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Title: From Isolation to Leadership, Revised - A Review of American Foreign Policy
Author: Latane, John Holladay, 1869-1932
Language: English
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FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP

REVISED


A Review of American Foreign Policy


BY

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE, PH.D., LL.D.

 PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
 COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY



 Author of
 "The United States and Latin America"
 "America as a World Power"
 Etc.



GARDEN CITY ------ NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1922



COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1922, BY

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY


ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF

TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,

INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN



PREFACE

The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeks
before the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at the
high tide of its power and influence.  In view of the subsequent course
of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the
original title.  In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more
appropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation to
Leadership, and Back."  But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as an
expression of the final judgment of the American people.  The world
still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and
assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.

The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes.
Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added.

JOHN H. LATANÉ.

Baltimore, June 10, 1922.



CONTENTS


CHAPTER

    I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
   II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
  III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
   IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
    V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
   VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
  VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
 VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
   IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION
    X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
   XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
  XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
       INDEX



From Isolation to Leadership

I

ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION

The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two
phases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writers
appear to draw any distinction between them.  The Monroe Doctrine was
in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application
to the American continents, of the right of independent states to
pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention,
domination, or subjugation by other states.  President Monroe announced
to the world that this principle would be upheld by the United States
in this hemisphere.  The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of
Washington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and Jefferson's
warning against _entangling_ alliances.  Both Washington and Jefferson
had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their
day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and
by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned
the interests of the first state or not.  Such alliances were usually
of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or
between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties
between nations.  In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently,
if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples
affected.  It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jefferson
intended that the United States should refrain permanently from the
exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the
peace and welfare of the community of nations.  Washington did not
object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson
object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects.
Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that
the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend
strictly to its own business.

The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been
fully justified by nearly a century of experience.  It has saved South
America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa
and Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey.  The policy
of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans
as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct
from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power.  The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be
illustrated by the following supposition.  If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condition
that England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any
European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle.
Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional
policy of isolation.  Of the two policies, that of avoiding political
alliances is the older.  It was announced by Washington under
circumstances that will be considered in a moment.

In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought
foreign alliances.  In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United
States was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratified
in 1778.  The aid which France extended under this treaty to our
revolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to
establish the independence of our country.  A few years later came the
French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed by
the execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between England and
France.  With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of the
newly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in the
newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the
treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778.  President
Washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his
cabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new government
which had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treaties
were still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutrality
should be issued.  Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length,
taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to the
binding force of the treaties.  Hamilton took the view that as the
government of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated,
had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their
stipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them.  Jefferson took
the correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and that
they were binding under whatever government the French people chose to
set up.  This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines
of international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his words
are well worth quoting.

"I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source
of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common
concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents
individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever
they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority
of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and
enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any
change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering
it.  Consequently the Treaties between the United States and France
were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but
between the two nations of America and France, and the nations
remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their
forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes."

The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to press
matters to a definite conclusion.  From his subsequent action it
appears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding,
but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that
we were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such as
she was then waging.  He accordingly issued his now famous proclamation
of neutrality, April, 1793.  Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leading
English authority on international law, writing one hundred years
later, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an
epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality.  There can be no
doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the
obligations then incumbent upon neutrals.  But it represented by far
the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were;
and in some points it even went farther than authoritative
international custom has up to the present time advanced.  In the main,
however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now
adopted by the community of nations."  Washington's proclamation laid
the real foundations of the American policy of isolation.

The very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by Washington made
the policy a difficult one to pursue.  In the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the
United States was the principal neutral.  The problems to which this
situation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during the
early years of the World War that many of the diplomatic notes prepared
by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates,
be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing.
Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European war
still hanging heavy on the horizon.  Under these circumstances he
delivered his famous Farewell Address in which he said:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
_political_ connection as possible.  So far as we have already formed
engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.  Here let us
stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation.  Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.  Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course.  If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?  Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground?  Why, by interweaving our destiny
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in
the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements.  I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the
best policy.  I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense.  But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be
unwise to extend them.

"Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against
_permanent_ alliances.  He expressly said that we might "safely trust
to _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies."  Further than
this many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warning
against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the
advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned.  In a
succeeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said:

"With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our
country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to
progress without interruption to that degree of strength and
consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the
command of its own fortunes."

The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the Farewell
Address, but was given currency by Jefferson.  In his first inaugural
address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate
his foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in
1801, Napoleon undertook the reëstablishment of French power in Santo
Domingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire which
he determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louisiana to
France by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800.  Fortunately for
us the ill-fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the opposition
of half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages of
yellow fever.  As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisiana
to France, he instructed Livingston, his representative at Paris, to
open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida,
stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation like
France would inevitably lead to friction and conflict.  "The day that
France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark.  It seals the union of
two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the
ocean.  From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation.  We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for
which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed
and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her
settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which
shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she
may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in
sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and
American nations.  This is not a state of things we seek or desire.  It
is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as
necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its
necessary effect."

Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was
instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of
the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the
meantime enter into conferences with the British Government, through
their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us
in peace until Congress meets."  Jefferson had already informed the
British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the
mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would
throw away the scabbard."  Monroe and Livingston were now instructed,
in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilities
against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to
stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the
consent of the other.  Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and
his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal
Declaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency to
form an alliance with England.  The unexpected cession of the entire
province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated
alliance with England unnecessary.

The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain
neutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war,
though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the
struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of
time.  Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights
which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly
bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council.  There was
really not much more reason why we should have fought England than
France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more
effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was
accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the
British service, we finally declared war against her.  No effort was
made, however, to form an alliance or even to coöperate with Napoleon.
The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we
gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake
Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy
Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national
capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas.
Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took
place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had,
consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war.



II

FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was
the most unusual in some respects that modern history records.  The
European alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose of
bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate the
affairs of Europe until 1823.  This alliance, which met at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,
at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822,
undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a
world government that had ever been tried.  While this alliance
publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of
peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its
real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every
attempt at the establishment of representative government.  As long as
England remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining
influence, for England was the only one of the allies which professed
to have a representative system of government.  As Castlereagh was
setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was
then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel
that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible,
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy
which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government."

The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was
soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed one
another in 1820.  In March the Spanish army turned against the
government of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of the
constitution of 1812.  The action of the army was everywhere approved
and sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim the
constitution and to promise to uphold it.  The Spanish revolution was
followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August
by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year witnessed the
outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence.  Thus in all three of
the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the
right of self-government.  The great powers at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise.  At
Troppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the
revolutionary movements in Italy.  An Austrian army entered Naples in
March, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been
inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power.  The
revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a
detachment of the Austrian army.  England held aloof from all
participation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though her
ambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822,
at Verona.  Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spain
came up for consideration.  At this congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented.  France was especially concerned about the
condition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out of
self-defense.  The Congress of Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs.  Wellington had been instructed to use
all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in
Spain.  When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step
and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress.
The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November
22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the
Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 by
Austria, Russia, and Prussia.  This last mentioned treaty sprang from
the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Baroness
Krüdener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant.
No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been
without influence upon the politics of Europe.  The text of the treaty
of Verona was never officially published, but the following articles
soon appeared in the press of Europe and America:

"Article I.--The high contracting powers being convinced that the
system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the
monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people
with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to
use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative
governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent
its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

"Article II.--As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is
the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights
of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting
parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress
it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe.

"Article III.--Convinced that the principles of religion contribute
most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which
they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to
be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those
measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their
own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the
authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their
thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit
his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations.

"Article IV.--The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily all
the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference.  The
high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an
end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions
of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to
the end of the war."

Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for
Europe and which they later proposed to extend to America.  It was an
attempt to make the world safe for autocracy.  Wellington's protest at
Verona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance which
had overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a
rapprochement with the United States.  The aim of the Holy Allies, as
the remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was to
undo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all the
peoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns.
After the overthrow of the constitutional movements in Piedmont,
Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western
Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that their task was not completed so
long as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained unsubjugated.
These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon's
brother Joseph was on the throne of Spain.  Nelson's great victory at
Trafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor
Joseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's American
colonies.  When Ferdinand was restored to his throne in 1814, he
unwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old
colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with
England and with the United States.  The different colonies soon
proclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued.  By
1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resubjugate them,
and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the new
republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them.  England,
although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of
Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the
final step of recognition.

In the late summer of 1823 circular letters were issued inviting the
powers to a conference at Paris to consider the Spanish-American
question.  George Canning, the British foreign secretary, at once
called into conference Richard Rush, the American minister, and
proposed joint action against the schemes of the Holy Alliance.  Rush
replied that he was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, but
that he would communicate the proposal at once to his government.  As
soon as Rush's dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully
the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an
Anglo-American alliance.  Before submitting the matter to his cabinet
he transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and
Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place.  In
his letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

"I transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush,
while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the
highest importance.  They contain two letters from Mr. Canning,
suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of
So. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U
States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance.  The
project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion,
somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning,
will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination.  By
Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in
which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone.
Many important considerations are involved in this proposition.  1st
Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on
the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by
agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result?  2d If a case
can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
not the present instance, precisely that case?  3d Has not the epoch
arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the
monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in
favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware
of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence,
as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the
commenc'ment of that career?

"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British
govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the
part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies,
by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded
with them, they would extend it to us.  I am sensible however of the
extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, &
Mr. Madison's opinions on it."

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a
profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of
the possibilities involved.  He said:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of
Independence.  That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points
the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on
us.  And never could we embark on it under circumstances more
auspicious.  Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe.  Our second, never to
suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.  America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and
peculiarly her own.  She should therefore have a system of her own,
separate and apart from that of Europe.  While the last is laboring to
become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make
our hemisphere that of freedom.  One nation, most of all, could disturb
us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in
it.  By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands,
bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and
emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long
in doubt and difficulty.  Great Britain is the nation which can do us
the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we
need not fear the whole world.  With her then, we should most
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to
knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the
same cause.  Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of
taking part in her wars.  But the war in which the present proposition
might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but
ours.  Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of
keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those
of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations.  It is to
maintain our own principle, not to depart from it.  And if, to
facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European
powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we
should do it.  But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will
prevent instead of provoking war.  With Great Britain withdrawn from
their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe
combined would not undertake such a war.  For how would they propose to
get at either enemy without superior fleets?  Nor is the occasion to be
slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest
against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the
interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so
flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally
lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting
the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even
further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the
American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late
invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey.  Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took
a different view of the situation.  From the diary of John Quincy
Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest.  Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain.  The composition of
the President's message remained in doubt until the 27th, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted.  He advocated an independent course of action on the
part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's
proposals, though substantially in accord with them.  Adams defined his
position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest
remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force
with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with
Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."
Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly
to the influence of Clay who advocated a Pan-American system, partly to
the fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bind
the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the
Spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as
the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part.
He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers.  Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance
with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the
world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed
by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete
change in our point of view.  After the beginning of the great world
conflict, especially after our entrance into it, several writers raised
the question as to whether, after all, the three elder statesmen were
not right and Adams and Clay wrong.  If the United States and England
had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in
the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide
principle, the course of human history during the next century might
have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole
story.  On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by
posterity for persuading the president to take a narrow American view
of a question which was world-wide in its bearing.  An important
element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude
between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the
formulation of the president's message.  Two days after the delivery of
his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the
form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of
late."  It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which
stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American
republics.  On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would
greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once
the full independence of the South American colonies.  In communicating
the account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:
"Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be
made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to
make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not
remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states
by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that
I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the
world."  About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at
the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without
waiting for specific instructions from his government.  He tried to
show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the
American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at
issue was American as much as European, if not more.  Rush then
indicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediately
and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states."
Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American
states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain
and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to
the proposal on a promise of future recognition.  Mr. Rush refused to
accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so
the matter ended.

As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the United
States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the
British cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with
Prince Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in
which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hasten
recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace,
would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go
into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an
equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon
that question."  This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that
he considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and
that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the
colonies by force of arms."  This admission was a distinct victory for
Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by
England, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay
to the allied courts.  The interview was not communicated to Rush until
the latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon the
formation of Monroe's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs
that occur in the message of December 2, 1823.  The first, relating to
Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the
beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the
American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no
longer open to European colonization.  This may be regarded as a
statement of fact.  No part of the continent at that time remained
unclaimed.  The second paragraph, relating to Spanish America and
occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the
extension to the American continents of the system of intervention
adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government
in Europe.

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

1. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through
the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and
instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States
at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective
rights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of this
continent.  A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to
the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to.
The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly
proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to
cultivate the best understanding with his Government.  In the
discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged
proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain,
are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization
by any European powers."

2. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our
policy so to do.  It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more
immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all
enlightened and impartial observers.  The political system of the
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
America.  This difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have
enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.  We owe it,
therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.  With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered
and shall not interfere.  But with the Governments who have declared
their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States."

The message made a profound impression on the world, all the more
profound for the fact that Canning's interview with Polignac was known
only to the chancelleries of Europe.  To the public at large it
appeared that the United States was blazing the way for democracy and
liberty and that Canning was holding back through fear of giving
offense to the allies.  The governments of Europe realized only too
well that Monroe's declaration would be backed by the British navy, and
all thought of intervention in Latin America was therefore abandoned.
A few months later England formally recognized the independence of the
Spanish-American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on the
floor of the House of Commons.  In a speech delivered December 12,
1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French
invasion of Spain, he said: "I looked another way--I sought for
compensation in another hemisphere.  Contemplating Spain, such as our
ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it
should not be Spain _with the Indies_.  I called the New World into
existence to redress the balance of the Old."



III

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER

President Monroe said in effect that the western hemisphere must be
made safe for democracy.  It was reserved for our own generation and
for President Wilson to extend the declaration and to say that the
world must be made safe for democracy.  President Monroe announced that
we would uphold international law and republican government in this
hemisphere, and as _quid pro quo_ he announced that it was the settled
policy of the United States to refrain from all interference in the
internal affairs of European states.  He based his declaration,
therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of the
separation of the European and American spheres of politics.  The
Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked together
in the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which could
stand without the other.  Even Secretary Olney as late as 1895 declared
that "American non-intervention in Europe implied European
non-intervention in America."  It is not strange, therefore, that the
public at large should regard the policy of isolation as the sole
justification for the Monroe Doctrine.  There is, however, neither
logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this
hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law
and humanity in Europe.  The real difficulty is that the Monroe
Doctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certain
imperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of the
policy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the European
powers.

For three quarters of a century after Monroe's declaration the policy
of isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal
departure from it being the signature and ratification of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850.  By the terms of this treaty we
recognized a joint British interest in any canal that might be built
through the isthmus connecting North and South America, undertook to
establish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed to
invite other powers, European and American, to unite in protecting the
same.  Owing to differences that soon arose between the United States
and England as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clause
providing for the adherence of other powers was never carried out.

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the Monroe
Doctrine without a resort to force.  The policy has never been
favorably regarded by the powers of continental Europe.  Bismarck
described it as "an international impertinence."  In recent years it
has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin
America.  Until recently no American writers appear to have considered
the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested.  How is
it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any
size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as
an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an
inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it.  In
view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired,
during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not hold
good and some other must be sought.  Americans have been so little
concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any
connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in
Europe.  The existence of a European balance of power is the only
explanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for
so long a time without a resort to force.  Some one or more of the
European powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff,
that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it,
had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became
engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the
rear.  A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis.

The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjected
was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to
establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices.  He
was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861
for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects
against the government of Mexico.  Before the joint intervention had
gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon
had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces.  Napoleon's Mexican
venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern
Confederacy.  Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederate
commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and
Maximilian backed by the power of France.  Against each successive step
taken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State,
protested.  As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion his
protests became more and more emphatic.  Finally, in the spring of
1866, the United States Government began massing troops on the Mexican
border and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the
French Emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawal
of the French troops would take place.  Napoleon replied, fixing the
dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments.

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to
Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United
States, which was, of course, greater then than at any previous time in
our history.  All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind,
but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment
had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican
scheme.  Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum
Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with
Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy.  Napoleon realized
that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any
corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige
and in fact endanger his throne.  He at once entered upon a long and
hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and
eventually forced him into war.  In order to have a free hand to meet
the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands.  As
the European situation developed he hastened the final withdrawal of
his troops and left Maximilian to his fate.  Thus the Monroe Doctrine
was vindicated!

Let us take next President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan
boundary dispute.  Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindication
of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount.  Let us briefly
examine the facts.  Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the border
of Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute.  Venezuela, a weak and
helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration.
Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused.  After Secretary
Olney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move the
British Government, President Cleveland decided to intervene.  In a
message to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed the controversy at
length, declared that the acquisition of territory in America by a
European power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a
clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an
appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to
appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said
it would then be our duty to uphold.  Lest there should be any
misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In making
these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred
and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."  Congress
promptly voted the appropriation.

Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England.  No one before had
ever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity.  The
English-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned and
amazed.  Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any
subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one
had any idea that it was of a serious nature.  Suddenly the two nations
found themselves on the point of war.  After the first outburst of
indignation the storm passed; and before the American boundary
commission completed its investigation England signed an arbitration
agreement with Venezuela.  Some persons, after looking in vain for an
explanation, have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more
seriously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British Government was
due to his sense of humor.

But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were
happening in another quarter of the globe.  Cleveland's Venezuelan
message was sent to Congress on December 17th.  At the end of the year
came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of January
the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to Paul
Kruger.  The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America to
Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United States
over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to England
in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater
interests in South Africa.  The Monroe Doctrine was none the less
effectively vindicated.

In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test
out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it.  In that
year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against
Venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain
claims of their subjects.  How England was led into the trap is still a
mystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed,
that if England once started in with him she could not turn against
him.  But he had evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon
III in Mexico.  Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American
minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the
foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount.  England and Italy accepted
this offer and withdrew their squadrons.  Germany, however, remained
for a time obdurate.  This much was known at the time.

A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been
made public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay."  Into the
merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of the
Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter.  The
significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure,
is, however, amply established.  Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the
entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in
Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice.  Why did Germany
back down from her position?  Her navy was supposed to be at least as
powerful as ours.  The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure
strength with the United States was that England had accepted
arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the
United States with the British navy in his rear.  Again the nicely
adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put
to the test of actual war.

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy.  The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade.  The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce.  The failure to
cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but
to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and
consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial
development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that
our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both
North and South America has been mainly with Europe.  There has,
therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powers
of Europe in the field of South American commerce.  Our interest has
been political rather than commercial.  We have prevented the
establishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door.
This situation has been in full accord with British policy.  Had Great
Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand
commercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrine
would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten.  Americans
should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past
twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding
difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine
and give her rival a free hand in South America.  In the face of such a
combination our navy would have been of little avail.



IV

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE

President Monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positive
side.  It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not
use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the Western
Hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business.
Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on
grounds of expediency.  Washington, as we have seen, regarded this
policy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separate
occasions was ready to form an alliance with England.  Probably neither
one of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirking
its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations.  Monroe's
message contained the implied promise that if Europe would refrain from
interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would
abstain from all intervention in Europe.  From that day until our
entrance into the World War it was generally understood, and on
numerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the United States would
not resort to force on any question arising outside of America except
where its material interests were directly involved.  We have not
refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, but
it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by
force.  In the existing state of world politics this limitation has
been a serious handicap to American diplomacy.  To take what we could
get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our
diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities.  Diplomatic
action without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished
something in the world at large, so that American influence has by no
means been limited to the western hemisphere.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery
absorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen.  The fact
that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the
American hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and
attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done.  Slavery
and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life,
especially during the period from 1830 to 1860.  As the movement
against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention
of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of
increasing our isolation.  The effort of the American Colonization
Society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near
giving us a colony in Africa.  In fact, Liberia, the negro republic
founded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was in
all essentials an American protectorate, though the United States
carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing
more than expressing its good will for the little republic.  As Liberia
was founded years before Africa became a field for European
exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside
interference, and the United States was never called upon to decide
whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force.

The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the United
States and England during the first half of the nineteenth century, and
an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIII
of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.  The only reason why the two
countries had never been able to act in accord on this question before
was that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right of
impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of
1812.  The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement which
would permit British naval officers to search American vessels in time
of peace.  In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be a
form of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there was
no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship
suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and
search ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flag
which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade.  The United
States stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view.  In the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the
two powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron
"to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and
obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the
slave trade."  It was further agreed that the officers should act in
concert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid
all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance.

The United States has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarian
interest in the natives of Africa.  In 1884 two delegates were sent to
the Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized
status to the Kongo Free State.  The American delegates signed the
treaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it was
not submitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated as
follows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8,
1885:

"A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held
at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might
be kept open to the world's trade.  Delegates attended on behalf of the
United States on the understanding that their part should be merely
deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so
far as the United States were concerned.  This reserve was due to the
indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an
international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign
territories.  The results of the conference were embodied in a formal
act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down
certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories,
subject to ratification within one year.  Notwithstanding the
reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended,
their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as
those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the
United States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories
to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the
conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we
have no established interests or control.

"This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty
of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an
engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the
remote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities
we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction
of the Senate to that general act."

The United States also sent delegates to the international conference
held at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave
trade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa.  The
American delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed
on the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo.  The European
representatives, being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals,
framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the American
delegates refused to sign.  The latter did, however, affix their
signatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression of
the African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms,
ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the African
continent.  In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American
policy of isolation in the following resolution:

"That the United States of America, having neither possessions nor
protectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying
this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or
protectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the other
powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness
thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act
which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and,
for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution be
inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of
the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States."

The United States has always stood for legality in international
relations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration of
international disputes.  Along these lines we have achieved notable
success.  It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions
of international law from questions of international politics.  We have
been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political
entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law
in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation.
We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the
land, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities that
rested on us as a member of the society of nations.  In fact, the
Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes the binding
force of the law of nations and of treaties.  As international law is
the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of
course, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and in
the development of new law.  When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up
by the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, the
United States was invited to give its adherence.  The four rules
embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of
maritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains,
abolished.  Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.  Third, neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the
enemy's flag.  Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be
effective.  The United States Government was in thorough accord with
the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters then
stood, to commit itself to the first rule.  It had never been our
policy to maintain a large standing navy.  In the War of 1812, as in
the Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of
the enemy.  In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the
declaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that
the powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private property,
except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in
time of war.  He said that if they would agree to this, the United
States would agree to abolish privateering.  The powers of Europe
refused to accept this amendment.  We refrained from signing the
Declaration of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but
because it did not go far enough.

During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomatic
efforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of the
Confederacy and the formation of hostile alliances.  It made no effort
to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded
as an American question.  The dispute with England over the _Alabama_
Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted
by the Treaty of Washington.  The most significant feature of this
treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal
adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of
the "Alabama Claims," but which were to be binding upon England and the
United States for the future.  It was further agreed that these rules
should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should
be invited to accede to them.  The rules forbade the fitting out,
arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended to
cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at
peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of
naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due
diligence to prevent these things from being done.  While these rules
have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are
generally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbent
upon all neutrals.

When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar of
Russia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, grave
misgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men in
public life.  The participation of the United States with the powers of
Europe in this conference was taken by many Americans to mark the end
of the old order and the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy.
The conference, however, was concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
any state, European or American.  Lest there should be any
misapprehension as to the historic policy of the United States, the
final treaty was signed by the American delegation under the express
reservation of a declaration previously read in open session.  This
declaration was as follows:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to
require the United States of America to depart from its traditional
policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in
the political questions or policy or internal administration of any
foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."  The
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague which
resulted from the first conference was a notable achievement, although
the Court has accomplished less than its advocates hoped.  This was the
most important occasion on which American delegates had sat together
with European diplomats in a general conference.  Our delegation was
the object of considerable interest and was not without influence in
shaping the provisions of the final treaty.  It was through the
personal influence of Andrew D. White that the Emperor of Germany was
persuaded to permit his delegation to take part in the proceedings
establishing the Court of Arbitration.

The second Hague Conference revised the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, drew up a plan for an
International Prize Court, and attempted a codification of the rules of
international law on a number of subjects relating to the conduct of
war and the rights of neutrals.  The American delegates, headed by Mr.
Choate, not only took a prominent part in these proceedings, but,
acting under instructions from Secretary Root, they proposed to the
Conference the creation of a permanent international court of justice.
The creation of an international court of justice whose decisions would
have the force of law, as distinguished from an international court of
arbitration whose decisions are usually arrived at by a compromise of
conflicting legal or political points of view, had long been advocated
by advanced thinkers, but the proposition had always been held by
practical statesmen to be purely academic.  The serious advocacy of the
proposition at this time by a great nation like the United States and
the able arguments advanced by Mr. Choate marked an important step
forward and made a profound impression.  There were two difficulties in
the way of establishing such a court at the second Hague Conference.
In the first place, the delegation of the United States was the only
one which had instructions on this subject, and in the second place it
was found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting the
judges.  The great world powers, with the exception of the United
States, demanded permanent representation on the court.  The smaller
nations, relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, demanded
likewise to be represented.  If each nation could have been given the
right to appoint a judge, the court could have been organized, but
there would have been forty-four judges instead of fifteen, the number
suggested in the American plan.  The Draft Convention for the
Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as it was agreed the
new court should be designated, was submitted to the Conference and its
adoption recommended to the signatory powers.  This Draft contained
thirty-five articles and covered everything except the method of
appointing judges.  This question was to be settled by diplomatic
negotiation, and it was agreed that the court should be established as
soon as a satisfactory agreement with regard to the choice of judges
could be reached.  After the adjournment of the Conference the United
States continued its advocacy of the international court of justice
through the ordinary diplomatic channels.  The proposal was made that
the method of selecting judges for the Prize Court be adopted for the
court of justice, that is, that each power should appoint a judge, that
the judges of the larger powers should always sit on the court while
the judges of the other powers should sit by a system of rotation for
limited periods.  It was found, however, that many of the smaller
states were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and as difficulties
which we will mention presently prevented the establishment of the
Prize Court, the whole question of the court of justice was postponed.

Most of the conventions adopted by the second Hague Conference were
ratified by the United States without reservation.  The fact, however,
that certain of these conventions were not ratified by all the powers
represented at the Conference, and that others were ratified with
important reservations, left the status of most of the conventions in
doubt, so that at the beginning of the World War there was great
confusion as to what rules were binding and what were not binding.  The
Conference found it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many of the
most vital questions of maritime law.  Under these circumstances the
powers were not willing to have the proposed International Prize Court
established without the previous codification of the body of law which
was to govern its decisions.

In order to supply this need the London Naval Conference was convened
in December, 1908, and issued a few months later the Declaration of
London.  The London Naval Conference was attended by representatives of
the principal maritime powers including the United States, and the
Declaration which it issued was avowedly a codification of the existing
rules of international law.  This was not true, however, of all the
provisions of the Declaration.  On several of the most vital questions
of maritime law, such as blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage,
the destruction of neutral prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs in
the list of conditional contraband, the Declaration was a compromise
and therefore unsatisfactory.  It encountered from the start the most
violent opposition in England.  In Parliament the Naval Prize Bill,
which was to give the Declaration effect, was discussed at considerable
length.  It passed the House of Commons by a small vote, but was
defeated in the House of Lords.  It was denounced by the press, and a
petition to the king, drawn up by the Imperial Maritime League
protesting against it, was signed by a long list of commercial
associations, mayors, members of the House of Lords, general officers,
and other public officials.  One hundred and thirty-eight naval
officers of flag rank addressed to the prime minister a public protest
against the Declaration.  In the debate in the House of Lords the main
objections to the Declaration were (1) that it made food stuffs
conditional contraband instead of placing them on the free list, (2)
that the clause permitting the seizure of conditional contraband bound
for a fortified place or "other place serving as a base for the armed
forces of the enemy" would render all English ports liable to be
treated as bases by an enemy, and (3) that it permitted the destruction
of neutral prizes.

The refusal of England to ratify the Declaration of London sealed its
fate.  The United States Senate formally ratified it, but this
ratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of other
powers.  At the beginning of the Great War the United States made a
formal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree to
adopt the Declaration for the period of the war in order that there
might be a definite body of law for all parties concerned.  This
proposal was accepted by Germany and Austria, but England, France, and
Russia were not willing to accept the Declaration of London without
modifications.  The United States, therefore, promptly withdrew its
proposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concerned
it would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rules
of international law and existing treaties.

The Hague Conferences were concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
states.  Such, however, was not the character of the conference which
convened at Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the purpose of
adjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between France and
Germany over the status of Morocco.  France had been engaged for some
years in the peaceful penetration of Morocco.  By the terms of the
Entente of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being within the French
sphere of influence and France agreed to recognize England's position
in Egypt.  The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of the
world to be divided up without his consent.  In March, 1905, while on a
cruise in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tangier and paid a visit
to the Sultan "in his character of independent sovereign."  As the
Russian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of the
Japanese, France could not count on aid from her ally and the Kaiser
did not believe that the recently formed Entente was strong enough to
enable her to count on English support.  His object in landing at
Tangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate France while she was
isolated and to break up the Entente before it should develop into an
alliance.  Delcassé, the French foreign minister, wanted to stand firm,
but Germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted his
resignation.  In recognition of this triumph, the German chancellor
Count von Bülow was given the title of Prince.  Not satisfied with this
achievement, the Kaiser demanded a general European conference on the
Moroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, President Roosevelt
persuaded France to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested.
The Algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment to
Germany.  Not only did France receive the loyal support of England, but
she was also backed by the United States and even by Italy--a warning
to Germany that the Triple Alliance was in danger.  As the conference
was called nominally for the purpose of instituting certain
administrative reforms in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in view
of our rights under a commercial treaty of 1880, to take part in the
proceedings.  The American delegates were Henry White, at that time
ambassador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummeré, minister to Morocco.  As
the United States professed to have no political interests at stake,
its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficulties
that arose during the conference and their influence was exerted to
preserve the European balance of power.  The facts in regard to
America's part in this conference were carefully concealed from the
public.  There was nothing in any published American document to
indicate that the participation of our representatives was anything
more than casual.  André Tardieu, the well-known French publicist, who
reported the conference and later published his impressions in book
form, first indicated that President Roosevelt was a positive factor in
the proceedings.  But it was not until the publication of Bishop's
"Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" that the full extent of Roosevelt's
activities in this connection became known.

There can be no doubt that our participation in the Moroccan conference
was the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy of
isolation.  Roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving the
balance of power in Europe.  As we look back upon the events of that
year we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fully
justified in the course he pursued.  Had his motives for participating
in the conference been known at the time, they would not have been
upheld either by the Senate or by public opinion.  There are many
serious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely done
away with even under a republican form of government until the people
are educated to a fuller understanding of international politics.  The
German Kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatic
triumph while France was isolated.  He was thwarted, however, by the
moral support which England, Italy, and the United States gave to
France.

During the proceedings of the conference the American delegates
declared in open session that the United States had no political
interest in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with the
understanding that the United States would thereby assume no
"obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof."  This
declaration did not satisfy the United States Senate, which no doubt
suspected the part that was actually played by America in the
conference.  At any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified the
Senate attached to its resolution of ratification the following
declaration:

"Resolved further.  That the Senate, as a part of this act of
ratification, understands that the participation of the United States
in the Algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of the
general act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole
purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the
protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing
or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and
efforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace
the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty
of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government; and
without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy
which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of
political questions which are entirely European in their scope."

The determination of the United States not to interfere in the internal
politics of European States has not prevented occasional protests in
the name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the Jews in
certain European countries.  On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay protested
in a note to the Rumanian government against a policy which was forcing
thousands of Jews to emigrate from that country.  The United States, he
claimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the
enforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania in a condition of utter
destitution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produced
diseased growth to a new place"; and, as the United States was
practically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly established
right of remonstrance.  In the case of Russia information has
repeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent of
destitution among the Jewish population, and permission has been
requested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the United
States.  Such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomatic
protests.  In his annual message of 1904 President Roosevelt went
further and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the massacre
of the Jews at Kishenef.  These protests, however, were purely
diplomatic in character.  There was not the slightest hint at
intervention.  During the early stages of the Great War in Europe the
Government of the United States endeavored to adhere strictly to its
historic policy.  The German invasion of Belgium with its attendant
horrors made a deep impression upon the American people and aroused
their fighting spirit even more perhaps than the German policy of
submarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the
interests and rights of the United States were directly involved, that
we finally entered the war.



V

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY

In the Orient American diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than in
Europe.  Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852-1854 was quite a
radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our
own business.  It would hardly have been undertaken against a country
lying within the European sphere of influence.  There were, it is true,
certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for the
expedition was that Japan refused to recognize her obligations as a
member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse
with the outside world.  American sailors who had been shipwrecked on
the coast of Japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded
by civilized nations.  Finally the United States decided to send a
naval force to Japan and to force that country to abandon her policy of
exclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries.
Japan yielded only under the threat of superior force.  The conduct of
the expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with
Japan, was highly creditable to the United States, and the Japanese
people later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spot
where he first landed.

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands tended to bring us more fully
into the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb
the balancing of European and American spheres as set up by President
Monroe.  Various explanations have been given of President McKinley's
decision to retain the Philippine group, but the whole truth has in all
probability not yet been fully revealed.  The partition of China
through the establishment of European spheres of influence was well
under way when the Philippine Islands came within our grasp.  American
commerce with China was at this time second to that of England alone,
and the concessions which were being wrung from China by the European
powers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us.  The
United States could not follow the example of the powers of Europe, for
the seizure of a sphere of influence in China would not have been
supported by the Senate or upheld by public opinion.  It is probable
that President McKinley thought that the Philippine Islands would not
only provide a market for American goods, which owing to the Dingley
tariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but that
they would provide a naval base which would be of great assistance in
upholding our interests in China.

Talcott Williams made public some years later another explanation of
President McKinley's decision which is interesting and appears to be
well vouched for.  He was informed by a member of McKinley's cabinet
that while the President's mind was not yet made up on the question, a
personal communication was received from Lord Salisbury who warned the
President that Germany was preparing to take over the Philippine
Islands in case the United States should withdraw; that such a step
would probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests of
peace and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain the
entire group.

The famous open-door policy was outlined by Secretary Hay in notes
dated September 6, 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, and
Russia.  Each of these powers was requested to give assurance and to
make a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would not
interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called
sphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff to
continue in force in such sphere and to be collected by Chinese
officials; (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners
in the matter of port dues or railroad rates.  Similar notes were later
addressed to France, Italy, and Japan.  England alone expressed her
willingness to sign such a declaration.  The other powers, while
professing thorough accord with the principles set forth by Mr. Hay,
avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no such
declaration was ever made.  Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, to
clinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note had
been addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the other
powers, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States was
considered "as final and definitive."

Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originated
the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the United
States.  Neither of these impressions is correct.  A few months before
John Hay formulated his famous note Lord Charles Beresford came through
America on his return from China and addressed the leading chambers of
commerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what was
actually taking place in China and urging this country to unite with
England and Japan in an effort to maintain the open door.  Like the
Monroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus Anglo-American in
origin.  There is little doubt that England and Japan were willing to
form an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintaining
the open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolation
prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force.
President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe,
preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other
powers to consent to it.  Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan
which he favored of an alliance with England and Japan, the mere
announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the
aggressions of the powers in China.  Instead of such an alliance,
however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door we
would not fight for it under any conditions.

The utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response to
Hay's note of September 6, 1899, became fully apparent in the
discussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the various
spheres of influence.  Japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass with
a lease and that even if China should surrender jurisdiction over her
own people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction over
foreigners in leased territory.  This position was undoubtedly correct
if the territorial integrity of China was really to be preserved, but
after negotiations with Russia and the other powers concerned Mr. Hay
wrote to Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that "The United States
consuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are to
be instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorial
consular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular acts
within the leased territory under their present Chinese exequaturs."
Application was then made to the European powers for the admission of
American consuls in the leased territories for the performance of the
ordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory.

The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturally
aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer
uprising.  Events moved with startling rapidity and United States
troops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, and
Japan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations.  In a
note to the powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the
attitude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "The
policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution
which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with
all parts of the Chinese empire."  Mr. Hay's notes were skillfully
worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on
the Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now
from his private letters which have recently been made public that he
realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the
course of events.  During the exciting days of June, 1900, when the
foreign legations at Peking were in a state of siege, Mr. Hay wrote to
John W. Foster as follows:

"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind?
There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers
and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of
our imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to Great
Britain'. . . .  Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let
it appear we have any understanding with England.'  How can I make
bricks without straw?  That we should be compelled to refuse the
assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own
policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are
fools--is enough to drive a man mad.  Yet we shall do what we can."

A little later (September 20, 1900) in confidential letters to Henry
Adams, he exclaimed:

"About China, it is the devil's own mess.  We cannot possibly publish
all the facts without breaking off relations with several Powers.  We
shall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which will
be pretty serious, I do not doubt.  'Give and take'--the axiom of
diplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, by
both the Senate and public opinion.  We must take what we can and give
nothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities.

"I take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possible
our military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at the
earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final
adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of
China, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . ."

Again, November 21, 1900:

"What a business this has been in China!  So far we have got on by
being honest and naïf. . . .  At least we are spared the infamy of an
alliance with Germany.  I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China,
than the chum of the Kaiser.  Have you noticed how the world will take
anything nowadays from a German?  Bülow said yesterday in
substance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of.  If
we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and
not a man in the world kicks."

During the long negotiations that followed the occupation of Peking by
the powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the
side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on
China and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong,
independent, responsible Chinese government.  Contrary to the terms of
the final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troops
concentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exacting
further concessions from China.  The open-door policy was again
ignored.  The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan to
sign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England's
interest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that if
either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other
party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which
event the second party would come to the assistance of the first.  A
formal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some of
the demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that the
American government had an understanding with England and Japan, but
Mr. Hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about the
Anglo-Japanese agreement until it was made public.  He succeeded in
securing from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate
Manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near,
Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberately
misrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals.

After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extend
the scope of her commercial treaties with the powers.  When the
negotiation of a new treaty with the United States was begun, our
representative demanded that at least two new ports in Manchuria be
opened to foreign trade and residence.  The Chinese commissioners
declined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had no
instructions to do so.  It was evident that there was secret opposition
somewhere, and after considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally secured
evidence that it came from Russia.  When confronted with the evidence
the Russian Government finally admitted the facts.  We were told that
we could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designated
because it was situated within the Russian railway zone, and therefore
not under the complete jurisdiction of China, but that another port
would be substituted for it.  Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt
were helpless.  They accepted what they could get and kept quiet.  "The
administrative entity" of China was again utterly ignored.  The
difficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the Pacific
to fight Russia alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay
realized that neither the Senate nor public opinion would consent to an
alliance with England and Japan.  Had these three powers made a joint
declaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation of
China would have ceased, there would have been no Russo-Japanese war,
and the course of world history during the period that has since
intervened might have been very different.

When we backed down and abandoned Manchuria to Russian exploitation
Japan stepped into the breach.  After long negotiations the Japanese
Government finally delivered an ultimatum to Russia which resulted in
the rupture of diplomatic relations and war.  After a series of notable
victories on land and sea Japan was fast approaching the end of her
resources, and it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote a
personal letter to President Roosevelt requesting him to intervene
diplomatically and pave the way for peace.  The President was quick to
act on the suggestion and the commissioners of Russia and Japan met at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  Here President Roosevelt's intervention
should have ceased.  The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were a
bitter disappointment to the Japanese people and the Japanese
commissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders by
stating that President Roosevelt had urged them to surrender their
claim to the Island of Saghalien and to give up all idea of an
indemnity.  Japanese military triumph had again, as at the close of the
Chino-Japanese War, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for this
defeat Japanese public opinion held President Roosevelt responsible.
From the days of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty of
Portsmouth, relations between the United States and Japan had been
almost ideal.  Since the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been a
considerable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relations
have been subjected to a severe strain.

Having fought a costly war in order to check the Russian advance in
Manchuria, the Japanese naturally felt that they had a paramount
interest in China.  They consequently sharply resented the attempts
which the United States subsequently made, particularly Secretary
Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria, to
formulate policies for China.  They took the position that we had had
our day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as China
was concerned.  This attitude of mind was not unnatural and during the
World War the United States, in order to bind the Japanese government
more closely to the Allied Cause, agreed to recognize, in the
Lansing-Ishii agreement, the "special interests" of Japan in China.



VI

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of British
colonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at all
improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take
such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great
significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the
temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity
was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar
economic and social conditions."  This statement does not appear as
extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago.  As early as 1894, Captain
Mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay
entitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," in which he
pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which
were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies
and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations.

In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy,
published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph with
this statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes is
the development of cordial relations with England; and it seems now
that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further
reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race
in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented
by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of
aims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of the
political stability and moral progress of the world."

The United States has very naturally had closer contact with England
than with any other European power.  This has been due to the fact that
England was the mother country, that after independence was established
a large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, that
our northern boundary touches British territory for nearly four
thousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine have
dominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway of
intercourse with other nations.  Having had more points of contact we
have had more disputes with England than with any other nation.  Some
writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common
language.  The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and
knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and
in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national
pride.

Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England about
America and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war was
avoided.  A large number of English travellers came to the United
States during this period and published books about us when they got
home.  The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great English
periodicals, the _Edinburgh Review_, _Blackwood's_, the _British
Review_, and the _Quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionable
passages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans and
American institutions.  American men were described as "turbulent
citizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers,
and treacherous friends."  Our soldiers and sailors were charged with
cowardice in the War of 1812.  It was stated that "in the southern
parts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost never
practised. . . .  Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious
instruction.  The religious principle is gaining ground in the northern
parts of the Union; it is becoming fashionable among the better orders
of society to go to church . . .  The greater number of states declare
it to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of God in any of
their public acts."  The _Quarterly Review_ informed its readers that
"the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body and
inanity of mind."  Dickens's _American Notes_ was an ungrateful return
for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this
country.  De Tocqueville's _Democracy in America_ was widely read in
England and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning
America.  Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman to
interpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force.
His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that British
policy should be more concerned with economic relations with America
than with European politics.  As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden made
the United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarism
and protectionism."

Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and
fur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questions
of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more
than a hundred years.  Upon several occasions, notably during the
Canadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War,
disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, but
absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the
part of either government.  The agreement of 1817, effecting
disarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries the
enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has
prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis.

During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border
expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and
munitions from the American side.  In December a British force crossed
the Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the _Caroline_, a
vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon
and other supplies.  The ship was fired and sent over the Falls.  When
the _Caroline_ was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed and
several others wounded.  The United States at once demanded redress,
but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the
_Caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom
their own government either could not or would not control.

The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 a
Canadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on the
American side that he had slain Durfee.  He was taken at his word,
examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport.
McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border.
The British minister at Washington called upon the Government of the
United States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of
Mr. McLeod."  Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense with
which McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of New
York; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was,
within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the Federal
Government; that the latter could not interfere.  The date set for the
trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841.  Van Buren's term
ended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster became
Secretary of State.  The British minister was given instructions by his
government to demand the immediate release of McLeod.  This demand was
made, he said, because the attack on the _Caroline_ was an act of a
public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the
defense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "British
rebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles
of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by
order of the constituted authorities of the State; and because Her
Majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the Federal
Government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest
with the State of New York.  The relations of foreign powers were with
the Federal Government.  To admit that the Federal Government had no
control over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so far
as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign
diplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separate
State.  Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general
to Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel.  After
considerable delay, during which Webster replied to the main arguments
of the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released.

In the midst of the dispute over the case of the _Caroline_ serious
trouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over
the undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and the
Highlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War."  During the
summer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along the
Aroostook River in large numbers.  The governor of Maine sent a body of
militia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswick
authorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up their
position.  Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General Winfield
Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities.  The
administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement
of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was
under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain
attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the
treaty.  As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devoted
himself earnestly to the boundary question.  He decided to drop the
mass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach
an agreement by direct negotiation.

In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Washington
and the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed.  The
boundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half the
area which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150,000 to
compensate Maine for the territory which she had lost.

The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with
England.  Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident that
the joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soon
have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon.  Great Britain
insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as
the Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of the
disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of
1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight."  At the same time Great Britain
actively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States.  Her
main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the
development of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could
draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the United
States.  If Texas should thus devote herself to the production of
cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a
free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for British
goods.

As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definite
steps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the coöperation of the
government of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by the
American republic.  While the treaty for the annexation of Texas was
before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition that
England and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomatic
act or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as an
independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory
beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union.  While the United
States would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that
the government of that country would agree to it.  Mexico obstinately
refused to recognize the independence of Texas.  Lord Aberdeen was so
anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, if
supported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but
the French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was
abandoned.

The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation of
Texas and the occupation of Oregon.  Texas was annexed by joint
resolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk.  This act, it
was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's first
task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complications
with England.  The fate of California was also involved.  That province
was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico.
In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for several
years been urging upon their government the great value of Upper
California.  Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary
movement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant
watch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in that
province.  Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding and
joined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are that
England would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, but
California besides.  In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the
point of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officially
proposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan.
Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had no
reason for wishing to go to war with the United States.  Mexico's offer
was therefore rejected.  Polk managed the diplomatic situation with
admirable promptness and firmness.  Notwithstanding the fact that the
democratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight," as soon
as Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the
49th parallel.  When this offer was declined he asked permission of
Congress to give England the necessary notice for the termination of
the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of
the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the United
States.  A few months later notice was given to England, but at the
same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted
diplomatically.  As soon as it was evident that the United States was
in earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had
been first proposed.

As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the
Oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the North
that the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slave
territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory.  In
fact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Years
of Peace," says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninth
parallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever
befell the United States.  Whether it could have been obtained without
a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said,
officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were
fully prepared to do so.  If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40
without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in
the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value,
and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a complete
control of the Pacific coast."

That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "the
roaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less than
a miracle.  During the next fifteen years relations were much more
amicable, though by no means free from disputes.  The most important
diplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
which conceded to England a joint interest in any canal that might be
built through the isthmus connecting North and South America.  One of
the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton,
the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the United
States for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales into
insignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorff
did during the early stages of the Great War.

Relations between the United States and England during the American
Civil War involved so many highly technical questions that it is
impossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection.
Diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity of
the blockade established by President Lincoln, the recognition by
England of Confederate belligerency, the _Trent_ affair, and the
responsibility of England for the depredations committed by the
_Alabama_ and other Confederate cruisers.  When the United States first
demanded reparation for the damage inflicted on American commerce by
the Confederate cruisers, the British Government disclaimed all
liability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had not
been completed within British jurisdiction.  Even after the close of
the war the British Government continued to reject all proposals for a
settlement.  The American nation, flushed with victory, was bent on
redress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against England, that
the Fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of an
independent republic in Ireland, met with open encouragement in this
country.  The House of Representatives went so far as to repeal the law
forbidding Americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senate
failed to concur.  The successful war waged by Prussia against Austria
in 1866 disturbed the European balance, and rumblings of the
approaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasiness in British cabinet
circles.  Fearing that if Great Britain were drawn into the conflict
the American people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out
"Alabamas" for her enemies, the British Government assumed a more
conciliatory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clarendon signed with
Reverdy Johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixed
commission of all claims which had arisen since 1853.  Though the
convention included, it did not specifically mention, the _Alabama_
Claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for the
course pursued by the British Government during the war.  The Senate,
therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify the
arrangement.

When Grant became President, Hamilton Fish renewed the negotiations
through Motley, the American minister at London, but the latter was
unduly influenced by the extreme views of Sumner, chairman of the
Senate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed his
appointment, and got things in a bad tangle.  Fish then transferred the
negotiations to Washington, where a joint high commission, appointed to
settle the various disputes with Canada, convened in 1871.  A few
months later the treaty of Washington was signed.  Among other things
it provided for submitting the _Alabama_ Claims to an arbitration
tribunal composed of five members, one appointed by England, one by the
United States, and the other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland,
and Brazil.  When this tribunal met at Geneva, the following year, the
United States, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not only
the direct claims for the damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers,
but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer of
American shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war,
and for increased rates of insurance.  Great Britain threatened to
withdraw from the arbitration, but Charles Francis Adams, the American
member of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided against
the contention of his own government.  The indirect claims were
rejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the United States
was awarded the sum of $15,500,000.  Although the British member of the
tribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid the
award.  This was the most important case that had ever been submitted
to arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope that
the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples would never
again have to resort to war.

Between the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims and the controversy over
the Venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the two
countries was enlivened by the efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to
convince the British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was out
of date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of American
ownership in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt to prevent
Canadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summary
dismissal of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minister to receive
his passports from the United States without request.

President Cleveland's bold assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the
Venezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at the
time both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportune
assertion of the intention of the United States to protect the American
continents from the sort of exploitation to which Africa and Asia have
fallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on our
relations with England, whose attitude has since been uniformly
friendly.

The Venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of Lord Salisbury to
renew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which had
been first entered into by Secretary Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote.
In the spring of 1890 the Congress of the United States had adopted a
resolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties with
friendly nations, and the British House of Commons had in July, 1893,
expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty between
the United States and England.  The matter was then taken up
diplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the Venezuelan
boundary dispute became acute.  Lord Salisbury's proposal was favorably
received by President Cleveland, and after mature deliberation the
draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Secretary Olney
and Sir Julian Pauncefote.  This treaty provided for the submission of
pecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire or
referee to decide disputed points.  Controversies involving the
determination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunal
composed of six members, three justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States or judges of the Circuit Court to be nominated by the
president of the United States, and three judges of the British Supreme
Court of Judicature or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council to be nominated by the British sovereign, and an award made by
a majority of not less than five to one was to be final.  In case of an
award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also to
be final unless either power should within three months protest against
it, in which case the award was to be of no validity.  This treaty was
concluded in January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the Senate.  When
President Cleveland's term expired in March no action had been taken.
President McKinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address and
urged the Senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken,
May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty.
It thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification.
The failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends of
international arbitration.  The opposition within his own party to
President Cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had been
negotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good deal
to do with its defeat.  Public opinion, especially in the Northern
States of the Union, was still hostile to England.  Irish agitators
could always get a sympathetic hearing in America, and politicians
could not resist the temptation to play on anti-British prejudices in
order to bring out the Irish vote.

The Spanish War was the turning point in our relations with England as
in many other things.  The question as to who were our friends in 1898
was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon the
occasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States
in February, 1902, even the cabinets of Europe could not refrain from
taking part in the controversy.  In order to diminish the enthusiasm
over the Prince's visit the British press circulated the story that
Lord Pauncefote had checked a movement of the European powers to
prevent any intervention of the United States in Cuba; while the German
papers asserted that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative in
opposing American intervention.  It is certain that the attitude of the
British Government, as well as of the British people, from the outbreak
of hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly.  As for Germany,
while the conduct of the government was officially correct, public
sentiment expressed itself with great violence against the United
States.  The conduct of the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila Bay
has never been satisfactorily explained.  Shortly after Dewey's victory
a German squadron, superior to the American in strength, steamed into
the Bay and displayed, according to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregard
of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse."  Dewey finally sent his
flag-lieutenant, Brumby, to inform the German admiral that "if he wants
a fight he can have it right now."  The German admiral at once
apologized.  It is well known now that the commander of the British
squadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on the
Germans, gave Dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moral
support from him in case of trouble.  In fact, John Hay wrote from
London at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at our
disposal for the asking.

Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was so
marked that some writers have naïvely concluded that a secret treaty of
alliance between the two countries was made in 1897.  The absurdity of
such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago.
England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand.  For a
hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued the
policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers.  With the
rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth
century, England realized that she could no longer pursue this policy.
Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted extensive naval programs
when we went to war with Spain.  Our acquisition of the Philippines and
Porto Rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made a
large American navy inevitable.  Great Britain realized, therefore,
that she would have to cast about for future allies.  She therefore
signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a defensive
alliance with Japan in 1902.

In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the
long-deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further
insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would lead to
friction and possible conflict.  She wisely decided, therefore, to
recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to
give us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal at
whatever point we might choose to build it.  While the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of
much wider significance.  It amounted, in fact, to the recognition of
American naval supremacy in the West Indies, and since its signature
Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic
area.  The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is now
firmly established and in fact unquestioned.  The American public did
not appreciate at the time the true significance of the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty, and a few years later Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Act
a clause exempting American ships engaged in the coast-wise trade from
the payment of tolls.  Great Britain at once protested against the
exemption clause as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and
anti-British sentiment at once flared up in all parts of the United
States.  Most American authorities on international law and diplomacy
believed that Great Britain's interpretation of the treaty was correct.
Fortunately President Wilson took the same view, and in spite of strong
opposition he persuaded Congress to repeal the exemption clause.  This
was an act of simple justice and it removed the only outstanding
subject of dispute between the two countries.

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was by no means the only evidence of a change
of attitude on the part of Great Britain.  As we have already seen,
Great Britain and the United States were in close accord during the
Boxer uprising in China and the subsequent negotiations.  During the
Russo-Japanese war public sentiment in both England and the United
States was strongly in favor of Japan.  At the Algeciras conference on
Moroccan affairs in 1905 the United States, in its effort to preserve
the European balance of power, threw the weight of its influence on the
side of England and France.

The submission of the Alaskan boundary dispute to a form of arbitration
in which Canada could not win and we could not lose was another
evidence of the friendly attitude of Great Britain.  The boundary
between the southern strip of Alaska and British Columbia had never
been marked or even accurately surveyed when gold was discovered in the
Klondike.  The shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing region
was by the trails leading up from Dyea and Skagway on the headwaters of
Lynn Canal.  The Canadian officials at once advanced claims to
jurisdiction over these village ports.  The question turned on the
treaty made in 1825 between Great Britain and Russia.  Whatever rights
Russia had under that treaty we acquired by the purchase of Alaska in
1867.  Not only did a long series of maps issued by the Canadian
government in years past confirm the American claim to the region in
dispute, but the correspondence of the British negotiator of the treaty
of 1825 shows that he made every effort to secure for England an outlet
to deep water through this strip of territory and failed.  Under the
circumstances President Roosevelt was not willing to submit the case to
the arbitration of third parties.  He agreed, however, to submit it to
a mixed commission composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord
Alverstone, chief justice of England.  As there was little doubt as to
the views that would be taken by the three Americans and the two
Canadians it was evident from the first that the trial was really
before Lord Alverstone.  In case he sustained the American contention
there would be an end of the controversy; in case he sustained the
Canadian view, there would be an even division, and matters would stand
where they stood when the trial began except that a great deal more
feeling would have been engendered and the United States might have had
to make good its claims by force.  Fortunately Lord Alverstone agreed
with the three Americans on the main points involved in the
controversy.  The decision was, of course, a disappointment to the
Canadians and it was charged that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their
interest in order to further the British policy of friendly relations
with the United States.

At the beginning of the Great War the interference of the British navy
with cargoes consigned to Germany at once aroused the latent
anti-British feeling in this country.  Owing to the fact that cotton
exports were so largely involved the feeling against Great Britain was
even stronger in the Southern States than in the Northern.  The State
Department promptly protested against the naval policy adopted by Great
Britain, and the dispute might have assumed very serious proportions
had not Germany inaugurated her submarine campaign.  The dispute with
England involved merely property rights, while that with Germany
involved the safety and lives of American citizens.  The main feature
of British policy, that is, her application of the doctrine of
continuous voyage, was so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted by
the United States during the Civil War that the protests of our State
Department were of little avail.  In fact Great Britain merely carried
the American doctrine to its logical conclusions.

We have undertaken in this brief review of Anglo-American relations to
outline the more important controversies that have arisen between the
two countries.  They have been sufficiently numerous and irritating to
jeopardize seriously the peace which has so happily subsisted for one
hundred years between the two great members of the English-speaking
family.  After all, they have not been based on any fundamental
conflict of policy, but have been for the most part superficial and in
many cases the result of bad manners.  In this connection Lord Bryce
makes the following interesting observations:

"There were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the British
foreign secretary exasperated the American negotiators, or when a
demagogic Secretary of State at Washington tried by a bullying tone to
win credit as the patriotic champion of national claims.  But whenever
there were bad manners in London there was good temper at Washington,
and when there was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on the Thames.
It was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any moment
rashness or vehemence was found on one side, it never happened to be
met by the like quality on the other."

"The moral of the story of Anglo-American relations," Lord Bryce says,
"is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of
controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it."  He adds that Great
Britain and the United States "have given the finest example ever seen
in history of an undefended frontier, along which each people has
trusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no naval
armaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped to
prevent hostile demonstrations.  Neither of them has ever questioned
the sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the moral
law."

It is not strange that so many controversies about more or less trivial
matters should have obscured in the minds of both Englishmen and
Americans the fundamental identity of aim and purpose in the larger
things of life.  For notwithstanding the German influence in America
which has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, our
civilization is still English.  Bismarck realized this when he said
that one of the most significant facts in modern history was that all
North America was English-speaking.  Our fundamental ideals are the
same.  We have a passion for liberty; we uphold the rights of the
individual as against the extreme claims of the state; we believe in
government through public opinion; we believe in the rule of law; we
believe in government limited by fundamental principles and
constitutional restraints as against the exercise of arbitrary power;
we have never been subjected to militarism or to the dominance of a
military caste; we are both so situated geographically as to be
dependent on sea power rather than on large armies, and not only do
navies not endanger the liberty of peoples but they are negligible
quantities politically.  Great Britain had in 1914 only 137,500
officers and men in her navy and 26,200 reserves, a wholly
insignificant number compared to the millions that formed the army of
Germany and gave a military color to the whole life and thought of the
nation.

Not only are our political ideals the same, but in general our attitude
toward world politics is the same, and most people are surprised when
they are told that our fundamental foreign policies are identical.  The
two most characteristic American foreign policies, the Monroe Doctrine
and the Open Door, were both, as we have seen, Anglo-American in origin.



VII

IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In its original form the Monroe Doctrine was a direct defiance of
Europe, and it has never been favorably regarded by the nations of the
old world.  Latterly, however, it has encountered adverse criticism in
some of the Latin-American states whose independence it helped to
secure and whose freedom from European control it has been instrumental
in maintaining.  The Latin-American attacks on the Doctrine during the
last few years have been reflected to a greater or less extent by
writers in this country, particularly in academic circles.  The
American writer who has become most conspicuous in this connection is
Professor Bingham of Yale, who has travelled extensively in South
America and who published in 1913 a little volume entitled "The Monroe
Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth."  The reasons why the Monroe Doctrine
has called forth so much criticism during the last few years are not
far to seek.  The rapid advance of the United States in the Caribbean
Sea since 1898 has naturally aroused the apprehensions of the feebler
Latin-American states in that region, while the building of the Panama
Canal has rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval
supremacy in the Caribbean and has led to the formulation of new
political policies in the zone of the Caribbean--what Admiral Chester
calls the larger Panama Canal Zone--that is, the West Indies, Mexico
and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela.  Some of these policies,
which have already been formulated to a far greater extent than is
generally realized, are the establishment of protectorates, the
supervision of finances, the control of all available canal routes, the
acquisition of coaling stations, and the policing of disorderly
countries.

The long-delayed advance of the United States in the Caribbean Sea
actually began with the Spanish War.  Since then we have made rapid
strides.  Porto Rico was annexed at the close of the war, and Cuba
became a protectorate; the Canal Zone was a little later leased on
terms that amounted to practical annexation, and the Dominican Republic
came under the financial supervision of the United States; President
Wilson went further and assumed the administration of Haitian affairs,
leased from Nicaragua for a term of ninety-nine years a naval base on
Fonseca Bay, and purchased the Danish West Indies.  As a result of this
rapid extension of American influence the political relations of the
countries bordering on the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundly
affected.  Our Latin-American policy has been enlarged in meaning and
limited in territorial application so far as its newer phases are
concerned.

In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical departure from our
traditional policy in proposing that we should assume financial
supervision over the Dominican Republic in order to prevent certain
European powers from forcibly collecting debts due their subjects.
Germany seemed especially determined to force a settlement of her
demands, and it was well known that Germany had for years regarded the
Monroe Doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of her acquiring a
foothold in Latin America.  The only effective method of collecting the
interest on the foreign debt of the Dominican Republic appeared to be
the seizure and administration of her custom houses by some foreign
power or group of foreign powers.  President Roosevelt foresaw that
such an occupation of the Dominican custom houses would, in view of the
large debt, constitute the occupation of American territory by European
powers for an indefinite period of time, and would, therefore, be a
violation of the Monroe Doctrine.  He had before him also the results
of a somewhat similar financial administration of Egypt undertaken
jointly by England and France in 1878, and after Arabi's revolt
continued by England alone, with the result that Egypt soon became a
possession of the British crown to almost as great a degree as if it
had been formally annexed, and during the World War it was in fact
treated as an integral part of the British Empire.  President Roosevelt
concluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt
American republic in the hands of a receiver, the United States must
undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its
finances.  He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant
Senate to acquiesce.  The arrangement has worked admirably.  In spite
of the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administration
not only continued it in Santo Domingo, but tried to extend it to
Nicaragua and Honduras.  In January, 1911, a treaty placing the
finances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States was
signed by Secretary Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed with
Nicaragua.  These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign
debt, in each case through loans made by American bankers and secured
by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the
United States and to make an annual report to the Department of State.
These treaties were not ratified by the Senate.

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question.  On
February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the
Senate by the terms of which Nicaragua agreed to give the United States
an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval
base in Fonseca Bay, in return for the payment of three millions of
dollars.  The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the
Taft administration was then at hand.  The Wilson administration
followed the same policy, however, and in July, 1913, Mr. Bryan
submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the
provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition certain provisions
of the Platt amendment, which defines our protectorate over Cuba.  This
treaty aroused strong opposition in the other Central American states,
and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed formal protests with the
United States Government against its ratification on the ground that it
would convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United States and
thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the Central American
republics.  The Senate of the United States objected to the
protectorate feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the
negotiations were renewed by the Wilson administration and on February
18, 1916, a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Platt
amendment, was accepted by the Senate.  This treaty grants to the
United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal by
way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to the United
States for ninety-nine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and
also the Great Corn and Little Corn islands as coaling stations.  The
consideration for these favors was the sum of three millions of dollars
to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary of State of the
United States, in paying the public debt of Nicaragua and for other
public purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties.

The treaty with the black Republic of Haiti, ratified by the Senate
February 28, 1916, carries the new Caribbean policies of the United
States to the farthest limits short of actual annexation.  It provides
for the establishment of a receivership of Haitian customs under the
control of the United States similar in most respects to that
established over the Dominican Republic.  It provides further for the
appointment, on the nomination of the President of the United States,
of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of the
foreign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the development
of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the republic.
It provides further for a native constabulary under American officers
appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of
the United States.  It further extends to Haiti the main provisions of
the Platt amendment.  By controlling the internal financial
administration of the government the United States hopes to remove all
incentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for their
object a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customs
and maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid all possibility
of foreign intervention.  The treaty is to remain in force for a period
of ten years and for another period of ten years if either party
presents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that its
purpose has not been fully accomplished.

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded
by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy.  The United
States did not undertake to control the financial administration or the
foreign policy of any of these republics.  It was only after their
misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or
group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by
force that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it that
foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory
or interference in internal politics.  The Monroe Doctrine has always
been in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose of
preventing European intervention, but American intervention always
awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some European
power.  President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to
restrain the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics before
disorders or public debts should reach a point which gave European
powers an excuse for intervening.  In a message to Congress in 1904 he
laid down this new doctrine, which soon became famous as the Big Stick
policy.  He said: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if
it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference
from the United States.  Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some
civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence,
to the exercise of an international police power."  In other words,
since we could not permit European powers to restrain or punish
American states in cases of wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertake
that task.  As long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of
benevolent protection which Latin-American states could invoke after
their unwise or evil conduct had brought European powers to the point
of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no
objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt doctrine, that if we were
to continue to protect Latin-American states against European
intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain from
conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a
different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition.

The Roosevelt application of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly a
perfectly logical step.  It was endorsed by the Taft administration and
further extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our most
important policies in regard to the zone of the Caribbean.  President
Roosevelt was right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a
point where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extend
its application so as to cover the constantly increasing number of
disputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loose
financial administration.  It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and
witness the utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations
that would inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertake
to fix the bounds and limits of that intervention.  It is interesting
to note that President Wilson did not hesitate to carry the new policy
to its logical conclusion, and that he went so far as to warn
Latin-American countries against granting to foreign corporations
concessions which, on account of their extended character, would be
certain to give rise to foreign claims which would, in turn, give an
excuse for European intervention.  In discussing our Latin-American
policy shortly after the beginning of his administration, President
Wilson said: "You hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in Latin
America.  You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the
United States.  They are not granted concessions.  They are invited to
make investments.  The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest
in it.  We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work.  It
is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because
their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise
and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign
interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs--a condition of
affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . .  What
these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the
subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an
assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these
difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate."

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which
Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia.
This concession is said to have covered practically all of the oil
interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors
and dig canals in the country.  However, before the meeting of the
Colombian congress in November, 1913, which was expected to confirm the
concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew
the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United
States.

Unfortunately President Roosevelt's assertion of the Big Stick policy
and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western
hemisphere was accompanied by his seizure of the Canal Zone.  This
action naturally aroused serious apprehensions in Latin America and
gave color to the charge that the United States had converted the
Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy into a policy of selfish
aggression.  Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was
not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech several years later to the
students of the University of California, in which he boasted of having
taken the Canal Zone and said that if he had not taken it as he did,
the debate over the matter in Congress would still be going on.  Before
the close of his administration President Roosevelt undertook to
placate Colombia, but the sop which he offered was indignantly
rejected.  In January, 1909, Secretary Root proposed three treaties,
one between the United States and Panama, one between the United States
and Colombia, and one between Colombia and Panama.  These treaties
provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and
for the transference to Colombia of the first ten installments of the
annual rental of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to
Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone.  The treaties were ratified by
the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia.

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to appease Colombia,
resulting in the formulation of a definite proposition by Secretary
Knox shortly before the close of President Taft's term.  His proposals
were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaties just referred to,
the United States would be willing to pay $10,000,000 for an exclusive
right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual
lease of the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence as coaling
stations.  These proposals were also rejected.  The American minister,
Mr. Du Bois, acting, he said, on his own responsibility, then inquired
informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would
satisfy Colombia.  The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing
but the arbitration of the whole Panama question.  Mr. Knox, in
reporting the matter to the President, said that Colombia seemed
determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.
Secretary Bryan took up the negotiations where Knox dropped them, and
concluded a treaty, according to the terms of which the United States
was to express regret at what had occurred and to pay Colombia
$25,000,000.  The Senate of the United States refused to ratify this
treaty while Wilson was in the White House, but as soon as Harding
became president they consented to the payment and ratified the treaty
with a few changes in the preamble.

The facts stated above show conclusively that the two most significant
developments of American policy in the Caribbean during the last twenty
years have been the establishment of formal protectorates and the
exercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states.  Our
protectorate over Cuba was clearly defined in the so-called Platt
amendment, which was inserted in the army appropriation bill of March
2, 1901, and directed the President to leave control of the island of
Cuba to its people so soon as a government should be established under
a constitution which defined the future relations with the United
States substantially as follows: (1) That the government of Cuba would
never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power
which would impair the independence of the island; (2) that the said
government would not contract any public debt which could not be met by
the ordinary revenues of the island; (3) that the government of Cuba
would permit the United States to exercise the right to intervene for
the preservation of Cuban independence, and for the protection of life,
property, and individual liberty; (4) that all acts of the United
States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof should be ratified
and validated; (5) that the government of Cuba would carry out the
plans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of the island;
and finally that the government of Cuba would sell or lease to the
United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States.

It is understood that these articles, with the exception of the fifth,
which was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by
Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, discussed at length by
President McKinley's Cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of
Connecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriation
bill.  The Wilson administration, as already stated, embodied the first
three provisions of the Platt amendment in the Haitian treaty of 1916.
Prior to the World War, which has upset all calculations, it seemed
highly probable that the Platt amendment would in time be extended to
all the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean.  If the United
States is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to
intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined
and publicly proclaimed.  Hitherto whatever action we have taken in
Latin America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine--a policy
without legal sanction--which an international court might not
recognize.  Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality.
In other words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states have
converted American policy into law.

The charge that in establishing protectorates and financial supervision
over independent states we have violated the terms of the Monroe
Doctrine is one that has been frequently made.  Those who have made it
appear to be laboring under the illusion that the Monroe Doctrine was
wholly altruistic in its aim.  As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine
has never been regarded by the United States as in any sense a
self-denying declaration.  President Monroe said that we should
consider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extend
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety."  The primary object of the policy outlined by
President Monroe was, therefore, the peace and safety of the United
States.  The protection of Latin-American states against European
intervention was merely a means of protecting ourselves.  While the
United States undertook to prevent the encroachment of European powers
in Latin America, it never for one moment admitted any limitation upon
the possibility of its own expansion in this region.  The whole course
of American history establishes the contrary point of view.  Since the
Monroe Doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at the expense of
Latin-American states, Texas, New Mexico, California, and the Canal
Zone.  Upon other occasions we emphatically declined to bind ourselves
by treaty stipulations with England and France that under no
circumstance would we annex the island of Cuba.  Shortly after the
beginning of his first term President Wilson declared in a public
address at Mobile that "the United States will never again seek one
additional foot of territory by conquest."  This declaration introduces
a new chapter in American diplomacy.



VIII

THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM

When President Wilson assumed office March 4, 1913, there was nothing
but the Huerta revolution, the full significance of which was not then
appreciated, to suggest to his mind the forecast that before the close
of his term questions of foreign policy would absorb the attention of
the American people and tax to the limit his own powers of mind and
body.  It seems now a strange fact that neither in his writings nor in
his public addresses had President Wilson ever shown any marked
interest in questions of international law and diplomacy.  He had, on
the contrary, made a life-long study of political organization and
legislative procedure.  Those who knew him had always thought that he
was by nature fitted to be a great parliamentary leader and it soon
appeared that he had a very definite legislative program which he
intended to put through Congress.  The foreign problems that confronted
him so suddenly and unexpectedly were doubtless felt to be annoying
distractions from the work which he had mapped out for himself and
which was far more congenial to his tastes.  As time went by, however,
he was forced to give more and more thought to our relations with Latin
America on the one hand and to the European war on the other.  His
ideas on international problems at first cautiously set forth, soon
caught step with the rapid march of events and guided the thought of
the world.

The Mexican situation, which reached a crisis a few days before Mr.
Wilson came into office, at once demanded his attention and led to the
enunciation of a general Latin-American policy.  He had scarcely been
in office a week when he issued a statement which was forwarded by the
secretary of state to all American diplomatic officers in Latin
America.  In it he said:

"One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the
friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of
Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable
way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two
continents. . . .

"The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America
except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the
security of governments intended for the people and for no special
group or interest, and the development of personal and trade
relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the
profit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights and
liberties of neither.

"From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this
government as it is necessary now to forecast, and in the spirit of
these principles I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence as
earnestness, to extend to the governments of all the republics of
America the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge my
own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace
and amity that a fortunate future may disclose."

The policy here outlined, and elaborated a few months later in an
address before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, has
been termed the New Pan-Americanism.  The Pan-American ideal is an old
one, dating back in fact to the Panama Congress of 1826.  The object of
this congress was not very definitely stated in the call, which was
issued by Simon Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independence
and peace of the new Spanish republics through either a permanent
confederation or a series of diplomatic congresses.  President Adams
through Henry Clay, who was at that time Secretary of State, promptly
accepted the invitation to send delegates.  The matter was debated at
such length, however, in the House and Senate that the American
delegates did not reach Panama until after the congress had adjourned.
In view of the opposition which the whole scheme encountered in
Congress, the instructions to the American delegates were very
carefully drawn and their powers were strictly limited.  They were
cautioned against committing their government in any way to the
establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power fully to
decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any
respect their conduct."  They were also to oppose the formation of an
offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as
Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of
assisting Spain in the reconquest of her late colonies.  After
referring to "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim" of
our foreign policy, Mr. Clay continued: "Without, therefore, asserting
that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most
intimate kind between the United States and the other American
republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said
that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established
maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed
now to exist."

The British Government sent a special envoy to reside near the Congress
and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the
delegates.  Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,
"Any project for putting the U. S. of North America at the head of an
American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to
your Government.  It would be felt as an ill return for the service
which has been rendered to those States, and the dangers which have
been averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and public
declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no distant
period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe."

The Panama Congress was without practical results and it was more than
half a century before the scheme for international coöperation on the
part of American states was again taken up.  In 1881 Secretary Blaine
issued an invitation to the American republics to hold a conference at
Washington, but the continuance of the war between Chile and Peru
caused an indefinite postponement of the proposed conference.  Toward
the close of President Cleveland's first administration the invitation
was renewed and the First International Conference of American States
convened at Washington in 1890.  It happened that when the Conference
met Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State and presided over its
opening sessions.  The most notable achievement of this Conference was
the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics, now known as the
Pan-American Union.  The Second International Conference of American
States, held in the City of Mexico in 1901, arranged for all American
states to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the
pacific settlement of international disputes and drafted a treaty for
the compulsory arbitration, as between American states, of pecuniary
claims.  The Third Conference, held at Rio Janeiro in 1906, extended
the above treaty for another period of five years and proposed that the
subject of pecuniary claims be considered at the second Hague
Conference.  Added significance was given to the Rio Conference by the
presence of Secretary Root who, although not a delegate, made it the
occasion of a special mission to South America.  The series of notable
addresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to the
Pan-American movement.  The Fourth Conference, held at Buenos Ayres in
1910, was occupied largely with routine matters.  It extended the
pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period.

The conferences above referred to were political or diplomatic in
character.  There have been held two Pan-American Scientific Congresses
in which the United States participated, one at Chile in 1908 and one
at Washington, December, 1915, to January, 1916.  A very important
Pan-American Financial Congress was held at Washington in May, 1915.
These congresses have accomplished a great deal in the way of promoting
friendly feeling as well as the advancement of science and commerce
among the republics of the Western Hemisphere.

The American Institute of International Law, organized at Washington in
October, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence in
promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere.  The Institute is
composed of five representatives from the national society of
international law in each of the twenty-one American republics.  At a
session held in the city of Washington, January 6, 1916, the Institute
adopted a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations.  This
declaration, designed to give a solid legal basis to the new
Pan-Americanism, was as follows:

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve
its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies
the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by
the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has
a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself
without interference or control from other states, provided that in so
doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states.

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other
nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the
right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the
United States, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the laws of nature and of Nature's God
entitle them."

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries,
and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all
persons whether native or foreign found therein.

V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled
to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for
right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all
to observe.

VI. International law is at one and the same time both national and
international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and
applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its
principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the
society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and
among the members of the society of nations involving its principles.

This Declaration has been criticised as being too altruistic for a
world in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims, yet Mr.
Root, in presenting it at the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law, claimed that every statement in it was "based upon
the decisions of American courts and the authority of American
publicists."

The Mexican situation put the principles of the new Pan-Americanism to
a severe test.  On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized and
imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals,
Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator.  Four
days later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's troops.
Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, promptly urged his
government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was
rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his
successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he
assumed control of affairs at Washington.  He refused to recognize
Huerta, whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in
various parts of the country.  It was claimed by the critics of the
administration that the refusal to recognize Huerta was a direct
violation of the well-known American policy of recognizing de facto
governments without undertaking to pass upon the rights involved.  It
is perfectly true that the United States has consistently followed the
policy of recognizing de facto governments as soon as it is evident in
each case that the new government rests on popular approval and is
likely to be permanent.  This doctrine of recognition is distinctively
an American doctrine.  It was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson when
he was Secretary of State as an offset to the European doctrine of
divine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other
Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed.  Huerta could lay no claim to
authority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of the
Mexican people.  He was a self-constituted dictator, whose authority
rested solely on military force.  President Wilson and Secretary Bryan
were fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power,
though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would never
recognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidential
contest.  This announcement made him deaf to advice from Washington and
utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life and property.

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico was
the occupation of Vera Cruz.  On April 20, 1914, the President asked
Congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States
in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at
Vera Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the
custom house at that port.  This he did after a sharp fight with
Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventy
wounded.  The American chargé d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at
once handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations between the
United States and Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called ABC Alliance,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for a
peaceful settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptly
accepted their mediation.  The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20,
was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the
elimination of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914.  On August 20,
General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions,
assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority was
disputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief.  On
Carranza's promise to respect the lives and property of American
citizens the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in
November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson, the six ranking
representatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessful
effort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico.  On their
advice, however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize the
government of Carranza, who now controlled three fourths of the
territory of Mexico.  As a result of this action Villa began a series
of attacks on American citizens and raids across the border, which in
March, 1916, compelled the President to send a punitive expedition into
Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies
of militia to the border.

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation.  Carranza not only
made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed the
steps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along the
border, and even assumed a threatening attitude.  There was a loud and
persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico.
American investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other
enterprises were very large, and these financial interests were
particularly outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting."
The President remained deaf to this clamor.  No country had been so
shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico.  Furthermore, it
was suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutions
had been financed by American capital.  President Wilson was determined
to give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their national
life on a better basis and to lend them every assistance in the task.
War with Mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even a
successful war would have meant the military occupation of Mexico for
an indefinite period.  After our entrance into the World War many of
those Americans who dissented radically from Wilson's Mexican policy
became convinced that his refusal to become involved in war with Mexico
was a most fortunate thing for us.

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the
President's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy.  The difference
between the two cases, however, was that order could be restored in
Haiti with a relatively small force of marines, while any attempt to
apply force to Mexico would have led to a long and bloody conflict.
The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was his
acceptance of the mediation of the ABC Alliance and his subsequent
consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America.  This
action brought the Pan-American ideal almost to the point of
realization.  It was received with enthusiasm and it placed our
relations with Latin America on a better footing than they had been for
years.

It was suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policy
that if we were to undertake to set the world right, we must come
before the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we
denounced the imperialistic policies of Europe, we should have
abandoned imperialistic policies at home.  The main features of
President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if we may draw a general
conclusion, were to pledge American republics not to do anything which
would invite European intervention, and to secure by treaty the right
of the United States to intervene for the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and for the establishment of self-government.  Such a
policy, unselfishly carried out, was not inconsistent with the general
war aims defined by President Wilson.



IX

THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION

In Washington's day the United States was an experiment in democracy.
The vital question was not our duty to the rest of the world, but
whether the rest of the world would let us live.  The policy of wisdom
was to keep aloof from world politics and give as little cause for
offense as possible to the great powers of Europe.  Washington pointed
out that "our detached and distant situation" rendered such a course
possible.  This policy was justified by events.  We were enabled to
follow unhindered the bent of our own political genius, to extend our
institutions over a vast continent and to attain a position of great
prosperity and power in the economic world.  While we are still a young
country, our government is, with the possible exception of that of
Great Britain, the oldest and most stable in the world, and since we
declared ourselves a nation and adopted our present constitution the
British Government has undergone radical changes of a democratic
character.  By age and stability we have long been entitled to a voice
and influence in the world, and yet we have been singularly indifferent
to our responsibilities as a member of the society of nations.  We have
been in the world, but not of it.

Our policy of isolation corresponded with the situation as it existed a
hundred years ago, but not with the situation as it exists to-day and
as it has existed for some years past.  We no longer occupy a "detached
and distant situation."  Steam and electricity, the cable and wireless
telegraphy have overcome the intervening space and made us the close
neighbors of Europe.  The whole world has been drawn together in a way
that our forefathers never dreamed of, and our commercial, financial,
and social relations with the rest of the world are intimate.  Under
such circumstances political isolation is an impossibility.  It has for
years been nothing more than a tradition, but a tradition which has
tied the hands of American diplomats and caused the American public to
ignore what was actually going on in the world.  The Spanish War and
the acquisition of the Philippines brought us into the full current of
world politics, and yet we refused to recognize the changes that
inevitably followed.

The emergence of Japan as a first-class power, conscious of achievement
and eager to enter on a great career, introduced a new and disturbing
element into world politics.  Our diplomacy, which had hitherto been
comparatively simple, now became exceedingly complex.  Formerly the
United States was the only great power outside the European balance.
The existence of a second detached power greatly complicated the
international situation and presented opportunities for new
combinations.  We have already seen how Germany undertook to use the
opportunity presented by Russia's war with Japan to humiliate France
and that the United States took a prominent part in the Algeciras
Conference for the purpose of preventing the threatened overthrow of
the European balance of power.  Thus, even before the World War began,
it had become evident to close observers of international affairs that
the European balance would soon be superseded by a world balance in
which the United States would be forced to take its place.

It took a world war, however, to dispel the popular illusion of
isolation and to arouse us to a temporary sense of our international
responsibilities.  When the war began the President, following the
traditions of a hundred years, issued, as a matter of course, a
proclamation of neutrality, and he thought that the more scrupulously
it was observed the greater would be the opportunity for the United
States to act as impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peace
terms.  As the fierceness of the conflict grew it became evident that
the role of neutral would not be an easy one to play and that the vital
interests of the United States would be involved to a far greater
extent than anyone had foreseen.

Neutrality in the modern sense is essentially an American doctrine and
the result of our policy of isolation.  If we were to keep out of
European conflicts, it was necessary for us to pursue a course of rigid
impartiality in wars between European powers.  In the Napoleonic wars
we insisted that neutrals had certain rights which belligerents were
bound to respect and we fought the War of 1812 with England in order to
establish that principle.  Half a century later, in the American Civil
War, we insisted that neutrals had certain duties which every
belligerent had a right to expect them to perform, and we forced Great
Britain in the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims to pay us damages to
the extent of $15,500,000 for having failed to perform her neutral
obligations.  We have thus been the leading champion of the rights and
duties of neutrals, and the principles for which we have contended have
been written into the modern law of nations.  When two or three nations
are engaged in war and the rest of the world is neutral, there is
usually very little difficulty in enforcing neutral rights, but when a
majority of the great powers are at war, it is impossible for the
remaining great powers, much less for the smaller neutrals, to maintain
their rights.  This was true in the Napoleonic wars, but at that time
the law of neutrality was in its infancy and had never been fully
recognized by the powers at war.  The failure of neutrality in the
Great War was far more serious, for the rights of neutrals had been
clearly defined and universally recognized.

Notwithstanding the large German population in this country and the
propaganda which we now know that the German Government had
systematically carried on for years in our very midst, the invasion of
Belgium and the atrocities committed by the Germans soon arrayed
opinion on the side of the Allies.  This was not a departure from
neutrality, for it should be remembered that neutrality is not an
attitude of mind, but a legal status.  As long as our Government
fulfilled its obligations as defined by the law of nations, no charge
of a violation of neutrality could be justly made.  To deny to the
citizens of a neutral country the right to express their moral
judgments would be to deny that the world can ever be governed by
public opinion.  The effort of the German propagandists to draw a
distinction between so-called ethical and legal neutrality was
plausible, but without real force.  While neutrality is based on the
general principle of impartiality, this principle has been embodied in
a fairly well-defined set of rules which may, and frequently do, in any
given war, work to the advantage of one belligerent and to the
disadvantage of the other.  In the Great War this result was brought
about by the naval superiority of Great Britain.  So far as our legal
obligations to Germany were concerned she had no cause for complaint.
If, on the other hand, our conduct had been determined solely by
ethical considerations, we would have joined the Allies long before we
did.

The naval superiority of Great Britain made it comparatively easy for
her to stop all direct trade with the enemy in articles contraband of
war, but this was of little avail so long as Germany could import these
articles through the neutral ports of Italy, Holland, and the
Scandinavian countries.  Under these circumstances an ordinary blockade
of the German coast would have had little effect.  Therefore, no such
blockade was proclaimed by Great Britain.  She adopted other methods of
cutting off overseas supplies from Germany.  She enlarged the lists of
both absolute and conditional contraband and under the doctrine of
continuous voyage seized articles on both lists bound for Germany
through neutral countries.

As to the right of a belligerent to enlarge the contraband lists there
can be no doubt.  Even the Declaration of London, which undertook for
the first time to establish an international classification of
contraband, provided in Article 23 that "articles and materials which
are exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute
contraband by means of a notified declaration," and Article 25 provided
that the list of conditional contraband might be enlarged in the same
manner.  Under modern conditions of warfare it would seem impossible to
determine in advance what articles are to be treated as contraband.
During the Great War many articles regarded in previous wars as
innocent became indispensable to the carrying on of the war.

Great Britain's application of the doctrine of continuous voyage was
more open to dispute.  She assumed that contraband articles shipped to
neutral countries adjacent to Germany and Austria were intended for
them unless proof to the contrary was forthcoming, and she failed to
draw any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.  The
United States protested vigorously against this policy, but the force
of its protest was weakened by the fact that during the Civil War the
American Government had pursued substantially the same policy in regard
to goods shipped by neutrals to Nassau, Havana, Matamoros, and other
ports adjacent to the Confederacy.  Prior to the American Civil War
goods could not be seized on any grounds unless bound directly for a
belligerent port.  Under the English doctrine of continuous voyage as
advanced during the Napoleonic wars, goods brought from the French West
Indies to the United States and reshipped to continental Europe were
condemned by the British Admiralty Court on the ground that
notwithstanding the unloading and reloading at an American port the
voyage from the West Indies to Europe was in effect a continuous
voyage, and under the Rule of 1756 Great Britain refused to admit the
right of neutral ships to engage in commerce between France and her
colonies.  Great Britain, however, seized ships only on the second leg
of the voyage, that is, when bound directly for a belligerent port.
During the American Civil War the United States seized goods under an
extension of the English doctrine on the first leg of the voyage, that
is, while they were in transit from one neutral port to another neutral
port, on the ground that they were to be subsequently shipped in
another vessel to a Confederate port.  Great Britain adopted and
applied the American doctrine during the Boer War.  The doctrine of
continuous voyage, as applied by the United States and England, was
strongly condemned by most of the continental writers on international
law.  The Declaration of London adopted a compromise by providing that
absolute contraband might be seized when bound through third countries,
but that conditional contraband was not liable to capture under such
circumstances.  As the Declaration of London was not ratified by the
British Government this distinction was ignored, and conditional as
well as absolute contraband was seized when bound for Germany through
neutral countries.

While Great Britain may be charged with having unwarrantably extended
the application of certain rules of international law and may have
rendered herself liable to pecuniary damages, she displayed in all her
measures a scrupulous regard for human life.  Her declaration that "The
whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area," was
explained as an act of retaliation against Germany for having scattered
floating mines on the high seas in the path of British commerce.  She
did not undertake to exclude neutral vessels from the North Sea, but
merely notified them that certain areas had been mined and warned them
not to enter without receiving sailing directions from the British
squadron.

The German decree of February 4, 1915, establishing a submarine
blockade or "war zone" around the British Isles, on the other hand, was
absolutely without legal justification.  It did not fulfill the
requirements of a valid blockade, because it cut off only a very small
percentage of British commerce, and the first requirement of a blockade
is that it must be effective.  The decree was aimed directly at enemy
merchant vessels and indirectly at the ships of neutrals.  It utterly
ignored the well-recognized right of neutral passengers to travel on
merchant vessels of belligerents.  The second decree announcing
unrestricted submarine warfare after February 1, 1917, was directed
against neutral as well as enemy ships.  It undertook to exclude all
neutral ships from a wide zone extending far out on the high seas,
irrespective of their mission or the character of their cargo.  It was
an utter defiance of all law.

The citizens of neutral countries have always had the right to travel
on the merchant vessels of belligerents, subject, of course, to the
risk of capture and detention.  The act of the German ambassador in
inserting an advertisement in a New York paper warning Americans not to
take passage on the _Lusitania_, when the President had publicly
asserted that they had a perfect right to travel on belligerent ships,
was an insolent and unparalleled violation of diplomatic usage and
would have justified his instant dismissal.  Some action would probably
have been taken by the State Department had not the incident been
overshadowed by the carrying out of the threat and the actual
destruction of the _Lusitania_.

The destruction of enemy prizes at sea is recognized by international
law under exceptional circumstances and subject to certain definite
restrictions, but an unlimited right of destruction even of enemy
merchant vessels had never been claimed by any authority on
international law or by any government prior to the German decree.  The
destruction of neutral prizes, though practised by some governments,
has not been so generally acquiesced in, and when resorted to has been
attended by an even more rigid observance of the rules designed to
safeguard human life.  Article 48 of the Declaration of London provided
that, "A captured neutral vessel is not to be destroyed by the captor,
but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determine
there the rights as regards the validity of the capture."
Unfortunately Article 49 largely negatived this statement by leaving
the whole matter to the discretion of the captor.  It is as follows:
"As an exception, a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent ship, and
which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the
observance of Article 48 would involve danger to the ship of war or to
the success of the operations in which she is at the time engaged."
The next article provided the following safeguards: "Before the
destruction the persons on board must be placed in safety, and all the
ship's papers and other documents which those interested consider
relevant for the decision as to the validity of the capture must be
taken on board the ship of war."

The Declaration of London was freely criticised for recognizing an
unlimited discretionary right on the part of a captor to destroy a
neutral prize.  Under all the circumstances the main grievance against
Germany was not that she destroyed prizes at sea, but that she utterly
ignored the restrictions imposed upon this right and the rules designed
to safeguard human life.

Germany sought to justify her submarine policy on the ground (1) that
the American manufacture and sale of munitions of war was one-sided and
therefore unneutral, and (2) that the United States had practically
acquiesced in what she considered the unlawful efforts of Great Britain
to cut off the food supply of Germany.  The subject of the munitions
trade was brought to the attention of the United States by Germany in a
note of April 4, 1915.  While not denying the legality of the trade in
munitions under ordinary circumstances the contentions of the German
Government were that the situation in the present war differed from
that of any previous war; that the recognition of the trade in the past
had sprung from the necessity of protecting existing industries, while
in the present war an entirely new industry had been created in the
United States; and it concluded with the following statement which was
the real point of the note: "This industry is actually delivering goods
to the enemies of Germany.  The theoretical willingness to supply
Germany also, if shipments were possible, does not alter the case.  If
it is the will of the American people that there should be a true
neutrality, the United States will find means of preventing this
one-sided supply of arms or at least of utilizing it to protect
legitimate trade with Germany, especially that in food stuffs."  To
this note Secretary Bryan replied that "Any change in its own laws of
neutrality during the progress of the war which would affect unequally
the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an
unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality."

Two months later the discussion was renewed by the Austro-Hungarian
Government.  The Austrian note did not question the intention of the
United States to conform to the letter of the law, but complained that
we were not carrying out its spirit, and suggested that a threat to
withhold food stuffs and raw materials from the Allies would be
sufficient to protect legitimate commerce between the United States and
the Central Powers.  To this note Secretary Lansing replied at length.
He held: (1) that the United States was under no obligation to change
or modify the rules of international usage on account of special
conditions.  (2) He rejected what he construed to be the contention of
the Austrian Government that "the advantages gained to a belligerent by
its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by
the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor."  (3)
He called attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany had
during the years preceding the present European war produced "a great
surplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world and
especially to belligerents.  Never during that period did either of
them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and
Royal Government."  (4) "But, in addition to the question of principle,
there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the
United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present
time advocated and practised unrestricted trade in arms and military
supplies.  It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in
time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and
ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerful
enemy.  It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid
any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and
navies.  In consequence of this standing policy the United States
would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of
the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and
ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to
supply the requirements of national defense.  The United States has
always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and
ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack.  This right,
which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others."

The German and Austrian authorities were fully aware that their
arguments had no basis in international law or practice.  Indeed, their
notes were probably designed to influence public opinion and help the
German propagandists in this country who were making a desperate effort
to get Congress to place an embargo on the export of munitions.  Having
failed in this attempt, an extensive conspiracy was formed to break up
the trade in munitions by a resort to criminal methods.  Numerous
explosions occurred in munition plants destroying many lives and
millions of dollars' worth of property, and bombs were placed in a
number of ships engaged in carrying supplies to the Allies.  The
Austrian ambassador and the German military and naval attachés at
Washington were involved in these activities and their recall was
promptly demanded by Secretary Lansing.

The violations of international law by Germany were so flagrant, her
methods of waging war so barbarous, the activities of her diplomats so
devoid of honor, and her solemn pledges were so ruthlessly broken that
the technical discussion of the rules of maritime law was completely
overshadowed by the higher moral issues involved in the contest.  All
further efforts to maintain neutrality finally became intolerable even
to President Wilson, who had exercised patience until patience ceased
to be a virtue.  Having failed in his efforts to persuade Congress to
authorize the arming of merchantmen, the President finally concluded,
in view of Germany's threat to treat armed guards as pirates, that
armed neutrality was impracticable.  He accepted the only alternative
and on April 2, 1917, went before Congress to ask for a formal
declaration of war against Germany.

Had Germany observed the rules of international law, the United States
would probably have remained neutral notwithstanding the imminent
danger of the overthrow of France and the possible invasion of England.
The upsetting of the European balance would eventually have led to a
conflict between Germany and the United States.  The violation of
American rights forced us to go to war, but having once entered the
war, we fought not merely for the vindication of American rights, but
for the establishment of human freedom and the recognition of human
rights throughout the world.  In his war address President Wilson said:
"Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the
world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to
that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic Governments
backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not
by the will of their people.  We have seen the last of neutrality in
such circumstances."  Having once abandoned neutrality and isolation we
are not likely to remain neutral again in any war which involves the
balance of power in the world or the destinies of the major portion of
mankind.  Neutrality and isolation were correlative.  They were both
based on the view that we were a remote and distant people and had no
intimate concern with what was going on in the great world across the
seas.

The failure of neutrality and the abandonment of isolation marked a
radical, though inevitable, change in our attitude toward world
politics.  President Wilson did not propose, however, to abandon the
great principles for which we as a nation had stood, but rather to
extend them and give them a world-wide application.  In his address to
the Senate on January 22, 1917, he said:

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord
adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world;
that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation
or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its
own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened,
unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances
which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net
of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with
influences intruded from without.  There is no entangling alliance in a
concert of power."

In other words, the Monroe Doctrine, stripped of its imperialistic
tendencies, was to be internationalized, and the American policy of
isolation, in the sense of avoiding secret alliances, was to become a
fundamental principle of the new international order.  If the United
States was to go into a league of nations, every member of the league
must stand on its own footing.  We were not to be made a buffer between
alliances and ententes.



X

THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

The advent of the United States into the family of nations nearly a
century and a half ago was an event of worldwide significance.  Our
revolutionary ancestors set up a government founded on a new principle,
happily phrased by Jefferson in the statement that governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed.  This principle
threatened, although remotely, the existence of the aristocratic
governments of the Old World which were still based on the doctrine of
divine right.  The entrance of the United States into the World War was
an event of equal significance because it gave an American president,
who was thoroughly grounded in the political philosophy of the Virginia
Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the writings of
the founders of the Republic, an opportunity to proclaim to the world
the things for which America has always stood.  In this connection H.
W. V. Temperley in "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris" (vol.
i, page 173) says: "The utterances of President Wilson have a unique
significance, not only because they were taken as the legal basis of
the Peace negotiations, but because they form a definite and coherent
body of political doctrine.  This doctrine, though developed and
expanded in view of the tremendous changes produced by the war, was not
formed or even altered by them.  His ideas, like those of no other
great statesman of the war, are capable of being worked out as a
complete political philosophy.  A peculiar interest, therefore,
attaches to his pre-war speeches, for they contain the germs of his
political faith and were not influenced by the terrifying portents of
to-day.  The tenets in themselves were few and simple, but their
consequences, when developed by the war, were such as to produce the
most far-reaching results.  It is not possible or necessary to discuss
how far these tenets were accepted by the American people as a whole,
for, as the utterances of their legal representative at a supreme
moment of world history, they will always retain their value."

The principal features of Wilson's political philosophy were revealed
in his policy toward Latin America before he had any idea of
intervening in the European situation.  At the outset of his
administration he declared that the United States would "never again
seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."  In December, 1915,
he declared: "From the first we have made common cause with all
partisans of liberty on this side of the sea and . . . have set America
aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political
freemen."  A few weeks later he proposed that the nations of America
should unite "in guaranteeing to each other absolute political
independence and territorial integrity."  This proposal was actually
embodied in a treaty, but this plan for an American league of nations
did not meet with the approval of the other states, who probably feared
that the United States would occupy too dominant a position in such a
league.  President Wilson's refusal to recognize the despotic power of
Huerta, while expressing sympathy for the people of Mexico, was the
first application of the policy which later so successfully drove a
wedge in between the Kaiser and the German people.  His refusal to
invade Mexico and his determination to give the people of that country
a chance to work out their own salvation gave evidence to the world of
the unselfishness and sincerity of his policies, and paved the way for
the moral leadership which he later exercised over the peoples of
Europe.

President Wilson's insistence on neutrality in "thought, word, and
deed," the expression "too proud to fight," and his statement in regard
to the war, May 27, 1916, that "with its causes and objects we are not
concerned," caused deep offense to many of his countrymen and were
received with ridicule by others at home and abroad.  His reasons for
remaining neutral were best stated in the speech accepting his second
nomination for the presidency, September 2, 1916: "We have been neutral
not only because it was the fixed and traditional policy of the United
States to stand aloof from the politics of Europe and because we had
had no part either of action or of policy in the influences which
brought on the present war, but also because it was manifestly our duty
to prevent, if it were possible, the indefinite extension of the fires
of hate and desolation kindled by that terrible conflict and seek to
serve mankind by reserving our strength and our resources for the
anxious and difficult days of restoration and healing which must
follow, when peace will have to build its house anew."

Other speeches made during the year 1916 show, however, that he was
being gradually forced to the conclusion that "peace is not always
within the choice of the nation" and that we must be "ready to fight
for our rights when those rights are coincident with the rights of man
and humanity."

After the German peace proposals of December 12, 1916, President Wilson
called on all the belligerents to state publicly what they were
fighting for.  This demand caused a searching of hearts everywhere, led
to a restatement of aims on the part of the Allies, and threw the
Central Governments on the defensive.  In formulating their replies the
Allies were somewhat embarrassed by the secret treaties relating to
Russia and Italy, which were later made public by the Bolsheviki.  In
March, 1915, England and France had made an agreement with Russia by
which she was to get Constantinople, the aim of her policy since the
days of Peter the Great.  By the secret Treaty of London, signed April
26, 1915, England, France, and Russia had promised Italy that she
should receive the Trentino and Southern Tyrol, including in its
population more than 250,000 Germans.  Italy was also promised Trieste
and the Istrian peninsula, the boundary running just west of Fiume,
over which city, it should be remembered, she acquired no claim under
this treaty.  Italy was also to receive about half of Dalmatia,
including towns over half of whose population were Jugo-Slavs.  To
President Wilson's note the Allies had to reply, therefore, in somewhat
general terms.  Their territorial demands were: "The restitution of
provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of
their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the
Slavs, Roumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination, the
setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the
Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly
foreign to Western civilization."  The German reply contained no
statement of territorial claims and gave no pledge even as to the
future status of Belgium.

In reporting the results of this interchange of views to the Senate,
January 22, 1917, President Wilson delivered the first of that series
of addresses on the essentials of a just and lasting peace which made
him the recognized spokesman of the liberal element in all countries
and gained for him a moral leadership that was without parallel in the
history of the world.  "In every discussion of the peace that must end
this war," he declared, "it is taken for granted that that peace must
be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it
virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us
again.  Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take
that for granted."  In fact, there was no dissent from this statement.
Most of our leading men, including Taft, Roosevelt, and Lodge, were
committed to the idea of a league of nations for the maintenance of law
and international peace.  The League to Enforce Peace, which had
branches in all the Allied countries, had done a great work in
popularizing this idea.  The President came before the Senate, he said,
"as the council associated with me in the final determination of our
international obligations," to formulate the conditions upon which he
would feel justified in asking the American people to give "formal and
solemn adherence to a League for Peace."  He disclaimed any right to a
voice in determining what the terms of peace should be, but he did
claim a right to "have a voice in determining whether they shall be
made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant."  First
of all, the peace must be a "peace without victory," for "only a peace
between equals can last."  And, he added, "there is a deeper thing
involved than even equality of right among organized nations.  No peace
can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the
consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand
peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
property."  He cited Poland as an example, declaring that statesmen
everywhere were agreed that she should be "united, independent, and
autonomous."

He declared that every great people "should be assured a direct outlet
to the sea," and that "no nation should be shut away from free access
to the open paths of the world's commerce."  He added: "The freedom of
the seas is the _sine qua non_ of peace, equality, and coöperation."
This problem, he said, was closely connected with the limitation of
naval armaments.  "The question of armaments, whether on land or sea,
is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with
the future fortunes of nations and of mankind."

The Russian revolution, which came in March, 1917, and resulted in the
overthrow of the Czar's government, cleared the political atmosphere
for the time being, and enabled President Wilson in his address to
Congress on April 2 to proclaim a war of democracy against autocracy.
The new Russian government repudiated all imperialistic aims and
adopted the formula: "Self-determination, no annexations, no
indemnities."  Poland was given her freedom and the demand for
Constantinople was abandoned.  The Allies were thus relieved from one
of their most embarrassing secret treaties.

Even after America entered the war, President Wilson continued to
advance the same ideas as to the ultimate conditions of peace.  His
attitude remained essentially different from that of the Allies, who
were hampered by secret treaties wholly at variance with the
President's aims.  In his war address he declared that we had "no
quarrel with the German people.  We have no feeling towards them but
one of sympathy and friendship.  It was not upon their impulse that
their government acted in entering this war."  Prussian autocracy was
the object of his attack.  "We are now about to accept gauge of battle
with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the
whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its
power.  We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false
pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world
and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for
the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men
everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience.  The world
must be made safe for democracy.  Its peace must be planted upon the
tested foundations of political liberty.  We have no selfish ends to
serve.  We desire no conquest, no dominion.  We seek no indemnities for
ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely
make.  We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind.  We
shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the
faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

About the time that the United States declared war, Austria and Germany
began another so-called "peace offensive."  Overtures were made by
Austria to France in March, and in August the Pope made a direct appeal
to the Powers.  This move was unmasked by President Wilson in a public
address at the Washington Monument, June 14, 1917.  "The military
masters under whom Germany is bleeding," he declared, "see very clearly
to what point fate has brought them: if they fall back or are forced
back an inch, their power abroad and at home will fall to pieces.  It
is their power at home of which they are thinking now more than of
their power abroad.  It is that power which is trembling under their
very feet.  Deep fear has entered their hearts.  They have but one
chance to perpetuate their military power, or even their controlling
political influence.  If they can secure peace now, with the immense
advantage still in their hands, they will have justified themselves
before the German people.  They will have gained by force what they
promised to gain  by it--an immense expansion of German power and an
immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities.
Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political
power.  If they fail, their people will thrust them aside.  A
government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in
Germany, as has been the case in England, the United States, and
France--in all great countries of modern times except Germany.  If they
succeed they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone.  If they
fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace.  If they
succeed, America will fall within the menace, and we, and all the rest
of the world, must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make
ready for the next step in their aggression.  If they fail, the world
may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union."

The task of replying to the Pope was left by the Allied governments to
Wilson, who was not hampered by secret treaties.  In this remarkable
document he drove still further the wedge between the German people and
the Kaiser.  "The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at
the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no
reprisal upon the German people who have themselves suffered all things
in this war which they did not choose.  They believe that peace should
rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments--the
rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal right
to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon
fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German
people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek
domination."

In conclusion he said: "We cannot take the word of the present rulers
of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless
explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and
purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the
world would be justified in accepting.  Without such guarantees,
treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up
arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments,
reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government,
no man, no nation could now depend on.  We must await some new evidence
of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers.  God grant
it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all
peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of
covenanted peace."

Early in November, 1917, the Kerensky Government was overthrown in
Russia and the Bolsheviki came into power.  They at once proposed a
general armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter into
peace negotiations.  The Central Powers accepted the invitation, and
early in December negotiations began at Brest-Litovsk.  The Russian
peace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories,
self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war
indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial
questions in accordance with the above principles.  The Austrian
minister, Count Czernin, replied for the Central Powers, accepting more
of the Russian program than had been expected, but rejecting the
principle of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto
independent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the Allies
of the offer of general peace.  The conference called on the Allies for
an answer by January 4.  No direct reply was made to this demand, but
the Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboring
classes in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilson
felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies.

In a speech delivered January 5, 1918, Lloyd George made the first
comprehensive and authoritative statement of British war aims.  He had
consulted the labor leaders and Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as well
as some of the representatives of the overseas dominions, and he was
speaking, he said, for "the nation and the Empire as a whole."  He
explained first what the British were not fighting for.  He disclaimed
any idea of overthrowing the German Government, although he considered
military autocracy "a dangerous anachronism"; they were not fighting to
destroy Austria-Hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to
"those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it"; they
were not fighting "to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and
renowned lands of Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race," but
the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea must be
"internationalized and neutralized."  The positive statement of aims
included the complete restoration of Belgium, the return of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, rectification of the Italian boundary, the
independence of Poland, the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the
occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania, and a disposition of the
German colonies with "primary regard to the wishes and interests of the
native inhabitants of such colonies."  He insisted on reparation for
injuries done in violation of international law, but disclaimed a
demand for war indemnity.  In conclusion he declared the following
conditions to be essential to a lasting peace: "First, the sanctity of
treaties must be reëstablished; secondly, a territorial settlement must
be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of
the governed; and lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some
international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and
diminish the probability of war."

On January 8, 1918, three days after Lloyd George's speech, President
Wilson appeared before both Houses of Congress and delivered the most
important of all his addresses on war aims.  It contained the famous
Fourteen Points:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire.  The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be the acid test
of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as
distinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent and
unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys
in common with all other free nations.  No other single act will serve
as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws
which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another.  Without this healing act the whole
structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter
of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for
nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once
more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest
opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated: occupied
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the
sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another
determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of
allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the
several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should
include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be
guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.


In February negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were broken off as a result
of the excessive demands of the Germans and the armistice was declared
at an end.  The Germans quickly overran Poland and the Baltic provinces
and occupied Ukraine under a treaty which virtually placed the material
resources of that country at the disposal of the Central Powers.  In an
address at Baltimore, April 6, the anniversary of our entrance into the
war, President Wilson denounced the insincerity and perfidy of the
German rulers, who, he said, were "enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph
in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride."  He concluded
with these strong words: "Germany has once more said that force, and
force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the
affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as
she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind.  There is,
therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the
utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant
force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every
selfish dominion down in the dust."

Between the addresses of January 8 and the Armistice, the President
delivered other addresses in which he elaborated some of the principles
of the Fourteen Points.  Of special significance were his speeches of
February 11, July 4, and September 27.  In the last his mind centered
on the League of Nations.  "There can be no leagues or alliances or
special covenants and understandings within the general and common
family of the League of Nations," he declared, and "there can be no
special selfish economic combinations within the League, and no
employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the
power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world,
may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline
and control."  In conclusion he said that the United States was
prepared "to assume its full share of responsibility for the
maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace
must henceforth rest."

We now know from the published memoirs of German and Austrian statesmen
that President Wilson's speeches made a profound impression on the
peoples of Central Europe.  His utterances in behalf of the oppressed
nationalities, not only Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, but also the
Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, became stronger and more frequent
during the spring and summer of 1918, and solidified the opposition to
Germany at a critical period of the war.  On September 3 he recognized
the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent government.  This
meant the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had not been
contemplated at an earlier period, but, as he stated in his reply to
the Austrian request for an armistice in October, conditions had
changed since the announcement of the Fourteen Points, and these
peoples would no longer be satisfied with mere autonomy.

As a result of the Russian collapse and the negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk, the Germans withdrew their divisions from the eastern
front and staked everything on the great western drive of March, 1918.
When this movement was finally checked and the Allied advance began,
the German military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did not
have the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeat
meant the overthrow of the old system of government based on military
success.  They waited in vain for some military advantage which would
give them an opportunity to open negotiations without openly
acknowledging defeat.  Finally the state of demoralization at
Headquarters became so complete that there was no alternative but to
ask for an immediate armistice.  In order to pave the way for this
step, the ministry resigned October 1, and Prince Max of Baden was
called on to form a new government.  On the 4th he dispatched a note to
President Wilson through the Swiss Government, requesting him to call a
peace conference and stating that the German Government "accepts the
program set forth by the President of the United States in his message
to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and in his later pronouncements,
especially his speech of the 27th September, as a basis for peace
negotiations."

In reply the President asked for a clearer understanding on three
points: (1) Did the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government
accepted the terms laid down in the President's addresses referred to,
and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree
upon the practical details of their application?"  (2) The President
would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Allied
Governments so long as the armies of the Central Powers were upon their
soil.  (3) The President asked whether the Chancellor was speaking for
the constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the
war.

The German reply of October 12 was satisfactory on the first point.
With respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territory
they proposed a mixed commission to arrange the details.  On the third
point it was stated that the new government had been formed in
agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag.  Having
accomplished this much, the President's next step was skilfully taken.
He replied that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an
armistice were matters which must be left to the judgment of the
military advisers of the United States and the Allied Governments, but
that he would not agree to any arrangement which did not provide
"absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance
of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States
and of the Allies in the field."  Referring next to submarine warfare,
he declared that the United States and the Allied Governments could not
consider an armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continue
the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in."  In
conclusion he referred to a clause contained in his speech of July 4,
now accepted by the German Government as one of the conditions of
peace, namely, "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that
can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of
the world."  He added: "The power which has hitherto controlled the
German nation is of the sort here described.  It is within the choice
of the German nation to alter it."  He demanded that the United States
and the Allied Governments "should know beyond a peradventure" with
whom they were dealing.

In reply the Chancellor assured the President that a bill had been
introduced in the Reichstag to alter the constitution of the Empire so
as to give the representatives of the people the right to decide for
war or peace, but the President was not satisfied that there had been
any real change.  "It may be that future wars have been brought under
the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and
it is with the present war that we are dealing."  He was not willing to
accept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on the
part of Germany impossible.  If, he concluded, the United States "must
deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany
now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to
the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not
peace negotiations but surrender.  Nothing can be gained by leaving
this essential thing unsaid."  This note was written October 23.  Four
days later the Chancellor replied: "The President knows the deep-rooted
changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German
constitutional life.  The peace negotiations will be conducted by a
People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in
accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will
also be subject.  The German Government now awaits the proposals for an
armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President
in his manifestations has described."

The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at
Versailles and completed by November 5.  They were much more severe
than the public had expected them to be.  Germany was required
immediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and
Luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left
bank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and
Turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and
airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers.  This was practically unconditional surrender.
Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Foch
and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany
would not accept them.  They wanted an armistice that Germany would
accept.  General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the
complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval
forces of the enemy."  In America there was much criticism of the
President for being willing to negotiate with Germany at all.  "On to
Berlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the President was
preventing a complete military triumph.  On October 10 Senator Lodge
declared in the Senate: "The Republican party stands for unconditional
surrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood.  My own belief is
that the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender.  They
mean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace."

After reviewing the Armistice negotiations André Tardieu, a member of
the French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says:

"What remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice
secretly determined upon by an American dictator; submitted to by the
European governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victorious
armies, despite the opposition of the generals?  The Armistice was
discussed in the open light of day.  President Wilson only consented to
communicate it to his associates on the triple condition that its
principle be approved by the military authorities and its clauses would
be drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and not
discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of
hostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of
peace.  So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin till October
23, and in Paris from that date till November 5.  It was to the
Commander-in-Chief [Foch] that final decision was left not only on the
principle of the Armistice but upon its application.  He it was who
drew up the text.  And it was his draft that was adopted.  The action
of the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it more
severe.  That is the truth:--it is perhaps less picturesque but
certainly more in accord with common sense."

The terms of the Armistice were delivered to the Germans by Marshal
Foch November 7, and they were given seventy-two hours to accept or
reject them.  Meanwhile Germany's allies were rapidly deserting her.
Bulgaria surrendered September 30, and on October 30 Turkey signed an
armistice.  Finally on November 4, the rapidly disintegrating
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy also signed an armistice.  On October 28
there had been a naval mutiny at Kiel which spread rapidly to the other
ports.  On the 31st the Emperor departed for Army Headquarters, leaving
Berlin on the verge of revolution.  On the 7th of November the Social
Democrats demanded the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown Prince.
On the 9th Prince Max resigned the Chancellorship, and the Kaiser
abdicated and ignominiously fled across the border into Holland.  On
the 11th at 5 A. M. the Armistice was signed by the German delegates
and Marshal Foch, and it went into effect at 11 o'clock that day.

In two particulars the Wilson principles had been modified by the
Allies.  In the American note to Germany of November 5 Secretary
Lansing stated that the President had submitted his correspondence with
the German authorities to the Allied Governments and that he had
received in reply the following memorandum:

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the
correspondence which has passed between the President of the United
States and the German Government.  Subject to the qualifications which
follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the
Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the
President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles
of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses.  They must point
out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as
the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of
which they could not accept.  They must therefore reserve to themselves
complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.
Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to
Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the
Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as
to what this provision implies.  By it they understand that
compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the
civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression
of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."  In transmitting this
memorandum Secretary Lansing stated that he was instructed by the
President to say that he agreed with this interpretation.

With these modifications the Wilson principles were accepted by all
parties as the legal basis of the peace negotiations.



XI

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, and
President Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that
he decided to head the American delegation himself.  Great Britain,
France, and Italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it was
fitting that the United States should be represented by its most
responsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman of
the Allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace was
to be made.  But the decision of the President to go to Paris was
without precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticism
and opposition.  When he announced the names of the other members of
the delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe.
They were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador to
France, Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss.  There
had been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and
many people thought that the President should have taken Root, or
Roosevelt, or Taft.  Mr. White was a Republican but he had never been
active in party affairs or in any sense a leader.  In the Senate there
was deep resentment that the President had not selected any members of
that body to accompany him.  President McKinley had appointed three
senators as members of the commission of five that negotiated the
treaty of peace at the close of the Spanish War.  With that exception,
senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty.
The delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military,
economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whom
were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were
drawn.

But just before the signing of the Armistice, the President had
suffered a serious political defeat at home.  There had been severe
criticism of Democratic leadership in Congress and growing
dissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet.  In response
to the appeals of Democratic Congressmen, the President issued a
statement from the White House on October 25, asking the people, if
they approved of his leadership and wished him to continue to be their
"unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad," to vote for
the Democratic candidates for Congress.  He acknowledged that the
Republicans in Congress had loyally supported his war measures, but he
declared that they were hostile to the administration and that the time
was too critical for divided leadership.  This statement created a
storm of criticism, and did more than any other act in his
administration to turn the tide of public opinion against the
President.  The elections resulted in a Republican majority of
thirty-nine in the House and two in the Senate.  The President had
followed the practice of European premiers in appealing to the people,
but under our constitutional system he could not very well resign.  Had
he not issued his appeal, the election would have been regarded as a
repudiation of the Democratic Congress, but not necessarily as a
repudiation of the President.  The situation was most unfortunate, but
the President made no comments and soon after announced his intention
of going to Paris.  In December Lloyd George went to the country, and
on pledging himself to make Germany pay for the war and to hang the
Kaiser, he was returned by a substantial majority.  These pledges were
unnecessary and had a most unfortunate influence on the subsequent
negotiations at Paris.

The President sailed for France December 4, leaving a divided country
behind him.  His enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him.
Senator Sherman introduced a resolution declaring the presidency vacant
because the President had left the territory of the United States, and
Senator Knox offered another resolution declaring that the Conference
should confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that the
proposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at some
future time.

While his enemies in the Senate were busily organizing all the forces
of opposition against him, the President was welcomed by the war-weary
peoples of Europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as had
been the lot of few men in history to receive.  Sovereigns and heads of
States bestowed the highest honors upon him, while great crowds of
working men gathered at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpse
of the man who had led the crusade for a peace that would end war and
establish justice as the rule of conduct between the nations of the
world, great and small nations alike.

No mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations that
centered in Wilson when he landed on the shores of France in December,
1918.  The Armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, and
the peoples of Europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodied
in the treaty of peace.  He still held the moral leadership of the
world, but the war was over, the German menace ended, and national
rivalries and jealousies were beginning to reappear, even among those
nations who had so recently fought and bled side by side.  This change
was to be revealed when the Conference met.  There was no sign of it in
the plaudits of the multitudes who welcomed the President in France, in
England, and in Italy.  He returned on January 7, 1919, from Italy to
Paris, where delegates to the Conference from all the countries which
had been at war with Germany were gathering.

The first session of the Peace Conference was held January 18.  The
main work of the Conference was carried on by the Supreme Council,
constituted at this meeting and composed of the two ranking delegates
of each of the five great powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, the
United States, and Japan.  The decisions which this Council arrived at,
with the aid of the large groups of technical advisers which
accompanied the delegations of the great powers, were reported to the
Conference in plenary session from time to time and ratified.  The
Supreme Council was, however, gradually superseded by the "Big Four,"
Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, while the "Five,"
composed of ministers of foreign affairs, handled much of the routine
business, and made some important decisions, subject to the approval of
the "Four."  According to statistics compiled by Tardieu, the Council
of Ten held seventy-two sessions, the "Five" held thirty-nine, and the
"Four" held one hundred and forty-five.  As one of the American experts
puts it: "The 'Ten' fell into the background, the 'Five' never emerged
from obscurity, the 'Four' ruled the Conference in the culminating
period when its decisions took shape."

At the plenary session of January 25, President Wilson made a notable
speech in which he proposed the creation of a league of nations, and a
resolution to organize such a league and make it an integral part of
the general treaty was unanimously adopted.  A commission to draft a
constitution for the League was appointed with President Wilson as
chairman.  On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the League
was presented by him to the Conference, and on the following day he
sailed for the United States in order to consider the bills passed by
Congress before the expiration of the session on March 4.  The first
draft of the Covenant was hastily prepared, and it went back to the
commission for revision.  As soon as the text was made known in the
United States, opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate.
During the President's brief visit to Washington, he gave a dinner at
the White House to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of
explaining to them the terms of the Covenant.  There was no official
report of what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some of
the senators objected to the Covenant on the ground that it was
contrary to our traditional policies and inconsistent with our
Constitution and form of government.  On March 4, the day before the
President left New York to resume his duties at the Conference,
Senators Lodge and Knox issued a round robin, signed by thirty-seven
senators, declaring that they would not vote for the Covenant in the
form proposed, and that consideration of the League of Nations should
be postponed until peace had been concluded with Germany.  That same
night the President made a speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in
New York City in which, after explaining and defining the Covenant, he
said: "When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the
Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the
Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without
destroying the whole vital structure."  In this same address he also
said: "The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side
of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is
in favour of the League of Nations.  I know that this is true.  I have
had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and
the voice rings true in every case."  The President was evidently quite
confident that public sentiment would compel the Senate to ratify the
peace treaty, including the Covenant of the League.  A nation-wide
propaganda was being carried on by the League to Enforce Peace and
other organizations, and public sentiment for the League appeared to be
overwhelming.  The President took back to Paris with him various
suggestions of changes in the Covenant, and later ex-President Taft,
Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hughes proposed amendments which were
forwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission.  Some of
these suggestions, such as the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine and
the right of withdrawal from the League, were embodied in the final
draft.

When the President returned to Paris he found that Secretary Lansing
and Colonel House had consented to the separation of the League from
the treaty of peace.  He immediately reversed this decision, but the
final adoption of the Covenant was delayed by the demand of Japan that
a clause be inserted establishing "the principle of equality of nations
and just treatment of their nationals," which would have brought within
the jurisdiction of the League the status of Japan's subjects in
California and in the British dominions.  France urged the inclusion of
a provision creating a permanent General Staff to direct the military
operations of the League, and Belgium insisted that Brussels rather
than Geneva should be the seat of the League.  Meanwhile other national
aspirations were also brought forward which delayed the general treaty
of peace.  France wanted the entire left bank of the Rhine; Italy put
forth a claim to Fiume; and Japan, relying on secret agreements with
England, France, and Italy, insisted on her claims to Shantung.  No
economic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question of
reparations was threatening the disruption of the Conference.

The most difficult problem that the Conference had to solve was the
establishment of a new Franco-German frontier.  There was no question
about Alsace-Lorraine.  That had been disposed of by the Fourteen
Points, and Germany had acquiesced in its return to France in the
pre-Armistice agreement.  But no sooner was the Armistice signed than
Foch addressed a note to Clemenceau, setting forth the necessity of
making the Rhine the western frontier of Germany.  The Left Bank,
extending from Alsace-Lorraine to the Dutch frontier, embraced about
10,000 square miles and 5,500,000 people.  The debate on this question
continued at intervals for six months and at times became very
acrimonious.  The French representatives did not demand the direct
annexation of the Left Bank, but they proposed an independent or
autonomous Rhineland and French, or inter-Allied, occupation of the
Rhine for an indefinite period, or at least until the full execution by
Germany of the financial clauses of the treaty.  Both the British and
American delegates opposed the French proposals.  Lloyd George
repeatedly said: "We must not create another Alsace-Lorraine."  He also
remarked on one occasion: "The strongest impression made upon me by my
first visit to Paris was the statue of Strasburg veiled in mourning.
Do not let us make it possible for Germany to erect a similar statue."

This discussion was being carried on with great earnestness and
intensity of feeling when Wilson returned to Paris March 14.  That very
afternoon he met Lloyd George and Clemenceau.  The French argument was
set forth again at length and with great skill.  The fact was again
pointed out that the destruction of the German fleet had relieved
England from all fear of German invasion, and that the Atlantic Ocean
lay between Germany and the United States, while France, which had
suffered two German invasions in half a century, had no safeguard but
the League of Nations, which she did not deem as good a guarantee as
the Rhine bridges.  Finally Wilson and Lloyd George offered the
guarantee treaties, and Clemenceau agreed to take the proposal under
consideration.  Three days later he came back with a counter
proposition and a compromise was reached.  France gave up her demand
for a separate Rhineland, but secured occupation of the Left Bank,
including the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years as a
guarantee of the execution of the treaty.  In return the United States
and Great Britain pledged themselves to come to the immediate aid of
France, in case of an unprovoked attack, by an agreement which was to
be binding only if ratified by both countries.  This treaty the United
States Senate refused to ratify.  Foch was opposed to this compromise,
and adopted a course of action which was very embarrassing to
Clemenceau.  Fierce attacks on the French Government and on the
representatives of Great Britain and the United States, inspired by
him, appeared in the papers.  When the treaty was finally completed, he
even went so far as to refuse to transmit the note summoning the German
delegates to Versailles to receive it.  Wilson and Lloyd George finally
protested so vigorously to Clemenceau that Foch had to give way.

In view of the promises of Clemenceau and Lloyd George that Germany
should pay the cost of the war, the question of reparations was an
exceedingly difficult one to adjust.  President Wilson stoutly opposed
the inclusion of war costs as contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement,
and Lloyd George and Clemenceau finally had to give in.  The entire
American delegation and their corps of experts endeavored to limit the
charges imposed on Germany rigidly to reparation for damage done to
civilians in the occupied areas and on land and sea.  Lloyd George,
remembering the promises which he had made prior to the December
elections, insisted that pensions paid by the Allied governments should
be included as damage done to the civilian population.  This claim was
utterly illogical, for pensions fall properly into the category of
military expenses, but it was pressed with such skill and determination
by Lloyd George and General Smuts that President Wilson finally gave
his assent.

From the first the American delegates and experts were in favor of
fixing definitely the amount that Germany was to pay in the way of
reparations and settling this question once for all.  They hoped to
agree upon a sum which it was within Germany's power to pay.  But
Clemenceau and Lloyd George had made such extravagant promises to their
people that they were afraid to announce at this time a sum which would
necessarily be much less than the people expected.  They, therefore,
insisted that the question should be left open to be determined later
by a Reparations Commission.  They declared that any other course would
mean the immediate overthrow of their governments and the
reorganization of the British and French delegations.  President Wilson
did not care to put himself in the position of appearing to precipitate
a political crisis in either country, so he finally gave way on this
point also.  These concessions proved to be the most serious mistakes
that he made at Paris, for they did more than anything else to
undermine the faith of liberals everywhere in him.

The Italian delegation advanced a claim to Fiume which was inconsistent
both with the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points.  When
disagreement over this question had been delaying for weeks the
settlement of other matters, President Wilson finally made a public
statement of his position which was virtually an appeal to the Italian
people over the heads of their delegation.  The entire delegation
withdrew from the Conference and went home, but Premier Orlando
received an almost unanimous vote of confidence from his parliament,
and he was supported by an overwhelming tide of public sentiment
throughout Italy.  This was the first indication of Wilson's loss of
prestige with the peoples of Europe.

As already stated, the Japanese had insisted on the insertion in the
Covenant of the League of the principle of racial equality.  It is very
doubtful whether they ever expected to succeed in this.  The
probability is that they advanced this principle in order to compel
concessions on other points.  Japan's main demand was that the German
leases and concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung should be
definitely confirmed to her by the treaty.  Two weeks after the
outbreak of the World War, Japan had addressed an ultimatum to Germany
to the effect that she immediately withdraw all German vessels from
Chinese and Japanese waters and deliver not later than September 15 "to
the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the
entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a view to the eventual
restoration of the same to China."  In a statement issued to the press
Count Okuma said:

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people
of America and all the world that Japan has no ulterior motive or
desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any
other peoples of anything which they now possess."

The Germans had spent about $100,000,000 in improving Tsing-tau, the
principal city of Kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering.
After a siege of two months the city was captured by the Japanese army
and navy, assisted by a small force of British troops.  This was the
first act in the drama.  On January 8, 1915, Japan suddenly presented
to the Chinese government the now famous Twenty-one Demands,
deliberately misrepresenting to the United States and other powers the
nature of these demands.  Among other things, Japan demanded not only
that China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung that
Japan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that
she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantung
than Germany had enjoyed.  China was finally forced to agree to these
demands.

Japan's next step was to acquire from the Allies the assurance that
they would support her claims to Shantung and to the islands in the
Pacific north of the equator on the conclusion of the war.  This she
did in secret agreements signed in February and March, 1917, with
England, France, Italy, and Russia.  England agreed to support Japan's
claim on condition that Japan would support her claims to the Pacific
islands south of the equator.  France signed on condition that Japan
would use her influence on China to break relations with Germany and
place at the disposal of the Allies the German ships interned in
Chinese ports.  The Allies were evidently uneasy about Japan, and were
willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her.  This
uncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of the
Lansing-Ishii agreement signed November 2, 1917, in which the United
States recognized the "special interests" of Japan in China.

The secret treaties of the Allies relating to the Japanese claims were
not revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific
was under discussion at the Peace Conference.  When informed by Baron
Makino that the islands north of the equator had been pledged to Japan
by agreements signed two years before, President Wilson inquired
whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the
German rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan.  As the
other powers were pledged to support Japan's claims, President Wilson
found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had
also to oppose Japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equality
be inserted in the Covenant of the League.  This was a moral claim that
Japan urged with great strategic effect.  In pushing her claims to
Shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon
her legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies,
(2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest.
When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915,
Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with China
had been extorted by force.  Japan declared, however, that she had no
intention of holding Shantung permanently, but that she would restore
the province in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic
privileges transferred from Germany.  In view of this oral promise,
President Wilson finally acquiesced in the recognition of Japan's legal
status in Shantung.

On May 7 the completed treaty was presented to the German delegates who
had been summoned to Versailles to receive it.  When the text was made
public in Berlin there was an indignant outcry against the alleged
injustice of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent with
the pledges given by President Wilson in the pre-Armistice
negotiations, and the Germans made repeated efforts to draw the Allies
into a general discussion of principles.  They were, however, finally
given to understand that they must accept or reject the treaty as it
stood, and on June 28 it was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles--the same hall in which William I had been crowned Emperor
of Germany forty-eight years before.

The next day President Wilson sailed for the United States, and on July
10 personally presented the treaty to the Senate with an earnest appeal
for prompt ratification.  The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which
the treaty was referred, proceeded with great deliberation, and on July
31 began a series of public hearings which lasted until September 12.
The Committee called before it Secretary Lansing and several of the
technical advisors to the American delegation, including B. M. Baruch,
economic adviser, Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and David Hunter
Miller, legal adviser.  The Committee also called before it a number of
American citizens who had had no official connection with the
negotiations but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups,
including Thomas F. Millard for China, Joseph W. Folk for Egypt, Dudley
Field Malone for India, and a large delegation of Americans of Irish
descent, who opposed the League of Nations on the ground that it would
stand in the way of Ireland's aspiration for independence.  The rival
claims of Jugo-Slavs and Italians to Fiume, the demand of Albania for
self-determination, the claims of Greece to Thrace, and arguments for
and against the separation of Austria and Hungary were all presented at
great length to the Committee.  On August 19 the President received the
Committee at the White House, and after submitting a written statement
on certain features of the Covenant, he was questioned by members of
the Committee and a general discussion followed.

Meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the Senate.  The
President had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as in
other things, and the Senate now undertook to use his own weapon
against him by a public attack on the treaty.  Although the opposition
to the treaty was started in the Senate by Lodge, Borah, Johnson,
Sherman, Reed, and Poindexter, it was not confined to that body.
Throughout the country there were persons of liberal views who favored
the League of Nations but objected to the severe terms imposed on
Germany, and charged the President with having proved false to the
principles of the Fourteen Points.  There were others who did not
object to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the tradition of
isolation and thought membership in the League of Nations would involve
the sacrifice of national sovereignty.  The main object of attack was
Article X, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political
independence of all the members of the League.  President Wilson stated
to the Senate Committee that he regarded Article X as "the very
backbone of the whole Covenant," and that "without it the League would
be hardly more than an influential debating society."  The opponents of
the League declared that this article would embroil the United States
in the internal affairs of Europe, and that it deprived Congress of its
constitutional right to declare war.

In the Senate there were three groups: the small number of
"irreconcilables" who opposed the ratification of the treaty in any
form; a larger group who favored ratification without amendments, but
who finally expressed their willingness to accept "interpretative
reservations"; and a large group composed mainly of Republicans who
favored the ratification of the treaty only on condition that there
should be attached to it reservations safeguarding what they declared
to be the fundamental rights and interests of the United States.  This
group differed among themselves as to the character of the reservations
that were necessary, and some of them became known as "mild
reservationists."

It is probable that at the outset only the small group of
"irreconcilables" hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of the
treaty, but as the debate proceeded and the opposition to the treaty
received more and more popular support, the reservationists determined
to defeat the treaty altogether rather than to accept any compromise.
The Republican leaders were quick to realize that the tide of public
opinion had turned and was now running strongly against the President.
They determined, therefore, to ruin him at all hazards, and thus to
bring about the election of a Republican president.

When President Wilson realized that the treaty was really in danger of
defeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for the
purpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure to
bear on the Senate.  Beginning at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, he
proceeded through the northern tier of states to the Pacific coast,
then visited California and returned through Colorado.  He addressed
large audiences who received him with great enthusiasm.  He was
"trailed" by Senator Hiram Johnson, who was sent out by the opposition
in the Senate to present the other side.  Johnson also attracted large
crowds.  On the return trip, while delivering an address at Wichita,
Kansas, September 26, the President showed signs of a nervous breakdown
and returned immediately to Washington.  He was able to walk from the
train to his automobile, but a few days later he was partially
paralyzed.  The full extent and seriousness of his illness was
carefully concealed from the public.  He was confined to the White
House for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of the
treaty.

On September 10 the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty
to the Senate with a number of amendments and reservations.  The
Committee declared that the League was an alliance, and that it would
"breed wars instead of securing peace."  They also declared that the
Covenant demanded "sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty
which would in no way promote the world's peace," and that the
amendments and reservations which they proposed were intended "to guard
American rights and American sovereignty."  The following day the
minority members of the Committee submitted a report opposing both
amendments and reservations.  A few days later Senator McCumber
presented a third report representing the views of the "mild
reservationists."  It objected to the phraseology of the Committee's
reservations as unnecessarily severe and recommended substitute
reservations.  The treaty then became the regular order in the Senate
and was read section by section and debated each day for over two
months.  The amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected by
substantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would have
made it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the Allies but
also to Germany.  The majority of the senators were opposed to such a
course.  The Committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservations
for amendments, and Senator Lodge finally submitted, on behalf of the
Committee, fourteen reservations preceded by a preamble, which declared
that the ratification of the treaty was not to take effect or bind the
United States until these reservations had been accepted as a condition
of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and
associated powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

The first reservation provided that in case of withdrawal from the
League the United States should be the sole judge as to whether its
international obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled.  This
reservation was adopted by a vote of 50 to 35.

The second reservation declared that the United States assumed no
obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political
independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies
between nations under the provisions of Article X "or to employ the
military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the
treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or
authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United
States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide."  This reservation
was adopted by a vote of 46 to 33.

Reservation Number 3, providing that no mandate under the treaty should
be accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, was
adopted by a vote of 52 to 31.

Number 4, excluding domestic questions from consideration by the
Council or the Assembly of the League, was adopted by a vote of 59 to
26.

Number 5, declaring the Monroe Doctrine "to be wholly outside the
jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any
provision contained in said treaty of peace with Germany," and
reserving to the United States the sole right to interpret the Monroe
Doctrine, was adopted by a vote of 55 to 34.

Number 6, withholding the assent of the United States from the
provisions of the treaty relating to Shantung and reserving full
liberty of action with respect to any controversy which might arise
under said articles between China and Japan, was adopted by a vote of
53 to 41.

Number 7, reserving to Congress the right to provide by law for the
appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly
and Council of the League and members of commissions, committees or
courts under the League, and requiring the confirmation of all by the
Senate, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 40.

Number 8, declaring that the Reparations Commission should not be
understood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exports
from the United States to Germany or from Germany to the United States
without an act or joint resolution of Congress, was adopted by a vote
of 54 to 40.

Number 9, declaring that the United States should not be under any
obligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the League without
an act of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 10, providing that if the United States should at any time adopt
any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the
League, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without the
consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with
invasion or engaged in war," was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 11, reserving the right of the United States to permit the
nationals of a Covenant-breaking State residing within the United
States to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations
with the nationals of the United States, was adopted by a vote of 53 to
41.

Number 12, relating to the very complicated question of private debts,
property rights and interests of American citizens, was adopted by a
vote of 52 to 41.

Number 13, withholding the assent of the United States from the entire
section of the treaty relating to international labor organization
until Congress should decide to participate, was adopted by a vote of
54 to 35.

Number 14 declared that the United States would not be bound by any
action of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and
its self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregate
more than one vote.  This reservation was adopted by a vote of 55 to 38.

A number of other reservations were offered and rejected.  Under the
rules of the Senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may be
adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by a
two-thirds vote.  A number of senators who were opposed to the treaty
voted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat.  When
the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken November 19, it
stood 39 for and 55 against.  A motion to reconsider the vote was then
adopted, and Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader, proposed five
reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, the
Monroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the employment of
the naval and military forces of the United States in any case arising
under Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers of
self-governing colonies or dominions.  These reservations were
rejected, the vote being 41 to 50.  Another vote was then taken on the
treaty with the Lodge reservations, the result being 41 for and 51
against.  Senator Underwood then offered a resolution to ratify the
treaty without reservations of any kind.  The vote on this resolution
was 38 for and 53 against.

It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the
ratification of the treaty without compromise.  On January 8, 1920, a
letter from the President was read at the Jackson Day dinner in
Washington, in which he refused to accept the decision of the Senate as
final and said: "There can be no reasonable objection to
interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself.  But when
the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we have
ratified or rejected it.  We cannot rewrite this treaty.  We must take
it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then,
after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable
task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany."  In
conclusion he declared: "If there is any doubt as to what the people of
the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is
to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of
the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn
referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in
completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the
future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate."

During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by an
informal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter saying
he would accept the Hitchcock reservations, but Lodge refused to accept
any compromise.  On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty to
the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back
immediately with the reservations previously adopted.  After several
weeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy
for Ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of 38 to 36.  It was as
follows: "In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germany
the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to
the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for
a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919,
and declares that when such government is obtained by Ireland, a
consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as
a member of the League of Nations."

With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an
important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally
put to the vote March 19, 1920.  The result was 49 votes for and 35
against.  On the following day the secretary of the Senate was
instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the President
and to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it.

The treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign,
but unfortunately it was not the only issue.  The election proved to be
a referendum on the Wilson administration as a whole rather than on the
treaty.  The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, attacked the Wilson
administration for its arbitrary and unconstitutional methods and
advocated a return to "normalcy."  He denounced the Wilson League as an
attempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored an
association of nations and an international court.  Governor Cox, the
Democratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularly
during the latter part of his campaign.  The result was an overwhelming
victory for Harding.  President Wilson had been too ill to take any
part in the campaign.  His administration had been the chief issue, and
the people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it.  He
accepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments,
content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairs
to the verdict of history.  In December, 1920, the Nobel Peace Prize
was awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he had
rendered to humanity.



XII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

After the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate,
President Wilson withdrew as far as possible from participation in
European affairs, and after the election of Harding he let it be known
that he would do nothing to embarrass the incoming administration.  The
public had been led to believe that when Harding became President there
would be a complete reversal of our foreign policy all along the line,
but such was not to be the case.  The new administration continued
unchanged the Wilson policy toward Mexico and toward Russia, and before
many months had passed was seeking from Congress the authority,
withheld from Wilson, to appoint a member on the Reparations
Commission.  On the question of our rights in mandated areas, Secretary
Hughes adopted in whole the arguments which had been advanced by
Secretary Colby in his note to Great Britain of November 20, 1920, in
regard to the oil resources of Mesopotamia.  By the San Remo agreement
of April 25, 1920, Great Britain and France had agreed upon a division
of the oil output of Mesopotamia by which France was to be allowed 25
per cent. and Great Britain 75 per cent.  The British Government had
intimated that the United States, having declined to join the League of
Nations, had no voice in the matter.  On this point Secretary Colby
took sharp issue in the following statement: "Such powers as the Allied
and Associated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of the
governmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a direct
result of the war against the Central Powers.  The United States, as a
participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful
issue, cannot consider any of the Associated Powers, the smallest not
less than herself, debarred from the discussion of any of its
consequences, or from participation in the rights and privileges
secured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace."

Japan likewise assumed that we had nothing to do with the disposition
of the former German islands in the Pacific.  When the Supreme Council
at Paris decided to give Japan a mandate over the islands north of the
equator, President Wilson reserved for future consideration the final
disposition of the island of Yap, which lies between Guam and the
Philippines, and is one of the most important cable stations in the
Pacific.  The entire question of cable communications was reserved for
a special conference which met at Washington in the autumn of 1920, but
this conference adjourned about the middle of December without having
reached any final conclusions, and the status of Yap became the subject
of a very sharp correspondence between the American and Japanese
governments.  When Hughes became Secretary of State, he restated the
American position in a note of April 2, 1921, as follows:

"It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas
possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the
Allied and Associated Powers, and it is also believed that there is no
disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to deny the
participation of the United States in that victory.  It would seem to
follow necessarily that the right accruing to the Allied and Associated
Powers through the common victory is shared by the United States and
that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas
possessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the assent of
the United States."

The discussion between the two governments was still in progress when
the Washington Conference convened, and at the close of the Conference
it was announced that an agreement had been reached which would be
embodied in a treaty.  The United States recognized Japan's mandate
over the islands north of the equator on the condition that the United
States should have full cable rights on the island of Yap, and that its
citizens should enjoy certain rights of residence on the island.  The
agreement also covered radio telegraphic service.

During the presidential campaign Harding's position on the League of
Nations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect,
but when Hughes and Hoover were appointed members of the Cabinet, it
was generally expected that the new administration would go into the
League with reservations.  This expectation was not to be fulfilled,
however, for the President persistently ignored the existence of the
League, and took no notice of the establishment of the permanent Court
of International Justice provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant.
Meanwhile Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State had instructed our
delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 to propose the establishment
of such a court, had been invited by the Council of the League to be
one of a commission of distinguished jurists to draft the statute
establishing the court.  This service he performed with conspicuous
ability.  As another evidence of Europe's unwillingness to leave us
out, when the court was organized John Bassett Moore, America's most
distinguished authority on international law, was elected one of the
judges.

Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and American
troops were still on the Rhine.  On July 2, 1921, Congress passed a
joint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to
reserve to the United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities,
reparations or advantages" to which it was entitled under the terms of
the Armistice, or by reason of its participation in the war, or which
had been stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or to
which it was entitled as one of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, or to which it was entitled by virtue of any act or acts of
Congress.  On August 25 the United States Government, through its
commissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a separate treaty of peace
with Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the joint
resolution of Congress.  About the same time a similar treaty was
signed with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senate
of the United States October 18.  The proclamation of peace produced no
immediate results of any importance.  American troops continued on the
Rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been
carried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses.

If mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the events
leading up to the World War should have exploded the fallacy that the
way to preserve peace is to prepare for war.  Competition in armament,
whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead to
nothing else.  And yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war,
the race for armaments continued with increased momentum.  France,
Russia, and Poland maintained huge armies, while the United States and
Japan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs in
the history of the world.  Great Britain, burdened with debt, was
making every effort to keep pace with the United States.

This naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united in
the war against Germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probable
outcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming.  We had no
quarrel with England, but England was the ally of Japan, and relations
between Japan and the United States in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia
were far from reassuring.  The question of the continuance of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial
Conference, which met at London in the early summer of 1921.  The
original purpose of this compact was to check the Russian advance in
Manchuria.  It was renewed in revised form in 1905 against Germany, and
again renewed in 1911 against Germany for a period of ten years.  With
the removal of the German menace, what reasons were there for Great
Britain to continue the alliance?  It bore too much the aspect of a
combination against the United States, and was of course the main
reason for the naval program which we had adopted.  So long as there
were only three navies of importance in the world and two of them
united in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard our
position as a sea power.

One of the main objects of the formation of the League of Nations was
to bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and a
commission was organized under the League to consider this question,
but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation of
navies so long as a great naval power like the United States refused to
coöperate with the League of Nations or even to recognize its
existence.  As President Harding had promised the American people some
substitute for the League of Nations, he decided, soon after coming
into office, to convene an international conference to consider the
limitation of armament on land and sea.  By the time the Conference
convened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subject
of land armament.  It was recognized from the first that the mere
proposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective steps
could be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflict
which make navies necessary.  Therefore the formal invitation to the
Conference extended to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy
and Japan, August 11, 1921, linked the subject of Limitation of
Armament with Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.  The European powers
accepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but Japan's answer was
held back for some time.  She was reluctant to have the powers review
the course she had pursued in China and Siberia while they were at war
with Germany.  After agreeing to attend the Conference, Japan
endeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, and
she soon entered into negotiations with China over the Shantung
question with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would prevent
that question from coming before the Conference.  Invitations to the
Conference were later sent to the governments of Belgium, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and China.  Portugal was interested because of
her settlement at Macao, the oldest European settlement in China.
Holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the Pacific.
While Belgium has no territorial interests in the Orient, she has for
years been interested in Chinese financial matters.

The Washington Conference convened in plenary session November 12,
1921, in Memorial Continental Hall.  Seats were reserved on the main
floor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved for
officials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to secure
tickets of admission.  The question of open diplomacy which had been
much discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes,
who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals for
the limitation of navies before the Conference.  There were in all
seven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little more
than confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee.
The real work of the Conference was carried on by committees, and from
the meetings of these committees the public and press representatives
were as a matter of course excluded.  There were two principal
committees, one on the Limitation of Armament, and the other on Pacific
and Far Eastern Questions.  There were various sub-committees, in the
work of which technical delegates participated.  Minutes were kept of
the meetings of the two principal committees, and after each meeting a
communiqué was prepared for the press.  In fact, the demand for
publicity defeated to a large extent its own ends.  So much matter was
given to the press that when it was published in full very few people
had time to read it.  As a general rule, the less real information
there was to give out, the longer were the communiqués.  Experienced
correspondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions were
made with as much secrecy in Washington as at Paris.

The plan of the United States for the limitation of armament presented
by Secretary Hughes at the first session proposed (1) that all programs
for the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, be
abandoned; (2) that a large number of battleships of older types still
in commission be scrapped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliary
combatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane
carriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital ships.  These
proposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under consideration
in the same relative positions.  Under this plan the United States
would be allowed 500,000 tons of capital ships, Great Britain 500,000
tons, and Japan 300,000 tons.

Japan objected to the 5-5-3 ratio proposed by Secretary Hughes, and
urged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength.  The
American proposal included the scrapping of the _Mutsu_, the pride of
the Japanese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed.
The sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navy
were much greater than those which England or Japan were called upon to
make, and in this lay the strength of the American position.  The
Japanese refused, however, to give up the _Mutsu_, and they were
finally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the 5-5-3
ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the United
States and Great Britain.  In the treaty as finally agreed upon, Japan
was allowed 315,000 tons of capital ships and the United States and
Great Britain each 525,000 tons.

In his address at the opening session, Secretary Hughes said: "In view
of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the
existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought
to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage
allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this
subject be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference."
This somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gave
unexpected offense to the French delegation.  During the next four or
five weeks, while Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were
discussing the case of the _Mutsu_ and the question of fortifications
in the Pacific, the French delegates were cherishing their resentment
at being treated as the representatives of a second-class power.
Hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation like
France undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of that
part of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines.

When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the
allowance of capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in
committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demand
of 350,000 tons of capital ships.  According to Hughes's figures based
on existing strength, she was entitled to 175,000 tons.  It is not
probable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a large
tonnage.  It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the
committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that
France could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order
to pave the way for their submarine proposal.  Unfortunately the French
demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and
caused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers.  In
the committee the relations between the British and French delegates
became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the
submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine
tonnage.  On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the
heads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris.
As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for
capital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon
cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft.  Italy accepted the same
ratio as France.

Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed.  As a result, the
treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if
they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial
warfare.  As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir
Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that
the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the
future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface
ships.  The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval
treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as
obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their
submarine and aircraft programs.  There is no limitation upon the
building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons
displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.

By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, and
Japan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and
naval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions,
notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand.  This
agreement relieves Japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope
that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of
1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on the
Great Lakes.

The 5-5-3 ratio puts the navies of Great Britain, the United States,
and Japan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis.
Each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one of
them will be able to attack the home territory of the others.  Of
course it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines,
together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alter
the situation.  Hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: national
defense and the enforcement of foreign policies.  The new treaty means
that as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be used
for defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies in
distant quarters of the globe.  In other words, when disputes arise,
British policies will prevail in the British area, American policies in
the American area, and Japanese policies in the Japanese area.  Having
agreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attack
Japan, the only pressure we can bring to bear upon her in China or
elsewhere is moral pressure.  Through what was considered by some a
grave strategical error, the naval treaty was completed before any
settlement of the Chinese and Siberian questions had been reached.

The French insistence on the practically unlimited right to build
submarines caused much hard feeling in England.  The British delegates
had proposed the total abolition of submarines, and this proposal had
been ably supported by the arguments of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee.
Unfortunately the United States delegation stood for the submarine,
proposing merely certain limits upon its use.  The five naval powers
finally signed a treaty reaffirming the old rules of international law
in regard to the search and seizure of merchant vessels, and declaring
that "any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of
those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war
and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy
and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of
any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found."  By the
same treaty the signatory powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibit
the use in war of poisonous gases.

The attempt to limit by treaty the use of the submarine and to prohibit
altogether the use of gases appears to many to be utterly futile.
After the experience of the late war, no nation would readily trust the
good faith of another in these matters.  Each party to a war would
probably feel justified in being prepared to use the submarine and
poison gases, contrary to law, in case the other party should do so.
We would thus have the same old dispute as in the late war in regard to
floating mines as to which party first resorted to the outlawed
practice.  What is the use in solemnly declaring that a submarine shall
not attack a merchant vessel, and that the commander of a submarine who
violates this law shall be treated as a pirate, when the contracting
parties found it utterly impossible to agree among themselves upon a
definition of a merchant vessel?

But the reader may ask, what is the use in signing any treaty if
nations are so devoid of good faith?  The answer is that the vast
majority of treaties are faithfully kept in time of peace, but that
very few treaties are fully observed in time of war.  Had these five
powers signed a treaty pledging themselves not to build or maintain
submarines of any kind or description, we would have every reason to
expect them to live up to it.  But when a nation is engaged in war and
has a large flotilla of submarines which it has agreed to use only for
certain purposes, there is apt to come a time when the temptation to
use them for wholly different purposes will be overwhelming.

The Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions held its first
meeting November 16.  This committee was primarily concerned with the
very delicate situation created by the aggressive action and expansion
of Japan during the past twenty years.  In 1905, by the Treaty of
Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the Russian rights in southern
Manchuria; in 1910 she annexed Korea; in 1911, during the Chinese
Revolution, she stationed troops at Hankow and later constructed
permanent barracks; in 1914, after the defeat of the Germans at
Kiao-chau, she took over all the German interests in the Shantung
peninsula; in 1915 she presented the Twenty-one Demands to China and
coerced that power into granting most of them; and in 1918, in
conjunction with the United States, Great Britain, and France, she
landed a military force in the Maritime Province of Siberia for the
definite purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops who had made
their way to that province and of guarding the military stores at
Vladivostok.  The other powers had all withdrawn their contingents, but
Japan had increased her force from one division to more than 70,000
troops.  The eastern coast of Asia was thus in the firm grip of Japan,
and she had secured concessions from China which seriously impaired the
independence of that country.

It was commonly supposed that the United States delegation had prepared
a program on the Far Eastern question, and that this would be presented
in the same way that Hughes had presented the naval program.  If this
was the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for between one
and two o'clock at night the Chinese delegates were aroused from their
slumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for them to
present China's case before the committee at eleven o'clock that
morning.  They at once went to work with their advisers, and a few
minutes before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of the
Ten Points, which Minister Sze read before the committee.  These Points
constituted a Chinese declaration of independence, and set forth a
series of general principles to be applied in the determination of
questions relating to China.  Several days later the committee adopted
four resolutions, presented by Mr. Root, covering in part some of the
Chinese principles.  By these resolutions the powers agreed to respect
the independence and territorial integrity of China, to give China the
fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable
government, to recognize the principle of equality for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China, and to
refrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek
special rights or privileges.  This somewhat vague and general
declaration of principles appeared to be all that China was likely to
get.  Had Mr. Hughes presented a Far Eastern program and gotten nothing
more than this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige of
the United States.  That is probably why he decided at the last moment
to let China present her own case.

At the fourth plenary session of the Conference the treaty relating to
the Pacific islands, generally known as the Four-Power Treaty, was
presented by Senator Lodge.  By the terms of this treaty, the United
States, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed "to respect their
rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions
in the region of the Pacific Ocean," and in case of any dispute arising
out of any Pacific question to refer the matter to a joint conference
for consideration and adjustment.  This article appeared harmless
enough, but Article 2 seemed to lay the foundations of an alliance
between these powers.  It was as follows: "If the said rights are
threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High
Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and
frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient
measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of
the particular situation."  This treaty is to remain in force for ten
years, after which it may be terminated by any of the High Contracting
Parties on twelve months' notice.  It supersedes the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance which, it expressly provided, should terminate on the exchange
of ratifications.

In presenting the treaty, Senator Lodge assured his hearers that "no
military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under
cover of these plain and direct clauses," and Secretary Hughes in
closing the discussion declared that it would probably not be possible
to find in all history "an international document couched in more
simple or even briefer terms," but he added, "we are again reminded
that the great things are the simple ones."  In view of these
statements the members of the Conference and the public generally were
completely flabbergasted some days later when Secretary Hughes and the
President gave out contradictory statements as to whether the treaty
included the Japanese homeland.  Hughes stated to the correspondents
that it did, the President said it did not.  Whereupon some wag
remarked that at Paris President Wilson did not let the American
delegation know what he did, while at Washington the delegates did not
let President Harding know what they were doing.  In deference to the
President's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the Japanese press
a supplementary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that the
term "insular possessions and insular dominions" did not include the
Japanese homeland.

Meanwhile the Shantung question was being discussed by China and Japan
outside of the Conference, but with representatives of the British and
American governments sitting as observers ready to use their good
offices if called on.  The reason for not bringing the question before
the Conference was that Great Britain, France, and Italy were parties
to the Treaty of Versailles, which gave Japan a legal title to the
German leases in Shantung.  The restoration of the province to China
was vital to a satisfactory adjustment of Chinese affairs generally.
Japan, however, was in no hurry to reach an agreement with China,
wishing for strategical purposes to keep the matter in suspense to the
last, if not to avoid a settlement until after the adjournment of the
Conference and continue negotiations under more favorable conditions at
Peking or Tokio.

By Christmas it seemed that the Conference had accomplished about all
that was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreements
already reached could be put into treaty form and signed.  At the end
of the first week in January it looked as if the Chinese and Japanese
had reached a deadlock, and that the Conference would adjourn without a
satisfactory adjustment of any of the Chinese problems.  Mr. Balfour
and other important delegates had engaged return passage, and all
indications pointed to an early dissolution of the Conference.  But the
unexpected happened.  At an informal gathering of Administration
leaders at the White House on Saturday night, January 7, stock was
taken of the work of the Conference, and some of the senators present
expressed the opinion that if it adjourned without doing more for
China, there would be little hope of getting the treaties ratified.  As
a result Secretary Hughes persuaded the British and Japanese delegates
to cancel their sailings, and with characteristic energy and
determination took personal charge of the Far Eastern situation, which
up to this time had been left mainly to Mr. Root.  After a little
pressure had been brought to bear on the Chinese by President Harding,
and probably on the Japanese by Mr. Balfour, Secretary Hughes was
finally able to announce at the plenary session of February 1 that
China and Japan had reached an agreement as to the terms on which
Shantung was to be restored.  At the same session the agreements in
regard to China reached by the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs were
announced.  These agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, one
dealing with the tariff and the other with the open door, and a series
of ten resolutions.

Since the middle of the last century Chinese tariffs have been
regulated by treaties with foreign powers, the customs service
organized and administered by foreigners, and the receipts mortgaged to
meet the interest on foreign loans.  China has never been permitted to
levy duties in excess of 5 per cent., and, in fact, as a result of the
methods of valuation the duties have not averaged above 3 1/2 per cent.
This has been an unjust state of affairs, and has deprived the Chinese
Government of what would naturally be one of its main sources of
revenue.  By the new agreement there is to be an immediate revision of
tariff valuations so as to make the 5 per cent. effective.  China is
also to be allowed to levy a surtax on certain articles, mainly
luxuries, which will yield an additional revenue.  It is estimated that
the total annual increase in revenue derived from maritime customs will
be about $150,000,000 silver.  It is claimed by some, with a certain
degree of truth, that any increase in Chinese customs duties will be
immediately covered by liens to secure new loans, and that putting
money into the Chinese treasury just now is like pouring it into a rat
hole.  As soon as China is able to establish a stable and honest
government, she should, without question, be relieved of all treaty
restrictions on her tariffs.

The Conference also took certain steps to restore to China other
sovereign rights long impaired by the encroachments of foreign powers.
A commission is to be appointed to investigate the administration of
justice with a view to the ultimate extinction of extraterritorial
rights now enjoyed by foreigners.  The powers also agreed to abandon
not later than January 1, 1923, their existing postal agencies in
China, provided an efficient Chinese postal service be maintained.  The
system of foreign post offices in China has been the subject of great
abuses, as through these agencies goods of various kinds, including
opium and other drugs, have been smuggled into China.  The powers
further made a general promise to aid the Chinese Government in the
unification of railways into a general system under Chinese control.
They also agreed to restore to China all radio stations other than
those regulated by treaty or maintained by foreign governments within
their legation limits.

In the treaty relating to the open door, the Contracting Powers other
than China pledged themselves to the following principles:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial
and administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China
to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing
and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order
to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action
inimical to the security of such States."

China on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, and
pledged herself for the first time to respect it.  Pledges to respect
the open door in China have been made by foreign powers upon various
occasions in the past and broken as often as made.  The expression
"equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" is not
new.  It occurs in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, in the
Root-Takahira agreement of 1908, and in numerous other documents.  In
recent years, however, the United States has been the only power which
has tried to preserve the open door in China.  Most of the other powers
have regarded the Chinese situation as hopeless, and have believed that
the only solution was to let foreign powers come in and divide and rule
the territory of the empire.  In view of the new treaty the open door
is no longer merely an American policy, but an international policy,
and responsibility for its enforcement rests not on the United States
alone but on all nine parties to the treaty.

The agenda or program of the Conference offered as one of the subjects
to be considered the status of existing commitments in China.  When
Secretary Hughes brought this subject up before the Far Eastern
Committee, Japan entered an emphatic objection to its consideration,
and the matter was dropped immediately without argument.  The treaty,
therefore, is not retroactive, for it recognizes the status quo in
Manchuria and to a less extent in other parts of China.  The saving
clause of the new agreement is, however, a resolution providing for the
establishment of an international board of reference, to which
questions arising in regard to the open door may be referred.

Will Japan respect the pledges she has made and live up to the spirit
of her promises?  If she does, the Washington Conference will prove to
be a great success.  If, on the contrary, Japan does not intend to live
up to her pledges or intends to fulfill them only in part, her position
in Asia has been greatly strengthened.  She is more firmly intrenched
in Manchuria than ever.  She holds the Maritime Province of Siberia
under a promise to get out, which she has repeatedly made and
repeatedly broken, as was plainly stated by Secretary Hughes before the
full Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, and repeated at a plenary
session of the Conference.  His statement was one of the most
remarkable, by reason of its directness and unvarnished truth, in the
history of American diplomacy.  After reviewing the correspondence
between the two governments and the reiterated assurances of Japan of
her intention to withdraw from Siberia, assurances which so far had not
been carried out, Mr. Hughes expressed his gratification at the renewal
of these assurances before the Conference in plenary session.  Unless
Japan is utterly devoid of moral shame, she will have to make good her
word this time.

When the treaties drafted by the Conference were submitted by the
President to the Senate, they encountered serious opposition, but were
finally ratified.  The Republican leaders, particularly Senator Lodge,
were twitted with charges of inconsistency in advocating certain
features of these treaties when they had violently opposed the League
of Nations.  The Four-Power Treaty is much more of an entangling
alliance than the Covenant of the League, and the Naval Treaty deprives
Congress for a period of fifteen years of its constitutional right to
determine the size of the navy and to provide for the defense of Guam
and the Philippines.  In fact, there were very few objections raised to
the League of Nations which could not with equal force be applied to
the Four-Power and Naval Treaties.  The Four-Power Treaty was the main
object of attack, and Senators Lodge and Underwood were greatly
embarrassed in attempting to explain its meaning.  Its "baffling
brevity" demanded explanations, but no satisfactory explanations were
forthcoming.  They talked in general terms about the tremendous
importance of the treaty, but they dared not state the real fact that
the treaty was drafted by Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato as the most
convenient method of terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without
making it appear to the Japanese public that their government had
surrendered the alliance without due compensation.  According to an
Associated Press Dispatch from Tokio, January 31, 1922, Baron Uchida,
the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying to interpolations in
the House of Peers, said: "The Four-Power Treaty was not intended to
abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but rather to widen and extend
it."  The real _quid pro quo_ for the termination of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance was the agreement of the United States not to construct naval
bases or new fortifications in Guam and the Philippines, and the clause
terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might just as well have been
attached to the Naval Treaty, but this would not have satisfied
Japanese public opinion.  Great Britain and Japan were permitted to
terminate their alliance in any way that they might deem best.  After
the Four-Power Treaty was accepted by the American delegates, they
feared that it would look too much as if the United States had merely
been drawn into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  It was decided,
therefore, at the eleventh hour to give the agreement a more general
character by inviting France to adhere to it.  France agreed to sign,
although she resented not having been consulted during the negotiation
of the treaty.

The achievements of the Conference, although falling far short of the
extravagant claims made by the President and the American delegates,
are undoubtedly of great importance.  The actual scrapping of millions
of dollars' worth of ships in commission or in process of construction
gives the world an object lesson such as it has never had before.  One
of the most significant results of the Conference was the development
of a complete accord between England and the United States, made
possible by the settlement of the Irish question and furthered by the
tact and gracious bearing of Mr. Balfour.  One of the unfortunate
results was the increased isolation of France, due to the failure of
her delegates to grasp the essential elements of the situation and to
play any but a negative role.  The success of the Conference was due
largely to Secretary Hughes who, though handicapped at every point by
fear of the Senate and by the unfortunate commitments of President
Harding during the last campaign, may be said on the whole to have
played his hand reasonably well.

Meanwhile we are still drifting, so far as a general European policy is
concerned.  President Harding's idea of holding aloof from "Europe's
league," as he prefers to designate the League of Nations, and of
having a little league of our own in the Pacific, will not work.  The
world's problems cannot be segregated in this way.  Europe's league
includes all of the principal American nations except the United States
and Mexico, while our Pacific league includes the two leading European
powers.  As soon as the American people realize--and there are
indications that they are already waking up to the reality--that the
depression in domestic industry and foreign commerce is due to
conditions in Europe and that prosperity will not return until we take
a hand in the solution of European problems, there will be a general
demand for a constructive policy and America will no longer hesitate to
reassume the leadership which she renounced in the referendum of 1920,
but which the rest of the world is ready to accord to her again.



INDEX


ABC alliance, 162, 165.

Aberdeen, Lord, opposes annexation of Texas by United States, 108.

Adams, Charles Francis, 114.

Adams, Henry, letter from Hay to, 90.

Adams, John Quincy, opposes joint action with England, 31; accepts
invitation to send delegates to Panama Congress, 154.

"Alabama Claims," 66, 113, 114.

Alaskan Boundary Dispute, 122, 124.

Algeciras Conference, 74; American participation in, 76, 77.

Alliance, of 1778 with France, 5-8; proposed alliance with England, 13,
26; Holy Alliance, 22, 24; Anglo-Japanese alliance, 92, 120.  _See_
"Entangling Alliances."

Alverstone, Lord, member of Alaskan boundary commission, 123.

American Colonisation Society, 59.

American delegation to Peace Conference, 225.

American Institute of International Law, 157.

American Republics, Bureau of, 156.

American Revolution, significance of, 99.

Anglo-American ideals, 126, 127.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 92, 120, 265, 279, 288.

Arbitration, international, 64.  _See_ Hague Court, Olney-Pauncefote
Treaty.

Armistice, negotiations preceding, 213-217.

Arms and ammunition.  _See_ Munitions of war.

"Aroostook War," 106.

Austria-Hungary, protests against trade in munitions, 182.


Balfour, Arthur James, 274, 288, 289.

Beer, George L., quoted, 99.

Belgium, German invasion of, 79; restoration of, demanded, 207.

Beresford, Lord Charles, advocates open door in China, 86.

Berlin Conference of 1884, 6l.

"Big Four," at Peace Conference, 230.

Bingham, Hiram, on Monroe Doctrine, 131.

Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe Doctrine, 45; on English control of North
America, 126; forces war on Austria, 47; forces war on France, 48.

Blaine, James G., efforts to modify Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 115; issues
invitation to International Conference of American States, 155, 156.

Bliss, Gen. Tasker H., 225.

Board of Reference, in China, 286.

Bolivar, Simon, 153.

Bolsheviki, 203.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, acquires Louisiana, 12; fails to establish control
over Spain's Colonies, 25.

Bowen, Herbert, 51.

Boxer uprising in China, 88

Brest-Litovsk, peace negotiations at, 203, 210, 212.

Brussels Conference on African slave trade, 62.

Bryan, William Jennings, negotiates treaty with Nicaragua, 135; with
Colombia, 144; refuses to modify neutrality laws at demand of Germany,
182.

Bryce, Lord, quoted, 125, 126.

Bülow, Prince von, 75, 91.


California, danger of English occupation of, 109.

Canada, insurrection of 1837, 103.

Canning, George, British foreign secretary, proposes Anglo-American
alliance, 26; delays recognition of South American republics, 33, 34;
interview with Prince Polignac, 35; boasts of calling new world into
existence, 39; opposes Pan-American movement, 155.

Caribbean Sea, American supremacy in, 121; advance of United States in,
132; new American policies in, 132, 137, 144.

_Caroline_, the, 103.

Carranza, Venustiano, 162, 163.

Castlereagh, Viscount, 20.

China, treaties relating to tariff and open door, 282-285.  _See_
Open-door policy.

Choate, Joseph H., at Second Hague Conference, 68, 69.

Civil War, foreign policy of United States during, 65; disputes with
England, 112.

Clay, Henry, opposes joint action with  England, 31; instructions to
delegates to Panama Congress, 154.

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 44, 111.

Cleveland, Grover, intervenes in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48;
withholds Kongo treaty from Senate, 61; Venezuelan policy justified by
events, 115; favours general arbitration treaty with England, 116.

Cobden, Richard, essay on America, 102.

Colby, Bainbridge, secretary of state, 259, 260.

Colombia, aggrieved at seizure of Canal Zone, 142; attempts of United
States to settle controversy, 143, 144.

Consuls, status of, in European leases in China, 87, 88.

Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 72, 124, 176, 177.

Cowdray, Lord, seeks concession from Colombia, 142.

Cox, James M., candidate for President, 255.

Crampton, British Minister to United States, dismissal of, 111.


Declaration of London, 71-73, 175, 177.

Declaration of Paris, 64, 65.

Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted by American
Institute of International Law, 158, 159.

Democracy against autocracy, 198.

Dewey, Admiral George, on withdrawal of Germany from Venezuela, 51;
demands apology from German admiral in Manila Bay, 119.

Dickens, Charles, "American Notes," 102.

Diederichs, German Admiral, 119.

Diplomacy, secret, 76, 77.

Dunning, William A., "British Empire and the United States," quoted,
102, 111.

Durfee, Amos, 103.


Egypt, financial administration of, by Great Britain, 134.

England.  _See_ Great Britain.

"Entangling Alliances," warning of Jefferson  against, 12; Wilson's
views on, 187.

Entente treaty of 1904 between England and France, 74.

European balance of power, interest of United States in preserving, 76;
disturbed by Japan, 171.


Fenian movement, encouraged in United States, 112, 113.

Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 20, 25.

Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state, renews negotiations for settlement
of "Alabama Claims," 113, 114.

Fiume, and Treaty of London, 195.

Foch, Ferdinand, 217-219, 236.

Fonseca Bay, United States acquires naval base on, 135, 136.

Forsyth, John, secretary of state, 104.

Fortifications in the Pacific, limitation of, 272.

Foster, John W., letter from Hay, to, 89.

Four-power Treaty, 278-280, 287-289.

Fourteen Points, 205-210, 220, 221.

France, treaty of alliance with, 5-8; refuses to accept plan for
limitation of navies, 270, 271; isolation of, 289.


Gases, use of poisonous, prohibited, 274, 275.

Gênet, Edmond C., minister of the French Republic, 6.

George, David Lloyd, defines British war aims, 204-205;  pre-election
pledges of, 227; opposes French demand for Left Bank of Rhine, 234.

Germany, intervenes in Venezuela, 50; excluded from South America by
aid of England, 53; designs of, on Philippine Islands, 85; adopts naval
policy, 120; influence of, in America, 126; submarine policy of, 178,
179; attempts of, to justify, 181; protests against munitions trade,
181; organizes propaganda and conspiracy in United States, 184.

Great Britain, withdraws from European alliance, 22; intervenes in
Mexico, 46; not unfavorable to Monroe Doctrine, 52, 53; forms alliance
with Japan, 92; points of contact with United States, 100; unfriendly
attitude, 101; change of attitude in Spanish War, 118; naval policy of,
120; interference with shipments to Germany resented in United States,
124; size of navy, 127; so-called blockade of Germany, 174-178.  _See_
Anglo-American ideals.

Great Lakes, disarmament on, 103.

Guarantee treaties, offered to France, 235.

Gummeré, S. R., delegate to Algeciras Conference, 75.


Hague Conference, of 1899, 67; of 1907, 68.

Hague Conventions, status of, 71.

Hague Court of Arbitration, 68.

Haiti, Republic of, United States acquires financial supervision over,
136, 137.

Hamilton, Alexander, opinion on French treaty of 1778, 6.

Harding, Warren G., elected president, 255; ignores League of Nations,
262; calls Washington Conference, 266; differs with Hughes as to
meaning of Four-Power Treaty, 279; attitude toward Europe, 290.

Harris, Townsend, 95.

Hay, John, secretary of state, protests against persecution of Jews in
Rumania, 78; formulates open-door policy for China, 85; defines status
of consuls in European leases in China, 88; insists on "territorial and
administrative entity" of China, 89; private correspondence on Chinese
situation, 89-91.

Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 120, 121.

Henry, of Prussia, Prince, visit of, to United States, 118.

Hitchcock, Senator G. H., 252.

Holy Alliance, 22, 24.

House, Edward M., 225, 233.

Huerta, Victoriano, 160, 162, 193.

Hughes, Charles E., suggests changes in Covenant of League, 232;
asserts rights of the United States in mandated areas, 261; proposes
reduction of navies, 267; details of plan, 268, 269; offends the French
delegates, 270; takes personal charge of Far Eastern question, 281;
success of Washington Conference, due to, 290.


International Conference of American States, 156.

International Court of Arbitral Justice, plan for, 70; Permanent Court
of International Justice, 263.

International Law, attitude of United States toward, 64; attempts to
codify, 68, 72.

International Law, American Institute of, 157.

International Prize Court, plan for, adopted by Second Hague
Conference, 68.

Isolation, policy of, distinct from Monroe Doctrine, 3, 5; policy no
longer possible, 170.


Jameson Raid, in the Transvaal, 50.

Japan, beginning of American intercourse with, 83, 84; forms alliance
with Great Britain, 92; goes to war with Russia, 94; disturbing factor
in world politics, 171; advocates principle of racial equality, 233,
238; demands German leases in Shantung, 239; secures consent of Allies,
240; reluctantly accepts invitation to Washington Conference, 266;
objects to 5-5-3 ratio, 269; expansion of, 276.

Jefferson, Thomas, opinion on French treaty of 1778, 7; warns against
"entangling alliances," 12; plans alliance with England against France,
12-14; favors joint action with England against Holy Alliance, 28-30;
author of doctrine of recognition, 161.

Jews, diplomatic protests against harsh treatment of, 78, 79.

Johnson, Senator Hiram, 246.

Johnson-Clarendon convention, 113.


Knox, Philander C., proposes neutralisation of railways of Manchuria,
95; negotiates treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua, 134, 135; proposes
settlement with Colombia, 143; opposes League of Nations, 228, 231.

Kongo Free State, treaty establishing, signed by American delegates but
withheld from Senate by President Cleveland, 6l, 62.

Kruger, Paul, 50.


Lansing, Robert, secretary of state, replies to Austro-Hungarian note
on munitions trade, 182, 183; dismisses Austrian Ambassador and German
military and naval attachés, 185; delegate to Peace Conference, 225,
233.

Lansing-Ishii agreement, 95.

League of Nations, 188, 196, 205, 209, 211, 230, 244-254.

League to Enforce Peace, 197, 232.

Left Bank of Rhine, French demand for, 234.

Liberia, Republic of, 59

Limitation of Armament, commission of League on, 265; Conference on,
266-290.

Liverpool, Lord, 20.

Livingston, Robert R., minister to France, 12.

Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, on Oregon dispute, 110, 111; denies
existence of secret treaty with England, 120; stands for unconditional
surrender of Germany, 217; issues round robin, 231; presents
reservations to Treaty of Versailles, 248; presents Four-Power Treaty,
278, inconsistency of, 287.

London Naval Conference, 71.

_Lusitania_, sinking of, 179.


Madero, Francisco, 160.

Madison, James, favors joint action with England against Holy Alliance,
30.

Mahan, Alfred T., 99.

Maine, boundary dispute with New Brunswick, 106.

Manchuria, Russian encroachments on, 91-93, 95.

Marcy, William L., secretary of state, views on Declaration of Paris,
65.

Maximilian, Prince, placed by Louis Napoleon on throne of Mexico, 46.

Merchant vessels, proposal to arm, 185.

Mexico, French intervention in, 46; Huerta revolution in, 160; American
policy toward, 160-164.

Monroe, James, sent to Paris to aid Livingston in negotiations for
purchase of New Orleans and West Florida, 13; consults Jefferson and
Madison on subject of British proposals for joint action against Holy
Alliance, 26-28; message of December 2, 1823, 36-39; emphasizes
separation of European and American politics, 43.

Monroe Doctrine, compared with policy of isolation, 3; justification
of, 4; formulation of, 19; text of, 36-39; reception of, in Europe, 39;
basis of, 43; sanction of, 45; relation of, to European balance of
power, 46, 52; attitude of England toward, 52; negative side of, 57;
adverse criticism of, 131; not a self-denying declaration, 147;
reservation of, 232, 249.

Moore, John Bassett, 263.

Moroccan question.  _See_ Algeciras Conference.

Motley, John L., 113.

Munitions of war, sale of to belligerents, 181-184.

McKinley, William, reasons for retaining Philippine Islands, 84, 85.

McLeod, Alexander, arrest of, 104; acquittal of, 105.


Napoleon, Louis, intervenes in Mexico, 46; decides to withdraw, 47, 48.

Neutral prizes, destruction of, 72, 180.

Neutrality, Washington's proclamation of 1793, 8; failure of, in
Napoleonic wars, 14, 15; Wilson's proclamation of, 172; nature of, 172,
173; so-called ethical neutrality, 174; abandonment of, 186.

New Brunswick, boundary dispute with Maine, 106.

Niagara conference on Mexican question, 162.


Olney, Richard, on Monroe Doctrine, 43; conducts correspondence on
Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48; signs general arbitration treaty with
England, 116.

Olney-Pauncefote treaty, 116, 117.

Open-door policy in China, Hay's note of September 6, 1890, 85;
Anglo-American origin of, 87; guaranteed by treaty, 284.

Oregon, joint occupation of, 107.

O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 162.


Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Conference on, 266-290.

Panama Canal, effect of, on naval policy, 132.

Panama Canal Zone, seizure of, 142.

Panama Congress of 1826, 153, 154.

Panama Tolls Act, 121.

Pan-American Financial Congress, 157.

Pan-American Scientific Congress, 157.

Pan-American Union, 156.

Pan-Americanism, 153-157.

Pauncefote, Sir Julian, signs general arbitration treaty with United
States, 116; signs Canal treaty, 120.

Platt Amendment, provisions of, 144, 145.

Peace Conference of Paris, 225-242.  _See_ Hague Conference.

Perry, Commodore Matthew C. commands expedition to Japan, 83, 84, 95.

Philippine Islands, McKinley's reasons for retaining, 84, 85.

Polignac, Prince, interview with Canning on subject of the Spanish
colonies, 35.

Polk, James K., settles Oregon dispute, 110.

Portsmouth, treaty of, 94.

Prize Court.  _See_ International Prize Court.

Prizes, destruction of, 179, 180.


Recognition, doctrine of, discussed with reference to Mexican question,
161.

Reparations, 236, 237.

Reservations to Treaty of Versailles, 248-251, 254.

Roosevelt, Theodore, forces Germany to withdraw from Venezuela, 51;
sends delegates to Algeciras Conference, 75; exerts influence to
preserve European balance of power, 76; protests against persecution of
Jews in Rumania and Russia, 78, 79; invites Russia and Japan to peace
conference, 94; incurs ill will of Japan, 95; submits Alaskan boundary
dispute to limited arbitration, 123; establishes financial supervision
over Dominican Republic, 133, 138; Big-Stick policy, 139; extension of
Monroe Doctrine, 140; seizure of Canal Zone, 142.

Root, Elihu, proposes international court of justice, 69; author of
Platt Amendment, 146; visits South America, 156; suggests changes in
Covenant of League, 232; member of commission to draft statute of
Permanent Court of International Justice, 263; presents resolutions on
China, 277.

Rush, Richard, conferences with Canning on South American situation,
26, 33, 34.

Russia, occupies Manchuria, 91, 92; opposes opening of Manchurian ports
to American commerce, 93; goes to war with Japan, 94; revolution, of
March, 1917, 198; of November, 1917, 203.

Russo-Japanese war, 94.


Sackville-West, Lord, dismissal of, 115.

Salisbury, Lord, backs down in Venezuelan dispute, 50; warns President
McKinley of Germany's designs on Philippines.

San Remo agreement, 259, 260.

Santo Domingo, financial supervision over, 133, 134.

Secret Treaties, 193.

Self-determination, 198, 203, 205.

Senate of the United States, debates Treaty of Versailles, 244-254.

Seward, William H., protests against French occupation of Mexico, 47.

Shantung question, at Peace Conference of Paris, 239-242; at Washington
Conference, 280-282.

Siberia, Japanese troops in, 276; promise of Japan to evacuate, 286.

Slave trade, provision for suppression of, in Webster-Ashburton treaty,
59, 60; Brussels conference on, 62.

Slavery, and isolation, 58.

South America, neglected by United States as field for commercial
development, 52; open door in, 53.

Spanish colonies, revolt of, 25.

Spanish revolution of 1820, 20.

Spanish War, turning point in relations of United States and England,
118.

Submarines, question of, discussed at Washington Conference, 271, 272;
use of, limited by treaty, 274, 275.

Sumner, Charles, 113.


Taft, William H., proposes to bring Nicaragua and Honduras under
financial supervision of United States, 134, 135; tries to reëstablish
friendly relations with Colombia, 143; suggests changes in Covenant of
League, 232.

Tardieu, André, report of Algeciras Conference, 76; quoted on Armistice
negotiations, 217, 218.

Temperley, H. W. V., "History of the Peace Conference of Paris," 191.

"Ten Points," 278.

Texas, annexation of, opposed by Great Britain, 107, 108.

Thayer, William R., gives version of Roosevelt-Holleben interview, 51.

Tocqueville, Alexis de, "Democracy in America," 102.

Treaty of London, 195.

Treaty of Peace with Austria, 263.

Treaty of Peace with Germany, 263.

Treaty of Versailles, signed, 242; laid before Senate, 243; debate on,
244-254; votes on, 252-254.

Twenty-One Demands, 276.


Vera Cruz, American occupation of, 162; evacuation of, 163.

Verona, Congress of, 19, 21, secret treaty of, 22-24.

Vienna, Congress of, 19.

Villa, Francisco, 162, 163.


War aims, of Allies, 196; British, 204.

War of 1812, 15.

Washington, George, requests opinions of cabinet on French treaty, 6;
issues proclamation of neutrality, 8; Farewell Address, 9-11.

Washington Conference, 266-290.

Washington, treaty of, 66, 114.

Webster, Daniel, secretary of state, 104, 105.

Webster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60, 107.

Wellington, Duke of, at Congress of Verona, 21; protest and withdrawal,
22.

West Indies, American supremacy in, 120.

White, Henry, delegate to Algeciras Conference, 75; to Peace
Conference, 225.

William II, German Kaiser, telegram to President Kruger, 50; forced to
withdraw from Venezuela, 51; visits Morocco, 74; demands retirement of
Delcassé, 75; insists on general conference on Morocco, 75; thwarted in
efforts to humiliate France, 77; abdicates and flees to Holland, 219.

Williams, Talcott, on McKinley's reasons for retaining Philippines, 85.

Wilson, Henry Lane, 160.

Wilson, Woodrow, secures modification of Panama Tolls Act, 121; extends
financial supervision over Nicaragua and Haiti, 136, 137; warns
Latin-American states against granting concessions to European
syndicates, 140, 141; attitude of, on questions of international law
and diplomacy, 151, 152; general Latin-American policy, 152, 165; New
Pan-Americanism, 153; Mexican policy, 160-164; asks for declaration of
war on Germany, 185; views on extension of Monroe Doctrine, 187;
political philosophy of, 192; refusal to recognize Huerta, 193; reasons
for neutrality, 194; calls on all belligerents to state war aims, 195;
first discussion of war aims, 196; war address, 199; draws distinction
between German people and German Government, 200-202; reply to Pope,
201; announces Fourteen Points, 205-210; decides to go to Paris, 225;
suffers political defeat, 226, 227; greeted with enthusiasm in Europe,
228; proposes League of Nations, 230; returns temporarily to the United
States, 231; makes concessions to French and British, 238; returns to
the United States and lays treaty before Senate, 242; tours the country
on behalf of League of Nations, 246; illness of, 247; letter read at
Jackson day dinner proposing referendum on Treaty of Versailles, 252,
253; awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 255; withdraws from participation in
European affairs, 259.

Wood, General Leonard, 146.


Yap, island of, 260-262.





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