Title: The Fight For The Republic in China
Author: Putnam Weale, B. L. (Bertram Lenox), 1877-1930
Language: English
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CHINA***


THE FIGHT FOR THE REPUBLIC IN CHINA

by

B. L. PUTNAM WEALE

Author of _Indiscreet Letters from Peking_, etc.

With 28 Illustrations

London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd.
Paternoster House, E.C.

1918



[Illustration: President Li Yuan-Hung.]



PREFACE


This volume tells everything that the student or the casual reader needs
to know about the Chinese Question. It is sufficiently exhaustive to
show very clearly the new forces at work, and to bring some realisation
of the great gulf which separates the thinking classes of to-day from
the men of a few years ago; whilst, at the same time, it is sufficiently
condensed not to overwhelm the reader with too great a multitude of
facts.

Particular attention may be devoted to an unique feature--namely, the
Chinese and Japanese documentation which affords a sharp contrast
between varying types of Eastern brains. Thus, in the Memorandum of the
Black Dragon Society (Chapter VII) we have a very clear and illuminating
revelation of the Japanese political mind which has been trained to
consider problems in the modern Western way, but which remains saturated
with theocratic ideals in the sharpest conflict with the Twentieth
Century. In the pamphlet of Yang Tu (Chapter VIII) which launched the
ill-fated Monarchy Scheme and contributed so largely to the dramatic
death of Yuan Shih-kai, we have an essentially Chinese mentality of the
reactionary or corrupt type which expresses itself both on home and
foreign issues in a naïvely dishonest way, helpful to future diplomacy.
In the Letter of Protest (Chapter X) against the revival of Imperialism
written by Liang Ch'i-chao--the most brilliant scholar living--we have a
Chinese of the New or Liberal China, who in spite of a complete
ignorance of foreign languages shows a marvellous grasp of political
absolutes, and is a harbinger of the great days which must come again to
Cathay. In other chapters dealing with the monarchist plot we see the
official mind at work, the telegraphic despatches exchanged between
Peking and the provinces being of the highest diplomatic interest. These
documents prove conclusively that although the Japanese is more
practical than the Chinese--and more concise--there can be no question
as to which brain is the more fruitful.

Coupled with this discussion there is much matter giving an insight into
the extraordinary and calamitous foreign ignorance about present-day
China, an ignorance which is just as marked among those resident in the
country as among those who have never visited it. The whole of the
material grouped in this novel fashion should not fail to bring
conviction that the Far East, with its 500 millions of people, is
destined to play an important rôle in _postbellum_ history because of
the new type of modern spirit which is being there evolved. The
influence of the Chinese Republic, in the opinion of the writer, cannot
fail to be ultimately world-wide in view of the practically unlimited
resources in man-power which it disposes of.

In the Appendices will be found every document of importance for the
period under examination,--1911 to 1917. The writer desires to record
his indebtedness to the columns of _The Peking Gazette_, a newspaper
which under the brilliant editorship of Eugene Ch'en--a pure Chinese
born and educated under the British flag--has fought consistently and
victoriously for Liberalism and Justice and has made the Republic a
reality to countless thousands who otherwise would have refused to
believe in it.

PUTNAM WEALE.

PEKING, June, 1917.



CONTENTS


    I.--GENERAL INTRODUCTION

   II.--THE ENIGMA OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

  III.--THE DREAM REPUBLIC
        (From the Manchu Abdication to the dissolution of Parliament)

   IV.--THE DICTATOR AT WORK
        (From the Coup d'état of the 4th Nov. 1913 to the outbreak of the
        World-war, 1st August, 1914)

    V.--THE FACTOR OF JAPAN

   VI.--THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

  VII.--THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

 VIII.--THE MONARCHIST PLOT
        1º The Pamphlet of Yang Tu

   IX.--THE MONARCHY PLOT
        2º Dr. Goodnow's Memorandum

    X.--THE MONARCHY MOVEMENT IS OPPOSED
        The Appeal of the Scholar Liang Chi-chao

   XI.--THE DREAM EMPIRE
        ("The People's Voice" and the action of the Powers)

  XII.--"THE THIRD REVOLUTION"
        The Revolt of Yunnan

 XIII.--"THE THIRD REVOLUTION" (_continued_)
        Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-kai

  XIV.--THE NEW RÉGIME--FROM 1916 TO 1917

   XV.--THE REPUBLIC IN COLLISION WITH REALITY: TWO TYPICAL INSTANCES OF
        "FOREIGN AGGRESSION"

  XVI.--CHINA AND THE WAR

 XVII.--THE FINAL PROBLEM:--REMODELLING THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC
        RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WORLD

        APPENDICES--DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA



ILLUSTRATIONS

  President Li Yuan-Hung

  The Funeral of Yuan-Shih-kai: The Procession passing down the great
  Palace Approach with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the distance

  The Provincial Troops of General Chang Hsun at his Headquarters of
  Hsuchowfu

  The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Catafalque over the Coffin on its
  way to the Railway Station

  The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing down the great
  Palace Approach with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the distance

  An Encampment of "The Punitive Expedition" of 1916 on the Upper
  Yangtsze (_By courtesy of Major Isaac Newell, U.S. Military Attaché_.)

  Revival of the Imperialistic Worship of Heaven by Yuan Shih-kai in
  1914: Scene on the Altar of Heaven, with Sacrificial Officers clothed
  in costumes dating from 2,000 years ago.

  A Manchu Country Fair: The figures in the foreground are all Manchu
  Women and Girls

  A Manchu Woman grinding Grain

  Silk-reeling done in the open under the Walls of Peking

  Modern Peking: A Run on a Bank

  The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1st, 1916, after three years of
  dictatorial rule

  The Original Constitutional Drafting Committee of 1913, photographed
  on the Steps of the Temple of Heaven, where the Draft was completed

  A Presidential Review of Troops in the Southern Hungtung Park outside
  Peking: Arrival of the President

  President Li Yuan-Hung and the General Staff watching the Review

  March-past of an Infantry Division

  Modern Peking: The Palace Entrance lined with Troops. Note the New
  Type Chinese Policeman in the foreground

  The Premier General Tuan Chi-Jui, Head of the Cabinet which decided to
  declare war on Germany General Feng Kuo-chang, President of the
  Republic The Scholar Liang Chi-chao, sometime Minister of Justice, and
  the foremost "Brain" in China

  General Tsao-ao, the Hero of the Yunnan Rebellion of 1915-16, who died
  from the effects of the campaign

  Liang Shih-yi, who was the Power behind Yuan Shih-kai, now proscribed
  and living in exile at Hong-Kong

  The Famous or Infamous General Chang Hsun, the leading Reactionary in
  China to-day, who still commands a force of 30,000 men astride of the
  Pukow Railway

  The Bas-relief in a Peking Temple, well illustrating Indo-Chinese
  Influences

  The Late President Yuan Shih-kai

  President Yuan Shih-kai photographed immediately after his
  Inauguration as Provisional President, March 10th, 1912

  The National Assembly sitting as a National Convention engaged on the
  Draft of the Permanent Constitution. (Specially photographed by
  permission of the Speakers for the Present Work)

  View from rear of the Hall of the National Assembly sitting as a
  National Convention engaged on the Draft of the Permanent
  Constitution. (Specially photographed by permission of the Speakers
  for the Present Work)



CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION


The revolution which broke out in China on the 10th October, 1911, and
which was completed with the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty on the
12th February, 1912, though acclaimed as highly successful, was in its
practical aspects something very different. With the proclamation of the
Republic, the fiction of autocratic rule had truly enough vanished; yet
the tradition survived and with it sufficient of the essential machinery
of Imperialism to defeat the nominal victors until the death of Yuan
Shih-kai.

The movement to expel the Manchus, who had seized the Dragon Throne in
1644 from the expiring Ming Dynasty, was an old one. Historians are
silent on the subject of the various secret plots which were always
being hatched to achieve that end, their silence being due to a lack of
proper records and to the difficulty of establishing the simple truth in
a country where rumour reigns supreme. But there is little doubt that
the famous Ko-lao-hui, a Secret Society with its headquarters in the
remote province of Szechuan, owed its origin to the last of the Ming
adherents, who after waging a desperate guerilla warfare from the date
of their expulsion from Peking, finally fell to the low level of
inciting assassinations and general unrest in the vain hope that they
might some day regain their heritage. At least, we know one thing
definitely: that the attempt on the life of the Emperor Chia Ching in
the Peking streets at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was a
Secret Society plot and brought to an abrupt end the pleasant habit of
travelling among their subjects which the great Manchu Emperors
K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien Lung had inaugurated and always pursued and which
had so largely encouraged the growth of personal loyalty to a foreign
House.

From that day onwards for over a century no Emperor ventured out from
behind the frowning Walls of the Forbidden City, save for brief annual
ceremonies, such as the Worship of Heaven on the occasion of the Winter
Solstice, and during the two "flights"--first in 1860 when Peking was
occupied by an Anglo-French expedition and the Court incontinently
sought sanctuary in the mountain Palaces of Jehol; and, again, in 1900,
when with the pricking of the Boxer bubble and the arrival of the
International relief armies, the Imperial Household was forced along the
stony road to far-off Hsianfu.

The effect of this immurement was soon visible; the Manchu rule, which
was emphatically a rule of the sword, was rapidly so weakened that the
emperors became no more than _rois fainéants_ at the mercy of their
minister.[1] The history of the Nineteenth Century is thus logically
enough the history of successive collapses. Not only did overseas
foreigners openly thunder at the gateways of the empire and force an
ingress, but native rebellions were constant and common. Leaving minor
disturbances out of account, there were during this period two huge
Mahommedan rebellions, besides the cataclysmic Taiping rising which
lasted ten years and is supposed to have destroyed the unbelievable
total of one hundred million persons. The empire, torn by internecine
warfare, surrendered many of its essential prerogatives to foreigners,
and by accepting the principle of extraterritoriality prepared the road
to ultimate collapse.

How in such circumstances was it possible to keep alive absolutism? The
answer is so curious that we must be explicit and exhaustive.

The simple truth is that save during the period of vigour immediately
following each foreign conquest (such as the Mongol conquest in the
Thirteenth Century and the Manchu in the Seventeenth) not only has there
never been any absolutism properly so-called in China, but that apart
from the most meagre and inefficient tax-collecting and some
rough-and-ready policing in and around the cities there has never been
any true governing at all save what the people did for themselves or
what they demanded of the officials as a protection against one another.
Any one who doubts these statements has no inkling of those facts which
are the crown as well as the foundation of the Chinese group-system, and
which must be patiently studied in the village-life of the country to be
fitly appreciated. To be quite frank, absolutism is a myth coming down
from the days of Kublai Khan when he so proudly built his _Khanbaligh_
(the Cambaluc of Marco Polo and the forebear of modern Peking) and
filled it with his troops who so soon vanished like the snows of winter.
An elaborate pretence, a deliberate policy of make-believe, ever since
those days invested Imperial Edicts with a majesty which they have never
really possessed, the effacement of the sovereign during the Nineteenth
Century contributing to the legend that there existed in the capital a
Grand and Fearful Panjandrum for whom no miracle was too great and to
whom people and officials owed trembling obedience.

In reality, the office of Emperor was never more than a
politico-religious concept, translated for the benefit of the masses
into socio-economic ordinances. These pronouncements, cast in the form
of periodic homilies called Edicts, were the ritual of government; their
purpose was instructional rather than mandatory; they were designed to
teach and keep alive the State-theory that the Emperor was the High
Priest of the Nation and that obedience to the morality of the Golden
Age, which had been inculcated by all the philosophers since Confucius
and Mencius flourished twenty-five centuries ago, would not only secure
universal happiness but contribute to national greatness.

The office of Emperor was thus heavenly rather than terrestrial, and
suasion, not arms, was the most potent argument used in everyday life.
The amazing reply (_i.e._, amazing to foreigners) made by the great
Emperor K'ang-hsi in the tremendous Eighteenth Century controversy
between the Jesuit and the Dominican missionaries, which ruined the
prospects of China's ever becoming Roman Catholic and which the Pope
refused to accept--that the custom of ancestor-worship was political and
not religious--was absolutely correct, _politics in China under the
Empire being only a system of national control exercised by inculcating
obedience to forebears_. The great efforts which the Manchus made from
the end of the Sixteenth Century (when they were still a small
Manchurian Principality striving for the succession to the Dragon Throne
and launching desperate attacks on the Great Wall of China) to receive
from the Dalai Lama, as well as from the lesser Pontiffs of Tibet and
Mongolia, high-sounding religious titles, prove conclusively that
dignities other than mere possession of the Throne were held necessary
to give solidity to a reign which began in militarism and which would
collapse as the Mongol rule had collapsed by a mere Palace revolution
unless an effective _moral_ title were somehow won.

Nor was the Manchu military Conquest, even after they had entered
Peking, so complete as has been represented by historians. The Manchus
were too small a handful, even with their Mongol and Chinese
auxiliaries, to do more than defeat the Ming armies and obtain the
submission of the chief cities of China. It is well-known to students of
their administrative methods, that whilst they reigned over China they
_ruled_ only in company with the Chinese, the system in force being a
dual control which, beginning on the Grand Council and in the various
great Boards and Departments in the capital, proceeded as far as the
provincial chief cities, but stopped short there so completely and
absolutely that the huge chains of villages and burgs had their historic
autonomy virtually untouched and lived on as they had always lived. The
elaborate system of examinations, with the splendid official honours
reserved for successful students which was adopted by the Dynasty, not
only conciliated Chinese society but provided a vast body of men whose
interest lay in maintaining the new conquest; and thus Literature, which
had always been the door to preferment, became not only one of the
instruments of government, but actually the advocate of an alien rule.
With their persons and properties safe, and their women-folk protected
by an elaborate set of capitulations from being requisitioned for the
harems of the invaders, small wonder if the mass of Chinese welcomed a
firm administration after the frightful disorders which had torn the
country during the last days of the Mings.[2]

It was the foreigner, arriving in force in China after the capture of
Peking and the ratification of the Tientsin Treaties in 1860, who so
greatly contributed to making the false idea of Manchu absolutism
current throughout the world; and in this work it was the foreign
diplomat, coming to the capital saturated with the tradition of European
absolutism, who played a not unimportant part. Investing the Emperors
with an authority with which they were never really clothed, save for
ceremonial purposes (principally perhaps because the Court was entirely
withdrawn from view and very insolent in its foreign intercourse) a
conception of High Mightiness was spread abroad reminiscent of the awe
in which Eighteenth Century nabobs spoke of the Great Mogul of India.
Chinese officials, quickly discovering that their easiest means of
defence against an irresistible pressure was to take refuge behind the
august name of the sovereign, played their rôle so successfully that
until 1900 it was generally believed by Europeans that no other form of
government than a despotism _sans phrase_ could be dreamed of. Finding
that on the surface an Imperial Decree enjoyed the majesty of an Ukaze
of the Czar, Europeans were ready enough to interpret as best suited
their enterprises something which they entirely failed to construe in
terms expressive of the negative nature of Chinese civilization; and so
it happened that though the government of China had become no
government at all from the moment that extraterritoriality destroyed the
theory of Imperial inviolability and infallibility, the miracle of
turning state negativism into an active governing element continued to
work after a fashion because of the disguise which the immense distances
afforded.

Adequately to explain the philosophy of distance in China, and what it
has meant historically, would require a whole volume to itself; but it
is sufficient for our purpose to indicate here certain prime essentials.
The old Chinese were so entrenched in their vastnesses that without the
play of forces which were supernatural to them, _i.e._, the
steam-engine, the telegraph, the armoured war-vessel, etc., their daily
lives could not be affected. Left to themselves, and assisted by their
own methods, they knew that blows struck across the immense roadless
spaces were so diminished in strength, by the time they reached the spot
aimed at, that they became a mere mockery of force; and, just because
they were so valueless, paved the way to effective compromises. Being
adepts in the art which modern surgeons have adopted, of leaving wounds
as far as possible to heal themselves, they trusted to time and to
nature to solve political differences which western countries boldly
attacked on very different principles. Nor were they wrong in their
view. From the capital to the Yangtsze Valley (which is the heart of the
country), is 800 miles, that is far more than the mileage between Paris
and Berlin. From Peking to Canton is 1,400 miles along a hard and
difficult route; the journey to Yunnan by the Yangtsze river is
upwards of 2,000 miles, a distance greater than the greatest march
ever undertaken by Napoleon. And when one speaks of the Outer
Dominions--Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan--for these hundreds of miles
it is necessary to substitute thousands, and add thereto difficulties
of terrain which would have disheartened even Roman Generals.

Now the old Chinese, accepting distance as the supreme thing, had made
it the starting-point as well as the end of their government. In the
perfected viceregal system which grew up under the Ming Dynasty, and
which was taken over by the Manchus as a sound and admirable governing
principle, though they superimposed their own military system of Tartar
Generals, we have the plan that nullified the great obstacle. Authority
of every kind was _delegated_ by the Throne to various distant governing
centuries in a most complete and sweeping manner, each group of
provinces, united under a viceroy, being in everything but name so many
independent linked commonwealths, called upon for matricular
contributions in money and grain but otherwise left severely alone[3].
The chain which bound provincial China to the metropolitan government
was therefore in the last analysis finance and nothing but finance; and
if the system broke down in 1911 it was because financial reform--to
discount the new forces of which the steam engine was the symbol--had
been attempted, like military reform, both too late and in the wrong
way, and instead of strengthening, had vastly weakened the authority of
the Throne.

In pursuance of the reform-plan which became popular after the Boxer
Settlement had allowed the court to return to Peking from Hsianfu, the
viceroys found their most essential prerogative, which was the control
of the provincial purse, largely taken from them and handed over to
Financial Commissioners who were directly responsible to the Peking
Ministry of Finance, a Department which was attempting to replace the
loose system of matricular contributions by the European system of a
directly controlled taxation every penny of which would be shown in an
annual Budget. No doubt had time been vouchsafed, and had European help
been enlisted on a large scale, this change could ultimately have been
made successful. But it was precisely time which was lacking; and the
Manchus consequently paid the penalty which is always paid by those who
delay until it is too late. The old theories having been openly
abandoned, it needed only the promise of a Parliament completely to
destroy the dignity of the Son of Heaven, and to leave the viceroys as
mere hostages in the hands of rebels. A few short weeks of rebellion was
sufficient in 1911 to cause the provinces to revert to their condition
of the earlier centuries when they had been vast unfettered agricultural
communities. And once they had tasted the joys of this new independence,
it was impossible to conceive of their becoming "obedient" again.

Here another word of explanation is necessary to show clearly the
precise meaning of regionalism in China.

What had originally created each province was the chief city in each
region, such cities necessarily being the walled repositories of all
increment. Greedy of territory to enhance their wealth, and jealous of
their power, these provincial capitals throughout the ages had left no
stone unturned to extend their influence in every possible direction and
bring under their economic control as much land as possible, a fact
which is abundantly proved by the highly diversified system of weights
and measures throughout the land deliberately drawn-up to serve as
economic barriers. River-courses, mountain-ranges, climate and soil, no
doubt assisted in governing this expansion, but commercial and financial
greed was the principal force. Of this we have an exceedingly
interesting and conclusive illustration in the struggle still proceeding
between the three Manchurian provinces, Fengtien, Kirin and
Heilungchiang, to seize the lion's share of the virgin land of Eastern
Inner Mongolia which has an "open frontier" of rolling prairies. Having
the strongest provincial capital--Moukden--it has been Fengtien province
which has encroached on the Mongolian grasslands to such an extent that
its jurisdiction to-day envelops the entire western flank of Kirin
province (as can be seen in the latest Chinese maps) in the form of a
salamander, effectively preventing the latter province from controlling
territory that geographically belongs to it. In the same way in the
land-settlement which is still going on the Mongolian plateau
immediately above Peking, much of what should be Shansi territory has
been added to the metropolitan province of Chihli. Though adjustments of
provincial boundaries have been summarily made in times past, in the
main the considerations we have indicated have been the dominant factors
in determining the area of each unit.

Now in many provinces where settlement is age-old, the regionalism which
results from great distances and bad communications has been greatly
increased by race-admixture. Canton province, which was largely settled
by Chinese adventurers sailing down the coast from the Yangtsze and
intermarrying with Annamese and the older autochthonous races, has a
population-mass possessing very distinct characteristics, which sharply
conflict with Northern traits. Fuhkien province is not only as
diversified but speaks a dialect which is virtually a foreign language.
And so on North and West of the Yangtsze it is the same story,
temperamental differences of the highest political importance being
everywhere in evidence and leading to perpetual bickerings and
jealousies. For although Chinese civilization resembles in one great
particular the Mahommedan religion, in that it accepts without question
all adherents irrespective of racial origin, _politically_ the effect of
this regionalism has been such that up to very recent times the Central
Government has been almost as much a foreign government in the eyes of
many provinces as the government of Japan. Money alone formed the bond
of union; so long as questions of taxation were not involved, Peking was
as far removed from daily life as the planet Mars.

As we are now able to see very clearly, fifty years ago--that is at the
time of the Taiping Rebellion--the old power and spell of the National
Capital as a military centre had really vanished. Though in ancient days
horsemen armed with bows and lances could sweep like a tornado over the
land, levelling everything save the walled cities, in the Nineteenth
Century such methods had become impossible. Mongolia and Manchuria had
also ceased to be inexhaustible reservoirs of warlike men; the more
adjacent portions had become commercialized; whilst the outer regions
had sunk to depopulated graziers' lands. The Government, after the
collapse of the Rebellion, being greatly impoverished, had openly fallen
to balancing province against province and personality against
personality, hoping that by some means it would be able to regain its
prestige and a portion of its former wealth. Taking down the ledgers
containing the lists of provincial contributions, the mandarins of
Peking completely revised every schedule, redistributed every weight,
and saw to it that the matricular levies should fall in such a way as to
be crushing. The new taxation, _likin_, which, like the income-tax in
England, is in origin purely a war-tax, by gripping inter-provincial
commerce by the throat and rudely controlling it by the barrier-system,
was suddenly disclosed as a new and excellent way of making felt the
menaced sovereignty of the Manchus; and though the system was plainly a
two-edged weapon, the first edge to cut was the Imperial edge; that is
largely why for several decades after the Taipings China was relatively
quiet.

Time was also giving birth to another important development--important
in the sense that it was to prove finally decisive. It would have been
impossible for Peking, unless men of outstanding genius had been living,
to have foreseen that not only had the real bases of government now
become entirely economic control, but that the very moment that control
faltered the central government of China would openly and absolutely
cease to be any government at all. Modern commercialism, already
invading China at many points through the medium of the treaty-ports,
was a force which in the long run could not be denied. Every year that
passed tended to emphasize the fact that modern conditions were cutting
Peking more and more adrift from the real centres of power--the economic
centres which, with the single exception of Tientsin, lie from 800 to
1,500 miles away. It was these centres that were developing
revolutionary ideas--_i.e._, ideas at variance with the Socio-economic
principles on which the old Chinese commonwealth had been slowly built
up, and which foreign dynasties such as the Mongol and the Manchu had
never touched. The Government of the post-Taiping period still imagined
that by making their hands lie more heavily than ever on the people and
by tightening the taxation control--not by true creative work--they
could rehabilitate themselves.

It would take too long, and would weary the indulgence of the reader to
establish in a conclusive manner this thesis which had long been a
subject of inquiry on the part of political students. Chinese society,
being essentially a society organized on a credit-co-operative system,
so nicely adjusted that money, either coined or fiduciary, was not
wanted save for the petty daily purchases of the people, any system
which boldly clutched the financial establishments undertaking the
movement of _sycee_ (silver) from province to province for the
settlement of trade-balances, was bound to be effective so long as those
financial establishments remained unshaken.

The best known establishments, united in the great group known as the
Shansi Bankers, being the government bankers, undertook not only all the
remittances of surpluses to Peking, but controlled by an intricate
pass-book system the perquisites of almost every office-holder in the
empire. No sooner did an official, under the system which had grown up,
receive a provincial appointment than there hastened to him a
confidential clerk of one of these accommodating houses, who in the name
of his employers advanced all the sums necessary for the payment of the
official's post, and then proceeded with him to his province so that
moiety by moiety, as taxation flowed in, advances could be paid off and
the equilibrium re-established. A very intimate and far-reaching
connection thus existed between provincial money-interests and the
official classes. The practical work of governing China was the
balancing of tax-books and native bankers' accounts. Even the
"melting-houses," where _sycee_ was "standardized" for provincial use,
were the joint enterprises of officials and merchants; bargaining
governing every transaction; and only when a violent break occurred in
the machinery, owing to famine or rebellion, did any other force than
money intervene.

There was nothing exceptional in these practices, in the use of which
the old Chinese empire was merely following the precedent of the Roman
Empire. The vast polity that was formed before the time of Christ by the
military and commercial expansion of Rome in the Mediterranean Basin,
and among the wild tribes of Northern Europe, depended very largely on
the genius of Italian financiers and tax-collectors to whom the revenues
were either directly "farmed," or who "assisted" precisely after the
Chinese method in financing officials and local administrations, and in
replenishing a central treasury which no wealth could satisfy. The
Chinese phenomenon was therefore in no sense new; the dearth of coined
money and the variety of local standards made the methods used economic
necessities. The system was not in itself a bad system: its fatal
quality lay in its woodenness, its lack of adaptability, and in its
growing weakness in the face of foreign competition which it could never
understand. Foreign competition--that was the enemy destined to achieve
an overwhelming triumph and dash to ruins a hoary survival.

War with Japan sounded the first trumpet-blast which should have been
heeded. In the year 1894, being faced with the necessity of finding
immediately a large sum of specie for purpose of war, the native bankers
proclaimed their total inability to do so, and the first great foreign
loan contract was signed.[4] Little attention was attracted to what is a
turning-point in Chinese history. There cannot be the slightest doubt
that in 1894 the Manchus wrote the first sentences of an abdication
which was only formally pronounced in 1912: they had inaugurated the
financial thraldom under which China still languishes. Within a period
of forty months, in order to settle the disastrous Japanese war, foreign
loans amounting to nearly fifty-five million pounds were completed. This
indebtedness, amounting to nearly three times the "visible" annual
revenues of the country--that is, the revenues actually accounted for to
Peking--was unparalleled in Chinese history. It was a gold indebtedness
subject to all sorts of manipulations which no Chinese properly
understood. It had special political meaning and special political
consequences because the loans were virtually guaranteed by the Powers.
It was a long-drawn _coup d'état_ of a nature that all foreigners
understood because it forged external chains.

The _internal_ significance was even greater than the external. The
loans were secured on the most important "direct" revenues reaching
Peking--the Customs receipts, which were concerned with the most vital
function in the new economic life springing up, the steam-borne coasting
and river-trade as well as the purely foreign trade. That most vital
function tended consequently to become more and more hall-marked as
foreign; it no longer depended in any direct sense on Peking for
protection. The hypothecation of these revenues to foreigners for
periods running into decades--coupled with their administration by
foreigners--was such a distinct restriction of the rights of eminent
domain as to amount to a partial abrogation of sovereignty.

That this was vaguely understood by the masses is now quite certain. The
Boxer movement of 1900, like the great proletarian risings which
occurred in Italy in the pre-Christian era as a result of the
impoverishment and moral disorder brought about by Roman misgovernment,
was simply a socio-economic catastrophe exhibiting itself in an
unexpected form. The dying Manchu dynasty, at last in open despair,
turned the revolt, insanely enough, against the foreigner--that is
against those who already held the really vital portion of their
sovereignty. So far from saving itself by this act, the dynasty wrote
another sentence in its death-warrant. Economically the Manchus had been
for years almost lost; the Boxer indemnities were the last straw. By
more than doubling the burden of foreign commitments, and by placing the
operation of the indemnities directly in the hands of foreign bankers by
the method of monthly quotas, payable in Shanghai, _the Peking
Government as far back as fifteen years ago was reduced to being a
government at thirty days' sight, at the mercy of any shock of events
which could be protracted over a few monthly settlements_. There is no
denying this signal fact, which is probably the most remarkable
illustration of the restrictive power of money which has ever been
afforded in the history of Asia.

The phenomenon, however, was complex and we must be careful to
understand its workings. A mercantile curiosity, to find the parallel
for which we must go back to the Middle Ages in Europe, when "free
cities" such as those of the Hanseatic League plentifully
dotted river and coast line, served to increase the general difficulties
of a situation which no one formula could adequately cover.
Extraterritoriality, by creating the "treaty port" in China, had been
the most powerful weapon in undermining native economics; yet at the
same time it had been the agent for creating powerful new
counter-balancing interests. Though the increasingly large groups of
foreigners, residing under their own laws, and building up, under their
own specially protected system of international exchange, a new and
imposing edifice, had made the hovel-like nature of Chinese economics
glaringly evident, the mercantile classes of the New China, being always
quick to avail themselves of money-making devices, had not only taken
shelter under this new and imposing edifice, but were rapidly extending
it of their own accord. In brief, the trading Chinese were identifying
themselves and their major interests with the treaty-ports; they were
transferring thither their specie and their credits; making huge
investments in land and properties, under the aegis of foreign flags in
which they absolutely trusted. The money-interests of the country knew
instinctively that the native system was doomed and that with this doom
there would come many changes; these interests, in the way common to
money all the world over, were insuring themselves against the
inevitable.

The force of this--politically--became finally evident in 1911; and what
we have said in our opening sentences should now be clear. The Chinese
Revolution was an emotional rising against the Peking System because it
was a bad and inefficient and retrograde system, just as much as against
the Manchus, who after all had adopted purely Chinese methods and who
were no more foreigners than Scotchmen or Irishmen are foreigners to-day
in England. The Revolution of 1911 derived its meaning and its value--as
well as its mandate--not from what it proclaimed, but for what it stood
for. Historically, 1911 was the lineal descendant of 1900, which again
was the offspring of the economic collapse advertised by the great
foreign loans of the Japanese war, loans made necessary because the
Taipings had disclosed the complete disappearance of the only _raison
d'être_ of Peking sovereignty, _i.e._ the old-time military power. The
story is, therefore, clear and well-connected and so logical in its
results that it has about it a finality suggesting the unrolling of the
inevitable.

During the Revolution the one decisive factor was shown to be almost at
once--money, nothing but money. The pinch was felt at the end of the
first thirty days. Provincial remittances ceased; the Boxer quotas
remained unpaid; a foreign embargo was laid upon the Customs funds. The
Northern troops, raised and trained by Yuan Shih-kai, when he was
Viceroy of the Metropolitan province, were, it is true, proving
themselves the masters of the Yangtsze and South China troops; yet that
circumstance was meaningless. Those troops were fighting for what had
already proved itself a lost cause--the Peking System, as well as the
Manchu dynasty. The fight turned more and more into a money-fight. It
was foreign money which brought about the first truce and the transfer
of the so-called republican government from Nanking to Peking. In the
strictest sense of the words every phase of the settlement then arrived
at was a settlement in terms of cash.[5]

Had means existed for rapidly replenishing the Chinese Treasury without
having recourse to European stockmarkets (whose actions are
semi-officially controlled when distant regions are involved) the
Republic might have fared better. But placed almost at once through
foreign dictation under a species of police-control, which while
nominally derived from Western conceptions, was primarily designed to
rehabilitate the semblance of the authority which had been so
sensationally extinguished, the Republic remained only a dream; and the
world, taught to believe that there could be no real stability until the
scheme of government approximated to the conception long formed of
Peking absolutism, waited patiently for the rude awakening which came
with the Yuan Shih-kai _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913. Thus we had
this double paradox; on the one hand the Chinese people awkwardly trying
to be western in a Chinese way and failing: on the other, foreign
officials and foreign governments trying to be Chinese and making the
confusion worse confounded. It was inevitable in such circumstances
that the history of the past six years should have been the history of a
slow tragedy, and that almost every page should be written over with the
name of the man who was the selected bailiff of the Powers--Yuan
Shih-kai.

[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing
down the great Palace Approach, with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the
distance.]

[Illustration: The Provincial Troops of General Chang Hsun at his
Headquarters of Hsuchowfu.]

[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Catafalque over the
Coffin on its way to the Railway Station.]

[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing down
the great Palace Approach, with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the
distance.]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] As there is a good deal of misunderstanding on the subject of the
Manchus an explanatory note is useful.

The Manchu people, who belong to the Mongol or Turanian Group, number at
the maximum five million souls. Their distribution at the time of the
revolution of 1911 was roughly as follows: In and around Peking say two
millions; in posts through China say one-half million,--or possibly
three-quarters of a million; in Manchuria Proper--the home of the
race--say two or two and a half millions. The fighting force was
composed in this fashion: When Peking fell into their hands in 1644 as a
result of a stratagem combined with dissensions among the Chinese
themselves, the entire armed strength was reorganized in Eight Banners
or Army Corps, each corps being composed of three racial divisions, (1)
pure Manchus, (2) Mongols who had assisted in the conquest and (3)
Northern Chinese who had gone over to the conquerors. These Eight
Banners, each commanded by an "iron-capped" Prince, represented the
authority of the Throne and had their headquarters in Peking with small
garrisons throughout the provinces at various strategic centres. These
garrisons had entirely ceased to have any value before the 18th Century
had closed and were therefore purely ceremonial and symbolic, all the
fighting being done by special Chinese corps which were raised as
necessity arose.

[2] This most interesting point--the immunity of Chinese women from
forced marriage with Manchus--has been far too little noticed by
historians though it throws a flood of light on the sociological aspects
of the Manchu conquest. Had that conquest been absolute it would have
been impossible for the Chinese people to have protected their
women-folk in such a significant way.

[3] A very interesting proof--and one that has never been properly
exposed--of the astoundingly rationalistic principles on which the
Chinese polity is founded is to be seen in the position of priesthoods
in China. Unlike every other civilization in the world, at no stage of
the development of the State has it been necessary for religion in China
to intervene between the rulers and the ruled, saving the people from
oppression. In Europe without the supernatural barrier of the Church,
the position of the common people in the Middle Ages would have been
intolerable, and life, and virtue totally unprotected. Buckle, in his
"History of Civilization," like other extreme radicals, has failed to
understand that established religions have paradoxically been most
valuable because of their vast secular powers, exercised under the mask
of spiritual authority. Without this ghostly restraint rulers would have
been so oppressive as to have destroyed their peoples. The two greatest
monuments to Chinese civilization, then consist of these twin facts;
first, that the Chinese have never had the need for such supernatural
restraints exercised by a privileged body, and secondly, that they are
absolutely without any feeling of class or caste--prince and pauper
meeting on terms of frank and humorous equality--the race thus being the
only pure and untinctured democracy the world has ever known.

[4] (a) This loan was the so-called 7 per cent. Silver loan of 1894 for
Shanghai Taels 10,000,000 negotiated by the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. It
was followed in 1895 by a £3,000,000 Gold 6 per cent. Loan, then by two
more 6 per cent. loans for a million each in the same year, making a
total of £6,635,000 sterling for the bare war-expenses. The Japanese war
indemnity raised in three successive issues--from 1895 to 1898--of
£16,000,000 each, added £48,000,000. Thus the Korean imbroglio cost
China nearly 55 millions sterling. As the purchasing power of the
sovereign is eight times larger in China than in Europe, this debt
economically would mean 440 millions in England--say nearly double what
the ruinous South African war cost. It is by such methods of comparison
that the vital nature of the economic factor in recent Chinese history
is made clear.

[5] There is no doubt that the so-called Belgian loan, £1,800,000 of
which was paid over in cash at the beginning of 1912, was the instrument
which brought every one to terms.



CHAPTER II

THE ENIGMA OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

THE HISTORY OF THE MAN FROM THE OPENING OF HIS CAREER IN KOREA IN 1882
TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 12TH FEBRUARY, 1912


Yuan Shih-kai's career falls into two clear-cut parts, almost as if it
had been specially arranged for the biographer; there is the
probationary period in Korea, and the executive in North China. The
first is important only because of the moulding-power which early
influences exerted on the man's character; but it is interesting in
another way since it affords glimpses of the sort of things which
affected this leader's imagination throughout his life and finally
brought him to irretrievable ruin. The second-period is choke-full of
action; and over every chapter one can see the ominous point of
interrogation which was finally answered in his tragic political and
physical collapse.

Yuan Shih-kai's origin, without being precisely obscure, is unimportant.
He came of a Honanese family who were nothing more distinguished than
farmers possessing a certain amount of land, but not too much of the
world's possessions. The boy probably ran wild in the field at an age
when the sons of high officials and literati were already pale and
anaemic from over-much study. To some such cause the man undoubtedly
owed his powerful physique, his remarkable appetite, his general
roughness. Native biographers state that as a youth he failed to pass
his _hsiu-tsai_ examinations--the lowest civil service degree--because
he had spent too much time in riding and boxing and fencing. An uncle in
official life early took charge of him; and when this relative died the
young man displayed filial piety in accompanying the corpse back to the
family graves and in otherwise manifesting grief. Through official
connections a place was subsequently found for him in that public
department under the Manchus which may be called the military
intendancy, and it was through this branch of the civil service that he
rose to power. Properly speaking Yuan Shih-kai was never an
army-officer; he was a military official--his highest rank later on
being that of military judge, or better, Judicial Commissioner.

Yuan Shih-kai first emerges into public view in 1882 when, as a sequel
to the opening of Korea through the action of foreign Powers in forcing
the then Hermit kingdom to sign commercial treaties, China began
dispatching troops to Seoul. Yuan Shih-kai, with two other officers,
commanding in all some 3,000 men, arrived from Shantung, where he had
been in the train of a certain General Wu Chang-ching, and now encamped
in the Korean capital nominally to preserve order, but in reality, to
enforce the claims of the suzerain power. For the Peking Government had
never retreated from the position that Korea had been a vassal state
ever since the Ming Dynasty had saved the country from the clutches of
Hideyoshi and his Japanese invaders in the Sixteenth Century. Yuan
Shih-kai had been personally recommended by this General Wu Chang-ching
as a young man of ability and energy to the famous Li Hung Chang, who as
Tientsin Viceroy and High Commissioner for the Northern Seas was
responsible for the conduct of Korean affairs. The future dictator of
China was then only twenty-five years old.

His very first contact with practical politics gave him a peculiar
manner of viewing political problems. The arrival of Chinese troops in
Seoul marked the beginning of that acute rivalry with Japan which
finally culminated in the short and disastrous war of 1894-95. China, in
order to preserve her influence in Korea against the growing influence
of Japan, intrigued night and day in the Seoul Palaces, allying herself
with the Conservative Court party which was led by the notorious Korean
Queen who was afterwards assassinated. The Chinese agents aided and
abetted the reactionary group, constantly inciting them to attack the
Japanese and drive them out of the country.

Continual outrages were the consequence. The Japanese legation was
attacked and destroyed by the Korean mob not once but on several
occasions during a decade which furnishes one of the most amazing
chapters in the history of Asia. Yuan Shih-kai, being then merely a
junior general officer under the orders of the Chinese Imperial
Resident, is of no particular importance; but it is significant of the
man that he should suddenly come well under the limelight on the first
possible occasion. On 6th December, 1884, leading 2,000 Chinese troops,
and acting in concert with 3,000 Korean soldiers, he attacked the Tong
Kwan Palace in which the Japanese Minister and his staff, protected by
two companies of Japanese infantry, had taken refuge owing to the
threatening state of affairs in the capital. Apparently there was no
particular plan--it was the action of a mob of soldiery tumbling into a
political brawl and assisted by their officers for reasons which appear
to-day nonsensical. The sequel was, however, extraordinary. The Japanese
held the Palace gates as long as possible, and then being desperate
exploded a mine which killed numbers of Koreans and Chinese soldiery and
threw the attack into confusion. They then fought their way out of the
city escaping ultimately to the nearest sea-port, Chemulpo.

The explanation of this extraordinary episode has never been made
public. The practical result was that after a period of extreme tension
between China and Japan which was expected to lead to war, that
political genius, the late Prince Ito, managed to calm things down and
arrange workable _modus vivendi_. Yuan Shih-kai, who had gone to
Tientsin to report in person to Li Hung Chang, returned to Seoul
triumphantly in October, 1885, as Imperial Resident. He was then
twenty-eight years old; he had come to the front, no matter by what
means, in a quite remarkable manner.

The history of the next nine years furnishes plenty of minor incidents,
but nothing of historic importance. As the faithful lieutenant of Li
Hung Chang, Yuan Shih-kai's particular business was simply to combat
Japanese influence and hold the threatened advance in check. He failed,
of course, since he was playing a losing game; and yet he succeeded
where he undoubtedly wished to succeed. By rendering faithful service
he established the reputation he wished to win; and though he did
nothing great he retained his post right up to the act which led to the
declaration of war in 1894. Whether he actually precipitated that war is
still a matter of opinion. On the sinking by the Japanese fleet of the
British steamer _Kowshing_, which was carrying Chinese reinforcements
from Taku anchorage to Asan Bay to his assistance, seeing that the game
was up, he quietly left the Korean capital and made his way overland to
North China. That swift, silent journey home ends the period of his
novitiate.

It took him a certain period to weather the storm which the utter
collapse of China in her armed encounter with Japan brought about--and
particularly to obtain forgiveness for evacuating Seoul without orders.
Technically his offence was punishable by death--the old Chinese code
being most stringent in such matters. But by 1896 he was back in favour
again, and through the influence of his patron Li Hung Chang, he was at
length appointed in command of the Hsiaochan camp near Tientsin, where
he was promoted and given the task of reforming a division of old-style
troops and making them as efficient as Japanese soldiery. He had already
earned a wide reputation for severity, for willingness to accept
responsibility, for nepotism, and for a rare ability to turn even
disasters to his own advantage--all attributes which up to the last
moment stood him in good stead.

In the Hsiaochan camp the most important chapter of his life opens;
there is every indication that he fully realized it. Tientsin has always
been the gateway to Peking: from there the road to high preferment is
easily reached. Yuan Shih-kai marched steadily forward, taking the very
first turning-point in a manner which stamped him for many of his
compatriots in a way which can never be obliterated.

It is first necessary to say a word about the troops of his command,
since this has a bearing on present-day politics. The bulk of the
soldiery were so-called _Huai Chun_--_i.e._, nominally troops from the
Huai districts, just south of Li Hung Chang's native province Anhui.
These Kiangu men, mixed with Shantung recruits, had earned a historic
place in the favour of the Manchus owing to the part they had played in
the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, in which great event General
Gordon and Li Hung Chang had been so closely associated. They and the
troops of Hunan province, led by the celebrated Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan,
were "the loyal troops," resembling the Sikhs during the Indian Mutiny;
they were supposed to be true to their salt to the last man. Certainly
they gave proofs of uncustomary fidelity.

In those military days of twenty years ago Yuan Shih-kai and his
henchmen were, however, concerned with simpler problems. It was then a
question of drill and nothing but drill. In his camp near Tientsin the
future President of the Chinese Republic succeeded in reorganizing his
troops so well that in a very short time the Hsiaochan Division became
known as a _corps d'élite_. The discipline was so stern that there were
said to be only two ways of noticing subordinates, either by promoting
or beheading them. Devoting himself to his task Yuan Shih-kai gave
promise of being able to handle much bigger problems.

His zeal soon attracted the attention of the Manchu Court. The
circumstances in Peking at that time were peculiar. The famous old
Empress Dowager, Tzu-hsi, after the Japanese war, had greatly relaxed
her hold on the Emperor Kwanghsu, who though still in subjection to her,
nominally governed the empire. A well-intentioned but weak man, he had
surrounded himself with advanced scholars, led by the celebrated Kang Yu
Wei, who daily studied with him and filled him with new doctrines,
teaching him to believe that if he would only exert his power he might
rescue the nation from international ignominy and make for himself an
imperishable name.

The sequel was inevitable. In 1898 the oriental world was electrified by
the so-called Reform Edicts, in which the Emperor undertook to modernize
China, and in which he exhorted the nation to obey him. The greatest
alarm was created in Court circles by this action; the whole vast body
of Metropolitan officialdom, seeing its future threatened, flooded the
Palace of the Empress Dowager with Secret Memorials praying her to
resume power. Flattered, she gave her secret assent.

Things marched quickly after that. The Empress, nothing loth, began
making certain dispositions. Troops were moved, men were shifted here
and there in a way that presaged action; and the Emperor, now
thoroughly alarmed and yielding to the entreaties of his followers, sent
two members of the Reform Party to Yuan Shih-kai bearing an alleged
autograph order for him to advance instantly on Peking with all his
troops; to surround the Palace, to secure the person of the Emperor from
all danger, and then to depose the Empress Dowager for ever from power.
What happened is equally well-known. Yuan Shih-kai, after an exhaustive
examination of the message and messengers, as well as other attempts to
substantiate the genuineness of the appeal, communicated its nature to
the then Viceroy of Chihli, the Imperial Clansman Jung Lu, whose
intimacy with the Empress Dowager since the days of her youth has passed
into history. Jung Lu lost no time in acting. He beheaded the two
messengers and personally reported the whole plot to the Empress Dowager
who was already fully warned. The result was the so-called _coup d'état_
of September, 1898, when all the Reformers who had not fled were
summarily executed, and the Emperor Kwanghsu himself closely imprisoned
in the Island Palace within that portion of the Forbidden City known as
the Three Lakes, having (until the Boxer outbreak of 1900 carried him to
Hsianfu), as sole companions his two favourites, the celebrated
odalisques "Pearl" and "Lustre."

This is no place to enter into the controversial aspect of Yuan
Shih-kai's action in 1898 which has been hotly debated by partisans for
many years. For onlookers the verdict must always remain largely a
matter of opinion; certainly this is one of those matters which cannot
be passed upon by any one but a Chinese tribunal furnished with all the
evidence. Those days which witnessed the imprisonment of Kwanghsu were
great because they opened wide the portals of the Romance of History:
all who were in Peking can never forget the counter-stroke; the arrival
of the hordes composed of Tung Fu-hsiang's Mahommedan cavalry--men who
had ridden hard across a formidable piece of Asia at the behest of their
Empress and who entered the capital in great clouds of dust. It was in
that year of 1898 also that Legation Guards reappeared in Peking--a few
files for each Legation as in 1860--and it was then that clear-sighted
prophets saw the beginning of the end of the Manchu Dynasty.

Yuan Shih-kai's reward for his share in this counter-revolution was his
appointment to the governorship of Shantung province. He moved thither
with all his troops in December, 1899. Armed _cap-à-pie_ he was ready
for the next act--the Boxers, who burst on China in the Summer of 1900.
These men were already at work in Shantung villages with their
incantations and alleged witchcraft. There is evidence that their
propaganda had been going on for months, if not for years, before any
one had heard of it. Yuan Shih-kai had the priceless opportunity of
studying them at close range and soon made up his mind about certain
things. When the storm burst, pretending to see nothing but mad fanatics
in those who, realizing the plight of their country, had adopted the
war-cry "Blot out the Manchus and the foreigner," he struck at them
fiercely, driving the whole savage horde head-long into the metropolitan
province of Chihli. There, seduced by the Manchus, they suddenly changed
the inscription on their flags. Their sole enemy became the foreigner
and all his works, and forthwith they were officially protected. Far and
wide they killed every white face they could find. They tore up
railways, burnt churches and chapels and produced a general anarchy
which could only have one end--European intervention. The man, sitting
on the edge of Chinese history but not yet identifying himself with its
main currents because he was not strong enough for that had once again
not judged wrongly. With his Korean experience to assist him, he had
seen precisely what the end must inevitably be.

The crash in Peking, when the siege of the Legations had been raised by
an international army, found him alert and sympathetic--ready with
advice, ready to shoulder new responsibilities, ready to explain away
everything. The signature of the Peace Protocol of 1901 was signalized
by his obtaining the viceroyalty of Chihli, succeeding the great Li Hung
Chang himself, who had been reappointed to his old post, but had found
active duties too wearisome. This was a marvellous success for a man but
little over forty. And when the fugitive Court at length returned from
Hsianfu in 1902, honours were heaped upon him as a person particularly
worthy of honour because he had kept up appearances and maintained the
authority of the distressed Throne. As if in answer to this he flooded
the Court with memorials praying that in order to restore the power of
the Dynasty a complete army of modern troops be raised--as numerous as
possible but above all efficient.

His advice was listened to. From 1902 until 1907 as Minister of the Army
Reorganization Council--a special post he held simultaneously with that
of metropolitan Viceroy--Yuan Shih-kai's great effort was concentrated
on raising an efficient fighting force. In those five years, despite all
financial embarrassments, North China raised and equipped six excellent
Divisions of field-troops--75,000 men--all looking to Yuan Shih-kai as
their sole master. So much energy did he display in pushing military
reorganization throughout the provinces that the Court, warned by
jealous rivals of his growing power, suddenly promoted him to a post
where he would be powerless. One day he was brought to Peking as Grand
Councillor and President of the Board of Foreign Affairs, and ordered to
hand over all army matters to his noted rival, the Manchu Tieh Liang.
The time had arrived to muzzle him. His last phase as a pawn had come.

Few foreign diplomats calling at China's Foreign Office to discuss
matters during that short period which lasted barely a twelve-month,
imagined that the square resolute-looking man who as President of the
Board gave the same energy and attention to consular squabbles as to the
reorganization of a national-fighting force, was almost daily engaged in
a fierce clandestine struggle to maintain even his modest position.
Jealousy, which flourishes in Peking like the upas tree, was for ever
blighting his schemes and blocking his plans. He had been brought to
Peking to be tied up; he was constantly being denounced; and even his
all powerful patroness, the old Empress Dowager, who owed so much to
him, suffered from constant premonitions that the end was fast
approaching, and that with her the Dynasty would die.

In the Autumn of 1908 she took sick. The gravest fears quickly spread.
It was immediately reported that the Emperor Kwanghsu was also very
ill--an ominous coincidence. Very suddenly both personages collapsed and
died, the Empress Dowager slightly before the Emperor. There is little
doubt that the Emperor himself was poisoned. The legend runs that as he
expired not only did he give his Consort, who was to succeed him in the
exercise of the nominal power of the Throne, a last secret Edict to
behead Yuan Shih-kai, but that his faltering hand described circle
after circle in the air until his followers understood the meaning. In
the vernacular the name of the great viceroy and the word for circle
have the same sound; the gesture signified that the dying monarch's last
wish was revenge on the man who had failed him ten years before.

An ominous calm followed this great break with the past. It was
understood that the Court was torn by two violent factions regarding the
succession which the Empress Tzu-hsi had herself decided. The fact that
another long Regency had become inevitable through the accession of the
child Hsuan Tung aroused instant apprehensions among foreign observers,
whilst it was confidently predicted that Yuan Shih-kai's last days had
come.

The blow fell suddenly on the 2nd January, 1909. In the interval between
the death of the old Empress and his disgrace, Yuan Shih-kai was
actually promoted to the highest rank in the gift of the Throne, that
is, made "Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent" and placed in charge of
the Imperial funeral arrangements--a lucrative appointment. During that
interval it is understood that the new Regent, brother of the Emperor
Kwanghsu, consulted all the most trusted magnates of the empire
regarding the manner in which the secret decapitation Decree should be
treated. All advised him to be warned in time, and not to venture on a
course of action which would be condemned both by the nation and by the
Powers. Another Edict was therefore prepared simply dismissing Yuan
Shih-kai from office and ordering him to return to his native place.

Every one remembers that day in Peking when popular rumour declared that
the man's last hour had come. Warned on every side to beware, Yuan
Shih-kai left the Palace as soon as he had read the Edict of dismissal
in the Grand Council and drove straight to the railway-station, whence
he entrained for Tientsin, dressed as a simple citizen. Rooms had been
taken for him at a European hotel, the British Consulate approached for
protection, when another train brought down his eldest son bearing a
message direct from the Grand Council Chamber, absolutely guaranteeing
the safety of his life. Accordingly he duly returned to his native place
in Honan province, and for two years--until the outbreak of the
Revolution--devoted himself sedulously to the development of the large
estate he had acquired with the fruits of office. Living like a
patriarch of old, surrounded by his many wives and children, he
announced constantly that he had entirely dropped out of the political
life of China and only desired to be left in peace. There is reason to
believe, however, that his henchmen continually reported to him the true
state of affairs, and bade him bide his time. Certain it is that the
firing of the first shots on the Yangtsze found him alert and issuing
private orders to his followers. It was inevitable that he should have
been recalled to office--and actually within one hundred hours of the
first news of the outbreak the Court sent for him urgently and
ungraciously.

From the 14th October, 1911, when he was appointed by Imperial Edict
Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan and ordered to proceed at once to the front
to quell the insurrection, until the 1st November, when he was given
virtually Supreme Power as President of the Grand Council in place of
Prince Ching, a whole volume is required to discuss adequately the maze
of questions involved. For the purposes of this account, however, the
matter can be dismissed very briefly in this way. Welcoming the
opportunity which had at last come and determined once for all to settle
matters decisively, so far as he was personally concerned, Yuan Shih-kai
deliberately followed the policy of holding back and delaying everything
until the very incapacity marking both sides--the Revolutionists quite
as much as the Manchus--forced him, as man of action and man of
diplomacy, to be acclaimed the sole mediator and saviour of the nation.

The detailed course of the Revolution, and the peculiar manner in which
Yuan Shih-kai allowed events rather than men to assert their mastery has
often been related and need not long detain us. It is generally conceded
that in spite of the bravery of the raw revolutionary levies, their
capacity was entirely unequal to the trump card Yuan Shih-kai held all
the while in his hand--the six fully-equipped Divisions of Field Troops
he himself had organized as Tientsin Viceroy. It was a portion of this
field-force which captured and destroyed the chief revolutionary base in
the triple city of Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang in November, 1911, and
which he held back just as it was about to give the _coup de grâce_ by
crossing the river in force and sweeping the last remnants of the
revolutionary army to perdition. Thus it is correct to declare that had
he so wished Yuan Shih-kai could have crushed the revolution entirely
before the end of 1911; but he was sufficiently astute to see that the
problem he had to solve was not merely military but moral as well. The
Chinese as a nation were suffering from a grave complaint. Their
civilization had been made almost bankrupt owing to unresisted foreign
aggression and to the native inability to cope with the mass of
accumulated wrongs which a superimposed and exhausted feudalism--the
Manchu system--had brought about. Yuan Shih-kai knew that the Boxers had
been theoretically correct in selecting as they first did the watchword
which they had first placed on their banners--"blot out the Manchus and
all foreign things." Both had sapped the old civilization to its
foundations. But the programme they had proposed was idealistic, not
practical. One element could be cleared away--the other had to be
endured. Had the Boxers been sensible they would have modified their
programme to the extent of protecting the foreigners, whilst they
assailed the Dynasty which had brought them so low. The Court Party, as
we have said, seduced their leaders to acting in precisely the reverse
sense.

Yuan Shih-kai was neither a Boxer, nor yet a believer in idealistic
foolishness. He had realized that the essence of successful rule in the
China of the Twentieth Century was to support the foreign point of
view--nominally at least--because foreigners disposed of unlimited
monetary resources, and had science on their side. He knew that so long
as he did not openly flout foreign opinion by indulging in bare-faced
assassinations, he would be supported owing to the international
reputation he had established in 1900. Arguing from these premises, his
instinct also told him that an appearance of legality must always be
sedulously preserved and the aspirations of the nation nominally
satisfied. For this reason he arranged matters in such a manner as to
appear always as the instrument of fate. For this reason, although he
destroyed the revolutionists on the mid-Yangtsze, to equalize matters,
on the lower Yangtsze he secretly ordered the evacuation of Nanking by
the Imperialist forces so that he might have a tangible argument with
which to convince the Manchus regarding the root and branch reform which
he knew was necessary. That reform had been accepted in principle by the
Throne when it agreed to the so-called Nineteen Fundamental Articles, a
corpus of demands which all the Northern Generals had endorsed and had
indeed insisted should be the basis of government before they would
fight the rebellious South in 1911. There is reason to believe that
provided he had been made _de facto_ Regent, Yuan Shih-kai would have
supported to the end a Manchu Monarchy. But the surprising swiftness of
the Revolutionary Party's action in proclaiming the Republic at Nanking
on the 1st January, 1912, and the support which foreign opinion gave
that venture confused him. He had already consented to peace
negotiations with the revolutionary South in the middle of December,
1911, and once he was drawn into those negotiations his policy wavered,
the armistice in the field being constantly extended because he saw that
the Foreign Powers, and particularly England, were averse from further
civil war. Having dispatched a former lieutenant, Tong Shao-yi, to
Shanghai as his Plenipotentiary, he soon found himself committed to a
course of action different from what he had originally contemplated.
South China and Central China insisted so vehemently that the only
solution that was acceptable to them was the permanent and absolute
elimination of the Manchu Dynasty, that he himself was half-convinced,
the last argument necessary being the secret promise that he should
become the first President of the united Republic. In the circumstances,
had he been really loyal, it was his duty either to resume his warfare
or resign his appointment as Prime Minister and go into retirement. He
did neither. In a thoroughly characteristic manner he sought a middle
course, after having vaguely advocated a national convention to settle
the matter. By specious misrepresentation the widow of the Emperor
Kwanghsu--the Dowager Empress Lung Yu who had succeeded the Prince
Regent Ch'un in her care of the interests of the child Emperor Hsuan
Tung--was induced to believe that ceremonial retirement was the only
course open to the Dynasty if the country was to be saved from
disruption and partition. There is reason to believe that the Memorial
of all the Northern Generals which was telegraphed to Peking on the 28th
January, 1912, and which advised abdication, was inspired by him. In any
case it was certainly Yuan Shih-kai who drew up the so-called Articles
of Favourable Treatment for the Manchu House and caused them to be
telegraphed to the South, whence they were telegraphed back to him as
the maximum the Revolutionary Party was prepared to concede: and by a
curious chance the attempt made to assassinate him outside the Palace
Gates actually occurred on the very day he had submitted an outline of
these terms on his bended knees to the Empress Dowager and secured their
qualified acceptance. The pathetic attempt to confer on him as late as
the 25th January the title of Marquess, the highest rank of nobility
which could be given a Chinese, an attempt which was four times renewed,
was the last despairing gesture of a moribund power. Within very few
days the Throne reluctantly decreed its own abdication in three
extremely curious Edicts which are worthy of study in the appendix. They
prove conclusively that the Imperial Family believed that it was only
abdicating its political power, whilst retaining all ancient ceremonial
rights and titles. Plainly the conception of a Republic, or a People's
Government, as it was termed in the native ideographs, was
unintelligible to Peking.

Yuan Shih-kai had now won everything he wished for. By securing that the
Imperial Commission to organize the Republic and re-unite the warring
sections was placed solely in his hands, he prepared to give a type of
Government about which he knew nothing a trial. It is interesting to
note that he held to the very end of his life that he derived his powers
solely from the Last Edicts, and in nowise from his compact with the
Nanking Republic which had instituted the so-called Provisional
Constitution. He was careful, however, not to lay this down
categorically until many months later, when his dictatorship seemed
undisputed. But from the day of the Manchu Abdication almost, he was
constantly engaged in calculating whether he dared risk everything on
one throw of the dice and ascend the Throne himself; and it is precisely
this which imparts such dramatic interest to the astounding story which
follows.



CHAPTER III

THE DREAM REPUBLIC

(FROM THE 1st JANUARY, 1912, TO THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT)


To describe briefly and intelligibly the series of transactions from the
1st January, 1912, when the Republic was proclaimed at Nanking by a
handful of provincial delegates, and Dr. Sun Yat Sen elected Provisional
President, to the _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913, when Yuan
Shih-kai, elected full President a few weeks previously, after having
acted as Chief Executive for twenty months, boldly broke up Parliament
and made himself _de facto_ Dictator of China, is a matter of
extraordinary difficulty.

All through this important period of Chinese history one has the
impression that one is in dreamland and that fleeting emotions take the
place of more solid things. Plot and counter-plot follow one another so
rapidly that an accurate record of them all would be as wearisome as the
Book of Chronicles itself; whilst the amazing web of financial intrigue
which binds the whole together is so complex--and at the same time so
antithetical to the political struggle--that the two stories seem to run
counter to one another, although they are as closely united as two
assassins pledged to carry through in common a dread adventure. A huge
agglomeration of people estimated to number four hundred millions, being
left without qualified leaders and told that the system of government,
which had been laid down by the Nanking Provisional Constitution and
endorsed by the Abdication Edicts, was a system in which every man was
as good as neighbour, swayed meaninglessly to and fro, vainly seeking to
regain the equilibrium which had been so sensationally lost. A litigious
spirit became so universal that all authority was openly derided,
crimes of every description being so common as to force most respectable
men to withdraw from public affairs and leave a bare rump of desperadoes
in power.

Long embarrassed by the struggle to pay her foreign loans and
indemnities, China was also virtually penniless. The impossibility of
arranging large borrowings on foreign markets without the open support
of foreign governments--a support which was hedged round with
conditions--made necessary a system of petty expedients under which
practically every provincial administration hypothecated every liquid
asset it could lay hands upon in order to pay the inordinate number of
undisciplined soldiery who littered the countryside. The issue of
unguaranteed paper-money soon reached such an immense figure that the
market was flooded with a worthless currency which it was unable to
absorb. The Provincial leaders, being powerless to introduce
improvement, exclaimed that it was the business of the Central
Government as representative of the sovereign people to find solutions;
and so long as they maintained themselves in office they went their
respective ways with a sublime contempt for the chaos around them.

What was this Central Government? In order successfully to understand an
unparalleled situation we must indicate its nature.

The manoeuvres to which Yuan Shih-kai had so astutely lent himself from
the outbreak of the Revolution had left him at its official close
supreme in name. Not only had he secured an Imperial Commission from the
abdicating Dynasty to organize a popular Government in obedience to the
national wish, but having brought to Peking the Delegates of the Nanking
Revolutionary Body he had received from them the formal offer of the
Presidency.

These arrangements had, of course, been secretly agreed to _en bloc_
before the fighting had been stopped and the abdication proclaimed, and
were part and parcel of the elaborate scenery which officialdom always
employs in Asia even when it is dealing with matters within the purview
of the masses. They had been made possible by the so-called "Article of
Favourable Treatment" drawn-up by Yuan Shih-kai himself, after
consultation with the rebellious South. In these Capitulations it had
been clearly stipulated that the Manchu Imperial Family should receive
in perpetuity a Civil List of $4,000,000 Mexican a year, retaining all
their titles as a return for the surrender of their political power, the
bitter pill being gilded in such fashion as to hide its real meaning,
which alone was a grave political error.

In spite of this agreement, however, great mutual suspicion existed
between North and South China. Yuan Shih-kai himself was unable to
forget that the bold attempt to assassinate him in the Peking streets on
the 17th January, when he was actually engaged in negotiating these very
terms of the Abdication, had been apparently inspired from Nanking;
whilst the Southern leaders were daily reminded by the vernacular press
that the man who held the balance of power had always played the part of
traitor in the past and would certainly do the same again in the near
future.

When the Delegates came to Peking in February, by far the most important
matter which was still in dispute was the question of the oath of office
which Yuan Shih-kai was called upon to take to insure that he would be
faithful to the Republic. The Delegates had been charged specifically to
demand on behalf of the seceding provinces that Yuan Shih-kai should
proceed with them to Nanking to take that oath, a course of action which
would have been held tantamount by the nation to surrender on his part
to those who had been unable to vanquish him in the field. It must also
not be forgotten that from the very beginning a sharp and dangerous
cleavage of opinion existed as to the manner in which the powers of the
new government had been derived. South and Central China claimed, and
claimed rightly, that the Nanking Provincial Constitution was the
Instrument on which the Republic was based: Yuan Shih-kai declared that
the Abdication Edicts, and not the Nanking Instrument had established
the Republic, and that therefore it lay within his competence to
organize the new government in the way which he considered most fit.

The discussion which raged was suddenly terminated on the night of the
29th February (1912) when without any warning there occurred the
extraordinary revolt of the 3rd Division, a picked Northern corps who
for forty-eight hours plundered and burnt portions of the capital
without any attempts at interference, there being little doubt to-day
that this manoeuvre was deliberately arranged as a means of intimidation
by Yuan Shih-kai himself. Although the disorders assumed such dimensions
that foreign intervention was narrowly escaped, the upshot was that the
Nanking Delegates were completely cowed and willing to forget all about
forcing the despot of Peking to proceed to the Southern capital. Yuan
Shih-kai as the man of the hour was enabled on the 10th March, 1912, to
take his oath in Peking as he had wished thus securing full freedom of
action during the succeeding years.[6]

[Illustration: An Encampment of "The Punitive Expedition" of 1910 on the
Upper Yangtsze.

_By courtesy of Major Isaac Newell, U.S. Military Attaché_.]

[Illustration: Revival of the Imperialistic Worship of Heaven by Yuan
Shih-kai in 1914: Scene on the Altar of Heaven, with Sacrificial
Officers clothed in costumes dating from 2,000 years ago.]

[Illustration: A Manchu Country Fair: The figures in the foreground are
all Manchu women and girls.]

[Illustration: A Manchu Woman grinding Grain.]

It was on this astounding basis--by means of an organized revolt--that
the Central Government was reorganized; and every act that followed
bears the mark of its tainted parentage. Accepting readily as his
Ministers in the more unimportant government Departments the nominees of
the Southern Confederacy (which was now formally dissolved), Yuan
Shih-kai was careful to reserve for his own men everything that
concerned the control of the army and the police, as well as the
all-important ministry of finance. The framework having been thus
erected, attention was almost immediately concentrated on the problem of
finding money, an amazing matter which would weary the stoutest reader
if given in all its detail but which being part and parcel of the
general problem must be referred to.

Certain essential features can be very rapidly exposed. We have already
made clear the purely economic nature of the forces which had sapped the
foundations of Chinese society. Primarily it had been the disastrous
nature of Chinese gold-indebtedness which had given the new ideas the
force they required to work their will on the nation. And just because
the question of this gold-indebtedness had become so serious and such a
drain on the nation, some months before the outbreak of the Revolution
an arrangement had been entered into with the bankers of four nations
for a Currency Loan of £10,000,000 with which to make an organized
effort to re-establish internal credit. But this loan had never actually
been floated, as a six months' safety clause had permitted a delay
during which the Revolution had come. It was therefore necessary to
begin the negotiations anew; and as the rich prizes to be won in the
Chinese lottery had attracted general attention in the European
financial world through the advertisement which the Revolution had given
the country, a host of alternative loan proposals now lay at the
disposal of Peking.

Consequently an extraordinary chapter of bargaining commenced. Warned
that an International Debt Commission was the goal aimed at by official
finance, Yuan Shih-kai and the various parties who made up the
Government of the day, though disagreeing on almost every other
question, were agreed that this danger must be fought as a common enemy.
Though the Four-Power group alleged that they held the first option on
all Chinese loans, money had already been advanced by a Franco-Belgian
Syndicate to the amount of nearly two million pounds during the critical
days of the Abdication. Furious at the prospect of losing their
percentages, the Four Power group made the confusion worse confounded by
blocking all competing proposals and closing every possible door. Russia
and Japan, who had hitherto not been parties to the official consortium,
perceiving that participation had become a political necessity, now
demanded a place which was grudgingly accorded them; and it was in this
way that the celebrated six-power Group arose.

It was round this group and the proposed issue of a £60,000,000 loan to
reorganize Chinese finance that the central battle raged. The Belgian
Syndicate, having been driven out of business by the financial boycott
which the official group was strong enough to organize on the European
bourses, it remained for China to see whether she could not find some
combination or some man who would be bold enough to ignore all
governments.

Her search was not in vain. In September (1912) a London stockbroker,
Mr. Birch Crisp, determined to risk a brilliant coup by negotiating by
himself a Loan of £10,000,000; and the world woke up one morning to
learn that one man was successfully opposing six governments. The
recollection of the storm raised in financial circles by this bold
attempt will be fresh in many minds. Every possible weapon was brought
into play by international finance to secure that the impudence of
financial independence should be properly checked; and so it happened
that although £5,000,000 was secured after an intense struggle it was
soon plain that the large requirements of a derelict government could
not be satisfied in this Quixotic manner. Two important points had,
however, been attained; first, China was kept financially afloat during
the year 1912 by the independence of a single member of the London Stock
Exchange; secondly, using this coup as a lever the Peking Government
secured better terms than otherwise would have been possible from the
official consortium.

Meanwhile the general internal situation remained deplorable. Nothing
was done for the provinces whose paper currency was depreciating from
month to month in an alarming manner; whilst the rivalries between the
various leaders instead of diminishing seemed to be increasing. The
Tutuhs, or Military Governors, acting precisely as they saw fit, derided
the authority of Peking and sought to strengthen their old position by
adding to their armed forces. In the capital the old Manchu court,
safely entrenched in the vast Winter Palace from which it has not even
to-day been ejected (1917) published daily the Imperial Gazette,
bestowing honours and decorations on courtiers and clansmen and
preserving all the old etiquette. In the North-western provinces, and in
Manchuria and Mongolia, the so-called Tsung She Tang, or Imperial Clan
Society, intrigued perpetually to create risings which would hasten the
restoration of the fallen House; and although these intrigues never rose
to the rank of a real menace to the country, the fact that they were
surreptitiously supported by the Japanese secret service was a continual
source of anxiety. The question of Outer Mongolia was also harassing the
Central Government. The Hutuktu or Living Buddha of Urga--the chief city
of Outer Mongolia--had utilized the revolution to throw off his
allegiance to Peking; and the whole of this vast region had been thrown
into complete disorder--which was still further accentuated when Russia
on the 21st October (1912) recognized its independence. It was known
that as a pendent to this Great Britain was about to insist on the
autonomy of Tibet,--a development which greatly hurt Chinese pride.

On the 15th August, 1912, the deplorable situation was well-epitomised
by an extraordinary act in Peking, when General Chang Cheng-wu, one of
the "heroes" of the original Wuchang rising, who had been enticed to the
capital, was suddenly seized after a banquet in his honour and shot
without trial at midnight.

This event, trivial in itself during times when judicial murders were
common, would have excited nothing more than passing interest had not
the national sentiment been so aroused by the chaotic conditions. As it
was it served to focus attention on the general mal-administration over
which Yuan Shih-kai ruled as provisional President. "What is my crime?"
had shrieked the unhappy revolutionist as he had been shot and then
bayonetted to death. That query was most easily answered. His crime was
that he was not strong enough or big enough to compete against more
sanguinary men, his disappearance being consequently in obedience to an
universal law of nature. Yuan Shih-kai was determined to assert his
mastery by any and every means; and as this man had flouted him he must
die.

The uproar which this crime aroused was, however, not easily appeased;
and the Advisory Council, which was sitting in Peking pending the
assembling of the first Parliament, denounced the Provisional President
so bitterly that to show that these reproaches were ill-deserved he
invited Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the capital treating him with unparalleled
honours and requesting him to act as intermediary between the rival
factions. All such manoeuvres, however, were inspired with one
object,--namely to prove how nobody but the master of Peking could
regulate the affairs of the country.

Still no Parliament was assembled. Although the Nanking Provisional
Constitution had stipulated that one was to meet within ten months
_i.e._ before 1st November, 1912, the elections were purposely delayed,
the attention of the Central Government being concentrated on the
problem of destroying all rivals, and everything being subordinate to
this war on persons. Rascals, getting daily more and more out of hand,
worked their will on rich and poor alike, discrediting by their actions
the name of republicanism and destroying public confidence--which was
precisely what suited Yuan Shih-kai. Dramatic and extraordinary
incidents continually inflamed the public mind, nothing being too
singular for those remarkable days.

Very slowly the problem developed, with everyone exclaiming that foreign
intervention was becoming inevitable. With the beginning of 1913, being
unable to delay the matter any longer, Yuan Shih-kai allowed elections
to be held in the provinces. He was so badly beaten at the polls that it
seemed in spite of his military power that he would be outvoted and
outmanoeuvred in the new National Assembly and his authority undermined.
To prevent this a fresh assassination was decided upon. The ablest
Southern leader, Sung Chiao-jen, just as he was entraining for Peking
with a number of Parliamentarians at Shanghai, was coolly shot in a
crowded railway station by a desperado who admitted under trial that he
had been paid £200 for the job by the highest authority in the land, the
evidence produced in court including telegrams from Peking which left no
doubt as to who had instigated the murder.

The storm raised by this evil measure made it appear as if no parliament
could ever assemble in Peking. But the feeling had become general that
the situation was so desperate that action had to be taken. Not only was
their reputation at stake, but the Kuomingtang or Revolutionary Party
now knew that the future of their country was involved just as much as
the safety of their own lives; and so after a rapid consultation they
determined that they would beard the lion in his den. Rather
unexpectedly on the 7th April (1913) Parliament was opened in Peking
with a huge Southern majority and the benediction of all Radicals.[7]
Hopes rose with mercurial rapidity as a solution at last seemed in
sight. But hardly had the first formalities been completed and Speakers
been elected to both Houses, than by a single dramatic stroke Yuan
Shih-kai reduced to nought these labours by stabbing in the back the
whole theory and practice of popular government.

The method he employed was simplicity itself, and it is peculiarly
characteristic of the man that he should have been so bluntly cynical.
Though the Provisional Nanking Constitution, which was the "law" of
China so far as there was any law at all, had laid down specifically in
article XIX that all measures affecting the National Treasury must
receive the assent of Parliament, Yuan Shih-kai, pretending that the
small Advisory Council which had assisted him during the previous year
and which had only just been dissolved, had sanctioned a foreign loan,
peremptorily ordered the signature of the great Reorganization Loan of
£25,000,000 which had been secretly under negotiation all winter with
the financial agents of six Powers[8], although the rupture which had
come in the previous June as a forerunner to the Crisp loan had caused
the general public to lose sight of the supreme importance of the
financial factor. Parliament, seeing that apart from the possibility of
a Foreign Debt Commission being created something after the Turkish and
Egyptian models, a direct challenge to its existence had been offered,
raged and stormed and did its utmost to delay the question; but the
Chief Executive having made up his mind shut himself up in his Palace
and absolutely refused to see any Parliamentary representatives.
Although the Minister of Finance himself hesitated to complete the
transaction in the face of the rising storm and actually fled the
capital, he was brought back by special train and forced to complete the
agreement. At four o'clock in the morning on the 25th April the last
documents were signed in the building of a foreign bank and the Finance
Minister, galloping his carriage suddenly out of the compound to avoid
possible bombs, reported to his master that at last--in spite of the
nominal foreign control which was to govern the disbursement--a vast sum
was at his disposal to further his own ends.

Safe in the knowledge that possession is nine points of the law, Yuan
Shih-kai now treated with derision the resolutions which Parliament
passed that the transaction was illegal and the loan agreement null and
void. Being openly backed by the agents of the Foreign Powers, he
immediately received large cash advances which enabled him to extend his
power in so many directions that further argument with him seemed
useless. It is necessary to record that the Parliamentary leaders had
almost gone down on their knees to certain of the foreign Ministers in
Peking in a vain attempt to persuade them to delay--as they could very
well have done--the signature of this vital Agreement for forty-eight
hours so that it could be formally passed by the National Assembly, and
thus save the vital portion of the sovereignty of the country from
passing under the heel of one man. But Peking diplomacy is a perverse
and disagreeable thing; and the Foreign Ministers of those days,
although accredited to a government which while it had not then been
formally recognized as a Republic by any Power save the United States,
was bound to be so very shortly, were determined to be reactionary and
were at heart delighted to find things running back normally to
absolutism[9]. High finance had at last got hold of everything it
required from China and was in no mood to relax the monopoly of the salt
administration which the Loan Agreement conferred. Nor must the fact be
lost sight of that of the nominal amount of £25,000,000 which had been
borrowed, fully half consisted of repayments to foreign Banks and never
left Europe. According to the schedules attached to the Agreement, Annex
A, comprising the Boxer arrears and bank advances, absorbed £4,317,778:
Annex B, being so-called provincial loans, absorbed a further
£2,870,000: Annex C, being liabilities shortly maturing, amounted to
£3,592,263: Annex D, for disbandment of troops, amounted to £3,000,000:
Annex C, to cover current administrative expenses totalled £5,500,000:
whilst Annex E which covered the reorganization of the Salt
Administration, absorbed the last £2,000,000; The bank profits on this
loan alone amounted to 1¼ million pounds; whilst Yuan Shih-kai
himself was placed in possession by a system of weekly disbursements of
a sum roughly amounting to ten million sterling, which was amply
sufficient to allow him to wreak his will on his fellow-countrymen.
Exasperated to the pitch of despair by this new development, the Central
and Southern provinces, after a couple of months' vain argument, began
openly to arm. On the 10th July in Kiangse province on the river
Yangtsze the Northern garrisons were fired upon from the Hukow forts by
the provincial troops under General Li Lieh-chun and the so-called
Second Revolution commenced.

The campaign was short and inglorious. The South, ill-furnished with
munitions and practically penniless, and always confronted by the same
well-trained Northern Divisions who had proved themselves invincible
only eighteen months before fought hard for a while, but never became a
serious menace to the Central Government owing to the lack of
co-operation between the various Rebel forces in the field. The Kiangse
troops under General Li Lieh-chun, who numbered at most 20,000 men,
fought stiffly, it is true, for a while but were unable to strike with
any success and were gradually driven far back from the river into the
mountains of Kiangse where their numbers rapidly melted away. The
redoubtable revolutionary Huang Hsin, who had proved useful as a
propagandist and a bomb-thrower in earlier days, but who was useless in
serious warfare, although he assumed command of the Nanking garrison
which had revolted to a man, and attempted a march up the Pukow railway
in the direction of Tientsin, found his effort break down almost
immediately from lack of organization and fled to Japan. The Nanking
troops, although deserted by their leader, offered a strenuous
resistance to the capture of the southern capital which was finally
effected by the old reactionary General Chang Hsun operating in
conjunction with General Feng Kuo-chang who had been dispatched from
Peking with a picked force. The attack on the Shanghai arsenal which had
been quietly occupied by a small Northern Garrison during the months
succeeding the great loan transaction, although pushed with vigour by
the South, likewise ultimately collapsed through lack of artillery and
proper leadership. The navy, which was wholly Southern in its sympathies
and which had been counted upon as a valuable weapon in cutting off the
whole Yangtsze Valley, was at the last moment purchased to neutrality by
a liberal use of money obtained from the foreign banks, under, it is
said, the heading of administrative expenses! The turbulent city of
Canton, although it also rose against the authority of Peking, had been
well provided for by Yuan Shih-kai. A border General, named Lung
Chi-kwang, with 20,000 semi-savage Kwangsi troops had been moved near
the city and at once attacked and overawed the garrison. Appointed
Military Governor of the province in return for his services, this Lung
Chi-kwang, who was an infamous brute, for three years ruled the South
with heartless barbarity, until he was finally ejected by the great
rising of 1916. Thoroughly disappointed in this and many other
directions the Southern Party was now emasculated; for the moneyed
classes had withheld their support to the end, and without money nothing
is possible in China. The 1913 outbreak, after lasting a bare two
months, ignominiously collapsed with the flight of every one of the
leaders on whose heads prices were put. The road was now left open for
the last step Yuan Shih-kai had in mind, the coup against Parliament
itself, which although unassociated in any direct way with the rising,
had undoubtedly maintained secret relations with the rebellious generals
in the field.

Parliament had further sinned by appointing a Special Constitutional
Drafting Committee which had held its sittings behind closed doors at
the Temple of Heaven. During this drafting of the Permanent
Constitution, admittance had been absolutely refused to Yuan Shih-kai's
delegates who had been sent to urge a modification of the
decentralization which had been such a characteristic of the Nanking
Instrument. Such details as transpired showed that the principle of
absolute money-control was not only to be the dominant note in the
Permanent Constitution, but that a new and startling innovation was
being included to secure that a _de facto_ Dictatorship should be
rendered impossible. Briefly, it was proposed that when Parliament was
not actually in session there should be left in Peking a special
Parliamentary Committee, charged with supervising and controlling the
Executive, and checking any usurpation of power.

This was enough for Yuan Shih-kai: he felt that he was not only an
object of general suspicion but that he was being treated with contempt.
He determined to finish with it all. He was as yet, however, only
provisional President and it was necessary to show cunning. Once more he
set to work in a characteristic way. By a liberal use of money
Parliament was induced to pass in advance of the main body of articles
the Chapter of the Constitution dealing with the election and term of
office of the President. When that had been done the two Chambers
sitting as an Electoral College, after the model of the French
Parliament, being partly bribed and partly terrorised by a military
display, were induced to elect him full President.

On the 10th October he took his final oath of office as President for a
term of five years before a great gathering of officials and the whole
diplomatic body in the magnificent Throne Room of the Winter Palace.
Safe now in his Constitutional position nothing remained for him but to
strike. On the 4th November he issued an arbitrary Mandate, which
received the counter-signature of the whole Cabinet, ordering the
unseating of all the so-called Kuomingtang or Radical Senators and
Representatives on the counts of conspiracy and secret complicity with
the July rising and vaguely referring to the filling of the vacancies
thus created by new elections.[10] The Metropolitan Police rigorously
carried out the order and although no brutality was shown, it was made
clear that if any of the indicted men remained in Peking their lives
would be at stake. Having made it impossible for Parliament to sit owing
to the lack of quorums, Yuan Shih-kai was able to proceed with his work
of reorganization in the way that best suited him; and the novel
spectacle was offered of a truly Mexican situation created in the Far
East by and with the assent of the Powers. It is significant that the
day succeeding this _coup d'état_ of the 4th November the agreement
conceding autonomy to Outer Mongolia was signed with Russia, China
simply retaining the right to station a diplomatic representative at
Urga.[11]

In spite of his undisputed power, matters however did not improve. The
police-control, judiciously mingled with assassinations, which was now
put in full vigour was hardly the administration to make room for which
the Manchus had been expelled; and the country secretly chafed and
cursed. But the disillusionment of the people was complete. Revolt had
been tried in vain; and as the support which the Powers were affording
to this régime was well understood there was nothing to do but to wait,
safe in the knowledge that such a situation possessed no elements of
permanency.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] The defective nature of this oath of office will be patent at a
glance:

"At the beginning of the Republic there are many things to be taken care
of. I, Yuan Shih-kai, sincerely wish to exert my utmost to promote the
democratic spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey
strictly the Constitution, and to abide by the wish of the people, so as
to place the country in a safe, united, strong, and firm position, and
to effect the happiness and welfare of the divisions of the Chinese
race. All these wishes I will fulfil without fail. As soon as a new
President is elected by the National Assembly I shall at once vacate my
present position. With all sincerity I take this oath before the people
of China.

"Dated the tenth day of March in the First Year of the Republic of China
(1912)."

(Signed) Yuan Shih-kai.

[7] The Parliament of China is composed of a House of Representatives
numbering 596 members and a Senate of 274. The Representatives are
elected by means of a property and educational franchise which is
estimated to give about four million voters (1 per cent of the
population) although in practice relatively few vote. The Senate is
elected by the Provincial Assemblies by direct ballot. In the opinion of
the writer, the Chinese Parliament in spite of obvious shortcoming, is
representative of the country in its present transitional stage.

[8] The American Group at the last moment dropped out of the Sextuple
combination (prior to the signature of the contract) after President
Wilson had made his well-known pronouncement deprecating the association
of Americans in any financial undertakings which impinged upon the
rights of sovereignty of a friendly Power,--which was his considered
view of the manner in which foreign governments were assisting their
nationals to gain control of the Salt Administration The exact language
the President used was that the conditions of the loan seemed "to touch
very nearly the administrative independence of China itself," and that a
loan thus obtained was "obnoxious" to the principles upon which the
American government rests. It is to be hoped that President Wilson's
dictum will be universally accepted after the war and that meddling in
Chinese affairs will cease.

[9] The United States accorded formal recognition to the Republic on the
election of the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament: the other
Treaty Powers delayed recognition until Yuan Shih-kai had been elected
full President in October. It has been very generally held that the long
delay in foreign recognition of the Republic contributed greatly to its
internal troubles by making every one doubt the reality of the Nanking
transaction. Most important, however, is the historical fact that a
group of Powers numbering the two great leaders of democracy in
Europe--England and France--did everything they could in Peking to
enthrone Yuan Shih-kai as dictator.

[10] According to the official lists published subsequent to the coup
d'état, 98 Senators and 252 Members of the House of Representatives had
their Parliamentary Certificates impounded by the police as a result of
the Mandates of the 4th November, and were ordered to leave the Capital.
In addition 34 Senators and 54 Members of the Lower House fled from
Peking before their Certificates could be seized. Therefore the total
number affected by the proscription was 132 Senators and 306
Representatives. As the quorums in the case of both Houses are half the
total membership, any further sittings were thus made impossible.

[11] A full copy of this agreement will be found in the appendix.



CHAPTER IV

THE DICTATOR AT WORK

(FROM THE COUP D'ETAT OF THE 4TH NOVEMBER, 1913, TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE
WORLD-WAR 1ST AUGUST, 1914)


With the Parliament of China effectively destroyed, and the turbulent
Yangtsze Valley dragooned into sullen submission, Yuan Shih-kai's task
had become so vastly simplified that he held the moment to have arrived
when he could openly turn his hand to the problem of making himself
absolutely supreme, _de jure_ as well as _de facto_. But there was one
remaining thing to be done. To drive the last nail into the coffin of
the Republic it was necessary to discredit and virtually imprison the
man who was Vice-President.

It is highly characteristic that although he had received from the hero
of the Wuchang Rising the most loyal co-operation--a co-operation of a
very arduous character since the Commander of the Middle Yangtsze had
had to resist the most desperate attempt? to force him over to the side
of the rebellion in July, 1913, nevertheless, Yuan Shih-kai was
determined to bring this man to Peking as a prisoner of state.

It was just the fact that General Li Yuan-hung was a national hero which
impelled the Dictator to action. In the election which had been carried
out in October, 1913, by the National Assembly sitting as a National
Convention, in spite of every effort to destroy his influence, the
personal popularity of the Vice-President had been such that he had
received a large number of votes for the office of full President--which
had necessitated not one but three ballots being taken, making most
people declare that had there been no bribery or intimidation he would
have probably been elected to the supreme office in the land, and
ousted the ambitious usurper. In such circumstances his complete
elimination was deemed an elementary necessity. To secure that end Yuan
Shih-kai suddenly dispatched to Wuchang--where the Vice-President had
resided without break since 1911--the Minister of War, General Tuan
Chi-jui, with implicit instructions to deal with the problem in any way
he deemed satisfactory, stopping short of nothing should his victim
prove recalcitrant.

Fortunately General Tuan Chi-jui did not belong to the ugly breed of men
Yuan Shih-kai loved to surround himself with; and although he was a
loyal and efficient officer the politics of the assassin were unknown to
him. He was therefore able to convince the Vice-President after a brief
discussion that the easiest way out of the ring of intriguers and
plotters in which Yuan Shih-kai was rapidly surrounding him in Wuchang
was to go voluntarily to the capital. There at least he would be in
daily touch with developments and able to fight his own battles without
fear of being stabbed in the back; since under the eye of the foreign
Legations even Yuan Shih-kai was exhibiting a certain timidity. Indeed
after the outcry which General Chang Cheng-wu's judicial murder had
aroused he had reserved his ugliest deeds for the provinces, only small
men being done to death in Peking. Accordingly, General Li Yuan-hung
packed a bag and accompanied only by an aide-de-camp left abruptly for
the capital where he arrived on the 11th December, 1913.

A great sensation was caused throughout China by this sudden departure,
consternation prevailing among the officers and men of the Hupeh
(Wuchang) army when the newspapers began to hint that their beloved
chief had been virtually abducted. Although cordially received by Yuan
Shih-kai and given as his personal residence the. Island Palace where
the unfortunate Emperor Kwanghsu had been so long imprisoned by the
Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi after her _coup d'état_ of 1898, it did not take
long for General Li Yuan-hung to understand that his presence was a
source of embarrassment to the man who would be king. Being, however,
gifted with an astounding fund of patience, he prepared to sit down and
allow the great game which he knew would now unroll to be played to its
normal ending. What General Li Yuan-hung desired above all was to be
forgotten completely and absolutely--springing to life when the hour of
deliverance finally arrived. His policy was shown to be not only
psychologically accurate, but masterly in a political sense. The
greatest ally of honesty in China has always been time, the inherent
decency of the race finally discrediting scoundrelism in every period of
Chinese history.

The year 1914 dawned with so many obstacles removed that Yuan Shih-kai
became more and more peremptory in his methods. In February the young
Empress Lun Yi, widow of the Emperor Kwanghsu, who two years previously
in her character of guardian of the boy-Emperor Hsuan Tung, had been
cajoled into sanctioning the Abdication Edicts, unexpectedly expired,
her death creating profound emotion because it snapped the last link
with the past. Yuan Shih-kai's position was considerably strengthened by
this auspicious event which secretly greatly delighted him; and by his
order for three days the defunct Empress lay in State in the Grand Hall
of the Winter Palace and received the obeisance of countless multitudes
who appeared strangely moved by this hitherto unknown procedure. There
was now only a nine-year old boy between the Dictator and his highest
ambitions. Two final problems still remained to be dealt with: to give a
legal form to a purely autocratic rule, and to find money to govern the
country. The second matter was vastly more important than the first to a
man who did not hesitate to base his whole polity on the teachings of
Machiavelli, legality being looked upon as only so much political
window-dressing to placate foreign opinion and prevent intervention,
whilst without money even the semblance of the rights of eminent domain
could not be preserved. Everything indeed hinged on the question of
finding money.

There was none in China, at least none for the government. Financial
chaos still reigned supreme in spite of the great Reorganization Loan of
£25,000,000, which had been carefully arranged more for the purpose of
wiping-out international indebtedness and balancing the books of foreign
bankers than to institute a modern government. All the available specie
in the country had been very quietly remitted in these troubled times by
the native merchant-guilds from every part of China to the vast emporium
of Shanghai for safe custody, where a sum not far short of a hundred
million ounces now choked the vaults of the foreign banks,--being safe
from governmental expropriation. The collection of provincial revenues
having been long disorganized, Yuan Shih-kai, in spite of his military
dictatorship, found it impossible to secure the proper resumption of the
provincial remittances. Fresh loans became more and more sought after;
by means of forced domestic issues a certain amount of cash was
obtained, but the country lived from hand to mouth and everybody was
unhappy. Added to this by March the formidable insurrection of the
"White Wolf" bandits in Central China--under the legendary leadership of
a man who was said to be invulnerable--necessitated the mobilization of
a fresh army which ran into scores of battalions and which was vainly
engaged for nearly half a year in rounding-up this replica of the
Mexican Villa. So demoralized had the army become from long licence that
this guerrilla warfare was waged with all possible slackness until a
chance shot mortally wounded the chief brigand and his immense following
automatically dispersed. During six months these pests had ravaged three
provinces and menaced one of the most strongly fortified cities in
Asia--the old capital of China, Hsianfu, whither the Manchu Court had
fled in 1900.

Meanwhile wholesale executions were carried out in the provinces with
monotonous regularity and all attempts at rising ruthlessly suppressed.
In Peking the infamous Chih Fa Chu or Military Court--a sort of Chinese
Star-Chamber--was continually engaged in summarily dispatching men
suspected of conspiring against the Dictator, Even the printed word was
looked upon as seditious, an unfortunate native editor being actually
flogged to death in Hankow for telling the truth about conditions in the
riverine districts. These cruelties made men more and more determined to
pay off the score the very first moment that was possible. Although he
was increasingly pressed for ready money, Yuan Shih-kai, by the end of
April, 1914, had the situation sufficiently in hand to bring out his
supreme surprise,--a brand-new Constitution promulgated under the
euphonious title of "The Constitutional Compact."

This precious document, which had no more legality behind it as a
governing instrument than a private letter, can be studied by the
curious in the appendix where it is given in full: here it is sufficient
to say that no such hocuspocus had ever been previously indulged in
China. Drafted by an American legal adviser, Dr. Goodnow, who was later
to earn unenviable international notoriety as the endorser of the
monarchy scheme, it erected what it was pleased to call the Presidential
System; that is, it placed all power directly in the hands of the
President, giving him a single Secretary of State after the American
model and reducing Cabinet Ministers to mere Department Chiefs who
received their instructions from the State Department but had no real
voice in the actual government. A new provincial system was likewise
invented for the provinces, the Tutuhs or Governors of the Revolutionary
period being turned into Chiang Chun or Military Officials on the Manchu
model and provincial control absolutely centralized in their hands,
whilst the Provincial Assemblies established under the former dynasty
were summarily abolished. The worship at the Temple of Heaven was also
re-established and so was the official worship of Confucius--both
Imperialistic measures--whilst a brand-new ceremony, the worship of the
two titulary Military Gods, was ordered so as to inculcate military
virtue! It was laid down that in the worship of Heaven the President
would wear the robes of the Dukes of the Chow dynasty, B.C. 1112, a
novel and interesting republican experiment. Excerpts from two Mandates
which belong to these days throw a flood of light on the kind of
reasoning which was held to justify these developments. The first
declares:

    ... "In a Republic the Sovereign Power is vested in the people, and
    the main principle is that all things should be determined in
    accordance with the desires of the majority. These desires may be
    embraced by two words, namely, existence and happiness. I, the
    President, came from my farm because I was unable to bear the
    eternal sufferings of the innocent people. I assumed office and
    tried vainly to soothe the violent feelings. The greatest evil
    nowadays is the misunderstanding of true principles. The Republicans
    on the pretext of public interest try to attain selfish ends, some
    going so far as to consider the forsaking of parents as a sign of
    liberty and regarding the violation of the laws as a demonstration
    of equality. I will certainly do my best to change all this."

In the second Mandate Yuan Shih-kai justifies the re-establishment of
the Confucian worship in a singular way, incidentally showing how
utterly incomprehensible to him is the idea of representative
government, since he would appear to have imagined that by dispatching
circular telegrams to the provincial capitals and receiving affirmative
replies from his creatures all that is necessary in the way of a
national endorsement of high constitutional measures had been obtained.

    ... "China's devotion to Confucius began with the reign of the
    Emperor Hsiaowu, of the Han dynasty, who rejected the works of the
    hundred authors, making the six Confucian classics the leading
    books. Confucius, born in the time of the tyranny of the nobility,
    in his works declared that after war disturbances comes peace, and
    with peace real tranquillity and happiness. This, therefore, is the
    fountain of Republicanism. After studying the history of China and
    consulting the opinions of scholars, I find that Confucius must
    remain the teacher for thousands of generations. But in a Republic
    the people possess sovereign power. Therefore circular telegrams
    were dispatched to all the provinces to collect opinions, and many
    affirmative answers have already been received. Therefore, all
    colleges, schools, and public bodies are ordered to revive the
    sacrificial ceremony of Confucius, which shall be carefully and
    minutely ordained." ...

With the formal promulgation of the Constitutional Compact the situation
had become bizarre in the extreme. Although even the child-mind might
have known that powers for Constitution-making were vested solely in the
National Assembly, and that the re-division of authority which was now
made was wholly illegal, because Yuan Shih-kai as the bailiff of the
Powers was able to do much as he pleased; and at a moment when Liberal
Europe was on the eve of plunging into the most terrible war in history
in defence of right against might, reaction and Prussianism of the most
repulsive type were passed by unnoticed in China. In a few loosely
drafted chapters not only was the governance of the country rearranged
to suit a purely dictational rule, but the actual Parliament was
permanently extinguished and replaced by a single Legislative Chamber
(_Li Fa Yuan_) which from its very composition could be nothing but a
harmless debating Society with no greater significance than a dietine of
one of the minor German States. Meanwhile, as there was no intention of
allowing even this chamber to assemble until the last possible moment, a
Senate was got together as the organ of public opinion, ten Senators
being chosen to draft yet another Constitution which would be the final
one. Remarkable steps were taken a little later in the year (1914) to
secure that the succession to the dictatorship should be left in Yuan
Shih-kai's own hands. An elaborate ritual was contrived and officially
promulgated under the title of the Presidential Succession Law on the
29th December whereby the Chief Executive selected three names which
were placed in a gold box in a Stone House in the grounds of the
Palace,--the gold box only to be opened when death or incapacity
deprived the nation of its self-appointed leader. For the term of the
presidency was openly converted into one of ten years and made subject
to indefinite renewal by this precious instrument which was the work of
the puppet senate. In case of the necessity of an election suddenly
arising, an Electoral College was to be formed by fifty members drawn
from the Legislative Chamber and fifty from the Senate, the Presidential
candidates consisting of the President (if he so desired) and the three
whose names were in the gold box in the Stone House in the Palace
grounds. It is not definitely known to whom these provisions were due,
but it is known that at least they were not the work of the American
adviser.

His responsibility, however, was very great; for the keynote of all this
scheme, according to Dr. Goodnow[12], was "centralization of power," a
parrot-like phrase which has deluded better men than ever came to China
and which--save as a method necessary during a state of war--should
have no place in modern politics. But it was precisely this which
appealed to Yuan Shih-kai. Although as President he was _ex officio_
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he now turned this office into
a direct and special organization installed within the precincts of the
Imperial City. The flags of this new dictatorship constantly floated
over his palace, whilst scores of officers were appointed to scores of
departments which were directly concerned with centralizing the control
of every armed man in the country in the master's hands. Meanwhile in
order to placate provincial commanders, a "Palace of Generals," was
created in Peking to which were brought all men it was held desirable to
emasculate. Here, drawing ample salaries, they could sit in idleness the
livelong day, discussing the battles they had never fought and
intriguing against one another, two occupations in which the product of
the older school of men in China excels. Provincial levies which had any
military virtue, were gradually disbanded, though many of the rascals
and rapscallions, who were open menaces to good government were left
with arms in their hands so as to be an argument in favour of drastic
police-rule. Thus it is significant of the underlying falseness and
weakness of the dictator's character that he never dared to touch the
troops of the reprobate General Chang Hsun, who had made trouble for
years, and who had nearly embroiled China in war with Japan during the
so-called Second Revolution (July-August, 1913) by massacring some
Japanese civilians in the streets of Nanking when the city was
recaptured. So far from disbanding his men, Chang Hsun managed
constantly to increase his army of 30,000 men on the plea that the post
of Inspector-General of the Yangtsze Valley, which had been given to him
as a reward for refusing to throw in his lot with the Southern rebels,
demanded larger forces. Yuan Shih-kai, although half afraid of him,
found him at various periods useful as a counterweight to other generals
in the provinces; in any case he was not the man to risk anything by
attempting to crush him. As he was planted with his men astride of the
strategically important Pukow railway, it was always possible to order
him at a moment's notice into the Yangtsze Valley which was thus
constantly under the menace of fire and sword.

Far and wide Yuan Shih-kai now stretched his nets. He even employed
Americans throughout the United States in the capacity of press-agents
in order to keep American public opinion favourable to him, hoping to
invoke their assistance against his life-enemy--Japan--should that be
necessary. The precise details of this propaganda and the sums spent in
its prosecution are known to the writer; if he refrains from publishing
them it is solely for reasons of policy. England it was not necessary to
deal with in this way. Chance had willed that the British Representative
in Peking should be an old friend who had known the Dictator intimately
since his Korean days; and who faithful to the extraordinary English
love of hero-worship believed that such a surprising character could do
little wrong. British policy which has always been a somewhat variable
quantity in China, owing to the spasmodic attention devoted to such a
distant problem, may be said to have been non-existent during all this
period--a state of affairs not conducive to international happiness.

Slowly the problem developed in a shiftless, irresolute way. Unable to
see that China had vastly changed, and that government by rascality had
become a physical and moral impossibility, the Legations in Peking
adopted an attitude of indifference leaving Yuan Shih-kai to wreak his
will on the people. The horde of foreign advisers who had been appointed
merely as a piece of political window-dressing, although they were
allowed to do no work, were useful in running backwards and forwards
between the Legations and the Presidential headquarters and in making
each Power suppose that its influence was of increasing importance. It
was made abundantly clear that in Yuan Shih-kai's estimation the
Legations played in international politics much the same rôle that
provincial capitals did in domestic politics: so long as you bound both
to benevolent neutrality the main problem--the consolidation of
dictatorial power--could be pushed on with as you wished. Money,
however, remained utterly lacking and a new twenty-five million sterling
loan was spoken of as inevitable--the accumulated deficit in 1914 being
alone estimated at thirty-eight million pounds. But although this
financial dearth was annoying, Chinese resources were sufficient to
allow the account to be carried on from day to day. Some progress was
made in railways, building concessions being liberally granted to
foreign corporations, this policy having received a great impetus from
the manner in which Dr. Sun Yat Sen had boomed the necessity for better
communications during the short time he had ruled at a National Railway
Bureau in Shanghai, an office from which he had been relieved in 1913 on
it being discovered that he was secretly indenting for quick-firing
guns. Certain questions proved annoying and insoluble, for instance the
Tibetan question concerning which England was very resolute, as well as
the perpetual risings in Inner Mongolia, a region so close to Peking
that concentrations of troops were necessary. But on the whole as time
went on there was increasing indifference both among the Foreign Powers
and Chinese for the extraordinary state of affairs which had been
allowed to grow up.

There was one notable exception, however, Japan. Never relaxing her grip
on a complicated problem, watchful and active, where others were
indifferent and slothful, Japan bided her time. Knowing that the hour
had almost arrived when it would be possible to strike, Japan was vastly
active behind the scenes in China long before the outbreak of the
European war gave her the longed for opportunity; and largely because of
her the pear, which seemed already almost ripe, finally withered on the
tree.

FOOTNOTES:

[12] It is significant that Dr. Goodnow carried out all his
Constitutional studies in Germany, specializing in that department known
as Administrative Law which has no place, fortunately, in Anglo-Saxon
conceptions of the State.



CHAPTER V

THE FACTOR OF JAPAN

(FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD-WAR, 1ST AUGUST, 1914, TO THE FILING OF
THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 18TH JANUARY, 1915)


The thunderclap of the European war shattered the uneasy calm in China,
not because the Chinese knew anything of the mighty issues which were to
be fought out with such desperation and valour, but because the presence
of the German colony of Kiaochow on Chinese soil and the activity of
German cruisers in the Yellow Sea brought the war to China's very doors.
Vaguely conscious that this might spell disaster to his own ambitious
plans, Yuan Shih-kai was actually in the midst of tentative negotiations
with the German Legation regarding the retrocession of the Kiaochow
territory when the news reached him that Japan, after some rapid
negotiations with her British Ally, had filed an ultimatum on Germany,
peremptorily demanding the handing-over of all those interests that had
been forcibly acquired in Shantung province in the great leasing-year of
1898.

At once Yuan Shih-kai realized that the Nemesis which had dogged his
footsteps all his life was again close behind him. In the Japanese
attack on Kiaochow he foresaw a web of complications which even his
unrivalled diplomacy might be unable to unravel; for he knew well from
bitter experience that wherever the Japanese sets his foot there he
remains. It is consequently round this single factor of Japan that the
history of the two succeeding years revolves. From being indisputably
the central figure on the Chinese canvas, Yuan Shih-kai suddenly becomes
subordinate to the terror of Japanese intervention which hangs over him
constantly like a black cloud, and governs every move he made from the
15th August, 1914, to the day of his dramatic death on the 6th June,
1916. We shall attempt to write down the true explanation of why this
should have been so.

It is extremely hard to discuss the question of Japan for the benefit of
an exclusively Western audience in a convincing way because Japanese
policy has two distinct facets which seem utterly contradictory, and yet
which are in a great measure understandable if the objects of that
diplomacy are set down. Being endowed with an extraordinary capacity for
taking detached views, the Statesmen of Tokio long ago discerned the
necessity of having two independent policies--an Eastern policy for
Eastern Asia and a Western policy for Western nations--because East and
West are essentially antithetical, and cannot be treated (at least not
yet) in precisely the same manner. Whilst the Western policy is frank
and manly, and is exclusively in the hands of brilliant and attractive
men who have been largely educated in the schools of Europe and America
and who are fully able to deal with all matters in accordance with the
customary traditions of diplomacy, the Eastern policy is the work of
obscurantists whose imaginations are held by the vast projects which the
Military Party believes are capable of realization in China. There is
thus a constant contradiction in the attitude of Japan which men have
sought in vain to reconcile. It is for this reason that the outer world
is divided into two schools of thought, one believing implicitly in
Japan's _bonâ fides_, the other vulgarly covering her with abuse and
declaring that she is the last of all nations in her conceptions of fair
play and honourable treatment. Both views are far-fetched. It is as true
of Japan as it is of every other Government in the world that her
actions are dictated neither by altruism nor by perfidy, but are merely
the result of the faulty working of a number of fallible brains and as
regards the work of administration in Japan itself the position is
equally extraordinary. Here, at the extreme end of the world, so far
from being in any way threatened, the principle of Divine Right, which
is being denounced and dismembered in Europe as a crude survival from
almost heathen days, stands untouched and still exhibits itself in all
its pristine glory. A highly aristocratic Court, possessing one of the
most complicated and jealously protected hierarchies in the world, and
presided over by a monarch claiming direct descent from the sacred Jimmu
Tenno of twenty-five hundred years ago, decrees to-day precisely as
before, the elaborate ritual governing every move, every decision and
every agreement. There is something so engaging in this political
curiosity, something so far removed from the vast world-movement now
rolling fiercely to its conclusion, that we may be pardoned for
interpolating certain capital considerations which closely affect the
future of China and therefore cannot fail to be of public interest.

The Japanese, who owe their whole theocratic conception to the Chinese,
just as they owe all their letters and their learning to them, still
nominally look upon their ruler as the link between Heaven and Earth,
and the central fact dominating their cosmogony. Although the vast
number of well-educated men who to-day crowd the cities of Japan are
fully conscious of the bizarre nature of this belief in an age which has
turned its back on superstition, nothing has yet been done to modify it
because--and this is the important point--the structure of Japanese
society is such that without a violent upheaval which shall hurl the
military clan system irremediably to the ground, it is absolutely
impossible for human equality to be admitted and the man-god theory to
be destroyed. So long as these two features-exist; that is so long as a
privileged military caste supports and attempts to make all-powerful the
man-god theory, so long will Japan be an international danger-spot
because there will lack those democratic restraints which this war has
shown are absolutely essential to secure a peaceful understanding among
the nations. It is for this reason that Japan will fail to attain the
position the art-genius and industry of her people entitle her to and
must limp behind the progress of the world unless a very radical
revision of the constitution is achieved. The disabilities which arise
from an archaic survival are so great that they will affect China as
adversely as Japan, and therefore should be universally understood.

Japanese history, if stripped of its superficial aspects, has a certain
remarkable quality; it seems steeped in heroic blood. The doctrine of
force, which expresses itself in its crudest forms in Europe, has always
been in Japan a system of heroic-action so fascinating to humanity at
large that until recent times its international significance has not
been realized. The feudal organization of Japanese society which arose
as a result of the armed conquest of the islands fifteen hundred years
ago, precluded centralizating measures being taken because the Throne,
relying on the virtues of Divine Ancestors rather than on any
well-articulated political theory, was weak in all except certain
quasisacerdotal qualities, and forced to rely on great chieftains for
the execution of its mandates as well as for its defence. The military
title of "barbarian-conquering general," which was first conferred on a
great clan leader eight centuries ago, was a natural enough development
when we remember that the autochthonous races were even then not yet
pushed out of the main island, and were still battling with the
advancing tide of Japanese civilization which was itself composed of
several rival streams coming from the Asiatic mainland and from the
Malayan archipelagoes. This armed settlement saturates Japanese history
and is responsible for the unending local wars and the glorification of
the warrior. The conception of triumphant generalship which Hideyoshi
attempted unsuccessfully to carry into Korea in the Sixteenth Century,
led directly at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century to the formal
establishment of the Shogunate, that military dictatorship being the
result of the backwash of the Korean adventure, and the greatest proof
of the disturbance which it had brought in Japanese society. The
persistence of this hereditary military dictatorship for more than two
and a half centuries is a remarkable illustration of the fact that as in
China so in Japan the theocratic conception was unworkable save in
primitive times--civilization demanding organization rather than
precepts and refusing to bow its head to speechless kings. Although the
Restoration of 1868 nominally gave back to the Throne all it had been
forced to leave in other hands since 1603, that transfer of power was
imaginary rather than real, the new military organization which
succeeded the Shogun's government being the vital portion of the
Restoration. In other words, it was the leaders of Japan's conscript
armies who inherited the real power, a fact made amply evident by the
crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion by these new corps whose organization
allowed them to overthrow the proudest and most valorous of the Samurai
and incidentally to proclaim the triumph of modern firearms.

Now it is important to note that as early as 1874--that is six years
after the Restoration of the Emperor Meiji--these facts were attracting
the widest notice in Japanese society, the agitation for a Constitution
and a popular assembly being very vigorously pushed. Led by the
well-known and aristocratic Itagaki, Japanese Liberalism had joined
battle with out-and-out Imperialism more than a quarter of a century
ago; and although the question of recovering Tariff and Judicial
autonomy and revising the Foreign Treaties was more urgent in those
days, the foreign question was often pushed aside by the fierceness of
the constitutional agitation.

It was not, however, until 1889 that a Constitution was finally granted
to the Japanese--that instrument being a gift from the Crown, and
nothing more than a conditional warrant to a limited number of men to
become witnesses of the processes of government but in no sense its
controllers. The very first Diet summoned in 1890 was sufficient proof
of that. A collision at once occurred over questions of finance which
resulted in the resignation of the Ministry. And ever since those days,
that is for twenty-seven consecutive years, successive Diets in Japan
have been fighting a forlorn fight for the power which can never be
theirs save by revolution, it being only natural that Socialism should
come to be looked upon by the governing class as Nihilism, whilst the
mob-threat has been very acute ever since the Tokio peace riots of 1905.

Now it is characteristic of the ceremonial respect which all Japanese
have for the Throne that all through this long contest the main issue
should have been purposely obscured. The traditional feelings of
veneration which a loyal and obedient people feel for a line of
monarchs, whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, are such that
they have turned what is in effect an ever-growing struggle against the
archaic principle of divine right into a contest with clan-leaders whom
they assert are acting "unconstitutionally" whenever they choose to
assert the undeniable principles of the Constitution. Thus to-day we
have this paradoxical situation; that although Japanese Liberalism must
from its very essence be revolutionary, _i.e._, destructive before it
can hope to be constructive, it feigns blindness, hoping that by suasion
rather than by force the principle of parliamentary government will
somehow be grafted on to the body politic and the emperors, being left
outside the controversy, become content to accept a greatly modified
rule.

This hope seems a vain one in the light of all history. Militarism and
the clans are by no means in the last ditch in Japan, and they will no
more surrender their power than would the Russian bureaucracy. The only
argument which is convincing in such a case is the last one which is
ever used; and the mere mention of it by so-called socialists is
sufficient to cause summary arrest in Japan. Sheltering themselves
behind the Throne, and nominally deriving their latter-day dictatorship
from the Imperial mandate, the military chiefs remain adamant, nothing
having yet occurred to incline them to surrender any of their
privileges. By a process of adaptation to present-day conditions, a
formula has now been discovered which it is hoped will serve many a long
year. By securing by extra-legal means the return of a "majority" in the
House of Representatives the fiction of national support of the
autocracy has been re-invigorated, and the doctrine laid down that what
is good for every other advanced people in the world is bad for the
Japanese, who must be content with what is granted them and never
question the superior intelligence of a privileged caste. In the opinion
of the writer, it is every whit as important for the peace of the world
that the people of Japan should govern themselves as it is for the
people of Germany to do so. The persistence of the type of military
government which we see to-day in Japan is harmful for all alike because
it is as antiquated as Tsarism and a perpetual menace to a disarmed
nation such as China. So long as that government remains, so long must
Japan remain an international suspect and be denied equal rights in the
council-chambers of the Liberal Powers.

If the situation which arose on the 15th August, 1914, is to be
thoroughly understood, it is necessary to pick up threads of
Chino-Japanese relations from a good many years back. First-hand
familiarity with the actors and the scenes of at least three decades is
essential to give the picture the completeness, the brilliancy of
colouring, and withal the suggestiveness inseparable from all true
works of art. For the Chino-Japanese question is primarily a work of art
and not merely a piece of jejune diplomacy stretched across the years.
As the shuttle of Fate has been cast swiftly backwards and forwards, the
threads of these entwining relations have been woven into patterns
involving the whole Far East, until to-day we have as it were a complete
Gobelin tapestry, magnificent with meaning, replete with action, and
full of scholastic interest.

Let us follow some of the tracery. It has long been the habit to affirm
that the conflict between China and Japan had its origin in Korea, when
Korea was a vassal state acknowledging the suzerainty of Peking; and
that the conflict merited ending there, since of the two protagonists
contending for empire Japan was left in undisputed mastery. This
statement, being incomplete, is dangerously false. Dating from that
vital period of thirty years ago, when Yuan Shih-kai first went to Seoul
as a general officer in the train of the Chinese Imperial Resident (on
China being forced to take action in protection of her interests, owing
to the "opening" of Korea by the American Treaty of 1882) three
contestants, equally interested in the balance of land-power in Eastern
Asia were constantly pitted against one another with Korea as their
common battling-ground--Russia, China and Japan. The struggle, which
ended in the eclipse of the first two, merely shifted the venue from the
Korean zone to the Manchurian zone; and from thence gradually extended
it further and further afield until at last not only was Inner Mongolia
and the vast belt of country fronting the Great Wall embraced within its
scope, but the entire aspect of China itself was changed. For these
important facts have to be noted. Until the Russian war of 1904-05 had
demonstrated the utter valuelessness of Tsarism as an international
military factor, Japan had been almost willing to resign herself to a
subordinate rôle in the Far East. Having eaten bitter bread as the
result of her premature attempt in 1895 (after the Korean war) to become
a continental power--an attempt which had resulted in the forced
retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula--she had been placed on her good
behaviour, an attitude which was admirably reflected in 1900 when her
Peking Expeditionary Force proved itself so well-behaved and so gallant
as to arouse the world's admiration. But the war with Russia and the
collapse of the Tsar's Manchurian adventure not only drew her back into
territory that she never hoped to see again, but placed her in
possession of a ready-made railway system which carried her almost up to
the Sungari river and surrendered to her military control vast
grasslands stretching to the Khingan mountains. This Westernly march so
greatly enlarged the Japanese political horizon, and so entirely changed
the Japanese viewpoint, that the statesmen of Tokio in their excitement
threw off their ancient spectacles and found to their astonishment that
their eyes were every whit as good as European eyes. Now seeing the
world as others had long seen it, they understood that just as with the
individuals so with nations the struggle for existence can most easily
be conducted by adopting that war-principle of Clausewitz--the restless
offensive, and not by writing meaningless dispatches. Prior to the
Russian war they had written to Russia a magnificent series of documents
in which they had pleaded with sincerity for an equitable
settlement,--only to find that all was in vain. Forced to battle, they
had found in combat not only success but a new principle.

The discovery necessitated a new policy. During the eighties, and in a
lesser degree in the nineties, Japan had apart from everything else been
content to act in a modest and retiring way, because she wished at all
costs to avoid testing too severely her immature strength. But owing to
the successive collapses of her rivals, she now found herself not only
forced to attack as the safest course of action, but driven to the view
that the Power that exerts the maximum pressure constantly and
unremittedly is inevitably the most successful. This conclusion had
great importance. For just as the first article of faith for England in
Asia has been the doctrine that no Power can be permitted to seize
strategic harbours which menace her sea-communications, so did it now
become equally true of Japan that her dominant policy became not an
Eastern Monroe doctrine, as shallow men have supposed, but simply the
Doctrine of Maximum Pressure. To press with all her strength on China
was henceforth considered vital by every Japanese; and it is in this
spirit that every diplomatic pattern has been woven since the die was
cast in 1905. Until this signal fact has been grasped no useful analysis
can be made of the evolution of present conditions. Standing behind
this policy, and constantly reinforcing it, are the serried ranks of
the new democracy which education and the great increase in material
prosperity have been so rapidly creating. The soaring ambition which
springs from the sea lends to the attacks developed by such a people the
aspect of piracies; and it is but natural. In such circumstances that
for Chinese Japan should not only have the aspect of a sea-monster but
that their country should appear as hapless Andromeda bound to a rock,
always awaiting a Perseus who never comes....

The Revolution of 1911 had been entirely unexpected in Japan. Whilst
large outbreaks had been certainly counted on since the Chinese
Revolutionary party had for years used Japan as an asylum and a base of
operations, never had it been anticipated that the fall of an ancient
Dynasty could be so easily encompassed. Consequently, the abdication of
the Manchus as the result of intrigues rather than of warfare was looked
upon as little short of a catastrophe because it hopelessly complicated
the outlook, broke the pattern which had been so carefully woven for so
many years, and interjected harsh elements which could not be assigned
an orderly place. Not only was a well-articulated State-system suddenly
consigned to the flames, but the ruin threatened to be so general that
the balance of power throughout the Far East would be twisted out of
shape. Japanese statesmen had desired a weak China, a China which would
ultimately turn to them for assistance because they were a kindred race,
but not a China that looked to the French Revolution for its
inspiration. To a people as slow to adjust themselves to violent
surprises as are the Japanese, there was an air of desperation about the
whole business which greatly alarmed them, and made them determined at
the earliest possible moment to throw every ounce of their weight in the
direction which would best serve them by bringing matters back to their
original starting-point. For this reason they were not only prepared in
theory in 1911 to lend armed assistance to the Manchus but would have
speedily done so had not England strongly dissented from such a course
of action when she was privately sounded about the matter. Even to-day,
when a temporary adjustment of Japanese policy has been successfully
arranged, it is of the highest importance for political students to
remember that the dynastic influences in Tokio have never departed from
the view that the legitimate sovereignty of China remains vested in the
Manchu House and that everything that has taken place since 1911 is
irregular and unconstitutional.

For the time being, however, two dissimilar circumstances demanded
caution: first, the enthusiasm which the Japanese democracy, fed by a
highly excited press, exhibited towards the Young China which had been
so largely grounded in the Tokio schools and which had carried out the
Revolution: secondly--and far more important--the deep, abiding and
ineradicable animosity which Japanese of all classes felt for the man
who had come out of the contest head and shoulders above everybody
else--Yuan Shih-kai. These two remarkable features ended by completely
thrusting into the background during the period 1911-1914 every other
element in Japanese statesmanship; and of the two the second must be
counted the decisive one. Dating back to Korea, when Yuan Shih-kai's
extraordinary diplomatic talents constantly allowed him to worst his
Japanese rivals and to make Chinese counsels supreme at the Korean Court
up to the very moment when the first shots of the war of 1894 were
fired, this ancient dislike, which amounted to a consuming hatred, had
become a fixed idea. Restrained by the world's opinion during the period
prior to the outbreak of the world-war as well as by the necessity of
acting financially in concert with the other Powers, it was not until
August, 1914, that the longed-for opportunity came and that Japan
prepared to act in a most remarkable way.

The campaign against Kiaochow was unpopular from the outset among the
Japanese public because it was felt that they were not legitimately
called upon to interest themselves in such a remote question as the
balance of power among European nations, which was what British warfare
against Germany seemed to them to be. Though some ill-will was felt
against Germany for the part played by her in the intervention of 1895,
it must not be forgotten that just as the Japanese navy is the child of
the British navy, so is the Japanese army the child of the German
army--and that Japanese army chiefs largely control Japan. These men
were averse from "spoiling their army" in a contest which did not
interest them. There was also the feeling abroad that England by
calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of her
Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bargain, and that
she was exploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail to
react adversely on Japan's future world's relationships. Furthermore, it
is necessary to underline the fact that official Japan was displeased by
the tacit support an uninterested British Foreign Office had
consistently given to the Yuan Shih-kai régime. That the Chinese
experiment was looked upon in England more with amusement than with
concern irritated the Japanese--more particularly as the British Foreign
Office was issuing in the form of White Papers documents covering Yuan
Shih-kai's public declarations as if they were contributions to
contemporary history. Thus in the preceding year (1913) under the
nomenclature of "affairs in China" the text of a _démenti_ regarding the
President of China's Imperial aspirations had been published,--a
document which Japanese had classified as a studied lie, and as an act
of presumption because its working showed that its author intended to
keep his back turned on Japan. The Dictator had declared:--

    ... From my student days, I, Yuan Shih-kai, have admired the
    example of the Emperors Yao and Shun, who treated the empire as a
    public trust, and considered that the record of a dynasty in history
    for good or ill is inseparably bound up with the public spirit or
    self-seeking by which it has been animated. On attaining middle age
    I grew more familiar with foreign affairs, was struck by the
    admirable republican system in France and America, and felt that
    they were a true embodiment of the democratic precepts of the
    ancients. When last year the patriotic crusade started in Wuchang
    its echoes went forth into all the provinces, with the result that
    this ancient nation with its 2,000 years of despotism adopted with
    one bound the republican system of government.

    It was my good fortune to see this glorious day at my life's late
    eve; I cherished the hope that I might dwell in the seclusion of my
    own home and participate in the blessings of an age of peace.

    But once again my fellow-countrymen honoured me with the pressing
    request that I should again assume a heavy burden, and on the day on
    which the Republic was proclaimed I announced to the whole nation
    that never again should a monarchy be permitted in China. At my
    inauguration I again took this solemn oath in the sight of heaven
    above and earth beneath. Yet of late ignorant persons in the
    provinces have fabricated wild rumours to delude men's minds, and
    have adduced the career of the First Napoleon on which to base their
    erroneous speculations. It is best not to inquire as to their
    motives; in some cases misconception may be the cause, in others
    deliberate malice.

    The Republic has now been proclaimed for six months; so far there
    is no prospect of recognition from the Powers, while order is far
    from being restored in the provinces. Our fate hangs upon a hair;
    the slightest negligence may forfeit all. I, who bear this arduous
    responsibility, feel it my bounden duty to stand at the helm in the
    hope of successfully breasting the wild waves.

    But while those in office are striving with all their might to
    effect a satisfactory solution, spectators seem to find a difficulty
    in maintaining a generous forbearance. They forget that I, who have
    received this charge from my countrymen, cannot possibly look
    dispassionately on when the fate of the nation is in the balance. If
    I were aware that the task was impossible and played a part of easy
    acquiescence, so that the future of the Republic might become
    irreparable, others might not reproach me, but my own conscience
    would never leave me alone.

    My thoughts are manifest in the sight of high heaven. But at this
    season of construction and dire crisis how shall these mutual
    suspicions find a place? Once more I issue this announcement; if
    you, my fellow countrymen, do indeed place the safety of China
    before all other considerations, it behooves you to be large-minded.
    Beware of lightly heeding the plausible voice of calumny, and of
    thus furnishing a medium for fostering anarchy. If evilly disposed
    persons, who are bent on destruction, seize the excuse for sowing
    dissension to the jeopardy of the situation, I, Yuan Shih-kai, shall
    follow the behest of my fellow-countrymen in placing such men beyond
    the pale of humanity.

    A vital issue is involved. It is my duty to lay before you my
    inmost thought, so that suspicion may be dissipated. Those who know
    have the right to impose their censure. It is for public opinion to
    take due notice.

[Illustration: Silk-reeling done in the open under the Walls of Peking.]

[Illustration: Modern Peking: A Run on a Bank.]

[Illustration: The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1st, 1916, after
three years of dictatorial rule.]

Moreover Yuan Shih-kai had also shown in his selection and use of
foreign Advisers, that he was determined to proceed in such a manner as
to advertise his suspicion and enmity of Japan. After the Coup d'état of
the 4th November, 1913, and the scattering of Parliament, it was an
American Adviser who was set to work on the new "Constitution"; and
although a Japanese, Dr. Ariga, who was in receipt of a princely salary,
aided and abetted this work, his endorsement of the dictatorial rule was
looked upon as traitorous by the bulk of his countrymen. Similarly, it
was perfectly well-known that Yuan Shih-kai was spending large sums of
money in Tokio in bribing certain organs of the Japanese Press and in
attempting to win adherents among Japanese members of Parliament.
Remarkable stories are current which compromise very highly-placed
Japanese but which the writer hesitates to set down in black and white
as documentary proof is not available. In any case, be this as it may,
it was felt in Tokio that the time had arrived to give a proper
definition to the relations between the two states,--the more so as Yuan
Shih-kai, by publicly proclaiming a small war-zone in Shantung within
the limits of which the Japanese were alone permitted to wage war
against the Germans, had shown himself indifferent to the majesty of
Japan. The Japanese having captured Kiaochow by assault before the end
of 1914 decided to accept the view that a _de facto_ Dictatorship
existed in China. Therefore on the 18th of January, 1915, the Japanese
Minister, Dr. Hioki, personally served on Yuan Shih-kai the now famous
Twenty-one Demands, a list designed to satisfy every present and future
need of Japanese policy and to reduce China to a state of vassalage.



CHAPTER VI

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS


Although the press of the world gave a certain prominence at the time to
the astounding _démarche_ with which we now have to deal, there was such
persistent mystery about the matter and so many official _démentis_
accompanied every publication of the facts that even to this day the
nature of the assault which Japan delivered on China is not adequately
realized, nor is the narrow escape assigned its proper place in
estimates of the future. Briefly, had there not been publication of the
facts and had not British diplomacy been aroused to action there is
little doubt that Japan would have forced matters so far that Chinese
independence would now be virtually a thing of the past. Fortunately,
however, China in her hour of need found many who were willing to
succour her; with the result that although she lost something in these
negotiations, Japan nevertheless failed in a very signal fashion to
attain her main objective. The Pyrrhic victory which she won with her
eleventh hour ultimatum will indeed in the end cost her more than would
have a complete failure, for Chinese suspicion and hostility are now so
deep-seated that nothing will ever completely eradicate them. It is
therefore only proper that an accurate record should be here
incorporated of a chapter of history which has much international
importance; and if we invite close attention to the mass of documents
that follow it is because we hold that an adequate comprehension of them
is essential to securing the future peace of the Far East. Let us first
give the official text of the original Demands:

    JAPAN'S ORIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

    Translations of Documents Handed to the President, Yuan Shih-kai, by
    Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18th, 1915.


    GROUP I

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being desirous of
    maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
    strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
    between the two nations agree to the following articles:--

    Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all
    matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with
    the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights,
    interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or
    otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

    Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province
    of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded
    or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

    Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a
    railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu
    railway.

    Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade
    and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as
    possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of
    Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be
    jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.


    GROUP II

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the
    Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position
    enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
    agree to the following articles:--

    Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term
    of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South
    Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended
    to the period of 99 years.

    Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
    Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either
    for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for
    farming.

    Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
    South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business
    and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

    Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese
    subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and
    Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they
    shall be decided upon jointly.

    Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the
    (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent
    shall be first obtained before action is taken:--

    (a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power
    to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the
    purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
    Mongolia.

    (b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the
    local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as
    security.

    Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese
    Government employs political, financial or military advisers or
    instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the
    Japanese Government shall first be consulted.

    Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and
    management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to
    the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the
    signing of this Agreement.


    GROUP III

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that
    Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have close relations with
    each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the
    two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:--

    Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the
    opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a
    joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without
    the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act
    dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said
    Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

    Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the
    neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be
    permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by
    other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that
    if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is
    apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the
    said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be
    obtained.


    GROUP IV

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object
    of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree
    to the following special articles:--

    The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power
    any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.


    GROUP V

    Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential
    Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

    Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior
    of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

    Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese
    Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and
    Chinese police to settle cases which caused no little
    misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police
    departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly
    administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments
    of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at
    the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police
    Service.

    Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of
    munitions of war (say 50% or more) of what is needed by the Chinese
    Government or that there shall be established in China a
    Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are
    to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

    Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing
    a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another
    line between Nanchang and Hanchow, and another between Nanchang and
    Chaochou.

    Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build
    railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards) in the
    Provinces of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

    Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right
    of missionary propaganda in China.[13]

The five groups into which the Japanese divided their demands possess a
remarkable interest not because of their sequence, or the style of their
phraseology, but because every word reveals a peculiar and very
illuminating chemistry of the soul. To study the original Chinese text
is to pass as it were into the secret recesses of the Japanese brain,
and to find in that darkened chamber a whole world of things which
advertise ambitions mixed with limitations, hesitations overwhelmed by
audacities, greatnesses succumbing to littlenesses, and vanities having
the appearance of velleities. Given an intimate knowledge of Far Eastern
politics and Far Eastern languages, only a few minutes are required to
re-write the demands in the sequence in which they were originally
conceived as well as to trace the natural history of their genesis.
Unfortunately a great deal is lost in their official translation, and
the menace revealed in the Chinese original partly cloaked: for by
transferring Eastern thoughts into Western moulds, things that are like
nails in the hands of soft sensitive Oriental beings are made to appear
to the steel-clad West as cold-blooded, evolutionary necessities which
may be repellent but which are never cruel. The more the matter is
studied the more convinced must the political student be that in this
affair of the 18th January we have an international _coup_ destined to
become classic in the new text-books of political science. All the way
through the twenty-one articles it is easy to see the desire for action,
the love of accomplished facts, struggling with the necessity to observe
the conventions of a stereotyped diplomacy and often overwhelming those
conventions. As the thoughts thicken and the plot develops, the effort
to mask the real intention lying behind every word plainly breaks down,
and a growing exultation rings louder and louder as if the coveted
Chinese prize were already firmly grasped. One sees as it were the
Japanese nation, released from bondage imposed by the Treaties which
have been binding on all nations since 1860, swarming madly through the
breached walls of ancient Cathay and disputing hotly the spoils of
age-old domains.

Group I, which deals with the fruits of victory in Shantung, has little
to detain us since events which have just unrolled there have already
told the story of those demands. In Shantung we have a simple and
easily-understood repeated performance of the history of 1905 and the
settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. Placed at the very head of the
list of demands, though its legitimate position should be after
Manchuria, obviously the purpose of Group I is conspicuously to call
attention to the fact that Japan had been at war with Germany, and is
still at war with her. This flourish of trumpets, after the battle is
over, however, scarcely serves to disguise that the fate of Shantung,
following so hard on the heels of the Russian débâcle in Manchuria, is
the great moral which Western peoples are called upon to note. Japan,
determined as she has repeatedly announced to preserve the peace of the
Orient by any means she deems necessary, has found the one and only
formula that is satisfactory--that of methodically annexing everything
worth fighting about.

So far so good. The insertion of a special preamble to Group II, which
covers not only South Manchuria but Eastern Inner Mongolia as well, is
an ingenious piece of work since it shows that the hot mood of conquest
suitable for Shantung must be exchanged for a certain judicial
detachment. The preamble undoubtedly betrays the guiding hand of
Viscount Kato, the then astute Minister of Foreign Affairs, who
saturated in the great series of international undertakings made by
Japan since the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, clearly believes
that the stately Elizabethan manner which still characterizes British
official phrasing is an admirable method to be here employed. The
preamble is quite English; it is so English that one is almost lulled
into believing that one's previous reasoning has been at fault and that
Japan is only demanding what she is entitled to. Yet study Group II
closely and subtleties gradually emerge. By boldly and categorically
placing Eastern Inner Mongolia on precisely the same footing as Southern
Manchuria--though they have nothing in common--the assumption is made
that the collapse in 1908 of the great Anglo-American scheme to run a
neutral railway up the flank of Southern Manchuria to Northern Manchuria
(the once celebrated Chinchow-Aigun scheme), coupled with general
agreement with Russia which was then arrived at, now impose upon China
the necessity of publicly resigning herself to a Japanese overlordship
of that region. In other words, the preamble of Group II lays down that
Eastern Inner Mongolia has become part and parcel of the Manchurian
Question because Japan has found a parallel for what she is doing in the
acts of European Powers.

These things, however, need not detain us. Not that Manchuria or the
adjoining Mongolian plain is not important; not that the threads of
destiny are not woven thickly there. For it is certain that the vast
region immediately beyond the Great Wall of China is the Flanders of the
Far East--and that the next inevitable war which will destroy China or
make her something of a nation must be fought on that soil just as two
other wars have been fought there during the past twenty years. But this
does not belong to contemporary politics; it is possibly an affair of
the Chinese army of 1925 or 1935. Some day China will fight for
Manchuria if it is impossible to recover it in any other way,--nobody
need doubt that. For Manchuria is absolutely Chinese--people must
remember. No matter how far the town-dwelling Japanese may invade the
country during the next two or three decades, no matter what large
alien garrisons may be planted there, the Chinese must and will remain
the dominant racial element, since their population which already
numbers twenty-five millions is growing at the rate of half a million a
year, and in a few decades will equal the population of a first-class
European Power.

When we reach Group III we touch matters that are not only immediately
vital but quite new in their type of audacity and which every one can
to-day understand since they are politico-industrial. Group III, as it
stands in the original text, is _simply the plan for the conquest of the
mineral wealth of the Yangtsze Valley_ which mainly centres round Hankow
because the vast alluvial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest
of rivers were once the floor of the Yellow Sea, the upper provinces of
Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi being the region of prehistoric forests clothing
the coasts, which once looked down upon the slowly-receding waste of
waters, and which to-day contain all the coal and iron. Hitherto every
one has always believed that the Yangtsze Valley was _par excellence_
the British sphere in China; and every one has always thought that that
belief was enough. It is true that political students, going carefully
over all published documents, have ended their search by declaring that
the matter certainly required further elucidation. To be precise, this
so-called British sphere is not an _enclave_ at all in the proper sense;
indeed it can only seem one to those who still believe that it is still
possible to pre-empt provinces by ministerial declarations. The Japanese
have been the first to dare to say that the preconceived general belief
was stupid. They know, of course, that it was a British force which
invaded the Yangtsze Valley seventy-five years ago, and forced the
signature of the Treaty of Nanking which first opened China to the
world's trade; but they are by no means impressed with the rights which
that action has been held to confer, since the mineral resources of this
region are priceless in their eyes and must somehow be won.

The study of twenty years of history proves this assumption to be
correct. Ever since 1895, Japan has been driving wedges into the
Yangtsze Valley of a peculiar kind to form the foundations for her
sweeping claims of 1915. Thus after the war with China in 1894-95, she
opened by her Treaty of Peace four ports in the Yangtsze Valley region,
Soochow, Hangchow, Chungking and Shasi; that is, at the two extreme ends
of the valley she established politico-commercial _points d'appui_ from
which to direct her campaign. Whilst the proximity of Soochow and
Hangchow to the British stronghold of Shanghai made it difficult to
carry out any "penetration" work at the lower end of the river save in
the form of subsidized steam-shipping, the case was different in Hunan
and Hupeh provinces. There she was unendingly busy, and in 1903 by a
fresh treaty she formally opened to trade Changsha, the capital of the
turbulent Hunan province. Changsha for years remained a secret centre
possessing the greatest political importance for her, and serving as a
focus for most varied activities involving Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, as
well as a vast hinterland. The great Tayeh iron-mines, although entirely
Chinese-owned, were already being tapped to supply iron-ore for the
Japanese Government Foundry at Wakamatsu on the island of Kiushiu. The
rich coal mines of Pinghsiang, being conveniently near, supplied the
great Chinese Government arsenal of Hanyang with fuel; and since Japan
had very little coal or iron of her own, she decided that it would be
best to embrace as soon as possible the whole area of interests in one
categorical demand--that is, to claim a dominant share in the Hanyang
arsenal, the Tayeh iron-mines and the Pinghsiang collieries.[14] By
lending money to these enterprises, which were grouped together under
the name of Hanyehping, she had early established a claim on them which
she turned at the psychological moment into an international question.

We can pass quickly by Group IV which is of little importance, except to
say that in taking upon herself, without consultation with the senior
ally, the duty of asking from China a declaration concerning the future
non-leasing of harbours and islands, Japan has attempted to assume a
protectorship of Chinese territory which does not belong to her
historically. It is well also to note that although Japan wished it to
appear to the world that this action was dictated by her desire to
prevent Germany from acquiring a fresh foothold in China after the war,
in reality Group IV was drafted as a general warning to the nations, one
point being that she believed that the United States was contemplating
the reorganization of the Foochow Arsenal in Fuhkien province, and that
as a corollary to that reorganization would be given the lease of an
adjoining harbour such as Santuao.

It is not, however, until we reach Group V that the real purpose of the
Japanese demands becomes unalterably clear, for in this Group we have
seven sketches of things designed to serve as the _coup de grâce_. Not
only is a new sphere--Fuhkien province--indicated; not only is the
mid-Yangtsze, from the vicinity of Kiukiang, to serve as the terminus
for a system of Japanese railways, radiating from the great river to the
coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the Japanese surgeon is
to aid the Japanese teacher in the great work of propaganda; the
Japanese monk and the Japanese policeman are to be dispersed like
skirmishers throughout the land; Japanese arsenals are to supply all the
necessary arms, or failing that a special Japanese arsenal is to be
established; Japanese advisers are to give the necessary advice in
finance, in politics, in every department--foreshadowing a complete and
all embracing political control. Never was a more sweeping programme of
supervision presented, and small wonder if Chinese when they learnt of
this climax exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own.

For a number of weeks after the presentation of these demands everything
remained clothed in impenetrable mystery, and despite every effort on
the part of diplomatists reliable details of what was occurring could
not be obtained. Gradually, however, the admission was forced that the
secrecy being preserved was due to the Japanese threat that publicity
would be met with the harshest reprisals; and presently the veil was
entirely lifted by newspaper publication and foreign Ambassadors began
making inquiries in Tokio. The nature and scope of the Twenty-one
Demands could now be no longer hidden; and in response to the growing
indignation which began to be voiced by the press and the pressure which
British diplomacy brought to bear, Japan found it necessary to modify
some of the most important items. She had held twenty-four meetings at
the Chinese Foreign Office, and although the Chinese negotiators had
been forced to give way in such matters as extending the "leasing"
periods of railways and territories in Manchuria and in admitting the
Japanese right to succeed to all German interests and rights in Shantung
(Group I and II), in the essential matters of the Hanyehping concessions
(Group III) and the noxious demands of Group V China had stood
absolutely firm, declining even to discuss some of the items.

Accordingly Japanese diplomacy was forced to restate and re-group the
whole corpus of the demands. On the 26th April, acting under direct
instructions from Tokio, the Japanese Minister to Peking presented a
revised list for renewed consideration, the demands being expanded to
twenty-four articles (in place of the original twenty-one largely
because discussion had shown the necessity of breaking up into smaller
units some of the original articles). Most significant, however, is the
fact that Group V (which in its original form was a more vicious assault
on Chinese sovereignty than the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of June,
1914), was so remodelled as to convey a very different meaning, the
group heading disappearing entirely and an innocent-looking exchange of
notes being asked for. It is necessary to recall that, when taxed with
making Demands which were entirely in conflict with the spirit of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Japanese Government through its ambassadors
abroad had categorically denied that they had ever laid any such Demands
on the Chinese Government. It was claimed that there had never been
twenty-one Demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, _the
seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in the interests of
China to endorse but which Japan had no intention of forcing upon her_.
The writer, being acquainted from first to last with everything that
took place in Peking from the 18th January to the filing of the Japanese
ultimatum of the 7th May, has no hesitation in stigmatizing this
statement as false. The whole aim and object of these negotiations was
to force through Group V. Japan would have gladly postponed _sine die_
the discussion of all the other Groups had China assented to provisions
which would have made her independence a thing of the past. Every
Chinese knew that, in the main, Group V was simply a repetition of the
measures undertaken in Korea after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 as a
forerunner to annexation; and although obviously in the case of China no
such rapid surgery could be practised, the endorsement of these measures
would have meant a virtual Japanese Protectorate. Even a cursory study
of the text that follows will confirm in every particular these capital
contentions:

    JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS

    Japan's Revised Demands on China, twenty-four in all, presented
    April 26, 1915.

    _Note on original text_:

    [The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation of the
    Japanese text. It is hereby declared that when a final decision is
    reached, there shall be a revision of the wording of the text.]


    GROUP I

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous
    of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
    strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
    between the two nations, agree to the following articles:--

    Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all
    matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with
    the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights,
    interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or
    otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

    Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung
    and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased
    to any Power under any pretext.

    Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the
    railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to
    connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to
    abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China
    will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

    Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade
    and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as
    soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung
    as Commercial Ports.

    (Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

    The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and the
    regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the
    Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.


    GROUP II

    The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with a view to
    developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern
    Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:--

    Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the term
    of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South
    Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to
    99 years.

    (Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

    The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th
    year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South
    Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the
    Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian
    Railway Agreement stating that it may be redeemed by China after 36
    years after the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of
    the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the
    Republic or 2007.

    Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or
    purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for
    trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

    Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
    South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any
    kind whatsoever.

    Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two
    articles, besides being required to register with the local
    authorities passports which they must procure under the existing
    regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax
    regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil and
    criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried
    and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the
    defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
    Authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed to the court
    to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and
    Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by
    delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law
    and local usage. When the judicial system in the said region is
    completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning
    Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

    Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall be
    permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for
    and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart
    from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or
    worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely settled methods at
    present in force shall be followed.

    PROVINCE OF FENG-TIEN

    |Locality               |District                   |Mineral
    |                       |                           |
    |Niu Hsin T'ai          |Pen-hsi                    |Coal
    |Tien Shih Fu Kou       |Pen-hsi                    |Coal
    |Sha Sung Kang          |Hai-lung                   |Coal
    |T'ieh Ch'ang           |Tung-hua                   |Coal
    |Nuan Ti Tang           |Chin                       |Coal
    |An Shan Chan region    |From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi   |Iron

    PROVINCE OF KIRIN

    (Southern portion)

    |Sha Sung Kang          |Ho-lung                    |Coal and Iron
    |Kang Yao               |Chi-lin (Kirin)            |Coal
    |Chia P'i Kou           |Hua-tien                   |Gold

    Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide
    funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital
    is required, the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for the loan
    with Japanese capitalists first.

    Article 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign loan is
    to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not
    including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loans
    have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate
    for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

    Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers
    or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters,
    are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be employed
    first.

    Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a
    fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement,
    taking as a standard the provisions in railroad loan agreements made
    heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more
    advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements
    are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans,
    the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with
    Japan's wishes.

    All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria
    shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Convention,
    remain in force.

    1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan
    is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner
    Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

    2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide
    funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if
    foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese
    Government first.

    3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for
    the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as
    possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as
    Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be
    chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese
    Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before
    making a decision.

    4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to
    undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental
    thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.


    GROUP III

    The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very
    intimate, if those interested in the said Company come to an
    agreement with the Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the
    Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The
    Chinese Government further agrees that, without the consent of the
    Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the Company into a
    state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use
    foreign capital other than Japanese.


    GROUP IV

    China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the
    following principle:--

    No bay, harbour, or island along the coast of China may be ceded or
    leased to any Power.

    Notes to be Exchanged

    A

    As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect
    with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and
    the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it is clearly ascertained that
    other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to
    Japan.

    B

    As regards the rights of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect
    with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang railway, a railway from Nanchang to
    Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese
    Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power
    before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is
    heretofore interested therein.

[Illustration: The Original Constitutional Drafting Committee of 1913,
photographed on the steps of the Temple of Heaven, where the Draft was
completed.]

[Illustration: A Presidential Review of Troops in the Southern Hungtung
Park outside Peking: Arrival of the President.]

    NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED

    The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be
    permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, a dockyard,
    a coaling station for military use, or a naval base; nor to be
    authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese
    Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up
    the above mentioned construction or establishment.

    Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:--

    1. The Chinese Government, shall, whenever, in future, it considers
    this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese advisers.

    2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or
    purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools or
    hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent
    thereto.

    3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese
    Government will send military officers to Japan to negotiate with
    Japanese military authorities the matter of purchasing arms or that
    of establishing a joint arsenal.

    Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:--

    As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda the
    same shall be taken up again for negotiation in future.

An ominous silence followed the delivery of this document. The Chinese
Foreign Office had already exhausted itself in a discussion which had
lasted three months, and pursuant to instructions from the Presidential
Palace prepared an exhaustive Memorandum on the subject. It was
understood by now that all the Foreign Offices in the world were
interesting themselves very particularly in the matter; and that all
were agreed that the situation which had so strangely developed was very
serious. On the 1st May, proceeding by appointment to the Waichiaopu
(Foreign Office) the Japanese Minister had read to him the following
Memorandum which it is very necessary to grasp as it shows how
solicitous China had become of terminating the business before there was
an open international break. It will also be seen that this Memorandum
was obviously composed for purpose of public record, the fifth group
being dealt with in such a way as to fix upon Japan the guilt of having
concealed from her British Ally matters which conflicted vitally with
the aims and objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty.

    MEMORANDUM

    Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hioki, the Japanese
    Minister, at a Conference held at Wai Chiao Pu, May 1, 1915.

    The list of demands which the Japanese Government first presented to
    the Chinese Government consists of five groups, the first relating
    to Shantung, the second relating to South Manchuria and Eastern
    Inner Mongolia, the third relating to Hanyehping Company, the fourth
    asking for non-alienation of the coast of the country, and the fifth
    relating to the questions of national advisers, national police,
    national arms, missionary propaganda, Yangtsze Valley railways, and
    Fukien Province. Out of profound regard for the intentions
    entertained by Japan, the Chinese Government took these momentous
    demands into grave and careful consideration and decided to
    negotiate with the Japanese Government frankly and sincerely what
    were possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation to Japan of the
    most profound regard which the Chinese Government entertains for the
    relations between the two nations.

    Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has been doing her
    best to hasten their progress holding as many as three conferences a
    week. As regards the articles in the second group, the Chinese
    Government being disposed to allow the Japanese Government to
    develop the economic relations of the two countries in South
    Manchuria, realizing that the Japanese Government attaches
    importance to its interests in that region, and wishing to meet the
    hope of Japan, made a painful effort, without hesitation, to agree
    to the extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, the
    36-year period of the South Manchurian Railway and the 15-year
    period of the Antung-Mukden Railway, all to 99 years; and to abandon
    its own cherished hopes to regain control of these places and
    properties at the expiration of their respective original terms of
    lease. It cannot but be admitted that this is a most genuine proof
    of China's friendship for Japan.

    As to the right of opening mines in South Manchuria, the Chinese
    Government has already agreed to permit Japanese to work mines
    within the mining areas designated by Japan. China has further
    agreed to give Japan a right of preference in the event of borrowing
    foreign capital for building railways or of making a loan on the
    security of the local taxes in South Manchuria. The question of
    revising the arrangement for the Kirin-Changchun Railway has been
    settled in accordance with the proposal made by Japan. The Chinese
    Government has further agreed to employ Japanese first in the event
    of employing foreign advisers on political, military, financial and
    police matters.

    Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase period in the South
    Manchurian Railway was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal.
    Subsequently, the Japanese Government alleging that its meaning was
    not clear, asked China to cancel the provision altogether. Again,
    Japan at first demanded the right of Japanese to carry on farming in
    South Manchuria, but subsequently she considered the word "farming"
    was not broad enough and asked to replace it with the phrase
    "agricultural enterprises." To these requests the Chinese
    Government, though well aware that the proposed changes could only
    benefit Japan, still acceded without delay. This, too, is a proof of
    China's frankness and sincerity towards Japan.

    As regards matters relating to Shantung the Chinese Government has
    agreed to a majority of the demands.

    The question of inland residence in South Manchuria is, in the
    opinion of the Chinese Government, incompatible with the treaties
    China had entered into with Japan and other Powers, still the
    Chinese Government did its best to consider how it was possible to
    avoid that incompatibility. At first, China suggested that the
    Chinese Authorities should have full rights of jurisdiction over
    Japanese settlers. Japan declined to agree to it. Thereupon China
    reconsidered the question and revised her counter-proposal five or
    six times, each time making some definite concession, and went so
    far to agree that all civil and criminal cases between Chinese and
    Japanese should be arranged according to existing treaties. Only
    cases relating to land or lease contracts were reserved to be
    adjudicated by Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over
    the region. This is another proof of China's readiness to concede as
    much as possible.

    Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region as yet, and the
    conditions existing there are entirely different from those
    prevailing in South Manchuria. The two places, therefore, cannot be
    considered in the same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open
    commercial marts first, in the interests of foreign trade.

    The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third group is entirely a
    private company, and the Chinese Government is precluded from
    interfering with it and negotiating with another government to make
    any disposal of the same as the Government likes, but having regard
    for the interests of the Japanese capitalists, the Chinese
    Government agreed that whenever, in future, the said company and the
    Japanese capitalists should arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for
    co-operation, China will give her assent thereto. Thus the interests
    of the Japanese capitalists are amply safeguarded.

    Although the demand in the fourth group asking for a declaration not
    to alienate China's coast is an infringement of her sovereign
    rights, yet the Chinese Government offered to make a voluntary
    pronouncement so far as it comports with China's sovereign rights.
    Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government, in deference to the
    wishes of Japan, gave a most serious consideration even to those
    demands, which gravely affect the sovereignty and territorial rights
    of China as well as the principle of equal opportunity and the
    treaties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful effort on the
    part of the Chinese Government to meet the situation--a fact of
    which the Japanese Government must be aware.

    As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe China's
    sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the principle of
    equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indicate any difference
    between this group and the preceding four in the list which she
    presented to China in respect to their character, the Chinese
    Government, in view of their palpably objectionable features,
    persuaded itself that these could not have been intended by Japan as
    anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accordingly China
    has declared from the very beginning that while she entertains the
    most profound regard for Japan's wishes, she was unable to admit
    that any of these matters could be made the subject of an
    understanding with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard to
    Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her own sovereign rights
    and the existing treaties with other Powers. In order to be rid of
    the seed for future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of
    friendship, China was constrained to iterate the reasons for
    refusing to negotiate on any of the articles in the fifth group, yet
    in view of Japan's wishes China has expressed her readiness to state
    that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbour work in
    Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as to see a
    solution for Japan of a question that really did not admit of
    negotiation. Was there, then, evasion, on the part of China?

    Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised list of
    demands and declared at the same time, that it will restore the
    leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government reconsiders the
    whole question and herewith submits a new reply to the friendly
    Japanese Government.

    In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group are stated
    again for discussion.

    As regards the second group, those articles which have already been
    initialled are omitted. In connection with the question of inland
    residence the police regulation clause has been revised in a more
    restrictive sense. As for the trial of cases relating to land and
    lease contracts the Chinese Government now permits the Japanese
    Consul to send an officer to attend the proceedings.

    Of the four demands in connection with that part of Eastern Inner
    Mongolia which is within the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the
    Jehol intendency, China agrees to three.

    China, also, agrees to the article relating to the Hanyehping
    Company as revised by Japan.

    It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appreciate the
    conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government in making this final
    concession and forthwith give her assent thereto.

    There is one more point. At the beginning of the present
    negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy but
    unfortunately a few days after the presentation of the demands by
    Japan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the text of the
    demands. The foreign and the Chinese press has since been paying
    considerable attention to this question and frequently publishing
    pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese comments in order to call forth the
    World's conjecture--a matter which the Chinese Government deeply
    regrets.

    The Chinese Government has never carried on any newspaper campaign
    and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly declared
    this to the Japanese Minster.

    In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to express its hope
    that the negotiations now pending between the two countries will
    soon come to an end and whatever misgivings foreign countries
    entertain toward the present situation may be quickly dispelled.

The Peking Government, although fully aware of the perils now
confronting it, had dared to draft a complete reply to the revised
Demands and had reduced Japanese redundancy to effective limits. Not
only were various articles made more compact, but the phraseology
employed conveyed unmistakably, if in a somewhat subtle way, that China
was not a subordinate State treating with a suzerain. Moreover, after
dealing succinctly and seriously with Groups I, II and III, the Chinese
reply terminates abruptly, the other points in the Japanese List being
left entirely unanswered. It is important to seize these points in the
text that follows.

    CHINA'S REPLY TO REVISED DEMANDS

    China's Reply of May 1, 1915, to the Japanese Revised Demands of
    April 26, 1915.


    GROUP I

    The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, being desirous
    of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
    strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
    between the two nations, agree to the following articles:--

    Article I. The Chinese Government declares that they will give full
    assent to all matters upon which the Japanese and German Governments
    may hereafter mutually agree, relating to the disposition of all
    interests, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or recorded cases,
    possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

    The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Government
    give their assent to the disposition of interests above referred to,
    Japan will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China; and
    further recognize the right of the Chinese Government to participate
    in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany.

    Article 2. The Japanese Government consents to be responsible for
    the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's military
    operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow. The customs,
    telegraphs and post offices within the leased territory of Kiaochow
    shall, prior to the restoration of the said leased territory to
    China, be administered as heretofore for the time being. The
    railways and telegraph lines erected by Japan for military purposes
    are to be removed forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed
    outside the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now to be
    withdrawn first, those within the original leased territory are to
    be withdrawn on the restoration of the said leased territory to
    China.

    Article 3. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

    The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung
    and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased
    to any Power under any pretext.

    Article 4. The Chinese Government consent that as regards the
    railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to
    connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany is willing to
    abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China
    will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan.

    Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the interest of trade
    and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as
    possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as
    Commercial Ports.

    (Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

    The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the
    regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but the
    Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

    Article 6. If the Japanese and German Governments are not able to
    come to a definite agreement in future in their negotiations
    respecting transfer, etc., this provisional agreement contained in
    the foregoing articles shall be void.


    GROUP II[15]

    The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, with a view to
    developing their economic relations in South Manchuria, agree to the
    following articles:--

    Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by arrangement
    with the owners, lease land required for erecting suitable buildings
    for trade and manufacture or agricultural enterprises.

    Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
    South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any
    kind whatsoever.

    Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two
    articles, besides being required to register with the local
    authorities passports which they must procure under the existing
    regulations, shall also observe police rules and regulations and pay
    taxes in the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal cases shall
    be tried and adjudicated by the authorities of the defendant
    nationality and an officer can be deputed to attend the proceedings.
    But all cases purely between Japanese subjects and mixed cases
    between Japanese or Chinese, relating to land or disputes arising
    from lease contracts, shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
    Authorities and the Japanese Consul may also depute an officer to
    attend the proceedings. When the judicial system in the said
    Province is completely reformed, all the civil and criminal cases
    concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law
    courts.

    RELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

    (To be Exchanged by Notes)

    1. The Chinese Government declare that China will not in future
    pledge the taxes, other than customs and salt revenue of that part
    of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria
    and Jehol Intendency, as security for raising a foreign loan.

    2. The Chinese Government declare that China will herself provide
    funds for building the railways in the part of Eastern Inner
    Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol
    Intendency; if foreign capital is required, China will negotiate
    with Japanese capitalists first, provided this does not conflict
    with agreements already concluded with other Powers.

    The Chinese Government agree, in the interest of trade and for the
    residence of foreigners, to open by China herself certain suitable
    places in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction
    of South Manchurian and the Jehol Intendency, as Commercial Marts.

    The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will be made in
    accordance with those of other Commercial Marts opened by China
    herself.


    GROUP III

    The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very
    intimate, if the said Company comes to an agreement with the
    Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the Chinese Government shall
    forthwith give their consent thereto. The Chinese Government further
    declare that China will not convert the company into a state
    enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use
    foreign capital other than Japanese.

    Letter to be addressed by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese
    Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    Excellency: I have the honour to state that a report has reached me
    that the Chinese Government have given permission to foreign nations
    to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling
    stations for military use, naval bases and other establishments for
    military purposes; and further, that the Chinese Government are
    borrowing foreign capital for putting up the above-mentioned
    constructions or establishments. I shall be much obliged if the
    Chinese Government will inform me whether or not these reports are
    well founded in fact.

    Reply to be addressed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to
    the Japanese Minister.

    Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
    Excellency's Note of.... In reply I beg to state that the Chinese
    Government have not given permission to foreign Powers to construct,
    on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for
    military use, naval bases or other establishments for military
    purposes; nor do they contemplate to borrow foreign capital for
    putting up such constructions or establishments.

Within forty-eight hours of this passage-at-arms of the 1st May it was
understood in Peking that Japan was meditating a serious step. That
vague feeling of unrest which so speedily comes in capitals when
national affairs reach a crisis was very evident, and the word
"ultimatum" began to be whispered. It was felt that whilst China had
held to her rights to the utmost and had received valuable indirect
support from both England and the United States, the world-situation was
such that it would be difficult to prevent Japan from proceeding to
extremities. Accordingly there was little real surprise when on the 7th
May Japan filed an ultimatum demanding a satisfactory reply within 48
hours to her Revised Demands--failing which those steps deemed necessary
would be taken. A perusal of the text of the Ultimatum will show an
interesting change in the language employed. Coaxing having failed, and
Japan being _now convinced that so long as she did not seek to annex the
rights of other Foreign Powers in China open opposition could not be
offered to her_, states her case very defiantly. One significant point,
however, must be carefully noted--that she agrees "to detach Group V
from the present negotiations and to discuss it separately in the
future." It is this fact which remains the sword of Damocles hanging
over China's head; and until this sword has been flung back into the
waters of the Yellow Sea the Far Eastern situation will remain perilous.

    JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO CHINA

    Japan's Ultimatum delivered by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese
    Government, on May 7th, 1915.

    The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present
    negotiations with the Chinese Government is first to endeavour to
    dispose of the complications arising out of the war between Japan
    and China, and secondly to attempt to solve those various questions
    which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan
    with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship
    subsisting between the two countries to the end that the peace of
    the Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this
    object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese
    Government in January of this year, and up to to-day as many as
    twenty-five conferences have been held with the Chinese Government
    in perfect sincerity and frankness.

    In the course of the negotiation the Imperial Government have
    consistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals in a
    conciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals of the
    Chinese Government, whether important or unimportant, have been
    attended to without any reserve.

    It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been spared to
    arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of those questions.

    The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically
    at an end at the twenty-fourth conference; that is on the 17th of
    the last month. The Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the
    negotiation and in consideration of the points raised by the Chinese
    Government, modified the original proposals with considerable
    concessions and presented to the Chinese Government on the 26th of
    the same month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same
    time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the revised
    proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity,
    restore, with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government
    the Kiaochow territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial
    Government had made a great sacrifice.

    On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply to the
    revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is contrary to
    the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese Government
    not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised
    proposals but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese
    Government to restore Kiaochow to the Chinese Government the latter
    did not manifest the least appreciation for Japan's good will and
    difficulties.

    From the commercial and military point of view Kiaochow is an
    important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire
    sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition the
    Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. But with the
    object of increasing the future friendly relations of the two
    countries, they went to the extent of proposing its restoration, yet
    to their great regret, the Chinese Government did not take into
    consideration the good intention of Japan and manifest appreciation
    of her difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only
    ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government in offering
    the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to the revised
    proposals they even demanded its unconditional restoration; and
    again China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of
    paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages
    resulting from Japan's military operations at Kiaochow; and still
    further in connection with the territory of Kiaochow China advanced
    other demands and declared that she has the right of participation
    at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany.
    Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of
    Kiaochow and Japan's responsibility of indemnification for the
    unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan yet
    she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply
    was final and decisive.

    Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the settlement of the
    other questions, however compromising it may be, would not be to her
    interest. The consequence is that the present reply of the Chinese
    Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless.

    Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the other
    proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, such as
    South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly
    has geographical, commercial, industrial and strategic relations, as
    recognized by all the nations, and made more remarkable in
    consequence of the two wars in which Japan was engaged the Chinese
    Government overlooks these facts and does not respect Japan's
    position in that place. The Chinese Government even freely altered
    those articles which the Imperial Government, in a compromising
    spirit, have formulated in accordance with the statement of the
    Chinese Representatives thereby making the statements of the
    Representatives an empty talk; and on seeing them conceding with the
    one hand and withholding with the other it is very difficult to
    attribute faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese authorities.

    As regards the articles relating to the employment of advisers, the
    establishment of schools, and hospitals, the supply of arms and
    ammunition and the establishment of arsenals and railway concessions
    in South China in the revised proposals they were either proposed
    with the proviso that the consent of the Power concerned must be
    obtained, or they are merely to be recorded in the minutes in
    accordance with the statements of the Chinese delegates, and thus
    they are not in the least in conflict either with Chinese
    sovereignty or her treaties with the Foreign Powers, yet the Chinese
    Government in their reply to the proposals, alleging that these
    proposals are incompatible with their sovereign rights and treaties
    with Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial
    Government. However, in spite of such attitude of the Chinese
    Government, the Imperial Government, though regretting to see that
    there is no room for further negotiations, yet warmly attached to
    the preservation of the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a
    satisfactory settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of the
    relations.

    So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no patience, they
    have reconsidered the feelings of the Government of their
    neighbouring country and, with the exception of the article relating
    to Fukien which is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has
    already been agreed upon by the Representatives of both nations,
    will undertake to detach the Group V from the present negotiation
    and discuss it separately in the future. Therefore the Chinese
    Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial
    Government by immediately accepting without any alteration all the
    articles of Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in
    connection with Fukien province in Group V as contained in the
    revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

    The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope
    that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a
    satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock P.M. on the 9th day of May. It is
    hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or
    at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they
    may deem necessary.


    EXPLANATORY NOTE

    Accompanying Ultimatum delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
    by the Japanese Minister, May 7th, 1915.

    1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to be arranged by an
    exchange of notes, the five articles postponed for later negotiation
    refer to (a) the employment of advisers, (b) the establishment of
    schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South China,
    (d) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of
    arsenals and (e) right of missionary propaganda.

    2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the article relating
    to Fukien may be either in the form as proposed by the Japanese
    Minister on the 26th of April or in that contained in the Reply of
    the Chinese Government of May 1st. Although the Ultimatum calls for
    the immediate acceptance by China of the modified proposals
    presented on April 26th, without alteration but it should be noted
    that it merely states the principle and does not apply to this
    article and articles 4 and 5 of this note.

    3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded in
    the Ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore
    Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will still hold good.

    4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or purchase of land,
    the terms "lease" and "purchase" may be replaced by the terms
    "temporary lease" and "perpetual lease" or "lease on consultation,"
    which means a long-term lease with its unconditional renewal.

    Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of police laws and
    Ordinances and local taxes by the Japanese Council may form the
    subject of a secret agreement.

    5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Government" in
    connection with questions of pledging the local taxes for raising
    loans and the loans for the construction of railways, in Eastern
    Inner Mongolia, which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria
    relating to the matters of the same kind, may be replaced by the
    phrase "to consult with the Japanese capitalists."

    The article relating to the opening of trade marts in Eastern Inner
    Mongolia in respect to location and regulations, may, following
    their precedent set in Shantung, be the subject of an exchange of
    notes.

    6. From the phrase "those interested in the Company" in Group III of
    the revised list of demands, the words "those interested in" may be
    deleted.

    7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement and its annexes
    shall be the official text or both the Chinese and Japanese shall be
    the official texts.

Whilst it would be an exaggeration to say that open panic followed the
filing of this document, there was certainly very acute alarm,--so much
so that it is to-day known in Peking that the Japanese Legation cabled
urgently to Tokio that even better terms could be obtained if the matter
was left to the discretion of the men on the spot. But the Japanese
Government had by now passed through a sufficiently anxious time itself,
being in possession of certain unmistakable warnings regarding what was
likely to happen after a world-peace had come,--if matters were pressed
too far. Consequently nothing more was done, and on the following day
China signified her acceptance of the Ultimatum in the following terms.

    _Reply of the Chinese Government to the Ultimatum of the Japanese
    Government, delivered to the Japanese Minister by the Minister of
    Foreign Affairs on the 8th of May, 1915._

    On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock P.M. the Chinese
    Government received an Ultimatum from the Japanese Government
    together with an Explanatory Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum
    concluded with the hope that the Chinese Government by six o'clock
    P.M. on the 9th of May will give a satisfactory reply, and it is
    hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or
    at the specified time, the Japanese Government will take steps she
    may deem necessary.

    The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace of the
    Far East hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles
    of Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of
    Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection
    with Fukien Province in Group V as contained in the revised
    proposals presented on the 26th of April, and in accordance with the
    Explanatory Note of seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the
    Japanese Government with the hope that thereby all the outstanding
    questions are settled, so that the cordial relationship between the
    two countries may be further consolidated. The Japanese Minister is
    hereby requested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs to make the literary improvement of the text and sign the
    Agreement as soon as possible.

Thus ended one of the most extraordinary diplomatic negotiations ever
undertaken in Peking.

FOOTNOTES:

[13] Refers to preaching Buddhism.

[14] The reader will observe, that the expression "Hanyehping
enterprises" is compounded by linking together characters denoting the
triple industry.

[15] Six articles found in Japan's Revised Demands are omitted here as
they had already been initialled by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the
Japanese Minister.



CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS


The key to this remarkable business was supplied by a cover sent
anonymously to the writer during the course of these negotiations with
no indication as to its origin. The documents which this envelope
contained are so interesting that they merit attention at the hands of
all students of history, explaining as they do the psychology of the
Demands as well as throwing much light on the manner in which the
world-war has been viewed in Japan.

The first document is purely introductory, but is none the less
interesting. It is a fragment, or rather a _précis_ of the momentous
conversation which took place between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese
Minister when the latter personally served the Demands on the Chief
Executive and took the opportunity to use language unprecedented even in
the diplomatic history of Peking.

The _précis_ begins in a curious way. After saying that "the Japanese
Minister tried to influence President Yuan Shih-kai with the following
words," several long lines of asterisks suggest that after reflection
the unknown chronicler had decided, for political reasons of the highest
importance, to allow others to guess how the "conversation" opened. From
the context it seems absolutely clear that the excised words have to
deal with the possibility of the re-establishment of the Empire in
China--a very important conclusion in view of what followed later in the
year. Indeed there is no reason to doubt that the Japanese Envoy
actually told Yuan Shih-kai that as he was already virtually Emperor it
lay within his power to settle the whole business and to secure his
position at one blow. In any case the _précis_ begins with these
illuminating sentences:

    ... Furthermore, the Chinese revolutionists are in close touch and
    have intimate relations with numerous irresponsible Japanese, some
    of whom have great influence and whose policy is for strong
    measures. Our Government has not been influenced by this policy, but
    if your Government does not quickly agree to these stipulations, it
    will be impossible to prevent some of our irresponsible people from
    inciting the Chinese revolutionists to create trouble in China.

    The majority of the Japanese people are also opposed to President
    Yuan and Yuan's Government. They all declare that the President
    entertains anti-Japanese feeling and adopts the policy of
    "befriending the Far" (Europe and America) and "antagonizing the
    Near" (Japan). Japanese public opinion is therefore exceedingly
    hostile.

    Our Government has all along from first to last exerted its best
    efforts to help the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese
    Government will speedily agree to these stipulations it will have
    thus manifested its friendship for Japan.

    The Japanese people will then be able to say that the President
    never entertained anti-Japanese feelings, or adopted the policy of
    "befriending the Far and antagonizing the Near." Will not this then
    be indeed a bonâ fide proof of our friendly relations?

    The Japanese Government also will then be inclined to render
    assistance to President Yuan's Government whenever it is
    necessary....

We are admittedly living in a remarkable age which is making waste paper
of our dearest principles. But in all the welter which the world war has
made it would be difficult to find anything more extraordinary than
these few paragraphs. Japan, through her official representative, boldly
tears down the veil hiding her ambitions, and using the undoubted menace
which Chinese revolutionary activities then held for the Peking
Government, declares in so many words that unless President Yuan
Shih-kai bows his head to the dictation of Tokio, the duel which began
in Seoul twenty-five years ago would be openly resumed.

Immediately following the "conversation" is the principal document in
the dossier. This is nothing less than an exhaustive Memorandum, divided
into two sections, containing the policy advocated by the Japanese
secret society, called the Black Dragon Society, which is said to have
assumed that name on account of the members (military officers) having
studied the situation in the Heilungchiang (or "Black Dragon") province
of Manchuria. The memorandum is the most remarkable document dealing
with the Far East which has come to light since the famous Cassini
Convention was published in 1896. Written presumably late in the autumn
of 1914 and immediately presented to the Japanese Government, it may
undoubtedly be called the fulminate which exploded the Japanese mine of
the 18th January, 1915. It shows such sound knowledge of
world-conditions, and is so scientific in its detachment that little
doubt can exist that distinguished Japanese took part in its drafting.
It can therefore be looked upon as a genuine expression of the highly
educated Japanese mind, and as such cannot fail to arouse serious
misgivings. The first part is a general review of the European War and
the Chinese Question: the second is concerned with the Defensive
Alliance between China and Japan, which is looked upon as the one goal
of all Japanese Diplomacy.

    PART I. THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE QUESTION

    The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in history.
    Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected and its effect
    felt all over the globe, but its results will create a New Era in
    the political and social world. Therefore, whether or not the
    Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far Eastern Question and
    bring to realization our great Imperial policy depends on our being
    able to skilfully avail ourselves of the world's general trend of
    affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of
    action towards China which shall be practical in execution. If our
    authorities and people view the present European War with
    indifference and without deep concern, merely devoting their
    attention to the attack on Kiaochow, neglecting the larger issues of
    the war, they will have brought to nought our great Imperial policy,
    and committed a blunder greater than which it can not be conceived.
    We are constrained to submit this statement of policy for the
    consideration of our authorities, not because we are fond of
    argument but because we are deeply anxious for our national welfare.

    No one at present can foretell the outcome of the European War. If
    the Allies meet with reverses and victory shall crown the arms of
    the Germans and Austrians, German militarism will undoubtedly
    dominate the European Continent and extend southward and eastward to
    other parts of the world. Should such a state of affairs happen to
    take place the consequences resulting therefrom will be indeed great
    and extensive. On this account we must devote our most serious
    attention to the subject. If, on the other hand, the Germans and
    Austrians should be crushed by the Allies, Germany will be deprived
    of her present status as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The
    Federation will be disintegrated into separate states, and Prussia
    will have to be content with the status of a second-rate Power.
    Austria and Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be
    divided. What their final fate shall be, no one would now venture
    to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex Galicia and the
    Austrian Poland: France will repossess Alsace and Lorraine: Great
    Britain will occupy the German Colonies in Africa and the South
    Pacific; Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, Herzegovina and a
    certain portion of Austrian Territory; thus making such great
    changes in the map of Europe that even the Napoleonic War in 1815
    could not find a parallel.

    When these events take place, not only will Europe experience great
    changes, but we should not ignore the fact that they will occur also
    in China and in the South Pacific. After Russia has replaced Germany
    in the territories lost by Germany and Austria, she will hold a
    controlling influence in Europe, and, for a long time to come, will
    have nothing to fear from her western frontier. Immediately after
    the war she will make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion
    in the East and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a
    controlling influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will
    strengthen her position in the Yangtsze Valley and prohibit any
    other country from getting a footing there. France will do likewise
    in Yunnan province using it as her base of operations for further
    encroachments upon China and never hesitate to extend her
    advantages. We must therefore seriously study the situation
    remembering always that the combined action of Great Britain,
    Russia, and France will not only affect Europe but that we can even
    foresee that it will also affect China.

    Whether this combined action on the part of England, France and
    Russia is to terminate at the end of the war or to continue to
    operate, we can not now predict. But after peace in Europe is
    restored, these Powers will certainly turn their attention to the
    expansion of their several spheres of interest in China, and, in the
    adjustment, their interests will most likely conflict with one
    another. If their interests do not conflict, they will work jointly
    to solve the Chinese Question. On this point we have not the least
    doubt. If England, France and Russia are actually to combine for the
    coercion of China, what course is to be adopted by the Imperial
    Japanese Government to meet the situation? What proper means shall
    we employ to maintain our influence and extend our interests within
    this ring of rivalry and competition? It is necessary that we bear
    in mind the final results of the European War and forestall the
    trend of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a
    policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately
    taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government's
    policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our
    diplomacy will be checked for ever by the combined force of the
    other Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and
    even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt
    be imperilled. It is therefore our first important duty at this
    moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to
    face that general situation after the war? What preparations are
    being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China?
    What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When
    the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not
    concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual
    Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but
    whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European
    influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial
    Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to
    check the movement before this occurrence. Now is the most opportune
    moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question. Such an
    opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come. Not only
    is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in
    China favour the execution of such a plan. We should by all means
    decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves
    of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be
    encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.
    Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and
    will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is
    now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at
    this very moment the Chinese Question?

No one--not even those who care nothing for politics--can deny that
there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental
attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards
their friends as well. They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody;
they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the
not distant future turn against them. The burden of their argument
swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and
Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make
it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan
shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so
many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the
gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will
forever be the enemy. At the same time it is expected, should the issue
of the struggle be clear-cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that
a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may
be made to operate against Japan. Although the alliance with England,
twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far
East as the _Entente_ between England and France occupies in Europe, not
one Japanese in a hundred knows or cares anything about such an
arrangement; and even if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to
his country's major international commitment a minimum and constantly
diminishing importance. In his view the British Alliance is nothing but
a piece of paper which may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding
such a lurid light over the world. What is germane to the matter is his
own plan, his own method of taking up arms in a sea of troubles. The
second part of the Black Dragon Society's Memorandum, pursuing the
argument logically and inexorably and disclosing traces of real
political genius, makes this unalterably clear.

Having established clearly the attitude of Japan towards the world--and
more particularly towards the rival political combinations now locked
together in a terrible death-struggle, this second part of the
Memorandum is concerned solely with China and can be broken into two
convenient sections. The first section is constructive--the plan for the
reconstruction of China is outlined in terms suited to the Japanese
genius. This part begins with an illuminating piece of rhetoric.

    PART II. THE CHINESE QUESTION AND THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

    It is a very important matter of policy whether the Japanese
    Government, in obedience to its divine mission, shall solve the
    Chinese Question in a heroic manner by making China voluntarily rely
    upon Japan. To force China to such a position there is nothing else
    for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but to take advantage of
    the present opportunity to seize the reins of political and
    financial power and to enter by all means into a defensive alliance
    with her under secret terms as enumerated below:

    _The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance_

    The Imperial Japanese Government, with due respect for the
    Sovereignty and Integrity of China and with the object and hope of
    maintaining the peace of the Far East, undertakes to share the
    responsibility of co-operating with China to guard her against
    internal trouble and foreign invasion and China shall accord to
    Japan special facilities in the matter of China's National Defence,
    or the protection of Japan's special rights and privileges and for
    these objects the following treaty of Alliance is to be entered into
    between the two contracting parties:

    1. When there is internal trouble in China or when she is at war
    with another nation or nations, Japan shall send her army to render
    assistance, to assume the responsibility of guarding Chinese
    territory and to maintain peace and order in China.

    2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged position in South
    Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign rights of
    these regions to Japan to enable her to carry out a scheme of local
    defence on a permanent basis.

    3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochow, Japan shall acquire
    all the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Germans in
    regard to railways, mines and all other interests, and after peace
    and order is restored in Tsingtao, the place shall be handed back to
    China to be opened as an International Treaty port.

    4. For the maritime defence of China and Japan, China shall lease
    strategic harbours along the coast of the Fukien province to Japan
    to be converted into naval bases and grant to Japan in the said
    province all railway and mining rights.

    5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army China shall entrust
    the training and drilling of the army to Japan.

    6. For the unification of China's firearms and munitions of war,
    China shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at the same time
    establish arsenals (with the help of Japan) in different strategic
    points.

    7. With the object of creating and maintaining a Chinese Navy, China
    shall entrust the training of her navy to Japan.

    8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and improving the
    methods of taxation, China shall entrust the work to Japan, and the
    latter shall elect competent financial experts who shall act as
    first-class advisers to the Chinese Government.

    9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts as educational
    advisers and extensively establish schools in different parts of the
    country to teach Japanese so as to raise the educational standard of
    the country.

    10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of Japan
    before she can enter into an agreement with another Power for making
    loans, the leasing of territory, or the cession of the same.

    From the date of the signing of this Defensive Alliance, Japan and
    China shall work together hand-in-hand. Japan will assume the
    responsibility of safeguarding Chinese territory and maintaining the
    peace and order in China. This will relieve China of all future
    anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms,
    and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her
    national development and regeneration. Even after the present
    European War is over and peace is restored China will absolutely
    have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure brought
    against her by the foreign powers. It is only thus that permanent
    peace can be secured in the Far East.

    But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two points must first
    be ascertained and settled, (1) Its bearing on the Chinese
    Government. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having intimate
    relations with and great interests in China.

    In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, Japan must try
    to foresee whether the position of China's present ruler Yuan
    Shih-kai shall be permanent or not; whether the present Government's
    policy will enjoy the confidence of a large section of the Chinese
    people; whether Yuan Shih-kai will readily agree to the Japanese
    Government's proposal to enter into a treaty of alliance with us.
    These are points to which we are bound to give a thorough
    consideration. Judging by the attitude hitherto adopted by Yuan
    Shih-kai we know he has always resorted to the policy of expediency
    in his diplomatic dealings, and although he may now outwardly show
    friendliness towards us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of
    the different Powers as the easiest check against us and refuse to
    accede to our demands. Take for a single instance, his conduct
    towards us since the Imperial Government declared war against
    Germany and his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can
    rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to gain our
    object or not it does not require much wisdom to decide. After the
    gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside America which
    will not press for advantage, China will not be able to obtain any
    loans from the other Powers. With a depleted treasury, without means
    to pay the officials and the army, with local bandits inciting the
    poverty-stricken populace to trouble, with the revolutionists
    waiting for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection actually
    occur while no outside assistance can be rendered to quell it we are
    certain it will be impossible for Yuan Shih-kai, single-handed, to
    restore order and consolidate the country. The result will be that
    the nation will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy.
    That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee.
    When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government and assist him
    to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain assurance
    that we could influence him to agree to our demands, or shall we
    help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize our object
    through them? This question must be definitely decided upon this
    very moment so that we may put it into practical execution. If we do
    not look into the future fate of China but go blindly to uphold
    Yuan's Government, to enter into a Defensive Alliance with China,
    hoping thus to secure a complete realization of our object by
    assisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a
    wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese people have
    lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih-kai who is discredited and
    attacked by the whole nation for having sold his country. If Japan
    gives Yuan the support, his Government, though in a very precarious
    state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shih-kai belongs to that
    school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and
    cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly
    abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when the European war
    is at an end. Judging by his past we have no doubt as to what he
    will do in the future. For Japan to ignore the general sentiment of
    the Chinese people and support Yuan Shih-kai with the hope that we
    can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blunder indeed.
    Therefore in order to secure the permanent peace of the Far East,
    instead of supporting a Chinese Government which can neither be long
    continued in power nor assist in the attainment of our object, we
    should rather support the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate
    their corrupt Government, to change its present form, to maintain
    peace and order in the land and to usher into China a new era of
    prosperity so that China and Japan may in fact as well as in name be
    brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each other.
    China's era of prosperity is based on the China-Japanese Alliance
    and this Alliance is the foundational power for the repelling of the
    foreign aggression that is to be directed against the Far East at
    the conclusion of the European war. This alliance is also the
    foundation-stone of the peace of the world. Japan therefore should
    take this as the last warning and immediately solve this question.
    Since the Imperial Japanese Government has considered it imperative
    to support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese
    revolutionists, the Imperialists and other Chinese malcontents to
    create trouble all over China. The whole country will be thrown into
    disorder and Yuan's Government will consequently be overthrown. We
    shall then select a man from amongst the most influential and most
    noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize a new
    form of Government and to consolidate the whole country. In the
    meantime our army must assist in the restoration of peace and order
    in the country, and in the protection of the lives and properties of
    the people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance to the
    new Government which will then naturally confide in and rely upon
    Japan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things that we
    shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of a
    Defensive Alliance with China.

    For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents to rise
    in China we consider the present to be the most opportune moment.
    The reason why these men cannot now carry on an active campaign is
    because they are insufficiently provided with funds. If the Imperial
    Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a loan and
    instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder
    will surely prevail all over China. We can intervene and easily
    adjust matters.

    The progress of the European War warns Japan with greater urgency of
    the imperative necessity of solving this most vital of questions.
    The Imperial Government cannot be considered as embarking on a rash
    project. This opportunity will not repeat itself for our benefit. We
    must avail ourselves of this chance and under no circumstances
    hesitate. Why should we wait for the spontaneous uprising of the
    revolutionists and malcontents? Why should we not think out and lay
    down a plan beforehand? When we examine into the form of Government
    in China, we must ask whether the existing Republic is well suited
    to the national temperament and well adapted to the thoughts and
    aspirations of the Chinese people. From the time the Republic of
    China was established up to the present moment, if what it has
    passed through is to be compared to what it ought to be in the
    matter of administration and unification, we find disappointment
    everywhere. Even the revolutionists themselves, the very ones who
    first advocated the Republican form of government, acknowledge that
    they have made a mistake. The retention of the Republican form of
    Government in China will be a great future obstacle in the way of a
    Chino-Japanese Alliance. And why must it be so? Because, in a
    Republic the fundamental principles of government as well as the
    social and moral aims of the people are distinctly different from
    that of a Constitutional Monarchy. Their laws and administration
    also conflict. If Japan act as a guide to China and China models
    herself after Japan, it will only then be possible for the two
    nations to solve by mutual effort the Far East Question without
    differences and disagreements. Therefore to start from the
    foundation for the purpose of reconstructing the Chinese
    Government, of establishing a Chino-Japanese Alliance, of
    maintaining the permanent peace of the Far East and of realizing the
    consummation of Japan's Imperial policy, we must take advantage of
    the present opportunity to alter China's Republican form of
    Government into a Constitutional Monarchy which shall necessarily be
    identical, in all its details, to the Constitutional Monarchy of
    Japan, and to no other. This is really the key and first principle
    to be firmly held for the actual reconstruction of the form of
    Government in China. If China changes her Republican form of
    Government to that of a Constitutional Monarchy, shall we, in the
    selection of a new ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T'ung to his
    throne or choose the most capable man from the Monarchists or select
    the most worthy member from among the revolutionists? We think,
    however, that it is advisable at present to leave this question to
    the exigency of the future when the matter is brought up for
    decision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that to actually
    put into execution this policy of a Chino-Japanese Alliance and the
    transformation of the Republic of China into a Constitutional
    Monarchy, is, in reality, the fundamental principle to be adopted
    for the reconstruction of China.

    We shall now consider the bearing of this Defensive Alliance on the
    other Powers. Needless to say, Japan and China will in no way impair
    the rights and interests already acquired by the Powers. At this
    moment it is of paramount importance for Japan to come to a special
    understanding with Russia to define our respective spheres in
    Manchuria and Mongolia so that the two countries may co-operate with
    each other in the future. This means that Japan after the
    acquisition of sovereign rights in South Manchuria and Inner
    Mongolia will work together with Russia after her acquisition of
    sovereign rights in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to maintain
    the status quo, and endeavour by every effort to protect the peace
    of the Far East. Russia, since the outbreak of the European War, has
    not only laid aside all ill-feelings against Japan, but has adopted
    the same attitude as her Allies and shown warm friendship for us. No
    matter how we regard the Manchurian and Mongolian Questions in the
    future she is anxious that we find some way of settlement. Therefore
    we need not doubt but that Russia, in her attitude towards this
    Chinese Question, will be able to come to an understanding with us
    for mutual co-operation.

    The British sphere of influence and interest in China is centred in
    Tibet and the Yangtsze Valley. Therefore if Japan can come to some
    satisfactory arrangement with China in regard to Tibet and also give
    certain privileges to Great Britain in the Yangtsze Valley, with an
    assurance to protect those privileges, no matter how powerful Great
    Britain might be, she will surely not oppose Japan's policy in
    regard to this Chinese Question. While this present European War is
    going on Great Britain has never asked Japan to render her
    assistance. That her strength will certainly not enable her to
    oppose us in the future need not be doubted in the least.

    Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose Japan's policy
    towards China, it can readily be seen what attitude France will
    adopt in regard to the subject. What Japan must now somewhat reckon
    with is America. But America in her attitude towards us regarding
    our policy towards China has already declared the principle of
    maintaining China's territorial integrity and equal opportunity and
    will be satisfied, if we, do not impair America's already acquired
    rights and privileges. We think America will also have no cause for
    complaint. Nevertheless America has in the East a naval force which
    can be fairly relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be
    feared. Therefore in Japan's attitude towards America there is
    nothing really for us to be afraid of.

    Since China's condition is such on the one hand and the Powers'
    relation towards China is such on the other hand, Japan should avail
    herself in the meantime of the European War to definitely decide
    upon a policy towards China, the most important move being the
    transformation of the Chinese Government to be followed up by
    preparing for the conclusion of the Defensive Alliance. The
    precipitate action on the part of our present Cabinet in acceding to
    the request of Great Britain to declare war against Germany without
    having definitely settled our policy towards China has no real
    connection with our future negotiations with China or affect the
    political condition in the Far East. Consequently all intelligent
    Japanese, of every walk of life throughout the land, are very deeply
    concerned about the matter.

    Our Imperial Government should now definitely change our dependent
    foreign policy which is being directed by others into an independent
    foreign policy which shall direct others, proclaiming the same with
    solemn sincerity to the world and carrying it out with
    determination. If we do so, even the gods and spirits will give way.
    These are important points in our policy towards China and the
    result depends on how we carry them out. Can our authorities firmly
    make up their mind to solve this Chinese Question by the actual
    carrying out of this fundamental principle? If they show
    irresolution while we have this heaven-conferred chance and merely
    depend on the good will of the other Powers, we shall eventually
    have greater pressure to be brought against the Far East after the
    European War is over, when the present equilibrium will be
    destroyed. That day will then be too late for us to repent of our
    folly. We are therefore impelled by force of circumstances to urge
    our authorities to a quicker sense of the situation and to come to a
    determination.

The first point which leaps out of this extraordinarily frank
disquisition is that the origin of the Twenty-one Demands is at last
disclosed. A perusal of the ten articles forming the basis of the
Defensive alliance proposed by the Black Dragon Society, allows us to
understand everything that occurred in Peking in the spring of 1915. As
far back as November, 1914, it was generally rumoured in Peking that
Japan had a surprise of an extraordinary nature in her diplomatic
archives, and that it would be merely a matter of weeks before it was
sprung. Comparing this elaborate memorandum of the Black Dragon Society
with the original text of the Twenty-one Demands it is plain that the
proposed plan, having been handed to Viscount Kato, had to be passed
through the diplomatic filters again and again until all gritty matter
had been removed, and an appearance of innocuousness given to it. It is
for this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges as five
compact little "groups" of demands, with the vital things directly
affecting Chinese sovereignty labelled _desiderata_, so that Japanese
ambassadors abroad could leave very warm assurances at every Foreign
Office that there was nothing in what Japan desired which in any way
conflicted with the Treaty rights of the Powers in China. The air of
mystery which surrounded the whole business from the 18th January to the
7th May--the day of the ultimatum--was due to the fact that Japan
attempted to translate the conspiracy into terms of ordinary
intercourse, only to find that in spite of the "filtering" the
atmosphere of plotting could not be shaken off or the political threat
adequately hidden. There is an arresting piece of psychology in this.

The conviction expressed in the first portion of the Memorandum that
bankruptcy was the rock on which the Peking administration must sooner
or later split, and that the moment which Japan must seize is the
outbreak of insurrections, is also highly instructive in view of what
happened later. Still more subtle is the manner in which the ultimate
solution is left open: it is consistently admitted throughout the mass
of reasoning that there is no means of knowing whether suasion or force
will ultimately be necessary. Force, however, always beckons to Japan
because that is the simplest formula. And since Japan is the
self-appointed defender of the dumb four hundred millions, her influence
will be thrown on the side of the populace in order "to usher into China
a new era of prosperity" so that China and Japan may in fact as well as
in name be brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each
other.

The object of the subsidized insurrections is also clearly stated; it is
to alter China's republican form of government into a Constitutional
Monarchy which shall necessarily be identical in all its details to the
Constitutional Monarchy of Japan and to no other. Who the new Emperor is
to be is a point left in suspense, although we may here again recall
that in 1912 in the midst of the revolution Japan privately sounded
England regarding the advisability of lending the Manchus armed
assistance, a proposal which was immediately vetoed. But there are other
things: nothing is forgotten in the Memorandum. Russia is to be
specially placated, England to be specially negotiated with, thus
incidentally explaining Japan's recent attitude regarding the Yangtsze
Railways. Japan, released from her dependent foreign policy, that is
from a policy which is bound by conventions and treaties which others
respect, can then carry out her own plans without fear of molestation.

And this brings us to the two last documents of the dossier--the method
of subsidizing and arranging insurrections in China when and wherever
necessary.

The first document is a detailed agreement between the Revolutionary
Party and various Japanese merchants. Trained leaders are to be used in
the provinces South of the Yellow River, and the matter of result is so
systematized that the agreement specifies the amount of compensation to
be paid for every Japanese killed on active service; it declares that
the Japanese will deliver arms and ammunition in the districts of
Jihchow in Shantung and Haichow in Kiangsu; and it ends by stating that
the first instalment of cash, Yen 400,000, had been paid over in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The second document is an
additional loan agreement between the interested parties creating a
special "trading" corporation, perhaps satirically named "The Europe and
Asia Trading Company," which in a consideration of a loan of half a
million yen gives Japanese prior rights over all the mines of China.

    ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN SUN WEN (SUN YAT SEN) AND THE
    JAPANESE

    In order to preserve the peace in the Far East, it is necessary for
    China and Japan to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance
    whereby in case of war with any other nation or nations Japan shall
    supply the military force while China shall be responsible for the
    finances. It is impossible for the present Chinese Government to
    work hand in hand with the Japanese Government nor does the Japanese
    Government desire to co-operate with the former. Consequently
    Japanese politicians and merchants who have the peace of the Far
    East at heart are anxious to assist China in her reconstruction. For
    this object the following Agreement is entered into by the two
    parties:

    1. Before an uprising is started, Terao, Okura, Tseji Karoku and
    their associates shall provide the necessary funds, weapons and
    military force, but the funds so provided must not exceed 1,500,000
    yen and rifles not to exceed 100,000 pieces.

    2. Before the uprising takes place the loan shall be temporarily
    secured by 10,000,000 yen worth of bonds to be issued by Sun Wen
    (Sun Yat Sen). It shall however, be secured afterwards by all the
    movable properties of the occupied territory. (See Article 14 of
    this Agreement.)

    3. The funds from the present loan and military force to be provided
    are for operations in the provinces South of the Yellow River, viz.:
    Yunnan, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan, Kiangsi, Anhuei, Kiangsu
    Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. If it is intended to invade
    the Northern provinces North of the Yellow River, Tseji Karoku and
    his associates shall participate with the revolutionists in all
    deliberations connected with such operations.

    4. The Japanese volunteer force shall be allowed from the date of
    their enrolment active service pay in accordance with the
    regulations of the Japanese army. After the occupation of a place,
    the two parties will settle the mode of rewarding the meritorious
    and compensating the family of the killed, adopting the most
    generous practice in vogue in China and Japan. In the case of the
    killed, compensation for each soldier shall, at the least, be more
    than 1,000 yen.

    5. Wherever the revolutionary army might be located the Japanese
    military officers accompanying these expeditions shall have the
    right to advise a continuation or cessation of operations.

    6. After the revolutionary army has occupied a region and
    strengthened its defences, all industrial undertakings and railway
    construction and the like, not mentioned in the Treaties with other
    foreign Powers, shall be worked with joint capital together with the
    Japanese.

    7. On the establishment of a new Government in China, all Japan's
    demands on China shall be recognized by the new Government as
    settled and binding.

    8. All Japanese Military Officers holding the rank of Captain or
    higher ranks engaged by the Chinese revolutionary army shall have
    the privilege of being continued in their employment with a limit as
    to date and shall have the right to ask to be thus employed.

    9. The loan shall be paid over in three instalments. The first
    instalment will be 400,000 yen, the second instalment ... yen and
    the third instalment ... yen. After the first instalment is paid
    over, Okura who advances the loan shall have the right to appoint
    men to supervise the expenditure of the money.

    10. The Japanese shall undertake to deliver all arms and ammunition
    in the Districts of Jih Chao and Haichow (in Shantung and Kiangsu,
    South of Kiaochow).

    11. The payment of the first instalment of the loan shall be made
    not later than three days after the signing of this Agreement.

    12. All the employed Japanese Military officers and Japanese
    volunteers are in duty bound to obey the orders of the Commander of
    the revolutionary army.

    13. The Commander of the revolutionary army shall have the right to
    send back to Japan those Japanese military officers and Japanese
    volunteers who disobey his orders and their passage money shall not
    be paid if such decision meets with the approval of three or more of
    the Japanese who accompany the revolutionary force.

    14. All the commissariat departments in the occupied territory must
    employ Japanese experts to co-operate in their management.

    15. This Agreement takes effect immediately it is signed by the two
    parties.

    The foregoing fifteen articles have been discussed several times
    between the two parties and signed by them in February. The first
    instalment of 400,000 yen has been paid according to the terms of
    this Agreement.


    LOAN AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY REPRESENTED BY
    CHANG YAO-CHING AND HIS ASSOCIATES OF THE FIRST PART AND KAWASAKI
    KULANOSKE OF THE SECOND PART

    1. The Europe and Asia Trading Company undertakes to raise a loan of
    500,000 yen. After the Agreement is signed and sealed by the
    contracting parties the Japanese Central Bank shall hand over 3/10
    of the loan as the first instalment. When Chang Yao-Ching and his
    associates arrive at their proper destination the sum of 150,000 yen
    shall be paid over as the second instalment. When final arrangements
    are made the third and last instalment of 200,000 yen shall be paid.

    2. When money is to be paid out, the Europe and Asia Trading Company
    shall appoint supervisors. Responsible individuals of the
    contracting parties shall jointly affix their seals (to the cheques)
    before money is drawn for expenditure.

    3. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall secure a volunteer
    force of 150 men, only retired officers of the Japanese army to be
    eligible.

    4. On leaving Japan the travelling expenses and personal effects of
    the volunteers shall be borne by themselves. After reaching China,
    Chang Yao-Ching and his associates shall give the volunteers the pay
    of officers of the subordinate grade according to the established
    regulations of the Japanese army.

    5. If a volunteer is wounded while on duty Chang Yao-Ching and his
    associates shall pay him a provisional compensation of not exceeding
    1,000 yen. When wounded seriously a provisional compensation of
    5,000 yen shall be paid as well as a life pension in accordance with
    the rules of the Japanese army. If a volunteer meets with an
    accident, thus losing his life, an indemnity of 50,000 yen shall be
    paid to his family.

    6. If a volunteer is not qualified for duty Chang Yao-Ching and his
    associates shall have the power to dismiss him. All volunteers are
    subject to the orders of Chang Yao-Ching and his associates and to
    their command in the battlefields.

    7. When volunteers are required to attack a certain selected place
    it shall be their duty to do so. But the necessary expenses for the
    undertaking shall be determined beforehand by both parties after
    investigating into existing conditions.

    8. The volunteer force shall be organized after the model of the
    Japanese army. Two Japanese officers recommended by the Europe and
    Asia Trading Company shall be employed.

    9. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the power to
    dispose of the public properties in the places occupied by the
    volunteer force.

    10. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the first
    preference for working the mines in places occupied and protected by
    the volunteer force.

And here ends this extraordinary collection of papers. Is fiction mixed
with fact--are these only "trial" drafts, or are they real documents
signed, sealed, and delivered? The point seems unimportant. The thing of
importance is the undoubted fact that assembled and treated in the way
we have treated them they present a complete and arresting picture of
the aims and ambitions of the ordinary Japanese; of their desire to push
home the attack to the last gasp and so to secure the infeodation of
China.



CHAPTER VIII

THE MONARCHIST PLOT

THE PAMPHLET OF YANG TU


A shiver of impotent rage passed over the country when the nature and
acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum became generally known. The
Chinese, always an emotional people, responding with quasi-feminine
volubility to oppressive acts, cried aloud at the ignominy of the
diplomacy which had so cruelly crucified them. One and all declared that
the day of shame which had been so harshly imposed upon them would never
be forgotten and that Japan would indeed pay bitterly for her policy of
extortion.

Two movements were started at once: one to raise a National Salvation
Fund to be applied towards strengthening the nation in any way the
government might decide; the other, to boycott all Japanese articles of
commerce. Both soon attained formidable proportions. The nation became
deeply and fervently interested in the double-idea; and had Yuan
Shih-kai possessed true political vision there is little doubt that by
responding to this national call he might have ultimately been borne to
the highest pinnacles of his ambitions without effort on his part. His
oldest enemies now openly declared that henceforth he had only to work
honourably and whole-heartedly in the nation's interest to find them
supporting him, and to have every black mark set against his name wiped
out.

In these circumstances what did he do? His actions form one of the most
incredible and, let it be said, contemptible chapters of contemporary
history.

In dealing with the origins of the Twenty-one Demands we have already
discussed the hints the Japan Representative had officially made when
presenting his now famous Memorandum. Briefly Yuan Shih-kai had been
told in so many words that since he was already autocrat of all the
Chinese, he had only to endorse the principle of Japanese guidance in
his administration to find that his Throne would be as good as publicly
and solidly established. Being saturated with the doleful diplomacy of
Korea, and seeing in these proposals a mere trap, Yuan Shih-kai, as we
have shown, had drawn back in apparent alarm. Nevertheless the words
spoken had sunk in deep, for the simple and excellent reason that ever
since the _coup d'état_ of the 4th November, 1913, the necessity of
"consolidating" his position by something more permanent than a display
of armed force had been a daily subject of conversation in the bosom of
his family. The problem, as this misguided man saw it, was simply by
means of an unrivalled display of cunning to profit by the Japanese
suggestion, and at the same time to leave the Japanese in the lurch.

His eldest son, an individual of whom it has been said that he had
absorbed every theory his foreign teachers had taught him without being
capable of applying a single one, was the leader in this family
intrigue. The unhappy victim of a brutal attempt to kill him during the
Revolution, this eldest son had been for years semi-paralyzed: but
brooding over his disaster had only fortified in him the resolve to
succeed his father as legitimate Heir. Having saturated himself in
Napoleonic literature, and being fully aware of how far a bold leader
can go in times of emergency, he daily preached to his father the
necessity of plucking the pear as soon as it was ripe. The older man,
being more skilled and more cautious in statecraft than this youthful
visionary, purposely rejected the idea so long as its execution seemed
to him premature. But at last the point was reached when he was
persuaded to give the monarchy advocates the free hand they solicited,
being largely helped to this decision by the argument that almost
anything in China could be accomplished under cover of the war,--_so
long as vested foreign interests were not jeopardized_.

In accordance with this decision, very shortly after the 18th January,
the dictator's lieutenants had begun to sound the leaders of public
opinion regarding the feasibility of substituting for the nominal
Republic a Constitutional Monarchy. Thus, in a highly characteristic
way, all through the tortuous course of the Japanese negotiations, to
which he was supposed to be devoting his sole attention in order to save
his menaced fatherland, Yuan Shih-kai was assisting his henchmen to
indoctrinate Peking officialdom with the idea that the salvation of the
State depended more on restoring on a modified basis the old empire than
in beating off the Japanese assault. It was his belief that if some
scholar of national repute could be found, who would openly champion
these ideas and urge them with such persuasiveness and authority that
they became accepted as a Categorical Imperative, the game would be as
good as won, the Foreign Powers being too deeply committed abroad to pay
much attention to the Far East. The one man who could have produced that
result in the way Yuan Shih-kai desired to see it, the brilliant
reformer Liang Chi-chao, famous ever since 1898, however, obstinately
refused to lend himself to such work; and, sooner than be involved in
any way in the plot, threw up his post of Minister of Justice and
retired to the neighbouring city of Tientsin from which centre he was
destined to play a notable part.

This hitch occasioned a delay in the public propaganda, though not for
long. Forced to turn to a man of secondary ability, Yuan Shih-kai now
invoked the services of a scholar who had been known to be his secret
agent in the Old Imperial Senate under the Manchus--a certain Yang
Tu--whose constant appeals in that chamber had indeed been the means of
forcing the Manchus to summon Yuan Shih-kai back to office to their
rescue on the outbreak of the Wuchang rebellion in 1911. After very
little discussion everything was arranged. In the person of this
ex-Senator, whose whole appearance was curiously Machiavellian and
decadent, the neo-imperialists at last found their champion.

Events now moved quickly enough. In the Eastern way, very few weeks
after the Japanese Ultimatum, a society was founded called the Society
for the Preservation of Peace (_Chou An Hui_) and hundreds of
affiliations opened in the provinces. Money was spent like water to
secure adherents, and when the time was deemed ripe the now famous
pamphlet of Yang Tu was published broadcast, being in everybody's hands
during the idle summer month of August. This document is so remarkable
as an illustration of the working of that type of Chinese mind which
has assimilated some portion of the facts of the modern world and yet
remains thoroughly reactionary and illogical, that special attention
must be directed to it. Couched in the form of an argument between two
individuals--one the inquirer, the other the expounder--it has something
of the Old Testament about it both in its blind faith and in its
insistence on a few simple essentials. It embodies everything essential
to an understanding of the old mentality of China which has not yet been
completely destroyed. From a literary standpoint it has also much that
is valuable because it is so naïve; and although it is concerned with
such a distant region of the world as China its treatment of modern
political ideas is so bizarre and yet so acute that it will repay study.

It was not, however, for some time, that the significance of this
pamphlet was generally understood. It was such an amazing departure from
old precedents for the Peking Government to lend itself to public
propaganda as a revolutionary weapon that the mind of the people refused
to credit the fatal turn things were taking. But presently when it
became known that the "Society for the Preservation of Peace" was
actually housed in the Imperial City and in daily relations with the
President's Palace; and that furthermore the Procurator-General of
Peking, in response to innumerable memorials of denunciation, having
attempted to proceed against the author and publishers of the pamphlet,
as well as against the Society, had been forced to leave the capital
under threats against his life, the document was accepted at its
face-value. Almost with a gasp of incredulity China at last realized
that Yuan Shih-kai had been seduced to the point of openly attempting to
make himself Emperor. From those August days of 1915 until the 6th June
of the succeeding year, when Fate had her own grim revenge, Peking was
given up to one of the most amazing episodes that has ever been
chronicled in the dramatic history of the capital. It was as if the old
city walls, which had looked down on so much real drama, had determined
to lend themselves to the staging of an unreal comedy. For from first to
last the monarchy movement had something unreal about it, and might have
been the scenario of some vast picture-play. It was acting pure and
simple--acting done in the hope that the people might find it so
admirable that they would acclaim it as real, and call the Dictator
their King. But it is time to turn to the arguments of Yang Tu and allow
a Chinese to picture the state of his country:

    A DEFENCE OF THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT

    PART I

    Mr. Ko (or "the stranger"): Since the establishment of the Republic
    four years have passed, and upon the President depends the
    preservation of order at home and the maintenance of prestige
    abroad. I suppose that after improving her internal administration
    for ten or twenty years, China will become a rich and prosperous
    country, and will be able to stand in the front rank with western
    nations.

    Mr. Hu: No! No! If China does not make any change in the form of
    government there is no hope for her becoming strong and rich; there
    is even no hope for her having a constitutional government. I say
    that China is doomed to perish.

    Mr. Ko: Why so?

    Mr. Hu: The republican form of government is responsible. The
    Chinese people are fond of good names, but they do not care much
    about the real welfare of the nation. No plan to save the country is
    possible. The formation of the Republic as a result of the first
    revolution has prevented that.

    Mr. Ko: Why is it that there is no hope of China's becoming strong?

    Mr. Hu: The people of a republic are accustomed to listen to the
    talk of equality and freedom which must affect the political and
    more especially the military administration. In normal circumstances
    both the military and student classes are required to lay great
    emphasis upon unquestioned obedience and respect for those who hold
    high titles. The German and Japanese troops observe strict
    discipline and obey the orders of their chiefs. That is why they are
    regarded as the best soldiers in the world. France and America are
    in a different position. They are rich but not strong. The sole
    difference is that Germany and Japan are ruled by monarchs while
    France and America are republics. Our conclusion therefore is that
    no republic can be strong.

    But since the French and American peoples possess general education
    they are in a position to assume responsibility for the good
    government of their nations which they keep in good order. On that
    account, although these republics are not strong in dealing with the
    Powers, they can maintain peace at home. China, however, is unlike
    these countries, for her standard of popular education is very low.
    Most of the Chinese soldiers declare as a commonplace: "We eat the
    imperial food and we must therefore serve the imperial master." But
    now the Imperial family is gone, and for it has been substituted an
    impersonal republic, of which they know nothing whatsoever. These
    soldiers are now law-abiding because they have awe-inspiring and
    respectful feelings for the man at the head of the state. But as the
    talk of equality and freedom has gradually influenced them, it has
    become a more difficult task to control them. As an example of this
    corrupt spirit, the commanders of the Southern troops formerly had
    to obey their subordinate officers and the subordinate officers had
    to obey their soldiers. Whenever there was an important question to
    be discussed, the soldiers demanded a voice and a share in the
    solution. These soldiers were called the republican army. Although
    the Northern troops have not yet become so degenerate, still they
    never hesitate to disobey the order of their superiors whenever they
    are ordered to proceed to distant localities. Now we have come to
    the point when we are deeply satisfied if the army of the Republic
    does not openly mutiny! We cannot expect any more from them save to
    hope that they will not mutiny and that they will be able to
    suppress internal disturbances. In the circumstances there is no use
    talking about resistance of a foreign invasion by these soldiers. As
    China, a republic, is situated between two countries, Japan and
    Russia, both of which have monarchical governments, how can we
    resist their aggression once diplomatic conversations begin? From
    this it is quite evident that there is nothing which can save China
    from destruction. Therefore I say there is no hope of China becoming
    strong.

    Mr. Ko: But why is it that there is no hope of China ever becoming
    rich?

    Mr. Hu: People may not believe that while France and America are
    rich China must remain poor. Nevertheless, the reason why France and
    America are rich is that they were allowed to work out their own
    salvation without foreign intervention for many years, and that at
    the same time they were free from internal disturbances. If any
    nation wishes to become rich, it must depend upon industries for its
    wealth. Now, what industries most fear is disorder and civil war.
    During the last two years order has been restored and many things
    have returned to their former state, but our industrial condition is
    the same as under the Manchu Dynasty. Merchants who lost their
    capital during the troublous times and who are now poor have no way
    of retrieving their losses, while those who are rich are unwilling
    to invest their money in industrial undertakings, fearing that
    another civil war may break out at any moment, since they take the
    recent abortive second revolution as their warning. In future, we
    shall have disquietude every few years; that is whenever the
    president is changed. Then our industrial and commercial condition
    will be in a still worse condition. If our industries are not
    developed, how can we expect to be strong? Take Mexico as a warning.
    There is very little difference between that country and China,
    which certainly cannot be compared with France and America.
    Therefore I say there is no hope for China ever becoming rich.

    Mr. Ko: Why is it that you say there is no hope for China having a
    Constitutional Government?

    Mr. Hu: A true republic must be conducted by many people possessing
    general education, political experience and a certain political
    morality. Its president is invested with power by the people to
    manage the general affairs of the state. Should the people desire to
    elect Mr. A their president to-day and Mr. B to-morrow, it does not
    make much difference; for the policy of the country may be changed
    together with the change of the president without there being any
    danger of disorder or chaos following such change. We have a very
    different problem to solve in China. The majority of our people do
    not know what the republic is, nor do they know anything about a
    Constitution nor have they any true sense of equality and freedom.
    Having overthrown the Empire and established in its place a republic
    they believe that from now on they are subservient to no one, and
    they think they can do as they please. Ambitious men hold that any
    person may be president, and if they cannot get the presidency by
    fair means of election they are prepared to fight for it with the
    assistance of troops and robbers. The second revolution is an
    illustration of this point. From the moment that the Emperor was
    deposed, the centralization of power in the government was
    destroyed; and no matter who may be at the head of the country, he
    cannot restore peace except by the re-establishment of the monarchy.
    So at the time when the republic was formed, those who had
    previously advocated Constitutional Government turned into
    monarchists. Although we have a Provisional Constitution now and we
    have all kinds of legislative organs, which give to the country an
    appearance of a constitutional government, China has a
    constitutional government in name only and is a monarchy in spirit.
    Had the government refrained from exercising monarchical power
    during the last four years, the people could not have enjoyed one
    day of peace. In short, China's republic must be governed by a
    monarchy through a constitutional government. If the constitutional
    government cannot govern the republic, the latter cannot remain. The
    question of constitutional government is therefore very important,
    but it will take ten or twenty years before it can be solved.

    Look at the people of China to-day! They know that something
    terrible is going to come sooner or later. They dare not think of
    the future. The corrupt official lines his pocket with unrighteous
    money, preparing to flee to foreign countries or at least to the
    Foreign Settlements for safety. The cautious work quietly and do not
    desire to earn merit but merely try to avoid giving offence. The
    scholars and politicians are grandiloquent and discourse upon their
    subjects in a sublime vein, but they are no better than the corrupt
    officials. As for our President, he can remain at the head of the
    State for a few years. At most he may hold office for several
    terms,--or perhaps for his whole life. Then questions must arise as
    to who shall succeed him; how to elect his successor; how many
    rivals will there be; whether their policies will be different from
    his, etc., etc. He personally has no idea regarding the solution of
    these questions. Even if the president is a sagacious and capable
    man he will not be able to make a policy for the country or fix a
    Constitution which will last for a hundred years. Because of this he
    is driven merely to adopt a policy so as to maintain peace in his
    own country and to keep the nation intact so long as he may live. In
    the circumstances such a president can be considered the best
    executive head we can have. Those who are worshippers of the
    constitutional government cannot do more than he does. Here we find
    the reason for the silence of the former advocates of a
    constitutional administration. They have realized that by the
    formation of the republic the fundamental problem of the country has
    been left unsolved. In this wise it happens that the situation is
    something like this. Whilst the country is governed by an able
    president, the people enjoy peace and prosperity. But once an
    incapable man assumes the presidency, chaos will become the order of
    the day, a state of affairs which will finally lead to the overthrow
    of the president himself and the destruction of the country. In such
    circumstances, how can you devise a general policy for the country
    which will last for a hundred years? I say that there is no hope for
    China establishing a truly constitutional government.

    Mr. Ko: In your opinion there is no hope for China becoming strong
    and rich or for her acquiring a constitutional government. She has
    no choice save ultimately to disappear. And yet is there no plan
    possible whereby she may be saved?

    Mr. Hu: If China wishes to save herself from ultimate disappearance
    from the face of the earth, first of all she must get rid of the
    republic. Should she desire wealth and strength, she must adopt a
    constitutional government. Should she want constitutional government
    she must first establish a monarchy.

    Mr. Ko: How is it that should China desire wealth and strength she
    must first adopt the constitutional form of government?

    Mr. Hu: Wealth and strength is the object of the country, and a
    constitutional government is the means to realizing this object. In
    the past able rulers could accomplish their purpose without a
    constitutional government. We refer to Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty
    and Emperor Tai Chung of the Tang Dynasty. However, when these able
    rulers died their system of administration died with them. This
    contention can be supported by numerous historical instances; but
    suffice to say that in China as well as in Europe, the lack of a
    constitutional government has been the cause of the weakness of most
    of the nations in ancient times. Japan was never known as a strong
    nation until she adopted a constitutional government. The reason is
    this: when there is no constitutional government, the country cannot
    continue to carry out a definite policy.

    Within comparatively recent times there was born in Europe the
    constitutional form of government. European nations adopted it, and
    they became strong. The most dangerous fate that can confront a
    nation is that after the death of an able ruler the system of
    administration he has established disappears with him; but this the
    constitutional form of government is able to avert. Take for
    instance William I. of Germany who is dead but whose country
    continues to this day strong and prosperous. It is because of
    constitutional government. The same is true of Japan, which has
    adopted constitutional government and which is becoming stronger and
    stronger every day. The change of her executive cannot affect her
    progress in respect of her strength. From this it is quite clear
    that constitutional government is a useful instrument for building
    up a country. It is a government with a set of fixed laws which
    guard the actions of both the people and the president none of whom
    can overstep the boundary as specified in the laws. No ruler,
    whether be he a good man or a bad man, can change one iota of the
    laws. The people reap the benefit of this in consequence. It is easy
    to make a country strong and rich but it is difficult to establish a
    constitutional government. When a constitutional government has been
    established, everything will take care of itself, prosperity
    following naturally enough. The adoption of a constitutional
    government at the present moment can be compared to the problem of a
    derailed train. It is hard to put the train back on the track, but
    once on the track it is very easy to move the train. What we should
    worry about is not how to make the country rich and prosperous, but
    how to form a genuine constitutional government. Therefore I say
    that if China desires to be strong and prosperous, she should first
    of all adopt the constitutional form of government.

    Mr. Ko: I do not understand why it is that a monarchy should be
    established before the constitutional form of government can be
    formed?

    Mr. Hu: Because if the present system continues there will be
    intermittent trouble. At every change of the president there will be
    riot and civil war. In order to avert the possibility of such awful
    times place the president in a position which is permanent. It
    follows that the best thing is to make him Emperor. When that bone
    of contention is removed, the people will settle down to business
    and feel peace in their hearts, and devote their whole energy and
    time to the pursuit of their vocations. It is logical to assume that
    after the adoption of the monarchy they will concentrate their
    attention on securing a constitutional government which they know is
    the only salvation for their country. As for the Emperor, knowing
    that he derives his position from the change from a republic, and
    filled with the desire of pacifying the people, he cannot help
    sanctioning the formation of the constitutional form of government
    which in addition, will insure to his offspring the continuation of
    the Throne. Should he adopt any other course, he will be exposed to
    great personal danger. If he is broadminded, he will further
    recognize the fact that if no constitutional form of government is
    introduced, his policy will perish after his death. Therefore I say
    that before the adoption of the constitutional form of government, a
    monarchy should be established. William I. of Germany and the
    Emperor Meiji of Japan both tried the constitutional form of
    government and found it a success.

    Mr. Ko: Please summarize your discussion.

    Mr. Hu: In short, the country cannot be saved except through the
    establishment of a constitutional form of government. No
    constitutional government can be formed except through the
    establishment of a monarchy. The constitutional form of government
    has a set of fixed laws, and the monarchy has a definite head who
    cannot be changed, in which matters lies the source of national
    strength and wealth.

    Mr. Ko: What you have said in regard to the adoption of the
    constitutional monarchy as a means of saving the country from
    dismemberment is quite true, but I would like to have your opinion
    on the relative advantages and disadvantages of a republic and a
    monarchy, assuming that China adopts the scheme of a monarchy.

    Mr. Hu: I am only too glad to give you my humble opinion on this
    momentous question.

    Mr. Ko: You have said that China would be devastated by contending
    armies of rival leaders trying to capture the presidency. At what
    precise moment will that occur?

    Mr. Hu: The four hundred million people of China now rely upon the
    President alone for the protection of their lives and property. Upon
    him likewise falls the burden of preserving both peace and the
    balance of power in the Far East. There is no time in the history of
    China that the Head of the State has had to assume such a heavy
    responsibility for the protection of life and property and for the
    preservation of peace in Asia; and at no time in our history has the
    country been in greater danger than at the present moment. China can
    enjoy peace so long as His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai remains the
    President, and no longer. Should anything befall the President,
    every business activity will at once be suspended, shops will be
    closed, disquietude will prevail, people will become panic-stricken,
    the troops uncontrollable, and foreign warships will enter our
    harbours. European and American newspapers will be full of special
    dispatches about the complicated events in China, and martial law
    will be declared in every part of the country. All this will be due
    to the uncertainty regarding the succession to the presidency.

It will be seen from the first section of this long and extraordinary
pamphlet how the author develops his argument. One of his major premises
is the inherent unruliness of Republican soldiery,--the armies of
republics not to be compared with the armed forces of monarchies,--and
consequently constituting a perpetual menace to good government. Passing
on from this, he lays down the proposition that China cannot hope to
become rich so long as the fear of civil war is ever-present; and that
without a proper universal education a republic is an impossibility. The
exercise of monarchical power in such circumstances can only be called
an inevitable development,--the one goal to be aimed at being the
substitution of Constitutional Government for the dictatorial rule. The
author deals at great length with the background to this idea, playing
on popular fears to reinforce his casuistry. For although constitutional
government is insisted upon as the sole solution, he speedily shows that
this constitutionalism will depend more on the benevolence of the
dictator than on the action of the people. And should his advice be not
heeded, when Fortune wills that Yuan Shih-kai's rule shall end, chaos
will ensue owing to the "uncertainty" regarding the succession.

Here the discussion reaches its climax--for the demand that salvation be
sought by enthroning Yuan Shih-kai now becomes clear and unmistakable.
Let the author speak for himself.

    Mr. Ko: But it is provided in the Constitutional Compact that a
    president must be selected from among the three candidates whose
    names are now kept in a golden box locked in a stone room. Do you
    think this provision is not sufficient to avert the terrible times
    which you have just described?

    Mr. Hu: The provision you have mentioned is useless. Can you find
    any person who is able to be at the head of the state besides His
    Excellency Yuan Shih-kai? The man who can succeed President Yuan
    must enjoy the implicit confidence of the people and must have
    extended his influence all over the country and be known both at
    home and abroad. He must be able to maintain order, and then no
    matter what the constitution provides, he will be unanimously
    elected President. He must also be able to assure himself that the
    two other candidates for the presidency have no hope for success in
    the presidential campaign. The provision in the constitution, as
    well as the golden casket in which the names of the three candidates
    are kept which you have mentioned, are nothing but nominal measures.
    Moreover there is no man in China who answers the description of a
    suitable, successor which I have just given. Here arises a difficult
    problem; and what has been specified in the Constitutional Compact
    is a vain attempt to solve it. It is pertinent to ask why the
    law-makers should not have made the law in such a way that the
    people could exercise their free choice in the matter of the
    presidential successor? The answer is that there is reason to fear
    that a bad man may be elected president by manipulations carried out
    with a masterly hand, thereby jeopardizing the national welfare.
    This fear has influenced the constitution-makers to settle upon
    three candidates from among whom the president must be elected. Then
    it may be asked why not fix upon one man instead of upon three since
    you have already deprived the people of part of their freedom? The
    answer is that: there is not a single man whose qualifications are
    high enough to be the successor. As it is, three candidates of equal
    qualifications are put forward for the people to their selection. No
    matter how one may argue this important question from the legal
    point of view, there is the fact that the law makers fixed upon
    three candidates for the presidency, believing that we do not
    possess a suitable presidential successor. The vital question of the
    day setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has a
    suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. Whether or not the
    constitutional compact can be actually carried out in future I do
    not know; but I do know that that instrument will eventually become
    ineffective.

    Mr. Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you have hinted
    will ensue in this country. Can you tell me anything along that
    line?

    Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the most
    important part, virtuous and experienced and learned statesmen being
    unable to cope with the situation. The only qualification which a
    leader at such a time needs to possess is the control of the
    military, and the ability to suppress Parliament. Should such a
    person be made the president, he cannot long hold his enviable post
    in view of the fact that he cannot possess sufficient influence to
    control the troops of the whole country. The generals of equal rank
    and standing will not obey each other, while the soldiers and
    politicians, seeing a chance in these differences for their
    advancement, will stir up their feelings and incite one another to
    fight. They will fight hard among themselves. The rebels, who are
    now exiles in foreign lands, taking advantage of the chaos in China,
    will return in very little time to perpetrate the worst crimes known
    in human history. The royalists who are in retirement will likewise
    come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons who have the
    qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to fight for the
    self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not wish to mention
    names, but I can safely predict that more than ten different parties
    will arise at the psychological moment. Men who will never be
    satisfied until they become president, and those who know they
    cannot get the presidency but who are unwilling to serve others,
    will come out one after another. Confusion and disturbance will
    follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have
    entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful
    situation in China will stir up ill-feelings among these parties and
    so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes, various
    countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of
    controlling China, will resort to armed intervention. In consequence
    the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the international
    peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into a battleground
    for the Chinese people or for the foreign Powers I cannot tell you.
    It is too dreadful to think of the future which is enshrouded in a
    veil of mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of this
    awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China like a melon or
    the suppression of internal trouble with foreign assistance which
    will lead to dismemberment. As to the second result some explanation
    is necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress
    internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li Wang
    of Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make him Emperor of
    China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of
    the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to be
    seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will not be
    vested political, financial and military power, which will be
    controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of
    industries and our abundant natural resources will likewise be
    developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation. In
    selecting a man of the Li Wang type, the aforesaid foreign countries
    will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of China's
    territory. But there can be easily found such a man who bears
    remarkable resemblance to Li Wang, and who will be willing to make a
    treaty with the foreigners whereby he unpatriotically sells his
    country in exchange for a throne which he can never obtain or keep
    without outside assistance. His procedure will be something like
    this: He will make an alliance with a foreign nation by which the
    latter will be given the power to carry on foreign relations on
    behalf of his country. In the eyes of foreigners, China will have
    been destroyed, but the people will continue deceived and made to
    believe that their country is still in existence. This is the first
    step. The second step will be to imitate the example of Korea and
    make a treaty with a certain power, whereby China is annexed and the
    throne abolished. The imperial figurehead then flees to the foreign
    country where he enjoys an empty title. Should you then try to make
    him devise means for regaining the lost territory it will be too
    late. For China will have been entirely destroyed by that time. This
    is the second procedure in the annexation of Chinese territory. The
    reason why that foreign country desires to change the republic into
    the monarchy is to set one man on the throne and make him witness
    the whole process of annexation of his country, thereby simplifying
    the matter. When that time has come, the people will not be
    permitted to make any comment upon the form of government suitable
    for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The rebels who
    raised the standard of the republic have no principles and if they
    now find that some other tactics will help to increase their power
    they will adopt these tactics. China's republic is doomed, no matter
    what happens. If we do not change it ourselves, others will do it
    for us. Should we undertake the change ourselves we can save the
    nation: otherwise there is no hope for China to remain a nation. It
    is to be regretted that our people now assume an attitude of
    indifference, being reluctant to look forward to the future, and
    caring not what may happen to them and their country. They are
    doomed to become slaves after the loss of their national
    independence.

    Mr. Ko: I am very much frightened by what you have said. You have
    stated that the adoption of a constitutional monarchy can avert such
    terrible consequences; but is there not likely to be disturbance
    during the change of the republic to monarchy, since such
    disturbance must always accompany the presidential election?

    Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two things. There
    may be tumult during the change of the form of government, but it
    will be better in comparison with the chaos that will some day ensue
    in the republic. There is no executive head in the country when a
    republic endeavours to select a presidential successor. At such a
    time, the ambitious try to improve their future, while the patriotic
    are at a loss now to do anything which will assist in the
    maintenance of order. Those who are rebellious rise in revolt while
    those who are peace-loving are compelled by circumstances to join
    their rank and file. Should the form of government be transformed
    into a monarchical one, and should the time for change of the head
    of the state come, the successor having already been provided for,
    that will be well-known to the people. Those who are patriotic will
    exert their utmost to preserve peace, and as result the
    heir-apparent can peacefully step on the throne. There are persons
    who will contend for the office of the President, but not for the
    throne. Those who contend for the office of President do not commit
    any crime, but those who try to seize the throne are rebels. Who
    dares to contend for the Throne?

    At the time of the change of the president in a republic, ambitious
    persons arise with the intention of capturing this most honourable
    office, but not so when the emperor is changed. Should there be a
    body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, that body must be very
    small. Therefore I say that the enemies of a succeeding Emperor are
    a few, whilst there are many in the case of a presidential
    successor. This is the first difference.

    Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts or persons
    who desire to make use of the name of the republic for their own
    benefit. These persons will raise trouble even without the change of
    the government. They do not mind disturbing the peace of the country
    at the present time when the republic exists. It is almost certain
    that at the first unfurling of the imperial flags they will at once
    grasp such an opportune moment and try to satisfy their ambition.
    Should they rise in revolt at the time when the Emperor is changed
    the Government, supported by the loyal statesmen and officials,
    whose interests are bound up with the welfare of the imperial family
    and whose influence has spread far and wide, will be able to deal
    easily with any situation which may develop. Therefore I declare
    that the successor to the throne has more supporters while the
    presidential successor has few. This is the second difference
    between the republic and the constitutional monarchy.

    Why certain persons will contend for the office of the President can
    be explained by the fact that there is not a single man in the
    country whose qualifications are above all the others. Succession to
    the throne is a question of blood-relation with the reigning
    Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. The high officials
    whose qualifications are unusually good are not subservient to
    others but they are obedient to the succeeding Emperor, because of
    their gratitude for what the imperial family has done for them, and
    because their well-being is closely associated with that of the
    imperial household. I can cite an historical incident to support my
    contention. Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time General Chu
    Chung-tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Mohammedan
    rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San generalissimo. Upon the
    death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang appointed his subordinate
    officers to lead the army but the subordinate officers competed for
    power. Chu Chung-tang finally made the step-son of General Liu the
    Commander-in-Chief and the officers and soldiers all obeyed his
    order as they did his father's. But it may be mentioned that this
    young man was not more able than any of his father's subordinate
    commanders. Nevertheless prestige counted. He owed his success to
    his natural qualification, being a step-son to General Liu. So is
    the case with the emperor whose successor nobody dares openly to
    defy--to say nothing of actually disputing his right to the throne.
    This is the third difference between the republic and the monarchy.

    I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no
    righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor-father,
    great danger may not confront the nation. However, in order to
    provide against any such case, I advocate that the formation of a
    constitutional government should go hand in hand with the
    establishment of the monarchy. At first it is difficult to establish
    and carry out a constitutional government, but once it is formed it
    will be comparatively easy. When the constitutional government has
    been established, the Emperor will have to seek his fame in such
    useful things as the defence of his country and the conquest of his
    enemy. Everything has to progress, and men possessing European
    education will be made use of by the reigning family. The first
    Emperor will certainly do all he can to capture the hearts of the
    people by means of adopting and carrying out in letter as well as in
    spirit constitutional government. The heir-apparent will pay
    attention to all new reforms and new things. Should he do so, the
    people will be able to console themselves by saying that they will
    aways be the people of a constitutional monarchy even after the
    succession to the throne of the heir-apparent. When the time comes
    for the heir-apparent to mount the throne the people will extend to
    him their cordial welcome, and there will be no need to worry about
    internal disturbances.

    Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential chair
    has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, while the
    new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever by means of his
    constitutional government. This is the fourth difference between the
    republic and the monarchy. These four differences are accountable
    for the fact that there will not be as much disturbance at the time
    of the change of emperors as at the time when the president is
    changed.

    Mr. Ko: I can understand what you have said with regard to the
    advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the monarchy, but
    there are many problems connected with the formation of a
    constitutional monarchy which we have to solve. Why is it that the
    attempt to introduce constitutional government during the last years
    of the Manchu Dynasty proved a failure?

    Mr. Hu: The constitutional government of the Manchu Dynasty was one
    in name only, and as such the forerunner of the revolution of 1911.
    Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty, the talk of starting a
    revolution to overthrow the imperial régime was in everybody's
    mouth, although the constitutional party endeavoured to accomplish
    something really useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai
    was the grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing except
    the adoption of a constitutional government could save the throne of
    the Manchus, he assumed the leadership of the constitutional party,
    which surpassed in strength the revolutionary party as a result of
    his active support. The people's hearts completely turned to the
    constitutional party for salvation, while the revolutionary party
    lost that popular support which it had formerly enjoyed. Then it
    seemed that the imperial household would soon adopt the
    constitutional monarchy and the threatening revolution could be
    averted. Unfortunately, the elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan
    Shih-kai regarding the adoption of the constitutional government
    were not carried out by the imperial household. A great change took
    place: His Excellency retired to his native province; and after
    losing this powerful leader the constitutional party was pitilessly
    shattered. A monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on the
    political arena to assist the imperial family, which pretended to do
    its very best for the development of a constitutional government,
    but secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the possession and
    retention of the real power. This double-dealing resulted in
    bringing about the revolution of 1911. For instance, when the people
    cried for the convening of a parliament, the imperial family said
    "No." The people also failed to secure the abolition of certain
    official organs for the imperialists. They lost confidence in the
    Reigning House, and simultaneously the revolutionary party raised
    its banner and gathered its supporters from every part of the
    country. As soon as the revolt started at Wuchang the troops all
    over the country joined in the movement to overthrow the Manchu
    Dynasty. The members of the Imperial Senate, most of whom were
    members of the constitutional party, could not help showing their
    sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the imperial household
    issued a proclamation containing Nineteen Articles--a veritable
    _magna charta_--but it was too late. The constitutional government
    which was about to be formed was thus laid aside. What the imperial
    family did was the mere organization of an advisory council. A
    famous foreign scholar aptly remarked: "A false constitutional
    government will eventually result in a true revolution." In trying
    to deceive the people by means of a false constitutional government
    the imperial house encompassed its own destruction. Once His
    Excellency Yuan Shih-kai stated in a memorial to the throne that
    there were only two alternatives: to give the people a
    constitutional government or to have them revolt. What happened
    afterwards is a matter of common knowledge. Therefore I say that the
    government which the imperial family attempted to form was not a
    constitutional government.

    Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of the imperial
    household to establish a constitutional government; but how about
    the Provisional Constitution, the parliament and the cabinet in the
    first and second years of the Republic? The parliament was then so
    powerful that the government was absolutely at its mercy, thereby
    disturbing the peaceful condition of the country. The people have
    tasted much of the bitterness of constitutional government. Should
    you mention the name of constitutional government again they would
    be thoroughly frightened. Is that true?

    Mr. Hu: During the first and second years of the Republic, in my
    many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang, I said
    that the republic could not form an efficient method of control, and
    that there would be an over centration of power through the adoption
    of monarchical methods of ruling, knowing as well as I did the
    standards of our people. When the members of the Kuo Ming Tang came
    to draw up the Provisional Constitution they purposely took
    precisely the opposite course of action and ignored my suggestion.
    It may, however, be mentioned that the Provisional Constitution made
    in Nanking was not so bad, but after the government was removed to
    Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied the hand and foot of the
    government by means of the Cabinet System and other restrictions
    with the intention of weakening the power of the central
    administration in order that they might be able to start another
    revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking government to the
    time of the second revolution they had this one object in view,
    namely to weaken the power of the central administration so that
    they could contend for the office of the president by raising
    further internal troubles in China. Those members of the Kuo Ming
    Tang who made the constitution know as well as I that China's
    republic must be governed through a monarchical administration; and
    therefore the unreasonable restrictions in the Provisional
    Constitution were purposely inserted.

    Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the constitutional government
    which you have proposed and the constitutional government which the
    Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt?

    Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of procedure and in
    honesty of purpose, which are imperative if constitutional
    government expects to be successful.

    Mr. Ko: What do you mean by the proper method of procedure?

    Mr. Hu: The Provisional Constitution made in Nanking, which was
    considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the future
    constitution, should a constitutional monarchy be established. In
    making a constitution for the future constitutional monarchy we have
    to consult the constitutions of the monarchies of the world. They
    can be divided into three classes which are represented by England,
    Prussia and Japan. England is advanced in its constitutional
    government, which has been in existence for thousands of years,
    (_sic_) and is the best of all in the world. The English king enjoys
    his empty title and the real power of the country is exercised by
    the parliament, which makes all the laws for the nation. As to
    Prussia, the constitutional monarchy was established when the people
    started a revolution. The ruler of Prussia was compelled to convene
    a parliament and submitted to that legal body a constitution.
    Prussia's constitution was made by its ruler together with the
    parliament. Its constitutional government is not so good as the
    English. As to the Japanese constitutional monarchy, the Emperor
    made a constitution and then convened a parliament. The
    constitutional power of the Japanese people is still less than that
    of the Prussian people. According to the standard of our people we
    cannot adopt the English constitution as our model, for it is too
    advanced. The best thing for us to do is to adopt part of the
    Prussian and part of the Japanese in our constitution-making. As our
    people are better educated now than ever before, it is decidedly
    unwise entirely to adopt the Japanese method, that is, for the
    Emperor to make a constitution without the approval of the
    parliament and then to convoke a legislative body. In the
    circumstances China should adopt the Prussian method as described
    above with some modifications, which will be very suitable to our
    conditions. As to the contents of the constitution we can copy such
    articles as those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders
    and appropriation of special funds, etc., from the Japanese
    Constitution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased
    without showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ. I
    consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the
    formation of a constitutional monarchy for China.

    Mr. Ko: Can I know something about the contents of our future
    constitution in advance?

    Mr. Hu: If you want to know them in detail I recommend you to read
    the Constitutions of Prussia and Japan. But I can tell you this
    much. Needless to say that such stipulations as articles
    guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power of the
    parliament will surely be worked into the future constitution. These
    are found in almost every constitution in the world. But as the
    former Provisional Constitution has so provided that the power of
    the parliament is unlimited, while that of the president is very
    small, the Chief Executive, besides conferring decorations and
    giving Orders of Merit, having almost nothing to do without the
    approval of the Senate, it is certain that nothing will be taken
    from that instrument for the future constitution. Nor will the
    makers of the future constitution take anything from the nineteen
    capitulations offered by the Manchu Government, which gave too much
    power to the legislative organ. According to the Nineteen Articles
    the Advisory Council was to draw up the constitution, which was to
    be ratified by the parliament; the Premier being elected by the
    parliament; whilst the use of the army and navy required the
    parliament's sanction; the making of treaties with foreign countries
    have likewise to be approved by the parliament, etc., etc. Such
    strict stipulations which are not even known in such an advanced
    country in matters constitutional as England were extorted from the
    imperial family by the advisory council. Therefore it is most
    unlikely that the makers of the future constitution will take any
    article from the nineteen capitulations of "confidence." They will
    use the Constitutions of Japan and Prussia as joint model and will
    always have in their mind the actual conditions of this country and
    the standard of the people. In short, they will copy some of the
    articles in the Japanese constitution, and adopt the Prussian method
    of procedure for the making of the constitution.

    Mr. Ko: What do you mean by honesty?

    Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Individually the
    people are simple, but they cannot be deceived collectively. The
    Manchu Government committed an irretrievable mistake by promising
    the people a constitutional government but never carrying out their
    promise. This attitude on the part of the then reigning house
    brought about the first revolution. As the standard of our people at
    the present time is not very high, they will be satisfied with less
    power if it is properly given to them. Should any one attempt to
    deceive them his cause will finally be lost. I do not know how much
    power the people and the parliament will get in the constitutional
    monarchy, but I would like to point out here that it is better to
    give them less power than to deceive them. If they are given less
    power, and if they want more, they will contend for it. Should the
    government deem it advisable to give them a little more, well and
    good. Should they be unfit for the possession of greater power, the
    government can issue a proclamation giving the reasons for not
    complying with their request, and they will not raise trouble
    knowing the true intention of the government. However, honesty is
    the most important element in the creation of a constitutional
    monarchy. It is easy and simple to practise it. The parliament must
    have the power to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its
    decision be too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the
    country, the Government can explain its faults and request it to
    reconsider its decision. Should the parliament return the same
    decision, the Government can dissolve it and convoke another
    parliament. In so doing the Government respects the parliament
    instead of despising it. But what the parliament has decided should
    be carried out strictly by the Government, and thus we will have a
    real constitutional Government. It is easy to talk but difficult to
    act, but China like all other countries has to go through the
    experimental stage and face all kinds of difficulties before a
    genuine constitutional government can be evolved. The beginning is
    difficult but once the difficulty is over everything will go on
    smoothly. I emphasize that it is better to give the people less
    power at the beginning than to deceive them. Be honest with them is
    my policy.

    Mr. Ko: I thank you very much for what you have said. Your
    discussion is interesting and I can understand it well. The proper
    method of procedure and honesty of purpose which you have mentioned
    will tend to wipe out all former corruption.

    Mr. Ko, or the stranger, then departed.

On this note the pamphleteer abruptly ends. Having discussed _ad
nauseam_ the inadequacy of all existing arrangements, even those made by
Yuan Shih-kai himself, to secure a peaceful succession to the
presidency; and having again insisted upon the evil part soldiery cannot
fail to play, he introduces a new peril, the certainty that the foreign
Powers will set up a puppet Emperor unless China solves this problem
herself, the case of Korea being invoked as an example of the fate of
divided nations. Fear of Japan and the precedent of Korea, being
familiar phenomena, are given a capital position in all this debate,
being secondary only to the crucial business of ensuring the peaceful
succession to the supreme office. The transparent manner in which the
history of the first three years of the Republic is handled in order to
drive home these arguments will be very apparent. A fit crown is put on
the whole business by the final suggestion that the Constitutional
Government of China under the new empire must be a mixture of the
Prussian and Japanese systems, Yang Tu's last words being that it is
best to be honest with the people!

No more damning indictment of Yuan Shih-kai's régime could possibly have
been penned.



CHAPTER IX

THE MONARCHY PLOT

THE MEMORANDUM OF DR. GOODNOW


Although this extraordinary pamphlet was soon accepted by Chinese
society as a semi-official warning of what was coming, it alone was not
sufficient to launch a movement which to be successful required the
benign endorsement of foreign opinion. The Chinese pamphleteer had dealt
with the emotional side of the case: it was necessary to reinforce his
arguments with an appeal which would be understood by Western statesmen
as well as by Eastern politicians. Yuan Shih-kai, still pretending to
stand aside, had kept his attention concentrated on this very essential
matter; for, as we have repeatedly pointed out, he never failed to
understand the superlative value of foreign support in all his
enterprises,--that support being given an exaggerated value by the
public thanks to China's reliance on foreign money. Accordingly, as if
still unconvinced, he now very naïvely requested the opinion of his
chief legal adviser, Dr. Goodnow, an American who had been appointed to
his office through the instrumentality of the Board of the Carnegie
Institute as a most competent authority on Administrative Law.

Even in this most serious matter the element of comedy was not lacking.
Dr. Goodnow had by special arrangement returned to Peking at the
psychological moment; for having kicked his heels during many weary
months in the capital, he had been permitted in 1914 to take up the
appointment of President of an American University on condition that he
would be available for legal "advice" whenever wanted. The Summer
vacation gave him the opportunity of revisiting in the capacity of a
transient adviser the scenes of his former idleness; and the
holiday-task set him by his large-hearted patron was to prove in as few
folios as possible that China ought to be a Monarchy and not a
Republic--a theme on which every schoolboy could no doubt write with
fluency. Consequently Dr. Goodnow, arming himself with a limited amount
of paper and ink, produced in very few days the Memorandum which
follows,--a document which it is difficult to speak of dispassionately
since it seems to have been deliberately designed to play into the hands
of a man who was now openly set on betraying the trust the nation
reposed in him, and who was ready to wade through rivers of blood to
satisfy his insensate ambition.

[Illustration: President Li Yuan-Hung and the General Staff watching the
Review.]

[Illustration: March-past of an Infantry Division.]

Nothing precisely similar to this Goodnow Memorandum has ever been seen
before in the history of Asia: it was the ultramodern spirit impressed
into the service of mediaeval minds. In any other capital of the world
the publication of such a subversive document, following the Yang Tu
pamphlet, would have led to riot and tumult. In China, the home of
pacifism, the politicians and people bowed their heads and bided their
time. Even foreign circles in China were somewhat nonplussed by the
insouciance displayed by the peripatetic legal authority; and the
Memorandum was for many days spoken of as an unnecessary
indiscretion.[16] Fastening at once on the point to which Yang Tu had
ascribed such importance--the question of succession--Dr. Goodnow in his
arguments certainly shows a detachment from received principles which
has an old-world flavour about it, and which has damned him for ever in
the eyes of the rising generation in China. The version which follows is
the translation of the Chinese translation, the original English
Memorandum having been either mislaid or destroyed; and it is best that
this argument should be carefully digested before we add our comments.

    DR. GOODNOW'S MEMORANDUM

    A country must have a certain form of government, and usually the
    particular form of government of a particular country is not the
    result of the choice of the people of that country. There is not any
    possibility even for the most intellectual to exercise any mental
    influence over the question. Whether it be a monarchy or republic,
    it cannot be the creation of human power except when it is suitable
    to the historical, habitual, social and financial conditions of that
    country. If an unsuitable form of government is decided upon, it may
    remain for a short while, but eventually a system better suited will
    take its place.

    In short, the form of government of a country is usually the natural
    and only result of its circumstances. The reasons for such an
    outcome are many, but the principal one is Force. If we study the
    monarchical countries we will find that usually a dynasty is created
    by a person who is capable of controlling the force of the entire
    country and overthrowing other persons opposed to him, working
    towards his goal with an undaunted spirit. If this man is capable of
    ruling the nation and if he is a rare genius of the day, and the
    conditions of the country are suited for a monarchical government,
    he as a rule creates a new dynasty and his descendants inherit the
    same from generation to generation.

    If this is so, then the solution of a difficult position of a
    country is to be found in a monarchy rather than a republic. For on
    the death of a monarch no doubt exists as to who shall succeed him,
    and there is no need of an election or other procedure. Englishmen
    say, "The King is dead, Long live the King." This expresses the
    point. But in order to attain this point it is necessary that the
    law of succession be definitely defined and publicly approved;
    otherwise there will not be lacking, on the death of the monarch,
    men aspiring to the throne; and as no one is qualified to settle the
    dispute for power, internal disturbance will be the result.

    Historically speaking no law of succession is so permanently
    satisfactory as that used by the nations of Europe. According to
    this system the right of succession belongs to the eldest son of the
    monarch, or failing him, the nearest and eldest male relative. The
    right of succession, however, may be voluntarily surrendered by the
    rightful successor if he so desires; thus if the eldest son declines
    to succeed to the throne the second son takes his place. This is the
    rule of Europe.

    If instead of this law of a succession a system is adopted by which
    the successor is chosen by the monarch from among his sons or
    relatives without any provision being made for the rights of the
    eldest son, disturbance will be the inevitable result. There will
    not be a few who would like to take possession of the throne and
    they will certainly plot in the very confines of the palace,
    resulting in an increase of the sufferings of an aged monarch; and,
    even if the disaster of civil war be avoided, much dispute will
    arise owing to the uncertainty of the successor--a dangerous
    situation indeed.

    Such is the lesson we learn from history. The conclusion is,
    speaking from the viewpoint of the problem of transmission of power,
    that the superiority of the monarchical system over the republican
    system is seen in the law of succession,--that is the eldest son of
    the ruler should succeed to the throne.

    Leaving out the nations of ancient times, the majority of countries
    in Europe and Asia have adopted the monarchical system. There are,
    however, exceptions such as _Wen-ni-shih_ (Venice) and Switzerland,
    which adopted the republican form of government; but they are in the
    minority while most of the great nations of the world have adopted
    the monarchical form of government.

    During the recent century and a half the attitude of Europe has
    undergone a sudden change and the general tendency is to discredit
    monarchism and adopt republicanism. The one great European power
    which first attempted to make a trial of republicanism is Great
    Britain. In the Seventeenth Century a revolution broke out in
    England and King Charles I. was condemned to death by Parliament and
    executed as a traitor to the nation. A republic was established and
    the administration was called republican with Cromwell as regent,
    _i.e._ President. Cromwell was able to control the power of
    government because at the head of the revolutionary army he defeated
    the King. This English republic, however, only existed for a few
    years and was finally defeated in turn. The reason was that the
    problem of succession after the death of Cromwell was difficult to
    solve. Cromwell had a desire to place his son in his place as regent
    after his death, but as the English people were then unsuited for a
    republic and his son had not the ability to act as chief executive,
    the republic of England suddenly disappeared. The British people
    then abandoned the republican system and readopted the monarchical
    system. Thus Charles II., the son of Charles I., was made King not
    only with the support of the army but also with the general consent
    of the country.

    The second European race which attempted to have a republic was the
    American. In the Eighteenth Century the United States of America was
    established in consequence of the success of a revolution. But the
    American revolution was not at first intended to overthrow the
    monarchy. What it sought to do was to throw off the yoke of the
    monarchy and become independent. The revolution, however, succeeded
    and the circumstances were such that there was no other alternative
    but to have a republic: for there was no royal or Imperial
    descendant to shoulder the responsibilities of the state. Another
    factor was the influence of the advocates of republicanism who came
    to America in the previous century from England and saturated the
    minds of the Americans with the ideas of republicanism. The minds of
    the American people were so imbued with the ideas of republicanism
    that a republican form of government was the ideal of the entire
    race. Had General Washington--the leader of the revolutionary
    army--had the desire to become a monarch himself he would probably
    have been successful. But Washington's one aim was to respect
    republicanism and he had no aspiration to become King. Besides he
    had no son capable of succeeding him on the throne. Consequently on
    the day independence was won, the republican form of government was
    adopted without hesitation, and it has survived over a hundred
    years.

    There is no need to ask whether the result of the establishment of
    the American Republic has been good or bad. The republican form of
    government is really the making of the United States of America.
    But it should be remembered that long before the establishment of
    the republic, the American people had already learned the good laws
    and ordinances of England, and the constitution and parliamentary
    system of England had been long in use in America for over a hundred
    years. Therefore the change in 1789 from a colony into a Republic
    was not a sudden change from a monarchy to a republic. Thorough
    preparations had been made and self-government was well practiced
    before the establishment of the republic. Not only this, but the
    intellectual standard of the American people was then already very
    high; for ever since the beginning of American history attention was
    given to universal education. No youth could be found who could not
    read, and the extent of education can thus be gauged.

    Soon after the formation of the American Republic, the French
    Republic followed in her footsteps. Now in France a monarchical
    government was in existence before the declaration of independence,
    and the supreme power of administration was in the hands of the
    King. The people, having never participated in the administration
    and lacking experience in self-government, made a poor experiment of
    the republican system which they suddenly set up. The result was
    that for many years disorder reigned, and the tyranny of the
    military governments held sway one after another. After the defeat
    of Napoleon, the monarchical system was restored as a result of the
    intervention of other Powers. The second revolution in 1830 again
    resulted in the restoration of the monarchy but the power of the
    common people was considerably increased. The monarchy was again
    overthrown in 1848 and a Republic formed in its stead--the nephew of
    Napoleon was then made President. This President, however, once more
    discarded republicanism and set up a monarchy for himself. It was
    not until after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 that Napoleon III.
    was overthrown and the final Republic established which has lived
    for half a century now, there being every likelihood of its
    continuing in its present form.

    Indeed the Republic of France has every prospect of being permanent,
    but the permanency is only the result of a hundred years' political
    revolution. For a hundred years the foundations were being laid by
    means of an energetic and persistent campaign of education, which
    increased the political knowledge of the people. The people were
    also allowed to participate in political affairs, and so gained
    experience in self-government. This is why the French Republic is a
    success. Then in France and America they have found a solution for
    the difficult problem of the nation, that is the problem of
    succession of the government in power. The President of France is
    elected by the Parliament while the President of America is elected
    by the people. The people of these two countries are all experienced
    in self-government as a result of participation in political
    affairs. Furthermore, for the last fifty years these two countries
    have all laid emphasis on universal education by having an extensive
    system of schools, subsidized by the Government. The intellectual
    standard of these two peoples is therefore fairly high.

    As a result of the examples set up by France and America, at the
    end of the Eighteenth Century the Spanish colonies in Central and
    South America also declared their independence one after the other.
    The conditions then prevailing in those countries were somewhat
    similar to those of America. When their independence was declared,
    it seemed that the republican system was best suited to their
    condition. For on the one hand there was no imperial house to direct
    the people, on the other hand the Republic of North America was a
    good example to follow. Public opinion was at that time unanimous
    that since the republican form of government was the ideal form, it
    was suitable for any country and any people. The idea thus quickly
    spread and almost every country became a republic. The independence
    of these countries, however, was secured only at the cost of a hard
    struggle and once the spirit of rebellion was aroused it became
    difficult to suppress in a short while. And since education was not
    then universal the intellect of the people was low. What they were
    expert in was in autocratic methods. No task is harder than to
    establish a republic in a country, the intelligence of whose people
    is low. These republics, therefore, reaped no good results although
    they tried to retain republicanism unnaturally. The consequence is
    that the republics of Central and South America have been a living
    drama of continuous internal disturbance. One after another their
    military leaders have grasped the power of administration.
    Occasionally there has been peace but this peace has only been
    secured by the iron hand of one or two powerful men holding the
    power. Such powerful men, however, seldom pay any attention to
    educational matters, and one never hears of their establishing any
    schools. As to the people under them, they are not allowed to
    participate in political affairs by which their experience in
    politics may be ripened. The result is, on the man in power becoming
    sick or dying--and the iron rule relaxed--that those who wish to
    usurp the power of the state rise at once; and as the satisfactory
    solution of the problem of succession cannot be found, those
    undertakings which have made progress during the time of peace are
    swept away without a single exception. In extreme cases the
    disturbances continue to such an extent that the country falls into
    a state of anarchy. Thus the social and financial factors of the
    whole country are trodden on and destroyed under foot.

    The conditions now prevailing in Mexico have been many times
    duplicated in other republics in Central and South America. For this
    can be the only result from adopting the republican form of
    government where the political and financial conditions are
    unsuited. Diaz, a military leader, once held the power of state in
    his own hand, and when he became the President of Mexico it looked
    as if the political problem was solved thereby. Diaz, however, did
    not push education but instead oppressed the people and did not
    allow them to participate in politics. When he was advanced in age
    and his influence decreased, he lost entire control once the banner
    of rebellion was raised. Ever since the overthrow of Diaz, military
    leaders of that country have been fighting one another and the
    disturbance is developing even to-day. In the present circumstances
    there is no other means to solve the political problem of Mexico
    except by intervention from abroad. (_Sic._)

    Among the republics of Central and South America, however, there are
    some which have made fairly good progress, the most prominent of
    which are Argentina, Chili, and Peru. For some time there was
    disorder in the first two republics immediately after the adoption
    of the republican system, but later peace was gradually restored and
    the people have been enjoying peace. As regards Peru, although some
    disturbances have occurred since the establishment of the republican
    government, the life of the Republic as a whole has been peaceful.
    All of these three countries, however, developed constitutional
    government with the utmost vigour. Even as far back as in the
    earlier part of the Nineteenth Century Argentina and Chili were
    already endeavouring to excel each other in their progress, and as
    for Peru, its people were encouraged even while under the Imperial
    régime, to participate in political affairs. The success of these
    three republics is, therefore, not a mere chance happening.

    The study of the experiences of these republics of Central and South
    America and the history of France and the United States brings
    forward two points which we should carefully consider:--

    1. In order to make a satisfactory solution of the problem of
    succession to the chief executive in a republican country, it is
    necessary that the country be in possession of an extensive system
    of schools; that the intellect of its people has been brought up to
    a high standard by means of a patient process of universal
    education; and that they be given a chance to participate in
    political affairs for the purpose of gaining the needed experience,
    before the republican form can be adopted without harm;

    2. It is certain that the adoption of a republican form of
    government in a country where the people are low in intellect and
    lack experience and knowledge in political affairs, will not yield
    any good result. For as the position of the President is not
    hereditary, and consequently the problem of succession cannot be
    satisfactorily solved, the result will be a military dictatorship.
    It might be possible to have a short-lived peace but such a period
    of peace is usually intermingled with periods of disturbances,
    during which the unduly ambitious people may rise and struggle with
    each other for the control of power, and the disaster which will
    follow will be irremediable.

    This is not all. The present tendency is that the European and other
    western Powers will not tolerate the existence of a military
    government in the world; for experience shows that the result of
    military government is anarchy. Now this is of vital importance to
    the interests of the European Powers. Since their financial
    influence has extended so far, their capital as well as their
    commercial undertakings of all branches and sorts have reached every
    corner of the world, they will not hesitate to express their views
    for the sake of peace, as to the system of government a country
    should adopt, although they have no right to interfere with the
    adoption of a form of government by another nation. For unless this
    is done they cannot hope to get the due profit on the capital they
    have invested. If this view is carried to the extreme, the political
    independence of a nation may be interfered with or even the
    Government may be replaced with some other organ. If such steps are
    necessary to attain their views the Powers will not scruple to take
    them. Therefore no nation will be allowed hereafter to choose its
    own form of government if that results in constant revolution, as in
    the case of South America in the last century. The Governments of
    the future should, therefore, carefully consider the system to be
    adopted for the maintenance of peace; otherwise control by
    foreigners will be unavoidable.

    We will now proceed to consider what significance these points
    reviewed above have for the political conditions of China. China,
    owing to the folly of an absolute monarchical system, has neglected
    the education of the masses, whose intellectual attainments have
    been consequently of a low standard. Then, there is the additional
    fact that the people have never had a voice in the doings of their
    government. Therefore they have not the ability to discuss politics.
    Four years ago the absolute monarchy was suddenly changed into a
    Republic. This movement was all too sudden to expect good results.
    If the Manchus had not been an alien race, which the country wished
    to overthrow, the best step which could then have been adopted was
    to retain the Emperor and gradually lead him to a constitutional
    government. What the Commissioners on Constitutional Government
    suggested was quite practical if carried out gradually until
    perfection was reached. Unfortunately the feeling of alien control
    was bitter to the people and the maintenance of the throne was an
    utter impossibility. Thus the monarchy was overthrown and the
    adoption of a republican system was the only alternative.

    Thus we see that China has during the last few years been
    progressing in constitutional government. The pioneering stage of
    the process was, however, not ideal. The results could have been
    much better if a person of royal blood, respected by the people, had
    come out and offered his service. Under the present conditions China
    has not yet solved the problem of the succession to the Presidency.
    What provisions we have now are not perfect. If the President should
    one day give up his power the difficulties experienced by other
    nations will manifest themselves again in China. The conditions in
    other countries are similar to those obtaining in China and the
    dangers are also the same. It is quite within the bounds of
    possibility that the situation might threaten China's independence
    if internal disturbance should occur in connection with this problem
    and not be immediately put down.

    What attitude then should those who have the good of the nation at
    heart, take under the present circumstances? Should they advocate
    the continuance of the Republic or suggest a change for a monarchy?
    It is difficult to answer these questions. But I have no doubt in
    saying that the monarchical system is better suited to China than
    the republican system. For, if China's independence is to be
    maintained, the government should be constitutional, and in
    consideration of China's conditions as well as her relations with
    other Powers, it will be easier to form a constitutional government
    by adopting a monarchy than a Republic.

    However, it must be remembered that in order to secure the best
    results from changing the Republic into a Monarchy not a single one
    of the following points can be dispensed with:

    1. Such a change must not arouse the opposition of the Chinese
    people or the Foreign Powers, which will cause the disturbances so
    energetically suppressed by the Republican Government to appear
    again in China. For the peace now prevailing in the country should
    be maintained at any price so that no danger may come therefrom.

    2. If the law of succession be not definitely defined in such a way
    that it will leave no doubts as to the proper successor, no good can
    come from the change from Republic to Monarchy. I have said enough
    about the necessity of not allowing the monarch to choose his own
    successor. Although the power of an Emperor is greater than that of
    a President, when the majority of the people know nothing, it is
    more respected by the people. But the reason for such a change will
    not be valid if the change is brought about merely to add to the
    power of the chief executive without the question of succession
    being definitely settled. For the definiteness about succession is
    the most prominent point of superiority of the monarchical system
    over the republican system.

    3 If the Government should fail to make provisions for the
    development of the constitutional government, no permanent benefit
    will result from the change of a republic into a monarchy. For if
    China wishes to occupy a suitable place among the world powers, the
    patriotism of her people must be made to grow so that the government
    will be more than strong enough to cope with outside aggression. The
    patriotism of the people will not grow if they are not allowed to
    participate in political affairs, and without the hearty assistance
    of the people no government can become strong. For the reason why
    the people will assist the government is because they feel they are
    a part of the government. Therefore the government should make the
    people realize that the government is the organ which aims at
    bringing blessing to the people, and make the people understand that
    they have the right to superintend the government before the
    government can achieve great things.

    Every one of the points mentioned above are indispensable for the
    change of the Republic into a monarchy. Whether the necessary
    conditions are present must be left to those who know China well and
    are responsible for her future progress. If these conditions are all
    present then I have no doubt that the change of the form of the
    government will be for the benefit of China.

The first illuminating point, as we have already said, to leap up and
lock attention to the exclusion of everything else in this memorandum,
is that the chief difficulty which perplexes Dr. Goodnow is not the
consolidation of a new government which had been recognized by all the
Treaty Powers only two years previously but the question of _succession_
to the supreme office in the land, a point which had already been fully
provided for in the one chapter of the Permanent Constitution which had
been legally passed prior to the _Coup d'état_ of the 4th November,
1913. But Yuan Shih-kai's first care after that _coup d'état_ had been
to promulgate with the assistance of Dr. Goodnow and others, a bogus
Law, resting on no other sanction than his personal volition, with an
elaborate flummery about three candidates whose names were to be
deposited in the gold box in the Stone House in the gardens of the
Palace. Therefore since the provisional nature of this prestidigitation
had always been clear, the learned doctor's only solution is to
recommend the overthrow of the government; the restoration of the Empire
under the name of Constitutional Monarchy; and, by means of a fresh plot
to do in China what all Europe has long been on the point of abandoning,
namely, to substitute Family rule for National rule.

Now had these suggestions been gravely made in any country but China by
a person officially employed it is difficult to know what would have
happened. Even in China had an Englishman published or caused to be
published--especially after the repeated statements Yuan Shih-kai had
given out that any attempt to force the sceptre on him would cause him
to leave the country and end his days abroad[17]--that Englishman, we
say, would have been liable under the Orders in Council to summary
imprisonment, the possibility of tumult and widespread internal
disturbances being sufficient to force a British Court to take action.
What are the forces which brought an American to say things which an
Englishman would not dare to say--that in 1915 there was a sanction for
a fresh revolutionary movement in China? First, an interpretation of
history so superficial, combined with such an amazing suppression of
contemporary political thought, that it is difficult to believe that the
requirements of the country were taken in the least bit seriously;
secondly, in the comparisons made between China and the Latin republics,
a deliberate scouting of the all-important racial factor; and, lastly, a
total ignorance of the intellectual qualities which are by far the most
outstanding feature of Chinese civilization.

Dr. Goodnow's method is simplicity itself. In order to prove the
superiority of Monarchism over Republicanism--and thus deliberately
ignoring the moral of the present cataclysmic war--he ransacks the
dust-laden centuries. The English Commonwealth, which disappeared nearly
three hundred years ago, is brought forward as an example of the dangers
which beset a republic, though it is difficult to see what relation an
experiment made before the idea of representative government had been
even understood bears to our times. But there is worse. The statement is
deliberately made that the reason for the disappearance of that
Commonwealth was "that the problem of succession after the death of
Cromwell was difficult to solve." English historians would no doubt have
numerous remarks to offer on this strange untruth which dismisses a
remarkably interesting chapter of history in the most misleading way,
and which tells Chinese political students nothing about the complete
failure which military government--not republicanism--must always have
among the Anglo-Saxon peoples and which is the sole reason why
Cromwellism disappeared. Even when treating the history of his own
country Dr. Goodnow seems to take pleasure in being absurd. For he says:
"The mind of the American people was so imbued with the idea of
republicanism that a republican form of government was the ideal of the
whole race"; then adding as if to refute his own statements, "Had
General Washington--the leader of the revolutionary army--had the desire
to become a monarch he would probably have been successful." We do not
know how Americans will like this kind of interpretation of their
history; but at least they will not fail to note what dismal results it
hastened on in China. With the experimental Eighteenth Century French
Republic; with the old Spanish Colonies of Central and South America;
and above all with Mexico, Dr. Goodnow deals in the same vein. Vast
movements, which can be handled only tentatively even in exhaustive
essays are dismissed in misleading sentences framed so as to serve as
mere introduction to the inevitable climax--the Chinese Constitutional
Monarchy of 1915 with Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor.

Yet this is not all. As if in alarm at the very conclusions he so
purposely reaches, at the end of his Memorandum he reduces these
conclusions to naught by stating that three impossible conditions are
necessary to consummate the Restoration of the Monarchy in China, (1) no
opposition should be aroused, (2) the law of succession must be properly
settled, (3) Full provision must be made for the development of
Constitutional Government. That these conditions were known to be
impossible, everyone in the Far East had long admitted. Had Dr. Goodnow
paid the slightest attention to the course of history in China he would
have known (a) that any usurpation of the Throne would infallibly lead
to rebellion in China and intervention on the part of Japan, (b) that
Yuan Shih-kai's power was purely personal and as such could not be
transmitted to any son by any means known to the human intellect, (c)
that all Yuan Shih-kai's sons were worthless, the eldest son being
semi-paralyzed, (d) that constitutional government and the Eastern
conception of kingship, which is purely theocratic, are so antithetical
that they cannot possibly co-exist, any re-establishment of the throne
being _ipso facto_ the re-establishment of a theocracy, (e) that
although he so constantly speaks of the low political knowledge of the
people, the Chinese have had a most complete form of local
self-government from the earliest times, the political problem of the
day being simply to gather up and express these local forms in some
centralized system: (f) the so-called non-patriotism of the Chinese is
non-existent and is an idea which has been spread abroad owing to the
complete foreign misunderstanding of certain basic facts--for instance
that under the Empire foreign affairs were the sole concern of the
Emperors, provincial China prior to 1911 being a socio-economic
confederation resembling mediaeval contrivances such as the Hanseatic
League--a provincial confederation not concerning itself with any matter
which lay outside its everyday economic life, such as territorial
overlordship or frontier questions or the regulation of sea-port
intercourse etc., because such matters were meaningless. It was only
when foreign encroachment in the _post_-Japanese war period (_i.e._
after 1895) carried problems from the fringes of the Empire into the
economic life of the people that their pride was touched and that in
spite of "their lack of experience and knowledge in political affairs"
they suddenly displayed a remarkable patriotic feeling, the history of
China during the past two decades being only comprehensible when this
capital contention, namely the reality of Chinese patriotism, is given
the central place.

It is useless, however, to pursue the subject: we have said enough to
disclose the utter levity of those who should have realized from the
first that the New China is a matter of life and death to the people,
and that the first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new
beliefs. The Goodnow Memorandum, immediately it was published, was put
to precisely those base uses which any one with an elementary knowledge
of China might have foreseen: it was simply exploited in an unscrupulous
way, its recommendations being carried out in such a manner as to
increase one's contempt for the men who were pushing the monarchist plot
with any means that they could seize hold of, and who were not averse
from making responsible foreigners their tools.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] It is perhaps of importance to note that Dr. Goodnow carried out
all his studies in Germany.

[17] The most widely-quoted statement on this subject is the remarkable
interview, published in the first week of July, 1915, throughout the
metropolitan press, between President Yuan Shih-kai and General Feng
Kuo-chang, commanding the forces on the lower Yangtsze. This statement
was telegraphed by foreign correspondents all over the world. Referring
to the many rumours afloat that titles of nobility would be revived as a
precursor to the monarchy the President declared that even if he seized
the Throne that would not increase his powers, whilst as for
transmitting the Imperial Yellow to his sons none were fitted for that
honour which would mean the collapse of any new dynasty. Here General
Feng Kuo-chang interrupted with the remark that the people of South
China would not oppose such a change ultimately, though they thought it
was too early to talk about it just now. Thereupon the President's
features became stern and he declared in a heightened voice: "You and
others seem still to believe that I harbour secret ambitions. I affirm
positively that when I sent my sons to study in England, I privately
ordered the purchase of a small estate there as a possible home. If the
people of China insist upon my accepting the sceptre I shall leave this
country and spend the remaining days of my life abroad." This interview,
so far from being denied, has been affirmed to the present writer as
being substantially correct.



CHAPTER X

THE MONARCHY MOVEMENT IS OPPOSED

THE APPEAL OF THE SCHOLAR LIANG CH'I-CHAO


We have already referred in several places to the extraordinary rôle
scholarship and the literary appeal play in the governance of China. It
is necessary to go back to the times of the birth of the Roman Empire,
and to invoke the great figure of Cicero, to understand how greatly the
voice of men of recognized intellectual qualities influences the nation.
Liang Ch'i-chao, a man of some forty-five years, had long been
distinguished for his literary attainments and for the skill with which,
though unversed in any Western language, he had expounded the European
theory and practice of government to his fellow-countrymen. To his brain
is due the coining of many exact expressions necessary for parliamentary
government, his mentality having grown with the modern growth of China
and adapted itself rather marvellously to the requirements of the
Twentieth Century. A reformer of 1898--that is one of the small devoted
band of men who under Kang Yu Wei almost succeeded in winning over the
ill-fated Emperor Kwang Hsu to carrying out a policy of modernizing the
country in the teeth of fierce mandarin opposition, he possessed in his
armoury every possible argument against the usurpation Yuan Shih-kai
proposed to practise. He knew precisely where to strike--and with what
strength; and he delivered himself over to his task with whole-hearted
fervour. It having become known that he was engaged in preparing this
brief for the people of China, every influence was brought to bear to
prevent such a disastrous publication. Influential deputations were sent
to him to implore him to remember the parlous international situation
China found herself in,--a situation which would result in open
disaster if subjected to the strain of further discords. For a time he
hesitated launching his counter-stroke. But at length the Republican
Party persuaded him to deal the tyrant the needed blow; and his now
famous accusation of the Chief Executive was published.

Its effect was immediate and very far-reaching. Men understood that
armed revolt was in the air. The almost Biblical fervour which pervades
this extraordinary document shows an unusual sense of moral outrage. The
masterly analysis of the Diaz régime in Mexico coupled with the manner
in which--always pretending to be examining the conduct of the
Mexican--he stabs at Yuan Shih-kai, won the applause of a race that
delights in oblique attacks and was ample proof that great trouble was
brewing. The document was read in every part of China and everywhere
approved. Although it suffers from translation, the text remains
singularly interesting as a disclosure of the Chinese mentality; whilst
the exhaustive examination of political terms it contains shows that
some day Chinese will carry their inventive genius into fields they have
hitherto never openly invaded. Especially interesting is it to contrast
the arguments of such a man with those of a decadent such as Yang Tu.

    FROM REPUBLIC TO MONARCHY

    Before I proceed with my argument I wish to make plain two points.
    One is that I am not one of those reformers whose ears are their
    brains, and who are intoxicated with the doctrine of republicanism.
    I have, therefore, no partiality for the republican form of
    government nor any bias for or against other forms of government.
    This can be proved by my literary work during the last ten years.
    The second point is that I am not one of the veteran conservatives
    who lay so much stress on the importance of having a dynasty. For
    such are the thoughts of men who only seek to adjust themselves to
    existing conditions. If one wishes to consider the present situation
    of the country without bias or prejudice he must disregard the rise
    or fall of any particular family. Only those who bear in mind these
    two points can read my argument with real understanding.


    I. THE QUESTION OF KUO-TI

    Some time ago I said that, as political students, we should only
    care for _Cheng-ti_, _i.e._, the form of government and not for
    _Kuo-ti_, _i.e._, the form of state. Do not call this trifling with
    words, for it is a principle which all critics of politics should
    follow and never depart from. The reason is that critics of politics
    should not, because they cannot, influence the question of _Kuo-ti_.
    They should not influence the question of _Kuo-ti_ because so long
    as the question of _Kuo-ti_ remains unsettled the major portion of
    the administration remains at a stand-still. Thus there will be no
    political situation properly so called and there will be no
    political questions to discuss (here the term political means really
    administrative). If a critic of politics, therefore, interfere with
    the question of _Kuo-ti_, he will be leading the nation into a
    condition of political instability, thus undermining the ground on
    which the people stand. Such critics can be likened unto a man
    trying to enter a house without ascending the steps or crossing a
    river without a boat.

    They cannot influence the question of _Kuo-ti_. The force which
    drives and steers the change of one form of State or _vice versa_ is
    generally not derived from mere politics. If the time is not ripe,
    then no amount of advocacy on the part of critics can hasten it. If
    the time is ripe, nothing the critics say can prevent it. He who
    indulges himself in the discussion of the problem of
    _Kuo-ti_--_i.e._, the form of States, as a political student, is
    ignorant of his own limitations and capacity. This is as true of the
    active politicians as of the critics; for the first duty of an
    active politician is to seek for the improvement and progress of the
    administration of the existing foundation of government. A step
    beyond this line is revolution and intrigue, and such cannot be the
    attitude of a right-minded active politician or statesman. This is
    looking at it from the negative side.

    From the positive, that is, the progressive point of view, there is
    also a boundary. Such actions under one form of government are
    political activities, and under the opposite form of government are
    also political activities. But these are not questions of political
    principle. For only when a man sacrifices the ideals which he has
    advocated and cherished during the whole of his life does the
    question of principle arise. Therefore the great principle of
    looking to the actual state of administration of the form of
    government and leaving the mere form of state in the background is a
    principle that is applicable under all circumstances and should be
    followed by all critics of politics.


    II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CHANGE

    No form of government is ideal. Its reason of existence can only be
    judged by what it has achieved. It is the height of folly to rely on
    theoretical conclusions as a basis for artificial arbitration as to
    what should be accepted and what discarded. Mere folly, however, is
    not to be seriously condemned. But the danger and harm to the
    country will be unmeasurable if a person has prejudiced views
    respecting a certain form of government and in order to prove the
    correctness of his prejudiced views, creates artificially a
    situation all by himself. For this reason my view has always been
    not to oppose any form of government. But I am always opposed to
    any one who engages in a propaganda in favour of a form of
    government other than the one under which we actually live. In the
    past I opposed those who tried to spread the republican form of
    government while the country was under monarchical government, and
    the arguments I advanced in support of my views were written in no
    fewer than 200,000 words. Even so late as the ninth month after the
    outbreak of the Revolution I issued a pamphlet entitled "The Problem
    of the Building of the New China," which was my last attempt to
    express my views respecting the maintenance of the old form of
    government.

    What obligations had I to the then Imperial House? Did it not heap
    persecution and humiliation on me to the utmost of its power and
    resources? I would have been an exile even to this day had it not
    been for the Revolution. Further, I was no child and I was fully
    aware of the disappointment which the then Government caused in the
    minds of the people. Yet I risked the opposition of the whole
    country and attempted to prolong the life of the dying dynasty. I
    had no other view in mind except that there would be some
    possibility of our hope being realized if the whole nation would
    unite in efforts to improve the administration under the then
    existing form of government. I believed that because the people were
    not educated for a change. But if the status of the country should
    be changed before the people are educated and accustomed to the new
    order of things, the danger and hardship during the transitional
    period of several years would be incalculable. In certain
    circumstances this might lead to the destruction of the nation. Even
    if we are spared the tragedy of national extinction, the losses
    sustained by the retarding of the progress of the administration
    would be unredeemable. It is painful to recall past experiences; but
    if my readers will read once more my articles in the _Hsin Min Tung
    Pao_ during the years 1905 and 1906 they will see that all the
    sufferings which the Republic has experienced bear out the
    predictions made then. The different stages of the sinister
    development have been unfolding themselves one by one just as I said
    they would. It was unfortunate that my words were not heeded
    although I wept and pleaded. Such has been the consequence of the
    change of the state of the country--a change of _Kuo-ti_.

    Yet before we have hardly ceased panting, this talk of a second
    change is on us. I am not in a position to say exactly how this talk
    had its beginning. Ostensibly it was started by the remarks of Dr.
    Goodnow. But I am unable to say whether Dr. Goodnow actually gave
    out such a view or for what purpose he expressed such a view. From
    what he told the representative of a Peking newspaper he never
    expressed the views attributed to him. Be this as it may, I cannot
    help having my doubts. All Dr. Goodnow is alleged to have said
    bearing on the merits of the monarchical and republican system of
    government as an abstract subject of discussion, such as the
    necessity of the form of state (_Kuo-ti_) being suited to the
    general conditions of the country and the lessons we should learn
    from the Central and South American republics, are really points of
    a very simple nature and easily deduced. How strange that among all
    this large number of politicians and scholars, who are as numerous
    as the trees in the forest and the perch in the stream, should have
    failed for all these years to notice these simple points; and now
    suddenly make a fetish of them because they have come out of the
    mouth of a foreigner. Is it because no one except a foreign doctor
    can discover such facts? Why even a humble learner like myself,
    though not so learned even to the extent of one ten-thousandth part
    of his knowledge, more than ten years ago anticipated what the good
    doctor has said; and I said much more and in much more comprehensive
    terms. I have no desire to talk about my work, but let my readers
    glance through the copies of the _Hsin Min Tsung Pao, Yin Ping Shih
    Wen Chi_, the "Fight between Constitutional Advocates" and
    "Revolutionary Advocates," the "Question of the Building of the New
    China," etc., etc. My regret is that my eyes are not blue and my
    hair not brown, and hence my words were not acceptable to the
    nation!


    III. RES JUDICATA

    I do not say that the merits or otherwise of the republican system
    should not be discussed, but the time for such a discussion has
    passed. The most opportune time for such a discussion was in 1911
    when the Revolution had just begun; but since then further
    discussions should not be tolerated. There might have been some
    excuse if this subject had been brought up for discussion when the
    second revolution broke out at Hukow on the Yangtsze river or before
    the President was formally inaugurated, or before the Powers
    formally recognized the Republic; but the excuse even then would
    have been a weak one. Where were you then, advocates of monarchy?
    Could you not at that time have brought out an essay by one of the
    great scholars of the world as a subject for discussion? Could you
    not have cited the cases of American republics as a warning for us
    that these republics were by no means peaceful? Yet at that time
    when the heroes of discretion were daily pushing the progress of the
    republican cause, stating that republicanism was the panacea for all
    the world's administrations and that republicanism was not a new
    factor in Chinese history, a humble and ignorant man like myself,
    then a stranger in a foreign land, was burdened with the fear of the
    unsuitability of the republican system to China and wrote articles
    in support of his own views and wept till his eyes were dry.

    Do you not realize that the State is a thing of great importance and
    should not be disturbed carelessly? How can you then experiment with
    it and treat it as if you were putting a chest into a dead hole,
    saying "Let me place it here for the moment and I will see to it
    later." The status of the State can be likened to marriage between
    man and woman. The greatest care should be taken during courtship.
    The lady should then exercise care to see that the man whom she is
    taking to be a life companion is worthy of her. During this period
    it is the duty of her relatives and friends to point out to her any
    danger or misunderstanding even to the extent of offending her
    feelings. But if you leave her alone at this stage when there is
    plenty of time to change her course, and--what is more--urge her to
    tie the knot despite incompatibility, what right have you afterwards
    to make the impudent suggestion to the wife that her husband is not
    a man to whom she should cling for life? Is such a course a
    charitable way of doing things?

    If indeed the republican cause is enough to cause the destruction of
    the nation then you, the advocates of monarchy, have placed the
    country in a position from which she has no hope of ever coming out
    independent. You are the men who--to the best of your
    ability--inculcated and pressed the adoption of the republican
    cause. The proverb says, "If now, why not then?" How many days can a
    person live that you, not satisfied with one great sin, are again to
    commit another. It is not long since the Republic was first
    established; yet you, the veterans of republicanism, are the leaders
    to-day in advocating the overthrow of the Republic. Yes. It is
    indeed strange that I, a man who once opposed the republican cause,
    should now be opposing you. Nothing is stranger and nothing is so
    fateful.

    But our modern critics say we prefer a constitutional monarchy to an
    autocratic republic. Now whether we are constitutional or not is a
    question concerning the administration, while the question whether
    we are republican or not is a question concerning the form or status
    of the country. We have always held that the question of _Kuo-ti_ is
    above discussion and that what we should consider is the actual
    condition of administration. If the administration (government) is
    constitutional, then it matters not whether the country is a
    Republic or a Monarchy. If the government is not constitutional then
    neither a republic nor a monarchy will avail. There is no connexion,
    therefore, between the question of _Kuo-ti_ and the question of
    _Cheng-ti_. It is an absurd idea to say that in order to improve the
    administration we must change the _Kuo-ti_--the status or form of
    the country--as a necessity. If this idea is to be entertained for a
    single moment the changes even in constitutional countries will be
    endless. But the curious paradox is that in former days the critics
    said that only a republic, not a monarchy, could be constitutional;
    whereas, the critics now say that a monarchy, not a republic, can
    alone be constitutional!


    IV. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONSTITUTION

    Let me therefore lay down a simple definition of what a Constitution
    is before discussing whether the contentions of the critics are
    reasonable. My opponents will agree with me that the main principle
    of a constitutional government is that the legislative organ should
    always balance the executive and that the exercising of the
    administrative power is always limited to a certain extent. They
    will also agree that the most important point of a so-called
    constitutional monarchy is that the monarch should act as a
    figurehead, and that the establishment of a responsible cabinet is
    an indispensable accompaniment. If these simple principles are
    recognized then we must put up the theory for discussion. Let us
    then raise the question who shall be the monarch. In plain words, is
    the person in our mind the President? or any other person? (In view
    of the repeated declarations of the President that he will never
    consent to become an Emperor, this suggestion on my part is a gross
    insult to his character, but I crave to excuse myself as this is
    only mere speculation and supposition.) What shall we do with the
    President if we find another man? The President, having so long
    borne the burdens of the State, will certainly be only too willing
    to vacate his post to live in retirement as far as his own person is
    concerned, but can we imagine that the country will allow the
    President to retire? If not, then are we going to ask the President
    to form a responsible cabinet under a figurehead monarch? Even if we
    take it for granted that the President, out of love for the country,
    would be willing to sacrifice his own principles and yield to the
    wish of the country, it will be dangerous indeed if he--a person on
    whom the whole nation depends--is placed in the path of parliament.
    Therefore the contention that a constitutional monarchy will be
    attained if a person other than the President be made a monarch is
    false and baseless.

    Shall we then make the present President a monarch? Of course the
    President will not consent to this. But leaving this aside let us
    suppose that the President, in consideration of the permanent
    welfare of the country, is willing to sacrifice everything to
    satisfy the wish of the people, do we expect that he will become a
    mere figurehead? A figurehead monarch is, to adapt the saying of the
    west, a fat porker, a guinea-pig, that is, good as an expensive
    ornament. Will it be wise to place so valuable a personage in so
    idle a position at a time when the situation is so extremely
    critical?

    Even if we are willing to suffer the President to become a
    figurehead it will remain a question whether a responsible cabinet
    can ever be formed. I do not say that the President will not allow a
    responsible cabinet to exist under him. My contention is that there
    is no one, within my knowledge, who commands respect enough and is
    capable of taking over the responsibilities of President Yuan. For
    who can replace the Great President in coping with our numerous
    difficulties? If we select an ordinary man and make him bear the
    great burdens, we will find that in addition to his lack of ability
    rendering him unequal to the occasion, his lack of dominating
    influence will disqualify him from exercising authority. It was for
    the purpose of meeting the requirements of the existing conditions
    that the Cabinet system was changed into a Presidential system--an
    excellent substitution for a weakened administration. Conditions in
    the next two or three years will not be very much different from
    what they are now. Therefore, the contention that the administration
    will be changed overnight for the better after a change in the form
    of the State is, if not a wicked untruth to deceive the common
    people, the ridiculous absurdity of a bookworm. Thus the theory that
    a constitutional monarchy will immediately follow, if the President
    consents to become a monarch, is also fallacious.

    Can it be possible that those who are now holding up the
    constitutional principle as a shield for their monarchical views
    have a different definition for the term "constitution"? The Ching
    (Manchu) Dynasty considered itself as possessing a constitution in
    its last days. Did we recognize it as such? Let me also ask the
    critics what guarantee they have to offer that the constitution will
    be put into effect without hindrance as soon as the form of State is
    changed. If they cannot give any definite guarantee, then what they
    advocate is merely an absolute monarchy and not a constitutional
    monarchy. As it is not likely to be a constitutional monarchy, we
    may safely assume that it will be an imperial autocracy. I cannot
    regard it as a wise plan if, owing to dislike of its defects, the
    Republic should be transformed into an Imperial autocracy. Owing to
    various unavoidable reasons, it is excusable in spite of violent
    opposition to adopt temporarily autocratic methods in a republican
    country. But if the plan proposed by present-day critics be put into
    effect, that on the promise of a constitution we should agree to the
    adoption of a monarchy, then the promise must be definitely made to
    the country at the time of transition that a constitutional
    government will become an actuality. But if, after the promise is
    made, existing conditions are alleged to justify the continuance of
    autocratic methods, I am afraid the whole country will not be so
    tolerant towards the Chief Executive. To assume outwardly the rôle
    of constitutional government, but in reality to rule in an
    unconstitutional manner, was the cause of the downfall of the Ching
    Dynasty. The object lesson is not obscure. Let us take warning by
    it.


    V. FALLACIES OF THE MONARCHISTS

    If, on the other hand, the present-day critics are really in earnest
    for a constitution, then I am unable to understand why they believe
    that this cannot be secured under the Republic but must be obtained
    in a roundabout way by means of a monarchy. In my view the real
    hindrances to the adoption of a constitution at the present day in
    China are the existing conditions, viz. the attitude of the
    officials and the traditions and intellectual standards of the
    people. But these hindrances have not resulted from the adoption of
    republicanism. Therefore they cannot be expected to disappear with
    the disappearance of the Republic. For instance, from the President
    downward to the minor official of every official organ in the
    capital or in the provinces, every one inclines to be independent of
    the law, and considers it convenient to deal with affairs as he
    pleases. This is the greatest obstacle to constitutional government.
    Now has that anything to do with the change or not of the form of
    State? Again, the absence, on the part of the people, of interest in
    political affairs, of knowledge of politics, of political morality
    and strength, and their inability to organize proper political
    parties to make use of an inviolable parliament, are also hindrances
    to the attainment of a constitution. Now what have these things to
    do with a change in the form of the States? If I were to go on
    naming such hindrances one by one, I should count my fingers many
    times over and I should not be through. Yet it is quite plain that
    not a single one of these hindrances can be attributed to
    republicanism.

    To say that what we cannot get under the republic can be secured
    immediately upon accepting a monarchical régime, or to say that
    what can be secured under a monarchical régime can never be secured
    in a republican period is beyond the understanding of a stupid man
    like myself, although I have searched my brain for a valid reason.

    My view is that if China is really in earnest for a constitution,
    the President should set the example himself by treating the
    Constitutional Compact as sacredly inviolable and compel his
    subordinates to do the same. Every letter of the compact should be
    carried out and no attempt should be made to step beyond its limits.

    Meantime give the people as many opportunities as possible to
    acquaint themselves with political affairs, and do not stifle the
    aspirations of the people or weaken their strength or damp their
    interest or crush their self-respect. Then within a few years we
    shall be rewarded with results. If, instead of doing all these
    things, we vainly blame the form of State, we are, as Chu Tse says,
    like a boat that blames the creek for its curves.

    The most powerful argument of those who advocate a change to a
    monarchy is that there is every possibility of disturbance at the
    time of a Presidential election. This is a real danger. It is for
    this reason that ten years ago I did not dare to associate myself
    with the advocates of republicanism. If the critics want to attack
    me on this point to support of their contentions, I advise them not
    to write another article but to reprint my articles written some
    time ago, which, I think, will be more effective. Fortunately,
    however, we have discovered a comparatively effective remedy. For,
    according to the latest President Election Law, the term of the
    President is to all intents and purposes a term for life. It is
    therefore impossible for such dangers to appear during the life of
    the President. What concerns us is therefore what will happen after
    the departure of the present President for another world. This, of
    course, is a question that we do not wish to touch upon; but since
    every one, even the patriarchs, must die some day, let us face the
    matter openly. If Heaven blesses China and allows the Great
    President to devote himself to the country for ten or more
    years--during which he will be able to assert the authority of the
    government, cleanse officialdom, store-up strength, consolidate the
    country, and banish all hidden dangers--then there will be nothing
    to choose between a republic or a monarchy. If, on the other hand,
    Heaven should not be pleased so to favour us and takes away our
    Great President before he is half through with his great task, then
    the fate of China is sealed. No changes in the form of State will
    avail under any circumstances. Therefore the question whether China
    will be left in peace or not depends entirely on the length of years
    the Great President will live and what he will be able to accomplish
    in his lifetime. Whether the country is ruled as a republic or a
    monarchy, the consequences will be the same.

    Do you still doubt my words? Let me go deeper into the analysis. The
    difference between a republic and a monarchy lies only in the
    methods of succession of the head of the nation. It is evident that
    although a certain law of succession may be made during the lifetime
    of the Head, it cannot take effect until his death; and whether or
    not the effect thus intended will come up to expectations will
    depend on two factors: (1) whether or not the merits and personal
    influence of the predecessor will continue effective after his
    death, and (2) whether or not there will be unscrupulous and
    insubordinate claimants at the death of the Head, and, if any, the
    number of such men and whether the point of dispute they raise be
    well-founded. If these are taken as the basis for discerning the
    future we will arrive at the same conclusion whether the country be
    a republic or a monarchy.


    VI. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW

    The Presidential Election Law, however, provides that the successor
    should be nominated by his predecessor, and the name of the
    successor so nominated is to be locked in the golden box in the
    stone strong-room. The President may now, on the one hand, multiply
    his merits and strengthen his personal influence so that the whole
    country will gladly bow to his wishes to the extent that even after
    his death they will not want to disobey his last wish, and on the
    other hand, the President may quietly ascertain the likely causes
    which would produce dissension, and take suitable steps to prevent
    and be rid of them. If the seed of dissension is in the ordinances,
    then alter the ordinances so that they may not be used as a tool by
    possible claimants. If the seed of dissension is in a person then
    cultivate that man, lead him to righteousness, place him in a
    suitable position so that he may be protected from temptation.
    Meanwhile let the President carefully select his successor on whom
    he may eventually lay the responsibilities of State (according to
    the Presidential Election Law the President is at liberty to suggest
    any one he likes, his own son or some one else). Let the nominee be
    placed in a responsible position so as to bring him to public
    notice. Give him real authority so that he may establish his
    influence. Place his name at the head of other men of little
    consequence in the golden box. Then there will be absolutely no
    ground for dispute when the time comes to open the box.

    If every President will do likewise this system can be used without
    fear of a break for hundreds of years. Otherwise we will have only
    the Imperial system on paper to rely on for assistance, which is not
    even to be thought of. A glance through the pages of Chinese history
    will show the numerous cases in the reign of Emperors when princes
    fought in the very confines of the Emperor's palace while the corpse
    of their royal father lay unburied in the hall. Thus it is seen that
    the hidden cause of the safety or otherwise of the country does not
    lie with the mere formality of a constitution either in a republic
    or a monarchy.


    VII. THE CASE OF DIAZ, THE DICTATOR

    The critics bring up the example of Mexico where live rivals have
    been struggling with each other for the presidency, and the internal
    confusion of the Central and South American republics as well as
    Portugal, as an unquestionable proof of their contention that a
    republic is not so good as a monarchy. I imagine that the idea of
    these critics is that all these disturbances can be avoided if all
    these republics were changed into monarchies. Let me tell them that
    Diaz ruled over Mexico for thirty years, and only died as an exile
    in May last (I am not quite sure of the exact month). If indeed the
    struggle in Mexico was a fight for succession then the fight should
    not have begun until this year. And indeed if it were necessary to
    have a monarch to avoid the disturbance, and supposing that Diaz,
    thirty years ago, had a man like Dr. Goodnow to make the suggestion,
    and men like the Chou An Hui to spread it, and suppose that Diaz
    boldly took the advice and set up an Imperial system for himself,
    would Mexico then have a peace that would last as long as the ages?

    If Diaz had assumed the throne I am positive he would long ago have
    been an exile in a foreign country before his imperial system could
    have come into effect or he himself become the proud founder of a
    new dynasty. What he would have held as an imperial charter would
    have become a mere scrap of paper. If he could not prevent rebellion
    even during his lifetime how can we expect an empty Imperial system
    to prevent it after his death. Even a child can see this. The
    disturbances in Mexico were unavoidable no matter under a republic
    or a monarchy. The reason? It is because Diaz, under the mask of a
    republic, actually played the rôle of a despot. During all the
    thirty years he held office he never devoted himself to the
    strengthening of the fundamental things of State, but diligently
    strengthened his own position. He massed an enormous number of
    troops for his own protection so that he might overawe the people.
    For fear that the troops might become arrogant and insubordinate, he
    provoked disagreement among them in order that he might play them
    round his fingers. He banished all those who opposed him, relying on
    force alone. In dealing with those who were really patriotic, he
    either corrupted their character by buying them with silver or
    removed them by assassination. He was a vainglorious man and spent
    money like water. From the foreign capitalists he borrowed in a most
    indiscriminate manner, while on the Mexican people he levied all
    sorts of cruel taxes. Thus the strength of the people was drained
    and the resources of the country were exhausted, creating a position
    over which he eventually had no control whatever. Ten years ago I
    wrote an article in the _Hsin Min Tsung Pao_ remarking that Diaz was
    a matchless fraud. I said then that a nation-wide calamity would
    befall Mexico after his death and that the Mexican nation would be
    reduced to a mere shadow. (My friend Mr. Tang Chio-tun also wrote an
    article, before the internal strife in Mexico broke out, on the same
    subject and in an even more comprehensive way.) Luckily for Diaz he
    ruled under the mask of republicanism, for only by so doing did he
    manage to usurp and keep the presidential chair for thirty years. He
    would long ago have disappeared had he attempted to assume the rôle
    of an emperor. This is also true of the other republics of Central
    and South America. Their presidents almost without a single
    exception used military force as a stepping-stone to the
    presidential chair. We have yet to see the last military aspirant.
    The unsuitability of the country to the republican system is of
    course one of the reasons but I cannot agree with those who say that
    this is the only reason.

    As to Portugal it is true that the change from the monarchy to
    republic has not stopped internal disturbance; but is it not a fact
    that Portugal became a republic as a result of internal disturbance
    and was it not during the existence of the monarch that the
    disturbance started? It is ridiculous to suppose that a republic
    will surely court disturbance while a monarchy will surely ensure
    peace and order. Is not Persia a monarchy? Is not Turkey a monarchy?
    Is not Russia a monarchy?

    Read their history in recent decades and see how many years of peace
    they have had. There have been no election of presidents in these
    countries. Why then such unrest?

    Again, why was the state of affairs during the Sixteen States of the
    Five Dynasty-Period and the Ten States of the Five Successions as
    deplorably miserable and disastrous as the state of affairs now
    prevailing in Mexico, although there was no election of Presidents
    then? In quoting objective facts as illustrations the critic should
    not allow his choice to be dictated by his personal like or dislike.
    Otherwise he will not be deceiving others than himself. Soberly
    speaking, any form of state is capable of either ensuring a
    successful government or causing rebellion. And nine cases out of
    ten the cause of rebellion lies in the conditions of the
    administration and not in the form of state. It cannot be denied,
    however, that the chances of rebellion and dissension are more
    frequent and easier when the form of state does not suit the
    conditions of the people. That is why I did not advocate
    republicanism; and even now I am not a blind believer in
    republicanism. In this I agree with you, the Chou An Hui people.

    The reason why I have not decided to advocate boldly a change in the
    form of state is because for years my heart has been burdened with
    an unspeakable sorrow and pain, believing that ever since the
    mistake made in 1911 the hope for China's future has dwindled to
    almost nothing. On one hand I have been troubled with our inability
    to make the Republic a success, and on the other I have been
    worrying over the fact that it would be impossible to restore the
    monarchy. The situation has so worked on my troubled mind that at
    times I seemed to be beside myself. But as the whole country seemed
    to be already in a state of desperation I have come to the
    conclusion that it would not do any good to add pain to sorrow.
    Therefore, instead of uttering pessimistic views I have been
    speaking words of encouragement to raise our spirits. In this,
    however, I have exhausted my own strength. My friend, Mr. Hsu Fo-su,
    told me some five or six years ago that it was impossible for China
    to escape a revolution, and as a result of the revolution could not
    escape from becoming a republic, and by becoming a republic China
    would be bound to disappear as a nation. I have been meditating on
    these words of ill-omen and sought to help the country to escape
    from his prediction but I have not yet found the way.


    VIII. "DIVINITY DOTH HEDGE A KING"

    Now my friends, you have stated in a worthy manner the reasons why
    the republican form of state cannot assist China to maintain her
    existence; now let me state why it is impossible to restore the
    monarchical system. The maintenance of the dignity of a monarch
    depends on a sort of mystical, historical, traditional influence or
    belief. Such an influence was capable of producing unconsciously and
    spontaneously a kind of effect to assist directly or indirectly in
    maintaining order and imparting blessing to the country. In this
    lies the value of a monarchy. But dignity is a thing not to be
    trifled with. Once it is trodden down it can never rise again. We
    carve wood or mould clay into the image of a person and call it a
    god (idol). Place it in a beautiful temple, and seat it in a
    glorious shrine and the people will worship it and find it
    miraculously potent. But suppose some insane person should pull it
    down, tread it under foot and throw it into a dirty pond and suppose
    some one should discover it and carry it back to its original sacred
    abode, you will find the charm has gone from it. Ever since the days
    of monarchical government the people have looked on the monarch with
    a sort of divine reverence, and never dared to question or criticize
    his position. After a period of republicanism, however, this
    attitude on the part of the common people has been abruptly
    terminated with no possibility of resurrection. A survey of all the
    republics of the world will tell us that although a large number of
    them suffered under republican rule, not a single one succeeded in
    shaking itself free of the republican fetters. Among the world
    republics only France has had her monarchical system revived twice
    after the republic was first inaugurated. The monarchy, however,
    disappeared almost immediately. Thus we may well understand how
    difficult it is for a country to return to its monarchical state
    after a republican régime. It may be said that China has had only a
    short experience of the republican régime; but it must also be
    remembered that the situation has been developing for more than ten
    years and in actual existence for about four years. During the
    period of development the revolutionists denounced the monarch in
    most extravagant terms and compared him to the devil. Their aim was
    to kill the mystic belief of the people in the Emperor; for only by
    diminishing the dignity of the monarch could the revolutionary cause
    make headway. And during and after the change all the official
    documents, school text-books, press views and social gossip have
    always coupled the word monarch with reprobation. Thus for a long
    while this glorious image has been lying in the dirty pond! Leaving
    out the question that it is difficult to restore the monarchy at the
    present day, let us suppose that by arbitrary method we do succeed
    in restoring it. You will then find that it will be impossible for
    it to regain in former dignity and influence.

    Turning to another aspect, the most natural course would seem to be
    a revival of the last dynasty. It might have been possible for a
    Charles II and Louis XVIII of China to appear again, if not for the
    hatred of racial domination. But since the last dynasty was Manchu
    this is out of the question. If a new dynasty were set up it would
    require many years of hard labour and a great deal of organizing to
    succeed. Even then only a few have succeeded in this way in
    prolonging their dynasties by actually convincing the people of
    their merits. Therefore for several years I have been saying to
    myself that it would be easier to strengthen the country and place
    it on a sounder basis if it were possible for us to return to our
    monarchical state. And to revive the monarchical government there
    are two ways.

    One is that after thoroughly reforming the internal administration
    under the leadership of the present Great President, that is, when
    all the neglected affairs of the country have been well attended to,
    every family in the land made happy and prosperous, the army
    well-trained and all the necessary bitterness "eaten," the
    President, when a suitable opportunity presented itself, should have
    the rare fortune to gain a decisive victory over a foreign foe; then
    his achievements would be such that the millions of people would
    compel him to ascend the throne, and so he would hand his sceptre on
    to his descendants for endless ages.

    The second possibility is that after a second great internal
    disturbance, resulting in the whole country being thrown into a
    state of utter confusion and cut up into small independent states,
    the President should suppress them and unite the country into one
    empire. We will, of course, not pray for the second possibility to
    come about as then there will be little left of the Chinese people.
    And no one can be certain whether the person who shall succeed in
    suppressing the internal strife will be a man of our own race or
    not. Thus the result will not differ very much from national
    extinction. As to the first possibility, we know that an exceedingly
    capable man is now in a most powerful position; let him be given
    time and he will soon show himself to be a man of success. Does not
    the last ray of hope for China depend on this?


    IX. THE UNRIPE PEAR

    This is why I say we should not deliberately create trouble for the
    Republic at this time to add to the worries of the Great President
    so that he might devote his puissant thoughts and energies to the
    institution of great reforms. Then our final hope will be satisfied
    some day. But what a year and what a day we are now living in? The
    great crisis (_Note: The reference is to the Japanese demands_) has
    just passed and we have not yet had time for a respite. By the
    pressure of a powerful neighbour we have been compelled to sign a
    "certain" Treaty. Floods, drought, epidemics and locusts visit our
    country and the land is full of suffering while robbers plunder the
    people. In ancient times this would have been a day for the Imperial
    Court to remove their ornaments and live in humiliation. What do the
    people of our day mean by advising and urging the President to
    ascend the throne? To pluck the fruit before it is ripe, injures the
    roots of the tree; and to force the premature birth of a child kills
    the mother. If the last "ray of hope" for China should be
    extinguished by the failure of a premature attempt to force matters,
    how could the advocates of such a premature attempt excuse
    themselves before the whole country? Let the members of the Chou An
    Hui meditate on this point.

    The Odes say, "The people are tired. Let them have a respite." In
    less than four years' time from the 8th moon of the year Hsin Hai we
    have had many changes. Like a bolt from the blue we had the Manchu
    Constitution, then "the Republic of Five Races," then the
    Provisional President, then the formal Presidency, then the
    Provisional Constitution was promulgated, then it was suddenly
    amended, suddenly the National Assembly was convoked, suddenly it
    was dissolved, suddenly we had a Cabinet System, suddenly it was
    changed to a Presidential System, suddenly it was a short-term
    Presidency, suddenly it was a life-term Presidency, suddenly the
    Provisional Constitution was temporarily placed in a legal position
    as a Permanent Constitution, suddenly the drafting of the Permanent
    Constitution was pressed. Generally speaking the average life of
    each new system has been less than six months, after which a new
    system quite contrary to the last succeeded it. Thus the whole
    country has been at a loss to know where it stood and how to act;
    and thus the dignity and credit of the Government in the eyes of the
    people have been lowered down to the dust. There are many subjects
    respecting internal and diplomatic affairs which we can profitably
    discuss. If you wish to serve the country in a patriotic way you
    have many ways to do so. Why stir the peaceful water and create a
    sea of troubles by your vain attempt to excite the people and sow
    seeds of discord for the State?


    X. THE ASSEVERATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

    One or two points more, and I am finished. These will be in the
    nature of a straight talk to the Chou An Hui. The question I would
    ask in plain words is, who is the person you have in your mind as
    the future Emperor? Do you wish to select a person other than the
    Great President? You know only too well that the moment the
    President relieves his shoulder of the burdens of State the country
    will be thrown into confusion. If you entertain this plot with the
    deliberation of a person bent upon the destruction of the country,
    then the four hundred million of people will not excuse you.

    Is the man you have in mind the present President? Heaven and earth
    as well as all living creatures in China and other lands know what
    the President swore to when he took the oath of office as President.
    Rumours have indeed been circulated, but whenever they reached the
    ears of the President he has never hesitated to express his
    righteous mind, saying that no amount of pressure could compel him
    to change his determination. All officials who have come into close
    contact with the President have heard such sentiments from the lips
    of the President on not a few occasions. To me his words are still
    ringing in my ears. General Feng Kuo-chang has conveyed to me what
    he was told by the President. He says that the President has
    prepared a "few rooms" in England, and that if the people would not
    spare him he would flee to the refuge he has prepared. Thus we may
    clearly see how determined the President is. Can it be possible that
    you have never heard of this and thus raise this extraordinary
    subject without any cause? If the situation should become such that
    the President should be compelled to carry out his threat and desert
    the Palace, what would you say and do then?

    Or, perhaps, you are measuring the lordly conduct of a gentleman
    with the heart of a mean man, saying to yourself that what the
    President has been saying cannot be the truth, but, as Confucius has
    said, "say you are not but make a point to do it," and that, knowing
    that he would not condemn you, you have taken the risk. If so, then
    what do you take the President for? To go back on one's words is an
    act despised by a vagabond. To suggest such an act as being capable
    of the President is an insult, the hideousness of which cannot be
    equalled by the number of hairs on one's head. Any one guilty of
    such an insult should not be spared by the four hundred million of
    people.


    XI. THE CHOU AN HUI AND THE LAW

    Next let me ask if you have read the Provisional Constitution, the
    Provisional Code, the Meeting and Association Law, the Press
    Regulations, the various mandates bearing on the punishment of
    persons who dare conspire against the existing form of state? Do you
    not know that you, as citizens of the Republic, must in duty bound
    observe the Constitution and obey the laws and mandates? Yet you
    have dared openly to call together your partisans and incite a
    revolution (the recognized definition in political science for
    revolution is "to change the existing form of state"). As the
    Judiciary have not been courageous enough to deal with you since you
    are all so closely in touch with the President, you have become
    bolder still and carry out your sinister scheme in broad daylight. I
    do not wish to say what sort of peace you are planning for China;
    but this much I know, that the law has been violated by you to the
    last letter. I will be silent if you believe that a nation can be
    governed without law. Otherwise tell me what you have got to say?

    It is quite apparent that you will not be satisfied with mere
    shouting and what you aim at is the actual fulfilment of your
    expectations. That is, you wish that once the expected monarchy is
    established it may continue for ever. Now by what principle can such
    a monarchy continue for ever, except that the laws and orders of
    that dynasty be obeyed, and obeyed implicitly by all, from the Court
    down to the common people? For one to adopt methods that violate the
    law while engaged in creating a new dynasty is like a man, who, to
    secure a wife, induces the virtuous virgin to commit fornication
    with him, on the plea that as a marriage will be arranged
    preservation of her virtue need not be insisted upon. Can such a man
    blame his wife for immorality after marriage? If, while still
    citizens of a republican country, one may openly and boldly call
    meetings and organize societies for the overthrow of the Republic,
    who shall say that we may not in due time openly and boldly call
    meetings and organize societies for the overthrow of the monarchy?
    What shall you say if in future there should be another foreign
    doctor to suggest another theory and another society to engage in
    another form of activity? The Odes have it, "To prevent the monkey
    from climbing a tree is like putting mud on a man in the mire." For
    a person to adopt such methods while engaged in the making of a
    dynasty is the height of folly. Mencius says, "a Chuntse when
    creating a dynasty aims at things that can be handed down as good
    examples." Is it not the greatest misfortune to set up an example
    that cannot be handed down as a precedent? The present state of
    affairs is causing me no small amount of anxiety.


    XII. A POSTSCRIPT

    A copy of Yang Tu's pamphlet, "Constitutional Monarchy or the
    Salvation of China" reached me after I had finished writing the
    above discussion. On a casual glance through it I alighted upon the
    following passage: "What is known as a constitutional country is a
    country which has definite laws and in which no one, from the ruler
    down to the common people, can take any action that is not permitted
    by law. Good men cannot do good outside of the bounds of law;
    neither can bad men do evil in violation of it." This is indeed a
    passage that breathes the very spirit of constitutionalism. Let us
    ask Mr. Yang if the activities of the Chou An Hui, of which he is
    the President, are acts within the bounds of law? Mr. Yang is a good
    man. It is therefore possible for him to believe that he is not
    doing evil in violation of the law; but has he not at least been
    doing good outside of the bounds of law? If an advocate of
    constitutional monarchy is capable of doing such unlawful acts, we
    may easily imagine what sort of a constitutional monarchy he
    advocates; and we may also easily imagine what the fate of his
    constitutional monarchy will be.

    Mencius says, "Am I argumentative? I cannot help it." Who would have
    thought that a man, who cares not for the question of the form of
    state like myself and who opposed you--Mr. Yang Tu--during your
    first campaign for the change in the form of State--you were a
    Republican then--would be opposing you again now that you are
    engaged in advocating another change in the form of state? A change
    in the form of government is a manifestation of progress while a
    change in the status of the State is a sign of revolution. The path
    of progress leads to further progress, but the path of revolution
    leads to more revolution. This is a fact proved by theory as well as
    actual experience. Therefore a man who has any love for his country,
    is afraid to mention revolution; and as for myself I am always
    opposed to revolution. I am now opposing your theory of monarchical
    revolution, just as I once opposed your theory of republican
    revolution, in the same spirit, and I am doing the same duty. My
    belief is that since the country is now in a most weakened state, we
    may yet fail even if we do all we can at all times to nurse its
    wound and gather up its scattered strength. How can any one devote
    his time and energy to the discussion of a question of no importance
    such as the form of state, and so obstruct the progress of the
    administration? But this is not all. The whole country is now
    stirred up to an excited state and is wondering how long this
    ever-changing situation is going to stop. The loss caused by this
    state of affairs, though unnoticed, is incalculable. In the Odes,
    it is written "Alas! my brethren. Befriended of the countrymen. No
    one wants rebellion. What has no parents?" Let the critics remember
    this--let them remember.

    Some will say to me that a revolution is an unavoidable thing. Of
    all things only the facts cannot be undone. Why then should I bother
    myself especially as my last effort fell on deaf ears. This I
    realize; but it is not my nature to abandon what is my conviction.
    Therefore, although aware of the futility of my words, I cannot
    refrain from uttering them all the same. Chu Yuan drowned himself in
    the Pilo and Chia Sheng died from his horse. Ask them why they did
    these things, they will say they did not know. Once I wrote a piece
    of poetry containing the following lines:

        "Ten years after you will think of me,
        The country is excited. To whom shall I speak?"

    I have spoken much in my life, and all my words have become subjects
    for meditation ten years after they were uttered. Never, however,
    have any of my words attracted the attention of my own countrymen
    before a decade has spent itself. Is it a misfortune for my words or
    a misfortune to the Country? My hope is that there will be no
    occasion for the country to think of my present words ten years
    hence.



CHAPTER XI

THE DREAM EMPIRE

"THE PEOPLE'S VOICE," AND THE ACTION OF THE POWERS (FROM SEPTEMBER TO
DECEMBER, 1915)


The effect of Liang Ch'i-chao's appeal was noticeable at once: there
were ominous mutterings among all the great class of "intellectuals" who
form such a remarkable element throughout the country. Nevertheless
there were no overt acts attempted against the authority of Peking.
Although literary and liberal China was now thoroughly convinced that
the usurpation which Yuan Shih-kai proposed to practise would be a
national disgrace and lead to far-reaching complications, this force
were too scattered and too much under the power of the military to
tender at once any active opposition as would have been the case in
Western countries. Yuan Shih-kai, measuring this situation very
accurately, and aware that he could easily become an object of popular
detestation if the people followed the lead of the scholars, decided to
place himself outside and beyond the controversy by throwing the entire
responsibility on the Tsan Cheng Yuan, the puppet Senate he had erected
in place of the parliament destroyed by his _coup d'état_ of the 4th
November, 1913. In a message issued to that body on the 6th September,
1915, he declared that although in his opinion the time was
inappropriate for making any change in the form of State, the matter
demanded the most careful and serious consideration which he had no
doubt would be given to it. If a change of so momentous a character as
was now being publicly advocated were decided in too great a haste it
might create grave complications: therefore the opinion of the nation
should be consulted by the method of the ballot. And with this _nunc
dimittis_ he officially washed his hands of a plot in which he had been
the prime mover.

The Senate now openly delivered itself over to the accomplishment of the
scheme which had been broached by Yang Tu, the monarchist pamphleteer.
Although this individual still posed as the leader of the movement, in
reality he was nothing but the tool of a remarkable man, one Liang
Shih-yi, famous throughout the country as the most unscrupulous and
adroit politician the Revolution had thrown up. This person, who is
known to have been gravely implicated in many assassinations, and who
was the instrument used in 1912 by Yuan Shih-kai to persuade the Manchu
Imperial Family to abdicate, had in a brief four years accumulated a
vast fortune by the manipulations he had indulged in as Director-General
of The Bank of Communications, an institution which, because it disposed
of all the railway receipts, was always in funds even when the Central
Treasury itself was empty. By making himself financially indispensable
to Yuan Shih-kai he had become recognized as the power behind the
Throne; for although, owing to foreign clamour, he had been dismissed
from his old office of Chief Secretary to the President (which he had
utilized to effect the sale of offices far and wide) he was a daily
visitor to the Presidential Palace and his creatures daily pulled all
the numerous strings.

The scheme now adopted by the Senate was to cause the provinces to flood
Peking with petitions, sent up through the agency of "The Society for
the Preservation of Peace," demanding that the Republic be replaced by
that form of government which the people alone understood, the name
Constitutional Monarchy being selected merely as a piece of political
window-dressing to please the foreign world. A vast amount of organizing
had to be done behind the scenes before the preliminaries were
completed: but on the 6th October the scheme was so far advanced that in
response to "hosts of petitions" the Senate, sitting in its capacity of
Legislative Chamber (_Li Fa Yuan_) passed a so-called King-making bill
in which elaborate regulations were adopted for referring the question
under discussion to a provincial referendum. According to this naïve
document the provinces were to be organized into electoral colleges, and
the votes of the electors, after being recorded, were to be sent up
to Peking for scrutiny. Some attempt was made to follow Dr. Goodnow's
advice to secure as far as possible that the various classes of the
community should be specially represented: and provision was therefore
made in the voting for the inclusion of "learned scholars," Chambers of
Commerce, and "oversea merchants," whose votes were to be directly
recorded by their special delegates. To secure uniformly satisfactory
results, the whole election was placed absolutely and without
restriction in the hands of the high provincial authorities, who were
invited to bestow on the matter their most earnest attention.

[Illustration: Modern Peking: The Palace Entrance lined with Troops.
Note the New-type Chinese Policeman in foreground.]

[Illustration: The Premier General Tuan Chi-jui, Head of the Cabinet
which decided to declare war on Germany.]

In a Mandate, issued in response to this Bill, Yuan Shih-kai merely
limits himself to handing over the control of the elections and voting
to the local authorities, safe in the knowledge that every detail of the
plot had been carefully worked out in advance. By this time the fact
that a serious and dangerous movement was being actively pushed had been
well-impressed on the Peking Legations, and some anxiety was publicly
manifested. It was known that Japan, as the active enemy of Yuan
Shih-kai, could not remain permanently silent: and on the 28th October
in association with Great Britain and Russia, she indeed made official
inquiries at the Chinese Foreign Office regarding the meaning of the
movement. She was careful, however, to declare that it was her
solicitude for the general peace that alone dictated her action.[18]
Nevertheless, her warning had an unmistakable note about it and
occasioned grave anxiety, since the ultimatum of the previous May in
connection with the Twenty-one Demands had not been forgotten. At the
beginning of November the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying
verbally to these representations, alleged that the movement had gone
too far for it to be stopped and insisted that no apprehensions need be
felt by the Foreign Powers regarding the public safety. Dissatisfied by
this reply all the Entente Powers, now including France and Italy,
renewed their representations, receiving a few days later a formal Note
in which absolute guarantees were given that law and order would be
sedulously preserved. Baffled by this firmness, and conscious that
further intervention in such matter would be fraught with grave
difficulties, the Entente Powers decided to maintain a watchful attitude
but to do no more publicly. Consequently events marched forward so
rapidly that by December the deed was done, and Yuan Shih-kai had
apparently been elected unanimously Emperor of China by the provincial
ballot.

The explanation of this extraordinary business was only made public
months later with the outbreak of the Yunnan rebellion and the secession
of the Southern provinces. In a remarkable publication, entitled
satirically "The People's Will," the Southern Republican Party, which
now possessed access to all the confidential archives of the provinces,
published in full the secret instructions from Peking which had brought
about this elaborate comedy. Though considerations of space prevent all
documents being included in our analysis, the salient ones are here
textually quoted so as to exhibit in its proper historical light the
character of the chief actor, and the _régime_ the Powers had
supported--until they were forced by Japan to be more honest. These
documents, consisting mainly of telegraphic dispatches sent from Peking
to the provinces, do more to explain the working of the Government of
China than a dozen treatises; for they drag into the garish light of day
the most secret Yamen machinery and show precisely how it is worked.

The play was set in motion by a circular code telegram sent out on the
30th August by Tuan Chih-kuei, Governor of Moukden and one of Yuan
Shih-kai's most trusted lieutenants, the device of utilizing a centre
other than the capital to propagate revolutionary ideas being a
familiar one and looked upon as a very discreet procedure. This initial
telegram is a document that speaks for itself:

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED AUGUST 30, 1915, FROM TUAN CHI-KUEI, MILITARY
    GOVERNOR OF MOUKDEN, ET ALIA, CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRESENTING
    PETITIONS TO PEKING IN THE NAME OF THE CITIZENS OF THE PROVINCES

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces:--

    (To be deciphered personally with the Council of State Code)

    The proposal of changing the form of the State into a monarchy
    having been unanimously agreed to by the provinces, the first step
    to be taken has now to be decided. We propose that petitions be sent
    in the name of the citizens of the respective provinces to the
    Senate acting in the capacity of Legislative Chamber, so as to
    demonstrate the wish of the people to have a monarchy. The acting
    Legislative Chamber will then decide upon the course to be adopted.

    The plan suggested is for each province to send in a separate
    petition, the draft of which will be made in Peking and wired to the
    respective provinces in due course. If you approve, you will insert
    your name as well as those of the gentry and merchants of the
    province who agree to the draft. These petitions are to be presented
    one by one to the Legislative Chamber, as soon as it is convoked. At
    all events, the change in the form of the State will have to be
    effected under the colour of carrying out the people's will.

    As leading members of political and military bodies, we should wait
    till the opportune moment arrives when we will give collateral
    support to the movement. Details of the plan will be made known to
    you from time to time.

This method of circular telegrams, which had been inherited from the
last days of the Manchus, and vastly extended during the
_post_-revolutionary period, was now to be used to the very utmost in
indoctrinating the provinces with the idea that not only was the
Republic doomed but that prompt steps must be taken to erect the
Constitutional Monarchy by use of fictitious legal machinery so that it
should not be said that the whole enterprise was a mere plot.
Accordingly, on the 10th September, as a sequel to the telegram we have
just quoted, an enormous circular message of several thousand words was
sent in code from Peking to all the Military and Civil Governors in the
provinces instructing them precisely how to act in order to throw a
cloak over the nefarious deed. After explaining the so-called "Law on
the General Convention of the Citizens' Representatives" (_i.e._
national referendum) the following illuminating sentences occur which
require no comment showing as they do what apt pupils reactionary
Chinese are in the matter of ballot-fraud.

    ... (1) The fact that no fewer than one hundred petitions for a
    change in the form of State have been received from people residing
    in all parts of the country shows that the people are of one mind
    concerning this matter. Hence the words in the "General Convention
    Law": "to be decided by the General Convention of the Citizens'
    Representatives," refer to nothing more than the formal approval of
    the Convention and are by no means intended to give room for
    discussion of any kind. Indeed, it was never intended that the
    citizens should have any choice between a republic and a monarchy.
    For this reason at the time of voting all the representatives must
    be made unanimously to advocate a change of the Republic into a
    Monarchy.

    It behooves you, therefore, prior to the election and voting,
    privately to search for such persons as are willing to express the
    people's will in the sense above indicated. You will also make the
    necessary arrangements beforehand, and devise every means to have
    such persons elected, so that there may be no divergence of opinion
    when the time arrives for putting the form of the State to the vote.

    (2) Article 2 provides: "The citizens' representatives shall be
    elected by separate ballot signed by the person voting. The person
    who obtains the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared
    elected."

    The citizens' representatives, though nominally elected by the
    electors, are really appointed beforehand by you acting in the
    capacity of Superintendent of Election. The principle of separate
    signed ballot is adopted in this article with the object of
    preventing the voters from casting their votes otherwise than as
    directed, and of awakening in them a sense of responsibility for
    their votes....

These admirable principles having been officially laid down by Peking,
it is not hard to understand that the Military and Civil Governors in
the provinces, being anxious to retain their posts and conciliate the
great personage who would be king, gave the problem their most earnest
attention, and left no stone unturned to secure that there should be no
awkward contretemps. On the 28th September, the Peking Government, being
now entirely surrendered into the hands of the plotters, thought it
advisable to give the common people a direct hint of what was coming, by
sending circular instructions regarding the non-observance of the
Republican anniversary (10th October). The message in question is so
frankly ingenuous that it merits inclusion in this singular _dossier_:

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1915, FROM THE COUNCIL OF STATE TO
    THE MILITARY AND CIVIL GOVERNORS OF THE PROVINCES RESPECTING THE
    NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REPUBLIC

    To the Military and Civil Governors and the Military Commissioners
    of the Provinces and the Intendant of Shanghai:--

    (Code Telegram)

    Now that a monarchical form of government has been advocated, the
    National Anniversary in commemoration of the Republic should, of
    course, be observed with least possible display, under the pretext
    either of the necessity for economy owing to the impoverished
    condition of the people, or of the advisability of celebrating the
    occasion quietly so as to prevent disturbances arising in
    consequence of the many rumours now afloat. In this way public peace
    and order may be maintained on the one hand, money and trouble saved
    on the other. How to put this suggestion into practice will be left
    to your discretion.

    (Signed) COUNCIL OF STATE.

By October such progress had been made in Peking in the general work of
organizing this _coup d'état_ that, as we have seen, the Senate had
passed on the 6th of that month the so-called "King-making Bill." The
very next day, so that nothing should be left in doubt, the following
circular telegram was dispatched to all the provinces:

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED OCTOBER 7, 1915, FROM CHU CHI-CHUN, MINISTER OF
    THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, DEVISING PLANS FOR NOMINATING YUAN SHIH-KAI
    AS EMPEROR

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces:--

    (To be deciphered with the Hua Code)

    Our telegram of the 12th ult. must have reached you by this time.

    The Administrative Council, at a meeting held on the 4th inst.,
    passed the Bill for a General Convention of the Citizens'
    Representatives. Article 12 of the Bill was amended so as to contain
    the following clause:--"The Superintendent of Election may, in case
    of necessity, delegate his functions to the several district
    magistrates." This will soon be communicated officially to the
    provinces. You are therefore requested to make the necessary
    preparations beforehand in accordance with the instructions
    contained in our telegram of the 29th September.

    We propose that the following steps be taken after the votes have
    been duly polled:--

    (1) After the form of the state has been put to the vote, the
    result should be reported to the sovereign (meaning Yuan Shih-kai)
    and to the Administrative Council in the name of the General
    Convention of the Citizens' Representatives.

    (2) In the telegrams to be sent by the General Convention of the
    Citizens' Representatives for nominating the emperor, the following
    words should be specifically used: "We respectfully nominate the
    present President Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor of the Chinese Empire."

    (3) The telegrams investing the Administrative Council with general
    powers to act on behalf of the General Convention of the Citizens'
    Representatives should be dispatched in the name of the General
    Convention of the Citizens of the Provinces.

    The drafts of the dispatches under the above-mentioned three heads
    will be wired to you beforehand. As soon as the votes are cast,
    these are to be shown to the representatives, who will sign them
    after perusal. Peking should be immediately informed by telegram.

    As for the telegrams to be sent by the commercial, military, and
    political bodies, they should bear as many signatures as possible,
    and be wired to the Central Government within three days after the
    voting.

    When the enthronement is promulgated by edict, letters of
    congratulation from the General Convention of the Citizens'
    Representatives, as well as from the commercial, military, and
    political bodies, will also have to be sent in. You are therefore
    requested to draw up these letters in advance.

    This is specially wired for your information beforehand. The details
    will be communicated by letter.

In ordinary circumstances it would have been thought that sufficiently
implicit instructions had already been given to permit leaving the
matter in the hands of the provincial authorities. Great anxiety,
however, was beginning to reign in Peking owing to continual rumours
that dangerous opposition, both internal and external, was developing.
It was therefore held necessary to clinch the matter in such a way that
no possible questions should be raised later. Accordingly, before the
end of October--and only two days before the "advice" was tendered by
Japan and her Allies,--the following additional instructions were
telegraphed wholesale to the provinces, being purposely designed to make
it absolutely impossible for any slip to occur between cup and lip. The
careful student will not fail to notice in these remarkable messages
that as the game develops, all disguise is thrown to the four winds, and
the central and only important point, namely the prompt election and
enthronement of Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor, insisted on with almost
indecent directness, every possible precaution being taken to secure
that end:

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED OCTOBER 26, 1915, FROM CHU CHI-CHUN, MINISTER OF
    THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, RESPECTING THE NOMINATION OF YUAN SHIH-KAI AS
    EMPEROR

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces:--

    (To be deciphered with the Hua Code)

    Your telegram of the 24th inst. came duly to hand.

    After the form of the state has been put to the vote, the nomination
    of Yuan Shih-kai as emperor should be made forthwith without further
    voting. You should address the representatives and tell them that a
    monarchy having been decided on, not even a single day should pass
    without an emperor; that the citizens' representatives present
    should nominate Yuan Shih-kai as the Great Emperor of the Chinese
    Empire; and that if they are in favour of the proposal, they should
    signify their assent by standing up. This done, the text of the
    proposed letter of nomination from the citizens should be handed to
    the representatives for their signatures; after which you should
    again address them to the effect that in all matters concerning the
    nomination and the petition for immediate enthronement, they may, in
    the name of the citizens' representatives, invest the acting
    Legislative Council with general powers to act on their behalf and
    to do the necessary things until their petition is granted. The text
    (already prepared) of the proposed telegram from the citizens'
    representatives to the acting Legislative Council should then be
    shown to the representatives for approval. Whereupon three separate
    telegrams are to be drawn up: one giving the number of votes in
    favour of a change in the form of the state, one containing the
    original text of the letter of nomination, and the third concerning
    the vesting of the acting Legislative Council with general powers to
    act on behalf of the citizens' representatives. These should be sent
    officially to the acting Legislative Council in the name of the
    citizens' representatives. You should at the same time wire to the
    President all that has taken place. The votes and the letter of
    nomination are to be forwarded to Peking in due course.

    As for the exact words to be inserted in the letter of nomination,
    they have been communicated to you in our telegram of the 23rd inst.
    These characters, forty-five in all, must on no account be altered.
    The rest of the text is left to your discretion.

    We may add that since the letter of nomination and the vesting of
    the acting Legislative Council with general powers to act on behalf
    of the citizens' representatives are matters which transgress the
    bounds of the law, you are earnestly requested not to send to the
    National Convention Bureau any telegraphic enquiry concerning them,
    so that the latter may not find itself in the awkward position of
    having to reply.

Two days after this telegram had been dispatched the longfeared action
on the part of Japan had been taken and a new situation had been
created. The Japanese "advice" of the 28th October was in fact a
veritable bombshell playing havoc with the house of cards which had been
so carefully erected. But the intrigue had gone so far, and the prizes
to be won by the monarchical supporters were so great that nothing could
induce them to retrace their footsteps. For a week and more a desperate
struggle went on behind the scenes in the Presidential Palace, since
Yuan Shih-kai was too astute a man not to understand that a most
perilous situation was being rapidly created and that if things went
wrong he would be the chief victim. But family influences and the voice
of the intriguers proved too strong for him, and in the end he gave his
reluctant consent to a further step. The monarchists, boldly acting on
the principle that possession is nine points of the law, called upon the
provinces to anticipate the vote and to substitute the title of Emperor
for that of President in all government documents and petitions so that
morally the question would be _chose jugée_.

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1915, FROM CHU CHI-CHUN, MINISTER OF
    THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, ENJOINING A STRONG ATTITUDE TOWARDS
    INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF A CERTAIN FOREIGN POWER

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces:--

    (To be deciphered personally with the Council of State Code)

    A certain foreign power, under the pretext that the Chinese people
    are not of one mind and that troubles are to be apprehended, has
    lately forced England and Russia to take part in tendering advice to
    China. In truth, all foreign nations know perfectly well that there
    will be no trouble, and they are obliged to follow the example of
    that power. If we accept the advice of other Powers concerning our
    domestic affairs and postpone the enthronement, we should be
    recognizing their right to interfere. Hence action should under no
    circumstance be deferred. When all the votes of the provinces
    unanimously recommending the enthronement shall have reached Peking,
    the Government will, of course, ostensibly assume a wavering and
    compromising attitude, so as to give due regard to international
    relations. The people, on the other hand, should show their firm
    determination to proceed with the matter at all costs, so as to let
    the foreign powers know that our people are of one mind. If we can
    only make them believe that the change of the republic into a
    monarchy will not in the least give rise to trouble of any kind, the
    effects of the advice tendered by Japan will _ipso facto_ come to
    nought.

    At present the whole nation is determined to nominate Yuan Shih-kai
    Emperor. All civil and military officers, being the natural leaders
    of the people, should accordingly give effect to the nomination. If
    this can be done without friction, the confidence of both Chinese
    and foreigners in the Government will be greatly strengthened. This
    is why we suggested to you in a previous telegram the necessity of
    immediately substituting the title of "Emperor" for "President." We
    trust you will concur in our suggestion and carry it out without
    delay.

    We may add that this matter should be treated as strictly
    confidential.

    A reply is requested.

    (Signed)

The die now being cast all that was left to be done was to rush through
the voting in the Provinces. Obsequious officials returned to the use of
the old Imperial phraseology and Yuan Shih-kai, even before his
"election," was memorialized as though he were the legitimate successor
of the immense line of Chinese sovereigns who stretch back to the
mythical days of Yao and Shun (2800 B.C.). The beginning of December saw
the voting completed and the results telegraphed to Peking; and on the
11th December, the Senate hastily meeting, and finding that "the
National Convention of Citizens" had unanimously elected Yuan Shih-kai
Emperor, formally offered him the Throne in a humble petition. Yuan
Shih-kai modestly refused: a second petition was promptly handed to him,
which he was pleased to accept in the following historic document:

    YUAN SHIH-KAI'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE

    The prosperity and decline of the country is a part of the
    responsibility of every individual, and my love for the country is
    certainly not less than that of others. But the task imposed on me
    by the designation of the millions of people is of extraordinary
    magnitude. It is therefore impossible for one without merit and
    without virtue like myself to shoulder the burdens of State involved
    in the enhancing of the welfare of the people, the strengthening of
    the standing of the country, the reformation of the administration
    and the advancement of civilization. My former declaration was,
    therefore, the expression of a sincere heart and not a mere
    expression of modesty. My fear was such that I could not but utter
    the words which I have expressed. The people, however, have viewed
    with increasing impatience that declaration and their expectation of
    me is now more pressing than ever. Thus I find myself unable to
    offer further argument just as I am unable to escape the position.
    The laying of a great foundation is, however, a thing of paramount
    importance and it must not be done in a hurry. I, therefore, order
    that the different Ministries and Bureaux take concerted action in
    making the necessary preparations in the affairs in which they are
    concerned; and when that is done, let the same be reported to me
    for promulgation. Meanwhile all our citizens should go on peacefully
    in their daily vocations with the view to obtain mutual benefit. Let
    not your doubts and suspicions hinder you in your work. All the
    officials should on their part be faithful at their posts and
    maintain to the best of their ability peace and order in their
    localities, so that the ambition of the Great President to work for
    the welfare of the people may thus be realized. Besides forwarding
    the memorial of the principal representatives of the Convention of
    the Representatives of Citizens and that of the provinces and
    special administrative area to the Cheng Shih Tang and publishing
    the same by a mandate, I have the honour to notify the acting Li Fan
    Yuan as the principal representatives of the Convention of the
    Representatives of Citizens, to this effect.

Cautious to the end, it will be seen that Yuan Shih-kai's very
acceptance is so worded as to convey the idea that he is being forced to
a course of action which is against his better instincts. There is no
word of what came to be called the Grand Ceremony, _i.e._ the
enthronement. That matter is carefully left in abeyance and the
government departments simply told to make the necessary preparations.
The attitude of Peking officialdom is well-illustrated in a circular
telegram dispatched to the provinces three days later, the analysis of
Japan's relationship to the Entente Powers being particularly revealing.
The obsequious note which pervades this document is also particularly
noticeable and shows how deeply the canker of sycophancy had now eaten
in.

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 14, 1915, FROM THE OFFICE OF
    COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES, RESPECTING CHINA'S
    ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN NATIONS

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces:--

    (To be deciphered with the Hua Code)

    On the 11th inst. the acting Legislature Council submitted a
    memorial to the Emperor, reporting on the number of votes cast by
    the people in favour of a monarchy and the letters of nomination of
    Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor received from all parts of the country, and
    begged that he would ascend the Throne at an early date. His Majesty
    was, however, so modest as to decline. The Council presented a
    second memorial couched in the most entreating terms, and received
    an order to the effect that all the ministries and departments were
    to make the necessary preparations for the enthronement. The details
    of this decision appeared in the Presidential Orders of the past few
    days, so need not be repeated now.

    The people are unanimously of the opinion that in a republic the
    foundation of the state is very apt to be shaken and the policy of
    the government to be changed; and that consequently there is no
    possibility of enjoying everlasting peace and prosperity, nor any
    hope for the nation to become powerful. Now that the form of the
    state has been decided in favour of a monarchy and the person who is
    to sit on the Throne agreed upon, the country is placed on a secure
    basis, and the way to national prosperity and strength is thus
    paved.

    Being the trustworthy ministers and, as it were, the hands and feet
    of His Majesty, we are united to him by more ties than one. On this
    account we should with one mind exert our utmost efforts in
    discharging our duty of loyalty to the country. This should be the
    spirit which guides us in our action at the beginning of the new
    dynasty. As for the enthronement, it is purely a matter of ceremony.
    Whether it takes place earlier or later is of no moment. Moreover
    His Majesty has always been modest, and does everything with
    circumspection. We should all appreciate his attitude.

    So far as our external relations are concerned, a thorough
    understanding must be come to with the foreign nations, so that
    recognition of the new régime may not be delayed and diplomatic
    intercourse interrupted. Japan, has, in conjunction with the Entente
    Powers, tendered advice to postpone the change of the Republic into
    an empire. As a divergence of opinion exists between Japan and the
    Entente Powers, the advice is of no great effect. Besides, the
    Elders and the Military Party in Japan are all opposed to the action
    taken by their Government. Only the press in Tokio has spread all
    sorts of threatening rumours. This is obviously the upshot of
    ingenious plots on the part of irresponsible persons. If we postpone
    the change we shall be subject to foreign interference, and the
    country will consequently cease to exist as an independent state. On
    the other hand, if we proclaim the enthronement forthwith, we shall
    then be flatly rejecting the advice,--an act which, we apprehend,
    will not be tolerated by Japan. As a result, she will place
    obstacles in the way of recognition of the new order of things.

    Since a monarchy has been decided to be the future form of the
    state, and His Majesty has consented to accept the Throne, the
    change may be said to be an accomplished fact. There is no question
    about it. All persons of whatever walk of life can henceforth
    continue their pursuits without anxiety. In the meantime we will
    proceed slowly and surely with the enthronement, as it involves many
    ceremonies and diplomatic etiquette. In this way both our domestic
    and our foreign policies will remain unchanged.

    We hope you will comprehend our ideas and treat them as strictly
    confidential.

    (Signed) Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval
    Force.

After this one last step remained to be taken--it was necessary to burn
all the incriminating evidence. On the 21st December, the last circular
telegram in connection with this extraordinary business was dispatched
from Peking, a delightful naïveté being displayed regarding the
possibility of certain letters and telegrams having transgressed the
bounds of the law. All such delinquencies are to be mercifully wiped out
by the simple and admirable method of invoking the help of the
kitchen-fires. And in this appropriate way does the monster-play end.

    CODE TELEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 21, 1915, FROM THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
    BUREAU, ORDERING THE DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE
    ELECTIONS

    To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces, the Military
    Commissioners at Foochow and Kweiyang; the Military Commandants at
    Changteh, Kweihuating, and Kalgan; and the Commissioner of Defence
    at Tachienlu:--(To be deciphered with the Hua Code)

    The change in the form of the state is now happily accomplished.
    This is due not only to the unity of the people's minds, but more
    especially to the skill with which, in realizing the object of
    saving the country, you have carried out the propaganda from the
    beginning, managed affairs according to the exigencies of the
    occasions, and adapted the law to suit the circumstances. The people
    have, to be sure, become tired of the Republic; yet unless you had
    taken the lead, they would not have dared to voice their sentiments.
    We all appreciate your noble efforts.

    Ever since the monarchical movement was started, the people as well
    as the high officials in the different localities have repeatedly
    petitioned for the change, a fact which proves that the people's
    will is in favour of it. In order to enable the people to express
    their will through a properly constituted organ, the General
    Convention of the Citizens' Representatives has been created.

    Since the promulgation of the Law on the Organization of the
    Citizens' Representatives, we, who are devoted to the welfare of the
    state, desire to see that the decisions of that Convention do not
    run counter to the wishes of the people. We are so anxious about the
    matter that we have striven so to apply the law to meet the
    circumstances as to carry out our designs. It is out of patriotic
    motives that we have adopted the policy of adhering to the law,
    whenever possible, and, at the same time, of yielding to expediency,
    whenever necessary. During the progress of this scheme there may
    have been certain letters and telegrams, both official and private,
    which have transgressed the bounds of the law. They will become
    absolutely useless after the affair is finished.' Moreover, no
    matter how carefully their secrets may have been guarded, still they
    remain as permanent records which might compromise us; and in the
    event of their becoming known to foreigners, we shall not escape
    severe criticism and bitter attacks, and, what is worse, should they
    be handed down as part of the national records, they will stain the
    opening pages of the history of the new dynasty. The Central
    Government, after carefully considering the matter, has concluded
    that it would be better to sort out and burn the documents so as to
    remove all unnecessary records and prevent regrettable consequences.
    For these reasons you are hereby requested to sift out all
    telegrams, letters, and dispatches concerning the change in the form
    of the state, whether official or private, whether received from
    Peking or the provinces (excepting those required by law to be filed
    on record), and cause the same to be burnt in your presence. As for
    those which have already been communicated to the local officials,
    you are likewise requested to order them to be returned immediately;
    to commit them to the flames; and to report to this Bureau for
    future reference the total number of documents so destroyed.

    The present change in the form of the state constitutes the most
    glorious episode of our national history. Not only is this far
    superior to the succession of dynasties by right of conquest or in
    virtue of voluntary transfer (as in the days of Yao and Shun), but
    it compares favourably with all the peaceful changes that have taken
    place in western politics. Everything will be perfect if whatever
    mars it (meaning the documents) is done away with.

    All of you have acquired greatness in founding the dynasty. You will
    doubtless concur with us, and will, we earnestly hope, lose no time
    in cautiously and secretly carrying out our request.

    We respectfully submit this to your consideration and wait for a
    reply.

    (Signed) NATIONAL CONVENTION BUREAU.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] A very remarkable illustration of the manner in which Yuan Shih-kai
was trapped by official Japan during the monarchist movement has
recently been extensively quoted in the Far Eastern press. Here is the
substance of a Japanese (vernacular) newspaper account showing the uses
to which Japanese politicians put the Press:

"... When that question was being hotly discussed in China Marquis
Okuma, interviewed by the Press, stated that monarchy was the right form
of government for China and that in case a monarchical régime was
revived Yuan Shih-kai was the only suitable person to sit on the Throne.
When this statement by Marquis Okuma was published in the Japanese
papers, Yuan Shih-kai naturally concluded that the Japanese Government,
at the head of which Marquis Okuma was, was favourably disposed towards
him and the monarchical movement. It can well be imagined, therefore,
how intense was his surprise when he later received a warning from the
Japanese Government against the resuscitation of the monarchy in China.
When this inconsistency in the Marquis's actions was called in question
in the Japanese House of Representatives, the ex-Premier absolutely
denied the truth of the statement attributed to him by the Japanese
papers, without any show of hesitancy, and thus boldly shirked the
responsibility which, in reality, lay on him...."



CHAPTER XII

"THE THIRD REVOLUTION"

THE REVOLT OF YUNNAN


In all the circumstances it was only natural that the extraordinary
chapter of history we have just narrated should have marched to its
appointed end in just as extraordinary a manner as it had commenced.
Yuan Shih-kai, the uncrowned king, actually enjoyed in peace his empty
title only for a bare fortnight, the curious air of unreality becoming
more and more noticeable after the first burst of excitement occasioned
by his acceptance of the Throne had subsided. Though the year 1915 ended
with Peking brightly illuminated in honour of the new régime, which had
adopted in conformity with Eastern precedents a new calendar under the
style of Hung Hsien or "glorious Constitutionalism," that official joy
was just as false as the rest had been and awakened the incredulity of
the crowd.

On Christmas Day ominous rumours had spread in the diplomatic circle
that dramatic developments in South China had come which not only
directly challenged the patient plotting of months but made a débâcle
appear inevitable. Very few days afterwards it was generally known that
the southernmost province of China, Yunnan--on the borders of
French-Indo-China--had telegraphed the Central Government a thinly
veiled ultimatum, that either the monarchy must be cancelled and the
chief monarchists executed at once or the province would take such steps
as were deemed advisable. The text of these telegrams which follows was
published by the courageous editor of the Peking Gazette on the 31st
December and electrified the capital. The reader will not fail to note
how richly allegorical they are in spite of their dramatic nature:

    FIRST TELEGRAM

    To the Great President:

    Since the question of _Kuo-ti_ (form of State) was raised
    consternation has seized the public mind; and on account of the
    interference of various Powers the spirit of the people has been
    more and more aroused. They have asked the question:--"Who has
    invited the disaster, and brought upon us such great disgrace?" Some
    one must be responsible for the alien insults heaped on us.

    We have learned that each day is given to rapid preparations for the
    Grand Ceremony; and it is now true that, internally, public opinion
    has been slighted, and, externally, occasions have been offered to
    foreigners to encroach on our rights. Our blood runs cold when we
    face the dangers at the door. Not once but twice hath the President
    taken the oath to observe and obey the Constitution and protect and
    maintain the Republic. The oath was sworn before Heaven and Earth;
    and it is on record in the hearts of millions of people and the
    words thereof still echo in the ears of the people of all nations.
    In the Classics it is said that "in dealing with the people of the
    country, faith is of the essence of great rule." Again it is written
    that "without faith a people cannot endure as a nation." How then
    can one rule the people when he "eats" his own words and tears his
    own oath? Principle has now been cast to the winds and the _Kuo-ti_
    has been changed. We know not how the country can be administered.

    Since the suspension of the National Assembly and the revision of
    the Constitution, the powers of Government have been centred in one
    person, with the implied freedom to do whatever seems meet without
    let or hindrance. If the Government were to use this power in order
    to reform the administration and consolidate the foundations of the
    nation, there would be no fear of failure. For the whole country
    would submit to the measures of the Central Government. Thus there
    is not the least necessity to commit treason by changing the
    _Kuo-ti_.

    But although the recent decision of the Citizens' Representatives in
    favour of a monarchy and the request of the high local officials for
    the President's accession to the Throne have been represented as
    inspired by the unanimous will of the people, it is well known that
    the same has been the work of ignoble men whose bribery and
    intimidation have been sanctioned by the authorities. Although inept
    efforts have been made to disguise the deceit, the same is unhidden
    to the eyes of the world.

    Fortunately it is said that the President has from the very
    beginning maintained a calm attitude, speaking not his mind on the
    subject. It is now as easy to turn the tide as the reversing of the
    palm. It may be objected that if the "face" of the nation is not
    preserved in view of the interference of Foreign Powers, there will
    be great danger in future. But it must be observed that official
    declaration can only be made in accordance with the will of the
    people, the tendency of which can easily be ascertained by searching
    for the facts. If the will of the people that the country should be
    the common property of the Nation be obeyed and the idea of the
    President that a Dynasty is as cheap as a worn-out shoe is heeded,
    the latter has it in his power to loosen the string that suspends
    the bell just as much as the person who has hung it. If the wrong
    path is not forsaken, it is feared that as soon as the heart of the
    people is gone, the country will be broken to pieces and the
    dismemberment of the Nation will take place when alien pressure is
    applied to us. We who have hitherto received favours from the
    President and have received high appointments from him hereby offer
    our faithful advice in the spirit of men who are sailing in common
    in a boat that is in danger; we speak as do those who love sincerity
    and cherish the unbroken word. We hope that the President will, with
    courage, refuse to listen to the speech of evil counsellors and heed
    the voice of conscience and of honour. We further hope that he will
    renew his promise to protect the Republic; and will publicly swear
    that a monarchical system will never again appear.

    Thus the heart of the people will be settled and the foundations of
    the Nation will be consolidated. Then by enlisting the services of
    sagacious colleagues in order to surmount the difficulties of the
    time and sweeping away all corruption and beginning anew with the
    people, it may be that the welfare and interest of the Nation will
    be furthered. In sending this telegram our eyes are wet with tears,
    knowing not what more to say. We respectfully await the order of the
    President with our troops under arms.

    (Signed) THE GOVERNORS OF YUNNAN.


    SECOND TELEGRAM

    For the Perusal of the Great President:--

    In our humble opinion the reason why the people--Chinese and
    foreign--cannot excuse the President is because the movement for the
    change of Kuo-ti has been inspired, and indeed actually originated
    in Peking, and that the ringleaders of the plot against the _Min
    Kuo_ are all "bosom-men" of the President. The Chou An Hui,
    organized by Yang Tu and five other men, set the fire ablaze and the
    circular telegram sent by Chu Chi-chien and six other persons
    precipitated the destruction of the Republican structure. The
    President knew that the bad deed was being done and yet he did
    nothing to arrest the same or punish the evil-doers. The people
    therefore, are suspicious. A mandate was issued on the 24th of the
    11th month of the 3rd year in which it is affirmed: "Democracy and
    republicanism are laid down in the Constitutional Compact; and there
    is also a law relating to the punishment of those who spread
    sedition in order to disturb the minds of the people. If any one
    Shall hereafter dare to advance strange doctrines and misconstrue
    the meaning of the Constitution, he will be punished severely in
    accordance with the law of sedition."

    Yang Tu for having publicly organized the said Society and Chu
    Chi-chien for having directly plotted by telegram are the principal
    offenders in the present flagrant case of sedition. As their crimes
    are obvious and the subject of abundant proof, we hereby ask the
    President to carry out at once the terms of the said mandate and
    publicly execute Yang Tu, Sun Yu-yun, Yen Fu, Liu Shih-pei, Li
    Hsieh-ho, Hu Ying, Chu Chi-chien, Tuan Chih-kuei, Chow Tzu-chi,
    Liang Shih-yi, Chang Cheng-fang and Yuan Nai-kuan to the end that
    the whole nation may be pacified. Then, and not till then, will the
    world believe in the sincerity of the President, in his love for the
    country and his intention to abide by the law. All the troops and
    people here are in anger; and unless a substantial proof from the
    Central Authorities is forthcoming, guaranteeing the maintenance of
    the Republic, it will be impossible to suppress or pacify them. We
    await a reply within twenty-four hours.

    (Signed) THE GOVERNORS OF YUNNAN PROVINCE.

[Illustration: General Feng Kuo-chang, President of the Republic.]

[Illustration: The Scholar Liang Chi-chao, sometime Minister of Justice,
and the foremost "Brain" in China.]

It was evident from the beginning that pride prevented Yuan Shih-kai
from retreating from the false position he had taken up. Under his
instructions the State Department sent a stream of powerful telegraphic
messages to Yunnan attempting to dissuade the Republican leaders from
revolt. But the die had been cast and very gravely the standard of
rebellion was raised in the capital city of Yunnan and the people
exhorted to shed their blood. Everything pointed to the fact that this
rising was to be very different from the abortive July outbreak of 1913.
There was a soberness and a deliberation about it all which impressed
close observers with a sense of the ominous end which was now in sight.

Still Peking remained purblind. During the month of January the
splendour of the dream empire, which was already dissolving into thin
air, filled the newspapers. It was reported that an Imperial Edict
printed on Yellow Paper announcing the enthronement was ready for
universal distribution: that twelve new Imperial Seals in jade or gold
were being manufactured: that a golden chair and a magnificent State
Coach in the style of Louis XV were almost ready. Homage to the portrait
of Yuan Shih-kai by all officials throughout the country was soon to be
ordered; sycophantic scholars were busily preparing a volume poetically
entitled "The Golden Mirror of the Empire," in which the virtues of the
new sovereign were extolled in high-sounding language. A recondite
significance, it was said, was to be given to the old ceremonial dress,
which was to be revived, from the fact that every official would carry a
Hu or Ivory Tablet to be held against the breast. The very mention of
this was sufficient to make the local price of ivory leap skywards! In
the privacy of drawing-rooms the story went the rounds that Yuan
Shih-kai, now completely deluded into believing in the success of his
great scheme, had held a full dress rehearsal of a ceremony which would
be the first one at his new Court when he would invest the numerous
ladies of his establishment with royal rank. Seated on his Throne he had
been engaged in instructing these interested females, already robed in
magnificent costumes, in the parts they were to play, when he had
noticed the absence of the Korean Lady--a consort he had won, it is
said, in his Seoul days in competition against the Japanese Envoy
accredited to Korea, thereby precipitating the war of 1894-95.[19] The
Korean Lady had refused to enter the Throne-room, he was told, because
she was dissatisfied with the rank he proposed to confer on her. Sternly
he sent for her and told her to take her place in the circle. But no
sooner had she arrived than hysterically she screamed, "You told me when
you wedded me that no wife would be my superior: now I am counted only a
secondary consort." With that she hurled herself at the eldest wife who
was occupying the post of honour and assailed her bitterly. Amidst the
general confusion the would-be-Emperor hastily descended from his Throne
and vainly intervened, but the women were not to be parted until their
robes were in tatters.

In such childishnesses did Peking indulge when a great disaster was
preparing. To explain what had occurred in Yunnan it is necessary to go
back and tell the story of a remarkable young Chinese--General Tsao-ao,
the soul of the new revolt.

In the revolution of 1911 each province had acted on the assumption that
it possessed inherent autonomous rights and could assume sovereignty as
soon as local arrangements had allowed the organization of a complete
provisional government. Yunnan had been one of the earliest provinces to
follow the lead of the Wuchang rebels and had virtually erected itself
into a separate republic, which attracted much attention because of the
iron discipline which was preserved. Possessing a fairly well-organized
military system, largely owing to the proximity of the French frontier
and the efforts which a succession of Viceroys had made to provide
adequate frontier defence, it was amply able to guarantee its newly won
autonomy. General Tsao-ao, then in command of a division of troops had
been elected Generalissimo of the province; and bending himself to his
task in very few weeks he had driven into exile all officials who
adhered to the Imperialist cause and made all local institutions
completely self-supporting. Even in 1911 it had been reported that this
young man dreamed of founding a dynasty for himself in the mountains of
South China--an ambition by no means impossible of realization since he
had received a first-class military education in the Tokio Military
Schools and was thoroughly up-to-date and conversant with modern
theories of government.

These reports had at the time greatly concerned Yuan Shih-kai who heard
it stated by all who knew him that the Yunnan leader was a genius in his
own way. In conformity with his policy of bringing to Peking all who
might challenge his authority, he had induced General Tsao-ao, since the
latter had played no part in the rebellion of 1913, to lay down his
office of Yunnan Governor-General and join him in the capital at the
beginning of 1914--another high provincial appointment being held out to
him as a bait.

Once in Peking, however, General Tsao-ao had been merely placed in
charge of an office concerned with the reorganization of the land-tax,
nominally a very important piece of work long advocated by foreign
critics. But as there were no funds available, and as the purpose was
plainly merely to keep him under observation, he fretted at the
restraint, and became engaged in secret political correspondence with
men who had been exiled abroad. As he was soon an open suspect, in order
to avoid arrest he had taken the bold step at the very inception of the
monarchy movement of heading the list of Generals in residence in Peking
who petitioned the Senate to institute a Monarchy, this act securing him
against summary treatment. But owing to his secret connection with the
scholar Liang Chi-chao, who had thrown up his post of Minister of
Justice and left the capital in order to oppose the new movement, he was
watched more and more carefully--his death being even hinted at.

He was clever enough to meet this ugly development with a masterly
piece of trickery conceived in the Eastern vein. One day a carefully
arranged dispute took place between him and his wife, and the police
were angrily called in to see that his family and all their belongings
were taken away to Tientsin as he refused any longer to share the same
roof with them. Being now alone in the capital, he apparently abandoned
himself to a life of shameless debauch, going nightly to the haunts of
pleasure and becoming a notorious figure in the great district in the
Outer City of Peking which is filled with adventure and adventuresses
and which is the locality from which Haroun al-Raschid obtained through
the medium of Arab travellers his great story of "Aladdin and the
Wonderful Lamp." When governmental suspicions were thoroughly lulled, he
arranged with a singing-girl to let him out by the backdoor of her house
at dawn from whence he escaped to the railway-station, rapidly reaching
Tientsin entirely unobserved.

The morning was well-advanced before the detectives who nightly watched
his movements became suspicious. Then finding that his whereabouts were
unknown to the coachman dozing on the box of his carriage, they roughly
entered the house where he had passed the night only to find that the
bird had flown. Hasty telegrams were dispatched in every direction,
particularly to Tientsin--the great centre for political refugees--and
his summary arrest ordered. But fortune favoured him. A bare
quarter-of-an-hour before the police began their search he had embarked
with his family on a Japanese steamer lying in the Tientsin river and
could snap his fingers at Yuan Shih-kai.

Once in Japan he lost no time in assembling his revolutionary friends
and in a body they embarked for South China. As rapidly as possible he
reached Yunnan province from Hongkong, travelling by way of the French
Tonkin railway. Entering the province early in December he found
everything fairly ready for revolt, though there was a deficiency in
arms and munitions which had to be made good. Yuan Shih-kai, furious at
this evasion, had telegraphed to confidential agents in Yunnan to kill
him at sight, but fortunately he was warned and spared to perform his
important work. Had a fortnight of grâce been vouchsafed him, he would
have probably made the most brilliant modern campaign that has been
witnessed in China, for he was an excellent soldier. Acting from the
natural fortress of Yunnan it was his plan to descend suddenly on the
Yangtsze Valley by way of Chungking and to capture the upper river in
one victorious march thus closing the vast province of Szechuan to the
Northern troops. But circumstances had made it imperative for him and
his friends to telegraph the Yunnan ultimatum a fortnight sooner than it
should have been dispatched, and the warning thus conveyed to the
Central Government largely crippled the Yunnan offensive.

The circumstances which had made instant action necessary were as
follows. As we have seen from the record of the previous risings, the
region of the Yangtsze river has superlative value in Chinese politics.
Offering as it does an easy road into the heart of the country and
touching more than half the Provinces, it is indeed a priceless means of
communication, and for this reason Yuan Shih-kai had been careful after
the crushing of the rebellion of 1913 to load the river-towns with his
troops under the command of Generals he believed incorruptible. Chief of
these was General Feng Kuo-chang at Nanking who held the balance of
power on the great river, and whose politics, though not entirely above
suspicion, had been proof against all the tempting offers South China
made to him until the ill-fated monarchy movement had commenced. But
during this movement General Feng Kuo-chang had expressed himself in
such contemptuous terms of the would-be Emperor that orders had been
given to another high official--Admiral Tseng, Garrison Commissioner at
Shanghai--to have him assassinated. Instead of obeying his instructions,
Admiral Tseng had conveyed a warning to his proposed victim, the
consequence being that the unfortunate admiral was himself brutally
murdered on the streets of Shanghai by revolver-shots for betraying the
confidence of his master. After this dénouement it was not very strange
that General Feng Kuo-chang should have intimated to the Republican
Party that as soon as they entered the Yangtsze Valley he would throw in
his lot with them together with all his troops. Of this Yuan Shih-kai
became aware through his extraordinary system of intelligence; and
following his usual practice he had ordered General Feng Kuo-chang to
Peking as Chief of the General Staff--an appointment which would place
him under direct surveillance. First on one excuse, then on another,
General Feng Kuo-chang had managed to delay his departure from day to
day without actually coming under the grave charge of refusing to obey
orders. But finally the position was such that he telegraphed to General
Tsao-ao that unless the Yunnan arrangements were hastened he would have
to leave Nanking--and abandon this important centre to one of Yuan
Shih-kai's own henchmen--which meant the end of all hopes of the
Yangtsze Valley rising _en masse_.

It was to save Feng Kuo-chang, then, that the young patriot Tsao-ao
caused the ultimatum to be dispatched fourteen days too soon, _i.e._,
before the Yunnan troops had marched over the mountain-barrier into the
neighbouring province of Szechuan and seized the city of
Chungking--which would have barred the advance of the Northern troops
permanently as the river defiles even when lightly defended are
impassable here to the strongest force. It was largely due to the
hardships of forced marches conducted over these rugged mountains, which
raise their precipitous peaks to the heavens, that Tsao-ao subsequently
lost his life, his health being undermined by exposure, tuberculosis
finally claiming him. But one thing at least did his resolute action
secure. With Yunnan in open revolt and several other provinces about to
follow suit, General Feng Kuo-chang was able to telegraph Peking that it
was impossible for him to leave his post at Nanking without rebellion
breaking out. This veiled threat was understood by Yuan Shih-kai. Grimly
he accepted the checkmate.

Yet all the while he was acting with his customary energy. Troops were
dispatched towards Szechuan in great numbers, being tracked up the
rapids of the upper river on board fleets of junks which were ruthlessly
commandeered. Now commenced an extraordinary race between the Yunnan
mountaineers and the Northern plainsmen for the strategic city of
Chungking. For some weeks the result was in doubt; for although Szechuan
province was held by Northern garrisons, they were relatively speaking
weak and surrounded by hostile Szechuan troops whose politics were
doubtful. In the end, however, Yuan Shih-kai's men reached their goal
first and Chungking was saved. Heavy and continuous mountain-fighting
ensued, in which the Southern troops were only partially successful.
Being less well-equipped in mountain artillery and less well-found in
general supplies they were forced to rely largely on guerrilla warfare.
There is little accurate record of the desperate fighting which occurred
in this wild region but it is known that the original Yunnan force was
nearly annihilated, and that of the remnant numbers perished from
disease and exposure.

Other events were, however, hastening the débâcle. Kueichow province had
almost at once followed the example of Yunnan. A third province,
Kwangsi, under a veteran who was much respected, General Lu Yun Ting,
was soon added; and gradually as in 1911 it became clear that the army
was only one chessman in a complicated and very ingenious game.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] This story is firmly believed by many, namely that a beautiful
woman caused the loss of Korea.



CHAPTER XIII

"THE THIRD REVOLUTION" (Continued)

THE DOWNFALL AND DEATH OF YUAN SHIH-KAI


As had been the case during the previous revolts, it was not publicly or
on the battlefield that the most crucial work was performed: the
decisive elements in this new and conclusive struggle were marshalled
behind the scenes and performed their task unseen. Though the
mandarinate, at the head of which stood Yuan Shih-kai, left no stone
unturned to save itself from its impending fate, all was in vain. Slowly
but inexorably it was shown that a final reckoning had to be faced.

The reasons are not far to seek. Too long had the moral sense of
educated men been outraged by common fraud and deceit for any
continuance of a régime which had disgraced China for four long years to
be humanly possible. Far and wide the word was rapidly passing that Yuan
Shih-kai was not the man he had once been; he was in reality feeble and
choleric--prematurely old from too much history-making and too many
hours spent in the harem. He had indeed become a mere Colossus with feet
of clay,--a man who could be hurled to the ground by precisely the same
methods he had used to destroy the Manchus. Even his foreign supporters
were becoming tired and suspicious of him, endless trouble being now
associated with his name, there being no promise that quieter times
could possibly come so long as he lived. A very full comprehension of
the general position is given by perusing the valedictory letter of the
leader of the Chinese intellectuals, that remarkable man--Liang
Ch'i-chao, who in December had silently and secretly fled from Tientsin
on information reaching him that his assassination was being planned. On
the even of his departure he had sent the following brilliant document
to the Emperor-elect as a reply to an attempt to entrap him to Peking, a
document the meaning of which was clear to every educated man. Its
exquisite irony mixed with its bluntness told all that was necessary to
tell--and forecasted the inevitable fall. It runs:--

    For the Kind Perusal of the Great President:--

    A respectful reading of your kind instructions reveals to me your
    modesty and the brotherly love which you cherish for your humble
    servant, who is so moved by your heart-touching sympathy that he
    does not know how to return your kindness. A desire then seized him
    to submit his humble views for your wise consideration; though on
    the one hand he has thought that he might fail to express what he
    wishes to say if he were to do so in a set of brief words, while on
    the other hand he has no desire to trouble the busy mind of one on
    whose shoulders fall myriads of affairs, with views expressed in
    many words. Furthermore, what Ch'i-chao desires to say relates to
    what can be likened to the anxiety of one who, fearing that the
    heavens may some day fall on him, strives to ward off the
    catastrophe. If his words should be misunderstood, it would only
    increase his offence. Time and again he has essayed to write; but
    each time he has stopped short. Now he is going South to visit his
    parents; and looking at the Palace-Gate from afar, he realizes that
    he is leaving the Capital indefinitely. The thought that he has been
    a protégé of the Great President and that dangers loom ahead before
    the nation as well as his sense of duty and friendly obligations,
    charge him with the responsibility of saying something. He therefore
    begs to take the liberty of presenting his humble but extravagant
    views for the kind consideration of the Great President.

    The problem of _Kuo-ti_ (form of State) appears to have gone too far
    for reconsideration: the position is like unto a man riding on the
    back of a wild tiger.... Ch'i-chao therefore at one moment thought
    he would say no more about it, since added comment thereon might
    make him all the more open to suspicion. But a sober study of the
    general situation and a quiet consideration of the possible future
    make him tremble like an autumn leaf; for the more he meditates, the
    more dangerous the situation appears. It is true that the minor
    trouble of "foreign advice" and rebel plotting can be settled and
    guarded against; but what Ch'i-chao bitterly deplores is that the
    original intention of the Great President to devote his life and
    energy to the interest of the country--an intention he has fulfilled
    during the past four years--will be difficult to explain to the
    world in future. The trust of the world in the Great President would
    be shattered with the result that the foundation of the country will
    be unsettled. Do not the Sages say: "In dealing with the people aim
    at faithfulness?" If faithfulness to promises be observed by those
    in authority, then the people will naturally surrender themselves.
    Once, however, a promise is broken, it will be as hard to win back
    the people's trust as to ascend to the very Heavens. Several times
    have oaths of office been uttered; yet even before the lips are dry,
    action hath falsified the words of promise. In these circumstances,
    how can one hope to send forth his orders to the country in the
    future, and expect them to be obeyed? The people will say "he
    started in righteousness but ended in self-seeking: how can we trust
    our lives in his hands, if he should choose to pursue even further
    his love of self-enrichment?" It is possible for Ch'i-chao to
    believe that the Great President has no desire to make profit for
    himself by the sacrifice of the country, but how can the mass of the
    people--who believe only what they are told--understand what
    Ch'i-chao may, perchance, believe?

    The Great President sees no one but those who are always near him;
    and these are the people who have tried to win his favour and gain
    rewards by concocting the alleged unanimous petitions of the whole
    country urging his accession to the Throne. In reality, however, the
    will of the people is precisely the opposite. Even the high
    officials in the Capital talk about the matter in a jeering and
    sarcastic way. As for the tone of the newspapers outside Peking,
    that is better left unmentioned. And as for the "small people" who
    crowd the streets and the market-places, they go about as if
    something untoward might happen at any moment. If a kingdom can be
    maintained by mere force, then the disturbance at the time of Ch'in
    Chih-huang and Sui Yang Ti could not have been successful. If, on
    the other hand, it is necessary to secure the co-operation and the
    willing submission of the hearts of the people, then is it not time
    that our Great President bethinks himself and boldly takes his own
    stand?

    Some argue that to hesitate in the middle of a course after
    indulging in much pomp and pageantry at the beginning will result in
    ridicule and derision and that the dignity of the Chief Executive
    will be lowered. But do they even know whether the Great President
    has taken the least part in connection with the phantasies of the
    past four months? Do they know that the Great President has, on many
    occasions, sworn fidelity before high Heaven and the noon-day sun?
    Now if he carries out his sacrosanct promise and is deaf to the
    unrighteous advice of evil counsellors, his high virtue will be made
    even more manifest than ever before. Wherein then is there need of
    doubt or fear?

    Others may even suggest that since the proposal was initiated by
    military men, the tie that has hitherto bound the latter to the
    Great President may be snapped in case the pear fails to ripen. But
    in the humble opinion of Ch'i-chao, the troops are now all fully
    inspired with a sense of obedience to the Chief Executive. Who then
    can claim the right to drag our Great President into unrighteousness
    for the sake of vanity and vainglory? Who will dare disobey the
    behests of the Great President if he should elect to open his heart
    and follow the path of honour and unbroken vows? If to-day, as Head
    of the nation, he is powerless to silence the riotous clamour of the
    soldiery as happened at Chen-chiao in ancient time, then be sure in
    the capacity of an Emperor he will not be able to suppress an
    outbreak of troops even as it happened once at Yuyang in the Tang
    dynasty.[20] To give them the handle of the sword is simply courting
    trouble for the future. But can we suspect the troops--so long
    trained under the Great President--of such unworthy conduct? The
    ancients say "However a thing is done, do not hurt the feelings of
    those who love you, or let your enemy have a chance to rejoice."
    Recently calamities in the forms of drought and flood have
    repeatedly visited China; and the ancients warn us that in such ways
    does Heaven manifest its Will regarding great movements in our
    country. In addition to these we must remember the prevailing evils
    of a corrupt officialdom, the incessant ravages of robbers, excesses
    in punishment, the unusually heavy burdens of taxation, as well as
    the irregularity of weather and rain, which all go to increase the
    murmurs and complaints of the people. Internally, the rebels are
    accumulating strength against an opportune time to rise; externally,
    powerful neighbouring countries are waiting for an opportunity to
    harass us. Why then should our Great President risk his precious
    person and become a target of public criticism; or "abandon the rock
    of peace in search of the tiger's tail"; or discourage the loyalty
    of faithful ones and encourage the sinister ambitions of the
    unscrupulous? Ch'i-chao sincerely hopes that the Great President
    will devote himself to the establishment of a new era which shall be
    an inspiration to heroism and thus escape the fate of those who are
    stigmatized in our annals with the name of Traitor. He hopes that
    the renown of the Great President will long be remembered in the
    land of _Chung Hua_ (China) and he prays that the fate of China may
    not end with any abrupt ending that may befall the Great President.
    He therefore submits his views with a bleeding heart. He realizes
    that his words may not win the approval of one who is wise and
    clever; but Ch'i-chao feels that unless he unburdens what is in his
    heart, he will be false to the duty which bids him speak and be true
    to the kindness that has been showered on him by the Great
    President. Whether his loyalty to the Imperative Word will be
    rewarded with approval or with reproof, the order of the Great
    President will say.

    There are other words of which Ch'i-chao wishes to tender to the
    Great President. To be an independent nation to-day, we must need
    follow the ways of the present age. One who opposes the current of
    the world and protects himself against the enriching influence of
    the world-spirit must eventually share the fate of the unselected.
    It is sincerely hoped that the Great President will refrain to some
    extent from restoring the old and withal work for real reform. Law
    can only be made a living force by both the ruler and the people
    obeying it with sincerity. When the law loses its strength, the
    people will not know how to act; and then the dignity of Government
    will disappear. It is hoped that the Great President will keep
    himself within the bounds of law and not lead the officials and the
    people to juggle with words. Participation in politics and
    patriotism are closely related. Bear well in mind that it is
    impossible to expect the people to share the responsibilities of the
    country, unless they are given a voice in the transaction of public
    business. The hope is expressed that the Great President will
    establish a real organ representing the true will of the people and
    encourage the natural growth of the free expression of public
    opinion. Let us not become so arrogant and oppressive that the
    people will have no chance to express their views, as this may
    inspire hatred on the part of the people. The relation between the
    Central Government and the provincial centres is like that between
    the trunk and branches of a tree. If the branches are all withered,
    how can the trunk continue to grow? It is hoped that the Great
    President, while giving due consideration to the maintenance of the
    dignity of the Central Government, will at the same time allow the
    local life of the provinces to develop. Ethics, Righteousness,
    Purity and Conscientiousness are four great principles. When these
    four principles are neglected, a country dies. If the whole country
    should come in spirit to be like "concubines and women," weak and
    open to be coerced and forced along with whomsoever be on the
    stronger side, how can a State be established? May the Great
    President encourage principle, and virtue, stimulate purity of
    character, reject men of covetous and mean character, and grant wise
    tolerance to those who know no fear in defending the right. Only
    then will the vitality of the country be retained in some degree;
    and in time of emergency, there will be a reserve of strength to be
    drawn upon in support of the State. All these considerations are of
    the order of obvious truths and it must be assumed that the Great
    President, who is greatly wise, is not unaware of the same. The
    reason why Ch'i-chao ventures to repeat them is this. He holds it
    true that a duty is laid on him to submit whatever humble thoughts
    are his, and at the same time he believes that the Great President
    will not condemn a proper physic even though it may be cheap and
    simple. How fortunate will Ch'i-chao be if advice so tendered shall
    meet with approval. He is proceeding farther and farther away from
    the Palace every day and he does not know how soon he will be able
    to seek an audience again. He writes these words with tears dropping
    into the ink-slab and he trusts that his words may receive the
    attention of the Great President.

So ends this remarkable missive which has become an historic document in
the archives of the Republic. Once again it was whispered that so great
an impression did this fateful warning produce on the Emperor-elect that
he was within an ace of cancelling the disastrous scheme which now
enmeshed him. But in the end family influence won the day; and
stubbornly and doggedly the doomed man pushed on with his attempt to
crush revolt and consolidate his crumbling position.

Every possible effort was made to minimize the effect of international
influence on the situation. As the sycophantic vernacular press of the
capital, long drilled to blind subservience, had begun to speak of his
enthronement as a certainty on the 9th February, a Circular Note was
sent to the Five Allied Powers that no such date had been fixed, and
that the newspaper reports to that effect were inventions. In order
specially to conciliate Japan, a high official was appointed to proceed
on an Embassy to Tokio to grant special industrial concessions--a
manoeuvre which was met with the official refusal of the Tokio
Government to be so placated. Peking was coldly informed that owing to
"court engagements" it would be impossible for the Emperor of Japan to
receive any Chinese Mission. After this open rebuff attention was
concentrated on "the punitive expedition" to chastise the disaffected
South, 80,000 men being put in the field and a reserve of 80,000
mobilized behind them. An attempt was also made to win over waverers by
an indiscriminate distribution of patents of nobility. Princes, Dukes,
Marquises, Viscounts and Barons were created in great batches overnight
only to be declined in very many cases, one of the most precious
possessions of the Chinese race being its sense of humour. Every one, or
almost every one, knew that the new patents were not worth the paper
they were written on, and that in future years the members of this
spurious nobility would be exposed to something worse than contempt.
France was invited to close the Tonkin frontier, but this request also
met with a rebuff, and revolutionists and arms were conveyed in an
ever-more menacing manner into the revolted province of Yunnan by the
French railways. A Princedom was at length conferred on Lung Chi Kwang,
the Military Governor of Canton, Canton being a pivotal point and Lung
Chi Kwang, one of the most cold-blooded murderers in China, in the hope
that this would spur him to such an orgy of crime that the South would
be crushed. Precisely the opposite occurred, since even murderers are
able to read the signs of the times. Attempts were likewise made to
enforce the use of the new Imperial Calendar, but little success crowned
such efforts, no one outside the metropolis believing for a moment that
this innovation possessed any of the elements of permanence.

Meanwhile the monetary position steadily worsened, the lack of money
becoming so marked as to spread panic. Still, in spite of this, the
leaders refused to take warning, and although the political impasse was
constantly discussed, the utmost concession the monarchists were willing
to make was to turn China into a Federal Empire with the provinces
constituted into self-governing units. The over-issue of paper currency
to make good the gaps in the National Finance, now slowly destroyed the
credit of the Central Government and made the suspension of specie
payment a mere matter of time. By the end of February the province of
Kueichow was not only officially admitted by the Peking Government to be
in open revolt as well as Yunnan, but rebel troops were reported to be
invading the neighbouring province of Hunan. Kwangsi was also reported
to be preparing for secession whilst in Szechuan local troops were
revolting in increasing numbers. Rumours of an attempted assassination
of Yuan Shih-kai by means of bombs now circulated,--and there were many
arrests and suicides in the capital. Though by a mandate issued on the
23rd February, the enthronement ceremony was indefinitely postponed,
that move came too late. The whole country was plainly trembling on the
edge of a huge outbreak when, less than four weeks later, Yuan Shih-kai
reluctantly and publicly admitted that the game was up. It is understood
that a fateful interview he had with the British Minister greatly
influenced him, though the formal declaration of independence of Kwangsi
on the 16th March, whither the scholar Liang Ch'i-chao had gone, was
also a powerful argument. On the 22nd March the Emperor-elect issued the
mandate categorically cancelling the entire monarchy scheme, it being
declared that he would now form a Responsible Cabinet. Until that date
the Government Gazette had actually perpetrated the folly of publishing
side by side Imperial Edicts and Presidential Mandates--the first for
Chinese eyes, the second for foreign consumption. Never before even in
China had such a farce been seen. A rapid perusal of the Mandate of
Cancellation will show how lamely and poorly the retreat is made:

    DECREE CANCELLING THE EMPIRE (22ND MARCH)

    After the establishment of the _Min Kuo_ (_i.e._ the Republic),
    disturbances rapidly followed one another; and a man of little
    virtue like me was called to take up the vast burden of the State.
    Fearing that disaster might befall us any day, all those who had the
    welfare of the country at heart advocated the reinstitution of the
    monarchical system of government to the end that a stop be put to
    all strife for power and a régime of peace be inaugurated.
    Suggestions in this sense have unceasingly been made to me since the
    days of Kuei Chou (the year of the first Revolution, 1911) and each
    time a sharp rebuke has been administered to the one making the
    suggestion. But the situation last year was indeed so different from
    the circumstances of preceding years that it was impossible to
    prevent the spread of such ideas.

    It was said that China could never hope to continue as a nation
    unless the constitutional monarchical form of state were adopted;
    and if quarrels like those occurring in Mexico and Portugal were to
    take place in China, we would soon share the fate of Annam and
    Burmah. A large number of people then advocated the restoration of a
    monarchy and advanced arguments which were reasonable. In this
    proposal all the military and civil officials, scholars and people
    concurred; and prayers were addressed to me in most earnest tone by
    telegram and in petitions. Owing to the position I was at the time
    holding, which laid on me the duty of maintaining the then existing
    situation, I repeatedly made declarations resisting the adoption of
    the advice; but the people did not seem to realize my embarrassment.
    And so it was decided by the acting Li Fa Yuan (_i.e._ the Senate)
    that the question of _Kuo-ti_ (form of State) should be settled by
    the Convention of Citizens' Representatives. As the result, the
    representatives of the Provinces and of the Special Administrative
    Areas unanimously decided in favour of a constitutional monarchy,
    and in one united voice elected me as the Emperor. Since the
    sovereignty of the country has been vested in the citizens of China
    and as the decision was made by the entire body of the
    representatives, there was no room left to me for further
    discussion. Nevertheless, I continued to be of the conviction that
    my sudden elevation to the Great Seat would be a violation of my
    oath and would compromise my good faith, leaving me unable to
    explain myself; I, therefore, declined in earnest words in order to
    make clear the view which hath always been mine. The said Senate
    however, stated with firmness that the oath of the Chief Executive
    rested on a peculiar sanction and should be observed or discarded
    according to the will of the people. Their arguments were so
    irresistible that there was in truth no excuse for me further to
    decline the offer.

    Therefore I took refuge behind the excuse of "preparations" in order
    that the desire of the people might be satisfied. But I took no
    steps actually to carry out the programme. When the trouble in
    Yunnan and Kueichow arose, a mandate was officially issued
    announcing the decision to postpone the measure and forbidding
    further presentation of petitions praying for the enthronement. I
    then hastened the convocation of the Li Fa Yuan (_i.e._, a new
    Parliament) in order to secure the views of that body and hoping
    thus to turn back to the original state of affairs, I, being a man
    of bitter experiences, had at once given up all ideas of world
    affairs; and having retired into the obscurity of the river Yuan (in
    Honan), I had no appetite for the political affairs of the country.
    As the result of the revolution in Hsin Hai, I was by mistake
    elected by the people. Reluctantly I came out of my retirement and
    endeavoured to prop up the tottering structure. I cared for nothing,
    but the salvation of the country. A perusal of our history of
    several thousand years will reveal in vivid manner the sad fate of
    the descendants of ancient kings and emperors. What then could have
    prompted me to aspire to the Throne? Yet while the representatives
    of the people were unwilling to believe in the sincerity of my
    refusal of the offer, a section of the people appear to have
    suspected me of harbouring the desire of gaining more power and
    privileges. Such difference in thought has resulted in the creation
    of an exceedingly dangerous situation. As my sincerity has not been
    such as to win the hearts of the people and my judgment has not been
    sound enough to appraise every man, I have myself alone to blame for
    lack of virtue. Why then should I blame others? The people have been
    thrown into misery and my soldiers have been made to bear hardships;
    and further the people have been cast into panic and commerce has
    rapidly declined. When I search my own heart a measure of sorrow
    fills it. I shall, therefore, not be unwilling to suppress myself in
    order to yield to others.

    I am still of the opinion that the "designation petitions" submitted
    through the Tsan Cheng Yuan are unsuited to the demands of the time;
    and the official acceptance of the Imperial Throne made on the 11th
    day of the 12th month of last year (11th December, 1915) is hereby
    cancelled. "The designation petitions" of the Provinces and of the
    Special Administrative Areas are hereby all returned through the
    State Department to the Tsan Cheng Yuan, _i.e._, the acting Li Fa
    Yuan (Parliament), to be forwarded to the petitioners for
    destruction; and all the preparations connected therewith are to
    cease at once. In this wise I hope to imitate the sincerity of the
    Ancients by taking on myself all the blame so that my action may
    fall in line with the spirit of humanity which is the expression of
    the will of Heaven. I now cleanse my heart and wash my thoughts to
    the end that trouble may be averted and the people may have peace.
    Those who advocated the monarchical system were prompted by the
    desire to strengthen the foundation of the country; but as their
    methods have proved unsuitable their patriotism might harm the
    country. Those who have opposed the monarchy have done so out of
    their desire to express their political views. It may be therefore
    presumed that they would not go to the extreme and so endanger the
    country. They should, therefore, all hearken to the voice of their
    own conscience and sacrifice their prejudices, and with one mind and
    one purpose unite in the effort of saving the situation so that the
    glorious descendants of the Sacred Continent may be spared the
    horrors of internal warfare and the bad omens may be changed into
    lucky signs.

    In brief I now confess that all the faults of the country are the
    result of my own faults. Now that the acceptance of the Imperial
    Throne has been cancelled every man will be responsible for his own
    action if he further disturbs the peace of the locality and thus
    gives an opportunity to others. I, the Great President, being
    charged with the duty of ruling over the whole country, cannot
    remain idle while the country is racing to perdition. At the present
    moment the homesteads are in misery, discipline has been
    disregarded, administration is being neglected and real talents have
    not been given a chance. When I think of such conditions I awake in
    the darkness of midnight. How can we stand as a nation if such a
    state of affairs is allowed to continue? Hereafter all officials
    should thoroughly get rid of their corrupt habits and endeavour to
    achieve merits. They should work with might and main in their
    duties, whether in introducing reforms or in abolishing old
    corruptions. Let all be not satisfied with empty words and entertain
    no bias regarding any affair. They should hold up as their main
    principle of administration the policy that only reality will count
    and deal out reward or punishment with strict promptness. Let all
    our generals, officials, soldiers and people all, all, act in
    accordance with this ideal.

This attempt at an _Amende honorable_, so far from being well-received,
was universally looked upon as an admission that Yuan Shih-kai had
almost been beaten and that a little more would complete his ruin.
Though, as we have said, the Northern troops were fighting well in his
cause on the upper reaches of the great Yangtsze, the movement against
him was now spreading as though it had been a dread contagious disease,
the entire South uniting against Peking. His promise to open a proper
Legislative Chamber on 1st May was met with derision. By the middle of
April five provinces--Yunnan, Kueichow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and
Chekiang--had declared their independence, and eight others were
preparing to follow suit. A Southern Confederacy, with a Supreme
Military Council sitting at Canton, was organized, the brutal Governor
Lung Chi Kwang having been won over against his master, and the scholar
Liang Ch'i-chao flitting from place to place, inspiring move after move.
The old parliament of 1913 was reported to be assembling in Shanghai,
whilst terrorist methods against Peking officials were bruited abroad
precipitating a panic in the capital and leading to an exodus of
well-to-do families who feared a general massacre.

An open agitation to secure Yuan Shih-kai's complete retirement and
exile now commenced. From every quarter notables began telegraphing him
that he must go,--including General Feng Kuo-chang who still held the
balance of power on the Yangtsze. Every enemy Yuan Shih-kai had ever had
was also racing back to China from exile. By the beginning of May the
situation was so threatening that the Foreign Legations became alarmed
and talked of concerting measures to insure their safety. On the 6th May
came the _coup de grâce_. The great province of Szechuan, which has a
population greater than the population of France, declared its
independence; and the whole Northern army on the upper reaches of the
Yangtsze was caught in a trap. The story is still told with bated breath
of the terrible manner in which Yuan Shih-kai sated his rage when this
news reached him--Szechuan being governed by a man he had hitherto
thoroughly trusted--one General Chen Yi. Arming himself with a sword and
beside himself with rage he burst into the room where his favourite
concubine was lying with her newly-delivered baby. With a few savage
blows he butchered them both, leaving them lying in their gore, thus
relieving the apoplectic stroke which threatened to overwhelm him.
Nothing better illustrates the real nature of the man who had been so
long the selected bailiff of the Powers.

On the 12th May it became necessary to suspend specie payment in Peking,
the government banks having scarcely a dollar of silver left, a last
attempt to negotiate a loan in America having failed. Meanwhile under
inspiration of General Feng Kuo-chang, a conference to deal with the
situation was assembling at Nanking; but on the 11th May, the Canton
Military Government, representing the Southern Confederacy, had already
unanimously elected Vice-President Li Yuan Hung as president of the
Republic, it being held that legally Yuan Shih-kai had ceased to be
President when he had accepted the Throne on the previous 13th December.
The Vice-President, who had managed to remove his residence outside the
Palace, had already received friendly offers of protection from certain
Powers which he declined, showing courage to the end. Even the Nanking
Conference, though composed of trimmers and wobblers, decided that the
retirement of Yuan Shih-kai was a political necessity, General Feng
Kuo-chang as chairman of the Conference producing at the last moment a
telegram from the fallen Dictator declaring that he was willing to go if
his life and property were guaranteed.

A more dramatic collapse was, however, in store. As May drew to an end
it was plain that there was no government at all left in Peking. The
last phase had been truly reached. Yuan Shih-kai's nervous collapse was
known to all the Legations which were exceedingly anxious about the
possibility of a soldiers' revolt in the capital. The arrival of a first
detachment of the savage hordes of General Chang Hsun added Byzantine
touches to a picture already lurid with a sickened ruler and the
Mephistophelian figure of that ruler's _âme damnée_, the Secretary Liang
Shih-yi, vainly striving to transmute paper into silver, and find the
wherewithal to prevent a sack of the capital. It was said at the time
that Liang Shih-yi had won over his master to trying one last throw of
the dice. The troops of the remaining loyal Generals, such as Ni
Shih-chung of Anhui, were transported up the Yangtsze in an attempt to
restore the situation by a savage display,--but that effort came to
nought.

The situation had become truly appalling in Peking. It was even said
that the neighbouring province of Shantung was to become a separate
state under Japanese protection. Although the Peking administration was
still nominally the Central Government of China, it was amply clear to
observers on the spot that by a process of successive collapses all that
was left of government was simply that pertaining to a city-state of the
antique Greek type--a mal-administration dominated by the enigmatic
personality of Liang Shih-yi. The writ of the capital no longer ran more
than ten miles beyond the city walls. The very Government Departments,
disgusted with, and distrustful of, the many hidden influences at work,
had virtually declared their independence and went their own way,
demanding foreign dollars and foreign banknotes from the public, and
refusing all Chinese money. The fine residuum of undisputed power left
in the hands of the Mal-administrator-in-chief, Liang Shih-yi, was the
control of the copper cash market which he busily juggled with to the
very end netting a few last thousands for his own purse, and showing
that men like water inevitably find their true level. In all China's
tribulations nothing similar had ever been seen. Even in 1900, after the
Boxer bubble had been pricked and the Court had sought safety in flight,
there was a certain dignity and majesty left. Then an immense misfortune
had fallen across the capital; but that misfortune was like a cloak
which hid the nakedness of the victim; and there was at least no
pretence at authority. In the Summer of 1916, had it not been for the
fact that an admirable police and gendarmerie system, comprising 16,000
men, secured the safety of the people, there can be little doubt that
firing and looting would have daily taken place and no woman been safe.
It was the last phase of political collapse with a vengeance: and small
wonder if all Chinese officials, including even high police officers,
sent their valuables either out of the city or into the Legation Quarter
for safe custody. Extraordinary rumours circulated endlessly among the
common people that there would be great trouble on the occasion of the
Dragon Festival, the 5th June; and what actually took place was perhaps
more than a coincidence.

Early on the 6th June an electric thrill ran through Peking--Yuan
Shih-kai was dead! At first the news was not believed, but by eleven
o'clock it was definitely known in the Legation Quarter that he had died
a few minutes after ten o'clock that morning from uraemia of the
blood--the surgeon of the French Legation being in attendance almost to
the last. A certificate issued later by this gentleman immediately
quieted the rumours of suicide, though many still refused to believe
that he was actually dead. "I did not wish this end," he is reported to
have whispered hoarsely a few minutes before he expired, "I did not wish
to be Emperor. Those around me said that the people wanted a king and
named me for the Throne. I believed and was misled." And in this way did
his light flicker out. If there are sermons in stones and books in the
running brooks surely there is an eloquent lesson in this tragedy!
Before expiring the wretched man issued the following Death Mandate in
accordance with the ancient tradition, attempting as the long night fell
on him to make his peace with men:--

    LAST MANDATE OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

    The Min Kuo has been established for five years. Unworthily have I,
    the Great President, been entrusted with the great task by the
    citizens. Owing to my lack of virtue and ability I have not been
    able fully to transform into deeds what I have desired to
    accomplish; and I blush to say that I have not realized one
    ten-thousandth part of my original intention to save the country and
    the people. I have, since my assumption of the office, worked in
    day and thought in the night, planning for the country. It is true
    that the foundation of the country is not yet consolidated, the
    hardships of the people not yet relieved, and innumerable reforms
    are still unattended to. But by the valuable services of the civil
    officials and military men, some semblance of peace and order has
    been maintained in the provinces and friendly relations with the
    Powers upheld till now.

    While on the one hand I comfort myself with such things
    accomplished, on the other hand I have much to blame myself for. I
    was just thinking how I could retire into private life and rest
    myself in the forest and near the springs in fulfilment of my
    original desire, when illness has suddenly overtaken me. As the
    affairs of the State are of gravest importance, the right man must
    be secured to take over charge of the same. In accordance with
    Article 29 of the Provisional Constitution, which states that in
    case the office of the Great President should be vacated for certain
    reasons or when the Great President is incapacitated from doing his
    duties, the Vice-President shall exercise authority and power in his
    stead. I, the Great President, declare in accordance with the
    Provisional Constitution that the Vice-President shall exercise in
    an acting capacity, the authority and power of the Great President
    of the Chung Hua Min Kuo.

    The Vice-President being a man of courtesy, good nature, benevolence
    and wisdom, will certainly be capable of greatly lessening the
    difficulties of the day and place the country on the foundation of
    peace, and so remedy the defects of me, the Great President, and
    satisfy the expectations of the people of the whole country. The
    civil and military officials outside of the Capital as well as the
    troops, police and scholars and people should doubly keep in mind
    the difficulties and perils of the nation, and endeavour to maintain
    peace and order to the best of their ability, placing before
    everything else the welfare of the country. The ancients once said:
    "It is only when the living do try to become strong that the dead
    are not dead." This is also the wish of me, the Great President.

    (Signed) TUAN CHI-JUI,
    Secretary of State and
    Minister of War

    TSAO JU-LIN,
    Minister of Foreign Affairs and
    Communications.

    WANG YI-TANG,
    Minister of Interior.

    CHOW TZU-CHI,
    Minister of Finance.

    LIU-KUAN-HSIUNG,
    Minister of Navy.

    CHANG TSUNG-HSIANG,
    Minister of Justice and
    Agriculture and Commerce.

    CHANG KUO-KAN,
    Minister of Education.

    6th day of the 6th month of the 5th year of Chung Hua Min Kuo.

This tragic dénouement did not fail to awaken within very few days
among thinking minds a feeling of profound sympathy for the dead man
coupled with sharp disgust for the part that foreigners had played--not
all, of course--but a great number of them. Briefly, when all the facts
are properly grouped it can be said that Yuan Shih-kai was killed by his
foreign friends--by the sort of advice he has been consistently given in
Constitutional Law, in Finance, in Politics, in Diplomacy. It is easy to
trace step by step the broad road he had been tempted to travel, and to
see how at each turning-point the men who should have taught him how to
be true and loyal to the Western things the country had nominally
adhered to from the proclamation of the Republic, showed him how to be
disloyal and untrue. The tragedy is one which is bound to be deeply
studied throughout the whole world when the facts are properly known and
there is time to think about them, and if there is anything to-day left
to poetic justice the West will know to whom to apportion the blame.

Yuan Shih-kai, the man, when he came out of retirement in 1911, was in
many ways a wonderful Chinese: he was a fount of energy and of a
physical sturdiness rare in a country whose governing classes have
hitherto been recruited from attenuated men, pale from study and the
lotus life. He had a certain task to which to put his hand, a huge task,
indeed, since the reformation of four hundred millions was involved, yet
one which was not beyond him if wisely advised. He was an ignorant man
in certain matters, but he had had much political experience and
apparently possessed a marvellous aptitude for learning. The people
needed a leader to guide them through the great gateway of the West, to
help them to acquire those jewels of wisdom and experience which are a
common heritage. An almost Elizabethan eagerness filled them, as if a
New World they had never dreamed of had been suddenly discovered for
them and lay open to their endeavours. China, hitherto derided as a
decaying land, had been born anew; and in single massive gesture had
proclaimed that she, too, would belong to the elect and be governed
accordingly.

What was the foreign response--the official response? In every
transaction into which it was possible to import them, reaction and
obscurantism were not only commonly employed but heartily recommended.
Not one trace of genuine statesmanship, not one flash of altruism, was
ever seen save the American flash in the pan of 1913, when President
Wilson refused to allow American participation in the great
Reorganization Loan because he held that the terms on which it was to be
granted infringed upon China's sovereign rights. Otherwise there was
nothing but a tacit endorsement of the very policy which has been
tearing the entrails out of Europe--namely militarism. That was the fine
fruit which was offered to a hopeful nation--something that would wither
on the branch or poison the people as they plucked it. They were taught
to believe that political instinct was the ability to misrepresent in a
convincing way the actions and arguments of your opponents and to profit
by their mistakes--not that it is a mighty impulse which can re-make
nations. The Republic was declared by the actions of Western bureaucrats
to be a Republic _pour rire_, not a serious thing; and by this false and
cruel assumption they killed Yuan Shih-kai.

If that epitaph is written on his political tombstone, it will be as
full of blinding truth as is only possible with Last Things.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] The incident of Chen-chiao is very celebrated in Chinese annals. A
yellow robe, the symbol of Imperial authority, was thrown around General
Chao Kuang-ying, at a place called Chen-chiao, by his soldiers and
officers when he commanded a force ordered to the front. Chao returned
to the Capital immediately to assume the Imperial Throne, and was thus
"compelled" to become the founder of the famous Sung dynasty.

The "incident of Yuyang" refers to the execution of Yang Kuei-fei, the
favourite concubine of Emperor Yuan Tsung of the Tang dynasty. The
Emperor for a long time was under the alluring influence of Yang
Kuei-fei, who had a paramour named An Lo-hsan. The latter finally
rebelled against the Emperor. The Emperor left the capital and proceeded
to another place together with his favourite concubine, guarded by a
large force of troops. Midway, however, the soldiers threatened to rebel
unless the concubine was killed on the spot. The clamour was such that
the Emperor was forced to sacrifice the favourite of his harem, putting
her to death in the presence of his soldiers.



CHAPTER XIV

THE NEW RÉGIME,--FROM 1916 TO 1917


Within an hour of the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the veteran General Tuan
Chi-jui, in his capacity of Secretary of State, had called on
Vice-President Li Yuan-hung--the man whom years before he had been sent
to the Yangtsze to bring captive to Peking--and welcomed him as
President of the Republic. At one o'clock on the same day the Ministers
of the Allied Powers who had hastily assembled at the Waichiaopu
(Foreign Office), were informed that General Li Yuan-hung had duly
assumed office and that the peace and security of the capital were fully
guaranteed. No unrest of any sort need be apprehended; for whilst
rumours would no doubt circulate wildly as soon as the populace realized
the tragic nature of the climax which had come the Gendarmerie Corps and
the Metropolitan Police--two forces that numbered 18,000 armed men--were
taking every possible precaution.

In spite of these assurances great uneasiness was felt. The foreign
Legations, which are very imperfectly informed regarding Chinese affairs
although living in the midst of them, could not be convinced that
internal peace could be so suddenly attained after five years of such
fierce rivalries. Among the many gloomy predictions made at the time,
the most common to fall from the lips of Foreign Plenipotentiaries was
the remark that the Japanese would be in full occupation of the country
within three months--the one effective barrier to their advance having
been removed. No better illustration could be given of the inadequate
grasp of politics possessed by those whose peculiar business it should
be to become expert in the science of cause and effect. In China, as in
the Balkans, professional diplomacy errs so constantly because it has
in the main neither the desire nor the training to study dispassionately
from day to day all those complex phenomena which go to make up modern
nationalism. Guided in its conduct almost entirely by a policy of
personal predilections, which is fitfully reinforced by the recollection
of precedents, it is small wonder if such mountains of mistakes choke
every Legation dossier. Determined to have nothing whatever to do, save
in the last resort, with anything that savours of Radicalism, and
inclining naturally towards ideals which have long been abandoned in the
workaday world, diplomacy is the instinctive lover of obscurantism and
the furtive enemy of progress. Distrusting all those generous movements
which spring from the popular desire to benefit by change, it follows
from this that the diplomatic brotherhood inclines towards those truly
detestable things--secret compacts. In the present instance, having been
bitterly disappointed by the complete collapse of the strong man theory,
it was only natural that consolation should be sought by casting doubt
on the future. Never have sensible men been so absurd. The life-story of
Yuan Shih-kai, and the part European and Japanese diplomacy played in
that story, form a chapter which should be taught as a warning to all
who enter politics as a career, since there is exhibited in this history
a complete compendium of all the more vicious traits of Byzantinism.

The first acts of President Li Yuan-hung rapidly restored confidence and
advertised to the keen-eyed that the end of the long drawn-out
Revolution had come. Calling before him all the generals in the capital,
he told them with sincerity and simplicity that their country's fortunes
rested in their hands; and he asked them to take such steps as would be
in the nature of a permanent insurance against foreign interference in
the affairs of the Republic. He was at once given fervent support. A
mass meeting of the military was followed by the whole body of
commissioned men volunteering to hold themselves personally responsible
for the maintenance of peace and order in the capital. The dreadful
disorders which had ushered in the Yuan Shih-kai régime were thus made
impossible; and almost at once men went about their business as usual.

The financial wreckage left by the mad monarchy adventure was, however,
appalling. Not only was there no money in the capital but hardly any
food as well; for since the suspension of specie payments country
supplies had ceased entering the city as farmers refused to accept
inconvertible paper in payment for their produce. It became necessary
for the government to sell at a nominal price the enormous quantities of
grain which had been accumulated for the army and the punitive
expedition against the South; and for many days a familiar sight was the
endless blue-coated queues waiting patiently to receive as in war-time
their stipulated pittance.

Meanwhile, although the troops remained loyal to the new régime, not so
the monarchist politicians. Seeing that their hour of obliteration had
come, they spared no effort to sow secret dissensions and prevent the
provinces from uniting again with Peking. It would be wearisome to give
in full detail the innumerable schemes which were now hourly formulated,
to secure that the control of the country should not be exercised in a
lawful way. Finding that it was impossible to conquer the general
detestation felt for them, the monarchists, led by Liang Shih-yi,
changed their tactics and exhausted themselves in attempting to secure
the issue of a general amnesty decree. But in spite of every argument
President Li Yuan-hung remained unmoved and refused absolutely to
consider their pardon. A just and merciful man, it was his intention to
allow the nation to speak its mind before issuing orders on the subject;
but to show that he was no advocate of the terrorist methods practised
by his predecessor, he now issued a Mandate summarily abolishing the
infamous _Chih Fa Chu_, or Military Court, which Yuan Shih-kai had
turned into an engine of judicial assassination, and within whose gloomy
precincts many thousands of unfortunate men had perished practically
untried in the period 1911-1916.

Meanwhile the general situation throughout the country only slowly
ameliorated. The Northern Military party, determined to prevent
political power from passing solely into the hands of the Southern
Radicals, bitterly opposed the revival of the Nanking Provisional
Constitution, and denounced the re-convocation of the old Parliament of
1913, which had already assembled in Shanghai, preparatory to coming up
to the capital. It needed a sharp manoeuvre to bring them to their
senses. The Chinese Navy, assembled in the waters near Shanghai, took
action; and in an ultimatum communicated to Peking by their Admiral,
declared that so long as the government in the hands of General Tuan
Chi-jui refused to conform to popular wishes by reviving the Nanking
Provisional Constitution and resummoning the old Parliament, so long
would the Navy refuse to recognize the authority of the Central
Government. With the fleet in the hands of the Southern Confederacy,
which had not yet been formally dissolved, the Peking Government was
powerless in the whole region of the Yangtsze; consequently, after many
vain manoeuvres to avoid this reasonable and proper solution, it was at
last agreed that things should be brought back precisely where they had
been before the _coup d'état_ of the 4th November, 1913--the Peking
Government being reconstituted by means of a coalition cabinet in which
there would be both nominees of the North and South--the premiership
remaining in the hands of General Tuan Chi-jui.

On the 28th June a long funeral procession wended its way from the
Presidential Palace to the railway Station; it was the remains of the
great dictator being taken to their last resting-place in Honan.
Conspicuous in this cortege was the magnificent stage-coach which had
been designed to bear the founder of the new dynasty to his throne but
which only accompanied him to his grave. The detached attitude of the
crowds and the studied simplicity of the procession, which was designed
to be republican, proved more clearly than reams of arguments that
China--despite herself perhaps--had become somewhat modernized, the
oldest country in the world being now the youngest republic and timidly
trying to learn the lessons of youth.

Once Yuan Shih-kai had been buried, a Mandate ordering the summary
arrest of all the chief monarchist plotters was issued; but the gang of
corrupt men had already sought safety in ignominious flight; and it was
understood that so long as they remained on soil under foreign
jurisdiction, no attempt would be made even to confiscate their goods
and chattels as would certainly have been done under former governments.
The days of treachery and double-dealing and cowardly revenge were
indeed passing away and the new régime was committed to decency and
fairplay. The task of the new President was no mean one, and in all the
circumstances if he managed to steer a safe middle course and avoid both
Caesarism and complete effacement, that is a tribute to his training.
Born in 1864 in Hupeh, one of the most important mid-Yangtsze provinces,
President Li Yuan-hung was now fifty-two years old, and in the prime of
life; but although he had been accustomed to a military atmosphere from
his earliest youth his policy had never been militaristic. His father
having been in command of a force in North China for many years, rising
from the ranks to the post of _Tsan Chiang_ (Lieutenant-Colonel), had
been constrained to give him the advantage of a thoroughly modern
training. At the age of 20 he had entered the Naval School at Tientsin;
whence six years later he had graduated, seeing service in the navy as
an engineer officer during the Chino-Japanese war of 1894. After that
campaign he had been invited by Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, then one of the
most distinguished of the older viceroys, to join his staff at Nanking,
and had been entrusted with the supervision of the construction of the
modern forts at the old Southern capital, which played such a notable
part in the Revolution. When Chang Chih-tung was transferred to the
Wuchang viceroyalty, General Li Yuan-hung had accompanied him, actively
participating in the training of the new Hupeh army, and being assisted
in that work by German instructors. In 1897 he had gone to Japan to
study educational, military and administrative methods, returning to
China after a short stay, but again proceeding to Tokio in 1897 as an
officer attached to the Imperial Guards. In the autumn of the following
year he had returned to Wuchang and been appointed Commander of the
Cavalry. Yet another visit was paid by him to Japan in 1902 to attend
the grand military manoeuvres, these journeys giving him a good working
knowledge of Japanese, in addition to the English which had been an
important item in the curriculum of the Naval School, and which he
understands moderately well. In 1903 he was promoted Brigadier-General,
being subsequently gazetted as the Commander of the 2nd Division of
Regulars (_Chang Pei Chun_) of Hupeh. He also constantly held various
subsidiary posts, in addition to his substantive appointment, connected
with educational and administrative work of various kinds, and has
therefore a sound grasp of provincial government. He was
Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Division during the famous military
manoeuvres of 1906 at Changtehfu in Honan province, which are said to
have given birth to the idea of a universal revolt against the Manchus
by using the army as the chief instrument.

On the memorable day of October 11, 1911, when the standard of revolt
was raised at Wuchang, somewhat against his will as he was a loyal
officer, he was elected military Governor, thus becoming the first real
leader of the Republic. Within the space of ten days his leadership had
secured the adhesion of fourteen provinces to the Republican cause; and
though confronted by grave difficulties owing to insufficiency of
equipment and military supplies, he fought the Northern soldiery for two
months around Wuchang with varying success. He it was, when the Republic
had been formally established and the Manchu régime made a thing of the
past, who worked earnestly to bring about better relations between the
armies of North and South China which had been arrayed against one
another during many bitter weeks. It was he, also, who was the first to
advocate the complete separation of the civil and military
administration--the administrative powers in the early days of the
Republic being entirely in the hands of the military governors of the
provinces who recruited soldiery in total disregard to the wishes of the
Central Government. Although this reform has even to-day only been
partially successful, there is no reason to doubt that before the
Republic is many years older the idea of the military dictating the
policy and administration of the country will pass away. The so-called
Second Revolution of 1913 awakened no sympathy in General Li Yuan-hung,
because he was opposed to internal strife and held that all Chinese
should work for unity and concerted reform rather than indulge in
fruitless dissensions. His disapproval of the monarchy movement had been
equally emphatic in the face of an ugly outlook. He was repeatedly
approached by the highest personages to give in his adhesion to Yuan
Shih-kai becoming emperor, but he persistently refused although grave
fears were publicly expressed that he would be assassinated. Upon the
formal acceptance of the Throne by Yuan Shih-kai, he had had conferred
on him a princedom which he steadfastly refused to accept; and when the
allowances of a prince were brought to him from the Palace he returned
them with the statement that as he had not accepted the title the money
was not his. Every effort to break his will proved unavailing, his
patience and calmness contributing very materially to the vast moral
opposition which finally destroyed Yuan Shih-kai.

Such was the man who was called upon to preside over the new government
and parliament which was now assembling in Peking; and certainly it may
be counted as an evidence of China's traditional luck which brought him
to the helm. General Li Yuan-hung knew well that the cool and singular
plan which had been pursued to forge a national mandate for a revival of
of the empire would take years completely to obliterate, and that the
octopus-hold of the Military Party--the army being the one effective
organization which had survived the Revolution--could not be loosened
in a day,--in fact would have to be tolerated until the nation asserted
itself and showed that it could and would be master. In the
circumstances his authority could not but be very limited, disclosing
itself in passive rather than in active ways. Wishing to be above all a
constitutional President, he quickly saw that an interregnum must be
philosophically accepted during which the Permanent Constitution would
be worked out and the various parties forced to a general agreement; and
thanks to this decision the year which has now elapsed since Yuan
Shih-kai's death has been almost entirely eventless, with the exception
of the crisis which arose over the war-issue, a matter which is fully
discussed elsewhere.

Meanwhile, in the closing months of 1916, the position was not a little
singular. Two great political parties had arisen through the
Revolution--the Kuo Ming Tang or Nationalists, who included all the
Radical elements, and the Chinputang or Progressives, whose adherents
were mainly men of the older official classes, and therefore
conservative. The Yunnan movement, which had led to the overthrow of
Yuan Shih-kai, had been inspired and very largely directed by the
scholar Liang Ch'i-chao, a leader of the Chinputang. To this party,
then, though numerically inferior to the Kuo Ming Tang, was due the
honour and credit of re-establishing the Republic, the Kuo Ming Tang
being under a cloud owing to the failure of the Second Revolution of
1913 which it had engineered. Nevertheless, owing to the Kuo Ming Tang
being more genuinely republican, since it was mainly composed of younger
and more modern minds, it was from its ranks that the greatest check to
militarism sprang; and therefore although its work was necessarily
confined to the Council-chamber, its moral influence was very great and
constantly representative of the civilian element as opposed to the
militarist. By staking everything on the necessity of adhering to the
Nanking Provisional Constitution until a permanent instrument was drawn
up, the Kuo Ming Tang rapidly established an ascendancy; for although
the Nanking Constitution had admittedly failed to bring representative
government because of the difficulty of defining powers in such a way as
to make a practical autocracy impossible, it had at least established as
a basic principle that China could no longer be ruled as a family
possession, which in itself marked a great advance on all previous
conceptions. President Li Yuan-hung's policy, in the circumstances, was
to play the part of a moderator and to seek to bring harmony to a mass
of heterogeneous elements that had to carry out the practical work of
government over four hundred millions of people.

His success was at the outset hampered by the appeal the military were
quick in making to a new method--to offset the power of Parliament in
Peking. We have already dealt with the evils of the circular telegram in
China--surely one of the most unexpected results of adapting foreign
inventions to native life. By means of these telegraphic campaigns a
rapid exchange of views is made possible among the provincial governors;
and consequently in the autumn of 1916, inspired by the Military Party,
a wholly illegal Conference of generals was organized by the redoubtable
old General Chang Hsun on the Pukow railway for the purpose of overawing
parliament, and securing that the Military Party retained a controlling
hand behind the scenes. It is perhaps unnecessary to-day to do more than
note the fact that the peace of the country was badly strained by this
procedure; but thanks to moderate counsels and the wisdom of the
President no open breach occurred and there is reason to believe that
this experiment will not be repeated,--at least not in the same way.[21]

The difficulty to be solved is of an unique nature. It is not that the
generals and the Military Party are necessarily reactionary: it is that,
not belonging to the intellectual-literary portion of the ruling
elements, they are less advanced and less accustomed to foreign ways,
and therefore more in touch with the older China which lingers on in the
vast agricultural districts, and in all those myriad of townships which
are dotted far and wide across the provinces to the confines of Central
Asia. Naturally it is hard for a class of men who hold the balance of
power and carry on much of the actual work of governing to submit to the
paper decrees of an institution they do not accept as being responsible
and representative: but many indications are available that when a
Permanent Constitution has been promulgated, and made an article of
faith in all the schools, a change for the better will come and the old
antagonisms gradually disappear.

It is on this Constitution that Parliament has been at work ever since
it re-assembled in August, 1916, and which is now practically completed.
Sitting together three times a week as a National Convention, the two
Houses have subjected the Draft Constitution (which was prepared by a
Special Parliamentary Drafting Committee) to a very exhaustive
examination and discussion. Many violent scenes have naturally marked
the progress of this important work, the two great parties, the Kuo Ming
Tang and the Chinputang, coming to loggerheads again and again. But in
the main the debates and the decisions arrived at have been satisfactory
and important, because they have tended to express in a concrete and
indisputable form the present state of the Chinese mind and its immense
underlying commonsense. Remarkable discussions and fierce enmities, for
instance, marked the final decision not to make the Confucian cult the
State Religion; but there is not the slightest doubt that in formally
registering this veritable revolution in the secret stronghold of
Chinese political thought, a Bastille has been overthrown and the
ground left clear for the development of individualism and personal
responsibility in a way which was impossible under the leaden formulae
of the greatest of the Chinese sages. In defining the relationship which
must exist between the Central Government and the provinces even more
formidable difficulties have been encountered, the apostles of
decentralization and the advocates of centralization refusing for many
months to agree on the so-called Provincial system, and then fighting a
battle _à outrance_ on the question of whether this body of law should
form a chapter in the Constitution or be simply an annexure to the main
instrument. The agreement which was finally arrived at--to make it part
and parcel of the Constitution--was masterly in that it has secured that
the sovereignty of the people will not tend to be expressed in the
provincial dietines which have now been re-erected (after having been
summarily destroyed by Yuan Shih-kai), the Central Parliament being left
the absolute master. This for a number of years will no doubt be more of
a theory than a practice; but there is every indication that
parliamentary government will within a limited period be more successful
in China than in some European countries; and that the Chinese with
their love of well-established procedure and cautious action, will
select open debate as the best method of sifting the grain from the
chaff and deciding every important matter by the vote of the majority.
Already in the period of 1916-1917 Parliament has more than justified
its re-convocation by becoming a National Watch Committee.
Interpellations on every conceivable subject have been constant and
frequent; fierce verbal assaults are delivered on Cabinet Ministers; and
slowly but inexorably a real sense of Ministerial responsibility is
being created, the fear of having to run the gauntlet of Parliament
abating, if it has not yet entirely destroyed, many malpractices. In the
opinion of the writer in less than ten years Parliament will have
succeeded in coalescing the country into an organic whole, and will have
placed the Cabinet in such close daily relations with it that something
very similar to the Anglo-Saxon theory of government will be impregnably
entrenched in Peking. That such a miracle should be possible in extreme
Eastern Asia is one more proof that there are no victories beyond the
capacity of the human mind.

[Illustration: General Tsao-ao, the Hero of the Yunnan Rebellion of
1915-16, who died from the effects of the campaign.]

[Illustration: Liang Shih-yi, who was the Power behind Yuan Shih-kai,
now proscribed and living in exile at Hong-Kong.]

Meanwhile, for the time being, in China as in countries ten thousand
miles away, ministerial irresponsibility is the enemy; that is to say
that so-called Cabinet-rule, with the effacement of the Chief Executive,
has tended to make Cabinet Ministers removed from effective daily
control. All sorts of things are done which should not be done and men
are still in charge of portfolios who should be summarily expelled from
the capital for malpractices.[22] But although Chinese are slow to take
action and prefer to delay all decisions until they have about them the
inexorable quality which is associated with Fate, there is not the
slightest doubt that in the long run the dishonest suffer, and an
increasingly efficient body of men take their place. From every point of
view then there is reason for congratulation in the present position,
and every hope that the future will unroll peacefully.

A visit to Parliament under the new régime is a revelation to most men:
the candid come away with an impression which is never effaced from
their minds. There is a peculiar suggestiveness even in the location of
the Houses of the National Assembly. They are tucked away in the distant
Western city immediately under the shadow of the vast Tartar Wall as if
it had been fully expected when they were called into being that they
would never justify their existence, and that the crushing weight of the
great bastion of brick and stone surrounding the capital would soon
prove to them how futile it was for such palpable intruders to aspire to
national control. Under Yuan Shih-kai, as under the Manchus, they were
an exercise in the arm of government, something which was never to be
allowed to harden into a settled practice. They were first cousins to
railways, to electrical power, to metalled roadways and all those other
modern instances beginning to modify an ancient civilization entirely
based on agriculture; and because they were so distantly related to the
real China of the farm-yard it was thought that they would always stand
outside the national life.

That was what the fools believed. Yet in a copy of the rules of
procedure of the old Imperial Senate (Tzuchengyuan) the writer finds
this note written in 1910: "The Debates of this body have been
remarkable during the very first session. They make it seem clear that
the first National Parliament of 1913 will seize control of China and
nullify the power of the Throne. Result, revolution--" Though the dating
is a little confused, the prophecy is worthy of record.

The watchfulness of the special police surrounding the Parliament of
1916-1917 and the great number of these men also tells a story as
eloquent as the location of the building. It is not so much that any
contemplated violence sets these guardians here as the necessity to
advertise that there has been unconstitutional violence in the past
which, if possible, will be rigidly defeated in the future. Probably no
National Assembly in the world has been held up to greater contempt than
the Parliament of Peking and probably no body deserves it less. An
afternoon spent in the House of Representatives would certainly surprise
most open-minded men who have been content to believe that the Chinese
experiment was what some critics have alleged it to be. The Chinese as a
people, being used to guild-house proceedings, debates, in which the
welfare of the majority is decided after an examination of the
principles at stake, are a very old and well-established custom; and
though at present there are awkwardnesses and gaucheries to be noted,
when practice has become better fixed, the common sense of the race will
abundantly disclose itself and make a lasting mark on contemporary
history. There can be no doubt about this at all.

Take your seat in the gallery and see for yourself. The first question
which rises to the lips is--where are the young men, those crude and
callow youths masquerading as legislators which the vernacular press has
so excessively lampooned? The majority of the members, so far from being
young, are men of thirty or forty, or even fifty, with intelligent and
tired faces that have lost the Spring of youth. Here and there you will
even see venerable greybeards suffering from rheumy coughs who ought to
be at home; and though occasionally there is a lithe youngster in
European clothes with the veneer he acquired abroad not yet completely
rubbed off, the total impression is that of oldish men who have reached
years of maturity and who are as representative of the country and as
good as the country is in a position to-day to provide. No one who knows
the real China can deny that.

The Continental arrangement of the Members' desks and the raised tribune
of the Speaker, with its rows of clerks and recorders, make an
impression of orderliness, tinged nevertheless with a faint
revolutionary flavour. Perhaps it is the straight black Chinese hair and
the rich silk clothing, set on a very plain and unadorned background,
which recall the pictures of the French Revolution. It is somehow
natural in such circumstances that there should occasionally be dramatic
outbursts with the blood of offenders bitterly demanded as though we
were not living in the Twentieth Century when blood alone is admittedly
no satisfaction. The presence of armed House police at every door, and
in the front rows of the strangers' gallery as well, contributes to this
impression which has certain qualities of the theatre about it and is
oddly stimulating. China at work legislating has already created her
first traditions: she is proceeding deliberately armed--with the
lessons of the immediate past fully noted.

This being the home of a literary race, papers and notebooks are on most
Members' desks. As the electric bells ring sharply an unending
procession of men file in to take their seats, for there has been a
recess and the House has been only half-filled. Nearly every one is in
Chinese dress (_pien-yi_) with the Member's badge pinned conspicuously
on the breast. The idea speedily becomes a conviction that this after
all is not extraneous to the nation, but actually of the living flesh, a
vital and imperative thing. The vastness and audacity of it all cannot
fail to strike the imaginative mind, for the four or five hundred men
who are gathered here typify, if they do not yet represent, the four or
five hundred millions who make up the country. You see as it were the
nation in profile, a ponderous, slow-moving mass, quickly responsive to
curious sub-conscious influences--suddenly angry and suddenly calm again
because Reason has after all always been the great goddess which is
perpetually worshipped. All are scholarly and deliberate in their
movements. When the Speaker calls the House in order and the debate
commences, deep silence comes save for the movement of hundreds of
nervous hands that touch papers or fidget to and fro. Every man uses
his hands, particularly when he speaks, not clenched as a European would
do, but open, with the slim fingers speaking a language of their own,
twisting, turning, insinuating, deriding, a little history of
compromises. It would be interesting to write the story of China from a
study of the hands.

Each man goes to the rostrum to speak, and each has much to say. Soon
another impression deepens--that the Northerners with their clear-cut
speech and their fuller voices have an advantage over the Southerners of
the kind that all public performers know. The mandarin language of
Peking is after all the mother-language of officialdom, the _madre
lingua_, less nervous and more precise than any other dialect and
invested with a certain air of authority which cannot be denied. The
sharp-sounding, high-pitched Southern voice, though it may argue very
acutely and rapidly, appears at an increasing disadvantage. There seems
to be a tendency inherent in it to become querulous, to make its
pleading sound specious because of over-much speech. These are curious
little things which have been not without influence in other regions of
the world.

The applause when it comes proves the same thing as applause does
everywhere; that if you want to drive home your points in a large
assembly you must be condensed and simple, using broad, slashing
arguments. This is precisely what distinguishes melodrama from drama,
and which explains why excessive analysis is no argument in the popular
mind. Generally, however, there is not much applause and the voice of
the speaker wanders through the hall uninterrupted by signs of content
or discontent. Sometimes, although rather rarely, there is a gust of
laughter as a point is scored against a hated rival. But it dies away as
suddenly as it arose--almost before you have noted it, as if it were
superfluous and must make room for more serious things.

With the closing of a debate there is the vote. An electric bell rings
again, and with a rough hand the House police close all the exits. The
clerks come down into the aisles. They seem to move listlessly and
indifferently; yet very quickly they have checked the membership to
insure that the excessively large quorum requisite is present. Now the
Speaker calls for the vote. Massively and stiffly, as at a word of
command the "ayes" rise in their seats. There is a round of applause;
the bill has been carried almost unanimously. That, however, is not
always so. When there is an obstreperous mood abroad, the House will
decline to proceed with the agenda, and a dozen men will rise at a time
and speak from behind their desks, trying to talk each other down. The
Speaker stands patiently wrestling with the problem of procedure--and
often failing since practice is still in process of being formed. Years
must elapse before absolutely hard-and-fast rules are established. Still
the progress already made since August, 1916, is remarkable, and
something is being learned every day. The business of a Parliament is
after all to debate--to give voice to the uppermost thoughts in the
nation's mind; and how those thoughts are expressed is a continual
exposition of the real state of the nation's political beliefs.
Parliament is--or should be--a microcosm of the race; parliament is
never any better or any worse than the mass of the people. The rule of
the majority as expressed in the voting of the National Assembly must be
taken as a fundamental thing; China is no exception to the rule--the
rule of the majority must be decisive. But here another complexity of
the new Chinese political life enters into the problem. The existence of
a responsible Cabinet, which is not yet linked to the Legislative body
in any well-understood way, and which furthermore has frequently acted
in opposition to the President's office, makes for a daily struggle in
the administration of the country which is strongly to be condemned and
which has already led to some ugly clashes. But nevertheless there are
increasing indications that parliamentary government is making steady
headway and that when both the Permanent Constitution and the Local
Government system have been enforced, a new note will be struck. No
doubt it will need a younger generation in office to secure a complete
abandonment of all the old ways, but the writer has noted with
astonishment during the past twelve-month how eager even viceroys
belonging to the old Manchu régime have become to fall in with the new
order and to lend their help, a sharp competition to obtain ministerial
posts being evident in spite of the fact that the gauntlet of Parliament
has to be run and a majority vote recorded before any appointment is
valid.

One last anomaly has, however, yet to be done away with in Peking. The
deposed boy Emperor still resides in the Winter Palace surrounded by a
miniature court,--a state of affairs which should not be tolerated any
longer as it no doubt tends to assist the rumours which every now and
again are mysteriously spread by interested parties that a Restoration
is imminent. The time has arrived when not only must the Manchu Imperial
Family be removed far from the capital but a scheme worked out for
commuting the pension-system of so-called Bannerman families who still
draw their monthly allowances as under the Manchus, thanks to the
articles of Favourable Treatment signed at the time of abdication of
1912. When these two important questions have been settled, imperialism
in China will tend rapidly to fade into complete oblivion.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] Although the events dealt with in Chapter XVI have brought China
face to face with a new crisis the force of the arguments used here is
in no wise weakened.

[22] Since this was written two Cabinet Ministers have been summarily
arrested.



CHAPTER XV

THE REPUBLIC IN COLLISION WITH REALITY: TWO TYPICAL INSTANCES OF
"FOREIGN AGGRESSION"


Such, then, were the internal conditions which the new administration
was called upon to face with the death of Yuan Shih-kai. With very
little money in the National Treasury and with the provinces unable or
unwilling to remit to the capital a single dollar, it was fortunate that
at least one public service, erected under foreign pressure, should be
brilliantly justifying its existence. The Salt Administration,
efficiently reorganized in the space of three years by the great Indian
authority, Sir Richard Dane, was now providing a monthly surplus of
nearly five million dollars; and it was this revenue which kept China
alive during a troubled transitional period when every one was declaring
that she must die. By husbanding this hard cash and mixing it liberally
with paper money, the Central Government has been able since June, 1916,
to meet its current obligations and to keep the general machinery from
breaking down.

But in a country such as China new dangers have to be constantly faced
and smoothed away--the interests of the outer world pressing on the
country and conflicting with the native interest at a myriad points. And
in order to illustrate and make clear the sort of daily exacerbation
which the nation must endure because of the vastness of its territory
and the octopus-hold of the foreigner we give two typical cases of
international trouble which have occurred since Yuan Shih-kai's death.
The first is the well-known Chengchiatun incident which occurred in
Manchuria in August, 1916: the second is the Lao-hsi-kai affair which
took place in Tientsin in November of the same year and created a storm
of rage against France throughout North China which at the moment of
writing has not yet abated.

The facts about the Chengchiatun incident are incredibly simple and
merit being properly told. Chengchiatun is a small Mongol-Manchurian
market-town lying some sixty miles west of the South Manchurian railway
by the ordinary cart-roads, though as the crow flies the distance is
much less. The country round about is "new country," the prefecture in
which Chengchiatun lies being originally purely Mongol territory on
which Chinese squatted in such numbers that it was necessary to erect
the ordinary Chinese civil administration. Thirty or forty miles due
west of the town cultivation practically ceases; and then nothing meets
the eye but the rolling grasslands of Mongolia, with their sparse
encampments of nomad horsemen and shepherds which stretch so
monotonously into the infinities of High Asia.

The region is strategically important because the trade-routes converge
there from the growing marts of the Taonanfu administration, which is
the extreme westernly limit of Chinese authority in the Mongolian
borderland. A rich exchange in hides, furs, skins, cattle and foodstuffs
has given this frontier town from year to year an increasing importance
in the eyes of the Chinese who are fully aware of the dangers of a
laissez aller policy and are determined to protect the rights they have
acquired by pre-emption. The fact that notorious Mongol brigand-chiefs,
such as the famous Babachapu who was allied to the Manchu Restoration
Party and who was said to have been subsidized by the Japanese Military
Party, had been making Chengchiatun one of their objectives, brought
concern early in 1916 to the Moukden Governor, the energetic General
Chang Tso-lin, who in order to cope with the danger promptly established
a military cordon round the district, with a relatively large reserve
based on Chengchiatun, drawn from the 28th Army Division. A certain
amount of desultory fighting months before any one had heard of the town
had given Chengchiatun the odour of the camp; and when in the summer the
Japanese began military manoeuvres in the district with various
scattered detachments, on the excuse that the South Manchuria railway
zone where they alone had the right under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty to
be, was too cramped for field exercises, it became apparent that
dangerous developments might be expected--particularly as a body of
Japanese infantry was billeted right in the centre of the town.

On the 13th August a Japanese civilian at Chengchiatun--there is a small
Japanese trading community there--approached a Chinese boy who was
selling fish. On the boy refusing to sell at the price offered him, the
Japanese caught hold of him and started beating him. A Chinese soldier
of the 28th Division who was passing intervened; and a scuffle commenced
in which other Chinese soldiers joined and which resulted in the
Japanese being severely handled. After the Chinese had left him, the man
betook himself to the nearest Japanese post and reported that he had
been grievously assaulted by Chinese soldiers for no reason whatsoever.
A Japanese gendarme made a preliminary investigation in company with the
man; then returning to the Japanese barracks, declared that he could
find no one in authority; that his attempts at discovering the culprits
had been resisted; and that he must have help. The Japanese officer in
command, who was a captain, detailed a lieutenant and twenty men to
proceed to the Chinese barracks to obtain satisfaction from the Chinese
Commander--using force if necessary. It was precisely in this way that
the play was set in motion.

The detachment marched off to the headquarters of the offending Chinese
detachment, which was billeted in a pawnshop, and tried to force their
way past a sentry who stood his ground, into the inner courtyards. A
long parley ensued with lowered bayonets; and at last on the Chinese
soldier absolutely refusing to give way, the lieutenant gave orders to
cut him down. There appears to be no doubt about these important
facts--that is to say, that the act of war was the deliberate attack by
a Japanese armed detachment on a Chinese sentry who was guarding the
quarters of his Commander.

A frightful scene followed. It appears that scattered groups of Chinese
soldiers, some with their arms, and some without, had collected during
this crisis and point-blank firing at once commenced. The first shots
appear to have been fired--though this was never proved--by a Chinese
régimental groom, who was standing with some horses some distance away
in the gateway of some stabling and who is said to have killed or
wounded the largest number of Japanese. In any case, seven Japanese
soldiers were killed outright, five more mortally wounded and four
severely so, the Chinese themselves losing four killed, besides a number
of wounded. The remnant of the Japanese detachment after this rude
reverse managed to retreat with their wounded officer to their own
barracks where the whole detachment barricaded themselves in, firing for
many hours at everything that moved on the roads though absolutely no
attempt was made by the Chinese soldiery to advance against them.

The sound of this heavy firing, and the wild report that many Japanese
had been killed, had meanwhile spread panic throughout the town, and
there was a general _sauve qui peut_, a terrible retribution being
feared. The local Magistrate finally restored some semblance of order;
and after dark proceeded in person with some notables of the town to the
Japanese barracks to tender his regrets and to arrange for the removal
of the Japanese corpses which were lying just as they had fallen, and
which Chinese custom demanded should be decently cared for, though they
constituted important and irrefragible evidence of the armed invasion
which had been practised. The Japanese Commander, instead of meeting
these conciliatory attempts half-way, thereupon illegally arrested the
Magistrate and locked him up, being impelled to this action by the
general fear among his men that a mass attack would be made in the night
by the Chinese troops in garrison and the whole command wiped out.
Nothing, however, occurred and on the 14th instant the Magistrate was
duly released on his sending for his son to take his place as hostage.
On the 16th the Magistrate had successfully arranged the withdrawal of
all Chinese troops five miles outside the town to prevent further
clashes. On the 15th Japanese cavalry and infantry began to arrive in
large numbers from the South Manchuria railway zone (where they alone
have the Treaty right to be) and the town of Chengchiatun was
arbitrarily placed by them in a state of siege.

Here is the stuff of which the whole incident was made: there is nothing
material beyond the facts stated which illustrate very glaringly the
manner in which a strong Power acts towards a weak one.

Meanwhile the effect in Tokio of these happenings had been electrical.
Relying on the well-known Japanese police axiom, that the man who gets
in his story first is the prosecutor and the accused the guilty party,
irrespective of what the evidence may be, the newspapers all came out
with the same account of a calculated attack by "ferocious Chinese
soldiers" on a Japanese detachment and the general public were asked to
believe that a number of their enlisted nationals had been deliberately
and brutally murdered. It was not, however, until more than a week after
the incident that an official report was published by the Tokio Foreign
Office, when the following garbled account was distributed far and wide
as the Japanese case:--

    "When one Kiyokishy Yoshimoto, aged 27, an employé of a Japanese
    apothecary at Chengchiatun, was passing the headquarters of the
    Chinese troops on the 13th instant, a Chinese soldier stopped him,
    and, with some remarks, which were unintelligible to the Japanese,
    suddenly struck him on the head. Yoshimoto became enraged, but was
    soon surrounded by a large number of Chinese soldiers and others,
    who subjected him to all kind of humiliation. As a result of this
    lawlessness on the part of the Chinese, the Japanese sustained
    injuries in seven or eight places, but somehow he managed to break
    away and reach a Japanese police box, where he applied for help. On
    receipt of this news, a policeman, named Kowase, hastened to the
    spot, but by the time he arrived there all the offenders had fled.
    He therefore repaired to the headquarters of the Chinese to lay a
    complaint, but the sentry stopped him, and presented a pistol at
    him, and under these circumstances he was obliged to apply to the
    Japanese Garrison headquarters, where Captain Inone instructed
    Lieutenant Matsuo with twenty men to escort the policeman to the
    Chinese headquarters. When the party approached the Chinese
    headquarters, Chinese troops began to fire, and the policeman and
    others were either killed or wounded. Despite the fact that the
    Japanese troops retired, the Chinese troops did not give up firing,
    but besieged the Japanese garrison, delivering several severe
    attacks. Soon after the fighting ceased, the Chinese authorities
    visited the Japanese barracks, and expressed the desire that the
    affair be settled amicably. It was the original intention of the
    Japanese troops to fight it out, but they were completely
    outnumbered, and lest the safety of the Japanese residents be
    endangered, they stopped fighting. On examination of the dead bodies
    of seven Japanese soldiers, who were attacked outside the barracks,
    it was discovered that they had been all slain by the Chinese
    troops, the bodies bearing marks of violence."

Without entering again into the merits of the case, we would ask those
who are acquainted with recent history whether it is likely that Chinese
soldiers, knowing all the pains and penalties attaching to such action,
would deliberately attack a body of twenty armed Japanese under an
officer as the Japanese official account states? We believe that no
impartial tribunal, investigating the matter on the spot, could fail to
point out the real aggressors and withal lay bare the web of a most
amazing state of affairs. For in order to understand what occurred, on
the 13th August, 1916, it is necessary to turn far away from
Chengchiatun and see what lies behind it all.

At the back of the brain of the Japanese Military Party, which by no
means represents the Japanese nation or the Japanese Government although
it exercises a powerful influence on both, is the fixed idea that South
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia must be turned into a strongly held and
fortified Japanese _enclave_, if the balance of power in Eastern Asia is
to be maintained. Pursuant to this idea, Japanese diplomacy was induced
many months ago to concentrate its efforts on winning--if not
wringing--from Russia the strategically important strip of railway south
of the Sungari River, because (and this should be carefully noted) with
the Sungari as the undisputed dividing-line between the Russian and
Japanese spheres in Manchuria, and with Japanese shallow-draft gun-boats
navigating that waterway and entering the Nonni river, it would be easily
possible for Japan to complete a "Continental quadrilateral" which would
include Korea, South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the extreme western
barrier of which would be the new system of Inner Mongolian railways
centring round Taonanfu and terminating at Jehol, for which Japan already
holds the building rights[23]. Policing rights--in the outer zone of this
_enclave_,--with a total exclusion of all Chinese garrisons, is the
preliminary goal towards which the Japanese Military Party has been long
plainly marching; and long before anybody had heard of Chengchiatun, a
scheme of reconnoitring detachments had been put in force to spy out the
land and form working alliances with the Mongol bands in order to harass
and drive away all the representatives of Chinese authority. What
occurred, then, at Chengchiatun might have taken place at any one of
half-a-dozen other places in this vast and little-known region whither
Japanese detachments have silently gone; and if Chinese diplomacy in the
month of August, 1916, was faced with a rude surprise, it was only what
political students had long been expecting. For though Japan should be
the real defender of Chinese liberties, it is a fact that in Chinese
affairs Japanese diplomacy has been too long dictated to by the Military
Party in Tokio and attempts nothing save when violence allows it to tear
from China some fresh portion of her independence.

And here we reach the crux of the matter. One of the little known
peculiarities of the day lies in the fact that Japan is the land of
political inaction _because there is no tradition of action save that
which has been built up by the military and naval chiefs since the
Chinese war of_ 1894-95. Having only visualized the world in
international terms during two short decades, there has been no time for
a proper tradition to be created by the civil government of Japan; and
because there is no such tradition, the island empire of the East has no
true foreign policy and is at the mercy of manufactured crises, being
too often committed to petty adventures which really range her on the
side of those in Europe the Allies have set themselves to destroy. It is
for this reason that the Chinese are consistently treated as though they
were hewers of wood and drawers of water, helots who are occasionally
nattered in the columns of the daily press and yet are secretly looked
upon as men who have been born merely to be cuffed and conquered. The
Moukden Governor, General Chang Tso-lin, discussing the Chengchiatun
affair with the writer, put the matter in a nutshell. Striking the table
he exclaimed: "After all we are not made of wood like this, we too are
flesh and blood and must defend our own people. A dozen times I have
said, 'Let them come and take Manchuria openly if they dare, but let
them cease their childish intrigues.' Why do they not do so? Because
they are not sure they can swallow us--not at all sure. Do you
understand? We are weak, we are stupid, we are divided, but we are
innumerable, and in the end, if they persist, China will burst the
Japanese stomach."

Such passionate periods are all very well, but when it comes to the
sober business of the council chamber it is a regrettable fact that
Chinese, although foreign friends implore them to do so, do not properly
use the many weapons in their armoury. Thus in this particular case,
instead of at once hurrying to Chengchiatun some of the many foreign
advisers who sit kicking their heels in Peking from one end of the year
to the other and who number competent jurisconsults, China did next to
nothing. No proper report was drawn up on the spot; sworn statements
were not gathered, nor were witnesses brought to Peking; and it
therefore happened that when Japan filed her demands for redress, China
had not in her possession anything save an utterly inadequate defence.
Mainly because of this she was forced to agree to forgoing any direct
discussion of the rights and wrongs of the case, proceeding directly to
negotiations based on the various claims which Japan filed and which
were as follows:--

    1. Punishment of the General commanding the 28th Division.

    2. The dismissal of officers at Chengchiatun responsible for the
    occurrence as well as the severe punishment of those who took direct
    part in the fracas.

    3. Proclamations to be posted ordering all Chinese soldiers and
    civilians in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to refrain
    from any act calculated to provoke a breach of the peace with
    Japanese soldiers or civilians.

    4. China to agree to the stationing of Japanese police officers in
    places in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia where their
    presence was considered necessary for the protection of Japanese
    subjects. China also to agree to the engagement by the officials of
    South Manchuria of Japanese police advisers.

    _And in addition_:--

    1. Chinese troops stationed in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
    Mongolia to employ a certain number of Japanese Military officers as
    advisers.

    2. Chinese Military Cadet schools to employ a certain number of
    Japanese Military officers as instructors.

    3. The Military Governor of Moukden to proceed personally to Port
    Arthur to the Japanese Military Governor of Kwantung to apologize
    for the occurrence and to tender similar personal apologies to the
    Japanese Consul General in Moukden.

    4. Adequate compensation to be paid by China to the Japanese
    sufferers and to the families of those killed.

The merest tyro will see at once that so far from caring very much about
the killing of her soldiery, Japan was bent on utilizing the opportunity
to gain a certain number of new rights and privileges in the zone of
Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia--notably an extension of
her police and military-supervision rights. In spite, however, of the
faulty procedure to which she had consented, China showed considerable
tenacity in the course of negotiations which lasted nearly half a year,
and by the end of January, 1917, had whittled down the question of
Japanese compensation to fairly meagre proportions. To be precise the
two governments agreed to embody by the exchange of Notes the five
following stipulations:--

    1. The General commanding the 28th Division to be reprimanded.

    2. Officers responsible to be punished according to law. If the law
    provides for severe punishment, such punishment will be inflicted.

    3. Proclamations to be issued enjoining Chinese soldiers and
    civilians in the districts where there is mixed residence to accord
    considerate treatment to Japanese soldiers and civilians.

    4. The Military Governor of Moukden to send a representative to Port
    Arthur to convey his regret when the Military Governor of Kwantung
    and Japanese Consul General at Moukden are there together.

    5. A solatium of $500 (Five Hundred Dollars) to be given to the
    Japanese merchant Yoshimoto.

But though the incident was thus nominally closed, and amicable
relations restored, the most important point--the question of Japanese
police-rights in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia--was left
precisely where it had been before, the most vigorous Chinese protests
not having induced Japan to abate in the slightest her pretensions.
During previous years a number of Japanese police-stations and
police-boxes had been established in defiance of the local authorities
in these regions, and although China in these negotiations recorded her
strongest possible objection to their presence as being the principal
cause of the continual friction between Chinese and Japanese, Japan
refused to withdraw from her contention that they did not constitute any
extension of the principle of extraterritoriality, and that indeed
Japanese police, distributed at such points as the Japanese consular
authorities considered necessary, must be permanently accepted. Here
then is a matter which will require careful consideration when the
Powers meet to revise their Chinese Treaties as they must revise them
after the world-war; for Japan in Manchuria is fundamentally in no
different a position from England in the Yangtsze Valley and what
applies to one must apply to the other. The new Chinese police which are
being distributed in ever greater numbers throughout China form an
admirable force and are superior to Japanese police in the performance
of nearly all their duties. It is monstrous that Japan, as well as other
Powers, should act in such a reprehensible manner when the Chinese
administration is doing all it can to provide efficient guardians of the
peace.

[Illustration: The Famous or Infamous General Chang-Hsun, the leading
Reactionary in China to-day, who still commands a force of 30,000 men
astride of the Pukow Railway.]

[Illustration: The Bas-relief in a Peking Temple, well illustrating
Indo-Chinese influences.]

The second case was one in which French officialdom by a curious act of
folly gravely alienated Chinese sympathies and gave a powerful weapon to
the German propaganda in China at the end of 1916. The Lao-hsi-kai
dispute, which involved a bare 333 acres of land in Tientsin, has now
taken its place beside the Chengchiatun affair, and has become a leading
case in that great dossier of griefs which many Chinese declare make up
the corpus of Euro-Chinese relations. Here again the facts are
absolutely simple and absolutely undisputed. In 1902 the French consular
authorities in Tientsin filed a request to have their Concession
extended on the ground that they were becoming cramped. The Chinese
authorities, although not wishing to grant the request and indeed
ignoring it for a long time, were finally induced to begin fitful
negotiations; and in October, 1916, after having passed through various
processes of alteration, reduction, and re-statement during the interval
of fourteen years, the issue had been so fined down that a virtual
agreement regarding the administration of the new area had been
reached--an agreement which the Peking Government was prepared to put
into force subject to one reasonable stipulation, that the local
opposition to the new grant of territory which was very real, as Chinese
feel passionately on the subject of the police-control of their
land-acreage, was first overcome. The whole essence or soul of the
disputes lay therein: that the lords of the soil, the people of China,
and in this case more particularly the population of Tientsin, should
accept the decision arrived at which was that a joint Franco-Chinese
administration be established under a Chinese Chairman.

When the terms of this proposed agreement were communicated to the
Tientsin Consulate by the French Legation the arrangement did not please
the French Consul-General, who was under transfer to Shanghai and who
proposed to settle the case to the satisfaction of his nationals before
he left. There is absolutely no dispute about this fact either--namely
that the main pre-occupation of a consular officer, charged primarily
under the Treaties with the simple preservation of law and order among
his nationals, was the closing-up of a vexatious outstanding case, by
force if necessary, before he handed over his office to his successor.
It was with this idea that an ultimatum was drawn up by the French
Consul General and, having been weakly approved by the French Legation,
was handed to the Chinese local authorities. It gave them a time-limit
of twenty-four hours in which to effect the complete police evacuation
of the coveted strip of territory on the ground that the delay in the
signature of a formal Protocol had been wilful and deliberate and had
closed the door to further negotiations; and as no response came at the
end of the time-limit, an open invasion of Chinese territory was
practised by an armed French detachment; nine uniformed Chinese
constables on duty being forcibly removed and locked up in French
barracks and French sentries posted on the disputed boundary.

The result of this misguided action was an enormous Chinese outcry and
the beginning of a boycott of the French in North China,--and this in
the middle of a war when France has acted with inspiring nobility. Some
2,000 native police, servants and employé's promptly deserted the French
Concession _en masse_; popular unions were formed to keep alive
resentment; and although in the end the arrested police were set at
liberty, the friendly intervention of the Allies proved unable to effect
a settlement of the case which at the moment of writing remains
precisely where it was a year ago.[24]

Here you have the matter of foreign interests in China explained in the
sense that they appear to Chinese. It is not too much to say that this
illustration of the deliberate lawlessness, which has too often been
practised in the past by consuls who are simply Justices of the Peace,
would be incredible elsewhere; and yet it is this lawlessness which has
come to be accepted as part and parcel of what is called "policy" in
China because in the fifty years preceding the establishment of the
Republic a weak and effeminate mandarinate consistently sought safety in
surrenders. It is this lawlessness which must at all costs be suppressed
if we are to have a happy future. The Chinese people have so far
contented themselves by pacific retaliation and have not exploded into
rage; but those who see in the gospel of boycott an ugly manifestation
of what lies slumbering should give thanks nightly that they live in a
land where reason is so supreme. Think of what might not happen in China
if the people were not wholly reasonable! Throughout the length and
breadth of the land you have small communities of foreigners, mere drops
in a mighty ocean of four hundred millions, living absolutely secure
although absolutely at the mercy of their huge swarms of neighbours. All
such foreigners--or nearly all--have come to China for purposes of
profit; they depend for their livelihood on co-operation with the
Chinese; and once that co-operation ceases they might as well be dead
and buried for all the good residence will do them. In such
circumstances it would be reasonable to suppose that a certain decency
would inspire their attitude, and that a policy of give-and-take would
always be sedulously practised; and we are happy to say that there is
more of this than there used to be. It is only when incidents such as
the Chengchiatun and Laihsikai affairs occur that the placid population
is stirred to action. Even then, instead of turning and rending the many
little defenceless communities--as European mobs would certainly
do--they simply confine themselves to boycotting the offenders and
hoping that this evidence of their displeasure will finally induce the
world to believe that they are determined to get reasonable treatment.
The Chinese as a people may be very irritating in the slowness with
which they do certain things--though they are as quick in business as
the quickest Anglo-Saxon--but that is no excuse why men who call
themselves superior should treat them with contempt. The Chinese are the
first to acknowledge that it will take them a generation at least to
modernize effectively their country and their government; but they
believe that having erected a Republic and having declared themselves as
disciples of the West they are justified in expecting the same treatment
and consideration which are to be given after the war even to the
smallest and weakest nations of Europe.

FOOTNOTES:

[23] Russian diplomats now deny that the Japanese proposals regarding
the cession of the railway south of the Sungari river have ever been
formally agreed to.

[24] A further illustration of the action of French diplomacy in China
has just been provided (April, 1917) in the protest lodged by France
against the building of a railway in Kwangsi Province by American
engineers with American capital--France claiming _exclusive rights_ in
Kwangsi by virtue of a letter sent by the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs to the French Legation in 1914 as settlement for a frontier
dispute in that year. The text of the letter is as follows:

"The dispute that rose in consequence of the disturbance at the border
of Annam and Kwangsi has been examined into by the Joint Committee
detailed by both parties concerned, and a conclusion has been reached to
the effect that all matters relating to the solution of the case would
be carried out in accordance with the request of Your Excellency.

"In order to demonstrate the especially good friendly relations existing
between the two countries, the Republican Government assures Your
Excellency that in case of a railway construction or a mining enterprise
being undertaken in Kwangsi Province in the future, for which foreign
capital is required, France would first be consulted for a loan of the
necessary capital. On such an occasion, the Governor of Kwangsi will
directly negotiate with a French syndicate and report to the
Government."

It is high time that the United States raises the whole question of the
open door in China again, and refuses to tolerate any longer the old
disruptive and dog-in-the-manger policy of the Powers. America is now
happily in a position to inaugurate a new era in the Far East as in the
Far West and to stop exploitation.



CHAPTER XVI

CHINA AND THE WAR


The question of Chinese sentiments on the subject of the war, as well as
the precise relations between the Chinese Government and the two groups
of belligerents, are matters which have been totally misunderstood. To
those who have grasped the significance of the exhaustive preceding
account of the Republic in travail, this statement should not cause
surprise; for China has been in no condition to play anything but an
insignificant and unsatisfactory rôle in world-politics.

When the world-war broke out China was still in the throes of her
domestic troubles and without any money at all in her Central Treasury;
and although Yuan Shih-kai, on being suddenly confronted with an
unparalleled international situation, did initiate certain negotiations
with the German Legation with a view to securing a cancellation of the
Kiaochow lease, the ultimatum which Japan dispatched to Germany on the
15th August, 1914, completely nullified his tentative proposals. Yuan
Shih-kai had, indeed, not been in the slightest degree prepared for such
a sensational development as war between Japan and Germany over the
question of a cruiser-base established on territory leased from China;
and although he considered the possibility of sending a Chinese force to
co-operate in the attack on the German stronghold, that project was
never matured, whilst his subsequent contrivances, notably the
establishment of a so-called war-zone in Shantung, were without
international value, and attracted no attention save in Japan.

Chinese, however, did not remain blind to the trend of events. After the
fall of Tsingtao and the subsequent complications with Japan, which so
greatly served to increase the complexities of a nebulous situation,
certain lines of thought insensibly developed. That the influential
classes in China should have desired that Germany should by some means
rehabilitate herself in Europe and so be placed in a position to
chastise a nation that for twenty years had brought nothing but sorrow
to them was perhaps only natural; and it is primarily to this one cause
that so-called sympathy with Germany during the first part of the war
has been due. But it must also be noticed that the immense German
propaganda in China during the first two years of the war, coupled with
the successes won in Russia and elsewhere, powerfully impressed the
population--not so much because they were attracted by the feats of a
Power that had enthroned militarism, but because they wrongly supposed
that sooner or later the effects of this military display would be not
only to secure the relaxation of the Japanese grip on the country but
would compel the Powers to re-cast their pre-war policies in China and
abandon their attempts at placing the country under financial
supervision. Thus, by the irony of Fate, Germany in Eastern Asia for the
best part of 1914, 1915 and 1916, stood for the aspirations of the
oppressed--a moral which we may very reasonably hope will not escape the
attention of the Foreign Offices of the world. Nor must it be forgotten
that the modern Chinese army, being like the Japanese, largely
Germany-trained and Germany-armed, had a natural predilection for
Teutonism; and since the army, as we have shown, plays a powerful rôle
in the politics of the Republic, public opinion was greatly swayed by
what it proclaimed through its accredited organs.

Be this as it may, it was humanly impossible for such a vast country
with such vast resources in men and raw materials to remain permanently
quiescent during an universal conflagration when there was so much to be
salvaged. Slowly the idea became general in China that something had to
be done; that is that a state of technical neutrality would lead nowhere
save possibly to Avernus.

As early as November, 1915, Yuan Shih-kai and his immediate henchmen had
indeed realized the internal advantages to be derived from a formal
war-partnership with the signatories of the Pact of London, the impulse
to the movement being given by certain important shipments of arms and
ammunition from China which were then made. A half-surreptitious
attempt to discuss terms in Peking caused no little excitement, the
matter being, however, only debated in very general terms. The principal
item proposed by the Peking government was characteristically the
stipulation that an immediate loan of two million pounds should be made
to China, in return for her technical belligerency. But when the
proposal was taken to Tokio, Japan rightly saw that its main purpose was
simply to secure an indirect foreign endorsement of Yuan Shih-kai's
candidature as Emperor; and for that reason she threw cold-water on the
whole project. To subscribe to a formula, which besides enthroning Yuan
Shih-kai would have been a grievous blow to her Continental ambitions,
was an unthinkable thing; and therefore the manoeuvre was foredoomed to
failure.

The death of Yuan Shih-kai in the summer of 1916 radically altered the
situation. Powerful influences were again set to work to stamp out the
German cult and to incline the minority of educated men who control the
destinies of the country to see that their real interests could only lie
with the Allies, who were beginning to export Chinese man-power as an
auxiliary war-aid and who were very anxious to place the whole matter on
a sounder footing. Little real progress was, however, made in the face
of the renewed German efforts to swamp the country with their
propaganda. By means of war-maps, printed in English and Chinese, and
also by means of an exhaustive daily telegraphic service which hammered
home every possible fact illustrative of German invincibility, the
German position in China, so far from being weakened, was actually
strengthened during the period when Rumania was being overrun. By a
singular destiny, any one advocating an alliance with the Allies was
bitterly attacked not only by the Germans but by the Japanese as
well--this somewhat naïve identification of Japan's political interest
with those of an enemy country being an unique feature of the situation
worthy of permanent record.

It was not until President Wilson sent out his Peace offering of the
19th December, 1916, that a distinct change came. On this document being
formally communicated to the Chinese Government great interest was
aroused, and the old hopes were revived that it would be somehow
possible for China to gain entry at the definitive Peace Congress which
would settle beyond repeal the question of the disposal of Kiaochow and
the whole of German interests in Shantung Province,--a subject of
burning interest to the country not only because of the harsh treatment
which had been experienced at the hands of Japan, but because the
precedent established in 1905 at the Portsmouth Treaty was one which it
was felt must be utterly shattered if China was not to abandon her claim
of being considered a sovereign international State. On that occasion
Japan had simply negotiated direct with Russia concerning all matters
affecting Manchuria, dispatching a Plenipotentiary to Peking, after the
Treaty of Peace had been signed, to secure China's adhesion to all
clauses _en bloc_ without discussion. True enough, by filing the
Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915--when the war was hardly half-a-year
old--and by forcing China's assent to all Shantung questions under the
threat of an Ultimatum, Japan had reversed the Portsmouth Treaty
procedure and apparently settled the issues at stake for all time;
nevertheless the Chinese hoped when the facts were properly known to the
world that this species of diplomacy would not be endorsed, and that
indeed the Shantung question could be reopened.

Consequently great pains were taken at the Chinese Foreign Office to
draft a reply to the Wilson Note which would tell its own story. The
authorized translation of the document handed to the American Legation
on the 8th January has therefore a peculiar political interest. It runs
as follows:--

    "I have examined with the care which the gravity of the question
    demands the note concerning peace which President Wilson has
    addressed to the Governments of the Allies and the Central Powers
    now at war and the text of which Your Excellency has been good
    enough to transmit to me under instructions of your Government.

    "China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently again
    manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties concerning the
    pacific settlement of international disputes, responding thus to the
    voeux of the Peace Conference held at the Hague.

    "On the other hand, the present war, by its prolongation, has
    seriously affected the interests of China, more so perhaps than
    those of other Powers which have remained neutral. She is at present
    at a time of reorganization which demands economically and
    industrially the co-operation of foreign countries, a co-operation
    which a large number of them are unable to accord on account of the
    war in which they are engaged.

    "In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of the President's
    Note, having in view the ending as soon as possible of the
    hostilities, China is but acting in conformity not only with her
    interests but also with her profound sentiments.

    "On account of the extent which modern wars are apt to assume and
    the repercussions which they bring about, their effects are no
    longer limited to belligerent States. All countries are interested
    in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China
    cannot but show satisfaction with the views of the Government and
    people of the United States of America who declare themselves ready,
    and even eager, to co-operate when the war is over, by all proper
    means to assure the respect of the principle of the equality of
    nations, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the
    peril of wrong and violence. China is ready to join her efforts with
    theirs for the attainment of such results which can only be obtained
    through the help of all."

Already, then, before there had been any question of Germany's ruthless
submarine war necessitating a decisive move, China had commenced to show
that she could not remain passive during a world-conflict which was
indirectly endangering her interests. America, by placing herself in
direct communication with the Peking Government on the subject of a
possible peace, had given a direct hint that she was solicitous of
China's future and determined to help her as far as possible. All this
was in strict accordance with the traditional policy of the United
States in China, a policy which although too idealistic to have had much
practical value--being too little supported by battleships and bayonets
to be respected--has nevertheless for sixty years tempered the wind to
the shorn lamb. The ground had consequently been well prepared for the
remarkable dénouement which came on the 9th February, 1917, and which
surprised all the world.

On the fourth of that month the United States formally communicated with
China on the subject of the threatened German submarine war against
neutral shipping and invited her to associate herself with America in
breaking-off diplomatic relations with Germany. China had meanwhile
received a telegraphic communication from the Chinese Minister in Berlin
transmitting a Note from the German Government making known the measures
endangering all merchant vessels navigating the prescribed zones. The
effect of these two communications on the mind of the Chinese Government
was at first admittedly stunning and very varied expressions of opinion
were heard in Peking. For the first time in the history of the country
the government had been invited to take a step which meant the
inauguration of a definite Foreign policy from which there could be no
retreat. For four days a discussion raged which created the greatest
uneasiness; but by the 8th February, President Li Yuan-hung had made up
his mind--the final problem being simply the "conversion" of the
Military Party to the idea that a decisive step, which would for ever
separate them from Germany, must at last be taken. It is known that the
brilliant Scholar Liang Ch'i-chao, who was hastily summoned to Peking,
proved a decisive influence and performed the seemingly impossible in a
few hours' discussion. Realizing at once the advantages which would
accrue from a single masculine decision he advised instant action in
such a convincing way that the military leaders surrendered. Accordingly
on the 9th February the presence of the German Minister was requested at
the Chinese Foreign Office when the following Note was read to him and
subsequently transmitted telegraphically to Berlin.

    Your Excellency:

    A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chinese
    Minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German Government
    dated February 1st, 1917, which makes known that the measures of
    blockade newly adopted by the Government of Germany will, from that
    day, endanger neutral merchant vessels navigating in certain
    prescribed zones.

    The new measures of submarine warfare, inaugurated by Germany,
    imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a
    greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already
    cost so many human lives to China, constitute a violation of the
    principles of public international law at present in force; the
    tolerance of their application would have as a result the
    introduction into international law of arbitrary principles
    incompatible with even legitimate commercial intercourse between
    neutral states and between neutral states and belligerent powers.

    The Chinese Government, therefore, protests energetically to the
    Imperial German Government against the measures proclaimed on
    February 1st, and sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the
    rights of neutral states and to maintaining the friendly relations
    between these two countries, the said measures will not be carried
    out.

    In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual
    the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its
    profound regret, to sever the diplomatic relations at present
    existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary to add that
    the attitude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by
    the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the
    maintenance of the sanctity of international law.

    I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
    assurance of my highest consideration.

At the same time the following reply was handed to the American Minister
in Peking thus definitely clinching the matter:

    Your Excellency:

    I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
    Note of the 4th February, 1917, informing me that the Government of
    the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German
    Government of its new policy of submarine warfare on the 1st of
    February, has decided to take certain action which it judges
    necessary as regards Germany.

    The Chinese Government, like the President of the United States of
    America, is reluctant to believe that the German Government will
    actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives
    and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the
    commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between
    neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced
    without opposition, to introduce a new principle into public
    international law.

    The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth
    in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the
    Government of the United States, has taken similar action by
    protesting energetically to the German Government against the new
    measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take
    such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the
    maintenance of the principles of international law.

    I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
    assurance of my highest consideration.

    His Excellency Paul S. Reinsch,
    Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary of
    The United States of America.

When these facts became generally known an extraordinary ferment was
noticeable. What efforts had to be made to overcome the not
inconsiderable opposition of the Military Party who were opposed to any
departure from a policy of passive neutrality need not now be set down;
but it is sufficient to state that the decision arrived at was in every
sense a victory of the younger intellectual forces over the older
mandarinate, whose traditions of _laissez faire_ and spineless diplomacy
had hitherto cost the country so dear. A definite and far-reaching
Foreign Policy had at last been inaugurated. By responding rapidly and
firmly to the invitation of the United States to associate herself with
the stand taken against Germany's piratical submarine warfare, China has
undoubtedly won for herself a new place in the world's esteem. Both in
Europe and America the news of this development awakened
well-understandable enthusiasm, and convinced men that the Republic at
last stood for something vital and real. Until the 9th February, 1917,
what China had been doing was not really to maintain her neutrality,
since she had been unable to defend her territory from being made a
common battleground in 1914: she had been engaged in guarding and
perpetuating her traditional impotency. For whilst it may be accurate to
declare--a fact which few Westerners have realized--that to the mass of
the Chinese nation the various members of the European Family are
undistinguishable from one another, there being little to choose in
China between a Russian or a German, an Englishman or an Austrian, a
Frenchman or a Greek, the trade-contact of a century had certainly
taught to a great many that there was profit in certain directions and
none in certain others. It was perfectly well-known, for instance, that
England stood for a sea-empire; that the sea was an universal road; that
British ships, both mercantile and military, were the most numerous; and
that other things being equal it must primarily be Britain more than any
other European country which would influence Chinese destinies. But the
British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened the trust which
originally existed; and this added to the fact that Germany, although
completely isolated and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself
intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed
forward with such horrible results in a number of directions, had made
inaction seem the best policy. And yet, although the Chinese may be
pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs
of the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that it was
absolutely essential for them not to remain outside the circle of
international friendships when a direct opportunity was offered them to
step within.

It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public
mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm. For the first time since Treaty
relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action
had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within
its scope. The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a
regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because
it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto
been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at
sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. To
find Chinese--five years after the inauguration of their Republic--ready
to accept literally and loyally in the western way all the duties and
obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and
fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a powerful rôle was
played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an
astute move: that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision
by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would
instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted
Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican
dollars. Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously
hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever
in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had
arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation
which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the
masses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was simply
expediency--the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to
define. But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium
brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy;
and just as America broke off relations because the scrapping of
undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative
for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the
doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the
whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence
finally rests. In the last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th
February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable
reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the
beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of
the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light
that her future actions must be judged. The leaders who direct the
destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency
from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be
supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since
their international position had for years been such that a single false
move might cripple them.

Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from the first fully
prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of
war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has
not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into
foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization of her resources could
only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for
instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter
experience that although Japan has played little or no part in the war,
and indeed classifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio
Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented
itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the
spot she is the most competent to insure the effectiveness of Chinese
co-operation, attempt to tighten her hold on the country. It is a fact
which is self-evident to observers on the spot that ever since the coup
of the Twenty-one Demands, many Japanese believe that their country has
succeeded in almost completely infeodating China and has become the
sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, as well as the pacificator of the
Eastern World. Statements which were incautiously allowed to appear in
the Japanese Press a few days prior to the Chinese Note of the 9th
February disclose what Japan really thought on the subject of China
identifying herself with the Allies. For instance, the following, which
bears the hall-mark of official inspiration, reads very curiously in the
light of after-events:

    ... "Dispatches from Peking say that England and France have already
    started a flanking movement to induce China to join the anti-German
    coalition. The intention of the Chinese Government has not yet been
    learned. But it is possible that China will agree, if conditions are
    favourable, thus gaining the right to voice her views at the coming
    peace conference. Should the Entente Powers give China a firm
    guarantee, it is feared here that China would not hesitate to act.

    "The policy of the Japanese Government toward this question cannot
    yet be learned. It appears, however, that the Japanese Government is
    not opposed to applying the resolutions of the Paris Economic
    Conference, in so far as they concern purely economic questions,
    since Japan desires that German influence in the commerce and
    finance of the Orient should be altogether uprooted. But should the
    Entente Powers of Europe try to induce China to join them, Japan may
    object on the ground that it will create more disturbances in China
    and lead to a general disturbance of peace in the Orient."

Now there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's mind--and he can
claim to speak as a student of twenty years' standing--that this
definition of Japanese aims and objects is a very true one; and that the
subsequent invitation to China to join the Allies which came from Tokio
after a meeting between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Allied Ambassadors was simply made when a new orientation of policy had
been forced by stress of circumstances. Japan has certainly always
wished German influence in the Far East to be uprooted if she can take
the place of Germany; but if she cannot take that place absolutely and
entirely she would vastly prefer the influence to remain, since it is in
the nature of counterweight to that of other European Powers and of
America--foreign influence in China, as Mr. Hioki blandly told the late
President Yuan Shih-kai in his famous interview of the 18th January,
1915, being a source of constant irritation to the Japanese people, and
the greatest stumbling-block to a permanent understanding in the Far
East.

Chinese suspicion of any invitation coming by way of Tokio has been,
therefore, in every way justified, if it is a reasonable and legitimate
thing for a nation of four hundred millions of people to be acutely
concerned about their independence; for events have already proved up to
the hilt that so far from the expulsion of Germany from Shantung having
resulted in the handing-back of interests which were forcibly acquired
from China in 1898, that expulsion has merely resulted in Japan
succeeding to such interests and thereby obliterating all trace of her
original promise to the world in 1914 that she would restore to China
what was originally taken from her. Here it is necessary to remark that
not only did Japan in her negotiations over the Twenty-one Demands force
China to hand over the twelve million pounds of German improvements in
Shantung province, but that Baron Hayashi, the present Japanese Minister
to China, has recently declared that Japan would demand from China a
vast settlement or concession at Tsingtao, thus making even the alleged
handing-back of the leased territory--which Japan is pledged to force
from Germany at the Peace Conference--wholly illusory, the formula of a
Settlement being adopted because twelve years' experience of Port Arthur
has shown that territorial "leases," with their military garrisons and
administrative offices, are expensive and antiquated things, and that it
is easier to push infiltration by means of a multitude of Settlements in
which police-boxes and policemen form an important element, than to cut
off slices of territory under a nomenclature which is a clamant
advertisement of disruptive aims.

Now although these matters appear to be taking us far from the
particular theme we are discussing, it is not really so. Like a dark
thunder-cloud on the horizon the menace of Japanese action has rendered
frank Chinese co-operation, even in such a simple matter as war-measures
against Germany, a thing of supreme difficulty. The mere rumour that
China might dispatch an Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia was
sufficient to send the host of unofficial Japanese agents in Peking
scurrying in every direction and insisting that if the Chinese did
anything at all they should limit themselves to sending troops to
Russia, where they would be "lost"--a suggestion made because that was
what Japan herself offered to do when she declined in 1915 the Allies'
proposal to dispatch troops to Europe. Nor must the fact be lost sight
of that as in other countries so in China, foreign affairs provide an
excellent opportunity for influencing the march of internal events.
Thus, as we have clearly shown, the Military Party, although originally
averse to any action at all, saw that a strong foreign policy would
greatly enhance its reputation and allow it to influence the important
elections for the Parliament of 1918 which, sitting as a National
Convention, will elect the next President. Thus, in the extraordinary
way which happens throughout the world, the whole of February was
consumed in the rival political parties manoeuvring for position, the
Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, himself coming hastily to Peking
from Nanking to take part in this elaborate game in which many were now
participating merely for what they could get out of it.

On the 4th March matters were brought to a climax by an open breach
between President Li Yuan-hung and the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, at
a Cabinet meeting regarding the procedure to be observed in breaking off
diplomatic relations with Germany. Although nearly a month had elapsed,
no reply had been received from Berlin; and of the many plans of action
proposed nothing had been formally decided. Owing to the pressure Japan
was exerting from Tokio to get China to come to a definite arrangement,
popular anxiety was growing. Over the question of certain telegrams to
be communicated to the Japanese Government, of which he had been kept in
ignorance, President Li Yuan-hung took a firm stand; with the result
that the Premier, deeply offended, abruptly left the Council Chamber,
handed in his resignation and left the capital--a course of action which
threatened to provoke a national crisis.

Fortunately in President Li Yuan-hung China had a cool and dispassionate
statesman. At the first grave crisis in his administration he wished at
all costs to secure that the assent of Parliament should be given to all
steps taken, and that nothing so speculative as a policy which had not
been publicly debated should be put into force. He held to this point
doggedly; and after some negotiations, the Premier was induced to return
to the capital and resume office, on the understanding that nothing
final was to be done until a popular endorsement had been secured.

On the 10th March the question was sent to Parliament for decision.
After a stormy debate of several hours in the Lower House the policy of
the Government was upheld by 330 votes to 87: on the following day the
Senate endorsed this decision by 158 votes to 37. By a coincidence which
was too extraordinary not to have been artificially contrived, the
long-awaited German reply arrived on the morning of this 10th March,
copies of the document being circulated wholesale by German agents among
the Members of Parliament in a last effort to influence their decision.
The actual text of the German reply was as follows, and it will be seen
how transparently worded it is:

    _To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China_:

    YOUR EXCELLENCY: By the instructions of my home Government--which
    reached me on the 10th inst.--I beg to forward you the following
    reply to China's protest to the latest blockade policy of Germany:--

    "The Imperial German Government expresses its great surprise at the
    action threatened by the Government of the Republic of China in its
    Note of protest. Many other countries have also protested, but
    China, which has been in friendly relations with Germany, is the
    only State which has added a threat to its protest. The surprise is
    doubly great, because of the fact that, as China has no shipping
    interests in the seas of the barred zones, she will not suffer
    thereby.

    "The Government of the Republic of China mentions that loss of life
    of Chinese citizens has occurred as the results of the present
    method of war. The Imperial German Government wishes to point out
    that the Government of the Republic of China has never communicated
    with the Imperial Government regarding a single case of this kind
    nor has it protested in this connexion before. According to reports
    received by the Imperial Government, such losses as have been
    actually sustained by Chinese subjects have occurred in the firing
    line while they were engaged in digging trenches and in other war
    services. While thus engaged, they were exposed to the dangers
    inevitable to all forces engaged in war. The fact that Germany has
    on several occasions protested against the employment of Chinese
    citizens for warlike purpose is evidence that the Imperial
    Government has given excellent proof of its friendly feelings toward
    China. In consideration of these friendly relations the Imperial
    Government is willing to treat the matter as if the threat had never
    been uttered. It is reasonable for the Imperial Government to expect
    that the Government of the Republic of China will revise its views
    respecting the question.

    "Germany's enemies were the first to declare a blockade on Germany
    and the same is being persistently carried out. It is therefore
    difficult for Germany to cancel her blockade policy. The Imperial
    Government is nevertheless willing to comply with the wishes of the
    Government of the Republic of China by opening negotiations to
    arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property,
    with the view that the end may be achieved and thereby the utmost
    regard be given to the shipping rights of China. The reason which
    has prompted the Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory
    policy is the knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed
    with Germany, China will not only lose a truly good friend but will
    also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."

    In forwarding to Your Excellency the above instructions from my home
    Government, I beg also to state that--if the Government of China be
    willing--I am empowered to open negotiations for the protection of
    the shipping rights of China.

    I have the honour to be....

    (Signed by the German Minister.)

    March 10, 1917.

With a Parliamentary endorsement behind them there remained nothing for
the Peking Government but to take the vital step of severing diplomatic
relations. Certain details remained to be settled but these were
expeditiously handled. Consequently, without any further discussion, at
noon on the 14th March the German Minister was handed his passports,
with the following covering dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office. It
is worthy of record that in the interval between the Chinese Note of the
9th February and the German reply of the 10th March the French
mail-steamer _Athos_ had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean and five
hundred Chinese labourers proceeding to France on board her drowned.

    _Your Excellency_:--

    With reference to the new submarine policy of Germany, the
    Government of the Republic of China, dictated by the desire to
    further the cause of world's peace and to maintain the sanctity of
    International Law, addressed a protest to Your Excellency on
    February 9th and declared that in case, contrary to its
    expectations, its protest be ineffectual, it would be constrained to
    sever the diplomatic relations at present existing between the two
    countries.

    During the lapse of a month no heed has been paid to the protest of
    the Government of the Republic in the activities of the German
    Submarines, activities which have caused the loss of many Chinese
    lives. On March 10, a reply was received from Your Excellency.
    Although it states that the Imperial German Government is willing to
    open negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese
    life and property, yet it declares that it is difficult for Germany
    to cancel her blockade policy. It is therefore not in accord with
    the object of the protest and the Government of the Chinese
    Republic, to its deep regret, considers its protest to be
    ineffectual. The Government of the Republic is constrained to sever
    the diplomatic relations at present existing with the Imperial
    German Government. I have the honour to send herewith to Your
    Excellency, the passport for Your Excellency, the members of the
    German Legation and their families and retinue for protection while
    leaving Chinese territory. With regard to the Consular Officers of
    Germany in China, this Ministry has instructed the different
    Commissioners of Foreign Affairs to issue to them similarly
    passports for leaving the country.

    I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
    assurance of my highest consideration.

    March 14th, 1917.

It was not until eleven days later--on the 25th March--that the German
Minister and his suite reluctantly left Peking for Germany via America.
Meanwhile the Chinese Government remained undecided regarding the taking
of the final step as a number of important matters had still to be
settled. Not only had arrangements to be made with the Allies but there
was the question of adjusting Chinese policy with American action. A
special commission on Diplomatic affairs daily debated the procedure to
be observed, but owing to the conflict of opinion in the provinces
further action was greatly delayed. As it is necessary to show the
nature of this conflict we give two typical opinions submitted to the
Government on the question of a formal declaration of war against
Germany (and Austria). The first Memorandum was written for the
Diplomatic Commission by the scholar Liang Ch'i-chao and is singularly
lucid:--

    THE NECESSITY FOR WAR

    "Those who question the necessity for war can only quote the
    attitude of America as example. The position of China is, however,
    different from that of America in two points. First, actual warfare
    will follow immediately after America's declaration of war, so it is
    necessary for her to make the necessary preparations before taking
    the step. For this purpose, America has voted several hundred
    million dollars for an increase of her naval appropriations. America
    therefore cannot declare war until she has completed every
    preparation. With China it is different. Even after the declaration
    of war, there will be no actual warfare. It is therefore unnecessary
    for us to wait.

    "Secondly, America has no such things as foreign settlements,
    consular jurisdiction or other unequal treaties with Germany. Under
    the existing conditions America has no difficulties in safeguarding
    herself against the Germans residing in America after the severance
    of diplomatic relations even though war has not yet been actually
    declared, and as to future welfare, America will have nothing to
    suffer even though her old treaties with Germany should continue to
    be operative. It is impossible for China to take the necessary steps
    to safeguard the country against the Germans residing in China
    unless the old treaties be cancelled. For unless war is declared it
    is impossible to cancel the consular jurisdiction of the Germans,
    and so long as German consular jurisdiction remains in China we will
    meet with difficulties everywhere whenever we wish to deal with the
    Germans. If our future is to be considered, unless war is declared,
    the old treaties will again come into force upon the resumption of
    diplomatic relations, in which case we shall be held responsible for
    all the steps which we have taken in contravention of treaties
    during the rupture. It will be advantageous to China if the old
    treaties be cancelled by a declaration of war and new treaties be
    negotiated after the conclusion of peace.

    "In short by severing diplomatic relations with Germany China has
    already incurred the ill-feelings of that country. We shall not be
    able to lessen the hostile feelings of the Germans even if we
    refrain from declaring war on them. It is therefore our obligation
    to choose the course that will be advantageous to us. This is not
    reluctantly yielding to the request of the Entente Allies. It is the
    course we must take in our present situation.


    THE REASON FOR DECLARING WAR

    "The presumptuous manner in which Germany has replied to our demand
    is an open affront to our national integrity. Recently Germany has
    deliberately shown hostility to our advice by reiterating her
    determination to carry out the ruthless submarine policy with
    increased vigour. All these are reasons for diplomatic rupture as
    well as for declaration of war. Furthermore, the peace of the Far
    East was broken by the occupation of Kiachow by Germany. This event
    marked the first step of the German disregard for international law.
    In the interests of humanity and for the sake of what China has
    passed through, she should rise and punish such a country, that
    dared to disregard international law. Such a reason for war is
    certainly beyond criticism.


    THE TIME TO DECLARE WAR

    "War should be declared as soon as possible. The reason for the
    diplomatic rupture is sufficient reason for declaring war. This has
    already been explained. It would be impossible for us to find an
    excuse for declaring war if war be not declared now. According to
    usual procedure war is declared when the forces of the two countries
    come into actual conflict. Now such a possibility does not exist
    between China and Germany. Since it is futile to expect Germany to
    declare war on us first, we should ask ourselves if war is
    necessary. If not, then let us go on as we are, otherwise we must
    not hesitate any more.

    "Some say that China should not declare war on Germany until we have
    come to a definite understanding with the Entente Allies respecting
    certain terms. This is indeed a wrong conception of things. We
    declare war because we want to fight for humanity, international law
    and against a national enemy. It is not because we are partial
    towards the Entente or against Germany or Austria. International
    relations are not commercial connexions. Why then should we talk
    about exchange of privileges and rights? As to the revision of
    Customs tariff, it has been our aspiration for more than ten years
    and a foremost diplomatic question, for which we have been looking
    for a suitable opportunity to negotiate with the foreign Powers. It
    is our view that the opportunity has come because foreign Powers are
    now on very friendly terms with China. It is distinctly a separate
    thing from the declaration of war. Let no one try to confuse the
    two.


    THE QUESTION OF AUSTRIA

    "If China decides to declare war on Germany the same attitude should
    be taken towards Austria. We have severed diplomatic relations with
    Germany but retain the _status quo_ with Austria. This is fraught
    with danger. German intrigue is to be dreaded. What they have done
    in America and Mexico is enough to shock us. The danger can easily
    be imagined when we remember that they have in China the Austrian
    Legation, Austrian Consulates and Austrian concessions as their
    bases of operation for intrigue and plotting. Some say we should
    follow America, which has not yet severed diplomatic relations with
    Austria. This is a great mistake. America can afford to ignore
    Austria because there are no Austrian concessions and Austrian
    consular jurisdiction in America.

    "The question is then what steps should be taken to sever diplomatic
    relations with and declare war on Austria. The solution is that
    since Austria has also communicated to our Minister regarding her
    submarine policy we can serve her with an ultimatum demanding that
    the submarine policy be cancelled within twenty-four hours. If
    Austria refuses, China may sever diplomatic relations and declare
    war at the same time immediately upon the expiry of the twenty-four
    hour limit.

    "In conclusion I wish to say that whenever a policy is adopted we
    should carry out the complete scheme. If we should hesitate in the
    middle and become afraid to go ahead we will soon find ourselves in
    an embarrassing position. The Government and Parliament should
    therefore stir up courage and boldly make the decision and take the
    step."

Unanswerable as seem these arguments to the Western mind, they were by
no means so to the mass of Chinese who are always fearful lest some
sudden reshuffling in the relationships existing between foreign Powers
exposes them to new and greater calamities. This Chinese viewpoint, with
its ignorance of basic considerations, is well-illustrated by the Second
Memorandum, which follows. Written by the famous reformer of 1898 Kang
Yu-wei, it demonstrates how greatly the revolutionists of 1911 are in
advance of a school which was the vogue less than twenty years ago and
which is completely out of touch with the thought which the war has made
world-wide. Nevertheless the line of argument which characterizes this
utterance is still a political factor in China and must be understood.

    MEMORANDUM

    ... "The breach between the United States and Germany is no concern
    of ours. But the Government suddenly severed diplomatic relations
    with Germany and is now contemplating entry into the war. This is to
    advance beyond the action of the United States which continues to
    observe neutrality. And if we analyse the public opinion of the
    country, we find that all peoples--high and low, well-informed and
    ignorant--betray great alarm when informed of the rupture and the
    proposal to declare war on Germany, fearing that such a development
    may cause grave peril to the country. This war-policy is being urged
    by a handful of politicians, including a few members of Parliament
    and several party men with the view of creating a diplomatic
    situation to serve their political ends and to reap great profits.

    "Their arguments are that China--by siding with the Entente--may
    obtain large loans, the revision of the Customs Tariff and the
    suspension of the Boxer indemnity to Germany, as well as the
    recovery of the German concessions, mining and railroad rights and
    the seizure of German commerce. Pray, how large is Germany's share
    of the Boxer indemnity? Seeing that German commerce is protected by
    international law, will China be able to seize it; and does she not
    know that the Kaiser may in the future exact restitution?


    PERILS OF WAR

    "News from Holland tells of a rumoured secret understanding between
    Germany, Japan and Russia. The Japanese Government is pursuing a
    policy of friendship toward Germany. This is very disquieting news
    to us. As to foreign loans and the revision of the Customs Tariff,
    we can raise these matters at any time. Why then should we traffic
    for these things at the risk of grave dangers to the nation? My view
    is that what we are to obtain from the transaction is far less than
    what we are to give. If it be argued that the policy aims at
    securing for China her right to live as an unfettered nation, then
    we ought to ask for the cancellation of the entire Boxer
    Indemnities, the abolition of exterritoriality, the retrocession of
    the foreign concessions and the repeal or amendment of all unjust
    treaties after the war. But none of these have we demanded. If we
    ourselves cannot improve our internal administration in order to
    become a strong country, it is absurd to expect our admission to the
    ranks of the first-class Powers simply by being allowed a seat at
    the Peace Conference and by taking a side with the Entente!

    "Which side will win the war? I shall not attempt to predict here.
    But it is undoubted that all the arms of Europe--and the industrial
    and financial strength of the United States and Japan--have proved
    unavailing against Germany. On the other hand France has lost her
    Northern provinces and Belgium, Serbia and Rumania are blotted off
    the map. Should Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe--not to
    speak of a weak country like China--would be in great peril of
    extinction. Should she be defeated, Germany still can--after the
    conclusion of peace--send a fleet to war against us. And as the
    Powers will be afraid of a second world-war, who will come to our
    aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea? There is no such thing
    as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of
    weak nations. I cannot bear to think of hearing the angry voice of
    German guns along our coasts!

    "If we allow the Entente to recruit labour in our country without
    restriction, thousands upon thousands of our fellow countrymen will
    die for no worthy cause; and if we allow free exportation of
    foodstuff, in a short time the price of daily necessaries will mount
    ten to a hundredfold. This is calculated to cause internal troubles.
    Yea, all gains from this policy will go to the politicians but the
    people will suffer the evil consequences through no fault of theirs.


    DIPLOMACY OF CONFUCIUS

    "In the matter of diplomacy, we do not need to go to the West for
    the apt learning on the point at issue. Confucius has said: 'Be
    truthful and cultivate friendship--this is the foundation of human
    happiness.' Our country being weak and undeveloped, if we strive to
    be truthful and cultivate friendship, we can still be a civilized
    nation, albeit hoary with age. But we are now advised to take
    advantage of the difficulties of Germany and abandon honesty in
    order that we may profit thereby. Discarding treaties is to be
    unfaithful, grasping for gains is not the way of a gentleman, taking
    advantage of another's difficulties is to be mean and joining the
    larger in numbers is cowardice. How can we be a nation, if we throw
    away all these fundamental qualities.

    "Even in the press of England and the United States, there is
    opposition to America entering the war. If we observe neutrality, we
    are not bound to any side; and when the time comes for peace--as a
    friend to both sides--we may be able to bring about the ends of the
    war. Is this not a service to humanity and the true spirit of
    civilization?

    "Now it is proposed to take the existence of this great nation of
    five thousand years and four hundred million people in order to
    serve the interests of politicians in their party struggles. We are
    now to be bound to foreign nations, without freedom to act for
    ourselves and running great risks of national destruction. Can you
    gentlemen bear to see this come to pass? China has severed relations
    with Germany but the decision for war has not yet been reached. The
    whole country is telegraphing opposition to the Government's policy
    and wants to know whether Germany will not in the future take
    revenge on account of our rupture with her; and if we are not
    secured against this eventuality, what are the preparations to meet
    with a contingency? The Government must not stake the fate of the
    nation as if it be a child's toy, and the people must not be cast
    into the whirlpool of slaughter. The people are the backbone of a
    country, and if the people are all opposed to war on Germany, the
    Government--in spite of the support of Parliament--must call a great
    citizens' convention to decide the question. We must persist in our
    neutrality. You gentlemen are patriotic sons of this country and
    must know that the existence of China as a nation depends upon what
    she does now in this matter. In tears, I appeal to you.

    "KANG YU-WEI."

March and April were consumed in this fruitless discussion in which
everybody participated. The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, in view of
the alleged provincial opposition, now summoned to Peking a Conference
of Provincial Military Governors to endorse his policy, but this action
although crowned with success so far as the army chiefs were
concerned--the conference voting solidly for war--was responsible for
greatly alarming Parliament which saw in this procedure a new attempt
to undermine its power and control the country by extra-legal means.
Furthermore, publication in the Metropolitan press of what the Japanese
were doing behind the scenes created a fear that extraordinary intrigues
were being indulged in with the object of securing by means of secret
diplomacy certain guarantees of a personal nature. Apart from being
associated with the semi-official negotiations of the Entente Powers in
Peking, Japan was carrying on a second set of negotiations partly by
means of a confidential agent named Kameio Nishihara dispatched from
Tokio specially for that purpose by Count Terauchi, the Japanese
Premier, a procedure which led to the circulation of highly sensational
stories regarding China's future commitments. When the Premier, General
Tuan Chi-jui, had made his statement to Parliament on the 10th March,
regarding the necessity of an immediate rupture with Germany, he had
implied that China had already received assurances from the Allies that
there would be a postponement of the Boxer Indemnities for a term of
years, an immediate increase in the Customs Tariff, and a modification
of the Peace Protocol of 1901 regarding the presence of Chinese troops
near Tientsin. Suddenly all these points were declared to be in doubt.
Round the question of the length of time the Indemnities might be
postponed, and the actual amount of the increase in the Customs Tariff,
there appeared to be an inexplicable muddle largely owing to the
intervention of so many agents and to the fact that the exchange of
views had been almost entirely verbal, unofficial, and secret. It would
be wearisome to analyse a dispute which belongs to the peculiar
atmosphere of Peking diplomacy; but the vast difficulties of making even
a simple decision in China were glaringly illustrated by this matter.
With a large section of the Metropolitan press daily insisting that the
future of democracy in China would be again imperilled should the
Military Party have its own way, small wonder if the question of a
formal declaration of war on Germany (and Austria) now assumed an
entirely different complexion.

On the 1st May, in spite of all these trials and tribulations, being
pressed by the Premier to do so, the Cabinet unanimously decided that a
declaration of war was imperative; and on the 7th May, after an
agreement with the President had been reached, Parliament received the
following dispatch--this method of communication being the usual one
between the executive and legislative branches of the Government:

    The President has the honour to communicate to the House of
    Representatives the following proposal. Since the severance of
    diplomatic relations with Germany, Germany has continued to violate
    the rights of the neutral nations and to damage and cause losses in
    life and property to our people as well as to trample on
    international law and disregard principles of humanity. For the
    purpose of hastening peace, upholding international law and
    protecting the life and property of our people, the President is of
    the view that it is necessary to declare war on the German
    Government. In accordance with Article 35 of the Provisional
    Constitution, he now asks for the approval of the House, and
    demands--in accordance with Article 21 of the Provisional
    Constitution--that the meeting in the House be held in secret.

On 8th May, after hearing a statement made in person by the Premier, the
House of Representatives in secret session referred the question for
examination to the House sitting as a Committee in order to gain time to
make up its mind. On the same day the Senate sat on the same question. A
very heated and bitter discussion followed in the upper House, not
because of any real disagreement regarding the matter at issue, but
because a large section of Senators were extremely anxious regarding the
internal consequences. This is well-explained by the following written
interpellation which was addressed to the government by a large number
of parliamentarians:

    We, the undersigned, hereby address this interpellation to the
    Government. As a declaration of war on Germany has become an object
    of the foreign policy of the Government, the latter has held
    informal meetings to ascertain the views of parliament on the
    question; and efforts are being made by the Government to secure the
    unanimous support of both Houses for its war policy. In pursuing
    this course, the Government appears to believe that its call for
    support will be readily complied with by the Houses. But in our view
    there are quite a number of members in both Houses who fail
    thoroughly to understand the war decision of the Government. The
    reason for this is that, according to recent reports, both foreign
    and vernacular, the Government has entered into secret treaties with
    a "neighbouring country." It is also reported that secret agents on
    both sides are active and are travelling between the two countries.
    The matter seems to be very grave; and it has already attracted the
    attention of Parliament, which in the near future will discuss the
    war-issue.

    Being in doubt as to the truth of such a report, we hereby request
    the Government for the necessary information in the matter. We also
    beg to suggest that, if there is any secret diplomatic agreement, we
    consider it expedient for the Government to submit the matter to
    Parliament for the latter's consideration. This will enable the
    members in Parliament to study the question with care and have a
    clear understanding of the matter. When this is done, Parliament
    will be able to support the Government in the prosecution of its war
    policy according to the dictates of conscience. In this event both
    Parliament and Government will be able to co-operate with each other
    in the solution of the present diplomatic problem. Troubled not a
    little with the present diplomatic situation of the country, we
    hereby address this interpellation to the Government in accordance
    with law. It is hoped that an answer from the Government will be
    dispatched to us within three days from date.

On the 10th May Parliament met in secret session and it was plain that a
crisis had come. Members of the House of Representatives experienced
great difficulties in forcing their way through a mob of several
thousand roughs who surrounded the approaches to Parliament, many
members being hustled if not struck. The mob was so plainly in control
of a secret organization that the House of Representatives refused to
sit. Urgent messages were sent to the Police and Gendarmerie
headquarters for reinforcements of armed men as a protection, whilst the
presence of the Premier was also demanded. Masses of police were soon on
the ground, but whilst they prevented the mob from entering Parliament
and carrying out their threat of burning the buildings, and murdering
the members, they could not--or would not--disperse the crowds, it
transpiring subsequently that half a battalion of infantry in plain
clothes under their officers formed the backbone of the demonstrators.

It was not until nearly dark, after six or seven hours of these
disorderly scenes, that the Premier finally arrived. Cavalry had
meanwhile also been massed on the main street; but it was only when the
report spread that a Japanese reporter had been killed that the order
was finally given to charge the mob and disperse it by force. This was
very rapidly done, as apart from the soldiers in plain clothes the mass
of people belonged to the lowest class, and had no stomach for a fight,
having only been paid to shout. It was nearly midnight, after twelve
hours of isolation and a foodless day, that the Representatives were
able to disperse without having debated the war-question. The upshot
was that with the exception of the Minister of Education, the Premier
found that his entire Cabinet had resigned, the Ministers being
unwilling to be associated with what had been an attempted coercion of
Parliament carried out by the Military.

The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, however, remained determined to carry
his point, and within a week a second dispatch was sent to the House of
Representatives demanding, in spite of what had happened, that the
declaration of war be immediately brought up for debate. Meanwhile
publication in a leading Peking newspaper of further details covering
Japan's subterranean activities greatly inflamed the public, and made
the Liberal political elements more determined than ever to stand firm.
It was alleged that Count Terauchi was reviving in a more subtle form
Group V of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, the latest Japanese proposal
taking the form of a secret Treaty of twenty articles of which the main
stipulations were to be a loan of twenty million yen to China to
reorganize the three main Chinese arsenals under Japanese guidance, and
a further loan of eighty million yen to be expended on the Japanization
of the Chinese army. As a result of this publication, which rightly or
wrongly was declared to be without foundation, the editor of _The Peking
Gazette_ was seized in the middle of the night and thrown into gaol; but
Parliament so far from being intimidated passed the very next day (19th
May) a resolution refusing to consider in any form the declaration of
war against Germany until the Cabinet had been reorganized--which meant
the resignation of General Tuan Chi-jui. A last effort was made by the
reactionary element to jockey the President into submission by
presenting to the Chief Executive a petition from the Military Governors
assembled in Peking demanding the immediate dissolution of Parliament.
On this proposal being absolutely rejected by the President as wholly
unconstitutional, and the Military Governors soundly rated for their
interference, an ominous calm followed.

Parliament, however, remained unmoved and continued its work. Although
the draft of the Permanent Constitution had been practically completed,
important additions to the text were now proposed, such additions being
designed to increase parliamentary control and provide every possible
precaution against arbitrary acts in the future. Thus the new provision
that a simple vote of want of confidence in the Cabinet must be followed
by the President either dismissing the Cabinet or dissolving the House
of Representatives--but that the dissolution of the Lower House could
not be ordered without the approval of the Senate--was generally
recognized as necessary to destroy the last vestiges of the Yuan
Shih-kai régime. Furthermore a new article, conferring on the President
the right to dismiss the Premier summarily by Presidential Mandate
without the counter-signature of the other Cabinet Ministers, completed
the disarray of the conservatives who saw in this provision the dashing
of their last hopes.[25]

By the 21st May, the last remaining Cabinet Minister--the Minister of
Education--had resigned and the Premier was left completely isolated. On
the 23rd May the President, relying on the general support of the
nation, summarily dismissed General Tuan Chi-jui from the Premiership
and appointed the veteran diplomat Dr. Wu Ting-fang to act during the
interim period in his stead, at the same time placing the metropolitan
districts under four trustworthy Generals who were vested with
provost-marshals' powers under a system which gave them command of all
the so-called "precautionary troops" holding the approaches to the
capital. The Military Governors, who a few hours before these events had
left Peking precipitately in a body on the proclaimed mission of allying
themselves with the redoubtable General Chang Hsun at Hsuchowfu, and
threatening the safety of the Republic, were, however, coolly received
in the provinces in spite of all their most bitter attempts to stir up
trouble. This, however, as will be shown, had no influence on their
subsequent conduct. The quiet disappearance of the ex-Premier in the
midst of this upheaval caused the report to spread that all the members
of the corrupt camarilla which had surrounded him were to be arrested,
but the President soon publicly disclaimed any intention of doing
so,--which appears to have been a fatal mistake. It is disheartening to
have to state that nearly all the Allied Legations in Peking had been in
intimate relations with this gang--always excepting the American
Legation whose attitude is uniformly correct--the French Minister going
so far as to entertain the Military Governors and declare, according to
reports in the native press, that Parliament was of no importance at
all, the only important thing being for China promptly to declare war.
That some sort of public investigation into Peking diplomacy is
necessary before there can be any hope of decent relations between China
and the Powers seems indisputable.[26]

Before the end of May the militarists being now desperate, attempted the
old game of inciting the provincial capitals "to declare their
independence," although the mass of the nation was plainly against them.
Some measure of success attended this move, since the soldiery of the
northern provinces obediently followed their leaders and there was a
sudden wild demand for a march on Peking. A large amount of
rolling-stock on the main railways was seized with this object, the
confusion being made worse confounded by the fierce denunciations which
now came from the southernmost provinces, coupled with their threats to
attack the Northern troops all along the line as soon as they could
mobilize.

The month of June opened with the situation more threatening than it had
been for years. Emissaries of the recalcitrant Military Governors,
together with all sorts of "politicals" and disgruntled generals,
gathered in Tientsin--which is 80 miles from Peking--and openly
established a Military Headquarters which they declared would be
converted into a Provisional Government which would seek the recognition
of the Powers. Troops were moved and concentrated against Peking; fresh
demands were made that the President should dissolve Parliament; whilst
the Metropolitan press was suddenly filled with seditious articles. The
President, seeing that the situation was becoming cataclysmic, was
induced, through what influences is not known, to issue a mandate
summoning General Chang Hsun to Peking to act as a mediator, which was
another fatal move. He arrived in Tientsin with many troops on the 7th
June where he halted and was speedily brought under subversive
influences, sending at once up to Peking a sort of ultimatum which was
simply the old demand for the dissolution of Parliament.

Meanwhile on the 5th June, the United States, which had been alarmed by
these occurrences, had handed China the following Note hoping thereby to
steady the situation:

    The Government of the United States learns with the most profound
    regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the most
    sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination may be
    forthwith re-established.

    The entry of China into war with Germany--or the continuance of the
    _status quo_ of her relations with that Government--are matters of
    secondary consideration.

    The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her
    political entity, to proceed along the road of national development
    on which she has made such marked progress.

    With the form of Government in China or the personnel which
    administers that Government, the United States has an interest only
    in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service to China. But
    in the maintenance by China of one Central United and alone
    responsible Government, the United States is deeply interested, and
    now expresses the very sincere hope that China, in her own interest
    and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her factional
    political disputes, and that all parties and persons will work for
    the re-establishment of a co-ordinate Government and the assumption
    of that place among the Powers of the World to which China is so
    justly entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in
    the midst of internal discord.

The situation had, however, developed so far and so rapidly that this
expression of opinion had little weight. The Vice-President of the
Republic, General Feng Kuo-chang, unwilling or unable to do anything,
had already tendered his resignation from Nanking, declaring that he
would maintain the "neutrality" of the important area of the lower
Yangtsze during this extraordinary struggle; and his action, strange as
it may seem, typified the vast misgivings which filled every one's mind
regarding the mad course of action which the rebellious camarilla had
decided upon.

Until Saturday the 9th June, the President had seemed adamant. On that
day he personally saw foreign press correspondents and assured them
that, in spite of every threat, he would in no conceivable
circumstances attempt the unconstitutional step of dissolving
Parliament,--unconstitutional because the Nanking Provisional
Constitution under which the country was still governed pending the
formal passage of the Permanent Constitution through Parliament, only
provided for the creation of Parliament as a grand constitutional
Drafting Committee but gave no power to the Chief Executive to dissolve
it during its "life" which was three years. As we have already shown,
the period between the _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913, and the
re-convocation of Parliament on 1st August, 1916, had been treated as a
mere interregnum: therefore until 1918, if the law were properly
construed, no power in the land could interrupt the Parliamentary
sessions except Parliament itself. Parliament, in view of these
threatening developments, had already expressed its willingness (a) to
reconsider certain provisions of the draft constitution in such a
conciliatory manner as to insure the passage of the whole instrument
through both houses within two weeks; (b) to alter the Election Law in
such fashion as to conciliate the more conservative elements in the
country; (c) to prorogue the second session (1916-1917) immediately
these things were done and after a very short recess to open the third
session (1917-1918) and close it within three months, allowing new
elections to be held in the early months of 1918,--the new Parliament to
be summoned in April, 1918, to form itself into a National Convention
and elect the President for the quinquennial period 1918-1923.

All these reasonable plans were knocked on the head on Sunday, the 10th
June, by the sudden report that the President having been peremptorily
told that the dissolution of Parliament was the sole means of saving the
Republic and preventing the sack of Peking, as well as an open armed
attempt to restore the boy-emperor Hsuan Tung, had at last made up his
mind to surrender to the inevitable. He had sealed a Mandate decreeing
the dissolution of Parliament which would be promulgated as soon as it
had received the counter-signature of the acting Premier, Dr. Wu
Ting-fang, such counter-signature being obligatory under Article 45 of
the Provisional Constitution.

At once it became clear again, as happens a thousand times during every
year in the East, that what is not nipped in the bud grows with such
malignant swiftness as finally to blight all honest intentions. Had
steps been taken on or about the 23rd May to detain forcibly in Peking
the ringleader of the recalcitrant Military Governors, one General Ni
Shih-chung of Anhui, history would have been very different and China
spared much national and international humiliation. Six years of stormy
happenings had certainly bred in the nation a desire for
constitutionalism and a detestation of military domination. But this
desire and detestation required firm leadership. Without that leadership
it was inchoate and powerless, and indeed made furtive by the constant
fear of savage reprisals. A great opportunity had come and a great
opportunity had been lost. President Li Yuan-hung's personal argument,
communicated to the writer, was that in sealing the Mandate dissolving
Parliament he had chosen the lesser of two evils, for although South
China and the Chinese Navy declared they would defend Parliament to the
last, they were far away whilst large armies were echeloned along the
railways leading into Peking and daily threatening action. The events of
the next year or so must prove conclusively, in spite of what has
happened in this month of June, 1917, that the corrupt power of the
sword can no longer even nominally rule China.

[Illustration: The Late President Yuan Shih-kai]

[Illustration: President Yuan Shi-kai photographed immediately after his
Inauguration as Provisional President, March 10th, 1912.]

Meanwhile the veteran Dr. Wu Ting-fang, true to his faith, declared that
no power on earth would cause him to sign a Mandate possessing no
legality behind it; and he indeed obstinately resisted every attempt to
seduce him. Although his resignation was refused he stood his ground
manfully, and it became clear that some other expedient would have to be
resorted to. In the small hours of the 13th June what this was was made
clear: by a rapid reshuffling of the cards Dr. Wu Ting-fang's
resignation was accepted and the general officer commanding the Peking
Gendarmerie, a genial soul named General Chiang Chao-tsung, who had
survived unscathed the vicissitudes of six years of revolution, was
appointed to act in his stead and duly counter-signed the fateful
Mandate which was at once printed and promulgated at four o'clock in the
morning. It has been stated to the writer that had it not been so issued
four battalions of Chang Hsun's savage pigtailed soldiery, who had been
bivouacked for some days in the grounds of the Temple of Heaven, would
have been let loose on the capital. The actual text of the Mandate
proves conclusively that the President had no hand in its drafting--one
argument being sufficient to prove that, namely the deliberate ignoring
of the fact that Parliament had been called into being by virtue of
article 53 of the Nanking Provisional Constitution and that under
article 54 its specific duty was to act as a grand constitutional
conference to draft and adopt the Permanent Constitution, article 55
furthermore giving Parliament the right summarily to amend the
Provisional Constitution before the Promulgation of the permanent
instrument, should that be necessary. Provisions of this sort would
naturally carry no weight with generals of the type of Chang Hsun, of
whom it is said that until recent years he possessed only the most
elementary education; but it is a dismal thing to have to record that
the Conservative Party in China should have adopted a platform of brute
force in the year of grâce, 1917.

    MANDATE DISSOLVING PARLIAMENT

    In the 6th month of last year I promulgated a Mandate stating that
    in order to make a Constitution it was imperative that Parliament
    should be convened. The Republic was inaugurated five years ago and
    yet there was no Constitution, which should be the fundamental law
    of a nation, therefore it was ordered that Parliament be re-convened
    to make the Constitution, etc., at once.

    Therefore the main object for the re-convocation of Parliament was
    to make a formal constitution for the country. Recently a petition
    was received from Meng En-yuen, Tu-chun of Kirin, and others, to the
    effect that "in the articles passed by the Constitution Conference
    there were several points as follows: 'when the House of
    Representatives passes a vote of want of confidence against the
    Cabinet Ministers, the President may dismiss the Cabinet Ministers,
    or dissolve the said House, but the dissolution of the House shall
    have the approval of the Senate.' Again, 'When the President
    dismisses his Prime Minister, it is unnecessary for him to secure
    the counter-signature of the Cabinet Ministers.' Again 'when a bill
    is passed by the Two Houses it shall have the force of the law.' We
    were surprised to read the above provisions.

    "According to the precedents of other nations the Constitution has
    never been made by Parliament. If we should desire a good and
    workable Constitution, we should seek a fundamental solution. Indeed
    Parliament is more important than any other organ in the country;
    but when the national welfare is imperilled, we must take action. As
    the present Parliament does not care about the national welfare, it
    is requested that in view of the critical condition of the country,
    drastic measures be taken and both the House of Representatives and
    the Senate be dissolved so that they may be reorganized and the
    Constitution may be made without any further delay. Thus the form of
    the Republican Government be preserved, etc."

    Of late petitions and telegrams have been received from the military
    and civil officials, merchants, scholars, etc., containing similar
    demands. The Senate and the House of Representatives have held the
    Constitution Conference for about one year, and the Constitution has
    not yet been completed. Moreover at this critical time most of the
    M.P.'s of both Houses have tendered their resignation. Hence it is
    impossible to secure quorums to discuss business. There is therefore
    no chance to revise the articles already passed. Unless means be
    devised to hasten the making of the Constitution, the heart of the
    people will never be satisfied.

    I, the President, who desire to comply with the will of the populace
    and to consolidate the foundation of the nation, grant the request
    of the Tuchuns and the people. It is hereby ordered that the Senate
    and the House of Representatives be dissolved, and that another
    election be held immediately. Thus a Constitutional Government can
    be maintained. It must be pointed out that the object for the
    reorganization of Parliament is to hasten the making of the
    Constitution, and not to abolish the Legislative Organ of the
    Republic. I hope all the citizens of the Republic will understand my
    motives.

A great agitation and much public uneasiness followed the publication of
this document; and the parliamentarians, who had already been leaving
Peking in small numbers, now evacuated the capital _en masse_ for the
South. The reasonable and wholly logical attitude of the
Constitutionalists is well-exhibited in the last Memorandum they
submitted to the President some days prior to his decision to issue the
Mandate above-quoted; and a perusal of this document will show what may
be expected in the future. It will be noted that the revolting Military
Governors are boldly termed rebels and that the constitutional view of
everything they may contrive as from the 13th June, 1917, is that it
will be bereft of all legality and simply mark a fresh interregnum.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the situation is brought back
by the Mandate of the 13th June to where it was on the 6th June, 1916,
with the death of Yuan Shih-kai, and that a period of civil commotion
seems inevitable.

    MEMORANDUM

    To the President: Our previous memorandum to Your Excellency must
    have received your attention. We now beg further to inform you that
    the rebels are now practically in an embarrassing predicament on
    account of internal differences, the warning of the friendly Powers,
    and the protest of the South-western provinces. Their position is
    becoming daily more and more untenable. If Your Excellency strongly
    holds out for another ten days or so, their movement will collapse.

    Some one, however, has the impudence to suggest that with the entry
    of Chang Hsun's troops into the Capital, and delay in the settlement
    of the question will mean woe and disaster. But to us, there need be
    no such fear. As the troops in the Capital have no mind to oppose
    the rebels, Tsao Kun and his troops alone will be adequate for their
    purposes in the Capital. But now the rebel troops have been halting
    in the neighbourhood of the Capital for the last ten days. This
    shows that they dare not open hostilities against the Government,
    which step will certainly bring about foreign intervention and incur
    the strong opposition of the South-western provinces. Having refused
    to participate in the rebellion at the invitation of Ni Shih-chung
    and Chang Tso-lin, Chang Hsun will certainly not do what Tsao Kun
    has not dared to do. But the rebels have secret agents in the
    Capital to circulate rumours to frighten the public and we hope that
    the President will remain calm and unperturbed, lest it will give an
    opportunity for the rebel agents to practise their evil tricks.

    Respecting Parliament, its re-assembly was one of the two most
    important conditions by means of which the political differences
    between the North and the South last year were healed. The
    dissolution of Parliament would mean the violation of the terms of
    settlement entered into between the North and the South last year
    and an open challenge to the South. Would the South remain silent
    respecting this outrageous measure? If the South rises in arms
    against this measure, what explanation can the Central Government
    give? It will only serve to hasten the split between the North and
    the South. From a legal point of view, the Power of Government is
    vested in the Provisional Constitution. When the Government
    exercises power which is not provided for by the Constitution, it
    simply means high treason.

    Some one has suggested that it would not be an illegal act for the
    Government to dissolve Parliament, since it is not provided in the
    Provisional Constitution as to how Parliament should be dissolved,
    nor does that instrument specifically prohibit the Government from
    dissolving Parliament. But this is a misinterpretation. For
    instance, the Provisional Constitution has not provided that the
    President shall not proclaim himself Emperor, nor does it prohibit
    him from so doing. According to such interpretation, it would not be
    illegal, if the President were to proclaim himself Emperor of the
    country.

    In short, the action taken by Ni Shih-chung and others is nothing
    short of open rebellion. From the legal point of view, any
    suggestion of compromise would be absurd. It has already been a
    fatal mistake for the President to have allowed them to do what they
    like, and if he again yields to their pressure by dissolving
    Parliament, he will be held responsible, when the righteous troops
    rise and punish the rebels. If the President, deceived by ignoble
    persons, take upon himself to dissolve the assembly, his name will
    go down in history as one committing high treason against the
    Government, and the author of the break between the North and the
    South. The President has been known as the man by whose hands the
    Republic was built. We have special regard for his benevolent
    character and kind disposition. We are reluctant to see him
    intimidated and misled by evil counsels to take a step which will
    undo all his meritorious services to the county and shatter the
    unique reputation he has enjoyed.

The unrolling of these dramatic events was the signal for the greatest
subterranean activity on the part of the Japanese, who were now
everywhere seen rubbing their hands and congratulating themselves on the
course history was taking. General Tanaka, Vice-Chief of the Japanese
General Staff, who had been on an extensive tour of inspection in China,
so _planned as to include every arsenal north of the Yangtsze_ had
arrived at the psychological moment in Peking and was now deeply engaged
through Japanese field-officers in the employ of the Chinese Government,
in pulling every string and in trying to commit the leaders of this
unedifying plot in such a way as to make them puppets of Japan. The
Japanese press, seizing on the American Note of the 5th June as an
excuse, had been belabouring the United States for some days for its
"interference" in Chinese affairs, and also for having ignored Japan's
"special position" in China, which according to these publicists
demanded that no Power take any action in the Far East, or give any
advice, without first consulting Japan. That a stern correction will
have to be offered to this presumption as soon as the development of the
war permits it is certain. But not only Japanese military officers and
journalists were endlessly busy: so-called Japanese advisers to the
Chinese Government had done their utmost to assist the confusion. Thus
Dr. Ariga, the Constitutional expert, when called in at the last moment
for advice by President Li Yuan-hung had flatly contradicted Dr.
Morrison, who with an Englishman's love of justice and constitutionalism
had insisted that there was only one thing for the President to do--to
be bound by legality to the last no matter what it might cost him. Dr.
Ariga had falsely stated that the issue was a question of expediency,
thus deliberately assisting the forces of disruption. This is perhaps
only what was to be expected of a man who had advised Yuan Shih-kai to
make himself Emperor--knowing full well that he could never succeed and
that indeed the whole enterprise from the point of view of Japan was an
elaborate trap.

The provincial response to the action taken on the 13th June became what
every one had expected: the South-western group of provinces, with their
military headquarters at Canton, began openly concerting measures to
resist not the authority of the President, who was recognized as a just
man surrounded by evil-minded persons who never hesitated to betray him,
but to destroy the usurping generals and the corrupt camarilla behind
them; whilst the Yangtsze provinces, with their headquarters at Nanking,
which had hitherto been pledged to "neutrality," began secretly
exchanging views with the genuinely Republican South. The group of
Tientsin generals and "politicals," confused by these developments,
remained inactive; and this was no doubt responsible for the mad coup
attempted by the semi-illiterate General Chang Hsun. In the small hours
of July 1st General Chang Hsun, relying on the disorganization in the
capital which we have dealt with in our preceding account entered the
Imperial City with his troops by prearrangement with the Imperial Family
and at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 1st July the Manchu boy-emperor
Hsuan Tung, who lost the Throne on the 12th February, 1912, was
enthroned before a small assembly of Manchu nobles, courtiers and
sycophantic Chinese. The capital woke up to find military patrols
everywhere and to hear incredulously that the old order had returned.
The police, obeying instructions, promptly visited all shops and
dwelling-houses and ordered every one to fly the Dragon Flag. In the
afternoon of the same day the following Restoration Edict was issued,
its statements being a tissue of falsehoods, the alleged memorial from
President Li Yuan-hung, which follows the principal document, being a
bare-faced forgery, whilst no single name inserted in the text save that
of Chang Hsun had any right to be there. There is also every reason to
believe that the Manchu court party was itself coerced, terror being
felt from the beginning regarding the consequences of this mad act which
was largely possible because Peking is a Manchu city.

    IMPERIAL EDICT

    Issued the 13th day of the 5th Moon of the 9th year of Hsuan Tung.

    While yet in our boyhood the inheritance of the great domain was
    unfortunately placed in our possession; and since we were then all
    alone, we were unable to weather the numerous difficulties. Upon the
    outbreak of the uprising in the year of Hsin Hai, (1911) Our
    Empress, Hsiao Ting Chin, owing to her Most High Virtue and Most
    Deep Benevolence was unwilling to allow the people to suffer, and
    courageously placed in the hands of the late Imperial Councillor,
    Yuan Shih-kai, the great dominion which our forefathers had built
    up, and with it the lives of the millions of Our People, with orders
    to establish a provisional government.

    The power of State was thus voluntarily given to the whole country
    with the hope that disputes might disappear, disturbances might stop
    and the people enabled to live in peace. But ever since the form of
    State was changed into a Republic, continuous strife has prevailed
    and several wars have taken place. Forcible seizure, excessive
    taxation and bribery have been of everyday occurrence. Although the
    annual revenue has increased to 400 millions this amount is still
    insufficient to meet the needs. The total amount of foreign
    obligations has reached a figure of more than ten thousand millions
    yet more loans are being contracted. The people within the seas are
    shocked by this state of affairs and interest in life has forsaken
    them. The step reluctantly taken by Our Empress Hsiao Ting Chin for
    the purpose of giving respite to the people has resulted untowardly
    in increasing the burdens of Our People. This indeed Our Empress
    Hsiao Ting Chin was unable to foresee, and the result must have made
    her Spirit in Heaven to weep sorely. And it is owing to this that we
    have been praying to Heaven day and night in the close confines of
    the palace, meditating and weeping in silent suffering.

    Recently party strife has resulted in war and the country has
    remained too long in an unsettled condition. The Republic has fallen
    to pieces and means of remedy have been exhausted.

    Chang Hsun, Feng Kuo-chang and Lu Yung-ting have jointly
    memorialized the Throne stating that the minds of people are
    disturbed and they are longing to see the old régime restored, and
    asking that the throne be reoccupied in order to comfort the people.

    Chu Hung-chi and others have also memorialized us stating that the
    country is in imminent danger and that the people have lost their
    faith in the Republic, and asking that we ascend the Throne in
    obedience to the mandate of Heaven and man.

    Li Yuan-hung has also memorialized the throne, returning the great
    power of State to us in order to benefit the country and save the
    people.

    A perusal of the said memorials, which are worded in earnest terms,
    has filled our heart with regret and fear. On the one hand We, being
    yet in Our boyhood, are afraid to assume the great responsibilities
    for the existence of the country but on the other hand We are
    unwilling to turn our head away from the welfare of the millions
    simply because the step might affect Our own safety.

    After weighing the two sides and considering the mandates of Heaven
    and man, we have decided reluctantly to comply with the prayers, and
    have again occupied the Court to attend to the affairs of State
    after resuming possession of the great power on the 13th day of the
    5th moon of the 9th year of Hsuan Tung.

    A new beginning will be made with our people. Hereafter the
    principles of morality and the sacred religion shall be our
    constitution in spirit, and order, righteousness, honesty and
    conscience will be practised to rebind the minds of the people who
    are now without bonds. People high and low will be uniformly treated
    with sincerity, and will not depend on obedience of law alone as the
    means of co-operation. Administration and orders will be based on
    conscientious realization and no one will be allowed to treat the
    form of State as material for experiment. At this time of exhaustion
    when its vitality is being wasted to the last drop and the existence
    of the country is hanging in the balance, we, as if treading on thin
    ice over deep waters, dare not in the slightest degree indulge in
    license on the principle that the Sovereign is entitled to
    enjoyment. It is our wish therefore that all officials, be they high
    or low, should purify their hearts and cleanse themselves of all
    forms of old corruption; constantly keeping in mind the real
    interests of the people. Every bit of vitality of the people they
    shall be able to preserve shall go to strengthen the life of the
    country for whatever it is worth. Only by doing so can the danger be
    averted and Heaven moved by our sincerity.


    THE NINE ARTICLES

    Herewith we promulgate the following principal things, which we must
    either introduce as reforms or abolish as undesirable in
    restoration.

    1. We shall obey the edict of Emperor Teh Tsung Chin (Kuang Hsu),
    namely, that the sovereign power shall be controlled by the Court
    (state) but the detailed administration shall be subject to public
    opinion. The country shall be called The Empire of Ta Ching; and the
    methods of other constitutional monarchies shall be carefully
    copied.

    2. The allowance for the Imperial House shall be the same as before,
    namely, $4,000,000 per year. The sum shall be paid annually and not
    a single cent is to be added.

    3. We shall strictly obey the instructions of our forefathers to the
    extent that no member of the imperial family shall be allowed to
    interfere with administrative affairs.

    4. The line of demarcation between Man (Manchu) and Han (Chinese)
    shall be positively obliterated. All Manchurian and Mongolian posts
    which have already been abolished shall not be restored. As to
    intermarriage and change of customs the officials concerned are
    hereby commanded to submit their views on the points concerning them
    respectively.

    5. All treaties and loan agreements, money for which has already
    been paid, formally concluded and signed with any eastern and
    western countries before this 13th day of the 5th Moon of the 9th
    year of Hsuan Tung, shall continue to be valid.

    6. The stamp duty which was introduced by the Republic is hereby
    abolished so that the people may be relieved of their burdens. As to
    other petty taxes and contributions the Viceroys and Governors of
    the provinces are hereby commanded to make investigations and report
    on the same for their abolition.

    7. The criminal code of the Republic is unsuited to this country. It
    is hereby abolished. For the time being the provisional criminal
    code as adopted in the first year of Hsuan Tung shall be observed.

    8. The evil custom of political parties is hereby forbidden. Old
    political offenders are all pardoned. We shall, however, not be able
    to pardon those who deliberately hold themselves aloof and disturb
    peace and order.

    9. All of our people and officials shall be left to decide for
    themselves the custom of wearing or cutting their queues as
    commanded in the 9th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung.

    We swear that we and our people shall abide by these articles. The
    Great Heaven and Earth bear witness to our words. Let this be made
    known to all.

    Counter-signed by Chang Hsun,
    Member of the Imperial Privy Council.

    ALLEGED MEMORIAL BY PRESIDENT LI YUAN-HUNG

    In a memorial submitted this day, offering to return the sovereign
    power of State and praying that we again ascend the throne to
    control the great empire, Li Yuan-hung states that some time ago he
    was forced by mutinous troops to steal the great throne and falsely
    remained at the head of the administration but failed to do good to
    the difficult situation. He enumerates the various evils in the
    establishment of a Republic and prays that we ascend the throne to
    again control the Empire with a view that the people may thereby be
    saved. As to himself he awaits punishment by the properly instituted
    authorities, etc. As his words are so mournful and full of remorse
    they must have been uttered from a sincere heart. Since it was not
    his free choice to follow the rebellion, the fact that he has
    returned the great power of administration to us shows that he knows
    the great principle of righteousness. At this time of national
    danger and uncertainty, he has taken the lead of the people in
    obeying their sovereign, and decided before others the plan to save
    the country from ruin. The merit is indeed great, and we are highly
    pleased with his achievement. Li Yuan-hung is hereby to have
    conferred on him the dignity of Duke of the first class so as to
    show our great appreciation. Let him accept our Edict and for ever
    receive our blessings.

    Counter-signed by Chang Hsun,
    Member of the Privy Council.


    PRIVY COUNCIL

    At this time of restoration a Privy Council is hereby established in
    order that we may be assisted in our duties and that responsibility
    may be made definite. Two Under-Secretaries of the Council are also
    created. Other officials serving outside of the capital shall remain
    as under the system in force during the first year of Hsuan Tung.
    All civil and military officials who are now serving at their
    various posts are hereby commanded to continue in office as
    hitherto.

    Counter-signed by Chang Hsun.

(Hereafter follow many appointments of reactionary Chinese officials.)

The general stupefaction at the madness of this act and the military
occupation of all posts and telegraph-offices in Peking allowed 48 hours
to go by before the reaction came. On the 2nd July Edicts still
continued to appear attempting to galvanize to life the corpse of
Imperialism and the puzzled populace flew the Dragon Flag. On the
morning of the 3rd, however, the news suddenly spread that President Li
Yuan-hung, who had virtually been made a prisoner in the Presidential
Palace, had escaped at nine o'clock the night before by motorcar
accompanied by two aides-de-camp, and after attempting to be received at
the French Hospital in the Legation Quarter, had proceeded to the
Japanese Legation where he was offered a suitable residence. On the
evening of the 3rd the Japanese Legation issued the following official
communique (in French) defining its attitude:


    TRANSLATION

    President Li, accompanied by two members of his staff, came at 9.30
    on the evening of July 2 to the residence of General Saito, Military
    Attaché of the Japanese Legation, and asked protection from him. He
    arrived in a spontaneous manner and without previous notice.

    Under these circumstances, the Imperial Japanese Legation, following
    international usage, has decided to accord him the necessary
    protection and has placed at his disposal a part of the military
    barracks.

    The Legation further declares that as long as President Li remains
    there, it will not permit any political action on his part.

Following this sensational development it became known that President Li
Yuan-hung had completely frustrated the efforts of the Imperialists by
sending away a number of important telegraphic Mandates by courier to
Tientsin as well as the Presidential Seal. By a masterly move in one of
these Mandates General Tuan Chi-jui was reappointed Premier, whilst
Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang was asked to officiate as President, the
arrangements being so complete as at once to catch Chang Hsun in his own
net.

Here is the text of these four historically important messages:

    (1) Dated July 1. To-day Inspector General Chang Hsun entered the
    city with his troops and actually restored the monarchy. He stopped
    traffic and sent Liang Ting-fen and others to my place to persuade
    me. Yuan-hung refused in firm language and swore that he would not
    recognize such a step. It is his hope that the Vice-President and
    others will take effective means to protect the Republic.

    Li Yuan-hung.

    (2) Dated July 1. As Heaven does not scorn calamity so has the
    monarchy been restored. It is said that in an edict issued by the
    Ching House it is stated that Yuan-hung had actually memorialized to
    return the power of State to the said House. This is an
    extraordinary announcement. China changed from autocracy to a
    Republic by the unanimous wish of the five races of the country.
    Since Yuan-hung was entrusted by the people with the great
    responsibilities it is his natural duty to maintain the Republic to
    the very end. Nothing more or less than this will he care to say. He
    is sending this in order to avoid misunderstanding.

    Li Yuan-hung.

    (3) The President to the Vice-President.

    To the Vice-President Feng at Nanking--It is to be presumed that the
    two telegrams sent on the 1st have safely reached you. I state with
    deepest regret and greatest sorrow that as the result of my lack of
    ability to handle the situation the political crisis has eventually
    affected the form of government. For this Yuan-hung realizes that he
    owes the country apology. The situation in Peking is daily becoming
    more precarious. Since Yuan-hung is now unable to exercise his power
    the continuity of the Republic may be suddenly interrupted. You are
    also entrusted by the citizens with great responsibilities; I ask
    you to temporarily exercise the power and functions of the President
    in your own office in accordance with the provisions of Article 42
    of the Provisional Constitution and Article 5 of the Presidential
    Election Law. As the means of communication is effectively blocked
    it is feared that the sending of my seal will meet with difficulty
    and obstruction. Tuan Chih-chuan (Tuan Chi-jui) has been appointed
    Premier, and is also ordered to temporarily protect the seal, and
    later to devise a means to forward it on to you. Hereafter
    everything pertaining to the important question of saving the
    country shall be energetically pushed by you and Chih-chuan with
    utmost vigour. The situation is pressing and your duty is clear. In
    great anxiety and expectation I am sending you this telegram.

    Li Yuan-hung.

    (4) Dated July 3. To Vice-President Feng, Tu Chuns and Governors of
    the Provinces, Provincial Assemblies, Inspector General Lu:--I
    presume that the two telegrams dated 1st and one dated 3rd inst.
    have safely reached your place. With bitter remorse to myself I now
    make the statement that the political crisis has resulted in
    affecting the form of government. Tuan Chih-chuan has been appointed
    on the 1st inst. as Premier; and the Vice-President has been asked
    to exercise the power and functions of the President in accordance
    of office by the Vice-President. Premier Tuan is authorized to act
    at his discretion. All the seal and documents have been sent to
    Tientsin, and Premier Tuan has been told to keep and guard the same
    for the time being. He has also been asked to forward the same to
    the Vice-President. The body guards of the President's Office have
    suddenly been replaced and I have been pressed to give up the Three
    Lakes. Yuan-hung has therefore removed to a sanctuary. As regards
    the means to save the country I trust that you will consult and work
    unitedly with Vice-President Feng and Premier Tuan. In great
    expectation, and with much of my heart not poured out.

    Li Yuan-hung.

Meanwhile, whilst these dramatic events were occurring in Peking, others
no less sensational were taking place in the provinces. The Tientsin
group, suddenly realizing that the country was in danger, took action
very swiftly, disclosing that in spite of all disputes Republicanism had
become very dear to every thinking man in the country, and that at last
it was possible to think of an united China. The Scholar Liang Chi Chao,
spokesman of Chinese Liberalism, in an extraordinarily able message
circularized the provinces in terms summarizing everything of
importance. Beginning with the fine literary flight that "heaven has
refused to sympathize with our difficulties by allowing traitors to be
born" he ends with the astounding phrase that although he had proposed
to remain silent to the end of his days, "at the sight of the fallen
nest he has, however, spat the stopper out of his throat," and he calls
upon all China to listen to his words which are simply that the Republic
must be upheld or dissolution will come.

Arms now united with Literature. General Tuan Chi-jui, immediately
accepting the burden placed on him, proceeded to the main entrenched
camp outside Tientsin and assumed command of the troops massed there,
issuing at the same time the following manifesto:

    TUAN CHI-JUI'S MANIFESTO

    To Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang, Inspector General of Wumin, Tu
    Chuns, Governors, Tu-tungs....

    Heaven is chastening this country by the series of disturbances that
    have taken place. Chang Hsun, filled with sinister designs, has
    occupied the capital by bringing up his troops under the pretext of
    effecting a compromise with the astounding result that last night
    the Republican form of government was overthrown. The question of
    the form of Government is the very fundamental principle on which
    the national existence depends. It requires assiduous efforts to
    settle the form of government and once a decision has been reached
    on the subject, any attempt to change the same is bound to bring on
    unspeakable disasters to the country. To-day the people of China are
    much more enlightened and democratic in spirit than ever before. It
    is, therefore, absolutely impossible to subjugate the millions by
    holding out to the country the majesty of any one family.

    When the Republic of China was being founded, the Ching House, being
    well aware of the general inclinations of modern peoples, sincerely
    and modestly abdicated its power. Believing that such spirit
    deserved handsome recognition the people were willing to place the
    Ching House under the protection of special treatment and actually
    recorded the covenant on paper, whereby contentment and honour were
    vouchsafed the Ching House. Of the end of more than 20 dynasties of
    Chinese history, none can compare with the Ching dynasty for peace
    and safety.

    Purely for sake of satisfying his ambitions of self-elevation Chang
    Hsun and others have audaciously committed a crime of inconceivable
    magnitude and are guilty of high treason. Like Wang Mang and Tung
    Tso he seeks to sway the whole nation by utilizing a young and
    helpless emperor. Moreover he has given the country to understand
    that Li Yuan-hung has memorialized the Ching House that many evils
    have resulted from republicanism and that the ex-emperor should be
    restored to save the masses. That Chang Hsun has been guilty of
    usurpation and forging documents is plain and the scandal is one
    that shocks all the world.

    Can it be imagined that Chang Hsun is actuated by a patriotic
    motive? Surely despotism is no longer tolerated in this stage of
    modern civilization. Such a scheme can only provoke universal
    opposition. Five years have already passed since the friendly Powers
    accorded their recognition of the Chinese Republic and if we think
    we could afford to amuse ourselves with changes in the national
    fabric, we could not expect foreign powers to put up with such
    childishness. Internal strife is bound to invite foreign
    intervention and the end of the country will then be near.

    Can it be possible that Chang Hsun has acted in the interest of the
    Ching House? The young boy-emperor lives in peace and contentment
    and has not the slightest idea of ever ruling China again. It is
    known that his tutors have been warning him of the dangers of
    intriguing for power. That the boy-emperor has been dragged on the
    throne entirely against his own wishes is undeniable. History tells
    us that no dynasty can live for ever. It is an unprecedented
    privilege for the Ching dynasty to be able to end with the gift of
    special treatment. How absurd to again place the Tsing house on the
    top of a high wall so that it may fall once more and disappear for
    ever.

    Chi-jui, after his dismissal, resolved not to participate in
    political affairs, but as he has had a share, however insignificant,
    in the formation of the Chinese Republic, and having served the
    Republic for so long he cannot bear to see its destruction without
    stretching out a helping hand. Further, he has been a recipient of
    favours from the defunct dynasty, and he cannot bear to watch
    unmoved, the sight of the Ching House being made the channel of
    brigandage with suicidal results. Wherever duty calls, Chi-jui will
    go in spite of the danger of death. You, gentlemen, are the pillars
    of the Republic of China and therefore have your own duties to
    perform. In face of this extraordinary crisis, our indignation must
    be one. For the interest of the country we should abide by our oath
    of unstinted loyalty; and for the sake of the Tsing House let us
    show our sympathy by sane and wise deeds. I feel sure you will put
    forth every ounce of your energy and combine your efforts to combat
    the great disaster. Though I am a feeble old soldier, I will follow
    you on the back of my steed.

    (Sgd) TUAN CHI-JUI.

Following the publication of this manifesto a general movement of troops
began. On the 5th July the important Peking-Tientsin railway was
reported interrupted forty miles from the capital--at Langfang which is
the station where Admiral Seymour's relief expedition in 1900 was nearly
surrounded and exterminated. Chang Hsun, made desperate by the swift
answer to his coup, had moved out of Peking in force stiffening his own
troops with numbers of Manchu soldiery, and announcing that he would
fight it out to the bitter end, although this proved as false as the
rest had been. The first collision occurred on the evening of the 5th
July and was disastrous for the King-maker. The whole Northern army,
with the exception of a Manchu Division in Peking, was so rapidly
concentrated on the two main railways leading to the capital that Chang
Hsun's army, hopelessly outnumbered and outmanoeuvred, fell back after a
brief resistance. Chang Hsun himself was plainly stupefied by the
discovery that imperialism of the classic type was as much out of date
in the North as in the South; and within one week of his _coup_ he was
prepared to surrender if his life and reputation were spared. By the 9th
July the position was this: the Republican forces had surrounded
Peking: Chang Hsun had resigned every appointment save the command of
his own troops: the Manchu Court party had drafted a fresh Edict of
Renunciation, but being terrorized by the pigtailed troops surrounding
the Palace did not dare to issue it.

The usual bargaining now commenced with the Legation Quarter acting as a
species of middleman. No one was anxious to see warfare carried into the
streets of Peking, as not only might this lead to the massacres of
innocent people, but to foreign complications as well. The novelty had
already been seen of a miniature air-raid on the Imperial city, and the
panic that exploding bombs had carried into the hearts of the Manchu
Imperial Family made them ready not only to capitulate but to run away.
The chief point at issue was, however, not the fate of the monarchy,
which was a dead thing, but simply what was going to happen to Chang
Hsun's head--a matter which was profoundly distressing Chang Hsun. The
Republican army had placed a price of £10,000 on it, and the firebrands
were advocating that the man must be captured, dead or alive, and suffer
decapitation in front of the Great Dynastic Gate of the Palace as a
revenge for his perfidy. Round this issue a subtle battle raged which
was not brought to a head until the evening of the 11th July, when all
attempts at forcing Chang Hsun to surrender unconditionally having
failed, it was announced that a general attack would be made on his
forces at daylight the next morning.

Promptly at dawn on the 12th July a gun-signal heralded the assault.
Large Republican contingents entered the city through various Gates, and
a storm of firing aroused terror among the populace. The main body of
Chang Hsun's men, entrenched in the great walled enclosure of the Temple
of Heaven, were soon surrounded, and although it would have been
possible for them to hold out for several days, after a few hours'
firing a parley began and they quietly surrendered. Similarly in the
Imperial city, where Chang Hsun had taken up his residence, this leader,
in spite of his fire-eating declarations, soon fled to the Legation
Quarter and besought an asylum. His men held out until two in the
afternoon, when their resistance collapsed and the cease-fire sounded.
The number of casualties on both sides was infinitesimal, and thus after
eleven days' farce the Manchu dynasty found itself worse off than ever
before. It is necessary, however, not to lose sight of the main problem
in China, which is the establishment of a united government and a
cessation of internecine warfare,--issues which have been somewhat
simplified by Chang Hsun's escapade, but not solved. That a united
government will ultimately be established is the writer's belief, based
on a knowledge of all the facts. But to attain that further provincial
struggles are inevitable, since China is too large a unit to find common
ground without much suffering and bitterness. President Li Yuan-hung
having declared that nothing would induce him to resume office,
Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang has become the legal successor and has
quietly assumed office. Chang Hsun's abortive coup has already cleared
the air in North China to this extent: that the Manchu Imperial Family
is to be removed from Peking and the Imperial allowance greatly reduced,
whilst the proscription of such out-and-out imperialists as Kang Yu-wei
has destroyed the last vestiges of public support. Finally the
completion of China's foreign policy, _i.e._ the declaration of war
against Germany and Austria, has at last been made on the 14th August,
1917, and a consistent course of action mapped out.

[Illustration: The National Assembly sitting as a National Convention
engaged on the Draft of the Permanent Constitution.

_Specially photographed by permission of the Speakers for the Present
Work_.]

[Illustration: View from rear of Hall of the National Assembly sitting
as a National Convention engaged on the Draft of the Permanent
Constitution.

_Specially photographed by permission of the Speakers for the Present
Work_.]

FOOTNOTES:

[25] The final text of the Permanent Constitution as it stood on the
28th May, 1917, will be found in the appendix. Its accuracy has been
guaranteed to the writer by the speakers of the two Houses.

[26] Since this was written certain diplomatists in Peking have been
forced to resign.



CHAPTER XVII

THE FINAL PROBLEM:--REMODELLING THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WORLD


The careful narrative we have made--supported as it is by documents--of
the history of China since the inception of the Republic six years ago
should not fail to awaken profound astonishment among those who are
interested in the spread of good government throughout the world. Even
casual readers will have no difficulty in realizing how many lives have
been lost and how greatly the country has been crippled both owing to
the blind foreign support given to Yuan Shih-kai during four long and
weary years and to the stupid adhesion to exploded ideas, when a little
intelligence and a little generosity and sympathy would have guided the
nation along very different paths. To have to go back, as China was
forced to do in 1916, and begin over again the work which should have
been performed in 1912 is a handicap which only persistent resolution
can overcome; for the nation has been so greatly impoverished that years
must elapse before a complete recovery from the disorders which have
upset the internal balance can be chronicled: and when we add that the
events of the period May-July, 1917, are likely still further to
increase the burden the nation carries, the complicated nature of the
outlook will be readily understood.

Happily foreign opinion has lately taken turn for the better. Whilst the
substitution of a new kind of rule in place of the Yuan Shih-kai régime,
with its thinly disguised Manchuism and its secret worship of fallen
gods, was at first looked upon as a political collapse tinged with
tragedy--most foreigners refusing to believe in an Asiatic Republic--the
masculine decision of the 9th February, 1917, which diplomatically
ranged China definitely on the side of the Liberal Powers, has caused
something of a _volte face_. Until this decision had been made it was
the fashion to declare that China was not only not fit to be a Republic
but that her final dissolution was only a matter of time. Though the
empire disappeared because it had become an impossible rule in the
modern world--being womanish, corrupt, and mediaeval--to the foreign
mind the empire remained the acme of Chinese civilization; and to kill
it meant to lop off the head of the Chinese giant and to leave lying on
the ground nothing but a corpse. It was in vain to insist that this
simile was wrong and that it was precisely because Chinese civilization
had exhausted itself that a new conception of government had to be
called in to renew the vitality of the people. Men, and particularly
diplomats, refused to understand that this embodied the heart and soul
of the controversy, and that the sole mandate for the Republic, as well
as the supreme reason why it had to be upheld if the country was not to
dissolve, has always lain in the fact that it postulates something which
is the very antithesis of the system it has replaced and which should be
wholly successful in a single generation, if courage is shown and the
whip unflinchingly used.

The chief trouble, in the opinion of the writer, has been the simplicity
of the problem and not its complexity. By eliminating the glamour which
surrounded the Throne, and by kicking away all the pomp and circumstance
which formed the age-old ritual of government, the glaring simplicity
and _barrenness_ of Chinese life--when contrasted with the complex
West--has been made evident. Bathed in the hard light of modern
realities, the poetic China which Haroun al-Raschid painted in his
Aladdin, and which still lives in the beautiful art of the country, has
vanished for ever and its place has been taken by a China of prose. To
those who have always pictured Asia in terms of poetry this has no doubt
been a very terrible thing--a thing synonymous with political death. And
yet in point of fact the elementary things remain much as they have
always been before, and if they appear to have acquired new meaning it
is simply because they have been moved into the foreground and are no
longer masked by a gaudy superstructure.

For if you eliminate questions of money and suppose for a moment that
the national balance-sheet is entirely in order, China is the old China
although she is stirred by new ideas. Here you have by far the greatest
agricultural community in the world, living just as it has always lived
in the simplest possible manner, and remitting to the cities (of which
there are not ten with half-a-million inhabitants) the increment which
the harvests yield. These cities have made much municipal progress and
developed an independence which is confessedly new. Printing presses
have spread a noisy assertiveness, as well as a very critical and
litigious spirit, which tends to resent and oppose authority.[27] Trade,
although constantly proclaimed to be in a bad way, is steadily growing
as new wants are created and fashions change. An immense amount of new
building has been done, particularly in those regions which the
Revolution of 1911 most devastated. The archaic fiscal system, having
been tumbled into open ruin, has been partially replaced by European
conceptions which are still only half-understood, but which are not
really opposed. The country, although boasting a population which is
only some fifty millions less than the population of the nineteen
countries of Europe, has an army and a police-force so small as to allow
one to say that China is virtually disarmed since there are only 900,000
men with weapons in their hands. Casting about to discover what really
tinges the outlook, that must simply be held to be the long delay the
world has made in extending the same treatment to China as is now
granted to the meanest community of Latin America. It has been almost
entirely this, coupled with the ever-present threat of Japanese
chauvinism, which has given China the appearance of a land that is
hopelessly water-logged, although the National Debt is relatively the
smallest in the world and the people the most industrious and
law-abiding who have ever lived. In such circumstances that ideas of
collapse should have spread so far is simply due to a faulty estimate
of basic considerations.

For we have to remember that in a country in which the thoroughly
English doctrine of _laissez faire_ has been so long practised that it
has become second nature, and in which the philosophic spirit is so
undisputed that the pillars of society are just as much the beggars who
beg as the rich men who support them, influences of a peculiar character
play an immense rôle and can be only very slowly overcome. Passivity has
been so long enthroned that of the Chinese it may be truly said that
they are not so much too proud to fight as too indifferent,--which is
not a fruitful state of affairs. Looking on the world with callous
detachment the masses go their own way, only pausing in their work on
their ancient Festival days which they still celebrate just as they have
always celebrated them since the beginning of their history. The petty
daily activities of a vast legion of people grouped together in this
extraordinary way, and actuated by impulses which seem sharply to
conflict with the impulses of the other great races of the world, appear
incredible to Westerners who know what the outer perils really are, and
who believe that China is not only at bay but encircled--caught in a
network of political agreements and commitments which have permanently
destroyed her power of initiative and reduced her to inanition. To find
her lumbering on undisturbed, ploughing the fields, marrying and giving
in marriage, buying, selling, cursing and laughing, carrying out
rebellions and little plots as though the centuries that stretch ahead
were still her willing slaves, has in the end become to onlookers a
veritable nightmare. Puzzled by a phenomenon which is so disconcerting
as to be incapable of any clear definition, they have ended by declaring
that an empty Treasury is an empty rule, adding that as it is solely
from this monetary viewpoint that the New China ought to be judged,
their opinion is the one which will finally be accepted as
authoritative. The situation is admittedly dangerous; and it is
imperative that a speedy remedy be sought; for the heirs and assigns of
an estate which has been mismanaged to the brink of bankruptcy must
secure at all costs that no public receivership is made.

What is the remedy? That must consist simply enough in attacking the
grand simplicities directly; in recognizing, as we have clearly shown,
that the bases of Chinese life having collapsed through Euro-Japanese
pressure, the politico-economic relationship between the Republic and
the world must be remodelled at the earliest possible opportunity, every
agreement which has been made since the Treaties of 1860 being carefully
and completely revised.[28]

To say this is to give utterance to nothing very new or brilliant: it is
the thought which has been present in everyone's mind for a number of
years. So far back as 1902, when Great Britain negotiated with China the
inoperative Mackay Commercial Treaty, provision was not only made for a
complete reform of the Tariff--import duties to be made two and a
half times as large in return for a complete abolition of _likin_
or inter-provincial trade-taxation--but for the abolition of
extraterritoriality when China should have erected a modern and efficient
judicial system. And although matters equally important, such as the
funding of all Chinese indemnities and loans into one Consolidated Debt,
as well as the withdrawal of the right of foreign banks to make banknote
issues in China, were not touched upon, the same principles would
undoubtedly have been applied in these instances, as being conducive to
the re-establishment of Chinese autonomy, had Chinese negotiators been
clever enough to urge them as being of equal importance to the older
issues. For it is primarily debt, and the manipulation of debt, which is
the great enemy.

Three groups of indebtedness and three groups of restrictions,
corresponding with the three vital periods in Chinese history, lie
to-day like three great weights on the body of the Chinese giant. First,
there is the imbroglio of the Japanese war of 1894-5; second, the
settlement following the Boxer explosion of 1900; and third, the cost of
the revolution of 1911-1912. We have already discussed so exhaustively
the Boxer Settlement and the finance of the Revolutionary period that it
is necessary to deal with the first period only.

In that first period China, having been rudely handled by Japan,
recovered herself only by indulging in the sort of diplomacy which had
become traditional under the Manchus. Thankful for any help in her
distress, she invited and welcomed the intervention of Russia, which
gave her back the Liaotung Peninsula and preserved for her the shadow of
her power when the substance had already been so sensationally lost. Men
are apt to forget to-day that the financial accommodation which allowed
China to liquidate the Japanese war-debt was a remarkable transaction in
which Russia formed the controlling element. In 1895 the Tsar's
Government had intervened for precisely the same motives that animate
every State at critical times in history, that is, for reasons of
self-interest. The rapid victory which Japan had won had revived in an
acute form the whole question of the future of the vast block of
territory which lies south of the Amur regions and is bathed by the
Yellow Sea. Russian statesmen suddenly became conscious that the policy
of which Muravieff-Amurski in the middle of the nineteenth century had
been the most brilliant exponent--the policy of reaching "warm
water"--was in danger of being crucified, and the work of many years
thrown away. Action on Russia's part was imperative; she was great
enough to see that; and so that it should not be said that she was
merely depriving a gallant nation of the fruits of victory and thereby
issuing to her a direct challenge, she invited the chief Powers in
Treaty relations with China to co-operate with her in readjusting what
she described as the threatened balance. France and Germany responded to
that invitation; England demurred. France did so because she was already
the devoted Ally of a nation that was a guarantee for the security of
her European frontiers: Germany because she was anxious to see that
Russia should be pushed into Asiatic commitments and drawn away from the
problems of the Near East. England on her part very prudently declined
to be associated with a transaction which, while not opposed to her
interests, was filled with many dubious elements.

It was in Petrograd that this account was liquidated. The extraordinary
chapter which only closed with the disastrous Peace of Portsmouth opened
for Russia in a very brilliant way. The presence in Moscow of the
veteran statesman Li Hung-chang on the occasion of the Tsar's Coronation
afforded an opportunity for exhaustively discussing the whole problem of
the Far East. China required money: Russia required the acceptance of
plans which ultimately proved so disastrous to her. Under Article IV of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April, 1895) China had agreed to pay Japan as
a war-indemnity 200 million Treasury taels in eight instalments: that is
50 million taels within six months, a further 50 millions within twelve
months, and the remaining 100 millions in six equal instalments spread
over seven years, as well as an additional sum of 50 millions for the
retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula.

China, therefore, needed at once 80 million taels. Russia undertook to
lend her at the phenomenally low rate of 4 per cent. the sum of
£16,000,000 sterling--the interest and capital of which the Tsar's
Government guaranteed to the French bankers undertaking the flotation.
In return for this accommodation, the well known Russo-Chinese
Declaration of the 24th June (6th July), 1895, was made in which the
vital article IX states that--"In consideration of this Loan the Chinese
Government declares that it will not grant to any foreign Power any
right or privilege of no matter what description touching the control or
administration of the revenues of the Chinese Empire. Should, however,
the Chinese Government grant to any foreign Power rights of this nature,
it is understood that the mere fact of having done so will extend those
rights to the Russian Government."

This clause has a monumental significance: it started the scramble in
China: and all the history of the past 22 years is piled like a pyramid
on top of it. Now that the Romanoffs have been hurled from the throne,
Russia must prove eager to reverse the policy which brought Japan to her
Siberian frontiers and which pinned a brother democracy to the ground.

For China, instead of being nearly bankrupt as so many have asserted,
has, thanks to the new scale of indebtedness which the war has
established, become one of the most debt-free countries in the world,
her entire national debt (exclusive of railway debt) amounting to less
than 150 millions sterling, or seven shillings per head of population,
which is certainly not very terrible. No student who has given due
attention to the question can deny that it is primarily on the proper
handling of this nexus of financial interests, and not by establishing
any artificial balance of power between foreign nations, that the peace
of the Far East really hinges. The method of securing national
redemption is ready-made: Western nations should use the Parliament of
China as an instrument of reform, and by limiting themselves to this one
method secure that civil authority is reinforced to such a point that
its behests have behind them all the wealth of the West. In questions of
currency, taxation, railways and every other vexatious problem, it is
solely by using this instrument that satisfactory results can be
attained.[29] For once Chinese realize that parliamentary government is
not merely an experimental thing but the last chance the country is to
be given to govern itself, they will rally to the call and prove that
much of the trouble and turmoil of past years has been due to the
misunderstanding of the internal problem by Western minds which has
incited the population to intrigue against one another and remain
disunited. And if we insist that there is urgent need for a settlement
of these matters in the terms we have indicated, it is because we know
very precisely what Japanese thought on this subject really is.

What is that thought--whither does it lead?

It may be broadly said that Japanese activities throughout the Far East
are based on a thorough and adequate appreciation of the fact that apart
from the winning of the hegemony of China, there is the far more
difficult and knotty problem of overshadowing and ultimately dislodging
the huge network of foreign interests--particularly British
interests--which seventy-five years of Treaty intercourse have entwined
about the country. These interests, growing out of the seed planted in
the early Canton Factory days, had their origin in the termination by
the act of the British Government of the trading monopoly enjoyed until
the thirties of last century by the East India Company. Left without
proper definition until the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 had formally won
the principle of trading-rights at five open ports, and thus established
a first basis of agreement between England and China (to which all the
trading powers hastened to subscribe), these interests expanded in a
half-hearted way until 1860, when in order to terminate friction, the
principle of extraterritoriality was boldly borrowed from the Turkish
Capitulations, and made the rock on which the entire fabric of
international dealings in China was based. These treaties, with their
always-recurring "most-favoured nation" clause, and their implication of
equal treatment for all Powers alike, constitute the Public Law of the
Far East, just as much as the Treaties between the Nations constitute
the Public Law of Europe; and any attempt to destroy, cripple, or limit
their scope and function has been very generally deemed an assault on
all the High Contracting Parties alike. By a thoroughly Machiavellian
piece of reasoning, those who have been responsible for the framing of
recent Japanese policy, have held it essential to their plan to keep the
world chained to the principle of extraterritoriality and Chinese Tariff
and economic subjection because these things, imposing as they
necessarily do restrictions and limitations in many fields, leave it
free to the Japanese to place themselves outside and beyond these
restrictions and limitations; and, by means of special zones and secret
encroachments, to extend their influence so widely that ultimately
foreign treaty-ports and foreign interests may be left isolated and at
the mercy of the "Higher machinery" which their hegemony is installing.
The Chinese themselves, it is hoped, will be gradually cajoled into
acquiescing in this very extraordinary state of affairs, because being
unorganized and split into suspicious groups, they can be manipulated in
such a way as to offer no effective mass resistance to the Japanese
advance, and in the end may be induced to accept it as inevitable.

If the reader keeps these great facts carefully in mind a new light will
dawn on him and the urgency of the Chinese question will be disclosed.
The Japanese Demands of 1915, instead of being fantastic and
far-fetched, as many have supposed, are shown to be very intelligently
drawn-up, the entire Treaty position in China having been most
exhaustively studied, and every loophole into the vast region left
untouched by the ex-territorialized Powers marked down for invasion. For
Western nations, in spite of exorbitant demands at certain periods in
Chinese history, having mainly limited themselves to acquiring coastal
and communication privileges, which were desired more for genuine
purposes of trade than for encompassing the destruction of Chinese
autonomy, are to-day in a disadvantageous position which the Japanese
have shown they thoroughly understand by not only tightening their hold
on Manchuria and Shantung, but by going straight to the root of the
matter and declaring on every possible occasion that they alone are
responsible for the peace and safety of the Far East--and this in spite
of the fact that their plan of 1915 was exposed and partially
frustrated. But the chief force behind the Japanese Foreign Office, it
should be noted, is militarist; and it is a point of honour for the
Military Party to return to the charge in China again and again until
there is definite success or definite failure.

Now in view of the facts which have been so voluminously set forth in
preceding chapters, it is imperative for men to realize that the
struggle in the Far East is like the Balkan Question a thing rooted in
geography and peoples, and cannot be brushed aside or settled by
compromises. The whole future of Chinese civilization is intimately
bound up with the questions involved, and the problem instead of
becoming easier to handle must become essentially more difficult from
day to day. Japan's real objective being the termination of the implied
trusteeship which Europe and America still exercise in the Far East, the
course of the European war must intimately effect the ultimate outcome.
If that end is satisfactory for democracies, China may reasonably claim
to share in the resulting benefits; if on the other hand the Liberal
Powers do not win an overwhelming victory which shall secure the
sanctity of Treaties for all time, it will go hard for China. Outwardly,
the immediate goal which Japan seeks to attain is merely to become the
accredited spokesman of Eastern Asia, the official representative; and,
using this attorneyship as a cloak for the advancement of objects which
other Powers would pursue on different principles, so impregnably to
entrench herself where she has no business to be that no one will dare
to attempt to turn her out. For this reason we see revived in Manchuria
on a modified scale the Eighteenth Century device, once so essential a
feature of Dutch policy in the struggle against Louis XIV, namely the
creation of "barrier-cities" for closing and securing a frontier by
giving them a special constitution which withdraws them from ordinary
jurisdiction and places foreign garrisons in them. This is precisely
what is going on from the Yalu to Eastern Mongolia, and this procedure
no doubt will be extended in time to other regions as opportunities
arise. Already in Shantung the same policy is being pursued and there
are indications that it is being thought of in Fuhkien; whilst the
infantry garrison which was quietly installed at Hankow--600 miles up
the Yangtsze river--at the time of the Revolution of 1911 is apparently
to be made permanent. Allowing her policy to be swayed by men who know
far too little of the sea, Japan stands in imminent danger of forgetting
the great lesson which Mahan taught, that for island-peoples sea-power
is everything and that land conquests which diminish the efficacy of
that power are merely a delusion and snare. Plunging farther and farther
into the vast regions of Manchuria and Mongolia which have been the
graves of a dozen dynasties, Japan is displaying increasing indifference
for the one great lesson which the war has yielded--the overwhelming
importance of the sea.[30] Necessarily guardian of the principles on
which intercourse in Asia is based, because she framed those principles
and fought for them and has built up great edifices under their
sanction, British sea-power--now allied for ever, let us hope, with
American power--nevertheless remains and will continue to remain, in
spite of what may be half-surreptitiously done to-day, the dominant
factor in the Far East as it is in the Far West. Withdrawn from view for
the time being, because of the exigencies of the hour and because the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance is still counted a binding agreement, Western
sea-power nevertheless stands there, a heavy cloud in the offing, full
of questionings regarding what is going on in the Orient, and fully
determined, let us pray, one day to receive frank answers. For the right
of every race, no matter how small or weak, to enjoy the inestimable
benefits of self-government and independence may be held to have been so
absolutely established that it is a mere question of time for the
doctrine not only to be universally accepted but to be universally
applied. In many cases, it is true, the claims of certain races are as
yet incapable of being expressed in practical state-forms; but where
nationalities have long been well-defined, there can be no question
whatsoever that a properly articulated autonomy must be secured in such
a way as to preclude the possibility of annexations.

Now although in their consideration of Asia it is notorious that Western
statesmen have not cared to keep in mind political concepts which have
become enthroned in Europe, owing to the fact that an active element of
opposition to such concepts was to be found in their own policies, a
vast change has undoubtedly been recently worked, making it certain
that the claims of nationalism are soon to be given the same force and
value in the East as in the West. But before there can be any question
of Asia for the Asiatics being adopted as a root principle by the whole
world, it will have to be established in some unmistakable form that the
surrender of the policy of conquest which Europe has pursued for four
centuries East of the Suez Canal will not lead to its adoption by an
Asiatic Power under specious forms which hide the glittering sword. If
that can be secured, then the present conflict will have truly been a
War of Liberation for the East as well as for the West. For although
Japan has been engaged for some years in declaring to all Asiatics under
her breath that she holds out the hand of a brother to them, and dreams
of the days when the age of European conquests will be nothing but a
distant memory, her actions have consistently belied her words and shown
that she has not progressed in political thought much beyond the crude
conceptions of the Eighteenth Century. Thus Korea, which fell under her
sway because the nominal independence of the country had long made it
the centre of disastrous international intrigues, is governed to-day as
a conquered province by a military viceroy without a trace of autonomy
remaining and without any promise that such a régime is only temporary.
Although nothing in the undertakings made with the Powers has ever
admitted that a nation which boasts of an ancient line of kings, and
which gave Japan much of her own civilization, should be stamped under
foot in such manner, the course which politics have taken in Korea has
been disastrous in the extreme ever since Lord Lansdowne in 1905, as
British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, pointed out in a careful dispatch
to the Russian Government that Korea was a region which fell naturally
under the sway of Japan. Not only has a tragic fate overcome the sixteen
million inhabitants of that country, but there has been a covert
extension of the principles applied to them to the people of China.

Now if as we say European concepts are to have universal meaning, and if
Japan desires European treatment, it is time that it is realized that
the policy followed in Korea, combined with the attempt to extend that
treatment to soil where China rightly claims undisputed sovereignty,
forms an insuperable barrier to Japan being admitted to the inner
council of the nations.[31] No one wishes to deny to Japan her proper
place in the world, in view of her marvellous industrial progress, but
that place must be one which fits in with modern conceptions and is not
one thing to the West and another to the East. Even the saying which was
made so much of during the Russian war of 1904, that Korea in foreign
hands was a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan--has been shown to be
inherently false by the lessons of the present struggle, the Korean
dagger-point being 120 sea miles from the Japanese coast. Such arguments
clearly show that if the truce which was hastily patched up in 1905 is
to give way to a permanent peace, that can be evolved only by locking on
to the Far East the principles which are in process of being vindicated
in Europe. In other words, precisely as Poland is to be given autonomy,
so must Korea enjoy the same privileges, the whole Japanese theory of
suzerainty on the Eastern Asiatic Continent being abandoned. To
re-establish a proper balance of power in the Far East, the Korean
nation, which has had a known historical existence of 1,500 years, must
be reinstated in something resembling its old position; for Korea has
always been the keystone of the Far Eastern arch, and it is the
destruction of that arch more than anything else which has brought the
collapse of China so perilously near.

Once the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people have been
satisfied, the whole Manchurian-Mongolian question will assume a
different aspect, and a true peace between China and Japan will be made
possible. It is to no one's interest to have a Polish question in the
Far East with all the bitterness and the crimes which such a question
must inevitably lead to; and the time to obviate the creation of such a
question is at the very beginning before it has become an obsession and
a great international issue. Although the Japanese annexation may be
held to have settled the question once and for all, we have but to point
to Poland to show that a race can pass through every possible
humiliation and endure every possible species of truncation without
dying or abating by one whit its determination to enjoy what happier
races have won.

The issue is a vital one. China by her recent acts has given a
categorical and unmistakable reply to all the insidious attempts to
place her outside and beyond the operation of international law and all
those sanctions which make life worth living; and because of the formal
birth of a Foreign Policy it can be definitely expected that this
nation, despite its internal troubles and struggles, will never rest
content until she has created a new nexus of world-relationships which
shall affirm and apply every one of the principles experience elsewhere
has proved are the absolute essentials to peace and happiness. China is
already many decades ahead of Japan in her theory of government, no
matter what the practice may be, the marvellous revolution of 1911
having given back to this ancient race its old position of leader in
ideas on the shores of the Yellow Sea. The whole dream Japan has
cherished, and has sought to give form to during the war, is in the last
analysis antiquated and forlorn and must ultimately dissolve into thin
air; for it is monstrous to suppose, in an age when European men have
sacrificed everything to free themselves from the last vestiges of
feudalism, that in the Far East the cult of Sparta should remain a
hallowed and respected doctrine. Japan's policy in the Far East during
the period of the war has been uniformly mischievous and is largely
responsible for the fierce hatreds which burst out in 1917 over the war
issue; and China will be forced to raise at the earliest possible moment
the whole question of the validity of the undertakings extorted from her
in 1915 under the threat of an ultimatum. Although the precise nature
of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy during the vital eleven days from the 4th to
the 15th August, 1914 [_i.e._ from the British declaration of war on
Germany to the Japanese ultimatum regarding Kiaochow] remains a sealed
book, China suspects that Japan from the very beginning of the present
war world-struggle has taken advantage of England's vast commitments and
acted _ultra vires_. China hopes and believes that Britain will never
again renew the Japanese alliance, which expires in 1921, in its present
form, particularly now that an Anglo-American agreement has been made
possible. China knows that in spite of all coquetting with both the
extreme radical and military parties which is going on daily in Peking
and the provinces the secret object of Japanese diplomacy is either the
restoration of the Manchu dynasty, or the enthronement of some pliant
usurper, a puppet-Emperor being what is needed to repeat in China the
history of Korea. Japan would be willing to go to any lengths to secure
the attainment of this reactionary object. Faithful to her "divine
mission," she is ceaselessly stirring up trouble and hoping that time
may still be left her to consolidate her position on the Asiatic
mainland, one of her latest methods being to busy herself at distant
points in the Pacific so that Western men for the sake of peace may be
ultimately willing to abandon the shores of the Yellow Seas to her
unchallenged mastery.

The problem thus outlined becomes a great dramatic thing. The lines
which trace the problem are immense, stretching from China to every
shore bathed by the Pacific and then from there to the distant west.
Whenever there is a dull calm, that calm must be treated solely as an
intermission, an interval between the acts, a preparation for something
more sensational than the last episode, but not as a permanent
settlement which can only come by the methods we have indicated. For the
Chinese question is no longer a local problem, but a great world-issue
which statesmen must regulate by conferences in which universal
principles will be vindicated if they wish permanently to eliminate what
is almost the last remaining international powder-magazine. A China that
is henceforth not only admitted to the family of nations on terms of
equality but welcomed as a representative of Liberalism and a subscriber
to all those sanctions on which the civilization of peace rests, will
directly tend to adjust every other Asiatic problem and to prevent a
recrudescence of those evil phenomena which are the enemies of progress
and happiness. Is it too much to dream of such a consummation? We think
not. It is to America and to England that China looks to rehabilitate
herself and to make her Republic a reality. If they lend her their help,
if they are consistent, there is still no reason why this democracy on
the shores of the Yellow Sea should not be reinstated in the proud
position it occupied twenty centuries ago, when it furnished the very
silks which clothed the daughters of the Caesars.

FOOTNOTES:

[27] The growth of the Chinese press is remarkable. Although no complete
statistics are available there is reason to believe that the number of
periodicals in China now approximates 10,000, the daily vernacular
newspapers in Peking alone exceeding 60. Although no newspaper in China
prints more than 20,000 copies a day, the reading public is growing at a
phenomenal rate, it being estimated that at least 50 million people read
the daily publications, or hear what they say,--a fact which is deemed
so politically important that all political parties and groups have
their chains of organs throughout the country.

[28] The mediaeval condition of Chinese trade taxation is well
illustrated by a Memorandum which the reader will find in the appendix.
One example may be quoted. Timber shipped from the Yalu river, _i.e._
from Chinese territory, to Peking, pays duties at _five_ different
places, the total amount of which aggregates 20 per cent. of its market
value; whilst timber from America, with transit dues and Peking Octroi
added, only pays 10 per cent.! China is probably the only country that
has ever existed that discriminates against its own goods and gives
preference to the foreigner,--through the operation of the Treaties.

[29] We need only give a single example of what we mean. If, in the
matter of the reform of the currency, instead of authorizing
trade-agencies, _i.e._ the foreign Exchange Banks, to make a loan to
China, which is necessarily hedged round with conditions favourable to
such trade-agencies, the Powers took the matter directly in their own
hands; and selecting the Bank of China--the national fiscal agent--as
the instrument of reform agreed to advance all the sums necessary,
_provided_ a Banking Law was passed by the Parliament of China of a
satisfying nature, and the necessary guarantees were forthcoming, it
would soon be possible to have a uniform National Currency which would
be everywhere accepted and lead to a phenomenal trade expansion. It
should be noted that China is still on a Copper Standard basis,--the
people's buying and selling being conducted in multiples of copper
cent-pieces of which there has been an immense over-issue, the latest
figures showing that there are no less than 22,000,000,000 1-cent, ten
cash pieces in circulation or 62 coins per head of population--roughly
twenty-five millions sterling in value,--or 160,000 tons of copper! The
number of silver dollars and subsidiary silver coins is not accurately
known,--nor is the value of the silver bullion; but it certainly cannot
greatly exceed this sum. In addition there is about £15,000,000 of paper
money. A comprehensive scheme of reform, placed in the hands of the Bank
of China, would require at least £15,000,000; but this sum would be
sufficient to modernize the currency and establish a universal silver
dollar standard.

The Bank of China requires at least 600 branches throughout the country
to become a true fiscal agent. It has to-day one-tenth of this number.

[30] It should be carefully noted that not only has Japan no unfriendly
feelings for Germany but that German Professors have been appointed to
office during the war. In the matter of enemy trading Japan's policy has
been even more extraordinary. Until there was a popular outcry among the
Entente Allies, German merchants were allowed to trade more or less as
usual. They were not denied the use of Japanese steamers, shipping
companies being simply "advised" not to deal with them, the two German
banks in Yokohama and Kobe being closed only in the Autumn of 1916. It
was not until April, 1917, that Enemy Trading Regulations were formally
promulgated and enforced,--that is when the war was very far
advanced--the action of China against Germany being no doubt largely
responsible for this step.

That the Japanese nation greatly admires the German system of government
and is in the main indifferent to the results of the war has long been
evident to observers on the spot.

[31] A very remarkable confirmation of these statements is afforded in
the latest Japanese decision regarding Manchuria which will be
immediately enforced. The experience of the past three years having
proved conclusively that the Chinese, in spite of their internal strife,
are united to a man in their determination to prevent Japan from
tightening her hold on Manchuria and instituting an open Protectorate,
the Tokio Government has now drawn up a subtle scheme which it is
believed will be effective. A Bill for the unification of administration
in South Manchuria has passed the Japanese Cabinet Conference and will
soon be formally promulgated. Under the provisions of this Bill, the
Manchuria Railway Company will become the actual organ of Japanese
administration in South Manchuria; the Japanese Consular Service will be
subordinate to the administration of the Railway; and all the powers
hitherto vested in the Consular Service, political, commercial, judicial
and administrative, will be made part of the organization of the South
Manchuria Railway. This is not all. From another Japanese source we
learn that a law is about to take effect by which the administration of
the South Manchuria Railway will be transferred directly to the control
of the Government-General of Korea, thus making the Railway at once an
apparently commercial but really political organization. In future the
revenues of the South Manchuria Railway are to be paid direct to the
Government-General of Korea; and the yearly appropriation for the upkeep
and administration of the Railway is to be fixed at Yen 12,000,000.
These arrangements, especially the amalgamation of the South Manchuria
Railway, are to take effect from the 1st July, 1917, and are an attempt
to do in the dark what Japan dares not yet attempt in the open.



APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS IN GROUP I


(1) The so-called Nineteen Articles, being the grant made by the Throne
after the outbreak of the Wuchang Rebellion in 1911 in a vain attempt to
satisfy the nation.

(2) The Abdication Edicts issued on the 12th February, 1912, endorsing
the establishment of the Republic.

(3) The terms of abdication, generally referred to as "The articles of
Favourable Treatment," in which special provision is made for the
"rights" of Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans, who are
considered as being outside the Chinese nation.


THE NINETEEN ARTICLES

1. The Ta-Ching Dynasty shall reign for ever.

2. The person of the Emperor shall be inviolable.

3. The power of the Emperor shall be limited by a Constitution.

4. The order of the succession shall be prescribed in the Constitution.

5. The Constitution shall be drawn up and adopted by the National
Assembly, and promulgated by the Emperor.

6. The power of amending the Constitution belongs to Parliament.

7. The members of the Upper House shall be elected by the people from
among those particularly eligible for the position.

8. Parliament shall select, and the Emperor shall appoint, the Premier,
who will recommend the other members of the Cabinet, these also being
appointed by the Emperor. The Imperial Princes shall be ineligible as
Premier, Cabinet Ministers, or administrative heads of provinces.

9. If the Premier, on being impeached by Parliament, does not dissolve
Parliament he must resign but one Cabinet shall not be allowed to
dissolve Parliament more than once.

10. The Emperor shall assume direct control of the army and navy, but
when that power is used with regard to internal affairs, he must observe
special conditions, to be decided upon by Parliament, otherwise he is
prohibited from exercising such power.

11. Imperial decrees cannot be made to replace the law except in the
event of immediate necessity in which case decrees in the nature of a
law may be issued in accordance with special conditions, but only when
they are in connection with the execution of a law or what has by law
been delegated.

12. International treaties shall not be concluded without the consent
of Parliament, but the conclusion of peace or a declaration of war may
be made by the Emperor if Parliament is not sitting, the approval of
Parliament to be obtained afterwards.

13. Ordinances in connection with the administration shall be settled by
Acts of Parliament.

14. In case the Budget fails to receive the approval of Parliament the
Government cannot act upon the previous year's Budget, nor may items of
expenditure not provided for in the Budget be appended to it. Further,
the Government shall not be allowed to adopt extraordinary financial
measures outside the Budget.

15. Parliament shall fix the expenses of the Imperial household, and any
increase or decrease therein.

16. Regulations in connection with the Imperial family must not conflict
with the Constitution.

17. The two Houses shall establish the machinery of an administrative
court.

18. The Emperor shall promulgate the decisions of Parliament.

19. The National Assembly shall act upon Articles 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14,
15 and 18 until the opening of Parliament.


EDICTS OF ABDICATION

I

We (the Emperor) have respectfully received the following Imperial Edict
from Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung Yu:--

As a consequence of the uprising of the Republican Army, to which the
different provinces immediately responded, the Empire seethed like a
boiling cauldron and the people were plunged into utter misery. Yuan
Shih-kai was, therefore, especially commanded some time ago to dispatch
commissioners to confer with the representatives of the Republican Army
on the general situation and to discuss matters pertaining to the
convening of a National Assembly for the decision of the suitable mode
of settlement. Separated as the South and the North are by great
distances, the unwillingness of either side to yield to the other can
result only in the continued interruption of trade and the prolongation
of hostilities, for, so long as the form of government is undecided, the
Nation can have no peace. It is now evident that the hearts of the
majority of the people are in favour of a republican form of government:
the provinces of the South were the first to espouse the cause, and the
generals of the North have since pledged their support. From the
preference of the people's hearts, the Will of Heaven can be discerned.
How could We then bear to oppose the will of the millions for the glory
of one Family! Therefore, observing the tendencies of the age on the one
hand and studying the opinions of the people on the other, We and His
Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the People and decide
in favour of a republican form of constitutional government. Thus we
would gratify on the one hand the desires of the whole nation who, tired
of anarchy, are desirous of peace, and on the other hand would follow in
the footsteps of the Ancient Sages, who regarded the Throne as the
sacred trust of the Nation.

Now Yuan Shih-kai was elected by the Tucheng-yuan to be the Premier.
During this period of transference of government from the old to the
new, there should be some means of uniting the South and the North. Let
Yuan Shih-kai organize with full powers a provisional republican
government and confer with the Republican Army as to the methods of
union, thus assuring peace to the people and tranquillity to the Empire,
and forming the one Great Republic of China by the union as heretofore,
of the five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and
Tibetans together with their territory in its integrity. We and His
Majesty the Emperor, thus enabled to live in retirement, free from
responsibilities, and cares and passing the time in ease and comfort,
shall enjoy without interruption the courteous treatment of the Nation
and see with Our own eyes the consummation of an illustrious government.
Is not this highly advisable?

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by
  Yuan Shih-kai, the Premier;
  Hoo Wei-teh, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior;
  Tan Hsuen-heng, Acting Minister of Navy;
  Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Commerce;
  Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications;
  Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies.

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung.

II

We have respectfully received the following Imperial Edict from Her
Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung Yu:--

On account of the perilous situation of the State and the intense
sufferings of the people, We some time ago commanded the Cabinet to
negotiate with the Republican Army the terms for the courteous treatment
of the Imperial House, with a view to a peaceful settlement. According
to the memorial now submitted to Us by the Cabinet embodying the
articles of courteous treatment proposed by the Republican Army, they
undertake to hold themselves responsible for the perpetual offering of
sacrifices before the Imperial Ancestral Temples and the Imperial
Mausolea and the completion as planned of the Mausoleum of His Late
Majesty the Emperor Kuang Hsu. His Majesty the Emperor is understood to
resign only his political power, while the Imperial Title is not
abolished. There have also been concluded eight articles for the
courteous treatment of the Imperial House, four articles for the
favourable treatment of Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans. We
find the terms of perusal to be fairly comprehensive. We hereby proclaim
to the Imperial Kinsmen and the Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and
Tibetans that they should endeavour in the future to fuse and remove
all racial differences and prejudices and maintain law and order with
united efforts. It is our sincere hope that peace will once more be seen
in the country and all the people will enjoy happiness under a
republican government.

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by
  Yuan Shih-kai, the Premier;
  Hoo Wei-teh, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior;
  Tan Hsuen-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy;
  Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Commerce;
  Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications;
  Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies.

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung.

III

We have respectfully received the following Edict from Her Imperial
Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung Yu:--

In ancient times the ruler of a country emphasized the important duty of
protecting the lives of his people, and as their shepherd could not have
the heart to cause them injury. Now the newly established form of
government has for its sole object the appeasement of the present
disorder with a view to the restoration of peace. If, however, renewed
warfare were to be indefinitely maintained, by disregarding the opinion
of the majority of the people, the general condition of the country
might be irretrievably ruined, and there might follow mutual slaughter
among the people, resulting in the horrible effects of a racial war. As
a consequence, the spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors might be greatly
disturbed and millions of people might be terrorized. The evil
consequences cannot be described. Between the two evils, We have adopted
the lesser one. Such is the motive of the Throne in modelling its policy
in accordance with the progress of time, the change of circumstances,
and the earnest desires of Our People. Our Ministers and subjects both
in and out of the Metropolis should, in conformity with Our idea,
consider most carefully the public weal and should not cause the country
and the people to suffer from the evil consequences of a stubborn pride
and of prejudiced opinions.

The Ministry of the Interior, the General Commandant of the Gendarmerie,
Chiang Kuei-ti, and Feng Kuo-chang, are ordered to take strict
precautions, and to make explanations to the peoples so clearly and
precisely as to enable every and all of them to understand the wish of
the Throne to abide by the ordinance of heaven, to meet the public
opinion of the people and to be just and unselfish.

The institution of the different offices by the State has been for the
welfare of the people, and the Cabinet, the various Ministries in the
Capital, the Vice-royalties, Governorships, Commissionerships, and
Taotaiships, have therefore been established for the safe protection of
the people, and not for the benefit of one man or of one family.
Metropolitan and Provincial officials of all grades should ponder over
the present difficulties and carefully perform their duties. We hereby
hold it the duty of the senior officials earnestly to advise and warn
their subordinates not to shirk their responsibilities, in order to
conform with Our original sincere intention to love and to take care of
Our people.

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by
  Yuan Shih-kai, the Premier;
  Hoo Wei-teh, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior;
  Tan Hsuen-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy;
  Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Commerce;
  Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications;
  Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies.

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung.


TERMS OF ABDICATION

N.B. These terms are generally referred to in China as "The Articles of
Favourable Treatment."

A.--Concerning the Emperor.

The Ta Ching Emperor having proclaimed a republican form of government,
the Republic of China will accord the following treatment to the Emperor
after his resignation and retirement.

Article 1. After abdication the Emperor may retain his title and shall
receive from the Republic of China the respect due to a foreign
sovereign.

Article 2. After the abdication the Throne shall receive from the
Republic of China an annuity of Tls. 4,000,000 until the establishment
of a new currency, when the sum shall be $4,000,000.

Article 3. After abdication the Emperor shall for the present be allowed
to reside in the Imperial Palace, but shall later remove to the Eho
Park, retaining his bodyguards at the same strength as hitherto.

Article 4. After abdication the Emperor shall continue to perform the
religious ritual at the Imperial Ancestral Temples and Mausolea, which
shall be protected by guards provided by the Republic of China.

Article 5. The Mausoleum of the late Emperor not being completed, the
work shall be carried out according to the original plans, and the
services in connection with the removal of the remains of the late
Emperor to the new Mausoleum shall be carried out as originally
arranged, the expense being borne by the Republic of China.

Article 6. All the retinue of the Imperial Household shall be employed
as hitherto, but no more eunuchs shall be appointed.

Article 7. After abdication all the private property of the Emperor
shall be respected and protected by the Republic of China.

Article 8. The Imperial Guards will be retained without change in
members or emolument, but they will be placed under the control of the
Department of War of the Republic of China.

B.--Concerning the Imperial Clansmen.

Article 1. Princes, Dukes and other hereditary nobility shall retain
their titles as hitherto.

Article 2. Imperial Clansmen shall enjoy public and private rights in
the Republic of China on an equality with all other citizens.

Article 3. The private property of the Imperial Clansmen shall be duly
protected.

Article 4. The Imperial Clansmen shall be exempt from military service.

C.--Concerning Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans.

The Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans having accepted the
Republic, the following terms are accorded to them:--

Article 1. They shall enjoy full equality with Chinese.

Article 2. They shall enjoy the full protection of their private
property.

Article 3. Princes, Dukes and other hereditary nobility shall retain
their titles as hitherto.

Article 4. Impoverished Princes and Dukes shall be provided with means
of livelihood.

Article 5. Provision for the livelihood of the Eight Banners, shall with
all dispatch be made, but until such provision has been made the pay of
the Eight Banners shall be continued as hitherto.

Article 6. Restrictions regarding trade and residence that have hitherto
been binding on them are abolished, and they shall now be allowed to
reside and settle in any department or district.

Article 7. Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans shall enjoy
complete religious freedom.



APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS IN GROUP II


(1) The Provisional Constitution passed at Nanking in January, 1912.

(2) The Presidential Election Law passed on the 4th October, 1913, by
the full Parliament, under which Yuan Shih-kai was elected
President,--and now formally incorporated as a separate chapter in the
Permanent Constitution.

(3) The Constitutional Compact, promulgated on 1st May, 1914. This "law"
which was the first result of the _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913,
and designed to take the place of the Nanking Constitution is wholly
illegal and disappeared with the death of Yuan Shih-kai.

(4) The Presidential Succession Law.

This instrument, like the Constitutional Compact, was wholly illegal and
drawn up to make Yuan Shih-kai dictator for life.


THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

_Passed at Nanking in 1912, currently referred to as the old Constitution_

CHAPTER I.--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. The Republic of China is composed of the Chinese people.

Art. 2. The sovereignty of the Chinese Republic is vested in the people.

Art. 3. The territory of the Chinese Republic consists of the 18
provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai.

Art. 4. The sovereignty of the Chinese Republic is exercised by the
National Council, the Provisional President, the Cabinet and the
Judiciary.

CHAPTER II.--CITIZENS

Art. 5. Citizens of the Chinese Republic are all equal, and there shall
be no racial, class or religious distinctions.

Art. 6. Citizens shall enjoy the following rights:--

(a) The person of the citizens shall not be arrested, imprisoned, tried
or punished except in accordance with law.

(b) The habitations of citizens shall not be entered or searched except
in accordance with law.

(c) Citizens shall enjoy the right of the security of their property and
the freedom of trade.

(d) Citizens shall have the freedom of speech, of composition, of
publication, of assembly and of association.

(e) Citizens shall have the right of the secrecy of their letters.

(f) Citizens shall have the liberty of residence and removal.

(g) Citizens shall have the freedom of religion.

Art. 7. Citizens shall have the right to petition the Parliament.

Art. 8. Citizens shall have the right of petitioning the executive
officials.

Art. 9. Citizens shall have the right to institute proceedings before
the Judiciary, and to receive its trial and judgment.

Art. 10. Citizens shall have the right of suing officials in the
Administrative Courts for violation of law or against their rights.

Art. 11. Citizens shall have the right of participating in civil
examinations.

Art. 12. Citizens shall have the right to vote and to be voted for.

Art. 13. Citizens shall have the duty to pay taxes according to law.

Art. 14. Citizens shall have the duty to enlist as soldiers according to
law.

Art. 15. The rights of citizens as provided in the present Chapter shall
be limited or modified by laws, provided such limitation or modification
shall be deemed necessary for the promotion of public welfare, for the
maintenance of public order, or on account of extraordinary exigency.

CHAPTER III.--THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

Art. 16. The legislative power of the Chinese Republic is exercised by
the National Council.

Art. 17. The Council shall be composed of members elected by the several
districts as provided in Article 18.

Art. 18. The Provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and Tibet shall each
elect and depute five members to the Council, and Chinghai shall elect
one member.

The election districts and methods of elections shall be decided by the
localities concerned.

During the meeting of the Council each member shall have one vote.

Art. 19. The National Council shall have the following powers:

(a) To pass all Bills.

(b) To pass the budgets of the Provisional Government.

(c) To pass laws of taxation, of currency, and weights and measures for
the whole country.

(d) To pass measures for the calling of public loans and to conclude
contracts affecting the National Treasury.

(e) To give consent to matters provided in Articles 34, 35 and 40.

(f) To reply to inquiries from, the Provisional Government.

(g) To receive and consider petitions of citizens.

(h) To make suggestions to the Government on legal or other matters.

(i) To introduce interpellations to members of the Cabinet, and to
insist on their being present in the Council in making replies thereto.

(j) To insist on the Government investigating into any alleged bribery
and infringement of laws by officials.

(k) To impeach the Provisional President for high treason by a majority
vote of three-fourths of the quorum consisting of more than four-fifths
of the total number of the members.

(l) To impeach members of the Cabinet for failure to perform their
official duties or for violation of the law by majority votes of
two-thirds of the quorum consisting of over three-fourths of the total
number of the members.

Art. 20. The National Council shall itself convoke, conduct and adjourn
its own meetings.

Art. 21. The meetings of the Advisory Council shall be conducted
publicly, but secret meetings may be held at the suggestion of members
of the Cabinet or by the majority vote of its quorum.

Art. 22. Matters passed by the Advisory Council shall be communicated to
the Provisional President for promulgation and execution.

Art. 23. If the Provisional President should veto matters passed by the
National Council he shall, within ten days after he has received such
resolutions, return the same with stated reasons to the Council for
reconsideration. If by a two-thirds vote of the quorum of the Council,
it shall be dealt with in accordance with Article 22.

Art. 24. The Chairman of the National Council shall be elected by
ballots signed by the voting members and the one receiving more than
one-half of the total number of the votes cast shall be elected.

Art. 25. Members of the National Council shall not, outside the Council,
be responsible for their opinion expressed and votes cast in the
Council.

Art. 26. Members of the Council shall not be arrested without the
permission of the Chairman of the Council except for crimes pertaining
to civil and international warfare.

Art. 27. Procedure of the National Council shall be decided by its own
members.

Art. 28. The National Council shall be dissolved on the day of the
convocation of the National Assembly, and its powers shall be exercised
by the latter.

CHAPTER IV.--THE PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

Art. 29. The Provisional President and Vice-President shall be elected
by the National Council, and he who receives two-thirds of the total
number of votes cast by a sitting of the Council consisting of over
three-fourths of the total number of members shall be elected.

Art. 30. The Provisional President represents the Provisional Government
as the fountain of all executive powers and for promulgating all laws.

Art. 31. The Provisional President may issue or cause to be issued
orders for the execution of laws and of powers delegated to him by the
law.

Art. 32. The Provisional President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the whole of China.

Art. 33. The Provisional President shall ordain and establish the
administrative system and official regulations, but he must first submit
them to the National Council for its approval.

Art. 34. The Provisional President shall appoint and remove civil and
military officials, but in the appointment of Members of the Cabinet,
Ambassadors and Ministers he must have the concurrence of the National
Council.

Art. 35. The Provisional President shall have power, with the
concurrence of the National Council, to declare war and conclude
treaties.

Art. 36. The Provisional President may, in accordance with law, declare
a state of siege.

Art. 37. The Provisional President shall, representing the whole
country, receive Ambassadors and Ministers of foreign countries.

Art. 38. The Provisional President may introduce Bills into the National
Council.

Art. 39. The Provisional President may confer decorations and other
insignia of honour.

Art. 40. The Provisional President may declare general amnesty, grant
special pardon, commute punishment, and restore rights, but in the case
of a general amnesty he must have the concurrence of the National
Council.

Art. 41. In case the Provisional President is impeached by the National
Council he shall be tried by a special Court consisting of nine judges
elected among the justices of the Supreme Court of the realm.

Art. 42. In case the Provisional President vacates his office for
various reasons, or is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office, the Provisional Vice-President shall take his place.

CHAPTER V.--MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

Art. 43. The Premier and the Chiefs of the Government Departments shall
be called Members of the Cabinet (literally, Secretaries of State
Affairs).

Art. 44. Members of the Cabinet shall assist the Provisional President
in assuming responsibilities.

Art. 45. Members of the Cabinet shall countersign all Bills introduced
by the Provisional President, and all laws and orders issued by him.

Art. 46. Members of the Cabinet and their deputies may be present and
speak in the National Council.

Art. 47. Upon members of the Cabinet having been impeached by the
National Council, the Provisional President may remove them from office,
but such removal shall be subject to the reconsideration of the National
Council.

CHAPTER VI.--THE JUDICIARY

Art. 48. The Judiciary shall be composed of those judges appointed by
the Provisional President and the Minister of Justice.

The organization of the Courts and the qualifications of judges shall be
determined by law.

Art. 49. The Judiciary shall try civil and criminal cases, but cases
involving administrative affairs or arising from other particular causes
shall be dealt with according to special laws.

Art. 50. The trial of cases in the law Courts shall be conducted
publicly, but those affecting public safety and order may be _in
camera_.

Art. 51. Judges shall be independent, and shall not be subject to the
interference of higher officials.

Art. 52. Judges during their continuance in office shall not have their
emoluments decreased and shall not be transferred to other offices, nor
shall they be removed from office except when they are convicted of
crimes, or of offences punishable according to law by removal from
office.

Regulations for the punishment of judges shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII.--SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES

Art. 53. Within ten months after the promulgation of this Provisional
Constitution the Provisional President shall convene a National
Assembly, the organization of which and the laws for the election of
whose members shall be decided by the National Council.

Art. 54. The Constitution of the Republic of China shall be adopted by
the National Assembly, but before the promulgation of the Constitution,
the Provisional Constitution shall be as effective as the Constitution
itself.

Art. 55. The Provisional Constitution may be amended by the assent of
two-thirds of the members of the National Council or upon the
application of the Provisional President and being passed by over
three-fourths of the quorum of the Council consisting of over
four-fifths of the total number of its members.

Art. 56. The present Provisional Constitution shall take effect on the
date of its promulgation, and the fundamental articles for the
organization of the Provisional Government shall cease to be effective
on the same date.

Sealed by

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.


THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW

_Passed October 4 1913, by the National Assembly and promulgated by the
then Provisional President on October 5 of the same year_.

Article 1. A citizen of the Chinese Republic, who is entitled to all the
rights of citizenship, is 40 years or more in age and has resided in
China for not less than ten years, is eligible for election as
President.

Art. 2. The President shall be elected by an Electoral College organized
by the members of the National Assembly of the Chinese Republic.

The said election shall be held by a quorum of two-thirds or more of the
entire membership of the said Electoral College and shall be conducted
by secret ballot. A candidate shall be deemed elected when the number of
votes in his favour shall not be less than three-fourths of the total
number of votes cast at the election. If no candidate secures the
requisite number of votes after two ballotings, a final balloting shall
be held with the two persons, securing the greatest number of votes at
the second balloting, as candidates. The one securing a majority of
votes shall be elected.

Art. 3. The term of office of the President shall be five years; and if
re-elected, he may hold office for one more term.

Three months previous to the expiration of the term, the members of the
National Assembly shall convene and organize by themselves the Electoral
College to elect the President for the next period.

Art. 4. The President on taking office shall make oath as follows:

"I hereby swear that I will most sincerely obey the constitution and
faithfully discharge the duties of the President."

Art. 5. Should the post of the President become vacant, the
Vice-President shall succeed to the same _to the end of the term of the
original President_.

Should the President be unable to discharge his duties for any cause the
Vice-President shall act in his stead.

Should the Vice-President vacate his post at the same time, the Cabinet
shall officiate for the President. In this event the members of the
National Assembly of the Chinese Republic shall convene themselves
within three months to organize an Electoral College to elect a new
President.

Art. 6. The President shall vacate office on the expiry of his term.
Should the election of the next President or Vice-President be not
effected for any cause, or having been elected should they be unable to
be inaugurated, the President and Vice-President whose terms have
expired shall quit their posts and the Cabinet shall officiate for them.

Art. 7. The election of the Vice-President shall be according to the
fixed regulations for the election of the President, and the election of
the Vice-President shall take place at the same time when the President
is elected. Should there be a vacancy for the Vice-Presidency a
Vice-President shall be elected according to the provisions herein set
forth.

APPENDIX

Before the completion of the Formal Constitution, with regard to the
duties and privileges of the President the Provisional Constitution
regarding the same shall temporarily be followed.


"THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT"

_Drafted by Dr. Frank Johnson Goodnow, Legal Adviser to Yuan Shih-kai,
and promulgated on May 1, 1914_

CHAPTER I.--THE NATION

Article 1. The Chung Hua Min Kuo is organized by the people of Chung
Hua.

Art. 2. The sovereignty of Chung Hua Min Kuo originates from the whole
body of the citizens.

Art. 3. The territory of the Chung Hua Min Kuo is the same as that
possessed by the former Empire.

CHAPTER II.--THE PEOPLE

Art. 4. The people of the Chung Hua Min Kuo are all equal in law,
irrespective of race, caste, or religion.

Art. 5. The people are entitled to the following rights of liberty:--

(1) No person shall be arrested, imprisoned, tried, or punished except
in accordance with law.

(2) The habitation of any person shall not be entered or searched except
in accordance with law.

(3) The people have the right of possession and protection of property
and the freedom of trade within the bounds of law.

(4) The people have the right of freedom of speech, of writing and
publication, of meeting and organizing association, within the bounds of
law.

(5) The people have the right of the secrecy of correspondence within
the bounds of law.

(6) The people have the liberty of residence and removal, within the
bounds of law.

(7) The people have freedom of religious belief, within the bounds of
law.

Art. 6. The people have the right to memorialize the Li Fa Yuan
according to the provisions of law.

Art. 7. The people have the right to institute proceedings at the
judiciary organ in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 8. The people have the right to petition the administrative organs
and lodge protests with the Administrative Court in accordance with the
provisions of law.

Art. 9. The people have the right to attend examinations held for
securing officials and to join the public service in accordance with the
provisions of law.

Art. 10. The people have the right to vote and to be voted for in
accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 11. The people have the obligation to pay taxes according to the
provisions of law.

Art. 12. The people have the obligation to serve in a military capacity
in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 13. The provisions made in this Chapter, except when in conflict
with the Army or Naval orders and rules, shall be applicable to military
and naval men.

CHAPTER III.--THE PRESIDENT

Art. 14. The President is the Head of the nation, and controls the power
of the entire administration.

Art. 15. The President represents the Chung Hua Min Kuo.

Art. 16. The President is responsible to the entire body of citizens.

Art. 17. The President convokes the Li Fa Yuan, declares the opening,
the suspension and the closing of the sessions.

The President may dissolve the Li Fa Yuan with the approval of the Tsan
Cheng Yuan; but in that case he must have the new members elected and
the House convoked within six months from the day of dissolution.

Art. 18. The President shall submit Bills of Law and the Budget to the
Li Fa Yuan.

Art. 19. For the purposes of improving the public welfare or enforcing
law or in accordance with the duties imposed upon him by law, the
President may issue orders and cause orders to be issued, but he shall
not alter the law by his order.

Art. 20. In order to maintain public peace or to prevent extraordinary
calamities at a time of great emergency when time will not permit the
convocation of the Li Fa Yuan, the President may, with the approval of
the Tsan Cheng Yuan [Senate], issue provisional orders which shall have
the force of law; but in that case he shall ask the Li Fa Yuan [House of
Representatives] for indemnification at its next session.

The provisional orders mentioned above shall immediately become void
when they are rejected by the Li Fa Yuan.

Art. 21. The President shall fix the official systems and official
regulations. The President shall appoint and dismiss military and civil
officials.

Art. 22. The President shall declare war and conclude peace.

Art. 23. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of, and controls, the
Army and Navy of the whole country. The President shall decide the
system of organization and the respective strength of the Army and Navy.

Art. 24. The President shall receive the Ambassadors and Ministers of
the foreign countries.

Art. 25. The President makes treaties.

But the approval of the Li Fa Yuan must be secured if the articles
should change the territories or increase the burdens of the citizens.

Art. 26. The President may, according to law, declare Martial Law.

Art. 27. The President may confer titles of nobility, decorations and
other insignia of honour.

Art. 28. The President may declare general amnesty, special pardon,
commutation of punishment, or restoration of rights. In case of general
amnesty the approval of the Li Fa Yuan must be secured.

Art. 29. When the President, for any cause, vacates his post or is
unable to attend to his duties, the Vice-President shall assume his
duties and authority in his stead.

CHAPTER IV.--THE LEGISLATURE

Art. 30. Legislation shall be done by the Legislature organized with the
members elected by the people.

The organization of the Legislature and the method of electing the
legislative members shall be fixed by the Provisional Constitution
Conference.

Art. 31. The duties and authorities of the Li Fa Yuan shall be as
follows:

(1) To discuss and pass all bills of law.

(2) To discuss and pass the Budget.

(3) To discuss and pass or approve articles relating to raising of
public loans and national financial responsibilities.

(4) To reply to the inquiries addressed to it by the Government.

(5) To receive petitions of the people.

(6) To bring up bills on law.

(7) To bring up suggestions and opinions before the President regarding
law and other affairs.

(8) To bring out the doubtful points of the administration and request
the President for an explanation; but when the President deems it
necessary for a matter to be kept secret he may refuse to give the
answer.

(9) Should the President attempt treason the Li Fa Yuan may institute
judicial proceedings in the Supreme Court against him by a three-fourths
or more vote of a four-fifths attendance of the total membership.

Regarding the clauses from 1 to 8 and articles 20, 25, 28, 55 and 27,
the approval of a majority of more than half of the attending members
will be required to make a decision.

Art. 32. The regular annual session of the Li Fa Yuan will be four
months in duration; but when the President deems it necessary it may be
prolonged. The President may also call special sessions when it is not
in session.

Art. 33. The meetings of the Li Fa Yuan shall be "open sessions," but
they may be held in secret at the request of the President or the
decision of the majority of more than half of the members present.

Art. 34. The law bills passed by the Li Fa Yuan shall be promulgated by
the President and enforced.

When the President vetoes a law bill passed by the Li Fa Yuan he must
give the reason and refer it again to the Li Fa Yuan for
reconsideration. If such bill should be again passed by a two-thirds
vote of the members present at the Li Fa Yuan but at the same time the
President should firmly hold that it would greatly harm the internal
administration or diplomacy to enforce such law or there will be great
and important obstacles against enforcing it, he may withhold
promulgation with the approval of the Tsan Cheng Yuan.

Art. 35. The Speaker and vice-Speaker of the Li Fa Yuan shall be elected
by and from among the members themselves by ballot. The one who secures
more than half of the votes cast shall be considered elected.

Art. 36. The members of the Li Fa Yuan shall not be held responsible to
outsiders for their speeches, arguments and voting in the House.

Art. 37. Except when discovered in the act of committing a crime or for
internal rebellion or external treason, the members of the Li Fa Yuan
shall not be arrested during the session period without the permission
of the House.

Art. 38. The House laws of the Li Fa Yuan shall be made by the House
itself.

CHAPTER V.--THE ADMINISTRATION

Art. 39. The President shall be the Chief of the Administration. A
Secretary of State shall be provided to assist him.

Art. 40. The affairs of the Administration shall be separately
administered by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Interior, of
Finance, of Army, of Navy, of Justice, of Education, of Agriculture and
Commerce and of Communications.

Art. 41. The Minister of each Ministry shall control the affairs in
accordance with law and orders.

Art. 42. The Secretary of State, Ministers of the Ministries and the
special representative of the President may take seats in the Li Fa Yuan
and express their views.

Art. 43. The Secretary of State or any of the Ministers when they commit
a breach of law shall be liable to impeachment by the Censorate
(Suchengting) and trial by the Administrative Court.

CHAPTER VI.--THE JUDICIARY

Art. 44. The judicial power shall be administered by the Judiciary
formed by the judicial officials appointed by the President.

The organization of the Judiciary and the qualifications of the Judicial
officials shall be fixed by law.

Art. 45. The Judiciary shall independently try and decide cases of civil
and criminal law suits according to law. But with regard to
administrative law suits and other special law cases they shall be
attended to according to the provisions of this law.

Art. 46. As to the procedure the Supreme Court should adopt for the
impeachment case stated in clause 9 of article 31, special rules will be
made by law.

Art. 47. The trial of law suits in the judicial courts should be open to
the public; but when they are deemed to be harmful to peace and order or
good custom, they may be held _in camera_.

Art. 48. The judicial officials shall not be given a reduced salary or
shifted from their posts when functioning as such, and except when a
sentence has been passed upon him for punishment or he is sentenced to
be removed, a judicial official shall not be dismissed from his post.

The regulations regarding punishment shall be fixed by law.

CHAPTER VII.--THE TSAN CHENG YUAN

Art. 49. The Tsan Cheng Yuan shall answer the inquiries of the President
and discuss important administrative affairs.

The organization of the Tsan Cheng Yuan shall be fixed by the
Provisional Constitution Conference.

CHAPTER VIII.--FINANCES

Art. 50. Levying of new taxes and dues and change of tariff shall be
decided by law.

The taxes and dues which are now in existence shall continue to be
collected as of old except as changed by law.

Art. 51. With regard to the annual receipts and expenditures of the
nation, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the Budget approved
by the Li Fa Yuan.

Art. 52. For special purposes continuous expenditures for a specified
number of years may be included in the budget.

Art. 53. To prepare for any deficiency of the budget and expenses needed
outside of the estimates in the budget, a special reserve fund must be
provided in the budget.

Art. 54. The following items of expenditures shall not be cancelled or
reduced except with the approval of the President:--

1. Any duties belonging to the nation according to law.

2. Necessities stipulated by law.

3. Necessities for the purpose of carrying out the treaties.

4. Expenses for the Army and Navy.

Art. 55. For national war or suppression of internal disturbance or
under unusual circumstances when time will not permit to convoke the Li
Fa Yuan, the President may make emergency disposal of finance with the
approval of the Tsan Cheng Yuan, but in such case he shall ask the Li Fa
Yuan for indemnification at its next session.

Art. 56. When a new Budget cannot be established, the Budget of the
previous year will be used. The same procedure will be adopted when the
Budget fails to pass at the time when the fiscal year has begun.

Art. 57. When the closed accounts of the receipts and expenditures of
the nation have been audited by the Board of Audit, they shall be
submitted by the President to the Li Fa Yuan for approval.

Art. 58. The organization of the Board of Audit shall be fixed by the
Provisional Constitution Conference.

CHAPTER IX.--PROCEDURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING

Art. 59. The Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo shall be drafted by the
Constitution Draft Committee, which shall be organized with the members
elected by and from among the members of the Tsan Cheng Yuan. The number
of such drafting Committee shall be limited to ten.

Art. 60. The Bill on the Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo shall be
fixed by the Tsan Cheng Yuan.

Art. 61. When the Bill on the Constitution of the Chung Hua Min Kuo has
been passed by the Tsan Cheng Yuan, it shall be submitted by the
President to the Citizens' Conference for final passage.

The organization of the Citizens' Conference shall be fixed by the
Provisional Constitution Conference.

Art. 62. The Citizens' Conference shall be convoked and dissolved by the
President.

Art. 63. The Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo shall be promulgated by
the President.

CHAPTER X.--APPENDIX

Art. 64.--Before the Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo comes into force
this Provisional Constitution shall have equal force to the Permanent
Constitution.

The order and instructions in force before the enforcement of this
Provisional Constitution shall continue to be valid, provided that they
do not come into conflict with the provisions of this Provisional
Constitution.

Art. 65. The articles published on the 12th of the Second Month of the
First Year of Chung Hua Min Kuo, regarding the favourable treatment of
the Ta Ching Emperor after his abdication, and the special treatment of
the Ching Imperial Clan, as well as the special treatment of the
Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans and Tibetans shall never lose their
effect.

As to the Articles dealing with the special treatment of Mongols in
connexion with the special treatment articles, it is guaranteed that
they shall continue to be effective, and that the same will not be
changed except by law.

Art. 66. This Provisional Constitution may be amended at the request of
two-thirds of the members of the Li Fa Yuan, or the proposal of the
President, by a three-fourths majority of a quorum consisting of
four-fifths or more of the whole membership of the House. The
Provisional Constitution Conference will then be convoked by the
President to undertake the amendment.

Art. 67. Before the establishment of the Li Fa Yuan the Tsan Cheng Yuan
shall have the duty and authority of the former and function in its
stead.

Art. 68. This Provisional Constitution shall come into force from the
date of promulgation. The Temporary Provisional Constitution promulgated
on the 11th day of the Third Month of the First Year of the Min Kuo
shall automatically cease to have force from the date on which this
Provisional Constitution comes into force.


THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

_Passed by a puppet political body and promulgated by Yuan Shih-kai on
December 29, 1914_

Article 1. A male citizen of the Republic of Chung Hua, possessing the
rights of citizenship, 40 or more years of age and having resided in the
Republic for not less than 20 years shall be eligible for election as
President.

Art. 2. The Presidential term shall be ten years with eligibility for
re-election.

Art. 3. At the time of the Presidential Election the then President
shall, representing the opinion of the people carefully and reverently
nominate (recommend) three persons, with the qualifications stated in
the first Article, as candidates for the Presidential Office.

The names of these nominated persons shall be written by the then
President on a gold Chia-ho-plate, sealed with the National Seal and
placed in a gold box, which shall be placed in a stone house in the
residence of the President.

The key of the box will be kept by the President while the keys to the
Stone House shall be kept separately by the President, the Chairman of
the Tsan Cheng Yuan and the Secretary of State. The Stone House may not
be opened without an order from the President.

Art. 4. The Presidential Electoral College shall be organized with the
following members:

1. Fifty members elected from the Tsan Cheng Yuan.

2. Fifty members elected from the Li Fa Yuan.

The said members shall be elected by ballot among the members
themselves. Those who secure the largest number of votes shall be
elected. The election shall be presided over by the Minister of
Interior. If it should happen that the Li Fa Yuan is in session at the
time of the organization of the Presidential Electoral College, the
fifty members heading the roll of the House and then in the Capital,
shall be automatically made members of the Electoral College.

Art. 5. The Electoral College shall be convocated by the President and
organized within three days before the election.

Art. 6. The house of the Tsan Cheng Yuan shall be used as a meeting
place for the Presidential Electoral College. The chairman of the Tsan
Cheng Yuan shall act as the chairman of the College.

If the Vice-President is the chairman of the Tsan Cheng Yuan or for
other reasons, the chairman of the Li Fa Yuan shall act as the chairman.

Art. 7. On the day of the Presidential Election the President shall
respectfully make known to the Presidential Electoral College the names
of the persons recommended by him as qualified candidates for the
Presidential office.

Art. 8. The Electoral College may vote for the re-election of the then
President, besides three candidates recommended by him.

Art. 9. The single ballot system will be adopted for the Presidential
Election. There should be an attendance of not less than three-fourths
of the total membership. One who receives a two-thirds majority or
greater of the total number of votes cast shall be elected. If no one
secures a two-thirds majority the two persons receiving the largest
number of votes shall be put to the final vote.

Art. 10. When the year of election arrives should the members of the
Tsan Cheng Yuan consider it a political necessity, the then President
may be re-elected for another term by a two-thirds majority of the Tsan
Cheng Yuan without a formal election. The decision shall then be
promulgated by the President.

Art. 11. Should the President vacate his post before the expiration of
his term of office a special Presidential Electoral College shall be
organized within three days. Before the election takes place the
Vice-President shall officiate as President according to the provisions
of Article 29 of the Constitutional Compact and if the Vice-President
should also vacate his post at the same time, or be absent from the
Capital or for any other reasons be unable to take up the office, the
Secretary of State shall officiate but he shall not assume the duties of
clauses I and 2, either as a substitute or a temporary executive.

Art. 12. On the day of the Presidential Election, the person officiating
as President or carrying on the duties as a substitute shall notify the
Chairman of the Special Presidential Electoral College to appoint ten
members as witnesses to the opening of the Stone House or the Gold Box,
which shall be carried reverently to the House and opened before the
assembly and its contents made known to them. Votes shall then be
forthwith cast for the election of one of the three candidates
recommended as provided for in article 9.

Art. 13. Whether at the re-election of the old President or the
assumption of office of the new President, he shall take oath in the
following words at the time of taking over the office:

"I swear that I shall with all sincerity adhere to the Constitution and
execute the duties of the President. I reverently swear."

Before the promulgation of the Constitution it shall be specifically
stated in the oath that the President shall adhere to the Constitutional
Compact.

Art. 14. The term of office for the Vice-President shall be the same as
that of the President. Upon the expiration of the term, three
candidates, possessing the qualifications of article 1, shall be
nominated by the re-elected or the new President, for election. The
regulations governing the election of the President shall be applicable.

Should the Vice-President vacate his post before the expiration of his
term for some reasons, the President shall proceed according to the
provisions of the preceding article.

Art. 15. The Law shall be enforced from the date of promulgation.

On the day of enforcement of this Law the Law on the Election of the
President as promulgated on the 5th day of the 10th Month of the 2nd
Year of the Min Kuo shall be cancelled.



APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS IN GROUP III


(1) The Russo-Chinese agreement of 5th November, 1913, which affirmed
the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.

(2) The Russo-Chinese-Mongolian tripartite agreement of the 7th June,
1915, ratifying the agreement of the 5th November, 1913.

(3) The Chino-Japanese Treaties and annexes of the 25th May, 1915, in
settlement of the Twenty-one Demands of the 18th January, 1915.


THE RUSSO-CHINESE AGREEMENT REGARDING OUTER MONGOLIA

(Translation from the official French Text)

DECLARATION

The Imperial Russian Government having formulated the principles on
which its relations with China on the subject of Outer Mongolia should
be based; and the Government of the Republic of China having signified
its approval of the aforesaid principles, the two Governments have come
to the following agreement:

Article I. Russia recognizes that Outer Mongolia is placed under the
suzerainty of China.

Art. II. China recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.

Art. III. Similarly, recognizing the exclusive right of the Mongols of
Outer Mongolia to carry on the internal administration of autonomous
Mongolia and to regulate all commercial and industrial questions
affecting that country, China undertakes not to interfere in these
matters, nor to dispatch troops to Outer Mongolia nor to appoint any
civil or military officer nor to carry out any colonization scheme in
this region. It is nevertheless understood that an envoy of the Chinese
Government may reside at Urga and be accompanied by the necessary staff
as well as an armed escort. In addition the Chinese Government may, in
case of necessity, maintain her agents for the protection of the
interests of her citizens at certain points in Outer Mongolia to be
agreed upon during the exchange of views provided for in Article V of
this agreement. Russia on her part undertakes not to quarter troops in
Outer Mongolia, excepting Consular Guards, nor to interfere in any
question affecting the administration of the country and will likewise
abstain from all colonization.

Art. IV. China declares herself ready to accept the good offices of
Russia in order to establish relations in conformity with the principles
mentioned above and with the stipulations of the Russo-Mongolian
Commercial Treaty of the 21st October, 1912.

Art. V. Questions affecting the interests of Russia and China in Outer
Mongolia which have been created by the new conditions of affairs in
that country shall be discussed at subsequent meetings. In witness
whereof the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed and
sealed the Present Declaration. Done in Duplicate in Peking on the 5th
November, 1913, corresponding to the 5th Day of the 11th Month of the
Second Year of the Republic of China.

(Signed) B. KRUPENSKY.

(Signed) SUN PAO CHI.

ADDENDUM

In signing the Declaration of to-day's date covering Outer Mongolia, the
undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, duly authorized to that effect,
has the honour to declare in the name of his Government to His
Excellency Monsieur Sun Pao Chi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of China as follows:

I. Russia recognizes that the territory of Outer Mongolia forms part of
the territory of China.

II. In all questions affecting matters of a political or territorial
nature, the Chinese Government will come to an understanding with the
Russian Government by means of negotiations at which the authorities of
Outer Mongolia shall take part.

III. The discussions which have been provided for in Article V of the
Declaration shall take place between the three contracting parties at a
place to be designated by them for that purpose for the meeting of their
delegates.

IV. Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions hitherto under the
jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, the Tartar General of
Uliasoutai and the Chinese Amban of Kobdo. In view of the fact that
there are no detailed maps of Mongolia, and that the boundaries of the
administrative divisions of this country are ill-defined, it is hereby
agreed that the precise boundaries of Outer Mongolia, as well as the
delimitation of the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, shall
be the subject of subsequent negotiations as provided for by Article V
of the Declaration.

The undersigned seizes the present occasion to renew to His Excellency
Sun Pao Chi the assurance of his highest consideration.

(Signed) B. KRUPENSKY.

In signing the Declaration of to-day's date covering Outer Mongolia, the
undersigned Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, duly
authorized to that effect, has the honour to declare in the name of his
Government to His Excellency Monsieur Krupensky, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias
as follows:

I. Russia recognizes that the territory of Outer Mongolia forms part of
the territory of China.

II. In all questions affecting matters of a political or territorial
nature, the Chinese Government will come to an understanding with the
Russian Government by means of negotiations at which the authorities of
Outer Mongolia shall take part.

III. The discussions which have been provided for in Article V of the
Declaration shall take place between the three contracting parties at a
place to be designated by them for that purpose for the meeting of their
delegates.

IV. Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions hitherto under the
jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, the Tartar General of
Uliasoutai and the Chinese Amban of Kobdo. In view of the fact that
there are no detailed maps of Mongolia, and that the boundaries of the
administrative divisions of this country are ill-defined, it is hereby
agreed that the precise boundaries of Outer Mongolia, as well as the
delimitation of the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, shall
be the subject of subsequent negotiations as provided for by Article V
of the Declaration.

The Undersigned seizes the present occasion to renew to His Excellency
Monsieur Krupensky the assurance of his highest consideration.

(Signed) SUN PAO CHI.


SINO-RUSSO MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT

(Translation from the French)

The President of the Republic of China, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor
of all Russias, and His Holiness the Bogdo Djembzoun Damba Khoutoukhtou
Khan of Outer Mongolia, animated by a sincere desire to settle by mutual
agreement various questions created by a new state of things in Outer
Mongolia, have named for that purpose their Plenipotentiary Delegates,
that is to say:

The President of the Republic of China, General Py-Koue-Fang and
Monsieur Tcheng-Loh, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of
China to Mexico;

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all Russias, His Councillor of
State, Alexandre Miller, Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General in
Mongolia; and His Holiness the Bogdo Djembzoun Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan
of Outer Mongolia, Erdeni Djonan Beise Shirnin Damdin, Vice-Chief of
Justice, and Touchetou Tsing Wang Tchakdourjab, Chief of Finance, who
having verified their respective full powers found in good and due form,
have agreed upon the following:

Article 1. Outer Mongolia recognizes the Sino-Russian Declaration and
the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the fifth day of the
eleventh month of the second year of the Republic of China (23rd
October, 1913. Old style).

Art. 2. Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty. China and Russia
recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese
territory.

Art. 3. Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international
treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial
questions.

As respects questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer
Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article II of the
Note exchanged between China and Russia on the fifth day of the eleventh
month of the second year of the Republic of China, 23rd October, 1913.

Art. 4. The title: "Bogdo Djembzonn Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan of Outer
Mongolia" is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The
calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical
signs are to be used in official documents.

Art. 5. China and Russia, conformably to Article 2 and 3 of the
Sino-Russian Declaration of the fifth day of the eleventh month of the
second year of the Republic of China, 23rd October, 1913, recognize the
exclusive right of the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia to attend
to all the affairs of its internal administration and to conclude with
foreign powers international treaties and agreements respecting
questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous
Mongolia.

Art. 6. Conformably to the same Article III of the Declaration, China
and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal
administration existing in Outer Mongolia.

Art. 7. The military escort of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga provided
for by Article III of the above-mentioned Declaration is not to exceed
two hundred men. The military escorts of his assistants at Ouliassoutai,
at Kobdo, and at the Mongolian-Kiachta are not to exceed fifty men each.
If, by agreement with the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia,
assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities of
Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each.

Art. 8. The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send more than one
hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its representative at Urga.
The military escorts of the Imperial consulates and vice-consulates of
Russia, which have already been established or which may be established
by agreement with the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia, in other
localities of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men each.

Art. 9. On all ceremonial or official occasions the first place of
honour is due to the Chinese Dignitary. He has the right, if necessary,
to present himself in private audience with His Holiness Bogdo Djembzoun
Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan of Outer Mongolia. The Imperial Representative
of Russia enjoys the same right of private audience.

Art. 10. The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the
different localities of Outer Mongolia provided for by Article VII of
this agreement are to exercise general control lest the acts of the
autonomous government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities
may impair the suzerain rights and the interests of China and her
subjects in autonomous Mongolia.

Art. 11. Conformably to Article IV of the Note exchanged between China
and Russia on the fifth day of the eleventh month of the second year of
the Republic of China (23rd October, 1915), the territory of autonomous
Outer Mongolia comprises the regions which were under the jurisdiction
of the Chinese Amban at Ourga, or the Tartar-General at Ouliassoutai and
of the Chinese Amban at Kobdo; and connects with the boundary of China
by the limits of the banners of the four aimaks of Khalkha and of the
district of Kobdo, bounded by the district of Houloun-Bourie on the
east, by Inner Mongolia on the south, by the Province of Sinkiang on the
southwest, and by the districts of Altai on the West.

The formal delimitation between China and autonomous Mongolia is to be
carried out by a special commission of delegates of China, Russia and
autonomous Outer Mongolia, which shall set itself to the work of
delimitation within a period of two years from the date of signature of
the present Agreement.

Art. 12. It is understood that customs duties are not to be established
for goods of whatever origin they may be, imported by Chinese merchants
into autonomous Outer Mongolia. Nevertheless, Chinese merchants shall
pay all the taxes on internal trade which have been established in
autonomous Outer Mongolia and which may be established therein in the
future, payable by the Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia. Similarly
the merchants of autonomous Outer Mongolia, when importing any kind of
goods of local production into "Inner China," shall pay all the taxes on
trade which have been established in "Inner China" and which may be
established therein in the future, payable by Chinese merchants. Goods
of foreign origin imported from autonomous Outer Mongolia into "Inner
China" shall be subject to the customs duties stipulated in the
regulations for land trade of the seventh year of the reign of
Kouang-Hsu (1881).

Art. 13. Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese subjects
residing in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and adjudicated
by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and by his assistants in the other
localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Art. 14. Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of
autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects residing therein are to
be examined and adjudicated by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his
assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia, or
their delegates, and the Mongolian authorities. If the defendant or
accused is of autonomous Outer Mongolia, the joint examination and
decision of the case are to be held at the Chinese Dignitary's place at
Niga and that of his assistants in the other localities of autonomous
Outer Mongolia; if the defendant or the accused is a Mongol of
autonomous Outer Mongolia and the claimant or the complainant is a
Chinese subject, the case is to be examined and decided in the same
manner in the Mongolian yamen. The guilty are to be punished according
to their own laws. The interested parties are free to arrange their
disputes amicably by means of arbitrators chosen by themselves.

Art. 15. Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of
autonomous Outer Mongolia and Russian subjects residing therein are to
be examined and decided conformably to the stipulations of Article XVI
of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial protocol of 21st October, 1912.

Art. 16. All civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese and
Russian subjects in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and
decided in the following manner: in an action wherein the claimant or
the complainant is a Russian subject and the defendant or accused is a
Chinese subject, the Russian Consul personally or through his delegate
participates in the judicial trial, enjoying the same right as the
Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his assistants in the other
localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Russian Consul or his
delegate proceeds to the hearing of the claimant and the Russian
witnesses in the court in session, and interrogates the defendant and
the Chinese witnesses through the medium of the Chinese Dignitary at
Urga or his delegates or of his assistants in the other localities of
autonomous Outer Mongolia; the Russian Consul or his delegate examines
the evidence presented, demands security for "revindication" and has
recourse to the opinion of experts, if he considers such expert opinion
necessary for the elucidation of the rights of the parties, etc.; he
takes part in deciding and in the drafting of the judgment, which he
signs with the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegates or his
assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The
execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Chinese authorities.

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his Assistants in the other localities
of autonomous Outer Mongolia may likewise personally or through their
delegates be present at the hearing of an action in the Consulates of
Russia wherein the defendant or the accused is a Russian subject and the
claimant or the complainant is a Chinese subject. The execution of the
judgment constitutes a duty of the Russian authorities.

Art. 17. Since a section of the Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan telegraph line lies
in the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia, it is agreed that the
said section of the said telegraph line constitutes the complete
property of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia. The details
respecting the establishment on the borders of that country and Inner
Mongolia of a station to be administered by Chinese and Mongolian
employés for the transmission of telegrams, as well as the questions of
the tariff for telegrams transmitted and of the apportionment of the
receipts, etc., are to be examined and settled by a special commission
of technical delegates of China, Russia and Autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Art. 18. The Chinese postal institutions at Urga and Mongolian Kiachta
remain in force on the old basis.

Art. 19. The Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia will place at the
disposal of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and of his assistants at
Ouliassoutai, Kobdo and Mongolian-Kiachta as well as of their staff the
necessary houses, which are to constitute the complete property of the
Government of the Republic of China. Similarly, necessary grounds in the
vicinity of the residences of the said staff are to be granted for their
escorts.

Art. 20. The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other
localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia and also their staff are to
enjoy the right to use the courier stations of the autonomous Mongolian
Government conformably to the stipulations of Article XI of the
Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 21st October, 1912.

Art. 21. The stipulations of the Sino-Russian declaration and the Notes
exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of
the 2nd year of the Republic of China, 23rd October, 1913, as well as
those of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of the 21st October,
1912, remain in full force.

Art. 22. The present Agreement, drawn up in triplicate in Chinese,
Russian, Mongolian and French languages, comes into force from the day
of its signature. Of the four texts which have been duly compared and
found to agree, the French text shall be authoritative in the
interpretation of the Present Agreement.

Done at Kiachta the 7th day of the Sixth Month of the Fourth year of the
Republic of China, corresponding to the Twenty-fifth of May, Seventh of
June, One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifteen.


CHINO-JAPANESE TREATIES AND ANNEXES

COMPLETE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE DOCUMENTS

_The following is an authoritative translation of the two Treaties and
thirteen Notes exchanged between His Excellency the President of the
Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan through their
respective plenipotentiaries_:

TREATY RESPECTING THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty
the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to conclude a Treaty with a view
to the maintenance of general peace in the Extreme East and the further
strengthening of the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood now
existing between the two nations, have for that purpose named as their
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou Tseng-tsiang,
_Chung-ching_, First Class _Chia Ho_ Decoration, Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

And His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Hioki Eki, _Jushii_, Second Class
of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister Plenipotentiary,
and Envoy Extraordinary:

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers and found
them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the
following Articles:--

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all
matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the
German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests
and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise,
possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Art. 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be
built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the
Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of
financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese
capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Art. 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of trade and for
the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as
possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as
Commercial Ports.

Art. 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day of its
signature.

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President of
the Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the
ratification thereof shall be exchanged at Tokio as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the High
Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, two
copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese.

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the fourth
year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the same day of the same
month of the fourth year of Taisho.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING SHANTUNG

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre.

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honour to make the
following declaration to your Government:--"Within the Province of
Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or
ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you made the following declaration in the
name of the Chinese Government:--"Within the Province of Shantung or
along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to any
foreign Power under any pretext."

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE OPENING OF PORTS IN SHANTUNG

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre.

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be opened as
Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 3 of the
Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung signed this day, will be
selected and the regulations therefor, will be drawn up, by the Chinese
Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after
consulting the Minister of Japan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you stated "that the places which ought to
be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 3
of the Treaty respecting the province of Shantung signed this day, will
be selected and the regulations therefor, will be drawn up by the
Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made
after consulting the Minister of Japan."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE RESTORATION OF THE LEASED TERRITORY OF
KIAOCHOW BAY

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make the following
declaration to the Chinese Government:--

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of
Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the
Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China
under the following conditions:--

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be
established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be
established.

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of
Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese
Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual
agreement before the restoration.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you made the following declaration in the
name of your Government:--

"When, after the termination of the present war the leased territory of
Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the
Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China
under the following conditions:--

"1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be
established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

"3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be
established.

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of
Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese
Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual
agreement before the restoration."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

TREATY RESPECTING SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty
the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to conclude a Treaty with a view
to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries,
that is to say;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou Tseng-tsiang,
_Chung-ching_, First Class _Chia-ho_ Decoration, and Minister of Foreign
Affairs; And His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Hioki Eki, _Jushii_,
Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister
Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary;

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, and
found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded
the following Articles:--

Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that the term of lease
of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway
and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease
land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture
or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South
Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind
whatsoever.

Art. 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to
undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto,
the Chinese Government may give its permission.

Art. 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three
articles, besides being required to register with the local Authorities
passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall
also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be
tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul: those in which the
defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
Authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to
attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and
Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of
both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is completely
reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects
shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for
the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as
possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as
Commercial Ports.

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental
revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a
standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore
between China and foreign financiers.

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway
loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers in connection with
railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance
with Japan's wishes.

Art. 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Treaty,
remain in force.

Art. 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of its
signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the
President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,
and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokio as soon as
possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two High
Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, two
copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese.

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the fourth
year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the same day of the same
month of the fourth year of Taisho.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

_Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the Terms of
South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways_.

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that, respecting the provisions contained in
Article I of the Treaty relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny
shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for
restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the
91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South
Manchurian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redeemed by China
after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is opened is hereby
cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the
96th year of the Republic or 2007.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date, in which you stated that respecting the provisions
contained in Article I of the Treaty relating to South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease of Port
Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997.
The date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall
due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original
South Manchurian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redeemed by
China after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is opened, is
hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in
the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE OPENING OF PORTS IN EASTERN INNER
MONGOLIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be opened as
Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 6 of the
Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this
day, will be selected, and the regulations therefor, will be drawn up
by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be
made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you stated "that the places which ought to
be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 6
of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia
signed this day, will be selected, and the regulations therefor, will be
drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which
will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKO EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SOUTH MANCHURIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that Japanese subjects shall, as soon as
possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas in South
Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being prospected for or
worked, and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or
work the same; but before the Mining regulations are definitely settled,
the practice at present in force shall be followed. Provinces
Fengtien:--

  |Locality            |District                 |Mineral
  |                    |                         |
  |Niu Hsin T'ai       |Pen-hsi                  |Coal
  |Tien Shih Fu Kou    |Pen-hsi                  |Coal
  |Sha Sung Kang       |Hai-lung                 |Coal
  |T'ieh Ch'ang        |Tung-hua                 |Coal
  |Nuan Ti T'ang       |Chin                     |Coal
  |An Shan Chan region |From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi |Iron

KIRIN (_Southern portion_)

  |Locality            |District                 |Mineral
  |                    |                         |
  |Sha Sung Kang       |Ho-lung                  |C. & I.
  |Kang Yao Chia       |Chi-lin (Kirin)          |Coal
  |P'i Kou             |Hua-tien                 |Gold

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.
Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day respecting the opening of mines in South Manchuria, stating;
"Japanese subjects shall, as soon as possible, investigate and select
mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder,
except those being prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government
will then permit them to prospect or work the same; but before the
Mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice at present in
force shall be followed.

1 Provinces Fengtien.

  |Locality               |District                 |Mineral
  |                       |                         |
  |1. Niu Hsin T'ai       |Pen-hsi                  |Coal
  |2. Tien Shih Fu Kou    |Pen-hsi                  |Coal
  |3. Sha Sung Kang       |Hai-lung                 |Coal
  |4. T'ieh Ch'ang        |Tung-hua                 |Coal
  |5. Nuan Ti T'ang       |Chin                     |Coal
  |6. An Shan Chan region |From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi |Iron

KIRIN (_Southern portion_)

  |1. Sha Sung Kang       |Ho-lung                  |C. & I.
  |2. Kang Yao            |Chi-lin (Kirin)          |Coal
  |3. Chia P'i Kou        |Hua-tien                 |Gold

"I avail, etc.,

(Signed) "HIOKI EKI."

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING RAILWAYS AND TAXES IN SOUTH MANCHURIA AND
EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of my Government.

I have the honour to make the following declaration to your
Government:--

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is
required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first;
and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the
security of the taxes in the above-mentioned places (excluding the salt
and customs revenue which has already been pledged by the Chinese
Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists
first.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date respecting railways and taxes in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia in which you stated:

"China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is
required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first;
and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the
security of taxes in the above mentioned places (excluding the salt and
customs revenue which has already been pledged by the Chinese Central
Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists first."

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKO EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF ADVISERS IN SOUTH
MANCHURIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the Chinese Government, I have the honour to make the
following declaration to your Government:--

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial,
military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria,
Japanese may be employed first."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you made the following declaration in the
name of your Government:--

"Hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors in political, financial,
military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria,
Japanese may be employed first."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE EXPLANATION OF "LEASE BY NEGOTIATION"
IN SOUTH MANCHURIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to state that the term lease by negotiation contained
in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia signed this day shall be understood to imply a long-term lease
of not more than thirty years and also the possibility of its
unconditional renewal.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you state.

"The term lease by negotiation contained in Article 2 of the Treaty
respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day
shall be understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than thirty
years and also the possibility of its unconditional renewal."

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENT FOR POLICE LAWS AND
ORDINANCES AND TAXATION IN SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that the Chinese Authorities will notify the
Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances and the taxation to
which Japanese subjects shall submit according to Article 5 of the
Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this
day so as to come to an understanding with him before their enforcement.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you state:

"The Chinese Authorities will notify the Japanese Consul of the Police
laws and ordinances and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall
submit according to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as to come to an
understanding with him before their enforcement."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that, inasmuch as preparations have to be
made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty respecting South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, the Chinese
Government proposes that the operation of the said Articles be postponed
for a period of three months beginning from the date of the signing of
the said Treaty.

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you stated that "inasmuch as preparations
have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty
respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day,
the Chinese Government proposes that the operation of the said Articles
be postponed for a period of three months beginning from the date of
the signing of the said Treaty."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE MATTER OF HANYEHPING

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that if in future the Hanyehping Company and
the Japanese capitalists agree upon co-operation, the Chinese
Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the
Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its
permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the
said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to
convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use
foreign capital other than Japanese.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date in which you state:

"If in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree
upon co-operation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate
relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said
Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government
further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the
consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state
enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than
Japanese."

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE FUKIEN QUESTION

--Note--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Excellency,

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Government has
the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish, on the coast
of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval
bases, or to set up other military establishments; and also of borrowing
foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned
establishments.

I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be good enough to
give me reply stating whether or not the Chinese Government really
entertains such an intention.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI EKI.

His Excellency,
Lou Tseng-tsiang,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

--Reply--

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of the Republic of
China.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note
of this day's date which I have noted.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government hereby declares
that it has given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the
coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use,
naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; nor does it
entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of
setting up the above-mentioned establishments.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

His Excellency,
Hioki Eki,
Japanese Minister.



APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS IN GROUP IV


(1) The Draft of the Permanent Constitution completed in May, 1917.

(2) The proposed Provincial System, _i.e._, the local government law.

(3) Memorandum by the Ministry of Commerce on Tariff Revision,
illustrating the anomalies of present trade taxation.

(4) The leading outstanding cases between China and the Foreign Powers.


DRAFT OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF CHINA

(As it stood on May 28th, 1917, in its second reading at the
Constitutional Conference.)

The Constitutional Conference of the Republic of China, in order to
enhance the national dignity, to unite the national dominion, to advance
the interest of society and to uphold the sacredness of humanity, hereby
adopt the following constitution which shall be promulgated to the whole
country, to be universally observed, and handed down unto the end of
time.

CHAPTER I. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Article 1. The Republic of China shall for ever be a consolidated
Republic.

CHAPTER II. NATIONAL TERRITORY

Art. 2. The National Territory of the Republic of China shall be in
accordance with the dominion hithertofore existing.

No change in National Territory and its divisions can be made save in
accordance with the law.

CHAPTER ... GOVERNING AUTHORITY

Art ... The power of Government of the Republic of China shall be
derived from the entire body of citizens.

CHAPTER III. THE CITIZENS

Art. 3. Those who are of Chinese nationality according to law shall be
called the citizens of the Republic of China.

Art. 4. Among the citizens of the Republic of China, there shall be, in
the eyes of the law, no racial, class, or religious distinctions, but
all shall be equal.

Art. 5. No citizens of the Republic of China shall be arrested,
detained, tried, or punished save in accordance with the law. Whoever
happens to be detained in custody shall be entitled, on application
therefore, to the immediate benefit of the writ of habeas corpus,
bringing him before a judicial court of competent jurisdiction for an
investigation of the case and appropriate action according to law.

Art. 6. The private habitations of the citizens of the Republic of China
shall not be entered or searched except in accordance with the law.

Art. 7. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right of
secrecy of correspondence, which may not be violated except as provided
by law.

Art. 8. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have liberty of
choice of residence and of profession which shall be unrestricted except
in accordance with law.

Art. 9. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have liberty to call
meetings or to organize societies which shall be unrestricted except in
accordance with the law.

Art. 10. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have freedom of
speech, writing and publication which shall be unrestricted except in
accordance with the law.

Art. 11. The citizens of the Republic of China shall be entitled to
honour Confucius and shall enjoy freedom of religious belief which shall
be unrestricted except in accordance with the law.

Art. 12. The citizens of the Republic of China shall enjoy the
inviolable right to the security of their property and any measure to
the contrary necessitated by public interest shall be determined by law.

Art. ... The citizens of the Republic of China shall enjoy all other
forms of freedom aside from those hithertofore mentioned, provided they
are not contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.

Art. 13. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to
appeal to the Judicial Courts according to law.

Art. 14. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to
submit petitions or make complaints according to law.

Art. 15. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to
vote and to be voted for according to law.

Art. 16. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to
hold official posts according to law.

Art. 17. The citizens of the Republic of China shall perform the
obligation of paying taxes according to law.

Art. 18. The citizens of the Republic of China shall perform the
obligation of military service according to law.

Art. 19. The citizens of the Republic of China shall be under the
obligation to receive primary education according to law.

CHAPTER IV. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Art. 20. The legislative power of the Republic of China shall be
exercised by the National Assembly exclusively.

Art. 21. The National Assembly shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.

Art. 22. The Senate shall be composed of the Senators elected by the
highest local legislative assemblies and other electoral bodies.

Art. 23. The House of Representatives shall be composed of the
representatives elected by the various electoral districts in proportion
to the population.

Art. 24. The members of both Houses shall be elected according to law.

Art. 25. In no case shall one person be a member of both Houses
simultaneously.

Art. 26. No member of either House shall hold any official post, civil
or military during his term.

Art. 27. The qualifications of the members of either House shall be
determined by the respective Houses.

Art. 28. The term of office for a member of the Senate shall be six
years. One-third of the members shall retire and new ones be elected
every two years.

Art. 29. The term of office for a member of the House of Representatives
shall be three years.

Art. 30. Each House shall have a President and a Vice-President who
shall be elected from among its members.

Art. 31. The National Assembly shall itself convene, open and close its
sessions, but as to extraordinary sessions, they shall be called under
one of the following circumstances:

(1) A signed request of more than one-third of the members of each
House.

(2) A mandate of the President.

Art. 32. The ordinary sessions of the National Assembly shall begin on
the first day of the eighth month in each year.

Art. 33. The period for the ordinary session of the National Assembly
shall be four months which may be prolonged, but the prolonged period
shall not exceed the length of the ordinary session.

Art. 34. (Eliminated.)

Art. 35. Both Houses shall meet in joint session at the opening and
closing of the National Assembly.

If one House suspends its session, the other House shall do likewise
during the same period.

When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Senate shall
adjourn during the same period.

Art. 36. The work of the National Assembly shall be conducted in the
Houses separately. No bill shall be introduced in both Houses
simultaneously.

Art. 37. Unless there be an attendance of over half of the total number
of members of either House, no sitting shall be held.

Art. 38. Any subject discussed in either House shall be decided by the
votes of the majority of members attending the sitting. The President of
each House shall have a deciding vote in case of a tie.

Art. 39. A decision of the National Assembly shall require the decision
of both Houses.

Art. 40. The sessions of both Houses shall be held in public, except on
request of the government, or decision of the Houses when secret
sessions may be held.

Art. 41. Should the House of Representatives consider either the
President or the Vice-President of the Republic of China has committed
treason, he may be impeached by the decision of a majority of over
two-thirds of the members present, there being a quorum of over
two-thirds of the total membership of the House.

Art. 42. Should the House of Representatives consider that the Cabinet
Ministers have violated the law, an impeachment may be instituted with
the approval of over two-thirds of the members present.

Art. 43. The House of Representatives may pass a vote of want of
Confidence in the Cabinet Ministers.

Art. 44. The Senate shall try the impeached President, Vice-President
and Cabinet Ministers.

With regard to the above-mentioned trial, no judgment of guilt or
violation of the law shall be passed without the approval of over
two-thirds of the members present.

When a verdict of "Guilty" is pronounced on the President or
Vice-President, he shall be deprived of his post, but the infliction of
punishment shall be determined by the Supreme Court of Justice.

When the verdict of "Guilty" is pronounced upon a Cabinet Minister, he
shall be deprived of his office and may forfeit his public rights.
Should the above penalty be insufficient for his offence, he shall be
tried by the Judicial Court.

Art. ... Either of the two Houses shall have power to request the
government to inquire into any case of delinquency or unlawful act on
the part of any official and to punish him accordingly.

Art. 45. Both Houses shall have the right to offer suggestions to the
Government.

Art. 46. Both Houses shall receive and consider the petitions of the
citizens.

Art. 47. Members of either House may introduce interpellations to the
members of the Cabinet and demand their attendance in the House to reply
thereto.

Art. 48. Members of either House shall not be responsible to those
outside the House for opinions expressed and votes cast in the House.

Art. 49. No member of either House during session shall be arrested or
detained in custody without the permission of his respective House,
unless he be arrested in the commission of the offence or act.

When any member of either House has been so arrested, the government
should report the cause to his respective House. Such member's House,
during session, may with the approval of its members demand for the
release of the arrested member and for temporary suspension of the legal
proceedings.

Art. 50. The annual allowance and other expenses of the members of both
Houses shall be fixed by law.

(CHAPTER V. on Resident Committee of the National Assembly with 4
articles has been eliminated.)

CHAPTER VI. THE PRESIDENT

Art. 55. The administrative power of the Republic of China shall be
vested in the President with the assistance of the Cabinet Ministers.

* Art. 56. A person of the Republic of China in the full enjoyment
of public rights, of the age of forty years or more, and resident in
China for at least ten years, is eligible for election as President.

* Art. 57. The President shall be elected by a Presidential
Election Convention, composed of the members of the National Assembly.

For the above election, an attendance of at least two-thirds of the
number of electors shall be required, and the voting shall be performed
by secret ballot. The person obtaining three-fourths of the total votes
cast shall be elected; but should no definite result be obtained after
the second ballot, the two candidates obtaining the most votes in the
second ballot shall be voted for and the candidate receiving the
majority vote shall be elected.

* Art. 58. The period of office of the President shall be five
years, and if re-elected, he may hold office for another term.

Three months previous to the expiration of the term, the members of the
National Assembly of the Republic shall themselves convene and organize
the President Election Convention to elect a President for the next
term.

* Art. 59. When the President is being inaugurated, he shall make
an oath as follows: "I hereby solemnly swear that I will most faithfully
obey the Constitution and discharge the duties of the President."

* Art. 60. Should the post of the President become vacant, the
Vice-President shall succeed him until the expiration of the term of
office of the President. Should the President be unable to discharge his
duties for any cause, the Vice-President shall act for him.

Should the Vice-President vacate his post at the same time, the Cabinet
shall officiate for the President, but at the same time, the members of
the National Assembly shall within three months convene themselves and
organize the Presidential Election Convention to elect a new President.

* Art. 61. The President shall be relieved of his office at the
expiration of his term of his office. If, at the end of the period, the
new President has not been elected, or, having been elected, be unable
to assume office and when the Vice-President is also unable to act as
President, the Cabinet shall officiate for the President.

* Art. 62. The election of the Vice-President shall be in
accordance with the regulations fixed for the election of the President;
and the election of the Vice-President shall take place simultaneously
with the election of the President. Should the post of the
Vice-President become vacant, a new Vice-President shall be elected.

Art. 63. The President shall promulgate all laws and supervise and
secure their enforcement.

Art. 64. The President may issue and publish mandates for the execution
of laws in accordance with the powers delegated to him by the law.

Art. 65. (Eliminated.)

Art. 66. The President shall appoint and remove all civil and military
officials, with the exception of those specially provided for by the
Constitution or laws.

Art. 67. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the Republic.

The organization of the Army and Navy shall be fixed by law.

Art. 68. In intercourse with foreign countries, the President shall be
the representative of the Republic.

Art. 69. The President may, with the concurrence of the National
Assembly, declare war, but, in case of defence against foreign invasion,
he may request recognition of the National Assembly after the
declaration of the war.

Art. 70. The President may conclude treaties; but with regard to
treaties of peace, and those affecting legislation, they shall not be
valid, if the consent of the National Assembly is not obtained.

Art. 71. The President may proclaim martial law according to law; but if
the National Assembly should consider that there is no such necessity,
he should declare the withdrawal of the martial law.

Art. 72. (Eliminated.)

Art. 73. The President may, with the concurrence of the Supreme Court of
Justice, grant pardons, commute punishment, and restore rights; but with
regard to a verdict of impeachment, unless with the concurrence of the
National Assembly, he shall not make any announcement of the restoration
of rights.

Art. 74. The President may suspend the session of either the Senate or
the House of Representatives for a period not exceeding ten days, but
during any one session, he may not exercise this right more than once.

Art. 75. With the concurrence of two-thirds or more of the members of
the Senate present, the President may dissolve the House of
Representatives, but there must not be a second dissolution during the
period of the same session.

When the House of Representatives is dissolved by the President,
another election shall take place immediately, and the convocation of
the House at a fixed date within five months should be effected to
continue the session.

Art. 76. With the exception of high treason, no criminal charges shall
be brought against the President before he has vacated his office.

Art. 77. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be fixed
by law.

CHAPTER VII. THE CABINET

Art. 78. The Cabinet shall be composed of the Cabinet Ministers.

Art. 79. The Premier and the Ministers of the various ministries shall
be called the Cabinet Ministers.

Art. 80. The appointment of the Premier shall be approved by the House
of Representatives.

Should a vacancy in the Premiership occur during the time of adjournment
of the National Assembly, the President may appoint an Acting-Premier,
but it shall be required that the appointment must be submitted to the
House of Representatives for approval within seven days after the
convening of the next session.

Art. 81. Cabinet Ministers shall assist the President and shall be
responsible to the House of Representatives.

Without the counter-signature of the Cabinet Minister to whose Ministry
the Mandate or dispatch applies, the mandate or dispatch of the
President in connection with State affairs shall not be valid; but this
shall not apply to the appointment or dismissal of the Premier.

Art. 82. When a vote of want of confidence in the Cabinet Ministers is
passed, if the President does not dissolve the House of Representatives
according to the provisions made in Art. 75, he should remove the
Cabinet Ministers.

Art. 83. The Cabinet Ministers shall be allowed to attend both Houses
and make speeches, but in case of introducing bills for the Executive
Department, their delegates may act for them.

CHAPTER VIII. COURTS OF JUSTICE

Art. 84. The Judicial authority of the Republic of China shall be
exercised by the Courts of Justice exclusively.

Art. 85. The organization of the Courts of Justice and the
qualifications of the Judges shall be fixed by law.

The appointment of the Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court should have
the approval of the Senate.

Art. 86. The Judiciary shall attend to and settle all civil, criminal,
administrative and other cases, but this does not include those cases
which have been specially provided for by the Constitution or law.

Art. 87. The trial of cases in the law courts shall be conducted
publicly, but those affecting public peace and order or propriety may be
held in camera.

Art. 88. The Judges shall be independent in the conducting of trials
and none shall be allowed to interfere.

Art. 89. Except in accordance with law, judges, during their
continuation of office shall not have their emoluments decreased, nor be
transferred to other offices, nor shall they be removed from office.

During his tenure of office, no judge shall be deprived of his office
unless he is convicted of crime, or for offences punishable by law. But
the above does not include cases of reorganization of Judicial Courts
and when the qualification of the Judges are modified. The punishments
and fines of the Judicial Officials shall be fixed by law.

CHAPTER IX. LEGISLATION

Art. 90. The members of both Houses and the Executive Department may
introduce bills of law, but if any bill of law is rejected by the House
it shall not be re-introduced during the same session.

Art. 91. Any bill of law which has been passed by the National Assembly
shall be promulgated by the President within 15 days after receipt of
the same.

Art. 92. Should the President disapprove of any bill of law passed by
the National Assembly, he shall within the period allowed for
promulgation, state the reason of his disapproval and request the
reconsideration of the same by the National Assembly.

If a bill of law has not yet been submitted with a request for
consideration and the period for promulgation has passed; it shall
become law. But the above shall not apply to the case when the session
of the National Assembly is adjourned, or, the House of Representatives
dissolved before the period for the promulgation is ended.

Art. 93. The law shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance
with the law.

Art. 94. Any law that is in conflict with the Constitution shall not be
valid.

CHAPTER X. NATIONAL FINANCE

Art. 95. The introduction of new taxes and alterations in the rate of
taxation shall be fixed by law.

Art. 96. (Eliminated.)

Art. 97. The approval of the National Assembly must be obtained for
National loans, or the conclusion of agreements which tend to increase
the burden of the National Treasury.

Art. ... Financial bills involving direct obligation on the part of the
citizens shall first be submitted to the House of Representatives.

Art. 98. The Executive Department of the Government shall prepare a
budget setting forth expenditures and receipts of the Nation for the
fiscal year which shall be submitted to the House of Representatives
within 15 days after the opening of the session of the National
Assembly.

Should the Senate amend or reject the budget passed by the House of
Representatives, it shall request the concurrence of the House of
Representatives in its amendment or rejection, and, if such concurrence
is not obtained, the budget shall be considered as passed.

Art. 99. In case of special provisions, the Executive Department may fix
in advance in the budget the period over which the appropriations are to
be spread and may provide for the successive appropriations continuing
over this period.

Art. 100. In order to provide for a safe margin for under-estimates or
for items left out of the budget, the Executive Department may include
contingent items in the budget under the heading of Reserve Fund. The
sum expended under the above provision shall be submitted to the House
of Representatives at the next session for recognition.

Art. 101. Unless approved by the Executive Department, the National
Assembly shall have no right to abolish or curtail any of the following
items:

(1) Items in connection with obligations of the Government according to
law.

(2) Items necessitated by the observance of treaties.

(3) Items legally fixed.

(4) Successive appropriations continuing over a period.

Art. 102. The National Assembly shall not increase the annual
expenditures as set down in the budget.

Art. 103. In case the budget is not yet passed, when the fiscal year
begins, the Executive Department may, during this period, follow the
budget for the preceding year by limiting its expenditures and receipts
by one-twelfth of the total amount for each month.

Art. 104. Should there be a defensive war against foreign invasion, or
should there be a suppression of internal rebellion, or to provide
against extraordinary calamity, when it is impossible to issue writs for
summoning the National Assembly, the Executive Department may adopt
financial measures for the emergency, but it should request the
recognition thereof by the House of Representatives within seven days
after the convening of the next session of the National Assembly.

Art. 105. Orders on the Treasury for payments on account of the annual
expenditures of the Government shall first be passed by the Auditing
Department.

Art. 106. Accounts of the annual expenditures and annual receipts for
each year should first be referred to the Auditing Department for
investigation and then the Executive Department shall report the same to
the National Assembly.

If the account be rejected by the House of Representatives, the Cabinet
shall be held responsible.

Art. 107. The method of organization of the Auditing Department and the
qualification of the Auditors shall be fixed by law.

During his tenure of office, the auditor shall not be dismissed or
transferred to any other duty or his salary be reduced except in
accordance with the law.

The manner of punishment of Auditors shall be fixed by law.

Art. 108. The Chief of the Auditing Department shall be elected by the
Senate. The Chief of the Auditing Department may attend sittings of both
Houses and report on the Audit with explanatory statements.

CHAPTER XI. AMENDMENTS, INTERPRETATION AND INVIOLABILITY OF THE
CONSTITUTION

Art. 109. The National Assembly may bring up bills for the amendment of
the National Constitution.

Bills of this nature shall not take effect unless approved by two-thirds
of the members of each House present.

No bill for the amendment of the Constitution shall be introduced unless
signed by one-fourth of the members of each House.

Art. 110. The amendment of the National Constitution shall be discussed
and decided by the National Constitutional Conference.

Art. 111. No proposal for a change of the form of Government shall be
allowed as a subject for amendment.

Art. 112. Should there be any doubt as to the meaning of the text of the
Constitution, it shall be interpreted by the National Constitutional
Conference.

Art. 113. The National Constitutional Conference shall be composed of
the members of the National Assembly.

Unless there be a quorum of two-thirds of the total number of the
members of the National Assembly, no Constitutional Conference shall be
held, and unless three-fourths of the members present vote in favour, no
amendment shall be passed. But with regard to the interpretation of the
Constitution, only two-thirds of the members present is required to
decide an issue.

Art. ... The National Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the Land
and shall be inviolable under any circumstances unless duly amended in
accordance with the procedure specified in this Constitution.

[Symbol: tick mark] A Chapter on Provincial or local organization is to
be inserted under Chapter ..., providing for certain powers and rights
to be given to local governments with the residual power left in the
hands of the central government. The exact text is not yet settled.

Note: The Mark (*) indicates that the article has already been
formally adopted as a part of the finished Constitution.

The Mark ([Symbol: tick mark]) indicates that the article has not yet
passed through the second reading.

Those without marks have passed through the second reading on May 28th,
1917. Articles bearing no number are additions to the original draft as
presented to the Conference by the Drafting Committee.


THE LOCAL SYSTEM

DRAFT SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT

The following Regulations on the Local System have been referred to the
Parliamentary Committee for consideration:--

Article 1. The Local System shall embrace provinces and hsien districts.

Any change for the existing division of provinces and hsien districts
shall be decided by the Senate. As to Mongolia, Tibet, Chinghai and
other places where no provinces and hsien districts have been fixed,
Parliament shall enforce these regulations there in future.

Art. 2. A province shall have the following duties and rights: (a) To
fix local laws. (b) To manage provincial properties. (c) To attend to
the affairs in connexion with police organization, sanitation,
conservancy, roads, and public works. (d) To develop education and
industry in accordance with the order and mandates of the Central
Government. (e) To improve its navigation and telegraphic lines, or to
undertake such enterprises with the co-operation of other provinces. (f)
To organize precautionary troops for the protection of local interests,
the method of whose organization, uniforms and arms shall be similar to
those of the National Army. With the exception of the matter of
declaring war against foreign countries, the President shall have no
power to transfer these troops to other provinces: and unless the
province is unable to suppress its own internal troubles, it shall not
ask the Central Government for the service of the National Army. (g) The
province shall defray its own expenses for the administration and the
maintenance of precautionary troops; but the provinces which have
hitherto received subsidies, shall continue to receive same from the
National Treasury with the approval of Parliament. (h) Land, Title Deed,
License, Mortgage, Tobacco and Wine, Butchery, Fishery and all other
principal and additional taxes shall be considered as local revenues.
(i) The province may fix rates for local tax or levy additional tax on
the National Taxes. (j) The province shall have a provincial treasury.
(k) It may raise provincial public loans. (l) It shall elect a certain
number of Senators. (m) It shall fix regulations for the smaller local
Self-Governing Bodies.

Art. 3. Besides the above rights and privileges, a province shall bear
the following responsibilities:

(a) In case of financial difficulties of the Central Government, it
shall share the burden according to the proportion of its revenue. (b)
It shall enforce the laws and mandates promulgated by the Central
Government. (c) It shall enforce the measures entrusted by the Central
Government, but the latter shall bear the expenses. (d) In case the
local laws and regulations are in conflict with those of the Central
Government the latter may with the approval of Parliament cancel or
modify the same. (e) In case of great necessity the provincial
telegraph, railway, etc., may be utilized by the Central Government. (f)
In case of negligence, or blunder made by the provincial authorities,
which injures the interests of the nation, the Central Government, with
the approval of Parliament, may reprimand and rectify same. (g) It shall
not make laws on the grant of monopoly and of copyrights; neither issue
bank notes, manufacture coins, make implements of weights and measures;
neither grant the right to local banks to manage the Government
Treasury; nor sign contracts with foreigners on the purchase or sale of
lands and mines, or mortgage land tax to them or construct naval
harbours or arsenals. (h) All local laws, budgets, and other important
matters shall be reported to the President from time to time. (i) The
Central Government may transfer to itself the ownership of enterprises
or rights which Parliament has decided should become national. (j) In
case of a quarrel arising between the Central Government and the
province, or between provinces, it shall be decided by Parliament. (k)
In case of refusal to obey the orders of the Central Government, the
President with the approval of Parliament may change the Shenchang
(Governor) or dissolve the Provincial Assembly. (l) The President with
the approval of Parliament may suppress by force any province which
defies the Central Authorities.

Art 4. A Shenchang shall be appointed for each province to represent the
Central Government in the supervision of the local administration. The
appointment shall be made with the approval of the Senate, the term, of
office for the Shenchang shall be four years, and his annual salary
shall be $24,000, which shall be paid out of the National Treasury.

Art. 5. The administration measures entrusted by the Government to the
Shenchang shall be enforced by the administrative organs under his
supervision, and he shall be responsible for same.

Art. 6. In the enforcement of the laws and mandates of the Central
Government, or of the laws and regulations of his province, he may issue
orders.

Art. 7. The province shall establish the following five Departments,
namely Interior, Police, Finance, Education and Industry. There shall be
one Department Chief for each Department, to be appointed by the
Shenchang.

Art. 8. A Provincial Council shall be organized to assist the Shenchang
to enforce the administrative measures, and it shall be responsible to
the Provincial Assembly for same.

This Council shall be composed of all the Departmental Chiefs, and five
members elected out of the Provincial Assembly. It shall discuss the
Bills on Budget, on administration, and on the organization of police
forces, submitted by the Shenchang.

Art. 9. If one member of the Council be impeached by the Provincial
Assembly, the Shenchang shall replace him, but if the whole body of the
Council be impeached, the Shenchang shall either dissolve the Assembly
or dismiss all his Departmental Chiefs. In one session the Assembly
shall not be dissolved twice, and after two months of the dissolution,
it shall be convened again.

Art. 10. The organization and election of the Provincial Assembly shall
be fixed by law.

Art. 11. The Provincial Assembly shall have the following duties and
powers: (a) It may pass such laws as allowed by the Constitution. (b) It
may pass the bills on the provincial Budget and Accounts. (c) It may
impeach the members of the Provincial Council. (d) It may address
interpellations or give suggestions to the Provincial Council. (e) It
may elect Members for the Provincial Council. (f) It may attend to the
petitions submitted by the public.

Art. 12. A Magistrate shall be appointed for each hsien district to
enforce administrative measures. He shall be appointed directly by the
Shenchang, and his term of office shall be three years.

Art. 13. The Central Government shall hold examinations in the provinces
for candidates for the Magistracy. In a province half of the total
number of magistrates shall be natives of the province and the other
half of other provinces; but a native shall hold office of Magistrate
300 _li_ away from his home.

Art. 14. The organization for the legislative organ of the hsien
district shall be fixed by law.


TARIFF REVISION IN CHINA

The following is a translation of a memorandum prepared by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Commerce regarding abolition of likin and an increase
of the Customs duties:--

THE MEMORANDUM

"Disproportionate taxation on commodities at inland towns and cities
tends to cripple the productive power of a country. Acting upon this
principle, France in the 17th, England, America, Germany and Austria in
the 18th Century abolished such kind of taxation, the Customs tariff
remaining, which is a levy on imports at the first port of entry. Its
purpose is to increase the cost of production of imported goods and to
serve as a protection of native products (sic). Raw materials from
abroad are, however, exempt from Customs duty in order to provide cheap
material for home manufactures. An altogether different state of
affairs, however, exists in this country. Likin stations are found
throughout the country, while raw materials are taxed. Take the Hangchow
silk for instance. When transported to the Capital for sale, it has to
pay a tax on raw material of 18 per cent. Foreign imported goods on the
other hand, are only taxed at the rate of five per cent _ad valorem_
Customs duty at the first port of entry with another 2.5 per cent
transit duty at one of the other ports through which the goods pass.
Besides these only landing duty is imposed upon imported goods at the
port of destination. Upon timber being shipped from Fengtien and Antung
to Peking, it has to pay duties at five different places, the total
amount of which aggregates 20 per cent of its market value, while timber
from America is taxed only ten per cent. Timber from Jueichow to Hankow
and Shanghai is taxed at six different places, the total amount of duty
paid aggregating 17.5 per cent., while timber imported from abroad to
these ports is required to pay Customs duty only one-third thereof. The
above-mentioned rates on native goods are the minimum. Not every
merchant can, however, obtain such special 'exemption,' without a long
negotiation and special arrangements with the authorities. Otherwise, a
merchant must pay 25 per cent of the market value of his goods as duty.
For this reason the import of timber into this country has greatly
increased within the last few years, the total amount of which being
valued at $13,000,000 a year. Is this not a great injustice to native
merchants?

THE CHINESE METHOD

"Respecting the improvement of the economic condition of the people, a
country can hardly attain this object without developing its foreign
commerce. The United States of America, Germany and Japan have one by
one abolished their export duty as well as made appropriations for
subsidies to encourage the export of certain kinds of commodities. We,
on the other hand, impose likin all along the line upon native
commodities destined for foreign markets in addition to export duty.
Goods for foreign markets are more heavily taxed than for home
consumption. Take the Chekiang silk for instance. Silk for export is
more heavily taxed than that for home use. Different rates of taxation
are imposed upon tea for foreign and home markets. Other kinds of native
products for export are also heavily taxed with the result that, within
the last two decades, the annual exports of this country are exceeded by
imports by over Tls. 640,000,000,000. From the 32nd year of the reign of
Kuang Hsu to the 4th year of the Republic, imports exceed exports on the
average by Tls. 120,000,000. These, figures speak for themselves.

LIKIN

"Likin stations have been established at places where railway
communication is available. This has done a good deal of harm to
transportation and the railway traffic. Lately a proposal has been made
in certain quarters that likin stations along the railways be abolished;
and the measure has been adopted by the Peking-Tientsin and
Tientsin-Pukow Railways at certain places. When the towns and cities
throughout the country are connected by railways, there will be no place
for likin stations. With the increase in the number of treaty ports, the
'likin zone' will be gradually diminished. Thencefrom the proceeds from
likin will be decreased year by year.

"Owing to the collection of likin the development of both home and
foreign trade has been arrested and the people are working under great
disadvantages. Hence in order to develop foreign and home trade the
Government must do away with likin, which will bring back business
prosperity, and in time the same will enable the Government to obtain
new sources of revenues.

"From the above-mentioned considerations, the Government can hardly
develop and encourage trade without the abolition of likin. By treaty
with Great Britain, America and Japan, the Government can increase the
rate of Customs tariff to cover losses due to the abolition of likin.
The question under consideration is not a new one. But the cause which
has prevented the Government from reaching a prompt decision upon this
question is the fear that, after the abolition of likin, the proceeds
from the increased Customs tariff would not be sufficient to cover the
shortage caused by the abolition of likin.

COST OF ABOLITION OF LIKIN

"But such a fear should disappear when the Authorities remember the
following facts:--

"(a) The loss as the result of the abolition of likin: $38,900,000.

"(b) The loss as the result of the abolition of a part of duty collected
by the native Customs houses: $7,300,000.

"(c) Annual proceeds from different kinds of principal and miscellaneous
taxes which shall be done away with the abolition of likin $11,800,000.

"The above figures are determined by comparing the actual amount of
proceeds collected by the Government in the 3rd and 4th years of the
Republic with the estimated amount in the Budget of the fifth year. The
total amount of loss caused by the abolition of likin will be
$58,000,000.

INCREASE OF CUSTOMS TARIFF

"The amount of increase in the Customs tariff which the Government
expects to collect is as follows:--(a) The increase in import duties
$29,000,000. (b) The increase in export duties Tls. 6,560,000.

"The above figures are determined according to the Customs returns of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years of the Republic. By deducting Tls. 2,200,000
of transit duty, the net increase will be Tls. 33,600,000, which is
equal to $48,500,000. For the sake of prudence, allowance of five per
cent. of the total amount is made against any incidental shortage. The
net revenue thus increased would amount to $46,100,000. Against the loss
of $58,000,000, there will be a shortage of some $11,900,000. This,
however, will not be difficult to make good by new sources of revenue as
the result of a tariff revision:--(a) Tax on goods at the time of
manufacture $800,000. (b) Tax on goods at the time of sale $8,000,000.
(c) Tax on cattle and slaughtering houses $2,000,000. (d) Tax on
foodstuffs $4,000,000.

"Under (a) and (b) are the taxes to be collected on native made foreign
imitation goods and various kinds of luxurious articles. Under (c) and
(d) are taxes which are already enforced in the provinces but which can
be increased to that much by reorganizing the method of collection. The
total sum of the proceeds set forth under above items will amount to
$14,800,000. These will be quite sufficient to cover the loss caused by
the abolition of likin.

A VITAL INTEREST

"As the abolition of likin concerns the vital interest of the merchants
and manufacturers, it should be carried out without delay. The
commercial and industrial enterprises of the country can only thrive
after likin is abolished and only then can new sources of revenue be
obtained. This measure will form the fundamental factor of our
industrial and economical development. But one thing to which we should
like to call the special attention of the Government is the procedure to
be adopted to negotiate with the Foreign countries respecting the
adoption of this measure. The first step in this connection should be
the increase of the present Customs tariff to the actual five per cent
_ad valorem_ rate. When this is done, proposals should be made to the
Powers having treaty relations with us concerning the abolition of likin
and revision of Customs tariff. The transit destination duties on
imported goods should at the same time be done away with. This would not
entail any disadvantage to the importers of foreign goods and any
diplomatic question would not be difficult of solution. Meantime
preparatory measures should be devised for reorganizing the method of
collecting duties set forth above so that the abolition of likin can
take place as soon as the Government obtains the consent of the foreign
Powers respecting the increase of Customs tariff."

MEMORANDUM

THE LEADING OUTSTANDING CASES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS

(Author's note. The following memorandum was drawn up by Dr. C.C. Wu,
Councillor at the Chinese Foreign Office and son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang,
the Foreign Minister, and is a most competent and precise statement. It
is a noteworthy fact that not only is Dr. C.C. Wu a British barrister
but he distinguished himself above all his fellows in the year he was
called to the Bar. It is also noteworthy that the Lao Hsi-kai case does
not figure in this summary, China taking the view that French action
throughout was _ultra vires_, and beyond discussion.)

BY DR. C.C. WU

Republican China inherited from imperial China the vast and rich
territory of China Proper and its Dependencies, but the inheritance was
by no means free from incumbrances as in the case of Outer Mongolia,
Tibet and Manchuria, and other impediments in the form of unfavourable
treaty obligations and a long list of outstanding foreign cases
affecting sovereign and territorial rights.

I have been asked by the Editor of the _North-China Daily News_ to
contribute an article on some of the outstanding questions between China
and foreign powers, instancing Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia, and to give
the Chinese point of view on these questions. Although the subject is a
delicate one to handle, particularly in the press, being as it is one in
which international susceptibilities are apt to be aroused, I have yet
accepted the invitation in the belief that a calm and temperate
statement of the Chinese case will hurt no one whose case will bear
public discussion but will perhaps do some good by bringing about a
clear understanding of the points at issue between China and the foreign
Powers concerned, and thus facilitating an early settlement which is so
earnestly desired by China. I may say that I have appreciated the
British sense of justice and fairplay displayed by the "North-China
Daily News" in inviting a statement of the Chinese case in its own
columns on questions one of which concerns British interests in no small
degree, and the discussion cannot be conducted under a better spirit
than that expressed in the motto of the senior British journal in the
Far East: "Impartial not Neutral."

1º MANCHURIA

The treaty between China and Japan of 1915 respecting South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia giving that power special rights and
privileges in those regions has given rise to many knotty problems for
the diplomatists of the two countries to solve. Two of such problems are
mentioned here.

JAPANESE POLICE BOXES IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA

Since the last days of the Tsings, the Japanese have been establishing
police boxes in different parts of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia always under protest of the local and Peking authorities. Since
the treaty of 1915, a new reason has become available in the right of
mixed residence given to Japanese in these regions. It is said that for
the protection and control of their subjects, and indeed for the
interest of the Chinese themselves, it is best that this measure should
be taken. It is further contended that the stationing of police officers
is but a corollary to the right of exterritoriality, and that it is in
no way a derogation of Chinese sovereignty.

It is pointed out by the Chinese Government that in the treaty of 1915,
express provision is made for Japanese in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia to submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation
of China (Article 5). This leaves the matter in no doubt. If the
Japanese wish to facilitate the Chinese police in their duty of
protection and control of the Japanese, they have many means at their
command for so doing. It is unnecessary to point out that the
establishment of foreign police on Chinese soil (except in foreign
settlements and concessions where it is by the permission of the Chinese
Government) is, to our thinking, at any rate, a very grave derogation to
China's sovereign rights. Furthermore, from actual experience, we know
that the activities of these foreign police will not be confined to
their countrymen; in a dispute between a Chinese and a Japanese both
will be taken to the Japanese station by the Japanese policeman. This
existence of an imperium in imperio, so far from accomplishing its
avowed object of "improving the relations of the countries and bringing
about the development of economic interests to no small degree," will,
it is feared, be the cause of continual friction between the officials
and people of the two countries.

As to the legal contention that the right of police control is a natural
corollary to the right of exterritoriality, it must be said that ever
since the grant of consular jurisdiction to foreigners by China in her
first treaties, this is the first time that such a claim has been
seriously put forward. We can only say that if this interpretation of
exterritoriality is correct the other nations enjoying exterritoriality
in China have been very neglectful in the assertion of their just
rights.

In the Chengchiatun case, the claim of establishing police boxes
wherever the Japanese think necessary was made one of the demands. The
Chinese Government in its final reply which settled the case took the
stand as above outlined.

It may be mentioned in passing that in Amoy the Japanese have also
endeavoured to establish similar police rights. The people of that city
and province, and indeed of the whole country, as evidenced by the
protests received from all over China, have been very much exercised
over the matter. It is sincerely hoped that with the undoubted
improvement of relations between the two countries within the last
several months, the matter will be smoothly and equitably settled.

LEGAL STATUS OF KOREANS IN CHIENTAO

The region which goes by the name of Chientao, a Japanese denomination,
comprises several districts in the Yenchi Circuit of Kirin Province
north of the Tumen Kiang (or the Tiumen River) which here forms the
boundary between China and Korea. For over thirty years Koreans have
been allowed here to cultivate the waste lands and acquire ownership
therein, a privilege which has not been permitted to any other
foreigners in China and which has been granted to these Koreans on
account of the peculiar local conditions. According to reliable sources,
the Korean population now amounts to over 200,000 which is more than the
Chinese population itself. In 1909 an Agreement, known as the Tumen
Kiang Boundary Agreement, was arrived at between China and Japan, who
was then the acknowledged suzerain of Korea, dealing, inter alia, with
the status of these Koreans. It was provided that while Koreans were to
continue to enjoy protection of their landed property, they were to be
subject to Chinese laws and to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. The
subsequent annexation of Korea did not affect this agreement in point of
international law, and as a matter of practice Japan has adhered to it
until September, 1915. Then the Japanese Consul suddenly interfered in
the administration of justice by the local authorities over the Koreans
and claimed that he should have jurisdiction.

The Japanese claim is based on the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia signed in May, 1915, article 5 of which provides
that civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall
be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul.

The Chinese view is that this article is inapplicable to Koreans in this
region and that the Tumen Kiang Agreement continues in force. This view
is based on a saving clause in article 8 of the Treaty of 1915 which
says that "all existing treaties between China and Japan relating to
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by treaty, remain
in force."

In the first place, the origin of the Tumen Kiang Agreement supports
this view. When the Japanese assumed suzerainty over Korea they raised
certain questions as to the boundary between China and Korea. There were
also outstanding several questions regarding railways and mines between
China and Japan. Japan insisted that the boundary question and the
railway and mining questions be settled at the same time. As a result,
two agreements were concluded in 1909 one respecting the boundary
question, the Tumen Kiang Agreement, and the other respecting railways
and mines whereby Japan obtained many new and valuable privileges and
concessions, such as the extension of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the
Korean frontier, the option on the Hsinminfu-Fakumen line, and the
working of the Fushun and Yentai mines, while in return China obtained a
bare recognition of existing rights, namely the boundary between China
and Korea and the jurisdiction over the Koreans in the Yenchi region.
The two settlements were in the nature of quid pro quo though it is
clear that the Japanese side of the scale heavily outweighed that of the
Chinese. Now Japan endeavours to repudiate, for no apparent reason so
far as we can see, the agreement which formed the consideration whereby
she obtained so many valuable concessions.

Secondly, while Koreans are now Japanese subjects, it is contended by
the Chinese that the particular Koreans inhabiting the Yenchi region
are, as regards China, in a different position from Japanese subjects
elsewhere. These Koreans enjoy the rights of free residence and of
cultivating and owning land in the interior of China, rights denied to
other foreigners, including Japanese who, even by the new treaty, may
only lease land in South Manchuria. For this exceptional privilege, they
are subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese laws and Chinese courts, a
duty not imposed on other foreigners. It would be "blowing hot and cold
at the same time" in the language of English lawyers if it is sought to
enjoy the special privileges without performing the duties.

Thirdly, Japanese under the Treaty of 1915 are required to register
their passports with the local authorities. On the other hand, Koreans
in Yenchi have never been nor are they now required to procure
passports. This would seem to be conclusive proof that Koreans in that
region are not within the provisions of the treaty of 1915 but are still
governed by the Tumen Kiang Agreement.

The question is something more than one of academic or even merely
judicial importance. As has been stated, the Koreans in Yenchi outnumber
the Chinese and the only thing that has kept the region Chinese
territory in fact as well as in name is the possession by the Chinese of
jurisdiction over every inhabitant, whether Chinese or Korean. Were
China to surrender that jurisdiction over a majority of those
inhabitants, it would be tantamount to a cession of territory.

2º MACAO

The dispute between China and Portugal over the Macao question has been
one of long standing. The first treaty of commerce signed between them
on August 13, 1862, at Tientsin, was not ratified in consequence of a
dispute respecting the Sovereignty of Macao. By a Protocol signed at
Lisbon on March 26, 1887, China formally recognized the perpetual
occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as
any other Portuguese possession; and in December of the same year, when
the formal treaty was signed, provision was made for the appointment of
a Commission to delimit the boundaries of Macao; "but as long as the
delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect
to them shall continue as at present without addition, diminution or
alteration by either of the Parties."

In the beginning of 1908, a Japanese steamer, the _Tatsu Maru_, engaged
in gun-running was captured by a Chinese customs cruiser near the
Kauchau archipelago (Nove Ilhas). The Portuguese authorities demanded
her release on the ground that she was seized in Portuguese territorial
waters thus raising the question of the status of the waters surrounding
Macao.

In the same year the Portuguese authorities of Macao attempted the
imposition of land tax in Maliaoho, and proposed to dredge the waterways
in the vicinity of Macao. The Chinese Government thereupon instructed
its Minister in France, who was also accredited to Portugal, to make
personal representations to the Portuguese Foreign Office in regard to
the unwarrantable action of the local Portuguese authorities. The
Portuguese Government requested the withdrawal of Chinese troops on the
Island of Lappa as a quid pro quo for the appointment of a new
Demarcation Commissioner, reserving to itself the right to refer to The
Hague Tribunal any dispute that may arise between the Commissioners
appointed by the respective Governments.

After protracted negotiations it was agreed between the Chinese Minister
and the Portuguese Government by an exchange of notes that the
respective Governments should each appoint a Demarcation Commissioner to
delimit the boundaries of Macao and its dependencies in pursuance of the
Lisbon Protocol and Article 2 of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 1887,
subject to the decision of their respective Governments.

THE PORTUGUESE CLAIM

In February, 1909, Portugal appointed General Joaquim Machado and China
Mr. Kao Erh-chien as their respective Commissioners and they met at
Hongkong in June of the same year.

The Portuguese claim consisted of the whole of the Peninsula of Macao as
far north as Portas do Cerco, the Island of Lappa, Green Island (Ilha
Verde), Ilhas de Taipa, Ilha de Coloane, Ilha Macarira, Ilha da
Tai-Vong-Cam, other small islands, and the waters of Porto Interior.
The Portuguese Commissioner also demanded that the portion of Chinese
territory between Portas de Cerco and Peishanling be neutralized.

In the absence of evidence, documentary or otherwise, China could not
admit Portugal's title to half the territory claimed, but was prepared
to concede all that part of the Peninsula of Macao south of Portas do
Cerco which was already beyond the limits of the original Portuguese
Possession of Macao, and also to grant the developed parts of Ilhas de
Coloane as Portuguese settlements. The ownership of territorial waters
was to remain vested in China.

The negotiations having proved fruitless were transferred to Lisbon but
on the outbreak of the Revolution in Portugal they were suspended. No
material progress has been made since.

3º TIBET

In November, 1911, the Chinese garrison in Lhassa, in sympathy with the
revolutionary cause in China, mutinied against Amban Lien-yu, a Chinese
Bannerman, and a few months later the Tibetans, by order of the Dalai
Lama, revolted and besieged the Chinese forces in Lhassa till they were
starved out and eventually evacuated Tibet. Chinese troops in Kham were
also ejected. An expedition was sent from Szechuan and Yunnan to Tibet,
but Great Britain protested and caused its withdrawal.

In August, 1912, the British Minister in Peking presented a Memorandum
to the Chinese Government outlining the attitude of Great Britain
towards the Tibetan question. China was asked to refrain from
dispatching a military expedition into Tibet, as the re-establishment of
Chinese authority would, it is stated, constitute a violation of the
Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. Chinese suzerainty in regard to Tibet was
recognized. But Great Britain could not consent to the assertion of
Chinese sovereignty over a State enjoying independent treaty relations
with her. In conclusion, China was invited to come to an agreement
regarding Tibet on the lines indicated in the Memorandum, such agreement
to be antecedent to Great Britain's recognition of the Republic. Great
Britain also imposed an embargo on the communications between China and
Tibet via India.

In deference to the wishes of the British Government, China at once
issued orders that the expeditionary force should not proceed beyond
Giamda. In her reply she declared that the Chinese Government had no
intention of converting Tibet into another province of China and that
the preservation of the traditional system of Tibetan government was as
much the desire of China as of Great Britain. The dispatch of troops
into Tibet was, however, necessary for the fulfilment of the
responsibilities attaching to China's treaty obligations with Great
Britain, which required her to preserve peace and order throughout that
vast territory, but she did not contemplate the idea of stationing an
unlimited number of soldiers in Tibet. China considered that the
existing treaties defined the status of Tibet with sufficient clearness,
and therefore there was no need to negotiate a new treaty. She
expressed the regret that the Indian Government had placed an embargo on
the communications between China and Tibet via India, as China was at
peace with Great Britain and regretted that Great Britain should
threaten to withhold recognition of the Republic, such recognition being
of mutual advantage to both countries. Finally, the Chinese Government
hoped that the British Government would reconsider its attitude.

THE SIMLA CONFERENCE

In May, 1913, the British Minister renewed his suggestion of the
previous year that China should come to an agreement on the Tibetan
question, and ultimately a Tripartite Conference was opened on October
13, at Simla with Mr. Ivan Chen, Sir Henry McMahon, and Lonchen Shatra
as plenipotentiaries representing China, Great Britain, and Tibet,
respectively.

The following is the substance of the Tibetan proposals:--

1. Tibet shall be an independent State, repudiating the Anglo-Chinese
Convention of 1906.

2. The boundary of Tibet in regard to China includes that portion of
Sinkiang south of Kuenlun Range and Altyn Tagh, the whole territory of
Chinghai, the western portion of Kansuh and Szechuan, including
Tachienlu and the northwestern portion of Yunnan, including Atuntzu.

3. Great Britain and Tibet to negotiate, independent of China, new trade
regulations.

4. No Chinese officials and troops to be stationed in Tibet.

5. China to recognize Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist Religion
and institutions in Mongolia and China.

6. China to compensate Tibet for forcible exactions of money or property
taken from the Tibetan Government.

The Chinese Plenipotentiary made the following counter-proposals:--

1. Tibet forms an integral part of Chinese territory and Chinese rights
of every description which have existed in consequence of this integrity
shall be respected by Tibet and recognized by Great Britain. China
engages not to convert Tibet into a province and Great Britain not to
annex Tibet or any portion of it.

2. China to appoint a Resident at Lhassa with an escort of 2,600
soldiers.

3. Tibet undertakes to be guided by China in her foreign and military
affairs and not to enter into negotiations with any foreign Power except
through the intermediary of China but this engagement does not exclude
direct relations between British Trade Agents and Tibetan authorities as
provided in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

4. Tibet to grant amnesty to those Tibetans known for their pro-Chinese
inclinations and to restore to them their property.

5. Clause 5 of Tibetan claims can be discussed.

6. Revision of Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908, if found necessary,
must be made by all the parties concerned.

7. In regard to the limits of Tibet China claims Giamda and all the
places east of it.

THE BOUNDARY DEADLOCK

The British plenipotentiary sustained in the main the Tibetan view
concerning the limits of Tibet. He suggested the creation of Inner and
Outer Tibet by a line drawn along the Kuenlun Range to the 96th
longitude, turning south reaching a point south of the 34th latitude,
then in south-easterly direction to Niarong, passing Hokow, Litang,
Batang in a western and then southern and southwestern direction to
Rima, thus involving the inclusion of Chiamdo in Outer Tibet and the
withdrawal of the Chinese garrison stationed there. He proposed that
recognition should be accorded to the autonomy of Outer Tibet whilst
admitting the right of the Chinese to re-establish such a measure of
control in Inner Tibet as would restore and safeguard their historic
position there, without in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as
a geographical and political entity. Sir Henry McMahon also submitted to
the Conference a draft proposal of the Convention to the
plenipotentiaries. After some modification this draft was initialled by
the British and Tibetan delegates but the Chinese delegate did not
consider himself authorized to do so. Thereupon the British member after
making slight concessions in regard to representation in the Chinese
Parliament and the boundary in the neighbourhood of Lake Kokonor
threatened, in the event of his persisting in his refusal, to eliminate
the clause recognizing the suzerainty of China, and ipso facto the
privileges appertaining thereto from the draft Convention already
initialled by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries. In order to
save the situation, the Chinese delegate initialled the documents, but
on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign were two
different things and that to sign he must obtain instructions from his
Government.

China, dissatisfied with the suggested division into an Inner and Outer
Tibet the boundaries of which would involve the evacuation of those
districts actually in Chinese effective occupation and under its
administration, though otherwise in accord with the general principles
of the draft Convention, declared that the initialled draft was in no
way binding upon her and took up the matter with the British Government
in London and with its representative in Peking. Protracted negotiations
took place thereafter, but, in spite of repeated concessions from the
Chinese side in regard to the boundary question, the British Government
would not negotiate on any basis other than the initialled convention.
On July 3 an Agreement based on the terms of the draft Convention but
providing special safe-guards for the interests of Great Britain and
Tibet in the event of China continuing to withhold her adherence, was
signed between Great Britain and Tibet, not, however, before Mr. Ivan
Chen had declared that the Chinese Government would recognize any treaty
or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between
Great Britain and Tibet.

CHINA'S STANDPOINT

With the same spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet the wishes of
the British Government and even to the extent of making considerable
sacrifices in so far as they were compatible with her dignity, China has
more than once offered to renew negotiations with the British Government
but the latter has up to the present declined to do so. China wants
nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet,
with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately under the
control of the Lhassa Government; she is agreeable to the British idea
of forming an effective buffer territory in so far as it is consistent
with equity and justice; she is anxious that her trade interest should
be looked after by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is
agreeable even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in
other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her
an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be any less
disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting Outer
Mongolia.

Considering that China has claimed and exercised sovereign rights over
Tibet, commanded the Tibetan army, supervised Tibetan internal
administration, and confirmed the appointments of Tibetan officials,
high and low, secular and even ecclesiastical, such expectations are
modest enough, surely. At the present moment, with communication via
India closed, with no official representative or agent present, with
relations unsettled and unregulated, the position of China _vis-à-vis_
Tibet is far from satisfactory and altogether anomalous, while as
between China and Great Britain there is always this important question
outstanding. An early settlement in a reciprocal spirit of give and take
and giving reasonable satisfaction to the legitimate aspirations and
claims of all parties is extremely desirable.

4º OUTER MONGOLIA

The world is more or less acquainted with the events in Urga in
December, 1911, and the proclamation of independence of Outer Mongolia
with Jetsun Dampa Hutukhtu as its ruler. By the Russo-Chinese
Declaration of November 5, 1913, and the Tripartite Convention of
Kiakhta of 1914 China has re-established her suzerainty over Outer
Mongolia and obtained the acknowledgment that it forms a part of the
Chinese territory. There remains the demarcation of boundary between
Inner and Outer Mongolia which will take place shortly, and the
outstanding question of the status of Tannu Uriankhai where Russia is
lately reported to be subjecting the inhabitants to Russian jurisdiction
and expelling Chinese traders.

The Tannu Uriankhai lands, according to the Imperial Institutes of the
Tsing Dynasty, were under the control of the Tartar General of
Uliasutai, the Sain Noin Aimak, the Jasaktu Khan Aimak and the Jetsun
Dampa Hutkhta, and divided into forty-eight somons (tsoling).
Geographically, according to the same authority, Tannu Uriankhai is
bounded on the north by Russia, east by Tushetu Khan Aimak, west by the
various aimaks of Kobdo, and south by Jasaktu Khan Aimak. By a Joint
Demarcation Commission in 1868 the Russo Chinese boundary in respect to
Uriankhai was demitted and eight wooden boundary posts were erected to
mark their respective frontiers.

In 1910, however, a Russian officer removed and burnt the boundary post
at Chapuchi Yalodapa. The matter was taken up by the then Waiwupu with
the Russian Minister. He replied to the effect that the limits of
Uriankhai were an unsettled question and the Russian Government would
not entertain the Chinese idea of taking independent steps to remark the
boundary or to replace the post and expressed dissatisfaction with the
work of the Joint Demarcation Commission of 1868, a dissatisfaction
which would seem to be somewhat tardily expressed, to say the least. The
case was temporarily dropped on account of the secession of Uliasutai
from China in the following year.

While Uriankhai forms part of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, yet since Outer
Mongolia is under China's suzerainty, and its territory is expressly
recognized to form part of that of China, China cannot look on with
indifference to any possible cession of territory by Outer Mongolia to
Russia. Article 3 of the Kaikhta Agreement, 1915, prohibiting Outer
Mongolia from concluding treaties with foreign powers respecting
political and territorial questions acknowledges China's right to
negotiate and make such treaties. It is the firm intention of the
Chinese Government to maintain its territorial integrity basing its case
on historical records, on treaty rights and finally on the principle of
nationality. It is notorious that the Mongols will be extremely
unwilling to see Uriankhai incorporated into the Russian Empire. While
Russia is spending countless lives and incalculable treasure in fighting
for the sacred principle of nationality in Europe, we cannot believe
that the will deliberately violate the same principle in Asia.



INDEX


Abdication Edict of 1912, text of
Absolutism, the myth of
Agreement between the Revolutionary Party and Europe and Asia Trading Co.
America drops out of the Six-Power group
American press agents
  treaty opening Korea
America's Chinese policy
Anglo-Japanese treaty
Annuity of Manchu Imperial Family
Antung-Mukden railway
Ariga, Dr.
Army Reorganization Council
"Articles of Favourable Treatment for the Manchus"
  text of

Babachapu
Bannerman families
Belgian loan, the
  Syndicate
Black Dragon Society, the
  memorandum of
Black Dragon Society's review of European war issues
Boycott on Japanese commerce
Boxer Indemnities postponed
  rebellion, the
  and European intervention
British policies in China
  position towards the Yuan Shih-kai régime

Cambaluc of Marco Polo, the
Canton province
Cassini Convention, the
Catholic, Roman, controversies
Central Government, organization of
Chang Cheng-wu, Gen.
  execution of
Chang Chih-tung
Chang Hsun, Gen.
Chang Kuo-kan
Chang Tso-lin, Gen.
Chang, Tsung-hsiang
Chang Yao Ching and the Europe
  and Asia Trading Co.
Chen Yi, Gen.
Chengchiatun incident, the
Chekiang revolts against Yuan Shih-kai
Chia Ching, emperor
Chiang Chao-tsung, Gen.
Chiang Chun, the
Ch'ien Lung, emperor
Chih Fa Chu, or Military Court, at Pekin
Chihli province
China,
  and her foreign residents
  and the Foreign Powers, outstanding
  cases between
  and the German submarine war
  considers war with Germany
  declares war against Germany
China's,
  break with Germany, causes leading to
  economics, weakness of
  financial reorganization
  future in Manchuria
  Imperial Government, negativeness
  disguised
  indignation at Japan's ultimatum
  note to Germany severing relations
  neutrality position
  new régime
  passivity
  polity, principles of
  protest against submarine war
  reception of Wilson's Peace note
  reply to Demands of Japan
  reply to Japan's ultimatum
  reply to President Wilson
  tariff question
Chinese army,
  German trained
  boycott of the French
  intrigues in Korea
Ching, Prince
Chino-Japanese,
  relations
  secret alliance proposed
  treaties of 1915, text of
Chinputang, the (Progressives)
_Chou An Hui_ (Society for the Preservation of Peace)
Chow Tzu-chi
Chu Chi-chun's telegram devising plans for electing Yuan Shih-kai as
    Emperor
Ch'un, Prince Regent
Chungking, open port
Clausewitz, war-principle of
Conference of Governors on the war question
Confucian worship re-established by Yuan Shih-kai
Conquest,
  Manchu, of XVIIth Century
  Mongol, of XIIIth Century
Consolidating national debt
Constitution,
  first granted in Japan
  Permanent, work on
"Constitutional Compact"
  of Yuan Shih-kai
  text of
  monarchy planned
Continental quadrilateral, the, of Japan
_Coup d'état_, the, of Sept., 1898
_Coup d'état_, the parliamentary of 1913
Crisp, Birch, attempts to float loan

Dane, Sir Richard
Death of Empress Lun Yi
Decree cancelling the Empire
Defence of the monarchial movement,
  by Yang Tu
  by Dr. Goodnow
_Dementi_, 1913, of Yuan Shih-kai
Diet of Japan, first summoned
Diplomatic relations with China broken
Distance in China, philosophy of

Eastern Asia, contestants for land-power in
Election,
  of 1913
  of Yuan Shih-kai as emperor, machinery of
  the, of 1915
  records ordered burnt
Electoral College, provision for
Emperor,
  analysis of powers of
  Chia Ching
  Ch'ien Lung
  Hsiaouri
  Hsuan Tung
  K'ang-hsi
  Kwanghsu
Emperors, immurement of in Forbidden City
Empire, the dissolution of
Empress,
  Lun Yi, death of
  Tsu Hsi
Europe and Asia Trading Co., the
European War,
  the, its effect in China
  China's predilection for Teutonism
  consideration of war-partnership with the Allies
  Japan's opposition
  German propaganda
  Pres. Wilson's Peace Note
  China's reply
  the submarine question
  note to Germany
  reply to
America
  Chinese diplomacy enters a new field
  Japan's policies
  China considers breaking diplomatic relations with Germany
  Parliament's action
  Germany's reply to China's note
  diplomatic relations severed
  German Minister leaves Pekin
  Liang Ch'i-chao's Memorandum
  Kang Yu-wei's Memorandum
  Cabinet decides on war
  interpellation to the Government
  Parliament mobbed
  Cabinet resigns
  Japan's subterranean activities
  note of the United States
  war against Germany declared
Europeans failed to recognize true state of Chinese government

Feng Kuo-chang, Gen.
Fengtien, Manchurian province
Feudal organization of Japan
Finance,
  between the provinces
  the binding chain between provincial
  and metropolitan China
Financial troubles
Foochow arsenal
Forbidden City, immurement of emperors in
Foreign Debt Commission
  intervention threatened
  loan, the first
  loans
Foreigners in China, position of
Four-Power group, the
France's status after the war
Franco-Belgian Syndicate
French,
  diplomacy in China
  Republic, Goodnow review of
  the, and the Lao-hsi-kai dispute
  the, Chinese boycott of
Fuhkien province

German,
  Boxer indemnity
  diplomatic relations broken
  minister leaves Pekin
  negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai
  propaganda in China
  reply to China's protest
  war declaration considered
Germany, war against declared
Germany's status after the war
Goodnow, Dr.
  legal adviser of Yuan Shih-kai
  memorandum of
Gordon, General
Government, the Central, definition of
Governmental system of the Manchu dynasty
Great Britain's status after the war

Hankow editor flogged to death
Hangchow, open port
Hanyang arsenal
Hanyehping Company, the
Heilungchiang, Manchurian province
Hioki, Dr., Japanese Minister
Hsianfu flight, the
Hsaiochan camp, the
  Division, the
Hsiaowu, emperor
Hsuan Tung,
  boy emperor
  enthroned
_Huai Chun_, the
Huang Hsin
Hutuktu, the Living Buddha of Urga

Imperial Clan Society
Imperialist-Republican conflict of 1917
Inner Mongolia, political unrest in
Insurrection of the "White Wolfs"
International Debt Commission
  financial contests
Interpellation to the government on
  the question of war with Germany
Ito, Prince

Japan,
  and Korea
  and the Kiaochow campaign
  demands participation in loan
  demands the Kiaochow territory from Germany
  feudal organization of
  first Diet summoned
  forced to revise the Twenty-one Demands
  forecasts result of European War
  formation of the Shogunate in
  inquires as to the monarchial movement
  militarism in
  receives fugitive President Li Yuan-hung
  recognizes Yuan Shih-kai as Dictator
  socialism in
  the new Far Eastern policy after Russian war
Japan-China secret alliance proposed
Japanese,
  Constitution first granted
  driven from Tong Kwan Palace
  incident at Chengchiatun
  intrigues
  Liberalism vs. Imperialism
  merchants and Lun Yat Sen, alleged secret agreement
  war indemnity
  war of 1894
Japan's,
  activities in the Yangtsze Valley
  account of the Chengchiatun incident
  alarm at the Chinese revolution
  animosity towards Yuan Shih-kai
  attitude toward Yuan Shih-kai
  Chinese policy
  "Continental quadrilateral"
  Doctrine of Maximum Pressure
  Far East activities
  German policy
  government foundry at Wakamatsu
  influence in China on European war question
  influence on the monarchial election
  influence over China's war measures
  original Twenty-one Demands
  Pekin Expeditionary Force
  police rights in Manchuria
  political history
  pressure on Yuan Shih-kai
  subterranean activities in China in 1916
  ultimatum to China, 88-91; China's reply
  ultimatum, China's indignation at
  Twenty-four Demands
Jehol, mountain palaces of
Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli

Kameio Nishihara
Kang Yu Wei
K'ang-hsi, emperor
Kato, Japanese Viscount
Kawasaki Kulanoske
Kiaochow campaign,
  unpopularity of, in Japan
  demanded by Japan
Kirin, Manchurian province
Kirin-Changchun railway
Kiushiu, island of
Ko-lao-hui, the, origin of
Korea, the opening of
Korean question, the
_Kowshing_, British steamer, sinking of
Kublai Khan
Kueichow province, revolt of
Kuomingtang, the
Kuo-ti,
  the question of
Kwanghsu, emperor
Kwangsi province, revolt of
Kwangtung revolts against Yuan Shih-kai
Lansdowne, Lord
Lao-hsi-kai dispute, the
Legations in Pekin,
  their attitude towards Yuan Shih-kai
  inquire as to the monarchial movement
Li Hung Chang
Li Lieh-chun, Gen.
Li Yuan-hung
  elected President
  assumes the office
  first presidential acts
  monarchists plot against him
  his early life and career
  his position as to breaking diplomatic relations with Germany
  he dissolves Parliament
  escapes from Pekin
  his important telegrams
Liang Ch'i-chao,
  resigns from Ministry of Justice
  his accusation of Yuan Shih-kai
  his address to Yuan Shih-kai
  opposes the movement
  directs the Yunnan revolt
  writes note to Germany on the submarine war
  his Memorandum on the war question
  upholds the Republic
Liang Shih-yi, political power of
_Likin_ taxation, introduction of
Liu-Kuan-hsiung
Loan Agreement,
  details of
  first foreign
  foreign, struggles over
Local Government Law, draft of
Lu Yun Ting, Gen.
Lun Yi, empress, death of
Lung Chi-Kwang, Gen.
  created Prince
Lung Yu, Empress
Mahommedan rebellions
Manchu conquest, the,
  of XVIIth Century
  dynasty, governmental system of
  plots against
  Imperial Family annuity
  people, number and distribution
Manchuria,
  Chinese domination of
  Japan's intrigues in
Manchurian policy of the Twenty-One
  Demands
Mandate of Cancellation,
  the
  Yuan Shih-kai's last
Manifesto of Gen. Tuan Chi-jui
Marco Polo
Marriage, immunity of Chinese women,
  with Manchus
Meiji, Japanese Emperor
Memorandum,
  of Dr. Goodnow
  of policy of the Black Dragon Society
  on Tariff Revision, draft of
Militarism in Japan
Military Governors,
  independence of
  attempt to coerce Parliament
  leave Pekin
  assemble in rebellion at Tientsin
  party opposition to New Republic
Mining privileges demanded by Japan
Ministerial irresponsibility
Modern commercialism, invasion of
Monarchial movement,
  Yang Tu's defence of
  Dr. Goodnow's defence of
Monarchy adopts a new calendar
Monarchy vs. Republicanism, memorandum
  by Dr. Goodnow
Monetary confusion in the new Republic
Money the bond of Chinese union
Mongol conquest, the, of XIIIth Century
Mongolian policy of the Twenty-one Demands
Nanking
  Conference, the
  Delegates
  Provisional Constitution
National debt, consolidation of
  Salvation Fund
Nationalists, the (Kuomingtang)
New calendar adopted
New Republic,
  organization of
  opposition of the Military party
Neutrality position of China
Ni Shih-chung, Gen.
Nineteen Articles, the, text of
  Fundamental Articles, the

Oath of office, presidential
Outer Mongolia question
  autonomy conceded to

"Palace of Generals"
Pamphlet of Yang Tu
Parliament,
  composition of
  provides for election of President
  Radical members unseated
  session of 1916
  dissensions over dissolution
  is dissolved
Parliamentary,
  change by the "Constitutional Compact"
  struggles
Peace note, President Wilson's, China's
  reply to
Peace of Portsmouth
Pekin, distances from
Peking System vs. Manchu Dynasty
Permanent Constitution
  draft of
Pinghsiang collieries
Presidential,
  Election Law of 1913
  oath of office
  Succession Law, the
    text of
Progressives, the (Chinputang)
Provincial capitals, influence and power of
  financial system
  system of government
Provisional Constitution of 1912,
  text of
  Nanking Constitution, the

Railway concessions demanded by Japan
  construction, progress of, under Yuan Shih-kai
Rebellion of 1813
Referendum arranged for by Senate
Reform Edicts of 1898
Religious provisions of "The Constitutional Compact"
Reorganization loan, the
Republic proclaimed
  recognition of by the Powers
Republic's anniversary, non-observance of
  review of in Goodnow Memorandum
Republican-Imperialist Conflict of 1917
Restoration Edict of Hsuan Tung
Revolt of February, 1912
Revolution of 1911
  effect on Japan
Revolutionary base at Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang
  Party and the Europe and Asia Trading Co. agreement
Rioting in Pekin
Russia demands participation in loan
  recognizes the independence of Tibet
  agrees to autonomy of Outer Mongolia
Russian loan, the
Russia's Chinese policy
  rôle in the Far East
  status after the war
Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1913, text of
  Declaration, the
  -Mongolian tripartite agreement of 1915, text of

Salt Administration, the
Santuao harbour
Secret society plots
Sectional dispute
Senate, rules of
Shanghai, specie hoarded at
Shansi Bankers
Shantung and the Twenty-One Demands
  province, Yuan Shih-kai appointed governor
Shasi, open port
Shogunate, establishment of, in Japan
Six-Power group, the
Socialism in Japan
Society for the Preservation of Peace (Chou An Hui)
Soochow, open port
South Manchurian railway
Southern Confederacy formed
  dissolution of
  Rebellion, the
Special Constitutional Drafting Committee
Specie payment suspended in Pekin
Submarine war question
Sun Yat Sen, Dr.
  his alleged secret agreement with Japan
Sung Chiao-jen, assassination of
Sungari River
Szechuan province revolts against Yuan Shih-kai

Taiping rebellion
Tanaka, Gen.
Taonanfu administration
Tariff reformation
Tax collection
Tayeh iron mines
Tibet, independence of recognized by Russia
Tieh Liang
Tientsin rebellion of the Military Governors
Tong Kwan Palace, the battle at
Tong Shao-yi
Treaty of Shimonoseki
Treaty-ports, economical effects of
Tsao-ao, Gen.
Tsao Ju-lin
Tsan Cheng Yuan, passes a "king-making" bill
Tseng Kuo-fan, Marquis
Tsung She Tang, the
Tuan Chi-jui, Gen.
Tung Fu-hsiang
Twenty-Four Demands,
  Japan's revised
  China's reply to
Twenty-One Demands of Japan
  Japan forced to revise
  the psychology of
  China's reply to
Tzu-Hsi, Empress

United States, Goodnow's review of

Viceroy's, prerogatives of in Chinese government

Wai Chiao Pu conference
Wakamatsu, Japanese government foundry at
Wang Yi-tang
War memorandums
"White Wolfs," insurrection of
Wilson, President
Wu, C.C., Dr.
Wu Chang-ching, Gen.
Wu Ting-fang, Dr.

Yang Tu,
  champion of neo-imperialists
  publisher famous pamphlet
  the pamphlet
Yangtsze Valley, Japanese activities in
Yuan Shih-kai
  the bailiff of the Powers
  his early life
  first emerges into public view
  in Seoul
  appointed Imperial Resident at Seoul
  leaves Korea
  in command of Hsaiochan camp
  refuses to depose Empress Tzu-Hsi
  appointed Governor of Shantung
  defeats the Boxers
  made Viceroy of Chihli
  reorganizes the army
  made Grand Councillor and President of
  the Board of Foreign Affairs
  made "Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent"
  dismissed from Pekin
  appointed Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan
  appointed President of Grand Council
  schemes for the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty
  attempted, assassination of
  commissioned to organize the Republic
  elected Provisional President
  takes oath of office
  negotiates the Reorganization loan
  negotiates and controls the great foreign loan
  suppresses the Southern rebellion
  elected full President
  unseats Radical members of Parliament
  entices Vice-President to Pekin
  position strengthened by death of
  Empress Lun Yi
  ruthless suppression of opposition
  brings out the Constitutional Compact
  promulgates the Presidential Succession law
  creates a "Palace of Generals"
  negotiates with Germany
  animosity of Japan
  his _démenti_ of
  bribes the Japanese press
  his Dictatorship recognized by Japan
  the _précis_ of Japanese Minister's coercive conversation
  reviewed in Black Dragon Society's Memorandum
  intrigues of his family
  he yields to advocates of monarchy
  invokes services of Yang-tu
  his interview with Gen. Feng Kuo-chang
  his accusation by Liang Chi-chao
  throws responsibility on the Senate
  his Mandate for a referendum
  elected Emperor
  substitutes title of Emperor for President
  refuses, then accepts the throne
  the revolt of Yunnan
  he rehearses court ceremonies
  his position weakens
  the communication from Liang Ch'i-chao
  attempts to placate Japan
  distributes patents of nobility
  financial troubles
  issues the Mandate of Cancellation
  his retirement sought
  he offers to resign
  his death
  his last mandate
  his funeral
  his policy towards the European War
Yunnan revolt of 1916





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