plank
road to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of the battle-
field of the 27th.( 6)  The Third Corps held the Union centre.
Warren's corps, with a division of the Third Corps, was sent to
reconnoitre for a point of attack on the Confederate right.  Warren
reported an attack there feasible.  Other reconnoissances were made
on the 29th, and Meade decided to assault from both flanks the next
morning, the Sixth and Fifth Corps under Sedgwick on the enemy's
left and the Second Corps and two divisions of the Third on his
right.  Carr's division of the Third marched at 4 A.M. two miles
to the left and joined Warren's column.  The night was cold and
there was much suffering.

Warren had about 20,000 men in readiness, and was to attack at 8
A.M. at a signal from the batteries of the centre.  Sedgwick was
to attack an hour later.  The signal batteries opened, and we stood,
in grand array, soberly withing for the order to charge.  The
enemy's strong works, with guns bristling in the morning sun, were
in our immediate front.  Minutes of delay were as hours to the
waiting troops.  Many sent up silent prayers for safety, and not
unfrequently through the column there could be seen on a soldier's
breast a paper giving his name, company, regiment, and home address,
so, if killed, his body could be identified.  Warren hesitated,
and just before 9 A.M. dispatched Meade, then four miles distant:

"The full light of sun shows me that I cannot succeed."

Meade suspended Sedgwick's attack, then in progress, and hastened
to Warren.  I saw the two men at a small, green, pine wood fire,
earnestly discussing the critical situation.  Meade seemed to be
censuring Warren, yet the latter adhered to his view that the
assault could not be successfully made, and Meade yielded.  Somehow
the troops of the great column, before the final decision was
announced, came to believe the charge would not be made, and they
cautiously commenced badgering each other, soldier like, over wasted
prayers.  The different commands were later ordered to their former
positions.

French opposed an assault on the centre.  The enemy's position,
naturally a strong one, had been greatly strengthened by labor.
The wisdom of not making any assault, in the light of all the facts,
was, I think, generally recognized.  The season was unfavorable;
Meade was a long distance from his base; success could only have
been temporary and could not have been followed up, and defeat
under the circumstances would have been a fatal catastrophe.  Even
Grant, in 1864, was "all summer" in trying to gather fruits of what
were called successes.

The 1st of December was spent by both armies in watching each other,
and behaving as if they dared each other to attack.

"One was afraid and the other dare not"--but which?

The campaign had been delayed beyond all expectation; all hope of
gaining an advantage by a surprise or otherwise was passed, food
was becoming scarce, and hence Meade decided to retire his army to
its base of supplies.  At dusk of the 1st, therefore, the Union
Army moved by different roads to various fords of the Rapidan, the
Third Corps to Culpeper Mine Ford, the farthest down the river of
any used, and by 8 A.M. of the coming morning all had recrossed,
and on the 3d they were in their former camps at Brandy Station.
The Army of the Potomac lost in this campaign, killed and wounded,
1272.( 7)

Thus ended the Mine Run campaign; not bloodless, yet disappointing,
as were many others.  In it Meade demonstrated his willingness to
fight, and that his army was loyal to him.  Another opportunity to
fight a great battle in independent command on the field never came
to him.  His chief glory for all time must rest on Gettysburg.

Lee, the night of December 1st, feeling certain Meade would not
assault him in his strong position, and knowing the latter was far
from his base, in an unfamiliar country, encumbered with trains,
determined to assume the offensive by throwing two of his divisions
against Meade's left on the following morning.  But Meade was safely
away when morning came, and pursuit impossible.

Lee, it is said, was greatly chagrined over his lost opportunity,
and exclaimed to his generals:

"I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted
these people to get away."( 8)

Before starting on this campaign Meade expressed a purpose to take
position in front of Fredericksburg, but Halleck disapproved the
plan.( 9)

The Army of the Potomac, having ended its historic work of the
memorable year 1863, went into winter quarters around Culpeper
Court-House, with Brandy Station for its base of supplies.  My
brigade occupied log huts on John Minor Botts' (10) farm, partly
constructed by the Confederates prior to November 8th.

The caring, in winter, for a large army calls for great vigilance,
skill, and energy.  The season not permitting much opportunity for
drill, discipline is hard to maintain.  Sickness becomes prevalent,
and there is much unrest, both of officers and soldiers.

Camp guards, however, had to be maintained; also grand-guards and
pickets around the front and flanks of the whole army.  The freezing
and thawing and the constant moving of supply trains caused deep
mud in the roads and camps.  The brigade commanders of the Third
Corps, and of other corps as well, were, alternately, detailed as
corps officer-of-the-day, the duties of which lasted twenty-four
hours, and required the officer to be with the advance-guard and
on the corps' picket lines to see that vigilance was preserved;
that orders were understood and obeyed, and to report any unusual
occurrences.  He was required to visit all guards and pickets,
personally, at least once by day and once by night.  The Third
Corps' advance line was from Mt. Pony, its left, around the front
of Culpeper Court-House, covering the Madison Court-House road;
in length about five miles.  This service was arduous, trying, and,
by night, attended with danger.

During my service as corps officer-of-the-day, in March, 1864,
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Townsend (106th N. Y.), in charge of
the grand-guard on the Sperryville road, in violation of orders,
admitted some refugee ladies, who presented a pass from an officer
of an outer cavalry picket.  The orders were to recognize no pass
for a citizen not emanating from army headquarters.  The Colonel
reported the occurrence to me, and I disapproved his action, but
made no report of it.  The ladies, on some errand, reached
headquarters, and told of their admittance on this road.  Meade
ordered me to report the delinquent officer, which I did, giving
all excuses I could for him, but they were unavailing.  I was
ordered to prefer charges against Colonel Townsend, "for disobedience
of orders."  A general court-martial was called for his trial, of
which General D. B. Birney was President, and, notwithstanding I
had preferred the charges, I was made a member of it.

On the trial I protested my interest and asked the court to excuse
me from sitting, but my request was refused.  The court found
Townsend guilty and sentenced him:  "To be suspended from rank and
pay for two months."  This sentence was approved by General Meade,
April 1st, but Townsend's suspension from rank was remitted, and
he was ordered to duty.  He was a gallant and accomplished officer,
and, feeling keenly the disgrace, rushed to his death at Cold Harbor
just after the sixty days' suspension of pay elapsed.  The incident
illustrates the severity of discipline and the fate of war.

The soldiers of the army, as far as possible, were kept active,
but the cold winter, with frequent rains, caused much discomfort,
and many were in hospital; few were furloughed.  Many rude log
chapels were erected and used, often alternately, for religious
worship, lectures, concerts, readings, and dances.  Civilian visitors
were, at times, numerous.  One most notable army ball was given at
the headquarters of General Joseph B. Carr.  This event took place
January 25, 1864, and was attended generally by officers of the
army, by some military officials from Washington and elsewhere, by
officers' wives and their friends visiting the army, and by invited
ladies and gentlemen from Washington, New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, and Baltimore.  Over four thousand attended.  The ball was
held in large communicating tents, erected for the purpose.  Ample
floors were laid for promenades and dancing.  Dinner was provided,
where everything obtainable from land or sea was served, with
liquors and wines without stint.  The night was entirely devoted
to it.  It was brilliant beyond descriptions.  To hundreds it was
their last ball, or appearance in social life.

Notwithstanding the necessarily promiscuous character of the
participants, and though no scandal attended it, and all decorum
usual on such occasions was observed, it was at the time the subject
of much severe criticism through the press, from the pulpit, and
by people generally.  General Carr and his good wife were adepts
in social affairs, and are entitled to the distinction of having
assembled and directed the most numerously attended ball of its
kind ever held in the United States.

Horse racing and other sports were indulged in, especially by the
cavalry.  But all these were mere diversions, and did not indicate
that the army was not preparing for the bloody work yet ahead of it.

Grant, with the armies under General George H. Thomas, W. T. Sherman,
and Joseph Hooker, November 25, 1863, drove Bragg from his perch
on Missionary Ridge and to a precipitate retreat, and the Army of
the Tennessee under Sherman subsequently relieved Burnside, besieged
at Knoxville by Longstreet, thus closing the campaigns of 1863 in
the West about the time they closed in the East.  Soon thereafter
rumors were current that Grant was to be promoted to chief command
of all the Union armies.  A law passed Congress February 29, 1864,
reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and President Lincoln,
the next day, appointed Ulysses S. Grant to the office, and the
Senate, the succeeding day, confirmed the appointment.  March 10,
1864, Halleck was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and became
thereafter Chief of Staff of the Army.  Grant was, the same day,
assigned by the President, "pursuant to the act of Congress, to
command the Armies of the United States," headquarters of the Army
to be in Washington, and "with General Grant in the field."  Grant
established his field-headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, March
26, 1864, and remained with the Army of the Potomac until Appomattox
came.  Just prior to his joining the Army of the Potomac, March
23, 1864, it was reorganized, the First and Third Corps being broken
up as separate organizations, and the troops composing them
distributed to the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, they retaining
their former corps badges.  Hancock resumed command of the Second
Corps.  Warren was assigned to command the Fifth.  Carr was
transferred to the Second.  The Third Division, Third Corps, became
the Third Division of the Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps, the old Third
Division of the Sixth being consolidated with its other divisions.

General H. Prince was assigned to command the Third Division of
the Sixth.  The Second Brigade (Keifer's) of this division, with
the 126th Ohio (Colonel Smith) and the 67th Pennsylvania (Colonel
Staunton) added, was placed under the command of General David A.
Russell,(11) but he was soon transferred to another command, and
Colonel B. F. Smith for a time succeeded him.  Major-General James
B. Ricketts, before April 30, 1864, relieved General Prince, and
thereafter the Third Division of the Sixth Corps was known as
"Ricketts' Division."

Much bad feeling existed on the part of Generals French, Sykes,
Newton, and others over the breaking up of their commands and their
being relieved from field duty.  The consolidation of divisions
and brigades in the corps retained, also caused much discontent,
and excited jealousies towards the organizations from the disbanded
corps which took their old designations.  This was the second time
troops I commanded had this experience.  While in camp or on marches
an officer may become disliked by his men, but a great battle in
which he does his duty will always restore him to popularity.  The
Third Corps badge was a diamond; the Sixth a Greek cross.  The
Third Division for a time adhered to the _diamond_, but later, wore
both proudly, and finally rejoiced alone under the _Greek cross_.

The Army of the Potomac was for the first time reduced to three
corps.  There was, however, belonging to this army, a large artillery
reserve, not attached to any corps, but under a chief, General
Henry J. Hunt; also a cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
and a reserve brigade, which Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was
assigned (April 5, 1864) to command.(12)  To each corps was attached
an artillery brigade.  This army, like any other well-appointed
one, also had (each with a chief officer) its Commissary, Quartermaster,
Ordnance, and Medical Departments; also a Provost-Guard, consisting
of a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under a Provost
Marshal-General;(13) also Signal and Engineer Corps, and other
minor and somewhat independent organizations, such as body-guards
to commanding generals, pioneers, pontoniers, etc.

The Army of the Potomac, thus organized, commanded, and appointed,
with the new commander of all the armies of the Union with it, now
awaited good weather to enter upon the bloodiest campaign civilized
man has ever witnessed.

( 1)  See sketch attached to Meade's report, _War Records_, vol.
xxix, Part I., p. 19.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 738.

( 3)  Birney's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 750.

( 4)  He died of disease October 18, 1864.

( 5)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 836-8.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 19. (Sketch).

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 686.

( 8)  _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., p. 241 (Col. Venable).

( 9)  _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 18.

(10)  Botts was then on his farm--a Union man.  He had been an old
line Whig, and was personally hostile to Jeff. Davis.

(11)  _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., pp. 717, 722, 732, 745.

(12)  _Ibid_., 798, 806.

(13)  A badge for each fighting corps of the Union Army was adopted
(January, 1863), its color indicating the number of the division
in a corps.  Three divisions of three brigades each usually
constituted a corps.  Each officer and soldier wore on his hat or
cap his proper corps badge; the first division being red, second
white, and third blue.  The badge appeared prominently in the centre
of all headquarters flags.  Division flags were square, brigade,
tri-cornered, all of white ground save those of a second division
which were blue; the flag of a second brigade had a red border next
to the pole, and of a third brigade a red border on all sides.


CHAPTER VI
Plans of Campaigns, Union and Confederate--Campaign and Battle of
the Wilderness, May, 1864--Author Wounded, and Personal Matters--
Movements of the Army to the James River, with Mention of Battles
of Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Other Engagements, and Statement
of Losses and Captures

A full detailed history of the great campaign of the Wilderness
and of the many battles fought in the spring and summer of 1864 in
Southeast Virginia and around Richmond and Petersburg will not here
be attempted.  I shall confine myself to a general story of the
campaign, with dates, results of engagements and losses, and some
details of the fighting participated in by troops I was immediately
connected with or interested in.

General Grant (April 9, 1864), in a confidential communication to
General Meade,( 1) outlined his plan for the early movements of
all the principal Union armies.  Texas was to be abandoned, save
on the Rio Grande, and General Banks, then on Red River, was to
concentrate a force, not less than 25,000 strong, at New Orleans
to move on Mobile.  Sherman was to leave Chattanooga at the same
time Meade moved, "Joe Johnston's army being his objective point
and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim"; if successful, Sherman
was to "secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid
of Banks."  General Franz Sigel (then in command of the Department
of West Virginia ( 2)), was to start two columns, one from Beverly
under General Ord, to endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad west of Lynchburg, and the other from Charleston, West
Virginia, under General George Crook, to strike at Saltville and
go thence eastward to join Ord.  General Quincy A. Gilmore was to
be transferred, with 10,000 men, from South Carolina to General B.
F. Butler at Fortress Monroe, and the latter General was to organize
a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of General
W. F. Smith, with which, and Gilmore's command, he should "seize
City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the
river," moving simultaneously with Meade's army.  To Meade he said:
"_Lee's army will be your objective point.  Wherever Lee goes there
you will go also_."  General Burnside, then at Annapolis organizing
the Ninth Army Corps, was to reinforce Meade with probably 25,000
men.  There was to be naval co-operation on the James.  Grant had
not then determined on which flank to attack Lee, or whether he
would cross the Rapidan above or below the Confederate Army.

All baggage was reduced to the lowest standard possible.  "Two
wagons to a regiment of 500 men . . . for all baggage, exclusive
of subsistence stores and ordnance stores.  One wagon to a brigade
and one to a division headquarters, . . . and about two to corps
headquarters."

Meade subsequently made a further reduction, and allowed only one
wagon to a regiment.

When it was finally determined to move by Lee's right flank, Meade
was ordered to have supplies forwarded to White House, on the
Pamunkey.( 3)

Sigel was directed to advance a column in co-operation from
Martinsburg up the Shenandoah Valley.

Grant, in a confidential dispatch,( 4) April 29th, to Halleck,
fixed May 4th as the date for putting the Army of the Potomac in
motion, saying:

"My own notions about our line of march are entirely made up, but
as circumstances beyond my control may change them, I will only
state that my effort will be to bring Butler's and Meade's forces
together."

The next day, on the authority of a rebel officer arrested in
Baltimore, who left Lee's army on April 17th, Halleck wired Grant
that Lee was about to move Longstreet by the mountain road westward
over the Blue Ridge with 20,000 men; that Hill, 50,000 strong, was
to force Grant's right at Culpeper, and with three divisions form
a junction at Warrenton with Ewell; that all Confederate troops
from East Tennessee were to strengthen Lee; that Breckinridge, with
25,000 men in West Virginia, accompanied by Morgan's cavalry, was
to force his way down the Kanawha into Ohio, near Gallipolis; that
if Lee reached Pennsylvania, Breckinridge was to join him, Morgan's
cavalry destroying all railroads to east and west; that Lee's
general direction was to be towards Wheeling and Pittsburg; that
Richmond's defence was to be left to Beauregard, with Pickett's
division of 15,000 men, the Maryland Line, details from hospitals,
conscripts, militia of Governor Smith's call (fifty to fifty-five
years of age), and a foreign legion of forced aliens.( 5)

This plan, if ever formed, comprehensive as it may have been in
conception, was never to be even partially put in execution.  It
probably originated in the fertile imagination of the rebel officer
from whom Halleck obtained it.

In March, 1864, an equally comprehensive plan was conceived by
Longstreet, then at Greenville, Tennessee, by which Beauregard was
to lead an advance column from the borders of North Carolina through
the mountain passes, Longstreet to follow through East Tennessee,
uniting with Beauregard in Kentucky, and, together, move against
the line of railway from Louisville, and thus force Sherman to
retire from Johnston's front, allowing him to advance northward,
avoiding general battle until all the Confederate columns could
form a grand junction on or near the Ohio River.  This plan was
approved by Lee, and by both Lee and Longstreet laid before President
Davis and the War Department at Richmond.  Davis disapproved it.

Another plan, submitted by Bragg (then "Commander-in-Chief near
the President"), received the approval of Davis.  By this Johnston
was to march to the headwaters of the Little Tennessee River,
Longstreet to the east of Knoxville and join Johnston, and, united,
they were to march west into Middle Tennessee and break the Union
line of supplies about Nashville.  Though some orders were issued
looking to the execution of this plan, it was not seriously attempted,
as Joe Johnston regarded it as impracticable.( 6)  Longstreet, with
the part of his command that had served in Virginia, was, early in
April, transferred to the Rapidan.  Grant alone moved his armies
to the execution of his campaigns as planned.

_Wilderness_

Not until May 2d did Meade send orders to his corps for the movement
on the 4th across the Rapidan.  On the day of starting he issued
a stirring and patriotic address to his soldiers.( 7)  Grant had
determined to attack and turn Lee's right flank.( 8)

As soon in the early morning as engineers could lay pontoons the
cavalry crossed the river at Ely and Germanna Fords, and cleared
the way for the infantry.  Hancock's (Second) corps crossed at
Ely's Ford and marched to the vicinity of Chancellorsville.  Warren's
(Fifth) corps, with Sedgwick's (Sixth) following, crossed at Germanna
Ford.  Warren proceeded to the Old Wilderness Tavern.  Sedgwick
bivouacked on the heights south of the river.  The reserve artillery
crossed at Ely's Ford, and subsistence and other trains at this
and Culpeper Mine Ford.  All these movements took place as ordered.( 9)

No serious resistance was met with the first day.  On the night of
the 4th I encamped immediately south of the Rapidan on the height
just above the ford.  I was ordered to cover the ford and protect
the pontoon bridge until the head of Burnside's column should reach
it.  The whole army slept without tents.  On rising in the early
morning, and while standing on a bluff overlooking the river, Major
Wm. S. McElwain of my regiment, in a quiet but somewhat troubled
way, ventured to suggest that unless I was more prudent than usual
I would never recross it.  I told him the chances of war were hardly
lessened by prudence where duty was involved, and that my chances
of going North alive were probably as good as his.  He seemed to
have no concern about himself.

General Grant, his staff, and escort, rode by while we waited.  He
was on a fine, though small, black horse, which he set well; was
plainly dressed, looked the picture of health, and bore no evidence
of anxiety about him.  His plain hat and clothes were in marked
contrast with a somewhat gaily dressed and equipped staff.  He
saluted and spoke pleasantly, but did not check his horse from a
rather rapid gait.

About 10 A.M. Burnside, at the head of his command, reached the
ford.  His corps, the Ninth, had been recently organized by him at
Annapolis, Maryland, and officers and soldiers were, in general,
newly equipped and clothed, and all regiments and headquarters had
new flags.  The long line, as displayed for miles, moving slowly
over the lowlands to the crossing, was most imposing, and gave rise
to varied reflections.  But the time for strong battle had come.
The head of the Fifth Corps was pushed forward on the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, the purpose being to avoid the intrenchments
of Mine Run, but the enemy appearing on the turnpike running, in
general, parallel with the plank road and to the north of it, the
Sixth Corps (except the Second Brigade, Third Division) moved to
position on the right of the Fifth, save Getty's division, which
was sent to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads
with instructions to hold it, at all hazards, until the arrival of
Hancock's corps from Todd's Tavern.  About noon two divisions of
Warren's corps had a sharp combat with the head of Ewell's corps
on the pike, driving it back some distance when, being outflanked,
they were in turn forced back, losing two guns.  Wadsworth's division
of this corps having been sent to the plank road was withdrawn to
a junction with Warren's other divisions.  Warren suffered some
loss in prisoners taken from Crawford's division.  Getty, on his
arrival on the plank road, found our cavalry being pressed back by
Hill's corps, but he deployed on each side of the road, and opening
fire on the enemy checked him.  Getty was able to hold his position
until Hancock arrived about 2 P.M.  Hancock, with his corps and
Getty's division, assailed the enemy furiously, and for a time
successfully, though meeting with stubborn resistance.  General
Alexander Hays was killed in this action while repairing a break
in our line.  The enemy moved troops from the turnpike to Hill's
relief, and Meade, seeing this, sent Wadsworth's division and
Baxter's brigade of the Fifth Corps to Hancock.  Night came, and
the battle ceased on this part of the field before the reinforcements
arrived, both armies holding their positions.

The Sixth Corps (Getty's division absent with Hancock) with much
difficulty made its way through the dense low pine thicket, and
about 2 P.M. was in position, principally deployed, on the right
of the Fifth, Ricketts' division (Second Brigade absent) on the
left, and Wright on the right.  Soon after the head of Burnside's
column reached Germanna Ford, my brigade moved to the battle-ground.
As we advanced, firing along the extended front soon told us where
serious work had begun.  General Truman Seymour (of Olustee fame)
was assigned this day to command the brigade, but he did not promptly
join it.  As we approached the battle, I was ordered by a staff
officer of Sedgwick to conduct the brigade to the right of that
part of the Sixth Corps already in line and partly engaged.  This
order being executed, we became the extreme right of the army.
The other brigades of the Third Division being in position on the
left of the corps, I was not in touch with them, and reported to
General H. G. Wright, commanding the First Division.

Heavy firing already extended along the line of the Sixth Corps to
the left of us.  The brigade, about 2 P.M., was put by me in position
in two lines, the 6th Maryland and 110th Ohio, from left to right,
in the front, and the 122d and 126th Ohio and the 138th Pennsylvania
on the rear line and in reserve.  Skirmishers were advanced, who
pressed the enemy's skirmishers back a short distance to his main
line, and a sharp engagement ensued, lasting until about 5 P.M.,
when, proper support being promised, an aggressive attack was made.

I quote from my official report, dated November 1, 1864:

"I received orders to assume general charge of the first line, to
press the enemy, and, if possible, outflank him upon his left.
The troops charged forward in gallant style, pressing the enemy
back by 6 P.M. about one half mile, when we came upon him upon the
slope of a hill, intrenched behind logs which had been hurriedly
thrown together.  During the advance the troops were twice halted
and the fire opened, killing and wounding a considerable number of
the enemy.

"The front line being upon the extreme right of the army, and the
troops upon its left failing to move forward in conjunction with
it, I deemed it prudent to halt without making an attack upon the
enemy's line.  After a short consultation with Col. John W. Horn,
I sent word that the advance line of the brigade was unsupported
upon either flank, and that the enemy overlapped the right and left
of the line, and was apparently in heavy force, rendering it
impossible for the troops to attain success in a further attack.

"I soon after received an order to attack at once.

"Feeling sure that the word I sent had not been received, I delayed
until a second order came to attack.  I accordingly made the attack
without further delay.

"The attack was made about 7 P.M.  The troops were in a thick and
dense wilderness.  The line was advanced to within 150 yards of
the enemy's works, under a most terrible fire from the front and
flanks.  It was impossible to succeed; but the two regiments,
notwithstanding, maintained their ground and kept up a rapid fire
for nearly three hours, and then retired under orders, for a short
distance only.

"I was wounded about 8.30 P.M. by a rifle ball passing through both
bones of the left forearm, but did not relinquish command until 9 P.M.

"The troops were required to maintain this unequal contest under
the belief that other troops were to attack the enemy upon his
flank.

"In this attack the 6th Maryland lost in killed, two officers and
sixteen men, and eight officers and 132 men wounded; and the 110th
Ohio lost one officer and thirteen men killed, and six (6) officers
and ninety-three (93) men wounded, making an aggregate in the two
regiments of 271.

"Major William S. McElwain, 110th Ohio, who had won the commendations
of all who knew him, for his skill, judgment, and gallantry, was
among the killed.

"Lieutenant Joseph McKnight, 110th Ohio, and Captain Adam B. Martin,
6th Maryland, were mortally wounded, and have since died.

"Captain J. B. Van Eaton and Lieutenants H. H. Stevens and G. O.
McMillen, 110th Ohio, Major J. C. Hill, Captains A. Billingslea,
J. T. Goldsborough, J. J. Bradshaw and J. R. Rouser, and Lieutenants
J. A. Swarts, C. Damuth and D. J. Smith, 6th Maryland, were more
or less severely wounded.

"All displayed the greatest bravery, and deserve the thanks of the
country.

"Colonel John W. Horn, 6th Maryland, and Lieutenant-Colonel O. H.
Binkley, 110th Ohio, deserve to be specially mentioned for their
courage, skill, and ability.

"Captains Brown, 110th Ohio, and Prentiss, 6th Maryland, distinguished
themselves in their successful management of skirmishers.

"From reports of this night attack published in the Richmond papers
it is known that the rebel Brigadier-General J. M. Jones, (commanding
the Stonewall Brigade) and many others were killed in the attack."

In consequence of my wound I was absent from the brigade after the
battle of the Wilderness until August 26, 1864, and I am therefore
unable to give its movements and operations from personal knowledge.
Colonel Ball succeeded me on the field in command of the brigade,
and Colonel Horn in charge of the advance line in the night attack.
Seymour was not present with the attacking troops.  He was captured
the next day, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel
B. F. Smith.

To enable the reader to follow it through the battle I quote further
from my report of November 1, 1864.

"Early on the morning of the 6th of May, the brigade formed in two
lines of battle and assaulted the enemy's works in its front, the
122d and 126th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania in the front line, and
the 110th Ohio and 6th Maryland in the rear line.  The brigade was
still the extreme right of the army.  The assault was most vigorously
made, but the enemy was found to be in too great numbers and too
strongly fortified to be driven from his position.  After suffering
very heavy loss, the troops were withdrawn to their original
position, where slight fortifications were thrown up.  In the charge
the troops behaved most gallantly.  The 122d and 126th Ohio and
138th Pennsylvania lost very heavily.

"About 2 P.M. Brigadier-General Shaler's brigade, of the First
Division, Sixth Army Corps, took position upon the right of this
brigade, and became the extreme right of the army.

"Skirmishing continued until about sunset, when the enemy turned
the right of the army and made an attack upon its flank and rear,
causing the troops to give way rapidly, and compelling them to fall
back for some distance before they were reformed.  So rapid was
the enemy's advance upon the flank and rear, that time was not
given to change front to meet him, and some confusion occurred in
the retreat.  Few prisoners were lost in the brigade.  The lines
were soon re-established and the progress of the enemy stopped.
An attack was made by the enemy upon the re-established line about
8 P.M., but was handsomely repulsed.

"Unfounded reports were circulated that the troops of this brigade
were the first to give way, when the first attack of the enemy was
made.

"It is not improper to state here that no charges of bad conduct
are made against the troops upon its right, but that this brigade
remained at its post and successfully resisted a simultaneous attack
from the front, until the troops upon its right were doubled back
and were retreating in disorder through and along its lines."

The presence of a general officer in authority, or an intelligent
staff officer representing him, would have averted the useless
slaughter of the evening of the 5th, and the disaster of the evening
of the 6th, which, for a time, threatened the safety of the whole
army.  A brigade or more of troops thrown on the enemy's left by
a little _détour_ on either evening would have doubled it back and
given us, with little loss, that part of the field and a free swing
for the next day.

The success in gaining ground on the 5th left our right in the air,
bent to the front, with the enemy on its flank, thus inviting the
attack made the next day by General J. B. Gordon, which drove back
the main part of the Sixth Corps on the Union centre.  Gordon's
attack was a repetition of Stonewall Jackson's flank movement at
Chancellorsville, and it should have been so far anticipated as to
cause its disastrous failure.

In field-hospital, on seeing a staff officer of mine (Captain Thomas
J. Black, who was having a wounded hand dressed), I discussed the
situation, and predicted the enemy would seize the favorable
opportunity of attacking.  Anticipating the attack, my servant
(Andy Jackson), in his eager solicitude for my safety, kept by
horse near the tent, saddled, so I might, when it came, be assisted
on him, and escape.  Gordon's men advanced far enough for their
bullets to pass through the hospital tents, but the hospital was
not taken.

General Shaler's brigade of the First Division, Sixth Corps, having
been placed on the extreme right of the Sixth, was the first to
give way; then, the enemy being well on the rear of the Second
Brigade as well as on its flank, and it being at the same time
attacked from the front, it also gave way in some confusion, but,
under its brave officers, Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan,
Lieutenant-Colonels Granger, Ebright, Binkley, and others, it was
soon assembled in good line in front of Gordon's advancing column,
where it did much to arrest it.  Generals Seymour and Shaler being
separated from their brigades, while searching for them were both
captured.(10)

But somebody needed, and sought, a "_scapegoat_."  There were only
three regiments in the Second Brigade--6th Maryland, 110th and 122d
Ohio, which had served under Milroy in the Shenandoah Valley in
1863.  Somebody reported to the press, and probably to Grant, that
on the evening of the 6th of May troops that had fought there under
Milroy were on the extreme right of the army, and were the first
to give way.  This was necessarily false, as these troops were not
then on the extreme right at all, and did not retire until the
force to their right had been broken and routed.  General Grant to
Halleck, in an excusatory and exculpatory letter (May 7th), as to
the disaster on his right, said:  "Milroy's old brigade was attacked
and gave way in great confusion, almost without resistance, carrying
good troops with them."(10)  This statement may have been made to
tickle Halleck's ear, as he was known to hate Milroy and his friends,
but it was, nevertheless, untrue and grossly unjust.  Of the three
regiments from the Shenandoah Valley, 494 (one third their number)
fell dead or wounded on that field, through inefficiency and blunders
of high officers who were never near enough to it to hear the fatal
thud or passing whiz of a rifle ball.  Many others of these regiments
had fallen (nearby) on the heights of Orange Grove, the November
before.  Grant, long after, acknowledged the injustice of his
statement.

After I had been wounded, though yet in command of the attacking
force, a Major rode up from the left, and reported to me that his
officers and men were falling fast, and expressed the fear that
they could not be long held to their work.  He was directed to
cheer them with the hope that the expected support would soon
arrive.  As he swung his horse around to return, it was shot, fell,
and the Major, lighting on his feet, without a word quickly
disappeared (as seen by the light of flashing rifles) among the
dense scrub pines.  He never was seen again, nor his body found.
He must have been killed, and his body consumed late by the great
conflagration which, feeding on the dry timber and _débris_, swept
the battle-field, licking up the precious blood and cremating the
bodies of the martyr dead.  This was the gallant McElwain, who, in
the early morning, expressed so much anxiety for my safety.

Colonel William H. Ball, on hearing, late at night, of my wound,
inquired particularly as to its nature, and being assured it was
serious, characteristically exclaimed:  "Good! he will get home
now and survive the war; his fighting days are over."  Not so, nor
yet with him.  As I was borne to the left along the rear of the
line on a stretcher towards the field-hospital, about midnight, a
quickened ear caught the sound of a voice, giving loud command,
familiar to me years before at my home city.  I summoned the officer,
and found him to be my fellow-townsman, Colonel Edwin C. Mason,
then commanding the 7th Maine.  A day or two more and he, too, was
severely wounded.

I had seen something of war, but, for the first time, my lot was
now cast with the dead, dying, and wounded in the rear.  A soldier
on the line of battle sees his comrades fall, indifferently generally,
and continues to discharge his duty.  The wounded get to the rear
themselves or with assistance and are seen no more by those in
battle line.  Some of the medical staff in a well organized army,
with hospital stewards and attendants, go on the field to temporarily
bind up wounds, staunch the flow of blood, and direct the stretcher-
bearers and ambulance corps in the work of taking the wounded to
the operating surgeons at field-hospital.  The dead need and generally
receive no attention until the battle is ended.

On my arrival at hospital, about 2 P.M., I was carried through an
entrance to a large tent, on each side of which lay human legs and
arms, resembling piles of stove wood, the blood only excepted.
All around were dead and wounded men, many of the latter dying.
The surgeons, with gleaming, sometimes bloody, knives and instruments,
were busy at their work.  I soon was laid on the rough board
operating table and chloroformed, and skilful surgeons--Charles E.
Cady (138th Pennsylvania) and Theodore A. Helwig (87th Pennsylvania)
--cut to the injured parts, exposed the fractured ends of the
shattered bones, dressed them off with saw and knife, and put them
again in place, splinted and bandaged.  I was then borne to a pallet
on the ground to make room for--"_Next_."  The sensation produced
by the anaesthetic, in passing to and from unconsciousness, was
exhilarating and delightful.  For some hours, exhausted from loss
of blood as I was, I fell into short dozes, accompanied with fanciful
dreams.  Not all have the same experience.

From this hospital, on the 7th, I was taken by ambulance, in the
immense train of wounded, towards Spotsylvania Court House, but on
nearing that place, the train diverging from the track of the army,
moved, with the roar of the battle in our ears, slowly to
Fredericksburg.  At its frequent halts, great kettles of beef tea
were made and brought to us.  I drank gallons of it, as did others.
It was grateful to a thirsty, fevered palate, but afforded little
nourishment.  For about ten days I was confined to a bed in a
private house--Mrs. Alsop's--taken for an officers' hospital.  The
wounded from Spotsylvania also soon arrived at Fredericksburg, and
surgeons and nurses were overtaxed.  Contract surgeons appeared
from the North; also nurses and attendants from each of the Sanitary
and Christian Commissions.  I was visited by Miss Dorothea L. Dix
(then seventy years of age), who was in charge of a corps of hospital
nurses.  Horace Mann had, long before, apotheosized her for her
philanthropic work for the insane.(11)  A highly inflamed condition
of my arm threatened my life while here, but finally reaching Acquia
Creek, I went by hospital boat to Washington, thence home.
Everywhere, hotels, hospitals, boats, and cars were crowded with
the wounded, fresh from the Wilderness and Spotsylvania.  Philanthropic
people of principal cities kept, day and night, surgeons with
skilled assistants at depots to care for the travelling wounded.

But to return to the Wilderness.  The Sixth Corps, with little
fighting, recovered its lost position on the morning of the 7th.
The Fifth had a fierce engagement on the 6th, to the left of the
Sixth Corps, but without material success.  Hancock's corps, with
Wadsworth's division of the Fifth and Getty's of the Sixth, opened
a brilliant battle on the plank road at early dawn of the 6th, and
drove the enemy more than a mile along the road in some confusion,
when Longstreet's corps arrived on Hancock's left and turned the
tide of battle, and in turn our troops were forced back to their
former position on the Brock road.  General James S. Wadsworth was
mortally wounded while rallying his men, and the heroic Getty was
severely wounded.  The losses in this engagement on both sides were
great.  General Jenkins of the Confederate Army was killed, and
Longstreet severely wounded.  They were shot by mistake, by their
own men,(12) as was "Stonewall" Jackson at Chancellorsville.  Lee,
in person, was on the plank road giving direction to the battle.
He exposed himself to danger, and despaired of the result.  At a
critical moment he sent his "Adjutant-General, Colonel W. H. Taylor,
back to Parker's Store to get the trains ready for a movement to
the rear."(13)  Grant, early on the 6th, put Burnside's corps in
between the turnpike and plank roads, and it sustained the battle
in the centre throughout the day, both armies holding well their
ground.  The morning of the 7th found Lee's army retired and strongly
intrenched on a new line, with right near Parker's Store, and left
extending northward across the turnpike.

On the 5th and 6th, Sheridan with his cavalry held the left flank
and covered the rear of the army, fighting and repulsing Stuart's
cavalry in attempts to penetrate to our rear.  At Todd's Tavern,
on the 7th, a severe cavalry engagement took place in which Sheridan
was victorious.  But the two great armies principally rested in
position on that day, and the great battle of the Wilderness, with
its alternate successes and repulses and its long lists of dead
and wounded, was ended.

Grant, having decided not to fight further in the Wilderness country,
on the night of the 7th put his army in motion for Spotsylvania
Court-House, the cavalry preceding the Fifth Corps over the Brock
road, followed by the Second and Sixth Corps on the plank and
turnpike roads, with the army trains in the advance, the Ninth
Corps in the rear.  Lee, having either anticipated or discovered
the movement, threw Longstreet's corps in Warren's front on the
Brock road, and heavy fighting ensued on the 8th, most of the corps
of both armies being, at different times, engaged.  Wilson's cavalry
division gained possession of the Court-House, but, being unsupported,
withdrew.  May 9th, the enemy was pressed and his position developed.
Two divisions of the Ninth Corps, finding the enemy on the
Fredericksburg road, drove him back and across the Ny River with
some loss.  This day, Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the
Sixth Corps, while on the advance line looking for the enemy's
position, was killed by a sharp-shooter.  He had the confidence
and love of his corps.

Sheridan, with the cavalry, cut loose from the main army on the
9th, with orders from Meade to move southerly, engage, whenever
possible, the enemy's cavalry, cut railroads, threaten Richmond,
and eventually communicate with or join the Union forces on James
River.  He passed around the enemy's right and destroyed the depot
at Beaver Dam, two locomotives, three trains of cars, one hundred
other cars, and large quantities of stores and rations for Lee's
army; also the telegraph line and railroad track for ten miles,
and recaptured some prisoners.  On the 10th of May he crossed the
South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge, captured Ashland Station, a
locomotive and a train of cars, and destroyed stores and railroad
track, and next day marched towards Richmond.  At Yellow Tavern he
met the Confederate cavalry, defeated it, killing its commander,
General J. E. B. Stuart, and taking two pieces of artillery and
some prisoners, and forcing it to retreat across the Chickahominy.
On the 12th Sheridan reached the second line of works around
Richmond, then recrossed the Chickahominy, and after much hard
fighting arrived at Bottom's Bridge the morning of the 13th.  On
the next day he was at Haxall's Landing on the James River, where
he sent off his wounded and recruited his men and horses.  On the
24th he rejoined the Army of the Potomac at Chesterfield, returning
_via_ White House on the Pamunkey.(14)

Fighting at and around Spotsylvania Court-House continued during
the 10th and 11th, and on the 12th Hancock's corps assaulted the
enemy's centre, capturing Major-General Edward Johnson, with General
George C. Steuart and about three thousand men of his division.
On advancing to the enemy's second line of breastworks, Hancock
met with desperate resistance at what is known as the salient, or
"_dead angle_."  This was the key to Lee's position, and concentrating
there his batteries and best troops, he mercilessly sacrificed the
latter to hold it.  The Second Corps was reinforced by the Sixth,
under Major-General Horatio G. Wright, the successor of Sedgwick.
The most deadly fighting occurred, and the dead and wounded of both
sides were greater, for the space covered, than anywhere in the
war, if not in all history.  Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps
fought in the "dead angle"; and the 126th Ohio of the Second Brigade,
Third Division, was detached and ordered to assault it.  In making
the assault it lost every fourth man.(15)  The whole of the Second
Brigade fought with conspicuous gallantry at Spotsylvania.

The enemy retired to a shorter line during the night.  From the
13th to the 17th, both armies being intrenched, nothing decisive
transpired, through there were frequent fierce conflicts.  The
Union sick and wounded were sent to the rear _via_ Fredericksburg
and Acquia Creek, and supplies were brought forward.(16)

General Grant, the morning of the 11th, wrote Halleck:

"We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting.  The result
to this time is much in our favor.  But our losses have been heavy,
as well as those of the enemy.  We have lost to this time, eleven
general officers, killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000
men.  I think the loss of the enemy must be greater.  We have taken
over 4000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken but few except
stragglers.  I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, _and propose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer_."(17)

The italics are mine, to emphasize the origin of the most frequently
quoted phrase of General Grant.

The Union Army was moving by its left flank on the 19th, when Ewell
attempted to turn its right flank and get possession of the
Fredericksburg road, but he met a new division under General R. O.
Tyler, later, two divisions of the Second Corps, and Ferrero's
division of colored troops (twelve companies, 2000 strong, recently
from the defences of Washington), and was handsomely beaten back.

The 9th New York Heavy Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
William H. Seward, son of Secretary Seward, joined the Second
Brigade at North Anna River, the 26th of May.(18)

The army, by the 26th, had crossed the North Anna at various fords,
and by the 28th it was across the Pamunkey at Hanoverton and Hundley
Fords, sharp engagements ensuing constantly.  The 29th the enemy
was driven into his works behind the Totopotomy, the Sixth Corps
occupying Hanover Court-House.  Warren was attacked, but repulsed
the enemy at Bethesda Church, and Barlow of the Sixth carried a
line of rifle-pits south of the river.  The cavalry was engaged
during these movements in many affairs, and Sheridan with two
divisions occupied Cold Harbor the 31st, but was hard pressed until
Wright with the Sixth and General W. F. Smith (recently arrived
with the Eighteenth Corps from Butler on the James) relieved him.
These corps, June 1st, attacked and took part of the enemy's
intrenched line.

At 6 P.M., in a general assault upon the enemy's works, Ricketts'
division (Third of Sixth) captured many prisoners and the works in
its front, and handsomely repulsed repeated efforts to retaken
them.  In this assault the Second Brigade moved in the following
order:  6th Maryland and 138th Pennsylvania in the first line, 9th
New York in the second and third lines, and the 122d and 126th Ohio
in the fourth line, all preceded by the 110th Ohio on the skirmish
line.

General Meade addressed this note to General Wright:

"Please give my thanks to Brigadier-General Ricketts and his gallant
command for the very handsome manner in which they have conducted
themselves to-day.  The success attained by them is of the greatest
importance, and if followed up will materially advance our
operations."

The morning of the 3d, the division charged forward about two
hundred yards under a heavy fire and intrenched, using bayonets,
tin cups, and plates for the purpose.(19)  At 4 A.M., June 3d, by
Grant's order, the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps and Barlow's division
of the Second assaulted the strongly fortified works of the enemy,
but suffered a most disastrous repulse--the bloodiest of the war.
Approximately 10,000 Union men fell.  The number and strength of
the enemy's position was not well understood.  He did not suffer
correspondingly.  There were found to be deep ravines and a morass
in front of his fortifications.

The assault was suspended about 7 A.M. and not renewed.  Grant says
in his _Memoirs:_(20)

"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was
ever made."

Other indecisive fighting occurred at Cold Harbor to the 12th, when
Lee's army having retired in consequence of further flank movements,
the last of the Union Army was withdrawn, and by June 13th, its
several corps crossing the Chickahominy at Long and Jones' Bridges,
reached the James River at Charles City Court-House.  Sheridan,
meantime, with two cavalry divisions, was ordered to Gordonsville
to destroy the Central Railroad, and to communicate, if practicable,
with Hunter's expedition, then in progress in the Shenandoah Valley.
Sheridan fought a successful battle at Trevilian Station, June
11th, overthrowing Hampton and Fitz Lee's cavalry divisions.

The Union Army soon crossed the James.

Excluding captured and missing, the casualties in the Union Army
during the operations mentioned, shown by revised lists, are given
in the summary table following:(21)

                    Killed.          Wounded.         Aggregate.
                    Officers.  Men.  Officers.  Men.
Wilderness, May 5-7     143    2013      569  11,468    14,193
Spotsylvania Court-House, May 8-21
                        174    2551      672  12,744    16,141
North Anna, Pamunkey, and Totopotomoy, May 21-June 1
                         41     550      159   2,575     3,325
Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, etc., June 2-15
                        143    1702      433   8,644    10,922
Todd's Tavern to James River (Cavalry, Sheridan), May 9-24
                          7      57       16     321       401
Trevilian raid (Cavalry, Sheridan), June 7-24
                         14     136       43     695       888
                     ------  ------   ------  ------    ------
  Totals                522    7009     1892  36,447    45,870.(22)

There do not seem to exist any lists, at all complete, by which a
summary of casualties of killed and wounded in the Confederate Army
during the Wilderness campaign can be made up, but, barring Cold
Harbor, they were, doubtless, approximately as great as in the
Union Army.  During the campaign the Union Army captured 22 field
guns and lost 3.  It captured at least 67 colors.  And reports show
the Army of the Potomac, from May 1 to 12, 1864, took 7078 prisoners,
and from May 12 to July 31, 1864, 6506; total, 13,584.

The Union reports show the "captured and missing [Union], May 4th
to June 24th," to be 8966.(23)

The killed and wounded in the Sixth Army Corps, May 5 to June 15,
1864, were 10,614; in the Third Division thereof, 1993, and in the
Second Brigade of this division, 1246.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., p. 827.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., p. 664.

( 3)  _Ibid_., p. 827-9.

( 4)  _Ibid_., p. 1017.

( 5)  _War Records_., vol. xxxiii., p. 1022.

( 6)  _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), p. 544-5.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 370.

( 8)  _Ibid_., Part I., p. 189 (Meade's Report).

( 9)  _Ibid_., Part II., p. 331.

(10)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., pp. 729, 742, 745, 748.

(11)  _Twelve Sermons_, p. 302.

(12)  _Manassas to Appomattox_, p. 564.

(13)  _Memoirs of Lee_, A. L. Long, p. 330.

(14)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., pp. 193, 776-792.

(15)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 749.

(16)  _Ibid_., pp. 188-195 (Meade's Report).

(17)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 627.

(18)  _Ibid_., pp. 734, 740.

(19)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 734-5 (Keifer's
Report).

(20)  Vol. ii., p. 276.

(21)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 188 (119-198).

(22)  It is interesting to note that the ratio of killed to wounded,
shown by this table is almost exactly 1 to 5, that is 16.6 per
cent. of the whole number were killed; that of the killed, 1 out
of every 14.6 was an officer; of the wounded, 1 out of 20 was an
officer; of the whole number killed and wounded, 1 officer was
killed out of every 88, 1 officer was wounded out of every 24.3,
and 1 enlisted man was killed out of every 6.5, and one officer
was killed or wounded out of every 19.

(23)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., pp. 188, 196.


CHAPTER VII
Campaign South of James River and Petersburg--Hunter's Raid--Battle
of Monocacy--Early's Advance on Washington (1864)--Sheridan's
Movements in Shenandoah Valley, and Other Events

In pursuance of the general plan, as we have seen, General B. F.
Butler had organized at Fortress Monroe the Army of the James,
composed of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, commanded, respectively,
by Generals Quincy A. Gilmore and W. F. Smith.  It moved by transports
up the James River on May 4, 1864, and effected a landing without
serious resistance at Bermuda Hundred the night of the 5th.  At
the same time General Kautz, with 3000 cavalry, made a raid from
Suffolk and destroyed a portion of the Petersburg and Weldon
Railroad.  These movements caused a hasty concentration against
Butler of all the available troops from the Carolinas.  Beauregard
was put in command of them.  There was some indecisive fighting
between parts of Butler's army at Stony Creek, Jarratt's Station,
and White Bridge, and there were somewhat general engagements at
Port Walthall Junction, Chester Station, Swift Creek, Proctor's
Creek, and Drewry's Bluff, and some minor affairs along the James.
Kautz, making a second successful raid, cut the Richmond and Danville
Railroad at Caulfield, destroying bridges, tracks, and depots.
The result of all was to leave Butler's command strongly intrenched
at Bermuda Hundred, but unable to advance and seriously threaten
Richmond.

The term "Bottled up," an expression used to describe Butler's
position, was derived from a dispatch of Grant to the War Department
in which he referred to Butler's situation between the James and
the Appomattox with the enemy intrenched across his front, as being
"like a bottle."( 1)

Grant ordered Smith's corps to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.
Butler attacked Petersburg on the 9th of June, chiefly with Gilmore's
corps, but, for want of co-operation by the several attacking
bodies, the place was not taken.  General Butler attributed the
defeat to Gilmore's failure to obey orders and act with energy.( 2)

After Smith's withdrawal, Butler did little more than hold his
position.  The Army of the Potomac crossed to the south of the
James on June 14th.  An attack was made by Meade on Petersburg on
the 16th, principally with troops under Hancock and Burnside, by
which a part only of the enemy's works with one battery and some
prisoners were taken.  Fighting continued on the 17th, and a general
assault was ordered at daylight on the 18th, but on advancing it
was found that the enemy had retired to an inner and stronger line.
Later in the day unsuccessful assaults were made on this new line
by portions of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps.  It was then
ascertained that Lee's main army had reached Petersburg, and further
efforts to take it by assault were abandoned.( 3)  There was much
fighting, extending through June, by detachments of infantry, for
possession of roads, all of which, however, was indecisive.  Wilson
and Kautz's cavalry divisions, on the 22d, in a raid took Reams
Station and destroyed some miles of the Weldon Railroad, and the
next day, after defeating W. H. F. Lee's cavalry near Nottoway
Station, reached Burkeville junction and destroyed the depot and
about twenty miles of railroad track.  The succeeding day they
destroyed the railroad from Meherim Station to Roanoke Bridge, a
distance of twenty-five miles, but on returning they encountered
at Reams Station, on the 28th, the enemy's cavalry and a strong
force of infantry, and were defeated, with the loss of trains and
artillery.  The Sixth Corps was sent to their relief, but arrived
at the Station after the affair was over and the enemy had withdrawn.( 4)

I shall not undertake to give the important movements and operations
( 5) of the troops under Grant in front of Petersburg and Richmond,
during the remainder fo the summer and the fall of 1864, as the
troops in which I was immediately interested were, early in July,
transferred to Maryland and Washington.  A summary of the occurrences
in the Shenandoah Valley and West Virginia is, however, necessary
to enable the reader the better to understand important events soon
to be narrated.

General Franz Sigel, in command of the Department of West Virginia,
moved up the Valley, and was defeated at New Market on the 15th of
May.  He retired to the north bank of Cedar Creek.  His loss was
about 1000 killed, wounded, and captured, and seven pieces of
artillery.  General George Crook, proceeding _via_ Fayetteville,
Raleigh, and Princeton, fought the battle of Cloyd's Mountain on
the 9th of May and gained a brilliant victory.  He did much damage
to the enemy, and returned to Meadow Bluff, on the Kanawha.  General
David Hunter relieved Sigel in command of the department on the
21st, and joined the troops at Cedar Creek in the Valley, on the
26th.  Sigel was assigned to command a Reserve Division along the
line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Hunter and Crook, from their respective positions, moved towards
Staunton on the 30th.  Hunter met the enemy under General W. E.
Jones at Piedmont, on June 5th, and after a severe engagement
defeated him, killing Jones and capturing about 1500 prisoners.
Hunter reached Staunton on the 6th, and was joined by Crook on the
8th.  They here destroyed railroads, Confederate supplies, mills,
and factories, and, together, advanced towards Lexington on the
10th.  They were now opposed by McCausland, whose command was
chiefly cavalry.  Lexington was taken on the 11th, after some
fighting, and with it large quantities of military supplies.  A
portion of the James River Canal and a number of extensive iron-
works were destroyed.  Hunter burned the Virginia Military Institute
and all buildings connected therewith on the 12th.  He also burned
the residence of ex-Governor John Letcher.  Doubts have been
entertained as to whether the burning of the Institute or Letcher's
home could be justified under the rules of modern warfare.  The
Institute, however, was a preparatory school for Confederate
officers, and its Principal, Colonel Smith, with 250 cadets, united
with McCausland's troops in the defence of Lexington.  Letcher had
issued a violent and inflammatory proclamation inciting the population
to rise and wage a guerilla warfare on the Union troops.( 6)

Hunter proceeded _via_ Buchanan and by the Peaks of Otter road
across the Blue Ridge, and arrived at Liberty, twenty-four miles
from Lynchburg, on the 15th.  Here he heard rumors through Confederate
channels of disasters to Grant and Sherman's armies, and of Sheridan's
fighting at Trevilian Station.  Hunter was also told Breckinridge
was in Lynchburg with all the rebel forces in West Virginia, and
that Ewell's corps, 20,000 strong, was arriving to reinforce him.
Notwithstanding these reports, Hunter commenced an advance on the
16th on Lynchburg.  His several columns met stubborn resistance on
this and the succeeding day, but at night, after a spirited affair
at Diamond Hill, he encamped his forces near the town.  It became
known to Hunter on the 18th that Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early,
with Ewell's corps from Lee's army, was at Lynchburg.  Early and
Breckinridge's combined commands far outnumbered Hunter's forces.
The situation was critical for Hunter.  He maintained a bold front,
however, until nightfall, and then withdrew _via_ Liberty and
Buford's Gap to New Castle and Sweet Springs.  General Wm. A.
Averell with the cavalry covered the rear.  The enemy pursued rather
tardily to Salem, where Early concentrated his army.  Hunter chose,
in his retreat, the Lewisburg route to Charleston on the Kanawha,
rather than retire down the Shenandoah Valley or by Warm Springs
and the South Branch of the Potomac.  The latter route would have
had the advantage of bringing him out at Cumberland or New Creek
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, much nearer to his proper base
at Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry.  His retreat, on the line chosen,
left the Valley, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and Baltimore
and Washington practically without defence.  Hunter arrived at
Charleston on the 30th, having marched through White Sulphur Springs,
Lewisburg, and Meadow Bluff.  From near Liberty, on the 16th, he
sent his supply train of 200 wagons, 141 prisoners, and his sick
and wounded in charge of Captain T. K. McCann, A.Q.M. of Volunteers,
with orders to reach the Kanawha at Charleston.  The train was
guarded by parts of the 152d and 161st Ohio Volunteers--one hundred
day men, commanded by Colonel David Putnam of the former regiment.
At Greenbrier River, on the 22d, the train was attacked by the
Thurmond brothers, and forced to return to White Sulphur Springs.
From thence it proceeded through Hillsborough to Beverly, where it
arrived on the 27th.( 7)  Hunter's raid, so brilliantly begun, thus
unfortunately ended.

Early reached Lynchburg on the 17th of June and assumed command of
all the forces there, including those under Breckinridge.  Early
pursued Hunter to the mountains, and then, on the 23d, marched
rapidly through Staunton and down the Shenandoah Valley, with the
purpose of invading Maryland, in pursuance of instructions given
him by Lee before being detached from the latter's main army.( 8)

Sigel was now holding Maryland Heights.  Early, therefore, on the
8th of July crossed the Potomac higher up the river, and reached
Frederick City, Maryland, the morning of the 9th.( 9)

Hunter's command was obliged to descend the Kanawha by boats, then
ascend the Ohio to Parkersburg, and from there move by rail to
Cumberland and points on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  Hunter
did not leave Charleston until July 3d, nor Parkersburg until the
8th, and did not reach Cumberland with any part of his army until
the 9th.  He was then too remote to be available in an effort to
resist Early's invasion.(10)

Early's movements in the Valley caused loud calls for troops, and
Grant ordered Ricketts' division (Sixth Corps) to Maryland.  The
division left its camp in front of the Williams house on the 6th
of July, and the same day embarked at City Point for Baltimore.
It disembarked at Locust Point, near Baltimore, on the morning of
the 8th, and took cars for Monocacy Junction, where, on the same
day, parts of two brigades of the division joined General Lew
Wallace, then in command of the department.

Prior to Ricketts' arrival Wallace had only been able to gather
together, under General E. B. Tyler, two regiments of the Potomac
Home Brigade, the 11th Maryland Infantry, two Ohio one hundred day
regiments (144th and 149th), the 8th Illinois Cavalry, and a
detachment of the 159th Ohio (one hundred day regiment), serving
as mounted infantry, all new or inexperienced troops.(11)  He had
only one battery of artillery.  Sigel, still at Maryland Heights,
was therefore unavailable as against Early.  Only the First Brigade,
numbering 1750 men, under Colonel Truax, and a part of the Second
Brigade (138th Pennsylvania, 9th New York Heavy Artillery, 110th
and 126th Ohio), 1600 strong, Colonel McClennan commanding, of
Ricketts' veteran troops reached the battle-field.  Tyler went into
position on the right, covering the stone bridge, and Ricketts on
the left.  The position chosen by Wallace was good, strategically,
and also strong to resist a front attack by a superior force.  It
was behind the Monocacy River, covering the railroad bridge and
the public highway and another bridge, and also had for lines of
retreat the turnpikes to Baltimore and Washington.  If the position
were held, communication could be kept up with these cities, also
with Sigel at the Heights.  It was Early's purpose to destroy
Wallace or brush him aside and move on Washington.  Early moved
from Frederick at 8 A.M., the 9th of July, and after demonstrating
on Wallace's front, marched Gordon's troops around by a ford to
fall on Ricketts' left.  The latter changed front to the left to
meet Gordon.  The battle opened in earnest at 10.30 A.M.  The
enemy's superiority in artillery gave him a great advantage, and
most of the day Ricketts' troops held their position under an
enfilading fire from Early's batteries.  The enemy's front was so
great that Ricketts, to meet it, had to put his entire command into
one line.  Gordon's first and second lines were beaten back, and
his third and fourth lines were, later, brought into action on the
Union left.  Early put in his reserves there, and still Ricketts'
troops were unbroken and undismayed.  It was, however, evident the
unequal contest must result in defeat, hence Wallace ordered a
retreat on the Baltimore pike.  Ricketts did not commence to retire
until 4 P.M., and then in good order.  Tyler's troops fought well,
and held the stone bridge until Ricketts had passed off the field.
Early was so seriously hurt that he did not or could not make a
vigorous or immediate pursuit.  Save some detachments of cavalry,
he halted his army at the stone bridge.  The Union loss was 10
officers and 113 men killed and 36 officers and 567 men wounded,
total, 726, besides captured or missing.(12)  Colonel Wm. H. Seward
(9th N. Y. H. A.) was slightly wounded and had an ankle broken by
the fall of his horse on its being shot.

The veteran Third Division lost 656 of the killed and wounded, and
the troops under Tyler 70.  My former assistant adjutant-general,
Captain Wm. A. Hathaway, was killed in this action.  The total
killed and wounded in the Second Brigade, from May 5th to July 9th,
inclusive, was 2033,(13) more than half the number lost under Scott
and Taylor in the Mexican War.

No report of the Confederate loss has been found, but from the
strong Union position, the character of the Confederate attacks,
and the number of wounded (400) left in hospital, it must have
largely exceeded that of the loyal army.  Early says in his report,
written immediately after the battle, that his loss "was between
600 and 700."(14)

On the morning of the 10th, Early marched _via_ Rockville towards
Washington, and arrived in front of the fortifications on the
Seventh Street pike late the next day.  He met no resistance on
the way.  Wallace, with Ricketts, had retired towards Baltimore.
Great consternation reigned at the Capital, and the volunteer
militia of the District of Columbia were called out.

The defences were, however, feebly manned.  The First and Second
Divisions of the Sixth Corps embarked at City Point on the 10th,
and a portion of the Second reached Fort Stevens on the 11th, about
the time Early reached its front, and the First Division, with the
remainder of the Second, arrived next morning.  Some skirmishing
took place in front of the fort, witnessed by President Lincoln.
Many government employees and citizens were put in the trenches.
Early retreated across the Potomac to Leesburg, somewhat precipitately,
commencing after nightfall on the 12th.  He again reached the Valley
on the 15th.  The Sixth Corps under Wright pursued Early on the
13th, but did not come up with him.  Ricketts' division rejoined
its corps on the 17th.  Portions of Hunter and Crook's commands also
joined Wright, who moved _via_ Snicker's Gap into the Valley at
Berryville.  Wright alternately retired and advanced his army,
crossing and recrossing the Potomac, until August 5th, when he was
at Monocacy Junction, Maryland.

It should be stated in this connection that Early sent General
Bradley Johnson with his brigade of cavalry to cut the Northern
Central and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroads; he succeeded in doing
this, and also in destroying some bridges and two passenger trains.
One bridge on the railroad between Washington and Baltimore was
destroyed by Johnson while on his way to Point Lookout, Maryland,
to release Confederate prisoners.  One of the principal objects
Lee had in ordering Early into Maryland was to release these
prisoners.(15)  When Early retired from Washington he recalled
Johnson.

The most remarkable thing connected with the campaign just described
was the utter dispersion of the thousands of troops in West Virginia
and the Valley under Hunter, Sigel, Crook, Averell, and B. F. Kelley,
so that none of them participated in the battle of Monocacy or the
defence of Washington.

Wright had been assigned, July 13th,(16) to command all the troops
engaged in the pursuit of Early, including a portion of the Nineteenth
Corps under General W. H. Emory, just arriving by transport from
the Army of the James.  Hunter still remained in command of the
Department of West Virginia.  The recent failure of Hunter caused
him to be distrusted for field work, and another commander was
sought.  General Sheridan was, by Grant, ordered from the Army of
the Potomac, August 2d, to report to Halleck at Washington.  In a
dispatch to Halleck of August 1st, Grant said he wanted Sheridan
put in command of all the troops in the field.  On this being shown
to President Lincoln (August 3d), he impatiently wired Grant:(17)

"I have seen your dispatch in which you say 'I want Sheridan put
in command of all the troops in the field with instructions to put
himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death.  Wherever
the enemy goes let our troops go also.'  This, I think, is exactly
right as to how our forces should move; but please look over the
dispatches you may have received from here ever since you made that
order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head
of any one here of 'putting our army south of the enemy,' or of
'following him to the death' in any direction.  I repeat to you it
will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day
and hour and force it."

Sheridan reached Harper's Ferry, August 7th, and assumed command
of the newly constituted Middle Military Division, including the
Middle Department, and the Departments of Washington, Susquehanna,
and West Virginia.(18)  The First Division of the cavalry, commanded
by General Alfred T. A. Torbert, reached Sheridan from before
Petersburg, August 9th.  Sheridan moved on the 10th, and reached
Cedar Creek twelve miles south of Winchester on the Strasburg pike
on the 12th, encountering some opposition at Opequon Creek,
Winchester, and Newtown.  Early was reinforced by Kershaw's division
of Longstreet's corps, and by other detachments from Lee's army.
The enemy manoeuvred on Sheridan's flanks, and by August 22d the
Union Army had retired to Halltown and Harper's Ferry.

Thus far Lincoln's predictions were fulfilled.  But great events
were soon to follow.

( 1)  _Memoirs of Grant_, vol. ii., p. 151.

( 2)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 273, 291.  _Butler's
Book_, p. 677.

( 3)  _Ibid_., vol. xl., p. 168.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. xl., Part II., p. 169.

( 5)  The memorable "Mine explosion," under the immediate direction
of Burnside, occurred July 30, 1864.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii., Part I., p. 97.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii., Part I., p. 99, 101, 618-19, 683.

( 8)  _Ibid_., 346, 347.

( 9)  _Ibid_., 302.

(10)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii. Part I., p. 102.

(11)  _Ibid_., 200.

(12)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii., Part I., p. 201-2.

(13)  _Ibid_., pp. 206-7.

(14)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii., Part I., pp. 348-9.

(15)  _War Records_, vol. xxxvii., Part I., pp. 349, 767, 769.

(16)  _Ibid_., Part II., pp. 261, 284.

(17)  _Ibid_., Part I., p. 582.

(18)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 709, 719, 721.


CHAPTER VIII
Personal Mention of Generals Sheridan, Wright, and Ricketts, and
Mrs. Ricketts--Also Generals Crook and Hayes--Battle of Opequon,
Under Sheridan, September, 1864, and Incidents

I had so far recovered from the wound received in the Wilderness
as to enable me to reach Baltimore, August 25th, on the way to the
army, though my arm was yet in splints and a sling.  In response
to a telegram, the War Department directed me to report to General
Sheridan.  I reached Harper's Ferry the next day.  When I reported
to Sheridan, he looked at me fiercely, and observed:  "I want
fighting men, not cripples.  What can I do with you?"  I asked
him to order me to General Wright for assignment to my old brigade.
He seemed to hesitate.  I informed him of my familiarity with the
Shenandoah Valley, and told him I thought I was able for duty.  He
gave the desired order reluctantly.

Sheridan did not impress me favorably then.  He seemed restless,
nervous, and petulant.  I now think I somewhat misjudged him.  He
was thirty-three years of age,( 1) in full vigor of manly strength.
He had, both in infantry and cavalry commands, won renown as a
soldier, though his highest fame was yet to be achieved.  He was
short of stature, especially broad across the shoulders, with legs
rather short even for his height.  His head was quite large, nose
prominent, eyes full; he had a strong face, and was of a cheerful,
social disposition, rather than retiring and taciturn.  Irish
characteristics predominated in him, and when not on duty he was
disposed to be rollicking and free and easy.  He was not hard to
approach by his inferiors, but he was not always discriminating in
the language he used to them.  He did not seem to be a deliberate
thinker or reasoner, and often gave the impression that his decisions
or opinions were off-hand and not the result of reflection.  In
the quiet of camp he seemed to be less able to combine or plan
great movements than in emergencies in the field.  In a battle he
often showed the excitement of his impetuous nature, but he never
lost his head or showed any disposition save to push the enemy.
These are some opinions formed after seeing him in several great
battles, and knowing him personally through all the later years of
his life.  It remains to say that he was an honest man, and devotedly
loyal to his friends.  His fame as a soldier of a high class will
endure.

Generals Wright and Ricketts each received me warmly, and, as
always, showed me the utmost kindness.

Horatio G. Wright was a skilled and educated soldier, of the engineer
class.  He, like the great Thomas, was of a most lovable disposition
and temperament.  He had held many important commands during the
war; had failed in none, and yet uncomplainingly suffered himself
to be assigned from the command of a department to that of a division
of troops.  He was unfortunate once, as we shall see, and the glory
of his chief shone so brightly as to dim the subordinate's well
earned fame.  But I must not anticipate.  Wright was especially
fitted to command infantry--a corps or more in battle.  His
intercourse with his officers was kindly and assuring under all
circumstances.  His characteristics as a soldier were of the
unassuming, sturdy, solid kind--never pyrotechnic.  He was modest,
and not specially ambitious.  In brief, he was a great soldier.

James B. Ricketts was also a highly educated soldier, and when I
met him in the Valley he had been in many battles.  He was a man
of great modesty, of quiet demeanor, and of the most generous
impulses.  He never spoke unkindly of any person, and was always
just to superiors and inferiors.  He was wounded at Bull Run (1861),
and captured and confined for many months in prison at Richmond.
His heroic wife, Fanny Ricketts, on learning of his being wounded,
joined him on the battle-field, and shared his six months' captivity
to nurse him.( 2)  The special mention of Wright and Ricketts and
his wife must be pardoned by the reader, as they were of my best
friends, not only during, but since the war.  Mrs. Ricketts was
often in camp with her husband, and though a most refined lady,
was, by disposition, education, and spirit quite capable of commanding
an army corps.  She possessed great executive ability.

Two other officers whose acquaintance I formed in the Valley in
1864, and who were in after life my friends, I venture to mention
also.

George Crook was an ideal soldier.  He was born near Dayton, Ohio,
September 8, 1828, and was a West Point graduate.  He was of medium
stature, possessed of a gentle but heroic spirit, and justly won
renown in the War of the Rebellion, and subsequently in Indian
wars.  He died suddenly in Chicago, March 21, 1890.  His body is
buried at Arlington in the midst of his fallen war-comrades.  He
left no children.  His fame as a patriot and soldier belongs to
history.

Rutherford B. Hayes, a brigade commander in the opening of Sheridan's
Valley campaign, was born at Delaware, Ohio, October 4, 1822.  He
was not educated for a soldier.  He was a man of medium height,
strong body, sandy hair, sanguine temperament, and was always self-
possessed, and gentle in his intercourse with others.  He was a
most efficient officer and had the power to inspire his men to
heroic deeds.  He was twice wounded, and retired at the end of the
war distinguished as a volunteer soldier.  Subsequently he served
a term in Congress, three terms as Governor of Ohio, and was
President of the United States 1877 to 1881.

I assumed command of my old brigade on the 26th of August, near
Halltown.  Its ranks had been much depleted, yet it numbered about
2000 effective men, including recruits.  It was then composed of
the 6th Maryland, 110th, 122d, and 126th Ohio, 67th and 138th
Pennsylvania, and 9th New York Heavy Artillery serving as infantry.
I found still with it, in command of regiments, Colonels John W.
Horn and Wm. H. Ball, Lieutenant-Colonels Otho H. Binkley and Aaron
W. Ebright, who had each passed safely through the recent bloody
campaigns.

Sheridan's cavalry made daily reconnoissances, and frequently
engaged the enemy in advance of Charlestown.  A cavalry reconnoissance
was made on the 29th which brought on an attack, near Smithfield,
by Fitz Lee's cavalry supported by infantry.  The report came that
our cavalry under General Wesley Merritt were being driven back,
and Ricketts was ordered to go to its relief.  As I was familiar
with the roads and country, he sent me forward with my brigade and
some attached troops.  We met our cavalry about two miles from
Smithfield retiring in a somewhat broken condition.  I deployed my
command on its left and pushed the enemy back to a ridge about a
mile north of that place.  Here he made a stand, displaying
considerable force.  I decided to attack at once.  While preparing
for an advance, I discovered what appeared to be a considerable
body of cavalry forming for a charge on my left flank.  My line
was single, and I was without support in that direction.  At this
juncture a small number of mounted officers and men appeared on a
knoll to my rear.  I supposed them to be a body of cavalry sent
forward to participate in the engagement.  I rode to advise the
officer in command of the threatened danger.  I found there Sheridan
and his staff and escort; also Merritt and some of his staff.
Sheridan had ridden to the front to see the situation.  He seemed
surprised to see me, and asked sharply, "What are _you_ doing here?"
There was no time then for parley, as my command had already begun
to advance.  I told him of the danger, and pointed out to him the
enemy's cavalry on our left, and asked for a force to meet it.  He
responded that he had no force on hand.  I suggested that the
cavalry with him, if immediately thrown well out to the left in a
threatening position, would answer the purpose.  He replied:  "----
 ----, that is my escort."  I rejoined that it was needed badly,
and might save disaster.  With a somewhat amused expression on his
face he ordered it to move as I indicated.( 3)

About the time of this incident a puff of smoke from a rifle, fired
on the heights held by the enemy about a mile distant, was seen.
Almost instantly a familiar _thud_ was heard, and all looked around
to see who of the assembled officers had been hit.  Major (Surgeon)
W. H. Rulison (9th New York Cavalry), serving as Medical Director
of the Cavalry, was killed by the shot.( 4)

The enemy was driven from the ridge and we were soon in possession
of Smithfield.( 5)  Merritt's cavalry took post at the bridge, and
the infantry were withdrawn to camp near Charlestown.

Sheridan threw his whole army forward on September 3d, the infantry
stretching from Clifton farm on the right to Berryville on the
left.  On this day there was short but fierce fighting between
Averell and McCausland's cavalry at Bunker Hill, in which the latter
was defeated with loss in prisoners, wagons, and supplies, and also
between Crook's command and Kershaw's division.  The latter seems
to have run, at nightfall, unexpectedly, into Crook, near Berryville,
and was severely punished.  Kershaw was of Longstreet's corps and
was then under orders to return to Lee's army at Petersburg.  No
other event of greater importance than a reconnoissance occurred
until the 19th.

Sheridan's army was then composed of the Sixth Corps, under Wright
--three divisions, commanded, respectively, by Generals David A.
Russell, George W. Getty, and James B. Ricketts, and an artillery
brigade of six batteries; the Nineteenth Corps under Emory--two
divisions and four batteries; Eighth Corps (Army of West Virginia)
under Crook--two divisions, and an artillery brigade of three
batteries.  Besides the troops mentioned, there were three divisions
of cavalry and eight light or horse artillery batteries, commanded
by General Alfred A. T. Torbert.  The cavalry divisions were
commanded, respectively, by Generals Wesley Merritt, Wm. W. Averell,
and James H. Wilson.( 6)  Although there were in Sheridan's command
about 50,000 men present for duty, they were so scattered, guarding
railroads and various positions, that he was not able to take into
battle more then 25,000 men of all arms.( 7)  Early had in the
Valley District Ewell's corps, Breckinridge's command, and at least
one division of Longstreet's corps, Fitz Lee's and McCausland's
cavalry divisions and other cavalry organizations, and it is probable
that he was not able to bring into battle more then 25,000 effective
men.  These estimates will hold good through the months of September
and October, though some additions and changes took place in each
army.  Grant met Sheridan at Charlestown the 16th, to arrange a
plan for the latter to attack Early.  Sheridan drew from his pocket
a plat showing the location of the opposing armies, roads, streams,
etc., and detailed to Grant a plan of battle of his own, saying he
could whip Early.  Grant approved the plan, and did not even exhibit
one of his own, previously prepared.  This meeting was on Friday.
Sheridan was to move the next Monday.( 8)

Sheridan gives much credit to Miss Rebecca M. Wright of Winchester
for sending him information by a messenger that Kershaw's division
and Cutshaw's artillery, under General Anderson, had started to
rejoin General Lee.( 9)

The enemy was in camp about five miles north of Winchester at
Stephenson's Depot, his cavalry extending eastward to the crossing
of the Opequon by the Berryville pike.  Our camps were, in general,
about six miles to the northward of Opequon Creek.  Sheridan's plan
submitted to Grant was to avoid Early's army, pass to the east of
Winchester, and strike the Valley pike at Newtown, seven miles
south of Winchester, and there, being in Early's rear, force him
to give battle.(10)  Early moved two divisions to Martinsburg on
the 18th, which caused Sheridan suddenly to change his plan and
determine to attack the remaining divisions at Stephenson's Depot.
Early, however, did not tarry at Martinsburg, but learning there
of Grant's visit to Sheridan, and fearing some aggressive movement,
returned the same night, leaving Gordon's division at Bunker's Hill
with orders to start at daylight the next morning for the Depot.
Gordon reached the Depot about the time the battle opened.(11)

Sheridan's final plan for the expected battle was set forth in
orders issued on the 18th.  It was for Wilson's cavalry and Wright's
corps to force a crossing of Opequon Creek on the Berryville pike.
Emory was to report to Wright and follow him.  As soon as the open
country, south of the Opequon, was reached, Wright was to put both
corps in line of battle fronting Stephenson's Depot.  Crook's
command was to move to the same crossing of the Opequon and be held
there as a reserve.  Merritt and Averell's cavalry divisions under
Torbert were to move to the right in the direction of Bunker
Hill.(12)

The army moved at 2 A.M. of the 19th as ordered.  Wilson's cavalry
succeeded in crossing the creek and driving the enemy's cavalry
through a deep defile some two miles towards Winchester.  Wright
followed, Getty's division leading, Ricketts and Russell following.
When the defile was passed, Getty went into position on the left
of the pike, Ricketts on the right, both in two lines, and Russell's
division was held in reserve.  My brigade was the right of the
corps as formed for battle.  The only battery up was put in position
on the right.  The Nineteenth Corps was ordered to form on the
right of the Sixth and to connect with it.  Up to this time no
severe fighting had taken place.  Early was forced to move the main
part of his army to his right to cover the Berryville and Winchester
pike.  Upon our side much delay occurred in getting up the artillery
and the Nineteenth Corps, during which time we were exposed to an
incessant fire from the enemy's guns.  The Nineteenth did not make
a close connection on the right of the Sixth.  Not until 11.40 A.M.
was the order given for a general attack.  Ricketts' division was
to keep its left on the pike.  As soon as the advance commenced
the Sixth Corps was exposed to a heavy artillery fire from the
enemy's batteries, but it went forward gallantly for about one
mile, driving or capturing all before it.  General Ricketts, in
his report of September 27th, described what took place:

"The Nineteenth Corps did not move and keep connection with my
right, and the turnpike upon which the division was dressing bore
to the left, causing a wide interval between the Sixth and Nineteenth
Corps.  As the lines advanced the interval became greater.  The
enemy, discovering this fact, hurled a large body of men towards
the interval and threatened to take my right in flank.  Colonel
Keifer at once caused the 138th and 67th Pennsylvania and 110th
Ohio to break their connection with the right of the remainder of
his brigade and move towards the advancing columns of the enemy.
These three regiments most gallantly met the overwhelming masses
of the enemy and held them in check.  As soon as the Nineteenth
Corps engaged the enemy the force in my front commenced slowly
retiring.  The three regiments named were pushed forward until they
came upon two batteries (eight guns), silencing them and compelling
the enemy to abandon them.  The three regiments had arrived within
less than two hundred yards of the two batteries when the Nineteenth
Corps, after a most gallant resistance, gave way.  These guns would
have been taken by our troops had our flanks been properly protected.
The enemy at once came upon my right flank in large force; successful
resistance was no longer possible; the order was given for our men
to fall back on our second line, but the enemy advancing at the
time in force threw us temporarily in confusion."

The repulse of the Nineteenth, and consequently of my three regiments,
left Breckinridge's corps full on our right flank, threatening
disaster to the army.  Wright promptly put in Russell's division,
until then in reserve, and the progress of the enemy was arrested.
Here the brave David A. Russell lost his life.  My report, written
September 27, 1864, described, in general, a further part taken by
my brigade:

"The broken troops of my brigade were halted and reformed in a
woods behind troops from the reserve, which had come forward to
fill up the interval.  As soon as reformed, they were moved forward
again over the same ground they had traversed the first time.
While moving this portion of my brigade forward, I received an
order from Brigadier-General Ricketts, commanding division, to
again unite my brigade near the centre of the corps, and to the
right of the turnpike, near a house.  This order was obeyed at
once, and my whole brigade was placed on one line, immediately
confronting the enemy.  The four regiments of my brigade, that were
upon the left, kept connection with the First Brigade, Third
Division, and fought desperately, in the main driving the enemy.
They also captured a considerable number of prisoners in their
first advance.

"Heavy firing was kept up along the whole line until about 4 P.M.,
when a general advance took place.  The enemy gave way before the
impetuosity of our troops, and were soon completely routed.  This
brigade pressed forward with the advance line to, and into, the
streets of Winchester.  The rout of the enemy was everywhere
complete.  Night came on, and the pursuit was stopped.  The troops
of my brigade encamped with the corps on the Strasburg and Front
Royal roads, south of Winchester."

It was Sheridan's design, if Wright's attack had been completely
successful, to push Crook rapidly past Winchester and seize the
Strasburg pike, and thus cut off Early's retreat; but the repulse
of the Nineteenth Corps made it necessary to move Crook to our
right.  This caused some delay, during which the Sixth Corps bore
the brunt of the battle.  General Hayes, in his report, dated
October 13, 1864, described the part taken by a division of Crook's
command:

"I have to honor to report that at the battle of Opequon, September
19, 1864, the Second Infantry Division, Army of West Virginia, was
commanded by Colonel Isaac H. Duval until late in the afternoon of
that day, when he was disabled by a severe wound, and the command
of the division devolved upon me.  Colonel Duval did not quit the
field until the defeat of the enemy was accomplished and the serious
fighting ended.  The division took no part in the action during the
forenoon, but remained in reserve at the Opequon bridge, on the
Berryville and Winchester pike.  The fighting of other portions of
the army had been severe, but indecisive.  There were some indications
as we approached the battle-field soon after noon that the forces
engaged in the forenoon had been overmatched.  About 1 P.M. this
division was formed on the extreme right of the infantry line of
our army, the First Brigade, under my command, in advance, and the
Second Brigade, Colonel D. D. Johnson commanding, about sixty yards
in the rear, forming a supporting line; the right of the Second
Brigade being, however, extended about one hundred yards farther
to the right than the First Brigade.  The division was swung around
some distance to the right, so as to strike the rebel line on the
left flank.  The rebel left was protected by field-works and a
battery on the south side of Red Bud Creek.  This creek was easily
crossed in some places, but in others was a deep, miry pool from
twenty to thirty yards wide and almost impassable.  The creek was
not visible from any part of our line when we began to move forward,
and no one probably knew of it until its banks were reached.  The
division moved forward at the same time with the First Division,
Colonel Thoburn, on our left, in good order and without much
opposition until they unexpectedly came upon Red Bud Creek.  This
creek and the rough ground and tangled thicket on its banks was in
easy range of grape, canister, and musketry from the rebel line.
A very destructive fire was opened upon us, in the midst of which
our men rushed into and over the creek.  Owing to the difficulty
in crossing, the rear and front lines and different regiments of
the same line mingled together and reached the rebel side of the
creek with lines and organizations broken; but all seemed inspired
by the right spirit, and charged the rebel works pell-mell in the
most determined manner.  In this charge our loss was heavy, but
our success was rapid and complete.  The rebel left in our front
was turned and broken, and one or more pieces of artillery captured.
No attempt was made after this to form lines or regiments.  Officers
and men went forward, pushing the rebels from one position to
another until the defeated enemy were routed and driven through
Winchester."

About 5 P.M. Sheridan galloped along the front line of the Sixth
Corps with hat and sword in hand and assured the men, in more
expressive than elegant language, of victory in the final attack,
and he, about the same time, ordered Wilson with his cavalry to
push out from the left and gain the Valley pike south of Winchester.
Torbert, with Merritt and Averell's cavalry, was ordered to sweep
down along the Martinsburg pike on Crook's right to strike Early's
left.  The enemy had been pushed back upon the open plains northeast
of Winchester and was trying hard to hold his left against the foot-
hills of Apple-Pie Ridge, and to cover the Martinsburg pike.

Most of the enemy's cavalry and much of his artillery were on his
left.  Getty (Sixth Corps), who from the first held the left of
our infantry, steadily advanced, holding whatever ground he gained.
The Nineteenth did not participate largely in the battle after its
repulse.  The cavalry bore a conspicuous part in the battle.  The
last stand was made by Early one mile from Winchester.  About 5
P.M. Wright and Crook's corps, though then in single line, impetuously
dashed forward, while Merritt and Averell's cavalry divisions under
Torbert, somewhat closely massed, overthrew the Confederate cavalry
and swept mercilessly along the Martinsburg pike and the foot of
the precipitous ridge.  The enemy's artillery was ridden over or
forced to fly from the field.  Torbert reached the left flank of
the Confederate infantry at the moment it was hard pressed by the
advancing troops of Wright and Crook.  Our cavalry, in deep column,
with sabres drawn, charged over the Confederate left, and the battle
was won.  This charge was the most stirring and picturesque of the
war.  The sun was setting, but could be seen through the church
spires of the city.  Its rays glistening upon the drawn sabres of
the thousands of mounted warriors made a picture in real war, rarely
witnessed.  In this charge, besides the division leaders mentioned,
were Generals Custer and Devin, and Colonels Lowell, Schoonmaker,
and Capehart, leading brigades, all specially distinguished as
cavalry soldiers.  The fighting continued into and through the
streets of Winchester.  The pursuit was arrested by the coming of
night and the weariness of the soldiers, many of whom had been
without food or rest for about eighteen hours.  The significance
of the victory was great, but it was particularly gratifying to
the old soldiers in my command who had fought at Winchester under
Milroy.  The night battle at Stephenson's Depot, fifteen months
before--June, 1863--was within the limits of the field of Opequon.
Ewell's corps had driven Milroy from Winchester, but now, in turn,
under another commander, it was flying as precipitately from our
forces.  The war-doomed city of Winchester was never again to see
a Confederate Army.  Wilson's cavalry division did good service on
the Union left, often fiercely attacking the Confederate right
flank.  Late in the day he pushed past Winchester on the east, and
encountered and dispersed Bradley Johnson's cavalry.  Wilson,
however, was too weak to cut off Early's retreat, but he continued
in pursuit until 10 P.M.

This was my first considerable battle after being severely wounded,
and candor compels me to say that I do not think being wounded one
or more times has a tendency to promote bravery or to steady nerves
for future battles.  The common experience, however, is that when
a soldier is once engaged in the conflict, his nerves, if before
affected, become steady, and danger is forgotten.

My horse was shot while leading the three regiments on the right
of the corps; later I was severely bruised on the left hip by a
portion of an exploded shell, and a second horse was struck by a
fragment of one which burst beneath him while I was trying to
capture a battery posted on a hill at the south end of the main
street of Winchester.

I quote again from my report:

"My brigade lost, in the battle of Opequon, some valiant and superior
officers.  Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ebright, commanding the 126th
Ohio, was killed instantly early in the action.  He was uniformly
brave and skilful.  He had fought in the many battles of the Sixth
Corps during the past summer's campaign.  Captain Thomas J. Hyatt
and Lieutenant Rufus Ricksecker, 126th Ohio, and Lieutenant Wm. H.
Burns, 6th Maryland, also fell in this action.  Each was conspicuous
for gallantry on this and other fields upon which he had fought.
Colonel John W. Horn, 6th Maryland, whom none excelled for
distinguished bravery, was severely if not mortally wounded.(13)
Colonel William H. Ball, 122d Ohio, received a wound from a shell,
but did not quit the field.  He maintained his usual reputation
for cool courage and excellent judgment and skill.  Captain John
S. Stucky, 138th Pennsylvania, lost a leg.  Major Chas. M. Cornyn,
122d Ohio; Captain Feight and Walter, 138th Pennsylvania; Captain
Williams, Lieutenants Patterson, Wells, and Crooks, 126th Ohio;
Captains Hawkins and Rouzer and Lieutenant Smith, 6th Maryland;
Lieutenants Fish and Calvin, 9th New York Heavy Artillery; Captains
Van Eaton and Trimble and Lieutenants Deeter and Simes, 110th Ohio,
are among the many officers more or less severely wounded.
(Lieutenant Deeter, 110th Ohio, has since died.)

"Captain J. P. Dudrow, 122d Ohio, and Lieutenant R. W. Wiley, 110th
Ohio, were each slightly wounded while acting as A. D. C.'s upon
my staff."

Colonel Ebright had a premonition of his death.  A few moments
before 12 M. he sought me, and coolly told me he would be killed
before the battle ended.  He insisted upon telling me that he wanted
his remains and effects sent to this home in Lancaster, Ohio, and
I was asked to write his wife as to some property in the West which
he feared she did not know about.  He was impatient when I tried
to remove the thought of imminent death from his mind.  A few
moments later the time for another advance came, and the interview
with Colonel Ebright closed.  In less than ten minutes, while he
was riding near me he fell dead from his horse, pierced in the
breast by a rifle ball.  His apprehension of death was not prompted
by fear.  He had been through the slaughters of the Wilderness and
Cold Harbor; had fought his regiment in the _dead angle_ of
Spotsylvania, and led it at Monocacy.  It is needless to say I
complied with his request.

Incidents like this were not uncommon.

The battle was a bloody one.

The Union killed and wounded were:(14)

                                Killed.    Wounded.  Aggregate.
                                Officers.  Officers.
                                |    Men.  |     Men.
Sixth Army Corps (Wright)        18   193   111  1331  1653
Nineteenth Army Corps (Emory)    22   292   104  1450  1868
Army of W. Va.                    6    98    34   649   787
Cavalry                           7    61    29   275   372
                               ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
  Totals                         53   644   278  3705  4680

The casualties in my brigade were 4 officers and 46 men killed, 24
officers and 261 men wounded; aggregate, 335.(15)  This was little
less than the total loss in the three cavalry divisions.

There is no complete list of the Confederate losses so far as I
can discover.  Early reported his killed and wounded in this battle
at 2141, and missing 1818, total, 3959.(16)  Doubtless many of the
missing were killed or wounded.  General R. E. Rodes was killed in
a charge with his division.(16)  General Godwin and Colonel Patton
were also killed; Generals Fitzhugh Lee and York were severely
wounded.

This battle was inspiriting to the country.  Lincoln, Stanton, and
Grant each wired congratulations and thanks.(17)

Sheridan was now appointed a Brigadier-General in the regular army
and assigned to the permanent command of the Middle Military
District.

The Valley was soon to further reek with blood, and the torch of
war was soon to consume it.

( 1)  Sheridan was born March 6, 1831, and died August 5, 1888.

( 2)  Mrs. Ricketts drove from Washington to Bull Run in her own
carriage and besought Gen. J. E. Johnston to parole her husband,
and allow her to take him to his home in Washington.  This was
refused, and her carriage was confiscated.  In after years, when
the Johnstons were in Washington, he holding high political positions,
she refused to recognize them.

( 3)  Members of his staff reported Sheridan as saying that the
request for his personal body-guard was impudent, but could not be
refused.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., 145.

( 5)  _Ibid_., 45.

( 6)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 107-112.

( 7)  _Ibid_., p. 61.

( 8)  Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., p. 328.

( 9)  Sheridan's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 4-7.

(10)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 46.

(11)  _Ibid_., p. 555.

(12)  _Ibid_., Part II., pp. 102-3.

(13)  Colonel Horn survived the war, and died near Mitchellville,
Md., October 4, 1897.

(14)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., 118.

(15)  _Ibid_., p. 113.

(16)  _Ibid_., p. 555.

(17)  _Ibid_., pp. 61-2.


CHAPTER IX
Battle of Fisher's Hill--Pursuit of Early--Devastation of the
Shenandoah Valley (1864)--Cavalry Battle at Tom's Brook, and Minor
Events

We left Sheridan's victorious army south of Winchester, five miles
from the battle-field.  It had only such opportunity for rest as
can be obtained on the night succeeding a long day's battle.  Some
of the officers and soldiers returned to the scene of the conflict
through the gloom of night, to minister to the wounded and to find
and identify the bodies of dead friends.  It was, however, the duty
of the surgeons, hospital attendants, ambulance corps, and stretcher-
bearers to care for the wounded; and the dead of both armies could
be buried later.  The bodies of some of the dead of the successful
army are always sent home for interment.  Chaplains are often
instrumental in doing the latter.  Rations, forage, and ammunition
had now to be brought up and distributed.  No matter how well
soldiers have been supplied, they generally come out of a great
battle with little.

Early's army bivouacked at Newtown, and at 3 A.M. of the 20th of
September continued its retreat to Fisher's Hill, about two miles
south of Strasburg.  Early placed his army in a strong defensive
position on this hill, which is an abrupt bluff with a precipitous
rocky face, and immediately south of Tumbling Run.  His right rested
on the Shenandoah River, and his left extended to the narrow Cedar
Creek Valley at the foot of Little North Mountain.  This naturally
strong position was well fortified and impregnable against front
attack.

Sheridan's army moved at day-dawn of the 20th in pursuit, Emory in
the advance.  Wright and Emory occupied the heights around Strasburg
on the evening of that day, and Crook's corps was moved to their
right and rear, north of Cedar Creek, where it was concealed in
the dense timber.  Sheridan determined to use Crook to turn the
enemy's left, if possible.  The Nineteenth and Sixth Corps during
the night of the 20th took position in the order named, from left
to right, in front of Fisher's Hill.  This was not accomplished
without some fierce conflicts, brought on in dislodging the enemy
from strongly fortified heights which he held in advance of his
main line.  A portion of my brigade was engaged in these preliminary
movements all the night.( 1)  The Third--Ricketts' division--was
again on the right of the Sixth Corps and of the army as formed on
the 21st.  Near the close of the day I was informed by a staff
officer of General Ricketts that my command was to be held in
reserve behind the right, and that I was not likely to be engaged
in the coming battle if the plan of the commanding general was
carried out.  I was directed to get my regiments into as comfortable
a situation as possible for rest, and hence selected a good place
to bivouac, and was employed in riding through the troops and
telling the officers of the prospect of freedom from severe work
the coming day when a brisk engagement broke out in my immediate
front.  A portion of the Second Division of the Sixth Corps was
repulsed in an attempt, just at nightfall, to carry a fortified
hill in front of our right, which Sheridan and Wright had suddenly
decided must be taken for the security of our army.( 2)  Wright,
seeing my command near at hand, ordered Ricketts to send to me for
a regiment to reinforce the repulsed troops.  I sent the 126th Ohio
under Captain George W. Hoge, and it soon became seriously imperilled
in a renewed attack.  Discovering this, I followed it with the 6th
Maryland under Major C. K. Prentiss, and, uniting the two with
other troops, charged the heights just at dark and carried them.
My two regiments occupied them for the night.( 3)

Sheridan, on the 21st, ordered Torbert with Merritt and Wilson's
cavalry divisions (save Devin's brigade) to the Luray Valley, with
instructions to drive out any force of the enemy he might encounter,
and, if possible, cross over from that Valley to New Market, and
intercept Early's retreat, should the latter be defeated in the
impending battle.  Averell's cavalry division was on the Back or
Cedar Creek road, well advanced.

The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps held their positions of the previous
evening, and threatened the enemy in front.  Part of my brigade
was continued on the advance line during the forenoon of the 22d,
the remainder in reserve.  The real attack was to be made by Crook,
but this rendered it desirable to conceal his movements and deceive
the vigilant enemy.  While Crook remained in hiding in the timber,
Sheridan decided to demonstrate against Early's left centre in such
way as to lead him to expect a formidable assault there.  Accordingly
the whole of Ricketts' division with Averell's cavalry was, about
12 M., rather defiantly displayed and moved conspicuously to our
right, and close upon the enemy's front.  My position in partial
reserve made my command the most available for this movement.  I
was therefore ordered to take the advance, followed by Colonel
Emerson with the First Brigade.  The movement was made in full
sight of the enemy and under the fire of his guns.  We gained,
after some fighting, a ridge that extended near to Tumbling Run on
the north of the enemy's fortifications.  The enemy fought hard to
hold possession of this ridge as a protection to his left and as
a good lookout.  Under Ricketts' orders I continued by repeated
charges to push the enemy along this ridge for about three quarters
of a mile until he was forced to abandon it, cross the Run, and
take refuge within his works.  Under such cover as we could get my
men were now held within easy musket shot of the enemy.  During
this movement our guns in the rear tried to aid us, but it was hard
to tell which we suffered from the most--our own shells or the
enemy's fire.  Averell's cavalry pushed back the enemy's skirmishers
still farther to our right.

The enemy, from his signal station of Three-Top Mountain, took the
movements of Ricketts and Averell to be a preparation for a real
attack, designed to fall upon the front of Ramseur's division, and
he prepared to meet it.  While these operations were taking place,
Crook moved his infantry under cover of the thick timber along the
face of Little North Mountain, and by 4 P.M. reached a position
with his two divisions full on Early's left flank.  Crook at once
crossed the narrow Valley and bore down on the enemy's extreme
left, which at once gave way.  Ramseur, in my front, had been
attentively watching Ricketts, and now seeing the danger from Crook,
commenced drawing his troops out of his breastworks and changing
front to his left.  I was near enough to discover this movement,
and, to prevent its consummation, I ordered an immediate charge,
which was executed on a run.  Ramseur, discovering the new and
seemingly more imminent danger, tried to reoccupy his works, but,
simultaneously, Crook charged, and Ramseur's troops, caught in the
mist of his movement, fell into confusion, became panic-stricken,
and fled through the timber or were captured.  This spread a panic
to Early's entire army.  The troops of my command did not halt to
fire in the charge, but crossed the Run and struggled up the
precipitous banks and over the breastworks, suffering little loss,
and were soon in possession of eight of the enemy's guns and some
prisoners.  They met inside of the enemy's fortifications and
commingled with Crook's men.  When the charge was well under way,
Colonel George A. (Sandy) Forsyth ( 4) of Sheridan's staff reached
me on the gallop.  He was the bearer of orders, but did not deliver
them.  He only exclaimed:  "You are all right; you need no orders."
He, later, explained that Sheridan had sent him to direct me to
assault, if opportunity presented, in co-operation with Crook.

In passing on horseback around the right of the enemy's works to
gain an entrance, and while going up a steep hill in the timber,
I fell in with a mounted officer wearing a plain blouse and a slouch
hat, but with no insignia of rank.  We continued together for a
short time, he inquiring of the progress of the battle as I had
observed it.  I asked him if he knew what General Crook was doing.
He modestly laughed, and said Crook was just then engaged with me
in gaining an entrance to the enemy's fortifications, and that he
supposed his command was pursuing Early.  Here began an acquaintance
with the hero of this battle, that ripened into a friendship which
ended only with his death.

Early could not rally his troops to a stand, and all his guns in
position behind his works fell into our hands.  Night only saved
him and his demoralized army from capture.  The other divisions of
the Sixth and the Nineteenth Corps came up promptly, but the battle
was over with the assault.

Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, of the Topographical Engineers serving in
Early's army, describes the operations in his journal of the 22d,
thus:

"The enemy at 1 P.M. advanced several lines of battle in front of
Ramseur, but did not come far, and only drove in our skirmish line.
At 4.30 P.M. they drove in the skirmishers in front of Gordon and
opened a lively artillery duel.  At the same time a flanking force
that had come on our left, near the North Mountain, advanced and
drove away the cavalry and moved on the left flank of our infantry
--rather beyond it.  The brigade there (Battle's) was ordered to
move to the left, and the whole line was ordered to extend that
way, moving along the line of the breastworks.  But the enemy
attacking just then (5.30 P.M.) the second brigade from the left,
instead of marching by the line of works, was marched across an
angle by its commander.  The enemy seeing this movement rushed over
the works, and the brigade fled in confusion, thus letting the
enemy into the rear of Early's division, as well as of Gordon's
and the rest of Rodes'; our whole line gave way towards the right,
offering little or no resistance, and the enemy came on and occupied
our line.  General Early and staff were near by, and I with others
went after Wharton (to the right), but it was too late."

At 4 A.M. next morning Early dispatched Lee:

"Late yesterday the enemy attacked my position at Fisher's Hill
and succeeded in driving back the left of my line, which was defended
by the cavalry, and throwing a force in the rear of the left of my
infantry, when the whole of the troops gave way in a panic and
could not be rallied.  This resulted in the loss of twelve pieces
of artillery, though my loss in men is not large."( 5)

He, later, reported his killed and wounded at Fisher's Hill at
240, missing 995; total, 1235.( 6)  Many of his missing were
doubtless killed or wounded.

The Union killed and wounded were:( 7)

                     Killed. Wounded. Aggregate.
Sixth Army Corps          27      208        235
Nineteenth Army Corps     15       86        101
Army of W. Va. (Crook)     8      152        160
Cavalry                    2       11         13
                         ---      ---        ---
  Totals                  52      457        509

The killed and wounded in my brigade were 80, exactly one half the
casualties in Crook's command, and above one third in the Sixth
Corps.

The victory of Fisher's Hill, though comparatively bloodless, was
one of the most complete of the war.  But from the inability of
Torbert to drive Fitz Lee's cavalry (then under Wickham in consequence
of Fitz Lee being wounded at Opequon) from the Luray Valley and to
gain a position in Early's rear, the latter's army would have been
destroyed.  Torbert encountered Wickham in a narrow gorge and was
unable to dislodge him in time.  Sheridan's infantry assembled on
the Valley pike south of Fisher's Hill after dark, and continuing
the pursuit all night, capturing many stragglers and two more guns,
reached Woodstock twelve miles farther south at daybreak.  Averell
was ordered to push forward up the Cedar Creek road and debouch at
Woodstock in rear of the retreating foe.  This, for some reason,
he did not do, but soon after dark went into camp and awaited
daylight.  He reached Woodstock after the infantry corps, too late
to cut off or assail the enemy.  For this and some other alleged
delinquencies Sheridan relieved him from command of his division,
and assigned Colonel William H. Powell to succeed him.

Early collected his broken forces and essayed to make a stand at
Rude's Hill, east of the Shenandoah and south of Mount Jackson.
As our troops advanced to attack him, however, he withdrew rapidly
in the direction of Staunton.  After passing New Market he took a
road leading to Brown's Gap, where he was joined by his cavalry
from the Luray Valley and Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery,
which had left him at Stephenson's Depot on the 15th.

Not until the 25th did Torbert with his cavalry reach Sheridan at
New Market.  Some of Sheridan's infantry advanced as far as Mount
Crawford and Lacey Springs, while the main body of the cavalry
pushed to Staunton and Waynesboro.

An incident occurred on the evening of the 3d of October that had
something to do with the severity of the orders relating to the
destruction of property in the Shenandoah valley.  Lieutenant John
R. Meigs, Sheridan's engineer officer, while returning from a
topographical survey of the country near Dayton, accompanied by
two assistants, fell in with three men in our uniform, and rode
with them towards Sheridan's headquarters.  Suddenly these men
turned on Lieutenant Meigs and, though demanding his surrender,
shot and killed him.  One of his assistants was captured and one
escaped and reported the event.  Sheridan was much enraged, as the
killing of the Lieutenant was little less than murder, occurring,
as it did, within our lines.  The three men were probably disguised
Confederates operating near their homes.  Sheridan ordered Custer,
who had succeeded to the command of Wilson's cavalry division, to
burn all houses within an area of five miles within the spot where
Meigs was killed.  The next morning Custer proceeded to execute
this order.  The designated area included the village of Dayton.
When a few houses had been burned the order was suspended, and
Custer was required instead to bring in all able-bodied men as
prisoners.( 8)

General T. W. Rosser, with a cavalry brigade from Richmond, joined
Early on the 5th of October, and the latter's army, being otherwise
much strengthened, soon began again to show signs of activity.

As the Sixth Corps was expected to rejoin the Army of the Potomac
in front of Petersburg, Sheridan decided to withdraw at least as
far as Strasburg, and he determined also to lay waste the Valley,
as it was a great magazine of supplies for the Confederate armies.
He commenced to move on the 6th, the infantry taking the advance.
The cavalry had begun the work of destruction at Waynesboro and
Staunton.  It usually remained quiet during the day, then at night,
while moving, set fire to all grain stacks, barns, and mills, thus
leaving behind it nothing but a waste.  The fires lit up the Valley
and the mountain sides, producing a picture of resplendent grandeur
seldom witnessed.  The flames lighted up the fertile Valley, casting
a hideous glare, commingled with clouds of smoke, over the foot-
hills and to the summits of the great mountain ranges on each side
of the doomed Valley.  The occasional discharge of artillery helped
to make the panorama sublime.  Fire and sword here literally combined
in the real work of war.  Of the necessity or wisdom of this
destruction of property there may be doubts, yet the war had then
progressed to an acute stage.  All possible means to hasten its
termination seemed justifiable.  Chambersburg, Pa., had been wantonly
burned July 30, 1864.  It has been charged that Sheridan declared
that he would so completely destroy everything in the Valley that
a "crow would have to carry a haversack when he flew over it."
The Confederates, with Rosser, their new cavalry leader, pursued
and daily assaulted Sheridan's rear-guard.  This continued until
the evening of the 8th.  Rosser's apparent success was heralded in
an exaggerated way at Richmond.  He was bulletined there as the
"Savior of the Valley."  He had recently before his advent in the
Valley won reputation in a raid on which he had captured and driven
off some cattle belonging to Grant's army.  Torbert was ordered by
Sheridan, on the night of the 8th, to whip Rosser the next morning
or get whipped.

The infantry of the army was halted to await the issue of the
cavalry battle.  Sheridan informed Torbert that he would witness
the fight from Round Top Mountain.  Merritt's division was encamped
on the Valley pike at the foot of this mountain, just north of
Tom's Brook, and Custer's division about five miles farther north
and west near Tumbling Run.  Custer during the night moved southward
by the Back road, which lay about three miles to the westward of
the pike.  At early daylight, Rosser, believing our army was still
falling back, unexpectedly met and assailed Custer with three
cavalry brigades, and almost simultaneously Merritt, in turn,
assailed Lomax and Johnson's cavalry divisions on the valley pike.
Merritt extended his right and Custer his left until the two
divisions united, when, under Torbert, they charged upon and broke
Rosser's lines all along Tom's Brook.  The battle lasted about two
hours, when Rosser's entire force fell into the wildest disorder,
and in falling back degenerated into a rout.  Torbert ( 9) pursued
for twenty-five miles, capturing about three hundred prisoners,
eleven pieces of artillery with their caissons, and all Rosser's
wagons and ambulances, including his headquarters wagons with his
official papers.  It was said that subsequent bulletins announcing
Rosser's anticipated victories for the day were found.  Rosser's
fame as a soldier, earned by years of hard fighting, was lost at
Tom's Brook in two hours.

Disasters had now become so frequent to the Confederates in the
Valley that some wag at Richmond marked a fresh shipment of new
guns destined for Early's army:  "_General Sheridan, care of Jubal
A. Early_."

Sheridan's army retired to the north of Cedar Creek.  The Sixth
Corps, having orders to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, continued
its march eastward towards Front Royal, expecting to proceed to
Piedmont and there take cars for Alexandria.  It abandoned that
route, however, on the 12th, and marched towards Ashby's Gap, with
a view of passing through it to Washington, and going thence, by
transports, to City Point.(10)  When this corps was partly across
the Shenandoah near Millwood, on the 13th, an order came from
Sheridan for Wright to return with his corps to Cedar Creek.  This
order was given in consequence of Early's return to Fisher's Hill.
The necessity of the Sixth Corps' action will soon be apparent.
It reached Cedar Creek and went into camp at noon of the 14th.

I recall the incident of a red fox starting to run through the
temporary bivouac of the corps at Millwood.  The troops all turned
out, about 10,000, formed a ring around it, while a few horsemen
rode after it until it fell from fright and exhaustion.  The officers
and men of an army always enjoyed incidents of this character.
There was, however, more serious diversion near at hand for these
bronzed soldiers.

( 1)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 152.

( 2)  _Ibid_., p. 152.

( 3)  _Ibid_., p. 223 (Ricketts' Report).

( 4)  Forsyth, precisely four years later, while in command of
fifty picked scouts was surrounded on Beecher Island, on the
Arickaree fork of the Republican River, by about nine hundred
Indians, led by the celebrated chief, Roman Nose, and made the most
desperate fight known in the annals of our Indian wars.  Lieutenant
Beecher, Surgeon Movers, and six of the scouts were killed and
twenty others severely wounded.  Forsyth was himself struck in the
right thigh and his left leg was broken by rifle balls.  He held
out eight days; meantime two of his scouts succeeded in eluding
the Indians, and, reaching Fort Wallace, 110 miles distant, returned
with a relieving party.--Custer's _Life on the Plains_, 88-98.

( 5)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 557.

( 6)  _Ibid_., p. 556.

( 7)  _Ibid_., p. 124.

( 8)  _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 50-2.

( 9)  General A. T. A. Torbert distinguished himself on many fields
and survived the war.  While making a voyage on the steamer _Vera
Cruz_ he was shipwrecked off the Florida coast, August 29, 1880.
He heroically aided others to escape death, and with almost superhuman
exertion kept himself afloat on a broken spar for twenty hours,
and thus reached shore, only to sink down and die from exhaustion.

(10)  _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 59.


CHAPTER X
Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments Thereon--
Also Personal Mention and Incidents

General Early, upon his arrival at Fisher's Hill with his reorganized
army, assumed, on the 13th of October, an aggressive attitude by
pushing a division of infantry north of Strasburg and his cavalry
along the Back road towards Cedar Creek.  This brought on sharp
engagements, in which Colonel Thoburn's division of Crook's corps
and Custer's cavalry participated.  Early seems to have acted in
the belief that all but Crook's command had gone to Petersburg.
This action resulted in bringing Wright back to Cedar Creek, as we
have seen.

Secretary Stanton, by telegram on the 13th, summoned Sheridan to
Washington for consultation as to the latter's future operations.

Early, having met unexpected resistance, withdrew his forces at
night to Fisher's Hill, and quiet being restored, Sheridan started
on the 16th to Washington, _via_ Front Royal and Manassas Gap.  He
took with him as far as Front Royal his cavalry, under Torbert,
intending to push them through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central
Railroad at Charlottesville, to make an extensive raid east of the
Blue Ridge.

Early had a signal station on Three Top Mountain in plain view of
our signal officers, who knew the Confederate signal code.  From
this station there was flagged, on the 16th, this message:

"To Lieutenant-General Early:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush
Sheridan.

  "Longstreet, Lieutenant-General."

Wright, who was left in command of the army at Cedar Creek, forwarded
this message to Sheridan, who received it when near Front Royal.
Wright, also, in a communication accompanying the message, expressed
fear of an attack in the absence of the cavalry.  He anticipated
that it would fall on his right.  Sheridan, deeming it best to be
on the safe side, abandoned the cavalry raid, and ordered Torbert
to report back to Wright, cautioning the latter to be well on his
guard, and expressing the opinion to Wright that if attacked he
could beat the enemy.( 1)  Sheridan with a cavalry escort proceeded
to Rectortown, the terminus of the railroad; there took cars, and
arrived in Washington the morning of the 17th.  He held a consultation
with Stanton and Halleck, and with certain members of his staff
left Washington at 12 M. by rail, arriving the evening of the same
day at Martinsburg.  Here he was met by an escort of three hundred
cavalry.  He left Martinsburg the next morning (18th), and reached
Winchester about 3 P.M., twenty-two miles distant.  He tarried at
the latter place over night, making some survey of the surrounding
heights as to their utility for fortifications.

But to return to his army.  Torbert reached Cedar Creek with the
cavalry on the 17th.  The Longstreet message was a ruse.  Longstreet,
though in Richmond, was not on duty, not having fully recovered
from his wound received in the Wilderness.( 2)

The position of the opposing armies the night of the 18th of October
can be briefly stated.

The Union Army was encamped on each side of the turnpike, facing
southward, and north of Cedar Creek, a tributary of the Shenandoah,
which, flowing in general direction from northwest to southeast,
empties into the river about two miles west of Strasburg.  The
north branch of the Shenandoah flows northward to Fisher's Hill,
thence bending to the eastward at the foot of and around the north
end of Three Top (or Massanutten) Mountain, thence, forming a
junction with the south branch, past Front Royal to the west and
again northward, emptying into the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.

Crook's two divisions, Colonel Joseph Thoburn and Colonel Rutherford
B. Hayes commanding, were wholly to the east of the pike; Thoburn's
division well advanced, his front conforming to the course of the
creek; the Nineteenth Corps (Emory's), two divisions, lay on each
side of the pike, covering the bridge and ford in its immediate
front, and the Sixth was on Emory's right.  Ricketts, Wheaton, and
Getty's divisions of the Sixth were encamped in the order named
from left to right.  Meadow Brook (sometimes called Marsh Run), a
small stream, with rugged banks, flowing from north to south and
emptying into Cedar Creek, separated the left of Ricketts' division
from the right of the Nineteenth Corps.  The Sixth Corps' front
conformed to the line of Cedar Creek; Getty's division being retired,
and consequently much nearer than the others to Middletown.  My
brigade was the left of the Sixth, and its left rested on Meadow
Brook.  Merritt's cavalry was in close proximity to Getty's right.
Custer was about one and a half miles to Merritt's right, on the
Back road beyond a range of hills and near the foot of Little North
Mountain.  The whole course of the Back road is through a rough
country not adapted to cavalry operations.  Powell's cavalry division
was near Front Royal.  Army headquarters were at the Belle Grove
House on the heights west of the pike, immediately in rear of the
right of the Nineteenth Corps.  Wright's headquarters were a short
distance to the rear of Sheridan's.

The supply and baggage trains of our army were about one mile behind
its right centre and about the same distance from Middletown, a
village twelve miles south of Winchester, and about two miles north
of the Cedar Creek bridge.  Getty and Merritt's camps were, in
general, westward of Middletown.  The front of our army covered
about two miles; Custer's and Thoburn's divisions, on the right
and left, being outside of this limit.

The Union Army was not intrenched, save a portion of the Nineteenth
and Eighth Corps.  Owing to reports that Early had withdrawn
southward, Wright ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps to
start at daylight of the 19th to make a strong reconnoissance.
The Union troops, except only the usual guards and pickets, quietly
slept in their tents the night of the 18th of October.

The Confederate Army was encamped on Fisher's Hill, two miles south
of Strasburg and about six miles from the centre of the Union Army,
measured by the pike.  Three Top Mountain was east and south of a
bend of the Shenandoah; its north end abutting close up to the
river.  General J. B. Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, from the
Confederate signal station of Three Top, on the 18th, with field-
glasses, marked the location of all the Union camps, and on their
report Early decided to attack the next morning.( 3)  Accordingly,
Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram's divisions and Payne's cavalry brigade
were moved in the night across the river, thence along the foot of
Three Top Mountain, and along its north end eastward to and again
across the river at Bowman and McIntorf's Fords below the mouth of
Cedar Creek, and thence, by 4 A.M., to a position east of the main
camp of Crook's corps.  These divisions were under Gordon.  Kershaw
and Wharton's divisions marched by the pike to the north of Strasburg,
and there separated; the former moving to the eastward, accompanied
by Early.  Kershaw crossed Cedar Creek at Robert's Ford, about one
and a half miles above its mouth, which brought him in front of
Thoburn of Crook's corps.  Wharton, followed by all of Early's
artillery, continued on the pike and took position in advance of
Hupp's Hill, less than a mile south of the bridge over Cedar Creek.
He had orders to push across the bridge as soon as Gordon made an
attack on the Union left and rear, and thus bring the artillery
into action.  Lomax's cavalry division, theretofore posted in Luray
Valley, was ordered to elude Powell's cavalry, join the right of
Gordon, and co-operate with him in the attack.  Rosser's cavalry
divisions were pushed up the night of the 18th close in front of
Custer, with orders to attack simultaneously with Gordon.  The
enemy did not know Sheridan was absent from his army, and Payne's
cavalry, which accompanied Gordon, was ordered to penetrate to the
Belle Grove House and make him a prisoner.( 4)

Wright was in command of the army for all military operations, but
otherwise it was commanded in Sheridan's name, during his absence,
by his staff.  Few of the army knew Sheridan was away when the
battle opened.

At 4 A.M. the still sleeping Union Army was aroused by sharp firing
far off on its right.  Rosser had attacked Custer; but though there
was some surprise, Custer held his ground.  This was the initial
attack, but almost at the moment Rosser's guns were heard came an
assault on Thoburn by Kershaw, followed at once by Gordon with his
three divisions and Payne's cavalry on Hayes' division of Crook's
corps.  Besides being surprised Crook's divisions were largely
outnumbered, and, consequently, after a short and desperate
resistance, both divisions were broken and somewhat dispersed.
Thoburn was killed.  The officers heroically did all in their power
to rally the men, but some were captured, and seventeen pieces of
artillery lost.  Early soon joined Gordon with Kershaw, and together
they fell on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, which was at the
same time assailed in front by Wharton with all Early's artillery.
The Nineteenth shared the fate of Crook's corps, and was soon broken
and flying to the rear.  This brought Early's five infantry divisions
and his artillery together on the heights near the Belle Grove
House, from whence they could operate against the Sixth Corps.
Sheridan's headquarters were captured, his staff being forced to
fly with such official papers as they could collect.  Crook and
Emory's commands were routed before it was fully day-dawn.  The
position of our cavalry was such that it could render no immediate
aid against the main attack.  Gordon prolonged his line towards
Middletown, facing generally to the westward, and was joined on
his right by some irregular cavalry, part of which appeared north
of Middletown.  These forces threatened our ammunition and other
trains.  A thick fog helped to conceal the enemy's movements.  The
disaster sustained must not be attributed to a want of skill and
bravery on the part of the troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth.
Crook, aided by such gallant officers as Colonels Thoburn, Thomas
M. Harris, and Milton Wells of the First, and Colonels R. B. Hayes,
H. F. Devol, James M. Comly, and B. F. Coates of his Second Division,
and Emory, assisted by Generals McMillen and Dwight and Colonels
Davis and Thomas of his First, and Generals Grover and Birge and
Colonels Porter, Molineux, Dan. McCauley, and Shunk of his Second
Division, did all possible under the circumstances to avert calamity.
No braver or more skillful officers could be found.  These corps
were victims of a surprise.  Their position was badly chosen, and
not well protected by pickets and guards.  There is no necessity
to defend the good name of the officers and men who were so
ingloriously routed.  The battle, so successful thus far for Early,
was, however, not over, nor was he to have continued good fortune.
Wright had retained the active command of the Sixth Corps, though
by virtue of seniority he was in command of the army.  He, as soon
as the attack was made, turned his corps over to Ricketts, who
turned the command of his division (Third) over to me, and I turned
my brigade over to Colonel Wm. H. Ball of the 122d Ohio.  My division
was the next to be struck by Early's troops.  It had time, however,
to break camp, form, and face about to the eastward.  Before it
was fairly daylight, my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, had crossed
Meadow Brook by my order and was advancing up the heights near the
Belle Grove House.  Ball's brigade was run through by the broken
troops of the Nineteenth, and it was feared for a time it could
not be held steady.  The enemy swung across the Valley pike to my
left and rear, and thus completely isolated my division from other
Union troops.  Notwithstanding this situation the division firmly
held its exposed position.  To cover a wider front the brigades
were fought and manoeuvred separately in single battle line, and
often faced in different directions.  I soon found I was able to
drive or hold back any enemy in front of any part of my command.
The fighting became general and furious and promised an early
success to our arms.  Wheaton, next on my right, and Getty next on
his right as camped, likewise faced about and moved eastward towards
the pike to meet the enemy already in possession of it immediately
south of Middletown.  Getty encountered some of Gordon's infantry
and cavalry among our trains.  Getty and Wheaton were soon widely
separated from each other, and Wheaton, the nearest, was still not
within a half mile of my division, which was the farthest south.
The broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps had retreated
as far as Middletown, and some soon reached Newtown, pressing onward
towards Winchester, carrying exaggerated reports of disaster to
the whole army.  Custer's cavalry was still held in Cedar Creek
Valley by Rosser.  Merritt came gallantly to the rescue, and by 7
A.M. the enemy were confronted at every point and held at bay.
Getty met a strong force along Meadow Brook, near Middletown, but
maintained himself, though his right flank was assailed by one of
Gordon's divisions.  Wheaton fought his division in the interval
between Getty's and my divisions, he having frequently to change
front, as had the other divisions, to meet flanking columns of the
enemy.  The complete isolation of the divisions of the Sixth Corps
rendered it impossible for their commanders to know the real
situation throughout the field, and neither of them had any assurance
of co-operation or assistance from the others.  My division, being
the farthest south, was in great danger of being cut off.  Each
division maintained, from 6 A.M. until after 9 A.M., a battle of
its own.  Neither division was, during that time, driven from its
position by any direct attack made on it, and every change of
position by any considerable part of the Sixth Corps was deliberately
made under orders and while not pressed by the enemy in front.
Wright was with Getty or Wheaton until assured of their ability to
cover the trains and to hold their ground.  Ricketts, in command
of the corps, after directing me to hold my position near Cedar
Creek until further orders, left me, promising soon to return with
assistance, but about 7 A.M. he fell pierced through the chest with
a rifle ball, and was borne from the field.( 5)  The command of
the corps then devolved on Getty, and the command of his division
of General L. A. Grant of Vermont.

About 8 A.M. Wright came to me with information of Getty and
Wheaton's success.  He said he would soon have cavalry on the
enemy's right flank, and that he believed the battle could be won.
He was tranquil, buoyant, and self-possessed.  He did not seem to
pay any attention to a wound under his chin, made by a passing
bullet, though he was bleeding profusely.  He had no staff officer
with him, and was without escort.( 6)  I ordered Captain Damon of
my staff to report to him.  Wright repeated Ricketts' order to hold
my division behind Meadow Brook well down to Cedar Creek.  This I
had been enabled to do when not threatened on my left flank.  It
must be remembered that after 6 A.M. the divisions of the corps
having been faced about, and the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps driven
to the rear, Getty's division became the left, Wheaton's the centre,
and my division the right of the army, the whole line facing, in
general, eastward.  In this position, isolated as before stated,
the divisions maintained the battle.  My greatest anxiety arose of
the possibility of the ammunition of the men becoming exhausted.
One officer conducted to us through the fog, smoke, and confusion
a considerable supply of cartridges in boxes strapped on mules.
Colonel Ball sent Captain R. W. Wiley of his staff to hasten forward
another such mule-caravan.  Owing to a change in the location of
the brigade, he conducted it within the Confederate lines.  Captain
Wiley was the only officer of my division captured in the day's
battle.

Getty, who had successfully fought with his division near Middletown,
took up a position before 10 A.M. with the left of his division
resting on the turnpike north of the town about three fourths of
a mile.

My division was fiercely engaged all the morning.  Colonel Tompkins,
Chief of Artillery of the Sixth Corps, assembled a number of guns
on the plateau to my left under Captains McKnight and Adams.  They
were unsupported by infantry.  The enemy approached under cover of
the smoke and fog and captured most of them.  Under my direction,
Colonel W. H. Henry and Captain C. K. Prentiss with the 10th Vermont
and 6th Maryland changed front and retook them after a fierce
struggle.  The guns not disabled were drawn off by hand.  My position
was in open ground along the crest of a ridge, right resting near
Cedar Creek, covering Marsh Run (or Meadow Brook).  The enemy forced
a crossing of the Run near its mouth, but soon were driven back;
then a fierce attack came on my left from a large force.  This too
was repulsed.  The battle raged with alternate assaults on the
front and flanks of my division.  They were each repulsed with
considerable loss to the enemy.  The situation grew so promising
that about 9 A.M. I ordered a general charge along the whole line.
This was promptly made, and the enemy were driven to the east of
Marsh Run, and complete success seemed assured, when a large force
of the enemy again appeared on my left in the direction of Middletown.
The charge had to be suspended and combinations made to meet the
new danger.  The battle still raged with great fury, my line being
frequently compelled to change front to meet the flank attacks.
Sometimes a portion of it faced northward, another eastward, and
another southward.  The enemy was at no time able to drive us.
All changes of position were made under my orders and after the
enemy had been repulsed in his direct attacks.  The importance of
uniting the divisions of the Sixth Corps was kept in mind, and as
the enemy was driven back on my left, my command slowly moved
northward towards Getty and Wheaton's battles.  My battle had been
maintained, in general, a mile and more southwestward of Middletown
and in the vicinity of our camps of the night before.  Getty and
Wheaton had thus far fought their divisions near Marsh Run to the
south of Middletown.  Before 10 A.M., I reached the Woollen Mill
road that ran parallel to the general line my troops were then
holding and almost at right angles to the turnpike, westward to
Cedar Creek from the south end of Middletown.  At this time the
enemy was in my front, and our flanks were no longer threatened.
He had suspended further attacks with his infantry, but concentrated
on us a heavy artillery fire which our guns returned.  We had lost
few prisoners; even the wounded of the division had been brought
off.  The men were in compact order and no demoralization had taken
place.  The captured and missing from the division the entire day
was two officers and thirty-four men.( 7)  From this last position
I leisurely moved the division to the left and rear over the Old
Forge road (which extended west from the Valley pike at the north
end of Middletown over Middle Marsh Brook and a ridge to the Creek),
passing Wheaton's front, and united with Getty's right.  Emerson's
brigade of the division through a mistake temporarily moved a short
distance north of the line designated, but the error was promptly
corrected.  Colonel Ball was then, by me, directed to cover the
front of the entire division with a heavy line of skirmishers, and
he accordingly deployed the 110th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania under
Lieutenant-Colonel Otho H. Binkley, and moved them about three
hundred yards to the front along the outskirts of a woods, with
orders to hold the enemy in check as long as possible if attacked.
Orders were at once given to resupply the troops with ammunition.
Wheaton's division soon formed on my right, and for the first time
after the battle opened the Sixth Corps was united.

The enemy was now in possession of the camps (except of the cavalry)
of our army, and was flushed with success.  Wright had given orders
for all the broken troops to be re-organized, and for Merritt and
Custer's cavalry to move from the right to the left of the army,( 8)
and the division commanders were told the enemy would be attacked
about 12 M.

We left Sheridan at Winchester.  He remained there the night of
the 18th of October.  Before rising in the morning an officer on
picket duty in front of the city reported artillery firing in the
direction of his army.  Sheridan interpreted this as a strong
reconnoissance in which the enemy was being felt.  He had been
notified the night before that Wright had ordered such a reconnoissance.
Further reports of heavy firing having reached him, he, at 8.30
A.M. started to join his army.  When he reached Mill Creek just
south of Winchester, with his escort following, he distinctly heard
the continuous roar of artillery, which satisfied him his army was
engaged in strong battle.  As he approached Kearnstown and came
upon a high place in the road, he caught sight of some demoralized
soldiers, camp followers, and baggage and sutler wagons, in great
confusion, hurrying to the rear.  There were in this mixed mass
sutlers and their clerks, teamsters, bummers, cow-leaders, servants,
and all manner of camp followers.  The sight greatly disturbed
Sheridan; it was almost appalling to him.  Such a scene in greater
or less degree may usually be witnessed in the rear of any great
army in battle.  The common false reports of the army being all
overwhelmed and in retreat were proclaimed by these flying men as
justification of their own disgraceful conduct.  Sheridan,
notwithstanding his experience as a soldier, was impressed with
the belief that his whole army was defeated and in retreat.( 9)
He formed, while riding through these people, erroneous impressions
of what had taken place in the morning battle which were never
removed from his mind.  The steady roar of guns and rattle of
musketry should have told him that some organized forces were, at
least, baring their breasts bravely to the enemy and standing as
food for shot and shell.  Sheridan mistook the disorganized horde
he passed through for substantial portions of a wholly routed army,
and this mistake prevented him, even later, from clearly understanding
the real situation.

He first met Torbert, his Chief of Cavalry, and from him only
learned what had taken place to the left of and around Middletown.
Torbert, who had not been to the right, where the battle with
infantry had raged for hours, assumed that demoralization extended
over that part of the field.  Next Sheridan came to Getty's division
(10.30 A.M.),(10) and finding it and its brave commander in unbroken
line, facing the foe, assumed without further investigation that
no other infantry troops were doing likewise.  He justly gives
Getty's division and the cavalry credit for being "in the presence
of and resisting the enemy."(11)  Getty, though theretofore in
command of the Sixth Corps, did not pretend to know the position
or the previous movements of the army.  He had remained constantly
with his division, and wisely held the turnpike, covering our left
flank and trains.  This, too, was according to Wright's order.
When Sheridan arrived Getty was not actually engaged, but the enemy
were, at long range, firing artillery.  A shot passed close to
Sheridan as he approached Getty.  After the first salutation,
Sheridan said to Getty:  "Emory's corps is four miles to your rear,
and Wheaton's division of your corps is two miles in your rear.
I will form them on your division."  Sheridan then said nothing of
Crook's corps, or of the Third Division of the Sixth, which I
commanded.(12)

Up to this time Sheridan had not met Wright, who was on the right
of the army, nor could Sheridan see from the pike the troops of my
division nor of Wheaton's, still to my right.  My division was at
no time as far to the rear as the left of Getty's line.  Wright
confirms my recollection of the position of my division at the time
of Sheridan's arrival, but his recollection is that Wheaton had
not completed a connection with my right.(13)

Colonel Ball, in his report dated the day after the battle, speaking
of the final movement of the Second Brigade of my division to
connect with Getty's division, correctly says:  "We were ordered
to move obliquely to the _left and rear_ and connect with the right
of the Second Division."  Instead of having to _advance_ to form
line with Getty it was necessary to move obliquely to the _rear_.
By about 10 A.M., the divisions of the Sixth Corps were united,
the organized troops of our army were in line, and the enemy's
flank movements were over.  Thenceforth he had to meet us in front.
Our trains were protected, and there was no thought of further
retiring.  The Sixth Corps had not lost any of its camp equipage,
not a wagon, nor, permanently, a piece of artillery.  Its organization
was perfect, and there were no stragglers from its ranks.  A strong
line of skirmishers had been thrown forward and the men resupplied
with ammunition.

An incident here occurred which came near causing my dismissal from
the army.  Colonel J. W. Snyder, of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery,
on being ordered to hold his command ready for an early advance,
notified me his men were practically out of ammunition, and that
the ordnance officer reported there were no cartridges to be had
of suitable size.  This was the only regiment in the command armed
with smooth-bore .69 calibre muskets.  They required buck and ball.
The other troops were armed with rifles, .58 calibre.  I ordered
the Colonel to instruct his men to throw away their muskets as fast
as rifles could be found on the field to take their places.  This
his men eagerly did, and Colonel Snyder soon reported his regiment
ready for action, with rifles in their hands and forty rounds of
cartridges.  This regiment, a very large and splendid one (three
battalions, four companies each), was thus kept in line to participate
in the impending conflict.  After the incident had been almost
forgotten a letter came through the army channels from the Chief
of Ordnance at Washington, advising me that the captains of companies
of the 9th New York had reported, severally, that their men had
thrown away their muskets "October 19, 1864, by order of Colonel
Keifer, division commander," and asking me for an explanation of
the reprehensible order.  I plead guilty and stated the circumstances
giving rise to the unusual order, but soon received a further
communication from the same officer informing me that my name had
been sent to the President, through the Secretary of War, for
dismissal.  I was told some correspondence arose over the matter,
in which Generals Sheridan and Wright approved my action fully.
This incident serves now to enable me to remember that Wright
proposed to attack Early at 12 M.

Two or three statements of Sheridan deserve special mention.
Speaking of his appearance on the field, he says:

"When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown, I saw about
three fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which
proved to be Ricketts and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps."

And speaking of a time after he had met Getty and Wright, he says:

"I ordered Custer's division back to the right flank, and returning
to the place where my headquarters had been established, I met near
them Ricketts' division under General Keifer and General Frank
Wheaton's division, both marching to the front."(14)

The distance from Newtown to Middletown is five miles.  My division
was at no time on that day within four miles of Newtown.  This is
also true, I am sure, of Wheaton's division.  Sheridan was deceived
by false reports received before his arrival, and by the sight of
magnified numbers of broken troops of other corps, who had continued
to the rear.  It was impossible for Sheridan to have met Wheaton
and myself leading our divisions to the front; besides, our divisions
were not at any time within a mile of his then headquarters.
Wheaton's and the right of my division were farther advanced than
any part of Getty's division.  This is proved by the recollection
of Wright, Getty, and others, also by the reports written soon
after the battle by many officers.(15)  Sheridan, when he wrote,
must have remembered meeting Wheaton and myself when we, together,
rode to him from the right to tell him of the position and situation
of our respective commands, and to assure him we could hold our
ground and advance as soon as ordered.  This ride brought Wheaton
and me nearer Newtown than we were at any other time that day.
Sheridan was so impressed by the circumstances attending his coming
to the field, and by his first meeting with Torbert and Getty, and
the previous reports to him, that he assumed a condition of things
which did not exist.  It has been stated that my division joined
Getty on his right.  It, however, turned out that a portion of
Hayes' division of Crook's corps had united with Getty's right,
though not at first distinguished by me from the latter's troops.

Years after the battle, ex-President Hayes referred to some statements
in Sheridan's _Memoirs_ thus:

"In speaking of that fight he says that, passing up the pike,
sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other, coming to Cedar
Creek, he struck the First Division of Getty, of the Sixth Corps;
that he passed along that division a short distance, when there
arose out of a hollow before him a line consisting entirely of
officers of Crook's Army of West Virginia and of color-bearers.
The army had been stampeded in the morning, but these people were
not panic-stricken.  They saluted him, but there was nothing now
between the enemy and him and the fugitives but this division of
Getty's.  Said he:  'These officers seemed to rise right up from
the ground.'  This was twenty-four years afterward, but he recollects
it perfectly well except names.  Among them, however, he recollects
seeing one, Colonel R. B. Hayes, since President of the United
States, and drops the story there, leaving the impression that
there were no men there--no privates, no army--simply some color-
bearers and some officers.

"The fact is that in the hollow, just in the rear, was a line of
men, a thousand or twelve hundred, probably, and they had thrown
up a little barricade and were lying close behind it.  He came up
and saw these officers and did not see the men, or seems not to
have seen them; but I had no idea at the time that he did not see
the private soldiers in that line.  He now tells that singular
story of a line of officers, a line of color-bearers, and no force.
The fact is that first came Getty's division, and then mine, and
then came General Keifer's division, all lying down behind that
barricade, but in good condition, except that there had been some
losses in the morning.  General Keifer was next to me, and then
came the rest of the Sixth Corps, and farther down I have no doubt
the Nineteenth Corps was in line.  We had then been, I suppose, an
hour or an hour and a half in that position."(16)

Passing from disputed, though important, points relating to the
battle, all agree that when Sheridan reached his army a battle had
been fought and lost to all appearance, and that the Union Army
had been forced to retire to a new position.  It should also be
regarded beyond controversy that the Sixth Corps had been united
before his arrival, that broken troops of other commands were being
formed on the Sixth, and that the enemy also had been forced to
change front, and was arrested in his advance.

Sheridan's presence went far towards giving confidence to his army,
and to inspire the men with a spirit of success.  While the army
loved Wright, and believed in him, his temperament was not such as
to cause him to work an army up to a high state of enthusiasm.  A
deep chagrin over the morning's disaster pervaded our army, and
had much to do with the subsequent efforts to win a victory.
Sheridan showed himself to the troops by riding along the front,
and he was loudly cheered.  He assured them of success before the
day ended.  During the lull in the day's battle some of the broken
troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were reorganized.

Wright resumed command of his corps and Getty his division.  Before
Sheridan came Wright had instructed his division commanders that
he would assume the offensive, and it was understood our army would
advance about 12 M., as soon as an ample resupply of ammunition
could be issued.  Sheridan, however, postponed the time for assuming
the offensive until 3 P.M.  Early, still filled with high hopes of
complete victory, about 1 P.M. pushed forward on our entire front.
He did not drive in the strong line of skirmishers, and the attack
was easily repulsed.  It seemed to me then, as it did to Wright
and others, that our whole army should have been thrown against
the enemy on this repulse, and thus decided the day.  Sheridan,
however, adhered to his purpose to act on the defensive until later
in the day.  A false report that a Confederate column was moving
towards Winchester on the Front Royal road caused Sheridan to delay
his attack until about 4 P.M.

Early promptly realized that the conditions had changed, that the
armies must meet face to face.  It will be kept in mind that our
army was now fronting southward instead of eastward, and Early's
army was forced to face northward instead of westward, as in the
morning's battle.

Early, hoping to hold the ground already won and thus reap some of
the fruits of victory, retired, on his repulse, beyond the range
of our guns, and took up a strong position, with his infantry and
artillery, mainly on a natural amphitheatre of hills, centre a
little retired, extending from a point north of Cedar Creek near
Middle Marsh Brook on his left to and across the turnpike near
Middletown, protecting his flanks west of this brook and east of
the town with his cavalry and horse artillery.  Early employed his
men busily for the succeeding two hours in throwing up lunettes or
redans to cover his field guns.  His men were skillfully posted
behind stone fences, common in the Valley, and on portions of his
line behind temporary breastworks.

Early, before 12 P.M., wired Richmond he had won a complete victory,
and would drive the Union Army across the Potomac.  At 4 P.M. our
army went forward in single line, with no considerable reserves,
but in splendid style.  Getty, with his left still on the turnpike,
was the division of direction.  My orders were to hold my left on
Getty's right.  Wheaton was to keep connection with my right, and
the Nineteenth Corps with the right of the Sixth Corps; and the
cavalry, Merritt east of Middletown and Custer on Cedar Creek, to
cover the flanks.  In verifying my position just before starting,
I found troops of Hayes' command filling a space of two or three
hundred yards between Getty's right and my left.  I discovered
Hayes temporarily resting on the ground a short distance in rear
of his men, with his staff around him.  From him I learned he had
no orders to advance, whereupon I requested him to withdraw his
men so I could close the interval before the movement commenced.
He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said:  "If this army goes
forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders."  Unfortunately,
orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth)
form in reserve near the turnpike.  His withdrawal left, at the
last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my
division to the left as it was moving forward.  This produced some
unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued
the movement too long, causing some massing of troops in the centre
of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under
a severe infantry and artillery fire.  This necessary movement also
caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby
imperilling my right.  Our attack, however, was not checked until
we had gone forward about one mile.  The enemy's centre was driven
back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned.
This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery
and infantry from front and flanks.  My right flank was especially
exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the
right.

The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to
hold the exposed troops to the charge.  They had not fired as they
advanced.  The division retired a short distance, where it was
halted and promptly faced about.  In less than five minutes it was
again charging the Confederate left centre.  The right of Getty's
division and Wheaton's left went forward with the second charge,
and an advance position in close rifle range of the enemy was gained
and held.  My division was partly protected by a stone fence located
on the north of an open field, while the Confederates held the
farther side of the field, about three hundred yards distant, and
were also protected by a stone fence as well as by some temporary
breastworks.  The enemy occupied the higher ground, and the field
was lower in the centre than on either side.  The battle here was
obstinate and, for a time, promised to extend into the night.
Early's artillery in my front did little execution, as it was
located on the crest of the hills behind his infantry line, and
the gunners, when they undertook to work their guns, were exposed
to our infantry fire.  Wheaton's division and that part of the
Nineteenth Corps to his right, though not keeping pace with the
centre, steadily gained ground; likewise the cavalry.  Getty, though
under orders to hold his left on the pike, moved his division
forward slowly, making a left half wheel.  In this movement Getty's
left reached Middletown, and his right swung somewhat past it on
the west.

Merritt's cavalry pushed around east of Middletown.  At this
juncture, Kershaw's division and part of Gordon's division were in
front of my right and part of Ramseur's in front of my left.
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions were in front of Getty, Wharton
being, in part, east of the pike confronting our cavalry.  Early's
left was held by Gordon's troops, including some of his cavalry.(17)
Early now made heroic efforts to hold his position, hoping at night
he could withdraw with some of the fruits of victory.  Sheridan
made every possible exertion to dislodge the enemy, and to accomplish
this he was much engaged, personally, on the flanks with the cavalry.
Wright, calm, confident, and unperturbed, gave close attention to
his corps, and was constantly exposed.  I frequently met him at
this crisis.  He ordered a further charge upon the enemy's centre.
This seemed impossible with the tired troops.  Preparation was,
however, made to attempt it.  The firing in this last position had
continued for about an hour, during which both sides had suffered
heavily.  As the sun was going down behind the mountains that
autumnal evening it became apparent something decisive must take
place or night would end the day of blood leaving the enemy in
possession of the principal part of the battle-field.

So confident was Early of final victory that, earlier, in the day,
he ordered up his headquarters and supply trains, and by 4 P.M.
they commenced to arrive on the field.

It must be remembered that the two armies had been manoeuvring and
fighting for twelve hours, with little food or rest and an insufficient
supply of water.  Exhausted troops may be held in line, especially
when under some cover, but it is difficult to move then in a charge
with the spirit essential to success.  There remained a considerable
interval between Wheaton's left and my right.  An illustrative
incident again occurred here in resupplying our men with ammunition.
Three mules loaded with boxes filled with cartridges were conducted
by an ordnance sergeant through the interval on my right in open
view of both armies, and with indifferent leisure to and behind
the stone wall occupied by the Confederates.  The sergeant and his
party were not fired on.  Word was passed along the line for my
division to make a charge on a given signal, and all subordinate
officers were instructed to use the utmost exertion to make it a
success.  The incident of the sergeant and his party going into
the enemy's line served to suggest to me the possibility of
penetrating it with a small body of our soldiers.

Before giving an order to charge, I instructed Colonel Emerson,
commanding the First Brigade, to hastily form, under a competent
staff officer, a small body of men, and direct them to advance
rapidly along the west of a stone wall extending traversely from
my right to the enemy's position, and to penetrate through a gap
between two of the enemy's brigades, with instructions to open an
enfilading fire on him as soon as his flank was reached.  The gap
was between two of Gordon's brigades.  The order was promptly and
handsomely executed, and its execution produced the desired effect.
Captain H. W. Day (151st New York, Acting Brigade Inspector) was
charged with the execution of this order.(18)

The party consisted of about 125 men, each of whom knew that if
unsuccessful death or capture must follow.  Colonel Moses H. Granger
(122d Ohio) voluntarily aided, and, in some sense, directed the
movement of this small party.  The gap was penetrated on the run
and a fire opened on the exposed flanks of the Confederates which
started them from the cover of their works and the stone wall.  At
this juncture the division, as ordered, poured a destructive fire
upon the now exposed Confederates, and at once charging across the
field, drove the enemy in utter rout.  A panic seized Gordon's
troops, who were the first struck, then spread to Kershaw's and
Ramseur's divisions, successively on Gordon's right.(19)

I quote from the report of Colonel Emerson, commanding my First
Brigade, in which he describes the final battle, including the
breaking of Early's line:

"The brigade lay here under a fire of shell until about 4 P.M.,
when Captain Smith came with an order to move forward connecting
on the left with the Second Brigade.  The brigade moved through
the woods, when it received a very heavy fire on the right flank,
under which it was broken, but soon reformed in its old position,
and again moved forward to a stone fence, the enemy being behind
another stone wall in front with a clear field intervening.  There
was a stone wall running from the right flank of the brigade to
the wall behind which the enemy lay.  Some of my men lay scattered
along this last named wall.  The First Division lay to the right
and in advance, nearly parallel with the enemy.  Everything appeared
to be at a deadlock, with heavy firing of artillery and musketry.
At this stage Colonel Keifer, commanding division, came to me and
inquired what men were those lying along the wall running from our
line to the enemy's, and ordered me to send them forward to flank
the enemy and drive them from their position.  The execution of
the order was entrusted to Captain H. W. Day, Inspector of the
[Second] Brigade, who proceeded along the wall, and getting on the
enemy's flank dislodged them, when the brigade was moved rapidly
forward, in connection with the Second Brigade, and did not stop
until we arrived in the works of the Nineteenth Corps, when, in
accordance with orders from Colonel Keifer, the brigade went into
its position of the morning, got its _breakfast_, and encamped,
satisfied that it had done a good day's work before breakfast."(20)

Also from a report of Colonel Ball, commanding Second Brigade:

"About 3 P.M. the whole army advanced in one line upon the enemy.
Immediately before advancing the troops were withdrawn to the left,
and my left connected with the Second Division, Sixth Army Corps,
while my right connected with the First Brigade, Third Division.
We advanced half a mile to the edge of the woods, when we were met
by a well-directed fire from the right flank.  This fire was returned
with spirit some fifteen minutes, when the troops wavered and fell
back a short distance in some disorder.  The Second and Third
Divisions gave way at the same time.  The line was speedily reformed
and moved forward and became engaged with the enemy again, each
force occupying a stone wall.  Advantage was taken of a wall or
fence running perpendicular to and connecting with that occupied
by the enemy.  After the action had continued here about three
quarters of an hour a heavy volley was fired at the enemy from the
transverse wall.  A hurried and general retreat of the enemy
immediately followed, and our troops eagerly followed, firing upon
the retreating army as it ran, and giving no opportunity to the
enemy to reform or make a stand.

"Several efforts were made by the enemy during the pursuit to rally,
but the enthusiastic pursuit foiled all such efforts.  Our troops
were subject to artillery fire of solid shot, shell, and grape
during the pursuit, and we reached the intrenchments of the Nineteenth
Army Corps (which were captured in the morning) as the sun set.
Here the pursuit by the infantry was discontinued.  The first and
second, and probably the third colors planted on the recovered
works of the Nineteenth Army Corps were of regiments composing this
brigade."(21)

General Early tells the effect on his army of penetrating his line
by the small body of our troops:

"A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of
the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right,
but they were invariably repulsed.  Late in the afternoon, the
enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon's
lines, and the attack on Ramseur and Kershaw's front was handsomely
repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours,
but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was
between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the
line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon
followed.  General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his
men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail.  The
information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly
along Kershaw and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the
apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder,
though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first
intimation of Gordon's condition.  At the same time the enemy's
cavalry, observing the disorder on our ranks, made another charge
on our right, but was again repulsed.  Every effort was made to
stop and rally Kershaw and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them
resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without
waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disaster."(22)

The charge of the division resulted in the total overthrow of
Early's army.  Pegram and Wharton's divisions on our extreme left
near Middletown were soon involved in the disaster, and our whole
army went forward, meeting little resistance, taking many prisoners
and guns, only halting when Early's forces were either destroyed,
captured, or driven in the wildest disorder beyond Cedar Creek.(23)
Our cavalry under Merritt and Custer pursued until late in the
night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg, and made many captures.

It often has been claimed that the cavalry on the right is entitled
to the credit of overthrowing Early's army.  It is true Custer did
make some attempts on Gordon's left and rear, but the appearance
of Rosser's cavalry on Custer's right, north and east of Cedar
Creek, called him off, and it was not until after Early's position
had been penetrated and a general retreat had commenced that Custer
again appeared on the enemy's flank and rear.  His presence there
had much to do with the wild retreat of Early's men.  Custer, who
claimed much for his cavalry, and insisted that it captured forty-
five pieces of artillery, etc., did not in his report of the battle
pretend that his division caused the final break in Early's forces.
Speaking of his last charge on the left, Custer says:

"Seeing so large a force of cavalry bearing rapidly down upon an
unprotected flank and their line of retreat in danger of being
intercepted, the lines of the enemy, already broken, now gave way
in the utmost confusion."(24)

Part of Early's artillery and caissons, with ammunition and supply
trains, also ambulances and many battle flags, were captured north
of Cedar Creek.  The cavalry, however, seized, south of the Creek,
other substantial fruits of the great victory, including many guns
and headquarters baggage and other trains, and some prisoners.  A
panic seized teamsters on the turnpike; they cut out mules or horses
to escape upon, leaving the teams to mingle in the greatest disorder.
Drivers of ambulances filled with dead and wounded also fled, and
the animals ran with them unguided over the field.  The scene was
of the wildest ruin.  The gloom of night soon fell over the field
to add to its appalling character.

The guns lost by the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were taken in the
morning to the public square of Strasburg and triumphantly parked
on exhibition.  Our cavalry found them there at night.  Little that
makes up an army was left to Early; the disaster reached every part
of his army save, possibly, his cavalry which operated on the remote
flanks.  In a large sense, Rosser's cavalry, throughout the day,
had been neutralized by a portion of Custer's, and Lomax had been
held back by Powell on the Front Royal road.  Dismay indescribable
extended to the Confederate officers as well as the private soldiers.
Among the former were some of the best and bravest the South
produced.  Early himself possessed the confidence of General Lee.
Early had, as division commanders, General John B. Gordon (since
in the United States Senate), Joseph B. Kershaw, Stephen D. Ramseur,
John Pegram, and Gabriel C. Wharton, all of whom had won distinction.
Ramseur fell mortally wounded in attempting a last stand near the
Belle Grove House, and died there.  Early fled from the field,
surrounded by a few faithful followers, deeply chagrined and
dejected, and filled with unjust censure of his own troops.(25)
The next day found him still without an organized army.(26)  He
seems to have deserved a better fate.  His star of military glory
had set.  It never rose again.  A few months later he reached
Richmond with a single attendant, having barely escaped capture
shortly before by a detachment of Sheridan's cavalry.  He finally
returned to Southwest Virginia, where Lee relieved him of all
command, March 30, 1865.

His misfortunes in the Valley, doubtless, had much to do with his
continued implacable hatred to the Union.  Sheridan was his nemesis.
Just after Kirby Smith had surrendered in 1865 and Sheridan was on
his way to the Rio Grande, the latter encountered Early escaping
across the Mississippi in a small boat, with his horses swimming
beside it.  He got away, but his horses were captured.(27)

Sheridan, for his great skill and gallantry, justly won the plaudits
of his country, and his fame as a soldier will be immortal, but
not alone on account of his victory at Cedar Creek, nor on account
of "Sheridan's Ride," as described by the poet Read.(28)

My division, at dark, resumed its camp of the night before, as did
other divisions of the army.

When the fifteen hours of carnage had ceased, and the sun had gone
down, spreading the gloom of a chilly October night over the wide
extended field, there remained a scene more horrid than usual.
The dead and dying of the two armies were commingled.  Many of the
wounded had dragged themselves to the streams in search of the
first want of a wounded man--_water_.  Many mangled and loosed
horses were straggling over the field to add to the confusion.
Wagons, gun-carriages, and caissons were strewn in disorder in the
rear of the last stand of the Confederate Army.  Abandoned ambulances,
sometimes filled with dead and dying Confederates, were to be seen
in large numbers, and loose teams dragged overturned vehicles over
the hills and through the ravines.  Dead and dying men were found
in the darkness almost everywhere.  Cries of agony from the suffering
victims were heard in all directions, and the moans of wounded
animals added much to the horrors of the night.

"_Mercy_ abandons the arena of battle," but when the conflict is
ended _mercy_ again asserts itself.  The disabled of both armies
were cared for alike.  Far into the night, with some all the long
night, the heroes in the day's strife ministered to friend and foe
alike, where but the night before our army had peacefully slumbered,
little dreaming of the death struggle of the coming day.  To an
efficient medical corps, however, belong the chief credit for the
good work done in caring for the unfortunate.

The loss in officers was unusually great.  Besides Colonel Thoburn,
killed in the opening of the battle, General D. D. Bidwell fell
early in the day, and Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., was killed
near its close while leading a charge of his cavalry brigade.
Eighty-six Union officers were killed or mortally wounded.

Many distinguished officers were wounded.  Of the six officers
belonging to my brigade staff who were turned over to Colonel Ball
in the early morning, one only (Captain J. T. Rorer) remained
uninjured at night.  Two were dead.

All was peaceful enough on the 20th, though on every hand the
evidence of the preceding day's struggle was to be seen.  The dead
of both armies were buried--the blue and the gray in separate
trenches, to await the resurrection morn.

I have no purpose to speak of individual acts of bravery.  The
number of killed and wounded of each army was about the same.  The
casualties in my division, excluding 36 captured or missing, were,
killed, 8 officers and 100 men; wounded, 34 officers and 528 men;
total, 670.  Wheaton lost, killed and wounded, 470; and Getty, 677.
The killed and wounded in the Sixth Corps were 1926, including 109
of its artillery.

Much credit for the victory was given by Sheridan to the cavalry.
Its total loss, in the three divisions under Torbert, was, killed,
2 officers and 27 men; wounded, 9 officers and 115 men; total, 153;
not one fourth the number killed and wounded in my infantry division
alone.  The killed and wounded in my old brigade, under Colonel
Ball, were 421.

The casualties of the Union Army are shown by the following official
table:(29)

                         Killed.    Wounded.   Captured or
                                               Missing.  Aggregate.
                        Officers.   Officers.  Officers.
                        |    Men.   |    Men.  |    Men.
Sixth Army Corps         23   275   103  1525    6   194  2126
Nineteenth Army Corps    19   238   109  1127   14   776  2383
Army of West Virginia     7    41    17   253   10   530   858
Provisional Division      1    11     6    66         18   102
Cavalry                   2    27     9   115         43   196
                        ---   ---   ---  ----  ---  ----  ----
  Grand total            52   529   244  3186   30  1561  5665

The table includes 156 of the artillery, killed or wounded.

The total Union killed and wounded was 4074.

The dead and wounded in the Sixth Corps, and in some other of the
infantry divisions approximated twenty per cent. of those engaged.
This was larger by six per cent. than similar losses in the French
army at Marengo, where Napoleon won a victory which enabled him,
later, to wear the iron crown of Charlemagne; by six per cent. than
at Austerlitz, the battle of the "Three Emperors"; by eight per
cent. than in Wellington's army at Waterloo, where Napoleon's star
of glory set; or in either the German or French army at Gravelotte,
or at Sedan, where Napoleon III. laid down his imperial crown; and
larger by about fifteen per cent. than the average like losses in
the Austrian and French armies at Hohenlinden.

  "Where drums beat at dead of night,
   Commanding the fires of death to light."

The number killed and wounded in this battle is far below that in
some other great battles of the Rebellion, yet the loss for the
Union Army alone was only a little below the aggregate like losses
in the American army from Lexington to Yorktown (1775-1781), and
approximately the same as in the American army in the Mexican War,
from Palo Alto to the City of Mexico (1846-1848).(30)

If either of two things had not occurred prior to the battle, the
result of it might have been different.  Had Early not precipitated
an attack with an infantry division and Rosser's cavalry on the
13th of October, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, would have gone to
Petersburg; and had the _fake_ (Longstreet) dispatch of the 16th
not been flagged from the Confederate signal station on Three Top
Mountain, Torbert, with the cavalry, would have been east of the
Blue Ridge on the intended raid.  But for the Longstreet dispatch,
Sheridan most likely would have tarried in Washington or delayed
his movements on his return trip.  Could the Sixth Corps, could
the cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle?

The principal peculiarities of the engagement were:  (1) That an
ably commanded army was surprised in its camp, and, in considerable
part, driven from it at the opening of the battle; (2) that
notwithstanding this, it won, at the close of the day, the most
signal and complete field-victory of the war, with the possible
exception of those won at Nashville and Sailor's Creek; (3) the
Confederate Army was destroyed, so there was no battle for the
morrow.  In most instances during the Rebellion, it transpired that
the defeated army sullenly retired only a short way in condition
to renew the fight.

Cedar Creek, in some respects, bears a striking analogy to Marengo.
Both were dual in character, each two battles in one day; the
victors of the morning being the defeated and routed of the evening.
Sheridan's victory over Early, like that of Napoleon over Marshal
Melas, left no further fighting for the victors the next day.  In
one other respect, also, the comparison holds good.  The commander
of each of the finally routed armies sent a message about the middle
of the day of battle announcing to his government a great victory,
to be followed at sunset with the news of a most signal disaster.

In other respects, how dissimilar?  Napoleon was, from the opening
to the close of Marengo, on the field, commanding in person, sharing
the defeat, then the victory.  Sheridan was absent and did not
participate in the discomfiture of his army, but was present at
the final success.  Napoleon, after his repulse, was reinforced by
Desaix with 6000 men; but the Army of the Shenandoah, after the
disaster of the morning, was reinforced only by its proper commander
--Sheridan.

There was not a great disparity of numbers in the opposing armies
at Cedar Creek.  Probably 20,000 men of all arms were engaged on
each side.  Relative position and situation of troops must be taken
into account, as well as numbers, in determining the strength of
one army over another.  Early has tried to excuse his defeat by
claiming he had the smaller army.  In response to this, Sheridan
and his Provost-Marshal, Crowninshield, have tried to show that
Early lost in captured more men than he claimed he had present for
duty.(31)  After Opequon and Fisher's Hill Early was reinforced by
Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, Cutshaw's three batteries,
and Rosser's division of cavalry with light artillery, together
with many smaller detachments, all of which participated in Cedar
Creek.  Sheridan received no reinforcements, and Edwards' brigade
of the First Division of the Sixth, Currie's of the Nineteenth,
and Curtis' of the Eighth Corps were each detached, after Opequon,
on other duties, and were not at Cedar Creek.  The surprise and
breaking up in the morning of the greater parts of Crook's and
Emory's corps eliminated them, in large part, from the day's battle,
and left the Sixth Corps and the cavalry to wage an unequal contest.

The war closed on the bloody battle-ground of the Shenandoah Valley,
so far as important operations were concerned, with Cedar Creek.

President Lincoln appointed me a Brigadier-General by brevet,
November 30, 1864; the commission recited the appointment was "for
gallant and meritorious services in the battles of Opequon, Fisher's
Hill, and Cedar Creek, Virginia," and I was assigned to duty by
him as Brigadier-General, December 29, 1864.

Sheridan's army returned to Kearnstown and went into winter quarters.
The Sixth Corps was, however, soon transferred by rail and steamboat,
_via_ Harper's Ferry and Washington, to City Point, rejoining the
Army of the Potomac, December 5, 1864.

( 1)  _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 64.

( 2)  _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), p. 574.

( 3)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 580, Captain Hotchkiss'
Journal.

( 4)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 580.

( 5)  General Ricketts was supposed to be mortally wounded.  His
wife a second time came to him on the battle-field.  He was taken
to Washington, his home, and slowly recovered.  He was able again
to perform some field service near the close of the war.  He died
of pneumonia, September 22, 1887, and is buried at Arlington.

( 6)  Major A. F. Hayden, of Wright's staff, while the battle was
raging in the early morning, was seen galloping towards me with
one hand raised to indicate he had some important order.  Just
before reaching me he was shot through the body and plunged off
his horse on the hard ground, rolling over and over until he lay
almost in a ball.  He was borne off in a blanket for dead.  In
February following I met him on a steamer on the Chesapeake returning
to duty, and I saw him again at the Centennial in Philadelphia in
1876.

( 7)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 132.

( 8)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 53.

( 9)  _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 68-82.

(10)  In one account Sheridan fixes his arrival at 9 A.M.  In his
_Memoirs_ at 10.30 A.M. (p. 86).  Getty, in his report of November,
1864, says, "Sheridan arrived at between 11 A.M. and 12 M."  I made
a note (still preserved), of the time Sheridan was seen by me riding
up to the rear of Getty's division.

(11)  _Memoirs_, p. 82.

(12)  These facts are as stated in a private letter from General
Getty to the writer, dated December 31, 1893.

(13)  Here is an extract from a letter of General Wright to me,
dated July 18, 1889:

"Orders had been given by me for the establishment of the lines,
and Getty's and your divisions (the Second and Third) were in
position, and Wheaton's (First) and the Nineteenth Corps were coming
into position when General Sheridan arrived upon the ground.  I
advised him of what had been done and what it was intended to do,
and he made no change in the dispositions I had made.  Indeed, as
I understand, he fully approved them. . . . General Sheridan did
later make some change in the disposition of the cavalry."

(14)  _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 82, 85.

(15)  Colonel Moses M. Granger, of the Second Brigade, Third
Division, says:  "It is plain that our brigade was in line on
Getty's right a considerable time before Sheridan's arrival."--
_Sketches War History_, vol. iii., p. 124.

(16)  This extract is from remarks of General Hayes made at a Loyal
Legion banquet in Cincinnati, May 6, 1889.  _Sketches War History_,
vol. iv., p. 23.

(17)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 581.

(18)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 228, 234, 251-2, 202.

(19)  _Ibid_., p. 562 (Early's Report).

(20)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 234.

(21)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 250-1.

(22)  _Battles and Leaders_, etc., vol. iv., p. 528.

(23)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 562-3, 580.

(24)  _Ibid_., p. 524.

(25)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 562-3.

(26)  Napoleon once remarked, "How much to be pitied is a general
the day after a lost battle!"

(27)  _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 211.

(28)  The distance from Winchester to Middletown is twelve miles.

(29)  _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 131, 137.

(30)  Great events in war are not always measured by the quantity
of blood shed.  Sherman's dead and wounded list on his march from
"Atlanta to the Sea" was only 531.  _Life of Grant_ (Church), pp.
297-8.

(31)  _Battles and Leaders_, etc., vol. iv., p. 532.


CHAPTER XI
Peace Negotiations--Lee's Suggestion to Jefferson Davis, 1862--
Fernando Wood's Correspondence with Mr. Lincoln, 1862--Mr. Stephens
at Fortress Monroe, 1863--Horace Greeley--Niagara Falls Conference,
1864--Jacquess-Gilmore Visits to Richmond, 1863-4--F. P. Blair,
Sen., Conference with Mr. Davis, 1865--Hampton Roads Conference,
Mr. Lincoln and Seward and Stephens and Others, 1865--Ord-Longstreet,
Lee and Grant Correspondence, 1865, and Lew Wallace and General
Slaughter, Point Isabel Conference, 1865.

The war had now lasted nearly four years, with varied success in
all the military departments, and the people North and South had
long been satiated with its dire calamities.  There had, from the
start, been an anti-war party in the North, and in certain localities
South there were large numbers of loyal men, many of whom joined
the Union Army.  The South was becoming exhausted in men and means.
The blockade had become so efficient as to render it almost impossible
for the Confederate authorities to get foreign supplies.  It seemed
to unprejudiced observers that the Confederacy must soon collapse.
Sherman in his march from "Atlanta to the Sea" had cut the Confederacy
in twain.  It was without gold or silver, and its paper issues were
valueless and passed only by compulsion within the Confederate
lines.  Provisions were obtainable only by a system of military
seizure.  The Confederacy had no credit at home or abroad; and
there was a growing discontent with President Davis and his advisers.
There also came to be a feeling in the South that slavery, in any
event, was doomed.  Lastly, the "cradle and the grave" were robbed
to fill up the army; this by a relentless draft.  The Confederate
Congress passed an act authorizing the incorporation into the army
of colored men--slaves.  This was not well received, though General
Lee approved of the policy, suggesting, however, that it would be
necessary to give those who became soldiers, freedom.( 1)

Notwithstanding the desperate straits into which the Confederacy
had fallen it still had in the field not less than 300,000 well-
equipped soldiers, generally well commanded, and, although forced
to act on the defensive, they were very formidable.

The officers and soldiers of the Union Army longest in the field,
though confident of final and complete success, desired very much
to see the war speedily terminated--to return to their families
and to peaceful pursuits.  This desire did not show itself so much
as in discontent as in a restless disposition towards those in
authority, who, it might be supposed, could in some way secure a
peace.  The credit of the United States remained good; its bonds
commanded ready sale at home and abroad, yet an enormous debt was
piling up at the rate of $4,000,000 daily, and its paper currency
was depreciated to about thirty-five per cent. of its face value.
These and many other causes led to a general desire for peace.  On
both sides, those in supreme authority were unjustly charged with
a disposition to continue the war for ulterior purposes when it
had been demonstrated that it was no longer justifiable.

This retrospect seems necessary before giving a summary of the
various efforts to negotiate a peace.  About the first open suggestion
to that end came from General Robert E. Lee in a letter to President
Davis written at Fredericktown, Maryland, September 8, 1862.  This
was just after the Second Bull Run, during the first Confederate
invasion of Maryland and in the hey-day of the Confederacy.  Davis
was requested to join Lee's army, and, from its head, propose to
the United States a recognition of the independence of the Confederate
States.  Lee in this letter showed himself something of a politician.
He urged that a rejection of such a proposition would throw the
responsibility of a continuance of the war on the Union authorities
and thus aid, at the elections, the party in the country opposed to
the war.( 2)  Nothing, however, came of this suggestion of Lee.

Fernando Wood, who had kept himself in some sort of relations with
President Lincoln, though at all times suspected by the latter,
pretended in a letter to him, dated December 8, 1862, to have
"reliable and truthful authority" for saying the Southern States
would send representatives to Congress provided a general amnesty
would permit them to do so.  The President was asked to give
immediate attention to the matter, and Wood suggested "that gentlemen
whose former social and political relations with the leaders of
the _Southern revolt_ may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence
with them on this subject."

Mr. Lincoln, whose power to discern a sham, or a false pretense,
exceeded that of any other man of his time, promptly responded:
"I strongly suspect your information will prove groundless;
nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me."  He said
further to Mr. Wood that if "the _people_ of the Southern States
would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and
maintain the national authority within the limits of such States,
the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if,
within a reasonable time, a full and general amnesty were necessary
to such an end, it would not be withheld."  The President declined
to suspend military operations "to try any experiment of negotiation."
He expressed a desire for any "exact information" Mr. Wood might
have, saying it "might be more valuable before than after January
1, 1863," referring, doubtless, to the promised Emancipation
Proclamation.  Wood's scheme, evidently having no substantial basis,
aborted.( 3)

Others, about the same time, pestered Mr. Lincoln with plans and
schemes for the termination of the war.  One Duff Green, a Virginia
politician, wrote from Richmond in January, 1863, asking the
President for an interview "to pave the way for an early termination
of the war."  He asked the same permission from Jeff. Davis.  His
efforts came to nothing.

Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, conceiving,
in the early summer of 1863, that the times were auspicious for
peace negotiations, wrote Mr. Davis, asking to be sent to Washington,
ostensibly to negotiate about the exchange of prisoners, but really
to try to "turn attention to a general adjustment, upon such basis
as might be ultimately acceptable to both parties, and stop the
further effusion of blood."  He assured Mr. Davis he had but one
idea of final adjustment--"the recognition of the sovereignty of
the States."  Mr. Davis wired Stephens to repair to Richmond, and
he arrived on June 22, 1863.  Davis and his Cabinet appear to have
seconded, with some heartiness, Stephens' scheme; all thinking it
might result in aiding the "peace party" North.  The Confederate
leaders had been greatly encouraged by the gains of the Democratic
party in the elections of 1862; by repeated attacks on the
Administration by some of Lincoln's party friends; by public meetings
held in New York City at which violent and denunciatory speeches
were listened to from Fernando Wood and others, and by the nomination
of Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio.  The