Title: Thoughts on Religion
Author: Romanes, George John, 1848-1894
Language: English
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_Thoughts on Religion_

BY THE LATE

GEORGE JOHN ROMANES
M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.

EDITED BY

CHARLES GORE, D.D.
BISHOP OF WORCESTER

Twelfth Impression

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
AND BOMBAY

1904



CONTENTS

                                                        PAGE

EDITOR'S PREFACE                                           5


PART I.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.

ESSAY I                                                   37

ESSAY II                                                  56


PART II.

NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR                           91

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY                                         98

§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE    104

§ 3. CAUSALITY                                           116

§ 4. FAITH                                               131

§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY                               154

CONCLUDING NOTE BY THE EDITOR                            184



PUBLISHER'S NOTE


The present edition of Romanes' _Thoughts on Religion_ is issued in
response to a request which has been made with some frequency of late
for very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW,
     LONDON,
     _January, 1904._



EDITOR'S PREFACE


The late Mr. George John Romanes--the author within the last few years
of _Darwin and After Darwin_, and of the _Examination of
Weismannism_--occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology.
But his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on the
problems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the early
summer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, made
mostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending to
write on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired that
these notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as I
thought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me,
in company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the first
part of the present volume.

After reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others in
whom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either in
publishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them with
the author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originally
projected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which George
Romanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized that
the notes if published after his death must be published with his name.

I have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that they
ought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value and
by the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man who
was not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, as
few men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted.
To all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the public
will bear unmistakeable witness.

With more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublished
essays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage of
thought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first.

Both Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind from
a position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of belief
in it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God if
haply he might feel after Him and find Him,' and not a position of
settled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things which
could not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural that
I should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my function
as an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solely
by the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to be
intelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreement
or disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubt
whether I should have published it, had it not been that my decided
disagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudiced
in withholding it.

The Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be better
understood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, that
is of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion.

In 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge,
the subject being _Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief
that the Almighty governs the world by general laws_. This was published
in 1874, with an appendix on _The Physical Efficacy of Prayer_. In this
essay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows the
characteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. The
sympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might be
expected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': the
logical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too the
natural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christian
prayer--a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits of
thought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard of
prize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceeds
within the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of the
argument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed[1], and also the
reality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reason
to expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restricted
limits, to prayers for _physical_ goods[2]. On the other side, there is
taken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observable
domain of physical nature. Then the question is considered--how is the
physical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authority
of revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that God
governs the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found in
emphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can be
conducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts of
response to prayer, even in the physical sphere, _may_ occur--force
_may_ be even originated in response to prayer--and still not produce
any phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard as
miraculous or contrary to the known order.

On one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay[3], and more
frequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughts
which had already been expressed in the earlier work but had been
obscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowing
whether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning and
conclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis on
which it rests[4]. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly after
publishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mind
moved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism about
the existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874.
Already in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a wholly
sceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by
_Physicus_[5]. As the Notes were written with direct reference to this
work, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this is
to be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the author
summarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture therefore
to reproduce this chapter at length[6].


'§ 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here
suffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts and
conclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first
disposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of
things, or the mystery of existence [i.e. the fact that anything exists
at all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with
regard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations
points to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to
observe that the argument could only be admissible after the possibility
of the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theistic
aspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
intuitive necessity of individual thought [i.e. the alleged fact that
men find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that God
exists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed
necessity were a real one, it would only possess an individual
applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely
improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for the
individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is not
such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the general
consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts and
principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced
worthless.

'§ 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in
favour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds
are caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our
mind is caused by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible
for two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in
the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,
although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of
_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the
unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that
explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far
an entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or caused
by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And
this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within
the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be
competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to
the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even
as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism
has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what
we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no
corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.
Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly
differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and
many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the
grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated
with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both
a qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and
cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot
produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we
have seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as
applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in
the present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is
speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it
seems _à priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable
reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in
that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is
imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_
conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is
in this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly,
the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects
can contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by
everyday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the
will and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively
by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of
utilitarianism.' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at this
stage of thought utterly untenable[7]; the evidence is overwhelming that
the moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution[8], and this
result, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistible
force by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by the
theory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and most
unexceptionable of inductions[9]. 'On the whole, then, with regard to
the argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to
decide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being
nothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by
another mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything
else whatsoever.

'§ 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that
Mill's presentation of it [in his _Essay on Theism_] is merely a
resuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.
And indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subject
with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while he
has failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidence
of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernatural
explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally in
his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with all
previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible for
us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to the
Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even
supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particular
intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the Design
argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due
to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that
this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and
such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise
the supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of
the existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after
all, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the
_methods_ of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that,
_in some way or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due
to Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the
first to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the
most unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many
competent writers can have insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for
Theism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no
means of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind
whose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is,
that the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the
observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the intellectual
_processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been
accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this
is merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyian
form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws.'

'§ 4. This argument was thus[10] stated in contrast with the argument
from design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God,
because such and such an organic structure must have been due to such
and such an intellectual _process_. The argument from general laws says,
There must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in
some way or other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence.' Every
structure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle of
order; it is related to all other things in a universal order. This
universality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance in
accounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality as
we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive
influence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous
magnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions of
deity[11].' The argument was developed in the words of Professor Baden
Powell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must be
itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or
express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is
but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind
and reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast and
complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more
evident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partially
manifested and its reality _as existing in the immutably connected order
of objects examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.'
This argument from the universal _Kosmos_ has the advantage of being
wholly independent of the method by which things came to be what they
are. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quite
recently it seemed irrefutable[12].

'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent
power dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if
force and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have
resulted by way of necessary consequence.... It does not admit of one
moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite
beauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitably
from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it
is certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended or
impenetrable[13].... It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerable
length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because of
its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but also
because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.' It was also
pointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm of
the universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted for
by the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of general
evolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting those
external relations of which they themselves are the product[14].

'§ 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the
conclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless
collapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully
demonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support
of the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons might
erroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be
untrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as
far as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to
account for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could
see farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unless
she had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words,
the probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to
explain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability
there is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and
eternally true.

'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the
region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,
and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the
discussion into the transcendental region of purely formal
considerations. And here we laid down the canon, "that the value of any
probability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, the
importance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as compared
with those of the relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in cases
where the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or more
indefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference
varies inversely as the difference in these respects between the
relations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem of
Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in its
unknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, these
relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations that
it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although
we have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we are
unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The
unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,
both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the
known relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite
probability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore,
although it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or human
thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right
on this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability,
therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest
kind if regarded scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific
demonstration,--is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically.
Although it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of
all experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as a
cause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that,
if there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed.

'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter
how great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative
sense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute
sense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another
argument in favour of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of
the teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing
that these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for
or against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such
reasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theistic
deductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now be
adduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence of
force. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown the
existence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formal
considerations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond the
sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the existence of Deity; so that
if there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheistic
deductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to account
for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may be
urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation of
general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing,
the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods whereby
the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does it
signify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific
province. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature,
we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her
harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.
Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be
remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to
distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in
contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction,
it will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms
of teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible
reach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific
refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis
which is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be
susceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system
of teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it
accepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be
cognizant--viz. the persistence of force and the consequently necessary
genesis of natural law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of
regarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this account
removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a
Supreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in a
super-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesis
at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can
penetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic
harmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from the
combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically
necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary
qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that
metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered
scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if
considered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable
that Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the
persistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept
the more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable
one, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is
required by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the
_Canon of probability_ laid down in the second paragraph of this
section, § 5].

'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,
although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense
legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this
argument can rest--viz. the position that the fundamental postulate of
Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of
Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie.

'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is
here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realizable_ relations
in the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_
relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is
true that the complexity of the human organization and its functions is
inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less
weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without
waiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative
standing of Materialism) how far even the genuine test of
inconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference which
there is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on to
the second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical
teleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as
impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i.e. Mind
being what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of it
as an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability,
therefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect on
Theism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism.

'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and
which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of
Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its
metaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical
science, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure
psychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry,
therefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of
these opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the
supporters of metaphysical teleology objected _à priori_ to the method
whereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the
persistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use
of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an
atheist to object _à priori_ to the method whereby a directing Mind was
inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved
the postulation of an unknowable cause,--and this of a character which
the whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit
an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.
On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their
respective standing _à priori_ is concerned, both theories may be
regarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their
standing _à posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least
one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely
inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the
two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a
question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of
absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a
man wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by
what I have designated relative inconceivability--i.e. in accordance
with the verdict given by his individual sense of probability as
determined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test
of relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to
vary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly
rational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in
like manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in
this matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure
scepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a
probability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or
else to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God,
according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an
inclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And
although, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more
rational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if this
course is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the
scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in
respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical
teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal
conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the
other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the
pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be
made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.

'§ 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the
abstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which
at the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the
confusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides
of the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not
think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the
score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when
traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so
commonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basis
of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this
short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific _status_ of the
subject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as
to the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of
the question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature
upon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative
philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly
shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without
the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as
certainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as
the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the
indestructibility of matter is certainly true.

'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite
as has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter
which does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of
necessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears
this consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly
complain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define as
sharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin.

'§ 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any
antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is
unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with
the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions
here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save
the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of
society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they
may be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the
most profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual
endeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed
and sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of
all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may
appear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is
concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the
possibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually
concerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I
regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative
probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it
equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I
conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard
to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch
as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the
twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for the
waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with
this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of
loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while it
is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly
intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can
work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the
appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once
was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such
times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of
which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence
not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or
whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me
at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that
for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in
those words of Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not
merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has
become transformed into the terrific oracle to OEdipus--

     "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."'

This analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear idea
of the general argument of the _Candid Examination_ and of its
melancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical reader
is perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almost
exclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason.

As evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:--

     P. xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position
     of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification
     as long as our intelligence remains human.'

     P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present
     day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can
     possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will.'

     P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
     hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as
     certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly
     true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a
     God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the
     universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will
     fall upon the table.'

As evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface--

     'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion
     that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific
     methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the
     question as to his existence is both more morally and more
     reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for
     methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other
     light.'

It is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thought
as exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous[15].

At what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions of
the _Candid Examination_ I cannot say. But after a period of ten
years--in his Rede lecture of 1885[16]--we find his frame of mind very
much changed. This lecture, on _Mind and Motion_, consists of a severe
criticism of the materialistic account of mind. On the other hand
'spiritualism'--or the theory which would suppose that mind is the cause
of motion--is pronounced from the point of view of science not
impossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory,' and the more probable conclusion
is found in a 'monism' like Bruno's--according to which mind and motion
are co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universal
fact--a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regarded
as an extension of contracted views of Theism[17]. The position
represented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from its
conclusion:--


'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the
conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the
independent conclusion of mental science is thus independently
confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without
knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we
may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study of
Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible
truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without mind, no
being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal
being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most
stupendous of questions,--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?

'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we
are careful to set out the logical conditions with complete
impartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as
science is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:
the whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a
parallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the
voice of science must thus of necessity speak the language of
agnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure[18];
let us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side of
aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought does
not admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable ways
of thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of its
earliest formulator apply with special force to its latest
dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology and a little
knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge of
both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to one
another, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it be
more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days.'


Some time before 1889 three articles were written for the _Nineteenth
Century_ on the _Influence of Science upon Religion_. They were never
published, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I have
thought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'
of this volume, both because they contain--written in George Romanes'
own name--an important criticism upon the _Candid Examination_ which he
had published anonymously, and also because, with their entirely
sceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mental
history of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who have
read this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. What
remains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes had
better be reserved till later.

                                                                   C.G.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] p. 7.

[2] p. 173.

[3] See p. 110.

[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' _Mind and Motion and Monism_
(Longmans, 1895) p. 111.

[5] Published in Trübner's _English and Foreign Philosophical Library_
in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrained
from publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, I
should find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which
the author sets forth.'

[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter more
intelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book or
explanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square
brackets.

[7] p. 24.

[8] p. 28.

[9] p. 28.

[10] p. 45.

[11] p. 47.

[12] p. 50.

[13] p. 63.

[14] pp. 58 ff.

[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _Candid
Examination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George
Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective
religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)
perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded
objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his
earlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that all
causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the
materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned
to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore
presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'
Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden
Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)
recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom
of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).

[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff.

[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The
result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial
contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to
certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he
has gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.

Logical priority of mind over matter.

Consequent untenability of materialism.

Relativity of knowledge.

The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of
matter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival
of the fittest.'

[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see below, pp. 107 ff.



PART I.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.



I.


I propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence of
Science upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself to
the strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into any
matters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the first
instance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted by
Science upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate the
probable extent of this influence in the future. The first two papers
will be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science upon
Natural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past and
prospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion[19].

Few subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which I
thus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matter
of surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only very
direct, but also extremely important from every point of view. For
generations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained an
undisputed sway over men's minds--if not always as a practical guide in
matters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among the
comparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejected
Christianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptions
were largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the only
court of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the few
minds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcely
escape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as side
by side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal was
gradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to be
regarded in the light of a rival to the old--more especially as the
searching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of its
judgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an age
disposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still further
fostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted upon
Religion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence.' That is to say,
not only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth more
congenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which may
broadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results of
the former have more than once directly contradicted those of the
latter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated that
religious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still,
the great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized the
present century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected with
philosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man of
the present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of the
Christian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as his
forefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in some
other sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thought
having been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipate
that in these respects it should continue to harmonize with the
unalterable system of theology.

Such I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted her
influence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency of
their united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceiving
how great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics are
triumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begun
finally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons,
on the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by the
past, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion,
strong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken,
and year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour of
Science.

This being the state of things of the present time, I think that with
the experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science has
exerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby to
estimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This,
therefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on general
principles, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that the
influence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it is
necessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influence
which has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past.

Thus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essential
nature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the first
step in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actual
and possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon the
other.

Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive
reference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department of
thought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena by
the discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Science
ventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeks
to interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernatural
or ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physical
science, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statement
has now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and terms
describing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary in
astronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology.

Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less
exclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is a
department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and
intelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and the
fountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the term
Religion has been of late years frequently used in senses which this
definition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows how
frequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory of
things a Religion which does not present any belief in any form of
Deity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it has
hitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of the
Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so
forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as
unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the
rationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to be
extracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them in
some metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such a
thing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifying
Humanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. But
by thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a
new religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be
successful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly
presents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.
Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading.
Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon
occurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that
we find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and
gratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity,
for example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an object
any more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possible
to construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically
ascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as
logically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly
regard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the
attributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can
properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate
source, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to
be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term
Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.

From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of
Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of
the proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as
Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)
data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
'an _à priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,
'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.

From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
as such.

On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to
affect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not
concerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have
any reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident
that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different
mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.

Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of
Religion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the
Religion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recently
Religion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an
overpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,
while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly
formulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to
refer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not
been ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the
Deity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to
distinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and
Religion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only so
far as the Religion of former times was impure--or mixed with the
ingredients of thought which belong to Science--that the baleful
influence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now all
but total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men,
to which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of the
fact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize the
fundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I have
stated.

Or, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body--and,
indeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of the
times--perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of any
natural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanation
at all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observed
phenomenon to the First Cause--i.e. to merge that particular phenomenon
in the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, on
the other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to its
physical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain the
hypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as a
scientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower and
asks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, and
so on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not really
answering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance of
Nature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study of
botany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin to
observe in his _Origin of Species_ that the theory of creation does not
serve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merely
re-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, by
thus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, we
are not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for it
would be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thus
explaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to the
immediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actually
to occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of the
Deity, then _ex hypothesi_, there would be no physical causes to
investigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man of
science, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, and
therefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientific
investigation.

Properly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does not
explain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states the
phenomena as observed--or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself an
ultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena taken
collectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possible
explanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable,
which just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged into
anything further--that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what it
is,' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it could
say of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicable
source of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentially
consists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in the
assumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physical
causation to investigate--i.e. an endless series of phenomena to be
explained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as the
process of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we may
say that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in the
postulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her own
satisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, and
therefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations or
discovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter of
Science. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, to
the effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such,
exclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department of
thought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate.
When these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, and
we find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory of
final causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it was
passing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the function
of explaining this or that phenomenon _in detail_, it ceased to be a
purely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reason
it blocked the way of scientific progress[20].

This remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which I
have to deal--viz. the doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the whole
question of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. In
handling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a view
as I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting to
show step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought into
this position, by the influence of Science.

In the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form or
another has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order of
Nature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper to
trace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings in
Fetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myself
exclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory,
and I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statement
which is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence in
all ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degree
of 'antecedent credibility.' With reference to this point, I should say,
that, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, the
hypothesis of mental agency in Nature--or, as the Duke of Argyll terms
it, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily have been the
earliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalence
of causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency between
causes and effects--i.e. the universal prevalence of natural law--became
a matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact that
nothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized.
Indeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by the
lowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence to
show, likewise by animals and infants[21]. And therefore, it appears to
me probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the idea
of cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space and
time are intuitive--i.e. the instinctive or [inherited] effect of
ancestral experience.

Now if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition of
causality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, the
human mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt at
assigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature--i.e. the
first attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena of
Nature--must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanation
was, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into external
Nature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as the
apparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and his
neighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation of
causality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know,
as we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of our
sense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this should
be the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any natural
phenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, the
cause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait to
trace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis from
its earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism
(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as the
effects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a
like kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special
charge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is
gathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enough
thus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of
anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing
conditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.

Thus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is a
fact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic
theory--so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned--whether
this be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the general
consent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other
matters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern
us. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages
for any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we
receive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that a
match is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the
most obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely
similar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support
from any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.

It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of
design in Nature, we must as it were start _de novo_, without reference
to anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one to
be considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,
and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the
ages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude
to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary
to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.

And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of
the argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely
presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon
a heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.
I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's
watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not
in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill
where he says,--'The inference would not be from marks of design, but
because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by
men.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for
there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to
mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by
examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination
only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For
the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the
finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the
manufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill
was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.

Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,
as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The
object of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of a
designer: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal
to the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of
any such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only
be entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of
being explained--i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.

Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in
numerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the
world down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic
nature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in
very many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity in
comparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch are
but miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know so
well as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree the
mechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in every
form of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence at
first sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no stronger
or better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words of
Paley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an
end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of
intelligence and mind.'

But next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may][22]
imply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitled
to assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent to
produce these effects? This is a question which never seems to have
occurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the natural
theologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkable
fact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logical
form, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the fact
remains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception,
were satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no cause
other than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work was
restricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of the
mechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obvious
that the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical,
effect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in nature
are so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any one
of them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though not
expressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if the
assumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Therefore
the argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere
accumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all
as mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.

If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days
of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of
mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of
their belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,
upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to
say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals
were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several
environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are
turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled
to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent
purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It
is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous
belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from
design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it
is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of
evolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradual
development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden
and ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument from
design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits
the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the
hypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by
the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the
theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by
Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as
distinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory
of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical
causes of that development. And this is the point where natural science
begins to exert her influence upon natural theology--or the point where
the theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As this
is a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an
extraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall
in my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views on the
relation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better and
more maturely expressed in the Notes.--ED.]

[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above
definitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions
in which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under other
conditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply
separated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a
revelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a
Religion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)
ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate
influence.

[21] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 155-8.

[22] [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of argument.--ED.]



II.


Suppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walk
till he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is as
ignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins
to observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less
refined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study in
the watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatly
larger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that there
is a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of a
bay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening are
most exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed of
rocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment of
the sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that the
sides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inland
are successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, are
constituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, and
eventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with as
great a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, the
stones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged in
sloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautiful
reference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most in
danger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further
observe, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective
arrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for
instance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed
artistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he
would see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely
little purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have
all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.
Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are
all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being
led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,
he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by
evaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish
fresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh
water, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral
constituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a
whole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,
continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find
that a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the
needs of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which
could survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our
imaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this
study, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by
the marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously
found in his study of the watch.

But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by
subsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch
was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with
reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as
a cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can
only be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?

If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,
he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were
then to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the
leading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being
both a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning
more he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaic
simplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured
perplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that
every one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his
admiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are
perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay
because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until
it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the
bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea
arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive
occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the
waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and
different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific
gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had
themselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous
forms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because
the unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,
therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be
compelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which he
had so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to
contrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish
the same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of
them was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.

He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological
interpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so
by taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the
particular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.
That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of
any _special_ design in the construction of that particular bay, and
fall back upon the theory of a much more _general_ design in the
construction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he would
require to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which in
the first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general laws
of Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos as
distinguished from a chaos.

Now I have been careful thus to present in all its more important
details an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because it
furnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn from
organic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design,
or of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which we
meet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and
suggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if
once we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter,
are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a
contriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to the
agency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence of
what we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter how
numerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organic
nature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of design
than is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature.

For the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'I
know of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of
comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with
a telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these
two pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under
circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal
evidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet to
acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the
plainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'

Well, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of special
creation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution by
physical causes the evidence in the two cases is _not_ equal. For, upon
this hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure
prepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a mere
differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first
instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature.
Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this
purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the
nerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The
better to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of
lens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind
these sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a
retina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till we
reach the eye of an eagle.

Of course the teleologist will here answer--'The fact of such a gradual
building up is no argument against design: whether the structure
appeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks
of design in either case occur in the structure as it stands.' All of
which is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradual
development _in itself_ does affect the argument from design. I am
maintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility
(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of the
structure having been proximately due to the operation of physical
causes. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that natural
selection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate to
account for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation,
struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, what
follows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of
the eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted
structures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better
adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist
maintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special
design? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain
that the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little
heap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of
special design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at
least of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general
laws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration
alike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be
that of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection in
the one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is as
obviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It is
perhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the face
of the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influence
of specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of the
earth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things
(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or who
shall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation of
means to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, there
is no intention served by the result of selection in the case of the
sea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to the
contrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in the
latter than in the former process.

For the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes with
which we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observed
phenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whether
or not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observed
phenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known or
unknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesis
of the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature
(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design in
organic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which is
occupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive
that Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after
observing with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is
not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful
mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes
on to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural
selection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store
for it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature
afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by
intelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want of
penetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issue
lies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis of
natural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies between
special design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one of
these causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulation
of evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to be
disproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology would
not thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be no
other causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in the
production of the observed adaptations.

I trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if we
believe the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes,
to extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as we
believe this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no better
evidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere fact
that we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instances
of design in the one province than in the other is, _ex hypothesi_,
merely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the more
intricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all at
present in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist when
studying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have
produced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial
key in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy
which is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that
physical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic
structures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which
these structures present is of just the same logical value as that which
we may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it
should still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature
are from their number and unity much more suggestive of design than
anything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is to
change the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute.
No one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether any
number and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of nature
afford other or better evidence of design than is afforded by
adaptations in other departments, when all departments alike are
supposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And this
question I answer in the negative, because we have no means of
ascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, or
any other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of the
kind observed.

Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,
it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly
designed for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this
conclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life
could exist under no other material conditions than those which are
furnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,
however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know
to the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other
heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and
the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the
gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that
it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves
(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular
gases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters of
still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited
to their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be
expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
regarded as proximately due to physical causes?

In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,
to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my
mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively
considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and
that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due
to physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the
largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases
are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,
How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to
the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy
to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means
as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of
atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to
conclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.
I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been
denied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be given
for the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation
itself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,
from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is
this--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?

On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think
it is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two
hypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of
mental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the
far-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his
_First Principles_ he argues that all causation arises immediately out
of existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law
inevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two
cases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous
antecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those
accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm
that the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force
has come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If the
co-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other,
each to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible to
conceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlike
that in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to have
increased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that force
is not persistent.'

Now this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome of
existence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next as
a theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not met
with the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leading
representatives of all these departments of thought having expressly
opposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one of
them has spoken in its favour[23]. But with this point I am not at
present concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish a
full and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail to
account for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which we
are now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by the
anonymous author 'Physicus,' who, in his _Candid Examination of Theism_,
lays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversive
of Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistic
hypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature on
purely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr.
Spencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts of
causality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which these
facts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence
of force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on
this account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we
follow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it
spreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are
literally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent
causes). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a
sufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence
contemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we
are thus as far as ever from explaining the _determination_ of this
force into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be
quite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and
direction by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction
of the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by
the outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till
we spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we
knew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a
position to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehand
by calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any given
instant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number and
extent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even if
it could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at the
expense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and this
amounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and out
of which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physical
source of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made with
reference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation
(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of all
physical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks to
give a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole.
It is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to rise
above its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its own
explanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were conceded
to account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give no
account of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the
construction and maintenance of universal order.

We are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing
the only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say,
by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far
as we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one
integrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most
probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can
conceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular
adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,
the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be
incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since
it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special
cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not
consider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of
Theism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our
stand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that
the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally
enduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its
being such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge
conceived as attainable.

Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no
explanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than
that of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to
two other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The
first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this
supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are
supplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to
the strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to
the existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shall
consider these two points separately.

No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis
whereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree
accounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we
confront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything
that we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this
difference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but
of kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest
analogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind,
we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy
is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much
nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer
has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in
ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,
he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the
evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as
flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a
series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of
the movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are
often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt
to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the
universe ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes
everywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there," "under the guise
of simple-dynamics," then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind
must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and
that, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception
disappears--the word Mind stands for a blank.'

Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as having
states produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these
states, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one
objective result to another?'[25]

Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be
difficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,
we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it
must differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes
illogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of
eternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a
category _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogy
furnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,
of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above
our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence
would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must
remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from
understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from
founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by
the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be
even 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind
only in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the best
provisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infinite
extension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrent
obliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone these
faculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this no
predication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is not
conceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it any
attributes.

Thus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail,
let us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist,
that it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personal
intelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works.
Even upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of large
and general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to be
regarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. I
will not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposeless
action in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by the
ulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole--viz. that as a
whole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appears
wasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relation
to the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this
ulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in
Nature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the
sense of right and wrong--with all its accompanying or constituting
emotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c.--is so important a factor, that
however greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind
to be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever
become so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work
as we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the
state of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special
design which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the
intelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object the
infliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; and
so far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the First
Cause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit the
narrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past,
and stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, it
scarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the morality
of that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are not
merely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of a
more general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of the
scheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to be
questionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to infer
that there is any such scheme at all.

Nature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question a
large and general fact that must be considered by any theory of
teleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of
the matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by
'Physicus[26],' whom I shall therefore quote:--

'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that he
is--viz. omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent than
that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an
incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character
than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For
let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means.
Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of
animals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time till
the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations
of millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this period
of incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms
have been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to
the outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have
survived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and
insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find
teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for
torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing
blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence
that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are
compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the
enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the
pains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told
that I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer
that if there are _purposes_, I _am_ able to judge of them so far as I
can see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear
to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when
they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of
the latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty," so long
as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent Designer_" are known to have
been so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this case
would be that, so far as observation can extend, "He cares for animal
perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to the
_total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely
be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God[27].'

The reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as the
writer goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a
spring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the being
who, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberately
employ his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing so
hideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higher
faculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice of
means to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms
no less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or
'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a
scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly
evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual
without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the
rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if it
can be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and
rigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by
Nature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the
extreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against
'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation
(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would
have been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called
'anthropopsychic.'

The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is
that which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is
argued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of
morality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating
source is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears
to me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell
to the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed
in, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in the
same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the
occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other
instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of
God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any
other view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such a
great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its
importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears
to other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under
unlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more
significance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may
this consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to
the theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything
analogous to those social relations out of which, according to the
scientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in
ourselves[28].

The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming
that the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they are
blinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they
endeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the
contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute
morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for
sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The
Deity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps we
may say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being
supra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of
morality may have no meaning as applied to Him.

But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it must
in consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the
human mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense
to the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are
not of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,
on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very
persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not
appear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the
argument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of
the human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of
analogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal
kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing
aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a
religious animal'--i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar
nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical
with, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in
favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of
this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument
is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual
conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by
different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts
differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that
these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they
would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least
so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual
conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably
trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of
interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the
fact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all other
instincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though,
like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _natural
cause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the
natural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for
its occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,
like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken
purpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in
the general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have
here what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the
effect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, the
character of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the most
highly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt the
opposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena of
biology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing,
either that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Nature
reveals God while man misrepresents Him.

There is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presented
by Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expression
of intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of great
weight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose.
It is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by any
other writer; but from its being one of the most general of all the
facts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of no
one single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly to
emphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have stated
it on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and
instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism
or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of
another species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or
instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be
utilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is
impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species
are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should
never be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species,
or why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent a
display of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if
all, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to
each other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likened
to a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm
of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; every
species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome of the always
and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life[29].'

The large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, the
strongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of natural
selection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is what
it is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.
But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately
due to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind
which has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach the
answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of
these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man
we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there
may be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not
entitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a
method of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented
to us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal
perfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total
disregard of animal suffering.

In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in
discussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. that all our
reasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our
inferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our
ignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been
considering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions
that we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely
precarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of
the matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa
Gray,--'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference
depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the
things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and
definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we
should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to
the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience
from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability
of the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly of
unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit
of human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to
institute the required measurements or to determine the proportion
between the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may
say--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is
our inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who,
therefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that our
inferences or "idea of design" would have any meaning if applied to the
"All-Upholder," whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'[30] And of
course, _mutatis mutandis_, the same remarks apply to all inferences
having a negative tendency.

As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears
that the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly
of a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparent
evidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidence
resides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as a
whole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that the
destructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can only
exist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great and
universal fact--which but for the effects of unremitting familiarity
could scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming--does betoken
mental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine
the probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We
cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which
essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and
therefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a
blank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in
some way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far
transcending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical
motion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature
which seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either
deficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in
man we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirations
of man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And,
lastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we have
seen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to the
conclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that Natural
Religion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full of
intellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go to
her with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with the
Most High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the only
clear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from the
depths of our own heart--'When I thought upon this it was too painful
for me.'

FOOTNOTES:

[23] A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being, considered in the
abstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing. For if by
successive stages of abstraction, we divest the conception of Being of
attribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be,
i.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being which
is Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's _Evolution of
Religion_.) The failure to perceive this fact constitutes a ground
fallacy in my _Candid Examination of Theism_, where I represent Being as
being a sufficient explanation of the Order of Nature or the law of
Causation.'

[24] This promise is only partially fulfilled in the penultimate
paragraph of the essay.--ED.

[25] _Essays_, vol. iii. p. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought to be
consulted, being too long to quote here.

[26] In an essay on Prof. Flint's _Theism_, appended to the _Candid
Examination_.

[27] _A Candid Examination of Theism_, pp. 171-2.

[28] [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in the above
argument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and point out
that 'according to the theological theory of things,' i.e. according to
the Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly
'analogous to social relations,' and He not merely exhibits in His
creation, but Himself _is_ Love. See, on the subject, especially, R.H.
Hutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his _Theological Essays_
(Macmillan).--ED.]

[29] _Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution_, pp. 76-7.

[30] _Nature_, April 5, 1883.



PART II.



+Introductory Note by the Editor+.


Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes
which are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was
to have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What little
does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of
thought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the
Notes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.

The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them
on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,
antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.

On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have
had more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice however
that in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the
Evidence of Design in Nature[32],' he appears to allow more weight than
before to the argument that the method of physical development must be
judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_.
Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis
of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is
only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was
developed by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless
destructions,' &c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But
these, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as
one of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process _per
se_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the
negative.


'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and
sacrifice." Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice," as
antecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how can
it be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?
Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste,
or _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when
our point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale
destruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even
within the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_
(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A
candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he
happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of
failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore
follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of
securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the
general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of
securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is
assuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure in
relation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be
regarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of
individual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence
against the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the
general system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fair
order of Nature," cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis
of Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails
the continual elimination of the less efficient types.

'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random
trial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument
may be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.
Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God," i.e. that if there be Design
in Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that the
evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of
Nature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as by
having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense
I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural
selection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the
much larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there
anything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,
that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a
whole?'


It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the
_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it
does[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:
'we see a rabbit, &c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here
described as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'

It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the
cruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the
most important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering
in the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more
impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the
religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The
Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against
pessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the
Divine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully
the awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals
suffering.

In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great
number of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's _Pensées_
downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the
Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this study
appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George
Romanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not be
unapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,
are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of
this volume.

In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with
a profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.
And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to
remember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not
finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy
and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for
repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one
can read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had
withheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of
a mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding
Him.

                                                                    C.G.

FOOTNOTES:

[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of a
date subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,
simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism
would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is
something out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot
know how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'

[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate),
vol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.

[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his death
expressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument of
Professor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which on
this subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through the
winnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products
aside,' &c.



NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.

BY METAPHYSICUS.


_Proposed Mottoes_.

     'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there
     is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and
     dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious
     far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.
     Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with
     you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who
     have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as
     idle tales.

     'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are
     arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your
     chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at
     the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may
     derive.'--PLATO.

     'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we
     must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is
     generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on
     which it is false.'--PASCAL.



§ 1. INTRODUCTORY.


Many years ago I published in Messrs. Trübner's 'Philosophical Series,'
a short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by
'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since
exhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its
authorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention,
if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several
accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow
identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same
pseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay
appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.
in order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without
the bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge
of the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. This
reason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examination
of Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _A
Candid Examination of Religion_.

It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached
in the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer
thought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to
state at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the
modifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence
from without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of
my own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with
no indebtedness to private friends and but little to published
utterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very original
ideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be
impossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some
time or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the
furthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and
arranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built
into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree
accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this
much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as
introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the
modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my
previous _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logical
processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more
or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.
The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience
modifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is
practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which
advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board
play of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the
accumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the
judgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such
regions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of
thought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For
the further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less
confidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more
do we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or
distrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.
Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought
which are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz.
metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these
departments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable
to the discipline in question by the experience of age.

However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the
matter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to
detect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of
my _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from the
premises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,
so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to
detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by
anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly
perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first
was undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when
derived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The
second was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the
foundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will
here briefly consider these two points separately.

As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his
claims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not in
letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering
how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier
argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical
problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his
other and higher faculties[37].

The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if
ever, recognized.

At the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly how
the whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the
question as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural
causation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;
but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher
causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i.e. whether
the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and
spiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or
mechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of
Parsimony.

Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of
Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians
themselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done
without entering into any question as to the objective validity of
Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in
fact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i.e.
it may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.

My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any
philosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,
what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is
commonly so called.

FOOTNOTES:

[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly
exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting
criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to
issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for
many years.

[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner &
Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
author's surprise.--ED.]

[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]

[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not
introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant
words obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]

[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind
expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of
the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that
Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
'extra-scientific.'--ED.]



§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.


[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
he uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling
that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.
He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process
of scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:
Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
and find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
sorts.--ED.]

It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.


_Theism._

It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
true,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
to--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
which the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_,
is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'


_Christianity._

Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be
meant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system
as a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its
development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself
which a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to
signify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma
of Christianity--even that of the Incarnation.

Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of
Christianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;
I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall
consider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of
course, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as
the highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human
mind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical
dogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this
treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important
question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious
instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question
whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective
evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old
Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case
only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far
the religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so
much superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled
them to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or
not in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question
for us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious
phenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and
person of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,
logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _quâ_ pure agnostics,
we are logically forbidden to touch.

But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the
fundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the
religious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not
God, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first
Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical
fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'
And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not
incompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,
Michael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own
personality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.


_Religion._

By the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in
the universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to
influence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or
in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any
sense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.
The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.


_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'._

The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very
different senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to
signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies
beyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to found
valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--and
also, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that I
shall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense
in which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.
Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.

This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important
negative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about
Him--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism is
as defined by Huxley.

Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his
agnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--was
Darwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] shows
no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His
mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is
the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to
any _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,
but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _a
posteriori_[41].) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in
science were like Darwin.

As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argument
against miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of
scientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they
have the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,
scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest
sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,
inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,
viz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing to
try ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to be
agnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their
philosophy by their conduct.

Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason
should not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e.g. in ordinary
life, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c., counts for evidence in a
court of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a
proportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed to
counterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to
convict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.
And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only
guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from
possible experience--i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere
contemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43].
_Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere
of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that
here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure
agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we
should all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,
if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means
of some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether
there are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever
appear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what
manner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in
that report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatise
is to be mainly concerned.

My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]
certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to
investigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may
seem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it
secures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of
mankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such
super-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be.
Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)
which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out
of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong
touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative
conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the
following results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of
pure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side
of intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in
truth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the
same position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very
account I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.

It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived
agnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with
regard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has
thereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object
of this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has
then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of
religious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it
the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of
truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their
respective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c., are
as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c., as is
reason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining
truth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs for
its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral
and spiritual region.


As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two
classes, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their
religion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any
incongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves
exclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they
have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is
much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both
these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
principles and by the method of science[45]]?


There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)
and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even
in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he
himself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of
trust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
for his direct intuitions.


Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].
Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
fundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes
in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
grounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their
present highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic
examination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'
between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest
generalities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail
which can be regarded as of any great importance.


In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the
fundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual
research, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer
knows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In
fact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are
discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own
experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although
all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating
the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have
been made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important
question as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced
years that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such
a research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto
clearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of
causation and the nature of faith.


My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify
agnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the
stand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,
more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such
causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the
same stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as
phenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and
especially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in
Christianity.

FOOTNOTES:

[38] [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely,
however, the proposition is not maintainable.--ED.]

[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; see
Burney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note
1.--ED.]

[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308.

[41] [See further, p. 182.--ED.]

[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names.--ED.]

[43] [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on the
subject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced any
quotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaning
plain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay in
question any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote.
The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the
scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the
physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument
from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable
physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;
and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote
from possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an
indefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our
imagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from
having legitimate application to the question in hand.--ED.]

[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894.

[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence.--ED.]

[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1.



§ 3. CAUSALITY.


Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality
do we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate
explanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'
thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in
the mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the
world, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of
intellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but
without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting
effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world
would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one
universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a
cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so
that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same
interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly
exact system of energizing should be found to present all the
appearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion
of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond
human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each
involving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from
an invertebrate ancestry,--that such things should be, would surely
strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.

Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder
to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,
philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a
fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.--that our knowledge of
it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No
result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47].
If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we
can now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most
general fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most
reasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most
generally entertained by philosophers of every school.

Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of
causality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energy
is derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our
volition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which
causation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known
mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.
Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature
of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.
Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest
philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,
e.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural
interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by
primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to
become also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest
levels of its culture[48].

But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of
abstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond
our sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing
that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind
inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a
will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,
and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in
natural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or not
piece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.

Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason
must be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one
another agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality to
a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is
anything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i.e. in the very
thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular
cases of it.


The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common
ground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--without
which, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict
could have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for
battle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases
where two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes
must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved
erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common
hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations
shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this
treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes
between Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not
only so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties
on the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever
encountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether
in the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the
self-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.

The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be a
personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_.
It is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned
with 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first
instance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under
'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less
expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present
century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which
entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';
as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to
the exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yet
entertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure
logic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival
doctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence with
personality.[49]

Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has
hitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to
show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c.,
and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there
are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That if
there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be
immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate
expression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to the
inference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if His
will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us
'mechanical.' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divine
origin of a thing, event, &c., to prove it due to natural causation.

After having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would show
that (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.
For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the
opposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been
assumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,
that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by
means of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable
[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the
supernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably
sound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has
furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished
the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of
all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed
learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,
and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here
that her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error of
denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the
origin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and
generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate
consequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is
clearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the
ultimate victory,--not only as against science, but as against
intellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the
line. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and
the experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism
on purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the
fundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of
imagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move
the ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?

Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of
this answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this
lesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His
own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As
examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous
religions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,
or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must
be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to
its being divine.

What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the
basis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation
of such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For
even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn
on the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being
'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and
all possible ground of dispute is removed.

I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in
question, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is
time for theists to abandon this assumption.

The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural
no doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the
historical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of
God must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be
within the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot
comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically
sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always
committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been
explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained
_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.

Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.

It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
know all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
much greater mystery than ever.

But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
perceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking
thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
nature or by man.

On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
explicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is
and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
the universe.

Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'être_ of anything.


It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks
touching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50].

_The remarkable nature of the facts._ These are remarkable, since they
are common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has a
cause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the same
consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great
fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the
theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the
same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which
expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this
fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.
Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of
Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the
irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human
experience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise
tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same
effects.

So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only
empirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have
failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
merely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of
sequence within human observation[51].


If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
at least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming
the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
natural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own
volitions.


_Free Will_[52].

Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--

1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.

2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
from the former.

3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
_x_--an unknown quantity.

4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this
seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.
Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?

5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.

6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well
include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of
personality.

7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we
at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,
even though all its acts are due to _x_.

8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to
_x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many
systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will
is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it
may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa
causarum_ as regards _x_.

9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each
the _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the
cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of
the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].

10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in
my essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in
the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and
seemingly ultimate, fact.

11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure
agnosticism.

FOOTNOTES:

[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing that
mere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded
idea of anything further than time and space relations.'--ED.]

[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and
ridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanes
intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on
causation as due to being _qua_ being.'--ED.]

[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte,
_Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. The
references not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine.--ED.]

[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows
immediately.--ED.]

[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and
point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction
after the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refers
also to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. pp. 152, 3.--ED.]

[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an
essay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion and
Monism_, pp. 129 ff.--ED.]

[53] [See above, p. 31.--ED.]

[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'
referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent
human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.--ED.]



§ 4. FAITH.


Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or
belief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual
element: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the
affections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all
parts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect,
emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of
reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,
&c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual
grounds--i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no
exercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,
or _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I
hold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.

Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what
psychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs
from will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action,
so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we
need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
purchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to
exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
Christianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a
necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some
scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
simplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been
performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
illumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and
revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism
would make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and very
comforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole
business is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably
father to the thought, and you might much better have performed your
"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a
Christian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit
of such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us well
enough to prevent that, &c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try
an experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and
so on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so
answering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the
difficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of
attaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others have
doubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an
undue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if so
it be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have
been of divine ordination.

This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more
pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration
(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our
personal interests are affected--whether these be material or
intellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, how
closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble
religious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is
virtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is
due to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find
that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy
of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which
similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little
difference in either case what level of general education, mental power,
special training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under
judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference
of opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the
explanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone
that in such regions of thought--i.e. where personal interests are
affected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature
demonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
to the thought, &c.

Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
important of all matters.

It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
than intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not
below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.

As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
judgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in
matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
prejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
determined[55].

As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of
religious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think
is the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual
pursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the
most exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,
as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit
may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in
respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned
their exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,
how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so much
so indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little
in the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.

Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,
we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an
infidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the
principal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, there
was a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such
as had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present
connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side
of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,
Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights,
such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.--were all avowed Christians.
Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism
to that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particular
interest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence
of a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual
one, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian belief
cannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.

Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge
mathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have
been, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,--although certainly
not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it
may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough
to prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest
powers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.


_Faith and Superstition._

Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction
between these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian
faith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point
of fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental
state called _belief_. It is on this account they are so often
confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more
important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one
case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.
_Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer
credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the
case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity
to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the
additional evidence supplied by the moral facts.


Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,
unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. they both
present the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but not
all people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are as
follows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual
verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the
moral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. In
other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis
(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if
not likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide
difference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a
personal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a
moral element.

'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy
faith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal
differences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of
faith.

Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to
reason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some
altogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right
or wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be
that the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all
implicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is
entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of
spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position
of pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective,
or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we
have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the
universality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,
it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main
evidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:
they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
reward.

From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
to educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from
what they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.


Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.


Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted
cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one
could suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since
acceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to
a demonstration made by higher intellects.

It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in
representing this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot
conceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a
better schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by
general reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,
its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary
diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and
spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same
external material or environment such astonishingly diverse products
arise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst
forms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have
no weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried
in[56].'

It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is
it possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any _raison d'être_
of human existence.

Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results
of his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This
could not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does
not hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should
need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men
should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some
men are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to
increase their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to
constitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such
things are so, we are inadequate judges.


It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be
'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a
fact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the
intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact
that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,
whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by
man's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to
constitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life
it is character that tells in the long run.

It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally
recognized--viz.

           {Animality.
           {Intellectuality.
     Human {Morality.
           {Spirituality.

Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different
things. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any
degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice
versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and
religion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or
not associated with any particular creed or dogma.

There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and
enduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who have
experienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,
&c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who
has had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature
of man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being.


It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there
will always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will
always be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without
brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to
higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,
and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the
materialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to
custom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?


It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on
the side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to
disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe
necessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these
reasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either
intellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.

Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a
thing to be proud of.


'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should
raise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.
But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should
it be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,
that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will
answer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of
reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so
to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of
which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And
to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the
resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the
purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of
personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have
been propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely
less distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not
said that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or
if form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that
he was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the
resurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic
objection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question
with which this paragraph opens.


We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of
scientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can
deny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature
of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.
No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary
conclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at
all) by intuition and not by reason.

Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as
such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is
a process of inferring from the known to the unknown.

Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if
He exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,
by intuition[57].


Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,
e.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge
of Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt
whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of
itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to
testify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do
so. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the
abstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such
demonstrative revelation has been given.

Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.
No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast
difference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles
and that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the
latter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is
here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a
state of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state
is not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational
explanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational
beings and moral agents[58].


It is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,
that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination
thus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject
thereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not
experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic
desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a
noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be
of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,
he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological
illusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large
section of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would
be no doubt as to their objective reality.


The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an
internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory
hallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent
philosophers.

Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature
of Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and
the high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the
probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in
Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this
however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this
view of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with
Luther, Pascal, &c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other
prophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.

If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these
with lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are
habitual.

Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of
our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly
because it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation.

But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,
we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.

Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers
and founders of religious systems both before and after him were
similarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had
occurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,
Newton, Darwin, &c.--supposing all these men to have declared that their
main ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken
language, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had
resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed
by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would it
be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of
subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any
longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be
communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any
evidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be
answered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the
fact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective
verification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly
the test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lying
prophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies
and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'

Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of
minds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it
is to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure
agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road.' But, on
the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly
the character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _a
posteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive
and negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.

The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It
is thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the
whole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go
over the ground which he has already so well traversed.

Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,
does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part
they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying
their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if
intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c.
This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from
experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,
philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well
aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,
in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the
whole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may
cheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into the
belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;
but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,
even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.

Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even
to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,
'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and
least 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by
the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--

               "It is by God decreed
     Fame shall not satisfy the highest need."

It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our
generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.
Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as
soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There
is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing
in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far
as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.

I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of
the subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill
save faith in God.

Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--and
chiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian--belief. It is a matter
of fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,
and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal
testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not
only in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to
what they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual
status. It is a thing by itself and supreme.

So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.
Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human
society--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c.; and, 2nd, by
the Christian Church on the world.

All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity
to human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in
proportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.
Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,
and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most
abundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c., agree in
their account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be
no question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.

PEU DE CHOSE.

     'La vie est vaine:
       Un peu d'amour,
     Un peu de haine ...
       Et puis--bon jour!

     La vie est brève:
       Un peu d'espoir,
     Un peu de rêve ...
       Et puis--bon soir!'

The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a
future one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of
fact, changes it entirely.

     'The night has a thousand eyes,
       And the day but one;
     Yet the light of a whole world dies
       With the setting sun.

     The mind has a thousand eyes,
       And the heart but one;
     Yet the light of a whole life dies
       When love is done.'

Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being
the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of
love's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensées_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we have
as much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that
the instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration
alone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the
mind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most
firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect
after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom
that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must
resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to
slake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us at
every hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We must
acquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence,
without art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all our
powers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it....

'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the
automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then
must be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is
enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and
by not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cor
meum Deus_.' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. vi. and
Church's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9.

[56] [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see further on,"
but nothing further on the subject appears to have been written.--ED.]

[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before his
death George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor
Knight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid on
the argument from intuition in different forms.--ED.]

[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensées_ (Kegan Paul's trans.) p. 103.



§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY.

Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,
because this _Examination of Religion_ [i.e. of the validity of the
religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism
presented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of the
religious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest
product.

When I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I did
not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, as
distinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But
since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science
of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result
of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature
as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to
have anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should have
perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.

Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was
played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational
bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless
inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity
has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity
was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault
of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.
Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred
documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been
very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that
Darwinism is like Copernicanism, &c., in this respect[59]; while the
outcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a
signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,
there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the
date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the
historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,
Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the
validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of
scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while
the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose
of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well
as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first
century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences
of Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator
should be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take
on authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,
as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance
of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points
still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the
Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,
and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main
doctrine of Christ Himself.


The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be
forgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in
the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such
observations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less
wonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.

Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes
by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records
impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction
that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are
not true as history.

There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that
were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of
miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _a
priori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, we
have no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds.


One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of
Christianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am
not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the
biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of
human knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,
or elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is really
almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For
when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or at
least attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal
truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in
the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says
John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation
of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to
endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast
Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even
Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in
advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only because
Athens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of
genius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,
following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of
human reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, is
nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and
see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors
of all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to
sayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest
level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by
alleged revelation.

Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of
Christ's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,
even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or
deduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to original
inspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_
says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and
the Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him.


It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject
Christianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any
kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the
other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who
have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify
Christ. These facts are remarkable.

If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has
exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular
point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.

It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base
vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity
in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in
history; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,
of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of
a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so
immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it
had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any
religion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of
human nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And
although there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its
development in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an
enormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.

But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all
other religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that
has ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.
Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,
science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or
beauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all
hands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may
be disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the
philosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared
with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what
belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i.e. its
influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit
its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as
regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its
incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency
in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the
entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration
to its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent
[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been
lived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its
being capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as
still a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly
destitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should
fail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,
and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever
been known upon our earth.

Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest
culture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation
to all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There
is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of
material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable
interest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a
peasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your
Bible? Still are you ...[64]


_Regeneration_.

How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is stated
in the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with the
non-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the
hypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of the
distinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly
and distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those who
received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the
Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous
phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by
direct vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would
not be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose
from the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment
of this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as
corroborating Christianity.

By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is
pre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from
arrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena
of experience.

Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been
foretold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first
time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has
been attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in
time called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large
number of Christian believers.

But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that
the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their
Master, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.


_Conversions._

St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear
testimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,
called _conversion_[66].

Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless
millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of
culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,
though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden
and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a
gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.
Bunyan, &c.)

In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no
means the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,
more or less profound.

Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot
be simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no
evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the
whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence
from conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these
psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their
continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,
&c., &c.


_Christianity and Pain_.

Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a
religion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and
tears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent
paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse
roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--or
rather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparently
opposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been
deepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much
as capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.

Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,
sacrifice captives, &c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical
deities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a
survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no
evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the
Christian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be
true, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier
inspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation
hereafter to be discussed[67].

But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _par
excellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and
deeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities
both of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in
civilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved
spiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historically
speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused
throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question
are those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin
against a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant
spirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely
physical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The
sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68].'


I agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained by
being a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only
an affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, having
nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only
when it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating
to the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its
system becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.

If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more
probable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.


Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to
Christianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to
be found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differences
between Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there
would, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious
kind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that
case I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would
consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,
and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.
This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other
psychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition,
selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of
Christian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine
type[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian
conduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether
the fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more
to do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman
is, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining
Christian belief.


Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;
it is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And this
it is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every
generation it must henceforth become more and more recognized by
logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded
on reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongest
objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;
hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing
the purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,
&c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being
incompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased.

And the logical development of this lies in the view already stated
about natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that
reason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christian
miracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if
they ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being
all of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is
concerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which
can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of
God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against
God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.
What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought
reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That
is, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment of
faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification
will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative
reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith
enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for
deciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of
faith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there
is enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such an
experimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure
agnostic.

It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to
thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do
His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John
vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be
allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it _ought_ to
appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.


Even within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')
modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely
done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of
battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have
been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's
epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is
enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the
doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,
'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of
criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical
facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative
criticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _ex
hypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from the
other.

Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all
that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.

These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old
Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.


_Plan in Revelation_.

The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate
[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the
theory of Evolution--i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably
furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of
Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of
ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this
particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the
history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more
than any other history.

It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full
implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to
this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events
(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of
Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of
the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New
Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to
so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it
ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous
case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no
logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in
organic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether all
pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the
evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown
elsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a
man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_,
but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.

So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been
no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to
appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which
Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be
demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden
revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it
would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides,
even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of
demonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events,
scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as
before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there
may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such
reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual
unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the
end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden
manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be
historically attested for all subsequent time. For

     1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.

     2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the
     historical period.

     3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all
     times--i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to
     some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history.

The _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable
enough to arrest serious attention.

If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that
it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise
intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be
always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This
reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on
account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,
unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as
requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern
advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the
world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts
before us.


Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it
conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical
period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity
as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective
evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be
seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is
itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as
present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly
speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon
mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have
been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with
moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so
largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion
unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,
has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been
painted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had been
going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the
subject thereof.


_Christian Dogmas_.

Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far
as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution
is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.
From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God
to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference
belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the
previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to
the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be
due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or
what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to
the mental, &c., this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divine
volition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism.
Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific
point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either
case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal
cause of the observable results.

Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves
itself into the question of all questions--viz. is or is not mechanical
causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual
grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?

Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really
divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause
of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on
earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';
that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an
abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change
of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on
the 'question of questions' just stated.


_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity._

Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have
nothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department of
enquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to be
considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the
Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic
days. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rational
difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is
necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So
that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being
postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further
difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one
time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally
intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the
doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly
irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by
[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common
sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Common
sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the
Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at
all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God
to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary
man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life
prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view
for the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'être_ of mankind is bound
up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering an
incarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there
_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,
&c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their
occurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity.
Why, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of the
Trinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind
(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?
The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders
of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as
unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged
triunity of God.


_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_.

These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit
by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas which
can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of
the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to
involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the
question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure
agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in
turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.

First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before
Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful
theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the
first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as
distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for
a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But
to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that
nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely
because it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though we
cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has
certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the
present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point
for the Divine Plan of Redemption.


_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_.

It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence
of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of
adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.
But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus
begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_
sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as
it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the
facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts
of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these
facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,
like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when
it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which
assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other
words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,
the facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ good
evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due to
natural causes, they are due to design.

Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both
divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,
there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to
the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of
pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the
inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been
expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all
ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On
this point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other
authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and
Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i.e.
quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.

_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows that
in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of
immediate intuition--i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is
supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a
man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by
hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight
in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our
present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek
Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in
Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--so
yielding additional evidence to his reason.

The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the
spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one
another.

Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the
teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very
imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he
treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very
partially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what
happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have
observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _Natural
Theology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one has
developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not
perceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in either
case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley
everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be
sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for
faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in
man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a
Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is
certain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not in
conviction, but in agnosticism.


The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man
without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done
by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;
the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i.e. _nil_.


_Christian Demonology_[77].

It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_
objections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the fact
that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic
possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the
horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.
If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all
similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore
that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not
by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases
are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of
mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in
A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if
you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the
ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'

The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.
For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the
acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or
merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ
knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it
was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the
people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,
if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,
if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence
of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of
His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance
with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has
nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.

The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much
larger one.


_Darwin's Difficulty_[78].

The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind
having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--

1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;
i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it
follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind
should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.

2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their
religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of
development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts
xvii. 30).

3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it
is represented that He died for all men--i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart
from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at
the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as
transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the
Atoner.

4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by
this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the
theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the
method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of
natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the
lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it
is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without
having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of
Theism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i.e. at the earliest
possible moment in history.

So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other
respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of
the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and
religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the current
teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism to
its necessary principles.--ED.]

[60] [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or
documents.--ED.]

[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff.

[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.

[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255.

[64] [Note unfinished.--ED.]

[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts bearing on
the subject.--ED.]

[66] See Pascal, _Pensées_, p. 245.

[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for
publication.--ED.]

[68] Ps. li.

[69] _Pensées_, pp. 91-93.

[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887.

[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of this
expression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed,
I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in
prominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine,
e.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service,
readiness to suffer, &c.'--ED.]

[72] See _Analogy_, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &c.

[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I.

[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler might
have written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature.

[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. ii.

[76] _Pensées_, pp. 205 ff.

[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible to
maintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so
great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as
seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or
else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be
even the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my
disagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly.--ED.]

[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me to
justify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But he
knew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is
not likely to have been in error on the subject.--ED.]



+Concluding Note by the Editor:--+

The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes
may be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the
scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the
spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its
intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical
and spiritual evidences of Christianity.

George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in
conversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before
the activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut
short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no
one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his
death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ
which he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.
In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness
allowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'

    _Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec
    requiescat in te_.


OXFORD: HORACE HART
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY


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     tells, and it is excellent reading. Not the least valuable part of
     the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various
     writers of eminence, which are placed in the form of notes at the
     end of the chapters. It is emphatically a book for both clergy and
     laity to buy and study.'--_Church Times_.

     'We are grateful for a little book which will be of service to many
     priests, young and old. We need more priests, and such a book may
     well increase their number by explaining the nature of the life to
     which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more
     that priests should realise the life to which they are called and
     pledged; and this they can hardly fail to do if they listen to Mr.
     Robinson's prudent and tender counsels.'--_Church Quarterly
     Review_.

SECOND EDITION.

+PATRISTIC STUDY+. By the Rev. H.B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of
Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

     'The whole of the work which this little volume contains is most
     admirably done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of
     the Fathers to make the study of their writings profitable.'
     --_Church Quarterly Review_.

     'This is an admirable little guide-book to wide study by one who
     well knows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full
     of information, yet pleasant in style and easy to understand.'
     --_Pall Mall Gazette_.

SECOND IMPRESSION.

+THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION+. By the Rev. A.J. MASON, D.D., Master of
Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Canon of Canterbury.

     'It will be found most valuable and interesting.'--_Guardian_.

     'Canon Mason has given a manual that should be carefully studied by
     all, whether clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the
     "Ministry of Conversion" by preaching, by parochial organisation,
     or by personal influence.'--_Scottish Guardian._

THIRD IMPRESSION.

+FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. H.H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly
Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts.

     'Bishop Montgomery's admirable little book.... Into a limited
     compass he has compressed the very kind of information which gives
     one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion,
     of what is its strength and weakness, what its relation to
     Christianity, what, the side upon which it must be approached.'
     _Church Quarterly Review_.

THIRD IMPRESSION.

+THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS+. By the Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.,
Dean of Westminster.

     'Nothing could be more desirable than that the Anglican clergy
     should be equipped with knowledge of the kind to which this little
     volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with
     which Biblical study abounds in the candid spirit, and with the
     breadth of view which they see here exemplified.'--_Spectator_.

     'The little book on the Gospels, which the new Dean of Westminster
     has recently published, is one to be warmly commended alike to
     clergy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to
     work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by
     gaining from it as clear a view of the synoptic problem as is
     possible without prolonged and independent study of the
     sources.'--_The Pilot_.

+A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC+. By the Very Rev. WILFORD L. ROBBINS, Dean of
the General Theological Seminary, New York; Author of _An Essay toward
Faith_.

     'We commend this handbook with confidence as a helpful guide to
     those clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal with,
     and who wish to build safely if they build at all.'--_Church of
     Ireland Gazette._

+PASTORAL VISITATION+. By the Rev. H.E. SAVAGE, M.A., Vicar of South
Shields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.

     'This is an excellent book.'--_Spectator_.

+AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH+. By the Very Rev. T.B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of
Christ Church.

     'This is a valuable and timely book, small in bulk, but weighty
     both in style and substance.... The Dean's essay is an admirable
     one, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to
     questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its
     clear and penetrating thought, are alike characteristic of the
     author, and give a peculiar distinction to everything he
     writes.'--_Guardian_.

+THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY+. By the Right Rev. W.E. COLLINS,
D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar.

     'A book which displays the master-mind on every page, and has what
     many master-minds lack, a sober, practical, common-sense strain
     about it, which is hardly ever found in those who set out to
     instruct us in Church History, or Canon Law, or Catholic use.'
     --_Church Bells_.

+LAY WORK AND THE OFFICE OF READER+. By the Right Rev. HUYSHE
YEATMAN-BIGGS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark.

+RELIGION AND SCIENCE+. By the Rev. P.N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society
of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley.

+CHURCH MUSIC+. By A. MADELEY RICHARDSON, Mus. Doc., Organist of St.
Saviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark.

+INTEMPERANCE+. By the Right Rev. H.H. PEREIRA, D.D., Bishop of Croydon.
                                                      [_In preparation_.

+SCHOOLS+. By the Rev. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and
Hon. Canon of Wakefield.                              [_In preparation_.


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